Photograph of the soul : towards a critical neuroscience

english

2014

volume 51, issue 5

critical neuroscience   epistemology   modularism   Neurosciences   Philosophy of science   phrenology   social neuroscience

Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede
(Obvezni izvod spletne publikacije)

The remarkable development of neuroscience in the past three decades (the so-called "neuroscientific revolution") has had a tremendous impact on our understanding of ourselves and the world. The slow, but persistent spread of neuroscience into humanities, social sciences, and everyday life has prompted several authors to critically examine and reassess some of its far-reaching claims, along with its methods of collecting, organising and interpreting data. It has been increasingly pointed out that there is a profound difference between what neuroscience purports to explain and what it actually does and can explain, and that therefore a better understanding of conceptual, methodological, and metaphysical presuppositions of neuroscience is needed. The goal of this article is to provide a small contribution to this vast critical endeavour, focusing particularly on the prominent modular hypothesis, i.e. the idea that the mind consists of a plethora of different cognitive functions (modules) and that these are somehow instantiated or realised in discrete brain regions. After delineating some of the major shortcomings of the modular thesis, the article goes on to argue that it is essential for neuroscience to become better acquainted with its underlying assumptions, and that a platform for constructive and engaged dialogue with other areas of research is needed.

23.11.2015