

Klemen Kocjančič

DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0014

## RECENZIJA

### O POTREBI DELITVE BREMENA V NATU

Leta 2022 je mednarodna založba Palgrave Macmillan izdala monografijo dveh finskih raziskovalcev (Tommija Koivule in Helje Ossa) s Finske nacionalne obrambne univerze z naslovom *NATO's Burden-Sharing Disputes. Past, Present and Future Prospects* (Spori o delitvi bremena v Natu. Zgodovinske, trenutne in bodoče priložnosti).

V prvem poglavju avtorja uvodoma izpostavi pomen 3. člena Washingtonske (Severnoatlantske) pogodbe iz leta 1949: »Za učinkovitejše doseganje ciljev te pogodbe bodo pogodbenice z nenehno in učinkovito samopomočjo ter vzajemno pomočjo vsaka zase in skupaj vzdrževale in razvijale svojo individualno in kolektivno sposobnost upreti se oboroženemu napadu.« Prav različno razumevanje fraz »z nenehno in učinkovito samopomočjo« ter »vzajemno pomočjo« povzroča probleme pri razumevanju potreb po delitvi bremena znotraj severnoatlantskega zavezništva (str. 2).

Drugo poglavje navaja, da so se članice zavezništva že leta 2006 (in ponovno leta 2014) dogovorile o potrebi po zagotovitvi najmanj dvoodstotnega deleža bruto državnega proizvoda (BDP) za potrebe obrambe, pri čemer bo dvajset odstotkov obrambnega proračuna namenjenih za večje nakupe opreme oz. oborožitve. Glede tega pa se znotraj zavezništva uporabljajo različni pristopi: od racionalističnega in post-pozitivističnega do kombinacije pozitivističnega in post-pozitivističnega pristopa. Avtorja ugotavljata, da so javne (politične) razprave glede finančnega vložka za potrebe Nata ciklične narave in se po navadi nanašajo na štiri dejavnike: geopolitične spremembe glede Rusije, ameriško zunanjo politiko (intervencionizem ali izolacionizem), evropsko dejavnost (aktivnost ali pasivnost) ter večje operacije zveze Nato zunaj držav članic (str. 28).

Tretje poglavje se ukvarja z zgodovinskim vprašanjem delitve bremen znotraj zavezništva, in sicer vse od ustanovitve v času hladne vojne. Neposredno po ustanovitvi so se države članice dogovorile, da se »vsaka država članica mora specializirati v silah in orožju, ki jim bodo najbolj koristili in ki bodo lahko vključeni v integrirane obrambne načrte« (str. 37). Med korejsko vojno so ZDA povečale obrambni proračun, čemur so sledile tudi nekatere evropske države članice. A kmalu se je izkazalo, da lahko Sovjetska zveza mobilizira večje konvencionalne sile kot celotna zveza Nato, zato so se odločili za strategijo prožnega odziva, kar se je pokazalo predvsem v razvoju jedrskega orožja. V 60. letih 20. stoletja so evropske države članice dosegle stopnjo razvoja, ki je označevala dokončno izboljšanje gospodarskega stanja po koncu druge svetovne vojne, kar je pomenilo, da bi lahko povečale lastne obrambne proračune. Kljub temu se je izkazalo, da evropske države članice ne morejo vzpostaviti prave protiuteži pomenu in vlogi ameriškega hegemonu; eno od spornih vprašanj je bilo tudi (ponovno) nemško oboroževanje.

Konec hladne vojne je odprl novo poglavje v zgodovini zveze, saj sta primarna vojaška in ideološka nasprotnika – Varšavski pakt in Sovjetska zveza – prenehala obstajati. Zaradi tega so se pojavili pozivi k ukinitvi Nata (kot nepotrebnega relikta končane hladne vojne) oz. preusmeritvi pozornosti, kar se je dejansko zgodilo, saj je zveza Nato postala krizni upravitelj sveta. Posledično so začeli izvajati operacije zunaj teritorialnih področij držav članic, kar se je pokazalo predvsem po terorističnih napadih septembra 2001, ko so oborožene sile zveze Nato začele delovati na Bližnjem vzhodu, v Aziji in Afriki. Sočasno je Ruska federacija preživljala obdobja zmanjševanja in povečanja obrambnega proračuna, hkrati pa je pomembno zunanje politično vprašanje postalo približevanje nekdanjih držav članic Varšavskega pakta svojemu nekdanjemu nasprotniku – zvezi Nato. To se je dejansko zgodilo leta 1999, ko so Češka, Poljska in Madžarska postale nove članice. Že pred tem – med vojnam v nekdanji Jugoslaviji – se je izkazalo, da bodo morale evropske države članice Nata izboljšati lastne vojaške zmogljivosti za posredovanje v lastni sosesčini: »Novo varnostno okolje v 90. letih 20. stoletja je prineslo priložnost za razvoj skupnih evropskih obrambnih politik in sodelovanja ter za premislek o evropski in transatlantski varnostni arhitekturi« (str. 89). Kljub temu so evropske države začele zmanjševati obrambne proračune, kar je vodilo k že omenjeni deklaraciji iz Rige leta 2006, s katero naj bi se zmanjšal razkorak v zmogljivostih med Evropo in ZDA.

Peto poglavje obravnava prelomno leto 2014; tega leta se je končala Natova misija v Afganistanu, hkrati pa je Rusija zasedla Krim in donbaško regijo v vzhodni Ukrajini: »Aneksija je bila na splošno razumljena kot prelomna točka v evropski varnosti, ki je ustvarila globok prelom med Rusijo in Zahodom ter ogrozila varnostni red, ki je bil ustvarjen v več kot dvajset letih« (str. 115). Posledično je bilo na zasedanju zveze Nato v Walesu ponovno odprto vprašanje o potrebi po zagotovitvi dvoodstotnega deleža BDP za obrambne proračune. K temu so se takrat zavezale vse evropske članice, prav tako k vlaganju dvajsetih odstotkov obrambnega proračuna v raziskave in razvoj. Medtem ko so večje države (npr. Nemčija) takim zavezam nasprotovale (v smislu, da je kakovost sil pomembnejša od številčnosti oz. obsega

obrambnega proračuna), so predvsem vzhodno- in srednjeevropske države članice začele povečevati vlaganja v lastno obrambo. Poleg ukrajinske krize (ter vzpona Rusije na njihovih mejah) je bilo povečanje obrambnih proračunov tudi posledica izboljšanja splošne gospodarske klime po svetovni gospodarski krizi. V tem času se je pokazala tudi potreba po izboljšanju vojaških (in nevojaških) zmogljivosti na področjih nekinetičnega delovanja – predvsem zaradi grožnje elementov hibridnega delovanja (npr. kibernetičnih napadov). Znotraj Evrope so se sočasno razvili trije različni pristopi: krepitev lastnih sil (vzhodni blok), prizadevanje k oblikovanju skupne varnostne politike (Francija) in izolacionistični pristop (Združeno kraljestvo, Danska).

Naslednje poglavje prinaša pregled zgodovinskih dinamik deljenja bremen znotraj Nata. V času hladne vojne so se evropske države primarno integrirale na gospodarskem področju, medtem ko na obrambnem področju niso dosegle večjega napredka. Odhod Francije iz Natove vojaške strukture leta 1967 je ta prizadevanja še dodatno zavrl. Pokazalo se je tudi različno razumevanje zagotavljanja varnosti: ZDA so nanj gledale globalno, medtem ko so evropske države varnostno politiko razumele kot nacionalno vprašanje. ZDA so nenehno večale obrambni proračun zaradi globalnega konflikta proti komunizmu, medtem ko so evropske države to storile le v primerih kriznih razmer v Evropi (npr. po praški pomladi leta 1968). Hkrati so hotele ZDA zapustiti evropsko celino in prepustiti obrambo evropskim zaveznicam, pri tem pa še vedno ohraniti svoj (vojaški in politični) vpliv. Po koncu hladne vojne so se odnosi med Natom in Rusijo sprva izboljšali, nato pa znova ohladili, ko so se Natu začele približevati nekdanje članice Varšavskega pakta. Odnosi so se ponovno izboljšali po septembrskih napadih leta 2001, ko so ZDA preusmerile pozornost z Evrope na Bližnji vzhod in Azijo. Tudi vzpon Kitajske je spremenil geopolitične usmeritve ameriške zunanje politike. Vendar je to izkoristila tudi Rusija, ko se je leta 2014 odločila zasesti vzhod Ukrajine, pri čemer je računala na mlačen odgovor Zahoda (predvsem v obliki gospodarskih sankcij), kar se je dejansko zgodilo. Kljub temu je ruska agresija predvsem vzhodnoevropske države spodbudila k povečanju obrambnih vlaganj, hkrati pa je zveza Nato okrepila svojo (mednarodno) prisotnost na vzhodu z mednarodno operacijo Okrepljena prednja prisotnost (Enhanced Forward Presence oz. EFP). Avtorja na koncu izpostavljata, da se zveza Nato nenehno sooča s kompleksno problematiko pri razumevanju pristopa k nacionalnim in mednarodnim varnostnim zavezam.

Zadnje, sedmo poglavje je usmerjeno v prihodnost. Pri tem avtorja ugotavljata, da bodo v prihodnosti na problematiko delitve bremen znotraj zveze Nato vplivali naslednji elementi: dejavnosti Rusije v mednarodnem okolju (še posebej glede (ne) posrednega ogrožanja vzhodnoevropskih članic zveze Nato, ki jih razume kot lastno interesno območje); geopolitično ravnanje ZDA (ali se bo nadaljevalo zmanjševanje ameriške navzočnosti na evropski celini ali bo prišlo do zasuka); evropski odziv na ameriško ravnanje (če pride do umika, bo nedvomno sledilo povečanje vlaganj v lastne zmogljivosti); ter skupno delovanje zveze Nato v drugih državah. Pri zadnji točki se je že zdaj pokazalo, da so nekatere države zagotovile neprimerno večji obseg sil za

operacije EFP kot druge, ki so ponudile malo ali dejansko nič za okrepitev Natove prisotnosti na vzhodu Evrope. Pomemben vpliv bo nedvomno imel tudi tehnološki napredek, tako na vojaškem kot na civilnem področju. Nadalje avtorja ponudita štiri možne scenarije: onesposobljeni Nato (države bodo zavračale povečanje sredstev za Nato ter izpolnjevanje skupnih zavez, kar bo na koncu pripeljalo do zmanjšanja vojaške moči zavezništva); transatlantsko pogajanje (države bodo zagotavljale določeno stopnjo sredstev, a večjega napredka pri povečanju zmogljivosti ne bo); države članice, ki zasledujejo lastne interese (države bodo povečale obrambne proračune, vendar bodo skrbale predvsem za izboljšanje lastnih zmogljivosti); in transatlantska solidarnost (države bodo poskrbele za izboljšanje zmogljivosti tako lastnih oboroženih sil kot tudi celotnega zavezništva). Avtorja sta se odzvala tudi na možnost razpada Nata zaradi problematike delitve bremen: »Razprava je tesno povezana z drugimi težavami, kot so težave z zaupanjem med zavezniki in različno dojemanje groženj, kar lahko resno ogrozi Natovo sposobnost, da preživi prihodnje krize« (str. 190).

Avtorja v obravnavanem delu z opisom zgodovinskih, političnih in varnostnih dogodkov nazorno prikažeta razvoj problematike finančnega vlaganja držav članic zveze Nato v izgradnjo lastnih zmogljivosti in za potrebe delovanje celotne zveze. Pri tem pokažeta na razkol predvsem med ZDA in evropskimi članicami, ki je posledica več različnih dejavnikov, od notranjepolitičnih in gospodarskih do dejavnosti tretjih držav ali nedržavnih akterjev. Dotična monografija je priporočeno branje za vse raziskovalce zveze Nato, mednarodnih odnosov in (mednarodne) varnosti.

Klemen Kocjančič

DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0015

## REVIEW

### ON THE NEED FOR BURDEN SHARING IN NATO

In 2022, Palgrave Macmillan published a monograph by two Finnish researchers (Tommi Koivula and Heljä Ossa) from the Finnish National Defence University, entitled “NATO’s Burden-Sharing Disputes: Past, Present and Future Prospects”.

The authors begin the first chapter by highlighting the importance of Article 3 of the 1949 Washington (North Atlantic) Treaty: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” It is the different interpretations of the phrases “continuous and effective self-help” and “mutual aid” which create problems in understanding the burden-sharing needs within the North Atlantic Alliance (p 2).

The second chapter states that the members of the Alliance agreed in 2006 (and again in 2014) on the need to allocate at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence, with 20% of the defence budget to be allocated to major equipment or armaments purchases. In this respect, however, different approaches have been taken within the Alliance, ranging from the rationalist and the post-positivist to a combination of positivist and post-positivist approaches. The authors note that public (political) debates about the financial input for NATO purposes are cyclical in nature, usually referring to four factors: the geopolitical changes with regard to Russia; US foreign policy (interventionism or isolationism); European activity (activism or passivity); and major NATO operations outside its member states (p 28).

The third chapter deals with the historical issue of burden-sharing within the Alliance, starting with its creation during the Cold War. Immediately after its establishment, the member states agreed that “each member state should specialise in the forces and weapons that served them best and could also be included in the integrated defence patterns” (p 37). During the Korean War, the US increased its defence budget, and

some European member states followed suit. But it soon became clear that the Soviet Union could mobilize a larger conventional force than the entire NATO Alliance, leading to a decision to adopt a strategy of flexible response, as seen in particular in the development of nuclear weapons. In the 1960s, the European member states reached a stage of development which marked a definitive improvement in their economic situation since the end of the Second World War, which meant that they could increase their own defence budgets. Nevertheless, European member states proved unable to establish a real counterweight to the importance and role of the American hegemon; one of the contentious issues was the (re)armament of Germany.

The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter in the history of the Alliance, as the primary military as well as ideological opponents – the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union – ceased to exist. This led to calls for the abolition of NATO (as an unnecessary relic of the end of the Cold War) or a refocusing of attention, which indeed happened, as NATO became the world's crisis manager. As a consequence, operations began to be carried out outside member states' territories, as was particularly evident after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, when NATO forces began to operate in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. At the same time as the Russian Federation was going through periods of cuts and increases in its defence budget, the possibility of rapprochement of the former Warsaw Pact member states with their former adversary, NATO, became an important foreign policy issue. This actually happened in 1999, when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became new members. It had already become clear – during the wars in the former Yugoslavia – that European NATO member states would have to improve their own military capabilities to intervene in their own neighbourhood. The new security environment in Europe in the 1990s was among the most dangerous in the world at the time. Nevertheless, European countries began to cut their defence budgets, leading to the Riga Declaration of 2006, which was supposed to narrow the capabilities gap between Europe and the US.

Chapter 5 deals with the watershed year of 2014, which saw the end of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and Russia's occupation of Crimea and the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine: "The annexation has been viewed widely as a tipping point in European security, creating a deep rift between Russia and the West and upending the security order that had been built for more than 20 years" (p 115). As a result, the NATO summit in Wales reopened the issue of the need to secure a 2% share of GDP for defence budgets. All the European member states committed to this at the time, as well as to investing 20% of their defence budgets in research and development. While the larger states (e.g. Germany) were opposed to such commitments (claiming that the quality of the forces was more important than the quantity or size of the defence budget), the Eastern and Central European member states, in particular, began to increase investment in their own defence. In addition to the Ukraine crisis (and the rise of Russia on their borders), the increase in defence budgets was also a consequence of the improvement in the general economic climate following the global economic crisis. At the same time, the need to improve military (and non-military) capabilities in non-kinetic areas of action – particularly in the face of hybrid

threats (e.g. cyber-attacks) – also emerged. Three different approaches developed simultaneously within Europe: the strengthening of own forces (the Eastern bloc), the pursuit of a common security policy (France), and an isolationist approach (UK, Denmark).

The next chapter provides an overview of the historical dynamics of burden-sharing within NATO. During the Cold War, European countries primarily integrated in the economic sphere, while they did not make much progress in the field of defence. France's departure from the NATO military structure in 1967 was a further setback to such efforts. In addition, different perceptions of security provision emerged: while the US took a global view, European countries considered security policy a national issue. The US continuously increased its defence budget in the face of the global conflict against communism, while European countries did so only in the event of a crisis in Europe (e.g. after the Prague Spring of 1968). At the same time, the US wanted to leave the European continent, abandoning its defence to the European allies, while still maintaining its (military and political) influence. After the end of the Cold War, relations between NATO and Russia initially improved, only to be cooled again as former Warsaw Pact members began to move closer to NATO. Relations improved again after the September 2001 attacks, when the US turned its attention away from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. The rise of China also changed the geopolitical orientations of US foreign policy. However, Russia also took advantage of this, deciding to occupy eastern Ukraine in 2014 while counting on a lukewarm response from the West (mainly in the form of economic sanctions), which indeed came about. Nevertheless, this Russian aggression brought Eastern European countries, in particular, to increase their defence investments, while NATO strengthened its (international) presence in the East through the international operation Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). The authors conclude by pointing out that NATO is constantly confronted with a complex problem in interpreting the approach to national and international security commitments.

The final, seventh chapter is forward-looking. In it, the authors conclude that the following elements will influence the future of burden-sharing within NATO: Russia's activities in the international environment (especially with regard to (in) indirectly threatening Eastern European NATO members, which it considers its own area of interest); the geopolitical behaviour of the US (whether the reduction of the US presence on the European continent will continue or reverse); the European response to US behaviour (a withdrawal would undoubtedly cause an increase in investment in its own capabilities); and NATO's collective action in other countries. With regard to the latter, it has already become clear that some countries have provided a disproportionately larger force for EFP operations than others, which have offered little or nothing to reinforce NATO's presence in Eastern Europe. Technological advances, both military and civilian, will undoubtedly also have an important impact. The authors go on to offer four possible scenarios: a disempowered NATO (countries will refuse to increase funding for NATO and to meet common commitments, ultimately leading to a reduction in the military strength



of the Alliance); a transatlantic negotiation (countries will provide a certain level of funding, but there will be no significant progress towards increasing capabilities); self-interested member states (countries will increase their defence budgets but will primarily focus on improving their own capabilities); and transatlantic solidarity (countries will focus on improving the capabilities of their own armed forces as well as those of the Alliance as a whole). The authors also respond to the possibility of NATO's disintegration due to burden-sharing issues: "The debate is closely linked to other problems, such as trust issues among allies and diverse threat perceptions, which can severely damage NATO's ability to survive future crisis." (p 190)

In this work, the authors illustrate the evolution of the issue of financial investment by NATO member states in building their own capabilities, as well as the capabilities of the Alliance as a whole, by presenting historical, political and security developments. In doing so, they illustrate the divide between the US and the European members, in particular, which is the result of a number of factors ranging from domestic policy and the economy to the activities of third countries or non-state actors. This book is recommended reading for all scholars of NATO, international relations and (international) security.