RAZISKAVE IN RAZPRAVE/RESEARCH and DISCUSSION
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Daniel KLIMOVSKY - Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Košice, Slovakia
Susanne KOLB - University of Siegen
Krunoslav NIKODEM - Sveučilište v Zagrebu
Rajesh K. PILLANIA - Management Development Institute, India
Matej MAKAROVIČ - Fakulteta za uporabne družbene študije v Novi Gorici
Uroš PINTERIČ - Univerzitetno in raziskovalno središče Novo mesto
Janez ŠUŠTERŠIČ - Univerza na Primorskem
Beti HOHLER - EU Rule of Law Mission (Eulex) Kosovo
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Vsebina/Contents
The unending Niger delta crisis: an ecological perspective
Kelly Ejumudo 3
Political rituals and nation building: exploring the slovenian statehood day
Tea Golob 43
Redukcionizem v humanističnih znanostih in bivanjska prikrajšanost
Sebastjan Kristovič
65
The unending Niger delta crisis: an ecological perspective1
Abstract
This study attempted a contextual definition of ecology and an explanation of the ecological perspective of the Niger Delta crisis. The study also assessed the macro or external ecological build-up that culminated in the crisis that has seemingly defied the varying cosmetic solutions that have been attempted in the region. It further identified the dimensions or attributes of the ecological climate which has not only existed, but has also endured with a strong actualized potentiality to stifle and under-develop the Niger Delta region. The study that relied on valuable secondary sources of data concluded with some useful recommendations including a well crafted, integrated, systemic and holistic ecological approach that will entail the dismantling of the existing dimensional attributes that constitute the status quo ecological climate in which the Niger Delta region is embedded.
Key words: Niger Delta, Crisis, Climate, Ecological Perspective.
1 Kelly Ejumudo, PhD, Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Delta State, Nigeria, e-mail: drkellypaulovieejumudo@yahoo.com.
Introduction
The Niger Delta palaver which started, metamorphosed through various stages of its development, and got rooted and entrenched with the collaboration of the key actors namely: the state, multinational oil corporations and local petit bourgeoisie, has reached a crescendo such .that it can appropriately be labelled a crisis. This crisis which has its foundation or origin in the colonial dispensation has arguably been processed by the processors through the neo-colonial dispensation to the modern dispensation so much so that the same ecology or climate, yet with its notable and discernible dimensions or attributes yet exist. The dimensions which include the legal/constitutional, policy/institutional and operational does not only depict the ecological origin, process, growth and development of the Niger Delta crisis, but also portray the efficacy of the same ecological perspective as the only genuine and permanent panacea to the crisis that has become a colossal loss and an embarrassment at the national and global levels.
Ecology: A Conceptualization
Ecology or climate, whether in organizations, governmental administration or society at large connotes personality (Aldag and Brief, 2009:32). It is a set of characteristics which are relatively enduring over time, typifying an organization and distinguishing it from other organizations (Knowles, 2010:45; Forehand and Gilmer, 2010:362). Such a set of characteristics create a distinctive ecology or climate and it has the tendency or potency of influencing the attitude of its members including individuals, organizations and societies (Pritchard and Karasick, 2010:126146; Taguirui, 2010:26-27). Ecology or climate which is a commonly experienced but abstract phenomenon and often referred to by many
expressions such as atmosphere, environment, milieu and culture, is a relatively enduring quality of the internal environment that is felt by its members, influences their behaviour and can be described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics of the organization, society and the like (Taguirui, 2010: 26-27). It can) also be viewed as a global expression of what an organization or a society is (Schneider and Snyder 1995:3 18). Ecology or climate which can equally be conceptualized as the study of how an organization, or society or any social system relate or interface with its environment (Webb, 2007:436) consists of multiple or diverse dimensions (Campbell et al, 2007:17). Some ecologies or climates can be described as considerable, warm and supportive, while others are indifferent, cold, hostile, and competitive (Aldag and Brief, 2009:32). The supportive and warm climate is the type that encourages and protects the individual's sense of personal worth and importance (Likert, 2007:127), while an unsupportive and cold type is the defensive and manipulative one. The dimensions of ecologies or climates which are multiple include legal constitutional, institutional and operational. In every organization or society certain factors or elements exert profound influence on the existing ecology or climate that is created or constructed whether by design or accidental (Rao, 2010:489). James and Jones (2010:1098), for instance, identified five factors that influence climatic creation or construction viz: context, structure, process, environment and system values and norms. Climate, whether supportive or hostile, is critical to the legal/constitutional, institutional and operational dimensions and it can be changed, recreated or reconstructed (Gordon and Goldberg, 2009:3744 and McClelland and Burnham, 2009:100-110).
Ecological or Climatic Perspective: An Explanation
Ecology, which is a term utilized to describe the relation between any environment or climate and its environed system, has its origin in biology
and was first used to mean the interactions between living, nonhuman species and their environments (Riggs, 1980:107; Ezeani, 2009:51). Every society and its institutions are influenced by the ecology or climate or environment which consists of multiple dimensions viz: social, political, economic, cultural, bureaucracy and the like. The ecology or climate of public administration, for example, has long been of interest to development administration scholars like Riggs (1980:107) and Gaus (1974:75) among others. According to Riggs (1980:108) ecology of administration has to do with the ways in which the environment conditions the politic-administrative process. The environment, climate or ecology of anything, may be, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, sets parameters which must be viewed as constraints that limit what can be achieved and, concurrently, as resources or strengths that may be utilized by decision makers. These parameters or dimensions are very impinging in that they either constrain or enhance the policies, activities and operations that are germane for the smooth functioning of all social systems like institutions, organizations and societies (Hellriegal and Slocum, 2010). The concern in respect of the influence of the ecology or climate on administration has given rise to the ecological approach to the study of public administration. This approach which seeks to systematically relate public administration does not exist or operate in a vacuum, for it is deeply embedded or ingrained in the various dimensions or elements that make up its environment. The norms and values of society, for example, limit the activities of public officials and the methods which they can adopt to achieve their goals (MacRae and Pitt, 2010:16). While there may exist similarity in the formal structure of the public administration system of different countries, their informal and behavioural patterns possess considerable diversities, each being conditioned by its ecology or climate. This interaction between public administration and its environment was underscored by Heady (1979:64) and Richardson and Balwin (1996:24). In Heady's (1979:64) perspective,
bureaucracies and other political and administrative institutions can be better understood if the surrounding conditions, influences and forces that shape and modify them are identified and ranked to the extent possible in order of relative importance and if the reciprocal impact of these institutions on their environment is also explored. It is thus instructive to note that, it is imperative for administrators to take cognizance of the environment in their various decisions and how the environment may be altered or, inversely, how environmental transformations that are occurring by themselves may be modified (Riggs, 1980:108). The need for administrators to comprehend the nature of and take account of the changing environment which exerts influence of various types, both beneficial that are to be utilized and detrimental that should be counteracted (Croft, 2007:9) is also indubitable. A useful approach in the ecological analysis of different social systems is "structural functionalism". Riggs (cited in Arora, 1979:106) considered this framework of analysis appropriate to his ecological orientation in the study of administrative systems for in many ways structural functionalism involves a delineation of the general social context within which administration operates. Various scholars have used the structural-functional approach in social analysis (Persons, 1954:137, Merton, 1967:38-39). In structural functionalism, social structure is considered as "any pattern of behaviour which has become a standard feature of a social system" (Riggs, 1980:20; Swingewood, 2007:187-193). In structural, functional terms, a function involves "a pattern of interdependence between two or more structures, a relationship between variables and it refers to "any consequences of a structure in so far as they affect other structures or the total system of which they are a part (Merton, 1967:60-75). In the context of the above, three dimensions or attributes of the ecology or climate of the Niger Delta region namely: legal/constitutional, institutional and operational have been identified. This three-way dimensional ecology or climate in which the Niger Delta region is situated and operates was deliberately created
and constructed during the colonial era. This climate which has endured through the neo-colonial to the modern day has been reinforced and stimulated by the collaboration of notable actors including the Nigerian state, the multinational corporations and the local bourgeoisie.
Critical Overview of the Niger Delta Crisis
As a mono-cultural nation with sole reliance on oil, gas, and ancillary derivatives, a preponderance of these resources is found in the NigerDelta. Two of the three operating refineries in Nigeria today are located in this geopolitical zone. The oldest refinery is situated in Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, whereas the other is situated in Warri, Delta State, the leading producer of oil and gas in Nigeria. The third refinery is situated in Kaduna, Kaduna State, in the geographical north of Nigeria (Jike, 2004). The bulk of the expatriate personnel in multinational oil companies live and work in the Niger-Delta, where the ubiquity of the natural resources has stemmed up the tide of petroleum exploration activities. The NigerDelta area has often experienced one period of boom after another in alternation between several natural resources. There was the boom era associated with vigorous exploitation of agricultural cash crops such as palm oil, timber, rubber, and so on (Olatunbosun, 1975). However, the discovery of petroleum oil in Oloibiri in 1958 marked the watershed in general exploitation and mining operations in Nigeria.
Within ten years, which is on the eve of the Nigerian civil war, production had reached about 500,000 barrels a day, thus establishing Nigeria as a significant oil producer (Owoeye and Ojakorotu, 2002:179-180). The post -1956 era saw the emergence of several other multinational operators in Nigeria, including Mobil (now Mobil Exxon) in 1955, Tenneco in 1960, Gulf (which later became Chevron and Texaco (which are now merged and today known as Chevron-Texaco) in 1965 (Aturu, 1989:6; Ejumudo,
2005:124). With the full-blown oil exploration and production activities of the oil giants in the oil-bearing communities of Nigeria, several issues including environmental degradation, poverty, marginalization, resource control and outright underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region have surfaced and constituted unending sources of conflict including youth restiveness.
The most pervasive and predominant cause of environmental degradation in the Niger-Delta to date is petroleum exploration and ancillary problems of spillage. This assertion, however, does not preclude or diminish the importance of other environmental issues such as bush burning, petroleum fires, erosion of various configurations,
Indiscriminate (sometimes toxic) waste disposal and excessive balkanization of land within the context of African land tenure among heirs and tenable inheritors along specific genealogies. Most of the other causes of environmental degradation pale into insignificance when pitched against the backdrop of oil exploration and the unintended consequences of spillage that have largely become a cog in the wheel of development of the Niger-Delta.
In the face of the petro-dollar dominated rich-oil wealth, Nigeria embarked on a frivolous path of profligacy, scampering from one white elephant project to the other with little use-value to the populace. The initial hope was lost and despair became the order of the day. General feelings of despair, disillusionment, and a profound sense of alienation became pervasive among the Niger-Delta peoples. With the discovery of oil, all other economic activities including agricultural pursuit became peripheral and subservient to oil exploration activities (Jike, 2004). The regime of oil boom resultantly became a paradoxical curse, largely because of the socio-economic dislocation of the Niger Delta people due to the devastating effects of the large-scale oil exploration and production activities by the many major oil players in Nigeria's oil industry.
In Nigeria's Niger Delta, the hydra-headed level of air pollution that has become closely associated with oil exploration and production activities has continued unabated. Some technical studies on the environmental consequences of oil operations provide insights into industry-mediated scourges of pollution, disease, resource degradation and socio-economic dislocation. Specific studies on Nigeria include assessments of the petroleum industry and the environment (Hutchful, 1970; Anderson, 1996; Kaladumo, 1996 and Oluwole et al, 2004). These studies throw some light on the deteriorating environment conditions in the oil producing areas. It has become common knowledge, for instance, that acid deposition is 'widespread' in the Niger Delta, while, as regards air quality, the level of carcinogenic risk in the area is 'unacceptable'. The work of Hutchful (1970) was one of the first attempts to document the environmental pollution arising from oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta region. He noted that the industry's operations are usually associated with pollution and that the extensive coastline nature of the region that is dominated by mangrove swamps, large numbers of offshore rigs and oil port facilities has accentuated the magnitude and perils of pollution in the region.
A most politically salient incidence of air pollution associated with oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta is from oil spills from flow stations, pipelines and export terminals among others. While oil spillages occur at various stages of product handling, from exploration and production through refining to distribution and marketing, no less than 96 per cent of the spills are associated with the actual exploration and production stage and hence localized in the producing areas (Roberts, 1998c). Between 1976 and 2005, there were over 10,005 reported cases of oil spills with a spillage of about 7.0 million barrels of which only
500,000 barrels were recovered while the rest (4.5m barrels) were retained in the environment. About 230,000 barrels of oil is spilt in 300 separate incidences each year in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states (World Bank, 2008), while in January 1998, about 40,000 barrels of light crude leaked from a Mobil producing Unlimited Pipeline at Eket in Akwa Ibom State.
In a similar vein, day and night, across the Niger Delta, oil transnationals burn off gas from hundreds of oil wells in huge fires. This process of continuous (24-hours) burning of gas produced with oil (associated gas) is called 'flaring'. It is the combustion of natural gas in stacks which may be vertical, horizontal or angular. The disposal of associated gas has been a major challenge to the country, for Nigeria is estimated as being responsible for a quarter of global flares and vents. This situation has several implications and consequences. First, is that the level of gas flares constitutes a massive waste of a vital national resource and secondly, gas flaring cause significant air pollution and damage with identifiable environmental effects including atmospheric and health hazards (Onosode, 2005). The flaring of associated gas across the Niger Delta pumps between 30 and 35 million tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year. With an estimated 12 million tons/yearly of methane, a very damaging greenhouse gas is emitted in Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states alone. Studies on source emissions and ambient air concentrations of air pollutants reveal that the level of volatile organic carbons (VOCS) is very high, exceeding FEPA standards for most of them (Oluwole, et. al, 2004; Onosode, 2005).
Another area of grave concern in the Niger Delta is water pollution. In many of the developed countries of the world, almost complete eradication of the water-born diseases has been achieved, a situation that is the reverse in the developing countries, particularly Nigeria's Niger
Delta (Ejumudo, 2010). And since water is a significant vehicle in the transmission of diseases when it contains water borne pathogens or disease producing organisms. These pathogens, which can be viruses, bacteria or parasitic worms, cause such diseases as dysentery, typhoid fever, cholera, infectious hepatitis and urban filariasis that is transmitted through mosquitoes breeding in polluted water. Water pollution has not only reduced the utility of water for industrial purposes, it has greatly affected the productivity of irrigated land in the Niger Delta region. The widely publicized Eket spillage in 2000 that drew the attention of the World Council of Mayors left dire consequences in its wake (Ejumudo, 2011). There are also fears that if the present trend of oil spillage and indiscriminate disposal of industrial effluents are not checked, aquatic life might be permanently damaged and some species of fish might disappear. The water pollution problematic in the Niger Delta is compounded by the fact that all pollutants, atmospheric, and land-based invariably enter water bodies by direct discharge, precipitation and run-offs (Narayanan 2007:155). Water bodies, thus, become sinks as well as carriers of pollutants. Water pollution has wide ecological impact, as it is an important raw material in photosynthesis and hydrological process.
Apart from air and water pollution and their attendant spill-over effects, land degradation has become ubiquitous. In fact, the agrarian status of the Niger Delta region altered with the huge discovery of oil in Nigeria. The people that hitherto cultivated different crops such as yams, cassava, maize, and groundnut with enough fresh fish from ponds, lakes, streams and bush meat from hunting became pauperized with the loss of their major sources of occupation and economic mainstay (Ejumudo, 2011). Soil degradation that is one of the implications of the activities of the various oil companies led to shortage of food from the farms and human beings have been particularly hit in the process, since most of their economic activities tied to the environment are either disrupted or
destroyed. Olalekan (2002:33), for instance, noted that environmental degradation reduced crops production leading to greater financial stress which threatens economic survival.
Urete (2002:21) also stressed that the impact of crude oil activities in the Niger Delta region is evident considering the fact that the valuable land which ought to have been used for the development of agricultural activities are been occupied by oil wells, pipelines, flow stations, borrow pits and the like. The thousands of hectares of land occupied by Shell that has been polluted and made barren is a typical example. Olubunmi (2003:12), in his study on oil spillage in East Boma of Rivers State, equally stated that as a result of frequent oil spillage in the area, many land became unsuitable for agricultural purposes. This is due to land degradation. In many communities in the Niger Delta region, people no longer till the soil again and this makes them to be idle. Arguably, excessive exploration and seismic activities have negative reverberations for soil toxicity and the quality of crops and there is a general concern among environmentalists that the quality of crops in the Niger Delta is rapidly deteriorating. The quality, size, and shape of traditional staples such as cassava, yam, plantain, and so on are adversely affected by the continuing forage for oil without the requisite environmental impact assessment. Essentially too, oil exploration and exploitation has culminated in declining natural resources (Onosode, 2005:14). Responses by the local people who are negatively affected by the hydra-headed soil degradation and devastation unending dilemma either attempt to find alternative sources of livelihood in the same locality, migrate temporarily to supplement their family livelihoods with income from elsewhere, organize collectively to undertake production or investment activities that would not be feasible individually or resist those that degrade their soil through legal and illegal activities.
Associated implications of the operations of the oil conglomerates in the Niger Delta region are oil spillage, gas flaring and pipeline vandalization. While oil spillages occur at various stages of product handling, from exploration to production through refining to distribution and marketing, no less than 96 percent of the spills are associated with the exploration and production and therefore localized in the producing areas (Roberts, 2005). Over the years, oil companies have spilt much oil in the region. Between 1976 and 2006, there were 9,005 reported cases of oil spills with a spillage of about 10.1 million barrels of which only 2.4 barrels were recovered, while the rest were retained in the environment. About 6,500m barrels of oil were spilt in 700 separate incidences each year in Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom states (World Bank, 2008). In January 1998 alone, about 40,000 barrels of light crude leaked from a Mobil Producing Unlimited pipeline at Eket in Akwa Ibom state. The incidences of spills and their impact are varied across the ecological zones, with more spillages in land than swamp and off-shore operations. This impact of spills on the Niger Delta environment is more revealing in view of the fact that Nigerian crude is very toxic and chemical dispersants often used to clean up spills tend to aggravate the damage on the aquatic environment. In addition, dispersants merely make spills more soluble and relatively invisible to the eye, but they do not remove the toxicity (Ayonote, 2005). The long-term effects of oil spills can be very enduring largely because the devastation of plants and farmlands continue in so far as spilled oil block oxygen supply and destroy essential nutrients in the soil like magnesium and nitrogen.
Arguably, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria poses unprecedented peacetime security challenges that threaten the corporate existence of the country as a nation state. Violent crimes, including politically and financially-motivated contract killings, cult wars, hostage-taking, kidnapping, arson, pipeline and oil installation vandalization threaten the
daily existence of the citizens and corporate integrity of Nigeria, while the security agencies lie prostrate. Agitations by ethnic minority groups, borne out of perceived or real deprivation and marginalization in the sharing of both economic and political benefits, have continued unabated. In fact, the youth militia groups are increasingly challenging community leaders, who in the past were unquestionably followed. This has led to a loss of societal values and the loss of traditional structures of authority. In earlier times, youth were typically at the bottom of the hierarchy (Aghalino, 2011). Today however, traditional rulers and elders in the various communities have lost control over youths. They have worked out their own largely unsustainable ways of reaching and dealing with the oil companies, government at every levels, and national and international organization s (UNDP, 2007:306). According to Roberts (2003), a state with in-built economic deprivation or marginalization outcomes cannot but lead to political exclusion. Where this obtains, crisis, even disintegration, is only but a mutually - assured expectation. A crisis of governance pervades the political system, which is, therefore, unable to play its expected role as a problem-solving device. Rather, inherent and open conflicts have attended this crisis of governance. In the same vein, economic well-being and well-operated political environment, which is the only protection against social injustice and violent outbursts, has been greatly compromised.
The Macro Ecological Metamorphosis of the Niger Delta Crisis
The Nigerian oil industry has its roots in the colonial state, which, through the 1914 colonial Minerals Ordinance, granted the monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria to "British or British-allied capital" (IDEA, 2010: 144). The law served as the basis for the granting of an oil exploration license to Shell (Shell D'Arcy and later Shell BP) covering the entire mainland of Nigeria, an area of 367,000 square miles. Effective 1957, a
few years before Nigeria's independence, Shell surrendered some of its oil acreage to other oil multinationals and the state, leaving it with a total land area of 16,000 miles. At this point, there were no direct linkages between the oil industry and the rest of the Nigerian economy, other than the 50-50 profit sharing arrangement with the state under the rubric of the 1959 Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance (IDEA, 2010:145). In the postcolonial era, precisely in 1969, the Federal Government of Nigeria abrogated the 1914 ordinance and transferred the "control" and "ownership" of oil to the state. Under the Petroleum Act of 1969, the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any land in Nigeria was vested in the state (Omorogbe, 2009:20). The fact that the ownership aspect in the Nigerian oil industry was copied verbatim from the colonial constitution where it said everything under the soil, and on the soil belonged to the colonial government and it is yet so stated in the Nigerian constitution (Tell 2008:80) smacks off the ecology or climate that was being constructed with negative concomitant implications for the Niger Delta region.
This ecological or climatic build up with its multiple dimensions and manifestations accounted for the separate identity that the Niger Delta region canvassed throughout the conferences that preceded and culminated in the independence of the Nigerian State. It was, in fact, the fears, feelings and disposition of the Niger Delta region that precipitated the setting up of the Willinks Commission that succinctly stated the legitimate fears of the region concerning the aggression, subjugation and distinctiveness of their people and their quest to be on their own and have some measure of autonomy within the confines of the Nigerian project (Tell, 2008:80). Even though the Willinks Commission corroborated the fears, pains, marginalization and oppression of the region within the Nigerian project, if no protective or safety measures or devices are put in place, nothing significant was done to alter the trend or redress the
anomaly. Up till today, the modem Nigerian state, rather than dismantle the ecological foundation that was well designed, constructed and created during the colonial dispensation, it further intensified the heat of the ecological climate, introducing other dimensions that will be captured in the other aspects of this article. For example, in 1976, the Land Use Act which gradually seized control of oil revenues thereby denying the Niger Delta adequate control of revenues accruing from their land was promulgated. It is expedient to assert at this point, that the foundational ecological or climatic build-up in respect of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, is not only non-accidental and problematic, it is traceable to the circumstances of our history that conspired to produce an elite that has caused further integration of the Nigerian state into the global oil relations. The same historical circumstances created an economy that is dependent to the extent that its position and relations to other economies in the international system and the articulation of its internal structure makes it incapable of autocentric development (Ake, 2005:55).
The local petit-bourgeoisie, a creation of the colonial system not by choice, but by circumstance, led the battle against colonialism out of self-interest. No wonder, the oil policies in the post-colonial era up to the present modem era in Nigeria reflect the typical contradictions that is symptomatic of the repressive and manipulative tendencies that characterized the colonial regime. At independence, the foundational ecological climate created during the colonial era, simply metamorphosed, with its structure already firmly set. The post- colonial leadership comprising the self-styled elite was not interested in fabricating a new ecological climate by structurally dismantling the one it inherited. The colonial ecological climate therefore, as far as oil relations in Nigeria are concerned, had imposed a certain logic and rigidity that did not only appeal to the local petit-bourgeoisie, but has largely affected the course of future development. This logic encouraged the persistence and
reinforcement of the colonial foundational ecological climate with which the Niger Delta Region is linked, entwined and interfaced. Thus, colonialism, in all its ramifications, was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose main purpose was to repatriate the profits created by African labour to Europe with the development of Europe assured, while dialectically, this meant the underdevelopment of Africa (Offiong, 2000:110) including the Niger Delta area of Nigeria.
The Dimensions or Attributes of the Enduring Macro Ecological Climate in which the Niger Delta Region is Embedded
The Niger Delta region, like other groups in society, be it states, regions, local governments and significant others such as public and private sector organizations exist and operate in an external environment or climate. In varying degrees they must take into account the elements and forces of their external environment (Koontz et al, 2008:39). While they may be able to do little or nothing to change the forces, they have no alternative but to identify, evaluate and respond or react to these external forces that affect their operations (Koontz et al, 2008:39). The external environment or climate of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria has key actors including the state, multinational oil corporations and the local petit-bourgeoisie. It is a combination of these actors that generate the laws, institutions, policies, activities and operations that affect and shape the fortunes and destiny of the region. The three dimensions of the enduring macro ecological climate or environment identified for purpose of this study are: legal/constitutional, operational and institutional. The dimensions are analytical assessed here-under: Legal/Constitutional Dimension
Nigerian legislation on petroleum predated exploration activities or efforts in Nigeria. The first piece of legislation was the Petroleum
Ordinance of 1889 which was followed by the Mineral Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907, both of which provided the basic legal framework for the development of petroleum and its natural resources (Omorogbe, 2009:16). The 1907 law stipulated, inter alia, that only British subjects or companies controlled by British subjects would be eligible to explore for oil resources. Although the mineral survey company pioneered mineralogical studies as far back as 1903, oil exploration started in 1908 when a German company, the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation (NBC) drilled about "fourteen wells along the northern edge of the Niger Delta Basin and off the coast of Lagos" (Ejumudo 2005:122). Essentially, various laws directly regulate the Nigerian oil industry. They include the Mineral Act of 1914, rephrased as the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Oil Pipeline Act of 1956, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act of 1959 and the various associated Gas Reinjection Acts, the Oil Terminal Dues Act and the Oil Navigable Water Acts, the Lands (title vesting) Act of 1993 and the National Inland Waterways Authority Act of 1996. The central focus is on the Petroleum Act of 1967 and the Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations of 1969, both of which constitute the bedrock for the petroleum development in Nigeria (Omoregbe 2001:19). To a very significant degree, the nature of the colonial and post-colonial Nigerian state are largely structurally the same, for the broad spectrum of laws and accompanying actions of the Nigerian state on the country's oil industry have been no less an extension of the 1914 Mineral Act which vested all powers over resources (solid and liquid) on the state as Omoweh (2009:111-112) rightly articulated. For instance, the post-colonial state like its predecessor has the exclusive right to issue mineral prospecting and mining licenses and the sole power to collect royalties, rents and fees from the oil companies. Both the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1978 are complementary and designed to strengthen the instrument of oppression, suppression, marginalization, dispossession, deprivation and disempowerment of the Niger Delta people by the state in collaboration
with its allies, the multi-national oil corporations and the local petit bourgeoisie. The Land Use Decree, for example has been described by legal experts as one of the most ambiguous laws ever made (Shelter Watch, 1996:39) and that it is infested with many contradictions and confusion which must have made those concerned with its administration uncomfortable with its provisions. In fact, the controversy surrounding the statute stems partly from the inelegant draftsmanship which has made the interpretation and construction of its provisions subject of perennial debates and partly from its dramatic impact on land rights (CRP, 2009:1).
The origin of the law in Nigeria is traceable to a similar law enacted by the British in northern Nigeria, inspired by English tradition which vested all land on the English Crown (CRP, 2009:2). The law can therefore be described as one of colonial inspiration and feudal inclination. Arguably, no where else in Nigeria has the impact of the Land Use Decree manifested, in all its ramifications and inequities as in the Niger Delta Region, Nigeria's main oil-producing region. Section 28 of the Decree, for example, provides for the revocation of the rights of occupancy, while section 29 provides for compensation payable on revocation of right of occupancy. The Land Use Decree also sought accommodation for the oil companies who need land for virtually all its operations. In fact, the oil giants need land for exploration. production, transportation of crude oil by pipeline, construction of oil terminal stations, flare sites, airstrips, offices and staff quarters. This partly explains the logic behind the content of the Land Use Decree which also provided a buffer for the oil giants to be more reckless in their operations. This may also be a part explanation for why Shell, for instance, can afford to flare gas on a daily basis since 1956 when it discovered oil in the Niger Delta and yet be shielded by the state over litigations on land where oil is explored or produced (Omoweh, 2009:115). Essentially, the issue of land ownership is the most fundamental around which the politics of environmental pollution and
degradation and its concomitant socio-economic crises are centred in Nigeria.
Previous studies on the land question in Africa, especially those by Denman (1978:15); Omotola (1988:12); Ollenu (2005:2 1) and Moyo (2005:32) had demonstrated that land was no man's creation. Rather, it is a gift of God. They had also noted that land ownership 'as rooted on the basis of first occupier and its use over a long period which sometimes spanned twenty years or more without counter claim. Therefore, the structure of land ownership and tenurial system were mostly familial and communal in pre-colonial Nigeria, although in some cases traditional and village heads held land in trust for their people. With the imposition of European rule on Nigeria, the structure of land ownership was distorted and altered and European land laws which vested all land including the resources found therein especially minerals resources on the colonial state held sway. These laws, particularly the Mineral Act of 1914 defined the nature and content of land ownership in colonial Nigeria. The Postcolonial Nigeria state rephrased the Mineral Act of 1914 as the Petroleum Act of 1969 with some changes and strengthened by the Land Use Decree of 1978, the mining companies of both the colonial and post-colonial dispensations had access to land only through the state, for which they paid rents and royalties to the state for the lease period. Since their acreages were on lease, the mining companies are not accountable to the people, but to the state, whose pre-occupation was to further their economic interest by getting more rents from land and royalties for the exploitation of its resources (Omoweh, 2009:212-13). Land protection in the light of sustainability was, as a result, and is still not of any interest to the state that gradually rendered the Niger Delta people into paupers for through successive legislation including the Petroleum and Land Use and squatters in their own land. For through successive legislation, including the Petroleum and Land Use Acts, the Federal Government gradually
seized control of oil revenues thereby denying the Niger Delta people the adequate control of resources accruing from their land. Thus, the entire structure of the macro ecological climate in which the Niger Delta is embedded and which has seriously stifled its development or facilitated its underdevelopment is founded or predicated and premised on the legal and constitutional framework from which the other two dimensions of the climate identified in this paper emerged.
Operational Dimension
The Passive Concessionaire Era (1914 — 1969)
Since 1956, when the then Shell-BP struck oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta after an investment of over N30 million in 1950, crude oil exploration, production and transportation activities have been on in the region with the first export of Nigeria's crude oil in 1957 (Ejumudo, 2005:123). Within ten years, that is on the eve of the Nigerian civil war, production had reached about 500,000 barrels a day, thus establishing Nigeria as a significant oil producer (Owoeye and Ojakorotu 2002:179-180). Concessions were granted to Mobil (now Mobil Exxon) in 1955, Tenneco in 1960, Gulf (which later became Chevron and Texaco (which are now merged and today known as Chevron-Texaco) in 1961, Elf (formerly Safrap and Agip in 1962 and Phillips Petroleum in 1965, when the sole monopoly given to Shell-BP was revoked in 1959 (Ejumudo, 2005:124; Aturu, 1989:6). A few companies like Esso (which later became Exxon), Union Oil and Great Basin from America showed passing interest and then pulled out in the period between 1965 and 1970. At this point, the oil industry had no linkages with the rest of the Nigerian economy, save for the 50-50 profit sharing arrangement with the state under the rubric of the 1959 Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance (IDEA, 2010:144-145). During this concessionaire era, the oil industry was dominated by the oil multinationals and government's role was limited to collecting rents and
royalties from oil companies and making laws to regulate the activities of the oil sector, for there was no meaningful resolve to assume an active role in the industry (Soremekun, 1999:10 1).
State Participation and Restricted Activism Era
Although the ownership structure of the oil industry was not changed during the concessionaire era, in 1969, the Federal Government of Nigeria, abrogated the 1914 Ordinance and transferred the "control" and "ownership" of oil to the state, after a number of enabling laws including the Companies Act of 1967 which compelled all the oil companies to incorporate Nigerian entities in which the concessions were vested and the Petroleum Profit Tax (Amendment) Act of 1967 came into force (Ejumudo, 2005:125; IDEA, 2010:145). The state also imposed OPEC terms on all oil companies operating in the Nigerian oil industry and formally joined OPEC in 1971. In April 1971, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation was set up by the Federal Government via Decree and acquired majority participating interest in the industry by entering into joint venture agreements with oil multinationals operating in Nigeria. It took up to 60 percent equity ownership of all the operating companies except Shell where it acquired 80 percent with the nationalization of BP in 1979 over the Zimbabwe crisis. The state eventually reduced its interest in BP to about 55 percent, surrendering the remainder to Elf (10 percent), Agip (5 percent) and Shell (30 percent). These joint ventures have continued to account for the bulk of Nigeria's oil production and export. In the downstream sector, the state acquired controlling interests in Shell Marketing (National Oil) and Chemical Company renamed Unipetrol. The other important oil marketing companies like Total, Mobil Marketing, Agip Marketing, Texaco and Elf were owned 60 percent privately by Nigerians and 40 percent by the foreign companies (Ejumudo, 2005:130). All the same, the state was not able to displace the foreign giants of the domestic market viz: Mobil, Total Agip and Texaco. The arm of state capitalism in
the Nigerian oil industry was eventually established in 1977 and it took over the functions of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation as well as those of the then Ministry of Petroleum Resources (Asiodu, 1994:166; Ejumudo, 2005:134). The Corporation was responsible for the regulatory and control functions and for determining oil policies in Nigeria in relation with other foreign governments. However, it could not withstand the sophistication, monopoly of oil technology and knowledge of global oil markets of the oil giants. This disadvantage position was further compounded by the hydra- headed and cut-throat competition for access to oil wealth, which weakened the NNPC and made it vulnerable as a result of excessive political intervention, corruption and high turnover of qualified manpower. In fact, NNPC lacks the will to regulate, participate or compete in the oil industry and the 1990s were years of unprecedented state dependence on oil multinationals to increase oil exploitation and provide more revenue for resolving the national crisis (IDEA, 2010:145). Therefore, the Nigerian state became deeply dependent on a mono-product that it did not control and the accompanying vulnerability to the oil giants, especially Shell Petroleum Development Company and the volatile global oil market, produced salutary effects on the Nigerian political economy.
The Dysfunctionality of the Operations and the Impact of the Alliance on the Niger Delta
That the alliance of the Nigerian state with the oil giants and the domestic bourgeoisie has played a dominant role in the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta is indubitable. The choice of the word "underdevelopment" is predicated on the understanding that the region has prospects for development, but not potentialities for same due to the laws, policies, actions and operations of the trio (three actors) in the alliance that has produced stagnation and retrogression in the region (Jhinghan, 2010:22). A clear picture of the nature of their operations and its impact on the
Niger Delta region is the real motive behind their alliance, the role that colonial capitalism played in shaping the nature of the post-colonial oil economy and the collaboration that re-integrated the neo-colonial economy into the global capitalist system. The role of the oil giants (transnational corporations) as agents of underdevelopment in the developing world has for long been acknowledged and highlighted (Omoweh, 2009:23-24; Rodney, 1986:244). Thus, the alliance did not only enhance the financial interests of the partners from the crude oil produced in the area, it equally enhanced surplus capitalist accumulation in the global oil and gas industry, leaving the region as the wretched of the earth. This primitive accumulation of capitalism draws sustenance from colonies and semi-colonies and its expanding reproduction seeks markets throughout the globe (Sau, 1978:36). Therefore, a clear understanding of the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region by the alliance partners demands an in-depth consideration of the nature and problems of monopoly capitalism in the global oil and gas industry of which Nigeria's upstream petroleum sector is an integral part. The legal/constitutional foundation did not only create the environment which is up till today plaguing the Niger Delta region. It also set the stage for the operational menace in which the region has been engulfed.
A deeper insight into the nature of the collaboration by the three partners in the unholy alliance can largely be provided, taking cognizance of the fact that the Nigerian state (pre-and-post-colonial) formulates the policies that creates and determines the political and business environment that are element for the capitalist development of the oil industry and the exploitation and under-developrnent of the Niger Delta region. For instance, due to the peculiar nature of crude oil production and transportation, the oil pipeline Act enacted in 1958 by the colonial state enabled the oil companies to obtain legal permit to lay oil pipelines linking up their various oil wells and fields across the Niger Delta, which are
connected to their terminals from where crude oil is eventually exported. The effects of the exploration, exploitation, production and transportation activities of the oil companies including gas flaring have been devastating to the rich-oil region called the "Niger Delta". This is because these activities destroy the soil, waters, vegetation and crops of the people. The environment is not only polluted and degraded, the costs in terms of the destruction of the economic base of the rural people who have been denied their sources of livelihood defies any accurate statistical calculation and quantification. The level of environmental degradation in the region is manifest in the inability of the environmental resources, like the atmosphere, river, soil and vegetation to renew themselves naturally which, invariably, incapacitates the people of the Niger Delta from regenerating themselves socio-economically.
The mass of the people of the region are therefore pauperized through rural poverty that is foisted on them. The people can thus be described as poor, malnourished, miserable, wretched, landless, neglected and virtually vulnerable and lacking in basic social amenities. The nature of rural poverty in the Niger Delta can be linked to the operations of the oil giants, supported by the state (both colonial and post-colonial) and its unproductive local bourgeoisie in the spirit of their unholy alliance. This is expected because the colonial state was created to facilitate the capitalist exploitation of the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general. At the heart of the rural poverty in the Niger Delta is land; for land which is regarded by the people of the region as the root of their ancestral origin, is the most badly hit by environmental degradation. And since land provides the basis for the main economic activities in the region, the politics of land provides an insight into the nature and complexity of the rural poverty afflicting the Niger Delta region. For example, the Mineral Act of 1914 as amended in 1967 and the Land Use Decree of 1978 vested the ownership of land in the state. By implication, the oil giants apply the
mining acreage and pay rents and associated fees to the state, which is the only entity that is legally empowered to protest. The people of the Niger Delta region are therefore rendered landless and squatters in their ancestral land by reason of the provision of the state laws on land. Regrettably too, the alliance of the state, the oil giants and the petit bourgeoisie makes the oil companies, particularly Shell Petroleum Development Company arrogant, reckless and insensitive to the plight and feelings of the devastated Niger Delta region and its impoverished people. In the mentality of Shell and the other oil giants, the region is a minefield that cannot be polluted, such that gas flaring, oil spillage and dumping of untreated wastes on land/swamps and sea are considered as normal hazards that accompany oil exploration, exploitation, production, transportation and storage. The operational dimension engendered and instigated largely by the foundational legal/constitutional dimension of the Niger Delta crisis has generated a lot of tension characterized by protests, militancy, youth restiveness, .piracy, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, illegal bunkering, violence and the like. State violence in the form of aggression against targeted groups has been the distinguishing mark of the responses and intervention tactics in conflict issues in the region, especially during the military dispensation (IDEA, 2010:146).
Institutional Dimension
The challenges of development; that is to say the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is as old as the colonial dispensation. These challenges range from the absence of basic social amenities and infrastructure to shortage of skilled manpower and socio-economic dislocations caused principally by blocked access to wealth. This anomalous state of affairs was admitted by the Willinks Commission of 1958 in its recommendations to the then Colonial Government, shortly before Nigeria attained independence in 1960. The only remedy that the
Commission proffered to assuage the agitated people of the Niger Delta region was the creation of The Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in 1959 to cater for the developmental needs and aspirations of the region. However, the impact of the NDBDA, which was supposedly an interventionist agency, was so infinitesimal and inconsequential that it can at best be described as an abysmal failure. Acting under the guise that it does not want to be reckoned with as insensitive to the yearnings and aspirations of the people of the rich-oil region, the Nigerian state began its own community- based projects. Similar to those embarked upon by the oil giants, they did not address the environmental degradation and they did not seek to reverse the rural poverty which became the characteristic feature of the Niger Delta. The Presidential Task Force (PTF) which the Babangida led military administration established in 1988 failed woefully to handle the complex ecological crisis and the deep-seated rural poverty in the oil areas. In 1992, the Babangida regime created the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) to replace the Presidential Task Force. Although the Commission was originally construed as a developmental strategy to cater for the needs of the oil-bearing communities, it became overtly clear that it was political machinery designed to serve the purpose of the self-seeking military junta through the erection of a clientele of political supporters in the Niger Delta.
The OMPADEC essentially deepened the misery of the people of the region given the political motive behind its creation and operations as mostly evident in the kind of projects that it embarked upon in the oil region and the manner it awarded the contracts (Omoweh, 2009:246). The Commission was somewhat glaringly designed to fail, for it was neither interested in addressing the environmental concerns of the oil-bearing communities, nor was it concerned about reversing the circle of poverty and neglect to which the people has been subjected. Acting on
behalf of the state, the Commission exhibited overt hostility against the youths who were adjudged to be fanning the flame of agitation under the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM) and the Isoko Youth Movement (IYM). Worse still, it aided the arrest of these youth organizations and others who were perceived as opponents to the fraudulent transition agenda of the self-styled military president, Ibrahim Babangida. Notably, the increased anger in the oil-bearing communities with the crude and exploitative activities of the oil giants such as Shell, and the growing perceptions of federal government's tacit endorsement of these, resulted in restiveness and the formation of activist youth organizations and militia groups in the Niger Delta.
Between 1990 and 1999, at least, 24 of such groups were formed, which have intensified struggles, often with violent outcomes, against the oil companies and federal state agents and agencies, such as the police and the armed forces. Many of these groups have, within one decade, made declarations, that underscore self-assertion and autonomy in the control of resources and management of the affairs of the communities in the Niger Delta (Jega, 2007: 222).These include the Ogoni Bill of Rights; the Kaiama Declaration; the Aklaka Declaration of the Egbi people; the Oron Bill of Rights; the Warri Accord and the resolution of the first Urhobo Summit. The OMPADEC equally established a clientele base into which traditional rulers and significant others including notable petro-dollar contractors were incorporated. These allies of the Babangida administration were awarded contracts valued at N60 billion and the contracts were taken as gratis, a plausible explanation for the failed unexecuted contracts. The Board of the Commission headed by A.K. Horsefall was eventually sacked in 1995 and Eric Opia was appointed as its Sole Administrator and he was later replaced with Dan Omatsola (Omoweh, 2009:17) OMPADEC was to any critical and discerning mind, a
fraudulent venture, a financial jamboree or spree and a state institutional framework to further the exploitation of the already pauperized and devastated Niger Delta people, for the commission was not responsive to the developmental needs of the victims of the activities of petro-dollar business in Nigeria. In fact, for many years, disbursed funds were by far short of what was budgeted, as Table I below indicates:
Financial Resources to OMPADEC, 1992-1995
Year	Budgeted N Millions	Actual release N Millions	Difference N Millions
1992	6,041.54	1,614.09	4,427.45 (%)
1993	6,413.36	2,618.85	3,794.39 (%)
1994	2,628.84	3,992.47	+ 1,363.63 (%)
1995	7,826.48	3,077.14	3,509.34 (%)
Source: Tempo Magazine, December 1998: CBN reports between 19921995.
The major policy instrument by which the Obasanjo administration pretended to use to intervene in the Niger Delta crisis is the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This Commission was expected to be an improvement on the woeful performance of the defunct NDBDA, PTF, OMPADEC and the ill-fated Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) that was established by the Abacha administration supposedly to improve infrastructure in the entire country, but which neglected the Niger Delta region. The NDDC was not significantly different from the previous deliberately designed failed efforts of the ill-fated state so-called interventionist development agencies because the thinking of the state and its allies in the exploitation and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta has not altered. Although the Commission appears to have scattered some projects across the Niger Delta states, nothing significant can be said to have been achieved in the light of the so-called development-based
30
purpose for which the NDDC was set up in the first instance. At least, while the name of the intervention agency has changed like the "Green Revolution" programme of the Shagari administration which replaced the Obasanjo "Operation Feed the Nation" programme; the state apparatus and the internal dynamics or workings has not changed. That the Commission is another aloof government agency like its predecessors and a superficially refurbished cocoon for official corruption by the state and its cronies is evident, considering the fact that eight years after its existence, the oil-rich region which is the treasure base of the nation fares relatively poor in every indicator of well-being. It is also evidently pellucid that the region is still locked up and mired in poverty, unabated youth unemployment, lack of infrastructural development, dysfunctional education system and environmental degradation and devastation which appears pervasive and unending. The insidiously high unemployment rate in the Niger Delta has, for instance contributed largely to the security threat by the youths whose survival instincts compel them to engage in various forms of anti-social behaviour including pipeline vandalization, thuggery, kidnapping and other destructive acts. While it is true that the parlous state of infrastructure in the region is partly self-inflicted because of the corruption of the elite in the Niger Delta, an x-ray of the Niger Delta crisis provides an integrated picture which shows that the region's state governments that have squandered their Federation Accounts and Internally generated revenues are part and parcel of the same state that is in alliance or collaboration with the oil giants and the petrodollar elite.
The Yar Adua/Jonathan administration with its sincerity and commitment posturing promised a holistic approach to the Niger Delta crisis and intended to actualize a Niger Delta Development Plan, yet it clearly stated that the Federal Government's contributory share to the NDDC's funds in the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty-Four Billion Naira (N224b) which was not paid by the Obasanjo's administration had expired (Vanguard,
2008:14). The level of indebtedness currently stands at over Three Hundred and Sixty Billion Naira (N360b). The administration also created the ministry of Niger Delta affairs and put in place an amnesty programme. While the former was supposedly meant to facilitate the development of the region, the later was probably designed to stop the menace of militancy and the accompanying dastardly acts of the armed Niger Delta youths whose reactions and responses had steadily and stoutly been against the unending regime of neglect, oppression, marginalization and pauperization by the Nigerian state in collaboration with the oil conglomerates and the local bourgeoisie. The Niger Delta ministry initiative has turned out to be a mockery because it has not achieved anything as far as the development of the region is concerned and the amnesty programme has only succeeded in selectively getting some of the militant youths to accept pardon and participate in training programmes that will enable them to acquire skills that will enhance their living standards. All the same, neither the over one year three months administration of President Goodluck Jonathan or the Niger Delta ministry has been able initiate and execute infrastructural development projects to tangibly address the hydra-headed nature of under-development that the oil-rich region had been enmeshed in and rehabilitate the teeming youths that are desperately in need of safety nets.
On the whole, the legal/constitutional, operational and institutional dimensions of the Niger Delta crisis is such that one can safely summarize that there has been a superficial tinkering with the burning issues that concern the collective destiny of the Niger Delta people and the region that is both the treasure base of the Nigerian state and a hot-bed of crisis and a contested terrain of power play. The bottom line of this deliberate approach that reveals the insincerity, negligence and lack of commitment on the part of the state and its elite, is the demonstration of the hollowness of the mission and the deceit of the vision behind the cosmetic
and dubious so-called development-based state intervention agencies. Panacea to the Unending Niger Delta Crisis
Several positions have been canvassed as possible solutions to the intractable Niger Delta crisis. Such positions include the provision of basic social amenities as a way of redressing the neglect of the oil bearing communities and their pauperized people, a tripartite developmental strategy that will involve counterpart funding by the Federal Government, oil bearing State Governments and the Oil Giants; Community-participation Development Model, Niger Delta Development Master Plan, Development-oriented intervention Agencies, and a holistic approach to the Niger Delta crisis, Resource Control and true Federalism (IDEA, 2010:150-156; Omoweh, 2009:280; Magbagbeola, 2010:32). These positions are various responses to the recognized fact that in spite of the huge natural resource base of the Niger Delta regions, its sustainable development dream remains a mirage and its future is being threatened by environmental degradation and deteriorating economic conditions (Magbagbeola, 2010:32).
In as much as the above suggested approaches are somewhat varying developmental initiatives, only the last one: resource control and true federalism is tangibly structural and therefore appears in tandem with the ecological solution that is the thrust of this article, except the contextualization dimension. All the same, the resource control and the federalism debate have its variants. For instance, does the Niger Delta region desire to control her resources so as to further empower the states in the region which is part of the state (Nigeria) apparatus that has sacrificed the development of the Niger Delta on the altar of reckless corruption and personal aggrandizement and both aided and facilitated the underdevelopment of the region. All the other approaches have not
only been superficial, hypocritical and advertently un-genuine, they are also monumentally fraudulent and diversionary. At least, the state, the multinational oil giants and the petit bourgeois collaborators could not have done anything significantly different to reverse the increasing incapacity of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta people, especially as they have not conceptualized the development of the region in the context of the logic, values and history of the Niger Delta (Omoweh, 2009:261). For example, the ambitious-like NDDC and the Master Plan initiative of the Obasanjo Administration which is theoretically the most comprehensive of all the pseudo-developmental efforts in Nigeria and was designed to involve the various oil-bearing communities in the region in the conceptualization, design and implementation of projects to be sited in their localities turned out to be a governmental gimmick and a ruse. Also, the Community Participation Development Model is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, especially as the elders and youths are not only working at cross purposes, they are equally disgruntled to the extent that they place more emphasis on their personal interests than the larger community interests. At the heart of the solution of the Niger Delta crisis, therefore, is the ecological perspective or approach that will require the dismantling of the various dimensions that characterize and typify the existing (status quo) macro ecological climate that surround and has determined and shaped the direction, underdevelopment and destiny of the region from the colonial genesis, particularly the oil era. This approach will require an abrogation, revision and amendment as the case may be, of the obnoxious and repressive colonial and post-colonial that had set the centre stage for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta.
The legal/constitutional reconstruction imperative will culminate in the recreation of the appropriate genial climate that will favour and enhance the development of the region, ceteris paribus. It is in the context of this new climate, reinforced by the right commitment to and predisposition by
the Nigerian State, the Oil Multinational Companies and the other relevant stakeholders including the oil-bearing state governments and communities, that the holistic development of the Niger Delta will be facilitated, sustained and guaranteed. Encapsulated in this macro ecological perspective, are oil resource control and management, community participation in development initiatives and efforts, capacity building and human capital development as well as other sundry issues affecting the Niger Delta region and its people. The politics of resource control, for instance, has its genesis in the manner by which revenues from petroleum-related economic activities have become the mainstays of the Nigerian political economy (Jega, 2007:221). The current sharing formula which gives the federal government more than 50% of the federation account and the remainder to the states and the local government is not only unjust and inequitable; it has also generated a lot of tension among the Niger Delta people. The alteration of the legal/constitutional, operational and institutional dimensions of the macro ecological climate of the Niger Delta is a necessary condition for resolution of the crisis. This will mean restructuring the Nigerian society, economy and polity in the direction of letting the Niger Delta people control and manage their resources. This quest for restructuring and resource control and management is borne out of a deep-seated feeling of marginalization of the Niger Delta people in spite of the huge petroleum wealth that Nigeria has generated from the region (IDEA, 2010:150). To this end, all the laws that militate against the rights of the region to significantly control its resources should appropriately be abrogated or amended. Thus the various ethnic nationalities in Nigeria including the Niger Delta should be allowed autonomy and a fairly significant access to their resources and political power in the spirit of true federalism.
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations
The Niger Delta crisis is undoubtedly a burning national issue that has somewhat attracted global attention. This rich-oil region from which so much oil has been extracted is largely underdeveloped, pauperized and threatened by defoliation, poverty, environmental devastation and ecological extinction. The magnitude of oil spillage and environmental deterioration issues concerning the region have also been acknowledged by sundry organizations and international development agencies (Environmental Rights Agenda, 1998: 17; CLO, 1996:15; Human Rights Watch, 1999:70). To free the Niger Delta from the shackles of underdevelopment that was deliberately designed, constructed and imposed by the Nigerian state and its allies and to facilitate the process of true development, the critical issues that are located in the macro ecological climate of the Niger Delta must be genuinely addressed in a holistic fashion. This macro ecological approach is however, a necessary. but not a sufficient condition for the developmental process by which the region and its people can reproduce themselves socially, economically and politically in consonance with their values, choices, experience and originality. This position derives from the fact that variables in the micro (internal) ecological environment of the Niger Delta are also useful and germane in the calculus of development for the region. A combination of both the macro (external) and the micro (internal) ecological climate of the region constitute a sufficient condition for the complete resolution of the Niger Delta crisis. While the macro environment is the primary, the micro environment is the secondary, both being complementary. The focus of further research efforts should be in the area of good governance as sustainable approach to the lingering Niger Delta crisis and dilemma. This expected good governance thrust, which will be developmental in mentality, orientation and practice, is expected to address the many-sided problems of Nigeria's oil-rich region in a sustainable fashion, as against
the present superficial piece-meal tinkering with the collective destiny of a pauperized, marginalized, oppressed and agitated people as well as under-developed and disadvantaged region.
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Political rituals and nation building: exploring the Slovenian statehood day
Tea Golob2
Abstract
The article addresses the Statehood day, one of the most important political rituals in Slovenia that occurs on every 25 June in order to commemorate the country's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. The article reveals the role of the national holiday in consolidating and legitimising the new political reality, and represents particular symbolic actions that have established new mythical horizons. Further, by drawing on insight from the ethnographic observation and interviews with individuals from different social background, the focus is also on attitudes of Slovenians towards the ritual ceremony. After the first celebration and with few exceptions (accession to the EU and NATO), the attendance on the event was low. Slovenians are rather indifferent to the ritual event and to the national holiday as such. The opinions and narratives on the Statehood event thus illustrate some significant elements of Slovenian transition period and also of the contemporary era.
Key words: Statehood day, political rituals, political symbols, nation building
Povzetek
2 Tea Golob is a doctoral candidate and research fellow at the School of Advanced Social Studies in Nova Gorica.
Članek obravnava Dan državnosti, ki je eden izmed najpomembnejših državnih praznikov Republike Slovenije. Politični ritual obeležuje spomin na odcepitev države od jugoslovanske politične tvorbe, ki se je zgodila 25. junija 1991. Besedilo razkriva vlogo rituala v kreiranju spominov, ki odsevajo določeno politično, zgodovinsko in kulturno ozadje in prikazujejo določena simbolna dejanja, ki so utrdila nova mitična obzorja. Poleg tega besedilo na podlagi etnografske metode opazovanja ter pogovorov z različnimi sogovorniki obravnava odnos Slovencev do ritualnega dogajanja. Po prvem praznovanju ter z določenimi izjemami (priključitev EU in Natu) je mogoče opaziti, da je bila udeležba na praznovanju zelo nizka. Slovenci so precej indiferentni do nacionalnega praznika. Mnenja in narativi, ki se vežejo na ta praznik, pa ilustrirajo pomembne elemente slovenske tranzicije in tudi sodobnega časa.
Ključne besede: Dan državnosti, politični rituali, politični simboli, politični miti
Introduction
The article addresses the Statehood day, one of the most important political rituals in Slovenia that occurs on every 25 June in order to commemorate the country's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. The ritual represents the emergence of the new political formation, which led to a break with the social, economic, political and cultural concepts of the former system. The Statehood day has aimed to establish and reaffirm particular social and political memories, myths and symbols presenting a construction material for Slovenian nation-building. It is a state-holiday, which takes a form of public festivities or public commemoration that in a way even exceeds the
significance of the political ritual as such (Mach 1992). Public commemorations are an important phenomenon, since they embrace a dense concentration of symbols and their associations. Their representations are inextricably interwoven with hidden cultural codes, which are seemingly invisible as they are sunk into the everyday social order. Exploration of such public events can reveal particular cultural codes which condition our everyday actions and perceptions. Those events create social spaces, where certain form of communication occurs, which orients participants to a form of social order in a relatively clear and coherent way. Public commemorations are means of legitimising the existing social order and authority and thereby contributing to social control and regulation (Handelman 1990).
The main intention of the paper is not in representing the structure and public performance of the ritual as such but to consider its role in creating social memories that reflect certain political, historical and cultural background, which became official Slovenian memories after disintegration from Yugoslavia. The political rituals are a crucial element in nation-building, which uses the national symbols, such as flags and anthems, and national myths in order to unify people within the state. Exploration of rituals should always be put into the framework of social context, which influences its emergence, contents and meaning. In 1991, the Slovenia became exposed to new political and economic circumstances, which took place all over the Eastern Europe. The collapse of communist totalitarianism caused the formation of new states, which were established on a basis of new identification codes. As Giordano says, the decline of socialist philosophy gave place to new ethnical discourses, which created new values and norms associated with nationality and citizenship. They were based on a concept of historical reversibility, which puts forward the idea of returning back to social order, which has not been yet violated by the communist experience (1998: 112). In Slovenia, just as in other countries of East and Southeast Europe where communist regime
lasted for several decades, the establishment of the new post-socialist government draw the legitimacy on symbols and myths leanings on the national memory and ideology of nationalism. The idea of Slovenian nation re-emerged not as the remnants of the nineteen century, but as the only possible response to totalitarianism. At national and local level was performed as a reaction to rebellion against the totalitarian system, which suppressed individuality and locality (Rihtman Augustin 2000). As Simonic (2009: 52-53) argues, new ethno-nationalism combined local specifics and political and cultural nationalism. The role of nationalism in the period of transition should be understood also in the broader context of global changes characterised by the expansion of neoliberalism and globalisation. Ethno-nationalisms in Eastern Europe thus emerged in efforts to ensure the internal cohesion in time of propagation of private initiative and market self-regulation. Accordingly, the time of transition and liberation from the previous regime was characterised by the variety of post-socialist mythic structures.
Statehood day should have played an important role in that regard, as it aimed to contribute to consolidation and legitimisation of the new political reality. By using symbolic actions it attempted to established new mythical horizons. But, the question appears, if the holiday has really accomplished its purpose? The paper focuses on its actual role in establishing national feelings and replacing mythical horizons of Slovenian past. Drawing the insight from the on opinions and narratives on the Statehood event, which were conducted by using the ethnographic method of participant observation and qualitative interviews, we attempt to show, that ritual has not generated firm national feelings in terms of Durkheimian collective consciousness. The paper also attempts to reveal certain factors influencing the so called failure of the ritual in Slovenian nation building.
National narratives and myths of origin emerge at major social changes
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and political transformations. Every society creates its own mythology, which defines its origins and establishes its own norms and rules. Each society is defined through a network of constructed symbolic meanings, which may include or exclude a historical basis. In order to understand particular political society and political rituals, one needs to consider such symbols and symbolic actions, which are fundamental components of the myths (cf. Kertzer 1988).
As Kos (1996: 8) argues, the emergence of the nation state cannot avoid mythologizing, while the situation in post-communist societies is somehow special. The societies in transition were facing a high degree of complexity, pluralisation and differentiation as a result of accelerated modernisation, which opened some new questions and re-actualised old ones. Contemporary national mythologies were built from various, mutually consistent and coherent, upgrading or concurrent old myths and new ideologies. Post-socialist countries in Eastern and central Europe, including Slovenia, were characterised by feverish search and articulation of new identities, and simultaneously by a restoration of old ones within the transformed image of the world (Velikonja 1996). Statehood day as a political ritual should have enabled the existence of new identities and transferred national mythologies confirming ideas of Slovenian nation. At the establishment of new political systems, old myths become inappropriate. A new political government is in a need of replacing them. In order to constellate a new political mythology, political actions lean on the so called "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawn 1993), which embraces a set of practices and actions framed by tactically adopted rules. By regular repetition of those rules, they become engraved in certain human values and norms that condition generally accepted social behaviour. Instead of using the term of mythology, some scholar prefer the notion of legacy, which is also based on distortion of historical facts and creation of myths in efforts to establish collective and personal identities (Lowenthal 1998; Simonic 2009). Rituals play an important role in that regard as their
yearly repetition automatically includes the continuation of the past (Hobsbawn 1993: 4). In Yugoslavia, the idea of brotherhood and unity among the six republics was in the forefront, which neglected the ideas of ethnicity and nationality. But the Slovenian state forged its foundations on exact those ideas. Slovenian identity is a product of hegemonic discourses of specific social-historical space (cf. Foucault 1997, Pusnik 2003), which differ from the Yugoslav discourses. Nation is thus a product of different traditions, symbols, and myths, which were in a case of Slovenia created during the transition period after the break with socialist and communist ideologies.
The emergence of modern states and nations is therefore founded on constructions that are based on invention of tradition. As all holidays, also national holidays, are a subject to a change, which is in hands of political elites, which are 'making' a tradition, which suits them the most (Vovelle 2004, Habinc 2006). Only valid mythical explanation provides individuals with a basis for personal identification and places them into a collectivity (Velikonja 1996). Due to the fact that people can change the content of rituals, they are a powerful tool of political action. Political rituals are manipulative tools enabling to manifest the political ideology through public events. Participation on particular political rituals influences the people's perception of appropriate political institution and leaders. Rituals act as symbolic representations that contribute to our imaginings of political reality (cf. Kertzer 1988). The subjective experience meets the social force through the ritual, which shapes those experiences. Being an important part of symbolic activities, the ritual structures our experiences, perceptions and channels of our interpretations. The formation of Slovenia was accompanied by a series of new political symbols and myths, without which no country can establish a legitimate and convincing foundation of its history, mythology and ideology. Exploring the content of such a ritual as it is Statehood day reveals the complex symbolic structures that enable the existence of the state
formation.
The political ritual and Slovenian nation building
The framework for national narratives and myths
First elements of Slovenian statehood can be found in the Slovenian national revival, which began to take roots in the second half of the eighteen century. As Granda (2001) says, the idea of Slovenian national individuality emerged in that time, which embraced all Slovenians regardless of their belonging to administrative role or countries in Habsburg Empire. Their common linkage was based primarily on a language, and the then political efforts mainly depended on the formation of cultural and political institution within the tabor movement and regular meetings in reading-rooms.
After the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the national political emancipation led to the establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which lasted only for a month. It was reshaped in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In constitutional and legal terms, the first Yugoslav political formation relied on national unitarism that denied national and cultural individuality of South Slavic nations. Slovenian aspirations for autonomic-federal formation thus did not come to the realisation (Perovsek, Stiplovsek 2001).
After the World War II, the Slovenians gained the status of the Federal Republic in the Yugoslav Federation. They were able to form own parliament, constitution and other autonomies, but within the repressive totalitarian regime. The political efforts of Slovenians were therefore oriented toward a greater decentralization and autonomy. After a death of Yugoslav president Josip Broz - Tito in 1980, the severe economic and political crisis came to the forth, and interethnic relations tightened. The
conflict between advocates of centralised state and supporters of federative model emerged, which took place in the context of the bipolar division of the world and declining of Soviet Union. Slovenian peculiarity of the situation was that due to the self-governing form of socialism, the political space was more open to the circulation of ideas. There were relatively strong civil actions and the important role was played by the Slovenian media. According to the then situation, three concepts appeared: a demand for immediate secession, the requirement for an asymmetric federation and the requirement of original sovereignty, which would lead to the formation of the new federation based on the confederative concept (Repe 2001). A plebiscite was conducted on November 1990, followed by a declaration of independence in on June 1991.
After the independence, the idea of the Slovenian nation, which has its roots in nineteen century, has become the official idea of the state. The idea of a nation is always composed of collective memories, which represent a complex and continuing process of selection and negotiation over what will be remembered and what forgotten. It is therefore a process which involves changing and restructuring one's perception of the past so that it both supports the needs of the present and projects a logical future (Natzmer 2002). Memories create a sense of tradition, which substitute a national story or narratives. The memories of Slovenian origins existed parallel with the Yugoslav national memories, but if there were no significant division between both groups of memories, the Yugoslav ideology would overcome the differences between the six nations. Despite the dominant Yugoslav ideology, the collective memories of Slovenians remained in existence. Communist ideology was linked to the invented tradition of common Slavic community, but the myth of National liberation war and construction of the external enemy, which was firmly incorporated in the Yugoslav state memories, were also taking part in Slovenian memories. With the decline of the communist regime, the reconstruction of Slovenian national memories occurred and the Slovenian
national identity was re-defined as the dominant national identity (Bajt 2003). As mentioned, the important part of remembering is forgetting, which was important in construction of Yugoslav multi-ethnic identity, as well as in formation of Slovene national identity (Rihtman Augustin 2000). In time of crucial political changes of a system, especially the political myths concerning the origin of a particular social group (ethnic, national etc.) are a subject of major transformations. The political actions in the time of emerging Slovenian independence leaned on a more remote mythological bases as it were offered by Yugoslavian regime (Simonic 2009: 53). Accordingly, the celebration of the Statehood day does not only represent the emergence of the new country, but also the realisation of the thousand years old national dreams. Myths are a special formation of political symbols, which give certain importance to actions and events. They reflect perceptions of particular social groups who firmly stand behind their beliefs. Narrative referring to the thousand years of Slovenian dreams, which inevitably led to the independence, has become an indisputable fact, although historical evidences are not as lenient. An important role in that symbolic creation is played by each individual that along with his/her belief enters into specific identification process. By adopting the identification attributes, individuals can selectively reconstitute the past by co-constructing it on a basis of their beliefs. As Murray (1971) says, myth always occurs in conjunction with the feelings of anxiety, which is a result of precarious situation of individuals as it establishes socially defined identity and offers a collective course of actions that are able to release the tension. The confirmation of a narrative of thousand years of Slovenian dreams offered that kind release. In the situation, when individuals face a mismatch between what have they been taught to believe and the real situation, myth reduces a discomfort. It offers a wide range of expectations and actions, and prescribes a clear and socially acceptable identity.
Behind the Slovenian independence is a narrative of a very long struggle
of people, who preserved their culture and language despite the aggressive politics of neighbourhood countries and relatively small number of Slovenes who fought for their country. Collective memories were chosen in order to strengthen the Slovenian identity and confirm idea referring to Slovenian nation. Through shared narratives, a particular form of temporally organised individual memory comes to serve as cultural function. Personal memories which have been encapsulated within the individual get transformed through verbal narratives into social memory, incorporating a cultural belief system. Individuals compose life narratives by picking through all the events of the past and selecting and highlighting those experiences that weave a cohesive story about where they have been and where they are headed (Natzmer 2002). Narratives are therefore constellations of relationship that are embedded in time and space, and indicate that people use narratives not only to represent lives as storytellers or historians but also to emplot their action in them. Social action is thus guided by narratives, seeing that social interactions as well as institutional and organisational processes are mediated by narratives (see Kelleher 2006: 59). Collective memories serve as a transmitter of collective identity as they consolidate nation as a community with a specific territory presented as a homeland and create the concept of a common past. The latter is particularly important for nations lacking the collective memory of so called ''golden age'', which is often replaced by the importance of language and culture. The latter is well evident in the case of the Slovenian nation-building, which took roots in the reading rooms and Tabor movement in the nineteen century. Due to the lack of own country, and the influence of the strong external influence of military, economic and political elites, it was a literary language that institutionalised the Slovenian national memory. After the Yugoslavia disintegration, the myth of Slavic brotherhood and common origin lost its force. The Slovenian history and efforts in building the nation came to the front. The settlement of the Slavs on the contemporary Slovenian territory
became unimportant and lost its role in the myths of creation. The central role in that regard was attributed to Carantania, which was a Slavic principality that emerged in the second half of the 7th century, in the territory of present-day southern Austria and north-eastern Slovenia. The myth emerged in order to destroy the previous one, and to establish Slovenian identity. The central role in Slovenian political mythology was given also to the Freising manuscripts, which are the first Latin-script continuous text in a Slavic language and the oldest document in Slovene language. The honour of being the father of Slovenian nation was accorded to Primoz Trubar, who was the Protestant reformer, most known as the author of the first Slovene language printed book, the founder and the first superintendent of the Protestant Church of the Slovene Lands, and notable for consolidating the Slovene language (Prunk 1996). Slovenian language is thus inextricably knitted with national identity forged trough national symbols and collective memories.
Political myths and ritual symbols
After the independence of Slovenia, new ideas on the Slovenian nation came to the forefront, which required a new symbolic world. Mythic structure of the Slovenian nation was based on the new or reinvented narratives and traditions, which were supported by the ritual symbolism. At the first celebration of the Slovenian independence in 1991, the important symbolic act representing the break with previous political system was done by descending the Yugoslav Flag from the top of the flagpole and ceremonially replacing it with the Slovenian one. The event was accompanied by the Slovenian national anthem. The Yugoslavian state symbols were thus signified as invalid and illegitimate. In that year, Slovenia completely replaced the national symbols, although they were not completely new. Flag with three coloured bands, i.e. white, blue and red, which are sorted in the same wide horizontal positions, resembles
colours of the old emblem of Carniola, which formation is assumed to take place in fifteen century. The colour combination was approved by imperial decree to be the provincial flag of Carniola. It was adopted also by the Slovenians living in Wien, Styria and Coastal region (Ovsec 1993). The same colour combination with additional a five-pointed star was preserved in the flag of the People's Republic of Slovenia in Yugoslavia. Slovenian national tricolour with an added national emblem was recognised as the national flag in 1991. The national emblem has a shape of a shield; in the middle is Triglav, with three golden stars of the Counts of Celje above it, and two blue curves representing the Adriatic Sea and Slovenian rivers below it (Vidic 1999). Triglav has been an integral part of Slovenian mythology already at the time of communist regime as a significant marker of Slovenian geographical belonging to the Eastern Alps. Imaginaries of alpine environment have become a focal point of identity constructions. Triglav has been established as a secular 'holy mountain' of Slovenian (Saver 2004). It is a generally accepted saying that each Slovenian needs to climb up the Triglav once in a life-time to confirm that he or her really is a true member of Slovenian nation.
The first ceremony of the Statehood day was taking place in the large platform in the centre of the Republic Square (Trg republike), which is surrounded by the Slovenian Parliament, Shopping centre Maximarket and two towers TR1 and TR2, where is the biggest Slovenian bank's headquarter. The ritual space was thus in the centre of administrative-monetary complex (Simonic 2009), and also in the political centre of Slovenia. It was designed by the architect Edvard Ravnikar to serve the manifest needs of communist regime, and was initially named as the Square of Revolution. Declaration of Slovenian independence in that square did not occur incidentally, but in order to change the symbolic connotation of the place. Links between ritual and public spaces are the most efficient way to bring together different groups within the particular
ideological system. In that regard, the ritual is not just normative, but also transformative process enabling the conditions for smoothing tensions between local groups, institutions, historical processes and changing ideologies. The space where ritual is performed and the ways in which that space is materially and timely structured play a significant role in that regard (cf. DeMarrais et al. 1996, Dillehay 2004). According to the new ideological bases, the square was renamed and the linden tree, as an important symbol of Slovenianess, was ceremonially placed in the centre.
The event was a rite of passage (cf. van Gennep 1977) denoting the entrance of the national community to the new constitutional era. The important element of ceremonial actions was made by the then archbishop who blessed the linden tree as a sign of blessing the new state. Involvement of the Church in public and political event was a significant symbolic action. The period of transition was marked by post-socialist mythic constructions referring to the role of religion and Church. The latter revived the myth of Catholic Slovenia and reached their peak with the visit of a Pope John Paul II. (Velikonja 1996). In communist societies, the separation of a Church and a state was radicalised, and characterised by a more or less thorough exclusion of traditional religious element. In the transition period, the Church thus took over a protagonist role in creating national mythologies and various political myths. A time of post-socialist reconstruction reopened or expanded the space of civil society available to the Church, and state apparatus no longer presented the competing element in their relationship (Kerševan 1996). Accordingly, the words of the archbishop Alojz Šuštar were an important element of ritual performance. Since then, every celebration of a Statehood day is accompanied by the solemn mass in Ljubljana's Cathedral. However, the presence of the Catholic Church at the beginning of the 1990s, however, has not been more relevant than its absence in the subsequent statehood day events, where religious ceremonies were much more strictly
separated from the state ones, though there were no relevant changes in the constitutional order. Why this shift? The answer can be found in the ideological division, which has heavily marked the political space in Slovenia and also divided the public sphere. As Adam et. al. 2009) argue, the Slovenian political space is characterised by a bipolar division into two political blocs. The first is the so-called 'left-liberal' and the second the so-called 'right' bloc. The cleavage among both poles refer to the positions of the two camps in the past, meaning both the period between the two world wars and the communist period as well as to some other positions of a symbolic and ideological nature like the role of religion and the Catholic Church in society. Therefore, as Adam et. al. postulate (2009), the 'left' takes a quite lenient attitude to the communist period while it is more rejective of the public engagement of the Church, while the 'right' is strongly critical of communism yet relatively supportive of the Church public role. The latter has become visible also in the organisation of the Statehood day. In the beginning, the division between both ideological poles was not of such importance, but it gained meaning during the political domination of the 'left-liberal' bloc and after the victory of the 'right' in the parliamentary elections in 2004. The Statehood day has become a tool for promoting ideological perspectives of particular political elites. Consequently, the Statehood day has acted more as a mean of separation of Slovenian nation than a uniting one, which one can notice also in some other public commemorations, where a public sphere is divided in regard to one of the political ideological blocs.
However, all commemorations of Slovenian independence emphasised the importance and success of Slovenian nation. The ritual communication occurred also through visual performances. The important symbolic elements presented short movies that reconstructed the war of independence and accompanied events. The war that lasted for ten days is a part of mythological drama and presented a convenient
basis for Slovenian myth of liberation. As Velikonja (1996) says, ten-day war for Slovenia was given a special place in the Slovenian political mythology being an important historical breaking-point, which reached its peak in a bloody but revealing redemptive decisive battle between good and evil. The short movies also represented the success of the Slovenian athletes, which portrayed the story of the great success of the entire country. Slovenian sports are an important element in the national identifications. The participants of the rituals were also watching pictures, stories and movies on the Slovenian natural and cultural beauties, which would make them proud of being as Slovenian.
The important role in ritual symbolism and political mythology was occupied also by the idea of Europe. In the years following independence, the idea of belonging to Europe came to the forefront in political discourses. At first celebration of the Statehood day, the then President of Slovenia Milan Kučan in his ceremonial speech stated that Slovenians are being the creators of the European space and history for thousand years. Public and political life became manipulated with new mythical horizons associated with Europe. The convergence and integration with European and the accession to the European Union became the highest objectives of political efforts. Europe represented the Promised Land for economists, political and cultural criterions (Mastnak 1996). Europe became a cradle of values, while the Balkans was gained a status of the 'Other' in contrast to which Slovenia started to build a national identity. The new chapter in history of Slovenian nation was opened. After the Slovenian accession to the European Union in 2004, the symbols of the EU joined Slovenians, which was also ceremonially represented on the ritual event.
Prevailing attitudes toward the ritual performance of the Statehood day
Exploring the contents and performing structures of the ritual of the Statehood day reveals much about the nation building and the political mythology of the state. But there is another thing that one should find important, therefore the attitudes of Slovenians towards the ritual ceremony. Except on the first celebration and maybe with some few exceptions (accession to the EU and NATO), the attendance on the event was low. Slovenians are rather indifferent to the ritual event and to the national holiday as such. The opinions and narratives on the Statehood event, which were conducted by using the ethnographic method of participant observation and qualitative interviews, illustrate some significant elements of Slovenian transition period and also of the contemporary era.
The majority of informants believe that the Statehood day is or it should be an important holiday, but share the opinion that it is merely "a cultural program" and "nothing so special". As one said "I know what the holiday means for us but I don't see any sense in participating on the event. I watch the celebration on a TV, and we always wait what failure is going to happen this year". Or as the other similarly remarked "Personally I don't have any special feeling toward the event, we just watch it on a TV in order to criticise the happening".
Ritual performance of the Statehood day has become an event to which Slovenians became accustomed. They perceived it as something that is mechanically repeated every year. Particularly the young people see the event as an entrance to the summer holiday period or the opportunity for socialising and drinking alcohol. A slight exception in the responses was offered by those who remembered the celebration in June 2006, which used the concepts and techniques reinforced by memories of the first
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celebration in 1991. The latter insinuates on a presumption that indifference of the Slovenian may be found in inappropriate organisation of celebration.
However, reasons for apathy and indifference toward the national holiday may be in a poor recognition of national symbols. Slovenian national symbols were adopted very quickly and a lot of Slovenians still believe that they are inadequate. One may find interesting that national symbols such as flag and emblem were officially recognised only two days before the first celebration of independence. Some people are dissatisfied with the Slavic tradition that is visible through these symbols and search for older or mythologised Slovenian history, while the others look for solution in the whole new ideas and images, which would represent a break with continuity. After the independence, there were several initiatives and competitions regarding the transformation of national symbols. Another reason, which we think is very important, can also be in the heritage of foreign domination, and in strong rejection of former regime. Obligation of flying with national flags was a pronounced characteristic of Yugoslavia. The participation on national celebrations was also mandatory. In the last years of Yugoslavia'a existence, people no longer believed in the system. Accordingly, as one of the informants remarked: "the attendance on such events was a boring and painful experience". In a new independent Slovenia, people were not required to participate on national celebrations. The threat from sanctioning the disobedience was gone. As Bajt (2003) argues, the lack of waving with flags is an important dimension of Slovenian nationalism. Several decades of being under rigid totalitarian regimes entrenched distrust in the state rules. The latter can be confirmed with viewing the intensity of Slovene national identity during the years after independence till nowadays. The indifferent or even negative attitudes toward the ritual do not mean that the national identity among Slovenians is low. Using the data from European value survey comparative data on national identity trends within years 1990 and
2010, one can see that the Slovenian national identity is quite high comparing with other countries of the European Union. In the study on national identity within Europe it was showed there are many differences between European countries in terms of intensity of national pride, feelings of belonging to one's country, beliefs in its superiority and so on (see Golob and Makarovic 2012). By clustering European countries in terms of national feelings as measured by social surveys, the Slovenia belongs to a group shared by Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland, which is with the exception of Ireland, marked by countries that went through similar post-communist transition. The groups is mostly characterised by strong national pride, relatively low or decreasing feeling of belonging to the country, weak belief in one's country being better than others. Those characteristics are not purely coincidental but may follow certain cultural and historical patterns At least after the Middle Age and during the 19th Century Spring of the Nations these nations typically belonged to multinational kingdoms or empires dominated by other nations. Due to these circumstances, their collective memories seem to be more focused not on being the glorious conquerors but more of being the victims trying to survive the oppression by the others (e.g. by the Austrian, German, Russian, British etc. rulers), which is well represented in Slovenian political mythology. As already mentioned, nationalism has mostly been based on the idea of the (cultural) ethnic/national community, while the nation states have only been the secondary product - coming after the clearly developed feelings of the 'imagined communities'. Consequently, even now they generally seem to be more attached to the nation as a community and the need to preserve its cultural heritage and comparatively less to their country as such (more in Golob and Makarovic 2012: 51-55).
Discussion
The emergence of the new political formation led to a break with the former political system. It established new constitutional foundations on a basis of reconceptualised ideological concepts, cultural patterns and economic-developmental policies. The Statehood day had a certain role in that regard. The transformation of a social order cannot be achieved only by the oppression of a dominant group over the others. People need to believe that new ideas are good for them, and that could bring some advantages to a community. As Dillehay (2004) argues, the dominance, power and social order are created through a variety of meanings, and the easiest way to bring those meanings closer to a people is through ritual performances and symbolic actions. The political symbols and mythology, which we represented in the article have played crucial role in legitimising the new state and enabled a bridge between the past and the present. On the first celebration, the participation was high, which insinuates on the importance of such symbols denoting a rite of passage. Political reality is on a first level defined by ritual actions, which lead to confirmation of our beliefs through collective expressions. Rituals provide a social context to overcome the transition from one to another political thinking. Later, those symbolic actions partly lost their importance, but with yearly repetition they stay encoded in our political and cultural perceptions. In last decade, the participation on the Statehood day is low, and people are rather indifferent to those events, but the latter does not mean that symbols and myths are less important, just their intensity decreased. An important role is also played by the fact that Slovenians are willing to identify themselves with the nation, but the problem appears when it comes to the state. The latter is seen as an imposed entity, which is scarcely recognised as an element of belonging. The reason for such indifference can also be found in ideological cleavage dividing Slovenians
on the 'left' or 'right' side of the national story revealing the competing myths, which in diametrically opposed relation deal with the interpretation of communism, the role of Church in society, National liberation struggle and other events that happened after the World War II.
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Redukcionizem v humanističnih znanostih in bivanjska prikrajšanost
Sebastjan Kristovič3
Povzetek
V	današnjem času vedno več ljudi doživlja bivanjsko prikrajšanost in krizo smisla. Doživljanje bivanjskega vakuuma je za mnogo ljudi skoraj stalnica; veliko jih svoj obstoj dojema kot prazen in nesmiseln. Spoznanj o človeku nikakor ne moremo zaobjeti z eno samo humanistično znanostjo. Človek je med drugim, odnosno, psihološko, sociološko, religiozno bitje - prav zaradi tega je k tovrstnemu problemu eksistence potreben širši interdisciplinarni pristop. Prispevek osvetljuje v kolikšni meri so k bivanjski prikrajšanosti doprinesle humanistične znanosti z redukcionističnim pristopom in simplifikacijo.
V	empiričnem delu smo uporabili uveljavljeni merilni instrument (PIL-test), ki sondira meje bivanjskega vakuuma in eksistencialne krize. Preko psihometričnih kazalcev osebnosti in lestvice za merjenje stališč smo dobili natančne rezultate stopnje bivanjske varnosti dvestotih testiranih oseb. Rezultati respondentov kažejo, da jih je kar ena tretjina bivanjsko ogroženih. Prispevek iz logoterapevtskega vidika osvetljuje bivanjsko problematiko in ponuja konkretne rešitve eksistencialne krize in redukcionističnih pristopov v humanističnih znanostih.
3 Asistent na področju psihologije osebnosti, Fakulteta za uporabne družbene študije v Novi Gorici, e-mail: skristovic@hotmail.com
Ključne besede:
Redukcionizem, bivanjska prikrajšanost, logoterapija, Franki, eksistencialna kriza.
Abstract
In modern times more and more people feel the existential deprivation and the crisis of meaning. Experiencing the existential vacuum is a constant for many people and a lot of them consider their existence as empty and unreasonable. Findings about a human being cannot be measured by only one humanistic science. A man is among other a related, psychological, sociable and religious being. These are the main reasons of existential problem and its finding of the appropriate solution which needs a broader interdisciplinary approach. The article wants to find out in what way humanistic sciences with reductionist approach and simplification have contributed to the deprivation of existence.
In our empirical part we have used a proved measured instrument (PIL-test), which probes the limits of existential vacuum and existential crisis. On the basis of psychometrical indicators of personality and a scale for measuring points of view we have received detailed results of living security among two hundred tested people. The results of respondents show that one third of them are under the existential threat. From logotherapeutic view the article enlightens the existential problems and offers concrete solutions of existential crisis and reductionist approaches in humanistic sciences.
Key words:
Reductionism, existential deprivation, logotherapy, Frankl, existential crisis
Uvod
Vsaka humanistična znanost ima v središču svojega nazora vprašanje po človeku, npr.: Kaj (vse) je človek? Kdo je človek? Kaj je bistvo človeka? Kaj ga določa? Kakšne so njegove temeljne potrebe? Torej je ta nazor izrednega pomena, ki določeno humanistično znanost bistveno zaznamuje oziroma določa. Ob vprašanju človeka se postavljajo v vsakem nazoru tudi mnoga druga vprašanja. Vendar prav slednje zavzema posebno mesto - vprašanje po človeku ni samo še eno izmed vprašanj, temveč je eminentno in edinstveno. Edinstveno je iz več razlogov. V prvi vrsti se nanaša na osebo, ki sprašuje. Še več, človek je sam sebi eno veliko vprašanje, saj se sprašuje celo, kako to, da se sploh sprašuje. Izmed vseh živih bitij ima omenjeno sposobnost samo človek (npr. žival se ni sposobna spraševati). In čeprav je človek samemu sebi najbližji, je obenem samemu sebi tudi največja uganka. Samega sebe nikoli popolnoma ne razume. Spraševanje ima še eno predpostavko, vedno je že a priori neko spoznanje, vedenje. Spraševanja o neki stvari je zmožen samo tisti, ki že nekaj ve, a hkrati ne ve - v smislu Sokratove znane izjave: »Vem, da nič ne vem.« Dejansko nam prav to, da je človek samemu sebi največje vprašanje, pove največ o njem. Na tem mestu je potrebno poudariti dve pomembni stvari, prvič, da je človek samemu sebi podarjen oziroma da je dar (v kontingentnem smislu, smislu prigodnosti), in drugič, da je samemu sebi naloga in obveznost. Oba poudarka sta v tesni zvezi z bivanjsko varnostjo in osmišljenim življenjem - osebnostno zrelostjo in duševnim zdravjem. Večina humanističnih znanostih (še posebej je to razvidno v psihoterapevtskih pristopih) za osnovno človekovo notranjo motivacijo še vedno postavlja, pod vplivom Sigmunda Freuda in Alfreda Adlerja, »voljo do užitka«, »voljo do moči« in načelo samouresničitve ter homeostaze. Logoterapija v nasprotju s psihoanalitičnimi in vedenjskimi pristopi
postavlja kot osnovno motivacijo v človekovi duhovni razsežnosti »voljo do smisla«.
Za vsemi nazori so v ozadju določene antropologije (psihološka, sociološka, znanstvena, teološka, filozofska ...) - določena antropološka smer oziroma nazor v temelju določa določeno humanistično znanost. Ali povedano drugače, je njen konstitutivni element. V grobem bi lahko vse te antropologije razdelili v dve skupini: izkustvene in ne-izkustvene. Izkustvene antropologije človeka dojemajo kot nekakšen imanentni-mehanicistični-dinamični ustroj. Kar pomeni, da je človek dojet kot objekt. Gre za klasičen redukcionizen, kjer je kakršna koli sinteza nemogoča. Prav tako tudi pri ne-izkustvenih antropologijah ni nujno, čeprav človeka skušajo dojemati kot subjekt, da se izognejo redukcionizmu in posledično determinizmu. Z redukcionističnim pristopom in posploševanjem so k novodobnemu nihilizmu, eksistencialni krizi in krizi smisla veliko doprinesle prav različne humanistične znanosti, ki človeka ne dojemajo in upoštevajo v njegovi celovitosti.
Novodobni nihilizem
Frankl (1994a) je v redukcionizmu in determinizmu videl temeljni problem in stranpot psihoterapije, še posebej psihoanalize (Freud) in individualne psihologije (Adler). Že v tistem času se je zavedal, da je v središču problema pojmovanje človeka. Frankl navaja, da je Paul Schilder psihoanalizo poimenoval Weltanschauung (svetovni nazor). Pravi, da »ne more iti za vprašanje, ali psihoterapija temelji na svetovnem nazoru ali ne, ampak ali je svetovni nazor, ki je njena podlaga, pravi ali napačen« (21). Po Franklovem mnenju je edino merilo, ali je določen nazor pravilen ali ne, človeškost - ohranja človekovo človeškost ali ne.
Izguba človeškosti se začne, kakor hitro določena strokovna usmeritev
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pride na točko, da začne posamezne specifično človeške pojave razumevati kot epifenomene (spremljajoče pojave). Med drugim Franki tudi v tem pojavu vidi vzroke za bivanjsko praznino in govori o »doživetem nihilizmu«. Če se »učeni nihilizem« izraža v redukcionizmu, se »doživeti nihilizem« izraža v bivanjski praznoti: »Redukcionizem s težnjo po reifikaciji in razosebljanju človeka napeljuje k bivanjski praznoti« (Frankl, 1994b: 38). V zvezi s tem še navaja ameriškega sociologa Williama I. Thompsona: »Ljudje niso predmeti, ki obstajajo kot stoli in mize, ampak živijo, in če ugotovijo, da so njihova življenja skrčena (reducirana) na goli obstoj stolov in miz, naredijo samomor« (38). Trditev je morda slišati nekoliko pretirana, vendar praksa slednje potrjuje. Izguba smisla življenja, ko človek nima več za kaj živeti, velikokrat pripelje do samomora.
V nadaljevanju razprave Frankl omenja ameriške avtorje, ki so se prvi resno zavedli pomena redukcionizma in se zavzeli za reševanje omenjenega problema. Uglasili so se tudi z zborom evropskih fenomenoloških raziskovalcev. Tisto, kar je pristno, priznavajo kot at face value. Sicer priznavajo veličino Freudovega dela, ki ga je opravil, vendar »v njem vidijo specialista za motive, ki pa da jih ne smemo spoznavati za pristne« (Frankl, 1994b: 38). In prav teh motivov ni mogoče jemati at face value. Za Freuda je bila npr. tudi filozofija ena »najspodobnejših oblik sublimacije potlačene spolnosti« (39). Če bi bilo to res, bi pomenilo, da je filozofija teoretizacija ali celo teologizacija prikrite nevroze, kar pa ne vzdrži nobene resne strokovne kritike. Frankl se vpraša: »Vprašanje, ali ni ravno obratno in ali ni nevroza ravno posledica zgrešene filozofije, ni upoštevano« (39). Izvor novodobnega nihilizma Frankl vidi v redukcionizmu in humanističnem fundamentalizmu, ki ima za posledico razosebljanje človeka: »Nihilizem se ne razkrinkava z govorjenjem o Niču, ampak se skriva za krinko izraza 'nič drugega kot'« (Frankl, 1994b: 37). Po njegovem mnenju je redukcionizem postal krinka nihilizma.
Pojem terrible simplificateurs je že dlje časa znan, Franki pa opozarja na »novo« nevarnost - terrible generalisateurs (Franki, 1994a: 26). Npr. če strokovnjak določenega področja pristopa k človeku, ga razume in razlaga samo s fizične plati (bio-kemijski procesi ...), govorimo o biologizmu. Če psiholog razumeva in razlaga človeka samo z duševnega ali s psihičnega vidika, govorimo o psihologizmu. Če ima teolog pred seboj človeka le kot pretežno duhovno bitje, je to teologizem. Sociolog je v stalni nevarnosti, da človeka in družbo (svet) razumeva in razlaga samo z vidika sociologije -sociologizem. Gre za militantno dogmatično držo, »v posesti imam(o) vso resnico«. Na ta način se določen nazor ali strokovno področje spremeni v »-izem« in postane ideologija, vsaka ideologija pa ima v sebi že a priori moment nasilja. Človek postane zreduciran na samo en določen vidik nekega nazora in postane razčlovečen. »Redukcionizem bi lahko opisal kot navidezno znanstveno ravnanje, s katerim specifično človeške pojave zmanjšujejo v podčloveške pojave oziroma jih iz teh izpeljujejo. Kako bi pa sploh mogli označiti redukcionizem drugače kakor z izrazom subhumanizem« (Frankl, 1994b: 37).
Pandeterminizem
Pri vprašanju determinizma gre dejansko za vprašanje svobodne izbire. Na tem mestu se izostri vprašanje, ali človeško vedenje določajo določeni pogoji (biološki, psihološki in sociološki) ali (še) kaj drugega. SSKJ determinizem definira: »Nauk, po katerem se vse razvija po objektivnih zakonih, ki so neodvisni od človekove volje in njegovega delovanja.«
Logoterapija ne pristaja na pandeterministično teorijo, da je človekovo ravnanje in delovanje holistično določeno z različnimi pogoji (npr. z otroštvom, vzgojo, podobo očeta, geni in socialnimi vplivi). Potemtakem je človek bitje, čigar delovanje je venomer z nečim pogojeno in že vnaprej določeno. Pomeni, da človek ni svobodno bitje, ampak je žrtev nekih
notranjih gonov, ki so posledica različnih notranjih ali zunanjih dejavnikov oziroma pogojev (vzrokov). Logoterapija seveda ne trdi, da človek ni determiniran. Vsak človek je do neke mere določen z biološkimi, psihološkimi in sociološkimi pogoji. Vendar ti pogoji niso absolutni, v smislu, da bi človekovo ravnanje absolutno določali. Obstaja tako imenovana relativna determiniranost, ki ji je podvržen vsak človek. Vendar lahko človek do te determiniranosti izbere svoje stališče. Absolutna determiniranost je dejansko njen antipod. Zato Frankl pravi, da ne gre za alternativo »indeterminizem« ali »determinizem«, ampak za alternativo »determinizem« ali »pandeterminizem« (Frankl, 2005a: 37). Pandeterminizem je dejansko absolutiziranje »normalnega« determinizma. Logoterapija upošteva, da je človek odvisen od različnih dejavnikov in pogojev, obenem pa upošteva človeško zmožnost, da do teh pogojev zavzame stališče. Pomeni, da ni zgolj »žrtev«, ampak odgovorno kreira in ustvarja svoje življenje. »Konec koncev človeškega vedenja ne narekujejo pogoji, s katerimi se človek srečuje, temveč odločitve, ki jih sprejema« (37). Pogoji, ki človeka do neke mere »omejujejo«, še ni nujno, da ga tudi determinirajo. Še vedno ohranja svobodo, da se do teh pogojev tudi opredeli. Pravzaprav je človek tisti, ki se odloči, ali se bo do teh pogojev opredelil ali se jim bo podredil.
Ustanovitelj logoterapije Viktor Frankl tega ni samo teoretično opredelil in kasneje v svoji praksi dokazal, ampak tudi podkrepil s svojim življenjem v koncentracijskem taborišču. Ali kot je zapisano v dodatnem poglavju knjige Človek pred vprašanjem o smislu: »Noben družboslovni inovator ni teorij preizkusil in potrdil v praksi na lastni koži na tako kalvarijski način, kakor je Frankl svoja spoznanja o moči notranje človeške svobode in volje do smisla - posebej o moči smiselnega stališča do najhujše usode, ko s človekovim življenjem in telesom krivično ravnajo tako kruto, kakor nihče ne ravna niti s smetmi, preden jih zavrže« (Frankl, 2005a: 225). Frankl ni samo specialist dveh področij, ampak tudi človek, ki je preživel štiri
koncentracijska taborišča. V taborišču se ni uresničila Freudova teorija: »Če poskusimo določeno število najrazličnejših ljudi enako izpostaviti lakoti, se bodo z naraščanjem gospodovalne potrebe po hrani zabrisale vse individualne razlike, namesto njih pa se bodo pojavili enotni izrazi nepotešenega nagona« (36-37). Ravno nasprotno, ljudje so postajali vse bolj različni. Prav to bistveno razliko prikažejo v strnjeni obliki zadnji stavki Franklovega najbolj znanega in branega dela:
»Človeško bitje ni samo stvar med stvarmi; stvari določajo druga drugo, človek pa konec koncev določa sam sebe. Kar postane - v mejah nadarjenosti in okolja - je naredil sam iz sebe. na primer v koncentracijskih taboriščih, v tem živem laboratoriju in na tem prostoru za preizkušanje, smo bili opazovalci in priče, kako se nekateri naši tovariši vedejo kot svinje, drugi pa kot svetniki. Človek ima obe možnosti v sebi; katera se uresniči, je odvisno od odločitev, ne pa od okoliščin.
Naša generacija je realistična, ker smo spoznali človeka, kakršen je v resnici. Navsezadnje je človek tisto bitje, ki je iznašlo plinske celice v Oswiecimu; vendar je tudi tisto bitje, ki je v tiste plinske celice stopalo zravnano, z očenašem ali molitvijo Šema Izrael na ustnicah« (Frankl, 1992: 101-102).
Dimenzionalna ontologija
Ena izmed novosti, ki jo je logoterapija doprinesla humanističnim znanostim je holističen pristop. Gre za celosten pristop, ki človeka dojema v vsej njegovi celovitosti - telesni, duševni in duhovni razsežnosti. Na ta način logoterapija ohranja človekovo človeškost in se izogne kakršnemukoli redukcionizmu in posploševanju. Pred Franklom sta se s podobnim problemom ukvarjala že dva znana strokovnjaka: Nicolai Hartmann (ontologija) in Max Scheler (antropologija). Gre za dva poskusa,
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da bi vsaki vedi oddelili področje omejene veljavnosti. Predstavo o tem, kaj je človek Scheler zaobjame s predstavitvijo treh idejnih krogov:
»Najprej je tu miselni krog judovsko-krščanske tradicije o Adamu in Evi, stvarjenju, raju in padcu. Drugič, grško-antični miselni krog, znotraj katerega se je človekovo samozavedanje prvič v zgodovini povzdignilo v pojem o njegovem posebnem položaju, in sicer v tezi, da je človek le toliko, kolikor poseduje 'um', logos, phronesis, ratio, mens itd. - logos pomeni tukaj hkrati govor in zmožnost, da zagrabimo 'kaj' vseh stvari; tesno je s tem nazorom povezan tudi nauk,da naj bi bil tudi temelj celotnega vesolja neki nadčloveški um, katerega del, med vsemi bitji edini, je človek. Tretji miselni krog, ki je že zdavnaj postal tradicionalen, je miselni krog modernega naravoslovja in genetične psihologije, po katerem je človek zelo pozen končni rezultat razvoja zemlje - bitje, ki se od svojih predform v živalskem svetu razlikuje samo po stopnji zapletenosti energijskih zmesi in po sposobnostih, ki se na sebi pojavljajo že v podčloveški naravi« (Scheler, 1998: 7).
Ob upoštevanju let od nastanka tega dela je Scheler slišati aktualno in vizionarsko obenem:
»Vsem trem idejnim krogom manjka sleherna medsebojna enotnost. Tako posedujemo naravoslovno, filozofsko in teološko antropologijo, ki jim ni mar drugi za drugo - ne posedujemo pa enotne ideje človeka. Čedalje bolj rastoče mnoštvo specialnih znanosti, ki se ukvarjajo s človekom, naj so še tako dragocene, neprimerno bolj zakriva človekovo bistvo, kot pa ga osvetljuje. Če pomislimo naprej, da so omenjeni trije tradicionalni idejni krogi danes dodobra omajani - še posebej omajana je darwinistična rešitev problema človekovega izvora - potem lahko rečemo, da v nobenem delu zgodovine človek samemu sebi ni bil tako problematičen kot v sedanjosti« (7).
Hartman je človeško bivanje razdelil na tri stopnje (Stufen): telesno, duševno in duhovno.
Slika 1: Stopnje človeške eksistence po Hartmanu
Razplastenost človeške eksistence je po Hartmanu hierarhična zgradba. Najnižja je telesna stopnja, naslednja je duševna in najvišja je duhovna, ki predstavlja vrh te zgradbe. Scheler v svoji antropologiji prav tako vidi človeka kot telesno, duševno in duhovno bitje. Vendar je njegova predstava razplastenosti človeškega bivanja nekoliko drugačna, kot pri Hartmanu. Bolj kot razdelitev na različne stopnje (Stufen) mu je bližja razdelitev na plasti (Schichten).
Slika 2: Plasti človeške eksistence po Schelerju
Z razdelitvijo na plasti Scheler »loči bolj ali manj obrobne biološke in psihološke plasti od srednje, osebne - duhovne osi« (Frankl, 1994a: 26). Na ta način Scheler poudari oziroma implementira tudi načelo individualizacije - gre za individualnost duhovnega v človeku.
Oba strokovnjaka sta upoštevala ontološke razlike med telesno, duševno in duhovno razsežnostjo - pojmovala sta jih v smislu kakovostnih in ne samo količinskih razlik. Vendar po Franklovem mnenju ne upoštevata dovolj »antropološke enotnosti«. Spregledala sta, skorajda bi lahko rekli, bistveno - ontološke težnje, ki so prav v tem. Ontologija v samem jedru teži po antropološki enotnosti, kot to imenuje Frankl. Pristop, ki upošteva antropološko enotnost Frankl poimenuje dimenzionalna ontologija oziroma dimenzionalna antropologija. Pri pristopu dimenzionalne ontologije gre za geometrijsko pojmovanje dimenzij - kot analogija za kakovostne razlike vseh razsežnosti. Razlikovanje ne gre na škodo enotnosti »zgradbe«. Dimenzionalna ontologija temelji na dveh zakonih: Prvi zakon: »Eden in isti pojav, projiciran iz lastne dimenzije v različni dimenziji, nižji od njegove lastne, je upodobljen tako, da sta si posamezni podobi med seboj protislovni« (Frankl, 1994a: 27). Torej nujno pridemo do protislovja, če opazujemo projekcijo (določenega pojava) v ostali dve dimenziji, ki sta različni od pojava samega in tudi nižje dimenzije. Za lažje razumevanje ključnega zakona dimenzionalne ontologije Frankl velikokrat uporabi primer kozarca v obliki valja.
Slika 3: Ponazoritev prvega zakona dimenzionalne ontologije
Kozarec v obliki valja je tridimenzionalni predmet. Če naredimo tloris in stranski ris tega predmeta oziroma ga projiciramo v navpično in v vodoravno dvodimenzionalno ravnino, v prvem primeru dobimo krog, v drugem pa pravokotnik. Nedvomno so si vse tri »podobe« med seboj v protislovju. Še več, dodatno protislovje dobimo, če upoštevamo, da je kozarec odprti valj, dvodimenzionalna krog in pravokotnik pa sta zaprta lika.
Drugi zakon: »Različni pojavi, projicirani iz lastne dimenzije v dimenzijo, nižjo od njihove, so upodobljeni tako, da so njihove podobe dvoumne« (28).
Slika 4: Ponazoritev drugega zakona dimenzionalne ontologije
Vsi trije, valj, stožec in krogla, so tridimenzionalni predmeti. Če spet gledamo tloris oziroma vse tri like obenem projiciramo v navpično dvodimenzionalno ravnino, vidimo samo tri kroge. Sodeč po teh dvodimenzionalnih krogih, nikakor ne moremo priti do sklepa, kateremu predmetu pripada kateri krog. Zlahka jih med seboj zamenjamo, kar pomeni, da so njihove podobe dvoumne. »Po prvem zakonu dimenzionalne ontologije projekcija pojava v različne nižje dimenzije pripelje do nedoslednosti, po drugem zakonu dimenzionalne ontologije pa projekcija različnih pojavov v nižje dimenzije pripelje do izomorfnosti, enakolikosti« (28).
Prav v tem je središčni problem simplifikacije. Če človeka ali določen »pojav« projiciramo samo na telesno ali duševno razsežnost, dobimo protislovne rezultate. V prvem primeru projekcije dobimo biološki mehanizem, v drugem primeru pa psihološkega. Šele v luči dimenzionalne antropologije (celostnega pristopa) lahko premostimo navidezno protislovje človeške enotnosti in edinstvenosti: »Dimenzionalna ontologija je še daleč od tega, da bi rešila vprašanje razum - telo. Pač pa pojasnjuje, zakaj problema razum - telo ni mogoče rešiti. Nujno je, da človekove enotnosti - enotnosti kljub mnogoterosti telesa in razuma - ni
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mogoče najti v biološki ali psihološki, ampak jo je treba iskati v tisti duhovni razsežnosti, iz katere je človek najprej projiciran« (Frankl, 1994a: 29).
Telesno razsežnost v večinski meri določajo geni in posameznik kot individuum. Na ta del človek nima bistvenega vpliva. Telesno razsežnost v glavnem določajo biološki, kemični in fizični procesi. Preko telesne razsežnosti zaznavamo skorajda celoten zunanji svet. Do percepcije vseh teh dražljajev pridemo preko naših petih čutil: vonj - nos, vid - oči, okus -jezik, sluh - ušesa in tip - koža. V telesni razsežnosti vlada tako imenovana biološko-kemična »harmonija« oziroma ravnovesje, v tem primeru govorimo o zdravju. Kadar je ravnovesje porušeno, govorimo o bolezenskem stanju. Telesna dimenzija spada pod empirično znanost, kar pomeni, da se jo da količinsko vrednotiti. Na duševno ali psihično razsežnost (npr. razum, spomin, čustva, instinkt, percepcija, značaj in karakter) vpliva ob dednosti v veliki meri tudi okolje. V ospredju je razumska (zavedna in nezavedna) obdelava »podatkov«, na tej podlagi človek ravna tako ali drugače. Za duševno raven je značilna tudi specifična introvertiranost oziroma posedovanje notranjega »sveta«. Človek poseduje svojo notranjost oziroma notranji svet; v tem oziru bi lahko dejali, da človek poseduje samega sebe. Scheler tovrstni fenomen imenuje »psihični prafenomen življenja« (Scheler, 1998: 9). Človek svoj notranji svet preko duševne in telesne razsežnosti izraža navzven. Gre za odnos med njim in svetom (vse žive in nežive stvari). Tudi duševno razsežnost, podobno kot telesno, se da količinsko »meriti« (npr. IQ, spomin, stopnja čustev). Dve glavni področji, ki v temelju vzpostavljata duševni svet, sta čustvovanje in razum. Z izrazom »čustvena zrelost« imamo po navadi pred očmi uravnoteženost in usklajenost čustev in razuma. »Čustvena zrelost pomeni ravnovesje med razumom in čustvom, skladnost med hladnostjo glave in toplino srca, kar daje pravilnost in dobrotnost, skratka, polnost življenja« (Trstenjak, 1994: 27). Tudi v duševni razsežnosti, podobno kot
telesni, kadar vlada notranje ravnovesje, govorimo o duševnem zdravju. V nasprotnem primeru pa o duševni obolelosti. Duhovna razsežnost v logoterapiji zavzema posebno mesto (potrebno je omeniti, da ko se v logoterapiji uporablja termin duhovno, pri tem ni mišljena religiozna ali teološka sfera, ampak gre za antropološki oziroma znanstveni pojem). V moči duhovne razsežnosti je posameznik zmožen udejanjati lastno svobodo in odgovornost. Prav duhovna razsežnost omogoča osebnostno distinkcijo do dednosti, vzgoje, vplivov okolja, preteklosti... V ospredju so posameznikove »duhovne« odločitve in ne pogoji, goni ali okoliščine. Pomeni, da posameznik prevzema odgovornost za svoje odločitve, dejanja oziroma ne-dejanja.
Človek deluje in se odloča na podlagi notranjih gonov, »sil«, mehanizmov, zunanjih pogojev ... S tega vidika lahko govorimo o pogojni svobodi, o svobodi ki ni absolutna (lat. absolvere; absolvo - pustiti, od-vezati) in ni neodvisna. Vprašanje, ki se tukaj poraja, je: V kolikšni meri je človek svoboden in v kolikšni meri ta pogojna svoboda vpliva na kvaliteto posameznikovih dejanj? Ko govorimo o svobodi, obenem govorimo tudi o človekovem delovanju. Kakor hitro pa govorimo o področju človekovega delovanja, govorimo o etiki. Etika je veda, ki se ukvarja s tem, kaj je prav in kaj je narobe, kaj je dobro in kaj je slabo, kaj je dobro in kaj je boljše. Prav ta moralni oziroma etični zakon, ki je v vsakem posamezniku že vrojen, je čudil Immanuela Kanta: »Dve stvari navdajata čud z vselej novim in naraščajočim občudovanjem in strahospoštovanjem, čim pogosteje in vztrajneje se razmišljanje z njima ukvarja: zvezdnato nebo nad menoj in moralni zakon v meni« (Kant, 2003a: 186). Glede vpliva na kasnejšo misel velja Kant za enega najpomembnejših mislecev vseh časov. Zavedal se je problema svobode in se ga lotil z vso ostrino (Kant, 2003a). Eden izmed postulatov praktičnega uma je tudi svoboda kot nujen pogoj (aksiom) za moralno delovanje. Moralnost in svoboda sta pri njem v nerazvezni povezavi. Brez svobode ni moralnosti; ker smo svobodni, smo zavezani
morali. Kanta najbolj zanima človek kot bitje, ki deluje, se odloča ... Po Kantu človek eksistira na dveh ravneh: 1. v svetu nekih determinizmov, pojavov, čutenja in 2. v »svetu umnosti«, svetu stvari samih na sebi. Prav slednja raven je področje svobode in osebnostne avtonomije. V okviru neodvisnosti in avtonomije od prve ravni govori Kant o pojmu transcedentalne svobode (35). Proti koncu znamenitega dela Kritika praktičnega uma razmišlja o nujnosti predpostavke »o neodvisnosti od čutnega sveta in o zmožnosti, da svojo voljo določamo glede na zakon inteligibilnega sveta, se pravi, svobodo« (153). Vendar po Kantu ni samo svoboda pogoj za moralo, ampak predvsem odgovornost, ki je implicitno vsebovana v prvem postulatu praktičnega uma - postulat nesmrtnosti. Freud na primer kljub svoji veličini tega uvida ni zmogel. Bistveni moment pri odgovornosti in posledično pri samodoločanju je razumevanje samega sebe. Ključno vlogo ima pri tem moment samozavedanja, da je človek svobodno in odgovorno bitje ter da je v vsakem posamezniku vraščena globoka potreba po smislu, kar Frankl imenuje »volja do smisla«. Slednje potrjujejo tudi različne raziskave. Carl R. Rogers je skušal definirati »empirično definicijo« svobodne volje (Frankl, 2005a: 39). Rezultati njegovih raziskav (na 151 odraščajočih zločincih) kažejo, »da vedenja ni mogoče napovedati niti na podlagi družinskih razmer niti na podlagi vzgoje, okolja, socialnega položaja, kulturnih vplivov, dedovanja ali prebolelih bolezni. Recidivnost je bilo mogoče precej bolje napovedati glede na stopnjo razumevanja samega sebe, saj je bila prav ta najbolj v korelaciji s kasnejšim vedenjem (0,84). Očitno se torej ne motimo, ko pojmujemo razumevanje samega sebe kot enega od vidikov, v katerih se kaže sposobnost odmika od samega sebe« (39). Bistveno pri razumevanju samega sebe je prav zmožnost samotranscendence, kar predpostavlja, da je človek svobodno in odgovorno bitje. Tako vidimo, da je duhovna razsežnost tista, v moči katere šele pridemo do pravilnega razumevanja samega sebe. Duhovna razsežnost je »bazen« notranje moči, iz katerega človek črpa moč za dvig nad gone, potiske in ostale »sile«, ki človeka
hočejo determinirati in ga s tem narediti nesvobodnega in posledično neodgovornega. Duhovna razsežnost je »prostor«, kjer se udejanjajo svoboda, ustvarjalnost, odgovornost, ideali, intuicija, »volja do smisla« in kjer je bolj kot determiniranost v ospredju človekova osebna odločitev.
Bivanjska prikrajšanost
Volja do smisla, kot tretji steber logoterapije, človeka intencionalno usmerja v svet nalog, vrednot in različnih možnosti. Vendar je potrebno razlikovati med gonom in voljo. Pri prvem gre za to, da človeka nekaj žene, pri volji do smisla pa gre za to, da si človek za nekaj prizadeva in ga nekaj privlači ali vleče. Volja do smisla ni nek gon v človeku. Če bi namreč bil, bi to pomenilo, da spet ne gre za nič drugega kot za vzpostavljanje notranjega ravnovesja in redukcijo napetosti (Frankl, 1994a). Človek doseže osebnostno uresničitev vedno preko nečesa, kar je zunaj njega. Šele ko si neha prizadevati, da bo sam sebe uresničil, osrečil, dosegel notranji mir, harmonijo... in se bo posvetil neki nalogi, smislu, osebi ..., nečemu, kar je zunaj njega samega, šele takrat bo resnično zadovoljen s samim seboj. Šele ko bo šel iz sebe k nečemu ali k nekomu, bo resnično srečen. In prav človekovo hrepenenje po sreči je najboljši pokazatelj specifične antropološke dinamike. Osnovna motivacija v človekovi duhovni razsežnosti je prav volja do smisla.
Človek vedno in povsod hoče in išče smisel. V življenju mu gre najbolj ravno za smisel. To specifično človeško »lastnost« posameznik doživlja kot nekakšno željo, da bi njegovo življenje bilo in bi ga lahko imel za smiselno. Posameznika intencionalno naravnava v svet vrednot, nalog in možnosti. Volja do smisla je vedno neločljivo povezana z vrednotami. Smisel je vedno tam, kjer so vrednote. In smisel je ravno v udejanjanju vrednot oziroma v življenju po poti vrednot. Med smislom in vrednotami je prav tako neločljivo vpeta odgovornost.
Na začetku svojega temeljnega dela Volja do smisla, Frankl navaja besede Alberta Einsteina: »Človek, ki ima svoje življenje za nesmiselno, ni samo nesrečen, ampak je komaj sposoben za življenje« (Frankl, 1994a: 50). Omenili smo že bistveno označbo človeka, in sicer da je zmožen samotranscendence. Človek je v sebi nezaključeno bitje (Fabry, 1988), vedno je nekam usmerjen (intencionalnost) in samega sebe nenehno presega. Notranje je nenehno usmerjen k določenemu smislu in udejanjanju le-tega; človek ne zadostuje samemu sebi. Logoterapija definira smisel kot naloge, ki nam jih življenje postavlja v točno določenem trenutku in v točno določeni situaciji. Edinstvenost in specifičnost smisla je v odkrivanju življenjskih nalog, ki jih življenje postavlja pred vsakega posameznika. V moči svobodne volje posameznik izpolni smisel in tako (odgovorno) odgovori na nalogo, ki jo predenj postavlja življenje v točno določenem trenutku in v točno določeni situaciji. Odgovornost kot osnovna substanca človeške eksistence ima na tem mestu ključno vlogo. Človek je torej vedno odgovoren nečemu ali nekomu - odgovornost je dejansko odgovor na določeni smisel, ki pa je »določen« z vrednotami oziroma z najvišjo vrednoto. Ta smisel ni stvar občosti, splošnega smisla, »stvar«, ki je bolj ali manj enaka vsem, le odkriti jo je treba, ampak je ta smisel edinstven, specifičen in enkraten za vsakega posameznika posebej. Dejansko ni človek tisti, ki bi spraševal po smislu, ampak je ravno nasprotno, on je tisti, ki je spraševan. V odgovornem odgovarjanju je bistvo življenja in bistvo smisla. Najvišja stopnja samozavedanja je posameznikovo zavedanje, da je nenehno spraševan in (po)klican k odgovoru. Na tem mestu logoterapija odpre še eno obzorje razumevanja odgovornosti. Klasična opredelba odgovornosti je, da človek odgovarja za posledice svojih dejanj. Potrebno je širše razumevanje odgovornosti (ne toliko retrospektivno in introspektivno) - nismo samo odgovorni za dejanja, ki smo jih storili, ampak tudi za dejanja, ki jih moramo oziroma bi jih morali storiti. Glede na to, da je v današnjem času odgovornost tako ali
tako že problematičen »pojem«, je ob tem zreducirana samo na preteklost. K odgovornosti spadata tudi opuščanje dejanj in nalog. Življenje lahko razumemo kot nalogo, katere izpolnitev je naša odgovornost. Pred človeka je ves čas postavljena kakšna naloga, ki čaka nanj, da jo opravi oziroma nanjo odgovori. Še več, samo življenje je naloga. In ta naloga ni v samouresničevanju, ampak v preseganju samega sebe, v naravnanosti k nečemu, kar je zunaj človeka samega. Pravzaprav človek uresničuje samega sebe najbolj takrat, ko nase »pozabi«, ko nima pred očmi le samega sebe in svojih interesov. Logoterapija usmerja človeka k bolj pristnemu in smiselnemu življenju, ki je v aktivnosti in dinamiki, ne pa v pasivni drži »notranjega miru« ter teženja k stanju homeostaze. Zelo zgovorne so Goethejeve besede, ki jih omenja Frankl: »Kako lahko spoznamo sami sebe? Nikoli z opazovanjem, pač pa z delovanjem. Poskušaj opravljati svojo dolžnost, pa takoj veš, kaj je na tebi. Kaj pa je tvoja dolžnost? Zahteva tistega dne« (Frankl, 1994b: 80). Dejansko so naloge naši smisli. Če ne izpolnimo naloge, če se ne-odgovorno odzovemo na nalogo, ki nam jo v določenem trenutku in določeni situaciji postavlja življenje, ne izpolnimo smisla. Iz tega sledi logičen sklep: več kot bo v življenju posameznika smiselnih odgovorov, bolj bo tudi življenje smiselno, polno in bivanjsko »varno«; v nasprotnem primeru pa več kot bo nesmiselnih odločitev, zamujenih trenutkov in zgrešenih ciljev, bolj bo tudi samo življenje postajalo »nesmiselno«, prazno, banalno in posledično bo posameznik drsel v stanje eksistencialne krize in bivanjskega vakuuma. Eksistencialna kriza se manifestno izraža na vseh področjih posameznikovega življenja: noogene nevroze, agresija, depresija, različne zasvojenosti, apatija, melanholija, ranjeni odnosi, ločitve, stres, samomori, egoizem, etični nihilizem, ...
V današnjem času, ko bolj ali manj vlada načelo užitka, ki skoraj neizpodbitno vodi v etični nihilizem, splošno bivanjsko dezorientacijo in eksistencialno frustracijo, je pomanjkanje smisla izvorni problem
človekove bivanjske varnosti in duševnega zdravja. Prav v tem lahko vidimo temeljni vzrok, kot potrjujejo tudi mnoge raziskave, za večino zasvojenosti in raznovrstnih anomalij (Frankl, 1994a: 77-88). Naj na tem mestu naštejemo samo nekaj izsledkov: Rezultati 20-letne raziskave bivših študentov harvardske univerze kažejo, da jih je 25 % (v glavnem gre za dobro situirane ljudi - pravnike, zdravnike, kirurge ...) poročalo o eksistencialni krizi v svojem življenju (Frankl, 1994a: 69). Doživljali so ga kot brezciljno in nesmiselno. Podobno statistično analizo so naredili tudi med Franklovimi študenti na dunajski medicinski fakulteti, ki je pokazala, da 40 % avstrijskih, zahodnonemških in švicarskih študentov pozna bivanjsko praznoto iz lastne izkušnje. Med ameriškimi študenti je bilo celo 81 % takšnih (78). Lukasova navaja ameriško študijo z več kot štirinajstletno raziskavo raka. V prvem letu po izgubi partnerja (zaradi ločitve ali smrti) se pet do desetkrat poveča tveganje za rakasto obolenje (Lukas, 1993: 70). Dokazano je, da je občutek nesmiselnosti najbolj razširjen med mladimi (Frankl, 2005a: 7). Ugotovili so, da se je pri 500 dunajskih vajencih strmo dvignil delež tistih, ki se srečujejo z občutkom nesmiselnosti: iz 30 na 80 % (Frankl, 2005a: 7). V Ameriki so npr. na prvem mestu med vzroki smrti med študenti prometne nesreče, na drugem mestu pa samomori. Inštitut za demoskopijo v Allensbachu je ugotovil, da je »nedeljsko nevrozo« leta 1952 doživljalo 26 % ljudi, danes pa že preko 37 % (Frankl, 2005a: 8). Crumbaugh in Maholic (1969) sta objavila rezultate 1151 posameznikov, ki potrjujejo Franklovo oceno noogenih nevroz - da je 20 % nevroz noogenega izvora, kar so potrdile tudi mnoge kasnejše raziskave. Raziskava Padelfordove (1973) na univerzi v San Diegu, ki je vključevala 416 študentov, je pokazala tesno povezavo med pomanjkanjem smisla v življenju in narkomanijo. Povprečni indeks prisotnosti narkomanije je bil pri študentih s pomanjkanjem smisla dvakrat večji kot pri tistih, ki so svoje življenje doživljali kot smiselno. Frankl navaja statistične raziskave 60 študentov z univerze Idaho State University, ki so jih po »neuspelih« poskusih samomorov spraševali o
motivu za to dejanje (Frankl, 2005a: 110). 85 % ni videlo več nobenega smisla v svojem življenju. Od teh jih je bilo 93 % psiho-fizično zdravih, živeli so v dobrih družinskih odnosih in ekonomskih pogojih, imeli so dobro družabno socialno življenje in bili zadovoljni s svojim študijskim uspehom. Pomeni, da vzroka ne moremo iskati v zunanjih pogojih in okoliščinah. Dejansko dajejo vse tovrstne raziskave, izvedene v zadnjih desetletjih po vsem svetu, skoraj identične rezultate. Empirične dokaze potrjujejo številne raziskave, da je smisel življenja moč najti in izpolniti ne glede na spol, starost, vzgojo, okolje, inteligenčni kvocient, značaj, vero. Gre za zelo pomembno dejstvo, ki je empirično potrjeno, da je smisel nepogojen z okoliščinami v najširšem smislu. Empirični dokazi so potrdili Franklovo teoretično domnevo logoterapije, da je smisel tesno povezan s človekovo duhovno razsežnostjo, tj. notranjo naravnanostjo, odnosom, svobodo in odgovornostjo in ne z determinantami zunaj človeka.
Eksistencialna kriza še ne pomeni nujno nevarnega bolezenskega stanja, lahko pa globoko dolgočasje (notranja praznina, melanholija, apatija...) pripelje človeka tudi do samomora. Ko je volja do smisla frustrirana, jo nadomesti volja do užitka in volja do moči: »Samo, če je kdo prikrajšan za prvotno skrb zaradi izpolnitve smisla, si bodisi prizadeva za uživanje ali je zadovoljen z močjo« (Frankl, 1994a: 86). Ob tem pride do zamenjave cilja s sredstvom, kar je še ena značilnost modernega časa. Denar npr. ni več sredstvo, ampak postane cilj. Prav gonja za denarjem je po Franklu ena izmed oblik volje do moči: »Volja do denarja povzroča dobršen del tiste pretirane poklicne dejavnosti, ki hkrati s pretirano spolno dejavnostjo deluje kot beg pred zavestjo, da nas daje bivanjska praznota« (86). Če duh časa sodobnega človeka vleče v držo egocentričnosti, si logoterapija prizadeva za nasprotno. Lukasova vidi v tem duhovni napredek človeštva, ki je v vedno večjem premagovanju egocentrične »središčne obsedenosti« (Lukas, 2001: 199). Duhovni napredek gre vedno v smeri smiselne prhodnosti: »Duhovna zrelost zahteva derefleksivni proces, preraščanje
samega sebe; to je skrivnost transcendence, preseganje samega sebe, ki človeka pelje naprej v prihodnost« (199).
Metoda Respondenti
Vzorec je zajemal 200 kandidatov ženskega spola v starostnem razponu 20-60 let. Povprečna starost vseh udeležencev je 38,73 let.
Tabela 1: Starostne skupine
Starost (leta)	Št. respondentov	Procenti (%)
16-29	41	20,5
30-39	66	33
40-49	66	33
50-60	27	13,5
Respondenti so bili naključno izbrani v okviru različnih strokovnih izobraževanj za starše, učitelje, vzgojitelje in strokovne kolektive (seminarji, šole za starše, predavanja ...) po vsej Sloveniji, v letih 2011/12. Gre za ljudi z visoko oziroma univerzitetno izobrazbo. Merski instrument je bil respondentom osebno predstavljen in razdeljen, prav tako so jim bila predstavljena tudi navodila. Zaradi osebnega pristopa je bila vrnitev testov stoodstotna.
Merski instrument in postopek
Uporabili smo analitično-sintezno metodo in mednarodno strokovno priznani in uveljavljen merilni instrument (PIL-test) za »merjenje« stopnje bivanjske varnosti in eksistencialne frustracije. Statistične rezultate smo obdelali s pomočjo statističnega programskega paketa SPSS.
V središču raziskave je bivanjska praznina, v kateri je volja za smislom kot temeljnim človeškim gonilom frustrirana in se odraža v nevrotičnih simptomih. V ta namen smo uporabili standardizirani merilni instrument (The Purpose in Life Test), katerega avtorja sta J. C. Crumbaugh in L. T. Maholic (1969). Teoretično se naslanja na logoterapijo in predstavlja lestvico za merjenje stališč. Kot smo že omenili, logoterapevtsko gledano, je osnovni človekov motiv »težnja po smislu«. Freudovo »težnjo po užitku« logoterapija razlaga kot kompenzacijo za frustrirano težnjo po smislu. Adlerjevo »težnjo po moči« pa kot sredstvo za iskanje smisla. V tem okvirju PIL-test sondira meje bivanjskega vakuuma in eksistencialne krize, ki sta osrednja pojma logoterapije. PIL-test meri tudi občutje smisla v danih trenutkih in preko psihometričnih kazalcev osebnosti in lestvice za merjenje stališč prikaže stopnjo bivanjske varnosti v življenju. Notranja praznina, dolgočasje, apatija in melanholija izhajajo iz neosmišljenega življenja, ki vodi v bivanjski vakuum in eksistencialno frustracijo. Gre za čustveno reakcijo na doživljanje praznote, ki v mnogih primerih vodi v noogeno nevrozo (20 % vseh nevroz je noogenega izvora, kar so potrdili različni raziskovalni projekti, ki so bili opravljeni neodvisno drug od drugega in so jih vodili strokovnjaki iz različnih delov sveta, npr.: Frank M. Buckley, Eric Klinger, Dietrich Langen, Elisabeth S. Lukas, Eva Niebauer-Kozdera, Kazimierz Popielski, Hans Joachim Prill, Nina Toll, Ruth Volhard in T. A. Werner (Frankl, 1994a: 142)). Noogena nevroza je osebnostni zlom, ki nastane ob istočasni prisotnosti različnih nevrotskih simptomov, skupaj z nezmožnostjo najti ustrezen življenjski cilj. Eksistencialni vakuum sam po
sebi ne predstavlja nekega nevrotičnega stanja, je pa odraz splošne življenjske situacije v dobi prevladovanja tehnologije, ko posameznik izgublja občutek individualne iniciative. Pri osebah z nevrotičnimi zasnovami se razvije noogena nevroza. PIL-test je glede na spremenljivke, kot so spol, starost, stopnja izobrazbe in inteligentnost, homogen.
Rezultati
Z lestvico za merjenje stališč (PIL-test) smo pri respondentih izmerili meje bivanjskega vakuuma in eksistencialne krize. Obenem smo dobili tudi vrednosti za občutje smisla in stopnjo bivanjske varnosti v življenju. PIL-test je sestavljen iz dvajsetih postavk, katerih vrednosti vseh respondentov prikazuje naslednja tabela:
Tabela 2: Tabelarični prikaz rezultatov vseh postavk PIL-testa
Postavke PIL-testa	Vsota	Srednja vrednost	Standardni odklon	Varianca
Navadno se:	1114	5,57	0,767	0,588
Življenje se mi zdi:	1158	5,79	0,906	0,82
V svojem življenju:	1189	5,95	0,828	0,685
Svoje življenje doživljam kot:	1211	6,06	0,809	0,655
Vsak dan:	1141	5,71	1,069	1,144
Če bi lahko izbiral:	1187	5,94	0,914	0,835
Ko bom odšel v pokoj:	1217	6,09	0,934	0,872
Pri doseganju svojih življenjskih ciljev:	1101	5,51	0,845	0,714
Moje življenje je:	1101	5,51	0,73	0,533
Če bi se moje življenje danes končalo, bi ga ocenil:	1307	6,54	0,722	0,521
Kadar razmišljam o svojem življenju:	1259	6,3	0,762	0,581
Svet, v katerem živim:	1086	5,43	1,154	1,332
Menim, da sem:	1253	6,27	0,799	0,638
Moje prepričanje v zvezi s človekovo svobodo je:	1046	5,23	1,155	1,334
Če pomislim na smrt:	940	4,7	1,771	3,136
Kar se tiče samomora:	1235	6,18	1,369	1,874
Moja možnost, da si poiščem nekaj, za kar je vredno živeti, je:	1274	6,37	0,974	0,948
Moje življenje je:	1179	5,9	0,916	0,838
Vsakdanje naloge mi predstavljajo:	1126	5,63	0,915	0,837
Do sedaj:	1192	5,96	1,046	1,094
Najnižjo vrednost so dosegle naslednje tri postavke: Če pomislim na smrt (940), Moje prepričanje v zvezi s človekovo svobodo je (1046) in Svet, v katerem živim (1086). Najvišjo pa: Če bi se moje življenje danes končalo, bi ga ocenil (1307), Moja možnost, da si poiščem nekaj, za kar je vredno živeti, je (1274) in Kadar razmišljam o svojem življenju (1259).
Naslednji histogram prikazuje porazdelitev celotne vsote PIL-testa:
Slika 1: Histogram vsote celotnega PIL-testa
12,5"
10,0"
C
d) t LL
5,o-	n	n nr
2,5"
0,0-'—Y ^ ^ V ^ ^ V ^ ^ V ^ ^ V ^ ^ y
85 98 100 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 116 118 120 122 124 126 128 130 132 134 138 140
Suma PIL
Skupna vsota PIL-testa je normalno porazdeljena (std. dev. je 9,557; varianca je 91,43). Zanesljivost PIL-testa je 0,822 (Crombachova alpha).
Rezultati pri respondentih, ki so dosegli 112 točk in več, kažejo na jasno izdelane cilje v življenju, rezultati pod 105 točk pa pomenijo prisotnost eksistencialnega vakuuma.
Tabela 3: Klasificirani rezultati PIL-testa
Vrednosti PIL-testa	Št. oseb	Delež oseb v %
manj kot 105	25	12,50
od 105 do 112	38	19
nad 112	137	68,50
Zanimalo nas je tudi, katere postavke imajo največji vpliv na skupni rezultat:
Tabela 4: Korelacijske vrednosti PIL-testa
Kategorizirane postavke PIL-testa		Vsota PIL
Do sedaj:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,695
Moje življenje je:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,636
Svoje življenje doživljam kot:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,625
Življenje se mi zdi:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,613
Moje življenje je:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,595
Če bi se moje življenje danes končalo, bi ga ocenil:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,594
Vsak dan:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,579
Vsakdanje naloge mi predstavljajo:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,566
Če bi lahko izbiral:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,561
Svet, v katerem živim:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,546
Kadar razmišljam o svojem življenju:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,536
Pri doseganju svojih življenjskih		
ciljev:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,513
V svojem življenju:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,507
Moja možnost, da si poiščem nekaj, za kar je vredno živeti, je:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,455
Moje prepričanje v zvezi s človekovo svobodo je:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,416
Ko bom odšel v pokoj:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,382
Če pomislim na smrt:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,377
Navadno se:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,363
Kar se tiče samomora:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,36
Menim, da sem:	Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient	0,354
Razprava
Kot je razvidno iz teoretičnega dela, človek ni zadovoljen samo z zadovoljitvijo svojih potreb, ampak je predvsem bitje smisla. Potrebno se je zavedati, da je človek bitje, ki samega sebe nenehno presega, bodisi v predanosti neki nalogi ali neki osebi bodisi v preseganju določenih okoliščin in pogojev. V samem bistvu človek teži k smislu - volja do smisla. Človek ne potrebuje samo dobrih pogojev, ki mu omogočajo udobno in dostojanstva vredno življenje, ampak tudi smisel, za kaj bo živel. Temeljna naloga PIL-testa, ki temelji na logoterapevtski usmeritvi, je poiskati in specificirati noogeno problematiko, kar omogoča pravočasno ukrepanje, še posebej, ko gre za akutne primere. Prednost PIL-testa je v njegovi eksaktnosti ter v poudarku na merjenju stališč, smotrnosti v življenju in nazornem prikazu stopnje bivanjskega vakuuma in prisotnosti noogenih nevroz. O noogenih nevrozah govorimo takrat, ko se bivanjska frustriranost kaže v nevrotičnih simptomih. Bivanjska praznina se pri posamezniku vedno manifestira v treh smereh: agresija, zasvojenost in depresija (samomorilnost). Bivanjski vakuum je lahko latentne ali manifestne narave.
Preko merjenja stališč (PIL-test) smo prišli do razmejitve bivanjske varnosti, eksistencialne krize in bivanjskega vakuuma. V ospredju je merjenje občutja smisla v danih trenutkih. Rezultati PIL-testa kažejo (tabela 3), da je 13 % vseh preizkusnih oseb v bivanjskem vakuumu. 19 % respondentov kaže na ogroženost z eksistencialno frustracijo, 69 % respondentov je bivanjsko zavarovanih. Rezultat primerjave deležev starostnih skupin na skupni rezultat nam je pokazal, da druga starostna skupina (30-39) izstopa iz povprečja v področju med 105 in 112. Pomeni, da jih je največ ogroženih z eksistencialno frustracijo v tej skupini - 30,3 % iz te starostne skupine je uvrščenih v področje med 105 in 112. Slednje potrjuje tudi rezultat deleža v področju nad 112, kjer prav tako izstopa iz povprečja tretja starostna skupina, in sicer jih je nadpovprečno malo. Po rezultatih PIL-testa pomeni, da največ preizkusnih oseb doživlja eksistencialno krizo ali pa so na robu eksistencialne krize v tem starostnem obdobju. Glavni razlogi so delo na karieri, uspehu, zunanjemu izgledu in družbeni poziciji, obenem pa se pozablja na smiselne naloge, ki človekovo pozornost in namero vedno usmerjajo (preko sebe, iz sebe) v odnose, družino in udejanjanje vrednot v skladu s hierarhijo vrednot, kar v celoti spada pod posameznikovo duhovno razsežnost. Podpovprečno malo je tudi četrte starostne skupine (50-59) v področju med 105 in 112 - kaže na zavedanje izgubljenih smiselnih možnosti in napačnih odločitev, posledično pa zastira tudi smiselne možnosti v prihodnosti. Del skupine je nad povprečjem v področju nad 112, kar pomeni, da gre za respondente, ki v tem trenutku doživljajo svoje življenje izpolnjeno in so zadovoljni sami s sabo. V tem področju po pričakovanju izstopa tudi prva starostna skupina, ki je polna idej in načrtov za prihodnost. Postavlja se vprašanje, kako bo posameznik odreagiral, če načrtov ne bo uspel uresničiti in kako se bo »poraz« odražal na kvalitativni ravni njegovega bivanja.
S pomočjo korelacijske analize smo dobili rezultate, katere postavke PIL-testa so najbolj signifikantne (tabela 4). Končni rezultat ima največjo
linearno povezavo z dvajseto postavko, v kateri respondenti izbirajo stopnjo osebnega življenjskega cilja, ki se razteza od »še nisem našel svojega življenjskega cilja« do »sem si našel zadovoljujoče in jasne cilje v življenju«. Vrednost, dobljena s pomočjo Spearmanovega korelacijskega koeficienta, je pričakovana, kajti dvajseta postavka eksplicitno meri notranji življenjski smisel. Naslednji dve postavki, ki najbolj vplivata na končni rezultat, sta osemnajsta (Moje življenje je) in četrta postavka (Svoje življenje doživljam kot). Tudi ti dve sta v skladu s pričakovanim rezultatom. Četrta postavka zajema osebno občutenje smisla v danem trenutku. V tej postavki se respondent opredeli glede bivanjskega stanja - kako doživlja svoje življenje. Lestvica se razteza med »povsem nesmiselno« in med »zelo polno in smiselno«. Osemnajsta postavka eksplicitno meri osebno doživljanje samega sebe kot svobodnega bitja. Gre za občutje osebne svobode - ali sem svoboden in kreator lastnega življenja ali sem žrtev okoliščin in okolja in na to nimam bistvenega vpliva. V tem smislu se merilna skala osemnajste postavke razteza med (Moje življenje je) »v mojih rokah in ga sam usmerjam« in med »izven moje kontrole in pod vplivom zunanjih dejavnikov«. Vprašanje svobode je temeljno vprašanje človeške eksistence. Iz odgovora na to vprašanje so odvisni osebno dostojanstvo, samospoštovanje, zdrava samopodoba in samozavest ter doživljanje samega sebe kot bitja »za smisel«. Z rezultatom je presenetila najnižja stopnja linearne povezave postavke trinajst, ki meri stopnjo osebne odgovornosti. Vrednosti se gibajo med (Menim, da sem:) »zelo neodgovoren človek« in med »zelo odgovoren človek«. Predvidoma bi morale biti vrednosti trinajste in osemnajste postavke v kongruentnem razmerju. Dobljeni rezultat razumemo v smislu, da se posameznik veliko bolj doživlja svobodnega kot odgovornega. Kar potrjuje tendenco sodobnega duha časa, ki svobodo razumeva bolj v smislu svobodnjaštva in samovolje kot pa svobode »za nekaj« oziroma »za nekoga«.
Dvanajsta postavka spada med zadnje tri z najnižjim rezultatom. Čeprav srednja vrednost te postavke sega preko polovice (5,43), je še vedno med najnižjimi - gledano na celoto; sicer implicitno zajema smisel, obenem pa je le-ta vezan na svet/okolje, v katerega je posameznik vpet. Nizek rezultat lahko razumemo v smislu napačne orientiranosti sodobnega človeka, da od okolice in sveta pričakuje preveč oziroma je zanj veliko bolj aktualno vprašanje, kaj bo od življenja (sveta, okolice) prejel, kot pa vprašanje, kaj bo življenju dal. Neizpolnjena pričakovanja in zahteve gredo vedno na škodo odnosa do sveta in posledično tudi osmišljenega življenja. Ob dvanajsti postavki z najnižjim rezultatom sta še postavki štirinajst in petnajst. Štirinajsto postavko zajema faktor svobode in izraža osebno prepričanje, v kolikšni meri je človek svoboden v svojem delovanju oziroma v kolikšni meri je pogojen od okolja in dednosti. K zmedi je na tem področju nedvomno veliko prispevala stroka, ki že dolga desetletja močno poudarja človekovo determiniranost s strani staršev, genov, okolja... Pozablja pa na človekovo zmožnost samotranscendence in zavzetja stališča. Človekovega vedenja in delovanja ne določajo zunanji pogoji in okoliščine, ampak osebne odločitve in stališča, ki jih zavzame do določenih danosti. Ob poudarjanju determiniranosti človek izgublja na dostojanstvu in notranji moči ter samega sebe vedno bolj doživlja kot žrtev raznih zunanjih vplivov, na katera nima bistvenega vpliva. Tudi v tej postavki vidimo potrditev sedanjega duha časa. Petnajsta postavka (faktor smrti) ima najnižji skupni rezultat (940). Smrt spada pod logoterapevtsko »tragično trojico bivanja«, ki se sprašuje, ali je do smrti možno zavzeti smiselno stališče. Čeprav je smrt najresničnejše dejstvo našega obstoja, je področje, ki vzbuja največ nelagodja (predvsem v razvitem svetu). Duh časa narekuje ljudem vrednote lepote, zdravja, moči in uspeha, zato je smrt v modernističnem konceptu tujek. Pomembno je še nekaj drugega, smrt daje našemu življenju dimenzijo dokončnosti. Izgubljeni, neosmišljeni trenutki našega življenja se ne bodo nikoli več vrnili, zato je smrt bistvena komponenta samega smisla. Kot smo že omenili, je smisel
določen z nalogami, ki jih pred nas postavlja življenje, in se odraža v dveh razsežnostih: ad personen (človek kot neponovljivo, enkratno in nenadomestljivo bitje) in adsituationen (ireverzibilnost vsakršne situacije in trenutka). Iz tega sledi, da bolj kot je posameznikovo življenje bivanjsko zavarovano in osmišljeno, manjši je strah pred smrtjo in obratno. Pomeni da ima faktor smrti pomembno vlogo pri evalvaciji stopnje smisla.
Rezultati raziskave PIL-testa so nam podali odstotni delež, da kar tretjina respondentov doživlja eksistencialno frustracijo, od tega jih je več kot petina že v bivanjskem vakuumu. V primerjavi s podobnimi raziskavami po vsem svetu je na slovenskem področju ta delež bistveno večji. Dejansko imajo vse postavke z najnižjimi rezultati svoj izvor v duhovni razsežnosti, ki je v današnjem času izredno zapostavljena in napačno interpretirana oziroma sploh ni; predvsem z vidika različnih humanističnih znanostih. Samo po sebi se torej pojavi vprašanje, kako preprečiti drsenje v eksistencialno frustracijo. Imamo generacije otrok in mladostnikov, ki postajajo vedno bolj nezadovoljne in apatične, nimajo svojih ciljev, ne vedo, za kaj bi si prizadevale in za kaj živele. Ostaja torej odprto vprašanje za vse ustanove, ki vzgajajo mlade, kaj jim ponuditi namesto lagodnega življenja. Rešitev vidimo v starših in učiteljih, ki imajo najprej sami osmišljeno življenje (saj predstavljajo otrokom vzore), in v zahtevah, ki bodo otrokom odpirale svet dela in učenja. Danes obstajajo številne ustanove, neformalne organizacije, skupine za nudenje različnih psihosocialnih pomoči, ki pomagajo ljudem pri soočenju, zdravljenju ali prenašanju življenjskih stisk. Verjetno bo v prihodnosti potrebno delati tudi na preventivnih programih vzgoje, ohranitve duševnega zdravja, ki bodo ljudi opremljali za smiselno življenje, predvsem na ozaveščanju človekove duhovne zmožnosti, s katero se lahko hrabro sooča z usodnimi stanji. V sodobnem času prevladuje tako imenovani kult telesa, ki seveda lahko pripomore k izboljšanju telesnega zdravja, pa tudi psihičnih obremenitev. Ker pa je zadovoljstvo (in indirektno tudi sreča) posameznika
dosegljivo le preko konkretnih odnosov z drugimi ali preko dobrih del, je potrebno na prvo mesto postaviti ustvarjanje in negovanje odnosov, doživljajske vrednote in zmanjševanje delavnosti, ki ima samo smisel potrošnje.
Viri in literatura
Burger, H. Daniel, Freddie, Crous in Gert, Roodt (2008): Logo-od: The
applicability of Logotherapy as an organisation development intervention.
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Chamberlain, Kerry in Zika, Sheryl (1988): Measuring meaning in life: An
examination of three scales. Personality and Individual Differences, 9:,
589-596.
Crumbaugh, James C. in Maholic, Leonard F. (1964): An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noogenic Neurosis. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 20:, 200-207. Fabry, Joseph (1988): Guideposts to meaning: Discovering What Really Matters. Oakland: New Harbinger Publications.
Fizzotti, Eugenio (2007): Il senso come terapia: Fondamenti teorico-clinici della logoterapia di Victor E. Frankl. Milano: FrancoAngeli. Frankl, Viktor E. (2005a): Človek pred vprašanjem o smislu. Ljubljana: Pasadena.
Frankl, Viktor E. (2005b): Man's Search for Ultimate Meaning. London: Random House Group.
Frankl, Viktor E. (2004): On the Theory and Therapy of Mental Disorders: An Introduction to Logotherapy and Existential Analysis. New York: Taylor&Francis Group.
Frankl, Viktor E. (2000): Viktor Frankl Recollections: An Autobiography. Cambridge: Basic Books.
Franki, Viktor E. (1994a): Volja do smisla. Celje: Mohorjeva družba. Franki, Viktor E. (1994b): Zdravnik in duša. Celje: Mohorjeva družba. Frankl, Viktor E. (1992): Kljub vsemu rečem življenju da. Celje: Mohorjeva družba.
Frankl, Viktor E. (1987): Man's search for meaning. New York: Pocket Books.
Frankl, Viktor E. (1985): Der unbewusste Gott. München: Kösel-Verlag. Frankl, Viktor E. (1983): ... Trotzem hat das Leben einen Sinn: Argumente für einen tragischen Optimismus. Tiroler Landerstheater zu Innsbruck (6. juni 1983). Audiotext Kasettenproduktion. Zvočni posnetek predavanja. Frankl, Viktor E. (1981): The Will of Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy. New York: New American Library. Frankl, Viktor E. (1980): Bog podsvijesti. Zagreb: Oko tri ujutru. Frankl, Viktor E. (1978): The unheard cry for meaning. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Frankl, Viktor E. (1967): Psychoterapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy. New York: Washington Square Press. Galimberti, Umberto (2009): Grozljivi gost: nihilizem in mladi. Ljubljana: Modrijan.
Halama, Peter (2009): The Pil test in a Slovak sample: Internal consistency and factor structure. The International Forum for Logotherapy 32:, 84-88. Jaspers, Karl (2000): O pogojih in možnostih novega humanizma. Ljubljana: Društvo Apokalipsa.
Kant, Immanuel (2003a): Kritika praktičnega uma. Ljubljana: Analecta. Kant, Immanuel (2003b): Kritika čistoga uma. Beograd: Dereta. Koprek, Ivan (1992: Korak za smisao: Antropologijsko-etičke studije i eseji. Zagreb: Filozofsko-teološki institut.
Lewis, Clive Staples (1998): Odprava človeka. Ljubljana: Claritas.
Lukas, Elisabeth (2001): Tudi tvoje trpljenje ima smisel. Celje: Mohorjeva
družba.
Lukas, Elisabeth (1993): Družina in smisel. Celje: Mohorjeva družba.
Lukas, Elisabeth (1986a): Meaning in Suffering: Comfort in Crisis Through logotherapy. Berkeley: Institute of Logotherapy Press. Lukas, Elisabeth (1986b): Test zur Messung von 'inner Sinnerfulung' und 'existentieller Frustration'. Wien: Franz Deuticke Verlagsgesellschaft mBH. Marshall, Maria (2010): Life with Meaning: Guide to the Fundamental Principles of Viktor E. Frankl's Logotherapy. Canada, Nova Scotia: Logotherapy Study Group of the Maritimes.
Musek, Janek (1995): Ljubezen, družina, vrednote. Ljubljana: Educy. Musek, Janek (1993): Osebnost in vrednote. Ljubljana: Educy. Scheler, Max (1998): Položaj človeka v kozmosu. Ljubljana: Nova revija. Taylor, Charles (2007): A Secular Age. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Trstenjak, Anton (1994): Človek samemu sebi. Celje: Mohorjeva družba.
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Fakulteta za uporabne družbene študije v Novi Gorici School of Advanced Social Studies in Nova Gorica Let. 6, Št. 1, Vol. 6, No. 1 2013
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