Strateška dilema Kremlja in vpliv naftnih sankcij na vzdržnost ruskega financiranja vojne v Ukrajini

slovenian

2026

volume 36, issue 1

economic sanctions   energy security   guerra in Ucraina   mercato petrolifero   oil market   price cap   Rederazione Russa   Russian Federation   sanzioni economiche   sicurezza energetica   tetto ai prezzi   war in Ukraine

Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko
(Obvezni izvod spletne publikacije)

The aim of this article is to analyze the effectiveness of Western energy sanctions against the Russian Federation, with a specific focus on their impact on the fiscal sustainability of financing the war in Ukraine during the 2023–2025 period. The analysis addresses two research questions: 1) whether specific sanction mechanisms (the European Union embargo, the G7 price cap) have successfully reduced Russian budgetary revenues from crude oil exports, and 2) what strategic and fiscal adjustments the Russian Federation has been forced to implement as a result, and what these reveal about the long-term (un)sustainability of its war economy model and war financing. The methodological approach is based on the analysis of primary budgetary data from the Russian Ministry of Finance and secondary data from international energy institutions regarding the dynamics of oil export flows and the budgetary expenditures of the Russian Federation. The results indicate that the sanctions did not trigger a collapse in Russian export volumes, as the country effectively bypassed the restrictions within six months of their implementation by establishing a shadow fleet and redirecting sales flows to Asia. Nevertheless, the analysis demonstrates that the sanctions are functioning as an effective fiscal pressure: due to forced discounts and higher transaction costs, the Russian Federation’s net revenues from oil rents have declined at the exact time when Russian military expenditures are reaching record levels in 2025. The interpretation of the data reveals that the Kremlin is facing a strategic dilemma, to which it responds by maintaining military spending while simultaneously seeking new (tax) sources to finance the war and cutting other non-essential, non-military expenditures. Although this model allows for the continuation of the war at its current intensity (autumn 2025) in the short term, the Kremlin’s long-term room for maneuver is narrowing, driving the country toward structural economic decline

27.10.2026