61 
© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
  Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 2
 Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 2
RECENZIJA
Klemen Kocjančič
O POTREBI DELITVE BREMENA V NATU
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0014
Leta 2022 je mednarodna založba Palgrave Macmillan izdala monografijo dveh 
finskih raziskovalcev (Tommija Koivule in Helje Ossa) s Finske nacionalne 
obrambne univerze z naslovom NATO‘s Burden-Sharing Disputes. Past, Present and 
Future Prospects (Spori o delitvi bremena v Natu. Zgodovinske, trenutne in bodoče 
priložnosti). 
V prvem poglavju avtorja uvodoma izpostavita pomen 3. člena Washingtonske 
(Severnoatlantske) pogodbe iz leta 1949: »Za učinkovitejše doseganje ciljev te 
pogodbe bodo pogodbenice z nenehno in učinkovito samopomočjo ter vzajemno 
pomočjo vsaka zase in skupaj vzdrževale in razvijale svojo individualno in kolektivno 
sposobnost upreti se oboroženemu napadu.« Prav različno razumevanje fraz »z 
nenehno in učinkovito samopomočjo« ter »vzajemno pomočjo« povzroča probleme 
pri razumevanju potreb po delitvi bremena znotraj severnoatlantskega zavezništva 
(str. 2). 
Drugo poglavje navaja, da so se članice zavezništva že leta 2006 (in ponovno leta 
2014) dogovorile o potrebi po zagotovitvi najmanj dvoodstotnega deleža bruto 
državnega proizvoda (BDP) za potrebe obrambe, pri čemer bo dvajset odstotkov 
obrambnega proračuna namenjenih za večje nakupe opreme oz. oborožitve. Glede 
tega pa se znotraj zavezništva uporabljajo različni pristopi: od racionalističnega 
in post-pozitivističnega do kombinacije pozitivističnega in post-pozitivističnega 
pristopa. Avtorja ugotavljata, da so javne (politične) razprave glede finančnega 
vložka za potrebe Nata ciklične narave in se po navadi nanašajo na štiri dejavnike: 
geopolitične spremembe glede Rusije, ameriško zunanjo politiko (intervencionizem 
ali izolacionizem), evropsko dejavnost (aktivnost ali pasivnost) ter večje operacije 
zveze Nato zunaj držav članic (str. 28). 
 62 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Tretje poglavje se ukvarja z zgodovinskim vprašanjem delitve bremen znotraj 
zavezništva, in sicer vse od ustanovitve v času hladne vojne. Neposredno po 
ustanovitvi so se države članice dogovorile, da se »vsaka država članica mora 
specializirati v silah in orožju, ki jim bodo najbolj koristili in ki bodo lahko vključeni 
v integrirane obrambne načrte« (str. 37). Med korejsko vojno so ZDA povečale 
obrambni proračun, čemur so sledile tudi nekatere evropske države članice. A 
kmalu se je izkazalo, da lahko Sovjetska zveza mobilizira večje konvencionalne sile 
kot celotna zveza Nato, zato so se odločili za strategijo prožnega odziva, kar se je 
pokazalo predvsem v razvoju jedrskega orožja. V 60. letih 20. stoletja so evropske 
države članice dosegle stopnjo razvoja, ki je označevala dokončno izboljšanje 
gospodarskega stanja po koncu druge svetovne vojne, kar je pomenilo, da bi lahko 
povečale lastne obrambne proračune. Kljub temu se je izkazalo, da evropske 
države članice ne morejo vzpostaviti prave protiuteži pomenu in vlogi ameriškega 
hegemona; eno od spornih vprašanj je bilo tudi (ponovno) nemško oboroževanje.
Konec hladne vojne je odprl novo poglavje v zgodovini zveze, saj sta primarna 
vojaška in ideološka nasprotnika – Varšavski pakt in Sovjetska zveza – prenehala 
obstajati. Zaradi tega so se pojavili pozivi k ukinitvi Nata (kot nepotrebnega relikta 
končane hladne vojne) oz. preusmeritvi pozornosti, kar se je dejansko zgodilo, saj 
je zveza Nato postala krizni upravitelj sveta. Posledično so začeli izvajati operacije 
zunaj teritorialnih področij držav članic, kar se je pokazalo predvsem po terorističnih 
napadih septembra 2001, ko so oborožene sile zveze Nato začele delovati na 
Bližnjem vzhodu, v Aziji in Afriki. Sočasno je Ruska federacija preživljala 
obdobja zmanjševanja in povečanja obrambnega proračuna, hkrati pa je pomembno 
zunanjepolitično vprašanje postalo približevanje nekdanjih držav članic Varšavskega 
pakta svojemu nekdanjemu nasprotniku – zvezi Nato. To se je dejansko zgodilo leta 
1999, ko so Češka, Poljska in Madžarska postale nove članice. Že pred tem– med 
vojnami v nekdanji Jugoslaviji – se je izkazalo, da bodo morale evropske države 
članice Nata izboljšati lastne vojaške zmogljivosti za posredovanje v lastni soseščini: 
»Novo varnostno okolje v 90. letih 20. stoletja je prineslo priložnost za razvoj 
skupnih evropskih obrambnih politik in sodelovanja ter za premislek o evropski in 
transatlantski varnostni arhitekturi« (str. 89). Kljub temu so evropske države začele 
zmanjševati obrambne proračune, kar je vodilo k že omenjeni deklaraciji iz Rige 
leta 2006, s katero naj bi se zmanjšal razkorak v zmogljivostih med Evropo in ZDA. 
Peto poglavje obravnava prelomno leto 2014; tega leta se je končala Natova misija 
v Afganistanu, hkrati pa je Rusija zasedla Krim in donbaško regijo v vzhodni 
Ukrajini: »Aneksija je bila na splošno razumljena kot prelomna točka v evropski 
varnosti, ki je ustvarila globok prelom med Rusijo in Zahodom ter ogrozila varnostni 
red, ki je bil ustvarjen v več kot dvajset letih« (str. 115). Posledično je bilo na 
zasedanju zveze Nato v Walesu ponovno odprto vprašanje o potrebi po zagotovitvi 
dvoodstotnega deleža BDP za obrambne proračune. K temu so se takrat zavezale vse 
evropske članice, prav tako k vlaganju dvajsetih odstotkov obrambnega proračuna 
v raziskave in razvoj. Medtem ko so večje države (npr. Nemčija) takim zavezam 
nasprotovale (v smislu, da je kakovost sil pomembnejša od številčnosti oz. obsega 
Klemen Kocjančič
 63 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
obrambnega proračuna), so predvsem vzhodno- in srednjeevropske države članice 
začele povečevati vlaganja v lastno obrambo. Poleg ukrajinske krize (ter vzpona 
Rusije na njihovih mejah) je bilo povečanje obrambnih proračunov tudi posledica 
izboljšanja splošne gospodarske klime po svetovni gospodarski krizi. V tem času 
se je pokazala tudi potreba po izboljšanju vojaških (in nevojaških) zmogljivosti na 
področjih nekinetičnega delovanja – predvsem zaradi grožnje elementov hibridnega 
delovanja (npr. kibernetičnih napadov). Znotraj Evrope so se sočasno razvili trije 
različni pristopi: krepitev lastnih sil (vzhodni blok), prizadevanje k oblikovanju 
skupne varnostne politike (Francija) in izolacionistični pristop (Združeno kraljestvo, 
Danska).
Naslednje poglavje prinaša pregled zgodovinskih dinamik deljenja bremen 
znotraj Nata. V času hladne vojne so se evropske države primarno integrirale na 
gospodarskem področju, medtem ko na obrambnem področju niso dosegle večjega 
napredka. Odhod Francije iz Natove vojaške strukture leta 1967 je ta prizadevanja 
še dodatno zavrl. Pokazalo se je tudi različno razumevanje zagotavljanja varnosti: 
ZDA so nanj gledale globalno, medtem ko so evropske države varnostno politiko 
razumele kot nacionalno vprašanje. ZDA so nenehno večale obrambni proračun 
zaradi globalnega konflikta proti komunizmu, medtem ko so evropske države to 
storile le v primerih kriznih razmer v Evropi (npr. po praški pomladi leta 1968). 
Hkrati so hotele ZDA zapustiti evropsko celino in prepustiti obrambo evropskim 
zaveznicam, pri tem pa še vedno ohraniti svoj (vojaški in politični) vpliv. Po koncu 
hladne vojne so se odnosi med Natom in Rusijo sprva izboljšali, nato pa znova 
ohladili, ko so se Natu začele približevati nekdanje članice Varšavskega pakta. 
Odnosi so se ponovno izboljšali po septembrskih napadih leta 2001, ko so ZDA 
preusmerile pozornost z Evrope na Bližnji vzhod in Azijo. Tudi vzpon Kitajske je 
spremenil geopolitične usmeritve ameriške zunanje politike. Vendar je to izkoristila 
tudi Rusija, ko se je leta 2014 odločila zasesti vzhod Ukrajine, pri čemer je računala 
na mlačen odgovor Zahoda (predvsem v obliki gospodarskih sankcij), kar se je 
dejansko zgodilo. Kljub temu je ruska agresija predvsem vzhodnoevropske države 
spodbudila k povečanju obrambnih vlaganj, hkrati pa je zveza Nato okrepila svojo 
(mednarodno) prisotnost na vzhodu z mednarodno operacijo Okrepljena prednja 
prisotnost (Enhanced Forward Presence oz. EFP). Avtorja na koncu izpostavljata, da 
se zveza Nato nenehno sooča s kompleksno problematiko pri razumevanju pristopa 
k nacionalnim in mednarodnim varnostnim zavezam.
Zadnje, sedmo poglavje je usmerjeno v prihodnost. Pri tem avtorja ugotavljata, 
da bodo v prihodnosti na problematiko delitve bremen znotraj zveze Nato vplivali 
naslednji elementi: dejavnosti Rusije v mednarodnem okolju (še posebej glede (ne)
posrednega ogrožanja vzhodnoevropskih članic zveze Nato, ki jih razume kot lastno 
interesno območje); geopolitično ravnanje ZDA (ali se bo nadaljevalo zmanjševanje 
ameriške navzočnosti na evropski celini ali bo prišlo do zasuka); evropski odziv na 
ameriško ravnanje (če pride do umika, bo nedvomno sledilo povečanje vlaganj v lastne 
zmogljivosti); ter skupno delovanje zveze Nato v drugih državah. Pri zadnji točki se 
je že zdaj pokazalo, da so nekatere države zagotovile neprimerno večji obseg sil za 
O POTREBI DELITVE BREMENA V NATU
 64 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
operacije EFP kot druge, ki so ponudile malo ali dejansko nič za okrepitev Natove 
prisotnosti na vzhodu Evrope. Pomemben vpliv bo nedvomno imel tudi tehnološki 
napredek, tako na vojaškem kot na civilnem področju. Nadalje avtorja ponudita štiri 
možne scenarije: onesposobljeni Nato (države bodo zavračale povečanje sredstev 
za Nato ter izpolnjevanje skupnih zavez, kar bo na koncu pripeljalo do zmanjšanja 
vojaške moči zavezništva); transatlantsko pogajanje (države bodo zagotavljale 
določeno stopnjo sredstev, a večjega napredka pri povečanju zmogljivosti ne bo); 
države članice, ki zasledujejo lastne interese (države bodo povečale obrambne 
proračune, vendar bodo skrbele predvsem za izboljšanje lastnih zmogljivosti); in 
transatlantska solidarnost (države bodo poskrbele za izboljšanje zmogljivosti tako 
lastnih oboroženih sil kot tudi celotnega zavezništva). Avtorja sta se odzvala tudi 
na možnost razpada Nata zaradi problematike delitve bremen: »Razprava je tesno 
povezana z drugimi težavami, kot so težave z zaupanjem med zavezniki in različno 
dojemanje groženj, kar lahko resno ogrozi Natovo sposobnost, da preživi prihodnje 
krize« (str. 190).
Avtorja v obravnavanem delu z opisom zgodovinskih, političnih in varnostnih 
dogodkov nazorno prikažeta razvoj problematike finančnega vlaganja držav članic 
zveze Nato v izgradnjo lastnih zmogljivosti in za potrebe delovanje celotne zveze. Pri 
tem pokažeta na razkol predvsem med ZDA in evropskimi članicami, ki je posledica 
več različnih dejavnikov, od notranjepolitičnih in gospodarskih do dejavnosti tretjih 
držav ali nedržavnih akterjev. Dotična monografija je priporočeno branje za vse 
raziskovalce zveze Nato, mednarodnih odnosov in (mednarodne) varnosti. 
Klemen Kocjančič
 65 
© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
  Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 2
 Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 2
REVIEW
Klemen Kocjančič
ON THE NEED FOR BURDEN SHARING IN NATO
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0015
In 2022, Palgrave Macmillan published a monograph by two Finnish researchers 
(Tommi Koivula and Heljä Ossa) from the Finnish National Defence University, 
entitled “NATO’s Burden-Sharing Disputes: Past, Present and Future Prospects”. 
The authors begin the first chapter by highlighting the importance of Article 3 of the 
1949 Washington (North Atlantic) Treaty: “In order more effectively to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous 
and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack.” It is the different interpretations of the 
phrases “continuous and effective self-help” and “mutual aid” which create problems 
in understanding the burden-sharing needs within the North Atlantic Alliance (p 2). 
The second chapter states that the members of the Alliance agreed in 2006 (and 
again in 2014) on the need to allocate at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
to defence, with 20% of the defence budget to be allocated to major equipment 
or armaments purchases. In this respect, however, different approaches have been 
taken within the Alliance, ranging from the rationalist and the post-positivist to a 
combination of positivist and post-positivist approaches. The authors note that 
public (political) debates about the financial input for NATO purposes are cyclical 
in nature, usually referring to four factors: the geopolitical changes with regard 
to Russia; US foreign policy (interventionism or isolationism); European activity 
(activism or passivity); and major NATO operations outside its member states (p 28). 
The third chapter deals with the historical issue of burden-sharing within the Alliance, 
starting with its creation during the Cold War. Immediately after its establishment, 
the member states agreed that “each member state should specialise in the forces and 
weapons that served them best and could also be included in the integrated defence 
patterns” (p 37). During the Korean War, the US increased its defence budget, and 
 66 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
some European member states followed suit. But it soon became clear that the Soviet 
Union could mobilize a larger conventional force than the entire NATO Alliance, 
leading to a decision to adopt a strategy of flexible response, as seen in particular 
in the development of nuclear weapons. In the 1960s, the European member states 
reached a stage of development which marked a definitive improvement in their 
economic situation since the end of the Second World War, which meant that they 
could increase their own defence budgets. Nevertheless, European member states 
proved unable to establish a real counterweight to the importance and role of the 
American hegemon; one of the contentious issues was the (re)armament of Germany. 
The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter in the history of the Alliance, as the 
primary military as well as ideological opponents – the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union – ceased to exist. This led to calls for the abolition of NATO (as an unnecessary 
relic of the end of the Cold War) or a refocusing of attention, which indeed happened, 
as NATO became the world’s crisis manager. As a consequence, operations began 
to be carried out outside member states’ territories, as was particularly evident after 
the terrorist attacks of September 2001, when NATO forces began to operate in 
the Middle East, Asia and Africa. At the same time as the Russian Federation was 
going through periods of cuts and increases in its defence budget, the possibility of 
rapprochement of the former Warsaw Pact member states with their former adversary, 
NATO, became an important foreign policy issue. This actually happened in 1999, 
when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became new members. It had already 
become clear – during the wars in the former Yugoslavia – that European NATO 
member states would have to improve their own military capabilities to intervene in 
their own neighbourhood. The new security environment in Europe in the 1990s was 
among the most dangerous in the world at the time. Nevertheless, European countries 
began to cut their defence budgets, leading to the Riga Declaration of 2006, which 
was supposed to narrow the capabilities gap between Europe and the US.
Chapter 5 deals with the watershed year of 2014, which saw the end of the NATO 
mission in Afghanistan, and Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the Donbas region 
in eastern Ukraine: “The annexation has been viewed widely as a tipping point in 
European security, creating a deep rift between Russia and the West and upending 
the security order that had been built for more than 20 years” (p 115). As a result, the 
NATO summit in Wales reopened the issue of the need to secure a 2% share of GDP 
for defence budgets. All the European member states committed to this at the time, 
as well as to investing 20% of their defence budgets in research and development. 
While the larger states (e.g. Germany) were opposed to such commitments (claiming 
that the quality of the forces was more important than the quantity or size of the 
defence budget), the Eastern and Central European member states, in particular, 
began to increase investment in their own defence. In addition to the Ukraine crisis 
(and the rise of Russia on their borders), the increase in defence budgets was also 
a consequence of the improvement in the general economic climate following the 
global economic crisis. At the same time, the need to improve military (and non-
military) capabilities in non-kinetic areas of action – particularly in the face of hybrid 
Klemen Kocjančič
 67 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
threats (e.g. cyber-attacks) – also emerged. Three different approaches developed 
simultaneously within Europe: the strengthening of own forces (the Eastern bloc), 
the pursuit of a common security policy (France), and an isolationist approach (UK, 
Denmark).
The next chapter provides an overview of the historical dynamics of burden-sharing 
within NATO. During the Cold War, European countries primarily integrated in the 
economic sphere, while they did not make much progress in the field of defence. 
France’s departure from the NATO military structure in 1967 was a further setback to 
such efforts. In addition, different perceptions of security provision emerged: while 
the US took a global view, European countries considered security policy a national 
issue. The US continuously increased its defence budget in the face of the global 
conflict against communism, while European countries did so only in the event of 
a crisis in Europe (e.g. after the Prague Spring of 1968). At the same time, the US 
wanted to leave the European continent, abandoning its defence to the European 
allies, while still maintaining its (military and political) influence. After the end 
of the Cold War, relations between NATO and Russia initially improved, only to 
be cooled again as former Warsaw Pact members began to move closer to NATO. 
Relations improved again after the September 2001 attacks, when the US turned 
its attention away from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. The rise of China also 
changed the geopolitical orientations of US foreign policy. However, Russia also 
took advantage of this, deciding to occupy eastern Ukraine in 2014 while counting 
on a lukewarm response from the West (mainly in the form of economic sanctions), 
which indeed came about. Nevertheless, this Russian aggression brought Eastern 
European countries, in particular, to increase their defence investments, while 
NATO strengthened its (international) presence in the East through the international 
operation Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). The authors conclude by pointing 
out that NATO is constantly confronted with a complex problem in interpreting the 
approach to national and international security commitments.
The final, seventh chapter is forward-looking. In it, the authors conclude that the 
following elements will influence the future of burden-sharing within NATO: 
Russia’s activities in the international environment (especially with regard to (in)
indirectly threatening Eastern European NATO members, which it considers its 
own area of interest); the geopolitical behaviour of the US (whether the reduction 
of the US presence on the European continent will continue or reverse); the 
European response to US behaviour (a withdrawal would undoubtedly cause an 
increase in investment in its own capabilities); and NATO’s collective action in 
other countries. With regard to the latter, it has already become clear that some 
countries have provided a disproportionately larger force for EFP operations than 
others, which have offered little or nothing to reinforce NATO’s presence in Eastern 
Europe. Technological advances, both military and civilian, will undoubtedly also 
have an important impact. The authors go on to offer four possible scenarios: a 
disempowered NATO (countries will refuse to increase funding for NATO and to 
meet common commitments, ultimately leading to a reduction in the military strength 
ON THE NEED FOR BURDEN SHARING IN NATO
 68 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
of the Alliance); a transatlantic negotiation (countries will provide a certain level of 
funding, but there will be no significant progress towards increasing capabilities); 
self-interested member states (countries will increase their defence budgets but will 
primarily focus on improving their own capabilities); and transatlantic solidarity 
(countries will focus on improving the capabilities of their own armed forces as well 
as those of the Alliance as a whole). The authors also respond to the possibility of 
NATO’s disintegration due to burden-sharing issues: “The debate is closely linked 
to other problems, such as trust issues among allies and diverse threat perceptions, 
which can severely damage NATO’s ability to survive future crisis.” (p 190)
In this work, the authors illustrate the evolution of the issue of financial investment by 
NATO member states in building their own capabilities, as well as the capabilities of 
the Alliance as a whole, by presenting historical, political and security developments. 
In doing so, they illustrate the divide between the US and the European members, 
in particular, which is the result of a number of factors ranging from domestic 
policy and the economy to the activities of third countries or non-state actors. This 
book is recommended reading for all scholars of NATO, international relations and 
(international) security.
Klemen Kocjančič