Zakaj direktorji odlašajo : vedenjski vpogled v sprožanje insolvenčnih postopkov

slovenian

2025

volume 51, issue 6/7

Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica
(Obvezni izvod spletne publikacije)

This paper addresses the initiation problem in insolvency proceedings. The first section after the introduction presents the theoretical foundations of efficient insolvency law and empirical evidence indicating that directors often postpone filing for insolvency, thereby reducing the chances of creditor repayment and successful restructuring of companies. Despite various incentives introduced by legal systems to encourage timely filing, the problem of delayed initiation persists. The paper then examines possible reasons for such delays, first from the perspective of rational choice theory and subsequently from the standpoint of behavioural economics. The author argues that the root cause of the delay lies in behavioural biases (such as over-optimism, loss aversion, status quo bias, and the sunk-cost fallacy), which significantly influence directors’ decision-making during financial distress. The conclusion emphasises that economic incentives alone are insufficient to reduce delays in initiating proceedings and that it is essential to design legal solutions that take into account behavioural factors.

08.12.2025