JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS  ◎  vol. 17  ◎  no. 2  ◎  2024  5 
 
	
	
	
	
	
(DIS)TRUST	 INTO	 POLITICAL	 INSTITUTIONS	 AND	
CONSPIRACY	THEORIES:	CASE	OF	SLOVENIA	
	
	
Miro	HAČEK1	
……………………………………………………………………….……………………………………	
	
After	the	collapse	of	the	non-democratic	regimes	in	the	late	1980s	
and	 early	 1990s,	 new	 democratic	 states	 emerged	 in	 Central	 and	
Eastern	Europe	(CEE)	and	began	their	state	building	on	the	wave	of	
democratic	 enthusiasm.	 Majority	 of	 those	 countries,	 including	
Slovenia,	 entered	 European	 Union	 in	 early	 2000s	 as	 consolidated	
well-working	 democracies,	 although	 public	 trust	 in	 democratic	
political	 institutions	 has	 been	 on	 the	 slow	 decline	 since	 gaining	
independence,	only	to	drop	substantially	more	after	global	economic	
crisis	and	wave	of	populist	politics	hit	CEE	in	the	last	decade.	Author	
is	analyzing	trends	in	(dis)trust	levels	in	key	political	institutions	in	
Slovenia	with	emphasis	on	 the	wave	of	 conspiracy	 theories,	which	
extensively	 spread	during	and	after	 global	 coronavirus	 pandemic.	
Crisis	events	such	as	recent	global	pandemic	have	triggered	a	wave	
of	concerns	about	the	actual	backgrounds	of	global	crises,	and	those	
concerns	 eroded	public	 trust	 into	 key	political	 and	administrative	
institutions	and	added	fuel	to	the	conspiracy	theories	that	were	often	
embraced	by	political	 parties	 and	non-governmental	 stakeholders	
that	exploited	sometimes-legitimate	concerns	to	their	own	benefits.	
	
Key	words:	conspiracy	theories;	political	trust;	information;	
institutions;	Slovenia.	
	
	
	
1	INTRODUCTION	
	
Conspiracy	 theories	 are	 theories	 or	 beliefs	 that	 certain	 events,	 decisions,	
situations,	 or	 phenomenon	 have	 been	 caused	 by	 a	 group	 of	 people	 who	 are	
secretly	working	 together	 to	achieve	a	specific	but	mysterious	goal.	There	are	
usually	 certain	 sinister,	 frightening	 intentions	 behind	 such	 theories	 (Barkun	
2013,	 3-4).	 Conspiracy	 theories	 often	 lack	 evidence	 and	 may	 be	 based	 on	
speculation	or	hearsay.	Conspiracy	theories	may	also	result	from	post	hoc	ergo	
prompter	 hoc,	 which	 is	 Latin	 for	 “after	 this,	 therefore	 because	 of	 this.”	 It	 is	 a	
logical	 fallacy	 in	 which	 two	 events	 occur	 sequentially	 or	 simultaneously	 that	
leads	to	misattribution	to	one	event	appearing	to	be	the	cause	of	the	following	
 
1 	Miro	 HAČEK,	 PhD,	 full	 professor	 at	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Social	 Sciences,	 University	 of	 Ljubljana,	
Slovenia.	Contact:	miro.hacek@fdv.uni-lj.si	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     6 
 
 
event.	Several	of	the	conspiracy	theories	surrounding	the	novel	coronavirus	stem	
from	numerous	sources	and	logical	fallacies.		
	
The	 spread	 of	 the	 coronavirus	 has	 been	 accompanied	by	 a	massive	 spread	 of	
conspiracy	 theories	 (Bierwiaczonek,	 Gunderson	 and	 Kunst	 2022,	 1;	 see	 also	
Šteger	2024,	83).	One	of	the	most	pervasive	conspiracy	theories	about	the	spread	
of	coronavirus	is	that	it	was	deliberately	released	into	the	population	by	some	
nefarious	group	or	organization,	most	often	the	government	of	China.	This	theory	
is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	virus	was	created	in	a	lab,	possibly	as	a	bioweapon,	
and	then	accidentally	or	deliberately	released	into	the	public	to	cause	mass	chaos	
and	destruction	(Birchall	and	Knight	2023,	60).	The	fact	the	virus	originated	in	
the	Wuhan	region	of	China	has	been	used	to	attribute	the	discovery	of	the	virus	
to	 nefarious	 actors	 in	 China,	 regardless	 of	 the	 severe	 lack	 of	 evidence.	
Bierwiaczonek,	 Gunderson	 and	 Kunst’s	 (2022,	 3)	 study	 on	 the	 impact	 of	
conspiratorial	 claims	 regarding	 coronavirus	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 and	
detrimental	 effect	 on	 public	 health	 simply	 due	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 a	 worldwide	
pandemic.	
	
Another	common	conspiracy	theory	is	that	the	virus	was	deliberately	spread	by	
5G	networks.	This	theory	claims	that	5G	radiation	is	powerful	enough	to	weaken	
the	 immune	 system,	 allowing	 the	 virus	 to	 spread	more	 quickly	 (Birchall	 and	
Knight	2023,	96).	While	there	is	no	scientific	evidence	to	support	this	claim,	the	
theory	continues	to	circulate.	Another	popular	conspiracy	theory	is	that	the	virus	
was	created	as	a	way	to	control	the	population	by	imposing	restrictions	on	travel	
and	public	gatherings.	This	theory	suggests	that	the	virus	was	created	as	a	tool	of	
social	engineering,	to	keep	people	in	their	homes	and	limit	their	ability	to	interact	
with	 one	 another.	 However,	 a	 motive	 for	 such	 social	 engineering	 never	
materializes	in	this	discourse.	Finally,	there	is	the	theory	that	the	virus	is	part	of	
a	vast	conspiracy	to	increase	the	power	and	wealth	of	a	select	group	of	people.	
This	 theory	 suggests	 that	 the	 virus	 was	 released	 to	 cause	 mass	 economic	
disruption,	giving	those	in	power	an	opportunity	to	amass	even	more	wealth	and	
power.	How	this	global	phenomenon	leads	to	creating	more	wealth	during	global	
lockdowns	seems	to	contradict	this	claim	but	does	not	halt	its	spread.	
	
As	 noted	 by	 Douglas,	 Sutton	 and	 Cichocka	 (2017),	 exposure	 to	 conspiracy	
theories	 is	having	a	negative	effect	on	some	 forms	of	political	participation	of	
citizens,	such	as	participation	in	elections.	The	authors	note	similar	findings	in	
some	 studies	 that	 followed	 this	 one	 (e.g.	 Douglas	 and	 Sutton	 2018,	 280).	
Conspiracy	theories,	among	other	things,	are	supposed	to	encourage	a	sense	of	
helplessness	(Wardawy-Dudziak	2024,	53;	see	also	Matuszewski	et	al	2024,	87),	
which	is	an	important	factor	in	an	individual's	decision	not	to	participate	in	the	
elections.	With	this,	the	authors	indicate	the	influence	that	conspiracy	theories	
can	have	in	political	arena.	Einstein	and	Glick	(2015,	682-685)	were	one	of	the	
first	 to	 investigate	 the	 connection	 between	 beliefs	 in	 conspiracy	 theories	 and	
trust	in	the	government.	According	to	them,	it	is	intuitive	to	expect	that	exposure	
to	various	conspiracy	theories	about	the	government's	 involvement	 in	sinister	
principles	 affects	 an	 individual's	 attitude	 towards	 government	 and	 political	
institutions	in	general.	The	goal	of	their	experimental	research	was	to	determine	
the	connection	between	exposure	to	conspiracy	theories	in	the	mass	media	and	
trust	 in	 the	 government.	 Their	 findings	 confirm	 that	 exposure	 to	 conspiracy	
theories	has	a	negative	effect	on	trust	in	the	government	and	political	institutions,	
even	when	 the	 institutions	 are	 not	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 conspiracy	 theory	
itself.	Mari	et	al.	(2022,	288)	make	a	similar	observation	on	the	example	of	a	study	
that	 covered	 almost	 12,000	 people	 in	 different	 cultural	 settings	 in	 Europe,	
America,	and	New	Zealand.	
	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     7 
 
 
The	goal	of	 this	 article	 is	 to	analyze	 trends	 in	 (dis)trust	 levels	 in	key	political	
institutions	 in	 Slovenia	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 most	 recent	 period	 before,	
during	and	after	coronavirus	pandemic,	when	the	wave	of	conspiracy	theories,	
both	old	and	new	ones,	especially	intensified	and	spread.	After	we	determine	the	
state	of	public	 (dis)trust	 towards	major	Slovenian	political	and	administrative	
institutions,	we	will	connect	those	findings	with	the	results	of	empirical	research	
among	followers	and	sympathizers	of	conspiracy	theorist	profiles	on	Slovenian	
social	media	sites,	mostly	Facebook,	to	ascertain	the	levels	of	embeddedness	of	
conspiracy	theories	in	Slovenia	and	to	discover	the	profile	of	average	Slovenian	
conspiracy	theories	follower	and	his/her	attitude	towards	mainstream	politics.		
	
	
2	 (DIS)TRUST	 IN	 KEY	 DECISION-MAKING	 POLITICAL	 AND	
ADMINISTRATIVE	INSTITUTIONS	
	
In	dealing	with	and	managing	crisis	situations	such	as	global	economic	crisis	of	
2008-2014	 (Koller	 2021,	 61)	 migration	 wave	 of	 2015	 or	 novel	 coronavirus	
pandemic	of	2020-2022,	a	policy	narrative	framework	is	extremely	important	for	
at	least	two	reasons.	First,	a	clear	policy	framework	reduces	ambiguity	and	thus	
challenges	policy	implementation,	but	it	cannot	ensure	effective	implementation.	
The	 latter	depends	on	structural	 issues	or	the	capacity	of	 the	system.	In	other	
words,	 if	 appropriate	 resources	 are	 not	 allocated	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	
adequate	policy	response,	the	crisis	situation	cannot	be	successfully	addressed,	
no	matter	how	good	the	policy	narrative	(Kukovič	2021,	639–641).	Second,	an	
effective	framework	for	action	increases	the	likelihood	that	citizens	will	correctly	
interpret	and	support	the	public	policies	and	actions	implemented.	The	latter	is	
essential	for	policy	implementation	and	compliance.	At	the	operational	level,	it	is	
important	that	leaders	provide	accurate,	timely	and	credible	information	across	
the	hierarchy	of	decision-making	and	crisis	response,	as	well	as	to	citizens	and	
communities	involved	in	crisis	management	in	different	settings	(Boin	and	't	Hart	
2010,	 360;	 Prebilič	 and	 Kukovič	 2021,	 539–540).	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	
political	 leaders'	 responses,	Mintrom	and	O'Connor	(2020,	209)	 formulate	 the	
following	four	recommendations:2	1)	convincing	accounts	of	what	is	happening,	
why	it	is	happening,	and	what	can	be	done	about	it;	2)	building	a	broad	coalition	
of	support	 for	the	policy	actions	to	be	taken	and	minimizing	opportunities	 for	
conflict;	3)	fostering	trust	and	collaboration	among	key	actors	and	groups	whose	
actions	are	relevant	to	managing	the	crisis;	and	4)	empowering	individuals	and	
communities	 to	 make	 informed	 decisions	 about	 crisis	 management	 in	 their	
respective	jurisdictions.	
	
The	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 framework	 for	 action	 leads	 to	 doubt	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 the	
messages	 that	 political	 leaders	 try	 to	 convey,	 leading	 to	 varying	 degrees	 of	
confusion	among	citizens.	If	we	take	most	recent	coronavirus	crisis	situation	as	
the	latest	example,	we	could	observe	a	contagious	coronavirus	on	one	side	and	
the	complacency	and	deviant	behavior	by	a	small	number	of	citizens	that	lead	to	
the	rapid	spread	of	the	virus	with	disastrous	and	fatal	results.	Because	of	the	high	
virulence	of	the	novel	coronavirus,	it	was	necessary	to	take	rapid	action,	which	
inevitably	had	a	major	impact	on	people's	daily	routines.	Many	political	leaders	
issued	emergency	powers	in	their	jurisdictions	to	enforce	social	distancing	and	
lockdown	measures,	 which	were	 a	 serious	 violation	 of	 social	 norms.	 For	 this	
reason,	it	was	necessary	to	create	a	clear	political	narrative	simultaneously	with	
the	 legalization	of	measures,	which	 some	political	 leaders	 succeeded	 in	doing	
 
2	It	should	be	added,	however,	that	new	crisis	situations	will	challenge	other	behavioral	patterns	of	
political	leaders.	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     8 
 
 
much	better	than	others	(Koller	2022).	Those	politicians	who	failed	to	enforce	an	
effective	political	narrative	among	 the	population	quickly	became	 targets	of	 a	
blame	game,	which	led	to	disregard	for	the	measures	taken	to	combat	the	novel	
coronavirus	 and	 a	 decline	 in	 citizens'	 support	 for	 and	 trust	 in	 policymakers.	
Indeed,	Haček	 and	Brezovšek	 (2014,	 3)	 explain	 that	 the	 trust	we	 have	 in	 the	
representatives	of	a	particular	political	or	administrative	 institution	generates	
trust	 in	 the	 institution	 as	 a	 whole.	 However,	 the	 consequences	 of	 distrust	 in	
political	institutions	-	especially	in	crisis	situations	–	can	be	fatal.	
	
Gamson	(1968,	42)	argues	that	trust	in	political	and	administrative	institutions	
is	 important	 because	 it	 serves	 as	 a	 creator	 of	 collective	 power,	 enabling	
government	 to	 make	 decisions	 and	 commit	 resources	 without	 resorting	 to	
coercion	or	seeking	the	explicit	consent	of	citizens	for	every	decision.	When	trust	
is	 high,	 governments	 can	make	 new	 commitments	 based	 on	 that	 trust	 and,	 if	
successful,	 increase	 support	 even	 further.	 A	 virtuous	 spiral	 is	 created.	On	 the	
other	hand,	if	trust	is	low,	governments	cannot	govern	effectively,	trust	is	further	
eroded,	 and	 a	 vicious	 cycle	 is	 created	 (Muller	 and	 Jukam	 1977).	 Trust	 is	
particularly	important	for	democratic	governments	because	they	cannot	rely	on	
coercion	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	 non-democratic	 regimes.	 Trust	 is	 therefore	
essential	 for	 representative	 relations	 (Bianco	 1994).	 In	modern	 democracies,	
where	 citizens	 exercise	 control	 over	 government	 through	 representative	
institutions,	it	is	trust	that	gives	representatives	the	latitude	to	set	aside	short-
term	 concerns	 of	 the	 electorate	 while	 pursuing	 long-term	 national	 interests	
(Mishler	and	Rose	1997,	419).	Trust	is	necessary	for	individuals	to	voluntarily	
participate	in	collective	institutions,	whether	political	or	civic.	However,	trust	is	
a	double-edged	sword.	Democracy	requires	trust,	but	it	also	requires	an	active	
and	vigilant	citizenry	(Haček	2019,	420)	with	a	healthy	skepticism	of	government	
and	 a	 willingness	 to	 suspend	 trust	 when	 necessary	 and	 assert	 control	 over	
government	by	replacing	the	current	government.	
	
We	begin	our	analysis	by	examining	the	level	of	trust	in	(political)	institutions	in	
selected	 European	 Union	 member	 states,	 namely	 Slovenia,	 Austria,	 Hungary,	
Croatia	and	Poland,	countries	that	share	many	aspects	of	 their	recent	political	
history	and	political	culture.	Four	time	periods	have	been	included	in	the	analysis,	
namely	(a)	the	period	before	the	novel	coronavirus	pandemic	(2018	and	2019),	
(b)	the	period	of	the	novel	coronavirus	pandemic	outbreak	(2020),	(c)	the	period	
of	the	second	and	third	waves	of	the	novel	coronavirus	pandemic	(2021	and	2022)	
and	(d)	the	period	after	novel	coronavirus	pandemic	(2023).	
	
Based	 on	 the	 publicly	 available	 data	 presented	 in	 Table	 1,	 two	 clusters	 of	
countries	 can	 be	 observed.	 The	 first	 cluster	 consists	 of	 countries	 (Austria,	
Hungary)	whose	populations	have	maintained	relatively	high	levels	of	trust	in	all	
major	 political	 and	 administrative	 institutions	 (namely	 national	 government,	
national	parliament,	political	parties,	police,	judiciary,	and	public	administration)	
from	before	the	novel	coronavirus	pandemic	to	the	last	measurement	after	the	
pandemic	 in	 early	 2023,	 when	 countries	 already	 implemented	 exit	 strategies	
from	 the	 crisis	 situation.	 Still,	 the	 first	 group	also	 includes	 cases	with	 a	 slight	
downward	trend	in	public	confidence,	with	Austria	showing	the	largest	decrease	
in	public	confidence,	as	trust	in	national	parliament	fell	by	ten	per	cent	and	in	
national	government	by	seventeen	per	cent	between	2018	and	2023.	The	second	
cluster	of	countries	are	those	that	have	stable,	but	very	low	levels	of	public	trust	
towards	major	 political	 and	 administrative	 institutions,	well	 below	 the	EU-27	
averages	 (Slovenia,	 Croatia,	 Poland).	 It	 should	 be	 added	 that	 the	 increase	 or	
decrease	 in	 public	 trust	 is	 influenced	 by	 various	 factors,	 one	 of	 which	 was	
certainly	the	change	of	government	that	we	have	experienced	in	Slovenia	in	April	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     9 
 
 
2022,	but	we	can	also	clearly	see	that	trust	levels	returned	to	the	pre-electoral	
levels	just	nine	months	after	(most	recent	Eurobarometer	survey	in	spring	2023).	
	
TABLE	1:	TRUST	IN	KEY	POLITICAL	INSTITUTIONS	(TEND	TO	TRUST;	IN	PER	CENT)	
	
Sources:	European	Union	(2018;	2019;	2020;	2021;	2022;	2023).	
	
TABLE	1	CONT.:	TRUST	 IN	KEY	POLITICAL	 INSTITUTIONS	 (TEND	TO	TRUST;	 IN	PER	
CENT)	
	
Sources:	European	Union	(2018;	2019;	2020;	2021;	2022;	2023).	
	
TABLE	1	CONT.:	TRUST	 IN	KEY	POLITICAL	 INSTITUTIONS	 (TEND	TO	TRUST;	 IN	PER	
CENT)	
	
Sources:	European	Union	(2018;	2019;	2020;	2021;	2022;	2023).	
	
In	addition	to	public	trust	in	key	decision-making	political	institutions	measured	
by	 Eurobarometer,	 we	 also	 examined	 public	 trust	 in	 key	 Slovenian	 political	
institutions	(see	Table	2)	measured	by	most	publicly	recognized	public	opinion	
trackers,	namely	Centre	for	Public	Opinion	and	Mass	Communication	Research,	
with	data	all	the	way	from	2010	to	2022.	We	can	observe	that	 levels	of	public	
trust	towards	major	political	institutions	were	on	the	quite	low	levels	until	2022,	
when	the	post-covid	elections	saw	the	biggest	voter	turnout	in	the	last	couple	of	
decades	that	also	brought	major	change	to	the	political	landscape,	and,	at	least	
temporarily,	increased	levels	of	public	trust	towards	major	political	institutions.		
	
TABLE	2:	TRUST	IN	KEY	POLITICAL	INSTITUTIONS	IN	SLOVENIA:	SURVEYS	FROM	2010	
TO	2022	
	
*	Question	was	“Please	use	a	scale	from	0	to	10	to	rate	how	much	you	personally	trust	each	of	the	
following	institutions.	How	much	you	trust:	The	National	Assembly	Please	use	a	scale	from	0	to	10	
to	rate	how	much	you	personally	trust	each	of	the	following	institutions.	0	means	you	don't	trust	
the	institution	at	all,	and	10	means	you	trust	it	completely.”		
Sources:	Centre	for	Public	Opinion	and	Mass	Communication	Research	(2020;	2022);	Toš	(2021a:	
644)	and	Toš	(2021b:	99).	
	
With	the	help	of	comparative	analysis,	we	can	establish	the	following	facts.	First,	
public	trust	in	the	main	political	and	administrative	institutions	is	on	the	highest	
levels	 in	 Austria	 and	Hungary,	 and	 quite	 a	 bit	 lower	 in	 Slovenia,	 Poland,	 and	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     10 
 
 
Croatia;	the	lowest	trust	in	the	key	political	institutions	is	perceived	in	Croatia.		
Second,	the	coronavirus	crisis	did	not	have	major	impact	on	the	public	trust	into	
key	political	and	administrative	institutions	in	any	of	the	five	analyzed	Central	
and	Eastern	European	states	with	some	drops	in	public	trust	detected	that	were	
mere	 temporal	 in	 nature.	 Third,	 Slovenian	 public	 trust	 into	 key	 political	 and	
administrative	institutions	is	in	most	part	well	below	EU-27	average	in	all	five	
analyzed	Eurobarometer	measurements	from	2018	to	2022.	And	fourth,	we	can	
see	that	the	coronavirus	crisis	and	political	backslash	to	 it	(Kukovič	2022,	17)	
had	 important	 –	 but	 also	 short-lived	 –	 influence	 on	 political	 events	 (prime	
example	 being	 the	national	 elections	 held	 in	 Slovenia	 in	 late	April	 2022)	 that	
brought	major	changes	to	the	political	landscape,	including	increased	public	trust	
towards	major	political	and	administrative	institutions.		
	
	
3	EMPIRICAL	STUDY	ON	CONSPIRACY	THEORIES	IN	SLOVENIA	
	
3.1	Research	design	
	
In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	 questions	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 embeddedness	 of	
conspiracy	theories	 in	Slovenian	society	and	to	discover	the	profile	of	average	
Slovenian	conspiracy	theories	followers	and	their	attitude	towards	mainstream	
politics,	we	conducted	empirical	research	among	followers	and	sympathizers	of	
most	frequented	Slovenian	conspiracy	theories	groups	profiles	on	Facebook.	The	
Generic	Conspiracist	Beliefs	Scale/GCBS	(Brotherton	2015)	was	used	to	explore	
conspiracy	mentality.	Survey	took	place	between	February	and	April	2023,	when	
followers	of	mentioned	groups	were	invited	several	times	to	fill	out	web-based	
anonymous	 questionnaire;	 257	 respondents	 answered	 the	 questionnaire,	 of	
which	115	were	men	and	142	were	women.	Most	respondents	were	quite	young,	
as	51,4	percent	declared	they	are	between	18	and	24	years	of	age,	and	only	3,5	
percent	of	respondents	were	over	65	years	of	age;	the	facts	that	could	also	very	
well	be	contributed	to	the	nature	of	our	research,	as	social	media	activity	is	much	
more	populated	by	younger	compared	to	older	population.	The	 largest	part	of	
our	 respondents	 (65,4	percent)	 completed	high	 school,	 30,4	percent	obtained	
higher,	or	university	level	diploma	and	3,1	percent	obtained	master	and/or	PhD.	
Most	 respondents	 were	 married	 or	 in	 relationship	 (47,1	 percent)	 and	 46,3	
percent	were	single	when	conducting	our	survey.3	
	
3.2	Results	
	
We	will	analyze	and	debate	some	of	the	most	intriguing	and	interesting	results	of	
the	 quite	 extensive	 study	 among	 Slovenian	 conspiracy	 theories	 followers.	We	
presented	 a	 series	 of	 statements	 to	 the	 survey	 respondents,	 where	 they	
evaluated	the	degree	to	which	they	believe	each	statement	is	likely	to	be	true	on	
the	scale	from	1	(definitely	not	true)	to	5	(definitely	true).		
	
The	first	four	statements	are	testing	the	conspiracy	theories	that	suggests	that	
the	virus	was	released	to	cause	mass	economic	disruption,	giving	those	in	power	
an	opportunity	to	amass	even	more	wealth	and	power	and	that	there	is	secret	
group	of	people	behind	the	world	governments	that	is	pulling	many	if	not	all	the	
strings.	 	We	 can	 see	 quite	 substantial	 support	 amongst	 Slovenian	 conspiracy	
theories	 followers	 for	 all	 four	 statements,	 which	 is	 not	 really	 surprising,	 as	
"secret	group"	conspiracy	theory	is	the	most	well-established	and	well-known.	
 
3 As	with	any	survey	conducted	on	the	social	media,	we	should	treat	this	survey	with	grain	of	salt	
and	appropriate	critical	distance.	 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     11 
 
 
Strongest	 support	 (65	 percent	 of	 respondents	 believe	 that	 it’s	 probably	 or	
definitely	true)	was	given	to	the	statement	that	claims	that	the	power	held	by	
heads	of	state	is	second	to	that	of	small	unknown	groups	who	really	control	world	
politics;	weakest	support	(55,4	percent	of	respondents	believe	that	it’s	probably	
or	definitely	 true)	was	given	to	 the	similar	statement	that	claims	small,	secret	
group	of	people	is	responsible	for	making	all	major	world	decisions,	such	as	going	
to	war.		
	
TABLE	3:	CONSPIRACY	THEORIES	FOLLOWERS’	OPINIONS	ON	SELECTED	STATEMENTS	
	
*	The	question	was:	"	There	is	often	debate	about	whether	or	not	the	public	is	told	the	whole	truth	
about	various	important	issues.	This	brief	survey	is	designed	to	assess	your	beliefs	about	some	of	
these	subjects.	Please	indicate	the	degree	to	which	you	believe	each	statement	is	likely	to	be	true	
on	the	following	scale."	N=	257.		
Source:	Haček	(2023).	
	
The	next	six	statements	(numbered	from	5-10)	focus	to	the	vaccines	and	covid-
19	 global	 pandemic	 and	 relate	 to	 the	 two	 popular	 and	 well-established	
conspiracy	 theories	 claiming	 a)	 that	 the	 virus	 was	 created	 in	 a	 lab	 and	
accidentally	or	deliberately	released	into	the	public	to	cause	mass	chaos	and	that	
coronavirus	is	tool	of	social	engineering,	to	keep	people	in	their	homes	and	limit	
their	ability	to	interact	with	one	another	and	b)	vaccines	are	harmful	and	their	
safety	data	is	compromised	and	fabricated.	We	can	clearly	see	from	Table	3	that	
support	of	conspiracy	theories	followers	towards	those	two	statement	clusters	is	
not	overwhelming,	especially	towards	the	statements	regarding	the	vaccines.	In	
fact,	 there	 is	 large	 group	 of	 conspiracy	 theories	 followers	 that	 are	 strongly	
opposing	 statements	 regarding	 the	 supposed	harmfulness	of	 vaccines	and	 the	
link	between	vaccines	and	autism.		
	
The	 situation	 is	 quite	 different	 with	 three	 statements	 (numbered	 from	 8-10)	
regarding	 covid-19	disease	 and	 global	 coronavirus	pandemic,	where	50	 to	60	
percent	 of	 conspiracy	 theories	 followers	 are	 (strongly)	 supporting	 all	 three	
statements,	 with	 strongest	 support	 (62,2	 percent	 of	 respondents	 (strongly)	
agreeing)	towards	the	statement	claiming	that	the	statistics	on	covid-19	disease	
cases	and	deaths	are	deliberately	fabricated.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	there	is	
(weak	 to	moderate)	 negative	 correlation	 between	 correspondent's	 interest	 in	
politics	and	their	support	for	these	three	statements.		
	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     12 
 
 
	
The	 last	 two	 statements	 (numbered	 from	 11-12)	 relate	 to	 the	 common	
conspiracy	theory	that	claims	the	virus	was	deliberately	spread	by	5G	networks.	
As	we	can	see	from	the	Table	3,	there	is	no	clear	cut	support	for	either	of	those	
two	statements,	as	majority	of	conspiracy	theories	followers	(53,2	percent)	do	
not	 agree	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 5G	network	 is	 related	 to	 the	 COVID-19	
pandemic,	and	there	are	also	more	conspiracy	theories	followers	(42,3	percent)	
not	agreeing	with	the	statement	"Evidence	of	the	dangers	of	5G	radiation	is	being	
hidden	from	the	public"	than	those	agreeing	with	that	particular	statement	(39,3	
percent).		
	
TABLE	4:	CONSPIRACY	THEORIES	FOLLOWERS'	LEVELS	OF	INTERACTION	
	
*	The	question	was:		"We	would	now	like	to	ask	you	about	your	experiences	on	the	Internet	related	
to	content	such	as	vaccinations,	5G,	the	pandemic	or	the	obscure	and	harmful	plans	of	people	in	
power.	How	often	in	the	last	month	have	you...?"	N=	257.		
Source:	Haček	(2023).	
	
We	also	asked	conspiracy	theories	followers	how	often	in	the	last	month	have	
they	 interacted	 about	 their	 experiences	 online	 related	 to	 content	 such	 as	
vaccinations,	5G,	the	pandemic	or	the	harmful	plans	of	people	in	power	(Table	4).	
We	can	see	that	Slovenian	conspiracy	theories	followers	are	quite	passive	and	
not	personally	engaged	in	online	activities	regarding	mentioned	topics;	most	of	
them	 are	 following	 and	 not	 too	 often,	 just	 once	 or	maybe	 twice	weekly,	 also	
"liking"	posts	dedicated	to	those	topics,	but	not	also	replying,	starting	discussions,	
participating	in	discussions	or	sharing	videos.	There	is	quite	small	sub-group	of	
conspiracy	theories	followers	(less	than	15	percent	of	them)	that	are	in	fact	very	
active	with	staring	discussion,	replying	to	other	people's	posts,	sharing	video	or	
other	contents,	and	participating	in	discussion	forums.		
	
It’s	 also	 interesting	 to	 analyze	 the	 sources	 of	 Slovenian	 conspiracy	 theories	
followers’	information	(Table	5).	We	can	see	that	(strongly)	prevailing	sources	of	
information	are	in	fact	not	traditional	media	channels,	like	television,	news	press	
or	the	radio,	but	the	online	news	sites,	friends	and	family	members	and	also	social	
media,	especially	Facebook,	where	more	that	40	percent	of	conspiracy	theories	
followers	get	their	information	about	currents	event	in	the	country	and	globally	
at	least	two	or	three	times	a	week.	The	least	popular	sources	of	information	are	
Telegram,	TikTok	and	Twitter/X	social	media	networks.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     13 
 
 
	
TABLE	5:	SOURCES	OF	INFORMATION	FOR	CONSPIRACY	THEORIES	FOLLOWERS	
	
*	The	question	was:	“How	often	during	the	last	month	did	you	get	information	about	current	events	
in	Slovenia	and	in	the	world	from	the	following	sources?”	N=	257.		
Source:	Haček	(2023).	
	
TABLE	6:	TRUST	INTO	VARIOUS	INSTITUTIONS	
	
*	The	question	was:		"To	what	extent	do	you	trust	the	following	institutions?"	N=	257.		
Source:	Haček	(2023).	
	
We	 also	 asked	 Slovenian	 conspiracy	 theories	 followers	 how	 interested	 about	
politics	they	are.	The	results	are	interesting,	as	48	percent	of	conspiracy	theories	
followers	are	following	what	 is	happening	 in	politics	quite	or	very	closely	and	
only	 25,4	 percent	 of	 them	 are	 not	 interesting	 in	 politics	 and	 are	 often	 over-
looking	 even	most	 important	 events.	 The	 group	 is	 also	 very	 active	 regarding	
various	elections,	as	they	claim	willing	to	cast	the	vote	at	presidential	elections	
(72,8	 percent),	 parliamentary	 elections	 (72	 percent),	 local	 elections	 (66,9	
percent)	and	even	at	 the	elections	 to	 the	European	parliament	(54,5	percent),	
contradicting	 the	 findings	of	Douglas,	 Sutton	 and	Cichocka	 (2017),	 that	 found	
that	exposure	to	conspiracy	theories	is	having	a	negative	effect	on	some	forms	of	
political	participation.	At	the	same	time,	the	group	is	also	very	reserved	regarding	
their	trust	levels	into	various	institutions	(Table	6),	especially	institutions	from	
the	political	sphere,	 like	political	parties	(72	percent	do	not	 trust),	parliament	
(63,4	percent	do	not	trust)	or	government	(69,3	percent	do	not	trust);	the	levels	
of	 distrust	 are	 (just)	 a	 bit	 higher	 compared	 to	 the	 general	 population	 results	
presented	and	analyzed	in	the	second	chapter.		
	
	
4	CONCLUSION	
	
Crisis	 events	 such	 as	 the	 global	 economic	 crisis	 in	 early	 2000s,	 the	 wave	 of	
migration	 in	 mid	 2010s	 or	 the	 recent	 pandemic	 have	 triggered	 a	 wave	 of	
concerns	about	the	actual	backgrounds	of	those	crises,	eroded	public	trust	into	
key	 political	 and	 administrative	 institutions	 and	 added	 fuel	 to	 the	 spread	 of	
conspiracy	theories	that	were	often	embraced	by	both	political	and	non-political	
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS     14 
 
 
stakeholders	that	exploited	sometimes-legitimate	concerns	to	their	own	benefits.	
The	goal	of	this	article	was	to	analyze	trends	in	(dis)trust	levels	in	key	political	
institutions	 in	 Slovenia	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 most	 recent	 period	 before,	
during	and	after	coronavirus	pandemic,	when	the	wave	of	conspiracy	theories,	
both	 old	 and	 new	 ones,	 especially	 intensified	 and	 spread.	 Using	 both	 sets	 of	
international	 (Eurobarometer,	 see	 Table	 1)	 and	 national	 (Centre	 for	 Public	
Opinion	 and	 Mass	 Communication	 Research,	 see	 Table	 2)	 data	 its	 very	
straightforward	conclusion	 that	Slovenia	can	be	regarded	to	be	among	the	EU	
members	with	below-average	levels	of	public	trust	towards	major	political	and	
administrative	 institutions	and	that	2020-22	global	coronavirus	pandemic	has	
not	had	much	either	negative	or	positive	influence	on	those	(dis)trust	levels	at	
all.		
	
We	 have	 then	 analyzed	 those	 findings	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 results	 of	 empirical	
research	among	followers	and	sympathizers	of	conspiracy	theorists’	profiles	on	
Slovenian	 social	 media	 sites,	 mostly	 Facebook,	 to	 ascertain	 the	 levels	 of	
embeddedness	of	conspiracy	theories	in	Slovenia	and	to	discover	the	profile	of	
average	 Slovenian	 conspiracy	 theories	 follower	 and	 his/her	 attitude	 towards	
mainstream	 politics.	 We	 could	 ascertain	 that	 levels	 of	 support	 of	 Slovenian	
conspiracy	theories	followers	are	stronger	towards	covid-19	related	conspiracy	
theories	and	also	towards	more	established	traditional	theories,	like	the	one	that	
suggests	there	is	secret	group	of	people	behind	the	world	governments	that	is	
pulling	many	strings;	at	the	same	time	levels	of	support	are	weaker	towards	the	
vaccine	and	5G	related	conspiracy	theories.	We	could	also	clearly	establish	that	
Slovenian	conspiracy	theories	followers	are	quite	passive,	mostly	just	following	
and	 maybe	 also	 liking	 posts	 regarding	 established	 conspiracy	 theories,	 but	
(mostly)	not	 also	actively	participating.	We	could	also	establish	 that	 the	most	
important	news	sources	of	conspiracy	theories	followers	are	online	news	sites,	
friends	 and	 family	 members	 and	 social	 media,	 and	 that	 conspiracy	 theories	
followers	are	on	one	side	above-averagely	political	active,	but	on	the	other	also	
very	distrustful	towards	major	political	institutions.		
	
	
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	
	
This	 research	 was	 funded	 by	 the	 Slovenian	 Research	 and	 Innovation	 Agency	
(grant	code	N5-0222).	
	
	
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	(NE)ZAUPANJE	 V	 POLITIČNE	 INSTITUCIJE	 IN	 TEORIJE	 ZAROT:	
PRIMER	SLOVENIJE	
	
Po	 razpadu	 nedemokratičnih	 režimov	 v	 poznih	 osemdesetih	 in	 zgodnjih	
devetdesetih	 letih	prejšnjega	stoletja	 so	v	 srednji	 in	vzhodni	Evropi	nastale	nove	
demokratične	države,	ki	so	izgrajevale	države	na	valu	demokratičnega	navdušenja.	
Večina	 teh	 držav	 -	 vključno	 s	 Slovenijo	 -	 je	 vstopila	 v	 Evropsko	 unijo	 v	 prvem	
desetletju	 tega	 tisočletja	 kot	 utrjene,	 dobro	 delujoče	 demokracije,	 čeprav	 je	
zaupanje	 javnosti	 v	 demokratične	 politične	 institucije	 od	 osamosvojitve	 počasi	
upadalo.	Po	svetovni	gospodarski	krizi	 in	valu	populizma	v	zadnjem	desetletju	je	
zaupanje	 javnosti	 v	 demokratične	 politične	 institucije	 še	 dodatno	 strmoglavilo.	
Avtor	 analizira	 trende	 (ne)zaupanja	 v	 ključne	 politične	 institucije	 v	 Sloveniji	 s	
poudarkom	 na	 valu	 teorij	 zarote,	 ki	 se	 je	 močno	 razširil	 med	 in	 po	 globalni	
pandemiji	koronavirusa.	Krizni	dogodki,	kot	je	nedavna	pandemija,	so	sprožili	val	
skrbi	 glede	 dejanskih	 ozadij	 svetovnih	 kriz,	 tovrstni	 pomisleki	 pa	 so	 še	 dodatno	
zmanjšali	 zaupanje	 javnosti	 v	 ključne	 politične	 institucije	 ter	 podžgali	 teorije	
zarote,	ki	so	jih	pogosto	sprejemale	tudi	politične	stranke	in	nevladne	organizacije	
ter	jih	izkoriščale	v	lastno	korist.	
	
Ključne	 besede:	 teorije	 zarote;	 politično	 zaupanje;	 informacije;	 ustanove;	
Slovenija.