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Neenakost v starih mestnih jedrih: analiza realnosti v mehiških mestih

Globalizacija vpliva na mehiška mesta in ustvarja nove urbane strukture. Z oblikovanjem novih državljskih praks globalizacija spreminja odnose, ki jih posamezniki vzpostavijo do določenega območja. Na podlagi multidisciplinarnega pristopa avtorja teoretično analizirata nove razmere v mehiških starih mestnih jedrih, ki so jih povzročili izzivi, povezani z njihovo razglasitvijo za območja svetovne dediščine. Pri tem uporabljata teoretični konstrukt, s katerim predstavlja določene vidike realnosti v mehiških mestih, ki se nanašajo na oblikovanje demokratičnih in participativnih državljskih praks. Pojav analizirata na podlagi dveh teoretičnih izhodišč: (a) procesa spreminjanja v območje svetovne dediščine (to je turiz-

ma in gentrifkacije) in (b) teorije družbenega kapitala. Ugotovitve kažejo, da nove razmere izražajo prostorsko, časovno in gospodarsko preobrazbo območja dediščine. V starih mestnih jedrih politični akterji in ustanove spodbujajo centralistični, nadnacionalni in mestni konservatorski razvoj. Nastaja urbanizem, ki daje prednost ohranjanju v korist turistov ter škodo zadovoljstva, uporabe in sodelovanja lokalnega prebivalstva. Poleg tega procesi izključevanja in gentrifkacije razjedajo družbeno tkivo in ogrožajo državljanstvo.

Ključne besede: ohranjanje dediščine, državljanstvo, gentrifkacija, izključitve, stara mestna jedra

1 Uvod

Sodobni diskurz o družbeni realnosti se na prostor ne osredotoča samo kot na nosilec vsebine družbenih procesov, ampak tudi kot na dejavno prvino, ki vpliva na samo strukturo družbene realnosti (Lezama, 2002). V tem pogledu je pomembno ločevati med grajenim okoljem, v katerem potekajo določeni procesi družbenega življenja, in njegovo zunanjo podobo, ki daje vsebino materialni razsežnosti prostora (Lezama, 2002). Z drugimi besedami, gre za ločevanje med prostorom kot materialno oporo in družbenim prostorom, ki skupaj z materialnim okvirom deluje kot vir in tudi sredstvo. Poleg tega gre za družbene odnose, ki jih posamezniki vzpostavijo v procesih, ki so odvisni od prostorskih praks (Lefebvre, 1969). Prostor tako ni samo resničen prizor, ampak tudi arhitekt te resničnosti; ni samo pasivna entiteta, na kateri ljudje gradijo zgodovino, ampak ima tudi dejavno vlogo pri oblikovanju življenjskih dogodkov na splošno (Castells, 1988).

Z zgodovinskega stališča je bilo državljanstvo vodilni vidik splošnega »življenja mesta«. Z združitvijo *civitas* in *urbs* v skupnost z družbenim redom in materialno oporo (to je javnimi prostori) se je v zahodnjaškem svetu gradila zgodovina državljanstva (Choay, 2009). Z drugimi besedami, različne ravni prilagajanja med družbenimi praksami in grajenim okoljem so vplivale na značaj državljanstva skozi stoletja. Vse to se je dogajalo med prilagajanjem, ki so v danem trenutku zgodovine spodbujala ali zavirala demokratično udeležbo, enakost, svobodo, spoštovanje in vzajemno priznavanje med posamezniki in skupinami v določeni skupnosti.

Na tej podlagi je treba poudariti, da lahko oblikovanje različnih vrst državljanstva analiziramo z vidika resničnosti družbenih praks in/ali ozemeljskih razmer, ki jih izraža ta družbena (mestna/prostorska) problematika. Analiza državljanstva kot družbenega vprašanja je v družboslovju dobro razvita. Britanski sociolog Thomas Humprey Marshall (1949) je ločeval med tremi vrstami državljanstva, ki so se pojavile v različnih časovnih obdobjih. Te vrste državljanstva, ki so se razvile iz potrebe po enakopravnosti vseh posameznikov, se dopolnjujejo, in sicer v smislu, da so omejitve vsake od njih jasno določene in se kažejo v izključitvi ene skupine posameznikov ali več teh. Tako v sodobni zahodnjaški družbi obstajajo vsaj tri glavne ravni državljanstva.

Civilno državljanstvo, ki se je oblikovalo v 18. stoletju, zagotavlja enakost pred zakonom, potrebno za uveljavljanje posameznih pravic (svobode govora in mišljenja, verske svobode ter pravice do lastnine, trgovanja, sodnega varstva in sklepanja pogodb). Ta domnevna enakost izključuje ljudi, ki so brez lastnine, in tudi revne ljudi, katerih zahtev ne sliši nihče. Mesta

so bila tej obliki državljanstva naklonjena, ker »se je rodila v trgovskih mestih in sledi razvoju pristojnih sodišč, ki razsojajo v trgovskih sporih« (Donzelot, 2012: 11).

Politično državljanstvo se je pojavilo v 19. stoletju kot način kompenziranja prejšnjih oblik izključitve, pri čemer so vsi posamezniki postali enakopravni. Družbena neenakost, ki jo povzroča prevladujoči kapitalistični sistem v zahodnjaški družbi, pa ne zadovoljuje osnovnih potreb, kar bi vsem ljudem omogočalo preživetje. Pri tem so številni posamezniki izključeni iz uveljavljanja civilnega in političnega državljanstva. Politično državljanstvo je zagotovilo pravico do udeležbe pri izvrševanju oblasti in se odzvalo na zahteve mestnega prebivalstva (tako bogatega kot revnega) po sodelovanju pri upravljanju mesta.

Socialno državljanstvo se je pojavilo v 20. stoletju kot posledica politike socialne države, ki se je osredotočala na zamisel, da so vsi ljudje enakopravni po dostojanstvu in pravicah. V tem primeru se dostojanstvo nanaša na niz pravic, ki so zagotovljene vsem državljanom ter povezane z njihovim družbenim položajem, dostopom do stanovanj, izobrazbe in zdravstva in s prihodkom, ki jim omogoča zadovoljevanje osnovnih potreb. V okviru te vrste državljanstva se rešujejo problemi vse večjega zgoščanja revnih ljudi v mestih, ki je posledica priseljevanja s podeželja.

Jacques Donzelot (2012) v skladu s teoretično, ne pa tudi kronološko strukturo državljanstva, o kateri je pisal Marshall (1949), obravnava pojem socialnega državljanstva v sredini 20. stoletja. Razume ga kot enakopravnost pravic, ki dopolnjuje že uveljavljeno civilno in politično državljanstvo iz prejšnjih stoletij. Donzelot predlaga prehod k novi vrsti državljanstva prostorske narave, ki izhaja iz mestnega okolja. Z vidika značilne francoske realnosti predstavi pojem urbanega državljanstva in razpravlja o koncu vseh vrst državljanstva, znanih doslej, da bi odprl novo poglavje. Novost urbane razsežnosti glede na pomembnost urbanega diskurza v literaturi s področja državljanstva je po njegovem mnenju nedosledna, vendar uvedbo te nove kategorije utemelji z radikalnimi spremembami, do katerih je v družbi in mestih prišlo v zadnjih 150 letih. V začetku tega obdobja (v 19. stoletju) je mesto določalo socialna vprašanja. V tem pogledu je mesto vzrok vseh socialnih tegob, pri čemer je človek razvrednoten, družba pa izprijena. Mesta so veljala za grozna bivališča, v katerih se je začel socialni boj za državljanstvo. Na koncu tega obdobja (v 20. stoletju) pa se je položaj obrnil in mesto je postalo žrtev družbe. Družbene prakse »getoizacije« atomizirajo mesta in segregirajo njihove prebivalce.

V tem zadnjem obdobju državljanstva država ne more več nadzirati socialnih posledic globalizacije, zato se je začela obračati navznoter, proti lokalnemu. Pri tem se pojavljajo nove pravice,

zlasti pravica do mesta. Urbano državljanstvo se tako spreminja v uveljavljanje pravic izvoljenih lokalnih predstavnikov, stanovalcev, lastnikov podjetij in drugih. Vsi se morajo na problematiko urbanega državljanstva odzvati s pomočjo lokalnih sporazumov o sodelovanju. Pravica do mesta se torej pojavlja v ozračju »urbanofilije«, ki mestni prostor pojmuje kot sredstvo za sprožanje socialnih, gospodarskih in ekoloških konfliktov.

2 Model mesta in glavne značilnosti državljanstva

Ena od zamisli, na kateri temelji ta razprava, je, da med mestom in državljanstvom obstaja neposredna povezava. To pomeni, da se določena socialna, gospodarska, kulturna in prostorska (arhitekturna in urbanistična) ureditev ujema z določenimi značilnostmi državljanstva, pravic, omejitev, trenj in izključitev pri skupinah in posameznikih. V tem pogledu avtorja s pomočjo dveh izbranih modelov mesta razlagata kraj kot gradnik glavnih značilnosti državljanstva.

Najprej analizirata socialno mesto. Ta model mesta se je razvil v Evropi po drugi svetovni vojni, ko so ljudje na splošno čutili velik prezir do mest. Dojemali so jih kot vzrok vseh socialnih tegob, vključno s fizičnim in moralnim propadom njihovih prebivalcev in poslabšanjem odnosov, kar se je izražalo v boleznih in kriminalu. Mestni prostor, zgrajen v imenu socialnega državljanstva, je tako temeljil na neke vrste »urbanofobiji«, ki se je pojavila med industrializacijo. Ta model poskuša obnoviti sledi socialno uravnoteženega mesta, ki je imelo spodbuden vpliv na razvoj socialnega državljanstva.

Primer tovrstnega modela je »vrtno mesto« Ebenezerja Howarda iz leta 1898, ki se je pojavilo kot alternativna mestna paradigma, ki naj bi odpravila okoljska in socialna neravnovesja ter ohranila mestne iznajdbe in naravo podeželja (Choay, 2009), katerih vezi so razjedle prakse industrijske dobe. Druga možnost, ki jo je za model industrijskega mesta leta 1899 predlagal Tony Garnier, pa upošteva načela sodobnega urbanističnega načrtovanja, predstavljena v Atenski listini (International Congress of Modern Architecture, CIAM, 1933).

Socialno mesto pooseblja načelo univerzalnega prava in spodbuja dostop vseh ljudi do enakih dobrin ter zmanjšuje neenakosti in socialne razlike. Vse to se izraža tudi v prizadevanjih po obsežni gradnji socialnih stanovanj in posledični ponovni zagotovitvi pravice do lastnega stanovanja. Funkcionalni urbanizem ponazarja »prostorsko podjetje«, ki še najbolj izraža to socialno poklicanost. Ta novi urbanizem s svojo vlogo skrbnika splošnih interesov utrjuje in spodbuja tudi socialna država. Tradicionalne ulice so zaradi varnosti prepovedane, razpršenost javnega prostora pa je eden od najznačilnejših dokazov libertar-

nih in higienskih načel. Razpadanje družbenega tkiva, značilno za te oblike urbanizma, pa bo povzročilo pojav novega modela. Poleg tega je prišlo do preporoda mest. V nasprotju s socialnim okoljem, ki ga predvideva socialno mesto, Donzelot (2012) navaja, da gre danes za nekakšno »urbanofilijo«, ki družbo in državljane spodbuja k temu, da razmišljajo o domnevni vrtilinah mesta, pri čemer dobi pojem državljanstva obliko, ki ceni, kar je urbano, in se nad njim ne pritožuje več.

S tem optimističnim pogledom na mesta pa se ne strinja popolnoma Jordi Borja, ki opozarja na protislovne razmere, ki kažejo, da mesta niso najprimernejša območja državljanstva. »Razpad mesta« se po njegovem kaže v mestnih območjih z nejasnimi mejami, razpršenim življenjskim prostorom, družbeno atomizacijo in netrajnim okoljem. Svoboščine se krčijo, socialni stroški pa se zaradi segregacije večajo. Nasprotna smer razvoja daje prednost družbenemu prevrednotenju mestne kulture in javnemu prostoru, v katerem imajo državljani določeno vrednost in ki spodbuja »pravico do mesta« (Borja, 2012).

Na podlagi pojmovnega okvira, ki sta ga predlagala Marshall in Donzelot, lahko povezave med mestom in državljanstvom analiziramo z vidika človeške izkušnje. Avtorja ta evropocentrični pogled na odnos med mestom in državljanstvom primerjata z mehiško realnostjo, pri čemer proučujeta, ali je veljaven, ter določata posebne značilnosti mestnega prostora in državljanstva na tej celini. Pri tem se osredotočata na primerjalno teoretično analizo sodobnega razvoja starih mestnih jeder Latinske Amerike, in sicer od konca 20. stoletja naprej. Analiza temelji na teh izhodiščih: (a) pojmu dediščine in (b) teoriji socialnega kapitala.

3 Mehika: urbanizacija, urbano državljanstvo in mesta na seznamu svetovne dediščine

V Mehiki se odnosi med državljanstvom in mesti spreminjajo zaradi globalnih praks in posledične mestne dinamike. Zato je »klasični pojem državljanstva, katerega nezadostna vsebina ne more zadostiti zahtevam nove družbeno-kulturne raznolikosti družbenih akterjev, postavljen pod vprašaj« (Ramírez Kuri, 2013: 628). Izraz *državljanstvo* je večpomenski, zato ga ne moremo omejiti na omejen repertoar pravic in dolžnosti v pravnem smislu. V tem primeru se ta repertoar zaradi vedno znova pojavljajočih se družbenih zahtev spreminja in širi; novi socialni, človeški, politični in kulturni konflikti niso povezani samo s socialnimi pravicami, ampak se nanašajo tudi na pravice do kulturne in mestne dediščine ter na pravice, povezane z okoljem, ekologijo, spolom, zdravjem, življenjem in varnostjo (Ramírez Kuri, 2013).

Državljanstvo se je spremenilo v niz mestnih dinamik, ki v mehiških mestih obstajajo od druge polovice 20. stoletja, kar se ujema z obdobjem gospodarske stabilnosti in rasti v državi. V tem obdobju je prišlo do modernizacije, in Mehika se je spremenila v državo, v kateri prevladujejo mesta. Na oblikovanje mestnih aglomeracij v državi so vplivali različni dejavniki, kot so selitve s podeželja v mesta, urbanizacija, industrializacija in ekonomska politika nadomeščanja uvoza z domačo proizvodnjo. Tako so začele nastajati metropole (na primer Ciudad de Mexico, Guadalajara, Monterrey in Puebla), mestne regije (na primer Bajío, ki velja za osrčje države) in druga mesta z več sto tisoč prebivalci, med katerimi izstopajo Cancun, Acapulco, Oaxaca, Ciudad Juárez in Morelia. Ta mesta v svojih regijah delujejo kot magnet, ki na škodo okoliškega podeželja privablja ljudi in dejavnosti. Prva velika faza spreminjanja oblike in obsega mehiškega starega mestnega jedra še vedno ne pojenja. Nove industrijske cone in stanovanjske soseske na obrobjih mest kar ne prenehajo rasti, ločeno (in izolirano) od mest se pojavljajo spalna naselja s socialnimi stanovanji, nastajajo nove glavne avenije in obvoznice, na podlagi katerih se mestna območja širijo, njihove meje pa se hitro prestavljajo; gradnja poteka na območjih, oddaljenih od tradicionalnih velikih mestnih središč, tržnic, avtobusnih postaj, nakupovalnih centrov, bolnic, upravnih središč in drugih storitev.

Ob koncu 20. stoletja sta liberalizacija državnega gospodarstva in njegov vstop na svetovni trg (privatizacija bank in sprejetje prostotrgovinskih sporazumov, kot je severnoameriški prostotrgovinski sporazum) sprožila reorganizacijo mestnih območij in mest. Po letu 1980 razvoj v mestih ni bil več odvisen izključno od načrtov in infrastrukture, ki jih je financirala država. Zato je bilo njeno poseganje oslABLJENO, kar je omogočilo vstop zasebnega kapitala in tujih podjetij v različne storitvene dejavnosti, v katerih so imeli monopol. Globalizacija je prišla še zlasti do izraza v nepremičninskem sektorju, kar je za večja mehiška mesta (kot so Ciudad de Mexico, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Leon, Queretaro, Morelia in Puebla) pomenilo novo fazo razvoja. V drugih mehiških regijah se je ta sektor prestrukturiral s prihodom tujega kapitala v obliki avtomobilske industrije v osrednji regiji Bajío in različnih tovarn v mestih ob meji z ZDA.

Pri preobrazbi mehiških mest so imele ključno vlogo tudi prometne in komunikacijske tehnologije, s pomočjo katerih so nekatera mednarodna podjetja svoje proizvodne obrate lahko namestila na mestna obrobja. Dostop do tehnologije je poleg tega povzročil nastanek obsežnih novih območij, ki prispevajo svoj delež k nenačrtnemu širjenju mest. Z vidika prostotrgovinskega trga promet in komunikacije omogočajo selitev proizvodnih središč na območja, ki so vse bolj oddaljena od potrošniških trgov (to je mest v Mehiki in ZDA). Tako od leta 2000 železnica, letališča, industrijske cone in avtocest-

te pomembno vplivajo na širjenje mestnih območij v Mehiki. Globalizacija je na podlagi interesov mednarodnega zasebnega kapitala in interesov lokalne elite povzročila doslej največje širjenje mehiških mestnih območij. Tovrstno širjenje pa se slabo ujema z družbenimi odnosi, ki določajo državljanstvo ter obliko in obseg tradicionalnega mehiškega mesta.

Z ozemeljskega vidika je mesto postalo krpanka starih mestnih jeder iz kolonialnega obdobja (z dodanim vidikom svetovne kulturne dediščine) z urbanimi sledmi ter enotnim in prepoznavnim arhitekturnim slogom, zlasti če je bilo omogočeno njihovo ohranjanje. Ta jedra so obdana s prvimi modernimi dozidavami z začetka 20. stoletja. Temu je sledilo pospešeno širjenje v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, ko so se začeli množiti slumi ter so se oblikovali nove ozemeljske oblike in središča na mestnem obrobju: letališča, nakupovalni centri, trgovske četrti, stanovanjske soseske in območja s socialnimi stanovanji. S to novo obliko urbanizacije se je obseg mesta spremenil iz nekdanje mestne utrdbe v ozemlje ali metropolo, ki jo zaznamujejo najrazličnejše urbane oblike ter heterogene strukture s tehnološko-arhitekturnimi in trgovskimi objekti.

V starih mestnih jedrih mehiških mest se ti pojavi zgoščajo, povzročajo pa jih lokalni in globalni procesi, povezani s strukturnimi spremembami v gospodarstvu. Eden od izzivov, ki se pojavlja, je oblikovanje kompleksnega družbenega tkiva grajenega okolja: »Latinska Amerika doživlja prevrednotenje grajenega mesta, v katerem danes v še večji meri obstajajo tri vrste zgodovinskih središč: njegovi temelji, urbani elementi in subjekt v kontekstu globalizacije.« (Carrión, 2013: 713.)

Fernando Carrión pravi, da je eden od razvojnih trendov v Latinski Ameriki usmerjen v zgodovinska središča in ne v širjenje mest na obrobjih, kar je bilo značilno za 20. stoletje. Naloga te nove centripetalne logike je vrnitev k združenemu mestu (Carrión, 1997). Ob upoštevanju »vzajemnega ujemanja oblike mestnega tkiva in življenjskega sloga« (Choay, 2009: 167) je nov način urbanizacije starih mestnih jeder v Latinski Ameriki del »javne in družbene zavesti, ki jo posebejajo novi *subjekti dediščine*« (Carrión, 2013: 717).

4 Državljanstvo z vidika teorije dediščine

Čeprav je zgodovinsko dejstvo, da se je pojem državljanstva izoblikoval na podlagi vzpostavitve pravic in dolžnosti posameznikov in skupin (Antaki, 2000), je dejstvo tudi to, da so na njegov razvoj vplivale ranljive skupine, ki teh pravic zaradi socialnih sporov niso imele in so se zanje borile (Marshall, 1949). Če ta načela prenesemo na kapitalistična mesta 21. stoletja, natančneje, na mesta v Latinski Ameriki, državljanstvo do-

loča predvsem ta drugi vidik (to je vidik konflikta; Castells, 2005; Delgadillo, 2009; Carrión, 2014). Z drugimi besedami, mehiško državljanstvo temelji na uporniškem nasprotovanju politični eliti in meščanskim skupinam. V tem boju za pravico do mesta (Harvey, 2011) se državljanstvo izraža kot nasprotje številnim izključitvam socialne, gospodarske, ozemeljske ali kulturne narave ter celo dediščini, ki pripada naprednim kapitalističnim mestom.

Konflikti in izključevalnost mehiških mest prežemajo njihova zgodovinska ozemlja in območja dediščine. Pravzaprav dosežejo vrhunec prav v spomeniško zaščitenih predelih mest, in sicer zaradi njihovih prostorskih in socialnih lastnosti, kot je koncentracija simboličnih nosilcev moči, trgov, parkov, spomenikov, palač in ustanov. V tem pogledu je državljanstvo v zgodovinskem mestu (de)konstruiralo spor glede uporabe in uživanja grajene dediščine (tako njenih snovnih kot nesnovnih vidikov).

Urbano državljanstvo v kontekstu zgodovinskih mest je posledica odsotnosti sodelovanja prebivalcev pri upravljanju in uporabi kulturnih virov. Na podlagi tega bolj zaželenega kot realnega sodelovanja pri načrtovanju mest so se razvili številni izrazi, povezani z uveljavljanjem pravic državljanov pri sprejemanju odločitev, ki se nanašajo na upravljanje mest: državljan-ska participacija, družbena participacija, upravljanje, participativno načrtovanje in podobno. Na podlagi teh dejavnikov se v teoretičnem in političnem diskurzu gradi oziroma bi se moralo graditi državljanstvo v mehiških zgodovinskih mestih. Tako lahko vsaj sklepamo iz deklaracij in operativnih priročnikov za razglašena območja kulturne dediščine, ki vsebujejo zahtevo oziroma priporočilo za vključitev lokalne civilne družbe v sprejemanje odločitev pri upravljanju dediščine (UNESCO, 2014).

V praksi pa je izvajanje pravice do odločanja o uporabi dediščine videti popolnoma drugače. Vsaj v Mehiki, razen v določenih primerih, kot sta arheološko najdišče Monte Alban v mehiški zvezni državi Oaxaca ter zgodovinsko središče Ciudad de Mexico in Xochimilco (Delgadillo, 2009), na razglašeni nacionalni ali mednarodni območjih kulturne dediščine organizacije civilne družbe niso vključene v odločanje o upravljanju dediščine (uvedba projektov, naložbe, kulturna ponudba in raba). V teh primerih sodelovanje državljanov spodbujajo napadi na pravice ranljivih skupin (kmetov, domorodcev, neformalnih trgovskih združenj in sosedov), povezani z ekonomskim, ekološkim in/ali kulturnim vidikom rabe zgodovinskega mesta.

Med akterji, ki gradijo državljanstvo v zgodovinskih mestih, ločujemo med dvema skupinama: (a) višjim in srednjim slojem (meščani in politična elita) ter (b) nižjim slojem in družbenimi manjšinami. Prva skupina, ki jo predstavlja družbena

in gospodarska elita, se poteguje za svoje pravice v vlogi podjetnikov, potrošnikov in prebivalcev. Te vloge, ki so povezane z gospodarsko dejavnostjo, se združujejo z vlogo zgodovinskega središča: turizmom. Interesi elite niso samo ekonomski, ampak so z vidika socialnega statusa povezani tudi s kulturno potrošnjo. Pri drugi skupini, ki jo sestavljajo drugi sloji in ranljive skupine, se zdi, da njeno državljanstvo trpi zaradi izključevalne dinamike ekonomske in politične mestne logike, ki spodkopava uporabo in koristi dediščine oziroma pravico do mesta ali v tem primeru njegove dediščine. Po eni strani razmere prebivalcev slumov v središču mesta slabša dinamika gentrifkacije, ki poskuša ta prostor obnoviti z zamenjavo sedanjih prebivalcev s premožnejšimi stanovalci, ki imajo večjo kupno moč, po drugi strani pa se v okviru politike »reševanja« starih mestnih jeder trgovinski predpisi določajo na podlagi javnih ulic, kar slabša položaj delavcev na območju dediščine in kaže jasne posledice izključevanja. Ob vsem tem bi pričakovali, da bo gospodarsko izkoriščanje dediščine povzročilo nastanek novih delovnih mest, v resnici pa se izraža v prekarnih zaposlitvah in nizkih plačah (na primer zaposlitve v hotelih, restavracijah, trgovini, gradbeništvu in osebnih storitvah). Poleg tega uporabniki mestnega zgodovinskega prostora omejujejo konkretni ukrepi, povezani s privatizacijo in varnostjo. Turistična policija skrbi za sterilno podobo mestne dediščine ter za namene kulturne in zgodovinske turistične potrošnje izvaja nezaželen pritisk na določene skupine prebivalcev, kot so brezdomci, domorodci, ki prodajajo svoje obrtniške izdelke, ulični prodajalci, prostitutke in »urbana plemena«.

Družbeno-prostorsko izključevanje in negotovost državljanstva se izražata na javnih in tudi zasebnih prostorih. V 80. letih 20. stoletja se je več starih mestnih jeder v mehiških mestih začelo usmerjati v najrazličnejše poslovne dejavnosti, od neformalne trgovine do financ in bančništva, hkrati pa so v istem desetletju stara mestna jedra postala zgodovinski subjekt dediščine, ki naj bi mestom prinesla novo podobo ter krepila njihovo prepoznavnost in politično moč (Monnet, 1993). Pri razglasitvah »območij svetovne dediščine« je bila izjemno pomembna vloga zasebnega sektorja, ki je celo izpodrinila nekatere vladne projekte prenove. Gospodarski interes obvladuje dediščino in pod izrazom »reševanje« zgodovinskih mest spodbuja trend gentrifkacije (Coulomb, 2009). V več mestih (Queretaro, Morelia, Guadalajara, Ciudad de Mexico, Oaxaca in Puebla) so na osrednjih območjih izvedli projekte prostorske prenove, ki so vplivali na dinamiko trga. Primer tovrstnih projektov je »program turističnih koridorjev«, ki se je v prvem desetletju 21. stoletja izvajal v mehiški prestolnici in katerega glavni cilj je bila pritegnitev novih dejavnosti, mednarodnih tokov ljudi, kapitala in nacionalne elite.^[1] Cilj načrtovanih posegov je bil narediti osrednja območja privlačnejša za višje sloje, ki naj bi po mnenju podpornikov programa ponovno aktivirali uporabo prostora, primerne za bivanje, in »življenje v sozeski«.

V javnem prostoru politika varstva kulturne dediščine predvideva sanacijo trgov, spomenikov, avenij, cest, vrtov, parkov, pešpoti in paviljonov, prenavo pročelij in zamenjavo ulične opreme. Večina tovrstnih primerov ni upravičena do sredstev države in Unesca, namenjenih za to, in to preprečuje neposredno sodelovanje v odločanju o projektih, ki vplivajo na uporabnike in lokalne prebivalce.

V zasebnem sektorju politika varovanja kulturne dediščine spodbuja davčno politiko, ki privablja naložbe v nepremičnine. V tem okviru so hoteli prestižnih mednarodnih verig, kot sta Holiday Inn in Fiesta Americana, in drugi butični hoteli za premožnejše poslovne potnike v mehiških starih mestnih jedrih našli potencialno tržišče za kulturni turizem. Novi uporabniki oziroma prebivalci mesta se med seboj ločijo glede na dejavnosti, povezane z mednarodnimi sedeži bank in finančnih storitev, s trgovino, luksuznim in poslovnim turizmom. Območja, ki so bila s pomočjo tujih naložb obnovljena ali novo zgrajena za turizem ali varstvo dediščine, so povezana z mednarodnimi podjetji. Ekskluzivnost in izključenost območij dediščine sta vključeni v komercialne dejavnosti teh podjetij, in tako se ta območja večinoma uporabljajo kot prostor za trgovine in tuje restavracije največjih svetovnih znamk, kot so Cartier, Zara, Sears, McDonald's, Starbucks in Burger King. Poleg tega se v obnovljenih delih mesta množijo luksuzne in modne restavracije v bistrojskem slogu. Še ena od izrazitih značilnosti je strog nadzor v zasebnem in okoliškem javnem prostoru. Položaj je bolj ali manj enak za hotele, butike, restavracije in druge prostore v lasti novih lastnikov kapitala osrednjih območij: mestni prostor ni nič drugega kot podaljšek trgovske dejavnosti elite, ki se izraža v trendovskih terasah kavarn, storitvah, pri katerih uslužbenci gostom hotelov ali restavracij parkirajo vozila, modernih parkiriščih, razkošnih nakupovalnih galerijah in razkošnih vhodih v hotele. V teh na zunaj sijajnih razmerah v mestu lokalni prebivalci nimajo dostopa do poslovnih prostorov, tujih turistov ali višjih slojev.

Zaradi vsega tega se manjša obseg mestnega prostora, ki še velja za javnega v smislu, da je njegova uporaba brezplačna ter omogoča prosti dostop in gibanje. Danes je socialna raznolikost v mestu vidna pri pešcih, kolesarjih, posameznikih, ki se zadržujejo ob mestnih vodnjakih, in udeležencih različnih koncertov, vendar v zgoraj opisanem »dezinficiranem« butičnem okolju ti uporabniki vse prej kot prevladujejo.

5 Državljeni z vidika teorije socialnega kapitala

Prispevek družbenih odnosov, v katerih posamezniki sodelujejo v procesu socializacije, imenujemo »socialni kapital« (Lou-

ry, 1977). Prvo sodobno sistematsko analizo socialnega kapitala je opravil Pierre Bourdieu (1985), ki je ta pojem opredelil kot »skupek dejanskih in potencialnih virov, ki izvirajo iz posedovanja bolj ali manj institucionalizirane mreže odnosov trajnega znanja ali medsebojnega upoštevanja« (Bourdieu 1985: 248). Bourdieu pojem obravnava instrumentalno, pri čemer se osredotoča na koristi, ki jih posamezniki prejmejo s sodelovanjem v skupinah in pri namenskem oblikovanju družabnosti, s čimer ustvarijo določen vir (Bourdieu, 1985). Podobno kot Bourdieu tudi James S. Coleman (1988) trdi, da socialne mreže spodbujajo norme vzajemnosti, kar pomeni, da eden daje drugemu, ne da bi za to pričakoval povračilo (vsaj ne takoj), in sicer z zagotovilom, da bo dejanje pripeljalo do odloženega prihodka. Odnos temelji na zaupanju.

V zgodovinskih središčih je gentrifkacija močno usmerjena v spodbujanje turizma. V nasprotju z gentrifkacijo, pri kateri gre za proces zamenjave določenega družbenega sloja s slabšimi finančnimi viri z drugim slojem, ki je v boljšem finančnem položaju, je za turiste značilna pretočnost in v tem pogledu ne izključujejo ali zamenjajo lokalnih prebivalcev. Družbena praksa turistov oziroma njihova narava (začasni obiskovalci) namreč ne gradi socialnega kapitala. Za razlago tega položaja avtorja predlagata, naj se problem analizira z dveh vidikov:

- Z vidika začasnega prebivanja: socialni kapital je vir, ki se gradi počasi. Status obiskovalcev turistom v večini primerov onemogoča oblikovanje dolgoročnih odnosov, zato je njihovo tovrstno začasno prebivanje nezadostno za oblikovanje trajnih mrež, ki ustvarjajo socialno zaupanje. V tem kontekstu je zaradi kratkega bivanja na določenem kraju pripravljenost turistov za oblikovanje trajnih družbenih praks majhna.
- Z vidika narave družbenih praks: Alessandro Pizzorno (2003) je proučeval naravo družbenih dejanj, ki gradijo socialni kapital, in opredelil lastnosti, ki jih ločijo od drugih družbenih dejanj. Najprej je določil tiste vrste družbenih odnosov, ki več kot očitno ne morejo tvoriti socialnega kapitala, in analiziral njihove skupne točke. Ugotovil je, da ne gre za ustaljene odnose, ampak le za srečanja med posamezniki, ki ne nadaljujejo odnosa, hkrati pa tudi ne za sovražne odnose, kot so različne oblike izkoriščanja ali konflikti na splošno. To so posebne značilnosti, za katere ni potrebno, da se priznajo na podlagi identitete drugega, niti ne poskušajo razveljaviti identitete drugega (Pizzorno, 2003). Posledično so tovrstni odnosi nosilci socialnega kapitala samo v smislu, da se pri njih priznava bolj ali manj trajna identiteta udeležencev ter predvideva določena oblika solidarnosti in vzajemnosti. Jasno je, da odnosi glavnih protagonistov te raziskave (to je turistov) izpolnjujejo prva pogoja, ki preprečujeta ustvarjanje socialnega kapitala: da gre za po-



Slika 1: Trg revolucije v Ciudadu de Mexico, družabne dejavnosti in nova oblika mestnega prostora (foto: David Navarrete)

slovne odnose in le srečanja med posamezniki, ki odnosa ne nadaljujejo; v tem pogledu jih ne določa priznavanje identitete akterjev, vključenih v zadevni odnos.

Alejandro Portes (1999) je opredelil tri osnovne funkcije socialnega kapitala, ki veljajo v različnih kontekstih, v katerih je kapital vir družbenega nadzora. V zvezi s tem se številne raziskave kapitala osredotočajo na uvedbo pravil. Socialni kapital, ki ga ustvarijo kompaktne mreže skupnosti, je uporaben za člane skupnosti, ki poskušajo vzdrževati disciplino in spodbujati zvestobo med vodilnimi. Njegov glavni cilj je doseči nepotrebnost formalnega ali odprtega nadzora (Portes, 1999).

Na podlagi tega lahko sklepamo, da je turist subjekt, ki v mestu, ki ga obišče, nima socialnega kapitala. Kakšna pa je vloga socialnega kapitala pri oblikovanju državljanstva? Državljanška participacija je osnova, na kateri se gradi socialni kapital. V mrežah, katerih hierarhična zgradba ne poskuša vplivati na javno politiko, sodelujejo najrazličnejši akterji. V tem kontekstu se pojem »državljanška participacija« nanaša na »politiko ali sodelovanje pri sprejemanju odločitev, ki se izraža v izboru vladarjev, posredno in neposredno pa tudi v oblikovanju, nadzoru in ocenjevanju javne politike« (Leal, 2003: 117). Tako je turist – čeprav velja za vseprisotnega akterja v zgodovinskih središčih, ki pa ne sodeluje pri njihovi vlogi odtujitve od družbene in materialne realnosti kraja, v katerem je dobrodošel – zaradi svojega kratkega postanka usmerjen v kratkotrajno iskanje zadovoljstva.

6 Analiza državljanov na turističnih območjih kulturne dediščine in slabenje socialnega kapitala v mehiških mestih

Avtorja obravnavata oblikovanje državljanstva z dveh vidikov: z vidika mesta kot družbeno-prostorskega graditelja državljanstva in, obratno, z vidika družbe kot dejavnega graditelja novih oblik urbanizma.

V Mehiki se nove oblike državljanstva pojavljajo zaradi konflikta med »simbolnimi univerzumi« oziroma zaradi zgodovinskih središč, v katerih trenutno potekajo pomembni procesi, povezani z dediščino. Ta izjemno bogata mestna območja zaznamuje prisotnost izrazito revnih prebivalcev, ki se dnevno borijo za to, da so opaženi. Če se vsak model mesta ujema z določeno značilnostjo državljanstva, je zgodovinska dediščina novi model, pri katerem državljanji ne izražajo samo sebe, ampak tudi vse tiste, ki se pretvarjajo za državljane. Uveljavljanje pravice do mesta zanje torej pomeni dnevni boj proti temu, da bi jih nekdo zamenjal. S tega vidika gre pri urbanem državljanstvu za pravice, ki bi jih morali uveljavljati vsi, ki živijo v zgodovinskem mestu.

Lokalne prakse so v splošnem izključene iz politike ohranjanja zgodovinskih središč. Za avtohtone skupine prebivalstva se



Slika 2: Ulica Sopeña v mehiški zvezni državi Guanajuato; ulični prodajalci, ranljive skupine prebivalstva in turistični prostori (foto: David Navarrete)

običajno nihče ne zmeni, hkrati pa jih zatirajo javna politika in zakoni trga. Izključeni so kot uporabniki, včasih pa tudi kot delavci, ki za preživetje opravljajo delo na črno. Ena od izjem, pri kateri so domačini in domorodci vključeni v urbanistično načrtovanje zgodovinskega središča, je njihovo izkoriščanje v turistične namene, katerih cilj je turistom ponuditi določena doživetja. Plesi, sejmi, verski prazniki, povorke in romanja se prikazujejo kot del podobe zgodovinskih središč. Še vedno pa ostaja nejasno, kako bi lahko dejavna vloga podjetij vplivala na načrtovanje mesta in krepitev državljanstva. V Mehiki bi bilo treba spodbujati vključenost nevladnih organizacij, prebivalcev, poslovnežev in verskih združenj, ki bi lahko reševali dediščino in zanjo poiskali novo obliko rabe, s čimer bi zadovoljevali tudi potrebe lokalnega prebivalstva. To bi omogočilo oblikovanje novega ravnotežja moči med državo, ki odloča o vsem, in lokalnimi skupinami državljanov, ki bi se oblikovale v okviru nove oblike državljanstva.

Zgodovinsko uveljavljen odnos, v katerem prostor velja za produkt in pogoj družbenih odnosov, je značilen tudi za Mehiko. To velja predvsem v smislu, da državljanstvo določa mestne pokrajine, ki združujejo načela demokratičnih in vključevalnih družbenih praks. Kaj je značilno za mehiško državljanstvo in kakšen bi bil model značilnega mehiškega zgodovinskega območja? Kot je bilo opisano zgoraj, v Mehiki trenutno pre-

vladuje dinamika komodifikacije, korporativizma, deregulacije in družbene brezbriznosti oziroma zanikanja konfliktov. Ta načela lahko ustvarijo skeptično pokrajino, ki bo na podlagi politike, ki se zavzema za povrnitev prestiža, čistočo, varnost, red in privlačno turistično podobo, izključevala nezaželene skupine, kot so avtohtona ljudstva, revni in/ali migranti. To bo teatralna pokrajina, ki bo z uporabo tehnologije, umetnosti, predstav in osvetljave iz dediščine naredila spektakel; pokrajina, ki bo postala muzej konservatorske politike območij dediščine in starih mestnih jeder, ki pogosto poskrbi za površinske posege, ne skrbi pa za družbeno dinamiko rabe in bivanja, ki bi omogočila oživitve mestnih jeder; komercialna pokrajina, ki omogoča lastnikom in poslovnim sferam zgodovinskih središč, da špekulirajo z vrednostjo zemljišč ter spremenijo zgodovinska središča v konglomeracije turizma in komercialnih storitev. Zgodovinska središča bi se tako spremenila v prostor s šibkim državljanstvom, ki je prežeto z neoliberalnimi vrednotami in globalizacijo in je protidemokratično.

Kako lahko to popravimo? Z vzpostavitvijo državljanstva, ki ima spet mesto. Z drugimi besedami, z vzpostavitvijo posebnih enot za državljane oziroma uporabnike mesta, z mejami, kažipotami in javnimi prostori – »javnimi« v smislu pluralnosti mnenj in prostora za različna stališča, kjer se lahko obravnavajo različni pogledi in sobivajo različne družbene skupine.

To lahko popravimo tudi z odpravo vplivne zamisli, povezane s slogovnimi značilnostmi umetniških del, ki omejujejo javno politiko ohranjanja in varstva dediščine. To zahteva široko poznavanje in razumevanje dediščine ter njenega ohranjanja in varstva, pri čemer je treba preseči fizično raven ter poleg kulturne in naravne dediščine upoštevati tudi nesnovno dediščino in tako priznati raznolikost pojavnih oblik kulture (Carrión, 2012). Pri upravljanju zgodovinskih središč je treba preseči idejo o spomenikih kot spominskih obeležjih, na podlagi česar bi lahko ljudje začeli o politiki zgodovinskega ohranjanja razmišljati drugače, ne le z vidika njenih birokratskih in konservatorskih procesov. V tem kontekstu bi morali vključiti pojem »simbolnih univerzumov«, na primer prizadevanja za vključitev različnih dihotomnih predstav o dediščini. V mestnem prostoru mehiških zgodovinskih središč veljajo prostorske korenine za nekakšno simbolno obliko komunikacije; so najljubši kraj teh univerzalnih simbolov. Zato je cilj institucionalnega načrtovanja mehiške dediščine uvedba vrednot, norm ter oblik oblasti in družbene reprezentacije, ki se ujemajo z dejavno politično oblastjo.

Položaj lahko popravimo tudi z obliko državljanstva, ki posameznikom in družbenim skupinam vseh kategorij državljanov omogoča, da nadzirajo porabo javnih sredstev. To pomeni, da skrbijo za to, da se ta ne trošijo samo v korist določenih korporacij v lasti privilegiranih poslovnežev in političnih elit. Treba je sprejeti zakonodajo, ki bo zagotovila nadzor in uvedla pravne mehanizme, s katerimi se bodo kaznovali vsi tisti, ki dajejo prednost zasebnim in korporativnim interesom pred interesi mesta. S tem se lahko borimo proti enemu od glavnih strukturnih problemov mehiške družbe: korupciji, ki je še eden od negativnih dejavnikov, ki slabša ali določa pogoje državljanstva v mehiških zgodovinskih središčih.

7 Sklep

V zgodovinskih mestih nastaja neenakopravno državljanstvo. To še zlasti drži, če upoštevamo, da procesi, povezani z varovanjem dediščine, poudarjajo dinamično socialne in prostorske izključenosti, ki ima negativne posledice za uveljavljanje pravice do mesta. Razmere na zgodovinskih območjih glavnih mest razvitih držav Latinske Amerike kažejo, da je samo še vprašanje časa, kdaj bodo tovrstne družbeno-prostorske prilagoditve še bolj okrepile neenakopravnost v mestu. Poleg tega te procese spodbuja vlada, ki se zavzema za nov gospodarski razvoj mesta, pri čemer bi obnovljeni predeli postali glavne poslovne osi v kapitalistični dobi globalizacije. Obsežne javne naložbe v dediščino, katerih cilj je povečati njeno turistično in ekonomsko privlačnost, koristijo tujemu kapitalu, zelo ozki kapitalistični

eliti in višjim družbenim slojem. Tovrstna specializacija ozemlja omejuje pravice lokalnih prebivalcev in izključuje njihove dejavnosti, ki manj ustrezajo ciljem mednarodne konkurenčnosti. Med vladnimi ukrepi ni vzpostavljene strategije za vključevanje manj premožnih prebivalcev ali tradicionalnih dejavnosti v bližini zgodovinskih območij. V teh razmerah se možnost oživitve osrednjih mestnih območij s pomočjo ohranjanja dediščine izkaže za erozivno obliko državljanstva, saj krepi socialno izključenost dela prebivalstva (zlasti z vidika njegove zaposlitve) v dejavnostih, povezanih s potrošnjo, kulturo in stanovanji.

Zgodovinska središča poleg tega povzročajo izgubo socialnega kapitala, in sicer na dva načina: z izgonom stanovalcev oziroma naravnih nosilcev vrednot identitete in zaupanja, potrebnih za spodbujanje in ohranjanje socialnega kapitala, ter s prevladujočo prisotnostjo tekočega prebivalstva, katerega glavni nosilec, turist, ne izpolnjuje potrebnih pogojev za izgradnjo socialnega kapitala oziroma tega niti ni pripravljen storiti. Na tem mestu ne smemo pozabiti, da je socialni kapital ključen za naravni nadzor javnega prostora (to je neformalni družbeni nadzor). V številnih stanovanjskih skupnostih se sosede zaradi vse večjega občutka ogroženosti združujejo v solidarnostne mreže, ker lahko tako skupaj ukrepajo na območjih, ki jih ogroža kriminal: na svojih ulicah. Nameščajo skupnostne alarme, urejajo varnostne koridorje, izvajajo načrte za opozarjanje skupnosti, objavljajo spletne bloge in forume, spodbujajo povezovanje po telefonu in organizirajo obhode soseske, da se zagotovita varnost in red. Vse to povzroča pomembno povečanje deleža socialnega kapitala v posamezni skupnosti, ki vpliva na pozitivno kroženje oziroma vzajemno delovanje mednjo in mestom.

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Opombe

[1] Tovrstni projekti so imeli te cilje: (a) krepitev mestnih središč in spodbujanje ponovnega zgoščanja osrednjih območij (privabljanje dejavnosti in ljudi); (b) boljša uporaba infrastrukture (storitve, oprema in promet) v obstoječem središču; (c) gospodarski razvoj in splošna družbena blaginja; (d) spodbujanje rabe prostora ter turističnih, finančnih, kulturnih, tehnoloških in komunikacijskih storitev na območjih načrtovanih posegov ter (e) varovanje in ohranjanje grajene dediščine (SECTUR DF 2004: 1–2; General Urban Development Programme 2001–2006).

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Inequality in heritage centres: Analysing the reality in Mexican cities

Globalisation has had an impact in Mexican cities, creating new urban structures. Therefore, globalisation modifies the relationships that individuals establish with the territory through the construction of new citizenship practices. With a multidisciplinary approach, we develop a theoretical analysis that allows us to understand the new condition of Mexican historical centres caused by the challenges imposed by becoming a World Heritage Site. We apply a theoretical construct that allows us to portray certain aspects of reality in Mexican cities regarding the construction of democratic and participative practices of citizenship. We analyse this phenomenon based on two theoretical points of departure: a) the process of becoming a heritage site (i.e., tourism/gentrification) and b) the

theory of social capital. The results show that the new situation implies a transformation in the space, time and economy of the heritage site. In the historical centre, the political actors and institutions promote centralist, transnational and urban conservationist development. An urbanism is created that prioritises conservation to the benefit of tourists and to the detriment of enjoyment, use and participation by the local population. Furthermore, there is an erosion of the social fabric through processes of exclusion and gentrification, which place citizenship in peril.

Keywords: heritage preservation, citizenship, gentrification, exclusions, historical centres

1 Introduction

Current discourse on social reality focuses on the consideration of space not only as a container or carrier of the substance of social processes, but as an active element that influences the very structure of social reality (Lezama, 2002). In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the built environment, in which certain processes of social life take place, and its appearance, which provides content to the material dimension of space (Lezama, 2002). In other words, this involves the distinction between space as mere material support and social space, which, in affiliation with the material framework, acts as both a source and a resource. Furthermore, this includes the social relationships that individuals establish through processes that depend on spatial practices (Lefebvre, 1969). Therefore, space is not only a real scene but also the architect of that reality; it refrains from being a passive entity upon which men build history to take an active role in shaping life events in general (Castells, 1988).

Historically, citizenship has been a leading aspect of the general “life of the city”. With the alliance of *civitas* and *urbs*, a community with social order and material support (i.e., public spaces), the history of citizenship has been built in the western world (Choay, 2009). In other words, the various levels of adjustment between social practices and the built environment had conditioned the character of citizenship over the centuries. This occurred in the middle of adjustments that, depending on the moment in history, promoted or inhibited democratic participation, equality, liberty, respect and recognition among the individuals and groups in a community.

Based on these considerations, it is important to highlight that creating citizenships can be analysed in terms of reality of social practices and/or the territorial conditions that this social (i.e., urban/spatial) issue manifests. The analysis of citizenship as a social question has been widely developed in the social sciences. In one of the clearest examples, the British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1949) proposes three types of citizenship, assigning temporality to each one. These citizenship types, which arise from the need of all individuals to enjoy the same rights, are complementary to the extent that the limitations of each of them are clearly defined and are manifest in the exclusion of one or more groups of individuals. There are thus at least three major levels of citizenship in modern western societies.

The first is *civil citizenship*, established in the eighteenth century, which confers the recognition of equality before the law necessary for the exercise of individual rights (the freedom of

speech, thought and religion, the right to property, commerce and justice, and the right to conclude mutually agreed-upon contracts). This supposed equality leaves out not only those without property, but also those that do not have the means to be heard. This form of citizenship was favoured by the cities because it was “born in the commercial cities and follows the development of the destined courts to arbitrate disputes about these exchanges” (Donzelot, 2012: 11).

The second is *political citizenship*, which arose in the nineteenth century as a way of compensating for the previous exclusions, assigning individuals the condition of being equally sovereign. However, the social inequality generated by the capitalist system, which pervades western society, does not ensure the satisfaction of essential needs for the survival of all. As such, it excludes many individuals from the exercise of civil and political citizenship. Political citizenship ensured the right to participate in exercising power, and responded to desires of the urban population, both poor and rich, to participate in the city government.

The last one is *social citizenship*, which emerged in the twentieth century as a result of the policy implemented by the welfare state oriented towards the idea that all people are equal in dignity and rights. Dignity is understood as the set of rights granted to all citizens, whether referring to their social status, access to housing, education and healthcare, or an income that allows them to satisfy their basic needs. This form of citizenship addresses the problem of the growing concentration of poor people in cities as a result of migration from the countryside to the city.

Returning to the line of argument, and in agreement with the theoretical although not the chronological structure of Marshall (1949), Jacques Donzelot (2012) addresses the concept of social citizenship in the mid-twentieth century. Social citizenship is understood as the equality of rights and is added to the already established civil and political citizenship of previous centuries. Donzelot proposes the passage to a new type of citizenship that has a spatial nature, one that is derived from the urban environment. From a narrative typical of French reality, Donzelot introduces the concept of urban citizenship and discusses the finished nature of all types of citizenship known thus far in order to open a new chapter. Although the novelty of the urban dimension, as expressed by the author himself, seems to be inconsistent, given the prominence of urban discourse in the descriptive part of citizenship, he clarified that the rationale for this new category is justified by evidence of a radical change that has occurred in society and the city over the last 150 years. At the beginning of this period (the nineteenth century), the city preceded and determined the

social question. In this regard, it is perceived as the cause of all social ills, where man is degraded and society perverted. The city was considered a dire abode that represented the origin of social struggles for citizenship. However, at the end of the period (in the twentieth century), the equation was reversed, and the city became a victim of society. Social practices of “ghettoisation” atomise the city and segregate its inhabitants.

In this last era of citizenship, the state can no longer control the social consequences of globalisation. Consequently, the state has begun to turn inwards towards the local. New rights are arising in light of this new perspective: the right to the city. Therefore, urban citizenship is becoming the exercise of rights by elected local representatives, residents, business owners and so on. All must agree to respond to the issue of urban citizenship with the help of local collaboration agreements. Thus, the right to the city emerges in a climate of “urban-philia”, which interprets urban space as a means to invoke social, economic and ecological conflicts.

2 The city model and the hallmarks of citizenship

One of the ideas this reflection is based on suggests that there is a direct relationship between the city and citizenship. This means that a certain social, economic, cultural and spatial (architectural and urban) order corresponds to certain features of citizenship, rights, restrictions, tensions and exclusions of groups and individuals. In this sense, using two specific models of the city, we interpret the locus as a builder of the distinctive hallmarks of citizenship.

We first analyse the social city. This model of the city arose after the Second World War in Europe in a general atmosphere of contempt for the city. The city was then conceived of as the cause of all social ills, including the physical and moral degradation of its inhabitants and the deterioration of relationships, which was expressed through disease and crime. In this sense, urban space built in the name of social citizenship fed on a sort of “urban-phobia” that occurred in the era of industrialisation. This model attempts to restore the traces of a socially balanced city, whose scope proved to be conducive to the construction of social citizenship.

This model is illustrated by the garden city concept introduced by Ebenezer Howard in 1898, which emerged as an alternative city paradigm that promotes itself as overcoming environmental and social imbalances, and aims at preserving both city artifices and the nature of the countryside (Choay, 2009), whose ties had been corroded by the practices of the

industrial era. Another alternative, proposed in 1899 by Tony Garnier for the model of the industrial city, follows the principles of modern urban planning as defined in the Charter of Athens (International Congress of Modern Architecture, CIAM, 1933).

The social city incarnates the principle of universal law, promoting access by all to the same goods, reducing inequality and alleviating social distances. This is reflected in the efforts to build large-scale social housing to re-assert the right to homeownership. Functional urbanism represents the “spatial company” that best reflects this social calling. This new urbanism is consolidated and promoted by the welfare state in its role as the custodian of the general interest. The traditional street is abolished in the name of security, and the dispersion of public space is one of the most emblematic testimonies of libertarian and hygienic principles. However, the erosion of the social fabric characteristic of these forms of urbanism will result in the emergence of a new model. Second, there is an urban renaissance. In contrast to the social environment that is posited by the social city, Donzelot (2012) argues that today a kind of “urban-philia” exists, which induces society and its citizens to think in terms of the alleged virtues of the city, whereby the concept of citizenship adopts the form that values the urban and no longer complains against it.

This optimistic view of the city is not entirely shared by Jordi Borja, who argues in favour of contradictory realities that challenge the appropriateness of the city as an area of citizenship. The “dissolution of the city”, he says, is expressed in urban regions of fuzzy boundaries, a dispersed habitat, social atomisation and environmental unsustainability. These freedoms are reduced, and social costs rise as a result of segregation. In contrast, a counter-trend is in favour of a social re-evaluation of the urban culture, and of a public space of citizen value, which promotes the “right to the city” (Borja, 2012).

The conceptual framework proposed by Marshall and Donzelot forms the basis for the links between the city and citizenship to be analysed in terms of human experience. We compare this Eurocentric view of the city/citizenship relationship with Mexican reality, checking whether or not it is valid and determining the particular characteristics of urban space and citizenship on this continent. Specifically, we focus our comparative theoretical analysis of the contemporary period of development in place since the late twentieth century in the selected territory of the historical centres of Latin American cities. The analysis, as stated above, has the following points of departure: a) the concept of heritage and b) the theory of social capital.

3 Mexico: Urbanisation, urban citizenship and world heritage cities

In Mexico, relationships between citizenship and cities are modified in the light of global practices and their consequent urban dynamics. Therefore, “the classical concept of citizenship, whose content is insufficient to meet the demands of a new socio-cultural diversity of social actors, is put under question” (Ramírez Kuri, 2013: 628). The term *citizenship* is polysemic and cannot be reduced to a limited repertoire of rights and obligations in a legal framework. In this case, this repertoire is reconfigured and expanded in light of ever-renewed social demands: new social, human, political and cultural conflicts are linked not only to social rights, but extend to rights to cultural and urban heritage, the environment, ecology, gender, health, life and safety (Ramírez Kuri, 2013).

Citizenship has been modified due to a series of urban dynamics present in Mexican cities since the second half of the twentieth century – that is to say, during a period of economic stability and growth in the country. During this, modernisation began and Mexico became mostly urban. Various factors such as rural-urban migration, urbanisation, industrialisation and the economic policy of import substitution structured urban agglomerations in Mexico. This is how metropolises began to form (e.g., Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey or Puebla); urban regions (the Mexican Bajío or heartlands) and other cities of several hundred thousand inhabitants, among which Cancún, Acapulco, Oaxaca, Ciudad Juárez, Morelia and others stand out. These cities act like magnets in their regions, attracting populations and activities, to the detriment of the surrounding rural zones. The first great dislocation of shapes and scale of the historic Mexican city does not seem to have slowed down. Industrial parks and popular residential zones on the periphery of cities do not seem to stop appearing; bedroom communities of social housing pop up isolated from the city; the main avenues and ring roads mark the urban expansion, with its new limits rapidly coming apart; construction takes place in zones far from the traditional large urban centres, markets, bus stations, malls, hospitals, administrative centres and other services.

At the end of the twentieth century, the liberalisation of the national economy and its entrance into the world market (the privatisation of banks and the integration of free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement) were definitive triggers of urban reorganisation, and subsequently the city. Since the 1980s, development in the city no longer depended exclusively on plans and infrastructure financed by the state. This weakened its intervention, and allowed the entrance of private capital and foreigners into various branches of

services that were exclusive to them. In particular, globalisation was manifested in the real-estate sector, which marked a new stage for major Mexican cities (e.g., Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, León, Querétaro, Morelia, Puebla, and others). In other regions of Mexico, this sector was restructured by the arrival of foreign capital in the form of industrial poles such as the automotive sector in the heartlands, or factories in towns along the border with the United States.

Transport and communication technologies also played a key role in the transformation of Mexican cities. This allowed certain industrial production by transnational companies to be located towards the outskirts of the city. Furthermore, access to technology translated into the creation of large areas that contribute their quota of urban sprawl. In the context of a free trade market, transport and communications allow the relocation of centres of production in radii ever further from the markets of consumption (i.e., Mexican and US cities). Thus, since 2000, the railroads, airports, industrial zones and highways have been directing an important part of urban expansion in Mexico. Therefore, globalisation has driven the largest expansion ever seen in Mexican urban areas, under the conditions of the interests of international private capital associated with the interests of the local elite. This extension was a poor fit with the social relationships that define citizenship and the form and scale of Mexican *urbs*.

In terms of territory, the city became a patchwork composed of historical centres of colonial origin – with a world heritage angle – with urban traces and a uniform and distinguishable architectural style in cases where conservation was allowed. Surrounding them are the first modern extensions from the beginning of the twentieth century. This was followed by accelerated expansion in the second half of the twentieth century, during which slums multiplied, with new forms of territory and urban poles of peripheral centres: airports, malls, commercial districts, residential neighbourhoods and social housing, among others. With this new structure of urbanisation, the citadel scale has passed to a territorial or metropolitan scale, creating a juxtaposition that generates an ensemble of urban pieces, and heterogeneous structures with technological-architectonic and commercial objects.

In this context, the historical centres of the Mexican city condense these phenomena driven by local and global processes related to structural adjustments in the economy. One challenge is the construction of the complex social fabric of the built environment: “Latin America is living a re-appreciation of the built city and, within it, to an even greater degree, the three types of historical centrality exist today: the foundation, the urban and the subject in the context of globalization” (Carrión, 2013: 713).

Fernando Carrión explains that one of the development trends in Latin America is oriented towards historical centrality as opposed to the peripheral expansion of the cities of the twentieth century. This new logic of a centripetal character has the task of returning to the consolidated city (Carrión, 1997). Assuming as a courtesy “the reciprocal fit of a form of urban fabric and a way of living” (Choay, 2009: 167), the new pattern of the urbanisation of Latin American historical centres is held in the “public and social conscience incarnated by new *heritage subjects*” (Carrión, 2013: 717).

4 Citizenship in the theory of heritage

Although it is true that, historically, the notion of citizenship has been built by the establishment of rights and obligations of individuals and groups (Antaki, 2000), it is also true that this notion has been structured by its counterpart; that is, by vulnerable groups that were deprived of those rights through social disputes, fighting for their conquest (Marshall, 1949). Taking these principles into the capitalist city of the twenty-first century, specifically in the Latin American region, it is especially in the second facet, that of the conflict, in which citizenship is defined (Castells, 2005; Delgadillo, 2009; Carrión, 2014). In other words, Mexican citizenship is built around rebellious expressions of opposition to the political elite and the bourgeoisie groups. It is in this struggle for the right to the city (Harvey, 2011) that citizenship is expressed against a number of exclusions that are social, economic, territorial and cultural in nature, and even heritage that belongs to advanced capitalist cities.

The conflict and exclusion of the Mexican city permeates its historical and heritage territory. In fact, conflict and exclusion reach their peak in the protected heritage parts of the cities. This is due to spatial and social characteristics: the concentration of symbolic supports of power, squares, parks, monuments, palaces and institutions, among others. In this context, we argue that citizenship in a heritage city (de)constructed the dispute over the use, enjoyment and usufruct of the built heritage, both tangible and intangible.

Indeed, urban citizenship in the context of heritage cities arises from the absence of the participation of the inhabitants in the administration and use of cultural resources. This participation, more desired than real, in town planning evokes a panoply of terms associated with the exercise of the rights of citizens in the decision-making regarding the administration of cities: citizen participation, social participation, governance, participatory planning and so on. In theoretical and political discourse, these factors construct, or at least should build, citizenship in a Mexican heritage city. This is the case, at least

in the declarations and operation manuals of declared heritage sites, where there is a requirement or recommendation to include local civil society in decision-making in managing heritage (UNESCO, 2014).

In reality, the right to decide on the use of heritage is different. At least in Mexico, except for some cases, such as Monte Alban in Oaxaca and the historical centre of Mexico City and Xochimilco (Delgadillo, 2009), national or supranational declared heritage sites do not have instances of civil society organisation integration in decision-making regarding asset management (establishment of projects, investment, range of cultural activities and uses, for example). Incidentally, the participation of citizens in these cases has been fuelled by the attack against the rights of vulnerable groups (farmers, indigenous peoples, informal trade associations and neighbours) in economic, ecological and/or cultural terms of use in a heritage city.

As for the actors that build citizenship in the heritage city, it is possible to distinguish two groups: a) the upper and middle classes (the bourgeoisie and political elite) and b) the lower classes and social minorities. The first group, represented by the social and economic elite, disputes its rights as entrepreneurs, consumers and inhabitants. These roles, associated with economic activity, converge on the role of a historical heritage centre: tourism. The interest of the elite is not only economic, but in terms of social status is also associated with cultural consumption. The second group, consisting of the other classes and vulnerable groups, is the group that appears to have their citizenship hurt due to the exclusionary dynamics of economic and political capitalist city logic, which undermines the use and benefit of heritage or, in other words, the right to the city or, in this case, to its heritage. On the one hand, the condition of residents of the central slums is eroded by the dynamics of gentrification, which seek to renew this space by substituting current residents with more affluent ones with greater purchasing power. On the other hand, the policies of the “rescue” of historical centres based trade regulation on public streets, undermining the status of workers within the heritage space, with obvious effects of exclusion. With this in mind, the prospect of new jobs derived from the economic exploitation of heritage may seem favourable, yet it occurs in situations of precarious employment and low wages (e.g., the service sector in hotels, restaurants, trade, construction and personal services). Finally, the condition of a user of heritage urban space is restricted by concrete actions of privatisation and security. Tourism police watch over an aseptic image of urban heritage and exert undesirable pressure on citizens for the purpose of cultural and heritage tourism consumption: homeless people, indigenous people selling crafts, street vendors, prostitutes and “urban tribes”, among others.

The socio-spatial exclusion and precariousness of citizenship are expressed in both public and private spaces. Since the 1980s, several historical centres in Mexican cities have specialised in diverse commercial activities, from informal trade to finance and banking. Equally, in the same decade, historical centres became a historical subject of a heritage that would give the city a new image for future use and serve for purposes of visibility and political power (Monnet, 1993). In the declarations of “World Heritage”, the role of the private sector has been very important and has even displaced some government-initiated renovation projects. Economic interest has dominated heritage and has promoted a tendency of gentrification under the term “rescue” of historical spaces (Coulomb, 2009). In several cities, such as Queretaro, Morelia, Guadalajara, Mexico City, Oaxaca or Puebla, spatial renewal projects were implemented in central areas and have since realised the implications for market dynamics. One example is the “Tourism Corridors Programme” in the first decade of the twenty-first century in the Mexican capital, whose primary objective was to attract new activities, international flows of people and capital or the national elite.^[1] The interventions sought to make central areas more attractive to the higher social classes, which, according to those supporting the programme, would reactivate the use of habitable space and “neighbourhood life”.

In the public space, heritage policies stipulate the renewal of squares, monuments, avenues, roads, gardens, parks, walkways, and gazebos, and the renovation of facades and replacement of street furniture. The funding for this that comes from the state and UNESCO excludes the vast majority of cases, hindering direct participation in decision-making on projects that affect both users and local inhabitants.

In the private sector, heritage policies promote tax policies that attract investment in property. In this framework, the hotels of prestigious multinational chains such as Holiday Inn and Fiesta Americana, and other boutique hotels aimed at high-level business travellers found a potential market for cultural tourism in Mexican historical centres. The new users/inhabitants of the city are distinguished by activities that revolve around the international headquarters of banks and financial services, commerce and luxury tourism, and business tourism. The areas reconstructed and constructed for tourism and heritage, thanks to foreign investments, are connected with global companies. The exclusivity and exclusion of heritage sites are incorporated in these companies’ commercial activities and so these sites are predominantly used as spaces for boutiques and international restaurants of globalised brands such as Cartier, Zara, Sears, McDonald’s, Starbucks and Burger King. In addition, luxurious, fashionable bistro-style restaurants multiply in renovated sectors. Another distinctive feature is the strict control found in private spaces and perimeters of surrounding

“public” space. The scheme is more or less the same for hotels, boutiques, restaurants and other places of the new owners of the equity of central areas: the urban space is nothing more than the extension of trade by the elite represented by trendy café terraces, valet-parking spaces and parking lots, luxury shopping galleries or the extended access of a hotel lobby. Under these great conditions of the city, the population is not within the range of business space, international tourism or the upper classes.

As a result, the amount of urban space that can still be considered public in the sense of being free and allowing free access and circulation is reduced. In these places and specific times, there is a social diversity around walkers, fountains, bike rides or concerts. However, these appropriations are far from dominant in a sanitised and boutique context, as described above.

5 Citizens in the theory of social capital

The contribution of social relations in which individuals participate during their socialisation process is called “social capital” (Loury, 1977). The first contemporary systematic analysis of social capital was by Pierre Bourdieu (1985), who defined it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a more or less institutionalized web of relationships of lasting knowledge or mutual recognition” (Bourdieu 1985: 248). His treatment of the concept is instrumental and focuses on the benefits received by individuals by virtue of their participation in groups and in the deliberate construction of sociability in order to create the resource (Bourdieu, 1985). Along the same lines as Bourdieu, James S. Coleman (1988) states that social networks encourage norms of reciprocity; that is, one gives to the other, without expecting retribution (at least not immediately), with the assurance that the action will result in a deferred income. The interaction is based on trust.

In historical heritage centres, gentrification is strongly oriented toward the promotion of tourism. However, unlike gentrification, which is understood as a process of replacing one class with fewer economic resources with another, better-positioned class, tourists are characterised by their floating condition, and in that sense neither expel the resident population nor replace it. This is because the social practices of tourists, by the nature of their condition (temporary visitors), do not build social capital. To explain this situation, we propose two categories of analysis of the problem, namely:

- Temporary residence: Social capital is a resource that requires construction over time, and its accumulation is slow. The tourists’ visiting status prevents them, in most

cases, from establishing long-term relationships, and as such their temporary residence is insufficient to build permanent networks that generate social trust. In this context, the willingness of tourists to establish lasting social practices is scarce, due to their brief stay in the place, and

- The nature of social practices: Alessandro Pizzorno (2003) explores the nature of social actions that build social capital and defines the traits that distinguish them from other social actions. He starts by excluding the types of social relationships that obviously cannot constitute social capital, analysing what they have in common. They are not, he says, the terms of trade, the mere encounter between people that do not continue their relationship, nor hostile ones, exploitation or conflict in general. These are distinctive hallmarks that need not be recognised by the other's identity, or that attempt to annul the identity of the other (Pizzorno 2003). As a result, these relationships bear social capital to the extent that a more or less lasting identity of the participants is recognised, and they also hypothesise forms of solidarity and reciprocity. In this explanatory context, it is clear that the relationship of the main character in this study, the tourist, meets the first two conditions that prevent the generation of social capital: trade relationships and mere encounters between people that do not continue their relationship, and, in that sense, they are not determined by the recognition of the identity of the actors involved in the interaction.

Alejandro Portes (1999) identifies three basic functions of social capital, applicable in a variety of contexts, among which capital is a source of social control. In this regard, there are a number of studies on capital that focus on the imposition of rules. The social capital created by compact community networks is useful for members of the community because they seek to maintain discipline and promote loyalty among those in charge. Its main result is to make formal or open controls unnecessary (Portes, 1999).

From these considerations, we conclude that the tourist is a subject devoid of social capital in the town visited. Now, what is the role of social capital in the construction of citizenship? Citizen participation is the basis on which capital is built. A wide range of actors are involved in networks, whose hierarchical structures do not seek to influence public policy. In this context, the term *citizen participation* means "politics or decisional participation, which is expressed in the selection of rulers and directly or indirectly in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies" (Leal, 2003: 117). Because of his fleeting passage, again the tourist – although an omnipresent player in the historical centres not involved in their capacity of alienation from the social and material reality of

the place that welcomes him – is oriented to an ephemeral search for satisfactions.

6 Stocktaking for citizens in tourism-heritage sites and the erosion of social capital in Mexican cities

This article addresses the construction of citizenship in two different ways: from the viewpoint of the city as a socio-spatial builder of citizenship, and the reverse, from the perspective of society as an agent builder of new forms of urbanism.

In Mexico, the emergence of new citizenships arises from the dispute of symbolic universes, from historical centres currently involved in strong heritage processes. These immensely wealthy urban areas are characterised by the presence of markedly poor populations, who struggle daily to make themselves visible. If each city model corresponds to particular hallmarks of citizenship, historical heritage is the new model where citizens not only express themselves, but also all those that pretend to be. To do so, claiming their right to the city is a daily struggle to avoid being displaced. In this sense, urban citizenship of heritage centres is about the rights that should be exercised broadly by all that inhabit the heritage city.

In general, local practices are excluded from the preservation policies for historical centres. Specifically, indigenous groups are objects of general indifference, and at the same time they are repressed by public policy and by the law of the market. They are excluded as users, and sometimes as workers in the middle of their sustenance activities, found in economic informality. One of the exceptions in which the locals and the indigenous are integrated into urban planning of the historical centre is by exploiting tourism in terms of the experience of the visitor. Dances, fairs, religious festivals, processions and pilgrimages, among other events, are integrated as part of the spectacle of historical centres. Beyond this, the unknown active role that the business could have on planning and this way of making citizenship robust still leaves many unknowns. In Mexico efforts should be made to promote the participation of non-governmental organisations, residents, businesspeople and religious associations that rescue and find new uses for heritage, so that they may also have a vocation that satisfies the needs of the local population. This would allow a new power balance to be formed between the state, which decides everything, and local citizen groups, which would emerge in a new citizenship.

The historically established relationship, in which space is seen as the product and the condition of social relationships, can also be observed in the Mexican case. This is true in the sense



Figure 1: Revolution Square in Mexico City; social activities and new urban space design (photo: David Navarrete).



Figure 2: Sopeña Street in Guanajuato, Mexico; view of street vendors, vulnerable populations and tourism spaces (photo: David Navarrete).

that citizenship is conditioning urban landscapes that synthesise the principles of social practices of democracy and inclusion. What would the characteristics of Mexican citizenship be, and what would model Mexican heritage sites be? It has been shown that the current dominant dynamics are those of commodification, corporatism, de-regulation and social indifference as a negation of conflict. These principles would produce a sceptical landscape that would exclude undesired groups such as indigenous peoples, the poor and/or migrants through re-claiming, cleanliness, security, order and tourism image policies; this is a theatrical landscape – or, in other words, about making a spectacle of heritage through technologies, art, performances and illumination; a landscape-cum-museum of conservationist policies of heritage and of historical centres that frequently produce superficial interventions, but that do not attend to the social dynamics of use and occupation to recover the centres; a commercial landscape that allows landowners and business spheres of historical centres to speculate on the value of the land and transform historical centres into conglomerates of tourism and commercial services. This would be the translation in the historical centre space of a weak citizenship that is impregnated with neoliberal values and globalisers, and is anti-democratic.

How can this be remediated? By reinventing a citizenship that has a city again. In other words, appropriate special units by and for citizen users, with limits, references and public spaces – public in the political sense of plurality of opinions and places for diverse points of view where one can discuss differences and coexist with diverse social groups.

Equally, this can be remediated by overcoming the notion of the monumental concept that is associated with stylistic attributes of artwork, which suggest limited public policy with regard to the conservation and protection of heritage. This requires broad knowledge and understanding of heritage, conservation and protection of heritage, transcending the physical scale to consider aspects not only of cultural and natural heritage, but also intangible heritage, in order to award recognition to the diversity of cultural manifestations (Carrión, 2012). It involves overcoming the idea of the monument for memory in the management of historical centres that may help people re-think historical preservation policies beyond bureaucratic, conservationist processes. In this context, one should include the concept of “symbolic universes”, such as the effort to integrate multiple dichotomous notions of heritage. In the urban space of the Mexican historical centre, a spatial root is recognised as a kind of symbolic communication; it is the favourite place of these universal symbols. Therefore, institutional planning of Mexican heritage has the objective of imposing values, norms, forms of authority and social representations that agree with the active political power.

Finally, the situation can also be remediated with a form of citizenship that allows individuals and social groups of all categories of citizens to control public money. This means avoiding it being invested only for the benefit of certain corporations of privileged business people and political elites. Legislation must be put in place in order to ensure control and to implement legal mechanisms to punish those that favour personal or corporate interests over those of the city. With this it is possible to combat one of the principal structural problems of Mexican society: corruption, which is another negative factor that deteriorates or determines the conditions of citizenship in Mexican historic centres.

7 Conclusion

The heritage city builds unequal citizenship. This is true if one considers that processes of heritage emphasise the dynamics of social and spatial exclusion, whose implications are negative for the exercise of the right to the city. The story told by the heritage districts of the capitals of developed countries and in Latin America shows that it is only a matter of time for these socio-spatial re-adjustments to accentuate the inequalities of the city. Furthermore, these processes are driven by government intervention that seeks to ensure the new economic development of the city, making renewed sectors the main axes of business in the capitalist era of globalisation. Major public investments in heritage with the goal of enhancing its economic and tourist attraction benefit foreign capital, a very small capitalist elite and the upper classes. This specialisation of the territory implies the limitation of rights and exclusion of population activities less suited to the objectives of international competitiveness. Among the government interventions, there is no determined strategy to include either the less well-off or traditional activities in the proximity. In this context, the option of restarting central urban areas through heritage preservation comes as an erosive form of citizenship because it also exacerbates social exclusion of part of the population, especially at work, in activities involving consumption, culture and housing.

Heritage centralities also lead to social capital losses via two different routes: 1. through the expulsion of their residents or natural agents that hold the values of identity and trust necessary for the promotion and preservation of social capital, and 2. through the dominant presence of a floating population, whose principal agent, the tourist, does not have the necessary conditions and is not ready to build social capital. It is appropriate to recall that social capital is crucial to the natural control of public space (i.e., informal social control); this is true if one considers that, in many residential communities, given the growing threat status (feelings of insecurity), neighbours are

organised in solidarity networks for joint action in vulnerable areas of crime: their residential streets. Community alarms are installed, safety corridors are plotted, community alert plans are implemented, internet blogs and forums are opened, phone chains are organised and neighbourhood patrols are created to ensure their integrity. This situation produces a significant increase in the share of the social capital of the community, establishing a circular flow between the community and city in a positive way.

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Notes

[1] These projects involve the following objectives: a) Strengthening urban centrality and promoting re-densification of central areas (attracting activities and people); b) Better use of infrastructure (services, equipment and transport) for the existing centre; c) Economic development and welfare of society in general; d) Promoting a mix between use of space and tourism, financial, cultural, technological and communication services in the perimeters of intervention and e) An opportunity to protect and preserve built heritage (SECTUR DF 2004: 1–2; General Urban Development Programme 2001–2006).

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