33
Iz virni	znans tv eni	članek/ Article	(1.01)
Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly	82	(2022)	1,	33—44
Besedilo	pr eje t o/R eceiv ed:09/2020;	spr eje t o/ Accep t ed:08/2021
UDK/UDC:	123:2-183.7
DOI:	10.34291/B V2022/01/Dobrz eniecki
©	2022	Dobrz eniecki,	CC	B Y	4.0
Marek Dobrzeniecki
Belief in God and Affective States: A Free-Will Re-
sponse to the Hiddenness Argument
1
Vera v Boga in afektivna stanja: odgovor svobodne 
volje na argument skritosti
Abstract : The	 paper	 off er s	 a	 ne w	 v er sion 	 of	 a	 fr ee-will	 de f ence	 t o	 Schellenber g ’ s	
hidde nne ss	 ar g ume n t.	 P r e v ious	 de f e nce s	 w e r e 	 accuse d	 of	 ab solutizing 	 human 	
fr eedom	 and	 not	 sho wing	 ho w a	 c ognitiv e 	 s t a t e	 c oncerning	 divine	 e xis t ence 	
c ould	 lim it	 the	 mor al	 fr eedom	 of	 people.	 The paper	 addr esses	 these	 issues	 b y	
r e f erring	 t o	 Aquinas’	 and	 Pruss’	 idea	 tha t	 ther e	 c ould	 be	 e vidence	 f a v ouring 	
God	 tha t	 r esults	 in	 a	 c ognitiv e	 s t a t e	 of	 cert ain ty	 acc ompanied	 b y	 the	 a ff ectiv e	
s t a t es	 tha t	 depri v e	 peopl e	 of	 mor al 	 fr eedom. 	 A	 r el a tionshi p	 with	 God	 f ounded 
on	 this	 e vidence	 w ould	 not	 be	 per sonal.	 Ther e f or e,	 God	 is	 jus tified	 in	 holding	
such	a	piece	of e vidence	back	(f or	a t	leas t	a	period	of	time).
Keywords :	 the	 hiddenness	 ar gumen t,	 fr ee-will	 de f ence,	 c ognitiv e	 fr eedom,	 mor al	
fr eedom,	the	dominan t	op tion
Povzetek:	 Članek	 ponuja	 no v o	 r azličic o	 z ag o v or a	 s v obodne	 v olje	 pr oti	 Schellenber -
g o v e m u	 ar g ume n tu	 sk r it os ti.	 P r e jšnjim 	 z ag o v or om 	 so	 oč it ali	 ab solutiz ac ijo	 č lo-
v ešk e	 s v obode	 in	 pa	 t o ,	 da	 ne	 pok až ejo	 z ar es,	 k ak o	 lahk o	 k ognitivna	s t anja, 	
po v e z ana	 z	 bo žjim	 ob s t ojem,	 omejujejo	 mor alno	 s v obodo	 ljudi.	 Članek	 obr a v -
na v a	 omenjena	 vpr ašanja	 s	 skli ce v anjem	 na	 idejoT omaž a	 Akv insk eg a	 in	 Prussa	
o	 dok az u	 z a	 ob s t oj	 Bog a.	 T o	 v odi	 v 	 k og nitiv no	 s t anje 	 g ot o v os ti, 	 k i	 g a	 spr e m ljajo	
a f ek tivna	 s t anja ,	 k ar	 pa	 ljudem	 jemlje	 mor alno	 s v obodo.	 Odnos	 z	 Bog om,	 ut e-
meljen	 na	 t ak šnem	 dok az u,	 ne	 bi	 bil	 oseben.	 Z a t o	 lahk o	 Bog	 t ak šen	 dok az	 upr a-
vičeno	z adrži	(v saj	z a	določen	č as).
Ključne besede :	 ar gumen t	 skrit os ti, 	 z ag o v or	 s v obodne	 v olje,	 k ognitivna	 s v oboda, 	
mor alna	s v oboda,	pr e vladujoč a	izbir a
The	 hiddenness	 ar gumen t	 f ormula t ed	 by	 John	 L.	 Schellenber g	 c oncen tr a t es	 on	 the 	
pr oblem	 of	 the	 e xis t ence	 of	 non-r esis t an t	 non-belie v er s	 or ,	 t o	 put	 it	 diff er en tly , 	 of 	
1	
The	 author	 ackno wledg es	 the	 financial	 support	 fr om	 the	 Na tional	 Cen t er	 of	 Science	 in	 P oland,	 r esear ch 	
pr oject	„Deus absconditus – Deus revelatus,	gr an t	no.	2018/29/B/HS1/00922“ .

34 Bogoslovni vestnik 82 (2022) • 1
the	 w eak	 epis t emic	 position	 of	 theism.	 The	 Canadian	 philosopher	 claims	 tha t	 ther e 	
is	 some thing	 inc onsis t en t	 in	 accepting	 both:	 (1)	 the	 claim	 tha t	 an	 omnipot en t	 and 	
omnibenev olen t	 God	 e xis ts	 (tha t	 is,	 a	 God	 whose	 one	 of	 the	 aims	 w ould	 be	 t o	 en t er 	
in t o	 per sonal	 r ela tionships	 with	 cr ea tur es	 c apable	 of	 an	 a w ar e	 and	 loving	 r esponse 	
f or	 the	 sak e	 of	 their	 g oodness	 and	 happiness),	 as	 w ell	 as	 (2)	 the	 c ommon-sense	 r e-
mark	 that	 among	 non-believer s	 ar e	 those	 who	 honestly	 sear ch	 f or	 God,	 who	 entert a-
in	 in	 such	 endea v our s	 their	 in t ellectual	 pow er s,	 but	 the y	 either	 s till	 r emain	 a	 sceptic 	
when	 it	 c omes	 t o	 God’ s	 e xis t ence,	 or	 the y	 s tr aigh tf orw ar dly	 r eject	 it.	 Schellenber g 	
ar gues	 tha t	 in	 a	 w orld	 g ov erned	 by	 a	 benev olen t	 and	 omnipot en t	 God,	 ther e	 w ould 	
be	 only	 one	 gr oup	 of	 non-belie v er s:	 those	 in v oking	 Schellenber g ’ s	 me t aphor	 who 	
in t en tionally	 close	 their	 ey es	 t o	 a v oid	 seeing	 the	 ligh t	 of	 evidence	 speaking	 in	 f a v our 	
of	 theism.	 In	 other	 w or ds,	 if	 theism	 is	 true,	 it	 cannot	 be	 in	 a	 w eak	 epis t emic	 position. 	
In	 wha t	 f ollo w s,	 I	 shall	 pr esen t	 an	 original	 fr ee-will	 de f ence	 of	 theism	 tha t	 is 	
i n sp i r ed 	 b y	 th e	 c o n cep t	 o f	 a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es. 	 I	 sh al l 	 b egi n 	 wi th 	 an al y si n g	 S ch el l en -
ber g ’ s	 e xpect a tions	 of	 God,	 which	 I	 shall	 enc ap sula t e	 in	 the	 c oncep t	 of	 e vidence	
T .	 In	 m y	 opinion,	 only	 r eligious	 e xperience	 (e vidence	 RE)	 fulfi ls	 the	 r equir emen ts	
of	 e vidence	 T ,	 so	 I	 shall	 ask	 if	 ther e	 ar e	 an y	 r easons	 f or	 which	 God	 does	 not	 uni -
v er sal l y	 gr ace	 us	 wi th	 such	 e xp eri ences?	 I	 wi l l 	 ar gue	 tha t	 ther e	 i s	 i n deed	 a	 jus tif y -
ing	 r eason	 f or	 tha t,	 namely	 our	 mor al	 fr eedom.	 A t	 the	 end	 of	 the	 paper ,	 I	 will	 ad-
dr ess	some	of	the	possible	objections	t o	m y	pr oposal.
1. Conditions of a Personal Relationship with God
Since	 a	 bene v ol en t	 and	 omnip ot en t	 Cr ea t or	 w ould	 c ar e	 f or	 the	 w ell-being	 of	 His	
self -c onscious	 cr ea tur es	 and	 w ould	 be	 a w ar e	 tha t	 the y	 achie v e	 thei r	 fulfilmen t	 in 	
a	 per sonal	 r ela tionship	 with	 Him,	 He	 w ould	 a t	 leas t	 be	 open	 t o	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tion -
ship	 with	 an y	 fin it e	 per son	 who 	 has	 the	 c apacities	 needed	 f or	 such	 a	 r ela tionship	
(Schellenber g	 2015,	 40).	 Ho w e v er ,	 since	 in	 or der	 t o	 participa t e	 in	 a	 r ela tionship 	
with	 another	 per son,	 one	 has	 t o	 be	 cert ain	 tha t	 the	 per son	 in	 ques tion	e xis ts, 	
the	 belie f	 in	 God	 appear s	 t o	 be	 the	 necessar y	 c ondition	 of	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tion-
ship	 be tw een	 man	 and	 God.	 It	 means	 tha t	 ,being	 open	 t o	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tionship ‘ 	
includes	 deliv er ing	 finit e	 per sons	 e vidence	 tha t	 w ould	 not	 ha v e	 t o	 aut oma tic ally	
p r od u ce	 a	 th ei s tic	 b el i e f	 (b ec au se	 i n	 o r d er	 t o 	 r emai n	 fr ee,	 a	 man 	 h as	 t o 	 b e	 ab l e 	
t o	 r eject	 it),	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 e vidence	 tha t	 w ould	 g ener ally	 be	 and	 a t	 all 	
times	 a v ailable	 and	 w ould	 r ender	 a	 belie f	 in	 God	 highly	 pr ob able	 (1993,	 28).	 Le t	
us	 c all	 such	 e vidence	–	e vidence	T	 (as	 e vidence	f or	theism).	 If	such	 e vidence	e xi -
s t ed,	 then	 all	 non-belie f	 w ould	 r esult	 only	 fr om	 epis t emic	 or	 mor al	 dr a wback s	 such 	
as	 neglig ence	 in	 e vidence	 acquisition, 	 indiff er ence 	 f or	 in v es tig a tion	 pr ocedur es, 	
mor al 	 pride,	 and 	 so	 on,	 and 	 w ould	 be	 r esis t an t. 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 w e	 kno w	 tha t 	
in	 the	 actual	 w orld	 it	 is	 not	 the	 c ase	 tha t	 e v er y	 a theis t	 or	 agnos tic	 is	 c ognitiv ely 	
s tubborn.	 Ther e	 ar e	 non-r esis t an t	 a theis ts	 or	 agnos tics	 among	 us,	 those	 who	 ar e	
both	 epis t emic ally	 as	 w ell	 as	 mor ally	 virtuous	 (or	 a t	 leas t	 those	 who	 ar e	 not	 mor e 	
c orrup t	and	misguided	than	theis ts).	

35 Marek Dobrzeniecki - Belief in God and Affective States
The	 mos t	 vit al	 ques tion	 with	 r eg ar d	 t o	 the	 hiddenness	 ar gumen t	 r eads	 as	 f ol -
lo w s:	 »Is	 e vidence	 T	 me t aph y sic ally	 possible?«	 If	 e vidence	 T	 w as	 me t aph y sic ally	
impossible,	 insis ting	 tha t	 not	 deliv ering	 e vidence	 T	 speak s	 ag ains t	 God’ s	 e xis t ence 	
w ould	not	f orm	a	c ase	f a v ouring	a theism	(1993,	44).
Schellenber g	claims	tha t,	since	God	is	omnipot en t,	ther e:
I.	Could	be	deliv er ed	an	e vidence	T	tha t	w ould:
	 a)	be	g ener ally	and	a t	all	times	a v ailable.
Acc or ding	 t o	 Schellenber g ’ s	 demands,	 ther e	 c annot	 be	 a	 time	t 	 when	 a	 non-
r esis t an t	 per son	 is	 in	 a	 non-belie f	 s t a t e	 in	 r ela tion	 t o	 the	 theis tic	 pr oposition	 (2015, 	
57).	 It	 w ould	 amoun t	 t o	 allo wing	 a	 non-r e sis t an t	 s t a t e 	 of	 nonbe lie f	 f or	 a	 ce r t ain 	
amoun t	 of	 time, 	 e v en	 if	 limit ed.	 E vidence	 T	 has	 t o	 be	 alw a y s	 ther e,	 it	 should	 be 	
noticeable	if	a	per son	turns	his	or	her	a tt en tion	t o	it.
	 b)	r ender	theism	true.
One 	 of	 the 	 mos t	 impor t an t	 f e a tur e s	 of	 e v ide nce	 T	 is	 tha t	 it	 has	 t o	 be 	 appar e n t.	
S ch el l en b er g	 i s	 a w ar e	 o f	 th e	 f act	 th a t	 th er e	 ar e	 p h i l o so p h er s	 wh o 	 th i n k	 th a t	 w e	
c an	 achie v e	 knowledg e	 of	 God,	 but	 wha t	 he	 poin ts	 out	 as	 char act eris tic	 of	 the 	
ar gumen ts	 the y	 in v ok e	 is	 tha t	 the y	 ar e	 r ebutt able,	 as	 the	 long-las ting	 deba t es 	
ar ound	 these	 ar gumen ts	 c on firm.	 The y	 ar e	 not	 appar en t	 in	 the	 sense	 tha t	 the y 	
do	 not	 pr oduce	 a	 c onsensus	 among	 non-r esis t an t	 r esear cher s	 in	 r ela tion	 t o	 the 	
ques tion	of	God.	E vidence	T	w ould	ha v e	t o	be	diff er en t	in	this	r eg ar d.	
Schellenber g	also	claims	tha t:
II.	W e	do	not	enc oun t er	e vidence	T	in	the	actual	w orld.	
Theses	 (I)	 and	 (II)	 mak e	 theism	 challenging	 t o	 de f end.	 If	 one	 c ould	 think	 of 	
e vidence	 tha t	 w ould	 be	 g ener ally	 a v ailable	 and	 w ould	 r ender	 theism	 pr obable, 	
then	 one	 c an	 r aise	 a	 ques tion:	 wh y	 does	 God	 le t	 innocen t	 in	 this	 r eg ar d 	 people 	
r emai n	 i n	 the	 darkn ess	 of	 doub t	 or	 e v en	 i n	 r ejection	 of	 Hi s	 e xi s t ence?	 S chel l en -
ber g	 ans w er s	 fr om	 the	 a theis tic	 poin t	 of	 vie w:	 the	 f act	 tha t	 ther e	 is	 no	 e vidence	
T	 in	 the	 actual 	 w orld	 means	 tha t	 ther e	 is	 an	 ob s t acle	 God	 c ould	 elimina t e	 in	 or der 	
t o	 ensur e	 tha t	 e v er y	 finit e	 per son	 is	 in	 a	 position	 t o	 participa t e	 in	 a	 per sonal	 r e -
la tionship	 with	 Him,	 tha t	 He	 appar en tly	 did	 not	 elimina t e.	 It	 c ould	 speak	 ag ains t	
his	 omn ipot ence	 (ma ybe	 He	 c annot	 do	 wha t e v er	 is	 me t aph y sic ally	 possible?)	 or	
bene v olence	 (ma ybe	 He	 does	 not	 c ar e	 a ft er 	 all	 about	 participa ting 	 in	 per sonal 	
r ela tionship s	 with	 us?).	 Ei ther	 w a y , 	 thei sm	 tha t	 pr oclaims	 the	 e xi s t ence	 of	 a	 be-
ne v olen t	and	omnipot en t	God	has	some thing	legitima t e	t o	e xplain.
2.  Religious Exp erienc e
In	 or der	 t o	 de f end	 it,	 w e	 should	 look	 mor e 	 c ar e fully	 a t	 the	 ques tion	 of	 whe ther 	
God	 is	 jus tified	 in	 not	 deliv ering	 t o	 us	 e vidence	 T .	 Wha t	 c ould 	 be	 the	 e x ample	 of	
e vidence	 T?	 Schellenber g	 is	 not	 clear	 on	 this	 poin t	 since	 he	 shifts	 his	 position	 with 	

36 Bogoslovni vestnik 82 (2022) • 1
the	 passag e	 of	 time. 	 In	 his	 earlier	 w ork s,	 he	 emphasiz ed	 the	 import ance	 of	 the 	
in w ar d	 e xperience	 of	 God;	 no w ada y s,	 his	 position	 is	 less	 e x clusiv e	 in	 this	 r eg ar d,	
but	 g ener ally ,	 he	 men tions	 r eli gious	 e xperience	 as	 a	 c andida t e	 f or	 e vidence	 T .	 He	
ar gues	 tha t	 the	 c o v e t ed	 e vidence	 T	 c ould	 be	 a	 non-sensor y ,	 in t ense,	 and	 appar en t 	
e xperience	 of	 God’ s	 f or giving ,	 c om f orting ,	 and	 guiding	 pr esence	 in	 a	 backgr ound	
a w ar eness,	 so	 it	 does	 not	 ha v e	 t o	 be	 (and	 one	 c an	 suspect	 tha t	 it	 c ould	 not	 be) 	
in trusiv e	 t o	 an y one’ s	 e xperience	 (le t	 us	 c all	 this	 type	 of	 e vidence	 –	 e vidence	 RE).	
E vidence	 RE	 includes	 God’ s	 c ons t an t	 pr esence	 in	 one’ s	 a w ar eness	 (e v en	 if	 not	
e xp l i ci t)	 an d 	 a	 p er so n ’ s	 s wi t ch i n g	 t o 	 th e	 d i vi n e	 p r esen ce	 i n s t an tl y	 wh en	 h e	 o r	 sh e 	
r eaches	 the	 appr opria t e	 s t ag e	 of	 de v elopmen t	 of	 c apacities	 enabling	 the	 per son	
t o	 e xplic itly	 gr asp	 the	 divine	 pr esence	 (1993,	 48–49).	 In	 this	 sense,	 one	 c an	 s t a t e	
tha t	 e vidence	 RE	 is	 a t	 all	 times	 a v ailable.	 Mor eo v er ,	 bec ause	 the	 e xperience	 of 	
the	 divine	 pr esence	 w ould	 be	 a v ailable 	 t o	 all	 human	 beings,	 e vidence	 RE	 w ould	
be	g ener ally	a v ailable	(in	other	w or ds,	it	fulfils	r equir emen t	(a)).
Schellenber g	 also	 de f ends	 the	 thesis	 tha t	 e vidence	 RE	 described	 as	 such	 w ould 	
r ender	 theism	 highly	 pr obable	 (it	 fulfils	 the	 r equir emen t	 (b)).	 He	 gr ounds	 his	 c on-
viction	 on	 f ea tur es	 of	 the	 e xperience	 of	 the	 divine	 pr esence.	 Acc or ding	 t o	 him,	 it	
w ould	be:
-	 in t ense,	so	tha t	one	w ould	not	mis t ak enly	ov erlook	it	in	one’ s	c onsciousness;
-	 appar en t	 –	 it	 w ould	 r ein f or ce	 the	 theis tic	 belie f s	 f ormed	 in	 other	 w a y s.	 F or 	
e x ample,	 it	 w ould	 be	 an	 e xperience	 of	 c onsola tion	 in	 the	 time	 of	 suff ering ,	 an 	
e xperience	 of	 a ffirma tion	 in	 the	 momen t	 of	 doubts	 with	 r eg ar d	 t o	 the	 sour ce 	
of	 the	 divine	 pr esence	 e xperience,	 it	 w ould	 be	 an	 e xperience	 of	 enc our ag e -
men t	in	momen ts	of	making	import an t	lif e	decisions,	e t c.;
-	 univ er sal	–	Schellenber g	think s	tha t	the	 unif ormity	of	 its	descriptions	c oming 	
fr om	 people	 e v ery	 time	 and	 e v erywher e	 w ould	 also	 r ein f or ce	 the	 s tr eng th	 of 	
e vidence	RE.
Mor e	import an tly ,	he	think s	tha t	such	e vidence	is	me t aph y sic ally	possible:
»The	 s t a t e	 of	 a ff air s	 I	 ha v e	 described	 seems	 clearly	 possible:	 its	 descrip-
tion	 seems	 perf ectly	 c oher en t.	 Indeed, 	 it	 c ould	 be	 the 	 c ase 	 tha t	 all	 human 	
beings	 with	 a	 c apacity	 f or	 a	 per sonal 	 r ela tionship	 with	 God	 bec ome	 a w ar e 	
of	God’ s	pr esence«	(1993,	51).
3. Hick’s and Swinburne’s Defences of Theism
In	 wha t	 f ollo w s,	 I	 shall	 de f end	 a	 simple	 claim.	 I	 shall	 ar gue	 tha t	 God	 has	 a	 jus tif y -
ing	 r eason	 not	 t o	 deliv er	 e vidence	 RE	 t o	 finit e	 per sons	 tha t	 ar e	 non-r esis t an t	 t o	 a	
r ela tionship	 with	 Him 	 and	 this	 r eason	 is	 His	 will	 t o	 pr eser v e 	 the	 mor al	 fr eedom 	 of 	
finit e	 per sons.	 It	 c ould	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 surprise	 bec ause	 Schellen ber g	 dismissed	 the	
so-c alled	 fr ee-will	 r esponses	 tha t	 occurr ed	 in	 the	 philosophic al	 lit er a tur e	 on	 this	

37 Marek Dobrzeniecki - Belief in God and Affective States
subject.	 F or	 e x ample,	 John	 Hick	 in	Faith and Knowledge claimed that in order to 
pr ot ect	 mor al	 fr eedom,	 a	 human	 being	 has	 t o	 pr eser v e	 c ognitiv e 	 fr eedom	 with 	
r eg ar d	 t o	 the	 e xis t ence	 of	 God,	 and	 this	 is	 wh y	 the	 cr ea t ed	 w orld	 is	 open	 t o	 both	
in t erpr e t a tions: 	 theis tic 	 as	 w ell	 as	 a theis tic.	 If	 w e	 had	 c on vincing	 pieces	 of	 e vi-
dence	 in 	 f a v our	 of	 theism	 a t	 ou r	 disposal,	 this	 w ould	 ruin	 ou r	 c ognitiv e	 fr eedom	
and,	 in	 c onsequence,	 our	 aut onom y	 (1988,	 133–135).	 This,	 how ev er ,	 assumes 	
tha t	 kno wledg e	 of	 God	 is	 of	 a	 special	 kind:	 acc or ding	 t o	 Hick,	 the	 act	 of	 kno wing	
God	 is	 a t	 the	 same	 time	 the	 act	 of	 obedience:	 »I	 c annot	 kno w	 tha t	 such	 a	 being	
e xis ts	 and	 be	 a t	 the	 same	 time 	 indiff er en t	 t o	 him.«	 (1983,	 48)	 Wher eas	 normally ,	
the	gr o w th	 of	 kno wledg e	br oadens	 the	c apacities	 of	 humank ind	 (e v en	if	 it	 limits	
the	 sc ope	 of	 wha t	 seems	 t o	 be	 a	 r a tional	 choice),	 the	 kno wledg e	 of	 God	 w ould 	
ha v e	 shrunk en	 it	 not	 only	 t o	 the	 poin t	 tha t	 w e	 w ould	 ha v e	 had	 a	 limit ed	 r ang e	 of	
sus t ainable	 positions	 in	 the ology	 and	 philosoph y	 (it	 se e ms	 tha t	 it	 w ould	 not	 ha v e 	
abolished	 our	 fr eedom	 jus t	 as	 an y	 other	 truth	 w e	 g ain	 during	 the	 c our se	 of	 the 	
de v elopmen t	 of	 our 	 socie ties	 does	 not	 abolish	 our	 fr eedom)	 but	 also	 t o	 a	 poin t 	
wher e	 w e	 w ould	 not	 ha v e	 been	 aut onomous	 subjects	 an ymor e	 c apable	 of	 making 	
fr ee	 decisions	 and	 of	 fr ee-thinking.	 It	 seems	 c on tr o v er sial,	 and	 as	 Schellenber g 	
poin ts	 out:	 »It	 is	 not	 a t	 all	 clear	 tha t	 individual 	 who 	 c ame	 t o	 belie v e	 w ould	 not	 be 	
c ognitiv ely	and	mor ally	fr ee.«	(1993,	109–110)
The	 other	 gr ea t	 theis tic	 philosopher ,	 Richar d	 S winburne,	 also	 ar gued	 tha t	 if	 w e 	
had	 a	 solid	 r eason	 t o	 belie v e	 in	 God,	 it	 w ould	 diminish	 our	 fr eedom.	 A	 per son	 who 	
k no w s	 t ha t 	 G od	 e xis t s	 also	 k no w s	 t ha t	 He 	 ob se r v e r s	 and	 judg e s	 e v e r y 	 m o v e m e n t	
of	 His	 cr ea tur es,	 especially	 self -c onscious	 and	 mor al	 ones,	 and	 tha t	 in	 the	 end,	 He 	
will	 mak e	 a	 decision	 about	 the	 final	 des tin y	 of	 the	 la tt er .	 In	 S winburne’ s	 vie w ,	 un -
der	such 	cir cums t ances,	 the	belie f	in	 God	w ould	 amoun t	t o	kno wledg e	 about	 an	
omnipot en t	 and	judging	 God.	The	act	of	obedience	t o	Him	w ould	 not	ha v e	 been	
an	 act	 of	 will	 an ymor e	 but	 an	 act	 of	 prudence	 (which	 is	 an	 in t ellectual	 virtue): 	
»Th e	 r eason s	 f or	 b ei n g	 g oo d 	 w ou l d 	 b e	 vi rtu al l y	 i rr esi s tib l e. «	 (1979,	 211)
2
 More-
o v er ,	 the	 t emp t a tion	 t o	 do	 wr ong	 w ould	 be	 almos t	 non-e xis t en t.	 A	 belie v er	 tha t	
w ould	 act	 f or	 pr ude n tial	 r e asons	 w ould	 not	 e x e r cise 	 his	 or	 he r 	 fr e e dom	 of	 choice	
and, 	 as	 suc h, 	 w ould	 not 	 ha v e 	 be e n	 a 	 fr e e 	 ag e n t .	 T o	 this	 ar g um e n t, 	 Sc he lle nbe r g 	
r esponds	 b y	 r aising	 doub ts	 if	 ha ving	 solid	 r easons	 t o	 do	p or not to do q makes 
desires not to do p or to do q	 g o	 a w a y	 (Schellenber g	 1993,	 119)?	 A	 s tuden t	 who	
has	 an	 e x am	 the	 ne x t	 da y	 has	 a	 solid	 pruden tial 	 r eason	 t o	 learn.	 It	 does	 not	 mean 	
tha t	his	desir e	t o	do	some thing	else	(i.e.,	w a t ch	TV)	v anishes.
How e v er ,	 e v en	 if	 these	 specific	 Schellenber g ’ s	 c oun t er ar gumen ts	 w ould	 not 	
w ork,	 he	 c ould	 s till 	 ask:	 is	 the	 fr ee	 will	 of	 human	 beings	 mor e	 import an t	 than 	
r e aching 	 the 	 ultima t e 	 g oal	 of	 c om munion	 with	 God?	 Mor e o v e r , 	 he 	 ans w e r s	 this 	
h ypothe tic al	ques tion:	
»Ther e	 is	 a	 t endency	 among	 some	 writ er s	 t o	 v alue	 the	 giving	 of	 fr eedom	
a nd	 r e sponsibilit y 	 a lm os t 	 lim it le ssly 	 /…/.	 B ut 	 t his	 is	 t o	 f or g e t 	 t ha t 	 t he 	 c on-
2 
An o th er	 fr ee-wi l l 	 d e f en ce	 t o	 th e	 p r o b l em	 o f	 h i d d en n ess	 w as	 d e v el o p ed	 b y	 Mi ch ael 	 Mu rr a y	 (2002),	 b u t 	
since	it	is	similar	t o	S winburne’ s	h ypothesis,	I	will	not	pr esen t	it	her e.

38 Bogoslovni vestnik 82 (2022) • 1
t e x t	f or	all	 theis tic	t alk	about	 these	 ma tt er s	mus t	be	the	lo v e	 of	God,	and	
tha t	 lo v e	 not	 on ly	 gr an ts	 fr eedom	 and	 r esponsibility ,	 but	 desi r es	 per sonal	
r ela tionship s.«	(199)
Is	 a	 fr ee-will	 r esponse	 a	 dead-end	 f or	 theism?	 If	 it	 w as,	 the	 c onsequences	 w ould 	
b y	 f ar	 e x ceed	 the	 deba t e	 ar ound	 the	 hiddenness	 ar gumen t.	 It	 w ould	 turn	 out	 tha t 	
one	 c annot	 use	 a	 fr ee-will	 r esponse	 in	 the	 deba t e	 about	 the	 pr oblem	 of	 e vil	 either . 	
It	 w ould	 be	 be c ause 	 a the is ts	 w ould	 finally 	 find	 e vil	 or	 suff e ring 	 (I	 assume 	 tha t	 the	
divine	 hiddenness	 w ould	 be	 such	 an	 e vil)	 t o	 which	 the	 divine	 desir e	 t o	 pr ot ect	 the 	
fr eedom	of	people	w ould	not	be	an	ans w er .
I	 find	 the	 deba t e	 be tw een	 Hick	 and	 S winburne	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 Schellen -
ber g 	 on	 the 	 other 	 unsa tis f ying.	 It	 is	 no	 w onder	 if	 one	 t ak es	 in t o	 acc oun t	 tha t	 both 	
Hick,	 as	 w ell	 as	 S winburne,	 had	 writt en	 their	 w ork s	 be f or e	 the	 hiddenness	 ar gu-
men t	 w as	 f ormula t ed.	 One	 c annot	 possibly 	 e xpect	 fr om	 the	 a f or emen tioned	 the-
is tic	 philosopher s	 a	 de t ailed	 r e fut a tion	 of	 an	 ar gumen t	 the y	 did	 not	 e v en	 kno w . 	
Sec ondly ,	 I	 think	 tha t	 ther e	 is	 a	 v er y	 v aluable	 in tuition	 b y	 Hick	 when	 he	 insis ts	 tha t 	
th er e	 i s	 a	 n eed 	 f o r	a priori 	 wi l l i n gn ess	 o n 	 o u r	 p art	 i f	 o u r	 e xp eri en ce	 o f	 Go d 	 i s	 t o	
be	 c omp a tible	 with	 our	 mor al	 fr eedom.	 In	 m y	 paper ,	 I	 shall	 e xplor e	 this	 in tuition.
4. Response to Necessity of a Moral Freedom
	 My	 g ener al	 r esponse	 t o	 Schellenber g ’ s	 claims	 is	 tha t	 while	 it	 is	 true	 tha t	 acc or ding 	
t o	 a t	 leas t	 the	 Ca tholic	 tr adition,	 a	 c ommunion	 with	 God	 (a	 c oun t erpart	 of	 wha t	
h e	 d escri b es	 as	 a	 p er so n al 	 r el a tio n sh i p 	 wi th 	 Go d )	 i s	 an 	 u l tima t e	 an d 	 a	 su p ern a tu -
r al	 human	 g oal,	 so	 one	 c annot	 think	 of	 an y	 gr ea t er	 g ood	 f or	 a	 human	 being ,	 it	 is	
also	 tr ue	 tha t	 r e aching 	 it	 is	 c onditione d	 b y	 fr e e dom	 of	 a	 human	 be ing.	 Whe n	 one	
speak s	 of	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tionsh ip,	 one	 means	 a	 r ela tionship	 of	 fr ee	 ag en ts,	 and	 a	
minimum	 c ondition	 tha t	 has	 t o	 be	 fulfilled	 in	 or der	 f or	 a	 r ela tionship	 t o	 be	 be t -
w een	 fr ee	 ag en ts	 is	 tha t	 a t	 the	 r oots	 of	 the	 r ela tionship	 s t and s	 a	 fr ee	 decision	of	
its	 participan ts.	 In	 m y	 opinion,	 Hick	 is	 righ t:	 if	 ther e	 w as	 no	 such	 willingness	 a t	 the 	
beginning	 of	 a	 r e la tionship	 with	 God	 on	 the	 part	 of	 a	 human	 being , 	 the n	 it	 w ould	
no	 lo ng er	 be	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tionship.	 If	 one	 is	 de t ermined	 t o	 be	 in	 a	 r ela tionship	
with	 the	 other ,	 then	 one	 is	 manipula t ed	 or	 f or ced	 in t o	 the	 r ela tionship	 and	 hence 	
is	 tr ea t ed	 r a ther	 as	 an	 object	 than	 as	 a	 subject.	 Summing	 up,	 in	 or der	 f or	 a	 human 	
t o	 r e ach	 the	 ultima t e	 g oal	 of	 c ommunion	 with	 God,	 a	 per son al	 r ela tionship	 with	
Him	has	t o	s t art	as	a	fr ee	decision	of	a	human.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 find	 it	 doub tful	 tha t	 the	 mor al	 fr eedom	 one	 needs	 in	 or der 	
t o	 mak e 	 a	 fr e e 	 de cision	 is	 c onditione d	 b y 	 c og nitiv e 	 fr e e dom.	 Hick 	 and	 S winbur ne	
seem	 t o	 sug g es t	 tha t	 the	 mer e	 kno wledg e	 tha t	 God	 e xis ts	 someho w	 depriv es	 us	
of	 fr eedom	 of	 choice.	 This	 ob ser v a tion	 is	 ob viously	 not	 true.	 Man y	 belie v er s	 claim 	
tha t	 the y 	 k no w 	 tha t	 G od	 e xis ts	 (f or 	 e x am ple , 	 those 	 w ho	 think 	 tha t	 the 	 tr aditional	
pr oof s	 f or	 God’ s	 e xis t ence	 r ender	 theism	 highly	 pr obable),	 and	 y e t	 the y	 do	 not 	
lose	 their	 aut onom y .	 The y	 ar e,	 f or	 e x ample,	 s till	 t emp t ed	 a t	 times	 t o	 r eject	 their	

39 Marek Dobrzeniecki - Belief in God and Affective States
r ela tion	 t o	 God.	 Summing	 up,	 wha t	 I	 will	 tr y	 t o	 pr eser v e	 fr om	 the	 fr ee-will	 de f ence 	
of	 Hick	 and	 S winburne	 is	 the	 c on viction	 tha t	 a t	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 per sonal	 r ela-
tionship	 with	 God,	 ther e	 has	 t o	 be	 a	 willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 a	 human	 per son.	
On	 the	 othe r 	 hand, 	 I 	 ag r e e 	 w ith	 Sc he lle nbe r g 	 tha t 	 the	 m e r e	 be lie f	 tha t 	 G od	 e xis ts 	
does	not	depriv e	one	of	such	fr eedom.	
The	 sec ond	 elemen t	 of	 m y	 de f ence	 is	 the 	 claim	 tha t	 ther e	 c ould	 be	 e vidence 	
tha t	 c ould	 depriv e	 people	 of	 mor al	 fr eedom.	 I	 will	 ar gue	 tha t	 e vidence	 RE,	 as	 de-
scribed	 b y	 Schellenber g ,	 is	 an	 e x ample	 of	 such	 e vidence.	 Ther e f or e,	 God	 is	 jus ti-
fied	 in	 not	 deliv ering	 it	 t o	 us.	 Wha t	 I	 find	 lacking	 in	 Schellenber g ’ s	 claims	 is	 the 	
analy sis	 if	 ther e 	 ar e	 an y	 c ognitiv e	 s t a t es	 tha t	 ar e	 necessarily	 acc ompanied	 b y	 the	
a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es	 tha t	 depriv e	 people	 of	 mor al	 fr eedom	 (le t	 us	 c all	 these	 c ognitiv e	
s t a t e s	 –	 s t a t e s	 C).	 In	 w ha t	 f ollo w s, 	 I	 shall	 pr e se n t	 m y 	 h y pothe sis	 in	 de t ail	 b y 	 r e f e r -
ring	t o	the	t eachings	of	Aquinas.	
4.1 The Affective States
Acc or ding	 t o	 him ,	 ther e	 ar e	 c ognitiv e	 s t a t es	 (among	 other s,	 a	 belie f	 in	 God’ s	 e xi -
s t en ce) 	 th a t	 g en er a t e	 a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es	 th a t	 h a v e	 c o n seq u en ces	 f o r	 a	 sp i ri tu al 	 l i f e 	
of	 a	 belie v er	 (Cr oss	 2012,	 179–180).	 The	 a ff ectiv e	 elemen t	 is	 built,	 f or	 e x ample,	 in 	
Aquinas’	 descrip tion	 of	 the	 earthly	 r eligious	 e xperiences,	 wher e	 he	 speak s	 e x t en-
siv ely	 about	 such	 a ff ectiv e 	 s t a t es	 as	gaudium	 ( jo y	 fr om	 sa tis f ying	 r a tional	 desir e),	
amor	 which	 leads	 t o	 ecs t as y	 (tha t	 is,	 ha ving	delectatio	in	 something	 e xt ernal, 	
s tr ong	 a tt achmen t	 t o	 the	 object	 of	 lo v e)	 (Summa Th.	 II-II,	 q.	 28),	 and	admiratio 
(a	 f ear	 which	 f ollow s	 the	 knowledg e	 of	 some thing	 tha t	 surpasses	 our	 pow er s) 	
(Summa Th. 	 II-II,	 q.	 180,	 a.	 3).	 Not e	 tha t	 the	 a f or emen tioned 	 s t a t es	 do	 no t	 mak e	
being	 in	 a	 s t a t e	 inc ompa tible 	 with	 the	 belie f	 in	 God	 impossible,	 but	 also	 not e	 tha t 	
one	 does	 not	 r e f er	 her e	 t o	 non -sensor y	 a w ar eness	 of	 the	 divine	 pr esence	 but	 t o	
f eelings,	memories,	or	emotions.
Both	 Aquinas	 as	 w ell	 as	 Schellenber g ,	 agr ee	 tha t	 ther e	 is	 no	 non-sensor y	 back -
gr ound	a w ar eness	 of	 the	 divin e	 pr esence	 in	 the	 actual	 w orld .	 A	 bea tific	 vision	of	
God	 is,	 acc or ding	 t o	 Aquinas,	 a	 divine	 gift	 tha t	 is	 not	 e xplaina ble	 b y	 the	 c ognitiv e	
po w er s	 of	 a	 human	 being.	 It	 belongs	 t o	 the	 kind	 of	 C-s t a t es	 bec ause	 it	 is	 also	 ac-
c ompanie d	 b y 	 the 	 a ff e ctiv e 	 s t a t e 	 of	delectatio	 (de lig h t)	 (Summa Th.	 I-II, 	 q.	 4, 	 a.	 1)	
or fruitio	 (deligh t	 of	 the	 g ood	 and	 r es t	 in	 the	 g ood)	 (Lotz	 1979,	 70).	 Wha t	 is	 im -
port an t	 in	 the	 c on t e x t	 of	 the	 curr en t	 discussion	 is	 tha t,	 acc or ding	 t o	 St.	 Thomas,	
in	 the	 s t a t e	 of	 the	 bea tific	 vision,	 one	 does	 not	 ha v e	 a	 fr eedom	 of	 choice:	 »The 	
will	 of	 one	 who	 sees	 God’ s	 essence	 necessarily	 clings	 t o	 God,	 bec ause	 then	 w e 	
c annot	 help	 willing	 t o	 be	 happ y .«	 (Summa Th. I,	 q.	 82,	 a.	 2)	 Using	 a	 c oncep tual 	
fr ame w ork	 de v eloped	 b y	 Ale x ander	 Pruss,	 one	 c an	 sa y	 tha t	 f or	 a	 per son	 ha ving	 a	
c ognitiv e 	 s t a t e	 of	 seeing	 the	 divine	 essence,	 an	 op tion	 t o	 do	 righ t	 alw a y s	 domi-
na t es	 o v er	 an	 op tion	 t o	 do	 wr ong	 (wher e	 op tion	 A	 domina t es	 op tion	 B	 when	 in 	
e v er y	 fundame n t al	 e v alua tiv e	r espect	A	is	 a t	 leas t	 as	 g ood	 as	 B	 and	 in	 some	 fun -
damen t al	 e v alua tiv e 	 r espect	 A	 is	 be tt er 	 than	 B.	 Op tion	 A	 is	 on	 balance	 be tt er 	 than 	
op tion	 B	 when	 op tion	 A	 domina t es	 op tion	 B ,	 but	 ther e	 ar e	 some	 non fundamen t al 	
e v alua tiv e 	 aspects	 when	 B	 is	 be tt er 	 than	 A).	 Bec ause	 w e	 ar e 	 alw a y s	 in	 our	 actions 	

40 Bogoslovni vestnik 82 (2022) • 1
motiv a t ed	 b y	 or	 a ttr act ed	 b y	 a	 g ood,	 the	 f act	 tha t	 w e	 enc oun t er	 on	 balance	 be t -
t er	 op tions	 is	 the	 only	 e xplana tion	 f or	 the	 f act	 tha t	 some times	 w e	 mak e	 wr ong	 or 	
w o r se	 th an 	 th e	 b es t	 p o ssi b l e	 d eci si o n s. 	 On 	 th e	 o th er	 h an d ,	 a	 b ea tifi c	 vi si o n 	 d o m-
ina t es	 all	 the	 alt erna tiv es, 	 which	 is	 wh y	 the	 blessed	 in	 hea v en	 c annot	 c ommit	 a 	
sin	 (Pruss	 2016,	 216–217).	 The y	 ar e	 fr ee	 if	 one	 c onceiv es	 fr eedom	 as	 a	 unity	 of 	
will	 and 	 in t ellect,	 but	 the y	 do	 not	 possess	 fr eedom	 of	 choice	 be tw een	 righ t	 and	
wr ong.
4.2 Belief in God as a Dominant Option
As	 Schellenber g	 righ tly	 poin ts	 out,	 e vidence	 RE	 does	 not	 ha v e	 t o	 be	 s ynon ymous	
with	 the	 bea tific 	 vision,	 but	 one	 c ould	 ne v ertheless	 specula t e	 if	 e vidence	 RE	 w ould 	
not	 also 	 pr esen t	 itself	 as	 a	 dom inan t	 op tion	 f or	 a	 human	 bein g?	 Experiencing	 a f -
f ectiv e 	 s t a t es	 of	 being	 lov ed,	 accept ed,	 c onsoled,	 emotionally 	 support ed,	 ha v -
ing	 a	 purpose	 in	 lif e,	 and	 mos t	 of	 all,	 »a	 quie t	 sense	 of	 God’ s	 e xis t ence«	 (Schel-
lenber g	 2015,	 67);	 the	 things	 tha t	 Schellenber g	 himself	 describes	 as	 an	 e ff ect	 of	
God’ s	 pr esence	 in	 the	 backgr ound	 a w ar eness	 c ould	 be	 such	 tha t	 no	 one	 w ould 	
be	 t emp t ed	 t o	 r eject	 it.	 E v en	 if 	 not	 in trusiv e	 or	 o v er whelming ,	 God’ s	 pr esence	 in	
th e	 b ackgr o u n d 	 a w ar en ess	 c ou l d 	 b e	 as	 d o mi n an t	 as	 th e	 b ea tific	 vi si on ;	 a t	 l eas t, 	
it	 seems	 plausible.	 One	 has	 t o	 t ak e 	 in t o	 acc oun t	 tha t	 the	 divine	 pr esence 	 in	 the 	
backgr ound	 e xperience	 w ould	 not	 only	 mean	 a	 per sonal	 in t er action,	 the	 f eeling	 of 	
pr ot ection	 and	 accep t ance,	 c ompanionship,	 g e tting	 friendly	 guidelines	 and	 indi -
c a tions	 in	 r ela tion	 t o	 mos t	 imp ort an t	 lif e	 decisions.	 One	 g e ts	 a	 f eeling	 tha t	 under	
su ch 	 d escri p tio n 	 th e	 fi gu r e	 o f 	 Go d 	 r emi n d s ,	 as 	 P au l 	 Mo ser	 o n ce	 c o mp l ai n ed ,	 » a	
doting 	 gr andpar en t	 or	 a	 celes tial	 San t a	 Claus«	 (Moser	 2013,	 38).	 Only	 bec ause 	
of	 this	 specific	 w a y	 of	 depicting 	 God	 one	 c ould	 belie v e	 tha t	 once	 ha ving	 an	 e x -
perience	 of	 His	 pr esence,	 one	 w ould	 be	 able	 so	 t o	 speak	 t o	 esc ape	 its	 charms. 	
The	 e xperience 	 of	 the	 divine	 pr esence	 should,	 although	 v aguely	 but	 a t	 the	 same	
time, 	 truth full y	 r e flect	 God’ s	 na tur e	 if	 it	 supposes	 t o	 trig g er	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tion-
ship	 with	 a	 finit e	 per son.	 Other wise,	 God	 w ould	 pla y	 a	 r ole	 tha t	 w ould	 amoun t 	
t o	 luring	 someone 	 in t o	 a	 r ela tionship.	 E v en	 if	 it	 w as	 success ful, 	 it	 w ould	 sha tt er 	
its	 per sonal	 char act er .	 It	 means	 tha t	 an	 e xperience	 of	 the	 div ine	 pr esence	 w ould	
pr obably	 includ e	 not	 only	 the	 e xperience	 of	 His	 charity	 and	 lo v e,	 but	 also	 of	 His	
glor y ,	 majes ty ,	 magnificence,	 splendour ,	 omniscience	 and	 omnipot ence,	 and	 this	
c ombina tion	 w ould	 mos t	pr ob ably	be	so	a ttr activ e	 (e v en	if	 these	 f ea tur es	 w ould	
be	 a	 dis t an t	 r e flection	of	 the	 r eal	 divine	 a ttributions	 and	 w ould	 be	 e xperienced 	
in	the	backgr ound	a w ar eness)	tha t	it	w ould	be	virtually	impossible	t o	r eject	it.
4.3 Moral Freedom as a Justifying Reason for Divine Hiddenness
Wha t	 one	 bene fits	 fr om	 using	 Aquinas’	 theory	 is	 a	 possible	 e xplana tion	 of	 wh y	 God 	
does	 not	 pr o vide	 e vidence	 RE,	 and	 wh y	 it	 is	 possible	 t o	 imagine	 both	 (a)	 tha t	 e vi-
dence	 RE	 is	 met aph y sic ally	 possible	 as	 w ell	 as	 (b)	 tha t	 an	 all-loving	 and	 all-pow erful 	
God	 w ould	 be	 jus tified	 in	 not	 giving	 it	 t o	 us.	 E vidence	 RE	 w ould	 pr obably	not	 only 	
r esult	 in	 the	 univ er sal	 belie f	 in	 God	 but	 also	 in	 a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es	 tha t	 w ould	 mak e	 a 	
r ela tionship	 with	 God	 a	 dominan t	 op tion	 f or	 a	 human	 being.	 God,	 as	 omnibene v o-

41 Marek Dobrzeniecki - Belief in God and Affective States
len t,	desir es	per sonal	r ela tionship s	with	other	per sons.	A	per sonal	aspect	of	such 	
a	 r ela tionship	 assumes	 tha t	 one	 a t	 leas t	 should	 be	 able	 t o	 decide	 if	 one	 w an ts	 t o 	
en t er	 in t o	 it	 or	 not,	 but	 if	 it	 w ould	 pr esen t	 itself	 as	 a	 dominan t	 op tion,	 then	 one 	
w ould	 be	 f or ced	 in t o	 it,	 and	 tha t	 w ould	 sha tt er 	 a	 per sonal	 char act er	 of	 the	 r ela tion-
ship.	 It	 w ould	 be	 then	 impossible	 t o	 r each	 the	 ultima t e	 g oal	 of	 a	 human	 being.	 If	 an 	
all-lo ving	 and	 omnipot en t	 God	 desir es	 per sonal	 r ela tionship s	 with	 human	 beings, 	
He	should	not	deliv er	e vidence	RE	and, 	in	this	sense,	r emain	hidden.
Notice	 tha t	 it	 does	 not	 mean	 tha t	 God	 has	 a	 r eason	 t o	 suspend	 e vidence	 of	 His 	
e xis t ence	 tha t	 r esults	 in	 C-s t a t es	 c ons t an tly . 	 It	 is	 jus t	 bec ause	 in	 the	 de finition 	 of 	
e vidence	 T	 is	 built	 the	 r equir emen t	 tha t	 it	 should	 be	 a v ailable	 a t	 all	 times,	 tha t	 it 	
mak es	 it	 inc onsis t en t	 with	 the	 divine	 r espect	 f or	 human	 fr eedom	 of	 choice	 and	 His 	
desir e 	 t o	 r ela t e	 t o	 us	 per sonally .	 Notice 	 also	 tha t	 I	 am	 not	 claiming	 her e	 tha t	 the 	
r eason	 f or	 the	 lack	 of	 fr eedom	 of	 choice	 if	 e vidence	 RE	 w ould	 be	 a v ailable,	 w ould 	
be	 the	 lack	 of	 c ognitiv e	 fr eedom.	 , The	 blame ‘	 is	 on	 a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es	 tha t	 mak e	 a 	
choice	 t o	 do	 wr ong	 (in	 this	 c on t e x t,	 the	 r ejection	 of	 the	 r ela tionship	 with	 God)	 im-
possible.	 My	 main	 poin t	 her e	 is	 tha t	 e v en	 if	 ther e	 is	 a	 diff er ence 	 be tw een	 seeing 	
God’ s	 essence	 and	 a	 backgr ound	 e xperience	 of	 the	 divine	 pr esence,	 s till	 the	 la tt er 	
c ould	 pr esen t	 itself	 in	 such	 a	 w a y	 tha t	 it	 w ould	 be	 per ceiv ed	 as	 a	 dominan t	 option.
5. Objections: The Analogy Argument and Absolutization 
of Freedom
I	 w ould	 lik e	 t o	 quickly	 addr ess	 one	 possible	 c oun t er ar gumen t,	 which	 is	 oft en	 c alled 	
the	 analogy	 ar gumen t.	 Schellenber g	 oft en 	 uses	 a	 c omparison	 be tw een	 God	 –	 The 	
F a ther	and	our	earthly	par en ts.	He	writ es,	among	other s:	
» D i scu ssi o n s	 o f 	 h u man 	 i n t er actio n ,	 i n cl u d i n g	 i n t er actio n 	 b e tw een 	 mo th -
er s	 and	 their	 childr en,	 do	 r epr esen t	 the	 primary	 c on t e xt	 in	 which	 such 	
c oncepts	 as	 those	 of	 ‚closeness ‘ ,	 ‚c ar e ‘ ,	 and	 ‚lov e ‘	 ar e	 used	 and	 acquir e 	
their	 meaning.	 Wha t,	 then,	 c ould	 jus tif y	 the	 supposition	 tha t	 God’ s	 close-
ness,	 c aring ,	 and	 lo ving	 w ould	 not	 be	 lik e	 those	 of	 ideal	 mother	 /…/?	 The	
ques tion	is	rhe t oric al.«	(2004,	33–34)	
Although	 ther e	 ar e	 author s	 who	 r espond	 t o	 the	 hiddenness	 ar gumen t	 b y	 in v ok -
ing	 the	 tr aditions	 of	 the	 neg a tiv e	 theology ,	 and	 who	 w ould	 be	 v ery	 de fian t	 in 	
dr a wing	 c onclusions	 fr om	 the	 f act	 tha t	 w e	 c all	 God	 our	 lo ving	 F a ther	 and	 w ould	
den y	 an y	 similarity	 be tw een	 the	 per sonhood	 of	 humans	 and	 God	 (R ea	 2015;	 2018, 	
42–62;	 P ouiv e t	 2018),	 in	 m y	 opinion	 f ollo wing	 the	 s t ep s	 of	 apopha tism 	 is	 not	 a 	
pr omising	op tion	f or	a	theis t.
Schellenber g	 is	 ultima t ely	 righ t:	 since	 one	 sub scribes	 t o	 the	 Chris tian	 r e v ela-
tion, 	 one	 e xpe cts	 fr om	 God	 close ne ss, 	 c ar e , 	 and	 lo v e	 in	 a	 w a y 	 similar 	 t o	 ho w	 the y	
ar e	 usually	 e xperienced	 in	 e v er y da y	 lif e.	 It	 is	 not,	 ho w e v er ,	 t o	 admit	 tha t	 one	 uses 	
the	 notion 	 of	 a	 per son	 or	 a	 f a ther	 in	 an	 unambiguous	 w a y	 with	 r eg ar d	 t o	 God. 	

42 Bogoslovni vestnik 82 (2022) • 1
Schellenber g	 w ould	 agr ee	 with	 it	 since	 he	 used	 the	 t erm	 ,analogic al‘	 t o	 describe	
his	 ar gumen t.	 It	 pr obably	 r e f er s	 t o	 the	 scholas tic	 theor y	of	analogia entis,	which	
Augus tine 	 enc ap sula t ed	 in	 the	 La tin	 f ormula	Deus semper maior ,	 and	 which	 al-
low s	 positiv e	 knowledg e	 of	 God	 under	 the	 c ondition 	 tha t	 one	 r emember s	 tha t 	
with	 e v er y	 similarity , 	 ho w e v er	 gr ea t,	 c omes	 e v en	 gr ea t er 	 dissimilarity	 (Racz yński-
R o ż ek	2019,	756).	
Wh a t	 i s	 th i s	 gr ea t er	 d i ssi mi l ari ty	 b e tw een 	 earth l y	 p ar en ts	 an d 	 h ea v en l y	 o n e	 i n 	
the	 c on t e x t	 of	 the	 curr en t	 deba t e?	 In	 m y	 opinion,	 it	 c onsis ts	 in	 the	 f act	 tha t	 ho w -
e v er	 lo ving ,	 c aring	 and	 close	 t o	 their	 descendan t ’ s	 par en ts	 c an	 be,	 a	 per sonal	 r e -
la tionship	 with	 par en ts	 w ould	 ne v er	 appear	 as	 a	 dominan t	 op tion	 t o	 them,	 ma y -
be	 with	 the	 e x cep tion	 of	 small 	 childr en.	 Ne v ertheless,	 a	 gr o wn-up	 per son,	 inde -
penden t	 of	 ho w	 wr ong	 and	 ungr a t e ful	 such	 a	 deed	 w ould	 be,	 c an	 r eject	 per sonal	
r ela tionships	with	 his	 or	 her	 par en ts.	 The	 mer e	 pr esence	 of	 loving	 and	 c aring 	
par en ts	does	 not	 endang er	the	fr eedom	of	 choice	 of	 their	childr en.	 As	I	sug g es t -
ed,	 w e	 ha v e	 r easons	 t o	 suspect	 tha t	 it	 w ould	 be	 diff er en t 	 if	 God	 w as	 pr esen t	 in 	
our	 liv es	 in	 the	 f orm	 of	 e vidence	 RE.	 Bec ause	 of	 this	 diff er ence,	 one	 c annot	 c on -
clude	 tha t	 since	 lo v ing	 par e n ts	 w ould	 do	 an y thing	 in	 the ir 	 po w e r 	 t o	 be	 pr e se n t	 in	
the 	 lif e 	 of	 the ir 	 childr e n, 	 the 	 ab se nc e 	 of	 e v ide nce	 RE	 spe ak s	 ag ains t	 the 	 e xis t e nce	
or	bene v olence	of	God.	
I	 w ould	 also	 emphasiz e	 tha t	 the	 pr esen t ed	 h ypothesis	 does	 not	 f all	 in t o	 the 	
tr ap	 of	 absolutiz a tion	 of	 mor al	 fr eedom.	 Acc or ding	 t o	 it,	 pr eser ving	 mor al	 fr eedom 	
is	 not	 the	 g ood	 in	 itself	 in	 c omparison	 t o	 which	 other	 g oods,	 such	 as	 the	 w ell-
being	 of	 people	 and	 their	 happiness,	 f ade	 a w a y .	 God	 suspends	 (a t	 leas t	 t empor ar -
ily)	 e vidence	 tha t	 w ould	 r ender	 His	 e xis t ence	 appar en t	 not	 bec ause 	 fr eedom	 of 	
choice	 is	 the	 g ood	 in	 itself	 but	 bec ause	 it	 is	 a	 necessar y	 elem en t	 of	 happiness	 of	
the	 finit e	 per sons	 tha t	 c onsis ts	 in	 participa ting	 in	 per sonal	 r ela tionship s	 with	 Him. 	
It	 does	 not	 mea n	 tha t	 He	 r ema ins	 hidden	 in	 e v er y	 possible	 meaning	 of	 the	 t erm.	
Ther e	 ar e	 m y s tics	 who	 e xperience	 the	 divine	 pr esence,	 ther e 	 ar e	 other	 pieces	 of	
e vidence	 tha t	 c ould	 r esult	 in	 the	 c ognitiv e	 cert ain ty	 tha t	 He	 e xis ts,	 but	 without 	
acc ompan ying	 a ff ectiv e	 s t a t es	 tha t	 c ould	 hinder	 the	 mor al	 fr eedom	 of	 a	 per son.	
Theis ts	 c ould	 men tion	 a	 gr ea t	 v arie ty	 of	 signs	 and	 pieces	 of	 e vidence	 tha t	 indic a t e 	
divine	 tr anscendence.	 Gr an t ed,	 these	 pieces	 of	 e vidence	 ar e	 not	 appar en t	 and	 as 	
such,	 the y	 do	 not	 c ons titut e	 a	 solid	 epis t emic	 position	 of	 theism.	 Other wise,	 w e	
w ould	 not	 ha v e	 curr en tly	 such	 lar g e	 number s	 of	 r easonable	 a theis ts	 and	 agnos -
tics. 	 How ev er ,	 if	 the	 solid	 epis t emic	 position 	 of	 theism	 w ould	 pr ev en t	 us	 fr om 	
r e ac hing 	 the 	 ultim a t e 	 g oal	 of	 our 	 liv e s, 	 the n	 be ing 	 ope n	 t o	 pe r sonal	 r e la tionship s	
with	 fin it e	 per sons	 on	 God’ s	 part	 means	 deliv ering	 us	 the	 e vidence	 w e	 curr en tly	
ha v e	a t	our	disposal.
6. Conclusions
Wha t	 ar e	 the	 r esults	 of	 the	 abov e	 de f ence?	 As	 one	 r emember s,	 I	 ascribed	 t o 	
Schellenber g	tw o	claims:

43 Marek Dobrzeniecki - Belief in God and Affective States
I.	E vidence	T	c ould	be	deliv er ed.
II.	W e	do	not	enc oun t er	e vidence	T	in	the	actual	w orld.	
I	 agr ee	 with	 both	 of	 them,	 but	 I	 disagr ee	 with	 Schellenber g	 in	 his	 c on t en tion 	
tha t	 (I)	 and	 (II)	 t og e ther	 r ender	 theism	 inc onsis t en t.	 In	 m y	 opinion,	 God	 is	 jus tified 	
in	 not	 giving	 t o	 the	 finit e	 per sons	 e vidence	 T ,	 bec ause	 b y	 deliv ering	 it,	 He	 w ould	
abolish	 the	 mor al	 fr eedom	 of	 finit e 	 per sons:	 He	 w ould	 e vince	 Himself	 in	 such	 a 	
f ashion	 tha t	 a	 r ela tionship	 with	 Him	 w ould	 appear	 as	 a	 dominan t	 op tion	 f or	 them. 	
It	 w ould	 be	 a	 critic al	obs t acle	 f or	 r eaching	 by	 them	 their	 ultima t e 	 g oal	 -	 a	 per -
sonal	 r ela tionship	 with	 the	 Cr ea t or .	 Since	 God	 is	 jus tified	 in	 not	 deliv ering	 e vidence 	
T ,	 w e	 s t art	 t o	 under s t and	 wh y	 God	 gov erns	 non-r esis t an t	 nonbeliev er s	 in	 the 	
w orld.	 God	 ma y	 ha v e	 only	 tw o	 alt erna tiv es: 	 either	 He	 abolishes	 human	 mor al 	
fr eedom	 and	 puts	 theism	 in	 a	 s tr ong	 epis t emic	 position,	 or	 He	 allo w s	 a	 w eak	 epis-
t e m ic 	 position	 of	 t he ism 	 and	 c onse que n t ly 	 t he 	 e xis t e nc e 	 of	 non-r e sis t an t	 nonbe -
lie v er s.	 Ho w e v er ,	 human	 mor al	 fr eedom	 is	 pr eser v ed,	 and	 c onsequen tly ,	 a	 pos-
sibility	 tha t	 people	 w ould	 r each	 their	 ultima t e 	 g oal.	 The	 sec ond	 alt erna tiv e 	 seems 	
t o	 be	 mor e	 c ommendable,	 especially	 if	 the	 las t	 tr end	 in	 Chris tian	 escha t ology ,	 tha t 	
sa y s	 tha t	 God’ s	 mer cy	 does	 not	 e x clude	 nonbelie v er s	 fr om	 the	 bea tific	 vision,	 r e -
flects	the	truth.	
Schellenber g	 is	 righ t	 when	 he	 claims	 tha t	 e vidence	 T	 is	 me t aph y sic ally	 possible, 	
he	 is	 also	 righ t	 in	 insis ting	 tha t	 God	 should	 do	 e v er y thing	 in	 His	 po w er	 t o	 elimina t e 	
ob s t acles	tha t	block	 us	fr om	being	in	 a	position	 t o	r ela t e	t o	God	 per sonally .	Ne v -
ertheless,	 since	 the	 pa th	 t o	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tionship	 with	 God	 does	 not	 lead	 thr ough 	
e vi d ence	 T ,	 h e	 i s	 wr on g	 wh en	 h e	 susp ects	 th a t	 tw o	 cl ai ms	 (I)	 and 	 (II)	 ar e	 i n c om-
pa tible	 with	 the	 belie f	 in	 God.	 Hence,	 theism	 c an	 de f end	 itself	 fr om	 the	 hidden -
ness argument.
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