


Primerjalna književnost



»Avtor: kdo ali kaj piše literaturo?«

Vanesa Matajč

Sodobna literarna teorija raziskuje vlogo avtorja v ustvarjanju literarnega besedila kakor tudi v ustvarjanju (literarne) kulture. Reprerentacije avtorja odgovarjajo na vprašanje njegove vloge na mnoge različne načine, odvisno od zgodovinske kulture in dojemanja literature. Ta situacija, ki se nadaljuje v sodobni literarni teoriji, se seveda razlikuje od modernih pogledov na literaturo, t. j. pogledov, ki so se oblikovali od renesanse naprej.

Sodobna literarna teorija je začela prevpraševati vlogo avtorja v ustvarjanju literature v času, ko se je zastavilo vprašanje o vlogi jezika v vzpostavljanju subjekta. Obdobje modernosti je termin (literarni) avtor dojemalo v nedvoumno jasnem pomenu: ker je moderna tradicija obravnavala človeka kot ustvarjalni subjekt s sposobnostjo iznajti ali odkriti nove objekte, je iznašla tudi besedo avtor v smislu posameznika, ki ustvarja literarno (ali metaliterarno) besedilo. To individualno literarno umetniško delo se je razumelo kot neponovljiva (izvirna) sinteza forme in vsebine, v kateri bralec prepozna (odkriva) pomene in smisel, kakor jih je ustvarila avtorjeva volja, namen in veščina.

Moderni koncept avtorja je v sodobnosti doživel nekaj temeljnih sprememb zlasti od šestdesetih let 20. stoletja naprej; te spremembe so povzročili t. i. obrat k zgodovini, obrat h kulturi in – morda najvažnejši za vprašanje literarne ustvarjalnosti – obrat k jeziku. V humanistiki so (pogosto interdisciplinarno) sooblikovali tudi nove discipline ali nove teorije (spremembe izpostavijo npr. epistemologijo, kulturne študije, antropologijo kulture, ženske študije, študije spola, postkolonialne študije in (prenovljeno) kulturno zgodovino).

Odgovor na vprašanje »kdo ali kaj piše literaturo?« se je tako razcepil v dve smeri.

Prvič, izhodiščna predpostavka, da realnost vzpostavlja jezik (kot konvencija, ne individualna invencija), se je zjedrila v idejo Jezika, ki piše / govori literarni tekst in določa njegovo recepcijo. Tako se je avtor kot ustvarjalni subjekt literarnega umetniškega dela nadomestil s konceptom intertekstualnosti oziroma z dialoškimi razmerji.

Drugič, izpostavljanje intertekstualnosti, predpostavke o »smrti avtorja« in »vstajenju« teksta in bralca so pod vprašaj postavile poleg avtorja tudi avtorjevo avtoriteto v literarni in kulturni tradiciji (reprezentirani kot literarni ali kulturni kanon) ter v (kulturni) politiki. Avtorjeva politična avtoriteta je bila še zlasti očitna v literaturah, ki so rabile namenom nacionalnih ideologij ali političnih totalitarizmov. Oba ideološka pritiska sta

značilna izkušnja literatur in njihovih avtorjev v Evropi, nekdanji Sovjetski zvezi, itn.

Avtor se je dojemal kot konstitutivni dejavnik kulturnih tradicij, pogosto kot sredstvo, s katerim so lahko različne politične skupine legitimirale svojo oblast. Literarni tekst, ki nastopa v pragmatični (kulturno-)politični vlogi, potrebuje in zahteva interpret. Tudi če je avtor »mrtev«, lahko avtorja kot ustvarjalni subjekt nadomesti kulturno-politični interpret besedila. Interpret, ki nadomešča literarnega avtorja, združuje obe vlogi: vlogo avtoritete in vlogo inventivnega avtorja (inventivno interpretira literarno besedilo v določenem kulturnem kontekstu).

S tem pa je interpretova praksa lahko tudi emancipacijsko dejanje. Emancipacijsko za različne družbene skupine, ki se prepoznajo kot zatirane in za poudarjanje svoje vrednosti uporabijo ustrezno interpretirano literarno besedilo; in emancipacijsko dejanje za avtonomijo literature. »Vstajenje« avtorja (A. Nehamas) ali avtorjeve vloge – tudi če se ta nanaša na interpreta – je lahko tudi način, ki vzpostavlja / ohranja avtonomijo, literarnost, literarnega diskurza.

Ta vprašanja so se oblikovala v naslednje tematske sklope:


1) Avtor kot individualni ustvarjalec in avtor v razmerju s kulturo: vloga avtorja v zgodovinskih invencijah tradicije, avtor kot diskurzivni konstrukt v vzpostavljanju socialno-političnih identitet, avtor v proizvodnih mehanizmih kulture. Te teme sta obravnavala Andrej Blatnik in Jüri Talvet.

2) Osebna izkušnja literarnega ustvarjalca, avtor kot subjekt literarnosti in literarnega dela, koncepti avtorja v 20. stoletju: virtualni avtor v novih medijih in medbesedilnosti. To temo so obravnavali Mojca Kumerdej, Boris A. Novak in Florian Hartling.

3) Antična Grčija in vprašanje »kdo ali kaj ustvarja literarni tekst« (ali: literarno umetniško delo); renesansa in iznajdba avtorja v moderni zahodni literarni teoriji; avtorska performativnost in avtobiografija v 20. stoletju. To temo so obravnavali Jera Marušič, Marijan Dovič in Gašper Troha.

4) Avtor med jazom in drugostjo, avtobiografijo in heterobiografijo, avtorska integriteta in avtoriteta od lirike prek romanopisja do postkolonialnih študij. To temo so obravnavali Lucia Boldrini, Jonathan L. Hart, Varja Balžalorsky in Julia A. Sozina. Sledi te spremenjene konceptualizacije avtorja v polju literarnega vpliva je opisala Lučka Urbanija.

Razprave



Od avre umetniškega dela do (psevdo)avre avtorja

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Čeprav je poststrukturalistična teorija oznanjala smrt avtorja, se zdi, da je dejansko stanje prav nasprotno. V času, ko se avra v proizvodih kulturne industrije izgublja, njeno izginevanje kompenzira avratizacija umetniškega akta oziroma kar umetnika samega. Fascinacijo s sakralno avro tradicionalne umetnosti nadomesti profanejši blišč umetnostne prezentacije.

Ključne besede: literatura in množični mediji / kulturna industrija / avtor / avtorstvo / množična kultura / popularna kultura

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Čeprav je poststrukturalistična teorija oznanjala smrt avtorja (naj-eksplicitneje Roland Barthes), čeprav je npr. ameriška metafikcija uspešno razstoličila avtorja kot odločilni dejavnik besedila, čeprav teorija bralčevega odziva prenaša težišče z avtorja na bralca in čeprav so to stališče pričeli tematizirati že avtorji sami v svojih literarnih delih, se zdi, da je dejansko stanje, vsaj kar zadeva zunajliterarnega in ne znotrajliterarnega avtorja (v tega pa je bila umerjena poststrukturalistična ost) prav nasprotno. Avtor je dandanes večji dejavnik literarnega polja kot morda kadarkoli v zgodovini. Preveriti pa velja, koliko k njegovi veličini prispeva tisto, kar ga vzpostavi kot avtorja – samo dejstvo avtorskega dejanja.

Novi svet

Vsako leto je v ZDA objavljenih na tisoče novih proznih knjig.¹ Le redki avtorji (med njimi Cormac McCarthy in Don DeLillo), ki imajo možnost izbire, se izogibajo medijem in pustijo knjigam, naj govorijo same zase. Nekateri, najopazneje Thomas Pynchon (pred njim pa J. D. Salinger), so iz izogibanja ne le medijem, temveč sploh kakršnikoli javni pojavnosti, naredili privlačno medijsko zgodbo. Vsi drugi jo skušajo narediti na običajnejši način – s pojavljanjem v medijih. Avtorjevo ime poseeblja žanr ali vsaj

njegovo specifično podzvrst in zagotavlja ustrežno raven proizvoda – nastopa kot *blagovna znamka*. Ta učinek je zlasti značilen za izdelke popularne kulture: kar 63 naslovov z ameriškega seznama stotih najbolj prodajanih leposlovnih knjig v letih od 1986 do 1996 je napisalo le šest avtorjev: Tom Clancy, Michael Crichton, John Grisham, Stephen King, Dean Koontz in Danielle Steel (Epstein 34). Homogenizacija kanona (seznam najbolj prodajanih knjig je zelo razviden kanon popularne kulture) pa se dogaja tudi v »visoki« kulturi, kjer sicer (še) niso tako pomembni prodajni rezultati kot prisotnost v kulturnem obtoku, ki jo avtorju zagotavljajo učni programi literature in prevodi, pri katerih deluje učinek snežne kepe: prevodi v velike jezike sprožajo prevode v majhne, že prevedeni avtorji pa imajo prednost pred še neprevedenimi, saj so delno že uveljavljeni v ciljni kulturi.

V času, ko se, po Walterju Benjaminu, avra v proizvodih kulturne industrije izgublja, njeno izginevanje kompenzira avratizacija umetniškega akta (z njo gre povezati tudi siloviti vznik programov kreativnega pisanja v ZDA sredi šestdesetih) oziroma kar umetnika samega. V pop artu umetnostna proizvodnja predstavlja samo vsebino umetnosti. Fascinacijo s sakralno avro tradicionalne umetnosti nadomesti profanejši blišč umetnostne prezentacije, kar je pojav, ki vpliva tudi na druge umetnostne panoge, v času vsesplošne medializacije vseh dejavnosti in umetnosti – »mediji so kolonizirali kulturo, so primarna oblika za njeno distribucijo in širjenje,« ugotavlja Douglas Kellner (35) – precej tudi na literaturo in njenega izhodiščnega predstavnika, pisatelja. Ta si benjaminovski »kultni status«, ki ga je njegovo delo v obdobju tehnične reprodukcije izgubilo, pridobi sam, če je le v hierarhiji uvrščen dovolj visoko, in ga varuje tudi s svojo nedostopnostjo, zelo velikokrat tudi fizično. Ne govorimo le o *backstage passes* za garderobe rokovskih zvezd. Tudi do pisateljev pot ni preprosta. Na spletu je mogoče najti zelo natančna navodila, kako priti do osamljene hiše J. D. Salingerja, hkrati pa opozorila, do kod je še varno hoditi, saj vas sicer lahko kdo pričaka z nabito puško. Don DeLillo se v javnosti ne pojavlja. Thomas Pynchon se ne pojavlja nikjer. V slovenskem merilu je stvar prestiža izjava ali prisotnost Svetlane Makarovič.

Tisto, kar je umetniškemu delu avro vzelo, namreč množična reprodukcija, jo je umetniku navidezno dodalo: ker je njegovo delo (vsaj teoretično) prišlo v vsak dom, mu umetnik fizično ni mogel slediti in biti z njim neločljivo povezan, kakor je bil lahko povezan *minstrel* iz raziskav Raymonda Williama. Ta avratizacija pa je navidezna, je *psevdoavratizacija*, saj, po benjaminovski, *edinstveni pojav odmika* in privzdignjeni položaj umetnika ne izhajata iz njegove osebnostne avtohtonosti, temveč iz totalitete njegove medijsko proizvedene in uveljavljene blagovne znamke, v kateri je sam najmanj odločilen in najbolj zamenljiv sestavni del. Kar medij da,

lahko medij tudi vzame,² saj je pomembnejša od avtorja njegova medijska reprezentacija. V ameriških medijih je ta v osemdesetih letih krepko narasla, Evropa pa je temu sledila z običajnim zamikom, ki v Sloveniji traja kakih dvajset let. Mediji so se bolj kot literarnim delom posvečali avtorjem. Trendovski časopisi so objavljali članke o njihovem življenjskem slogu, poročali, v katere klube in na katere zabave so zahajali, katere obleke so nosili, kakšne predujme so dobili za svoje knjige, itd. Medijsko najbolj izpostavljena avtorica nove izgubljene generacije Tama Janowitz je gostovala v številnih gledanih televizijskih oddajah, recimo na *Late Night with David Letterman*, *Good Morning America* in *The Today Show*. Pojavljala se je na naslovnica trendovskih revij, nastopala v reklamah za potrošne izdelke, se za ovitek svoje prve knjige slikala v svileni pižami, leže na postelji, in posnela literarni videospot za MTV. Kot ljubiteljica reklam, ki je premišljevala, da bi se zaposlila v oglasni agenciji (in se za nekaj mesecev tudi je, kot pomočnica umetniškega vodje, vendar je bila odpuščena), je bila nad takšno promocijo navdušena. »Založništvo [...] je petdeset let za časom. Zdaj že banke reklamirajo svoje storitve – vsi to počno, založniki pa govorijo: 'Mi tega ne počnemo.' Danes človek v samopostrežni ne kupi niti nove mačje hrane, če ni prej kje videl reklame zanjo.« (Schumacher 218)

Pisatelji so torej dobili status *celebrities*, zvezdnikov oziroma »slavnežev«, kakršni so pred njimi postali športne, filmske in glasbene zvezde, kar je seveda odločilno pomagalo knjižni prodaji. Za Breta Eastona Ellisa je njegova agentka ugotavljala, da ima »slabe ocene, vendar dobro publiciteteto«. Ni le nastopal na televizijskih *talk-showih*, temveč je bil v medijih prisoten celo brez uporabe pisateljskega medija, besede – revije kot *Vanity Fair* in *Interview* so ga uporabljale kot fotomodel, ki mu ni bilo treba govoriti ali pisati. Vendar sta stalna izpostavljenost medijem in stalna prisotnost v javni pozornosti jemali možnost za *splendid isolation*, žlahtno osamo, ki je vsaj pri pisanju še zmeraj *conditio sine qua non*, nujni pogoj ustvarjalnosti, in večina avtorjev nove izgubljene generacije je ustvarjalno potonila ali pa sploh nehala pisati, deloma morda tudi zato, ker je bil medijski uspeh te generacije precej povezan s kultom mladosti: David Leavitt je prvo zgodbo v *The New Yorkerju* objavil pri dvajsetih, njegov knjižni prvenec *Family Dancing* (1984) pa je izšel dve leti pozneje, kar je bilo neobičajno v ameriški književni kulturi, v kateri je knjižni natis pred tridesetim letom redka izjema, ne pa pravilo.

Podobno zgodaj so začeli drugi avtorji, recimo Bret Easton Ellis, ki je objavil prvenec *Manj kot nič* (1985) pri enaindvajsetih. Knjiga sicer ni dobila prav veliko pozitivnih ocen, nekaj pa le, med njimi zapisa v pomembnih oblikovalcih javnega mnenja, časopisih *Village Voice* in *The New York Times*. Penguin je za 99.000 dolarjev kupil pravice za mehko vezano izdajo, filmske pravice pa je odkupil Twentieth Century-Fox; s prodajo nadaljnjih pravic se

je torej *Manj kot nič* selil v najmogočnejše obrate ameriške in mednarodne kulturne industrije. Ta poslovni uspeh pa je pisatelju prinesel tudi kreativne težave, saj mu je Twentieth Century-Fox hotel preprečiti, da bi Claya, junaka *Manj kot nič*, uporabil tudi v naslednjem romanu Pravila privlačnosti (*Rules of Attraction*), in posest nad svojim literarnim likom si je Ellis zagotovil šele v pravnem postopku, končanem tik pred izidom romana.

Ob izdaji tega romana se pojavi kar nekaj posebnosti, značilnih za iztek 20. stoletja, ki vplivajo na obstoj literarnega dela in prihajajo iz območja popularne kulture. Prva je *serializacija*, pojav, ko liki oziroma občasno celo zgodba prehajajo iz romana v roman.³ Vendar je serializacija vsaj znotraj kanonične literature zvečine obrobni pojav: iz romana v roman pri Ellisu, Thomasu Pynchonu, Marku Leynerju in drugih prehajajo posamezni bolj ali manj obstranski liki, ne pa ključne strukturne sestavine. Pomembnejše je naraščanje vzajemne povezanosti oziroma kar *soodvisnosti založniške in filmske industrije* – na tem mestu moramo strukturo znotrajliterarnih vplivov pustiti ob strani in se osredotočiti na socialne vplive. Filmska industrija je tradicionalno kupovala pravice za ekranizacijo knjižnih uspešnic in v nekaterih primerih (najbolj nemara s Puzovim in pozneje Coppolovim *Botrom*) uspešnost ponovila ali celo preseгла še v drugem mediju ali pa je v literaturi iskala vsaj primerne narativne podlage, v današnjem času pa se pravice za snemanje filmov po romanu, zlasti pri preverjenih avtorjih uspešnic, kakršna sta John Grisham in Michael Crichton, prodajo za večje vsote kot pravice za knjižno izdajo – in to običajno še pred objavo knjižne izdaje, nemalokdaj na osnovi nekajstranskega sinopsisa književnega dela.⁴

Deloma je pisce nove izgubljene generacije bolj enovito kot prejšnje generacije oblikovala tudi posebna veja kulturne industrije, *industrija univerze*, prek svojih oddelkov za kreativno pisanje, ki so jih univerze začele množično ustanovljati od začetka šestdesetih let dalje in so postali ne le izjemno privlačna študijska ponudba, temveč tudi poglavitni vir preživetja za pisatelje, ki so se v tedanjem času uveljavili na ameriškem literarnem prizorišču. Tako je oddelek za kreativno pisanje na Univerzi v Iowi v Iowa Cityju, poimenovan Iowa Writers' Workshop, od ustanovitve leta 1936 v vlogi učiteljev, učencev in nemalokrat obojega gostil vrsto uglednih pisateljev druge polovice 20. stoletja. Omeniti je treba nekaj imen: Flannery O'Connor, Philip Roth, Nelson Algren, Raymond Carver, Andre Dubus, Wallace Stegner, Kurt Vonnegut, John Irving, Robert Penn Warren ... Večina piscev nove izgubljene generacije pa prihaja z ameriške Vzhodne obale in številni so študirali kreativno pisanje na Univerzi Columbia v New Yorku. Na to skupino je imel precejšen vpliv pisatelj in urednik Gordon Lish, ki je nekatere učil na univerzi (pri njem so študirali Amy Hempel, Nancy Lemann, Anderson Ferrell, David Levitt ...) in pozneje tudi ured-

nik. Lish je deloval v vrsti različic kulturnega posredništva, zaposlen je bil kot urednik učbenikov, nato pričel urejati prozo za revijo *Esquire*. Tam je objavil tudi zgodbo Raymonda Carverja *Neighbors*, prvo zgodbo, ki je bila objavljena v vseameriški reviji, kar je preobrnilo Carverjevo pisateljsko in življenjsko usodo – kot kulturni posrednik je torej Lish bistveno vplival na oblikovanje ameriškega in posledično svetovnega proznega prizorišča, saj bi bilo to brez Carverja, torej morebiti brez objave *Neighbors* v *Esquire*, bistveno drugačno. Od tod se je preselil k založbi Knopf, kjer je izdal vrsto pomembnih knjig sodobne ameriške proze, med njimi Carverjevo knjigo O čem govorimo, kadar govorimo o ljubezni (*What We Talk About When We Talk About Love*) (1981).

V nasprotju s pisci te generacije, zlasti metafikcionalisti, ki so skorajda brez izjeme vse svoje (tudi) poklicno življenje preživeli v varstvu Univerze, pa so mlajši avtorji, rojeni v šestdesetih letih, pogosteje spoznavali kolesje kulturne industrije od znotraj. Amy Hempel je skrbela za stike z mediji pri založbi Putnam, organizirala je pisateljske turnee in skušala založbinim avtorjem zagotoviti televizijsko promocijo, pozneje pa je pri založbi Crown delala kot urednica na nižji ravni. Jay McInerney je delal pri eni največjih ameriških literarnih institucij, reviji *The New Yorker*, s katero so povezane kariere pisateljev, kakršni so Salinger, Thurber, Updike in E. B. White. Vendar z *New Yorkerjem* ni sodeloval kot pisec, niti tako kot junak njegovega romana *Bright Lights, Big City*, ki uredniku za prozo pošilja kratke zgodbe in od njega prejema brezosebne obrazce zavračila. Delal je kot »fact checker«, raziskoval, ali so podatki, ki so jih navajala v objavo sprejeta besedila, točni. Nato je (podobno kot pred njim E. L. Doctorow) v hierarhiji kulturne industrije napredoval, postal bralec/recenzent za založbo Random House in vrednotil poslane rokopise. Iz »vratarskega asistenta« pri *New Yorkerju* se je spremenil v »vratarja« samega, čakal pa ga je še vstop skozi vrata. Zaposlitve v medijskem svetu, ki so nadomeščale zaposlovanje v akademskem svetu, spet govorijo o spremembi kulturne paradigme oziroma tudi o premestitvi *psevdoavre*: če je bil prej privilegirani prostor predajanja vrednotenja kulturnih vsebin doma na univerzah, se je zdaj preselil v svet kulturne industrije, zlasti njenega kapitalsko in vplivno najmočnejšega polja, industrije oglaševanja.

Stari dom

Čeprav tudi v Sloveniji lahko izsledimo kakega avtorja, ki se preživlja z oglaševalskimi besedili, kulturna industrija še ni (in za tiste, ki delujejo v jeziku z zelo omejenim dosegom, najbrž tudi nikoli ne bo) pričela

diktirati pogojev preživetja za avtorje, hkrati pa jim tudi ne nudi dovolj možnosti za uveljavitev blagovne znamke *znotrjektualno*, temveč šele, z nekaj ironije rečeno, *interdisciplinarno*. Slovenski avtor se lahko nasloni na podporo drugega medija (tako je najbolj brana slovenska pisateljica po podatkih knjižnične izposoje vse od začetka merjenja Desa Muck, kar najbrž ni samo posledica njene berljivosti, ampak tudi dolgoletnega nastopanja v zelo gledanih večernih nedeljskih televizijskih oddajah) ali pa na podporo slovenskega pisateljskega arhetipa, ki lahko *individualni psevdoavri* doda kar nekaj *kolektivne psevdoavre*, kakršna se prilega narodu, ki se je, vsaj po prepričanju večine samih literatov in tudi po usmeritvah šolskega sistema, uveljavil, če že ne vzpostavil, prek kulturne paradigme, ki jo najbolj povzema sintagma Aleša Debeljaka o rojstvu naroda iz duha pesmi, zapisana v naslovu spremne besede k antologiji Ujetniki svobode: Sodobna slovenska poezija (*Prisoners of Freedom: Contemporary Slovenian Poetry*) (Santa Fe, ZDA: Pedernal Press, 1994). Avtor ima tudi v Sloveniji lahko še izvenekstualni pomen, je lahko več kot »samo« avtor, in slovensko literarno izročilo, v katerem je literatura vseskozi opravljala tudi izvenliterarne funkcije, temu dodobra pritrjuje. Tako so bile izrazite literarne uspešnice v osemdesetih romani *Levitan* (1982) Vitomila Zupana, ki demistificira narodnoosvobodilno vojno, *Umiranje na obroke* (1984) Igorja Torkarja, ki priča o dachauskih procesih, in *Noč do jutra* (1984) Branka Hofmana, ki govori o golotoških kaznovanjih. Izjemno zanimanje, ki so ga te knjige požele, ni samo pomagalo osvobajati potlačenih nacionalnih tematik, temveč je tudi nadaljevalo konflikt med pisateljem in družbo, ki je stalnica (ne le slovenske) literarne zgodovine.

Nadaljevanje tega konflikta lahko spremljamo še dandanes. Tako medijsko kot strokovno odmevna odločitev slovenskih sodišč, ki so obravnavale knjigi Matjaža Pikala *Modri E* (1998) in Brede Smolnikar *Ko se tam gori olistajo breže* (1998), je bila seveda bolj odločilna za ponatis teh dveh knjig kot pa njuna literarna odličnost ali bralna privlačnost. Čeprav sta bila avtorja predmet civilnega sodnega procesa, se je s temi spori (reflektiral jih je tudi komparativistični simpozij na Vilenici 2007) nadaljevala specifična vloga slovenskega pisatelja: *pisatelj kot žrtev*. Kot *politična žrtev* (dolg niz, na katerega se še dandanes sklicujejo številni slovenski avtorji, vključno z Dragom Jančarjem), kot *ekonomska žrtev* (Desa Muck, ki jo ob vsakem javnem nastopu povprašajo po meji knjižničnega nadomestila), kot *kelanovska žrtev* (težko se je spomniti slovenskega pisatelja, ki ne bi vsaj v enem medijskem nastopu potožil, kako so ga izigrali takšni ali drugačni centri moči). In če se je nekdanj lahko slovenski pisatelj tolažil, da uspeh pride v zanj ugodnejšem *času* (petdeset let po smrti, je ocenjeval Bartol, in še prav je imel), zdaj lahko upa na ugodnejše *kraje* in opozarja na – namišljeni ali

kdaj tudi dejanski – boljši sprejem v kaki drugi kulturi po znanem reku »nobenega preroka ne sprejmejo v domačem kraju« (Luka 4:24). Torej postaja celo geografska, dobesedno *narojena* žrtev, tudi onkraj tega, da se rodi v slovenskem jeziku, ne pa, kakor angleški avtorji, že preveden.

Pravzaprav velja stopiti še korak dalje in opozoriti: ne le, da je avtor v slovenskem literarnem polju *lahko* več kot »samo« avtor, ampak to celo *mora biti*. Še zlasti v današnji medijski prenasičenosti, ko avtorju za javno prisotnost ne zadostuje avtorski glas (torej njegova avtopoetika), temveč je vse bolj odločilen kontekst nadjaza, v katerega se vpenja, naj bo nacionalni, žanrski ali periodizacijski. Avtorju za avtorsko legitimizacijo ni več bistven *označenec* (torej avtorsko delo), ampak *označevalec* (torej njegovo razpoznavanje kot avtorja). Borgesovo reklo, nastalo nemara iz frustracije iz vse bolj vizualne in vse manj besedne kulture sodobnosti, »Biti se pravi biti fotografiran«, bi lahko malce dopolnili: biti pisatelj se pravi biti fotografiran kot pisatelj. Mlado in čedno avtorico je največji slovenski najemnik medijskega prostora (ki, mimogrede, za najem medijskega prostora letno plačuje več, kot Ministrstvo za kulturo Republike Slovenije prispeva za natis *in* odkup knjig v javnem interesu) na svoje gigantske plakate upodobil s pripisom *pisateljica* že teden dni po izidu njenega prvenca, ki je kasneje res postal sorazmerna uspešnica. Največji komunikacijski mogotec je sklenil vnovčiti simbolni kapital poklica. Morda nam ta potreba po simbiozi med stvarnim in simbolnim kapitalom lahko vrača vero v pisateljski poklic!

Da pa je strukturno mesto, ki ga v ameriškem literarnem polju pisatelju odmerja medijska in socialna opaženost, torej vloga »slavneža«, v slovenski udomačitvi zamenjano z vlogo žrtve in »žrtvek«, pa je že dejstvo, ki kliče po vnovičnem premisleku slovenskega nacionalnega duha. Zato velja na tem mestu nacionalno in ustvarjalno kolegialno umolkiniti.

OPOMBE

¹ Podoben pojav pa spremljamo tudi v Sloveniji. Če se je število izdanih knjig zadnja leta ustavilo nekje pri dobrih 4000 naslovih, se za nagrado kresnik poteguje vsako leto več romanov, 17 v letu 1991, 45 v letu 2002, 80 v letu 2007, leto kasneje pa blizu 120 romanov, za nagrado fabula pa kakih 80 v letu dni izdanih zbirk kratke proze, skupaj je izšlo torej kakih 200 novih izvirnih proznih knjig. Simbolni kapital leposlovja torej očitno narašča.

² Zanimivo različico spora med avtorjem in njegovo medijsko reprezentacijo sem ob primeru Jonathana Franzena opisal v besedilu *Romani našega življenja ne bodo spremenili našega življenja* (Andrej Blatnik: *Neonski pečati*, Ljubljana: LUD Literatura, 2005). Franzena je v hude neodvisnostne skušnjave pripeljalo povabilo v *Oprab Winfrey Show*.

³ Elementi serialnega romana, ki se materializirajo zlasti pri izdelkih popularne literature (recimo serija Zelena milja (*The Green Mile*) Stephena Kinga), pa se od zgodovinskih vzorov (serialnih romanov Dickensa ali Balzaca) razlikujejo po tem, da so zgodovinski serialni romani nastajali zaradi zahtev ciljnega medija (časopisne objave), dandanes pa nastane-

jo avtonomno in uveljavljajo svoj produkcijski način v večinsko drugače organiziranem knjižnem trgu zato, da bi dodatno eksploatirali že vzpostavljeno romaneskno blagovno znamko.

⁴ Filmska industrija povzroči tudi nastajanje knjig po filmih, torej zaobrnjen proces od pravkar opisanega – knjige, ki romansirajo scenarije največjih filmskih uspešnic, so postale že skorajda pravilo *spin-off* eksploatacije, torej širjenja v kinematografski mreži uveljavljenega proizvoda v druge medije, kamor sodi tudi trženje produktov s filmskimi liki, zlasti popularno pri izdelkih za mlajše občinstvo, a nikakor ne omejeno nanje. Takšni knjižni izdelki dosegajo precej impresivne prodajne rezultate: knjiga, napisana po scenariju prvega Ramba, se je prodala v 800.000 izvodih (Kellner 71). Takšna vključitev pisateljev v neposredno trženje blagovne znamke se sicer omejuje na izdelke popularne kulture, vendar se zdi, da je novo razumevanje pisatelja kot ne več od družbe neodvisnega ustvarjalca, po notranji potrebi zaprtega v samoto svojega ustvarjalnega eksila, temveč kot v verigo menjalnih razmerij vpetega bolj ali manj uspešnega poslovneža, v marsičem povezano z vseprisotnostjo filmske industrije. Kreativna avtonomija ni več samoumevna, temveč postane zavestna odločitev.

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Avtor in umetniška ustvarjalnost: Jurij M. Lotman in njegova »semiosfera«

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Postmodernistični obrat v kulturnih študijah vse od 60-ih let dalje ni poskusil problematizirati avtoritete »moderne« tradicije kot domnevnega konstrukta renesančnih humanistov. Namesto tega je vzpostavil svoj lastni sistem, v katerem imajo interpret (ponovni bralec, konceptualizator), pa tudi (lingvistična) anonimnost in (kulturna) pluralnost osrednjo vlogo.

Ob koncu prvega desetletja 21. stoletja sta se svežina in inovativnost postmodernističnega mišljenja izčrpala, pri čemer mislim na dejstvo, da se je njegov diskurz izkazal za močno tautološkega, medtem ko je njegov predmet postal žrtev simplifikacij. Iskanje avtorja pri tem ni nobena izjema.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / semiotika / Lotman, Jurij Mihajlovič / avtor / avtorstvo / umetniška ustvarjalnost / Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhold / Liiv, Juhan

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V enem svojih zgodnjih pomembnih, za razvoj Lotmanove misli ključnih del, Analiza pesniškega teksta (*Analiz poetičeskogo teksta*) (Leningrad, 1972) je poznejši predstojnik tartujske (ali tartujsko-moskovske) šole semiotike, Jurij M. Lotman (1922–1993), utemeljil osnovno razlikovanje literarnih besedil: prvi tip besedil, večinoma pripovednih, upravljajo *sintagmatska* razmerja, medtem ko je organizacijski princip drugega tipa besedil, vzpostavljenih predvsem v lirski poeziji, *paradigmatski* (93).

Kot še posebej pomenljivo aluzijo (vključno z njeno prikrito ironijo) za področje, ki ga zajema razprava, Lotman priznava, da »pričujoča razprava poetičnega teksta ne obravnava v [...] totaliteti njegovih kulturnih pomenov, marveč le z mnogo ožjega gledišča, dostopnega sodobni znanosti«¹ (5). In v predhodnem odlomku, ko vizualno razteza besedo »znanstveno«, zatrdi: »vendar znanost ne more ponuditi nič drugega kot z n a n s t v e n o resnico« (5).

Ironija je v tem, da se je Lotman v resnici strastno zanimal za »totaliteto kulturnih pomenov« že od samega začetka svojih raziskav. Z natančnim branjem njegovih tako imenovanih »znanstvenih« besedil odkrijemo mnogo odlomkov, v katerih Lotman 'zdrsne' ali 'pade' v domeno filozofije, za stroge meje znanosti.

V tej knjigi Lotman komajda omenja 'semiotiko' ali 'semiotično'; ti poimenovanji sta se pojavili s postopnim razmahom Tartujske šole. Vseskozi sta ostajali sumljivi uradnemu komunističnemu režimu. Zato so tartujski raziskovalci kot vzporednico 'semiotiki' uporabljali evfemizem, ki je denotiral osrednji predmet semiotične raziskave: *drugotni modelativni sistem*² (Lotman, *Kulturisemiotika* 3–4). Ni mogoče zanikati, da je Lotman vsaj do konca sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja iskreno verjel, da se je znanost sposobna razširiti v obravnavo umetnosti ne le s formalnega vidika, marveč tudi tako, da lahko zajame njeno vsebino, ki jo je tradicija obravnavala kot predmet metafizično-filozofskih in metaforičnih spekulacij. V tem času se je Lotman resno ukvarjal z razmerji med obema hemisferama človeških možganov, z možnostjo »umetnega razuma«; in v nekaterih člankih šel tako daleč, da je kulturo poistovetil s »kolektivnim razumom« ali »kolektivnim intelektom« (prim. Lotman, *Kultura kak*).³

Vendar pa ne smemo pozabiti na dejstvo, ki pri tem predstavlja temeljno ozadje, namreč da je uradna sovjetska ideologija posebej posvečen položaj odmerjala znanosti in razumu, vtem ko je sočasno zahodno filozofijo odločno zavračala. Prevladovali so omalovažujoči komentarji marksističnih filozofov iz Sovjetske zveze ali Vzhodnega bloka, sama filozofska besedila, ki so prihajala z Zahoda, pa vsaj do začetka *perestrojke* v Sovjetski zvezi sredi osemdesetih let 20. stoletja nikdar niso bila prevedena ali objavljena.

Ugotavljam, da je Lotman od osemdesetih letih naprej, skladno s svojo teorijo 'semiosferičnih' 'skokov' in 'eksplozij', v svojem poznem delu dovršil izviren 'skok' v novo kvaliteto. V zadnjih desetih letih svojega življenja se je Lotman-znanstveni semiotik začel odkriteje istovetiti z Lotmanom-filozofom. V postopno liberalnejšem socialno-ideološkem okolju je naposled lahko brez od zunaj zaukazanih pridržkov in samozaukazanih omejitev obravnaval temo, ki ji je bil življenjsko privržen, to je kulturo in umetniško ustvarjanje.

Nastop tega, poznega Lotmana je sovpadal s postmodernimi idejnimi tokovi, ki so sočasno prihajali z Zahoda, v tem smislu, da so oboji presegli formalistično rigidnost strukturalizma. Vendar je med Lotmanovim poznim mišljenjem in postmodernim teoretskim *mainstreamom* tudi bistvena razlika. Nanaša se prav na položaj in razumevanje vloge avtorja v umetniškem ustvarjanju.

Leta 1984 je Lotman objavil članek O semiosferi (»O semiosfere«). Vpeljal je pojem »semiosfere«, ki ga sicer ni jasno definiral. Izpeljal ga je iz pojmov Vladimirja Vernadskega »biosfera« in »noosfera«, vendar je problematiziral vzporejanje z »noosfero«; pač pa je Lotman prepoznal analogijo med semiosfero in biosfero v tem smislu, da, kakor pravi, semiotični univerzum ali semiotični prostor lahko razumemo kot »homogen mehanizem ali celo organizem«. Tak »veliki sistem«, v katerem so vse njegove sestavine in komponente odprte v dinamična medsebojna razmerja, lahko imenujemo »semiosfera« (Lotman, *Kultura i* 13).⁴ Kot nato ugotavlja, je »semiosfera semiotični prostor, zunaj katerega semioza ne more obstajati« (13). Lotman sicer priznava, da je »semiosfera« abstrakcija, vendar pa zavrača možnost, da bi bila v svojem bistvu zgolj metaforična (12).

Lotmanov ključni pojem v tem članku je »semiotična meja«. Te funkcije kot bilingvistični mehanizmi prevoda adaptivno predelujejo signale »zunanjega prostora« v »naš prostor«. Lotman dodaja, da lahko semiosfera le s pomočjo »meje« vzpostavlja stik z »ne-semiotičnim« in »tuje-semiotičnim« prostorom (14–15). Vsi mehanizmi prevoda, ki omogočajo posredovanje tujih kontaktov, pripadajo mejni strukturi. Ugotavlja tudi, da semiotični procesi pospešeno potekajo na periferiji kulturnega prostranstva (15), da so v primerjavi s tistimi, ki se razvijajo v »centrih« ali jedrih (nuclei) bolj dinamični (16). Medsebojno razmerje med jedri in periferijo ni stalno, marveč se nenehno spreminja. To, kar se je dojemalo kot »ne-semiotični« prostor, se lahko pojavi kot drug in drugačen semiotični prostor. Semiotični procesi težijo k svoji čedalje večji notranji raznolikosti, ne da bi semiosfera pri tem izgubila svojo enotnost (20).

V nadaljevanju Lotman obravnava okolje dialoga, ki se dogaja na meji. Ugotavlja, da semiotično različni prostori za vzpostavitev dialoga potrebujejo stične elemente ali invariante. Med strukturnimi modeli dialoga navaja palindrome, zrcala, desno in levo stran.

V svoji zadnji knjigi *Kultura in eksplozija (Kultura i vzryv, 1992)*, ki jo je napisal le malo pred smrtjo, Lotman skorajda opusti svoj prejšnji semiotični slovar, da bi razumljiveje predstavil procese, ki potekajo v kulturi. Vendar knjiga, ki se nanaša na semiosfero in Lotmanovo pozno filozofijo, v celoti retrospektivno osvetli tudi osrednje vidike predhodnega Lotmanovega mišljenja.

Zamisel o revolucijah v sistemu 'gramatike kulture' se je pojavila že v Lotmanovem kratkem članku iz leta 1985, ko je kulturo še istovetil s »kolektivnim intelektom« in »kolektivnim spominom«. Postopoma je prenesel poudarek s »kolektivnega intelekta« na »kolektivni spomin«. Obravnaval je informativni in kreativni spomin; kako spomin vzpostavlja aktualnost besedil in kako se neaktualna besedila ohranjajo v rezervi ali kot potencial.

V *Kul'tura i vzryv* se Lotman osredini na »eksplozije« in »skoke« tako v sistemih in procesih kulture kot tudi v ustvarjalnih mišljenjih in ustvarjenih tekstih. Literatura kot celota se torej lahko dojema kot tekst (179). Ključni problem ostaja »meja« kot presečišče različnih kulturnih kodov, le da zdaj bolj kot dialoško okolje predstavlja okolje »eksplozij« in revolucij. Lotman se je začel odkrito zanimati za neregularno in nepredvidljivo, kar je prepoznaval kot pravo jedro kulturne semioze v tem smislu, da docela novi znaki, pomeni in perspektive vzniknejo kot rezultat »eksplozij« in »skokov«. Obenem dodaja, da sta za razvoj (»skok«) potrebni tako eksplozivnost kot stabilnost, prva omogoča prenavljanje, druga kontinuiteto (16, 20, 26). Meni tudi, da se nekatere kulture razvijajo zgolj s postopno spremembo, zabrisujoč eksplozije (17).

Lotman v obdobju med 18. in 20. stoletjem prepozna postopno degeneracijo eksplozij (22). V tem kontekstu sooča razlike med tehnično-mehaničnimi ter znanstveno-umetniškimi in filozofskimi eksplozijami. Lotmana v njegovem zadnjem delu več kot očitno ne zanima, kar je regularno, proizvod logike in tehnike, ki sta zmožni zgolj imitacij eksplozije (21), marveč predvsem okoliščine, v katerih se dogajajo prave eksplozije v umetniškem ustvarjalnosti, z drugimi besedami, kako in zakaj avtor lahko postane Avtor, najvišji ustvarjalec, in zakaj so drugi avtorji, velika večina ustvarjalcev, obsojeni na plavanje s tokom ali modo, dokler jih nova eksplozija virtualno ne odnese v kulturno pozabo.

Kot beremo v *Kul'tura i vzryv* (60), sta umetnost in religija najvišji obliki zavesti. V nasprotju s svojim prejšnjim prepričanjem o »kolektivnem razumu«, Lotman zdaj zavrača Leninov izrek, da je religija »opij za ljudstvo«, in ugotavlja, da je »močno sredstvo samoorganizacije« (224). V isti knjigi Lotman obravnava tudi žensko emancipacijo in revolucijo ter sanje, ki jih imenuje »semiotično okno«.

V knjigi je najti še mnoge druge važne filozofske zamisli, vendar skušam zdaj na kratko povzeti, zakaj se mi zdi Lotmanova pozna filozofija za interpretacijo avtorja plodnejša od mišljenja, ki se je od Rolanda Barthesa, Michela Foucaulta in Jacquesa Derridaja naneslo na začetku 21. stoletja v *mainstreamovsko* naplavino postmodernega stanja duha.

Prvič, Lotman v tem smislu predstavlja »periferijo«, območje, ki je *par excellence* dovzetno za dialog in prav tako za kulturne »eksplozije«. Francoski misleci, nasprotno, predstavljajo »center«, pri čemer so v veliki meri odvisni od jezika »centra«. Zelo prepričano so se zanašali na francoščino – na svoj 'lastni' jezik – ne da bi se pri tem kaj dosti ozirali na jezik evropskih »drugih«, kaj šele na bolj oddaljene »druge«. V nekem drugem besedilu (2007) na temo sodobne filozofije prevoda sem skušal prikazati, kako lahko pretirano zanašanje na 'svoj lastni' jezik zlasti pri filozofih, ki

tako ostroumno obravnavajo jezik in v njem formirane diskurze, problematizira njihova dognanja o prevodu.

Zdi se mi, da s tem, ko francoski misleci knjižni jezik in v njem vzpostavljene diskurze razglašajo za tako rekoč edino upoštevanja vredno realnost, hudo omejuje polje kulturne ustvarjalnosti. V tem mišljenju lahko slišimo oddaljeni odmev znamenitega stavka Renéja Descartesa *Cogito ergo sum*. Realnost, ki je onstran mišljenja, nima pomena. Vrhovni kriterij postane sposobnost razuma in fizikalni in biološki svetovi se ji morajo pokoriti. Človek, ki mu je dana sposobnost razuma, je najvišji vrh Stvarjenja.

Descartes, potomec izčrpane renesanse, si je to lahko samo zamislil, njegova sorojaka Bernard de Fontenelle in Charles Perrault, 'postmodernista' 17. stoletja, pa sta šla precej dlje. Svoje stoletje – s čimer sta seveda mislila na 'svojo lastno' sodobno francosko književnost – sta razglasila za vrh literarnega ustvarjanja, vrh, ki presega antične stvaritve.

(Post)moderni »napredek« v kulturi?

Vrednotenje književnosti in umetnosti največkrat ni nič drugega kot stvar okusa, in okusi so, kot vemo, različni od osebe do osebe, od enega do drugega zgodovinskega obdobja in kulturnega prostora. Kar pa je, zlasti z ozirom na postmodernost v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, pri 'postmodernistih' 17. stoletja precej pomenljivejše, je pojav ideje 'napredka'. Začenja se vera v napredujoči razvoj književnosti, novi književnosti se pripíše, da je vrednejša od stare. S tega zornega kota stare avtorje vselej presežejo mladi. Novo, moderno, postane sinonim za dobro.

To ne zanikuje samo Boga kot prvega stvarnika, marveč tudi veličino nekdanjih avtorjev pogojuje zgolj z genijem sodobnega kritičnega uma, ki je odločil, ali naj obstajajo, s kritiškim prenovopisom ali vnovično interpretacijo njihovih del. S tega vidika sodeč, pisatelji ne vedo kaj dosti o svojem ustvarjanju. Najvažnejši avtorji so kritiki, brez katerih pisatelji ne bi obstajali.

Z drugimi besedami, metabesedilno in postbesedilno – torej intelektualno – ustvarjanje postane nadrejeno izvirnemu umetniškemu ustvarjanju, ki s tem, ko se prepleta s čutnim in 'nižjim' (ne-kulturnim), postane manjvredna dejavnost. Posledica tega je, da velik del postmodernega kritištva ceni predvsem intelektualistične stvaritve, katerih izhodišče in tema je kultura. Skladno z visoko sofisticirano uporabo jezika v postmodernem kritiškem diskurzu učenjake in kritike najbolj privlači ironija, intelektualne zanke, pripovedne tehnike in strategije. Zavračajo takšno vsebinsko razlago literarnih del, ki bi segla onstran strogo formalnega in

kulturološkega. Če pa se tega že lotijo, se zlahka ujamejo v past socioloških simplifikacij.

Metabesedilni jezik še nikdar doslej ni bil abstraktnejši. Teorije se nenehno nadomeščajo z novimi; v prepričanju, da je tako mogoče doseči napredek v kulturi.

Rečeno z Lotmanovim semiotičnim slovarjem, je v raziskovanju kulture začela prevladovati os »sintagme«. Sledeč *credu*, sposojenem pri eksaktnih in naravoslovnih vedah, namreč da teorija utira pot praksi, je mogoče pričakovati, da se bo temu analogen 'napredek' umestil tudi v kulturo.

V pojmovniku Lotmanove semiosfere, skuša postmodernocentrično mišljenje kulture premeščati kulturo v območje »noosfere«, ki jo obvladuje človekova intelektualna dejavnost. Tako modificirana, bi se torej kultura podredila logiki, kavzalnosti in regularnosti. Besedila se dojemajo kot členi v brezimnem veriženju medbesedilnosti, ki se postopno razvija v vse bolj in bolj dovršenost; kakor znanost, pod vodstvom teorije.

Kar zadeva ustvarjanje kulture, moram zase priznati, da še vedno precej bolj kot v »sintagmo« verjamem v »paradigmo«. Strinjam se, da (jezikovna, stilna, itn.) tradicija in splošno kulturno ozadje prav tako močno opredeljujeta literarno in umetniško ustvarjanje. Pač pa se skupaj z Lotmanom nagibam k mnenju, da lahko brezimno verigo prekine ustvarjalni avtor v dejanju, ki ni samo kulturno, marveč tudi eksistencialno. Samo tedaj ustvarjalno dejanje postane semiotično dejanje, ki ustvarja izvirno nove vrednote, kulturo obogati in ji vzpostavlja večjo notranjo raznolikost. To je daleč stran od ideje napredka.

Umetniško ustvarjanje kot semiosferično in simbiotično dejanje

Z drugimi besedami in bližje Lotmanovemu sklepu: Avtor ustvarja na odprti meji med kulturo in življenjem na eni strani in življenjem in smrtjo na drugi. Avtor/Avtorica aktivira sočasno vse ustvarjalne zmožnosti: spomin, duha, čute, zavest in nezavedno. V vsakem pomembnem umetniškem ustvarjanju in delu so številni robovi in meje, ki so odprti tako v dialog kot v »eksplozije«. Zgodovina sicer dokazuje tudi, da v določenih zgodovinskih okoliščinah kultura 'spi' in jo nadomešča povprečno ustvarjanje, v katerem – skladno z nekaterimi osrednjimi postulati postmoderne teorije – prevlada tehnika kopiranja (prepisovanja).

Obče veljavna resnica je, da je pomen umetniškega dela ali teksta odprt; vzpostavlja se in se postopno spreminja v času in prostoru, v dialogu med avtorjem in njegovimi/njenimi bralci. To je simbiotični proces, v kate-

rem imajo, kot to manifestira zgodovinska izkušnja, simbiotični ustvarjalci – bodisi avtorji izvirnih del bodisi kritiki-interpreti (kot avtorji) – kar največjo možnost, da ustanavljajo in vplivajo na kanonizacijo.

Zakaj simbiotični ustvarjalci? Ker zlasti postmoderno kritištvo prej ko ne teži k temu, da podcenjuje zmožnosti avtorjev literarnih del na račun filozofskega in metafizičnega mišljenja. Lotman v svoji razpravi »O semiosfere« slučajno sicer neposredno poveže pojem »meje« s semiotično individualnostjo in pride do sklepa, da »je semiosfera 'semiotična oseba'«, ki bi jo bilo zelo zapleteno podvreči kaki konkretnější pedantni definiciji (13).

Največji pisatelji preteklosti so bili brez izjeme takšni »semiosferični« ali »semiotično-simbiotični« avtorji v tem smislu, da so s tem, ko so aktivirali mnoge meje, nenehno privlačevali to, kar leži onstran meje znanega. Življenje so interpretirali kot filozofi, a njihova večšina je bila najvišja, saj se niso zamejili v abstraktno formuliranje idej in konceptov – s čimer bi razgradili integriteto človeškega bitja – marveč so svojo filozofijo predočali v čutnih podobah, ki jih je sprejemala tudi širša publika.

Leta 2003 sem objavil članek o Cervantesovi teoriji romana, pri čemer nisem imel v mislih predvsem tega, kar si je Cervantes sposodil od Aristotela ali drugih filozofov, in tudi ne njegovih eksplicitnih stališč o literarnem ustvarjanju in umetnosti romana, pač pa praktično udejanjeno teorijo ali filozofijo v podobah, kakršna nastaja v njegovih *Zglednih novelah* (*Novelas ejemplares*) in v samem *Don Kibotu* (*Don Quixote*).

Calderón, Camões, Kreutzwald, Liiv, Pessoa

Eno od najmočnejših manifestacij avtorja v zahodni literarni zgodovini je najti v igri Pedra Calderóna de la Barca, pravzaprav v njegovi *auto sacramental Veliko svetovno gledališče* (*El gran teatro del mundo*). Kot še nikomur pred njim, je Calderónu uspelo na gledališkem odru združiti celoto življenja, božje stvarstvo, ki ga predstavljajo alegorični karakterji. V dogajanju je Bog – imenovan *el Autor* – tisti, ki poseduje vso človeško vednost. Vendar je avtor igre Calderón, ki omogoči konceptualni shemi, da zaživi, se preporej in razkriva v liričnih in čutnih podobah. Avtor Calderón priklicuje v zavest avtorja Boga, s tem ko ustvarjanje preobraža v semiosferično dejanje in ne v golo razumsko abstrakcijo. Igra je živi dialog med izvirnim stvarnikom (Bogom) in interpretom njegovega stvarjenja, Calderónom, ki postane avtor v najširšem smislu te besede.

Portugalec Luís Vaz de Camões v poznorenesančnem obdobju v svojem znamenitem epu *Luzitanci* (*Os Lusíadas*) ni iznašel novih estetskih vzorcev. Vendar je imel kot avtor z male evropske periferije, Portugalske,

izostreno senzibilnost za mejo. To lahko razloži, zakaj je bil Camões edini renesančni avtor, ki mu je uspelo napisati dovršen nacionalno-patriotski ep; to, kar je poskušal tudi Francoz Pierre de Ronsard, vendar ne dokončal. Veliki evropski narodi so v tem času že ustvarili svoje epske pesnitve. Lahko so razširjali svoja ozemlja in tako oskrbovali svojo 'matico' z novo energijo in vitalnostjo.

Medtem je Portugalsko že stoletja in tudi še tedaj ogrožala mogočna sosedna Španija. Camõesev poglobitni dosežek je, da mu je v epu uspelo nazorno prikazati, da imajo tudi manjši narodi s periferije individualno identiteto in da so sposobni velikih duhovnih podvigov. Camões v svojih *Luzitancih* nenehno izpostavlja portugalsko popotovanje v Indijo kot podvig duha, obsoja pa ekspanzionizem, ki ga vodi posvetni pohlep. Njegov ep je postal velika duhovna opora njegovemu narodu in hkrati eno od paradigmatičnih del, ki so dve stoletji pozneje romantičnim filozofom, kot je bil Johann Gottfried Herder, navdihnili stališče, da so duhovno enakopravni vsi ljudje in narodi, naj pripadajo obrobju ali središču, naj so fizično mali ali veliki.

Nekaj najvidnejših avtorjev prebujajočega se estonskega naroda je v drugi polovici 19. in v začetku 20. stoletja delovalo v isti paradigmi. Prihajali so s periferije, ki je bila celo še obrobnejša od portugalske. Tudi v socialnopsihološkem smislu je šlo za najbolj oddaljeno periferijo, saj so bili Estonci, pretežno kmečko ljudstvo, do začetka 19. stoletja v ponižujočem tlačanskem razmerju do baltsko-germanske zemljiške gosposke v okviru carske Rusije.

Dva avtorja, katerih delo je še posebej pomembno za Estonijo, sta Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald (1803–1882) in Juhana Liiva (1864–1913). Oba sta bila pesnika, semiosferična in paradigmatična avtorja *par excellence*. Kreutzwaldovi starši so bili tlačani, vendar je po študiju na tartujski univerzi uspel postati doktor medicine. Ko je delal kot zdravnik v zakotnem južnoestonskem obmejnem mestu, je Kreutzwald napisal ep *Kalevipoeg* (dobesedno: Kalevov sin, 1861).

Starši Juhana Liiva niso bili tlačani, vendar je tudi on prihajal iz skromne kmečke družine in predvsem zaradi revščine nikdar ni študiral na univerzi, četudi je v posameznih obdobjih živel v Tartuju. Leta 1893 je zapadel duhovni krizi in postal duševni bolnik. Dejstvo pa je, da je svojo najboljšo poezijo ustvaril v času svoje bolezni, na negotovi meji med prisebnostjo in norostjo.

Kreutzwald je svoj ep oskrbel z znanstvenim aparatom. Prvikrat je ep, z vzporednim nemškim prevodom, izšel v zborniku Estonske znanstvene družbe (Gelehrte Estnische Gesellschaft / Õpetatud Eesti Selts). Avtor je trdil, da ep temelji na avtentičnem ljudskem izročilu. V resnici pa je bila

to vsaj deloma mistifikacija, ki jo je Kreutzwald moral vzdrževati, saj sicer delo najbrž nikoli ne bi bilo objavljeno. Estonska književnost kot taka še ni obstajala, carska cenzura pa bi bila brez oklevanja že v kali zatrla patriotsko literarno delo. V teh okoliščinah je bila podpora, ki je prihajala od zunaj, odločilni dejavnik za to, da je ep lahko izšel in da mu je bila, kljub sami estonski kritiki, pozneje lahko pripoznana njegova vloga. Peterburška akademija znanosti je Kreutzwaldu podelila pomembno nagrado, še preden se je objava v Zborniku sploh zaključila, finski folklorist S. Elmgren pa je leta 1859 v govoru v Helsinkih izjavil, da je Kreutzwaldov *Kalevipoeg* enakovreden *Kalevali* (*Kalevala*) Eliasa Lönnrota. Dejansko je *Kalevipoeg* v knjižni obliki izšel najprej na Finskem (Kuopio, 1862), nakar šele so sledili natisi v sami Estoniji.

Če ga primerjamo s Camõesevim portugalskim epom, tudi Kreutzwaldov ep s periferije prepozna individualno identiteto estonskega naroda in njegovo hrepenenje po svobodi. Delo v mogočnih sosledjih simbolov in liricnih prisodob duhovno vzpostavlja estonski narod in njegovo kulturo. Tudi v tem primeru ne gre zgolj za mentalni konstrukt – v nasprotju s trditvami nekaterih postmodernih teoretikov, po katerih naj bi le to utemeljevalo nacionalno ontologijo – marveč je delo globlje vkoreninjeno v eksistencialno zavest s periferije, v kateri senzibilnost, občutja, ideje in filozofija vstopajo v simbiotično, interaktivno razmerje. Le takšna dela zmorejo vplivati in navdihovati kolektivno občinstvo, širšo skupnost, kakršna je narod.

Posledično je *Kalevipoeg* postal temeljni tekst estonskega naroda in kulture. Obenem je ustvaril zapleten mit, na katerega so vplivali najsubtilnejši nanosi romantične filozofije (Herder, Goethe). Čeprav je bil v poznejši estonski kulturi *Kalevipoeg* pogosto ironiziran ali parodiran, se je njegova mitska veljava celo okrepila. Čeprav je angleški prevod *Kalevipoeg* Jürija Kurmana (ZDA, 1982), ki sledi starejšemu folklorističnemu gledišču, Kreutzwalda še opredelil predvsem za »kompilatorja«, njegov lik z novim pristopi (E. g. Laak 2008) dobiva še očitnejše poteze enega izmed velikih evropskih avtorjev iztekajoče se romantike.

Drugi portugalski (= s periferije prihajajoči) pesnik, Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935), nekaj mlajši od estonskega Juhana Liiva, je ponekod v svojih delih ugotavljal, da je edini resnični poet narave; s tem, ko je z narave zbrisal vse ideje in občutja, kakršna ji je pripisal osrednji tok romantike, je Pessoa v resnici dosegel impresivno pesniško-filozofski izvornost. Še posebej je prišla do izraza s tem, ko se je namerno fragmentiral in kot pesnik porazdelil svoje avtorstvo na množstvo avtorjev, njegovih heteronimov (med najznamenitejšimi so Alvaro de Campos, Ricardo Reis, Alberto Caeiro).

V eni svojih pesmi (XXVIII) Alberto Caeiro torej piše:

*Jaz pišem prozo svojih verzov
in ostajam vesel,*

*ker vem, da razumem Naravo od zunaj;
in ne razumem je od znotraj,*

*ker Narava nima notranjosti;
drugače ne bi bila narava.*

Por mim, escrevo a prosa dos meus versos

E fico contente,

*Porque sei que compreendo a Natureza por fora;
E não a compreendo por dentro*

*Porque a Natureza não tem dentro;
Senão não era a Natureza.*

(Pesmi Alberta Caeira; iz cikla Varuh čred; XXVIII.)

Prev. Miklavž Komelj. V: Pessoa: *Pesmi; Mornar; Bankir anarhist.*

Ljubljana: LUD Šerpa, 2003. Str. 13)

Filozofija Alberta Caeira, učitelja Alvara de Camposa, vzbuja vtis skrajnega racionalizma, v katerem ni nikakršnega prostora za občutja. Temu nasprotno nekatere pesmi Alvara de Camposa (kot na primer njegova znamenita *Pomorska oda* (Ode marítima)) reflektirajo spolne in telesne naravne gone; ko se projicirajo v človeško dejanje, so jim odvzeta vsakršna čustva in razum. Vendar zaključek *Pomorske ode*, prav kakor še ena znamenita pesem Alvara de Camposa, *Tobakarija* (*Tabacaria*), prikazuje, kako so odločitve »čistega razuma« in odločitve po naravi zreducirane na goli mehanizem seksualnosti – in s tem analogne človeškemu tehničnemu stremljenju. To zasenčuje ironija. V svoji ustvarjalni integriteti je pesnik Pessoa še zelo stopal po tesnobno razbolelem obodu eksistence. Pomik k »varnemu« središčnemu razumskemu temelju ali namišljeni »notrini« narave bi bil težko kaj drugega kot parodija človekovih razumskih teženj.

Isto stanje stalnega nemira – in ob tem lahko pomislimo na Pessoevo knjigo razmišljanj, *Knjigo nespokoja* (*Livro do dessassego*) je lastno poeziji Estonca Juhana Liiva. Mlajša generacija estonskih simbolistov ga je skušala predstaviti kot predhodnika njihovih lastnih teženj, vendar je Liiv precej kočljivejši. Ni se odzval simbolističnemu pozivu k strogim rimam, t. j. k oblikovnemu racionalizmu pesmi. Čeprav pogosto izhaja iz vizij narave, se lahko njegove podobe le redko zreducirajo na zgolj površinske impresije ali le nakazovanje občutij. Liivovo poezijo opredeljuje močna intelektualna intenziteta; s čimer prednjači večini 'intelektualističnih pesnikov', pa je to, da nikdar ne predstavlja svojih idej v njihovi goloti. Vstajajo iz njegovih podob, ki so obenem čutne in lirične, vpete v obod eksistence, z magijo, kakršne 'noosferični' pesnik – ne glede na njegovo ali njeno artistskično veščino – nikdar ne more doseči. Zato v svojih esejih (prim. 2007) vidim Liiva kot enega največjih evropskih eksistencialnih lirikov in zato odkrivam podobnosti med njim in baskovskim filozofom in pisateljem eksistence Miguelom de Unamunom z drugega obrobja Evrope. Njuni letnici rojstva – simbolno – sovpadata.

Za konec; ali gornje trditve pomenijo, da podcenjujem vlogo interpretov / ponovnopiscev kot avtorjev? Nikakor ne. Vtem ko Juhanu Liivu za časa življenja ni uspelo objaviti knjige, so ga kot avtorja v zvezde kovali drugi, mlajši avtorji, predvsem novelist in esejist Friedebert Tuglas (1886–1971). Zahvaljujoč Tuglasovim zgodnjim monografijam o Liivu in temeljni izdaji Liivovega izbranega dela, je Liiv lahko trajno vstopil v kanon estonske književnosti, posmrtno slaven.

Splošno znano je, da so temelje velikega kanona zahodne književnosti, če ne celo svetovne književnosti, postavili romantični pisci in misleci (Herder, Goethe, brata Schlegel in drugi). Mnogi od njih so bili avtorji v najglobljem smislu besede. Njihova semiosferična odprtost k drugemu je bila najvažnejši dejavnik v vzpostavljanju tega plodovitega simbiotičnega dialoga med avtorjem in interpretom, v katerem kot Avtorja naposled nastopata oba.

OPOMBE

¹ Ta in vsi naslednji prevodi so moji.

² Na naslovnica semiotičnih serijskih publikacij, ki jih je uredil Lotman, je beseda »semiotika« zapisana v grških črkah, uradni ruski naslov, »Trudy po znakovym sistemam«, pa se oprezno izogne temu pojmu.

³ Kratka razprava je bila istega leta prevedena in je izšla v Italiji: *La cultura come mente collettiva e i problemi dell'intelligenza artificiale*. Urbino: Università di Urbino, Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica, Ser. A, 1977, N. 66.

⁴ Za vire uporabljam ponatis članka v: Lotman 1992.

PRIPOMBE K SLOVENSKEMU BESEDILU

Slovensko besedišče upošteva razprave: *Kultura i eksplozija*. Prev. Sanja Veršič (Zagreb: Alfa, 1998 (str. 209) – v podnaslovu te razprave ohranja pojem 'pesniškega'), *Znotraj mislečih svetov*. Prev. Urša Zabukovec (Ljubljana: Studia humanitatis, 2006. str. 9) (npr.: »razumsko človeško življenje, tj. življenje kulture« Prim. Lotman: *Znotraj mislečih svetov*, str. 188.). Ob pojmu 'eksplozije' Lotman uporabi tudi pojem 'skok', npr. ob Blokovi pesniški tematizaciji trenutka kot »skok 'preteklosti' v 'prihodnost'« (ibid., 30.), predvsem pa prim. že obstoječi slovenski prevod Lotmanove semiotične terminologije v poglavjih »Semiotični prostor« in »Pojem meje« v: Lotman: *Znotraj mislečih svetov*, str. 173–83 in 185–201.

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Med božjo iskrico in lastno smrtjo

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Kljub sodobnim literarnim teorijam, ki so piscu snele lovoriko avtorstva kot neponovljive izvirne sinteze forme in vsebine in so vcepile dvom v ustvarjalnost kot učinek avtorjeve volje, veščin in namena, se v ustvarjalnem procesu ohranja ena ključnih potez tradicionalnega pojmovanja avtorstva – narcizem kot podaljšek infantilnega obdobja in z njim povezan občutek zmožnosti kreacije v polju neomejenih možnosti. Paradoks literarne – in nemara vsakršne umetniške ustvarjalnosti – je v tem, da se pisec čuti najbolj na sebi in za sebe v tistih ustvarjalnih obdobjih, ko se mu zdi, da ga, prežetega z neomejenim, oceanskim občutjem njegova lastna ustvarjalnost presega, da torej ni sam tisti, ki proces nadzoruje, ampak je »zgolj« sredstvo ustvarjalnega procesa, hkrati pa je ključni vezni element tega procesa njegovo ingeniozno veličanstvo – avtor sam.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / umetniška ustvarjalnost / ustvarjalni proces

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Kljub sodobnim literarnim teorijam, ki so piscu snele lovoriko avtorstva kot neponovljive izvirne sinteze forme in vsebine in so vcepile dvom o ustvarjalnosti kot učinku avtorjeve volje in veščin, se v ustvarjalčevem procesu ohranja ena ključnih potez tradicionalnega koncepta avtorstva – narcisizem kot infantilni podaljšek in z njim povezan občutek zmožnosti kreacije v polju neomejenih zmožnosti. In če je otrokom dopuščeno animistično verovanje, da s svojimi željami in mislimi naredijo, da se sonce pojavi in da luna izgine, in je v odraslem obdobju taisto prepričanje kaj hitro diagnosticirano kot psihoza, je v literaturi kreiranje svetov zgolj z mislijo ali, biblijsko rečeno, z besedo, ne le družbeno sprejemljivo, ampak celo spoštovano, četudi v prenekaterih prostorih, kot je tudi slovenski, (zgolj) simbolno, ne pa tudi finančno, kar pa je dejansko druga, mračna stran simbolnega statusa slovenskega jezika in literature.

Narcisizem je vgrajen v avtorjevo željo po izpostavitvi lastnega ustvarjalnega dela in s tem sebe v javnosti, od katere pričakuje, si želi ter zahteva pohvale in nagrajevanje in je ob nasprotnih reakcijah nemalokrat otroško prizadet in užaljen. A tudi avtorji, ki svojega dela javnosti ne izpostavijo in »pišejo le zase« – čeprav s tem pišejo tudi za Drugega –, v svoji intimni

estetizaciji eksistence, če se navežemo na Freuda, ohranjajo narcisizem kot podaljšek otroške igre, ki ustvarjalcu nudi zelo posebno vrsto užitka.

Avtor danes še zdaleč ni pokojen, ampak je celo vse bolj živ in porejen, saj se od njega pričakuje, da s podobo in biografijo v javnosti deluje kot promotor svoje literature. Toda v avtorjevi porejenosti marketinškemu sistemu preži past, da se avtor, nenazadnje tudi zaradi ekonomskega preživetja, podredi zahtevam tržnih mehanizmov in pritisku literarne produkcije, posledica česar je lahko razrahljanje kriterijev in s tem zdrš umetnosti v kulturno produkcijo. Umetnost, ki meri na realno in prek tega na resnico, s čimer realno in resnica postaneta vidna, če se navežemo na Gérarda Wajcmana, zahteva svoj ritem, ki ga je težko nadzorovati in ga nemalokrat ni mogoče pospešiti, medtem ko kulturna produkcija brez večjih težav nastaja med dogovorjenimi roki za oddajo. V nasprotju s kulturno produkcijo naj bi namreč umetnost ustvarjalcu in sprejemniku prinesla mnogo več kot zgolj zloščeno pomirljivo ugodje, saj naj bi tako v avtorju kot v bralcu, poslušalcu oziroma gledalcu razprla niše in izvrtala luknje, skozi katere pronikne resnica, za katero si kultura prizadeva, da bi ostala lepo prikrito zakrita.

Kadarkoli pisatelji pojasnjujejo svoj ustvarjalni proces, takšni poskusi lahko zvenijo zanimivo, hkrati pa se ta proces izkaže kot izkustvo, do katerega drugi nima dostopa. In ta drugi ni le bralec, ampak, kar zadeva njegovo pojasnitev, tudi avtor sam. Freud, ki je bil očaran nad literaturo, je v *Spisih o umetnosti* zapisal: »Ko bi vsaj pri sebi ali sebi podobnih našli kako dejavnost, ki bi bila podobna literarni! Potem bi jo lahko raziskali, v upanju, da se dokopljemo do prvih pojasnil o tem, za kaj gre pri literarnem ustvarjanju.« A tudi ko sama poskušam razložiti svojo *ars poetica*, svojo metodo pisanja, že med izrekanjem dvomim, da je sploh kaj od tega, kar pripovedujem, tudi res, in se vmes sprašujem, mar ne gre zgolj za mojo pripoved, za rekonstrukcijo ustvarjalnega procesa. Kajti tako kot ne obstaja zunanje mesto, s katerega bi avtor med ustvarjanjem lahko nevtravno opazoval samega sebe, je pisanje dejavnost, v katerem sta subjekt in objekt globoko premešana. In če gre za umetnost, in ne za kulturo, potem se v ustvarjalnem procesu, če se navežemo na Lacana, subjekt dejansko vzpostavlja, in to v točkah neprepoznavanja, kjer avtor v sebi sreča tistega drugega, svojega tujca, ki ni integriran v lastno avtorjevo podobo, in slednja ni prav nič več kot zgolj imaginarna tvorba.

Med ustvarjalnim procesom je percepcija časa in prostora transformirana, poleg tega je ustvarjalni proces težko zamejiti, saj se ne odvija le v zamejeni situaciji, sede za računalnikom ali nad listom papirja, ampak tudi v »neposvečenih« vsakodnevnih trenutkih, ko se iznenada prikrade ideja, se razveže kak vozec ali se kar tako izlušči kak stavek. In ker avtorju

ustvarjalnost izzove izjemen užitek, na katerega sta pripeta ustvarjalčeva bit in identiteta, česar se avtor nemara najmočneje zave v nemih obdobjih kreativnih blokad, lahko ustvarjalna suša povzroči tako izgubo identitete kot občutek drsenja v ne-bit.

Paradoks literarnega ustvarjanja kot tudi drugih oblik ustvarjalnosti je namreč v tem, da četudi je ustvarjalnosti pripet pojem svobode, svobodnega delovanja na teritoriju brezmejnih možnosti, se avtor čuti najbolj na sebi in za sebe v tistih ustvarjalnih procesih, ko prežet z oceanskim užikom, če uporabimo Freudov izraz, izkuša, da ni on sam tisti, ki ustvarjalnost nadzoruje, ampak da – nasprotno – ustvarjalnost nadzoruje njega. Toda taka obdobja se lahko kaj hitro sprevrnejo v svoje nasprotje, ko se eruptivni vir iznenada osuši in včasih za daljši čas, lahko pa tudi za vekomaj povsem presahne. In medtem ko enigmatični mehanizmi ustvarjalnega procesa odpirajo niše, skozi katere od časa do časa poblisne »božja iskrica«, kar avtor izkuša kot presežek lastnega bivanja ter točko gotovosti svojega obstoja, pa v daljših obdobjih ustvarjalnih blokad, ko izpuhti ustvarjalni užitek in z njim povezana gotovost biti, lahko sebe doživlja kot mrtvega avtorja, svoje življenje pa kot parazitiranje na preteklih poglavjih neke uspešne biografije.

Pa obstaja način, s katerim bi lahko pritisnili na sprožilec ustvarjalnosti? Pozitivna psihologija v to verjame in ponuja recepte, na katerih je jogi, meditaciji in podobnim sprostitvenim tehnikam pripisano zlasti pozitivno mišljenje. A če je takšna terapija morda učinkovita v menedžmentu in podobnih dejavnostih, kjer šteje učinkovitost, učinkovitost kot regeneracija kulture, je umetniški proces na recepture za doseganje homeostaze običajno imun, saj se umetnost praviloma zgodi v skrajnostih, tam, kjer je nečesa preveč, natanko zato, ker nekaj drugega manjka, oziroma tedaj, ko ekscesivnost stiske, kot v *Arvani 17* zapiše André Breton, povzroči spremembo znaka, ko umetnost kot dejanje stisko, bolečino ali smrt transformira v zlato, v vrednost, v življenje. Tako Dostojevski po besedah njegove žene, kot navaja Freud, nikakor ni pisal v harmoničnih stanjih – če je Dostojevski, razpet med nebom in peklom, takšna stanja sploh kdaj izkušal? –, ampak po izjemno vzburljivih in napetih igrah na srečo, ki so se končale z bankroti in se je njegova samopodoba, njegovo fantazmatsko trdno jedro razblinilo med občutke krivde in izgubo dignitete.

Ustvarjalne mehanizme je mogoče primerjati z ekstenzijami in kontrakcijami, z dihanjem s polnimi pljuči in z astmatičnim dušenjem, z vrhunci, ko avtorjev ego prehaja od nič do megalomanskih razsežnosti, pa vse do podtalja, ko se avtorjev ego prši in izginja. V ustvarjalnosti se stikata zavedno in nezavedno, avtor s svojim imaginarnim jazom z avtorjem kot subjektom nezavednega. V ustvarjalnosti se stikata avtorjeva samoglori-

fikacija, pripeta na trdno jedro samogotovosti, in razpršenost biti, skozi katero avtor sreča drugost v samem sebi, ko se mu ob tretjem delu izjave cogito ergo sum zatakne, kajti ta cogito ni zavedno, ni trdna substancialna formacija, temveč njegov »zasebni« tujec, ki pa se ob spretni umetniški artikulaciji lahko zaiskri kot božja iskrica, transcendenca ali, odvisno od ustvarjalčevega koncepta sveta, kot lastni iztisnjeni izmeček, kot izmuzljivi kvantni delec, ki nenehno izginja pa se spet in spet vrača in pojavlja.

Izjava, da so vse zgodbe že povedane in napisane, je prežvečena in površna, saj nekaj takega kot »vse zgodbe«, niti ne obstaja, obstajajo le temeljne človeške vsebine, kot so smisel in brez-smisel življenja, bit in ne-bit, misteriji medčloveških odnosov in zapletov, razmerje med človekom in svetom, pa karkoli naj svet že pomeni. In zgodbe, ne le narativne pripovedi, ampak tudi druge oblike ubeseditve razpetosti med bivanje in ne-bivanje, niso zgolj razlaga realnosti, temveč obenem njena konstrukcija. Ali je potemtakem sploh možno pisanje avtobiografij kot ubeseditve tistega, kar se nam je zgodilo, in ali ne obstaja način, s katerim lahko bolj radikalno posežemo v »svojo življenjsko zgodbo«? Četudi je že sama beseda, jezik posrednik lastne domnevno neposredne izkušnje, je avtobiografija podobno kot miselni tok naših spominov vselej skonstruirana pripoved. In čeprav v nas samih morda celo obstaja nekakšen trdi disk, na katerem so zabeležene najmanjše podrobnosti našega življenja, pa iskanje in odpiranje teh dokumentov nadzoruje naš lastni cenzor in hkrati montažer naših spominov. Prav zato verjamem, da je mogoče skozi fikcijo kot namerno skonstruirano pripoved, ki ni zavezana ponovitvi tega, kar vemo – kajti to, kar vemo, je zgolj nam samim sprejemljiva konstrukcija –, temeljiteje izbežati tudi neprijetne in zlasti nam tuje delčke resnice in jih povnanjiti skozi besede.

A ne oziraje se na različne ustvarjalne postopke in žanre, v pisanju vselej ostaja avtorjeva sled – in to bolj kot v izbiri neštetokrat predelanih tem in vsebin, v samem načinu njihove obdelave, v strukturi pisanja in v avtorjevi perspektivi, saj že rahel zamik perspektive namreč lahko osvetli objekt, da je videti čisto drugače, kot pa smo ga vajeni in ga poznamo. Te zavedno-nezavedne izbire, naj se avtor tega zaveda ali ne, vsebujejo njegova duhovna, materialna, čustvena in druga izkustva. In prav na teh ostrinah in robovih ostaja sled avtorstva in avtorja, in ta sled je ne le močnejša, ampak tudi resničnejša od spremljajoče všečno skonstruirane avtorjeve javne podobe in biografije.

Avtoriteta avtorja: kult preteklosti ali prihodnosti?

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Članek analizira zgodovino pojma originalnost kot nepogrešljivega atributa avtorstva. Opre se na Lotmanovo razlikovanje med »estetiko istovetnosti«, značilno za starejša obdobja, in »estetiko različnosti«, ki se začne uveljavljati od renesanse naprej, ter na Mortierovo tezo, da postane originalnost kriterij umetniškosti že v razsvetljenstvu, in ne šele v romantiki in modernizmu, kot običajno mislimo. Spreminjanje koncepta avtorstva vpliva tudi na spreminjanje statusa prevoda: v srednjem veku je prevod vselej že tudi priredba, z dvigom Avtorja na piedestal absolutnega Stvarnika umetniškega sveta pa se status prevajalcev poslabša, prevajanje se sprevrže v izpeljano, sekundarno dejavnost. To hierarhično razmerje traja vse do pred kratkim, ko postmodernizem v književnosti (Borges) ter fenomenologija in recepcijska estetika na teoretičnem področju rehabilitirajo prevajalsko dejavnost. Tezo o smrti Avtorja nakaže že Mallarmé, eksplicite pa jo razvije Valéry. Pisec članka, sam pesnik, je prepričan, da je bila postmodernistična omejitev modernistične arogance Avtorja nujna, da pa ponavljanje Barthesovega gesla o smrti Avtorja dandanašnji ni več produktivno, saj globalna ekonomija temelji na avtorskih pravicah, ki jih hoče Kapital ukrasti avtorjem. Avtorjem, ki so še kako živi in z vso močjo brcajo nazaj.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / posnemanje / izvirnost / avtentičnost / zgodovinski pregledi / Mortier, Roland

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Pričujoče razmišljanje je posvečeno literarnozgodovinski analizi kategorije, ki je tesno povezana s pojmom avtorja in je pravzaprav temeljni atribut in *conditio sine qua non* kakršnegakoli avtorstva: gre za kategorijo *originalnosti*, estetske inovativnosti.

Etimološki izvor pojma je seveda latinska beseda *origo*, – *originis*. Slovenci ta pojem označujemo z dvema etimološko tesno povezanima izrazoma, ki izkazujejo pomenljivo razliko: *izvir* in *izvor*. Prva beseda – *izvir* – je vsebinsko konkretnjša, saj je povezana z vodo (*izvir potoka* ali *reke*). Izraz *izvor* nedvomno *izvira* iz besede *izvir*, a je sčasoma izgubil vsebinsko povezavo z vodo in pridobil pojmovno širino. Če besedi *izvir* in *izvor* marsikdaj še lahko uporabljamo kot sinonima, pa se njuna medsebojna razlika

poveča pri posplošenju obeh v abstraktna pojma: tako je *izvirnost* slovenski ekvivalent za *originalnost*, medtem ko *izvornost* pomeni *prvobitnost*.

Francoski strukturalist Paul Zumthor je v delu *Essai de poétique médiévale* (Razprava o srednjeveški poetiki) lucidno in duhovito prikazal razmerje med avtorjem in jezikom v srednjem veku: »Pesnik je zasidran v jeziku bolj kakor jezik v njem.« (Le poète est situé dans son langage plutôt que son langage en lui.) (Zumthor 1972 68) V nasprotju z današnjim časom, ko si predstavljamo, da tekst izvira iz avtorja, je v srednjem veku avtor izviral iz teksta. V srednjem veku je bilo vse vnaprej določeno, vse je bilo tekst, torej ni bilo nikakršnega prostora in potrebe po originalnosti.

Za izhodišče našega razmišljanja je nadvse primerna tipologija kultur Jurija M. Lotmana, ki razlikuje med »*estetiko istovetnosti*«, značilno za starejša obdobja, in »*estetiko različnosti*«, ki prevlada v novem veku:

Zgodovinarjem srednjeveške umetnosti je znano, da se je njena estetika načelno razlikovala od sodobne. Če sodobna umetnost izhaja iz predstave, da originalnost, neponovljivost, individualna posebnost sodijo med vrline umetniškega dela, je srednjeveška vse to imela za greh, za izraz napuha, ter je zahtevala zvestobo pravadnim, 'od Boga navdihnjenim' vzorcem. Spretno ponavljanje zapletenih pravil umetniškega rituala – to je tisto, kar so zahtevali od umetnika. (Lotman 1970 120)

Estetika istovetnosti »je utemeljena na popolni identifikaciji naslikanih življenjskih pojavov z avditoriju že znanimi modeli-klišei, ki so vstopili v sistem 'pravil'. Klišei v umetnosti – to niso slabšalne besede, ampak določen pojav, ki je negativen le iz nekaterih zgodovinskih in strukturnih vidikov. (Lotman 1970 245)

Drugo vrsto sistemov, če jih premišljujemo na tej ravni, bodo predstavljali sistemi, pri katerih narava kodov pred začetkom umetniške percepcije avditoriju ni znana. To ni estetika istovetnosti, temveč različnosti. Načinom modeliranja stvarnosti, katerih je bralec vajen, umetnik zoperstavlja svojo, originalno rešitev, ki jo ima za resničnejšo.« (Lotman 1970 248)

Shakespeare bi po današnjih zakonih o avtorskih pravicah veljal za plagiatorja, saj si je na veliko izposojal teme in motive, zgodbe in dialoge pri starejših dramatikih ali italijanskih renesančnih novelistih. K sreči je bil Shakespeare boljši od avtorjev, od katerih je »kradel«. Da se je prav v času pozne renesanse »estetika istovetnosti« prelomila v »estetiko različnosti«, dokazuje pamflet, ki ga je dramatik Robert Green (ena izmed t. i. »univerzitetnih glav«) objavil l. 1592 in v katerem je označil mladega Shakespeara z besedno igro »shake-scene« (kar bi lahko prevedli kot »stresi-oder«) ter ga zasmehoval in mu očital, da krade od drugih. Tovrstna kritika bi v srednjem veku ne imela smisla, saj so vsi »kradli«. Zajemanje z drugih (iz)virov je bil normalen del ustvarjalnega procesa.

Tovrstno razumevanje kulture in umetnosti je imelo globoke posledice za vrednostna razmerja med avtorjem in prevajalcem. V srednjem veku je

bil prevajalec vselej že tudi prirejevalec: vsak prevedeni tekst je bil tudi že adaptacija. Meje med izvirnim besedilom, priredbo in prevodom so bile zabrisane. Zato prevode v tistem času pogosto uvrščamo med avtorska dela: Chaucerjeva verzija *Romana o roži* velja v enaki meri za prevod francoskega romana v verzih, ki sta ga napisala Guillaume de Lorris in Jean de Meung, kot za njegovo lastno delo. To prepletanje avtorske in prevajalske dejavnosti se je dogajalo na vmesnem manevrskem prostoru, ki se mu ponavadi reče *adaptacija, priredba*. Načelna razmerja med izvirnikom, prevodom in priredbo je dobro definirala Majda Stanovnik: »Prevod je jezikovno v celoti drugačen od izvirnika, ohranja pa njegovo individualno in zvrstno oblikovanost; priredba spreminja izvirnikovo namembnost, pogosto tudi zvrstno pripadnost, vendar se razpoznavno navezuje nanj s parafrazami in citati.« (Stanovnik 1998 35) V pričujočem članku poskušamo ta razmerja umestiti v zgodovinski kontekst.

»Estetika različnosti«, ki jo vzpostavi novi vek, ustoliči avtorja kot suverenega Princa Domišljije, Ustvarjalca, Kreatorja, Stvarnika umetniškega sveta, ki uživa božanske attribute. Posledično so tudi umetniško ustvarjanje razumeli kot *creatio ex nihilo*. Ta proces sakralizacije Avtorja se zgodi predvsem na podlagi kategorije originalnosti. Brez originalnosti ni Avtorja. Avtor, ki ni originalen, ni Avtor, je *contradictio in adiecto*.

Vzpon Avtorja ima za posledico padec statusa prevajalca: iz dela, ki je v srednjem veku zaradi svoje verske, intelektualne in kulturne vloge uživalo status po-ustvarjalne dejavnosti, se prevajanje sprevrže v sekundarno, izpeljano dejavnost. Prevajalec postane služabnik Avtorja, Stvarnika in Gospodarja umetniškega sveta. Joachim du Bellay, pesnik in član francoske renesančne skupine *Plejada*, je l. 1549 napisal strupene argumente zoper prevajalce v svojem manifestu *Défense et Illustration de la langue française* (Obramba in požlahtnitev francoskega jezika):

Mais que dirai-je d'aucuns, vraiment mieux dignes d'être appelés traditeurs que traducteurs? vu qu'ils trahissent ceux qu'ils entreprennent exposer, les frustrant de leur gloire, et par même moyen séduisent les lecteurs ignorants, leur montrant le blanc pour le noir (...) O Apollon! O Muses! Profaner ainsi les sacrées reliques de l'Antiquité!

Toda kaj naj povem o nekaterih, ki bi bolj zaslužili, da bi jih imenovali izdajalce kakor prevajalce? glede na dejstvo, da izdajajo tiste, ki naj bi jih predstavili, uničujejo njihovo slavo in na ta način zapeljujejo nevedne bralce, katerim prodajajo belo za črno (...) O Apolon! O Muze! Tako skruniti svete ostanke Starodavnosti! (Du Bellay 1988 58–59)

Ta poniževalni status prevajalcev je trajal vse do pred kratkim: šele postmodernizem je rehabilitiral prevajalsko dejavnost. Kakor v mnogih drugih rečeh je tudi pri tem inicialno vlogo odigral Jorge Luis Borges: če s

stališča razmerja med avtorji in prevajalci premislimo, kdo so glavni junaki mnogih Borgesovih zgodb in romanov, bomo prišli do presenetljivega sklepa, da so to prevajalci, ne avtorji. Kot je poudaril hrvaški umetnostni in literarni zgodovinar Tonko Maroević v knjigi *Borgesov bralec*, je Borges rehabilitiral branje in bralce (Maroević 2005 340). Branje ni več pasiven proces, temveč postane nadvse aktivna dejavnost, prava pravcata duhovna avantura. In kaj so prevajalci drugega kot najbolj strastni, temeljiti in natančni bralci? Na teoretičnem področju so to spremembo miselnosti pripravljali filozofi v okrožjih hermenevtike in fenomenologije, med drugim Roman Ingarden s teorijo, da je tekst literarnega dela le predloga, ki jo bralec aktivno dopolni v skladu s svojim doživljajskim obzorjem (Ingarden 1971 46). To stališče je v zadnjih desetletjih razvila predvsem recepcijska estetika, ki je obrnila na glavo tradicionalno vrednostno razmerje med izvornim in ciljnim jezikom: če je bila literarna zgodovina svojčas skoraj povsem osredotočena na avtorja in njegovo kulturo ter je posledično odnose med posameznimi nacionalnimi književnostmi obravnavala skozi arogantno imperialistično prizmo »*vpliva*«, potem je za recepcijsko estetiko primaren ciljni jezik, se pravi procesi adaptiranja izvornega teksta v estetski, zgodovinski, družbeni itd. kontekst ciljne kulture. Avtor je tu postavljen v oklepaj, za moj občutek preveč radikalno.

Mimogrede: prav Shakespearove genialne nadgraditve virov, iz katerih je zajemal, odpirajo vprašanje, na kateri ravni je literarno in sploh umetniško delo sploh originalno, izvirno, avtorsko v pravem pomenu besede. Vsi se strinjamo, da so mitološke zgodbe splošna last: originalnost Sofoklove, Anouilheve ali Smoletove *Antigone* ni odvisna od same zgodbe tragedije, ki pripada *mitosu*, ampak od različnih avtorskih interpretacij te tragične zgodbe, ki sodi v izročilo zahodne civilizacije in svetovno kulturno zakladnico ... čeprav se seveda zavedamo tudi dejstva Sofoklove *izvornosti* v primerjavi s poznejšimi obdelavami *Antigone*. Anouilh in Smole sta v odnosu do Sofokla *izvirna*, Sofokles pa je *izvoren*. Je pri *izviru*, pri porodni vodi mita. A razmerje med Sofoklovo *izvornostjo* ter Anouilhevo in Smoletovo *izvirnostjo* ne predstavlja večjega problema, saj je Sofokles v časovnem in emfatičnem smislu *prvi*. Teže razumemo Shakespearov paradoks: je eden izmed *prvih* avtorjev, Avtor z veliko začetnico, in vendar je, kot smo že omenili, v nekaterih fabulativnih in dramaturških razsežnostih svojih besedil po današnjih merilih za avtorske pravice (*copy-right*) – plagiator.

V nasprotju s splošnim prepričanjem, da se je ustoličenje Avtorja zgodilo v času romantike, analiza belgijskega literarnega zgodovinarja Rolanda Mortiera v knjigi *L'originalité* (Originalnost) kaže, da je kategorija originalnosti po svojem izvoru razsvetljenska. Podnaslov tega sistematičnega in lucidnega literarnozgodovinskega dela je pomenljiv: *Nova estetska kategorija v razsvetljen-*

skem stoletju (Une nouvelle catégorie esthétique au siècle des Lumières).

Pojem *originalnosti* ima seveda tudi svojo predzgodovino, ki je – saj ne more biti drugače – tesno povezana z zgodovino pojma *mimesis*, temeljne kategorije zahodne umetnosti in teorije umetnosti. Pojma *mimesis* v srednjem in novem veku niso razumeli zgolj kot posnemanje zunajumetniške stvarnosti, kakor pri Platonu in Aristotelu, temveč tudi kot posnemanje drugih, predhodno obstoječih umetniških del. V tem smislu je pojem *originalnosti* vrednostno zoperstavljen pojmu *posnemanja*, *imitacije* (latinska beseda *imitatio* je redukcija prvotnega bogastva starogrške besede *mimesis*).

Sodeč po *Slovarju slovenskega knjižnega jezika* ima beseda *original* več pomenov:

izvirnik, literarno, znanstveno delo v jeziku, v katerem ga je napisal avtor; kipi ali slika, kakor jo je ustvaril umetnik, v nasprotju z njuno reprodukcijo; prvi, prvotni izvod, primerek listine; (ekspr.) kedor se po določenih lastnostih, nazorih, navadah loči od drugih, izvirnež.

Če so prvi trije pomeni vrednostno pozitivni, je zadnja raba besede *original* pogosto slabšalna; je sinonim za besedo *čudak*. Tovrstna pejorativna raba oznake *original* je bila v starih časih pogosto značilna tudi za kritike literarnih in umetniških del nasploh. Tako je abbé Féraud v svojem *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française* (3. zvezek, 1787) potegnil naslednjo pomensko distinkcijo (citirano po: Mortier 1982 33):

– Originalni avtor je genij	– Un auteur original est un homme de génie
toda	mais
– original je bizaren in čudaški človek.	– un original est un homme bizarre et singulier.

Spomnim se sestanka Društva slovenskih pisateljev v osemdesetih letih, ko je Franček Rudolf vstal in dejal: »Ko sem bil mlad, so mi lepo starši govorili, nikar med pisatelje, Franček, sicer boš postal tak original, kot je Peter Božič!« Pa je vstal Peter Božič in dejal: »Ko sem bil pa jaz mlad, so mi lepo starši govorili, nikar med pisatelje, Peter, sicer boš postal tak original, kot je Ivan Mrak!« Pa je vstal Ivan Mrak in dejal: »Ko sem bil pa jaz mlad, so mi lepo starši govorili, nikar med pisatelje, Ivan, sicer boš postal tak original, kot je Jakob Alešovec!«

Nasprotje med posnemanjem in izvirnostjo je bilo v jedru znamenitega *Spora med starimi in modernimi* (*La Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*) v 16. in 17. stoletju: dilema se je glasila – posnemanje klasičnih zgledov ali ustvarjanje originalnih del.

Presenetljivo moderno je na tej ravni geslo *Imitation*, ki ga je za znamenito francosko *Enciklopedijo* (1765) po vsej verjetnosti napisal sam Diderot:

v tem nenavadno dolgem geslu je imitacija uvodoma definirana kot »spojanje podob, misli, čustev, ki jih črpajo iz kakšnega avtorja in jih uporabljajo na način, ki je bodisi drugačen bodisi podoben ali pa bogati original«. Šokanten je v Diderotovem geslu stavek: »Dobra imitacija je nenehna invencija – La bonne imitation est une continuelle invention.« Diderotov sklep je torej zelo pozitiven: »Tako imitacija, ki je porojena iz nenehnega branja dobrih originalov, odpira imaginacijo, navdihuje okus, razširja genija in izpopolnjuje talente.« (Citirano po: Mortier 1982 27–29)

Alexander Pope kritizira posnemovalce v smislu oportunističnega in hlapčevskega kopiranja, vztraja pa pri principu posnemanja, vendar posnemanja – Narave (citirano po: Mortier 1982 44):

*First follow Nature, and your judgement frame
By her just standard, which is still the same ...*

V svojem uvodu k izdaji Shakespeara Pope pravi (citirano po: Mortier 1982 46): Shakespearova poezija je bila dejansko **navdih**; on ni toliko posnemovalce kot **instrument Narave** (*The poetry of Shakespeare was inspiration indeed; he is not so much an imitator, as an instrument of Nature*). Pope tu anticipira pomen, ki ga bo Narava odigrala v vrednostnem sistemu razsvetljenstva. Razsvetlenci razumejo izvirnost kot pomemben kriterij in pozitivno oznako pri estetskih sodbah, vendar še zmeraj vztrajajo pri temeljnem principu *mimesis*. Če pa avtor ne posnema drugih, predhodnih avtorjev, če se ne ozira na klasične vzore in vzornike, koga potemtakem sploh posnema? Posnema Naravo. V najbolj radikalnih različicah je Avtor – Narava sama. Tukaj se seveda gibljemo na tleh filozofije. Kaj je narava? Je to starogrški *physis*? Je to renesančna *natura*? Je to Spinozova »*natura naturata*« (ustvarjena narava) ali njegova »*natura naturans*«, se pravi *porajajoča narava*, kar je Spinozovo ime za Stvarnika, za Boga? Prav zares: je to Spinozov panteistični »*Deus sive Natura*« (Bog ali Narava)? Je to Narava znanstvenih zakonov, ki so empirično ugotovljivi in preverljivi? Kakšno je razmerje med estetskimi zakonitostmi umetnosti in narave? Je Narava tista razsežnost, ki sodi v razsežnost *vzvišenega, sublimnega*, kakor ga je razumel Kant? In kakšna je etična vsebina Narave? Je Narava Dobro ali Zlo? Za Rousseauja Dobro, za markiza de Sada Zlo.

Prelomna točka pri kronanju Avtorja za kralja umetniškega sveta se je zgodila v obdobju predromantike in jo zaznamuje esej angleškega pesnika Edwarda Younga *Conjectures on original Composition* (Podmene o originalni kompoziciji) iz l. 1759. Kot ugotavlja Roland Mortier, »je Youngova pomembnost, kot kaže, manj v idejah kakor v učinkovitosti njihovega izražanja« (Mortier 1982 76). Ta esej se je razširil po Evropi in s svojim žarom očaral mnoge mlade duhove. Prava pravcata napoved romantike.

Zakaj je ta odločilna iniciativa prišla iz Anglije in ne iz Francije ali Nemčije? Vpliv normativne klasicistične estetike z zahtevo po posnemanju visokih klasičnih zgledov je bil v Franciji v 18. stoletju kljub razsvetljenskem gibanju še zmeraj tako močan, da ni dopuščal prodora inovativnosti. Francoska književnost zbere revolucionarnega duha šele stoletje pozneje, s simbolističnim raziskovanjem pesniškega jezika, ki doseže vrhunec z Rimbaudevo ukinitvijo mimetičnega principa v *Illuminacijah* in Mallarméjevo tezo, da ne piše Jaz, ampak Jezik. Kljub prevladujočemu nasprotnemu mnenju se je razsvetljenstvo v nemških deželah uveljavilo zelo pozno: Kantova definicija razsvetljenstva, ki v nemški terminologiji dokončno ustoliči izraz *Aufklärung*, je objavljena šele l. 1784, v notici *Was ist Aufklärung* (Kaj je razsvetljenstvo) v *Berlinische Monatschrift* (Mortier 1982 14).

Youngove ideje prevzamejo Lessing, Klopstock, Hamann, Herder in pesniki gibanja *Sturm und Drang*, ki razvijejo pojem *genija* v različnih variantah (*Originalgeist*, *Originalgenie*, *Kraftgenie* itd.).

Velja pripomniti, da se ob principih mimetičnosti in originalnosti ves čas oglašča še tretji princip – *avtentičnost*. Po Mortieru ta temelji na kriteriju *intenzivnosti* in uveljavlja *ekspresijo* kot osnovni način umetniškega ustvarjanja (Mortier 1982 129). Pri tem principu gre za posnemanje Narave, ki je v avtorju samem. Mimetični princip je torej ohranjen, vendar ponotrjen.

Literarna veda zadnjih desetletij je sledila postmodernistični demontaži prestola, na katerega je Avtorja posadila romantika in njen zadnji tozadevni poganjek – radikalni modernizem – s povečevanjem inovacije. Pri avantgardističnih gibanjih 20. stoletja je kriterij inovacije pogosto funkcional kot edino preostalo estetsko načelo. Kult Avtorja kot božanskega Stvarnika je bil nedvomno potreben kritike in streznitve. Veliko vprašanje pa je, ali je umetnost sploh možna brez avtorja. Točneje: podpis avtorja na knjigi prav gotovo ni nujno potreben – roman ali pesniško zbirko ponavadi enako razumemo tudi v primeru anonimnega avtorstva. Vendar ta raven avtorstva ni bistvena – za umetnost je bistvena tista raven, ki jo Jurij Lotman v *Strukturi umetniškega teksta* imenuje »avtorjev model sveta« (Lotman 1976 369). Ta model, ta prizma, skozi katero je svet prikazan, to je – »avtor«.

Vprašanje razmerja med umetniškim delom in avtorjevo lastno izkušnjo je še bolj zapleteno. Mallarmé je izbrisal princip prvoosebnega lirskega subjekta, a ni bil zato nič manj avtorski – ravno obratno: je eden največjih in najbolj prelomnih avtorjev moderne dobe. A čeprav jo je zamolčal in navidezno izbrisal, se je njegova lastna izkušnja vpisala v pesniški jezik. Mallarmé je v svojih sonetih pogosto upesnjeval prazne interierje (npr. znameniti *Sonet na -iks*). V napornem procesu prevajanja Mallarméja v slo-

venščino sem našel razlago za to obsesivno temo v ciklu *Za Anatolov grob* (*Pour un tombeau d'Anatole*), kjer je pesnik izrazil bolečino ob smrti svojega osemletnega sina. Mallarméja so vse življenje preganjale izgube najbližjih oseb: najprej matere, ki je umrla, ko sta bila z mlajšo sestro Marie še otroka in je usoda sirot intenzivirala njun odnos; nato smrt sestrice nekaj let pozneje ... Navidezno formalistična, brezosebna in hladna praznina Mallarméjevih sob se mi je torej izkazala kot smrtna odsotnost ljubljenih bitij, ki jih pesniška beseda ponovno unavzoči (Novak 2006 318–323). Lastna izkušnja je ogenj, skozi katerega gredo besede plemena (»les mots de la tribu«), da bi pridobile »čistejši pomen (»un sens plus pur«), če naj uporabimo Mallarméjev verz iz soneta *Grobnica Edgarja Poeja* (*Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe*) – v originalu in v prevodu pisca pričujočega članka:

Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu. (Mallarmé 1975 94)

Iščiti pomene vseh besed plemena. (Mallarmé 1989 53)

Tradicionalno razumljeni avtor je bil neke vrste Bog – Stvarnik in obenem lastnik izključnega smisla besedila. Ta monopolni položaj je Mallarmé presegel s preroškimi besedami iz eseja *Križa verza*: »Čisto delo implicira izrazno izginotje pesnika, ki prepušča iniciativo besedam [cède l'initiative aux mots], te pa v gibanje spravi trk njihovih neenakosti; prižigajo se od medsebojnih odsevov kakor možna sled ognja na draguljih ...« (Mallarmé 1945 325)

Mallarméjev učenec Paul Valéry je radikaliziral to tendenco brisanja tradicionalno razumljenega avtorstva. Bil je eden izmed mladih »*torkovcev*« (»*mardistes*«, tako imenovanih po francoski besedi za *torek* – *mardi*), ki so se vsak torek zvečer od l. 1880 do srede devetdesetih let zbirali v pesniškem salonu – točneje: kuhinji – skromnega Mallarméjevega stanovanja na pariški Rue de Rome, da bi občudovali Poezijo in njeno posebljenje, Mallarméja. Imenovali so ga *Maître*, ta izraz pa v francoščini pokriva celo vrsto pomenov – od *Mojstra* v smislu *Obrtnika* prek *Učitelja* do *Gospodarja*. V nasprotju z večino pesniških »učencev«, ki – prosto po Haroldu Bloomu – čutijo »*tesnobo vplivanja*« (*anxiety of influence*), je bila sleherna primerjava z Mallarméjem zanj neznosna, zato je protestiral zoper primerjalno analizo Henrija Ghéona, ki je Valéryja vrednostno postavil na višje mesto kakor Mallarméja. Tu se dotikamo za avtorje nadvse občutljivega in travmatičnega problema *vpliva*, ki ga je Valéry skozi svojo pesniško izkušnjo in z izjemno lucidnostjo avtorefleksije ugledal na bistveno drugačen in bolj svež način kakor tradicionalna literarna veda. V *Pismu o Mallarméju* (*Lettre sur Mallarmé*) iz l. 1927 pravi:

*Ni besede, ki bi jo kritičsko pero lažje in pogosteje zapisalo kot besedo vpliv, hkrati pa ni bolj praznega med vsemi pojmi, ki tvorijo iluzorično orodje estetike. Kljub temu je intelekt na najbolj filozofski način zainteresiran za vprašanje vpliva, ki spodbuja k analizi modifikacije, kakršno določen dub sproži v drugem dubu. Zgodi se, da delo določenega avtorja dobi nenavadno vrednost za neko drugo bitje, da v njem povzroči dejavne posledice, ki jih je bilo nemogoče predvideti in ki jih je dokaj pogosto skoraj nemogoče odkriti. (Na tem mestu Valéry vstavi bistveno opombo: »Po tem se vpliv – influence – razlikuje od posnemanja – imitation.«) Z druge strani vemo, da je sleherna izpeljana dejavnost bistvena za ustvarjalnost na vseh področjih. Naj gre za znanost ali za umetnost, opažamo, če se ukvarjamo z nastajanjem rezultatov, da **nastajajoče vselej ponavlja že ustvarjeno** ali pa ga spodbuja: ponavlja ga v drugih tonih, ga prečiščuje, krepi, poenostavlja, obremenjuje ali preobremenjuje; a ga torej na neviden način izkorenjšča.« (Valéry 1957 634; Valéry 1987 712)*

Ali, kot je z udarnim cinizmom formuliral v zbirki esejističnih aforizmov *Tel Quel* (Valéry 1960 478): »Ni ničesar bolj izvirnega, bolj **svojega** kakor hraniti se z drugimi. Toda treba jih je prebaviti. Lev je narejen iz prebavljene ovce.«

Paul Valéry ima bistvene zasluge za to, da sodobna literarna veda avtorja ne obravnava več kot ekskluzivnega Lastnika smisla svojega dela, kot prvega, najvišjega in monopolnega Interpreta svojih besedil. Valéryjeva zahteva, da imajo bralci enako pravico do interpretacije kot avtor, gre celo tako daleč, da je v predgovoru k izdaji zbirke *Charmes* (Mikavnost), ki jo je komentiral filozof Alain, zapisal:

»Resnična enotnost mojega dela (ouvrage) se ne sestavi v meni. Napisal sem le 'partituro', – toda lahko jo slišim izvedeno le v duši in duhu drugega. [...]

*Ni pravega smisla teksta. Ni avtoritete avtorja. Karkoli je že **hotel povedati**, napisal je tisto, kar je pač napisal. Brž ko je enkrat objavljen, je tekst podoben orodju, ki ga vsakdo sme uporabljati po svoji všeči in v skladu s svojimi sposobnostmi; in ni povsem zanesljivo, da ga njegov konstruktor uporablja bolje kot kdo drug.*

Moji verzji imajo pač tak smisel, kot jim ga podelimo. Pomen, ki jim ga podeljujem jaz, se prilega le meni, in ni v nikakršnem nasprotju z branjem drugih. Gre za napako, ki je nasprotna naravi poezije in ki zanjo utegne biti celo usodna, če zahtevamo, da sleherni pesmi mora ustrezati nek resničen in enkratni smisel, ki se sklada ali pa je identičen s kakšno avtorjevo mislijo.«

(Valéry 1957 1507–9; Novak 1997 165).

Roland Barthes s svojo tezo o smrti avtorja (*La Mort de l'Auteur*) iz revolucionarnega leta 1968 v bistvu ponavlja Paula Valéryja. Treba pa je poudariti, da je pred nekaj desetletji omejitve arogance Avtorja bila potrebna. V zadnjih štiridesetih letih se je marsikaj spremenilo. Prepričan sem, da je dandanašnji situacija obratna in da je avtorje treba zaščititi kot ogroženo vrsto.

Z Valéryjem je Youngov koncept originalnosti kot *conditio sine qua non* umetniškega dela doživel detronizacijo. Avtorji pa vselej gredo svoja pota

in ne verjamejo teoriji niti takrat, kadar dobro zveni in jih hvali. Celo več: resnični avtorji ne verjamejo niti lastnim teorijam. Tak je bil tudi primer Paula Valéryja, nadarjenega pesnika in briljantnega misleca, ki v svoji pesniški praksi k sreči ni sledil lastnim idejam o *čisti poeziji* (*poésie pure*).

Nenavadna anekdota je povezala življenjsko nesrečo Edwarda Younga s pesniško 'srečo' Paula Valéryja. Kot študent Univerze v Montpellieru (ki zdaj nosi njegovo ime) na začetku devetdesetih let 19. stoletja se je Valéry rad sprehajal in meditiral v lepem Botaničnem vrtu. V tihem kotu je bil (in še zmeraj je, kot sem se prepričal na lastne oči) skrivnosten grob brez podatkov, le z latinskim napisom: *Narcissae placandis manibus* (*Naj se umiri Narcissina senca*). Sodeč po lokalni legendi, naj bi angleški pesnik Edward Young tu pokopal svojo hčerko Narcisso. (Racionalistični duh moderne dobe je razumel to zgodbo zgolj kot proizvod ljudske domišljije, a arheologi so pri izkopavanju na tem mestu res našli otroško okostje.) Ta grob in zgodba sta tako pretresla mladega Valéryja, da je napisal pesnitev *Narcis govori* (*Narcisse parle*), ki jo je knjižno objavil šele pozneje, l. 1920, v *Albumu starodavnih pesmi* (*Album des vers anciens*), v katerem je na prigravarjanje prijatelja Andréja Gida po dvajsetletnem pesniškem molku zbral mladostne pesmi. Ime nesrečne deklice Narcisse ga je spomnilo na baje-slovnega lepega mladeniča Narcisa, ki se je na smrt zaljubil v lastno podobo. Zgodba o nesrečnem angleškem pesniku Edwardu Youngu in njegovi tragično preminuli hčerki Narcissi je torej botrovala začetku Valéryjevega obsesivnega ukvarjanja s temo Narcisa. Pesnik *poezije grobov in noči*, ki je povzdigoval izvirnost, je dal temno témo pesniku Svetlobe in Morja, ki je z njo izrazil svoj temeljni osebni problem, da bi nato zanikal vlogo osebnih motivov v poeziji ter celo razpusil sam pojem Avtorja. Da je pesnitev o Narcisu vzniknila iz zavesti o smrtnosti, ne more biti nikakršno naključje. Spomnimo se: narcise so v različnih mitologijah cvetlice smrti. Zato je za motto pesnitve Valéry izbral epitaf na grobu: *Narcissae placandis manibus*.

Za konec še sociološka opomba: principa originalnosti in avtentičnosti sta osnovni zakonitosti postmoderne globalne ekonomije. Zaščitene blagovne znamke (*registered trade marks*) so ekonomski prevod umetniških in intelektualnih avtorskih pravic. Temeljni zakon politične ekonomije Evropske unije je pravilo, da mora sleherni proizvod na trgu biti opremljen z oznako *dežele izvora* (*land of origin*) oziroma *zibelke vrste* (*cradle of the race*), če gre za živali in njihove izdelke. Tako imajo le francoski vinogradniki pravico do imena *šampanjec*, saj je Francija *land of origin* šampanjca; če enak izdelek ponujajo vinogradniki iz drugih dežel, to ni *šampanjec*, ampak navadna *penina*, kajti avtorske pravice je treba spoštovati!

Največja gospodarska panoga prihodnosti bodo avtorske pravice. Ponovno lansirana teza o smrti Avtorja se žal vpisuje v kontekst nenehne-

ga prizadevanja globalnega Kapitala, da avtorjem odvzame avtorske pravice in se jih polasti. Etična dolžnost literarne vede je, da solidarno pomaga avtorjem v njihovem pravičnem boju za avtorske pravice. Navsezadnje, prihodnost slednjega intelektualnega dela bo odvisna od izida tega konflikta. Vsi smo na istem čolnu, in skupaj bomo pluli naprej ali pa skupaj potonili.

To zapisavši, naj odgovorim tudi na izziv našega kolokvija o smrti Avtorja. Kako gre Avtorju danes? Živ je in brca.

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Digitalni avtor? Avtorstvo v digitalni dobi

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Vse od rojstva »svetovnega spleta« kot najuspešnejše internetne aplikacije so literarni teoretiki (Landow, Bolter) upali, da bo nov digitalni medij naposled dopustil »smrt avtorja« in rojstvo »pišočega bralca«. Hipertekst kot nov besedilni žanr se je zdel dovolj močan, da bi izpolnil staro upanje poststrukturalistov (Barthes, Foucault).

Čeprav je literarna teorija večinoma opustila to zaneseno upanje, se zdi, da internet v sedanji literarni produkciji še vedno ohranja moč svojega načeloma »brezavtorskega« medija: razvpita enciklopedija Wikipedija dopušča domnevo, da je sâmo, skupinsko napisano besedilo pomembnejše od avtorjev. Literarni eksperimenti v digitalnih medijih celo raziskujejo, kako je mogoče napisati besedilo le s pomočjo tekstovnih algoritmov. Tovrstni projekti sploh več ne potrebujejo avtorja, saj uporabljene podatke preskrbijo kar računalniški iskalniki.

To naivno predstavo o brezavtorskem tekstu je kaj lahko spodbiti. Prvič, novi mediji so omogočili ponovno oživljanje in celo razcvet avtorja. Drugič, za razliko od hitro rastoče produkcije skupinskih internetnih novinarskih tekstov takšne literarne produkcije praktično ni. Tretjič, kljub skupinskim projektom ali »kodnim delom« se funkcija avtorja ne izgubi, marveč se le razprši na različne osebe, kar vodi k »disociiranemu« avtorstvu. Avtor torej v dobi interneta ni umrl, saj so mu njegove lastnosti zagotovile preživetje. Še več, internet je zanj postal pravzaprav nekakšen vrelec mladosti, kar bom skušal utemeljiti z nedavno izvedenimi eksperimenti o avtorstvu v digitalni dobi.

Ključne besede: literatura in tehnologija / digitalna literatura / medmrežje / avtor / avtorstvo

UDK 82.0:808.1

Uvod: Specifika internetnega avtorja - historična perspektiva

Internetna literatura je na začetku pomenila nov up literarne teorije. Njeni pionirji, npr. Jay David Bolter, George P. Landow in Benjamin Wooley, so na začetku devetdesetih let verjeli, da bo internet omogočil nastanek nove, skupinske tekstne produkcije.

Avtor naj bi popolnoma izginil iz teh tekstov in dal prostor pišočemu bralcu, ki so ga imenovali wreader. Na svetovnem spletu je vsakdo avtor, kar pomeni, da ni avtor nihče. »Razlikovanje med avtorjem in bralcem postane nesmiselno in avtor se mora umaknit« (Wooley 165)

Internetno literaturo so torej razumeli kot uresničenje nekaterih post-strukturalističnih idej, ki sta jih Roland Barth in Michel Foucault razglasila za »smrt avtorja«.

Kot je znano, je kritika avtorske pozicije obvladovala pisanje o avtorju zadnjih nekaj desetletij, a se je avtor na nek način vrnil v literarnoteoretično razpravljanje od devetdesetih let dalje (prim. Bein, Detering in Jannidis), pri čemer se vseskozi postavlja vprašanje, ali gre res za nov pojav ali bolj za vračanje enakega, saj koncept avtorja ni nikoli postal zares preživet.

Čeprav so novejša raziskava internetne literature veliko bolj kompleksne in dopuščajo avtorjevo vlogo, še vedno ostaja temeljna tendenca, da bi bila ta vloga marginalizirana. Vendar pa se ta teorija izkaže za prekratko takoj, ko si približe ogledamo dejanske tekste, saj jih pišejo avtorji z zelo tradicionalnimi pogledi na svojo vlogo. Najpopularnejši žanr, t.i. pametna internetna literatura, temelji na multimedijskih in interaktivnih stilističnih programih, ki jih uravnava in določa en osrednji avtor. Skupinski projekti so bili uspešni le v primerih, ko je šlo za majhne skupine avtorjev oziroma so bili vnaprej natančno strukturirani s strani enega, osrednjega avtorja. Tudi performativni projekti, ki temeljijo na računalniški kodi in za katere se zdi, da delujejo sami od sebe, predvidevajo močno vlogo koncepta, ki pa je ponovno delo individualnega avtorja.

Poleg tega obstaja še en razlog za trdoživost avtorske funkcije. Ljudje kot biološka bitja namreč vedno iščemo za tekstom njegov izvir oziroma avtorja. Slednjega predstavlja empirični avtor ali avtorska funkcija, ki bi si ju bralec moral izmisliti, če ju v tekstu dejansko ne bi bilo.

A kaj je potem internetna literatura? Izraz internetna literatura bom uporabljal za tekste, ki so tipični za svetovni splet oziroma kot pravi Föllmer, »so strukturirani v skladu z lastnostmi svetovnega spleta« (Föllmer 1). Uporaba svetovnega spleta je v internetni literaturi samonanašalna, saj se ne uporablja le za izdelavo, promocijo in recepcijo literature, ampak vstopa v njeno vsebino in formo, ki ju sooblikuje.

Posebnosti internetnega avtorja - aktualne tendence

Potem ko smo ovrgli tezo o smrti avtorja v internetni dobi, moramo razmisliti o spremembah, ki jih je ta prinesla v njegov koncept. Dejstvo je, da podobno kot v klasični literaturi tudi tu soobstajajo različne oblike av-

torjev, ki jih določa umetniški koncept. Gre za različne modele, pri čemer se eni nagibajo k individualnemu avtorstvu, drugi pa h kolektivnemu, vendar je res, da sta ta ekstrema pri internetni literaturi bolj jasno izražena. Po eni strani je kult avtorja lahko še bolj poudarjen, saj internet omogoča nove oblike samopromocije. Gre za individualne avtorje, katerih spletne strani služijo le lastni predstavitvi in gradnji kulta osebnosti, enako pa velja za številne skupinske projekte, ki močno poudarjajo ljudi za njimi. Vse to bom imenoval močno avtorstvo.

365	<---	825	---->	693
Catholic <--> decamp <--> el eneral <--> it senile <--> th wrath .I. --> .Next, -> .but. --> her's. --> .fo .my. --> .qui k. --> .would. I <--> Still, --> father's <-- -> it <--> la my <--> not <-- evolver <--> s --> to <--> w		a <--> an <--> ude <--> epito <--> of <--> e <--> the <-- . --> .a. --> .convinced. --> r. --> .in. -- te. --> .there <--> a <--> a -> greatest <-- ughing, <--> l -> not <--> n uch <--> the < ith <--> witho		and <--> awf me <--> father of <--> prude > to <--> udg .bath. --> .b .everywhere. > .look. --> ,. --> .they. nd <--> bad <-- -> having <--> evity <--> mig ote <--> pocke --> the <--> ut <--> writte
I <--> Still, -> father's <-- -> it <--> la my <--> not <-- evolver <--> s --> to <--> w .I. --> .Still .be. --> .fath .idea. --> . .might. --> . -> .pocket. -- > .the. --> . thout. --> .wr		<--> a <--> a -> greatest <-- ughing, <--> l -> not <--> n uch <--> the < ith <--> witho ,. --> .a. --> er's. --> .gre it. --> .laugh my. --> .not. > .revolver. - thought. --> . itten.		nd <--> bad <-- -> having <--> evity <--> mig ote <--> pocke --> the <--> ut <--> writte .and. --> .b atest. --> .ha ing,. --> .lev --> .not. --> -> .such. --> to. --> .with.

Po drugi strani je tudi marginalizacija avtorske vloge lahko veliko bolj radikalna, saj z računalniškimi generatorji teksta avtor svojo vlogo minimalizira oziroma celo uprizori svoj lasten konec. To imenujem šibko avtorstvo. Vendar pa šibko avtorstvo ne pomeni izginotje avtorske funkcije, kot smo že omenili, ampak ima za posledico njeno večjo razpršenost.

Na tem mestu se moramo vrniti k Michelu Foucaultu in njegovim modelom avtorske funkcije, ki so že nakazali možnosti ločevanja različnih oblik avtorske funkcije. V internetni literaturi v tem smislu ločujemo avtorja kot izvor teksta, ustvarjalca koncepta in celo založnika (prim. Weimar, Wirth). Svetovni splet in internetna literatura si torej delita predvsem izrazito diverzifikacijo avtorske funkcije. V nadaljevanju bomo obravnavali soobstoj različnih avtorskih funkcij v prej omenjenih žanrih internetne literature.

Tipologija avtorja

Pametna internetna literatura

Klasični žanri internetne literature nadaljujejo eksperimente v smeri nelinearnosti, hipermedijskosti in interaktivnosti, ki so značilni že za njeno modernistično tiskano različico, a pri tem nikakor ne gre za stare vsebine v novi preobleki. Čeprav je tudi v tradicionalni literaturi obstajala možnost nesklenjenega branja, ta na svetovnem spletu postane osnovni dispozitiv, saj je bralčeva intervencija njen osnovni pogoj. Beseda ni več edini nosilec pomena, saj se ji pridružijo elementi drugih medijev, ki so poudarjeno interaktivni. Kljub temu nekatere lastnosti klasične literature ostajajo. Tu imam v mislih močni koncept avtorstva, pri katerem avtorjevo ime garantira in podeljuje tekstu umetniškost, bralcu pa so dovoljene le intervence, ki jih dopušča avtor sam.

Dober primer tovrstne prakse je projekt *The Bubble Bath* Susanne Berkenheger, ki je izrazito usmerjevalen. Teksti, podobe in brskalnik so močno poudarjeni, ključne besede vnašata računalnik in bralec, poleg tega pa močno dominirata tekst in podoba. Bralec ima komajda možnost intervenirati v potek pripovedi, saj le izvaja v naprej sprogramiran potek. Bralčeva svoboda je tu pravzaprav paradoks, saj je koncept avtorja pri Berkenhegerjevi zelo močan. Sama ima popolno kontrolo in bralec je na milost in nemilost prepuščen njej in samemu projektu.

Skupinska internetna literatura

Seveda pa internet omogoča tudi kolektivno avtorstvo. Za te projekte je značilno da ves čas sprevrčajo, prekinjajo oziroma celo črtajo tradicionalno zvezo med avtorjem in bralcem, a ga, kot bomo videli, ne uspejo do konca prekiniti ter pripeljati do smrti avtorja.

Za to trditev obstaja več razlogov. Prvič, večina takih projektov ustvari tradicionalni tekst, ki bi bil lahko objavljen tudi v tiskani obliki, kar je v nasprotju z osnovnim določilom internetne literature. Poleg tega se zdi, da tovrstni projekti močno slonijo na tradicionalnem konceptu avtorstva, kar je v nasprotju z njihovo deklarativno skupinsko naravo. Drugič, skupinski projekti so uspešni in umetniško kvalitetni le v primerih, ko je svoboda recipienta zmanjšana na minimum. Večinoma gre za omejeno število soavtorjev in močan koncept avtorstva, kar je blizu tradicionalni obliki sodelovanja, ko nekaj avtorjev objavi skupno delo. Tak primer je nagrajeni večmedijski projekt *The Famous Sound of Absolute Wreaders*, pod katerega se je podpisalo šest vodilnih nemških internetnih avtorjev. Tretjič, če pobljže pogledamo kolektivne projekte na svetovnem spletu, vidimo, da večinoma spadajo v neumetniški, informativni kontekst. Platforma, kakršna je Wikipedia, je odličen primer številnih wiki in blogovskih projektov. Kolektivni projekti, ki temeljijo na šibkem konceptu avtorstva, so postali od svojega razcveta v devetdesetih letih izredno redki. Najpopularnejša orodja za skupinske projekte, wiki in blogi, se v literaturi komajda uporabljajo – vsaj v nemškem prostoru –, kar je bržkone posledica tega, da so še vedno odločilno vezani na tradicionalni koncept literarne umetnosti, ki predvideva avtorjevo ime in druge temeljne lastnosti besedne umetnosti.

KEIN GAST IST NAH UND JEDER Steckenpferd IST GROSS
 EIN TISCH IST TIEF. KEIN HALLE IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER TURM IST WUETEND, SO GILT NICHT JEDER woc IST WUETEND
 EIN BAUER IST WUETEND ODER JEDER BAUER IST GROSS
 JEDER TAG IST GROSS. JEDER Aufmerksamkeitsdefizitsyndrom IST RADIOLOG
 EIN WEG IST WUETEND, SO GILT NICHT JEDER woc IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER WEG IST GROSS. EIN KNECHT IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER KNECHT IST GUT ODER KEIN JOHANNES IST WUETEND
 KEIN Kredit IST GROSS, SO GILT NICHT JEDER fifa 07 testberichte IST GUT
 JEDER TAG IST GUT, SO GILT NICHT JEDER TAG IST SPAET
 JEDES HAUS IST TIEF. EIN TURM IST FERN
 JEDER Aufmerksamkeitsdefizitsyndrom IST WUETEND. KEIN HAUS IST WUETEND
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 KEIN fifa 07 testberichte IST GROSS. KEIN Steckenpferd IST FERN
 JEDER TISCH IST WUETEND. EIN TURM IST TIEF

WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:28 woc
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:38 Steckenpferd
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:50 wolke10
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:26:22 Aufmerksamk
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:26:32 fifa 07 testber
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:26:43 Kredit
 141.48.173.62 schrieb um 17:19:15 JOHANNES LEISE
 141.48.173.62 schrieb um 17:20:00 HALLE RADIOLOG

stochastische texte 1959 // search lutz 2006 info Livesuche starten

Substantiv Geschlecht w m n Adjektiv (Prädikativ)

Kodna umetnost

Tako smo prišli do t.i. kodne umetnosti, v kateri avtor na videz izgine, kar je značilno za šibki koncept avtorstva. Ta žanr reflektira dejstvo, da je vsa internetna literatura narejena s pomočjo računalniških programov, kar pomeni, da postavlja v središče svojega zanimanja lastno izhodišče.

V kodnih delih se kombinirajo elementi programskih jezikov in spletnih protokolov z naravnimi in umetnimi jeziki. Prevpričujejo pomen same računalniške kode in vlogo računalnika v umetniški produkciji. Raznovrstni računalniški procesi postanejo vidni na zaslonu. *Plaintext.cc*, projekt Floriana Cramerja iz l. 2005, nazorno pokaže, kaj lahko takšna literatura doseže. Njegova spletna instalacija iz obsežnega nabora tekstov generira nova in presenetljiva dela. Spominjajo na konkretno poezijo, a so kodna umetniška dela. Tri povezave na vrhu strani sprožijo nastanek novega teksta, ki je sam po sebi večinoma nerazumljiv in poln namigov. »Jaz še vedno, očetov / *lamy* ne *evolver*¹.« Pomen kreira šele bralec. A kaj pomenijo kodna dela za koncept avtorja? Zdi se, da je ta žanr najbolj obsežen in najmanj razumljiv od vseh, ki smo jih do sedaj obravnavali. Programer sestavi le algoritem, ki poganja celotno instalacijo. Računalnik bruha besede na ekran. Cilj umetnosti ni več končni produkt, ampak to postane koda oziroma koncept, ki je zadaj. Avtor torej ni edini ustvarjalec, saj pomembno vlogo prevzame računalniška koda in uporabnik, a kljub temu se zdi, da je programerjevo strukturiranje programa izrednega pomena, še posebej če pomislimo na vlogo koncepta pri tovrstnih tekstih.

Kodna dela torej predstavljajo šibek koncept avtorstva, a omogočajo tudi oblike z močnim konceptom. T.i. zlomljene kode uporabljajo le dele programa in operirajo s številnimi jeziki, a so še vedno strogo nadzorovane s strani avtorja. Dober primer so dela **mez** (Mary-Anne Breeze), ki ima popoln nadzor nad svojimi projekti, čeprav se zdi, da nastajajo sami od sebe.

Performativni projekti

Razpršenost avtorskih funkcij je lahko tako močna, da se avtorstvo praktično izgubi. To se zgodi v četrtem žanru internetne književnosti, ki združuje koncept literature na svetovnem spletu in performativno umetnost. Naslanja se na že obravnavane elemente internetne literature, ki pa jih radikalizira. Poudariti je treba, da tu močni koncept avtorstva ni več mogoč, kar dokazuje projekt *Search Luz* Johanna Auerja.


Prvič je bil predstavljen na radijskem festivalu v nemškem Halleju l. 2006 in je posebej zanimiv zaradi virtuozne uporabe avtorskih funkcij.

¹neprevedljivi besedi (op.p.)

Auer je kot iniciator in programer ustvaril le okvir za generiranje tekstov, sam tekst pa je posledica kompleksne interakcije večih avtorjev, ki so ustvarili skupno delo kljub izredno omejeni medsebojni komunikaciji.

Osnovni algoritem se naslanja ne eno temeljnih del računalniško tvorjene literature, *Stochastische Texte* Thea Lutza (1959), ki je prvi uporabil citate iz Kafkovih tekstov kot izhodiščni tekst. Nato dovoli poljubnemu številu obiskovalcev, da dodajajo svoje besede v poseben spletni formular, jemlje dodatne naključne besede s svetovnega spleta in na koncu iz vsega tega materiala tvori stokastične tekste. Pomen teh tekstov, boljše kodov, je imel posebno težo, saj se je zdelo, da jih ustvarja računalnik sam.

Integracija v performans, ki je novost tega žanra, se je pri projektu *Search Lutz* izvršila s pomočjo živega performerja, ki je bral generirana besedila. Prav tako so bili v situacijo potegnjeni poslušalci. Recitacija je bila namreč predvajana na valovih radijske postaje in poslušalci so imeli možnost prispevati lastni material preko interneta. Performans je trajal le 30 minut in se je s tem zaključil, čeprav je bil v svoji končni obliki ponovno uprizorjen. Avtorstvo je bilo pri tem veliko širše kot pri do sedaj obravnavanih primerih. Avtorsko funkcijo so zavzemali povsem različni ljudje, a kljub temu je bil zadaj programer z zanimivim konceptom, ki je od začetka predvidel to množico različnih avtorjev in jo osmislil.



Zaključek

Naš zadnji primer kaže, da so na svetovnem spletu možne številne oblike cepljenja avtorske funkcije, med katerimi so nekatere še posebej radikalne, obenem pa postaja jasno, da avtorska funkcija ostaja ne glede na stopnjo njene razcepljenosti in razpršenost. Ta maksimalna razpršenost avtorstva pravzaprav potrjuje našo izhodiščno tezo, da sta avtor in njegova funkcija preživela ne glede na stopnjo njune razpršenosti, ki se znova in znova pojavlja kot ena temeljnih lastnosti interneta.

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Pesništvo kot *mimēsis* v Aristotelovi *Poetiki*

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V uvodnem poglavju Poetike Aristotel zagovarja tezo, da bistvena značilnost pesništva ni verz, pač pa mimēsis. Članek ima namen pokazati, da ta izhodiščna teza Aristotelove teorije pesništva ni nedvoumna, pa tudi ne neproblematična.

Ključne besede: antična estetika / poetika / mimesis / Aristoteles / Platon

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Uvod

Aristotel začne razpravo o pesništvu s polemiko o vprašanju, kaj je bistvena značilnost pesništva; nasprotuje namreč očitno razširjenemu pogledu, ki pesništvo enači z govorom v verzih in tako šteje med pesnike tudi tiste, ki skladajo dela v verzih o medicini ali o naravi, npr. Empedokla. Nasprotno Aristotel trdi, da razen verza nimata Empedokles in Homer nič skupnega, in da bi morali Empedokla imeti za naravoslovca, ne pa za pesnika (*Po.* 1, 1447b17–20). Pozneje v *Poetiki* bo Aristotel podobno zavrnil verz kot element, po katerem se pesnik loči od zgodovinarja: v 9. poglavju pravi, da če bi bila Herodotova dela prenesena v verzno obliko, bi bila ravno tako zgodovina – ne pa, kot je očitno implicirano, pesništvo (*Po.* 9, 1451b2–4). Kot je znano, Aristotel trdi, da je bistvena značilnost pesništva *mimēsis* in ne verz. Grška beseda *mimēsis* je v slovenščino običajno prevedena kot »posnemanje« ali »predstavljanje«, vendar jo bom tukaj pustila v grški obliki in se tako izognila vnaprejšnji določitvi njenega pomena. Eno od vprašanj, ki jih bom obravnavala, je namreč prav to, kako je *mimēsis* razumel Aristotel in kako avtorji pred njim. Skozi razpravo bo postalo razvidno tudi, v čem se pojem *mimēsis* razlikuje od našega pojma predstavljanja.

V uvodnem poglavju *Poetike* Aristotel označi vse zvrsti pesništva kot, v celoti vzeto, *mimēsei*¹. Od teh zvrsti Aristotel omeni epiko, tragedijo, komedijo, ditiramb in glasbo za *aulos* in *kebitaro* (*Po.* 1, 1447a13–16).¹ Pomembno je, da za Aristotela *mimētici* značaj pesništva ni le lastnost, ki je skupna

vsem zvrstem pesništva, glasbenim in neglasbenim, pač pa tudi lastnost, ki pesniški govor (tj. pesniška neglasbena dela) loči od medicinskega ali naravoslovnega govora. Aristotel namreč pravi, da bi morali nekoga (ki sklada govore) klicati pesnik »zaradi *mimēsis*«, ne pa »zaradi verza«, in dalje trdi, da bi morali nekoga, ki sklada govore, klicati pesnik ne glede na metrično obliko skladanja: v skladu s tem merilom Aristotel Empedoklovih del ne uvrsti med pesniška, medtem ko dozdevno prišteva k pesniškim delom celo *sokratske pogovore*, se pravi prozna dela (*Po.* 1, 1447a28–b20; 9, 1451b27–29).²

Vendar pa Aristotel ne v *Poetiki* ne v nobenem drugem delu ne razloži, kako razume *mimēsis*, pa tudi ne, v kakšnem smislu razume pesništvo kot *mimēsis*. Kljub temu Aristotelovo označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis* ni bilo pogosto prevprašano. Pogosta predpostavka je namreč, da Aristotelov pojem *mimēsis* približno ustreza našemu pojmu literarnega predstavljanja, t. j. predstavljanja oseb, njihovih dejanj, dogodkov itd. v literarnih delih. Pogosta predpostavka je tudi, da so pesniško *mimēsis* razumeli v tem smislu že avtorji pred Platonom ali pa vsaj Platon, predvsem v 10. knjigi *Države*, kjer je pesništvo nasploh označeno kot *mimēsis*.³

Nasprotno pa je moje mnenje, da je tako razumevanje pesniške *mimēsis* tuje Platonu. Tu ni mogoče podrobno obravnavati Platonove zapletene označitve pesništva kot *mimēsis* v 10. knjigi *Države*. Kot pa sem zagovarjala drugje, tam pojem pesniške *mimēsis* nikakor ne ustreza našemu pojmu predstavljanja oseb, dogodkov, itd. v literarnih delih, pač pa se pesniško *mimēsis* razume precej drugače: kot varljivo *mimēsis* oseb, ki imajo znanje o stvareh, o katerih pesniki govore.⁴ Označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis* te vrste torej že samo po sebi pesnike diskreditira. Vendar se bom tu osredotočila na Aristotelovo označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis*. Kot bomo videli, je pri tem Aristotel pod vplivom zgodnejše tradicije, predvsem Platonove razprave o glasbenem in dramatskem pesništvu; vseeno pa po mojem mnenju označevanje v tej splošni obliki (»vse zvrsti pesništva so, v celoti vzeto, *mimēseis*«) prvič najdemo v Aristotelovi *Poetiki*. Moj namen je pokazati, da to označevanje ni nedvoumno pa tudi ne neproblematično. Kot bom dokazovala, Aristotel pri tem označevanju uporablja izraz *mimēsis* za dve precej različni pesniški dejavnosti, ki ju bom tu imenovala 'figurativno predstavljanje' (značilno za glasbeno in dramsko pesništvo) in 'ne-figurativno predstavljanje' (ki ga pogosto najdemo v epiki). Poleg tega pa bom poskušala pokazati, da s tem, ko Aristotel označuje pesniško ne-figurativno predstavljanje kot *mimēsis*, njegova teza, da se pesniški govor loči od drugih vrst govora po *mimēsis*, ne drži več. Nazadnje bom pokazala na še nekatere druge odlomke v *Poetiki*, ki kažejo na Aristotelovo ohlapno razumevanje tega, iz česa sestoji pesniška *mimēsis*.

Preden se obrnem k *Poetiki*, pa je potrebno pojasniti, kako so *mimēsis* razumeli avtorji pred Aristotelom, in dalje, v kakšnem smislu je pesništvo kot *mimēsis* razumel Platon in s tem vplival na Aristotela.

***Mimēsis* pri avtorjih pred Aristotelom**

Raba glagola *mimēisthai* in sorodnih izrazov je relativno dobro dokumentirana od 6. stoletja pr. n. š. Tu ni mogoče obravnavati zgodovine teh izrazov, iz besedne rabe teh izrazov pa lahko *mimēsis* opredelimo takole: »delati ali proizvajati nekaj, kar je namerno podobno nečemu drugemu v tem ali onem pogledu«; oziroma krajše, »delati ali proizvajati nekaj s posnemanjem nečesa drugega v tem ali onem pogledu«. ⁵ Najprej pa je treba opozoriti na dve vrsti *mimēsis* v ontološkem smislu: figurativni in ne-figurativno *mimēsis*. ⁶ Razliko med njima ponazarjata naslednja dva primera. Primer ne-figurativne *mimēsis* najdemo v Evripidovi *Elektri*: Klitemnestra opravičuje svojo nezvestobo Agamemnonu z besedami, da »ko mož greši in zavrže svojo ženo doma, je ženska nagnjena k temu, da *mimēisthai* moškega in si dobi novega ljubimca« (*Elektra* 1036–38). Iz konteksta je razvidno, da žena tudi sama vara moža, enako kot mož, ki ga posnema. Izvajana dejavnost (ženina) je v tem primeru *bistveno* podobna posnemani dejavnosti (moževa), t. j. prva je podobna drugi v tistem vidiku, zaradi katerega tako ena kot druga štejeta za primer neke dejavnosti (varanje).

Primer drugačne vrste *mimēsis* pa najdemo v Platonovi *Državi*: sogo-vorniki snujejo model pravične države in se ob tem vprašajo tudi, kakšna pesniška dela bodo primerna za šolanje bodočih čuvajev ⁷ te države, npr. ali tudi taka, ki vključujejo *mimēsis* različnih obrtnikov in rokovnjačev, med njimi veslačev (*Država* III, 396b). Iz konteksta je spet razvidno, da s posnemanjem veslačev ti učenci ne bodo zares veslali (to je, na barki in v vodi), pač pa bodo npr. izvajali gibe, podobne veslaškimi, in to počeli na suhem. Ključno pri tem pa je, da dejavnost učencev tvori *figuro* veslanja, tj. označuje veslanje oziroma se nanaša nanj. Dejavnost učencev pa ima ta figurativni značaj prav zaradi tega, ker je podobna veslanju v nekem določenem *nebistvenem* vidiku, npr. v načinu gibanja. To dejavnost lahko tako označimo kot figurativno *mimēsis*, v nasprotju s prejšnjim primerom ženinega varanja, ki tvori ne-figurativno *mimēsis*.

Kot že omenjeno, *mimēsis* lahko sestoji tudi v proizvajanju, t. j. v dejavnosti, ki ima nek materialni proizvod. Take dejavnosti so slikanje, kiparstvo, lahko pa tudi vezenje; vse te tvorijo *mimēsis* figurativne vrste. Poglejmo primer slikanja kavča iz Platonove *Države*: tu je proizvod slikarjeve dejavnosti, t. j. slika, podoben nečemu drugemu, se pravi kavču,

vizualno (se pravi v nekem nebitnem vidiku): prav zaradi te vizualne podobnosti slika tvori figuro kavča. Razlika med dejavnostjo učencev in dejavnostjo slikarja, ki obe nastopata kot *mimēseis*, pa je v tem, da prva dejavnost sama po sebi tvori figuro veslanja, medtem ko je le proizvod slikarjeve dejavnosti tisti, ki tvori podobo kavča (nasprotno pa slikarjeva dejavnost ne tvori figure mizarjeve dejavnosti ne katerekoli druge).

Še eno vprašanje v zvezi s figurami, ki jih tvori *mimēsis*, pa je, katere predmete natanko označujejo. Npr. katero veslanje označuje figura veslanja v gornjem primeru, in na kateri kavč se nanaša figura kavča? Očitno je, da figura veslanja ne označuje nujno nekega določenega preteklega veslanja, in prav tako, da figura kavča ne označuje nujno nekega določenega, že izdelanega kavča. Seveda je mogoče, da figura označuje neko obstoječo stvar ali osebo ali celo določen pretekli dogodek. Npr. slika lahko tvori figuro Sokrata in se torej nanaša na neko osebo, ki je resnično obstajala; ta figura lahko celo označuje Sokrata, tik preden spi je trobeliko (kot na Davidovi sliki *Sokratova smrt*), in torej nek dogodek, ki se je v resnici zgodil. Na enak način lahko igralec tvori figuro, ki označuje Sokrata v nekem določenem trenutku iz njegovega življenja (npr. skozi vlogo Sokrata v Platonovi *Apologiji*). Vendar je prav tako mogoče, da figura ne označuje nič obstoječega oziroma dogodenega. Od tu izhajajo zapletena vprašanja o tem, kakšen je ontološki status predmetov, ki jih figure označujejo, in kakšen je odnos med figurami in temi predmeti. Vendar se ta vprašanja bistveno ne dotikajo problematike, ki jo obravnavam tu, zato jih puščam ob strani.⁸

Pesniška *mimēsis* v Platonovih dialogih

Aristotelova obravnava pesništva vsebuje precej elementov, ki jih najdemo tudi v Platonovi obravnavi pesništva kot *mimēsis*, vendar se tudi pomembno razlikuje od slednje. Splošno znano je, da je ta Platonova obravnava precej zapletena; tu jo bom le na kratko predstavila.

Platon govori o pesniški *mimēsis* v več razpravah. Kot sem poskušala dokazati drugje, Platon v teh razpravah pojmuje kot *mimēseis* tri različne dejavnosti pesnikov in ne ene same, pri čemer so te *mimēseis* spet različnih vrst; pri tem Platon uporablja izraz *mimēsis* v gornjem pomenu, tj. »delati ali proizvajati nekaj, kar je namerno podobno nečemu drugemu v tem ali onem pogledu.«⁹ Kot bomo videli pozneje, izraz *mimēsis* pri Aristotelu nima vedno tega pomena.

V 3. knjigi Platonove *Države* in v 2. in 7. knjigi njegovih *Zakonov* najdemo teorijo, ki razume glasbeno pesništvo kot *mimēsis* človeških značajev in

različnih vedenj; v *Državi* sogovorniki povezujejo teorijo z muzikologom Damonom,¹¹ medtem ko je v *Zakonih* predstavljena kot splošno znana in sprejeta.¹¹ Aristotel se naslanja na to glasbeno teorijo tako v *Poetiki* kot v *Politiki* (VIII 7, 1342a33–34), v slednji se izrecno nanaša na *Državo*.

Ta, zelo verjetno pred-platonska teorija se lahko zdi precej tuja našemu dojetanju glasbe. V skladu z njo izvajanje nekega glasbenega dela (ki lahko vključuje petje, igranje na glasbila, ples) tvori npr. *mimēsis* tožbe (*Rep.* III 398e2), hrabrega boja ali vzdržnega vedenja (*Rep.* III 399a5–8).¹² Natančneje, glasbena skladba tvori takšno *mimēsis* skozi harmonijo in ritem, dva elementa glasbenega skladanja (poleg *logos*, neglasbenega elementa), ki po tej teoriji tvorita *mimēsis* različnih človeških značajev in vedenja.¹³

Čeprav si lahko le predstavljamo, kako je ta glasba zvenela, pa je mogoče kljub temu sklepati, v kakšnem smislu jo teorija pojmuje kot *mimēsis*. Iz razprave je razvidno, da harmonije in ritmi tvorijo *mimēsis* določenih dejavnosti in vedenja skozi njihovo zvočno *podobnost* s temi dejavnostmi in značaji. Npr. melodija zveni *podobno* kot ženska tožba (*Rep.* III 398e2); ritem zveni *podobno* kot korakanje vojakov. Dalje, zaradi te zvočne ali tudi kinetične (ples) podobnosti, skladanje in izvajanje nekega glasbenega dela tvori figuro ženske tožbe ali pa figuro vojaškega korakanja (in seveda ni še en primer takšne dejavnosti). Označevanje glasbenega skladanja kot *mimēsis* tako ustreza gornjemu pomenu *izraza* *mimēsis*; glasbeno skladanje namreč lahko opišemo kot dejavnost, ki je namerno podobna neki drugi dejavnosti oziroma vedenju, pri tem pa je ta podobnost seveda figurativna.

Še ena pesniška dejavnost, ki jo Platon označi kot *mimēsis*, je poosebljanje oseb, o katerih pesniki govore. 3. knjiga *Države* to poosebljanje ponazoriti s primerom iz Homerjeve *Iliade*: ko Homer govori »kot da bi bil« (*Rep.* III 393a8 in c1), t. j. pooseblja Hriza, ko prosi Ahajce, naj izpustijo njegovo hčer (*Il.* I 17–21), pesnik izvaja *mimēsis* Hriza.¹⁴ Ko pa Homer pripoveduje o Hrizu kot on sam, t. j. kot Homer, kot stori ravno pred tem, ne izvaja *mimēsis* Hriza; njegovo pripovedovanje je »preprosto«, t. j. »brez *mimēsis*«.

Označevanje pesniškega poosebljanja kot *mimēsis* je predstavljeno kot novost;¹⁵ obrazloženo pa je takole: ko Homer govori, kot da bi bil Hriz, 'naredi sebe podobnega nekemu drugemu'; »narediti se podobnega nekemu po glasu ali po gibu pa je *mimēsis* [te] osebe« (*Rep.* III 393c5–6).¹⁶ Iz te razlage lahko zaključimo, da je označevanje pesniškega poosebljanja kot *mimēsis* v skladu z gornjim pomenom tega izraza: namreč, ko se Homer »naredi po glasu in gibu podobnega« Hrizu, lahko njegovo početje opišemo tudi kot dejavnost (pripovedovanje), ki je namerno podobno neki drugi dejavnosti, tj. Hrizovemu govoru. Pri tem je podobnost Homerjeve dejavnosti s Hrizovo seveda figurativna: zaradi te podobnosti Homerjev govor tvori *figuro* Hrizovega govora, Homer sam pa *figuro* Hriza.

Dodamo lahko, da so v 3. knjigi *Države* nato različne pesniške zvrsti opredeljene glede na način pripovedovanja »skozi *mimēsis*« oziroma »brez« *mimēsis*. Tragedija in komedija v celoti tvorita pripoved skozi *mimēsis*; diti-ramb je v celoti brez *mimēsis*; epika je sestavljena iz obeh vrst pripovedovanja (*Rep.* III 394b8–c5). V primeru tragedije in komedije tako pesniško pripovedovanje tvori izmenoma figurativno *mimēsis* govora ali dejanja ene ali druge osebe oziroma več oseb (npr. zbor). Kot bomo videli kasneje, bo Aristotel v *Poetiki* uvedel razliko med pripovedovanjem 'skozi' in 'brez' *mimēsis* v nekoliko spremenjeni obliki.

Poleg teh dveh dejavnosti, ki ju Platon označi kot *mimēseis*, je tu še tretja. V prvem, 'epistemološkem' delu razprave v 10. knjigi *Države* je pesništvo na splošno označeno kot *mimēsis*. Pogosta interpretacija, s katero pa se ne strinjam (kot omenjeno zgoraj) je, da ta *mimēsis* označuje pesniško predstavljanje oseb, njihovih dejanj in ostalega, o čemer govore pesniki.

Pri interpretaciji, ki jo zagovarjam, je pomembno upoštevati nekatere predpostavke opredelitve pesništva kot *mimēsis* v tej Platonovi razpravi. Najprej, pesništvo se v njej obravnava kot govor o stvareh, ki spadajo v to ali ono stroko ali večino, npr. v medicino, vojskovanje, mizarstvo, usnjarstvo; npr. Homer govori o medicini, ko v *Iliadi* pripoveduje, kako je Hekameda pripravila *kykeon* za ranjenega Mahaona.¹⁷ Nadalje, predpostavlja se, da pesniki ne morejo imeti, in da torej nimajo, tako širokega strokovnega znanja, zato pa tudi ne znanja o stvareh, o katerih govore. Nadalje, Sokrat opozori, da se kljub temu mnogim zdi, da pesniki »dobro govore« o teh stvareh in zato tudi, da se pesniki spoznajo nanje. Šele po tem, ko so pesniki predstavljeni na ta način, so označeni kot *mimētai* in njihova dejavnost kot *mimēsis*.

Mimēsis, ki je pripisana pesnikom, se tako izkaže za varljivo *mimēsis* oseb, ki imajo znanje o stvareh, o katerih govore pesniki. Npr., ko Homer govori o stvareh, ki spadajo v medicino, in poleg tega ustvarja napačen vtis, da »dobro govori« o teh stvareh, s tem »naredi sebe podobnega« nekemu, ki se spozna na medicino. Ta podobnost pa je taka, da se zaradi nje mnogim zdi, da se Homer v resnici spozna na to stroko, ne pa, da je samo *podoben* poznavalcu medicine. Tako Homer tvori varljivo figuro poznavalca medicine; nasprotno pa, ko se Homer »naredi podobnega« Hrizu, ga poslušalci nimajo za resničnega Hriza in figura Hriza, ki jo Homer tvori, ni varljiva.

Po tej interpretaciji je Platonovo označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis* v 10. knjigi *Države* spet v skladu z gornjim pomenom izraza *mimēsis*. Kajti ko pesniki pripovedujejo o stvareh, ki spadajo k eni ali drugi stroki ali večini, govore *podobno* kot tisti, ki imajo znanje o teh stvareh; ta podobnost pa je taka, da se zaradi nje napačno zdi, da se pesniki v resnici spoznajo na stvari, o katerih govore. Njihovo pripovedovanje tako tvori varljivo figuro

govora, ki temelji na znanju. Nadalje, po tej interpretaciji *mimēsis*, ki je v 10. knjigi *Države* pripisana pesnikom, nima nič z omenjenim literarnim predstavljanjem oseb, njihovih dejanj itd., kot se ga ponavadi razume. Zdi se tudi, da ta *mimēsis* nima vzporednice v Aristotelovi *Poetiki*; kajti celo preden ugotovimo, kako natanko Aristotel razume pesniško *mimēsis*, je očitno, da je njegovo označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis neutralno* (in ne diskreditira, kot Platonovo) in da tudi ne temelji na kakršnikoli predpostavki o znanju pesnikov o stvareh, o katerih govore.

Zgoraj sem poskušala pokazati, da avtorji pred Aristotelom, vključno s Platonom, z izrazom *mimēsis* in sorodnimi izrazi označujejo dejavnost, ki je namerno podobna, t. j. posnema, neko drugo dejavnost v enem ali drugem pogledu; zaradi te podobnosti je dejavnost bodisi še en primer dejavnosti te vrste (se pravi, da ji je bistveno podobna) bodisi tvori figuro posnemane dejavnosti. Nato sem razločila tri dejavnosti pesnikov, ki jih Platon označi kot *mimēseis* in razločila, na kakšen način je vsaka od njih *mimēsis* v gornjem pomenu. Vse tri dejavnosti so figurativne: glasbeno skladanje in (pripovedno) poosebljanje tvorita ne-varljive figure (prvo figure značajev ali vedenja, drugo pa figure govora ali dejanja oseb), medtem ko pesniški 'govor o različnih strokah oziroma veččinah' tvori varljive figure poznavalskega govora. Zdaj pa si pogledjmo Aristotelovo pojmovanje *mimēsis* in njegovo označevanje pesništva kot *mimēsis*.

***Mimēsis* v Aristotelovih delih**

Aristotel v večini primerov uporablja samostalnik *mimēsis* in sorodne izraze enako kot avtorji pred njim; t. j. tem izrazom lahko v večini primerov pripišemo gornji pomen (»delati ali proizvajati nekaj, kar je namerno podobno nečemu drugemu v enem ali drugem pogledu«). Pogledjmo primer iz *Nikomahove etike*. Aristotel trdi, da bi morali *mimēsthai* plemenitega človeka v vseh stvareh in tako tudi v tem, da ne pusti prijateljem, da bi sočustvovali z njim (*EN IX 11, 1171b12*). Iz konteksta je razvidno, da Aristotel tu govori o *z gledovanju* po plemenitem človeku, t. j. o ravnanju, ki je bistveno *podobno* posnemanemu ravnanju, tako da je samo primer takšnega ravnanja (in ne tvori figure takšnega ravnanja). V tem primeru je torej Aristotelova raba izraza *mimēsis* v skladu z gornjim pomenom izraza. Enako velja za primere, kjer Aristotel govori o dejavnosti slikanja kot o *mimēsis* (npr. *Po. 1,1447a18–19* in *4, 1448b17–19*); kajti, kot smo videli zgoraj, je slikanje kot tako vrsta proizvodjanja, katerega proizvod, t. j. slika, je podobno nečemu drugemu v vizualnem pogledu in zaradi te podobnosti tvori figuro le tega.

Prav pri Aristotelovem označevanju pesništva kot *mimēsis* pa pomen tega izraza postane nejasen. Natančneje, epike, ki jo Aristotel tako kot vse druge zvrsti pesništva označi kot *mimēsis*, ni mogoče opisati kot dejavnosti, ki je namerno podobna neki drugi dejavnosti v enem ali drugem pogledu. Ko torej Aristotel označi kot *mimēsis* epiko, očitno uporablja ta izraz v drugem pomenu. Poglejmo torej поблиžje, kako Aristotel razume epiko.

Ne-figurativno predstavljanje kot *mimēsis*

V *Poetiki* Aristotel označi epsko pesništvo kot *mimēsis* »skozi pripovedovanje«, ki ga postavi nasproti tragediji in komediji, ki ju, nasprotno, označi kot *mimēseis* skozi dejanje (vse te zvrsti pa opredeli kot *mimēseis* skozi govor). Tako se za Aristotela Homer in Sofokles ločita po tem, kako izvajata *mimēsis*, podobna pa sta si v tem, da oba izvajata *mimēsis* »plemenitih oseb« in njihovih dejanj (v nasprotju s pesniki komedij, ki izvajajo *mimēsis* »nižjih« oseb; *Po.* 3, 1448a25–27). Pri pripovednem načinu, ki je značilen za epiko, Aristotel nato razlikuje še med pripovedovanjem, ko pesnik »postane nekdo drug«, t. j. pooseblja, in ko pripoveduje kot »on sam« (*Po.* 3, 1448a21–23).

Aristotel se tu očitno naslanja na Platonovo razlikovanje med dvema načinoma pripovedovanja v 3. knjige *Države*, t. j. skozi poosebljanje in brez njega, vendar ju hkrati opredeli drugače: pri Platonu Homerjevo pripovedovanje o Hrizu in njegovih dejanjih šteje kot *mimēsis* Hriza le takrat, ko ga Homer pooseblja; nasprotno pa pri Aristotelu Homerjevo pripovedovanje šteje kot *mimēsis* Hriza ne glede na to, ali Homer pri tem 'postane' Hriz ali pa govori kot on sam.

Zdi se torej, da Aristotel pojmuje pesniško pripovedovanje o tem ali onem samo po sebi kot *mimēsis* le tega. To potrjuje tudi pomemben odlomek iz *Nikomahove etike*. V odlomku Aristotel govori o pojmu izbire in pri tem omeni »stare državne ureditve, ki jih Homer *emimeito*« (t. j. izvaja *mimēsis* le teh). Jasno je, da se Aristotel z »*mimēsis*-om starih državnih ureditev« nanaša na Homerjevo *pripovedovanje* o teh državah. To pa pomeni, da izraz *mimēsis* tu ne more imeti gornjega pomena. Če namreč opišemo Homerjevo pripovedovanje o »starih državnih ureditvah« kot govor, pri katerem Homer izvaja nekaj, kar je namerno podobno starim državnim ureditvam (in posledično, kar tvori figuro teh ureditev), je naš opis preprosto nesmiseln. Aristotel tu *mimēsis* očitno ne razume kot dejavnost, ki bi vključevala namerno podobnost in ustvarjanje podobnega. A kako potemtakem Aristotel razume *mimēsis*, ko označi epsko pesništvo v celoti s tem izrazom?

Sklepamo lahko takole. Ko Homer v prvi osebi pripoveduje o Hrizu in njegovih dejanjih, ima njegovo pripovedovanje nekaj skupnega z nje-

govim poosebljanjem Hriza. Pri prvoosebno pripovedovanju o Hrizu Homerjeva pripoved *označuje* Hrizova dejanja, jih dela (miselno) prisotna, ali še drugače rečeno: Homer Hrizova dejanja *predstavlja* skozi govor. Kljub temu, da Homer tega ne doseže z ustvarjanjem podobnosti in torej s figuro Hriza, Homer predstavlja Hriza in njegova dejanja preprosto s pripovedovanjem o Hrizu.

Če je za Aristotela pesniško pripovedovanje *mimēsis* prav zaradi tega, ker »dela nekaj prisotno« skozi govor, potem njegovo pojmovanje pesniškega *mimēsis*-a očitno ustreza našemu pojmu predstavljanja¹⁸ skozi govor. Homerjevo prvoosebno pripovedovanje o Hrizu namreč lahko opišemo kot 'predstavljanje Hriza' in ga kot takega vzporejamo npr. z igralčevim poosebljanjem Hriza in s sliko Hriza. Ti trije primeri nam štejejo za tri vrste predstavljanja Hriza: pripovedno, dramsko in slikarsko predstavljanje. Razlog, da jih imamo za vrste predstavljanja Hriza, pa je očitno ta, da vsako od njih *označuje* Hriza; vendar pri tem samo zadnji dve to dosežeta s tem, da tvorita figuro Hriza.

Ta dva načina predstavljanja lahko poimenujemo 'ne-figurativni' in 'figurativni' način. 'Figurativno predstavljanje' ustreza temu, kar sem zgoraj opredelila kot figurativno ne-varljivo *mimēsis*, t. j. dejavnost oziroma proizvod le te, ki tvori nevarljivo figuro nečesa zaradi podobnosti z le tem. Glasbeno skladanje in poosebljanje tako lahko označimo kot figurativno predstavljanje. Nasprotno pa pesniško prvoosebno pripovedovanje tvori ne-figurativno predstavljanje. Kot smo videli zgoraj, Platon označi pesniško figurativno predstavljanje kot *mimēsis*, vendar ne tudi pesniškega ne-figurativnega predstavljanja. Aristotel pa označi tudi pesniško ne-figurativno predstavljanje kot *mimēsis*.¹⁹

Omeniti velja, da primerov, kjer se izraz *mimēsis* (oziroma sorodni izraz) nanaša na pesniško ne-figurativno predstavljanje, ne najdemo samo pri Aristotelu, pač pa tudi pri nekaterih drugih sodobnih ali kasnejših avtorjih, čeprav so ti primeri izjemno redki. Tak primer najdemo v govoru atenskega govornika Likurga (396–323 BC) *Proti Leokratu*: v njem Likurg primerja »zakone« in pesnike, in trdi, da »s svojo jednatostjo, zakoni ne učijo, temveč ukazujejo, kaj storiti, medtem ko pesniki, ko *mimoumenoi* človeško življenje, prepričajo ljudi z argumenti in nazornostjo« (*Leoc.* 102, 6 – 103, 1). Pred tem je Likurg govoril o Evripidu in Homerju, tu omenja pesnike nasploh: 'pesniška *mimēsis* človeškega življenja' se tako očitno nanaša na pesniški govor o človeškem življenju, ne glede na to, ali tvori figurativno predstavljanje le tega ali ne; tako npr. Evripidovo pesništvo v celoti sestoji iz figurativnega predstavljanja, Homerjevo pesništvo pa vsebuje tudi ne-figurativno predstavljanje.

Figurativno predstavljanje kot *mimēsis*

Zdaj pa si pogledjmo še druge zvrsti pesništva poleg epike, ki jih Aristotel v 1. poglavju *Poetike* označi kot *mimēseis*. To so tragedija, komedija, ditiramb in »v večjem delu skladanje glasbe za aulos in kitharo« (Po. 1, 1447a13–16). Kot rečeno zgoraj, vsaka od teh zvrsti tvori figurativno predstavljanje, bodisi skozi glasbene elemente bodisi skozi poosebljanje.

Ugotovimo lahko, da ko Aristotel v *Poetiki* označi te zvrsti pesništva kot *mimēseis*, se nanaša na iste figurativne elemente teh zvrsti kot že Platon. Npr. v kratki in edini obravnavi skladanja glasbe za *aulos* in *kitharo* (in drugih glasbil) v 1. poglavju, Aristotel to zvrst opredeli kot pesništvo, ki izvaja *mimēsis* z uporabo harmonije in ritma, ne pa govora (*logos*). Ob tem navede, da tako glasba kot ples tvorita »*mimēsis* značajev, čustev in dejanj« (Po. 1, 1447a27–28). Tako kot Platon torej tudi Aristotel pojmuje glasbeno pesništvo kot *mimēsis* prav zaradi tega, ker to tvori figure značajev, čustev in dejanj skozi akustično in kinetično podobnost z njimi (kot prej omenjeno, je to razumevanje glasbe širše predstavljeno v 8. knjigi *Politike*).

Tragedija in komedija sta v 2. poglavju *Poetike* opredeljeni kot *mimēseis*, ki v različnih delih uporabljata tako govorne kot glasbene elemente, vendar Aristotela zanimata predvsem kot govorni deli. In spet enako kot Platon v 3. knjigi *Države* (gl. zgoraj), Aristotel šteje tragedijo in komedijo za *mimēseis*, ker tvorita poosebljanje oseb, o katerih pesniki govore, in ker torej figurativno predstavljata te osebe.

Sklepamo lahko, da Aristotel pojmuje druge zvrsti pesništva, ki so v *Poetiki* le mimogrede omenjene, npr. skladanje ditirambov ali nomov (obe zborovski zvrsti), kot *mimēseis* iz enakih razlogov, t. j. bodisi zato, ker tvorijo figurativno predstavljanje skozi harmonijo in ritem ali tudi skozi poosebljanje, bodisi zato, ker tvorijo ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor.

Dodati velja, da nekaj pomembnih sestavkov v *Poetiki*, ki naj bi se navezovali na pesništvo v celoti, dejansko lahko navežemo *le* na pesniško *figurativno* predstavljanje, medtem ko se za ne-figurativno predstavljanje sploh ne zdijo relevantni. Tako npr. v 1. poglavju Aristotel opredeli pesništvo kot *mimēsis* »skozi ritem, govor in harmonijo«, in ju ob tem vzporeja z dvema drugima dejavnostma: s slikarstvom in vokalno mimikrijo (*mimēseis* »preko ustvarjanja podob z barvami in oblikami« in pa »z glasom«). Ti dve dejavnosti obe tvorita *figurativno* predstavljanje, slikarsko in vokalno (Po. 1, 1447a18–23). Dalje, v 4. poglavju Aristotel navede dva vzroka pesništva. Prvi vzrok je prirojenost *mimēsis*; kot pravi, se otroci naučijo prvih stvari skozi *mimēsis*. Drugi vzrok pa je ugodje, ki ga *mimēmata* vzbujajo pri vseh; pri tem Aristotel omeni ugodje, ki ga zbuja naslikana figura. Oba ta vzroka se očitno *ne* navezujeta na ne-figurativno predstavljanje.

***Mimēsis* kot posebnost pesniškega govora?**

Če tako sprejmemo, da Aristotel razume pesniško *mimēsis* v razširjenem pomenu, ki vključuje tako figurativno kot ne-figurativno predstavljanje, pa v Aristotelovem razumevanju pesništva nastopi problem: ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor namreč ni značilno le za pesništvo; pravzaprav katerokoli pripovedovanje in govor s tem, ko označuje to ali ono, tvori ne-figurativno predstavljanje le tega. Če pa je tako, se zdi Aristotelovo vztrajanje v uvodni polemiki, da je *mimēsis* in ne verz tisto, po čemer se pesništvo bistveno razlikuje od drugih vrst govora (npr. medicinskega ali naravoslovnega), neutemeljeno. Če *mimēsis* vključuje tudi ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor, potem se zdi, da bi morali za *mimēsis* šteti tudi Empedoklova dela o naravi, in prav tako zgodovinski govor. Slednji sestoji npr. iz pripovedovanja o tem, »kaj je naredil Alkibiades in kaj se mu je zgodilo« (Po. 9, 1451b11), in je v tem podoben npr. Homerjevemu pripovedovanju o tem, kaj je Odisej naredil in kaj se mu je zgodilo, ki pa seveda šteje za *mimēsis*.

In res, ko Aristotel v 9. poglavju naredi znano primerjavo med pesnikom in zgodovinarjem, ne trdi, da le prvi izvaja *mimēsis*, temveč opredeli razliko med njima na drug način: kot pravi, zgodovinar govori o stvareh, ki so se zgodile, pesnik pa o stvareh, ki se lahko zgodijo (Po. 9, 1451b4–5). V skladu s tem je treba Homerjevo pripoved o Odiseju pojmovati kot govor, ki je na nek način o stvareh, »ki se lahko zgodijo«. Tu se sicer ne moremo lotiti vprašanja, kako razumeti Aristotelovo razlikovanje med pesniškim in zgodovinskim govorom, pomembno pa je, da Aristotel ne omenja *mimēsis* kot značilnosti, po kateri se pesništvo loči od zgodovine.

Pri avtorjih po Aristotelu v resnici najdemo nekaj primerov, v katerih se izraz *mimēsis* nanaša na zgodovinski govor in očitno označuje ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor. Tako Dioniz iz Halikarnasa (fl. I BC) razpravlja o Herodotovi in Tukididovi '*mimēsis* značajev in čustev' (*Epistula ad Pompeium Gremium* 3.18.1–2); s tem očitno misli na ne-figurativno predstavljanje značajev in čustev skozi pripovedovanje (kljub temu, da oba zgodovinarja priložnostno poosebljata osebe, o katerih govorita, to poosebljanje ne more šteti za »*mimēsis* značajev ali čustev«).²⁰

Če torej predpostavimo, da Aristotel šteje tudi ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor kot *mimēsis*, moramo zaključiti, da je njegova teza, da je *mimēsis* posebnost pesniškega govora v primerjavi z drugimi vrstami govora (medicinskim, naravoslovnim in zgodovinskim govorom) neutemeljena. Tak zaključek je morda pretenciozen, pa vendar se zdi, da najdemo še dodaten dokaz zanj v 24. poglavju *Poetike*. Tu Aristotel presenetljivo ponudi drugačno opredelitev pesniški *mimēsis* skozi govor. Ko se po razpravi

o tragediji loti epike, izpostavi Homerja kot boljšega od drugih epskih pesnikov tudi po tem, da je edini, ki

ni neveden glede tega, kaj mora pesnik skladati v prvi osebi. Pesnik mora namreč kar najmanj govoriti v prvi osebi; *mimētēs* namreč ni zaradi tega. Drugi pesniki po večini skladajo v prvi osebi in izvajajo *mimēsis* poredko in le na kratko. Nasprotno pa [Homer] po kratkem uvodu takoj vpelje moškega ali žensko ali kakšen drug značaj; in noben od njih ni brez značaja, pač pa imajo vsi značaje. (*Po.* 24, 1460a6–11)

Ta sestavek je v očitnem nasprotju z Aristotelovo predhodno obravnavo pesniški *mimēsis*. Aristotel namreč tu trdi, da se *mora* pesnik izogibati prvoosebneemu pripovedovanju, in utemeljuje svojo zahtevo s trditvijo, da pesnik ni *mimētēs* zaradi le tega, pač pa, kot je implicirano, zaradi poosebljanja. V skladu s tem torej Homerjevo pripovedovanje o starih državnih ureditvah ali pa o Hrizu kot tako ne more šteti kot *mimēsis* le teh. Tako se zdi, da Aristotel tu 'popravlja' prejšnjo trditev, da pesniško pripovedovanje kot tako tvori *mimēsis*, in da implicitno zavrača pojmovanje ne-figurativnega predstavljanja kot *mimēsis*.

Zaključki

V *Poetiki* Aristotel zagovarja tezo, da je bistvena značilnost pesništva *mimēsis*, ne pa verz; vendar se je zgoraj izkazalo, da je Aristotelovo razumevanje pesniški *mimēsis* precej ohlapno. Če Aristotel razume tudi ne-figurativno predstavljanje skozi govor kot *mimēsis*, se zdi, da je treba kot *mimēsis* označiti tudi nekatere druge vrste govora, ki pa jih Aristotel ne šteje med pesniške, npr. zgodovinski govor. Če pa, nasprotno, Aristotel ne-figurativnega predstavljanja skozi govor ne pojmuje kot *mimēsis* (kot v 24. poglavju), nekaterih del, ki jih Aristotel šteje med pesniška, npr. takšne epske pesnitve, ki ne vsebujejo poosebljanja, ne moremo označiti kot *mimēsis*.

Izraz *mimēsis* se je ohranil v teoretskem razmišljanju o pesništvu in literaturi po Aristotelu vse do danes, in je tudi pozneje pri različnih avtorjih označeval različne pojme. Vendar pa nihče od teh avtorjev ni prevzel Aristotelove teze o *mimēsis* kot o bistveni lastnosti pesništva. Zdi se, da Aristotel poskuša z opredelitvijo pesništva kot *mimēsis* skozi ritem, govor in harmonijo jasno razločiti pesništvo od drugih človeških dejavnosti; vendar se je njegov poskus tu pokazal kot preveč ambiciozen.

OPOMBE

¹ Samostalnik 'pesništvo' je običajni prevedek grškega samostalnika *poiēsis* (od koder 'poezija'), vendar je grški pojem imel širši pomen: *poiēsis* je zajemala tudi sestavljanje glasbenih del (vokalnih in instrumentalnih), kot je razvidno tudi iz Aristotelove navedbe zgoraj.

² *Sokratski govori* so dialogi, v katerih nastopa Sokrat; od teh so se ohranili samo Platonovi in Ksenofonovi. Aristotelov predlog, da bi k pesništvu prištevali tudi nekatera prozna dela (zaradi njihovi *mimēsis*), se zdi precej drzen, saj ta dela nimajo prav tistega elementa, ki je bil splošno priznan kot bistvena značilnost pesništva, t. j. verza. Vendar Aristotel o tem ne razpravlja dalje.

³ Razširjenost tega pogleda je izpričana v *Oxford English Dictionary*: »mimesis, n. [...] b. Imitation; *spec.* the representation or imitation of the real world in (a work of) art, literature, etc. Sometimes used with reference to Aristotle *Poetics* 1447a or Plato *Republic* 598b [...]«.

⁴ Marušič 95–128.

⁵ Med mnogimi študijami pojma *mimēsis* bi tu omenila delo G. Ledde, na katerega se v mnogih pogledih naslanja moja analiza.

⁶ Na to razliko je opozoril že Russel (101) in kasneje Ledda (19, op. 36).

⁷ 'Čuvaji' oziroma 'stražarji' je primernejši prevod gr. *phylakes* kot pa 'varuhi' (ali v ang. 'guardians'). Kot opozori Burnyeat 257, op. 3 (in se pri tem sklicuje na Malcoma Schofielda), so *phylakes* predstavljeni kot tudi represivni organ, ne samo defenzivni (*Rep.* III, 415e in IV, 424b–d); represivna konotacija umanjka v izrazu 'varuhi'.

⁸ Lucidno razpravo o teh vprašanjih po mojem mnenju nudijo Goodman (21–26), Doležel in Ledda (18–24).

⁹ Marušič (95–128).

¹⁰ Gl. *Rep.* III 400b1 in 400c4. Damon je omenjen tudi v *Rep.* IV 424c6.

¹¹ Teorija je predstavljena v *Rep.* III 398c6–401a8, *L.* II 655a4671b1, VII 795d6–e1 in 813a5–817e3, in kot splošno sprejeta v *L.* II 668a6–7 in 668b9–c2.

¹² Tako Platon kot Aristotel govorita o glasbenem in govornem skladanju tako, kot da bi pesniki hkrati tudi izvajali, kar skladajo. Skladanje lahko tako razumemo kot nekakšno virtualno izvajanje dela, ki nastaja.

¹³ *Rep.* III 399a5–c4; prim. Aristotel, *Pol.* VIII 7, 1342b12–14.

¹⁴ Razprava se nikjer ne loteva vprašanja o zgodovinski resničnosti Hrizu; Hriz ni obravnavan nič drugače kot resnične (nedoločene) osebe, o katerih se razpravlja kot o predmetih pesniške *mimēsis*.

¹⁵ *Contra Halliwell* 51, op. 35.

¹⁶ Kot že rečeno, Homerjevo recitacijo in tako tudi njegovo posebljanje Hrizu lahko razumemo kot virtualno; v nasprotju s to je npr. rapsodova recitacija Homerjeve epike.

¹⁷ Ta epizoda iz Homerjeve *Iliade* (*Il.* XI 630, 639–640) je v dialogu *Ion* (538c2–3) omejenjena kot primer, kjer Homer govori o medicini.

¹⁸ Prim. *SSKJ*: »predstavljati: [...] 2b posredovati v najvišji meri lastnosti, značilnosti koga, česa: slika predstavlja različne dobe človekovega življenja / tip, kakršnega predstavlja junak Jurčičeve povesti / na maskeradi je predstavljala ciganko; predstavljati si: [...] povzročati, da nastane kaj v zavesti kot posledica izkušenj, vedenja, miselne ali čustvene dejavnosti.«

¹⁹ Ne-figurativnega predstavljanja ne smemo zamenjati z ne-figurativna *mimēsis*, ki sem jo zgoraj ponazorila s primerom ženine *mimēsis* moževega varanja iz Evripidove *Elektre*. Ne-figurativna *mimēsis* sestoji iz dejavnosti, ki je iste vrste kot posnemana dejavnost in ki ne tvori niti figure te dejavnosti niti ne-figurativnega predstavljanja le te.

²⁰ Prim. Dioniz iz Halikarnasa, *De Thucydide* 45, 35–39. V starejših primerih, v katerih se *mimēsis* nanaša na zgodovinsko pripoved (nekaj jih najdemo v fragmentih zgodovinarja Duriisa iz IV–III pr. n. št.), ni povsem jasno, ali označujejo ne-figurativno predstavljanje ali ne.

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Antične korenine modernega avtorskega koncepta

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Sodobna teoretska razpravljanja o »smrti« in morebitnem ponovnem »vstajenju« avtorja (od strukturalizma in psihoanalize do feminizma in postkolonialnih študij) večinoma merijo na model »romantičnega« avtorja kot iz sebe ustvarjajočega, originalnega genija (E. Young) in skritega »zakonodajalca sveta« (P. Shelley). Ni dvoma, da je ta model v temelju zaznamoval moderne evropske literature vse do 20. stoletja, ko ga je (literarna) teorija temeljito vzela v precep. Pri tem se je izkazalo, da so njegove korenine večplastne in vsaj deloma segajo k antični filozofiji in literaturi. Razprava skuša z revizijo filozofskih diskusij o avtorstvu (od Platona do Longinusa) in nekaterih grških in rimskih pesniških besedil (od Hezioda do Ovidija) raziskati, koliko in na kakšen način so poznejše izpeljave odvisne od antičnih. Poleg tega skuša ugotoviti, ali je razvoj modernega avtorja primerno pojasnjevati z linearno shemo, ki se razteza od na pol anonimnega rapsoda do samozaverovanega romantičnega genija. Predvsem za Ovidijevo ljubezensko liriko je značilna nenavadno visoka stopnja avtorske zavesti in igrive prisotnosti v tekstu, ki poenostavljeno razumevanje razvoja avtorskega koncepta v zgodovini zahodnih literatur postavlja pod vprašaj.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / antična estetika / starogrška književnost / rimska književnost / avtor / avtorstvo

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Strinjati se je mogoče z opazko Charlesa Taylorja, da so v miselni tradiciji modernih zahodnih kultur avtorji in ustvarjalci mnogo bolj cenjeni kot v večini drugih civilizacij (Bennett, *The Author* 4). Na splošno velja, da se je koncept avtorja kot ustvarjalca »teksta«, njegovega *iznajditelja*, ki ima nad njim ne le nekakšne lastniške pravice, temveč tudi določeno avtoriteto pri interpretaciji, v evropskih kulturah večinoma utrdil šele v osemnajstem stoletju.¹ Takšen avtor naj bi bil torej posameznik, ki je edini odgovoren in zato tudi edini zaslužen za enkratno stvaritev, nekdo, ki proizvaja nekaj novega ali celo nepričakovanega in ki hkrati obvlada svoje delo v celoti, natanko ve, kaj pomeni, z njim nekaj namerava ter je sposoben zamejiti njegove interpretacije.

Takšno razumevanje avtorstva je danes institucionalizirano, udejanjeno je v *praksi*, saj njegovo veljavo v zadnji instanci budno varuje sodni sistem z avtorskimi pravicami. Toda v *teoriji* pozicija »velikega Avtorja« nikakor ni tako trdna, saj so bile družbene in diskurzivne konvencije o avtorstvu v drugi polovici 20. stoletja predmet temeljitih analiz.² V živahni diskusiji, ki sta jo konec šestdesetih let kritično poglobila Roland Barthes in Michel Foucault,³ je bilo posebne pozornosti deležno vprašanje o vzniku modernega avtorskega koncepta. Čeprav so nekateri raziskovalci poudarili pomen zgodnejših obdobj, denimo renesanse, ko je že mogoče opazovati oblikovanje vzorca »absolutnega umetnika«, ki se skozi biografski anekdotizem vpisuje v zgodovino likovne in tudi literarne umetnosti,⁴ se večina analiz izvora pojmovanja modernega avtorja osredotoča na prelomno 18. stoletje – in sicer ne le na (pred)romantično ideologijo, ki je artikulirala spremembe v dojemanju avtorja, temveč tudi na razmah literarnega trga in diferenciacijo literature kot družbenega (pod)sistema, dejavnika, ki sta bistvene spremembe pravzaprav generirala.⁵

Sočasno s tem, ko je avtorstvo postajalo pravno in finančno urejeno, je v spremljajočem diskurzu filozofije oziroma estetike stekla diskusija o avtonomiji umetnosti. V njenem okviru se je oblikoval koncept novoveškega avtorja.⁶ Krepilo se je razlikovanje med inovacijo in imitacijo, pri čemer je *inovacija* postala tisto, kar je zares vredno. Tako je v eseju *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759) (Podmene o originalni kompoziciji) znameniti angleški pesnik Edward Young odločno prevrednotil nekoč enakovredne postopke proizvajanja besedil.⁷ Young vztraja, da je pravi avtor originalen, neodvisen in avtonomen *genij*, ki ustvarja iz sebe in širi obzorje »literarne republike«, medtem ko je imitacija postopek, nevreden pravega avtorja, navadna kraja. Koncept *originalnosti* se v romantiki razvije dalje, v kliše o pesniku, ki je »pred svojim časom« pravi genij naj bi bil tako originalen, da ga bo njegov čas nujno zanikal in ga bo ustrezno vrednotila šele prihodnost. Poleg tega se krepi prepričanje, da je avtor sicer človek, a hkrati tudi nekaj nadčloveškega, kajti navdihujejo ga sile, ki so zunaj njega in ki jih razumsko in zavestno ne obvlada povsem (Bennett, *The Author* 55–71).

Iskanje izvora modernega avtorskega koncepta v predromantični in romantični ideologiji – kolikor je trdno vpeto v kontekst sočasnih ekonomskih, pravnih in medijskih inovacij –, seveda ostaja smiselno in produktivno. Nadvse prenagljeno pa bi bilo, če bi odtod sklepali, da je zgodovinski razvoj avtorja mogoče opisati z nekakšno *linearno sbemo*, ki se razteza od napol anonimnega rapsoda v ustnem slovstvu do narcisoidnega romantičnega genija, kreatorja *ex nibilo*. Takšna predpostavka – seveda učinkovita in privlačna – je namreč močno problematična.⁸ To problematičnost bomo skušali prikazati s pozornim branjem nekaterih antičnih literarnih tekstov

(od Homerja in Hezioda do Ovidija) in spremljajočega teoretskega (filozofskega) metadiskurza. Skušali bomo torej raziskati, v kolikšni meri so poznejše izpeljave odvisne od antičnih oziroma kako globoko v preteklost segajo nekatere poteze »modernega avtorja«.

Teorije avtorstva v antični filozofiji in poetiki

Predsokratik Demokrit (460–370 pr. Kr.) velja po izročilu za prvega antičnega filozofa, ki je formuliral t.i. *inspiracijsko teorijo*. Demokrit meni, da resnično dober pesnik ustvarja v strastnem, ekstatičnem zanosu, ki je blizu roba norosti; vir te ekstaze pa ni sam pesnik, temveč za njo stojijo božanske sile.⁹ Inspiracijsko teorijo – kot bomo videli, je ta že mnogo prej tematizirana v epiki arhaične dobe – je jasneje artikuliral in obenem tudi zapletel Platon. V domnevno zgodnjem dialogu *Ion* Sokrat obračunava z nadutim, a nekoliko omejenim rapsodom Ionom, ter zatrjuje, da je pesnik načelno brez veščine in črpa le iz božanskega navdiha:

[...] pesnik je láhko, okriljeno in sveto bitje in ne more pesniti prej, dokler ni deležen božanskega navdiha, dokler ne izgubi razuma in v njem ni več uma [...] [pesniki] ne ustvarjajo na osnovi veščine, ampak zaradi božanskega daru. [...] Zato pesnikom bog odvzema um in jih uporablja za služabnike, vedeže in božanske vedeževalce, da bi mi poslušalci vedeli, da niso ti ljudje, v katerih ni uma, tisti, ki govorijo tako zelo dragocene stvari, ampak da govori bog sam in po njih nagovarja nas (*Ion* 534b–d).

Pesniki so potemtakem povsem odvezani zaslug za svoje stvaritve in lahko se zgodi celo, da je najlepša pesem zapeta »po najslabšem pesniku«. Ustvarjalni in poustvarjalni proces sta zaznamovana z brez-umno razsežnostjo, saj tudi rapsodi med recitiranjem, okrašeni s »pisano obleko in zlatimi vencic«, niso *pri pameti*, temveč »nasprotno, ko vstopijo v harmonijo in ritem, bakhovsko norijo in so obsedeni« (*Ion* 534a). V Platonovem *Fajdrosu*, kjer najdemo eno najbolj eksplicitnih povezav kreativnega stanja z norostjo – ta pa, kot vemo, se je v valovih obujala vse do danes – so zdravi oziroma trezni pesniki »obsojeni« na neuspeh:

Kdor pa brez blaznosti Muz pride do pesniških vrat, prepričan, da bo dovolj dober pesnik na osnovi veščine, (ostane) sam nepopoln in pesništvo človeka, ki je pri zdravi pameti, izgine spričo tistih, ki blaznijo (*Fajdros* 245a).

Sokratovo argumentacijo v obeh omenjenih dialogih, kolikor jo seveda beremo dobesedno oziroma naivno, je mogoče razumeti kot pripravo te-

rena za razvpiti »izgon pesnikov« iz idealne polis. Pesnik je tu 'razkrinkan' kot prevarant, ki ničesar ne zna in ne pozna, njegovi izdelki pa nimajo nobene zveze z resničnostjo, saj se nahajajo šele »na tretjem mestu od Bivajočega« (Platon, *Država* X: 599a). O božanski naravi inspiracije ne najdemo več sledu, od pesniške veščine pa je ostalo le šarlatanstvo, saj »posnemovalec ne ve ničesar omembe vrednega o stvareh, ki jih posnema«, posnemanje pa je »nekakšna igra in ne resno opravilo« (*Država* X: 602b), zvijača, ki nagovarja slabi, ničvredni del duše, tisti, ki je v nasprotju z razumnim delom podvržen emocijam in iracionalnemu. Sokratovo (Platonovo) cenzorsko 'razsodbo' nad pesništvom je sicer tvegano enoznačno interpretirati, vsekakor pa izpostavlja ustvarjalno ekstazo in njeno zvezo z božanskim razodetjem in resnico kot problem.¹⁰

Kar presenetljivo se torej zdi, da Platonov učenec Aristotel, ki se v *Poetiki* sicer izrecno posveča pesništvu, tako rekoč ničesar ne pove o njegovem ustvarjalcu. Povsem mogoče je, da se je s tem ukvarjal v kakem drugem spisu, morda v izgubljenem tridelnem dialogu *O pesnikih* (*Peri poetôn*); medtem ko v *Poetiki* o virih avtorjeve dejavnosti ne najdemo skoraj ničesar – z izjemo spodnjega odlomka:

Zato je pesniška umetnost ali stvar izredne nadarjenosti (*euphyés*) ali pa blazne čustvenosti (*manikón*): prve vodi globokoumna prodornost, druge ekstatična zanesenost (*Poetika* XVII: 1455a).

Lapidarni opis sam po sebi ne implicira privilegiranja katere izmed navedenih proizvodnih strategij, pa tudi vir *manikón* ni jasen. Pa vendar duh celotne *Poetike* navaja k intuitivnemu sklepu, da se Aristotel nagiba k racionalni utemeljitvi ustvarjalnega procesa, opredeljenega kot *mimesis*. Podobno je mogoče reči za še en vpliven premislek o naravi pesniškega ustvarjanja, verzificirano Horacijevu *Pismo o pesništvu* (*Ars poetica*). Znameniti avgustejski lirik je v tretjem pismu, ki ga je mogoče brati kot teoretični tekst, skušal harmonično združiti nasprotna pola – poudaril je, da sta za pesniško umetnost nujna tako naravni talent kot s trudom in z izkustvom pridobljena veščina:

Star je že spor, li za dobro pesnitev potreben je genij
ali priučena umetnost. Po mojem ne vodi do uspeha
šola nikár brez talenta, pa tudi talent ne brez šole;
drugo se veže ob drugo in terja pomoč vzajemno.

(*Pismo o pesništvu* 408–412)

Horacij sicer v pismu omenja, da je »talent in zgovernost« Grkom podarila Muza (*Pismo* 323), toda obenem se bridko norčuje iz fanatično ob-

sedenih pesnikov, ki zavračajo vsakršno večščino kot nepomembno, in se izrecno obregne ob Demokrita, ki »meče z vrhov Helikona / pesnike vse, ki zdravi so v glavi« (Pismo 296–297). *Genij* brez truda, dela in učenja torej ostaja problematičen in sumljiv.

S podobnimi dilemami se v znamenitem eseju *O vzvišenem* (Peri hypsus) ukvarja Longinus, antični mislec, ki ga je – pomenljivo – pravzaprav 'odkrila' šele predromantika.¹¹ Longinus razpravlja o geniju, ki mora biti širokogruden, zanesen, sposoben globokih misli in plemenitega duha. Toda ko se Longinus izvorov vzvišenosti stila loti podrobneje, se izlušči pet njegovih komponent, od katerih sta prvi dve, namreč sposobnost za velike zamisli ter globoko in navdahnjeno občutenje, pretežno prirojeni, medtem ko je ostale tri mogoče pridobiti (obdelava figur, plemenitost izraza in kompozicija). A tudi pri Longinusu ostaja odprto, kaj zares pomeni »priorojen«, inspiracijska teorija pa pri njem doživi zanimivo metamorfozo.¹²

Če torej skušamo strniti najvplivnejše antične teoretične diskusije o avtorstvu, kaže, da se te bolj ali manj vrtijo okoli dvojic *veščina / navdih*, *razum / iracionalnost* in *mimesis (imitacija) / mediacija*, ki jih je mogoče razumeti kot izpeljanke izhodiščne ontološke dileme, spora o resničnem *izvoru* avtorskega dela. Zdi se, da inspiracijska teorija v svoji skrajni obliki ostaja problem, morda zato, ker jo je težko uskladiti s praktično izkušnjo. Konvencija sklicevanja na Muze kot vir navdiha sicer ohranja veljavnost, toda vera v božansko navezo blede. S tem je pod vprašaj postavljena ne le narava genija, temveč tudi vloga ekstatične ustvarjalne blaznosti. Kljub temu se je težko izogniti vtisu, da iracionalni *enthousiasmós* ostaja neka komponenta, ki se ji nihče ne želi povsem odpovedati in ostaja privlačna celo za mislece, ki se sicer nagibajo k racionalnim razlagam ustvarjanja.

Ni dvoma o tem, da so omenjene teorije neizbrisno zaznamovale poznejša razmišljanja o avtorstvu.¹³ Renesančne diskusije o pesniku kot bitju božanskega izvora (Girolamo Vida), izumitelju/stvarniku nove resničnosti (Scaligero), manično navdahnjenem ustvarjalcu (Petrić), Castelvetrova obsodba plagiata in celo Fracastorov pomenljivi antropološki obrat – Fracastoro namreč premakne vir ekstaze *v notranjost* samega kreativnega procesa – večinoma ostajajo inspirirane s klasičnimi teorijami oziroma se oblikujejo v polemični napetosti z njimi. Zdi se, da celo skrajni romantični pogledi na ustvarjanje, ki umetnika postavijo v *središče* literarnega dela in ga tolmačijo kot ekspresivni vir in vrelec poezije, misterioznega glasnika pomladi, ljubezni in sreče (Novalis), človeka s široko dušo, izjemno senzibilnostjo in navdušenjem (Wordsworth), z domišljijo, ki raztaplja znano, da bi ustvarjala nove celote (Coleridge), ali skritega zakonodajalca sveta (Shelley), v veliki meri izhajajo iz nekega risa možnosti, ki jih je začrtala antična misel, četudi jih ni izpeljala do skrajnih konsekvenc.

'Avtorstvo' v antičnih literarnih besedilih

Toda vrnimo se zdaj k samim literarnim besedilom in si oglejmo, kako se ista vprašanja artikulirajo v literarnem diskurzu – in sicer še pred ali kvečjemu vzporedno s teoretsko refleksijo.¹⁴ Vsekakor se avtorska problematika prek tematiziranja pesništva in pesnika v njih pojavlja že od začetka, pri čemer je mogoče za silo razlikovati med vprašanji *ontološke* narave, ki zadevajo izvir poezije oziroma navdiha in naravo pesniške osebe, in med s prvimi tesno prepletenimi *aksiološkimi* vprašanji, ki zadevajo mesto, vrednost in funkcijo pesništva/pesnika v družbi. Medtem ko so nagovori Muz kot prazvir pevčevega navdiha ali slavljenje magične moči poezije že rutinski del epskega sveta, se besedilna samotematizacija pesnika–avtorja razvija le postopoma. Kot bomo videli, se prostor zanjo zares odpre šele v liriki.

Najstarejši znan avtorski 'podpis' v svetovni literaturi se pojavi v Heziodovi *Teogoniji*. Na njenem začetku poleg standardnih božanskih Muz, Zeusovih hčera, nastopi tudi njihov učenc: »Muze le-te so Hezioda učile prelepega petja, / Nékdaj, ko pasel ovcé je pod sveto goró helikonsko« (*Teogonija* 22–23).¹⁵ Kot običajno muze niso le zastopnice rodu nesmrtnih bogov, temveč tudi navdihovalke pesniškega govora:

To govorile so Zeusove hčere mi z glasom razločnim,
dale, da utrgam za žezlo si lovora bujno mladiko,
čudo prečudno! In vame vdahnile so govor božanski,
glas, da bi pel o prihodnjih in pel o preteklih dogodkih,
rod presrečnih, nesmrtnih bogov mi slaviti velele ...

(*Teogonija* 29–33)

Tako kot retorična večšina kraljev ni njihova last, temveč blagohotno darilo Muz, tudi pesmi ne poje sam pesnik. Subjekt ni avtonomen vir svoje stvaritve, ne izmišlja si sam, temveč skozenj preseva umetnost Zevsovih hčera, ki mu tako rekoč 'narekujejo' tekst: »Slavljene, Zevsove hčere! Ve dajte mi pesem mikavno, / pojte o svetem mi rodu nesmrtnikov, večno živečih ...« (*Teogonija* 104–105).

Muze na podoben način navdihujejo že Homerja, ki pa se na primerljiv način ne pojavlja v besedilu. Pač pa je inspiracijska konvencija neobičajno jasno artikulirana sredi drugega speva *Iliade*, kjer so vsepričujoče Muze izrecno omenjene kot »zapisovalke« teksta, saj »pevci pa slišimo glas le, samí ne vemo ničesar« (*Iliada* II: 486). Kljub temu ostaja vprašljivo, koliko smemo takšnemu avtomatizmu zares verjeti: iz nekaterih mest v *Odiseji* prej sklepamo, da pesniki, ki so resda ljubljenci in izbranci Muze, saj jih je ta sama učila peti (*Odiseja* VIII: 479–481), vseeno ohranjajo nekaj individualnosti. Tako ali tako pa svet herojske epike, kjer vlada neizprosna ostrina broná, še zdaleč

ni pravo gojišče za subtilnosti avtorskih samotematizacij. Šele vzpon lirske muze (pri Mimnermosu, Sapfo, Anakreonu in Kalimahu) je lahko subvertiral homerski militaristični vrednostni model in hkrati odprl prostor nove subjektivnosti in intimizma, ki so ga do skrajnosti razširili rimski elegiki.¹⁶

Preden se lotimo slednjih, se velja za hip pomuditi pri še eni temi, ki je vzniknila v grški poeziji (najprej pri Teognisu in Pindarju) in pomembno zaznamovala diskusijo o avtorstvu. Gre za temo nesmrtnosti pesniške slave in trajnosti velikih umetnin. V svojih odah in fragmentih Pindar izpostavi odličnost pesništva, ki je božanski dar Apolona in temnolasih Muz in ravno zato premore magično moč. Obenem Pindar pesem razume kot medij, ki bo redkim izbrancem omogočila, da njihova veličina v pesmih preživi stoletja, kajti »Brez pesmi bi tudi največja junaštva / gosta tema zagrnila« (7. Nemejska oda). V sloviti odi Exegi monumentum je zamisel nadgradil Horacij in ustvaril eno izmed njenih najvplivnejših formulacij. V njej ne bi smeli spregledati pomenljive zvijazce: na retorični ravni so »monument«, torej predmet kanonizacije, sicer res *same pesmi*, vendar se hkrati z njimi na prizorišče že premeteno tihotapi tudi ustvarjalec s svojim življenjem: pesnik, rojen v revni kmečki družini, se iz socialnih nižav dviguje s pomočjo pesniške veščine. Variiran obrazec smo poslej še nešteto krat videli, saj zaznamuje novoveško fascinacijo z literarnim avtorjem.

Najbolj živahen razvoj je avtorstvo kot pesniška tema doživelo v rimski elegiji, ki odpira novo poglavje v zgodovini tekstualne prisotnosti avtorja. Že Katul se povsem umika iz javnega prostora v zasebnost ter vpelje literarno konstruiran lik idolatrično čaščene ženske-boginje.¹⁷ Podoben vzorec privzame elegik Tibul, ki še nadgradi tematiko intimne ljubezni in umikanja iz klavrne »jupitrovske« realnosti. A tematizacije avtorskih problemov so pri njiju kvečjemu nakazane.¹⁸ Šele pri Properciju, ki duhovito variira kult kraljice srca, najdemo pomembno novo težišče: dekle prekrsti v edini vir lastnega pesniškega navdiha in s tem nadomesti staro »muzično« prtljago ter hkrati dopusti, da ustvarjalni proces ostane ekstatičen:

Iščete vir, iz katerega vro mi ljubezenski stih,
 Mehke pesnitve od kod najdejo pot med ljudi.
 Mojih mi pesmi ne poje Kaliope, niti Apolon,
 Ljubo deklè je samó meni navdihnjeni vir. /.../
 Najsi kar koli počne, z besedami ali v dejanjih,
 meni neznaten je nič vir neizčrpnih snovi.

(*Elegije* II/1: 1–4, 15–16)

V vse bolj igrivi rimski elegiki stare konvencije počasi razpadajo in postajajo le še gradivo za duhovičenje, ki ga do skrajnosti pritira norčava Ovidijeva ljubezenska elegika. Ovidij učinkovito izrablja konvencionalni

avtorski repertorij (Apolon, Muze, Afrodit, inspiracijska teorija, teorija »blaznosti«), a bralca ves čas pušča v skušnjavi, da vse skupaj razume kot pregnano, ironično izigravanje žanrskih klišejev: »Mar nam ne pravijo 'sveti poetje'? 'Bogov varovanci'? / Marsikdo misli, da v nas biva božanstvo celó« (*Amores* III/9: 17–18). Poantirano je preigran celo filozofski disput o *mimesis*, kombiniran z elegičnim kultom izvoljenke:

Pevcev svoboda je plodna in gre v neizmerno širino,
saj jih ne sili nihče biti historično zvest.
Hvaljenje ženske takó za zlagano bi morali šteti;
ker pa ga ne, sem postal žrtev naivnih ljudi.

(*Amores* III/12: 41–44)

Ovidij se pogosto ukvarja s socialnim statusom pesnika, pri čemer se nostalgično (a prejkone spet z blago ironijo) ozira h Grkom,¹⁹ še z večjo vneto pa se loteva tematike nesmrtnosti poezije in pesniške slave; hudo mušno zatrjuje, da je ravno ta pravi cilj pesnikov: »Česa si pesniki sveti žele? Le slave nesmrtni. / V vsem, kar počnemo, tiči to hrepenenje po njej« (*Ars amatoria* III, 403–404).²⁰ Neštetokrat lirski subjekt povzdiguje sebe hkrati s svojimi izdelki. 'Kanonizacija', ki jo Ovidij brez oklevanja prikaže v svojih verzih, seveda vključuje pesnika in njegovo biografijo, za nameček pa še njegovo oboževanko: »Svoji izbranki bom dal slavo umetniških del« (*Amores* I/10: 60). Ovidij gre tudi tu za korak dlje od Propercija in si izmisli *wanna-be* Korino: »Eno poznam, ki povsod govori, da je ona Korina; / vem, da dala bi vse, le da postala bi ti« (*Amores* II/17: 27–30); potem pa se pregnano pokesa, češ da je ljubljenko s svojim trobentanjem o njeni lepoti tako rekoč sam 'sprostituiral'.

Ovidijev notorični narcizem, občudovanje lastnega genija, ki je tako vznejevoljilo retorika Kvintiljana (*Institutio oratoria* X), vodi tega bistrumnega pesnika v ekscesno tekstualno prisotnost. Skoraj nas ne preseneti, da se denominator »Naso«, pod katerim Ovidij nastopa v svoji poeziji, pojavi že kar v prvem verzu njegove prve pesniške zbirke, v motu k *Ljubeznim*. »Naso« ves čas igrivo vstopa v svoja besedila, pogosto na izpostavljenih mestih, na primer v *Ars amatoria* (Umetnost ljubezni), ko moškim in ženskam, ki zmagajo v ljubezenski igri, priporoča inskripcijo imena svojega mentorja (»*Naso magister erat*«), ali pa ko predlaga rabo svoje prejšnje zbirke v praktične namene ljubezenskega vojskovanja:²¹

Kdo ti poreče morda: 'Le prebiraj izbrušene pesmi
Našega mojstra, ki v njih spola oba podučí,
Ali iz knjig, ki so tri, z naslovom *Ljubezni*, si pesem
Kakšno izberi, gladkó jo z milim glasom povej ...'

(*Ars amatoria* III: 341–344)

Ovidijeva avtorska samozavest presega vse meje. Če se je Propercij že v prvi knjigi elegij samooklical za »poeta z imenom in slavo«, enega izmed »vélikih mož Rima«, suvereni veščak peresa Ovidij, ki klesanje tekstualnih »monumentov« malodane spremeni v rutino, v lastni poeziji brez oklevanja slavi samega sebe kot velemejstra pesniške zvrsti: »Saj elegija prizna, da je toliko moja dolžnica, / kakor Vergiliju že vzvišeni ep je dolžnik« (*Remedia amoris* 395–396) in celo kot izumitelja novega žanra; avtor *Heroid* (zbirke ljubezenskih pesmi v obliki pisem, ki jih mitološke junakinje naslavljajo na svoje ljubimce) namreč »drugim neznano še zvrst prvi ustvaril je sam« (*Ars amatoria* III: 346). Pesnikova osebnost, življenje, veščina in ustvarjalni postopki nedvomno vstopajo v samo *jedro* Ovidijeve ljubezenske elegike.²²

Sklep

Iz zgornjega pregleda je vsekakor mogoče ugotoviti, da je bila v teoretskem in še bolj v literarnem diskurzu antike avtorska problematika razprta zelo na široko. Njeno osrednje problemsko vozlišče, ki zadeva ontološki status pesniške inspiracije, dobro ponazarja nasprotje med pretežno *inspiracijskim* in pretežno *mimetičnim* stališčem, torej nasprotje med razumevanjem pesnika kot (božansko) navdahnjenega, ekstatičnega stvaritelja ali predvsem kot (veščega) obrtnika. Ta dvojnost se vsaj približno odraža tudi v nekaterih terminoloških dvojicah. Tako je izvorni grški pevec *aidos* še povezan z božansko inspiracijo in v sebi ohranja jasnovidno dimenzijo, pozneje tako ljubo romantikom, medtem ko je *poieta*, ki se kot profesionalni mojster besede pojavi šele v grški klasični dobi, desakraliziran. Podobno velja za poznejšo filološko antitezo med božansko zamaknjenim *poeta vates* in eruditskim, učenjaškim *poeta doctus*. V isti okvir je mogoče umestiti še dvojico *dionizično* / *apolinično*, aktualizirano v Nietzschejevi interpretaciji Dionizovega mita, ki je rehabilitirala kreativno norost. Omenjene dihotomije je mogoče za silo ponazoriti s takšnole shemo:

	božanski vir		kolektivna (intertekstualna) narava produkcije
INSPIRACIJA (navdih)	aidos	poieta	MIMESIS (imitacija)
ekstaza / emocija	poeta vates	poeta doctus	<i>razum</i> / <i>veščina</i>
	dionizično	apolinično	
posvetni vir			individualna (unikatna) narava produkcije

Kot je mogoče videti, je vsak od obeh namišljenih 'polov' razpet tudi od znotraj. Medtem ko je mimetični pol razpet med možnostma, da av-

torsko delo razume predvsem kot kolektivno dejanje, vezano na obstoječo tradicijo, ali že povsem individualno, kot unikatno stvaritev, pri inspiracijskem polu lahko sledimo dilemi, ali je vir ekstaze božanski ali posveten. Nekoliko posplošeno bi lahko sklepali, da se težišče antičnega dojemanja avtorske produkcije sčasoma premika k bolj *posvetnemu* in bolj *individualnemu*. Seveda je v praksi situacija neprimerno bolj kompleksna: skoraj nemogoče je najti čiste primere »inspiracijskega« pogleda, podobno pa velja za utilitarno stališče, ki bi povsem zanikalo moment genialnosti. Tudi če je pesnik razumljen pretežno kot imitator, ni nikdar reducirana na raven golega obrtnika – proizvajanje umetniškega dela ostaja *razločeno* od drugih proizvodnih praks.²³

Iracionalni *manikón* torej ostaja relevanten tudi tedaj, ko zamisel o »božanskem nareku« blede in se raztaplja v konvencijo, možen predmet igrive samoreferenčnosti, kot se dogaja na primer v Ovidijevi ljubezenski liriki. Ta s svojo narcistično, ekscenno tematizacijo pesnika in njegove vloge ironično sprevrča žanrske vzorce, stereotipe in celo avtorsko teorijo. Osupljivi razvojni lok, na katerega koncu stoji ravno Ovidijeva elegika, izkazuje vso kompleksnost antičnega pojmovanja avtorstva. Ovidijevi primerljiva avtorska zavest se mora namreč v novoveški literaturi še dolgo razvijati, da bi avtor, resda na nekoliko drugačen način in v drugačnem kontekstu, (vnovič) vstopil v samo središče literarnega dela kot njegov genialni originator.²⁴ Pestrost, notranje napetosti in evolucijski tok avtorskih tem znotraj klasične literature in filozofije še enkrat dokazujejo, da linearni, kontinuitetni razlagalni modeli zgodovine modernega avtorja enostavno ne vzdržijo.

OPOMBE

¹ »Tekst« je tu treba razumeti v najširšem semiotičnem smislu; v tem smislu torej med avtorje sodijo tudi skladatelji, slikarji, arhitekti, znanstveniki ipd.

² Teoretiki in zgodovinarji avtorstva so opazovali njegove spreminjajoče se reprezentacije, pretehtavali učinke založniških tehnologij, institucij, zakonodaje o avtorskih pravicah in cenzure ter analizirali naravo skupinskega avtorstva, plagiata, medbesedilnosti in parodije (Bennett, *The Author* 5).

³ V znameniti *Smrti avtorja* (*La mort de l'Auteur*) skuša Barthes pokazati, da avtor (nezavedno) ves čas citira in da je govor o izvornem avtorstvu nesmiseln. Besedila naj bi delovala neodvisno od avtorja, pisanje pa je v temelju brez izvora. Tako želi Barthes subvertirati strukture moči, ki so vpletene v promocijo figure avtorja v konvencionalnem razumevanju besedilnosti – zamisel avtorja mu je predvsem »tiranija«, ki besedilu oži pomen. Tudi Foucault v eseju *Kaj je avtor?* (*Quest-ce que l'Auteur?*) uveljavljeni koncept avtorja razume kot (nasilen) ideološki produkt, ki zaznamuje način, kako se izogibamo množanju pomenov.

⁴ Gl. C. M. Soussloff, *The Absolute Artist* 43–72.

⁵ Že v sedemnajstem stoletju se je najrazvitejši del zahodne Evrope preoblikoval v družbo množične potrošnje, literarna dela pa so se – ob naraščajoči blaginji in napredku pismenosti – spreminjala v široko dostopno blago. Do konca stoletja, ko so se časniki in periodika trdno zasidrali v založništvu, je mogoče govoriti o nastanku množičnega trga za literaturo. Pisanje ni moglo več ostati, kar je bilo poprej, namreč cirkulacija omejenega niza besedil znotraj elite. V Angliji je bil razmah tiskarstva in knjigotrštva zelo zgoden, zato se je že v 17. stoletju pojavila potreba po pravni regulaciji avtorskih pravic (*copyright*); leta 1710 je t.i. »Statute of Anne« zakonsko ustoličil avtorja kot pravno kategorijo. Šlo je predvsem za to, da se je avtorska pravica spremenila v lastniško pravico, avtorsko delo pa v tržno blago. Novoveški 'avtor' v smislu pravne kategorije torej ni nastal kot produkt refleksije v filozofiji ali poetiki, temveč v interesu posla in trgovanja (gl. Rose, *Authors and Owners*).

⁶ Ta diskusija, v kateri je bila med drugim »prava vrednost« dela izenačena z njegovo razdaljo od polja produkcije, seveda ni bila neodvisna od ekonomskih in pravnih perturbacij (gl. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*).

⁷ Franciškan sv. Bonaventura iz 13. stoletja loči štiri načelno enakovredne (!) tipe tekstualnega proizvajalca: prvi je *scriptor*, ki dobesedno kopira (prepisuje), drugi *compilator*, ki združuje odlomke drugih (citata), tretji *commentator*, ki dodaja lastne besede in komentarje k besedam drugih, zadnji pa je *auctor*, ki navaja lastne besede, besede drugih pa uporablja kvečjemu za potrditev lastnih tez.

⁸ Ob strani bomo pustili pomislek, da utegne biti predstava o koherentnem »romantičnem avtorju« le konstrukt, nastal za potrebe 20. stoletja, ki je hotelo obračunati z njim; oziroma model, ki pretirano poenostavlja sicer paradokсно in nestabilno romantično razumevanje avtorstva. Tezo je nadvse bolj razvil Ken Ruthven v *Faking Literature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 (Bennett, *The Author* 71).

⁹ Demokritovi spisi so žal ohranjeni le fragmentarno oziroma posredno (gl. A. Sovre, ur., *Predsokratiki* 194–226).

¹⁰ Vprašanje 'sporočila' Platonovih besedil je zaradi njihove literarizirane dialoške strukture, negotove identifikacije Platona-filozofa s protagonistom dialogov Sokratom, še bolj pa zaradi ironičnosti sokratskega diskurza, zelo zapleteno. »Dobesedno« branje »izgona pesnikov« je po mnenju mnogih interpretov povsem zgrešeno (Kocijančič, *Platon II*: 997–1002).

¹¹ Avtorstvo eseja in identiteta pisca ostajata uganki, najverjetneje pa tekst izvira iz prvega stoletja.

¹² Longinus priporoča pesnikom kreativno posnemanje velikih predhodnikov, češ da iz ustvarjalnega genija starodavnih piscev kot iz »svetih odprtin« prihaja nekakšna emanacija v duh tistih, ki z njimi tekmujejo. Zanimivo, da za Longinusa takšni izdelki niso plagiat (*O vzvišenem XIII*).

¹³ Vsaka od njih ima tudi specifično recepcijsko zgodovino, ki je tu ne bo mogoče razgrinjati, čeprav še malo ni nepomembna.

¹⁴ Antične teorije pesništva oziroma avtorstva so dobro raziskane, tako da teoretska linija »od Demokrita do Longinusa« deluje skoraj rutinsko (gl. Bennett, *The Author*, ali Beker, *Povijest književnih teorija*). S tematološke plati je avtorstvo mnogo slabše raziskano.

¹⁵ Proces, v katerem se iz nejasnega kotla ustne tradicije postopoma izluščita (fiksirano) delo in njegov (individualni) avtor, je seveda predpogoj takšnega tekstualnega »podpisa«. Transmisija zgodb v ustni kulturi namreč nakazuje še povsem drugačen koncept avtorstva. Albert Lord v temeljnem delu *The Singer of Tales* (1960) trdi, da je treba Homerja videti hkrati kot posameznika in kot ustno izročilo. Po eni strani je Homer res posameznik, ki je pesnitvi *Iliada* in *Odisjeja* dvignil na raven, ki presega raven drugih znanih ustnih tradicij, a pri tem ni podedoval le golih zgodb (v smislu *sižija*), temveč tudi kompozicijske tehnike,

teme, jezikovne formule, ki so izhajale iz večstoletne tradicije. Vsaka posamezna izvedba v ustni epski tradiciji ustvari novo kompozicijo in je enkratna, a istočasno vstavljena v tradicijo. Opozoriti velja, da se problematika »kolektivnega avtorstva« ne izčrpa vse do danes (gl. Stillinger, *Multiple Authorship*).

¹⁶ Že Mimnermos se v Minljivosti ljubezenskih radosti retorično vpraša: »Kakšna je radost življenja brez zlatih darov Afrodite?« (*Antična poezija* 142); medtem ko Sapfo v pesmi *Mnogim konjenica se ždi najlepša* odkrito zavrne militantni svet in povzdiguje ljubezen, poezijo in estetsko razmerje do sveta.

¹⁷ Takšna sublimacija nima primere pred Katulom. Ženska zadobi usodno oblast nad pesnikom, Katulova Lesbija pa postane prototip kasnejših kraljic srca.

¹⁸ »Katul« kot lastno ime se pojavlja nekoliko ironizirano, kot nekakšen (samo)nagovor: »Katul ubogi, zdaj nikar ne nori več! / Pozabi in pokoplji, kar je izgubljeno!« (*Katul* 20).

¹⁹ »Pesnikom nekđaj posvečali skrb so bogovi in kralji, / zborovski spevi takrat želi so kupe nagrad, / Neoskrunljiv so ugled in ime častivredno imeli, / tudi z bogastvom obsut bil je pogosto poet« (*Ars amatoria* III: 405–408).

²⁰ Ista tema za spoznanje bolj resno zazveni v sklepnih verzih Ovidijeve epske mojstrovine: »Delo končal sem: ne more ga Jupitrov srd in ne ogenj, / niti ne meč pokončati, ne zob požrešne starosti. [...] neumrljiv z najboljšim se delom bom svojega jaza / dvignil visoko nad zvezde [...] v svoji bom slavi na vekomaj živel« (*Metamorfoze* XV: 871–879).

²¹ Ovidij seveda svetuje lastne stihe tudi tistim, ki si želijo opomoči od ljubezenskih ran: »Brali obvezno Nazóna ste že pri učenju ljubezni, / zdaj pa bo Nazo že spet čtivo obvezno za vas« (*Remedia amoris* 71–72).

²² To pa je po Bennettovem mnenju ravno ena temeljnih značilnosti romantičnega avtorja (*The Idea of the Author* 655–656).

²³ Nasploh se je *eforična* dimenzija, ki izvira iz prvotne zamisli o božanskem navdihu, ves čas zadržala – resda v zelo različnih stopnjah – v okviru novoveškega razumevanja avtorstva.

²⁴ Prelomen v tem smislu naj bi bil predvsem Wordsworthov revidirani uvod k *Lyrical Ballads* iz leta 1802 (Bennett, *The Idea of the Author* 654).

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Avtor je mrtev. Naj živi avtor!

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Čeprav se je v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja deklarativno razglašalo »smrt avtorja« (Barthes) in skušalo slednjega nadomestiti z nekakšno drugačno entiteto (npr. Foucaultova avtorska funkcija), je konec stoletja pokazal, da je avtor bolj trdoživ, kot bi lahko pričakovali. Od kod torej ta večna ujetost in nedoločljivost literarnega avtorja? Moja hipoteza je, da je odgovor mogoče iskati v analizi heterogene narave avtorja, konkretnije v analizi dveh njegovih vlog – empirični avtor in avtor kot funkcija, ki se po Foucaultu giblje na robu teksta oziroma diskurza. Razprava se ukvarja z dvema avtobiografskima tekstoma Lojzeta Kovačiča – opisu prve šolske izkušnje v romanih Basel in Otroške stvari.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / avtobiografija / avtobiografska literatura / Kovačič, Lojze

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Uvod

Roland Barthes je l. 1968 razglasil smrt avtorja in s tem usmeril pozornost literarne vede na bralca, kar je bila morda najznamenitejša posledica krize romantičnega koncepta avtorja, ki pa ni uspela povsem ukiniti te institucije v literaturi. Tomaž Toporišič je to krizo vzel za izhodišče lastne raziskave dramskega avtorja v 80-ih in 90-ih letih prejšnjega stoletja in ugotovil, da je t.i. postdramsko gledališče, kljub temu da se je zdel dramski avtor nepotrebna in presežena kategorija, ponovno ustoličilo ravno slednjega (npr. v primerih Sarah Kane in Elfriede Jelinek). Kot pravi Toporišič, »dramski avtor je vedno znova preživel različne člene verige svojih kriz in vedno znova se je znašel v nespravljivem stanju ujetosti med izrazoma 'končati' in 'začeti'« (Toporišič 269). Od kod izhaja ta začarani krog začetkov in koncev? Je morda posledica heterogene narave našega predmeta, natančneje njegovih dveh vlog: 1. vloge empiričnega avtorja in 2. avtorske funkcije, ki je del diskurza ali pa je postavljena na njegovo mejo?

Na koncu razprave *Kaj je avtor?* (Quest-ce que l'Auteur?) je Michel Foucault zapisal nekatere predloge za nadaljnje raziskave.

Ali bi ne mogli ponovno preučiti privilegijev subjekta, izhajajoč prav iz analiz takega tipa (historičnih analiz diskurza, op. a.)? Dobro se zavedam, da so z notranjo in arhitektonsko analizo nekega dela [...] ter s tem, da so biografske in psihološke reference postavili v oklepaj, že zamajali absolutni značaj in utemeljiteljsko vlogo subjekta. Vendar bi se bilo mogoče povrniti k temu vprašanju. Ne zato, da bi ponovno uvedli temo o izvirnem subjektu, temveč da bi dojeli točke, na katerih subjekt prodre v diskurz, subjektov način delovanja in njegove odvisnosti (»Kaj je avtor?«, 39).

Foucault torej zagovarja tezo, da bi morali raziskovati vlogo avtorja tako v njegovi empirični obliki kot tudi znotraj diskurza. Pričujoča razprava se bo ukvarjala z dvema fragmentoma avtobiografskih romanov Lojzeta Kovačiča, v katerih avtor opisuje svoje prve šolske dni. Prvi roman z naslovom *Basel* je bil napisan med februarjem in aprilom l. 1983, drugi z naslovom *Otroške stvari* pa marca 2003. Pri analizi bom uporabljal avtobiografske tekste zato, ker je v njih prisotnost empiričnega avtorja močno poudarjena, obenem pa garantira bolj ali manj nespremenljivo zgodbo, tako da bodo razlike med obema tekstoma bržkone pokazale na vlogo avtorske funkcije. Rezultati analize bodo odprli nadaljnja vprašanja o zanesljivosti avtobiografije in vlogi empiričnega avtorja znotraj fikcije. Še preden pa se posvetimo obema tekstoma, moramo podrobneje utemeljiti našo izbiro ter predstaviti nekatere lastnosti avtobiografije.

Fiktivna in pragmatična narava avtobiografije

Čeprav je žanrska določitev avtobiografije predmet dolgotrajne debate, v kateri so se pojavili različni predlogi, od izraza avtobiografska fikcija ali literatura do romana kot avtobiografije (prim. Koron), bomo za naše potrebe izraz avtobiografija uporabljali za različne tekste, »kjer govori osrednji lik o sebi in svojem življenju« (Leben 84). Tako Alenka Koron kot Andrej Leben, ki skušata avtobiografijo žanrsko umestiti, ugotavljata, da je njena glavna lastnost mešanica fikcije in realnosti. Nič čudnega torej, da Leben predlaga metode empirične literarne znanosti kot najbolj učinkovite za analizo avtobiografije. Te namreč raziskujejo tako empiričnega avtorja v vlogi literarnega proizvajalca kot tudi literarne osebe in pripovedovalce kot del literarnega obdelovanja (prim. Leben 89).

V našem primeru so avtor, pripovedovalec in protagonist ista oseba v različnih vlogah znotraj literarnega diskurza. Izkušnja empiričnega avtorja bi morala ostati enaka, čeprav bomo bržkone morali upoštevati možnost, da avtorjev odnos do lastne preteklosti lahko spremeni tudi njegov spomin oziroma izkušnjo, ki je vtisnjena vanj. Pripovedovalca-protagonista pisa-

telj ustvari za vsak tekst posebej, zato je najverjetneje v oziroma na meji literarnega diskurza. Po eni strani ga ustvarja, po drugi pa je del tega istega diskurza, ki ga določa oziroma oblikuje. Ravno zato je avtobiografija posebej primerna za našo analizo, saj se zdi, da sta obe avtorski vlogi, ki ju raziskujemo, posebej poudarjeni in vidni. Zato bi se morali v poteku razprave dokopati do bolj ali manj jasne slike o njuni obliki, lastnostih in mejah.

Basel

Lojze Kovačič se je rodil v Baslu Švicarki in Slovencu. Njegov oče se je odrekel švicarskemu državljanstvu v času ekonomske blaginje in bil zato skupaj z družino izgnan v Jugoslavijo l. 1938. V romanu *Basel* Kovačič opisuje svojo prvo vrnitev v rojstni kraj po šestintridesetih letih izgnanstva. Sprehaja se po ulicah in obiskuje kraje, ki so posebej zaznamovali njegovo otroštvo, ter svojo sestro Margrit, ki Basla ni nikoli zapustila. Roman je pisatelj napisal l. 1983 in izdal šest let kasneje.

Zanimiva podrobnost, ki jo bralec opazi že takoj na začetku, je sprememba pripovedovalca. Roman se namreč začne in konča kot prvoosebna pripoved, ki je sicer običajna za avtobiografijo, a že po prvih nekaj straneh se pripoved spremeni v tretjeosebno, kar ustvari občutek distance med pripovedovalcem in junakom. Pripovedovalec spominja na avktorialnega, ki podaja nekakšno objektivno podobo sveta, opisuje zunanje dogodke in tudi čustvene reakcije junakov, a kmalu ugotovimo, da se pri slednjih omejuje na protagonista, pri ostalih osebah pa opiše le zunanjo akcijo. Z drugimi besedami, izbira tretjeosebnega pripovedovalca v avtobiografski pripovedi, ki bi sicer zahtevala prvoosebno pripoved, daje tekstu vtis objektivnosti.

Druga, izstopajoča lastnost romana, ki bržkone izhaja iz eksistencialističnih in modernističnih pripovednih vzorcev, je pogosta uporaba elipse, kar vodi v nizanje opisov in drobcev spomina, ki ostajajo nepojasnjeni in nereflektirani, zaradi česar delujejo bolj avtentično.

V odlomku o protagonistovih prvih šolskih dneh se pripovedovalec takoj po opisu stavbe, kjer je bila nekoč šola, loti najbolj travmatičnih doživetij. Objektivni in hladni opis stavbe je v popolnem naprotju z mučnimi doživetji – moral se je presesti v prvo vrsto, ker si ni ničesar zapomnil, kasneje mu niso mogli pomagati niti domači, tako da je pristal v razredu pomožne šole (t.i. Hilfsschule).

Place de l'Etoile. Glej, od velikanske, gotski stolnici podobne šole iz rdečih opek z dvema stolpoma, v kateri je mali zvon oglašal odmore, je ostala samo nekakšna majhna, roza izprana sakralna-profana bajta z dvema turenčkoma. (*Basel* 169).

Njegovi spomini na šolo se končajo, ko s spremljevalko zapustita bližino poslopja in se opis premakne v njuno neposredno sedanjost. *Basel* spominja na serijo vtisov iz sedanjosti in preteklosti, ki nima urejevalnega načela ali perspektive, a kljub temu opiše identiteto avtorja-protagonista, o kateri pripovedovalec razmišlja na koncu, ko se z vlakom vrača v Jugoslavijo. Sprašuje se: »Iz katerih izkustev sem se nekaj naučil? In katera so, ki so se odbrala, da bodo podlaga mojemu kesanju?« (*Basel* 187)

Odgovore na ti dve vprašanji je Kovačič iskal v svojem zadnjem projektu – romanoma *Otroške stvari* in *Zrele reči* –, v katerem je skušal potegniti črto pod svoje življenje, a je ostal nedokončan, saj je umrl med pisanjem drugega romana, 1. maja 2004.

Otroške stvari

Otroške stvari so zadnji roman, ki ga je avtor dokončal. Končal ga je marca l. 2003, le dva meseca kasneje pa je izšel pri ljubljanski Študentski založbi. Čeprav je v njem opis pisateljevih prvih izkušenj s šolo kar trikrat daljši kot v *Baslu*, je zgodba skorajda identična. Obstaja nekaj manjših nedoslednosti – npr. v *Baslu* omenja dva učitelja v *Hilfsschule*, v *Otroških stvarih* samo enega; v *Baslu* ni opisal travmatične izkušnje z izgubo nove šolske torbe in na splošno je opis v *Otroških stvarih* bolj podroben, kljub temu pa se bralčevo dožemanje obeh fragmentov razlikuje v večji meri zaradi oblike naracije

Najbolj očitni razliki sta: 1. prvoosebni pripovedovalec, ki je prisoten skozi ves roman in 2. kronološko in kavzalno urejena zgodba *Otroških stvari*. Z drugimi besedami, *Otroške stvari* so bližje tradicionalni avtobiografiji, v kateri »govori osrednji lik o sebi in svojem življenju« (*Leben* 84), in nam skušajo podati sliko sveta, ki je celovit. Nič čudnega, saj je Kovačič ta roman podnaslovil kot *Post scriptum I*, s čimer je nakazal, da je hotel zaočkrožiti svoje življenjsko izkustvo in priti do nekaterih sklepov.

Bolj subtilna, a morda celo pomembnejša lastnost romana je, da Kovačič v svojem pisanju uporablja nize metafor in aluzij, ki napovedujejo nadaljnji potek dogodkov in opisujejo protagonistovo notranje dogajanje. Fragment se tako začne s striženjem pri frizerju, ko se mora junak posloviti od svojih dolgih las in se spremeni v neznanca. Vznemirjenje ob prvem šolskem dnevu kazi pogled na *Hilfsschule* in občutek, da je zaprt v to institucijo proti lastni volji.

To je bil že moj tretji prihod v tuji zavod, v katerega sem moral, a moj pravi odpor se je zares začel šele tukaj. Odvedli so nas v dvostopih v stransko krilo, pred vrata

na hodniku, kjer so bila na koncu še ena, zanemarjena vrata, za katerimi je bila pomožna šola, ki so jo obiskovali sami bebci in pohablenci in v katero se je prišlo iz stranske ulice po lesenih stopnicah. (*Otroške stvari* 126).

Ta občutek ujetosti se sčasoma stopnjuje, saj ima težave z učenjem in ga okolica postopoma izloči, zato začne špricati šolo in hodi na pomole ob reki Ren. Tu lahko ponovno sprosti svojo domišljijo, v kateri najbolj uživa, a obenem ima občutek, da nikoli ne bo mogel postati uspešni člen družbe. Čeprav se zaveda, da lepota in denar ločujeta ljudi med seboj, ve, »da se mi ta želja ne bo nikoli izpolnila, tudi ko bom sto let star in hudo bolan« (*Otroške stvari* 139). Na koncu je izključen iz svojega razreda in poslan v pomožno šolo, kar je zanj veliko ponižanje in razočaranje za vso družino, a junak najde uteho v tem, da med odmori straši svoje nekdanje sošolce. Učenci iz pomožne šole namreč veljajo za neumne in agresivne, zato jim gredo ostali s poti. Na koncu odlomka opiše tudi svojo vrnitev v Basel, ki je bila predmet istoimenskega romana, ter svoje razočaranje ob ponovnem soočenju z enonadstropno stavbo, v kateri je doživel toliko travmatičnih izkušenj.

Avtor in njegove vloge

Vsekakor se zdi, da bi na podlagi dosedanje analize lahko razlikovali med dvema vlogama, v katerih nastopa avtor literarnega dela. Najprej empirični avtor s svojo življenjsko izkušnjo in spominom, ki je bolj ali manj nespremenljiv, in avtorska funkcija, ki organizira posamezen diskurz. V našem primeru gre za Lojzeta Kovačiča, ki opisuje svoja doživetja v prvem razredu osnovne šole, a to stori vsakič na drugačen način. V *Bastu* le beleži vtise in svoje reakcije, saj skuša ugotoviti, koliko se je spremenil v šestintridesetih letih izgnanstva, in morda priti do korenin svoje usode, v *Otroških stvarih* pa ima ves material pred sabo in ga zgolj urejuje, išče vzroke in posledice ter piše lastno kronologijo na način, da bi ji končno našel nek smisel.

Ravno to dejstvo izpodbija našo zgornjo hipotezo o avtorskih vlogah. Brez intence empiričnega avtorja/avtorjev prav gotovo ne more nastati noben tekst. Še več, pri tradicionalnem načinu pisanja – tu puščam ob strani nekatere poskuse avtomatične pisave oziroma ne-avtorskih tekstov, ki nastajajo s pomočjo računalniških algoritmov – avtor izbere osnovne parametre, kot so oblika pripovedovalca, pripovedi itd.

Avtopoetski teksti so bržkone najzanesljivejši vpogled v avtorjev *credo* oziroma način pisanja, zato si oglejmo Kovačičeva razmišljanja, ki so izšla v knjigi *Literatura ali življenje*. Gre za zapis z enakim naslovom, ki ga je

Kovačič predstavil na literarnem festivalu Vilenica l. 1995. Med drugim avtor poda dva razloga za svoje pisanje. »Prvi: da izrazim svojo nesrečo. Drugi: da bi kaosu našel formo, ki bi se mu mogoče prilegala« (*Literatura* 31). Takoj za tem zapiše svoj pisateljski *credo*:

Eno prepričanje me preveva od prvega dne pisanja do danes, tako da lahko rečem, da že ves čas pišem pod njegovim diktatom. Prepričanje namreč, da se literatura nikoli ne sme sramovati pred življenjem. In da mora slaba literatura – posebno kadar si jo zagrešil sam – venomer zardevati pred dobro. (*Literatura* 31).

Lojze Kovačič torej v svojih delih ni le popisoval lastnih spominov, ampak jim je hotel dati obliko, ki bi organizirala kaotičnost njegovega bivanja. Še posebej to velja za njegov nedokončani projekt *Post scriptum I in II*, katerega prvi del so *Otroške stvari*. Glede na to dejstvo lahko rečemo, da empirični avtor ni le vir pripovedi, ampak postavlja tudi njene osnovne parametre (pripovedovalca, protagoniste, vzorec pripovedi). Tu pa smo že na meji literarnega diskura, saj smo ob analizi obeh odlomkov pokazali, da je ravno izbira pripovedovalca vzrok za njune razlike. Uporaba tretjeosebne pripovedovalca in modernistične pripovedne tehnike ustvarjata v *Baslu* občutek distance in objektivnosti, medtem ko prvoosebni pripovedovalec, ki z aluzijami napoveduje razplet dogodkov, ter realistična pripovedna tehnika bržkone ustvarita bolj neposreden čustveni učinek na bralca v *Otroških stvareh*. Na tem mestu moramo upoštevati še eno Kovačičevo izjavo. Pravi namreč, da išče obliko, ki bi se njegovemu bivanju prilegala, in nikoli ne more predvideti, kakšen bo rezultat njegovega pisanja.

Če sledimo Foucaultevemu izvajanju, lahko rečemo, da je vloga empiričnega avtorja v tem, da izbere snov in temo pripovedi ter določi njene osnovne parametre. S slednjim že posega v polje literarnega diskurza, ki pa je v večji meri pod vplivom t.i. avtorske funkcije. Ta nastane ravno z intervencijo empiričnega avtorja v diskurz, a sledi lastnim pravilom. Rezultat je zato nepredvidljiv, še posebej če upoštevamo tudi reakcijo bralca oziroma recepcijo dela. Kovačič ta razmerja opisuje na naslednji način.

Iz oči v oči se soočaš z njimi [bralci], neizprosno te povprašujejo po vsem – zakaj si nekje z epitetom, adjektivi ali zgolj s tonom pridušil to ali ono nesrečo ali godljo – in tako vsakokrat znova zveš, da tako branje kot pisanje izhajata iz istih pobud. Ni dovolj, da spišeš samo dobro knjigo, marveč da si tudi izpišeš srce iz prsi, da pustiš, da zagorijo vse tvoje zvezde. (*Literatura* 27).

Ta vprašanja, ki jih običajno zastavljamo empiričnim avtorjem, bi morali bržkone zastaviti avtorski funkciji, saj je izbira posameznih besed bolj, če ne izključno domena diskurza.

Bi morali torej ponoviti za Barthesom, da »vemo, da moramo, če hočemo pisanju vrniti njegovo prihodnost, preobrniti mit o njem: rojstvo bralca je treba plačati s smrtjo Avtorja« (Barthes 23). Lahko bi si zamislili stroj ali celo človeka, ki bi pisal po vnaprej danih pravilih in dejstvih. Morda so blizu tega poročila tiskovnih agencij. Seveda lahko kdo ugovarja, da je tudi ta pravila nekdo določil in bi ga zato lahko imeli za empiričnega avtorja, a moramo priznati, da je ta subjektivnost manj zaznavna, če ni že dosegla praga zaznavnosti. Kljub temu pa je Barthesov zaključek napačen. Odvisnost od empiričnega avtorja namreč Kovačič uporabi pri obrambi literature pred sodobnimi elektronskimi mediji.

Za vsakim pripetljajem mora biti zmeraj človek, ki tak dogodek predela v sebi, v snu in budnosti, kemično, arhitektonsko, da precizira njegovo težo v jedru in lupini. Vse drugo, česar ne moremo predelati v globini svojega organizma, se nas ne dotakne in ostaja zunaj nas, zgolj informacija, pusto strnišče, ki se z vsako nadaljnjo informacijo širi v nedogled in vseenost. (*Literatura* 12).

Ni torej le empirični avtor odvisen od avtorske funkcije, jezika in bralčeve recepcije, ampak so tudi jezik, informacija, sprejemnik in avtorska funkcija odvisni od empiričnega avtorja. Govorimo lahko torej o soodvisnosti, ki mora biti v središču našega zanimanja.

Zaključek

Zavedam se, da moja razprava postavlja več vprašanj, kot daje odgovorov. Sedaj bi morali raziskati vlogo empiričnega avtorja v tekstih, ki niso avtobiografski, v tekstih z več avtorji, spremembe, ki nastajajo s prevodi, pri katerih pravila ciljnega jezika in pričakovanja bralcev lahko odigrajo pomembno vlogo pri kreiranju pomenov itd. Vse to pa moram pustiti za kako drugo priložnost, saj hočem vsaj delno odgovoriti na svoji izhodiščni vprašanji.

Od kod izhaja začarani krog začetkov in koncev? Je morda posledica heterogene narave našega predmeta?

Kot je pokazala naša analiza, je odgovor pritrdilen. Vračanje krize avtorja je posledica njegove temeljne narave, ki je heterogena. Ker empirični avtor in avtorska funkcija nista zaključena v samih sebi, skušamo zdaj eno zdaj drugo odpraviti kot odvečno in nepotrebno, a ker sta soodvisna, se ju ne moremo nikoli povsem znebiti. Nedvomno se njuno razmerje spreminja od teksta do teksta, od žanra do žanra – v našem primeru avtobiografije ima empirični avtor bržkone dominantno vlogo –, prekrivata pa se na samem pragu diskurza. Slednje seveda dodatno zakomplicira naše raziskovanja, a

ga ne naredi nujno nemogočega. Morali bi iti v drugo skrajnost in raziskati tekste, ki jih proizvajajo stroji, računalniški algoritmi, da bi lahko določili meje avtorske funkcije, poiskali delež empiričnega avtorja, ki spremeni tak tekst v literarno delo, in s tem nadalje raziskali soodvisnost obeh.

Kljub vsemu lahko na tej točki zaključimo, da nas zavest o tem, da ima avtor heterogeno naravo, varuje pred skrajnima rešitvama – razglašanjem njegove smrti ali povzdigovanjem njegovega genija – in nas spodbuja, da raziščemo kompleksnost možnosti, ki se skrivajo med obema.

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Heterobiografija, hipokritika in etika avtorske odgovornosti

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Z utemeljitvami, zakaj »heterobiografija« (fiktivna avtobiografija zgodovinskih oseb) umešča subjekt v središče kompleksnih razmerij med kategorijami zgodovinskega, fiksijskega, kritiškega, pravnega in etičnega, članek obravnava nekatera ključna vprašanja, ki jih odpirajo tovrstna besedila.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / smrt avtorja / De Man, Paul / avtobiografska literatura / heterobiografija / avtorska odgovornost

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V Resnični zgodovini Kellyjeve tolpe (*True History of the Kelly Gang*) Petra Careya razvpiti avstralski izobčenec Ned Kelly napiše dve različici pisma, v katerem pripoveduje o svoji bedi in policijskem pregonu ter nato pripomni: »Tako sem zabredel v ta poklic kot avtor« (318). Eno izmed obeh pisem je za njegovo še nerojeno hčer, da bi lahko slišala to zgodovino neposredno od očeta in spoznala svoj izvor – drugače od Neda, pri katerem je oče otrokom zamolčal zgodbo o sebi in o »veliki deportaciji« in jih pustil »nevedne kot žabje paglavce, izležene v mlakah na luni« (334). Drugo pismo je naslovljeno na Donalda Camerona, člana zakonodajne skupščine, ki naj bi bil, drugače od sodstva in policije, dozdevno pripravljen poslušati Nedovo zgodbo (a je ni). Po eni strani bi ta avtorska drža Nedu omogočila, da posreduje kulturni, zgodovinski in osebni spomin na njegovo irsko-avstralsko družino svoji hčeri in ji tako uzavesti njeno identiteto; po drugi strani bi sodstvo, s tem ko bi slišalo njegovo lastno zgodbo, Nedu priznalo pravno subjektivnost, ki mu je bila odvzeta (bil je postavljen izven zakona, tako da bi ga bil lahko vsakdo brez oklevanja ustrelil). Prvo pismo Neda *moralno* zavezuje k temu, da o sebi pripoveduje resnico, drugo zahteva isto s *pravnega* vidika. To se da razumeti kot le rahlo zapletenejšo različico Lejeuneve »avtobiografske pogodbe«, s katero avtobiografski avtor svojemu bralcu na način pravne pogodbe jamči, da bo njegovo pisanje z referencialnega vidika iskreno, in z lastnim imenom, natisnjениm na platnici knjige, zagotavlja istovetnost avtorja, pripovedovalca in karakterja (Lejeune 26).

Besede Neda Kellyja, govorjene v prvi osebi, v resnici seveda niso Kellyjeve, so Careyve (četudi se opirajo na pismi, ki ju je napisal Kelly sam):¹ (fiktivna) avtobiografija pripoveduje o neki drugi, zgodovinski osebi; imenujem jo *heterobiografija*.² V heterobiografski situaciji, v kateri avtor prvoosebno govori kot nekdo drug, ki ga prepoznamo kot zgodovinsko obstoječo osebo, avtobiografska pogodba več ne velja. Vendar heterobiografija prav s tem, ko ne dopušča, da bi od avtorja (ime na platnici) terjali odgovornost za resničnost prvoosebne pripovedi (pripovedovalca-karakterja), še bolj plastično predstavi to povezavo avtorja z njegovimi besedami. S tem ko Carey za svojega protagonista izbere izobčenca, še bolj poudari pravni kontekst te zaveze (kot nakazuje tudi Lejeuneva pogodba), v katerem nihče ne more govoriti kot nekdo drug, privzeti prvoosebni glas drugega in prevzeti odgovornost za njegove besede. V pravu sta identiteta subjekta in njegova odgovornost za to, kar pove, v neposrednem in izključnem razmerju, utemeljenem na nameri. Z izjemo privilegiranih situacij (gledališče, umetnost) se zdi torej izdajanje za nekoga drugega pravno in moralno sporno. Zanimala me bo prav ta interakcija med pravnim in etičnim ter avtorstvom in avtorsko odgovornostjo, zlasti kolikor zadeva literarno teorijo.

Eden najostrejših ugovorov Lejeunevi avtobiografski pogodbi je zagotovo razprava Paula de Mana *Avtobiografija kot raz-osebitev* («Autobiography as De-facement»). De Man obtoži Lejeunea svojeglavosti («in njegovo trdovratnost imam za svojeglavost, ker ne kaže, da bi bila utemeljena z argumentom ali dokazom» (71)), češ da bralno pogodbo obravnava kot pravno, kognitivno in »reprezentacijsko«, pri čemer nenehno preskakuje s »pogodbene« na ontološko raven in zanemarja dejstvo, da je jezik sistem tropov («Ime na naslovnici ni lastno ime subjekta, ki je zmožen samospoznanja in razumetja, marveč podpis, ki pogodbi podeljuje pravno, nikakor pa ne tudi epistemološko veljavnost.» (71)). Prav v tem kontekstu nastanejo de Manove najbrž najbolj sloveče – celo razvpite – izjave o subjektu. Loti se stališča, po katerem naj bi v avtobiografiji »naivna oblika referenčnosti, reprezentacije in diegeze« obvladovala fikcijskost, in se sprašuje: »Smo res tako prepričani, da avtobiografijo opredeljuje referenca [...]?« Sam dokazuje nasprotno, v najočitnejšem logičnem obratu:

Domišljamo si, da življenje *proizvaja* avtobiografijo kakor posledice akta; mar ne bi mogli enako upravičeno domnevati, da utegne sam avtobiografski projekt proizvajati in opredeljevati življenje in da to, kar pač *dela* pisatelj, dejansko vodijo tehnične zahteve avtoportreta, tako da to v vsakem pogledu določajo sredstva njegovega medija? In če je že mimesis, ki naj bi to regulirala, ena izmed oblik figurativnosti, ali torej referent določa figuro ali je res prav nasprotno: mar iluzija re-

ference ni korelacija figurativne strukture, torej tako rekoč sploh ne več preprosto in nedvoumno referent, marveč nekaj, kar je sorodnejše fikciji, ta pa nato na sebi lasten način vzpostavlja referencialno produkcijo? (*Autobiography* 68–69)

Kot vemo, je de Mana njegova biografija povezala s problemom odgovornosti za besede in ga posmrtno preganjala po odkritju člankov, ki jih je napisal za kolaboracionistični časnik med nacistično okupacijo Belgije.³ Nekateri kritiki so (na primer Corngold) de Manove ponazoritve njegove teorije v »Autobiography as De-facement« z natančnim branjem (*close reading*) podob razkroja in deformiranja v Wordsworthu in figure nasilja in razkosavanja, ki se pogosto pojavljajo v njegovem pisanju, dejansko poprijeli kot znak nespremenjeno nasilne, fašistične čudi. Tako ne preseneča, da je de Man – po igri ironije neprostovoljni protagonist tega paradoksnega povratka biografskega avtorja »v središče odra« (Burke 1) in za koga tudi kot nadvse prikladen primer modernega samoprecenjevanja in zloma – postal bolj ali manj slabo zakrita tema ali pobuda za fikcijo, ki tematizira zločin in akademski prostor. Takšna sta na primer Smrt avtorja (*The Death of the Author*) (1992) Gilberta Adaira in sodobnejši Mrtvaški prt (*Shroud*) (2002) Johna Banvilla.

Adair v strukturi parodičnega detektivskega romana podrobno preigrava in v dobesednost prevaja paradoksalne okoliščine »smrti avtorja« (seveda z referenco na Barthesovo znamenito razpravo s tem naslovom). Protagonist Leopold Sfax, ki komajda kaj zakriva Paula de Mana, avtobiografsko piše o svoji mladosti (prej v Franciji kot Belgiji), o svojih kolaboracionističnih spisih pod nacistično okupacijo, o povojni emigraciji v Ameriko, akademski karieri, tesnobi pred razkritjem, o zavračanju možnosti, da bi avtorja povezovali z njegovimi besedami (»smrt avtorja« je v romanu teorija, ki jo Sfax izumi izrecno za zagotovitev *post-facto* alibija), z rabo prepoznavnega jezika, vključno z nekaj citati, in razmišlja, kako bi bilo to lahko povod za obtožbo nasilja (Sfax pojasnjuje svojo »predanost jeziku«, ki jo je »ne le en razjarjeni komentator« opisal kot »v bistvu fašistično, nabito z ideološkim nihilizmom in amoralnostjo« (102)). Potem ko ga ubije eden od njegovih študentov, Sfax piše še po svoji smrti in s tem biografsko in teoretsko pretvarja »smrt avtorja« v »dobeseden« dogodek.

Vse to odpira vrsto zanimivih vprašanj, kar pa lahko tu le na kratko orišem. Nanaša se na burno debato o tem, ali naj bi biografsko razkrinkanje de Mana bodisi enkrat za vselej jasno predočilo v principu etični manko, kritiško hipokrizijo in teoretsko dvoumnost dekonstrukcijskega projekta; bodisi, nasprotno, naj bi de Manovo kritištvo v povojnih desetletjih predstavljalo nelahko refleksijo njegovih zgodnjih člankov (refleksijo razmerja med jezikom in ideologijo), brez utehe v javni spovedi, v ritualu slovesne odpovedi in oznanitvi preteklih zmot; v dejanju, ki bi sicer razkrilo kriv-

do, nedvomno pa je njegova funkcija očiščenje in dekulpacija. S tem je povezano vprašanje, ali se tisti kritiki, ki so za to, da bi ovrgli teorijo radikalne jezikovne in literarne avtonomije, posegli po avtorjevi biografiji, niso nemara zagnali v nekakšno samoopravičujočo akademsko čistko (privoščljivo, hipokritsko kritištvo, ki ga lahko imenujemo tudi *hipokritika*: z namenom, da ponavlja in promovira svoja lastna načela, kar lahko razumemo kot oportunistično izkoriščanje nemilosti, v katero je padel nekdo drug⁴). Po drugi strani pa so ti kritiki nemara le opozorili na neizogibno etično vez odgovornosti med avtorjem in tem, kar govori, s tem pa na neizbežno slepo ulico ali celo propad tistih teoretskih pozicij, ki to zanikajo. Drugo s tem povezano vprašanje je torej, ali se da razlikovati literarno kritištvo (ki poteka izrecno na tekstu) in biografijo (ta je kontekst de Manovih kontroverznih trditev, da »je s stališča literarne vede premislek o sodobnem in zgodovinskem bivanju piscev izguba časa« (»Form and Intent«, 35) (Forma in namera) in da je »smrt zgolj premeščeno ime za lingvistično trditev« (»Autobiography as De-facement«, 81)) ter ali je to dvoje sploh možno razločiti. To zaporedoma odpre še dve vprašanji: ali veljavnost kake teorije branja zavisi od moralne veličine njenega zagovornika in, kar postavi v žarišče heterobiografska situacija, ali ima avtor (glede na biografsko dejstvo) sploh pravico, da govori kot neko drugo zgodovinsko bitje: da »uzurpiraj« glas in besede nekoga drugega – v najboljšem primeru daje glas drugemu, kakor da bi bil ta glas (nekomu lasten), glas nekoga drugega. Z drugimi besedami, če nekogaršnje besede povezujemo z njegovo biografijo in zahtevo po avtorjevi moralnosti, tvegamo, da nas bo to privedlo do različnih oblik esencializma (je Pound lahko dober pesnik, če je bil fašist? Lahko beli pisatelj predstavlja glas črnega sužnja? – gl. na primer polemiko okrog Izpovedi Nata Turnerja (*The Confessions of Nat Turner*) Williama Styrona). A v tem primeru bi se bilo treba tudi vprašati, kaj če subjekt v svojem življenju nima nobene možnosti za samoreprezentacijo s svojim lastnim glasom – suženj, nepismeni, izobčenec, čigar glasu zakon ne dovoli, da bi ga bilo slišati. Kaj če so njihovi glasovi lahko slišani le skozi glas nekoga drugega?⁵ Carey fiktivno govori kot Ned Kelly, ker Kelly zgodovinsko, pravno ni mogel doseči, da bi ga kdo poslušal njega.

Zahteva, naj avtor sprejme moralno odgovornost, spomni na Sartrovo zahtevo avtorjem brž po vojni. Njihova dolžnost je, da se vprašujejo, kaj bi se zgodilo, če bi vsakdo bral moje besede (14), in se ravnal po tem. Besede so nabiti revolverji (15); niso nedolžne in avtor odgovarja za njihov učinek prav toliko, kolikor je za strel odgovoren tisti, ki pritisne na petelina. Prav nasprotno od de Mana, ki vztraja pri nepremostljivi vrzeli med besedo in svetom, Sartre poziva pisatelja, naj besedam, ki jih je razvrednotila vojna propaganda, povrne smoter, verodostojnost in integriteto, ki temelji na

njihovi referenčnosti (216–19). Prav ta usklajenost besede, sveta in avtorske intence – kar bi lahko imenovali sartrovska »pogodba« – je temelj pisateljeve nepogrešljive dolžnosti.

Oba primera heterobiografije, ki ju obravnavam, se zelo razlikujeta, vendar pomenljivo odsevata drug v drugem. Obsojeni izobčenec, ki je bil usmrčen zaradi svojih zgodovinskih, dejanskih zločinov; čigar avtobiografskega zagovora zakon za časa njegovega življenja ni upošteval, je pozneje prek svojih besed zaslovel kot avstralski nacionalni junak (zavrnitvi, da bi ga slišali zaživa, je sledilo posmrtno čaščenje). In kritik, čigar pisanje je bilo za časa njegovega življenja deležno velike pozornosti, dokler ga njegove besede niso dohitele in začele preganjati ne le njegov ugled, marveč tudi tehtnost njegove kritiške teorije in zamisli iz njegovih avtoriziranih spisov. V obeh primerih gre za molk: v enem primeru avtorjev (de Man se nikdar ni »spovedal«, vsaj ne javno, četudi je pisal o izpovedi (»Izgovori (*Izpovedi*)«; »Excuses (*Confessions*)«). Mnogim za krivdo, večjo od njegovih člankov, velja njegov molk pred javnostjo. V drugem primeru je molk v vrzeli med avtorjem in naslovnikom, ko so Nedove besede naletele na gluha ušesa zakona. Prav iz tega molka pišeta Adair in Carey, ko (v Adairevem primeru parodično) posojata glas zgodovinski osebi-pripovedovalcu-karakterju; in prav ta molk generira heterobiografijo ter etična vprašanja, ki jih zastavlja žanr. Zdi se torej, da je heterobiografska prva oseba mesto, kjer trčijo kategorije literarnega, zgodovinskega, fikcijskega, kritiškega, teoretskega, pravnega in etičnega; da prevprašuje vse našteto in razmerja, ki se vzpostavljajo med njimi.

Adairevo *The Death of the Author* je marsikdo razumel kot posmehljiv napad na de Mana in dekonstrukcijo, navedki z zadnje platnice opisujejo knjigo kot »briljantno črno satiro na kultotvornost kulture« (Philip Howard, *The Times*), kot »resno kritiko zvijačnega intelektualnega gibanja« (Lucasta Miller, *Financial Times*) in »bleščečo satiro literarnokritiške prevzetnosti« – dekonstrukcije, »modnega pristopa«, ki predpostavlja, da besedilo »pomeni to, kar bralec hoče, da pomeni, avtorjeva intenca je nična, besedilo v resnici nima avtorjev« (Anthony Quinton, *The Evening Standard*). Vendar se zdi, da si je kompleksno, izostreno drsenje sloga v precejšnji meri prisvojilo de Manov in dekonstrukcijski nauk – nedoločljivosti, aporije, samorazveljavljajoča se narava literature in kritištvu.⁶ Prav na koncu, ki spodnese vsakršno ambicijo zresnenja, ki bi utegnila životariti v ozadju, Sfax (ki kljub dejstvu, da je bil ubit, v vulgarnem uredničenju »smrti avtorja« nadaljuje s pisanjem) knjigo označi za »neresno, nepopoljšljivo in nepomembno«. Vprašanje, ki se zastavlja, je, ali se te besede metabesedilno nanašajo na (Adairevo) knjigo, ki smo jo ravnokar prebrali, ali na zgodbo v zgodbi (Sfaxovo avtobiografijo). Morda celo na

ključ tega romana s *ključem* (na de Manovo biografijo). Ali Adaireva knjiga oporeka dekonstrukciji in de Manu osebno ali se šali na račun napadov, ki so ju doleteli. Ali je preprosto (čeprav dejansko sploh ne tako preprosto) zabavna, duhovita zgodba o resnem vprašanju, kaj pravzaprav lahko implicira teorija, in o polemiki, ki se je razbesnela okrog »afere de Man«. Vprašanje, ki se zastavlja v iskanju odgovora na te alternative, v bistvu zadeva osebno stališče Avtorja Adaira – pri čemer je pojem »Avtor« rabljen v Barthesovem smislu – kar bi ustrezalo vprašanju: kateri je »pravi pomen« knjige, kaj »hočeta povedati« knjiga in njen Avtor? (Ne da bi pozabili, da Barthes ni »ubil« avtorja kot takega, marveč le specifični konstrukt določenega, prevladujočega, tradicionalnega tipa akademskega kritištva, ki je sebe in svoje interpretacije skušalo avtorizirati prek avtorskega *vouloir dire*.) Ne glede na to, katero osebno stališče se odločimo pripisati Avtorju Adairu (če seveda sploh katero), ta kratek roman izpostavi etični vidik avtorske funkcije, vprašanje pisateljeve odgovornosti za to, kar piše; in roman to počne tako, da izkoristi prav tiste tehnike, ki so se znašle ali vsaj dozdevno znašle na udaru, kakor na primer strukturacijo tekstnih aporij, pretkanost medbesedilnih mrež, obrat principa kavzalnosti, v katerem prvi umor v romanu nastopi kot posledica drugega in se »zakaj« in »zato« rabita kot zamenljiva (48–49, 59, 129).

Imam izreči še kake posmrtno poslednje besede? Pravzaprav ne. Kot sem v svoje razočaranje sprevidel, smrt je zgolj premeščeno ime za lingvistično trditev, in počutim se približno tako, kot da bi hotel vračilo denarja – morda tudi ti, Bralec, ko zapiram tole neresno in nepomembno knjigo. (135)

Smo mi bralci tisti, ki smo se ušteli za pet funtov (cena na platnici moje izdaje v mehki vezavi *The Death of the Author* je £4.99) in v vračilo dobili en peni in ceneno, ničvredno knjigo? Naj zahtevamo denar nazaj? Je vredno zganjati hrup? Ali pa je bilo tveganje navsezadnje vredno tržne vrednosti knjige? (*The Death of the Author* po očitnem mnenju njenih založnikov, da ni vredna ponatisa, že nekaj let ni več na tržišču, spletna cena izvoda iz druge roke pa je v času konference, na kateri sem govorila o teh vprašanjih (*The Author: Who or What is Writing Literature?*, Slovenija, September 2008), dosegla 188.51 funtov. Bralec, ki jo je kupil prvi in jo je bil zdaj pripravljen prodati, je očitno sprejel modro odločitev, ko ni zahteval vračila denarja.) To se zdi več kot dobra šala. Smo nasedli temu, kar je Derrida po izbruhu »de Manove afere«, ob hlastnih obsodbah in celo zmagoslavju nekaterih, označil za *petit jeu médiocre* detektivske fikcije (»Comme le bruit« (214), žanra, ki malone po definiciji temelji na strukturalni in narativni prevari? Je bil resnični zločin – po Adairu – storjen nad našo lahkovernostjo? Ko piše o Poejevem *Umoru v ulici Morgue* (*The Murders in the Rue Morgue*) (eni od

zgodb, ki jih Adairev roman vplete v svojo mnogotero medbesedilnost), Shawn Rosenheim dokazuje, da lahko zgodbo razumemo

kot znak, ki na delčku žanrske celote indeksira še globljo prevaro, s tem ko po pravilu ruši ravnotežje med pripovedno zgradbo suspenza, značilno za detektivsko zgodbo, in često nezadovoljivim razpletom. Bralce detektivske fikcije lahko zmede občutek, da njeno tipično gotsko razkritje ni v sorazmerju z moralno težo, ki jo predpostavlja pripovedna forma tega žanra. Tudi v tem smislu je Poejev orangutan emblem svojih bralcev – njihovo pozornost je torej zavzemala pozornosti nevredna pripovedna dilema – ko ugotovijo, da se je resnični zločin izvršil nad njihovo lahkovernostjo. (68)

Kaj je torej tisti resnični »zločin«? Nas goljufa sama knjiga? Tako pojem zločinski kot pojem kritiško (etimološko sorodni si besedi⁸) implicirata sodbo, ovrednotenje, izbiro, zmožnost razsojanja – Ned Kelly je prosil prav za pravno presojo (diskriminacijo), preden bi se sodstvo odločilo za obsodbo (inkriminacijo). Mar »kritištvu« – literarna, estetska in etična dejavnost, ki se izvršuje nad besedami drugega – od nas ne zahteva, da smo manj prenagljeni, skrbnejši in strožji, če se želimo izogniti *hipokritištvu* (kritištvu s podmiznimi posli – s tem, kar so kritiki Paula de Mana bili pripravljene pripisati njemu samemu)? Z drugimi besedami, kakšna je naša kritiška vloga in odgovornost (Derrida piše, kako »etika« izvršuje celo najreduktivnejša branja, brez ozira na najosnovnejša pravila diskusije: »la lecture différenciée ou l'écoute de l'autre, la preuve, l'argumentation, l'analyse et la citation.« (»Comme le bruit«, 225))

Vrnimo se spet k Ned Kellyju. Besede so lahko nabiti revolverji, kot je rekel Sartre, a kaj, če zgrešijo in tega strela ne sliši nihče. Ned poskuša z avtobiografijo, a ko sodstvo zavrne, da bi ga poslušalo (s tem, ko sodstvo odredi, da se na Neda lahko strelja brez kazni, seveda zakonsko onemogoči Nedu, da bi sploh lahko izrekel svoje besede), se Ned naposled – in dobesedno – zateče k nabiti puški. Jedro problema je najbrž to umanjkanje poslušanja. Ko avtorjeva avtobiografska odgovornost tvega, da ji ne bo uspelo – da dobesedno naleti na gluha ušesa – kadar drugi, ki so mu besede namenjene, noče poslušati, upoštevati, ovrednotiti, razsojati po množstvu njihovih smislov – in ko bi jih morda lahko povezal z biografsko osebo –, slednjič presoditi. Presoja bi bila neizogibno osebna, naključna, možnost zmote ji je inherentna, vendar pa bi se skušala izogniti *hipokritičnosti*. Breme odgovornosti torej ne leži na avtorjevi strani avtobiografske pogodbe, marveč enakovredno zavezuje bralca/poslušalca/kritika.

To se lahko zdi – in v mnogih ozirih tudi je – izpopolnjena različica »rojstva bralca«, ki ga po Rolandu Barthesu generira »smrt avtorja«. V Barthesovem prevpraševanju razmerja med Avtorjem, Tekstom in

Bralcem/Kritikom, Avtor (zdaj avtor ali, bolje, pisar) nič več ne nadzoruje pomena svojega pisanja; in Kritik (zdaj preprosto »bralec«) nič več ne odreja vrednosti in pomenljivosti Dela (zdaj Teksta), marveč je svoboden za udeležbo v igri z njegovo produkcijsko polisemijo. V heterobiografskih besedilih, ki so vsidrana v zgodovino svojih protagonistov, je posledica ponovne vpeljave »odgovornosti« kot osrednje kategorije ta, da se *zahteva* po bralskem/kritičkem sodelovanju v besedilni polisemiji ne nanaša le na njegov smisel (njegov *vouloir-dire*), ki mora ostati odprt, marveč, širše, na to, kar je Barthes izključil: na kompleksnost zgodovinskih in etičnih situacij, na katere se odzivajo tako pisatelji kot bralci. Sama etimologija besede »odgovornost« (iz latinske *respondere*, odgovarjati, odzvati se) predpostavlja odzivanje, odgovarjanje (za), torej dialog in obligacijo. Tudi kot bralci smo pozvani k temu, da sprejmemo svojo ustvarjalno in dialoško odgovornost.

Prevzeti breme avtorske odgovornosti torej predpostavlja, da ga dopolnjuje tudi bralčevo sprejetje tega bremena. V tej zahtevi razločno odmeva Derridajev argument, da »je uho drugega« tisto, ki podpisuje avtobiografsko (*The Ear of the Other* 51). Uho, ki se posodi, se ne sme delati, da je gluho. Adaireva *The Death of the Author* je posvečena »Bralcu« (»To the Reader«). Po eni strani je lahko naslovnik posvetila nebiografski, razosebljena entiteta, ki naj bi se rodila s smrtjo avtorja. Po drugi strani predstavlja težavo, ki jih ima francosko/belgijski kritik z izgovorjavo priporniških zobnikov »th« [θ] in [ð]: tadva postaneta [t] oz. [d], tako da se »the reader« (»bralec«) spremeni v [de'ri:da], torej v anglicizirano (napačno) izgovorjavo Derridajevega priimka, s čimer je knjiga učinkovito posvečena francoskemu filozofu dekonstrukcije.

Ponovno sprejeto prepričanje o avtorski odgovornosti nasprotuje stališčem, kakršno je de Manovo: da »je s stališča literarne vede premislek o sodobnem in zgodovinskem bivanju piscev izguba časa«; ali Barthesova dehistorizacija pisatelja/bralca. Breme enakovredno naloži tudi bralcu/kritiku (in s tem nasprotuje simplifikaciji, da »mora avtor govoriti resnico in stati za svojimi besedami«). Glede na to se zdi, da smo prišli do neke vrste aporije in da tega problema ni mogoče razrešiti s preprostim pojmom integritete.

K obema obravnavanima heterobiografskima besediloma lahko nanizamo naslednje aporije: v primeru Adairea/Sfaxes/de Mana se lahko zadržanost in molk krivca, ki noče *zmanjševati* svoje krivde z udobno uteho v javni spovedi, izkaže za najboljši način ohranjanja lastne integritete. Lahko izhaja iz nenehnega notranjega obračuna z njegovo moralno sporno preteklostjo – ali pa tudi ne: lahko je preprosto primer poskusa, da bi utekel razkritju. Nikdar ne bomo zanesljivo vedeli. Nasprotno se

zmore v primeru Careya/Neda Kellyja integriteta vzpostaviti s tem, ko se nekdo pretvarja, da je nekdo drug – zločinec – in govori z njegovim glasom, tako da po eni strani privzema odgovornost za njegove izjave in po drugi zavrača odgovornost za točnost prvoosebne pripovedi. Tvega celo, da priredi njegovo zgodbo in njeno resnico nadomesti z drugo. V tem primeru odgovornost vzdržuje integriteta fikcije, ki s tem, ko je fikcija, avtorju onemogoči, da bi jamčil za verodostojnost svojih besed – to ne pomeni nujno laži ali izkrivljanja dejstev, lahko pa tudi: nikdar ne bomo zanesljivo vedeli.

S to nerešljivo ambivalenco ali/ali, ki se končuje z »nikdar ne bomo zanesljivo vedeli«, zaključujem razmislek o »tem poslu kot avtorju«, saj ne morem ponuditi nobenega dokončnega izhoda iz slepe ulice avtorske ali bralčeve odgovornosti; lahko zgolj predstavim nepresegljive aporije, ki onemogočajo preproste (etične in estetske) rešitve tako kočljivih in različnih problematik, kot so pravne, epistemološke in ontološke implikacije »avtobiografske pogodbe«, tradicionalne podmene o premoči resnice nad fikcijo in premoči priznanja nad molkom – vsi ti vidiki se zdijo heterogeni, vendar jih združuje heterobiografsko besedilo. »Nikdar ne bomo zanesljivo vedeli«: naj nas to ne pripelje do brezupne vdaje ali k lahkotni opustitvi ideje o odgovornosti, temveč naj omogoči, da jo dojamemo kot še bolj bistveno in eno osrednjih problematik literarnega kritištva.

OPOMBE

¹ To je pismo Donaldu Cameronu MLA (ki je v Zakonodajni skupščini nasprotoval Felonovemu »Zakonu o aretaciji«) s prošnjo za poravnavo krivice, ki je po Kellyjevih trditvah doletela njega in njegovo družino, pismo pa ni bilo objavljeno v časnikih, kot je upal Kelly. Drugo je osemindeset strani obsežno Jerilderieško pismo, ki ga je nameraval zasebno natisniti v Jerilderieju, kjer je oropal lokalno banko (tudi ta načrt je propadel, ker je tiskarju uspelo pobegniti, pismo pa je bilo pozneje predano policiji). Rokopis Cameronovega pisma je izgubljen, pismo obstaja le v kopiji, ki jo je napravil duhovnik. Izvirnik Jerilderieškega pisma je v victorijski Državni knjižnici, kjer hranijo tudi slavni Kellyjev oklep). Faksimile s transkripcijo je dostopen na: <http://www.slv.vic.gov.au/collections/treasures/jerilderie-letter/jerilderie00.html> (2. 2. 2009). Spisek in transkripcije vseh znanih pisem in beležk Neda Kellyja je najti na: <http://www.ironoutlaw.com/html/writings.html> (2. 2. 2009).

² Ta pojem sem uporabila npr. že v »'Allowing it to speak out of him': The Heterobiographies of David Malouf, Antonio Tabucchi and Marguerite Yourcenar.«

³ To lahko preberemo v: de Man: *Wartime Journalism*. Drugi zvezek izdaje, *Responses on Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism* v uredništvu Hamacherja, Hertza in Keenana, je zbirka mnogih odzivov na te članke, tako v podporo avtorju kot v njegovo obsodbo.

⁴ Jacques Derrida naznani: »il s'agit toujours de sauter sur une occasion [...] On ne résiste plus à la tentation d'exploiter à tout prix une aubaine« (»Comme le bruit«, 220).

⁵ Marguerite Yourcenar je *Hadrijanove spomine* (Mémoires d'Hadrien) (še en primer heterobiografije) opisala kot »portrait d'une voix« (527).

⁶ Tudi biografsko dejstvo, da je Adaire prevedel *La disparition* Georgesa Pereca kot *A Void*, dokazuje njegovo zanimanje za kompleksne in izzivalne etične, literarne in tehnične probleme.

⁷ Najvišja cena, ki jo je bilo v času tega pisanja najti na spletu, je znašala £59.10, kar je še vedno precejšen prirast k prvotni ceni.

⁸ »Zločin«, lat. *crimen-criminis* (sodni sklep, obsodba, obtožba), iz osnove *cernere* (odbirati, razlikovati, odločiti); »kritik«, gr. *krinesthai* (iz tega: *crinein* (oddeliti, odločiti, razsoditi), oboje z indoevropskim korenem **(s)q(e)rei*.

POJASNILO K SLOVENSKEMU BESEDIŠČU

Problematika se razteza med (avtobiografsko) etično kategorijo iskrenosti, ki jo lahko izraža fraza »stati za svojimi besedami«, in pravno kategorijo govorčeve (sodne) odgovornosti za njegove izjave. Vmesnost tega položaja v heterobiografiji skuša povzeti izrazni »kompromis« med obema kontekstoma, etičnim in pravnim: biti odgovoren za svoje besede.

Naslov de Manove razprave »Autobiography as De-facement« je prevedla Alenka Koron (195). Gl. Koron: »Roman kot avtobiografija«. *Slovenski roman. Obdobja 21*. Ljubljana: Center za slovenščino kot drugi/tuji jezik, 2003. 191-200.

Naslov eseja »Form and Intent« se nanaša na poglavje »Forma in namera v ameriškem novem kritištvu« (46) v: Paul de Man: *Slepota in uvid*. Prev. Jelka Kernev Štrajn. Ljubljana: LUD Literatura, 1997. 33-46.

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Drugost in vprašanje avtoritete

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Primerjave med kulturami odpirajo nove perspektive. Pričujoči članek je primerjalna razprava o Zahodnih Evropejcih, o tem, kako so se sporazumeli z drugostjo staroselcev Novega sveta in kako so kot avtorji problematizirali svojo lastno avtoriteto ter pogled na svet. Reprerzentacija staroselcev je tema, ki se nenehno obnavlja. Ta reprerzentacija in 'prevod'sta pogosto vključevala tako premoč nad drugimi, »barbarskimi« kulturami – ali sporazumetje z njimi – kakor tudi dediščino tamkajšnje predhodne vladavine ali tekmeca. Problemi, kot so vprašanje pristnosti pričevanj, retorična pogodba med piscem in bralcem ter tipologija Starega in Novega sveta me zanimajo z vidika resnice in laži, o čemer se morajo zgoditi avtorji in bralci popotnih poročil. To imamo lahko za etnologijo branja ali za uporabo etnologije, da bi uvideli drugost znotraj njih ali med jazom in drugim dramatično tenzijo, kakršno so izkušali pisci in bralci nekoč in jo izkušajo danes.

Ključne besede: literatura in ideologija / zahodna kultura / ameriški staroselci / kulturni imperializem / drugost

UDK 316.7

Primerjave med kulturami običajno odprejo nove perspektive. V razpravi se nameravam lotiti vprašanja, kako so zahodni Evropejci pristopali k drugosti avtohtonih prebivalcev novega sveta (obeh Amerik) in kako je ta proces preobrazil njihovo dožemanje avtoritete avtorja ter njihov pogled na svet. Reprerzentacija domorodcev je ponavljajoča se tema, ki skupaj s »prevodom«, ki jo nujno spremlja, pomeni sprejetje ali asimilacijo drugih, »barbarskih« kultur ter obenem gradi na dediščini lastnega imperija. V osebnostih, kot so bile Kolumb, Caminha, Las Casas, Vitoria, Montaigne, Léry, Raleigh, Shakespeare, Aphra Behn in drugi, so se sprožala vprašanja o lastni avtoriteti ob njihovih srečanjih z domorodci, sužnji in ostalimi skupinami, ki so predstavljale drugost v obeh Amerikah. Familiarizacija in potujitev se v posameznih tekstih dogajata sočasno. Opisi običajev, žensk in kanibalov se naslanjajo na tradicijo, ki so jo začrtali Herodot, Plinij, Tacit in drugi. Teoretiki, kot sta Tzvetan Todorov in Michel de Certeau, so raziskali drugost v kontekstu potovanj v novi svet, sam pa se bom poskušal približati temu problemu z bolj primerjalnega stališča. Predmet razprave bom razširil preko do sedaj začrtanih meja Cortésa in Montaigna.

Bolj kot z vprašanji resnice in laži, ki se jim avtorji v teh srečanjih niso mogli izogniti, se bom ukvarjal z retoričnim dogovorom med piscem in bralcem ter tipologijo starega in novega sveta. Ta pristop bi lahko imenovali etnologija branja ali pa uporaba etnologije pri raziskavi notranje drugosti, dramatične napetosti med sebstvom in drugim, ki ga pisci in bralci nenehno doživljajo. Še preden pa se lotim teh vprašanj, se moram nekoliko podrobneje ustaviti pri konceptu drugosti.

Ozadje

Drugost je nekaj, kar lahko spoznamo v samih sebi. V trenutkih, ko se zavemo naše odtujenosti od narave, negotovosti življenja in gotovosti smrti, smo odtujeni sami sebi. Tudi če ne gremo nikamor, vidimo življenjski krog, a sami stojimo izven te narave.

Če bi živeli v omejenem prostoru in opazovali naravo, bi videli rojstvo in smrt, mir in nasilje. Enako velja za opazovanje ljudi posamič ali v skupinah. Nič od tega ni novo, a velja si zapomniti, da drugost ni le nekaj eksotičnega, ampak predstavlja aspekt vsakega od nas.

Ko se otrok nauči brati, doživi svet v drugi obliki, obliki tiska in jezika. Otroci prve mesece svojega življenja doživljajo zunanost, ne da bi jo bili sposobni artikulirati z besedami. Slišijo zvoke in jih imitirajo ter jih pripisujejo posameznim pojavom. Sčasoma sestavijo besede, stavke in zgodbe v govoru in pisavi. Naučijo se, da besede odsevajo svet simbolično, ne da bi same posedovale enako materialnost.

Na nek način nas skuša jezik preko opisa in razumevanja integrirati v svet, obenem pa nas od sveta tudi odtuja. Če bi bile namreč naše misli in predstave eno s svetom, ne bi potrebovali jezika kot posrednika. Jezik je torej na eni strani orodje, s katerim razumemo svet okrog nas, na drugi pa način, kako izraziti tujost slednjega. Predpostavimo, da imamo opravka z otrokom, ki se je v zahodni kulturi naučil brati ob vsega dveh knjigah, ki bi v zadnjih 500 letih najverjetneje bile *Biblija* in knjiga grških ali rimskih mitov. Za naše potrebe so to lahko Ovidove *Metamorfoze*.

V teh dveh knjigah, ki jih otrok bržkone prebira v skrajšanih verzijah, bo spoznal pripoved o padcu Adama in Eve, ki sta jedla od drevesa spoznanja, o dobrem in zlem in o različnih transformacijah življenja in smrti med grškimi in rimskimi smrtniki. Te spremembe mu kažejo, da je življenje spremenljivo, negotovo in segmentirano, a transformacije v *Bibliji* in pri Ovidu nenehno skušajo preseči ta židovsko-krščanski in poganski občutek kaosa. Pri Ovidu se ljudje transformirajo celo v živali ali rastline, da bi ušli smrti ter odtujenosti od sveta, kot se to zgodi v zgodbah o Filomeni in Adonisu.

V *Bibliji* je zgodba o izgonu Adama in Eve iz raja pravzaprav zgodba o odtujenosti od narave, saj prva človeka šele po svojem grehu spoznata občutek sramu in dojameta svoji telesi kot nekaj, kar je ločeno od ostalega stvarstva. Kljub temu je *Biblija* božanska komedija, čeprav opisuje številne človeške padce in tragedije v smislu *de casibus*. Oblika *Biblije* je hkrati tipološka in komična. Tipologija se vzpostavlja med rajskim vrtom in novim Jeruzalemom, Jezus iz Nazareta je novi Adam, križ je nova verzija drevesa spoznanja, s katerega sta bila skušana Adam in Eva. Vendar pa je Kristusova smrt na križu, ki je narejen iz drevesa in spominja na drevo, smrt, ki odreši ljudi vseh grehov, večne krivde in smrti.

Človekov izgon iz raja je nekakšna odtujitev od samega sebe, s čimer tujost, vsaj v zahodnoevropski kulturi in krščanstvu posebej, postane sestavni del osebnosti posameznika. Sram in krivda tako vstopita v otrokov svet bržkone po na pol zavestnem načrtu odraslih.

Ponovitev prapadca Adama in Eve je puberteta, v kateri se seksualni občutki, ki so pri otroku prisotni v milih in prikritih oblikah, intenzivirajo. To seksualno prebujenje močno spominja na zavedanje lastnega telesa pri Adamu in Evi, ko sta jedla od drevesa spoznanja. Telo postane simbol za sramoto, kar je seveda močno problematično ob močni seksualni sli. Kako lahko to odtujeno telo poišče drugo telo, da bi ustvarilo novo telo, ki bo ravno tako rojeno nedolžno, a zaznamovano z izvirnim grehom? Prav Kristus, ki je bil rojen iz človeka in z razvojem teologije dojet kot sin božji, in njegova žrtev odrešita človeka izvornega upora proti Bogu, ki je Adama in Evo stal enotnega sveta, v katerega ju je Bog postavil.

Padec postane stvar spoznanja (epistemologija) in biti (ontologija) ter ima moralno poanto (etika). Tudi izdaja in križanje Kristusa je dejanje ljudi proti ljudem, v kasnejših tolmačenjih ljudi proti Bogu. S križanjem sina božjega, ki je bil rojen iz človeka, Pilat, predstavnik politične moči rimskega imperija, omogoči nasilne delitve med ljudmi. To je zlo, ki izhaja iz greha. Paradoksalno je prav ta greh način, na katerega Bog odreši človeštvo njegovih grehov, v tipološkem smislu pa gre za nekakšno ponovitev zahteve Abrahamu, naj žrtvuje Izaka. Drugi prihod Kristusa ob poslednji sodbi je možnost sprave, ponovne enosti za tiste, ki bodo odrešeni. Prekleti bodo šli seveda v pekel večne alienacije, medtem ko bodo rešeni postali del božanske komedije, v kateri bodo drugost, razcepljenost subjekta in greh odpravljeni.

A tu je tudi poganska stran naše kulture. Tako bo otrok nenehno fantaziral o užitkih telesa in željah, ki jih bodo hoteli odrasli vsaj omejiti, če ne že popolnoma zatreti. Seks, vsaj izven zakona, postane negativno drugo, ki ga etiketirajo kot greh, sramoto in zablodo. Za poganske bogove, npr. Zevsa, ki se je spremenil v laboda, da je lahko spal z Ledo, pa

so seks in seksualne osvojitve nekaj povsem drugega. Za boga je to slava, kot jo razume W. B. Yeats v *Ledi in labodu*, a je hkrati tudi izključno njihov privilegij, saj je Tarkvinovo posilstvo Lukrecije, čeprav gre za kralja, kaznovano z njegovim izgonom iz rimske monarhije in zmago republike.

Lukrecija se ubije od sramu in Brutus, ne pa njen mož Kolatin, v Shakespearovi pesmi *Posilstvo Lukrecije* maščuje njegov zločin. Vendar bralec Shakespearovega teksta ne dobi le moralne lekcije in obsodbe dejanja, ampak tudi dobršno mero retorike zapeljevanja, s katero avtor opiše Tarkvinovo slo. Lukrecija se čuti nepopravljivo ranjena in postane simbolna žrtev za Rim, obenem pa gre za povsem ideološki pogled na posilstvo in seksualnost, ki naj odtuji ženske od njih samih, čeprav za to ne nosijo nobene krivde. In tako mladi, bržkone pa tudi starejši bralec vidi, da lahko postanemo sami sebi drugi, odtujeni tistemu, kar smo, hočemo biti ali o nas pravijo drugi.

V *Bibliji* in Ovidu je znanje od samega začetka povezano s seksualnostjo. Bogovi zapeljujejo ženske in Eva se vda skušnjavi, da bi jedla od drevesa spoznanja. Skušnjava je povsod in pripoved, teologija ter družba so strukturirane na ta način, da posameznika nenehno opozarjajo na njegove pomanjkljivosti, padec in razkol. Nedolžnost in izkušnja predstavljata v tej konstelaciji drugi konec nasprotja užitek-nevšečnost. Odkritje telesa je, kot vsako odkritje, prehod od nevednosti k vednosti. Kolumbovo odkritje Amerike pogosto prikazuje nasprotje med pokritimi telesi Evropejcev in nagimi telesi domorodcev, pri katerih sta želja in nedolžnost še pomešana.

Koliko gre za spoznanje in koliko za prikrivanje, je težko reči, saj je odgovor odvisen od zornega kota. Otrok je del narave, a hkrati je od nje odtujen. Kultura ga uči, naj se uresniči v svojem telesu, a ga obenem obteži s sramom nad telesom in njegovo seksualnostjo. Poganska in krščanska telesa so v sebi razcepljena in tudi v ostalih kulturah lahko najdemo delitve v drugačnih konfiguracijah. Sam se bom omejil na etnografsko drugost, ki ima največ opraviti s potovanjem in spoznavanjem ljudstev, čeprav si velja zapomniti, da je naš hipotetični otrok, ki je komaj kam potoval in je bral le dve knjigi, že tujec sam sebi. Pri tujcih v tuji deželi so ti občutki še veliko močnejši in ravno ti bodo predmet mojega nadaljnega razpravljanja.

Biti tam in videti na lastne oči

Veliko smo razpravljali o otroštvu in o njem se da reči, da se lastnosti, ki mu pritičejo, s časom spreminjajo. V 19. stoletju je Victor Hugo zapisal: »Krištof Kolumb je odkril le Ameriko. Sam sem odkril otroka« (citirano po Heywood 26). Ta izjava izhaja iz romantičnega pogleda na nedolžnost kot

lastnost otrok, ki jo najdemo tudi pri Williamu Wordsworthu in Williamu Blaku – slednji jo je opisal v *Songs of Innocence and Experience*. Tukaj se bomo ukvarjali s čudenjem in pričevanji odraslih nad neznanimi prostori, kot jih je opisal Herodot.

Doživljanje neznanih pokrajin je Herodot opisal v svojih *Historijah*. V teh je podoben etnologu, ki razpravlja o navadah drugih. Na nekem mestu razpravlja o razpadu običajnih spolnih vlog pri skupini grških žensk. V četrti knjigi opisuje amazonke in poudarja njihovo drugačnost:

Zdaj pa še nekaj besed o Sauromatih. Ko so se Heleni bojevali z Amazonkami (Skitje jim pravijo Oiropata, kar bi se po naše reklo ubijalke mož; kajti oior pomeni pri njih moža, pata pa ubiti) in so, kakor gre glas, po zmagoviti bitki ob Termodontu z ujetnicami, kolikor so jih mogli dobiti, na treh ladjah odpluli proti domu, so jih ženske na širokem morju napadle in poklale. (4.110)

Gre za ženske, ki lahko nadvladajo moške na brezobziren način, kar Herodot pojasnjuje z njihovim imenom – uničevalke moških. Čeprav po smrti Grkov ne vedo ne kod ne kam, ponovno prevzamejo kontrolo, ko pridejo do Kremnov: »Ugrabile so prvo čredo konj, ki so naletele nanjo, se okonjile in ropale po skitski pokrajini.« (4.110) Po pokolu začnejo amazonke pleniti, kar Herodot opiše v naslednjem odlomku: »Skitje si stvari niso umeli razložiti. Začudeno so se spraševali, od kod so se vzeli ti tujci: jezik, obleka, pleme – vse jim je bilo neznano.« (4.111) Čudenje je del soočanja z neznanim. Skiti sklepajo o njihovi naravi na podlagi njihovih dejanj in ukrepajo v skladu s tem: »Pač pa so jih imeli za mlade moške enake starosti in so se spoprijeli z njimi.« (4.111) Na bojišču seveda spoznajo svojo zmoto, saj najdejo nekaj povsem drugega, kar Herodot izrazi z veliko mero olepševanja: »Po bitki jim je prišlo nekaj padlih v roke in tako so spoznali, da so bile ženske.« (4.111) Njihova reakcija je konvencionalna v tem smislu, da najprej pomislijo na spoštljiv odnos, ki ga dolgujejo nasprotnemu spolu, in jih ne prevzame želja po dominaciji preko fizičnega in seksualnega nasilja. »Zategadelj so sklenili, da jih nikakor ne bodo več pobijali, temveč poslali svoje mlade moške k njim, in sicer toliko, kolikor je bilo Amazonk.« (4.111) Njihova strategija izkorišča privlačnost in ravnovesje: »Če bi jih napadle, naj bi se ne upirali, temveč pobegnili; kadar bi odnehale, pa naj bi zopet prišli ter v njih bližini postavili tabor.« (4.111) Njihov umik in potem vrnitev, da bi si bili bliže je naravnost komična. Herodot eksplicitno poudarja ta paritveni ritual: »To so Skitje sklenili zato, ker bi bili radi imeli otroke od njih.« (4.111) Na koncu se Skiti poklonijo tem ženskam s svojo željo, da bi preko njih obnovili svoje ljudstvo. Prav njihova drugačnost jih naredi opazne.

Nenavadnost vodi k zблиževanju, saj amazonke, ki ugotovijo, da jim mladci nočejo nič hudega vsak dan zблиžujejo oba tabora in sčasoma spo-

znajo: »Mladci niso imeli, prav kakor Amazonke, nič drugega nego orožje in konje ter so njim enako živeli on lovu in ropu.« (4.112) Drugi postane enak ali vsaj podoben.

Veliko pred Kolumbom, ki je zapisal, da je z domorodci komuniciral s pomočjo govora in znakov, je podobno situacijo opisal Herodot: »In ko je eden nekoč zalotil eno na samem ter jo naskočil, se ni branila, ampak je dovolila, da jo je vzel. Govoriti sicer ni mogla – saj se nista razumela –, pač pa mu je s kretnjami naročila, naj pride drugi dan na isti kraj in privede še koga s seboj – pri tem je s prsti kazala, naj bosta dva, češ da bo tudi ona privedla prijateljico.« (4.113) Jezik znakov je prvi način komuniciranja s tujci, saj predvideva skupno komunikacijo in zaupanje: »Naslednjega dne je poiskal isti kraj v družbi tovariša in našel tam svojo Amazonki, ki je že čakala nanj, in z njo še neko drugo. Ko so drugi mladci to videli, so se tudi sami sprijaznili z ostalimi, da so jim bile na voljo.« (4.113) Njen pristanek je dokaz ljubezni, ki postane simbol srečanj in zveze med Skiti in Amazonkami.

Iz te različnosti zraste nova kultura enakih. Poslej so živeli v skupnem taboru in slednji je imel tisto za ženo, s katero se je bil združil ob prvem srečanju.« (4.114) Vendar je zanimivo, da je Herodot pripisal lastnost drugosti prav ženskam. »Govorici žena se moški niso mogli priučiti, pač pa so ženske privzele jezik svojih mož.« (4.114) Brez ženk komunikacija ne bi bila mogoča. »Ko so se mogli že sporazumevati med seboj, so možje dejali Amazonkam: 'Mi smo iz dobrih družin in dovolj premožni, da nam ni treba živeti dalje tako. Zategadelj se hočemo vrniti k svojcem in prebivati med njimi, a tudi tam boste ve naše žene in nobene druge.« (4.114) A ko možje pristanejo na to, da bodo Amazonke njihove edine žene, podcenijo njihovo drugačnost, saj mislijo, da jih bodo lahko brez večjih problemov prilagodili svojemu načinu življenja. Herodot poudari to različnost: Amazonke pa so jim odvrnile: 'Me bi ne mogle prebivati med vašimi ženskami, ker imamo druge navade mimo njih: me smo vajene z lokom streljati pa kopja metati pa na konju sedeti, na ženska dela se pa ne razumemo.'« (4.114) Njihova narava bojevnic in lovcev ponovno stopi v ospredje. Izpostavljanje tega problema nakazuje, da se bodo morali Skiti prilagoditi njihovi naravi. »'Z vašimi je drugače: one presedevajo vse dni na vozech in opravljajo ženska opravila, ne hodijo na lov kakor me, pa tudi nikamor drugam ne.'« (4.114) Moški se bodo morali odreči spolnim vlogam, s katerimi so živeli do tedaj. »'Zato bi nikakor ne mogle živeti v slogi z njimi. Če nas torej hočete imeti za žene in dokazati, da mislite pošteno z nami, dobro, pa pojdite k svojim staršem ter si dajte izplačati dedino, potem pa se vrnite k nam in živeli bomo sami zase!'« (4.114) Ta oblika doma in družbenega dogovora je nov način sobivanja. Skiti morajo pustiti svoje tradicionalne vrednote in sprejeti drugost v sebi in svoji družbi.

Vendar pa se Amazonke ne zadovoljijo s tem, saj od svojih mož, ko se vrnejo, zahtevajo: »Me mislimo s skrbjo in strahom na to, da bi morale bivati v teh krajih, nekaj zato, ker smo vas odtrgale od vaših očetov, nekaj, ker smo tako grdo opustošile vašo deželo. Ker pa že hočete, da bodimo vaše žene, nujte, odidimo skupno iz te pokrajine ter se naselimo na oni strani Tanaisa!« (4.115) Možje se uklonijo tudi tej zahtevi, njihov novi dom postane tujina.

Po prečkanju reke se ustalijo v treh dneh. Herodot predstavi njihovo zgodovino in tradicijo: »Od tistih časov do danes so ženske Sauromatov ohranile stari način življenja, da jahajo na lov skupno z možmi, pa tudi same, da hodijo na vojsko in se oblačijo kakor moški.« (4.116) Ni mogoče govoriti o spremembah v identiteti Amazonk oziroma njihovi asimilaciji v kulturo Skitov, saj so same bojevniki, ki določajo pogoje bivanja in običaje ter zavračajo konvencionalne spolne vloge. Herodot te situacije ne opiše v pretekliku, kar bi sicer pričakovali pri mitu, ampak kot del neposredne sedanjosti, čeprav le poroča o nečem, kar so videli drugi.

Zaradi svojega etnografskega pogleda Herodot odlomek o Amazonkah konča z ugotovitvami o jeziku in navadah: »Sauromati govorijo po skitsko, vendar slej ko prej popačeno, ker so se bile Amazonke slabo naučile jezika.« (4.117) Čeprav so Amazonke boljši lingvisti in se naučijo jezika Skitov, se ga ne morejo naučiti pravilno, tako da svojim potomcem predajajo nek popačen jezik. Pri tem je seveda zanimivo, da moški, katerih materni jezik je bil skitščina, niso mogli tega popraviti, saj bi upravičeno pričakovali, da se bodo njihovi potomci naučili maternega jezika tudi od njih. Herodot je mojster detajlov: »Pri njih se ne omoži nobeno dekle, preden ni ubila sovražnega moškega.« (4.117) To je prav gotovo nenavadna zahteva v grškem ali skitskem kontekstu, bolj razumljiva pa se zdi za družbo Amazonk, ki so bile ogrožene s strani moških. Zanimivo je, da Herodot tega dejstva ne komentira, ampak dodaja naslednjo podrobnost: »mnoge ostanejo vse življenje stare device, ker ne morejo ustreči običaju.« (4.117) Drugost je v tem primeru prepoznana in sprejeta v družbenem kontekstu Amazonk, ki imajo svoje može, a jih morajo kljub temu pobjati. Ta lastnost nove družbe je paradoks, ki pa ne preraste v konflikt dokler možje, kot pri Herodotu, sprejemajo dane zahteve. Moški se uklonijo in sklenejo kompromis, zaradi katerega se lahko zvežejo z Amazonkami. Herodot ne opisuje nobenega nasprotovanja oziroma upora ranjene moškosti ali pa žensk, ki ne bi hotele biti ženske. Amazonke so čudežne in nenavadne, a ravno zaradi tega opazne. Drugost ni nujno strašljiva, da bi bila vredna opisa.

Tudi Kolumb se je srečal z ljudmi, ki so imeli drugačne navade in način oblačenja. V zapisih o svojih prvih srečanjih z avtohtonimi ljudstvi, pravi:

»Prebivalci tega otoka in ostalih, ki sem jih odkril in o katerih imam informacije, hodijo naokrog nagi, kot jih je rodila mati narava, čeprav se nekatere ženske pokrivajo z listom rastlin ali bombažno tkanino, ki jo izdelujejo za ta namen« (6). Tu opisuje nagost kot neke vrste pogum in njeno pokrivanje kot znak spodobnosti, podobno kot ob Evini reakciji, ko je jedla od drevesa spoznanja. Svojo pozornost kasneje preusmeri na načine bojevanja: »Nimajo železa in jekla ali drugega orožja, prav tako pa niso usposobljeni za ravnanje z njim, a ne zato, ker ne bi bili dovolj močni, ampak ker so presenetljivo plašni« (6). Njihov karakter je upogljiv in mirljuben, povsem nasproten karakterju Amazonk pri Herodotu. Kolumb jih opisuje, kot ljudi, ki »nimajo nobenega orožja mimo lesenih palic, na katere pritrdijo priostreno ost. Poleg tega pa si še teh ne upajo uporabiti« (6). Njihovo orožje Kolumba ne ogroža, kar je razumljivo, če pomislimo na tehnologijo, s katero je razpolagal.

Kolumbov tekst ima etnografsko naravo, saj včasih opisuje stvari, kot jih vidi. Piše o ženskah, pošastih, lastnini, rasi in klimi. Za moške zapiše, da so večinoma, z izjemo kralja, monogamni, za lastnino pa se zdi, da je skupna. Čeprav je pričakoval, da bo srečal pošasti, mora priznati, da so avtohtoni prebivalci daleč od tega (14). Vendar pa Kolumb poroča tudi o stvareh, ki jih ni videl, o zvezi med kanibali in Amazonkami, tistimi, ki jedo ljudi, in tistimi, ki lahko živijo brez moških: »Sam nisem srečal nobenih pošasti in tudi nimam takšnih poročil, razen prebivalcev otoka Quaris, drugega na naši poti v Indijo, ki povsod zbuja strah in jedo človeško meso« (16). Strah pred kanibali se meša z bojznijo pred ženskimi bojevicami, ki Kolumba plašijo veliko bolj kot so nekoč Herodota: »Ti imajo odnose z ženskami z otoka Matinino, ki smo ga prvega odkrili na naši poti in na katerem ni nobenega moškega« (16). Kolumb nadaljuje v nekakšnem etnološkem tonu. Njegov jezik postane bolj stvaren in distanciran. Te ženske ne opravljajo ženskih opravil, ampak uporabljajo loke in puščice, ki sem jih že opisal, in se oborožijo z bakrenimi ploščami, ki jih imajo veliko« (16; prim. Hart 1994). Podobno kot Herodot tudi Kolumb skuša opisati druge kulture in spol ter hkrati vzpostaviti avtoriteto lastnega diskurza. Herodotova tradicija predstavlja Kolumbu tekstualno tradicijo, ne glede na to, ali je šlo za zavestno intertekstualnost, ki postavlja njegovo pisanje, čeprav je nekaj povsem novega – gre za Ameriko, ki je bila na novo odkrita –, v znan okvir. Obstajajo pa seveda tudi druga pričevanja očitcev.

Pedro Álvares Cabral je še en dober primer. Potoval je v Afriko, Azijo in Južno Ameriko, kjer naj bi Brazilija, ki so jo Portugalci zasedli v velikonočnem tednu l. 1500, postala njihova osrednja kolonija. Pero Vaz de Caminha, član Cabralove posadke, opisuje dogodke na potovanju. Caminha opisuje podobne teme kot Kolumb. Izpostavlja nedolžnost, za-

radi katere so Indijance zlahka pokristjanjevali, njihovo goloto, zlato in druge znake bogastva ter božjo voljo in odrešitev. Še preden je Cabral odplul iz Brazilije v Indijo, je Caminha, ki je bil njegov pisar, pisal kralju Manuelu in mu opisal njihovo bivanje v Braziliji. Caminha, ki je plul na Cabralovi ladji, pravi, da ubira srednjo pot: »naj njegovo visočanstvo spregleda mojo nevednost in naj zaupa, da bom zapisal le tisto, kar sem sam videl in mislil ter ne bom ničesar povečeval ali pomanjševal, da bi dejstva ublažil ali jih naredil bolj privlačna« (Caminha 5). Sebe predstavi kot vernega očividca, kar je tedaj veljalo za avtoriteto (prim. Caminha, Hart 2003). Naslednji primer pričevanja je zapis Binota de Paulmier de Gonnevilla, katerega opis potovanja v Brazilijo l. 1504 je prvi tovrsten tekst v francoščini. Tudi on se srečuje s podobnimi težavami kot Kolumb. Kolumb piše, da so Indijanci imeli Špance za bogove, de Gonneville govori o Francozih kot o angelih. Podobno kot pri Bernalu Diazu, ki je opisal Cortesov pohod, tudi de Gonneville opisuje navdušenje Indijancev nad pisavo. Še več, Jaques Cartier je trdil, da so bili Francozi za Indijance bogovi. Podobno kot Gonneville je razumel križ kot znak za posest, kjer se začne kazati ceremonialna uporaba občinstva. Prisvajanje posesti z zasaditvijo križa je upoštevalo avtohtone prebivalce kot publiko, ki je legitimirala dejanje. Tekst je bil politično in etnografsko dejanje, ki je bilo namenjeno Indijancem, pa tudi tekmeccem, saj so Francozi jemali svoj delež novega sveta v tekmi s Španci in Portugalci (prim. *Les Français* 1946; *Voyages au Canada* 1981).

Drug pomemben način asimilacije drugosti je prevod. Richard Eden je s pomočjo prevoda zagovarjal angleško kolonizacijo in kasneje zvezo s Španijo. Drug primer je uporaba poročil očividcev o francosko-španskem sporu na Floridi, kakršni sta poročili Jeana Ribaulta in Le Challeuxa v prevodu Thomasa Hacketa. Prevod se lahko uporablja v politične, religiozne in ostale ideološke namene. Eden tako raziskuje možnosti zaveznitva med Anglijo in Francijo, Ribault in Le Challeux pa sta bila francoska protestanta, ki sta ustvarila črno legendo o Španiji.

Črna legenda in Kolumbovi teksti dajejo pomembne uvide v raziskovanje izvorov pisanja o novem svetu. Obtožbe, ki jih je Richard Hakluyt mlajši povzel od Bartolomeja de las Casasa proti Špancem, so zelo resne, saj navajajo poboje in preselitve 12 milijonov ljudi v obdobju 40-ih let. Te obsodbe so bile znane iz različnih evropskih zapisov, med katerimi so angleški in francoski prevodi Las Casasa. Hakluyt je prevedel odlomke o Hispanioli in krutostih, ki so vključevale avtorjevo osebno pričevanje. Las Casasovo obsodbo odraža tudi eden od podnaslovov, ki poudarja njegovo vlogo očividca: »Sam sem videl vse, o čemer sem govoril.« (Hakluyt, *Discourse*, 56). Čeprav je Hakluyt izbral odlomek o napadu na Indijance

s psi in odločitvi, da bodo za vsakega Španca ubili 100 Indijancev, se je zavedal, da mora biti politično in religiozno korekten, čeravno je imel pomembno zaslombo v angleškem svetu in zveze s francoskimi protestnati, kakršen je bil Philippe Duplessis-Mornay. Tako je opis grozot dopolnil z mnenjem katoliške avtoritete, Johannes Matellusa Sequanusa, ki potrjuje Las Casasove navedbe (Hakluyt 59, prim. Hart 2001).

André Thevet je bil pomemben za širjenje prvih informacij o Indijancih med Francozi. Podobno kot Oviedo, ki je napisal ključni španski zapis v 20-ih letih 16. st., se je Thevet naslonil na lastna pričevanja. Po Kolumbu se je pogosto postavljalo vprašanje originalnosti: Je bil avtor priča dogodkom? Reakcije na Kolumbove tekste so bile različne. Nekateri so ga citirali in ga delno dopolnjevali, drugi so trdili, da imajo nove informacije, in so spodbijali njegova spoznanja. Včasih so ga skušali enostavno prezreti (prim. Hart 1996). Vprašanja resnice in laži, pomanjknja zanesljivosti in prisvajanja avtoritete so bila na delu pri Thevetu, njegovih predhodnikih, sodobnikih in naslednjikih.

Druga vprašanja in zaključek

Retorični dogovor med avtorjem in bralcem je ključ do teh tekstov. Retorika je bila sredstvo, s katerim so prepričevali monarhe, plemstvo oziroma bralce za ali proti raziskovanju, širjenju, naselitvi in graditvi imperija (prim. Hart 2005). Retorika kot umetnost prepričevanja je prav tako odnos med govorcem in poslušalcem, kot je med avtorjem in bralcem. Naravo tega odnosa določa napetost med avtoriteto in podrejenim, z drugimi besedami, vprašanje je, koliko vložka je vključenega v izmenjavo med produkcijo in recepcijo.

Javnost ni vedno odobraval širitve in sprememb vzorcev iz preteklosti. Španski kraljevi svet je tako zavrnil Kolumbovo peticijo. Med decembrom 1486 in januarjem 1487 je zasedala komisija, sestavljena iz *letrados* (pravniki z univerzitetno izobrazbo na dvoru) in *sabios* (kartografi in astrologi), ki je zavrnila Kolumbov načrt za potovanje na zahod. Svoja dognanja so posredovali tudi kralju Ferdinandu in kraljici Izabeli. Učenjaki in suvereni niso bili vedno navdušeni nad ustvarjanjem imperija in še, ko se je zdelo, da to navdušenje obstaja, so bili v njem zelo previdni. Tudi po odkritju Amerike sta se španska krona in Kolumb bojevala za nadzor nad novimi ozemlji in lastništvo nad tamkajšnjim bogastvom. Avtorji, ki so opisovali nove dežele, kažejo veliko mero ambivalentnosti, saj Indijance opisujejo enkrat kot pošasti, drugič kot prebivalce raja. Verrazzano je v tem pogledu enak Kolumbu. Mestoma idealizira Ameriko kot paradiz, na drugih mestih

prikazuje njene prebivalce kot barbare. Prihaja do mešanice Izgubljenih plemen Izraela in bogastva Orienta.

Drugje deluje Amerika kot ideal, ki naj sodi pomanjkljivosti starega sveta. Ta kritika ima lahko obliko krščanskega odklanjanja bogastva in moči, nekateri krščanski intelektualci pa jo uporabljajo za kritiko ekspanzionizma in kolonializma. Decembra 1511 je dominikanec Antón Montesino pridigal proti zlorabam Indijancev na mestu, kjer je pristal Kolumb. V pridigi je napadel guvernerja in naseljence ter jih označil za brezverce. Montesinova pridiga je prizadela Krištofovega sina Diega Kolumba, ki je posredoval pri španskem kralju. Slednji je naročil provincialu dominikanskega reda v Hispanioli, naj pomiri situacijo. Podobno situacijo kasneje najdemo v domeni fikcije. Lope de Vega v *El Nuevo Mundo descubierto por Cristóbal Colón* (okrog 1598–1603) opiše indijanskega kralja Dulcanquellína, ki pravi Kolumbovemu bratu Bartolomeju, da je miroljubno krščanstvo pravi način za spreobrnitev Indijancev (prim. Hart 2005, 3. poglavje). Besede, izrečene in zapisane, so postale bojno polje za prevlado nad novim svetom.

Vsak od obravnavanih tekstov temelji na avtoriteti vednosti, avtorja, mecena ali priče. V vsem tem se kaže tipologija starega in novega sveta. V *Utopiji* (1516) Thomas More postavlja Vespuccijevo potovanje kot kontekst za pripoved Raphaela Hythlodæusa. Eden od aspektov ideje, da je možno najti Utopijo, je dejstvo, da so Raphael in njegovi prijatelji ostali v neki brazilski utrdbi po odhodu Vespuccija. Thomas More poudarja, da je bilo preživetje teh Evropejcev v veliki meri posledica velikodušnosti lokalnega poglavarja in hvali njihovo gospodarsko ureditev. More prav tako uporablja tipologijo starega in novega sveta, da bi osmešil Evropo. *Natural History of the West Indies* (1526) Gonzala Fernández de Ovieda naslavlja Karla V., prav tako pa poudarja pomen izkušnje in prič, ki jo potrdi z zavzemanjem za klasično avtoriteto. Zavzema se za opazovanje narave in ne za navajanje drugih knjig, čeprav se sklicuje na Plinija in njegovo *Natural History*, ki poleg avtorjevih opazovanj vključuje tudi korektno citirane vire za zgodbe, ki jih je Plinij le prebral ali slišal.

V *Zelo kratkem poročilu o uničenju Indij* Las Casas govori o sebi kot o prič in očividcu grozot, ki so se dogajale v Ameriki. V sinopsisu pravi: »Toda, ko je ponovno srečal ljudi, kis ta jih pohlep in častihlepje tako pokvarila, da niso bili več podobni ljudem ...« (Las Casas 23) *History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil* (1580) Jeana de Léryja opisuje avtohtono prebivalstvo, da bi kritizirala Francoze doma. Med verskimi vojnami je torej za Léryja Brazilija postala nekakšen preskusni kamen. L. 1574 je objavil opis obleganja Sancerra, ki ga je sam doživel. Tipologija je sledeča: avtor je priča, ki je doživel strahote v starem in novem svetu. V eseju »O kanibalih« (1580) Montaigne navaja Platonov opis Solonovega poročila o Atlantidi, da bi

kritiziral evropsko ekspanzijo in trgovanje v novem svetu. V »O svinjah« se osredotoči na Špance in se sprašuje, zakaj Amerika ni mogla biti osvojena v času Grkov in Rimljanov, ko bi Evropejci tamkajšnjim prebivalcem še lahko prinesli vrline, ne pa da jih sedaj učijo krutosti in pohlepa. Montaigne včasih skuša napisati preprosto in resnično pripoved o novem svetu, kar ga vodi v uporabo retoričnega in pripovednega okrasja. Na nekem mestu tako postavi enega svojih zaposlenih za očividca. »Ta človek je bil preprost in verna priča dogodkom, saj so prefinjeni ljudje sicer bolj zvedavi in opazijo več podrobnosti, a jih olepšujejo. Poleg tega si ne morejo kaj, da ne bi vsaj malo spremenili zgodovine, da bi ji dali večjo prepričljivost in vrednost« (Montaigne, *Essais*, I, 169). De Certeau je mnenja, da Montaigne tu uporablja prijeme popotne literature, ki jo obravnava. Uporabi podobno strukturo s potovanjem v tujino, opisom primitivne družbe in vrnitvijo domov (de Certeau 69–70; prim. Hart 2005). Razmerje med zgodovino in sedanostjo ima številne plasti interpretacije, saj so pisci hkrati bralci, o katerih se bere in piše. Avtorjev drugi so njegova notranja ideja bralca in seveda nepregledna množica realnih bralcev, zato ima avtoriteta naravo bralca.

Obstajajo številne raziskave teh odnosov avtorstva in avtoritete, Oviedov primer pa nam lahko služi za ilustracijo, saj je sprožil številne polemike. Tzvetan Todorov ga opisuje kot zgodovinarja, ki je konkvistador (Todorov 1992 148), ksenofob in rasist (151). J. H. Elliott zagovarja, da Oviedo pledira za večje priznanje Kolumba (Elliott 1992 11), je naravni zgodovinar poln čudenja (21) in preveč spoštuje Plinija, postavlja opazovanje nad tradicionalno avtoriteto (40) ter je, podobno kot Léry skeptičen do spreobrnitve Indijancev. Anthony Pagden Oviedo opiše kot opazovalca, ki podobnim pojavom pripisuje identiteto (Pagden 1986 11), kot zgodovinarja, ki ima slabo mnenje o domorodcih in ga Humboldt imenuje Plinij novega sveta (Pagden 1993 56). Gre torej za številne plasti v odnosu med avtorjem in občinstvom skozi zgodovino (prim. Hart 2005).

Kot smo videli, so obstajali kontroverzni pisci, kakršna sta Thevet, kozmograf francoskega kralja, in Oviedo, ki se je potegoval za podobno službo na španskem dvoru tri desetletja pred njim. Thevet trdi, da je zbral pomembne dokaze in je edini sposoben združiti natančno opazovanje nove celine z veliko učenostjo. Medtem ko sta Jean de Léry in François de Belleforest smešila njegovo delo, sta ga Ronsard in De Bellay kovala v zvezde. Španija je v številnih pogledih oblikovala naše dojemanje novega sveta. Francisco de Vitoria je bil ključna oseba pri postavljanju neljubih vprašanj o vlogi Špancev v osvojitvi Amerik. Vprašal se je npr., po katerem zakonu so domorodci postali podaniki Španije. Prav tako se je spraševal, kakšno pristojnost ima Španija v primeru civilnih sporov med domorodci, enako pa je veljalo tudi za pristojnosti v duhovnih zadevah in

vprašanih religije, s čimer je odpiral vprašanja avtoritete cerkve, suverena in države (konkretno Španije).

Tudi Walter Raleigh v *The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Beautiful Empire of Guiana* (1596) kaže ambivalenten odnos do predmeta, saj se v opisu Črne legende postavlja na stran Indijancev. Zagovarja mnenje, da je bila konkvista nelegalno dejanje, ki je pobilo 20 milijonov ljudi, obenem pa gre za način, kako povečati svoj vpliv v tekmi s Španci in najti še več zlata. V tekstu se namreč pojavi tendenca, da bi raziskal španski primer in uporabil lastne metode, s katerimi bi ga spodkopal.

Več kot devet desetletij kasneje, l. 1688, je Aphra Behn objavil roman *Oroonoko*, ki kaže še eno temno plat kolonizacije, nehumanost suženjstva. Gre za obrambo afriškega princa, ki je bil zaslužjen in je poln dvoumnosti. Pripovedovalec je tako lahko ena od oseb ali pa Aphra Behn, ki zapisuje svoje spomine v obliki romana ali potopisa. Posvetilo nas podučí, da gre za zapis Behnove izkušnje iz Surinama, a izkušnje se mešajo s fikcijo ter predstavljajo del družbenega in literarnega dogajanja.

Resničnost, fikcija in očitne nepravilnosti so nekaj, s čimer operirajo avtorji in bralci popotne literature o novem svetu. Kralj Brobdingnaga iz Swiftovih *Guliverjevih potovanj* imenuje Angleže škodljivci, podobno kritičen pa je Alaudah Equiano v svoji avtobiografiji *The Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African* (1789; druga izdaja 1814). V Posvetilu zgornjemu in spodnjemu domu britanskega parlamenta opisuje Evropejce kot golazen, saj se spomni groze, ki so jo prinesli njegovi deželi. Na koncu knjige tako pledira za odpravo suženjstva.

Resnico enega imperija lahko postavimo pod vprašaj in pripovedi o humanizmu in superiornosti na glavo. Avtoriteta piscev je še posebej vprašljiva ob opisih drugega oziroma novih kultur, zato so avtorji in bralci v Zahodni Evropi in na drugi strani Atlantika postavili pod vprašaj avtoriteto Evropejcev s tipologijo, ki je pokazala kompleksnost tekstualnega, kulturnega in političnega polja. Pojav drugosti pri otroku in v seksualnosti, torej od znotraj, lahko najdemo tudi pri etnološki naravnosti v opisih drugih kultur.

Prevedel Gašper Troha

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Jaz je nekdo drug: subjekt pesmi v procesu, subjekt v procesu pesmi

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Prispevek tematizira transformativno moč pesemskega diskurza z navajanjem nekatereh (zgodovinskih) teoretičnih momentov, ki poezijo obravnavajo kot transformativno. Pri tem se osredotoča na avtorsko figuriran lirski subjekt, na postajanja pesemskega jaza kot drugega, obenem pa skuša namigniti na nekatere problemske točke za premislek o pojmu lirskega subjekta.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / poezija / avtorska funkcija / lirski subjekt

UDK 82.0-1

*Ta drugost, to »nisimo mi« je vse, kar je dano videti v ogledalu,
čepprav nihče ne more povedati, kako se je zgodilo, da je tako.*

J. Ashbery, *Avtoportret v konveksnem ogledalu*

V naslovu simpozija odmevata manifesta, ki v marsičem predstavljata mejnika v literarni vedi in družboslovju sploh; znameniti Barthesov tekst *Smrt avtorja* (1968) (*La mort de l'Auteur*) in Foucaultovo predavanje *Kaj je avtor?* (1969) (*Quest-ce que l'Auteur?*). Ustaljeno je (prevzeto) prepričanje, da avtorja v teh tekstih in tudi sicer razglašata izbris avtorja in subjekta v literaturi in drugih diskurzih. Barthesove teze o smrti avtorja so kasnejše interpretacije namreč bolj ali manj upravičeno vpisovale v paradigmo smrti subjekta. Tudi Foucault na začetku predavanja morda zavajajoče najavlja ponikanje, če ne že smrti subjekta, ko pravi, da pisanje kot praksa in ne rezultat – pisava – »odpira prostor, v katerem pišoči subjekt nenehno izginja« (26). Vendar tako pri Barthesu kot pri Foucaultu oba principa spet vznikneta. Foucault se je navsezadnje ob koncu svojega življenja vrnil k problemu subjekta.¹

V *Smrti avtorja* Barthes resda detronizira avtorja kot novoveško institucijo individualistične kapitalistične ideologije in nanjo vezane pozitivistične literarne vede, utemeljene na iskanju avtorjeve intence in zapove-

danega enoznačnega smisla ter obremenjene s psihologističnim biogra-
fizmom. Rušenje te institucije mu hkrati pomeni začetek »bralčeve erek-
že s tega vidika bi bilo današnje, že dovolj distancirano branje tovrstnih
tez, porojenih v duhu »jezikovnega obrata«, ko se je povsod govoril jezik
sam, predhajajoč subjektu, zgolj v smislu izginotja subjekta nerefektirano.
Poleg tega z ustoličenjem bralca Barthes vzpostavi nov subjekt. Tudi ta
je navezadnje resda dolgo ostal le implicitni teoretični dispozitiv v na-
daljnem poststrukturalističnem razrahljanju (literarnega) teksta kot zaprte,
zaokrožene strukture v neskončen intertekst, saj se je to rahljanje povečini
dogajalo v polju teorij, ki so se osredotočale na jezik-sistem-kod in posledično
na brezsubjektno, anonimno, avtonomno iterabilnost, manj pa v
območju tistih teoretizacij diskurza in izjavljanja, ki v ospredje postavljajo
intersubjektivnost v radikalni historičnosti diskurza.² Barthes se je že nekaj
let kasneje v *Užitku teksta* (1973) (*Plaisir du texte*) distanciral od svoje ra-
dikalne pozicije in se celo vrnil k avtorju kot bralčevi fantazmi, kot podobi
avtorja v tekstu. Bralec si v tekstu avtorja želi, potrebuje njegovo podobo.
Vendar ta podoba ni reprezentacija avtorja niti njegova projekcija, je bral-
čev konstrukt. (*Le Plaisir* 38) Taisti tekst še jasneje zareže v problematiko
artikulacije subjekta v tekstu in izpostavi problem definiranja literarnega
subjekta na podlagi »materialistične« teorije subjekta (82). S tem pravza-
prav izpostavi problem pojmovanja literarnega subjekta kot substance in
identitete. Subjekt kot identiteta se, ugotavlja Barthes, na eni strani v teks-
tu sicer še pojavlja, »a ne kot iluzija«, temveč kot »fiktivno identitete«, kajti
v bralnem dejanju »uživamo v tem, da sami sebe zamišljamo kot indivi-
duume«, pri čemer pa ne gre za »iluzijo enotnosti«, temveč za »družbeno
gledališče, v katerega postavljamo našo množino« (83). Po drugi strani
pa v *Užitku teksta* najdemo podobo o tekstu, ne kot tkanini, temveč kot
tkanju, podobo teksta kot procesa, kjer se subjekt–pajek para v pajčevini,
ki jo tke (86). Subjekt v procesu teksta, subjekt teksta v procesu? S tem
vprašanjem ne vstopamo v neznano območje, (literarno)teoretska misel se
je s procesualnostjo literarnega besedila ukvarjala vsaj od Ingardna naprej.
(gl. Juvan, *Literarna* 134).

V Foucaultovem predavanju se ta Barthesova podoba odslikava v kon-
ceptualnem razmisleku. Foucault poudari, da se je treba vrniti k vprašanju
subjekta. Apelira tako na akademizem pozitivistične tradicije kot na vse bolj
okorelo strukturalistično modernost. Vrnitev k subjektu je po Foucaultu
potrebna »... ne zato, da bi ponovno uvedli temo o izvirnem subjektu,
temveč da bi dojeli točke, na katerih subjekt prodre v diskurz, subjektov
način delovanja in njegove odvisnosti.« (39) Avtorska funkcija, ki jo vpelje
Foucault in v kateri so mnogi kasnejši interpreti videli predvsem izbris
avtorja in subjekta v diskurzivnem redu, je, kot pravi sam Foucault, »le ena

od mogočih specifikacij subjektive funkcije» (40). Foucault avtorju kot avtorski funkciji pravzaprav podeli novo moč, ko ga imenuje utemeljitelj diskurza, in to v času splošne nenaklonjenosti konceptom avtorstva in avtorja. Vsi diskurzi z avtorsko funkcijo, pravi Foucault, vsebujejo pluralnost egov, pri čemer avtorske funkcije ne zagotavlja zgolj eden teh egov-jazov, temveč prav avtorska funkcija sama po sebi, saj omogoča simultano razpršitev egov. Avtorska funkcija je torej ena subjektivnih točk v diskurzu, ki ima urejevalno vlogo. Avtorja kot avtorsko funkcijo zato ne smemo iskati ne v osebi resničnega pisatelja ne v (fiktivnem) govorniku (34). Avtorska funkcija, ki je pri Foucaultu znotrajdiskurzivna funkcija, se nahaja v pregibu med zunajdiskurzivno stvarnostjo in diskurzom, na samem robu diskurza, ta pregib pa vselej že pomeni razcep, oddaljenost, razliko.

Podobno pojmovanje avtorske funkcije v smislu urejevalnega načela na povsem drugačni filozofsko-teoretski podlagi najdemo v Bahtinovem principu transgredientnosti-zunajbivanja avtorja glede na upodobljeni svet. Avtorska funkcija pri Bahtinu je t.i. čisti ali prvinski avtor, ki je upodabljaljoče načelo, *natura creata creans*, in se nahaja v delu *kot celoti*. Princip zunajbivanja avtorja se pri Bahtinu utemeljuje na postulatu o dialoški oziroma večglasnosti, ki sta pogoja za obstoj literature. Za Bahtina avtor kot diskurzivna funkcija razdaja besede tujim glasovom, tudi podobi avtorja in drugim »avtorskim maskam«, in sicer tudi v liriki (Bahtin, *Estetika* 294–298).

Uvodni, shematično vpeljani teoretični zaznamki so zanimivi iz več razlogov. Kljub načelnim razrešitvam problematike odnosa med literarnim subjektom in empiričnim avtorjem v velikih literarnoteoretičnih sistemih polpreteklega obdobja se na manj teoretični, t.j. na bralski, kritiški, esejistični, pedagoški ravni vprašanje t.i. lirskega subjekta še vedno tesno navezuje na vprašanje avtorja in avtobiografske dimenzije pesmi. Literarnoteoretični koncepti subjekta v liriki pa so večinoma temeljili na nekaterih »večnih« aksiomih, izpeljanih bodisi iz reinterpretacije (poenostavljene) romantične paradigme bodisi iz skrajne antihumanistične paradigme, »paradigme označevalca«. Če je vprašanje kategorije subjekta vselej *work in progress* in je, kot pravi Sartre, predvsem projekt, ki vedno lahko postane nekaj drugega (Klepec 13), je moderna literarna teorija pojem t.i. lirskega subjekta večinoma fiksirala v mesto govornika, katerega govor ni posredovan prek nobene druge govorne instance. To enotno, enoplastno mesto, *origo* teksta, je tudi v osrčju tradicionalnega prepričanja o monološkosti lirike.³ Tako razumljen pojem lirskega subjekta, ki je nase brez večjih težav vezal dve osnovni paradigmi, je (bil) v številnih poskusih definicij lirike celo konstitutiven za opredelitev lirike kot nadvrste (prim. Wolf 27–28). Vendar tudi zgoraj omenjeni paradigmi s tem nista bili preseženi.

Na eni strani nekatere najnovejše teoretične obravnave problema, predvsem pod vplivom literarne pragmatike, pretežno afirmativno obravnavajo teorijo lirskega subjekta K. Hamburger, ki naj bi t.i. lirski jaz povsem enačila z realnim, eksistencialnim subjektom – pesnikom.⁴ Lirski subjekt, ki ga Hamburgerjeva postulira kot izjavni subjekt, večinoma razumejo kot realen, nefiksijski, njegove izjave pa kot fikcijske, pri čemer pa vse obravnave spregledajo specifično izjavnega subjekta Hamburgerjeve.⁵

Tako razumevanje je seveda problematično. Prvič zaradi psihologistične preobremenjenosti z biografskimi in psihološkimi referencami. Drugič zato, ker zavrača postulat o fikcijskosti literarnega diskurza. Tretjič – ker se, kolikor pristaja na fikcijskost lirskih izjav, zapira v reprezentacijsko koncepcijo poezije (in jezika nasploh) in ne prevpraša njene performativno-transformativne moči. Zgreši tako moment procesualnosti, dogodkovnosti (teksta-diskurza in njegovega subjekta), kot razmislek o specifični pesemskega izjavljanja in referiranja.

Vendar nepreseženi recepcijski topos, izhajajoč iz (trivializirane) romantične koncepcije poezije kot izključno izpovednega izraza zunajbesedilne individualne notranjosti, ne predstavlja edine težave v sodobnem diskurzu o poeziji. Literarnoteoretski sistemi so v duhu »fenomenološke redukcije« subjekt lirike največkrat fiksirali kot enotno, zgolj govorno fikcijsko instanco v zaprtem tekstu, pojmovanem z vidika jezika kot sistema, utemeljenega na znaku, in ne diskurza v njegovi dogodkovnosti. Najradikalnejši so v tem smislu pogledi na subjekt v liriki, utemeljeni na zmotno razumljeni Mallarméjevi zahtevi po »*govornem* izginotju pesnika« v tekstu, ki depersonalizacijo v izjavnem mestu, ki je nastopila v moderni liriki, tolmačijo kot njeno popolno desubjektivizacijo. Po teh prepričanjih naj bi subjekt iz pesmi izginil, čim pesem ne vsebuje več antropomorfne oblike, največkrat figurirane s prvoosebni subjektom izjave, lirsko persono.

Razlog, da se zdi literarnoteoretski koncept lirskega subjekta vse bolj problematičen in neuporaben, gre iskati prav v dejstvu, da se je koncept oblikoval v okviru filozofskih tradicij, ki so subjekt pojmoval v smislu (enotne) identitete in substance. Na podlagi premislekov o konfiguriranju teksta kot diskurza, ki v ospredje postavljajo pojme nefiksiranosti, dinamičnosti, procesualnosti, in (neegoloških) teorij subjekta, ki tematizirajo te iste pojme, bi veljalo ponovno premisliti in skušati opredeliti ravni, na katerih se artikulira subjektiviteta, ki konfigurira pesniški diskurz in se v lirski konfiguraciji ustvarja, najprej v samem aktu ustvarjanja, nato pa v verigi nadaljnjih aktualizacij teksta. To bi obenem ponudilo nekaj smiselnih nastavkov za rekonceptualizacijo pojma lirskega subjekta.

Barthesova misel o razparanju subjekta v tekstu, Foucaulteva teza o avtorski funkciji kot eni od subjektnih funkcij, ki omogoča in ureja pluralnost

egov v (literarnem) diskurzu, predvsem pa na liriko aplicirana Bahtinova principa *zunajbinanje* in *večglasnost*, ki ju lahko ob podpori teorije izjavljanja E. Benvenista in teorije polifonije O. Ducrota⁶ izpeljemo na način, da je mogoče govoriti o dveh konfigurativnih, v zgodovinskih objektivacijah največkrat prekrivajočih se poljih subjekta izjavljanja in subjekta izjave, seveda predstavljajo samo tri od relevantnih vstopov v premišljevanje o artikulaciji lirske subjektivitete. Na tem mestu so bili uporabljeni kot ozadje za razmislek o tisti lirski konfiguraciji, ki v Baudelairevi binarni formuli o *razpršitvi in središčanju jaza* zavzema pozicijo vsaj navideznega središčenja. Rimbaudevo spoznanje *jaz je nekdo drug* problematiko osvetljuje na različne načine. Četudi se osredotočimo zgolj na tista besedila v zgodovini lirike, kjer se različna artikulacijska polja pesemske subjektivitete prekrivajo na način, da se konfigurira avtorski subjekt- persona,⁷ je mogoče opaziti dovolj jasen zgodovinski lok avtorefleksivnih pesniških tekstov, metapesniških besedil avtorjev in nekaterih teorij poezije, ki bolj ali manj eksplicitno tematizirajo postajanja tega *drugega* pesmi v performativno-transformativni dinamiki *poiesis*, na temelju osciliranja med identiteto in drugostjo, seveda vsakokrat v danem zgodovinskem obzorju. Ta tendenca tudi zgodovinsko stopa v opozicijo z identifikacijsko-avtorsko tezo, ki se je radikalno uveljavila s prehodom v ekspresivno estetiko v romantiki. V nadaljevanju bo z navajanjem nekaterih zgodovinskih momentov, ki tematizirajo transformativni dispozitiv poezije, *jaz je nekdo drug*, nakazanih nekaj problemskih točk za premislek o subjektivni konfiguraciji lirike.

Z vzpostavitevjo nadvrstne triade po dialektičnem principu se je dokončno uveljavilo razumevanje lirike kot subjektivne oblike pesništva. Dokončno sintezo romantičnih pojmovanj je podal Hegel v *Predavanjih o estetiki* (1835–1838). Po Heglu vsebino lirske umetnine predstavlja individualni subjekt, lirska pesem je singularen način, kako se duševnost skozi to vsebino začneja zavedati same sebe (*Estetika* 518). Lirika ustvarja zaprt, samorefleksiven subjektivni svet, zunanje okoliščine so zgolj izgovor, da se izrazi duševnost. Čisti izvir lirike je notranja subjektivnost (527) in včasih je lirska pesem lahko zgolj čisto »prepevanje in popevanje« (prav tam), saj je vloga »zunanje« zvočnosti poudarjanje notranje zvočnosti duše (543) in zadovoljevanje le te prek glasbe besed (527). Čeprav je lirska pesem upodobljena subjektiviteta, pa nikjer v Heglovih postavkah ne naletimo na eksplicitno obravnavo povezave med osebo lirskega subjekta/persone in avtorjem. Govor je o izrazu subjektivitete na način, da ta prežame ves tekst (525). Seveda to povezavo pri Heglu lahko predpostavljamo. V Heglovem uvodu v razmišljanje o liriki pa je mogoče opaziti nekatere elemente, ki ne govorijo povsem v prid identifikacijski avtorski tezi. Po Heglu se ustvarjajoči subjekt epike izgubi v predstavljenem predmet-

nem svetu, ki ga slika. Tej samodtujitvi pa se subjekt lirike izogne tako, da vase potegne ves predmetni svet in ga prežme s svojo notranjostjo⁸ (516). Samoodtujitev subjekta, ki je topos lirike od antičnih teorij naprej, je pri Heglu najprej povsem zanikana. V liriki se duh spušča sam v sebe, izstopa iz objektivnosti predmetov, opazuje svojo lastno zavest in namesto dejanskosti stvari, predstavlja to zavest v subjektivni duševnosti (prav tam). Toda takoj nato je samoodtujitev implicirana, namreč samoodtujitev, ki jo predpostavlja sama *mimesis* – kot *poiesis*. Pesniško izjavljanje ne sme ostati zgolj »naključni izraz subjekta kot takega, njegovih neposrednih občutenj in predstav«, temveč se mora pretvoriti v »govor poetične notranjosti«, ki resda pripada pesniku kot posamezniku, vendar mora zadobiti jasno splošno veljavo (prav tam). To veljavo Hegel vidi ravno v resničnosti občutenj in pravilnosti opazovanja. Vendar izpovednost, kolikor to misel beremo v smislu izpovednosti, tu ni mišljena kot neposredna, temveč posredna: pesniški diskurz namreč izjavlja *poetično notranjost*; lirika *upodablja* – »živo si izmišlja in najde ustrezni izraz« (517). Objektivizira in izčiščuje: »poezija naše srce napravi za predmet svoje *predelave*, vendar ne ostaja samo pri tem, da vsebino izvrže iz subjekta in jo loči od neposredne povezanosti z njim, temveč iz nje ustvari *objekt*, ki je očiščen vseh naključnih razpoloženj in v katerem se osvobodjena notranjost istočasno vrača k sebi v pomirjenem samozavedanju in je sama pri sebi.« (Prav tam) Tu je lirska *mimesis* tista, ki je tematizirana kot *agens*; tematiziran je njen aktivni značaj, ki ji ga podeljuje sama *poiesis* (prim. Ricoeur, *Krog* 67–78). Identičnost med notranjostjo in njenim upodabljanjem Hegel torej implicitno izključuje; identična je notranjost lahko sama s seboj, vendar je taka notranjost *nema in brez predstav-podob* (517). Poezija, kot dejanje, ustvarja in spreminja, transformira (532–533). Tu se *razlika* povezuje z občutjem; kajti, pravi Hegel, srce, ki je pred *poiesis* le občutilo, sedaj občutenje tudi dojame. Implicirana je torej tudi katarzična funkcija lirike. V tem pasusu *Estetike* lahko razberemo že vse momente, ki bodo v kasnejših teorijah lirskega subjekta in poezije zavzemali različne pozicije in se izoblikovali v dve paradigmi, ki bi ju lahko imenovali izpovedno-avtentična in avtonomno-avtotelična: subjektivnost, afektivnost, izpovednost – za katero se zdi, da je reflektirana ob upoštevanju transformativnosti *poiesis*–, samorefleksivnost, poudarek na čutno-oblikovni konfiguracijski plasti. Hegel pa v nadaljevanju pri obravnavi tipov čiste lirike, na primeru ditirambične poezije, govori tudi o »izstopu subjekta iz sebe in njegov[em] dvig[uj] k absolutni biti« (544). Tako vzdigovanje, pravi Hegel, ne pomeni poglobljanja subjekta v konkretne vsebine, temveč gre za »nedoločen entuziazem, ki prevzema pesnika v njegovi težnji sprožiti, da bi občutili in neposredno opazili, kar je za našo zavest neizrekljivo.« (545) Hegel tu pesniškega entuziazma ne tolmači le kot izstop subjekta iz

sebe, kot (transcendentno) težnjo k dvigu v neskončnost (544) in k absolu, temveč tudi kot (imanentno) težnjo dati občutiti neizrekljivo. Moment entuziazma in neizrekljivega Hegel poveže z ritmom. Zdi se, da pri tem opozori na dvojno vlogo povezovalne in izrazne funkcije ritma, ko pravi, da subjektivni domišljiji v zanosu pri upodabljanju služi ritem. Ta moment pa je mogoče povezati s Schleiermacherjevo teorijo stila in Novalisovo teorijo pesniškega upodabljanja, *Darstellung*, h katerima se bom na kratko vrnila malce kasneje.

Neizrekljivo, ki je topos poetične modernosti od romantike naprej, Hegel torej vpne v zgodovinsko nit teorij (božanske) pesniške inspiracije od Demokrita, Platona, Horacija, Kvintiljana, Cicerona pa do renesančnih reinterpretacij, med katerimi je najslavnejša in najvplivnejša Ficinova teorija *furor divinus*. Tu je transformativni dispozitiv poezije tematiziran kot transcendenten in celo razosebljajoč. V sklopu renesančnih teorij poezije smo priča prvim teoretskim tematizacijam individualnosti pisatelja, ki pa je vse do pozne renesanse vezana na neoplatonistično doktrino pesniškega entuziazma in božanske inspiracije. Dokončno se namreč oblikuje intertekstualni in recepcijski topos individualizirane in idealizirane figure Pesnika-Avtorja, na primeru Danteja in Petrarke.⁹ Individualizirana pesnikova oseba se v *furor poeticus* povzdigne nad ostale. Na podlagi ideje o nadnaravnem izvoru pesniške inspiracije v pesniškem aktu naj bi se nato spojila z višjim redom neosebnega oziroma nadosebnega in se, vsaj v teoretičnem idealu, v mistični ekstazi absorbirala v neoplatonistično Eno. Individualizacija pesniškega genija, s katero se vzpostavi razlika pesnikove podobe od drugih, rezultira oziroma naj bi v teoretskem idealu rezultirala v neko drugo razliko, ki naj bi pripeljala do razosebitve. Če že ne razpade jaz, razpade vsaj identitetno načelo jaz = jaz. Dialektika individualizacije – ki je na eni strani peljala h konfiguraciji avtorske lirске persone, na drugi strani pa v intertekstualni topos figure navdahnjenega Pesnika – in transformacije v ekstazi pesniškega akta, ki jo povzroči predpostavljeni božanski izvor inspiracije, namreč pogosto dialoško odseva v živahni polifoničnosti renesančne lirike, na primer pri Ronsardu, kjer v izjavnem mestu pogosto pride do zdrsa identitete avtorskega subjekta izjave. Večinoma gre za razcep znotraj same lirске persone na avtorsko persono in njene metamorfoze v mitološke subjekte. To razplasti diegetični okvir na več ravni, obenem pa z metapesemskim postopkom osvetli tudi razcep med subjektom izjave in subjektom izjavljanja (prim. Dauvois 46–58 in 90–103).

Teorija božanske pesniške inspiracije na dionizičnem temelju odmeva v Nietzschejevem premisslavljanju o liriki v *Rojstvu tragedije iz duba glasbe* (1872). Nietzsche zariše nekaj pomembnih postavk: lirika nikakor ne more biti subjektivna vrsta, subjektivnost, kakor jo pojmujejo sodobni estetiki, je utvara,

saj vsaka umetnost, da bi sploh bila umetnost, zahteva razrešitev jaza, popolno objektivizacijo (35). Nadalje: lirika je bistveno vezana na duha glasbe, lirski ustvarjalni proces izhaja iz glasbenega, ki pa je v temelju dionizičen. Tako se lirski umetnik v ustvarjalnem aktu najprej v dionizičnem procesu zlije «s Praenim, z njegovo bolečino in protislovjem, in ustvarja podobo Praenega kot glasbo» (36). To «mistično stanje samoodtujitve» je razlog, da se lirikov genij upodobi v celoti lirsko figuriranega sveta, kjer deluje kot »gibajoče središče« (37); v lirski stvaritvi namreč ni epskega varovala pred »zlitjem z lastnimi podobami«; lirsko ustvarjen svet je objektivizacija lirskega genija samega, pravi Nietzsche. Če sledimo Nietzschejevi logiki, potem takem objektivizacija v transformativnem dionizičnem procesu že objektiviziranega ustvarjalnega subjekta. Zato tako upodobljena »jazost« ni istovetna identiteti empiričnega jaza, temveč je »edina sploh resnična bivajoča in večna, v temelju stvari mirujoča jazost.« (37) Tega ne gre razumeti zgolj v luči transformacije oziroma samoodtujitve subjekta v pesniško-mistični izkušnji, kakor pesniški akt tolmači Nietzsche, temveč v specifični strukturiranja lirskega diskurza. Na eni strani se upodabljaajoči se subjekt objektivizira na način, da se razprši v lirsko upodobljenem svetu, pri čemer pa ostaja *gibajoče središče*. Znotraj tega figurativnega okvira, ki kot pravi Nietzsche, predstavlja »svet podob in prispodob s popolnoma drugačno barvitostjo, vzročnostjo in hitrostjo kakor v svetu kiparja in epika« (37), lirski genij lahko med upodobitvami figurira tudi *svojo podobo* kot negenija, svoj »subjekt« (37). Tu naletimo na pomenljivo opozorilo: »če je tedaj videti, kakor da sta lirski genij in z njim povezani negenij eno in kakor da prvi izgovarja besedico 'jaz' o sebi, nas vendar ta videz ne more več zapeljati, kakor je gotovo zapeljal tiste, ki so lirika imenovali subjektivnega pesnika.« (37)

Transformativni dispozitiv poezije je pri Nietzscheju tematiziran v dvojni luči; kot dispozitiv depersonalizacije-samoodtujitve na eni strani in kot (sicer implicitni) dispozitiv dialogizacije. Prvi sprovede razpršitev subjekta, ki ga Nietzsche imenuje lirski genij, v diskurzu. Eno od artikulacijskih mest je tudi *lirski*, lahko avtorski, *jaz*. Pri tem je pomembno, da *lirski genij* deluje kot integrativna instanca – gibalno središče, celotne konfiguracije. Zato ga lahko razumemo v smislu Foucaulteve avtorske funkcije kot ene subjektivnih funkcij in v smislu Bahtinovega čistega avtorja. Kot integrativna instanca je 1) instanca govora, 2) je razpršena v elementih fiktivnega – diegetičnega sveta, 3) in to je še posebej pomembno: spričo poudarka na njeni utemeljitvi v duhu glasbe, morda lahko predpostavimo, da pronica v druga mesta *energeie* teksta, in sicer v plasti, ki v tradicionalnih teorijah spadajo v območje literarne forme.

Transformativni dispozitiv, ki ga tematizirajo doslej omenjene teorije, lahko v luči premislekov o subjektu pri F. Schleiermacherju, Novalisu,

F. Hölderlinu, v 20. stol. pa pri J.-P. Sartru, M. Franku, delno tudi D. Henrichu, tolmačimo še na drug način; v smislu dialektike predrefleksijske (neposredne) in refleksijske zavesti. Pesniški diskurz naj bi po teh razmislekih, predvsem pri prvih treh mislecih pa tudi pri M. Franku, ki iz njih izhaja, predstavljal osrednje mesto dogajanja dinamike med t.i. neposredno in refleksijsko zavestjo.

Vsi ti avtorji vsak po svoji poti, a s podobnimi zaključki, izvedejo kritiko refleksijskega modela samozavedanja. Identiteta racionalističnega ali idealističnega subjekta ne more biti utemeljena na empirični zavesti, subjekt v refleksijskem modelu nikoli ne more biti identičen s seboj, saj je v tovrstnem teoretskem »samopostavljanju« na eni strani odsevajoči jaz-subjekt, na drugi strani pa odsevani jaz-objekt. Vmes je vselej vrzel, zamuda, manko, ki ustvarja neidentiteto, zato ta model ne zmore zaobjeti neposrednosti samo-prisotnosti biti-jaz (domačnosti s seboj) v pred- ali nerefleksijskem stanju, v katerem še ni prišlo do razcepa na subjekt in objekt. (gl. Novalis, *Fichte* 3–7, Hölderlin 26–27, Bowie 196–200, Frank, *L'Ultime* 87, Jovanovski 106) Ta nerefleksijski modus Schleiermacher poimenuje neposredna zavest, Hölderlin bit, Novalis občutje ali samoobčutje, Sartre predrefleksijska zavest, Henrich domačnost s seboj. Nastavki za tako razumevanje izhajajo iz Fichtejevih uvidov v problematičnost refleksijske zavesti in »jazosti«, čeprav mu modela ni uspelo preseči (gl. Frank, *L'Ultime* 30–35). Na podlagi teh premislekov zgodnje romantike in nemškega idealizma je M. Frank izpeljal svojo teorijo subjekta oziroma individuuma in jo utemeljil prav na dialektiki med refleksijsko zavestjo, ki je pozicionalna, tetična, vzpostavljena na optični logiki uvida lastnega zrcalnega odseva in je naperjena na subjekt kot na objekt; in predrefleksijsko zavestjo, ki je predrazcepna v smislu nedeljenosti subjekta in objekta (Frank, *L'Ultime* 49). Pri tem je bistveno tudi, da Frank pokaže, kako je Schleiermacherjevo razumevanje individuuma kot neponovljivega, nedeljivega, ireduktibilno singularnega in dogodkovnega (Frank, *L'Ultime* 12, 89–90, 93) in konceptualizacija neposredne zavesti, ki predstavljata eno od teorij v zgodovinski liniji neegoloških teorij subjekta, povezana s Schleiermacherjevo hermenevitično teorijo jezika, teksta in stila. V slednji je mogoče videti anticipacijo filozofsko-lingvističnih teorij diskurza. Schleiermacherjeva teorija teksta podobno kot nato Bahtinova in Benvenisteva teorija diskurza uvidi dvoravninskost teksta (*Eстетika* 289, *Problemes II* 59–65); raven jezika kot koda-sistema znakov in raven individualnosti, neponovljivosti izjave. Neposredna zavest individuuma kot ireduktibilno singularnega in časovno-dogodkovno ustrojenga se v tekstu artikulira v območju stila. Očitno je, da se stil lahko manifestira le na ravni teksta kot diskurza-izjave-izjavljajna, in ne jezika kot koda. Frank glede Schleiermacherjevega pojmovanja

stila ugotavlja, da, če je raven znakov in celo tipov izjav tisto »izrekljivo«, potem je stil tisto »neizrekljivo«, tista *energeia* subjekta teksta (*The Subject* 80, 92).

Polg Schleiermacherjeve teorije je za Frankovo sintezo teh teorij subjekta ključno Novalisovo razlikovanje dveh modusov samozavedanja, refleksije in občutja, in njegovega uvida v ustroj individuuma. Podobno kot pri Schleiermacherju, ki artikulacijo neposredne zavesti veže na umetniško ustvarjanje, se tudi Novalisov razmislek o subjektu povezuje z njegovim razumevanjem poezije in njegovo teorijo pesniškega upodabljanja (prim. Jovanovski). Novalis individuum uvidi kot v temelju razcepljeno entiteto (*Fichte* 25), ki ne more biti nič temeljnega, temveč se kaže kot proces osciliranja med identiteto in ne-identiteto, med Jazom in Ne-Jazom (*Fichte* 164): »Jaz označuje tisti negativno spoznan absolut – tisto, kar ostane po vsej abstrakciji – tisto, kar lahko spoznamo le prek dejanja in kar se udejanja le skozi večno umanjkanje ... Jaz postane učinkovit in določen le preko svojega nasprotja.« (*Fichte* 168) To osciliranje, ki dogodkovno, procesualno udejani absolutni jaz kot sintezo dveh modusov zavedanja – refleksije in občutja – v poeziji, je povezano s procesom romantiziranja. Novalis ga teoretizira, predvsem pa uresniči v svoji t.i. transcendentalni poeziji (gl. Jovanovski). Romantiziranje je »kvalitativno potenciranje«, v katerem se »nižji jaz identificira z boljšim jazom« (*Svet so* 202). V tem smislu ga lahko povežemo s prej omenjenimi teorijami inspiracije iz drugega duhovnozgodovinskega okvira, kolikor gre za transformativni dispozitiv. Če se subjekt upodobi v avtorsko figurirani lirski personi, je tak subjekt skozi poetični transformativ »kvalitativno povišan«. Tudi Novalis podobno kot nato Hegel sicer zapiše, »da je poezija upodobitev duše, notranjega sveta v njegovi celotnosti« (*Svet so* 196), vendar pravi tudi, da poezija »identično opušča, da bi ga upodobila« (*Fichte* 3). Upodablja ga morda v območju tistega, kar Schleiermacher imenuje stil, Frank pa neizrekljivo *energeie* teksta. Tudi Novalisova teorija *Darstellung*, predvsem v navezavi na vprašanje subjekta v smislu dialektike refleksije in občutja, ne navaja le k premisleku o primerih, kjer gre za očitno avtorsko figurirano lirsko persono, temveč nasploh o konfiguiranju subjektivitete v lirskem diskurzu.

Kakšne implikacije ima sklop teorij neposredne zavesti oziroma dialektike med refleksijskim in nerefleksijskim subjektnim modusom, ki jih je mogoče v okviru teorije poezije razumeti kot novo postajo v tolmačenju transformativnega dispozitiva poezije, na premišljevanje o lirskem subjektu z vidika, na katerega se osredotoča prispevek? Kako je figuriran avtorski lirski subjekt v smislu subjekta izjave-lirske persone v luči teh teorij? Je mogoče reči, da v tem artikulacijskem polju lirske subjektivitete odseva zrcalna podoba osebne identitete kot začasni (iluzorni) moment refleksij-

ske zavesti, ali pa je avtorska lirski persona že konfigurirana skozi transformacijsko sito dinamičnega procesa pesmi, kjer naj bi se po Novalisu in Franku v modernosti na najbolj temeljen način dogajal tudi dialektični proces refleksijske in predrefleksijske zavesti? Kolikor se ta proces kaže kot konstitutivni element celotnega lirskega diskurza, je smiselno in potrebno iskati in opredeliti druge »subjektne točke«, v katerih se artikuli- ra dinamika tega subjekta v procesu. Schleiermacherjeva teorija stila in Novalisova *Darstellung* nakazujeta nekaj smiselnih smeri.

Če pa se osredotočim zgolj na avtorsko figurirano lirsko persono, je mogoče problem na teoretični ravni delno osvetliti še z Ricoeurjevo teorijo konstituiranja osebne identitete na podlagi konfiguriranja narativne identitete, pri katerem igra ključno vlogo časovnost. Ta proces je tudi ena od faz konstituiranja subjekta v Ricoeurjevi hermenevtiki subjekta oziroma sebstva.¹⁰ Narativna operacija po principu neubrane ubranosti konfigurira narativno identiteto osebe v diskontinuirani dialektiki, ki poteka med *idem* - stalno, fiksirano identiteto istosti, temelječo na načelu sedimentacije, in *ipse* - postajajočo identiteto nasebnosti, temelječo na načelu inovacije. Šele nasebnost kot identiteta-neidentiteta poleg dialektike z istostjo predpostavlja tudi dialektiko sebstva in drugosti. Drugost se tako pokaže kot konstitutivna za nasebnost, vanjo vstopa. Nasebnost sebstva namreč implicira drugost tako, da ene ni mogoče misliti brez druge. Šele skozi nasebnost sebstvo, subjekt, lahko vzpostavi odnos do drugosti (*Soi-meme* 13–14, 167–197). Bistvo narativne identitete, preko katere Ricoeur hkrati metaforično in dobesedno pristopa k problemu konstituiranja osebne identitete in je ne gre razumeti zgolj v smislu identitete narativnih besedil, temveč literarnih besedil nasploh (*Krog* 8–9), je torej prav dialektika nasebnosti in istosti, ki je pravzaprav že dialektika drugosti in istosti.

Če pomislimo na vrsto avtorefleksivnih pesniških tekstov in poetoloških spisov, ki so v zgodovini spremljali pesniško ustvarjanje, ki implicitno ali eksplicitno tematizirajo spoznanje *jaz je nekdo drug* na različne načine, v prispevku pa jih ni bilo mogoče navajati, je morda smiselno predpostaviti naslednje: četudi bi pristali na tezo, da je avtorsko figuriran lirski subjekt v smislu narativne-lirske identitete, ki se v procesu lirskega teksta konstituira po minimaliziranem principu narativnih drobcev-dogodkov, mogoče razumeti kot iluzoren moment refleksijske zavesti, ga gre razumeti kot postajajočo identiteto nasebnosti. Že sama narava strukturacije pesniškega diskurza predpostavlja minimaliziranje principa ubranosti v dinamiki ubranosti in neubranosti, ki jo Ricoeur na podlagi branja Aristotelove *Poetike* postulira kot konfiguracijski model literature. Inovacija, ki je princip postajanja *ipse*, nasebnosti, je v procesu pesmi pogosto podprta z metaforičnim izjavljanjem, ki predstavlja višek semantične inovacije. To pa

tako, da ukinja deskriptivno referencialno funkcijo pesniškega diskurza na način, kot pravi Ricoeur, da pre-opiše (redécrit) resničnost s tem, ko ubeseduje vidike resničnosti, ki so lahko izraženi le z evociranjem in jih ni mogoče izraziti neposredno z deskriptivnim jezikom, temveč vznikajo le v tenzijskem, dinamičnem odnosu med ruševinami dobesedne semantične ustreznosti metaforične izjave in novo (nelogično) ustreznostjo. (*La métaphore* 289–301) Ta teorija metafore, ki je, kot pravi sam Ricoeur, pravzaprav teorija pesemskega diskurza (*La métaphore* 301), pa seveda ni brez povezav z Novalisovo teorijo Darstellung, ki »identično opušča, da bi ga upodobila.« Po analogiji morda lahko princip metaforične redeskripcije (sveta) prenesemo tudi na vprašanje avtorsko figuriranega subjekta. Tudi avtobiografsko upodobljena lirska persona v pesemskem diskurzu implicira nerazrešljivo tenzijo med identiteto in diferenco na način, da vselej ustvarja »podvojeno referenco« (*La métaphore* 288).

Lahko rečemo, da figuralnost pesemskega diskurza predstavlja pesemsko fabulo (*mitos*), ki se gradi z upodabljalno operacijo, v kateri prevladuje neubranost, s tem pa princip *ipse*. Neubrani razpršenosti strukturacije pesniškega izjavljanja je tako sopostavljena oziroma vanjo vpletena identiteta-*ipse* narativne-lirske identitete-persone, lirskega subjekta, ki postaja skozi različne momente upodabljanja, na način, da ne more priti do sedimentacije v *idem*. Ti momenti so (neidentične) upodobitve momentalnih jazov-person, ki se konstituirajo skozi pesem-proces. Teza o postajajoči nasebnosti avtorsko figurirane lirske persone-subjekta se zdi smiselna tudi v primeru prevlade narativne nad figuralno-metaforično strukturacijo fabule pesniškega diskurza, ki je ena osrednjih značilnosti močnega toka sodobne, tudi slovenske, poezije. Mogoče je reči, da za poezijo nasploh na ravni besedilne povezljivosti velja princip *ipse*. Vendar pa prav tendence narativizacije poezije navajajo k ponovnem razmisleku o ustaljenih koncepcijah lirskega subjekta, ki se ob tovrstnih tekstih zdijo pogostokrat popolnoma neuporabne.

Po Ricoeurju je šele prek identitete *ipse*, ki je drugost v identiteti, mogoče vzpostaviti odnos do drugosti drugega. Avtorsko figuriran *jaz-drugi* pesmi v njej išče, in morda uzre, tudi *drugega-drugega*, mu govori. P. Celan v *Bremenskem govoru* dialoško bistvo poezije, ki je vedno usmerjena k drugemu, ponazori s podobo pesmi kot v morje vržene steklenice: pesem je vedno na poti k nečemu, na poti do "odprtega mesta«, do *ti-ja*.

Naj zato na kratko zaključim z omembno tiste plasti naslovne sintagme *subjekt pesmi v procesu, subjekt v procesu pesmi*, ki misli tudi re-konstitucijo subjekta v vsakokratnem dogodku življenja teksta, kolikor se po Iserju ob konstituciji tekstnega smisla dogaja tudi konstitucija subjekta (Iser 236–246). To Iserjevo tezo iz *Bralnega dejanja* lahko povežemo z Benvenistevim

postulatom, da se subjekt v govoric, v govornem dejanju, vsakič znova konstituira. S tega gledišča se v zvezi *jaz je drugi* razpre tudi tista intersubjektivna in interdiskurzivna razsežnost jaza kot jezikovne oblike-*shifterja*, ki vedno nastopa kot element dvojice *jaz-ti*. Toda ta v Benvenistevi teoriji izjavljanja ne poimenuje nobene leksikalne enote, temveč se nanaša zgolj na individualno govorno dejanje, v katerem je izrečen in v katerem označuje govorca (Benveniste, *Problemi* 283). Tega govorca, *l'éconciateur* (izjavljalec) v Benvenistevi teoriji ne gre zamenjevati z govorečim subjektom, *le sujet parlant* (govorec). *Jaz-ti* namreč po Benvenistu v tem smislu nista reprezentacijska, temveč indikativna, saj je po Benvenistu realnost, na katero napotuje, govorna-diskurzivna realnost (*Problemi* 283–284). Vendar ta *jaz* v Benvenistevi teoriji diskurza ni zgolj subjekt izjave, temveč subjekt izjavljanja. V prenosu te teorije na pesemski diskurz pa tako razumljeni subjekt ni lirski persona, Bahtinov lirski junak ali eden od Foucaultovih razpršenih egov, temveč jaz-ti izjavljanja, subjekt-pesem sama, subjekt procesa-dejavnosti pesmi, ki iz »celotnega teksta naredi jaz in v svojem procesu transformira tudi bralčev jaz« (Meschonnic, *Politique* 192). S tem se udejanja/dogaja tudi »radikalno historična«, »tranhistorična« in »transsubjektivna«¹¹ po-etika poezije, v kateri se v dogodku pesmi vedno srečata dva subjekta v procesu.

OPOMBE

¹ Gl. M. Foucault. *L'hérnéutique du sujet. Cours du collège de France 1982–1981*. Pariz: Seuil, 2001.

² Pomenljiva je Barthesova navedba Nietzschejeve misli v *Užitku v tekstu*, s katero zanika vladavino bralca: »Ne smemo vprašati: »Kdo interpretira«, temveč ima interpretiranje kot oblika volje do moči svoje bivanje (vendar ne kot bit, temveč kot proces, nastajanje), kot afekt.« (Le plaisir 83) Prevod po F. Nietzsche. *Volja do moči . Poskus prevrednotenja vseh vrednot*. (prev. J. Moder) Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1991.

³ Kot temeljno monološka je lirika obravnavana npr. pri J. Petersenu, (*Wissenschaft von der Dichtung*, 1939), deloma M. Bahtinu, D. Lampingu (*Das lyrische Gedicht: Definitionen zu Theorie und Geschichte der Gattung*, 1989).

⁴ K. Hamburger. *Die Logik der Dichtung*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. 1957 (1968). Teorijo Hamburgerjeve bolj ali manj afirmativno obravnavajo ali navajajo npr. L. Jenny: "Fictions du moi et figuration du moi" V: *Figures du sujet lyrique*. Pariz: PUF, 1996. 99–111; D. Combe "La référence dédoublée" *Figures du sujet lyrique*. Pariz: PUF, 1996. 39–63; A. L. Luján Atienza. *Pragmática del discurso lírico*. Madrid: Arco Libros, S. A., 2005. 143–152.

⁵ Hamburgerjeva izjavni subjekt skuša postulirati kot jezikovno-strukturni element. (Hamburger 58) S tem pa Hamburgerjeva začrta tudi načelno razliko med izjavnim subjektom, kot ga razume sama, in subjektom, kot se pojavlja v teorijah informacije, danes bi rekli pragmatike diskurza; njena teorija izjave se želi vzpostaviti kot teorija skrite strukture jezika (56), komunikacijska in informacijska teorija pa obravnavata situacijo govora. Tako pošiljatelja v teoriji informacije ne gre enačiti z njenim izjavnim subjektom.

Prvemu je namreč vselej sopostavljen prejemnik, drugemu pa objekt. V izjavnem sistemu jezika Hamburgerjeve je izjava ustrojena v relaciji subjekt-objekt.

⁶ Oswald Ducrot. *Le Dire et le dit*. Pariz: Minuit, 1989.

⁷ Izraz lirski subjekt v tem prispevku uporabljam v ustaljenem pomenu- v smislu lirskega govorca in ga enačim z izrazom lirski persona. Vse pojme oziroma izraze razumem v smislu subjekta izjave, tj. instance znotraj diegetičnega okvira- predstavljenega sveta teksta. Prim. Balžalorsky 68

⁸ To pa je pravzaprav moment, ki ga teoretizirajo tudi številne moderne teorije lirike, ki se skušajo distancirati od pojmovanja lirike kot subjektivne vrste, s tem, da lirski diskurz obravnavajo kot prenos na subjektni pol, pri čemer sta subjekt in objekt znotrajbesedilni strukturni funkciji. (npr. pri K. Hamburger s teoretizacijo izjave, utemeljene v relaciji subjekt-objekt, pri čemer je lirski prenos na subjektni pol; pri J. Kosu s postavko, da »lirski realnost obrača nazaj k subjektu kot njegova zrcalna podoba.« Kos, *Lirika* 54)

⁹ Kakor v svoji obsežni monografiji o oblikovanju literarne osebnosti v renesansi ugotavlja J. Leconte je bil srednjeveški literarni subjekt predvsem produkt teksta, v renesansi pa se z Boccaciom v njegovem teoretsko-kritičnem tekstu *Genealogie deorum gentilium libri XV* (1360–1374) vzpostavi nov model literarne osebnosti, ki ne temelji toliko na literarnotekstnih elementih, kot na dejanskih biografskih podatkih o avtorju. S tem se je zgodil pomemben obrat, ki je vplival na celoten razvoj metaliterarne, a tudi intertekstualne percepcije. Kajti oseba avtorja od renesanse naprej, ni več zgolj literarna, pač pa postane eksistencialna; Dante in Petrarka nista več le Dante in Petrarka iz *Novega življenja in Kanconiera*, temveč navdahnjena genija z idealizirano, a singularno, zunajtekstualno eksistenco. Gl. Leconte 236–270.

¹⁰ Ricoeurjev model samozavedanja Frank kritizira, ker je utemeljen na refleksijski logiki. (The Subject 5)

¹¹ Izraze prevzemam od H. Meschonnicca. Uporablja jih v večini svojih del (npr. *Pour la poésie I, II, III, IV, Critique du rythme, Politique du rythme, La rime et la vie, Poétique du traduire*, itd.) v katerih razvija poetiko diskurza, teorijo ritma, poetiko prevajanja.

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Avtor kot psihološka, intelektualna in nravstvena celota v slovenskem romanu zadnje tretjine 20. stoletja

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V slovenskem romanu zadnje tretjine 20. stoletja prevladujejo literarni subjekti, ki so močno vezani na družbeno situacijo. Literatura namreč v prvi vrsti postavlja etično-moralno ogledalo družbi. S pomočjo literarnih likov v različnih slovenskih romanih, njihovih psiholoških, intelektualnih in nravstvenih stališč, se kažejo sodbe romanopisca kot glasnika nacionalnih usmeritev in popisovalca stanja v sodobni družbi. Avtorska volja je nujno povezana z aktom ustvarjanja pripovednega dela, v katerem avtor rešuje zase in za družbo pomembna nravstvena, zgodovinska in filozofska vprašanja. S pomočjo zasebnih zgodb in osebnih problemov v sodobnem romanu lahko torej raziskujemo razvoj celotne družbe in kulture v Sloveniji pred demokratičnimi spremembami s konca 80-ih let in ob krepitvi nacionalne države v začetku 90-ih.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / avtor / avtorstvo / avtobiografska literatura / slovenski roman / 20. st.

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Ko skušamo odgovoriti na vprašanje »Kdo ali kaj piše literaturo?«, moramo najprej opredeliti enega izmed številnih možnih pomenov besede »literatura«, tistega, ki je za nas relevanten. To ni literatura kot celota zapisanih del in izjav, ki so nastajali z razvojem naše kulture, kakor tudi ne strokovna literatura, neodtujljivi temelj razvoja in napredka, pač pa tako imenovano leposlovje, in sicer ne glede na to, da je danes težko govoriti o lepoti kot značilnosti sodobne umetniške literature, saj se ta najpogosteje skuša najti med kaosom in negacijo. Upoštevajoč pomembnost študij o pisanju in besedilu, želimo poudariti (za naše raziskave najpomembnejšo) značilnost umetniškega dela – zavestno upodablajoče-estetsko celoto. Če se preveč navdušimo le nad funkcionalnim, formalnim pristopom k literarnemu gradivu, lahko namreč reduciramo vlogo avtorja na množico načinov pisanja, nekakšno metodo (podobno raznim pravilom za oblikovanje pravnih aktov).

Prav pri podobnih zvrsteh literature lahko upravičeno govorimo o resnični smrti avtorja. Takšna besedila, kdorkoli se jih je že izmislil v preteklosti, so za vedno izgubila notranjo, tako rekoč duhovno povezavo s svojim virom; funkcionirajo samostojno, vendar ne živijo. S tem izgubljajo neponovljivost mojstrovine, ki očara različne ljudi po celem svetu. V umetniškem delu se v celoto spajajo elementi, ki prihajajo tako iz zunanjih predpostavk kot tudi iz notranjih značilnosti avtorjeve osebe, individualnosti.

Ustroj literarnega dela kot skupka posebnih, docela samostojnih elementov, organiziranje dela v dokončano celoto je mogoče le prek določene povezujoče substance, ta pa je lahko samo človek. To je še posebej poudarjal Mihail M. Bahtin že na začetku dvajsetih let prejšnjega stoletja, in sicer v delu »Avtor in junak v estetski dejavnosti«, ki je postalo temelj njegove filozofske estetike. V skladu z njegovo koncepcijo je ta povezujoča substanca junak literarnega dela. Obenem je Bahtin dosledno izpeljal tole misel:

Da bi se proza zaključila in se zlila v dokončano delo, mora izkoristiti estetizirani proces ustvarjalnega individua, tj. njenega avtorja, v sebi mora odsevati podobo dokončanega dogodka avtorjeve ustvarjalnosti, saj v okviru svojega čistega, od avtorja abstrahiranega smisla ne more najti momentov, ki bi jo zaključili in arhitektonsko uredili. (Бахтин 11; citat je iz »Fragmenta prvega poglavja«, ki ni preveden v slovenski izdaji).

Po Bahtinu so junak, njegova zavest, čustva in želje, se pravi njegova predmetno emocionalno-intencionalna naravnost, z vseh strani zajeti v avtorjevo zaključujočo zavest o junaku in njegovem svetu. Menimo, da »smrt avtorja«, ki jo je mnogo pozneje razglasil Roland Barthes, ni mogla omajati predpostavk ruskega znanstvenika. Kakor Bahtin obravnavamo avtorja kot »enotno aktivno oblikovalno energijo«.

Razmerja med avtorjem in junakom so kompleksna, niso enoznačna in zadevajo ne le tako imenovane »gramatične« vidike (kot jim pravi Barthes), pač pa tudi vidike upodobitve in spoznavno-etične vidike. Avtor pogosto poskuša s pomočjo svojega junaka odgovoriti na mnoga zanj življenjsko pomembna etična, zgodovinska, filozofska vprašanja. Včasih se avtor odreče položaju objektivnega »zunajbivanja«¹ in se približuje junaku, tako da se meje med njima skoraj zabišejo kakor denimo v avtobiografsko naravnanih delih, kjer si avtor in junak delita ne samo misli in čustva, temveč tudi biografsko gradivo. Vseeno pa junakov »jaz« nikdar ne postane avtorjev »jaz«, saj je v njem vselej mogoče zaznati nekaj izmišljije, občutek ustvarjenosti.²

Dejavnost »avtorske volje« je neločljiv od dejanja ustvarjanja literarnega dela. Umetniška podoba je venomer odvisna od subjektivnosti njenega ustvarjalca. Kot rečeno, avtor v vsakem delu rešuje mnoga zanj in za družbo

pomembna vprašanja. Celo »čista« fiksacija osebnih doživljajev, emocij in razpoloženj, izraženih z besedo, predpostavlja možnost vnovične ali drugotne aktualizacije v svoji izvorni enotnosti podobe, in sicer prek kasnejše recepcije s strani samega avtorja ali koga drugega. Možnost estetskega obstoja zapisanega teksta je bistveno pogojena z njegovo notranjo enotnostjo podobe, enotnostjo, ki jo določa avtor. Ta enotnost se pojavi brž, ko avtor denimo posamezne pripovedi, sižeje in podobe združi v enoten cikel, tako da jih bralec sprejema kot estetsko enotne. Tako sodobni roman, ki je presegel žanrske okvire in konvencije prejšnjih obdobj, premore obilico »gramatičnih« in drugih formalnih postopkov, vendar je načelo organiziranja misli in podob tudi v tem primeru avtor, njegova ideja, načrt, volja.

V zadnji tretjini 20. stoletja roman v Sloveniji ostaja eden najbolj priljubljenih žanrov. K njegovemu razvoju so v teh letih prispevali mnogi notranji kot tudi zunanji dejavniki. Ker je vpisana v širši evropski kontekst, slovenska književnost nikdar ni bila zaprt sistem. Tako lahko slovenski roman sprejema najnovejše pojave mednarodnih literarnih procesov tako rekoč brez zamud, obenem pa se podaja na lastne umetniške, estetske poti. V tem času je postopni razvoj slovenske družbe, zaznamovan tudi z nekaterimi konstitutivnimi spremembami, omogočil pisateljem kompleksno refleksijo dejanskosti. Tudi prelomni leti 1990 in 1991, ko je slovenski narod pokazal izjemno enotnost, nam lahko veljata za spontan prehod na novo razvojno stopnjo. Velike zasluge pri tem imajo sami pisatelji, ki so postopoma rušili prepovedi in stereotipe, zaobšli različne politične in ideološke tabuje, vzpostavljali zgodovinsko pravičnost, prevzemali odgovornost za ohranitev nacionalnega samozavedanja. Slovenski roman je kot nekakšna slutnja sprememb odigral nacionalno konstitutivno vlogo; skupaj z njim je družba postopoma uresničevala svoj najpomembnejši cilj, tj. ustanovitev samostojne države, kar se je v zgodnjih 90. letih tudi zgodilo.

Ker zajema polifonijo, ima sodobni roman na voljo številna sredstva za obravnavo pojava človeka kot takega, pri tem pa stalno preskuša nove postopke, razvija vse kompleksnejše strategije. Bralec je vabljen v raziskovalni laboratorij, kjer lahko postane priča pa tudi asistent poskusov, ki jih na človeku izvajata pisatelj in življenje samo. Sodobni romanopisci domala niso več zavezani žanrskim konvencijam. Na vseh ravneh umetniškega tkiva preskušajo najrazličnejša sredstva, celo tista, ki so poprej veljala za nezdružljiva. To izrazito potrjuje tudi slovenski roman. V njem soobstajajo in sodelujejo izmišljaja in dokumenti (Drago Jančar, *Severni sij*, 1984), množično in elitno (Dimitrij Rupel, *Levi delež*, 1989), proza in poezija (Jože Snoj, *Gavžjen brib: roman o vojnem otroštvu*, 1982), tradicija in eksperiment. Tako je bil na primer Blatnikov roman-antiutopija s pustolovskim sižejem *Plamenice in solze* (1987) sprva zasnovan kot eksperiment po postmodernističnem modelu.

Toda slovenski roman zadnje tretjine prejšnjega stoletja zvečine ni eksperimentiral zaradi samega eksperimentiranja, saj je bila v ozadju želja reflektirati dejanskost, in sicer pogosto zasebno življenje. V sodobnem slovenskem romanu so, kakor bržkone tudi v drugih sodobnih književnostih, zelo razširjeni tako imenovani hibridi, ki združujejo znake različnih žanrov in se poigravajo z njimi. »Čistih« vzorcev tega ali onega romanesknega žanra tako rekoč ni več. Vse to priča o popolni pisateljski svobodi pri izbiri oblik in sredstev pa tudi o zrelosti sprejemnika, bralca, ki ne potrebuje več žanrskih »konvencij«, saj ga, nasprotno, zanimajo nove, nenavadne kombinacije, ki dodatno bogatijo njegov um in duha. Tako prek osebne zgodbe, lastnih problemov in omejenih nalog sodobni roman reflektira splošni razvoj družbe in kulture Slovenije na poti k demokracijskim spremembam s konca 80. in začetka 90. let ter iz obdobja uveljavljanja nove države.

Osrediščenost slovenskih romanopiscev na človekov notranji svet je omogočila tudi razcvet tako imenovanega avtobiografskega romana,³ ki je bil povsem po meri omenjenega obdobja. Avtobiografski romani pisateljev, kakršni so Lojze Kovačič, Vitomil Zupan ali Marjan Rožanc, so dandanes že klasični. Med pisatelji srednje generacije lahko mednje dodamo Franja Franciča ali Andreja Moroviča. Avtorsko vlogo v slovenskih avtobiografskih romanih bi lahko zajeli v naslednje tipe.⁴

V romanih prvega tipa igra vlogo organizirajočega načela lik avtorja, ki deluje kot eden od likov romana. V takšnih romanih avtor premišljeno demonstrira svojo navzočnost, voljo in vednost. Zanj je človeško življenje na vsakem koraku neizčrpno pestro, zato skupaj z junakom tankovestno raziskuje človeka in svet. Avtorjev emocionalno-intencionalni odziv, ki daje enoten ritem⁵ celotni umetnini, je pogosto podkrepjen z lucidno argumentacijo s pomočjo literarnih citatov, zgodovinskih primerov, filozofskih spekulacij, različnih digresij, ki dopolnjujejo podobo junaka, itn. Izrazit primer je trilogija Vitomila Zupana (»Menuet za kitaro /na petindvajset strellov/«, 1975, »Levitan«, 1982, »Komedijska človeškega tkiva«, 1980).

Drugačna pa so razmerja med avtorjem in junakom v romanih, v katerih se pisatelj skriva za likom pripovedovalca ali samega junaka, ki je obenem prvoosebni pripovedovalec; to velja denimo za avtobiografske romane Marjana Rožanca (*Metulj*, 1981, *Sentimentalni časi*, 1985). Avtobiografija tu služi pisatelju le kot konkretno gradivo. Odprtost čutov, globina notranje samoanalize zgolj podrepijo avtorjevo željo, da bi se posvetil raziskovanju človeške družbe, svoji aktivni družbeni vlogi, ne pa analizi lastnega formiranja kot človeka in pisatelja.

Junak avtobiografskega romana Andreja Moroviča (roj. 1960) *Bomba la petrolia* (1989) prav tako ne sprejema obstoječega vrednostnega sistema,

zato se poskuša najti v *undergroundu*. Pripoved o junakovem blodenju je polna ironičnega in celo sarkastičnega odnosa do dejanskosti in lastnega življenja (droge, konflikti z oblastmi, pohajanja itn.). Kakor akumulator zbira vidne in zvočne signale ter jih prenaša bralcu, ki mora samostojno postaviti naglase.

Znana ruska raziskovalka književnosti Lidija Jakovlevna Ginzburg leta 1979 v delu *О литературном герое* (O literarnem junaku) pravi, da se zanimanje za dokumentarnost (in s tem zanimanjem razcvet avtobiografskega žanra) praviloma poveča v »obdobjih odprtih mej«. ⁶ To potrjuje tudi slovenski roman. Avtobiografskemu žanru so se posvetili tudi pisatelji, ki se poprej niso ukvarjali z njim. Tako Jože Snoj po *Gavžen hribu*, v katerem je avtobiografska prvina izrazita, a vendarle prevladuje mitopoetsko načelo, in po drugih, od avtobiografskosti precej oddaljenih delih leta 1999 dokončuje roman *Gospod Pepi ali Zgodnje iskanje imena*, ki izide leta 2000. V tem romanu pisatelj, še zmerom zvest svojemu individualnemu poetičnemu videnju, nadaljuje najboljšo tradicijo ustvarjalnosti slovenskega klasika avtobiografskega žanra Lojzeta Kovačiča.

Za Kovačičeve romane je značilna odsotnost izmišljije kot take: z redkimi izjemami je gradivo umetniškega ustvarjanja samo življenje. Kovačičev ustvarjalni *credo* bi lahko označili tako: ničesar si ni treba izmišljati, nič ni bolj nabitega s pomeni, kompleksnega in zanimivega kakor življenje samo. To velja za Kovačičeve romane, v katerih je oblika podrejena načelu zvestobe resnici o življenju (trilogija *Prišleki*, 1984–1985, ali roman *Otroške stvari*, 2003), kot tudi za dela, ki so pristni formalni modernistični eksperimenti (*Pet fragmentov*, od katerih sta izšla le prva dva, in sicer 1981). S svojim ustvarjanjem je Kovačič pokazal, da lahko čista avtobiografija, preprosta deskripcija lastnega življenja, preide iz paraličnega žanra v vrhunsko umetniško delo, ne da bi izgubila vrednost zgodovinskega pričevanja. Poseben estetski naboj dobi opis tega, kar je avtor dejansko videl in slišal, saj ta zmore videti dejstvo umetniško pregnantno.

Kovačičevi avtobiografski romani ⁷ sodijo v poseben tip razmerja med avtorjem in junakom. Avtor se – kljub želji, da bi z junakovo pomočjo pogledal nase z očmi drugega, tj. s položaja zunajbivanja, dostopnega ustvarjalcu umetnine (kakor pri Rožancu) – vselej vrača v svojega junaka kakor vase, saj ne more najti bolj ali manj trdnega oporišča zunaj svojega junaka in še naprej vrednoti dogodke iz junakovega življenja od znotraj. Niti s pomočjo nevtralne oblike tretjeosebne pripovedi (*Resničnost* in *Pet fragmentov*) se avtor ne more oddaljiti od notranjega »jaza« svojega junaka. V takšnih delih se izkristalizira vloga avtorja kot psihološkega središča, ki združuje okrog sebe različne pojave dejanskosti.

Siže romana *Resničnost* temelji na dejanskih dogodkih iz življenja pisatelja, ki je med služenjem vojaškega roka prebil šest mesecev v kazenskem bataljonu. Tu Kovačič ne prevzame odgovornosti, da bi zatrdil neposredno identiteto med lastno in junakovo usodo, kakor počne v drugih romanih. Obenem pa se pisatelj ne želi ne zunanje ne notranje oddaljiti od junaka. Vsi romaneskni dogodki, poteze drugih likov, situacijski opisi – vse je podano skozi junakovo konkretno, subjektivno optiko, se pravi vse prej kot nepristransko. Vse informacije se podane v prostorsko-časovnem kontekstu junakovega življenja. Brezosebni pripovedovalec dosledno poudarja, da junak »ni niti sekunde verjel v obstoj [...] resničnosti od začetka do konca« [(Kovačič 106)], in najbrž prav zato roman ne obravnava te objektivne dejanskosti. Konceptija lika junaka se nam pokaže kot popolnoma subjektivna percepcija sveta, pogosto zmotna, a za posameznika dejanska. Kot glavna tema romana se razvija tema človeškega strahu in svobode, ki se sčasoma konkretizirata v bolj specifičnih temah, kakršne so razmerja med obsojenci, red v vojski, družbene spremembe v kontekstu zgodovinskih dogodkov in kataklizem, mednacionalna razmerja. Pri tem si roman ne zada objektivne analize teh tem, čeravno v določeni meri teži k vsesplošni veljavnosti. Posamična opažanja na obče teme so vendarle podana prek junakovega konteksta, prav tu vznikne tisti vseobsegajoči avtor, čigar ustvarjalna energija je nujna za zaključenje junaka. Avtor vznikna tudi v ironiji, ki sega od lahkotne šale do žolčnega sarkazma.

Takšna razmerja med avtorjem in junakom – kjer se avtor ne poskuša ločiti od junaka, ta pa zavzema gledišče, s katerega nastaja celotna umetniška razsežnost literarnega dela – niso tako zelo redka. Opazujemo jih lahko denimo v delu *Domovina, bleda mati* (1986), avtobiografskem romanu Franja Frančiča, pisatelja, ki pripada neki drugi generaciji (roj. 1958). Skupni izhodišči ustvarjalnosti Lojzeta Kovačiča in Franja Frančiča sta zvestoba avtobiografskemu žanru in težka usoda na začetku življenjske poti. Zdi se, da je omenjeni tip razmerja med avtorjem in junakom v določeni meri pogojen s psihično travmo, ki jo pisatelj poskuša premagati v svojem ustvarjanju.

Za sodobni slovenski roman so značilni dovzetnost za zunanjo dejanskost, prepvrševanje lastne poklicanosti v odnosu do te dejanskosti, zavračanje trivialnosti – in vse to priča o določeni usmerjenosti tega romana k notranji psihološki refleksiji. Tu moramo seveda dodati, da je psihološkost že tradicionalna poteza slovenskega romana. Pač pa razvoj sodobne znanosti, zlasti psihoanalize, vpliv vzhodnih filozofij in nazorov, povečanje dovzetnosti pisateljev pa tudi bralcev za tovrstne teme postavljajo to tradicionalno psihološko prvino slovenskega romana na novo raven.⁸

Poslanstvo avtorja kot psihološke enotnosti je pomembno tudi v romanih, ki so daleč od realistične zasnove, recimo v *Gavžen bribu* Jožeta

Snoja ali antiutopični dilogiji Berte Bojetu. V romanih *Filio ni doma* (1990) in *Ptičja hiša* (1995) pisateljica opisuje od zunanjega sveta izolirana sistema agresivno-patriarhalne družbe in poskusi razkrinkati to družbo, v kateri je človek ponižan in brezpraven; v prvem romanu je prizorišče otok, v drugem pa odročen planinski kraj. V tej dilogiji se avtor ne manifestira, na tok pripovedi ne vpliva eksplicitno. Pripoved je prvo-, drugo- ali tretjeosebna ter sestavljena iz različnih in razločenih delov. Pa vendar je poleg sižēja in glavnih junakov moč zaznati neko silo, ki združuje vse te elemente v psihično-emocionalno celoto. V obeh romanih junakinja bržkone ni zmožna dejanskega upora zoper obstoječi red. Toda sama dilogija postane tak upor. Trpljenje, ponižanje, brezdušnost okolice preizkušajo ljudi, ki iščejo pristnost človeških odnosov in potrpežljivo pričakujejo konec muk. Prek njihovih usod avtor poskuša pokazati bralcu, da lahko ljubezen premaga strah, da je duhovna trdnost vredna več kakor zunanja lepota, da še ni izgubljen boj med oblastjo in znanjem, silama, ki sta zmožni spremeniti svet.

Neka druga avtorska vloga – avtor kot intelektualna celota – je v ospredju postmodernističnih del. Izrazita primera sta roman Andreja Blatnika *Plamenice in solze* ter roman Dimitrija Rupla *Levi delež*. Njunjo poetiko utemeljujejo palimpsestnost, ironija, igra z literarnim gradivom pred bralčevimi očmi, načelo *déjà vu*, svoboda mezalianse, intertekstualnost. Teksta izkoriščata najrazličnejše prvine splošnoevropskega kulturnega konteksta, in sicer tako konstitutivne poteze naše civilizacije kakor običajne pozitivne in negativne stereotipe. Avtorja se navezujeta tudi na aktualne, časovno omejene izjave. Tako je Blatnik leta 2005 za drugo izdajo med drugim umaknil nekatere asociacije in aluzije, ki tedaj niso bile več aktualne. Obenem tudi takšna literarna dela zaznamuje pisateljeva težnja, da bi nagovoril bralca kot svojega duhovnega in ne zgolj intelektualnega sodobnika.

V romanu Draga Jančarja *Zvenenje v glavi* (1998) avtorska volja v enotno pripoved združi pričevanje udeleženca upora zapornikov v Livadi in molk starodavnih kamnov. Avtor primerja upor zapornikov z obleganjem utrjenega mesta Masada pred več kot dvema tisočletjema, ki se je končalo s samomorom prebivalcev. Sama tema zločina, upora zoper nepravico in kazni izpostavi etični vidik. Jetniško »samoupravljanje« se je spreverglo v tiranijo nove oblasti, ki se je udušila v lastni nizkotnosti, okrutnosti in razvratu. Človeška čustva in dejanja so pogosto primerjana z živalskimi; vendar so v istih ljudeh tudi drugačna moč. Avtorja ne zanima nujnost zunanjih norm človeškega vedenja, ki jih podpira obča morala, ampak notranja moč volje, težnja k pravičnosti (denimo pri Kebru, glavnem junaku-kriminalcu).

V slovenskem romanu zadnje tretjine 20. stoletja prevladuje osebno- struktura, pri čemer je problematika umetnostnega »jaza« neločljivo povezana z razvojem družbene zavesti o vprašanih osebnosti. Literarna

umetnina zastavlja bralcu in s tem družbi ključna etična vprašanja. Lik avtorja v različnih slovenskih romanih – psihološko, intelektualno in etično načelo, ki ga avtor uteleša – izraža gledišča romanopisca kot zastopnika vsenarodnih teženj, kot indikatorja stanja sodobne družbe in kulture. Sleherno literarno delo razteza niti analogij, korespondenc, antitez in sorodstvenih vezi v vse smeri, tako v globino literarne preteklosti kakor v širino sodobnega življenja. Zadnja tretjina 20. stoletja pomeni za slovenski roman srečni čas premagovanja vsakršnih ideoloških kot tudi estetskih tabujev, nikakor pa ne čas smrti avtorja. Nasprotno, po dolgem času omejitve in boja z zunanjimi ovirami je to obdobje prineslo slovenskim pisateljem občutje svobode in uživanja v ustvarjalnosti.

OPOMBE

¹ Ta pojem je v znanstveno rabo uvedel Bahtin v delu »Avtor in junak v estetski dejavnosti« (gl. Bahtin 22).

² S tega gledišča je zgovorno, da Bahtin ni videl načelne razlike med avtobiografijo in biografijo.

³ Ta pojem je večpomenski, raziskovalci mu pripisujejo zelo različne pomene. Za nekatere zadošča že sovpadanje avtorjevega in junakovega imena, četudi je siže delno fantastičen; drugi pa zahtevajo, da so v tekst vpisani dejanski dogodki iz avtorjevega življenja. Vprašanje, kaj je avtobiografsko literarno delo, terja temeljito raziskovanje, kakršno poteka recimo na Inštitutu za slovensko literaturo in literarne vede ZRC SAZU, sodelavci katerega so aprila 2009 vidno sodelovali na mednarodnem simpoziju »Slovenska avtobiografija«, ki so ga tudi soorganizirali (<http://lit.zrc-sazu.si/index.php?q=sl/node/63>).

⁴ O nekaterih smo že podrobno pisali (gl. Sozina).

⁵ Enoten ritem daje nekakšen enoten ton vsem izjavam, saj jim doda skupni emocionalno-intencionalni imenovalec.

⁶ Izraz sodobne odprtosti estetskih mej je bila najbrž tudi diskusija o krizi (smrti) avtorja.

⁷ Poleg navedenih gre omeniti vsaj še avtobiografska dela *Deček in smrt* (1968), *Resničnost* (1972), *Basel* (1989) in *Kristalni čas* (1990).

⁸ Psihološkost se ohranja, četudi ne venomer, celo v tako imenovanih »množičnih«, bolje, »blagajniških« opusih.

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Dinamika posredovalnih procesov v literaturi

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V članku bom na podlagi literarnih del, ki zaradi svoje vplivnosti učinkujejo kot avtoriteta in tako odpirajo nove medbesedilne odzive, obravnavala različne literarne procese produkcije in recepcije. Pri tem se bom posvetila raziskovanju pojmov »vpliva« in »medbesedilnosti«, hkrati pa tudi pojmu »literarne recepcije«, saj se povezuje z obema zgoraj navedenima pojmomoma. Tema, ki družni obravnavana literarna dela in njihova medbesedilna razmerja, je tema zla in krivde, s katero se srečujemo ob prebiranju Jobove knjige.¹ V povezavi s tem bom izpostavila motiv greha in lik Satana. Poudarek bo na literaturi Thomasa Manna in Goethejevi dramski umetnini Faust. Obravnava teh del razkriva tudi historičnost pristopov, s katerimi se spopadamo ob njunem branju.

Ključne besede: literarna teorija / medbesedilnost / literarni vpliv / literarna recepcija / tematologija

UDK 82.091

Mednarodni literarni procesi – »vpliv« in »intertekstualnost«

Med najstarejše literarne procese lahko prištevamo pojem »vpliva« – sprva se je izraz nanašal na astrologijo (vpliv zvezd na ljudi), kasneje pa se je ta pojem prenesel tudi v književnost. O tem razpravlja Gvozden Eror v knjigi *Genetički vidovi inter(literarnosti)*, ki svoje ugotovitve strne z naslednjimi besedami: »Ob koncu 19. stoletja je postal koncept literarnega vpliva vsesplošno sprejet, in sicer kot pojavna oblika, manifestacija vezi med različnimi književnostmi, razumljen v smislu kavzalnih relacij na genetični ravni.« (Eror 92) Najpomembnejša lastnost literarnih »vplivov« je torej kavzalnost, kar razumemo kot razvojni proces posameznih tem, motivov, literarnih likov itd. Avtor v svoje delo sprejema in vpleta tuje ideje, motive, teme, ki pa jih po svoje preoblikuje in jim na ta način zagotovi svojo lastno vrednost. Morda najbolj znan primer takega vpliva najdemo v Dantejevi *Božanski komediji*, na katero je močno vplival Vergil s svojim slogom in razumevanjem sveta.²

Ti si moj mojster, knjiga mi domača,
pri tebi, glej, sem lepega se stila³
navzel, ki s slavo me nekoč poplača.

(Pekel I: 85– 87).

Vergil je na Danteja vplival z izbiro svoje tematike,⁴ vendar pa v pesnitvi najdemo tudi druge vrste vplivov; poleg idejnih vplivov (religiozni, filozofski, estetski) še snovne, oblikovne in stilne⁵ vplive (povzeto po A. Ocvirku: *Teorija primerjalne literarne zgodovine*, 1936). Dantejeva pesnitev še danes vpliva na vrsto pesnikov in pisateljev, ki v *Božanski komediji* odkrivajo nove možnosti prikazovanja onstranstva oziroma onstranskega življenja, z njegovo pomočjo pa razčlenjujejo tudi družbo, svet in preteklost.

Po Bloomovi definiciji lahko o vplivu govorimo šele takrat, kadar sta v proces vpleteni dve močni pesniški avtoriteti:

Pesniški vpliv [...] zmeraj nastane z mimobranjem starejšega pesnika, z ustvarjalnim popravkom, ki je v resnici in neizogibno preinterpretacija. Zgodovina plodovitih pesniških vplivov [...] je zgodovina tesnobe in samih sebe rešujočih spak, zgodovina preobračanja besed, perverzij in premišljenega revizionizma, brez katerega moderna poezija kot taka sploh ne bi obstajala. (Bloom 32)

Na pesnikovo delno nerazumevanje svojega predhodnika vpliva med drugim časovna oddaljenost, neznanje jezika itd.⁶ Tako ima novonastalo delo svojo lastno identiteto in karakteristiko. To se najlepše opazi v primerjavi Goethejevega in Mannovega *Fausta / Doktorja Faustusa*: »Mannovo odstopanje od Goetheja je nadvse ironično zanikanje tega, da je kakršnokoli odstopanje potrebno. Njegovo napačno interpretiranje Goetheja izraža prav branje njegovega lastnega parodističnega genija, njegov svojevrsten način ljubeče ironije do svojega predhodnika.« (Bloom 54)

Vsak vplivanec v svoje delo vtke ne le ideje in teme, ki jih najde pri svojem vzorniku, ampak vanj vplete – včasih hote, drugič spet nehote – duh svoje dobe, svojega časa in prostora. Tako je vsako literarno delo odvisno od mnogih vidikov konteksta, ki vplivajo na njegov nastanek.

Lahko rečemo, da je literarna umetnina posledica različnih vzrokov. Vendar pa se moramo pri tem vprašati, ali v tem primeru še velja Hermerénova definicija »vpliva«: »A je vplival na B z a«. Kot ugotavlja Jay Clayton: »Tako je veriga vpliva seže prek enega člana, ali ne bi morali raje začeti govoriti o medbesedilnosti kot pa o vplivu?« (Clayton 38) Odgovor nikakor ni preprost, zato bom temeljito predstavila pojem »medbesedilnosti« in probleme, ki se z njim pojavljajo. Na koncu se bom vrnila k zastavljenemu vprašanju in podala osnovne razlike med »vplivom« in »medbesedilnostjo«.

Pojem »medbesedilnosti« (»intertekstualnosti«) se je v književnosti pojavil pozno. Prvič ga zasledimo v delih Julie Kristeve, ki je izraz vpeljala v literarno vedo s pomočjo Bahtinove teorije dialoščnosti in Saussurovih raziskav anagramov.⁷ Avtorica razume pod pojmom »medbesedilnost« vsako »tekstovno interakcijo, ki nastaja znotraj enega samega teksta. Za poznavalca je intertekstualnost pojem, ki bo označeval način, na katerega tekst bere zgodovino in se vanjo vključuje« (Pfister 212), kar utemeljuje dinamičnost posredovalnih procesov. Kristeva nam tako razkriva, da se literarna dela medsebojno dopolnjujejo in jih je zato mogoče pravilno razumeti le s pomočjo dobrega poznavanja literarne tradicije. Julia Kristeva torej v svoji teoriji razume *vse tekste* kot intertekstualne relacije, zato jo zanimajo ontološke značilnosti besedil: njihova zgradba, pomen, zgodovinske navezave itd. V skladu s tem Kristeva pravi: »Vsako besedilo je zgrajeno kot mozaik citatov, vsako besedilo je absorbiranje in transformiranje drugega besedila« (navedeno po: Eror 239).

Delo Thomasa Manna *Jožef in njegovi bratje* (*Joseph und seine Brüder*) nam je precej manj razumljivo, če ne poznamo oziroma nismo seznanjeni z avtorjevim branjem in prenašanjem idej iz midrašev (Micha Josef bin Gorion). Jožef v Mannovem romanu predstavlja človeka, ki se skušnjava – Putifarjevi ženi – ne more upreti zaradi osebne moči (ni podoba nekega grškega junaka), ampak šele, ko se mu prikaže očetov razočarani obraz. Na ta način midraš odločilno poseže v samo dogajanje Mannovega romana. Kot ugotavlja Terry R. Wright: »Midraš služi kot posredujoči pripovedni okvir med zgoščenimi vrsticami Geneze 31 in Mannovim dovršenim romanom.« (Wright 153)

Marko Juvan pojem »medbesedilnost« rabi kot splošni pojem; za posebno, eksplicitno obliko medbesedilnosti pa uporablja izraz »citatnost«. Citatnost je tako »strategija pisanja, ki s svojimi [...] figurami in žanri zavestno računa na delovanje oziroma aktiviranje kulturnega spomina« (Juvan 2006 285). Po Juvanovem mnenju spadajo v citatnost literarni teksti, ki bi »brez navezave na tuje ozadje izgubili svojo pomensko in estetsko figuro« (Juvan 2000 245). Na citatnost nas največkrat opozarjajo različne kazalke, medtem ko so pojavi obče intertekstualnosti zaradi njihove zunanje neprepoznavnosti težje določljivi. Besedilo je citatno šele takrat, kadar lahko z gotovostjo trdimo, da se je avtor zavestno skliceval na neko drugo besedilo, pri tem pa računal na bralčevo zmožnost prepoznavanja navezav na prvotno besedilo. Prav zato se lahko strinjamo z Juvanovo trditvijo, da citatnost »vedno znova prenavlja že uporabljeno gradivo. V tem je eden od dokazov za avtopoetičnost literarnega sistema: literatura ne vznikla neposredno iz avtorjeve eksistencialne vrženosti v svet, ampak se razvija tudi iz svoje lastne preteklosti izkušnje in s svojo lastno snovjo« (Juvan 2006 286).

Vendar pa tudi citatnost ločujemo na poljudno in elitistično citatnost. *Elitistično-hermetična* citatnost predstavlja navezave, kjer je sporočilo – zaradi nejasnih, celo zabrisanih kazalk – težje razumljivo. Na ta način je napisana večina postmodernistične metafikcije. V nasprotju z elitistično citatnostjo, pa bralec hitreje prepozna *poljudno* citatnost, saj zajema snov iz klasičnega, vsem znanega repertoarja: Dante v svoji pesnitvi večkrat povzema dogodke, opisane v *Bibliji*:

O Savel, meč prebodel te je zvesti
na Gilbóe, ki ni potlej dobila
ne rose ne dežja na tistem mésti!

(Vice XII: 40– 42)

Francoski avtor F. Goyet, ki se ukvarja z raziskovanjem in pojasnjevanjem razmerja med »medbesedilnostjo« in »citatnostjo«, ugotavlja, da medtem ko citat izrecno apelira na nek drug tekst, ki je prisoten, pa pojem interteksta napeljuje oziroma nakazuje na nek tekst, ki ni nikoli prisoten: skriti tekst, tekst pod tekstom. Citat je torej ekspliciten, intertekst pa impliciten (prim. Eror 262). Pri razumevanju pojmov »intertekstualnosti« in »citatnosti« opazimo, da pojem »intertekstualnost« opredeljuje prikriti lastnosti besedil, medtem ko je »citatnost« predstavljena kot očitna lastnost besedil, zvrsti ali literarnih smeri. Ponovno lahko poudarimo, da so se »literarni teksti [...] vedno nanašali ne samo na stvarnost (*imitatio vitae*), ampak tudi na predhodna besedila (*imitatio veterum*)«⁸ (Pfister 210). Kaj je torej bistvena razlika med pojmom »vpliv« in »intertekstualnost«?

Pomenska razlika med terminoma izvira iz odnosa oziroma relacij, katerim sta podvržena teksta. »Vpliv« označuje vsako enosmerno delovanje teksta A na tekst B, medtem ko »intertekstualnost« lahko ponazorimo z modelom dialoga (Bahtin), kjer gre za dvosmerne inter-akcije besedil A in B. Odnos med njima pogojuje naslednjo razliko: pri »vplivu« gre za nujnost temporalnega sosledja, »medbesedilnost« pa časovnega sosledja – zaradi narave medsebojnega povezovanja tekstov – ne potrebuje.

Zelo pomembna lastnost »vpliva« je kavzalnost: poteze v tekstu B so simptom vzroka v tekstu A, pri čemer je tekst B podrejen prvotnemu tekstu. »Vpliv« tako ohranja vzročnost s hierarhično vrednostno konotacijo avtoritete. Popolnoma drugače opazimo pri preučevanju pojma »intertekstualnost«: kavzalna hierarhija je dekonstruirana – tekst A je prevzet in/ali impliciran s tekstom B.⁹

Razlika med pojmom izvira med drugim tudi iz razumevanja in preučevanja postopkov prenašanja prvin (ideje, motivi, teme) iz enega teksta v drugega. »Vpliv« upošteva različnost in izvornost teksta B, pri tem pa vseeno ni razčlenjen proces, kako novonastali tekst predeluje elemente

prvotnega besedila. Avtor si na ta način prisvoji, asimilira tuje prvine za svoje potrebe, svoje literarno delo. V nasprotju z »vplivom«, pa »medbesedilnost« razčlenjuje vse postopke, oblike in funkcije, ki jih tekst B jemlje iz teksta A. »Medbesedilnost« postavlja v ospredje recepcijo elementov prvotnega teksta (teksta A) v njegovi novi preobrazbi (tekst B).

Pomemben razloček med »vplivom« in »intertekstualnostjo« prinaša razmerje med avtorjem in bralcem. Avtor že od Rolanda Barthesa naprej ni več »garant identitete teksta«: to vlogo prevzame bralec, ki je desubjektiviziran.¹⁰ Pojem »vpliv« nasprotno vzpostavlja intersubjektivne odnose: *avtor* teksta A vpliva na *avtorja* teksta B. Opazimo, da je »garant identitete teksta« v tem primeru avtor.

Pomembna razlika med »vplivom« in »intertekstualnostjo« je v mnogih primerih pogojena z drugačnim pogledom na prvotni tekst (tekst A). Pri »vplivu« je tekst A »pisava s podpisom«, kar pomeni, da gre za literarno delo, katerega avtor nam je znan.¹¹ Drugačen pogled se nam razkrije, kadar preučujemo »intertekstualno« literarno delo: tekst A so v tem primeru lahko anonimni kodi, konvencije, presupozicije.¹²

Premik od avtorja k bralcu – nastanek nove literarne paradigme

Pojma »vpliv« in »intertekstualnost« opredeljujeta poseben način pisanja tekstov, hkrati pa razčlenjujeta vlogo, ki jo imata bralec in avtor v literarnem delu. Skupaj s preučevanjem obeh pojmov se pojavijo spremembe v odnosu avtor – delo – bralec, kar predstavlja začetek nove paradigme v literarni vedi.

Medtem ko se je tradicionalna literarna veda ukvarjala pretežno z avtorjem, pa je modernejša literarna veda poudarila vlogo literarne umetnine kot besedila.¹³ Tako Julia Kristeva razume »medbesedilnost« kot »način pisanja in ne toliko branja« (Rajan 61). Bralec zato pri njej nima posebne veljave, kar kaže na njeno zanimanje in ukvarjanje s tekstom samim (njegova originalnost pa je že problematična – gl. op. 10). Vendar pa Kristeva, ki pozornost namenja samo tekstu, zato spregleda neko lastnost besedila: besedilo je pogojeno z aktivnimi ali pasivnimi intertekstualnimi relacijami. Pasivne medbesedilne relacije tvori »zgodovinsko in kulturno drugačen bralec, ki umešča to, kar sam opredeljuje kot avtonomen prikaz resničnosti, na vodoravno in navpično os¹⁴ svoje lastne medbesedilnosti« (Rajan 69).

Preučevanje »medbesedilnosti« Kristevi omogoči globlji vpogled v samo zgradbo in zgodovino besedila, hkrati pa prav zaradi njene ozke začetnosti raziskovanja ostanejo njena razmišljanja o literaturi neizpeljana.

V nasprotju s Kristevo pa Roland Barthes opazi pomen bralca in zato svoje raziskovalno delo usmeri v preučevanje njegove vloge: Barthesova teorija »medbesedilnosti« tako temelji na »bralcu kot organizacijskem središču interpretacije« (Clayton 21). Nova literarna paradigma v ospredje postavi tretji moment triade: bralca oziroma sprejemnika in z njim povezane okoliščine sprejema. Barthes premakne poudarek s »pišočega subjekta« na bralca in na njegovo kulturno identiteto.¹⁵ Njegova pomembnost se kaže zato predvsem v dejstvu, da je med prvimi prenesel poudarek s teksta in avtorjevega ustvarjanja na stran bralca.¹⁶ Kot sam pravi: »Enotnost teksta ne obstaja v točki njegovega izvora, ampak v točki njegovega sprejema. Ta točka sprejema pa ne more biti več oseba: bralec je človek brez zgodovine, brez biografije, brez psihologije.« (Barthes 23)

Z Barthesovo izjavo o »smrti avtorja« smo hkrati priče izginotju tradicionalnega koncepta bralca. Branje zato razumemo – v skladu z Barthesovim razmišljanjem – kot proces, ki se dogaja, »nikjer in nikomur« (Rajan 73). Pomembno vlogo avtor vidi v anonimnih citatih, klišejih, stereotipih itd., ki referirajo (med)besedilnost, ne osebo.

Temu sledi tudi Michel Riffaterre, ki je »intertekstualnost« tematiziral kot »splošno lastnost *besedil* in njihove recepcije« (Juvan 2000: 143, poudarek L. U.). Riffaterre tako izraz »medbesedilnost« omeji na literaturo, saj samo preko intertekstualnih navezav lahko razumemo smisel in posebnosti besedila. »Medbesedilnost« Riffaterre razume kot »prisilno sredstvo« – z njegovo pomočjo literarno delo vodi in usmerja bralčevo interpretacijo teksta. Na tem mestu Riffaterre zahteva hermenevitično branje besedila, saj le takó besedilo dobi točno določen smisel. Riffaterre je s svojim preučevanjem recepcije pomembno vplival na teoretike konstanške šole, ki so se posvečali raziskovanju bralčevega kreativnega branja besedila. Med njihovimi najvidnejšimi predstavniki sta Hans Robert Jauß in Wolfgang Iser.

Jauß povezuje literarno delo z recepcijo takole: »Smisel literarnega dela ni podan s samim delom, ampak se konstituira šele v zgodovini recepcije« (Bürger 139). Jaußovo ukvarjanje z literaturo in recepcijsko estetiko ga pripelje k ugotovitvi, da je vplivani avtor vedno tudi bralec, »vpliv« pa je zato posebna oblika ustvarjalne recepcije. Pojem »vpliva« je torej pogojen z avtorjevim obzorjem pričakovanj, družbenimi, eksistencialnimi in estetskimi potrebami ter z avtorjevim videnjem domače literature. Novonastalo literarno delo lahko zato, po Jaußovem mnenju, »prevzame probleme predhodnih del in predlaga nove rešitve, sodobni sprejemniki oz. recipienti pa ga bodo sprejemali v okviru določenih *pričakovanj*, in njegov vpliv tako lahko seže izven obdobja, v katerem je nastal«¹⁷ (Bürger 140, poudarek L. U.). Jauß na tem mestu uvede izraz »horizont pričakovanja«, s katerim prikaže, da se komunikativna in družbenotvorna funkcija umetno-

sti »začne že z implicitnim prevzetjem pričakovanj in norm, vendar tudi uvidov v izkustvo in vloge drugih, ki vnaprej oblikujejo posameznikovo družbeno ravnanje, vendar ga lahko tudi motivirajo in spremenijo« (Jauß 451). Prav s procesom branja pa je omogočeno »osamljenemu bralcu«,¹⁸ da postane »zgodovinska sila«. Vlogo »osamljenega bralca« Jauß tako pomembno spremeni, saj ga prikaže kot aktivni člen v procesu nastajanja in oblikovanja literarnega dela.

Pomen posredništva pri nastanku literarnega dela

S pojmom »vpliv« in »intertekstualnost« preučujemo različne odnose med teksti, pri tem pa moramo upoštevati številne dejavnike, ki so vplivali na nastanek novega literarnega dela. Pomembno vlogo imajo pri tem posredniki.¹⁹

Pogosto sredstvo za razširjanje in posredovanje literarnih umetnin med jezikovnimi skupnostmi je prevod. Pri tem moramo biti pozorni na dejstvo, da prevod nikoli ne more popolnoma nadomestiti izvornika. Kljub temu pa morajo prevodi ohranяти bistvene lastnosti in poteze originala. Na uspeh nekega literarnega dela v svetu vplivajo spremembe, ki jih je le-to doživelo v številnih prevodih in priredbah. Opazimo, da s pojmom »posredništva« največkrat imenujemo delovanje »ene književnosti in njenih bralcev v drugi (jezikovni) sredi, vključno s pisatelji kot bralci«²⁰ (Eror 221).

Kot povzema Gvozden Eror v knjigi *Genetički vidovi inter(literarnosti)* Daniela-Henrya Pageauxa, je posrednik prenašalec idej in (spo)znanj, ki razpolaga s precej širokim razponom literarnih žanrov, podžanrov in form (prim. Eror 218).

Posredništvo torej omogoča, da se prelivajo ideje, teme in motivi, pa tudi literarne oblike, stili in žanri iz ene literarne umetnine v drugo oziroma vzpostavljajo medbesedilna razmerja. Pojem »posredništva« tako zavzema osrednje mesto v medbesedilni relaciji dveh tekstov: tekst A – posrednik (npr. prevod) – tekst B.

Tematologija – dinamika motivov in tem med književnostmi

Smisel nekega literarnega dela se formulira s pomočjo drugih književnih del. Motivi in teme tako niso imanentne sestavine nekega besedila, ampak jih izoblikujejo šele interpretativne obdelave. Tematologija je zato na poseben način povezana s pojmom »vpliv« in »intertekstualnost«.

Vsako literarno delo ima svoje lastne značilnosti, a vendar nekatero delo bolj, drugo manj natančno sledi originalu.²¹ Tako Marko Juvan razlikuje dve vrsti citatnih perspektiv: asimilacijsko²² (ujemanje s predlogo) in disimilacijsko²³ (oddaljevanje in zavračanje predloge).

Yves Chevrel ugotavlja, da je značilnost mita njegova zmožnost, da se skozi stoletja modificira in obenem ostaja ista zgodba (prim. Chevrel 18). Chevrelova misel nas pripelje do sklepa, da so literarna dela »nosilci mitov« (kot motivov, tem, snovi²⁴), saj jih prevzemajo, razvijajo in jim celo dajejo prvotno obliko, hkrati pa je ukvarjanje z njimi pomembno za razumevanje posameznih kultur.

Medtem ko Chevrel »mit« razume kot »snov« (nem. »Stoff«, op. L. U.) za oblikovanje, je Jaußova razlaga mita nekoliko drugačna: »Z 'novim mitom' razumem nov odgovor na elementarno [...] vprašanje, ki ga je mogoče ponazoriti v kaki pripovedi ali utelesiti v drami« (Jauß 438). Jauß zato prepozna mit že v *Genezi*, kjer gre po njegovem mnenju »brez dvoma za mit, če z mitom ne razumemo zgolj kakega znamenitega zgodovinskega dejanja, temveč pripoved, ki ovekoveča neki dogodek izpred zgodovine, ki v svojih razsežnostih zajema celoto sveta, vključuje človekov odnos do Boga ali višjih sil in odgovarja na elementarno vprašanje tako, da je to zaradi tistega prvotnega dogodka za vse čase vnaprej odločeno« (Jauß 262). Mit, katerega nam pripoveduje *Geneza*, je po Jaußovi definiciji zato »odgovor na vprašanje, kako in za kakšno ceno se je človek lahko dokopal do vednosti o dobrem in zlem«²⁵ (Jauß 263). Članek bo v nadaljevanju prikazal, kako na to vprašanje odgovarjajo posamezni primeri²⁶ iz svetovne literature.

Funkcija vprašanja in odgovora

Spraševanje – postavljanje vprašanj in iskanja njihovih odgovorov – je osnovni princip, ki nas pripelje na pot razumevanja.²⁷ Začetki spraševanja so povezani s premagovanjem strahov in groze, s katerimi se je soočal človek. Vsekakor moramo na ta način razumeti Jobove tožbe Bogu: Čemu se daje luč trpečemu, / življenje zagrenjenim v duši? / Tem, ki hrepenijo po smrti, pa ne pride, / ki jo iščejo bolj kakor zaklade« (Job 3,20–21). Starozaveznemu očaku se na koncu razodene božja vsemogočnost in njegova dobrota; Job tako v 4 vrstici 42 stolpca nagovori Boga, kjer prizna na eni strani svojo nevednost ter božjo modrost in nedoumljivost na drugi strani: »Poslušaj torej ti, jaz pa bom govoril, / vprašal te bom in ti me pouči.« (Job 42,4; poudarek L. U.).

Bultmannova trditev – s katero se strinja tudi Jauß – je, da »razumevanje ni zgolj kontemplativen akt, v katerem bi moral interpret zgolj zadušiti

svojo subjektivnost in pozabiti svoje zgodovinsko stališče, da bi se lahko dokopal do objektivnega spoznanja kake stvari. Razumevanje se ves čas orientira glede na neko določeno postavljanje vprašanja, glede na 'usmerjenost spraševanja', kar pomeni, da ga vodi nekakšno predrazumevanje stvari, ki temelji v interesu sprašujočega« (Jauß 235). Razumevanje nekega literarnega dela je potemtakem aktiven proces, ki ga usmerja spraševanje. Postavljanje vprašanj pa že kaže na pričakovanja, ki jih v sebi nosi interpret ali bralec teksta. Pričakovanja in predsodki zato sooblikujejo interpretacijo/razumevanje umetniškega dela.

Jobova knjiga postavlja v ospredje problem teodiceje, po kateri se božja pravičnost skriva za kruto realnostjo sveta. Teologija na drugi strani zavrača človekovo opravičevanje Boga in njegovih (nerazumljivih) dejanj, zavrača pa med drugim tudi »kanon pravične poravnave kot antropomorfen in rekurira na iracionalno nedoumljivost božje volje« (Jauß 271).

V bibličnem tekstu postavi prvo vprašanje Bog Satanu: »Si kaj mislil v svojem srcu na mojega služabnika Joba?« (Job 1, 8). Vprašanje takoj nakaže, da je razmerje med Bogom in Jobom razmerje med gospodarjem in njegovim podanikom, hkrati pa v isto razmerje postavlja tudi božji odnos do Satana, enega izmed »božjih sinov«.

Kot smo že omenili, je pot »na kateri je Adam, teološko gledano, priveden do svojega lastnega spraševanja, filozofsko gledano, sprememba funkcije vprašanja v tok emancipacije. Šele tu lahko zgolj odgovarjajoči Adam iz zgodbe o stvarjenju kot Job dejansko postane sprašujoči Adam« (Jauß 227). Na tem mestu bi si bilo smiselno postaviti vprašanje, kakšno mesto ima pri tem Satan in ali morda Satan prav na tem mestu postane »sprašujoče bitje«. Sveto pismo Satana tu prvič izpostavi in ga dvigne nad druge angele s tem, da ga postavi v enakovreden dialog z Bogom. To se vidi predvsem v njegovem protivprašanju, ki kasneje spodbudi stavo: »Mar se Job zastonj boji Boga?« (Job 1,9). Satanov padec, ki je v *Jobovi knjigi* sicer samo nakazan, je tako na nek način povezan z začetkom spraševanja. Jauß zato povsem upravičeno Satanovo obče ime spremeni v lastno.²⁸

Jobova knjiga podaja osrednje vprašanje teodiceje v že omenjenih verzih: »Čemu se daje luč trpečemu, / življenje zagrenjenim v duši?« (Job 3, 20). Na to vprašanje nam svetopisemska knjiga nikjer ne poda točnega odgovora, vendar nam zastavlja nova vprašanja o tem ali »Bog zlo zgolj dopušča ali želi, in ali ga je sploh mogoče želeti« (Jauß 273). Razsežnost tega vprašanja se zrcali v pogovorih Jobovih prijateljev o krivdi: »Pomisli vendar, kdo je bil pošten, a je propadel, / kje so se pravični izgubili?« (Job 4, 7). Iz tega sledi sklep, da kdor trpi, mora biti česa kriv (prim. Jauß 272), temu pa se na koncu navidezno podredi tudi Job: »Jaz moram veljati za krivega, / čemu naj se še trudim?« (Job 9, 29).

Vprašani zla in krivde, ki ju odpira *Jobova knjiga*, ostaneta tako nerazrešeni in omogočata različne interpretacije. Pridigar (1,18) povezuje modrost z bolečino in trpljenjem: »Kajti kjer je veliko modrosti, je veliko žalosti: in tisti, kdor si veča znanje, si veča bolečino«, a vendar skozi stoletja »želja po vednosti/znanju« še vedno ostaja. Avguštin v *Izpovedih* spregovori, da je največja med skušnjavami prav hrepenenje po znanju in izkustvu:

Razen poželenja mesa [...] biva v duši še drugo poželenje. [...] Ker je bistvo tega poželenja težnja po spoznavanju [...] ga imenuje božji izrek *poželenje oči*. [...] nasladnost hodi za tem, kar je lepo, zvonko, vonjavo, okusno, rahlo, radovednost²⁹ pa rada preskuša tudi nasprotno, seveda ne zato, da bi si naprtila kako neugodje, temveč iz gole sle do preizkušanja in spoznavanja. (Avguštin 231–232)

Greh in kazen, ki ju prinese s seboj želja po spoznanju, sta najbolj razvidna v mitu³⁰ o Faustu. Ziolkowski ugotavlja, da je prvo spremembo v razumevanju Faustovega mita prineslo delo neznanega avtorja *Historia von D. Johann Fausten*: »Fausta prvotno žene želja po znanju, ki bi presegalo tradicionalne doktrine iz šol [...] Zgodnejše zgodbe so preprosto domnevale, da mora biti Faust v zvezi s hudičem, da bi dobil njegovo magično moč.« (Ziolkowski 56) V tem delu se tudi prvič pojavijo motivi, ki zaznamujejo kasnejša dela: pogodba s hudičem, ki je podpisana s krvjo; ime hudiča (Mefisto); Faustova želja po razumevanju osnovnih elementov, iz katerih je zgrajen svet in do katerega mu lahko pomaga le satan itd.

V nadaljevanju si bomo pogledali, kako te elemente prevzemata v svoji umetnini Goethe in Thomas Mann, jih povezali z zgodbo o starozavzemnem Jobu in kako odgovarjata na zastavljeno vprašanje zla in krivde.

Vpliv *Jobove knjige* na Goethejevo dramsko umetnino *Faust* je opazen predvsem v številnih ključnih elementih, ki sestavljajo predromantično pesnitev. Mnogi raziskovalci *Fausta* so opozorili na podobnost prologa v nebesih z *Jobovo knjigo*. Oba protagonista sta tako nedolžna, saj ne vesta za stavo med Bogom in Satanom/Mefistom. Hkrati pa je treba opozoriti še na eno podrobnost: tako v *Faustu* kot v *Jobu* je nad Satanom oziroma Mefistom Gospod. On namreč določi »pravila igre« – Satan v *Jobovi knjigi* dobi od njega pooblastilo le za določeno področje delovanja (Job ne sme umreti), medtem ko Mefistu dopušča Bog le toliko »destruktivnosti, kolikor je v korist napredovanja človeka in s tem človeštva« (Janko 1999 35).

Zanimivo je tudi, da v obeh delih Bog izzove Satana. Kot smo že opazili, postavi Bog v *Jobovi knjigi* Satanu vprašanje: »Si kaj mislil v svojem srcu na mojega služabnika Joba?« (Job 1,8). Prav tako pa lahko beremo v *Faustu*, da je Bog tisti, ki vpraša po Faustu: »In Faust?« (Goethe 62). Morda je ta izziv bolje viden v nemškem izvorniku, kjer Bog vpraša

Mefista: »Kennst du den Faust?«, kar pomeni, če pozna Fausta. Iz njenega pogovora lahko razberemo, da sta si »Bog (Gospod) in Mefisto v tem prologu enakopravna dialoška partnerja«³¹ (Križman 23). Enako velja tudi za odnos Bog – Satan v že obravnavani *Jobovi knjigi*.

Podobnost med obema knjigama se vidi tudi v tem, da Bog imenuje Joba / Fausta za svojega služabnika. Pri Jobu je to jasneje vidno kot pri Faustu, kjer Bog vpraša: »Mi on (Faust) služi prav?« (Goethe 62). Čeprav Faust Gospodu služi »v zmedi vjet«, je Bog z njim zadovoljen, saj »*dokler sploh išče, vsak greši*« (Goethe 62, poudarila L. U.). S temi besedami pa se nakazuje eden od možnih odgovorov na teodicejsko vprašanje, ki ga postavlja *Jobova knjiga*.

Goethejeva drama o človeštvu tako podaja odgovor na novo zastavljeno, mefistofelovsko vprašanje: je ta svet sploh ustvarjen za človeško srečo? (prim. Jauß 276) Odgovor se pojavi na koncu drame, kjer Faust spregovori, za Mefista sicer usodne, besede: »V predslutnji teh neskončno srečnih dni / doživljam zdaj vrhunec vseh slasti« (Goethe 515). Hasselbachova ugotovitev, da »pri Goetheju Faust, ki deluje zaradi nezaslišanega življenja in radovednosti, postane iskalec resnice« (Hasselbach 1988: 41), se ujema z mnenjem Hansa Roberta Jaußa: ob Faustovi usodi se je pokazala možnost človeške samoizpolnitve in s tem skrita idealiteta ustvarjenega božjega sveta (povzeto po: Jauß 277), zato lahko Faust najde svojo odrešitev le v svojem neskončnem stremljenju.

Novo interpretacijo faustovske teme, s tem pa tudi nove poglede na problem krivde in zla, prinaša modernistično³² delo Thomasa Manna *Doktor Faustus*³³. Pojem »greha« je prestavljen v okvir ideje o samoodgovarjajočem individuumu: »V Faustu je predstavljeno, kako ideja samoodgovornega subjekta prehaja v vsa področja družbene kulture« (Hasselbach 44). V romanu se zato Satan nikoli ne pojavi z lastnim imenom, vendar nam njegov izvor ni neznan, saj sam sebe označi z besedami: »Če sem [...], potem sem lahko samo tisti Edini« (Mann 303, 1. knjiga). S temi besedami avtor prikazuje napuh in prevzetnost Satana, saj se s temi besedami največkrat označuje Boga in njegovo vseobsegajočo prisotnost. Protagonist romana – Adrian Leverkühn – ga vidi kot prebrisanega človeka, kar se opazi v njunem edinem dialogu (XXV. poglavje).

Kljub temu je Satan prisoten skozi celotno umetnino na tih in zato toliko bolj pomenljiv način.

Thomas Mann, na malce komičen način, izpostavi še eno pomembno lastnost Satana: grozen mraz, ki ga obdaja: » – Mar ne morete opustiti to grdo navado, ta svoj ledeni duh? – Žal ne. Obžalujem, da ti v tem ne morem ustreči. Sem pač tako mrzel« (Mann 304, 1. knjiga). Thomas Mann se je pri tem najverjetneje navezal na Dantejevo podobo pekla, kjer

Luciferja obdaja večni led. Hlad v Mannovem delu *Doktor Faustus* metaforično kaže na pomanjkanje topline med ljudmi, prikazuje stanje posameznika v sodobni družbi. Satan ne pozna ljubezni in usmiljenja: Adriana je dolgo časa zapeljeval na svojo pot (primer s prostitutko). Prav zato pa ga Mann obsodi na večni mraz, hkrati pa tudi na strašno vročino: »[B]listvo pekla [...] je v tem, da ne pušča svojim prebivalcem drugega kot izbiro med skrajnim mrazom in takšnim žarom, ob katerem bi se lahko topil granit.« (Mann 327, I)

Adrianova izbira poklica odločilno zaznamuje njegovo povezanost s Satanom, saj »njegovo potovanje v globine glasbenega ustvarjanja je potovanje v skrajno profanost, v to, kar se nahaja (popolnoma) onkraj jezika in govora. Skratka: gre za potovanje v demoničnost, potovanje v pekel. Kajti [...] značilnost pekla, kot tudi glasbe, je v njegovi neizrekljivosti« (Pattison 9). Nenehno iskanje popolnosti svojih stvaritev, Adriana na koncu pripelje v blaznost. Umetnikova bolezen pomenljivo kaže na razpad modernega subjekta, njegovo avtodestrukcijo. Leverkühnovi zadnje umetniško delo tako nosi pomenljiv naslov: Dr. Faustova tožba.

Roman nemškega romanopisca prinaša drugačen odgovor na zastavljeno vprašanje zla in krivde. Medtem ko Goethejev Faust najde rešitev (svojih želja nikoli popolnoma ne zadovolji), pa Mannov "Faust" rešitve ne najde. Kot povzema Hasselbach: »[...] umetniška produktivnost predstavlja zadovoljitev njegovega (Leverkühnovega, op. L. U.) zemeljskega poželenja, blaznost pa kazen zanj« (Hasselbach 42). »Možnost človeške samoizpolnitve« (nakazana v Goethejevem *Faustu*) in z njo Leverkühnove rešitve, v Mannovem romanu tako ostaja neizpolnjena, saj pisatelj – po besedah Theodorja Ziolkowskega – opisuje »samouničevalno pot Nemčije v začetku dvajsetega stoletja« (Ziolkowski 149).

Po Bloomovi interpretaciji je vsako literarno delo napačna interpretacija prvotnega teksta, vendar njegova trditev ne more veljati v polnosti za obravnavana literarna dela. *Jobova knjiga* namreč ne poda odgovora na zastavljeno teodicejsko vprašanje zla in krivde, medtem ko se Goethe in Mann spopadata z iskanjem in ponujanjem možnih rešitev.

Sklep

Članek se je ukvarjal s procesi, ki oblikujejo literarno delo. Analiza treh del (*Jobove knjige*, Goethejevega in Mannovega *Fausta*) je pokazala, kako se v delih prepletata najmanj dva pomembna literarna procesa: vpliv in intertekstualnost. »Vpliv« se je v literaturi pojavil že kmalu (govorili smo o Vergilovem stilnem vplivu na Danteja), opazen pa je tudi v sodobni nem-

ški literaturi (pri T. Mannu je podoba pekla oblikovana po Dantejevem 32. spevu *Pekla*).

Sodobnejše razumevanje razmerij med (literarnimi) besedili je »intertekstualnost« (slov. »medbesedilnost«). Prvič se izraz pojavi v delih Julie Kristeve, ki je začela opozarjati, da se literarna dela medsebojno dopolnjujejo in jih zato pravilno razumemo le s pomočjo dobrega poznavanja literarne tradicije. Oblika medbesedilnosti je *citatnost*, ki se v obravnavanih delih pojavi v naslovu Mannovega romana *Doktor Faustus*³⁴, hkrati pa dela ne moremo razumeti brez navezav na *Historio von D. Johann Fausten*, iz katere avtor povzema vse odločilnejše elemente (v tem primeru govorimo o *širši medbesedilnosti*).

Raziskovanje literarnih del je pokazalo, da na razumevanje posameznih del bistveno vpliva bralčeva recepcija teksta (repcijska estetika). Natančneje smo si pogledali vprašanja, ki se posamezniku porajajo ob branju *Jobove knjige* (vprašanja zla in krivde) in odgovore, ki jih na zastavljena vprašanja ponujata Goethe (možna je junakova rešitev) in Thomas Mann (Leverküha želja po uspehu pripelje v blaznost). Literarni deli podajata drugačen odgovor zaradi različnega dojetja individuuma, kateri se v Mannovem romanu (napisanem sredi 20. stoletja) osamosvoji in tako postane samozadosten, sebi odgovarjajoč subjekt, s tem pa si ogrozi lastni temelj.

OPOMBE

¹ Biblijo navajam po *JSP* (1996).

² Dante se v svoji pesnitvi zavestno naslanja na Vergila, ki je v srednjem veku veljal za avtoriteto na tem področju. Izraz »avtoriteta« je že od samega začetka močno povezan s pojmom »auctor«, saj pojem označuje avtorja, čigar besede so bile deležne spoštovanja in veljave (npr. Cicero, Aristotel, rimski in grški pesniki itd.). Njihova dela so tako pridobivala na veljavi in moči, odnos med njimi in svetom pa je bil v srednjem veku alegoričen. Kot ugotavlja Donald E. Pease: »Izkusiti dogodek na alegoričen način je pomenilo prestaviti dogodek iz področja osebnega življenja v področje primerne vpliva. Po takšnem prenosu je dogodek postal neoseben« (Pease 1995 106). Z odkritjem Novega sveta pa se je izgubil pomen pojma »auctor« – pojavil se je namreč »novi človek«, ki je v nasprotju s srednjeveškimi »auctores« (katerega avtoritativnost je temeljila na božjem razodetju), imenoval sebe za avtoriteto svojih besed in je v svoje zgodbe vpletal del svoje osebnosti.

³ Kot navaja Barthes, se je srednjeveška retorika napajala ob Ciceronovih in Kvintilijanovih spisih. V svojih razpravah se je ukvarjala z ukrasi in figurami, »barvami«, kasneje tudi s poetiko (*artes versificatoriae*); pri tem so slog delili na tri vrste »Vergilijevega kolesa« (predstavlja figurirano razvrstitev treh slogov): *gravis* (vzvišeni), *humilis* (preprosti) in *mediocris* (srednji); glede na dve vrsti ukrasa pa slog razdelimo še na *facile* in *difficile*. Za visoki slog so se srednjeveški umetniki zgledovali po Vergilovi *Eneidi*, kjer je v ospredju gospodujoči vojščak (Hektor, Ajaks itd.); predstavnik preprostega sloga je brezdelni pastir, kakršnega najdemo v *Bukoliki* (Titir, Melibej); *Georgika* pa s svojim prikazom poljedelca (Triptolem) ustvarja srednji slog. (Barthes 1990 39–40).

⁴ Vergil v prvem spevu *Eneide* napoveduje slavni vzpon Julija Cezarja (»Slava njegova bo segla do nevezd, in prav k Oceanu / meje pomaknil bo svoje države. In ti ga sprejela / mirno nekoč boš v nebesih / .../ .Potem umirili se bodo / časi viharni, ker bodo prenehale vojne na svetu«), kar vpliva na prikazovanje Kristusove veličine v Dantejevi *Komediji*.

⁵ V *Božanski komediji* se vpliv rimskega pesnika najbolj opazi v posnemanju epskega (visokega) stila, hkrati pa postaja Vergilov vpliv na Danteja, po besedah Colina Burrowa, močnejši v trenutku, ko ga Vergil na koncu *Vic* zapusti (Burrow 1997 81).

⁶ Hegel razume svetovno zgodovino kot razvoj splošnega duha prek osnovnih stopenj do absolutnega duha. Bistvo tega razvoja je, da se duh zaveda samega sebe tudi v svoji drugobiti in da ves čas ohranja identiteto s samim seboj. Svetovna zgodovina je po Heglovem mnenju vzporedna z zgodovino posameznih oblik absolutnega duha: umetnosti, religije in filozofije. Vsebina teh treh oblik je ista (absolutni duh / resnica / ideja / Bog), razlikujejo se le v načinu prikazovanja svojega objekta – Absolutnega. Povzamemo lahko, da Hegel na ta način opazuje istost v razlikah (identiteto v diferencah).

Foucaulteva arheologija kot metoda odkriva odsotnost istosti. Zgodovina pojma, po avtorjevem mnenju, ni zgodovina njegovega progresivnega izboljšanja, ampak gre za zgodovino njegovih različnih polj konstitucije in veljavnosti. S tega vidika pa Foucault odkriva, da je novoveško zgodovinopisje delovalo z »ustvarjalnim popravkom«. Ena najbolj bistvenih potez nove zgodovine je zato premestitev diskontinuiranega, kamor spadajo mutacije, transformacije, rezi in prelomi (prim. Foucault 2001 8).

⁷ O tem avtorica spregovori več v razpravi *Sémiotikè: Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (1969).

⁸ Avtorji oziroma teksti so bili razglašeni za avtoritete in tako je njihov način razlaganja stvarnosti veljal za obče veljavno.

⁹ Potrebno je opozoriti, da avtoriteta (vpliva) torej ne deluje več kot avtoriteta – avtor oziroma tekst, ki se ponovno uporabi v drugem tekstu, izgubi svojo avtoriteto.

¹⁰ Desubjektiviziran je tudi avtor, ki skupaj z bralcem tvori vozlišče medbesedilnosti.

¹¹ Tako govorimo o vplivu Vergilove *Eneide* na Dantejevo *Božansko komedijo*.

¹² Skrajna predstavitev te možnosti je nanašanje na neobstoječe tekste, mistifikacije, katerih morda najlepši primer najdemo v Borgesovi prozi (na primer v *Babilonski knjižnici*).

¹³ Ko prevlada tekst v svoji medbesedilni strukturiranosti in recepciji, se število recepcij razmnožuje v neskončnost in ni nujno, da je besedilo dojeto kot (zaključena) literarna umetnina/delo: nasprotno, dojetje gre »od dela k tekstu« (Barthes), tekst ni več zaključeno delo; postane – diskurz. Opazimo torej, da pride do transformacije v dojetju besedila: literarna umetnina postane zato na tem mestu že problematičen izraz.

¹⁴ V posnemanju zgodovinskih in družbenih stvarnosti, besedilo (za katerega velja pasivna medbesedilnost), ruši sebe in resničnost, ki jo prikazuje. Tako nastane prostor med stvarnostjo in posnemanjem v katerem se besedilo lahko obnaša kot »branje in predmet njegovega branja« (Rajan 1991 68). Literarno delo, ki je tako oblikovano z intertekstualnimi relacijami, na ta način pospešuje svoje lastno vnovično branje.

¹⁵ Z identiteto je povezana avtonomna zavest posameznika, ta pa je vir vsega dogajanja in mišljenja. Koncept subjektivnosti problematizira odnos med individuumom in jezikom, hkrati pa koncept s pomočjo ideologije, pogovora ali jezika zamenja človeško naravo s konceptom ljudi. Prav ideologija, pogovor in jezik pa so odločilni faktorji v konstituiranju posameznikove identitete. Le ta postane tako posledica teh faktorjev in ne njihov povod.

¹⁶ Konec šestesetih leti 20. stoletja se pojavijo spremembe na področju filozofije, ki jih v svoje razprave med prvimi vpelje Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Resnica in metoda*). Po njegovem mnenju je interpretacija kakega literarnega dela vedno vnaprej pogojena z našim vnaprejšnjim razumevanjem. Pri tem poudarja, da je razumevanje vedno zgodovinsko in da je predsodek, interpretovo vnaprejšnje razumevanje, nekaj, česar se ni mogoče znebiti. Bralec tako delo nekako soustvari, dodaja mu osebnostne ali zgodovinske subjektivnosti.

Hans Robert Jauß se pri svojem delu naslanja na Gadamerja in ob sodelovanju Iserjeve estetike učinkovanja vzpostavi recepcijsko estetiko. Roland Barthes pa se vključuje v tretjo metodološko paradigmo – bralec – po eseju *Smrt avtorja* (1968).

¹⁷ Jaußovo teoretično delo *Estetsko izkušstvo in literarna hermenevtika* (1998) obravnava na primeru *Jobove knjige* funkciji vprašanja in odgovora, saj po njegovem mnenju poleg treh komponent hermenevtičnega procesa (razumevanja, razlaganja in aplikacije) prav omejeni funkciji pomembno vplivata na razumevanje nekega literarnega dela.

¹⁸ Recepcijska estetika zahteva po Jaußovih besedah »odprtost do komunikacije, delovanja in znanja, če naj bo umetnost razumljena v družbeni dimenziji kot zgodovinska sila« (Jauß 1998: 450). Bralec zato, po avtorjevem mnenju, ne stoji »zgolj kot beroči individuum«, osamljen v družbenem prostoru, ampak je z izkustvom, ki mu ga omogoča branje, udeležen pri komunikativnem procesu.

¹⁹ Posrednik z vidika prejšnjega poglavja tudi ni subjekt, ampak je sam mesto, kjer deluje medbesedilnost.

²⁰ Eror pojmuje »interliterarnost« kot področje z očitnimi terminološkimi podobnostmi. Tako po njegovem mnenju lahko opazimo, da na primer beseda »plagiat« v vseh jezikih kaže na majhno skupino z ekvivalentnim, a ne sinonimnim, latinskim korenem.

²¹ Na tem mestu je potrebno ponovno opozoriti, da »vpliv« (po omenjeni Bloomovi definiciji) predstavlja kreativno popravljanje predhodnega dela, na podlagi napačne interpretacije le-tega.

²² Pretežno asimilacijsko perspektivo uporablja John Milton v *Izgubljenem raj*; v pesnitvi se svetopisemska zgodba izгона iz raja ujema z biblično predlogo.

²³ Disimilacijsko perspektivo oziroma popoln odklon od biblične predloge opazimo v delu Izolde Kurz *Die Kinder der Lilith*.

²⁴ V *Genezi* je mit o stvarjenju sveta povezan z motivi izgubljenega raja, prepovedanega sadeža in želje po spoznanju (1Mz 3,5: »tisti dan, ko bi jedla z njega [bi se vama] odprle oči in bi postala kakor Bog, poznala bi dobro in hudo.«). Ti motivi so odločilnega pomena za vse nadaljne obravnave tega mita (Milton: *Izgubljeni raj* itd.).

²⁵ S tem v povezavi Milton v *Izgubljenem raj* ugotavlja, da bi moralo prvo veliko spoznanje, »da osamljeni ne more biti srečen, veljati tudi za Boga« (Jauß 1998: 269): »Se zdim zadosi srečen, ki od nekda / sem sam in ni podobnega pod mano, / enakega še manj? S kom, če ne s temi, / naj družim se, ki sem jih vse ustvaril / neskončno nižje od sebe kot od tebe?« (Milton 208).

²⁶ Problem upodobitve zla si bomo najprej pogledali na primeru *Jobove knjige*, ki zastavlja nekatera vprašanja na katera bomo nato iskali odgovore v Goethejevi umetnini *Faust* in Mannovemu romanu *Doktor Faustus*.

²⁷ V *Genezi* (1 Mz 1–3) ima samo Bog pravico do spraševanja, Adam ima funkcijo podložnika. Adam pridobi vlogo enakovrednega partnerja v dialogu zato šele takrat, kadar se dvigne iz svoje funkcije podložnika v Boga enakovreden položaj: Adam se torej upre Bogu, zato pa je izgnan iz raja.

²⁸ Sprememba iz občega imena v osebno lastno ime v Jaußovem delu zaradi nemške posebnosti v slovnici ni tako očitna kot v slovenskem prevodu.

²⁹ Avguštin uporabi na tem mestu izraz *curiositas*, kateremu slovenski prevod *radovednost* ne usteza popolnoma. Beseda izhaja iz lat. *cura* (»skrb«), *curiositas* je zato že po svojem izvoru nasprotje brezskrbnosti. Izraz ima po antičnem pojmovanju negativno konotacijo in je zato v antični literaturi večkrat prisoten motiv kaznovane radovednosti (prim. npr. Apulej: Lukij in osel v *Metamorfozab*).

³⁰ Faustovski mit ima drugačen razvoj kot drugi miti (stvarjenje sveta, Prometej itd.), saj se opira na življenje resničnega človeka, po pričevanjih rojenega okoli leta 1480. Njegovo življenje je bilo razvpito, znan je bil tudi kot sodomit in čarodej (več v: Ziolkowski 43–49).

³¹ Gre za navidezno enakopravnost, ki se pojavi na ravni dramsko-dialogične forme. S formo izmenjave sporočil jo dejansko postavlja Bog; on začne pogovor in določi »pravila igre«.

³² Delo Thomasa Manna Doktor Faustus je nastalo leta 1947 in sodi v obdobje modernizma, vanj pa vidno vstopajo posamezne preokupacije ekspresionističnega toka in njegovih literarnih inovacij. Kot ugotavlja Thomas Anz sta za ekspresionistična dela, nastala okoli leta 1920, značilni vizija/utopija boljšega sveta in novi človek (posledica 1. svetovne vojne), kasneje se temu pridružijo še »izkušnje nemoči in izgube (pomanjkanje) orientacije, osamitve in odtujitve, gnusa in strahu« (Anz 1987 135). To pa so tudi karakteristike Mannovega junaka Adriana Leverkühna.

³³ Mann se v delu opira na literarno delo *Historia* iz 16. stoletja in ne na Goethejevo dramsko pesnitev *Faust*.

³⁴ Mann citira naslov Goethejeve knjige *Faust* (lat. Faustus), čeprav se nanjo v svojem romanu ne nasloni.

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O AVTORJIH

Varja Balžalorsky je diplomirala iz primerjalne književnosti in literarne teorije ter iz francoščine in francoske književnosti na Filozofski fakulteti. Objavila je nekaj razprav (»Subjektiviteta v Montaignevih Esejih«, »Pogledi na subjektiviteto in govorca v trubadurski liriki«, »Romani Chrétiena de Troyes v luči treh sodobnih teorij romana«). V okviru doktorskega študija na Oddelku za primerjalno književnost in literarno teorijo FF, kjer deluje kot mlada raziskovalka, se ukvarja s problematiko subjektivitete v liriki.

Andrej Blatnik je doktoriral iz komunikologije. Uči kreativno pisanje na Fakulteti za humanistične študije Univerze na Primorskem in na delavnicah revije *Literatura*. Je docent knjigarstva na Filozofski fakulteti. Objavil je deset knjig v Sloveniji in štirinajst v tujini, zadnja strokovna je bila *Neonski pečati. Književnost v digitalnem času* (2005), zadnja leposlovna pa roman *Spremeni me* (2008).

Lucia Boldrini predava angleško in primerjalno književnost na Univerzi Goldsmiths v Londonu. Med drugim je objavila monografiji *Joyce, Dante, and the Poetics of Literary Relations* (Joyce, Dante in poetika literarnih razmerij) ter *Biografie fittizie di personaggi storici* (Fiktivne biografije zgodovinskih osebnosti). Objavila je številne članke o modernističnem srednjeveštvu, primerjalni književnosti, fiksijski avtobiografiji, književnosti in znanosti. Pravkar soureja knjigo razprav *Folly* (Norost) za zbirko Comparative Critical Studies. Je glavna koordinatorka Evropske raziskovalne mreže za primerjalno književnost.

Marijan Dovič je raziskovalec na literarnem inštitutu ZRC SAZU in docent na UNG. Zanimajo ga sodobna sistemska teorija literature, literarno vrednotenje in kanon, teorija in zgodovina avtorstva, pa tudi slovenska zgodovinska avantgarda (Kosovel, Podbevšek) in literatura 19. stoletja. Objavil je pregledno monografijo *Sistemske in empirične obravnave literature* (2004) in literarno-sociološki pregled razvoja slovenskega literarnega avtorja *Slovenski pisatelj* (2007). Kot izvajalec in skladatelj se ukvarja tudi z jazz glasbo.

Jonathan Hart je predstojnik katedre za primerjalno književnost v Alberti, urednik *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature*, bil je gostujoči profesor na Churchill College v Cambridgeu. V letu 2009 je »Northrop Frye Professor« v Torontu in gostujoči profesor na Sorbonne Nouvelle. Njegove knjige obsegajo pesniško zbirko *Breath and Dust* (2000) (Dih in prah), teoretska dela, kot je *Interpreting Culture* (2006) (Interpretiranje kulture), in zgodovinska dela, kot so *Empires and Colonies* (2008) (Imperiji in kolonije).

Florian Hartling je doktoriral iz medijskih študijev in komunikologije s tezo »Digitalni avtor. O avtorstvu v internetnem okolju« na Univerzi Halle-Wittenberg. Je raziskovalec na Oddelku za študije medijev in komunikacijske študije v Halleju in na European School of Journalism Alfred Neven DuMont v Halleju. Tam predava na magistrskem programu »MultiMedia & Avtorstvo«. Ukvarja se s teorijo interneta, avtorstva in multimedijske narativnosti. Leta 2009 je izšla njegova monografija *Der digitale Autor: Autorschaft in Zeitalter des Internets* (Digitalni avtor: avtorstvo v dobi medmrežja).

Mojca Kumerdej je diplomirala iz filozofije in sociologije kulture na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani. Je publicistka in umetnostna kritičarka pri časopisu Delo. Leta 2001 je objavila svoj prvi roman *Krst nad Triglavom*, v katerem se ironično loteva slovenskih stereotipov in nacionalne mitologije. Zbirka kratkih zgodb *Fragma* (2003) obsega trinajst zgodb o intimnih človeških razpokah, ki jih naselujeta želja in nagon. Njene zgodbe so prevedene v nemščino, angleščino, francoščino, srbsščino, ruščino, makedonščino, češčino, španščino, grščino in madžarščino. Na 22. mednarodnem literarnem festivalu Vilenica leta 2006 je za kratko zgodbo *Pod gladino* prejela nagrado Kristal Vilenice.

Jera Marušič se je študijsko in raziskovalno doslej ukvarjala predvsem s starogrško filozofijo in ožje s Platonovim in Aristotelovim razumevanjem literature in umetnosti. Med njenimi prispevki s tega področja so »Tragiški užitki v Aristotelovi *Poetiki*« (Keria, 2000), »Pesniki in mimezis v Platonovi *Državi*« (Leuven, 2006) in doktorska disertacija *Platon in pesniki. Epistemološka, etiška in ontološka vprašanja v dialogih* (Univerza v Edinburgu/ VB, 2008).

Vanesa Matajc je docentka na Oddelku za primerjalno književnost in literarno teorijo na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani in predsednica Slovenskega društva za primerjalno književnost. Med njenimi novejšimi članki so »Intermedialität in der Slowenischen Lyrik: die Erfahrung der (Post-)Modernität« (2007), »Communist Revolution and Daedalus' Labyrinth: Confronting Two Concepts of Time, Confronting Two Types of Myth« (2008), »Soočenje s trendom: primerjalna književnost, kulturne študije, kulturna zgodovina in literarni kanon« (2009).

Boris A. Novak je pesnik, dramatik in prevajalec, profesor na Oddelku za primerjalno književnost in literarno teorijo Univerze v Ljubljani, podpredsednik Mednarodnega PEN-a in član francoske pesniške Akademije Mallarmé. Med drugim je objavil pesniške zbirke *Mojster nespečnosti*, *Alba*, *Žarenje*, *Obredi slovesa* in *MOM: Mala Osebnost Mitologija*, tragedijo *Kasandra*, prevode provansalskih trubadurjev, Verlaina, Mallarméja, Valéryja in Monike van Paemel ter vrsto znanstvenih del, nazadnje *Pogleda na francoski simbolizem*.

Julia A. Sozina je raziskovalka na Centru za zgodovino slovanske književnosti pri Inštitutu za slovanske študije Ruske akademije znanosti. Diplomirala je na Moskovski državni univerzi Lomonosov (Slovanske književnosti & Slovenski jezik) leta 1995. Leta 2000 je doktorirala s tezo Književnosti evropskih, ameriških in avstralskih ljudstev. Sozinino znanstveno zanimanje zajema predvsem slovensko književnost in kulturo ter literarno komunikacijo med Južnimi Slovani in Rusijo.


Jüri Talvet je objavil sedem pesniških zbirk v estonskem jeziku. Je dobitnik Pesniške nagrade Juhana Liiva (1997) in Memorialne nagrade Ivarja Ivaska (2002) za poezijo in razprave. Talvetova *Elegía estonia y otros poemas* je leta 2002 izšla v Španiji, zbirka angleških esejev *A Call for Cultural Symbiosis* pa leta 2005 v Torontu. Jüri Talvet je predstojnik katedre za primerjalno književnost na Univerzi v Tartuju in urednik letne mednarodne revije za primerjalno književnost *Interlitteraria*.

Gašper Troha je asistent na Oddelku za primerjalno književnost in literarno teorijo Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani. Ukvarja se s sociologijo literature ter s sodobno evropsko in slovensko dramatiko. Med drugim je objavil članka »Dramatizacije na slovenskih odrih 1992-2006« (2006) in »Zgodovinska drama na Slovenskem in njena družbena vloga pod komunizmom« (2008).

Lučka Urbanija je študentka na doktorskem študiju Primerjalne književnosti in literarne teorije Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani. Raziskuje medliterarna razmerja besedil in avtorjev s statusom avtoritete v zahodni kulturi (Biblija) in literaturi; s poudarkom na judovsko-krščanski apokaliptiki v nemškem ekspresionizmu.

**The Author: Who or What Is Writing
Literature**

Edited by: Vanesa Matajč, Gašper Troha



“The Author: Who or What Is Writing Literature?”

Vanesa Matajc

Contemporary literary theory examines the author's role in the creation of a literary text, as well as of (literary) culture. Representations of the author's role answer these two questions in many different ways, depending on the historical culture in which the questions appear. This situation, which still qualifies as the *contemporary* situation in literary theory, of course differs from the so-called *modern* views on literature, that is, views developed since the Renaissance period.

Contemporary literary theory began to re-examine the author's role in creating literature at the very moment when the role of language in creating subjectivity came under scrutiny, whereas the *modern* period had endowed the term “(literary) Author” with an “undoubtedly” clear meaning: considering the human being as a creative subject with an inherent ability to invent or reveal completely new objects, the modern tradition “invented” the word “Author” in the sense of a recognisable individual who writes (or creates in the sense of invention) a literary text. This individual text / work of art was likewise conceived as a unique combination of form and content, revealing its recognisable meanings and sense as created by the author's will, intention, and ability. In the contemporary period, the modern concept of the author has undergone some basic changes since the 1960s – changes caused by the so-called historical turn, cultural turn, and – probably the most relevant to the question of literary creation – linguistic turn. Often interdisciplinary, these have operated in the humanities, including some newly founded disciplines and theories, such as epistemology, cultural studies, cultural anthropology, women's studies, gender and queer studies, post-colonial studies, and (renewed) cultural history.

The answer to the question of “who or what is writing literature” has therefore split to pursue two possible directions.

First, the initial presupposition of reality being created by language (by a convention rather than an individual invention) has crystallised into the idea of Language writing / speaking a literary text, as well as orchestrating its reception. The author as the creative subject of a literary work of art is therefore being replaced with the concept of the intertextuality, the inherent plurality of the dialogical relationship.

And secondly, pointing out the idea of intertextuality, the presuppositions of “the death of the author” and of the “resurrection” of a text and

its reader have called into question the author's authority in the literary and cultural tradition (represented as a literary or cultural canon) and in the (cultural) politics. The author's political authority has been particularly obvious in literatures subjected to the pressure of national ideologies or political totalitarianism. Both ideological pressures have been a characteristic experience of the literatures of Europe, of the former Soviet Union, etc. The author has been conceived as a constitutive performer of cultural traditions, and thus of the means by which different political groups have been able to legitimise their power. Even if "dead", the author as a creative subject could be replaced with a cultural-political interpreter of the text. The interpreter, replacing the author of a literary text, can unite both roles: the role of an authority and of the inventive author.

In addition, the interpreter's practice may be an emancipating gesture for various social groups becoming aware of their suppression. On the other hand, such a gesture can also provide the emancipation of literature as an autonomous discourse. The "resurrection" of the author's role, even when referring to the interpreter, can also be a way of providing the autonomy, "literariness", of literary discourse.

Thematics and scopes structured by this questions are as following:


1) The Author as an individual creator and the Author in the relationship with his / her culture: the role of the Author in historical inventions of traditions, the Author as a discursive construction in constructing of the socio-political identities, the Author in producing mechanisms of the cultures. This questions have been adressed by Andrej Blatnik and Jüri Talvet.

2) The Author as a personal experience, the Author as a subject of literariness and of a literary work, the concepts of the Author in the 20th century: virtual author in the new multimedia and its intertextuality. This questions have been adressed by Mojca Kumerdej, Boris A. Novak and Florian Hartling.

3) Ancient Greek and the question "who or what is creating literary text (or: literary work of art)", Renaissance and the invention of the Author in the modern Western literary theory, authorial performativity and autobiography in the 20th century. This questions have been adressed by Jera Marušič, Marijan Dović and Gašper Troha.

4) The Author between Self and the Otherness, the Author between autobiography and heterobiography, the authorial integrity and authority from lyrical poetry over novels to the post-colonial studies. This questions have been adressed by Lucia Boldrini, Jonathan L. Hart, Varja Balžalorsky and Julia A. Sozina. Traces of this changing conceptualisation of the Author might be read in the field of concerning the literary influence. This field has been described by Lučka Urbanija.

Papers



From the Aura of the Artwork to the (Pseudo)Aura of the Author

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Although post structuralism declared the death of the author, it seems that reality shows a completely different picture. In a time when products of the culture industry have lost aura, this disappearance is compensated for by the auratization of the artistic act or of the artist himself. The fascination with the sacred aura of traditional art has been replaced by the more profane glamour of artistic presentation.

Keywords: literature and mass media / cultural industry / author / authorship / mass culture / popular culture

UDK 808.1:316.7

Although poststructural theory (most explicitly through Roland Barthes) declared the death of the author, although there is, for example, in American metafiction a successful deposing of the author as the determining factor of the text, although the theory of reading calls for a shifting of the focal point from the author to the reader, and although authors themselves have started to deal with these thematic standpoints in their literature, it appears that the actual state, at least as pertains to extraliterary and not the intraliterary author (in which the poststructuralist axis was directed), is precisely the opposite. Today the author is a greater factor in the field of literature than perhaps ever before in history. It is worth investigating how much of his grandeur is contributed to by what he established as an author – the very fact of the author's work.

The New World

Every year thousands of new works of fiction are published in the United States. Only a select few authors (among them, Cormac McCarthy and Don DeLillo), who have the option of avoiding the media, allow their books to speak for themselves. Some, most obviously Thomas Pynchon (and before him, J.D. Salinger), have spun an enticing media story out of their very avoidance of the media and public appearances. All others try

to attract attention in the usual manner: through media presence. The author's name personifies a genre or at least his specific sub-genre and ensures an appropriate level of production – the author appears as a trade mark. This effect is especially characteristic for products of popular culture: 63 of the titles from the American list of the 100 best-selling works of fiction between 1986 and 1996 were written by a total of only 6 authors – Tom Clancy, Michael Crichton, John Grisham, Stephen King, Dean Koontz and Danielle Steel (Epstein 33). Homogenization of the canon (and the list of the most-sold books is very evidently a canon of popular literature) is also occurring in “high” culture, where sales are not (yet) as important as is the presence, in terms of cultural currency, that is provided when a work appears on syllabi and in translation. There is a snowball effect when it comes to translation: translations into “big languages” are followed by translations into smaller ones, and already-translated authors have an advantage over those who have not yet been translated, as they have already asserted themselves to a certain extent in the target culture.

In a time when, according to Walter Benjamin, aura in the culture industry's products has been lost, its loss is compensated for by the “auratization” of the artistic act (and hand-in-hand with this goes the striking rise in creating writing programs in the United States in the mid 1960s), or of the artist himself. In pop art, artistic production represents only the content of art. The fascination with the sacred aura of traditional art has been replaced by the secular brilliance of artistic presentation, which is a phenomenon that influences other fields of art, and also, in a time of the universal mediatization of all activities and arts – “the media have colonized culture, that they are the primary vehicle for the distribution and dissemination of culture” notes Douglas Kellner (35) – literature to a fair extent, as well as the writer, its main representative. The writer himself acquires Benjamin's “cult status”, which the work of art has lost in an age of mechanical reproduction, provided he is high enough up in the hierarchy and is also protected by means of his inaccessibility, very often in the physical sense as well. This does not pertain solely to backstage passes to the rock star's dressing room. Even finding one's way to writers is not easy. One can find specific on-line directions for getting to J.D. Salinger's isolated house, along with a warning regarding how far it is safe to walk because there will surely be someone waiting there with a loaded rifle. Don DeLillo does not appear in public. Thomas Pynchon does not appear anywhere. By Slovenian standards statements or appearances by Svetlana Makarovič are a thing of prestige.

Mass production, the very thing that robbed the work of art of its aura, clearly bestowed this aura on the artists: because his work (at least theo-

retically) entered each household, it was physically impossible for the artist to follow it and be indelibly linked to it – not unlike the “minstrel” in Raymond Williams’ studies. But this “auratization” is seeming or delusive, it is pseudo-auratization, since, according to Benjamin, the “unique phenomenon of [...] distance” and the raising of the artist’s position do not stem from the artist’s personal indigenoussness, but from the totality of the trade mark which has been created by and asserted through the media, and in which he or she is least involved in the decision-making and is the most replaceable constituent element. What the media giveth, the media can also taketh away, since more important than the author is his or her media representation. This began to grow immensely in the American media in the 1980s, and Europe followed with the usual delay, which lasted about twenty years in Slovenia. The media dedicated more attention to the author than to the work itself. Trendy newspapers published articles about their lifestyles, reported which clubs they belonged to and which parties they frequented, which clothes they wore, the advances they received for their books and so on. The writer most exposed to the media, Tama Janowitz, appeared on a number of prominent television shows, such as *Late Night with David Letterman*, *Good Morning America*, and *The Today Show*. She graced the covers of trendy magazines, advertised consumer goods, had herself photographed lying in bed in silk pajamas for the dust cover of her first book, and had a literary video on MTV. As one who loved advertisements, and who thought about working at an advertising agency (and actually did so for a few months, before she was fired as an assistant artistic director), she was thrilled by such promotion. She pointed out in an interview that, in an era in which even banks advertise their services, and in which people do not even purchase cat food if they have not previously seen an advertisement for it, publishing is a good fifty years behind the times because they refrain from these practices (Schumacher 218).

And so writers acquired the status of celebrities, stars in the manner of the athletes, silver screen and movie idols before them, which was of course wonderfully conducive to book sales. Bret Easton Ellis’s agent stated that he “gets bad reviews, but good publicity”. Not only did he appear on talk shows, he was present in the media even without the use of the writer’s media of words – magazines like *Vanity Fair* and *Interview* used him as photo model, where he did not have to speak or write. Nevertheless the constant media exposure and constant public presence rob one of the possibility of splendid isolation which is, at least for writing, a *conditio sine qua non*, the necessary condition of creation, and most authors of the new lost generation lost their creativity or stopped writing altogether, which was perhaps also due in part to the fact that the media success of this gen-

eration was rather tightly linked to the cult of youth: David Leavitt published his first story in *The New Yorker* at twenty, and his first book *Family Dancing* (1984) appeared two years later, which was unusual in American literary culture, in which having a book published before the age of thirty was the rare exception rather than the rule.

Other authors, such as Bret Easton Ellis, who published his first novel *Less Than Zero* (1985) at the age of twenty one, began at a similarly young age. Although the book did not receive a great many positive reviews, it did receive a few, including comments in those important shapers of public: the newspapers *The Village Voice* and *The New York Times*. Penguin purchased the rights to a paperback edition for \$99 000, and Twentieth Century-Fox obtained the film rights; through the selling of further rights, thus, *Less Than Zero* migrated into the mightiest machine of the American and international culture industry. This business success, however, also presented the writer with other creative difficulties, as Twentieth Century-Fox wanted the prevent him from using Clay, the hero of *Less Than Zero*, also in the subsequent novel *Rules of Attraction*, and Ellis assured ownership over his own literary character only after a law suit which ended just before the publication of the novel.

The publication of this novel was accompanied by a few curiosities that were characteristic for the end of the 20th century, and these influence the existence of the literary work and emerge from the area of popular culture. The first was *serialization*, a phenomenon in which the characters and sometimes even the story are carried over from novel to novel. However, serialization, at least within canonical literature, was usually a marginal phenomenon: in Ellis, Thomas Pynchon, Mark Leyner and others more or less secondary characters are carried over from novel to novel, and not the key structural elements. More significant are the growing links or even *dependence of publishing houses and the film industry* – here we must leave the structure of intraliterary influences aside and focus on social influences. Traditionally the film industry purchased the film rights of successful books and in some cases (perhaps most of all with Puzo and later Coppola's *The Godfather*) the success was repeated or even surpassed in other media, or in the literature it sought at least a suitable narrative basis, whereas today the rights to make a film of a novel, especially with proven successful authors like John Grisham and Michael Crichton, are sold for a greater sum than the book rights – and this usually even before the publication of the book, and frequently on the basis of a few-page synopsis of the book.

Partly the writer of the new lost generation were more evenly than previous generations formed also by a particular branch of the culture in-

dustry, the industry of the university, through its departments for creative writing, which universities began to establish en masse at since the early 1960s and which became not just an extremely attractive study option, but also a key source of survival for writers who were of any note at that time in the American literary scene. And so the department for creative writing at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, called the Iowa Writers' Workshop, has since its establishment in 1936 played host, as teachers, students and frequently both, to a number of leading writers from the second half of the 20th century. A few names should be mentioned: Flannery O'Connor, Philip Roth, Nelson Algren, Raymond Carver, Andre Dubus, Wallace Stegner, Kurt Vonnegut, John Irving, Robert Penn Warren ... The majority of writers from the new lost generation come from the American east coast and many studied creative writing at Columbia University in New York. The writer and editor Gordon Lish, who taught some of them (including Amy Hempel, Nancy Lemann, Anderson Ferrell, David Leavitt ...), had a real influence on them. Lish was active in a row of different cultural centers, and he was also employed as an editor of textbooks, before he began editing prose for *Esquire*. There he also published Raymond Carver's story "Neighbors", the first story which was published in the all-American magazine, and which turned Carver's career and destiny around – as a cultural mediator Lish thus crucially influenced the form of American and later the world prose scene, since without Carter, that is, without the publication of "Neighbors", this would have been drastically different. From there he went to work at the Knopf publishing house where he published a series of significant works of American prose, including Carver's 1981 book *What We Talk About When We Talk About Love*.

In contrast to writers of this generation, especially the metafictionalists who almost without exception spent (also) their professional life in the comforts of the university, young authors who were born in the 1960s often knew the workings of the culture industry from the inside. Amy Hempel was in charge of media contact at the Putnam publishing house, organized writers' tours and strove to ensure television promotion for the publishing house's authors, and later she had a junior position at the publisher Crown. Jay McNerney worked at one of America's greatest literary institution, *The New Yorker*, which the careers of such writers as Salinger, Thurber, Updike and E.B. White are linked. But he did not work at *The New Yorker* as a writer, not even like the hero of his novel *Bright Lights, Big City*, who sent the fiction editor short stories and received from him impersonal form letters in return. He worked as a "fact checker", verifying whether the information cited in the works accepted for publication was correct. After this (like E.L. Doctorow) he advanced in the hierarchy of

the culture industry, becoming a reader for Random House and evaluating the manuscripts they received. From the “gatekeeper’s assistant” at *The New Yorker* he changed into the “gatekeeper”, and only the entrance through the gates awaited him. Those employed in the world of media, who have replaced employment in the academic world, speak again of the cultural paradigm shift or of the transfer of the *pseudoaura*: if previously the privileged space for passing on the values of cultural elements was at home in the university, now it had moved into the world of the culture industry, especially its most capital-laden and influential field, the advertising industry.

The Old Slovenian Home

A Slovenian author can look for the support of other media (which is why the most-read Slovenian writer according to the number of library loans has, since they began counting, been Desa Muck, which is probably not only a result of readability but also her years of appearing on very much-viewed Sunday evening television programs) or the support of the Slovenian writer archetype, which can lend the individual pseudoaura a certain amount of collective pseudoaura, such as befits a nation that, at least in the conviction of most individual authors, and also in the direction of the school system established through cultural paradigms best encapsulated in Aleš Debeljak’s *bon mot* about the birth of the nation through the spirit of poetry, written in the title of the accompanying text to the anthology *Prisoners of Freedom: Contemporary Slovenian Poetry* (Pedernal Press, Santa Fe, USA: 1994). In Slovenia, too, an author can have a meaning beyond textuality, he can be more than “only” an author and the Slovenian literary tradition, in which literature always performed functions outside literature, assents to this. The most strident literary successes of the 1980s were the novels *Levitan* (1982), by Vitomil Zupan, which demystifies the national war of liberation, *Umiranje na obroke* (Dying by Instalments) (1984) by Igor Torkar, which bears witness to the Dachau trials, and *Noč do jutra* (Night until Tomorrow) (1984) by Branko Hofman, which speaks of the Goli Otok penal colony. The intense interest aroused by these books did not only help to free Slovenian literature of the theme of national oppression, but also continued the conflict between the writer and society, which is a constant (not only of Slovenian) literary history.

We can see the continuation of this conflict even today. The media and expert response to the decision of the Slovenian court, which dealt with the books by Matjaž Pikalo *Modri E* (The Blue E) (1998) and Breda

Smolnikar's *Ko se tam gori olistajo breže* (When the Birches up there Are Turning Green, 1998) was of course more determinative of the decision for a second edition of these two books than was their literary quality or readers' attraction. Although both authors were the subject of a civil trial, clash (which was also reflected at the comparative literature symposium in Vilenica in 2007) continued a particular role of the Slovenian writer: the writer as victim. As legal victims (Smolnikar, Pikalo), political victims (a long line leading to Jančar), economic victims (Desa Muck, who is asked about the limits of library royalties at every public appearance), clan victims (it is hard to recall a Slovenian writer who in at least one media appearance did not moan of having been manipulated by this or that centre of power). And if Slovenian writers used to console themselves that success would come at a more convenient time (fifty years after death was Bartol's estimation, and he was right), now they can hope for the right place and point to – an imagined or sometimes actual – better reception in another culture à la “no prophet is accepted in his own country” (Luke 4: 24). Thus they become geographic, literally born, victims, even beyond the fact that they are born into the Slovenian language and not, like English authors, already translated.

It is actually worth going a step further and noting: not only can the author in the Slovenian literary space be more than “just” an author, he has to be. Especially in today's supersaturation of media, when for public presence the author's voice (that is, his “autopoetic”) does not suffice, but all the more decisive is the context of the Super-Ego, into which he or she is filed, be it in terms of nation, genre or periodization. For the author's legitimization as an author, it is no longer the signified (that is, the author's work) that is crucial but the signifier (that is, his recognition as an author). Borges' statement, perhaps born of frustration from the increasingly visual and decreasingly literary culture of modernity, “to be means to be photographed,” could be extended somewhat: to be a writer means to be photographed as a writer. A young and cute author is the largest leaser of media space (which, by the way, pays more per year for media space that the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Slovenia spends on printing and repurchasing books in the public interest) and her gigantic billboard was graced by the word “writer” already a week after the publication of her first book, which later actually did become a relatively successful work. The largest communication magnate decided to cash in on the symbolic capital of the profession. Perhaps this need for a symbiosis between actual and symbolic capital can restore believe in the writer's profession.

However, that the structural space which the American literary space doles out to the author through media and social prominence, that is, the

role of the “star”, is replaced in Slovenia with the role of the “victim”, is already a fact that calls for renewed thinking about the Slovenian national spirit. At this point, thus, one should, in both national and collegial terms, fall silent.

NOTES

¹ A similar phenomenon exists also in Slovenia. If the number of published books stopped at about 4000 titles last year, the number of novels up for the Kresnik Prize increases with each year: in 1991 there were 17, 45 in 2002, 80 in 2007, and a year later there were approximately 120 novels. For the Fabula prize there were some 80 collections of short stories in one year, making for about 200 original prose books. The symbolic capital of literature, thus, is clearly growing.

² Using the example of Jonathan Franzen in the text *Romani našega življenja ne bodo spremenili našega življenja* (The Novels of our Life will not Change Our Life, Andrej Blatnik: Neonski pečati, LUD Literatura: Ljubljana 2005), I have described an interesting variation on the clash between the author and his representation in the media. The invitation to be on the *Oprah Winfrey Show* led Franzen into great independent temptation.

³ Elements of the serial novel, which are materialized especially in popular cultural products (such as Stephen King's series *The Green Mile*), differ from historical models (such as the serial novels by Dickens or Balzac) in that serial novels historically came into being due to the demands of the target media (newspapers), whereas today they come into being autonomously and assert their production ways into the majority of other organized book markets in order to additionally exploit already established novel trademarks.

⁴ The film industry also fuels the creation of film-based books, that is, the reverse process of what has just been described – books that are novel versions of the biggest film successes have become virtually the rule of spin-off exploitation, and the broadening in the cinematic web thus moves the product into other media, which also includes marketing the product through film figures, which are especially popular among the young public, but are by no means limited to them. Such book products achieve rather impressive sales results: the book written after the script of the first *Rambo* sold 800 000 copies (Kellner 71). Such inclusion of authors into the immediate marketing of trademarks may be limited to popular cultural products, but it appears that the new understanding of the writer is that of a creator who is no longer independent from society, closed in the loneliness of his creative exile, but as one ordered into the chain of changing relations as a more or less successful businessman who is in some ways linked to the omnipresence of the film industry. Creative autonomy is no longer a given; rather it becomes a conscious decision.

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The Author and Artistic Creativity

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The postmodern turn in cultural studies, from the 1960s onward, has ever tried to subvert the authority of „modern“ tradition, as a supposed construct of Renaissance humanists. Instead, it has tried to establish its own authority in which the interpreter (re-reader, re-conceptualizer) as well as (linguistic) anonymity and (cultural) plurality of creation has a dominant role.

However, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, postmodern thinking, despite its initial novelty, seems to have come to a standstill, in the sense that in its discourses a strong tendency to tautology is revealed, while the object of its oppositional discourse has undergone a regrettable simplification. The question about the author is no exception in this sense.

Keywords: literary theory / semiotics / Lotman, Yuri Mikhailovich / author / authorship / artistic creativity / Kreuzwald, Friedrich Reinhold / Liiv, Juhan

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Yuri M. Lotman and His “Semiosphere”

In one of his early, important, and seminal works, *Analiz poetitsheskogo teksta* (Leningrad, 1972), the late head of the Tartu (or Tartu-Moscow) school of semiotics, Yuri M. Lotman (1922–1993), established a basic division of literary texts: one type of texts, mainly narrative, is governed by *syntagmatic* relations, while in the other type of texts, above all constituted by lyrical poetry, the organizing principle is *paradigmatic* (93).

As a highly significant hint at the scope of his study (and not excluding hidden irony), Lotman admits that “the poetic text in the present treatment will not be handled in [...] the totality of its cultural meaning, but only from a much narrower point of view, accessible to contemporary science”¹ (5). And in the preceding passage he claims, visually stretching out the word “scientific”: “but science cannot offer anything else beyond scientific truth” (5).

The point of the irony is that Lotman, in fact, was passionately interested in the “totality of cultural meaning” from the very beginning of his research. A close reading of his allegedly “scientific” texts reveals many

passages in which he “slips” or “leaps” into the realm of philosophy, beyond the rigid bounds of science.

In this book, Lotman hardly applies the notions of “semiotics” or “semiotic”; rather, they emerged gradually, as the Tartu school was expanding. It remained forever suspect to the official Communist regime. Therefore, in parallel with “semiotics” an euphemism was applied by Tartu scholars, denoting the primary object of semiotic research: “secondary modeling systems”² (Lotman, *Kultuurisemiootika* 3–4).

There is no denying that Lotman, at least until the end of the 1970s, could sincerely believe in the capacity of science to expand to the realm of the arts not only in the formal sense but grasping also its content which, traditionally, has been the object of metaphysical-philosophic and metaphoric speculations. In those times Lotman seriously dealt with the interrelations of both hemispheres of the human brain, the possibility of “artificial reason” and in some articles went as far as to identify culture with “collective reason” or “collective intellect” (cf. Lotman, *Kul'tura kak*).³

However, as an essential background fact, one should not forget that while science and reason enjoyed a truly deified position in the official ideology of the USSR, contemporary Western philosophy was flatly rejected. Dismissive commentaries of Soviet or Eastern block Marxist philosophers on Western “decadent” philosophy abounded, while original philosophic texts proceeding from the West were never translated or published, at least until the start of the *perestroika* in the USSR in the mid- 1980s.

What I claim here is that Lotman, starting from the 1980s, in accord with his own theory of “semiospheric” “leaps” and “explosions”, effectuated in his late work a genuine “leap” to a new quality. Lotman the scientist-semiotician ever more openly became in the last ten years of his life identifiable with Lotman the philosopher. In a gradually more liberal socio-ideological condition he could at last deal with the object of his life-long passion, culture and artistic creation, without externally imposed restrictions or prescribed self-restrictions.

There is a co-occurrence in the late Lotman with postmodern currents of thought deriving from the Western centres in the sense that both overcome the formalist rigidity of structuralism. However, there is also a substantial divergence of Lotman’s late thought from the postmodern mainstream of theory. It directly concerns the position and understanding of the role of the author in artistic creation.

In 1984 Lotman published the article “O semiosfere” (About the Semiosphere). He introduced the notion of “semiosphere” without providing any clear-cut definition of it. The point of departure was Vladimir Vernadski’s terms, “biosphere” and “noosphere”, but Lotman warned

against drawing parallels with the “noosphere”; rather, he saw an analogy for the semiosphere in biosphere, in the sense that, as he says, the semiotic universe or semiotic space can be treated as “a homogeneous mechanism or even an organism”. Such a “great system”, in which all ingredients and components are in an open state of dynamic interrelations, can be called the “semiosphere” (Lotman, *Kul'tura i* 13).⁴ As Lotman further claims, “the semiosphere is the semiotic space beyond which the existence of semiosis is impossible” (13). Lotman admits that the “semiosphere” is an abstract phenomenon, yet he denies that its essence is merely metaphorical (12).

Lotman's key notion in the same article is the “semiotic border”. This functions as a bilingual translation mechanism adapting signals from the “outer space” into “our space”. He adds that only by means of the “border” can the semiosphere establish contact with the “non-semiotic” and the “foreign semiotic” space (14–15). All translation mechanisms that serve to intermediate foreign contacts belong to the border structure. Lotman also claims that semiotic processes are accelerated in the periphery of the cultural ecumene (15), that they are more dynamic in comparison with those developing in “centres” or nuclei (16). The interrelation between the nuclei and the periphery is never rigid, but changing. What has been considered a “non-semiotic” space can appear as another and different semiotic space. There is a tendency in semiospheric processes towards becoming internally ever more varied, without the semiosphere losing its unity (20).

In what follows, Lotman deals with the conditions of the dialogue that takes place on the border. He admits that semiotically different spaces, to establish a dialogue, need invariants or common elements. He speaks of palindromes, mirrors, the right and the left side, as structural models for dialogue.

In his last book, *Kul'tura i vzyv* (Culture and Explosion, 1992), written shortly before death, Lotman almost abandons his former semiotic vocabulary in order to discuss much more openly the processes taking place in culture. The book, however, can in retrospect illuminate important aspects in Lotman's thinking, as regards the semiosphere and Lotman's late philosophy, on the whole.

Already in a short article published in 1985, when Lotman still identified culture with “collective intellect” and “collective memory”, the idea of revolutions in the system of the “cultural grammar” appeared. Lotman's emphasis gradually shifts from “collective intellect” to “collective memory”. He speaks of informative and creative memory, of how actual texts are illuminated in memory and non-actual texts are left in reserve or as a potential.

In *Kul'tura i vzryv*, Lotman centres on “explosions” and “leaps” in the systems and processes of culture, as well as in creative minds and created texts. Also, literature, as a whole can be regarded as a text (179). The key issue continues to be the “border” as an intersection of different cultural encodings, but now it is not so much a condition for a dialogue, but for “explosions” and revolutions. Lotman became explicitly interested in the irregular and the unpredictable, which were considered by him the very core of cultural semiosis, in the sense that totally new signs, meanings and perspectives emerge as the result of “explosions” and “leaps”. At the same time Lotman admits that for development (the “leap”) both explosiveness and stability are necessary, the former allows for renovation and the latter, continuation (16, 20, 26). He also mentions that some cultures develop only by means of a gradual change, avoiding explosions (17).

Lotman observes a gradual degeneration of “explosions” from the 18th to the 20th century (22). In this context he contrasts technical-mechanical explosions with spiritual and philosophic explosions. It becomes clear that Lotman in his last work is not interested in the regular, the product of logic and technique, capable of merely imitative explosions (21) but, above all, in the conditions under which genuine explosions in artistic creation take place, or, in other words, how and why an author can become an Author, a supreme creator, and why other authors, the great main body of creators, are destined to drift in a current or fashion, until a new explosion drives them virtually into a cultural oblivion.

Arts and religion, as we read in *Kul'tura i vzryv* (60) are the highest forms of conscience. Quite contrary to his earlier belief in “collective reason”, Lotman now defies Vladimir Lenin’s saying that religion is the “opium of the people”, claiming that it is, instead, a “powerful means of self-organization” (224). In the same book, Lotman also deals with feminist emancipation and revolution, as well as with dreams, which he calls “a semiotic window”.

Many other important philosophical ideas can be found in the book, but now I will try to resume briefly why I consider Lotman’s late philosophy more productive, as regards the interpretation of the author, than the thinking which has drifted to the start of the current century with the mainstream of postmodern attitudes, since Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

First, Lotman, in a sense, himself represents the “periphery”, the zone par excellence for dialogue as well as for cultural “explosions”. The French thinkers, on the contrary, represent the “centre” and to a great extent have been dependent on its language. They have relied very confidently on the French language – their “own” language – not much taking

into the account the language of the European “others”, not to mention more distant “others”. In another text (2007) on contemporary translation philosophy, I have tried to show how excessive confidence in one’s “own” language, especially in philosophers who are so keen about language and discourses formed by language, tend to debilitate their conclusions about translation.

By declaring the written language and discourses accumulated in the written language almost the only meaningful reality, the French thinkers, to my mind, strongly restrict the field of cultural creation. The remote background to such thinking could be seen in the famous phrase of René Descartes: *Cogito ergo sum*. Reality beyond thinking has no value. The intellectual faculty is declared the supreme criterion, and the physical and biological worlds must obey it. Man, provided with the faculty of reason, is the very peak of God’s creation.

Descartes, the child of the Renaissance’s waning, could still only imagine it so, but his compatriots, the 17th-century “postmoderns” Bernard de Fontenelle and Charles Perrault, went much further. They declared their own age – naturally, meaning by it their “own” contemporary French literature – the very peak of literary creation, superior to that of the ancients.

(Post)modern “Progress” in Culture?

Appreciation of literature and the arts is more often than not a matter of taste, and tastes, as we all know, differ from one person to another, from one historical epoch and cultural space to another. However, what is much more significant, especially as related to the postmoderns of the second half of the 20th century, is the emergence with the 17th-century “postmoderns” of the idea of “progress”. New literature is considered superior to older literature, a belief in a progressive literary development appears. From such a position, old authors are always overcome by the young. The new, the modern, is made to be synonymous with the good.

Not only God as the initial creator is denied, but also great authors of the past are thought to exist only thanks to the genius of the contemporary critical mind which decides their fate by the critical rewriting or reinterpreting of their work. According to this view, writers do not know much about their own creation. The critics are the main authors, without whom writers would not exist.

In other words, meta-textual and post-textual creation – thus, intellectual creation – is considered superior to original artistic creation which, being mixed with the sensual and the “low” (non-cultural), comes to be

considered an inferior activity. As a result, a large sector of postmodern criticism appreciates, above all, intellectually orientated creation, whose object and point of departure is culture. In parallel with the high degree of sophistication in the use of the language in postmodern critical discourses themselves, irony and mind games, narrative techniques and strategies attract scholars and critics in the first place. They are reluctant to explain the content of literary works beyond the strictly cultural and the formal. Or, if they do, they easily fall into the trap of sociological simplifications.

The meta-textual language becomes ever more abstract. Theories depart from theories, in the belief that in this way cultural progress can be achieved.

To use Lotman's semiotic vocabulary, "syntagmatics" has been turned into the main sign of cultural scholarship. Following the creed borrowed from exact and natural sciences, namely, that theory illuminates the path for practice, probably an analogous "progress" is expected to take place in culture.

In terms of Lotman's semiosphere, postmodern-centric cultural thinking is attempting to move culture into the "noo-sphere" dominated by man's intellectual activity. There, its modification would be subjected to logic, causality and regularity. Texts are considered as segments in the anonymous chain of intertextualities, gradually developing towards greater perfection, like science, under the guidance of theory.

For my part, I confess that, as regards cultural creation, I still believe much more in "paradigmatics" than in "syntagmatics". I fully admit that (linguistic, stylistic and so on) tradition and the general cultural background are just as strongly conditioning any creation in literature and arts. However, with Lotman, I tend to believe that the anonymous chain can be interrupted by a creative author in an act that is not merely cultural but also existential. Only then does the creative act become an act of semiosis, creating genuinely new values and making culture richer and more varied in its content. It is very far from the idea of progress.

Artistic Creation as a Semiospheric and Symbiotic Act

In other words, and moving closer to Lotman's conclusion: the Author creates on the open border between culture and life, on the one hand, and life and death, on the other. He/she brings in all creative faculties at the same time: memory, intellect, senses, conscience and sub-conscience. There are a number of borders and edges open to dialogue as well as "explosions" in any significant artistic creation and work. However, history also proves

that in certain historical conditions culture “sleeps”, being replaced by mediocre creation in which the copying (re-writing) technique, congenial with some of the main postmodern theoretical postulates, prevails.

It is a topical truth that the meaning of an artistic work or text is open, it emerges and becomes modified gradually in time and space, in a dialogue between the author and his/her readers. It is a symbiotic process, in which, as historical experience demonstrates, symbiotic creators – either authors of original works or critics-interpreters (as authors) – have the greatest possibilities to establish and influence the canon-formation.

Why speak of symbiotic creators? Because more often than not, especially in the case of postmodern criticism, there is a tendency to undervalue the capacity of the authors of literary works for philosophic and metaphysical thinking. Incidentally, in his article “O semiosfere” Lotman directly connects the notion of the “border” with a semiotic individuality and proceeds to claim that “the semiosphere is a ‘semiotic personality’” whose submission to any more concrete formal definition is highly complicated (13).

The greatest writers of the past, without exception, have been such “semiospheric” or “semiotic-symbiotic” authors in the sense that they have worked on a number of borders, were perpetually attracted by what lies beyond the border of the known. They worked like philosophers interpreting life, but theirs was the superior art, as they did not limit themselves to the abstract formulation of ideas and concepts – thus decomposing the integrity of a human being – but revealed their philosophy in sensual images, which could be received even by a large public.

I have published an article (2003) about Cervantes’s theory of the novel, meaning by it not so much what Cervantes borrowed from Aristotle or other philosophers, nor his explicitly manifested ideas about literary creation and the art of the novel, but the theory or philosophy in images, turned into practice, as it emerges from his *Novelas ejemplares* and *Don Quixote* itself.

Calderón, Camões, Kreutzwald, Liiv, Pessoa

One of the supreme manifestations of the author in Western literary history can be found in Pedro Calderón de la Barca’s play, in fact, his *auto sacramental*, *El gran teatro del mundo* (The Great Theatre of the World). Calderón, like nobody before or after him, manages to assemble on the theatrical stage the whole of life, God’s creation represented by allegorical characters. God himself is in the action – called *el Autor*, the possessor of all human knowledge. However, it is Calderón the author of the play who

makes the conceptual scheme come to life, revive, and emerge through lyrical and sensual images. Calderón the author resuscitates God the author, turning creation into a semiospheric act, not just a mere intellectual abstract. The play is a vivid dialogue between the original creator (God) and the interpreter of his creation, Calderón, who becomes an author in the widest sense of the term.

The Portuguese Luís Vaz de Camões, in the late Renaissance did not invent any new aesthetic patterns in his famous epic *Os Lusíadas*. However, as an author belonging to the European smaller periphery, Portugal, Camões had a keen border sensibility. This could be one of the explanations for why Camões was the only Renaissance author who managed to write a complete national-patriotic epic, something that was attempted also by the French Pierre de Ronsard, but left unfinished. The great European nations, by that time, had already created their epics. They could expand their territories, thus providing their “body” with new energy and vital force.

Portugal, meanwhile, had for centuries been and was still at that time strongly menaced by its mighty neighbour, Spain. Camões’s main achievement was that in his epic he managed to demonstrate that also smaller, peripheral nations have their individual identity and are capable of great spiritual deeds. Camões constantly emphasises in his *Os Lusíadas* the voyage to India of the Portuguese as a spiritual act, while condemning expansion as guided by earthly greed. His epic became a great spiritual support for his nation and at the same time was also one of the paradigmatic works that inspired Romantic philosophers, like Johann Gottfried Herder, two centuries later, to claim spiritual equality of all peoples and nations, whether they belonged to centres or peripheries, whether they were physically big or small.

Some of the most outstanding authors of the Estonian budding nation in the second half of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century worked in the same paradigm. They came from even a much remoter periphery than the one to which Portugal belonged. It was the deepest periphery also in the socio-psychological meaning, as the Estonians, mainly a peasant people, were until the start of the 19th century in the humiliating state of serfdom under the Baltic-German landlords, within the Russian Tsarist empire.

The two authors whose work has been of a particular significance for Estonia, are Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald (1803–1882) and Juhan Liiv (1864–1913). Both were poets, semiospheric as well as paradigmatic authors par excellence. Kreutzwald’s parents had been serfs, but after studying at Tartu University he managed to become a medical doctor. In the re-

mote Southern Estonian border town, practicing as a doctor, Kreutzwald wrote the epic *Kalevipoeg* (literally: The Son of Kalev, 1861).

Juhan Liiv's parents were not serfs, but he too came from a humble peasant family, and mainly because of poverty never studied at the university, though he also lived for several periods in Tartu. In 1893 he suffered a spiritual crisis and fell mentally ill. However, it remains a fact that the best part of his poetry was created during the years of his illness, on the unstable border of madness and sanity.

Kreutzwald provided his epic *Kalevipoeg* with a scientific framework. It was first published, with a parallel German translation, in the proceedings of the Learned Estonian Society (Gelehrte Estnische Gesellschaft / Õpetatud Eesti Selts). The author claimed that the epic was based on genuine folklore. In fact, it was, at least in part, a mystification on which Kreutzwald was forced to rely, because otherwise the work would probably never have been published. Estonian literature did not exist as yet, and the tsarist censorship would have remorselessly crushed a patriotic literary work in the bud. In those conditions, support from outside Estonia was an essential factor in the epic's coming into existence and its subsequent recognition, despite criticism from Estonians themselves. The St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences gave Kreutzwald an important award even before the publication in the Proceedings was finished, while in a speech in Helsinki in 1859 a Finnish folklorist, S. Elmgren, claimed that Kreutzwald's *Kalevipoeg* was equal to Elias Lönnrot's *Kalevala*. As a matter of fact, in the book form *Kalevipoeg* appeared first in Kuopio, Finland (1862), and only after that did publications in Estonia itself follow.

In parallel with the Portuguese epic of Camões, Kreutzwald's peripheral epic claimed the individual identity of the Estonian nation and its yearning for liberty. The work, spiritually, constructs the Estonian nation and its culture through a powerful series of symbols and lyrical imagery. Again, it is not a mere mental construct – in contrast to what some post-modern theoreticians have claimed as the basis of nations' ontology – but its roots lie deep in the peripheral consciousness of existence, in which sensibility, feelings, ideas and philosophy enter into a symbiotic, interactive relationship. Only such works can influence and inspire a collective public, a wider community, like a nation.

As a result, *Kalevipoeg* has become a fundamental text for the Estonian nation and its culture. It created at the same time a complicated myth, influenced by the subtlest layers of Romantic philosophy (Herder, Goethe). Although *Kalevipoeg* in later Estonian culture has often been an object of irony and parody, its mythical significance has ever expanded. Although in the English translation of *Kalevipoeg* (by Jüri Kurman, USA, 1982)

Kreutzwald is still being qualified, in the footsteps of the older folkloric point of view, as a mere “compiler” of the epic, Kreutzwald’s figure as one of the great European authors of the closing era of Romanticism becomes ever more apparent, as new approaches appear (see Laak 2008).

Another Portuguese (= peripheral) poet, Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935), somewhat younger than the Estonian Juhan Liiv, claimed in some of his work that he was the only truly nature poet, in the sense that by depriving nature of any ideas and feelings, attributed to it by the Romantic mainstream, Pessoa really achieved a great poetic-philosophic originality. It became accentuated, as he intentionally fragmented himself by distributing his authorship, as a poet, among a number of authors, his heteronyms (Alvaro de Campos, Ricardo Reis, Alberto Caeiro, among the best known).

Thus, in one of his poems (XXVIII) Alberto Caeiro writes:

Por mim, escrevo a prosa dos meus versos
E fico contente,
Porque sei que compreendo a Natureza por fora;
E não a compreendo por dentro
Porque a Natureza não tem dentro;
Senão não era a Natureza.

(XXVIII)

(As for me, I write the prose of my verses/ And I am satisfied, / Since I understand Nature from outside; / And I don’t understand it from inside / Because Nature doesn’t have inside; / Or else it would not be Nature.)

The philosophy of Alberto Caeiro, the teacher of Alvaro de Campos, produces an impression of extreme rationalism, in which feelings have no place at all. Some of Alvaro de Campos’s poems (such as his famous *Ode marítima*), in contrast, reflect the sexual and physical impulses of nature, which are deprived of any sentiments and reason, as they are projected into human action. However, the final portion of *Ode marítima*, as well as another famous poem by Alvaro de Campos, *Tabacaria*, show that the decisions of “pure reason”, as well as those of nature, are reduced to a mere sexual mechanism – thus analogous with man’s technical striving. In this there resides a shade of irony. Pessoa the poet in his creative integrity was still very much acting on the anguish-ridden edge of existence. The movement towards the “safe” centric ground of reason or the imagined “inside” of nature is hardly more than a parody of man’s rational aspirations.

The same state of a permanent disquiet – and here one can recall Pessoa’s book of reflections, *Livro do desassossego* – is inherent in the poetry of the Estonian Juhan Liiv. The younger generation of Estonian symbol-

ists tried to make him a forerunner of their own aspirations, but Liiv was much subtler. He did not accept the symbolists' call for strict rhymes – i.e. their formal rationality. Though departing more often than not from visions of nature, Liiv's images could seldom be reduced to mere surface impressions or mere hinting at some feelings. Liiv's poetry contains a strong intellectual intensity, but his great advantage with most "intellectual poets" is that his ideas never appeared in their nakedness. They emerged from his images which, being sensual and lyrical at the same time, and dragged to the edge of existence, have a magic that a "noo-spheric" poet – regardless of his/ her artistic abilities – would never achieve. For that reason in several of my recent essays about Liiv (cf. 2007) I have seen Liiv as one of the greatest European existential-lyrical poets and have sought analogies between him and the Basque existential thinker and writer Miguel de Unamuno, at the other edge of Europe. Their year of birth, symbolically, coincides.

Finally, does what has been stated above mean that I undervalue the role of interpreters / rewriters as authors? Not at all. As Juhan Liiv himself never managed to publish a book in his life-time, he as an Author was coined by other, younger authors, the short story and essay writer Friedebert Tuglas (1886–1971), in the first place. Thanks to Tuglas's early monographs on Liiv and a substantial selection of Liiv's work published by him, Liiv could enter the permanent canon of Estonian literature and become consecrated by posterity.

We all know very well that the ground for the great canon of Western literature, if not of world literature, was prepared above all by Romantic writers and philosophers (Herder, Goethe, the brothers Schlegel and others). Several of them were Authors in the deepest sense of the word. Their semiospheric openness to the "other" was the most important factor in the establishment of such a fertile symbiotic dialogue between the author and the interpreter that in the final result both appeared as Authors.

NOTES

¹ Here and in the following, the translation is mine.

² The semiotic series edited by Lotman had on its cover the word "Semiotics" in Greek letters, but its official Russian title, "Trudy po znakovym sistemam" cautiously avoided the term.

³ The short treatise was translated and published the same year in Italy: *La cultura come mente collettiva e i problemi dell'intelligenza artificiale*. Urbino: Università di Urbino, Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica, Ser. A, 1977, N. 66.

⁴ I use in my references the reprint of the article in Lotman 1992.

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Between the Divine Spark and One's Own Death

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In spite of contemporary literary theories, which have taken off writer's laurels of the authorship as an unrepeated original synthesis of form and content and have implanted doubt about creativeness as an effect of author's will, skills and intention, one of the key features of the traditional authorship concept is kept in the creative process – narcissism as a prolongation of the infantile period and with it connected feeling of creation ability within the field of unlimited possibilities. The paradox of the literary – and perhaps of any artistic creativeness – is in this, that a writer feels the most on himself and for himself in those creative periods, when it seems to him that, pervaded by unlimited, ocean feeling, he is surpassed by his own creativeness, that thus he alone is not that one, who controls the process, but he is »merely« means of a creative process.

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / artistic creativity / creative process

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In spite of contemporary literary theories which have robbed the writer of the laurel of authorship as an unrepeatably original synthesis of form and content and injected doubt into creativity as an effect of the author's will and knowledge, one of the key features of the traditional concept of authorship has been retained in the creative process: narcissism as an infantile extension and the sense of the capability of creation in the field of unlimited capabilities that is linked with that. And if children are granted the animistic belief that they, through their wishes and thoughts, can make the sun rise and the moon wane, and if in adulthood the same conviction is quickly diagnosed as psychosis, in literature the creating of worlds through thought alone or – expressed in biblical terms – through the word, is not only socially acceptable but even respected, even if in some spaces, as in the Slovenian one, too, (only) symbolically, but also not financially, which is actually the other, dark side of the symbolic status of Slovenian language and literature.

Narcissism is built into the author's wish to unveil his own creative work and, with that, himself to the public, from whom he expects wishes and demands praise and reward and is often, in the event of contrary reac-

tions, childishly offended and insulted. But also authors who do not unveil their work to the public and “write only for themselves” – although, with that, they are also writing for the Other – in their intimate aestheticization of existence, if we take recourse to Freud, retain narcissism as an extension of childish play, which offers the creator a very particular sort of pleasure.

Today the author has not only not passed away, but seems very much alive and fleshy, as he is expected to publicly act as a promoter of his literature through his image and biography. Yet in the author’s fleshy existence there lies in the marketing system the fact that the author, not least for reasons of economic survival, is subjugated to the demands of market mechanisms and to the pressures of literary production, and the consequence of this can be a loosening of criteria and through this also a sliding of art into cultural production. Art which points to the real and through it to the truth, by which the real and truth and visible, if we refer to Gérard Wajcman, demands its own rhythm – a rhythm which is difficult to control and which can hardly ever be quickened – while cultural production comes into being without any greater difficulties during the agreed-upon terms for delivery. In contrast to cultural production, art should provide the creator and the recipient with much more than just a polished, relaxing pleasure, as it should, in both author and reader, or listener, alike, put asunder niches, boring holes out of which that truth seeps which culture blithely strives to keep concealed.

Whenever writers explain their own creative process, such experiments can sound interesting, but at the same time, this process proves to be an experience to which no other individual has access. And this other one is not merely a reader, but, concerning his explanation, the other is the author himself. Freud, who was enchanted by literature, wrote in his *Der Dichter und das Phantasieren* (1908): “Wenn wir wenigstens bei uns oder bei unsersgleichen eine dem Dichten irgendwie verwandte Tätigkeit auffinden könnten! Die Untersuchung derselben liesse uns hoffen, eine erste Aufklärung über das Schaffen des Dichters zu gewinnen.” But also when I try to explain my *ars poetica*, my own method of writing, by myself, I already during the uttering ask myself whether it is only a matter of my narrative, of a reconstruction of the creative process. For though there does not exist an external position from which the author could neutrally observe himself as he creates, writing is an activity in which subject and object are profoundly mixed. And if it is a matter of art and not culture, then in the creative process, if we refer to Lacan, the subject is actually re-established, and this is in points of non-recognition, where the author meets in himself that other, his own stranger, who is not integrated into

his own author's image, which is really nothing more than a merely imaginary construct.

During the creative process, the perception of time and space is transformed, and in addition to this it is difficult to limit the creative process, as it occurs not only in a circumscribed situation, seated at the computer or over a sheet of paper, but also in "un-consecrated" everyday moments, when suddenly an idea furtively arises, a knot is untied or a sentence happens to un-husk itself. And because creativity gives rise in the author to extraordinary enjoyment, to which the creator's essence and identity are attached, and of which the author is most keenly aware during those silent periods of creative blocks, creative drought can cause both the loss of identity and a sense of having slid into non-being.

The paradox of both literary creativeness and other forms of creativeness lies in the fact that although the idea of freedom is linked to creativeness, to the free activity in the realm of limitless possibilities, the author feels most himself and for himself in those creative processes in which he, pervaded by the ocean of enjoyment, if we employ Freud's term, experiences it is not he who control creativeness but, on the contrary, he is controlled by creativeness. But such periods can quickly be converted into their opposite, when the eruptive source suddenly dries up, sometimes for a lengthy period of time, but sometimes it is drained forever. And while the enigmatic mechanisms of the creative process open the niches through which the "Divine spark" occasionally flashes, which the author experiences as the surplus of his own existence and a firm point of his existence, during the longer periods of creative drought, when the creative enjoyment evaporates, along with the certainty of existence that is linked with it, he can experience himself as a dead author, and his life as a parasitical one that feeds on the past chapters of a somewhat successful biography.

But is there a means of triggering creativeness? Positive psychology believes in this and offers a formula which attributes especially positive thinking to yoga, meditation and similar relaxation techniques. But if such a therapy is perhaps effective in management and in similar activities, in which efficiency counts, efficiency as a regeneration of culture, the artistic process as a formula for achieving homeostasis, is usually immune. This is because art usually happens in the extremes, there where there is something that is too much, which is right because something else is lacking, or at that times when there is an excessiveness of distress, as André Breton writes in *Arcane 17*, which causes a change of the sign, when art as an act transforms a distress, pain or death into gold, value, life. So Dostoevsky, according to the words of his wife, as Freud states, wrote in conditions

that were by no means harmonic – if Dostoevsky, spanned between sky and hell had ever experienced such conditions at all – but after extremely exciting and agitating gambling which had ended in bankruptcy and his self-image, his phantasmal firm core had evaporated between guilty feelings and the loss of dignity.

It is possible to compare creative mechanism with the extensions and contractions, with deep breathing and with asthmatic restricted breathing, with peaks, when the author's ego passes over from nil to the megalomaniac extensions, all the way to the subterranean, when the author's ego evaporates and disappears. In creativeness the conscious and the unconscious are united, the author with his imaginary self is united with the author as the subject of the unconscious. In creativeness the author's self-glorification, which is fastened to the firm core of self-certainty, and the essence of the dispersion through with the author encounters otherness in himself, when he stumbles over the third part of the statement *cogito ergo sum*, for this *cogito* is not conscious, it is not the firm substantial formation, but his "private" foreigner, who at skilled artistic articulation can twinkle as a divine spark, transcendence, or, depending on the creator's concept of the world, as the own squeezed scum, as the slippery quantum fraction, which is disappearing constantly, and returning and appearing again and again.

The statement that all the stories have already been told and written has been chewed over and is superficial, for something like "all stories" does not even exist, and there exist only the basic human contents like sense and non-sense of life, essence and non-essence, the mysteries of human relations and complications, the relation between man and the world and whatever the world should already mean. And stories, not only narrative tales, but also other forms of putting-into-words of the distance between existence and non-existence, are not merely the explanation of reality but at the same time its construction. Is, consequently, the writing of autobiographies as a putting-into-words of what has happened to us at all possible, and is there not a way in which we can more radically intervene in "our life story"? Although the word itself, language, is a mediator of its own supposed immediate experience, autobiography is, similarly to the stream of thoughts of our memories, always a constructed narrative. And although within ourselves there perhaps even exists a sort of hard drive, on which the most minute details of our life are inscribed, the searching for and opening of those documents are controlled by our own censor and are at the same time the fitter of our memories. I therefore believe that it is possible through fiction as an intentionally-constructed narrative which is not obliged to repeat that which we know – because that which we know is merely a construction that is acceptable to ourselves – more thoroughly

to poke out also the unpleasant and, especially, the parts of truth that are foreign to us and to reproduce them through words.

But irrespective of the various creative methods and genres, there always exists a trace of the author in the writing – and this more than in the choice of innumerable reworking of themes and contents, in the vary manner of their handling, in the structure of writing and in the author's perspective, for already a slight shift in perspective can illuminate the object so that it is seen completely differently than we are used to seeing and knowing it. These conscious-unconscious choices, whether the author be aware of them or not, encompass his spiritual, material, emotional and other experiences. And it is precisely on this sharpness and on these edges that there remains the trace of authorship and of the author, and this trace is not only stronger but also truer than the accompanying, agreeable constructed public image and biography of the author.

Translated by Jason Blake

The Authority of the Author: A Cult of the Past or of the Future?

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This paper analyses the history of the category originality, which is a conditio sine qua non of any authorship. It takes as a starting point Lotman's models of "aesthetics of identity", characteristic for the Middle Ages, and "aesthetics of difference", which prevailed in the last centuries. It owes a lot also to Mortier's thesis that originality became an artistic criterium already in the period of the Enlightenment, and not only later, in those of Romanticism and Modernism, as we usually think. The changing of the concept of the authorship over the centuries had its consequences also for the changing of the status of translation: in the Middle Ages a translation was always an adaptation as well; the rise of the Author to the throne of the absolute Creator of the artistic world caused the fall of the status of translators, since their activity was seen as secondary. This hierarchic relation lasted until recently, when Postmodernism in literature (Borges) and phenomenology and reception theory (Rezeptionsästhetik) rehabilitated translators in the field of literary criticism. The thesis about the death of the Author could be traced implicitly already in Mallarmé's poetics; explicitly it was developed by Valéry. The writer of this article, a poet himself, is convinced that the Postmodern limitation of the arrogance of the Author was necessary, but that repeating Barthes' slogan about the death of the Author is no longer productive: we live in a period when the global economy is based on copyrights, which Capital is trying to steal from their original creators and owners - authors who are alive and kicking.

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / imitation / originality / authenticity / historical overviews / Mortier, Roland

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This paper is dedicated to the analysis of a category which is closely connected with the notion of the author and serves as the *conditio sine qua non* of any authorship: it is the category of *originality*, of aesthetic innovation. The etymological source of that category is, of course, the Latin word *origo* – *originis*. The French structuralist Paul Zumthor has in his brilliant book *Essai de poétique médiévale* lucidly defined the relation between the author and the language during the Middle Ages: "*Le poète est situé dans*

son langage plutôt que son langage en lui.” (“The poet is anchored in his language more than his language in him.”) (68) Contrary to our contemporary image that the text emerges from the author, the medieval author came from the text. Everything in the Middle Ages was a text, so there was no place or need for any originality.

The cultural typology founded by Jurij M. Lotman can serve as a starting point for our analysis. Lotman has delineated a clear difference between “the aesthetics of identity” that was characteristic of antiquity and the Middle Ages, on the one hand, and “the aesthetics of difference” characteristic for the modern era, on the other. “The aesthetics of identity” is based on the identification with the models – *clichés* which are already known to the audience and which have entered into the system of “rules” (Lotman 1970 245). Individual innovation was rejected as a sin, an expression of vanity, because this aesthetics demanded loyalty to the ancient, “God-given” patterns (Lotman 1970 120).

“The aesthetics of difference” is a system in which the nature of the codes is not known to the audience before the beginning of artistic perception. Against the models of reality the reader is used to, the artist imposes his own, original solution, which he considers to be more real (Lotman 1970 248).

According to today’s copyright laws Shakespeare would be accused of plagiarism because he frequently borrowed themes and motifs, stories and dialogues from elder playwrights or Italian Renaissance writers of novellas. Fortunately, Shakespeare was better than the authors from who he was so shamelessly “stealing”. A pamphlet written in 1592 by the playwright Robert Greene (one of the so-called “University Wits”), in which he defined the young Shakespeare as a “shake-scene” accusing him of stealing from others, proves that “the aesthetics of identity” was overruled by “the aesthetics of difference” approximately at that time, in the late Renaissance. Such a criticism would not have had any validity in the Middle Ages when everybody “was stealing”. Taking from other sources was a normal part of the creative process.

Such an understanding of culture and art had far reaching consequences for the relations between the author and the translator. In the Middle Ages the translator was always an adapter as well. The borders between the original text, an adaptation and a translation were blurred. That is the reason why translations were frequently treated as original works: *Romaunt of the Rose* is simultaneously considered to be Chaucer’s translation of the French verse novel *Roman de la Rose*, which was originally written by Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meung, and Chaucer’s own work. This interweaving of the creative and translation activities was possible in the

manoeuvring space between them – usually called the *adaptation*. The basic relations between the original, the translation and the adaptation have been well defined by the Slovene translation theorist Majda Stanovnik: “As far as the language is concerned, the translation is entirely different from the original, but it maintains its individual and genre form; the adaptation changes the purpose of the original, frequently its genre character as well, but it clearly remains attached to it with paraphrases and quotations.” (Stanovnik 1998 35) Here we are trying to put these relations into a historical perspective.

“The aesthetics of difference” has crowned the author as a sovereign Prince of Imagination, as a Creator of the artistic world who enjoyed divine attributes. Consequently, the artistic creation was understood as *creatio ex nihilo*. This process of the sacralization of the Author happened primarily on the basis of the category of originality. There is no originality without the Author. An author, who is not original, is a *contradictio in adiecto*.

The rise of the Author had negative consequences for the status of the translator: the translating activity which had enjoyed such a lofty reputation in the Middle Ages for its religious, intellectual and cultural importance, turned out to play just a secondary role, as the translator was a servant of the creative power of the Author, the Master of the artistic world. Joachim du Bellay, a poet and a member of the French Renaissance *Pléiade*, wrote venomous arguments against translators in his manifesto *Défense et Illustration de la langue française* (1549):

Mais que dirai-je d'aucuns, vraiment mieux dignes d'être appelés traditeurs que traducteurs? Vu qu'ils trahissent ceux qu'ils entreprennent exposer, les frustrant de leur gloire, et par même moyen séduisent les lecteurs ignorants, leur montrant le blanc pour le noir (...) O Appolon! O Muses! Profaner ainsi les sacrées reliques de l'Antiquité! (Du Bellay 1988: 58-59).

But what should I say about some people who would rather deserve to be called traitors instead of translators? If they betray those whom they should present, robbing them of their glory, and in this way seduce ignorant readers, selling them white for black (...) O Appollo! O Muses! To profane like this the sacred relicts of the Antiquity!

This humiliating status of translators lasted until very recently: it was Postmodernism which rehabilitated the activity of translating. As in many other dimensions the initial role in this development was played by Jorge Luis Borges: if we re-consider his oeuvre from the point of view of the relation between authors and translators we come to the surprising conclusion that the heroes of Borges' novels and stories are frequently translators, not authors. As Tonko Maroević, a Croatian art and literary historian, pointed out in his book *The Reader of Borges*, Borges

has rehabilitated the dignity of readers and reading (Maroević 2005 340). Reading is no longer a passive process – it has become an utterly creative activity, a real spiritual adventure. And what are translators – if not the most passionate, systematic and precise readers? In the field of theory this change in mentality was prepared by philosophers of hermeneutics and phenomenology, among others by Roman Ingarden, who pointed out that the text of the literary work is just a basis which must be actively completed by the reader and his/her mental horizon (Ingarden 1973: 50). This tendency has been further developed during the past decades by reception theory (*Rezeptionsästhetik*), which has reversed the traditional relation between the origin and the target language: if in old times literary history was almost exclusively focused on the author and therefore treated relations between different national literatures through the imperialistic prisma of “influence”, the primary field of research of reception theory is the target language, namely varied strategies of the adaptation of the original texts into the – aesthetic, historical, social, etc. – contexts of the target culture. The author here plays no role; personally, I find this position too radical.

By the way: precisely Shakespeare’s creative “reception” of other authors’ “material” raises a crucial question: on which level is a literary and, generally, artistic work original? We all agree that the originality of *Antigone* does not depend on the story itself which belongs to *mythos*, but on various authors interpretations of this tragic story: Sophocles’ *Antigone* is different from Jean Anouilh’s or Dominik Smole’s (the Slovene playwright has written a poetic version of the fratricide at the end of the Second World War in which the main heroine, Antigone, never appears). The story itself, therefore, belongs to everybody, to the tradition of the Western civilization and to the treasury of the world culture ... although we are clearly aware that Sophocles’ originality is deeper and primordial in comparison with the later adaptations of this mythological story. Sophocles is the first, he is a source, but Anouilh and Smole are equally original. It is more difficult to understand Shakespeare’s phenomenon: he is one of the *first* authors, the Author in the emphatic sense of the word, although, as we have already pointed out, certain segments of his dramaturgy, plots and dialogues would according to the today’s copyright laws be treated as: plagiarism.

Contrary to the widely spread conviction that the coronation of the Author as an absolute dictator of the creative originality stemmed from the Romantic and Modernist cult of so-called artistic freedom, the analysis by the Belgian literary historian Roland Mortier in his book *Originality (L’originalité)* shows that the category of originality had its *origin* in the pe-

riod of the Enlightenment. The subtitle of this systematic and lucid analysis is significant: “*Une nouvelle catégorie esthétique au siècle des Lumières*” (A new aesthetic category in the century of the Enlightenment).

The notion of *originality* has, of course, its own pre-history which is – it cannot be otherwise – closely connected with the history of *mimesis*, the basic category of both Western art and theory of art. In the Middle Ages and beyond *mimesis* was not understood merely as an imitation of the *reality*, as it had been originally in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy (with all the differences in their understanding of *reality*), but as an imitation of other, previously existing artistic works and authors as well. In this sense *originality* is the opposite of *mimesis* or *imitatio* (a Latin translation which reduced the original semantic wealth of the ancient Greek term *mimesis* to mere craft).

According to dictionaries the word *original* has several meanings, such as: original literary or scientific work in the language in which the author has written it; a sculpture or a painting as created by a visual artist, contrary to its reproduction; the first example of a legal document, etc. Besides these positive meanings there is, however, a negative meaning as well: *original* can be a name for a *weirdo*. Abbé Féraud drew the following distinction in his *Dictionnaire critique de la langue française* (3rd book, 1787, quoted by: Mortier 1982 33).

– Un auteur original est un homme de génie – An original author is a genius
 mais but
 – un original est un homme bizarre et singulier. – an original is a bizarre and weird person.

The opposition between imitation and originality was at the core of *La Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* in the 16th and 17th centuries: the dilemma was whether to imitate classical aesthetic ideals and authors or to create original works.

Surprisingly modern is the definition of the notion *Imitation* in the famous French *Encyclopédie* (1765); it was most likely written by Diderot himself. It is an unusually long description, which starts with the definition: “*On peut la définir, l’emprunt des images, des pensées, des sentiments, qu’on puise dans les écrits de quelque auteur, et dont on fait un usage soit différent, soit approchant, soit en enchérisant sur l’original.*” (Mortier 1982 27) Imitation, according to Diderot, is lending of images, thoughts and sentiments from other authors in three possible ways – copying them, or making from them something different or richer. The most shocking sentence in Diderot’s analysis is: “*La bonne imitation est une continuelle invention.*” (“A good imitation is a constant innovation”.) Diderot’s conclusion is, therefore, very positive: “*Ainsi l’imitation née de la lecture continuelle des bons originaux, ouvre*

l'imagination, inspire le goût, étend le génie, et perfectionne les talents." Roughly translated: imitation of good original sources opens imagination, inspires the taste, widens the genius, and raises the talents (Mortier 1982 27–29). Very modern, indeed!

Alexander Pope criticized imitators, accusing them of producing just opportunistic and slavish copies of pre-existing greater works. Nevertheless, he insisted on the principle of the imitation, but the imitation of – Nature itself (quoted by Mortier 1982 44):

First follow Nature, and your judgement frame
By her just standard, which is still the same ...

In his introduction to an edition of Shakespeare Pope wrote (quoted by Mortier 1982 46): "The poetry of Shakespeare was inspiration indeed; he is not so much an imitator, as an instrument of Nature." Pope anticipated the meaning which Nature was about to play in the value system of the Enlightenment. Enlightenment philosophers understood originality as an important criterium and a positive evaluation in aesthetic judgements, but they still insisted on the basic principle of *mimesis*. And if an author does not imitate his predecessors' works, classical ideals and idols, what does he imitate? He imitates Nature. In the most radical variations of this understanding the author is Nature itself. Here we have entered the realm of philosophy. What is Nature? Is it the ancient Greek *physis*? Or the Renaissance *natura*? Is it Spinoza's "*natura naturata*" (created nature) or his "*natura naturans*" meaning "creative nature", which is Spinoza's name for the Creator, for God? Indeed: is it Spinoza's pantheist "*Deus sive Natura*" (God or Nature)? Or is it the Nature of scientific laws which can be empirically established and verified? What is the relation between the aesthetic laws of Art and Nature? Does Nature belong to the realm of the so called *sublime* as Kant understood it? And what is the ethical nature of Nature? Is Nature Good or Evil? For Rousseau, Good, for Marquis de Sade, Evil.

The turning point in the rise of the author to the role of the king of the artistic world occurred in the period of Pre-romantics, and it was marked by the essay of the English poet Edward Young "*Conjectures on original Composition*" (1759). As Roland Mortier justly remarks: "*Young's importance was less in ideas than in the efficiency of their expression.*" (Mortier 1982 76). This essay spread all over Europe and charmed many young spirits with its freshness and passion. A true announcement of the Romanticism.

Why did this decisive initiative come from England, and not from France (as was usual at the time) or Germany? In the 18th century the

normative Classicism was still so strong in France that it did not allow for such outburst of innovations. French literature gathered revolutionary force only a century later, when Symbolists carefully examined poetic language, reaching the peak in Rimbaud's abolition of the mimetic principle in *Illuminations* and with Mallarmé's thesis that poetry was not written by I, but by the Language itself. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the Enlightenment imposed itself in German speaking countries relatively late: Kant's definition of the Enlightenment, which introduced the term *Aufklärung* in the German language and culture, was published only in 1784, in the note *Was ist Aufklärung* in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (Mortier 1982 14).

Young's enthusiasm for originality was taken over by Lessing, Klopstock, Hamann, Herder and poets of the movement *Sturm und Drang*; it is characteristic of the German spirit that they radicalized the notion of originality into the idea of a *genius* in different variations (*Originalgeist*, *Originalgenie*, *Kraftgenie*, etc.).

It is worth mentioning that in addition to the principles of *mimesis* and *originality* there was always the third principle – *authenticity*. Mortier claims that it is based on the criterium of *intensity* and that it involves *expression* as the basic strategy of the artistic process (Mortier 1982 129). This principle functions as an imitation of Nature *within* the author himself. The mimetic principle is, thus, maintained, but interiorized.

In the last decades literary criticism dismantled the throne on which the Author was crowned by Romanticism and its last descendant, the radical Modernism with its glorification of the principle of innovation. Avant-guard movements in the 20th century frequently used the criterium of innovation as the only remaining aesthetic principle. The cult of the Author as a divine Creator was in desperate need of critical distance and soberness. But there is still a basic question whether art is possible without the author. To put it more precisely: the signature of the author on the cover of the book is definitely not necessary – we would understand a novel or a volume of poems equally well even in the case of anonymous authorship. The simple level of the authorship is not essential – essential is the other level which Lotman has in *The Structure of the Artistic Text* called “the author's model of the world” (Lotman 1976 369). This model, this prisma through which the world is shown in a literary work – that is the “author”.

The question of the relation between the artistic work and the author's personal experience is even more complicated. Mallarmé has erased the principle of the first person singular in poetry, but was no less personal, nor did his author's authority suffer in any way from it. Quite the contrary:

he is one of the greatest and most revolutionary authors of the modern era. But although he apparently erased the personal experience, it is inscribed into his poetic language. Mallarmé frequently wrote sonnets describing empty rooms (for example *Sonnet en -yx*). Translating Mallarmé into Slovene I have found an explanation for this obsessive theme in the cycle *Pour un tombeau d'Anatole* (For Anatol's Grave), where Mallarmé expressed his pain after the death of his son at the age of eight. There were other dead souls haunting him: his mother, who died when he was a child, leaving him and his younger sister Marie orphans and intensifying their relation; the death of the little sister a few years later... The seemingly formal, impersonal and cold emptiness of Mallarmé rooms turned out to be the mortal absence of the human beings he loved, and the poetic word was the only way to call them back. (Novak 2006 318–323) The personal experience is the fire through which “*les mots de la tribu*” (“the words of the tribe”) must go in order to obtain “*un sens plus pur*” (“a purified sense”) – to quote in full Mallarmé’s lines from his sonnet *Le Tombeau d’Edgar Poe* (The Grave of Edgar Poe):

Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu. (Mallarmé 1975 94)

Literally: To give a purified sense to the words of the tribe.

Mallarmé transcended the monopoly of the Author by means of his prophetic words in the essay “*La Crise du Vers*” (“*The Crisis of Verse*”), namely that “*le poète cède l’initiative aux mots*” (“the poet yields the initiative to words”) (Mallarmé 1945 325). That is also the message of the following anecdote: when his friend, the painter Edgar Degas, lamented that he had so many brilliant ideas, but that he could not write good poems, Mallarmé gently responded: “My dear Degas, poems are not written with ideas, but with words.”

Mallarmé’s follower Paul Valéry radicalized this tendency of the abolition of the traditional understanding of the Author. He was one of the young “*mardistes*” (the term coming from the French for *Tuesday*) who every Tuesday evening from 1880 to the mid nineties gathered in the “poetic salon” – more precisely: the kitchen – of Mallarmé’s modest apartment at the Rue de Rome in Paris to worship Poetry and its personification, Mallarmé. They called him *Maître*, encompassing the word’s entire range of meaning, from “craftsman” to “teacher” to “boss.” Contrary to the great majority of poetic “apprentices” who – according to Harold Bloom – feel “the anxiety of influence”, Valéry found unbearable any comparison between him and his Maître Mallarmé, and that is why he protested

against the comparative analysis of Henri Ghéon who had placed Valéry above Mallarmé. Here we encounter the problem of influence, an utterly sensitive topic for authors. Departing from his own poetic experience and with his exceptional power of self-reflection Valéry has seen this problem not as a trauma, but as a possibility for a poetic growth, quite differently from the traditional literary history. He has articulated this with breathtaking cynicism in his volume of essayistic fragments and poetic aphorisms *Tel Quel*: “There is nothing more original, more *mine*, than to feed with the others. But you have to digest them. A lion is made of a well digested sheep.” (Valéry 1960 478)

Paul Valéry has great merits for the dethronement of the Author as the only and exclusive Proprietor of the sense of his work, as the supreme Interpreter with an absolute monopoly over the meaning of his text. At the end of the essay “*Au sujet du Cimetière marin*” (“Speaking about The Graveyard by the Sea”) (1933) where Valéry explained the genesis of his most famous poem, *Le Cimetière marin*, he has come to the far-reaching conclusion: “*There is no real sense of the text.* There is no authority of the author. Whatever he *wanted* to say, he has written what he has written. Once published the text is similar to the tool that everybody can use according to his wishes and abilities; and it is not quite sure whether its constructor uses it better than anybody else.” (Valéry 1957 1507) In the preface to the edition of the poetry collection *Charmes*, commented on by the philosopher Alain (1929), Valéry wrote: “My verses have the meaning that is given to them. The meaning that I give to them is suitable for me only, and it is not in discordance with any other. It is the error which is contrary to the nature of poetry and can be even fatal for it if we demand that each poem should have a real and unique sense which would correspond or be identical with the author’s thoughts.” (Valéry 1957 1509)

Roland Barthes with his slogan about “*la Mort de l’Auteur*” (launched in the revolutionary year 1968) basically repeated Paul Valéry. But it is only fair to point out that forty years ago limiting the Author’s arrogance was still necessary. I am convinced that today the situation is quite different, the opposite, and that authors need protection as an endangered species.

Paul Valéry has broken the validity of Young’s concept of originality as a *conditio sine qua non* of the artistic work. But authors follow their ways and they do not believe theories even when they sound good and when they praise an author’s work. As a matter of fact, true authors do not believe their own theories. That was the case with Paul Valéry – a talented poet and a brilliant mind who (fortunately) in his poetic *praxis* did not follow his own ideas about *poésie pure* (“pure poetry”).

An unusual anecdote has connected the tragic personal destiny of Edward Young with the bright poetic “fortune” of Paul Valéry. As a student of the University in Montpellier (which now bears his name) at the beginning of the 1890s Valéry liked to walk and meditate in the beautiful Botanical garden. In a quiet corner there was (and still is, I have seen it myself) a mysterious grave without any data, with the Latin inscription: “*Narcissae placandis minibus*” (“To placate the shades of Narcissa”). According to the local legend the English poet Edward Young had buried there his little daughter named Narcissa. (The rationalistic spirit of the modern era took this story to be just a fabrication of the people’s imagination. However, excavating this site archeologists have found a child’s skeleton.) Paul Valéry was so touched by this grave and its story that he wrote the longer poem *Narcisse parle* (Narcissus speaks), published later, in 1920, in his volume *Album des vers ancien* (Album of Ancient Verses) in which – persuaded by his friend André Gide – he gathered his youth poems. The name Narcissa had reminded him of the ancient Greek myth about the beautiful young man Narcissus falling in love with his own image. That was the beginning of Valéry’s obsessive writing about Narcissus. The poet of the “poetry of graves and nights”, who launched the idea of originality as a sign of true art, had given the eternal theme to the poet of the Light and of the Sea, who used it to express his basic personal problem and later denied the role of personal experience in poetry and even dismantled the category of Authorship. That this poem stemmed from the consciousness of mortality as human destiny cannot be a coincidence. Let us remember that narcissi were in various mythologies flowers of death. Valéry has used as a motto the epitaph on the grave: “*Narcissae placandis manibus.*”

I would like to conclude with a sociological comment: principles of originality and authenticity are basic laws of Postmodernist global economy. Registered trademarks are an economic translation of artistic and intellectual copyrights. The basic law of the political economy of the European Union is the rule that each product must be labelled with an indication of “the land of origin” or “cradle of the race”, if animals and their products are concerned. That is the reason why only the French wine producers have the right to the name “champagne”, because France is “the land of origin” of champagne; if the same product is offered at the market by wine producers coming from other countries, then it is not “champagne” but ordinary “sparkling wine”, because copy-rights must be respected!

The biggest economic field of the future will be copyrights. The revived thesis about the death of the Author, unfortunately, enters into the

context of the aggressive pressure of global capitalism to steal copyrights from their rightful owners, the authors themselves. The ethical duty of literary criticism is to lend a hand of solidarity to authors in their legitimate struggle for copyrights. After all, the future of all intellectual work depends on the outcome of this conflict. We are all in the same boat, and we are going to sail forward or to drown together.

Having said that, let me answer the challenge of the title of our colloquium about the death of the Author. How is the Author doing today? He is alive and kicking.

Translated by the author

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The Digital Author? Authorship in the Digital Era

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Since the birth of the World Wide Web as the most successful application of the Internet there have been hopes of literary theorists (Landow, Bolter) that the new digital media would finally allow for the “death of the author” and the birth of the “writing reader”. The hypertext as new genre of text seemed to be powerful enough to fulfill the older hopes of the poststructuralists (Barthes, Foucault).

Although these euphoric hopes have been abandoned by literary theory for the most part, the Internet in the actual literary production still seems to have the power to be an “authorless” media in principle: In the oft-discussed encyclopaedia “Wikipedia” the collaborative written text supposedly is more important than the authors. Literary experiments in the digital media are exploring how text can be written just by text-algorithms. These projects finally do not need writers anymore; they are using data taken from search engines.

But this somewhat naïve idea of an “authorless” digital media clearly can be refuted. First, the author has been revived by the new media and continues to thrive within it. Second, in contrast to the prediction of huge “authorless” collaborative text-production in online journalism, it is hard to find any collaborative works of literature. Third, even with collaborative projects or “codeworks” the function of an author does not disappear but is spread over different persons, which can even lead to a “dissociated” authorship. The author cannot disappear or “die” in the Internet, because its characteristics will not allow this to happen. Therefore the Internet does not stand for the “death” of the author; it actually appears to be a fountain of youth for literary authorship instead. These findings are discussed using recent experiments with authorship in digital literature.

Keywords: literature and technology / digital literature / internet / author / authorship

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Introduction: Specifics of Internet authors. A Historical Perspective

Net Literature seems to stand for the redemption of old hopes from the perspective of literary history. Hypertext pioneers such as Jay David Bolter, George P. Landow or Benjamin Woolley were of the opinion in

the early 1990s that digital media would allow for completely new, collaborative literary text production.

The author would now completely disappear in the New Media, giving birth to the writing reader, the so called “wreader”: “In cyberspace, everyone is an author, which means that no one is an author: the distinction upon which it rests, the author distinct from the reader disappears. Exit author ...” (Woolley 165)

The internet therefore seems to stand for the redemption of certain utopian promises from post-structuralism that was expressed, for example, by Roland Barthes or Michel Foucault under the slogan “the death of the author” (Barthes, Foucault).

As is known, author criticism, particularly that criticism characterized by post-structuralism, has dominated the debate about authors for a few decades. However, there has been a strong “return of the author” (Bein et al., Detering, Jannidis et al.) since the 1990s. Connected with that was always the question of whether this supposed “return” was not rather a “recurrence” or “rediscovery,” because the concept of the author itself was never really shelved.

These fairly naïve beliefs have in the meantime also been dismissed in the relatively recent discourse about the internet author. Newer positions are absolutely more differentiated and permit the author to be part of the internet (again). But, research still tends basically to marginalize the author in Net Literature.

However, this primary thesis can be refuted if one looks at the actual literary production on the internet that is still characterized by strong authors with a very traditional understanding of authorship. The most popular genre, “ingenious Net Literature”, works with multimedia-based and interactive stylistic devices that are very much worked through and controlled by the individual artist. Collaborative projects also seem to have only met with success when they were produced by a small team of co-authors or when they were significantly pre-structured by a primary author. Finally, code-based and performative Net Literature show that the concept behind literature is becoming more and more important the more author representatives are involved in a project. But, in turn, it is primarily individual authors that are responsible for these concepts.

Furthermore, humans as biological beings cannot help but associate a text with an originator, even on the internet. Readers only accept literary texts on the internet as such when they can assume that they can be comprehended or accepted as “literature”. However, this principal comprehension is ensured by the real or staged author instance. This only means: the author concept in the internet cannot disappear due to human socialization. It is recreated where it does not exit.

But what is Net Literature? In the following, the term “Net Literature” is used as a comprehensive term for internet-typical literature. “Net Literature” is literature that “structurally reflects the specific characteristics of the Internet” (Föllmer 1). The use of the internet medium can be viewed as self-referential within Net Literature. The internet is not only used for generation, propagation and reception of literature, but it also enters literature and shapes it.

365	<---	825	---->	693
<p>Catholic <--> decamp <--> el eneral <--> it senile <--> th wrath .I. --> .Next, -> .but. --> her's. --> .fo .my. --> .qui k. --> .would. I <--> Still, -> father's <- -> it <--> la my <--> not <- evolver <--> s --> to <--> w</p> <p>I <--> Still, -> father's <- -> it <--> la my <--> not <- evolver <--> s --> to <--> w .I. --> .Still .be. --> .fath .idea. --> . .might. --> . -> .pocket. -- > .the. --> . thout. --> .wr</p>		<p>a <--> an <--> ude <--> epito <--> of <--> e <--> the <--</p> <p>. --> .a. --> .convinced. --> r. --> .in. -- te. --> .there</p> <p><--> a <--> a -> greatest <- ughing, <--> l -> not <--> n uch <--> the < ith <--> witho</p> <p><--> a <--> a -> greatest <- ughing, <--> l -> not <--> n uch <--> the < ith <--> witho ,. --> .a. --> er's. --> .gre it. --> .laugh my. --> .not. > .revolver. - thought. --> . itten.</p>		<p>and <--> awf me <--> father of <--> prude > to <--> udg</p> <p>.bath. --> .b .everywhere. > .look. --> ,. --> .they.</p> <p>nd <--> bad <- -> having <--> evity <--> mig ote <--> pocke --> the <--> ut <--> writte</p> <p>nd <--> bad <- -> having <--> evity <--> mig ote <--> pocke --> the <--> ut <--> writte .and. --> .b atest. --> .ha ing,. --> .lev --> .not. --> -> .such. --> to. --> .with.</p>

Specifics of Internet Authors. Current Tendencies

After the refutation of “the death of the author” on the internet it is interesting to observe what the actual changes in internet authorship concepts are. Concepts that are very different from one another coexist

just like in traditional print literature. This is activated depending on the artistic program. There are certain “modes”, the preference for stronger individualistic or stronger collaborative models. But the extremes are greater than in traditional literature: on the one hand the personality cult surrounding authors can be even more exaggerated, because more extensive and more complex self-dramatizations are possible here. With this authors are meant who portray themselves on their websites almost without limits. But it is also referring to many collaborative projects: here the texts are often authored and portrayed fairly traditionally. The result is a downright “name obsession”. This can be characterized by the term “strong” authorship.

On the other hand the marginalization of the author can also be much more pronounced: machine-based conceptions are possible where the authors can reduce their role or rather stage their disappearance. This is also much easier on the web and can be called “weak” authorship. However, this marginalization does not manifest itself in complete dismissal of the author, because, as mentioned before, this is not possible on the internet. Instead it manifests itself in the diversification of the author functions to many different instances.

At this point, it is useful to refer to Michel Foucault’s model of author functions, because he had already pointed out the basic possibility of separation in his analysis of author functions. Based on this model it has been demanded that one differentiate online between the author as text originator, as creator of the concept and even as publisher (Weimar, Wirth). The internet medium and digital literature therefore particularly have the separation of author functions in common. In the following this coexistence of different authorship conceptions will be discussed with the aforementioned four central genres of Net Literature and the corresponding author types.

Author Typology

Ingenious Net Literature

The genres of Net Literature that can be described as “classical” continued the nonlinear, hypermedial and interactive experiments of modern print literature. But this in no way means old wine in new skins. While there was always the possibility in traditional literature to violate the norms of serial reading this infraction becomes the rule on the dispositif internet. The basis of the literature is the reader’s interactive intervention. New qualities

of text develop detached from the word as the sole conveyor of meaning and supplemented by multimedial and interactive elements. However, some classical literary characteristics are continued. These works represent a strong concept of authorship that manifests itself, for example, in the production by the authors, guaranteeing artistic quality of the work. With all interactivity, the reader can also only take the paths provided by the author (the “author genius”). There are certainly no weak authorship models here.

A good example of this is the elaborately and detailed programmed project *The Bubble Bath* by Susanne Berkenheger. The author particularly implements a directorial story-telling principle: texts, images and browser elements make an “appearance”, the keywords are supplied by the program and the recipient. Furthermore, the dominance of text and the focusing on animations are noticeable.

However, the recipient barely has the opportunity to really interfere in the story interactively. He or she only performs the default programming. But this does away with the idea of the “free” reader in hypertext and represents an ironic turn of the production principle in Berkenheger’s project. It becomes apparent this way that the author concept in Berkenheger’s work is very strong. She exercises absolute control and the recipient is seemingly downright at the author’s and the project’s “mercy”.

KEIN GAST IST NAH UND JEDER Steckenpferd IST GROSS
 EIN TISCH IST TIEF. KEIN HALLE IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER TURM IST WUETEND, SO GILT NICHT JEDER woc IST WUETEND
 EIN BAUER IST WUETEND ODER JEDER BAUER IST GROSS
 JEDER TAG IST GROSS. JEDER Aufmerksamkeitsdefizitsyndrom IST RADIOLOG
 EIN WEG IST WUETEND, SO GILT NICHT JEDER woc IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER WEG IST GROSS. EIN KNECHT IST WUETEND
 NICHT JEDER KNECHT IST GUT ODER KEIN JOHANNES IST WUETEND
 KEIN Kredit IST GROSS, SO GILT NICHT JEDER fifa 07 testberichte IST GUT
 JEDER TAG IST GUT, SO GILT NICHT JEDER TAG IST SPAET
 JEDES HAUS IST TIEF. EIN TURM IST FERN
 JEDER Aufmerksamkeitsdefizitsyndrom IST WUETEND. KEIN HAUS IST WUETEND
 EIN TURM IST RADIOLOG. JEDER KNECHT IST GUT
 KEIN fifa 07 testberichte IST GROSS. KEIN Steckenpferd IST FERN
 JEDER TISCH IST WUETEND. EIN TURM IST TIEF

WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:28 woc
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:38 Steckenpferd
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:19:50 wolke10
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:20:22 Aufmerksamk
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:20:32 fifa 07 testber
 WEB.DE Livesuche schrieb um 13:20:43 Kredit
 141.48.173.62 schrieb um 17:19:15 JOHANNES LEISE
 141.48.173.62 schrieb um 17:20:00 HALLE RADIOLOG

stochastische texte 1959 // search lutz 2006 info Livesuche starten

Substantiv	Geschlecht	Adjektiv (Prädikativ)
<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> w <input type="radio"/> m <input type="radio"/> n	<input type="text"/>
<input type="button" value="abschicken (LUTZEN)"/>	<input type="button" value="reset (LUTZ Original)"/>	

Collaborative Net Literature

As mentioned above, Net Literature, however, also allows for collaborative works. This fulfills the model of collaborative authors. The authorship functions are no longer assumed by one single author here. It is characteristic for this type of literature that it consistently appears to reverse, obliterate and in the end even sever the traditional relationship between author and reader. However, a closer look shows that collaborative projects do not seem to stand precisely for “the death of the author”.

A first observation to the contrary: most collaborative projects work particularly with traditional text that could also be published in form of a book without breaking with the media. But this is very untypical for the dispositif internet. Furthermore, the contributions make strong and traditional reference to the author which, however, is not in line with the expectations of a collaborative project.

Second observation: collaborative projects seem to become aesthetically interesting and artistically successful only when the reader’s freedom is repressed and limited. Good works are commonly produced by a few co-authors and feature a strong author concept. This is rather a classical cooperation of authors who publish a common work. A convincing example for this is the award winning crossmedial project *The Famous Sound of Absolute Wreaders* that was produced and devised in cooperation by six established German internet authors.

A third observation makes “the death of the author” in the internet seem questionable. If one takes a closer look at the extent of collaborative text production on the internet it becomes clear that it currently takes place in non-artistic, particularly informative contexts. Platforms such as “Wikipedia” are very prominent examples of a number of other Wikis or weblogs. By contrast, collaborative literary works that implement weak author concepts have become relatively rare since their boom in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the most popular collaborative tools like Wikis or weblogs are barely used to perform literary projects, which is particularly the case in the German-speaking countries. This seems to be associated with the artistic and economical gratification systems. They are still tied to the author’s name and the traditional dispositif book.

Codeworks

With this the discussion has arrived at so-called codeworks and the marginalized author who almost tries to do away with itself in the literature. This genre implements particularly weak authorship conceptions. It

reflects and emphasizes that digital literature is always based on software. The conceptual “behind the scenes” of Net Literature therefore moves to the center of attention.

In “codeworks”, elements of programming languages and network protocols are combined poetically with natural and artificial languages. They question the meaning of code and the computer’s role in artistic production. The various processes “in the computer” are made visible on the screen.

Florian Cramer’s work “plaintext.cc” made in 2005 vividly shows what code-oriented “story-telling” can achieve. In his online installation new and amazing texts are generated from a heterogeneous pool of all sorts of texts. They remind the user of concrete and visual poetry, but represent “code art”. The three links at the top trigger the generation of new texts. The texts themselves are almost illegible or rich in innuendos. For example: “I Still, Father’s it / lamy not evolver.” The reader creates the meaning.

But what do “code-based” and “code-reflecting” works mean for authorship? Apparently, this form of art is the bulkiest and the least accessible of the forms of art discussed up to now. The programmer only takes responsibility in the background for a program algorithm that is often not even visible. The computer seems to “let off steam” on the screen. The final product on the screen is no longer at the center of this form of art, as the concept behind it – namely the “code” – is the focal point. It is obvious here that the programmer no longer carries out full authorship. The code and reader assume a large part of this task, the author functions are therefore separates. Still, the author remains present: if the concept is so important for the project the programmer has to do good work for pre-structuring.

Codeworks therefore particularly stand for weak authorship, as mentioned above. But there are also forms within this genre that feature strong authorship. The so-called “broken codes” are inoperative codes that only evoke programs in fragments and otherwise also use movable pieces of many languages. “Broken code” authors such as **mez** (**Mary-Anne Breeze**) mostly represent classical original geniuses who practice strong authorship and exercise complete control of their work.

Performative Projects

The separation of author functions can be so severe that authorship formally “dissociates”. This happens in the fourth genre of Net Literature, namely internet literary concept and performance art similar to its precur-

sors from the offline world. It combines stylistic elements of the genres discussed above, but goes beyond that. It is particularly noteworthy that strong authorship is no longer possible here, but that there are only weak forms. A good example of this is the project *Search Lutz!* by Johannes Auer.

The world premiere of the project took place at the radio festival in Halle (Germany) in September 2006 and it is particularly interesting because of its virtuosic play with author functions. Auer himself effectively only created the framework for the text generation as initiator and programmer. The actual “text” was generated from a complex interaction of different partial authors. They produced a common work without having consulted with each other too much.

The underlying algorithm referred to a historical precursor from the early times of computer-generated literature, the work “*Stochastische Texte*” by Theo Lutz (1959). He used terms by Franz Kafka as text material for the first time. Secondly, he allowed an arbitrary number of collaborators to contribute terms by typing them into an online form. Thirdly he took additional words from the World Wide Web and then created stochastic texts from all of this material. The meaning of algorithms – therefore codes – was emphatically reflected, since the text-generating web server seemed to work primarily autonomously.


Fourthly: the integration to a performance or live situation is new and different in this genre of Net Literature. The text generated during “*Search Lutz!*” was loudly recited to the audience by a professional speaker. The listeners were encouraged to collaborate with the project.

The “*Search Lutz!*” recitation was simultaneously broadcast by a radio station, also with the invitation to send in material over the internet. The performance itself only lasted about 30 minutes; it was therefore completed and non-recurring (although it has been staged again later). The authorship of this performance was apparently much wider and different than in collaborative projects. The author functions were assumed by very heterogeneous persons and dispositifs. But it was also the programmer here who had to develop an aesthetically interesting plan and the manifold partial authors had to be conceptually considered from the outset.

Conclusion

The last example makes clear that the consequences of this “dissociated” authorship for literature in the dispositif internet are fairly manifold: it seems as though more extreme implementations of the author are possible.

But it also becomes clear that with all the dissociation of the author function the importance and relevance of the author does not disappear in any way, no matter how foreign the concept and distributed the function seems to be. This perspectivization to a maximally distributed authorship leads to a final affirmation of the thesis stated at the outset: the author is still present on the internet and there is still evidence of his function even if authorship is significantly dissociated. This is recreated over and over again due to the conditions of the internet.



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Poetry as *mimēsis* in Aristotle's *Poetics*

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In the opening of the Poetics, Aristotle suggests that mimēsis, rather than verse, is the defining feature of poetry. This article aims to show both the vagueness and the implausibility of this basic claim of Aristotle's account of poetry.

Keywords: ancient aesthetics / poetics / mimesis / Aristotle / Plato

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Introduction

Aristotle begins his discussion of poetry with polemics about what the defining feature of poetry is. He rejects the view, apparently widely held, that identifies poetry with versed discourse and that thus counts among poets also those who make compositions in verse on medical or natural matters, for example Empedocles. Against this view, Aristotle argues that “Empedocles and Homer have nothing in common apart from verse” and that Empedocles should be called “a natural scientist rather than a poet” (*Po.* 1, 1447b17–20). Later, Aristotle will similarly dismiss verse as a differentiating element between the poet and the historian: as he argues in Chapter 9, if Herodotus’ works were put into verse, they would be history all the same – and not, as is evidently implied, poetry (*Po.* 9, 1451b2–4). Instead of verse, Aristotle famously indicates *mimēsis* as the defining feature of poetry. The Greek term *mimēsis* is in English commonly rendered as “representation”, or “imitation”. In this paper, however, I shall leave this term and its cognates un-translated, so as to avoid predetermining their meaning; for one of the questions I shall address is precisely how *mimēsis* is understood by both Aristotle and the authors before him. In the course of the discussion, it will also emerge in what aspect the Greek notion of *mimēsis* differs from our notion of representation.

At the opening of the *Poetics*, Aristotle characterises all kinds of poetry as “being on the whole *mimēseis*”: of these kinds, he cites the composition of epics and tragedy, comedy, the composition of dithyramb and the

music for *aulos* and *kithara* (*Po.* 1, 1447a13–16).¹ Importantly, for Aristotle the presumed *mimetic* character of a poet's activity is not only a feature common to all kinds of poetry, musical and non-musical, but also a feature that distinguishes the discourse of poetry (*i.e.* poets' verbal compositions) from medical and naturalist discourse, and supposedly also from other kinds of discourse. He in fact suggests calling someone (supposedly, a composer of discourses) a poet “because of *mimēsis*”, rather than “because of verse”, further arguing that any verbal composer who creates an instance of *mimēsis*, regardless of the metrical form of his composition, should be called a poet. Following this criterion, Aristotle does not include Empedocles' versed compositions in poetry, while he does seem to include even “Socratic discourses”, namely prose compositions (*Po.* 1, 1447a 28–b20; cf. 9, 1451b27–29).²

However, neither in the *Poetics* nor anywhere else in his works does Aristotle explain what he means by *mimēsis*, nor does he explain exactly in what sense poetry should be understood as *mimēsis*. Despite this lack of explanation, Aristotle's characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis* has not been questioned frequently. In fact, it has commonly been taken for granted that his notion of poets' *mimēsis* roughly corresponds to our notion of literary representation, *i.e.* representation of men, their actions, events, etc. in works of literature. Moreover, it has commonly been assumed that poets' *mimēsis* was understood in these terms, if not already by pre-Platonic authors, at least by Plato in some discussions, notably in *Republic X*, where poetry in general is characterised as *mimēsis*.³

By contrast, this understanding of poets' *mimēsis* seems alien to Plato. I cannot here discuss Plato's intricate characterisation of poetry in general as *mimēsis* in *Republic X*. However, as I have suggested elsewhere, in *Republic X* the notion of poets' *mimēsis* does not at all correspond to our notion of “representation” of men, events, etc. in poets' works, but consists of something quite different: deceptive *mimēsis* of persons competent in the matters about which poets speak. The characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis* of this kind is thus as such discrediting.⁴ But in this paper, I shall examine Aristotle's characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis*. As we shall see, while this characterisation is influenced by the earlier tradition and in particular by Plato's discussions of musical and dramatic poetry, in my view it is in this general form (“all kinds of poetry are on the whole *mimēseis*”) first found in Aristotle's *Poetics*. My aim will be to show that this characterisation is neither clear nor unproblematic. As I shall argue, in characterising all kinds of poetry as *mimēseis*, Aristotle uses the term *mimēsis* to refer to two quite different activities of poets, which I shall call “figurative representation” (characteristic of musical and dramatic poetry) and “non-figurative repre-

sentation” (which is typically found in epics). Furthermore, I shall aim to show that by characterising poets’ non-figurative representation as *mimēsis*, Aristotle’s indication of *mimēsis* as a feature that distinguishes poetry from other kinds of discourse no longer holds. Finally I shall point out further evidence in the *Poetics* that shows Aristotle’s loose understanding of what poets’ *mimēsis* consists of.

Before examining the *Poetics* though, I first need to consider how the activity of *mimēsis* is understood by authors preceding Aristotle. Then I shall clarify in what sense poetry is understood as *mimēsis* by Plato, since Aristotle’s account of poetry is certainly influenced by him.

The Activity of *mimēsis* in Pre-Aristotelian Texts

The use of the verb *mimēsthai* and cognate terms is relatively well documented from the sixth century BC onwards. While it is not possible to discuss here the history of these terms, relying on these occurrences we may attempt the following definition of *mimēsis*: doing or making something that is intentionally like something else in one aspect or another; or slightly differently, doing or making something by imitating something else in one aspect or another.⁵ The first distinction that may be drawn regarding the activity of *mimēsis* is ontological: *mimēsis* can be either figurative or non-figurative.⁶ (This distinction is not to be confused with the above distinction between figurative and non-figurative representation, which will be discussed later on.) To understand the difference between the two, consider first an example of non-figurative *mimēsis* from Euripides’ *Electra*: Clytemnestra justifies her betrayal of Agamemnon, saying that “when [...] a husband does wrong, rejecting his wife at home, the woman is apt to *mimēsthai*, ‘imitate’, the man and acquire another lover” (*Electra* 1036–38). It is clear from the context that the woman’s activity is an instance of adultery no less than her husband’s, the activity imitated. We may thus say that the woman does something *like* her husband’s adultery in the way that her activity constitutes in its turn a *true* (or *real*) adultery. The activity performed is in this case *essentially* like the activity imitated, *i.e.* it is like it in the aspect by virtue of which an activity *is* a (true) instance of adultery.

Contrast now this case of *mimēsis* with the following example from Plato’s *Republic*: laying down a model of a just state, the interlocutors consider whether the prospective guards⁷ of this state should, in the course of their literary education, do *mimēsis* of various craftsmen and specialist workers, including a *mimēsis* of rowers of triremes (*Rep.* III, 396a8–b2). As is again clear from the context, by imitating, *i.e.* doing something like, row-

ers of triremes, the children will not in their turn *truly* be rowing (*i.e.* propelling a boat with oars in a water), meaning that their activity will not be *essentially* like that of rowers; instead, they will, for instance, merely move *like* rowers do, doing so on the dry ground. But crucially, this activity will constitute a “figure” of rowing: that is to say, it will “stand for”, or “refer to” rowing. The children’s activity will have this figurative nature precisely by virtue of being *like* the activity of rowing in some non-essential aspect of this activity, such as the manner of movement. The children’s activity may thus be characterised as *mimēsis* of the figurative kind, as opposed to the earlier case of the woman’s adultery, which is an example of non-figurative *mimēsis*.

As mentioned earlier on, the activity of *mimēsis* can also consist of making – that is to say, it can be an activity that has a material result. Such activities are painting, sculpture, embroidery, which are as such all *mimēseis* of the figurative kind. Consider the well-known example of painting a couch from Plato’s *Republic X*. In this case, the material product of a painter’s activity, *i.e.* a painting, is like something else, namely a couch, in its visual appearance (and thus in a non-essential aspect of a couch): by virtue of this visual likeness, the painting constitutes a figure of a couch. The difference between the children’s activity and the painter’s activity, which both feature as *mimēseis*, is that the children’s activity itself constitutes a figure of rowing (and children themselves constitute figures of rowers), whereas it is only the *product* of the painter’s activity that constitutes a figure of a couch (and the activity of painting does not constitute a figure of a carpenter’s activity, nor of any other activity).

Another question concerning figures constituted by *mimēsis* is what kind of objects they denote, or stand for. For instance, exactly which rowers and which couch do the figures from the above two examples denote respectively? It is evident that the figure of rowing need not denote any particular activity of rowing that has actually taken place and, likewise, that the figure of a couch need not stand for any particular couch that has been previously manufactured. Of course, it is possible for a figure to be a figure of an existing particular thing or individual, or even of a specific event that has actually taken place. For example, a painting may constitute a figure of Socrates; or even more specifically, a painting may constitute a figure of Socrates who is about to drink hemlock (a modern example of which is Jacques-Louis David’s 1787 “The Death of Socrates”), and thus denote an event that in fact took place. In a similar way, an actor may enact Socrates on a particular occasion of his life (for example, playing Socrates’ part in Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*); his activity will thus constitute a figure that denotes an individual who truly existed and an event that truly

took place. However, figures constituted by *mimēsis* may just as well *not* denote any thing or individual that has previously existed or occurred. From here, complex questions arise as to what the ontological status of objects denoted by figures is and how these objects relate to figures constituted by *mimēsis*. However, as these questions do not substantially bear on the present argument, they will not be discussed here.⁸

Poets' *mimēsis* in Plato's Dialogues

Aristotle's account of poetry in various aspects evokes Plato's treatment of poetry as *mimēsis*, yet it also differs significantly from it. My aim here is to present an outline of Plato's treatment. Plato's arguments about poetry and *mimēsis* are notoriously intricate. Plato speaks of poets as doing *mimēsis* in various discussions: as I have argued elsewhere, in these discussions, it is not one and the same, but different activities by poets that are characterised as *mimēseis*, where these *mimēseis* are again of different kinds.⁹ Relying on this analysis, I shall here indicate the three activities of poets that feature as *mimēseis* in Plato's dialogues and try to show that, by characterising each of them as *mimēsis*, Plato uses the term *mimēsis* with the meaning indicated above: *i.e.* "doing something that is intentionally like something else in one aspect or another". As we shall see, the term will not always have this meaning in Aristotle's characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis*.

Book III of the *Republic* and Books II and VII of the *Laws* both present the account that conceives of *musical* poetry as *mimēsis* of men's characters and modes of conduct; in the *Republic*, the account is associated with the musicologist Damon¹⁰ while in the *Laws* it is introduced as a generally known and accepted one.¹¹ Aristotle adopts this musical "theory" both in the *Poetics* and the *Politics* (VIII 7, 1342a33–34), in the latter explicitly referring to the *Republic*.

This arguably pre-Platonic account may well seem alien to our perception of music. According to it, a performance of a particular musical piece (which may involve singing, playing instruments, dancing) constitutes, for example, a *mimēsis* of lamentation (*Rep.* III 398e1–2), or of courageous fight, or again of temperate conduct (*Rep.* III 399a5–8).¹² More precisely, a musical composition would constitute such *mimēsis* through harmony (or musical mode) and rhythm, the two musical elements of a composition (the non-musical element being *logos*, discourse), which are considered as constituting *mimēseis* of different types of character and conduct.¹³

Now, although we can only imagine exactly how the music discussed by Plato actually sounded, we can nonetheless understand in what sense

it is characterised as *mimēsis*. As is made clear in the argument, harmonies and rhythms constitute *mimēseis* of particular actions and conduct by virtue of their *likeness* with the “sounds” of such actions and conduct. For example, a particular musical mode will sound *like* women’s lamentation (*Rep.* III 398e1); similarly, a particular rhythm will sound *like* soldiers’ marching sounds. Further, by virtue of this acoustic or also kinetic (dancing) likeness, composition and performance of a particular musical piece will constitute a *figure* of women’s lamentation, or in the other case, of soldiers’ marching (as opposed to being another instance of such conduct). The characterisation of musical poetry as *mimēsis* thus agrees with the above meaning of the term *mimēsis*; for musical composing is (intentionally) like a particular kind of action or conduct, where this likeness is obviously figurative.

Another activity of poets characterised as *mimēsis* by Plato is poets’ impersonation of characters about whom they narrate. In *Republic* III, it is introduced employing an example from Homer’s *Iliad*: when Homer speaks “as if he were” (*Rep.* III 393a8 and c1), *i.e.* impersonates, Chryses imploring the Achaeans to release his daughter (*Il.* I 17–21); the poet does a *mimēsis* of Chryses (*Il.* I 17–21).¹⁴ By contrast, when Homer narrates about Chryses as himself, *i.e.* as Homer, as he does just before that, he does not do a *mimēsis* of Chryses or of any other individual about whom he is narrating; his narration is “simple”, *i.e.* “without *mimēsis*”.

The characterisation of poets’ narration through impersonation as *mimēsis* is presented as a novelty,¹⁵ and this justification is provided for it: Homer’s speaking as if he were Chryses is a kind of “likening oneself to someone else”, and such “likening oneself to someone else either in voice or gesture [is] a *mimēsis* of the person to whom one is likening oneself” (*Rep.* III 393c5–6).¹⁶ Relying on this justification, we may conclude that the characterisation of poets’ impersonation as *mimēsis* agrees with the above meaning of the term: for Homer’s “likening himself in voice or gesture” to Chryses can also be described as an activity (narrating) that is intentionally like another activity, *i.e.* Chryses’ imploring the Achaeans to release his daughter. As is again obvious, the likeness of Homer’s activity with Chryses’ is figurative (as opposed to essential): by virtue of this likeness, Homer’s speaking constitutes a *figure* of Chryses’ speaking, and Homer himself constitutes a *figure* of Chryses.

It may be added that in *Republic* III, the distinction between narration “through” and “without” *mimēsis* is next applied to various kinds of poets’ compositions: tragedy and comedy consist of narration that is entirely “through *mimēsis*”; dithyramb is entirely without it; and finally the epic is occasionally through *mimēsis* (*Rep.* III 394b8–c5). In the case of tragedy and comedy, a poet’s verbal composing will thus in turn constitute a *figure*

rative *mimēsis* of speaking and acting by one character or another, or by a group of them (chorus). As we shall see, the distinction between narration through and without *mimēsis* will feature in a modified form in Aristotle's *Poetics*.

In addition to the two activities of poets characterised as *mimēseis*, there is a third kind of *mimēsis* Plato attributes to poets. In the first, “epistemological” argument of *Republic X*, by and large all poetry is characterised as *mimēsis*; importantly, however, poetry is approached as discourse on matters related to various arts, such as medicine, generalship, carpentry, leatherwork; for example, when in the *Iliad* Homer narrates how Hecamede prepared *kikeon* for the wounded Machaon, he speaks about matters to do with medicine.¹⁷ It is then assumed that poets are not competent in these arts, and thus in the matters of which they speak, and it is observed that poets nonetheless seem to many people to “speak well” about their subject matter and thus to be competent in this. It is only once poetry has been presented in this way that poets are characterised as being in fact *mimētai* and their activity *mimēsis*.

The *mimēsis* attributed to poets thus appears to be, more precisely, deceptive *mimēsis* of persons competent in matters about which poets speak. For when Homer speaks about matters to do with medicine, he “likens himself” to someone competent in medicine. But importantly, by virtue of this likeness, Homer seems to many people to speak well about it and to be in fact competent in medicine, and not just to be *like* someone competent in this art; thus, Homer constitutes a *deceptive figure* of someone competent in medicine. (By contrast, when Homer “likens himself” to Chryses, he is not perceived as the true Chryses; the figure of Chryses Homer constitutes is thus non-deceptive.)

Accepting this interpretation, Plato's characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis* in *Republic X* thus again allows us to attribute the above-indicated meaning to the term *mimēsis*: for by narrating about matters related to arts, poets speak *like* those who are in fact competent in these arts. This likeness is such that it makes poets wrongly appear to be competent in their subject matter; their narration thus constitutes a deceptive figure of competent discourse.

Thus interpreted, the *mimēsis* attributed to poets in *Republic X* has nothing to do with “literary presentation”, *i.e.* representation of men, their actions, events, etc., through poets' narration, although it is commonly so understood. Moreover, the characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis* in *Republic X* does not seem to be reflected in Aristotle's *Poetics* at all: for even without yet establishing exactly what Aristotle means by poets' *mimēsis*, it is clear that his characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis* is *neutral* (as opposed to *dis-*

crediting, as Plato's is) and unrelated to any assumption concerning poets' competence in their subject matter.

So far, I have aimed to show that in the pre-Aristotelian texts the term *mimēsis* and its cognates denote an activity that is intentionally like, *i.e.* imitates, another activity in one aspect or another; by virtue of this likeness, this activity can either be another instance of the same kind as the activity imitated (*i.e.* be essentially like it), or it can constitute a figure of the activity imitated. I have then indicated three activities of poets that are characterised as *mimēseis* by Plato and aimed to show in what way each of them is *mimēsis* in the above sense. All three activities have appeared to be of the figurative kind: musical composing and impersonation will constitute non-deceptive figures (the former of a particular kind of character, conduct or action, the latter of an individual's discourse or action), whereas poets' narrating "about arts" constitutes a deceptive figure of competent discourse. I shall now turn to examining Aristotle's notion of *mimēsis* and his characterisation of poetry as *mimēsis*.

***Mimēsis* in Aristotle's Works**

On most occasions, Aristotle uses the term *mimēsis* and its cognates in the same way as authors before him – that is to say, the meaning of the term *mimēsis* indicated above (*i.e.* doing or making something that is intentionally like something else in one aspect or another) applies to the majority of instances of these terms found in Aristotle's works. Consider an example from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle argues that one should do *mimēsis* of a virtuous man in all things and thus also in not involving one's friends in one's suffering (*EN IX 11, 1171b12*). As is clear from the context, Aristotle speaks here of emulating conduct of a virtuous man, *i.e.* of conduct that is *like* a virtuous man's conduct so that it is in its turn an instance of such conduct (as opposed to constituting a figure of such conduct). In this case, Aristotle's usage of *mimēsis* therefore accords with the above-indicated meaning of the term. The same applies to cases in which Aristotle speaks of the activity of painting as *mimēsis* (see, *e.g.*, *Po.* 1, 1447a18–19 and 4, 1448b17–19), since, as has been observed earlier, the activity of painting as such is a kind of making the product of which, *i.e.* a painting, is *like* something else in a visual respect and by virtue of this likeness constitutes a figure of it.

In spite of this, it is precisely in Aristotle's characterisation of all kinds of poetry as *mimēseis* that the meaning of the term *mimēsis* becomes unclear. More specifically, epic poetry, which Aristotle characterises as *mimēsis* to-

gether with all other kinds of poetry, *cannot* be as such described as doing something that is intentionally like something else in one respect or another. By characterising it as *mimēsis*, Aristotle must thus mean something else by this term. Let us then consider Aristotle's treatment of epic poetry more closely.

Non-Figurative Representation as *mimēsis*

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle characterises epic poetry as *mimēsis* through narrating, opposing it to tragedy and comedy as *mimēseis* through enacting (counting all of them as *mimēseis* through discourse). Thus for Aristotle, Homer and Sophocles differ in the mode in which they do *mimēsis* (narrative *vs.* dramatic), yet they are similar in that they both do *mimēsis* of “noble men” and their actions (as opposed to composers of comedy, whose objects of *mimēsis* are “base men”; *Po.* 3, 1448a25–27). With regard to narrative mode, specific to the epic, Aristotle further distinguishes between poets' narrating by “becoming someone else”, *i.e.* impersonating someone, and “as himself” (*Po.* 3, 1448a21–23).

Aristotle seems to adopt here Plato's distinction in *Republic* III between Homer's speaking as himself and “as if he were” someone else, yet accounting for it differently: while according to *Republic* III, Homer's narration about Chryses and his actions will count as *mimēsis* of Chryses *only* when by narrating Homer speaks “as if he were” this individual, for Aristotle, Homer's narrating *about* Chryses seems to count as *mimēsis* of Chryses *regardless* of whether by narrating, Homer “becomes” Chryses or speaks as himself. It thus seems that for Aristotle a poet's narration about something *as such* counts as *mimēsis* of it. This is in fact confirmed in a passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In this passage, Aristotle illustrates a specific point he has made about the notion of choice by mentioning “ancient forms of government, which Homer *emimeito*”, *i.e.* did a *mimēsis* of (*EN* III 3, 1113a7–8). Here it is clearly Homer's *narrating* about “ancient forms of government” as such to which Aristotle refers as a *mimēsis* of them. The term *mimēsis* thus cannot have the above-indicated meaning here. For it does not make any sense to describe Homer's *mimēsis* of “ancient forms of government” as Homer's doing something that is intentionally *like* “ancient forms of government” in one aspect or another, nor, by consequence, as Homer's constituting a *figure* of these. *Mimēsis* is here evidently not understood as an activity involving likeness and likening oneself to someone or something. But what does Aristotle mean by *mimēsis* when he characterises poets' narration as such as *mimēsis*?

Observe that when Homer narrates, as himself, about Chryses and his actions, his narration does have something in common with his narration through “becoming” Chryses. By narrating, as himself, about Chryses, Homer *denotes* Chryses and his actions, or we may say, *make* Chryses’ actions *present to mind*: although Homer does not do so by constituting a *likeness* and therefore a *figure of* Chryses, he brings Chryses before the mind simply by narrating *about* Chryses. If this “denoting” and “presenting something to mind” through discourse is the feature by virtue of which poets’ narration is *mimēsis* for Aristotle, his notion of poets’ *mimēsis* seems to correspond to our notion of representation through discourse. We can in fact characterise Homer’ narrating, as himself, about Chryses as a “representation” of Chryses, and as such group it together with, for example, someone’s impersonation of Chryses and a painting of Chryses. These count for us as three different representations of Chryses, narrative, dramatic and pictorial. Supposedly, they are representations of Chryses for us in so far as they each *denote* this individual, or make him present to mind;¹⁸ however, only the latter two do so by constituting *figures* of Chryses.

We may call these two kinds of representation “non-figurative” and “figurative” respectively. Note that “figurative representation” corresponds to what has been above described as figurative non-deceptive *mimēsis*, *i.e.* an activity or its product that constitutes a non-deceptive figure of something by virtue of its likeness with it. Thus, poets’ musical composing and poets’ impersonation can be accounted for as figurative representations. By contrast, a poet’s narration as himself constitutes a non-figurative representation. As seen above, Plato characterises poets’ figurative representation as *mimēsis*, yet not their non-figurative representation; whereas Aristotle characterises also poets’ non-figurative representation as *mimēsis*.¹⁹

It is important to note, however, that the instances in which the term *mimēsis* (or its cognate) refers to poets’ non-figurative representation are not found only in Aristotle, but also in some other authors contemporary with Aristotle or succeeding him, though they are very rare. Consider the following example from the speech *Against Leocrates* by the Athenian orator Lycurgos (396–323 BC), Aristotle’s contemporary; in it, Lycurgos contrasts “the laws” with poets, suggesting that by being concise the laws do not teach, but order what one must do, whereas poets, by doing *mimēsis* of (*mimoumenoi*) human life, choose the finest of deeds and thus persuade men through argument and demonstration” (*Leoc.* 102, 6 – 103, 1). Just beforehand, Lycurgos has talked about Euripides and Homer, here he refers to poets in general: by “poets’ *mimēsis* of human life” he thus supposedly refers to their speaking

of human life, regardless of whether or not it constitutes figurative representation of it; while Euripides' poetry constitutes figurative representation entirely, Homer's poetry involves also non-figurative representation.

Figurative Representation as *mimēsis*

But let us now consider other kinds of poetry besides epics, which Aristotle also characterises as “being on the whole *mimēseis*” in Chapter I of the *Poetics*; these are tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, and, “for the most part, music for *aulos* and *kitbara*” (*Po.* 1, 1447a13–16). As noted above, each of these kinds of poetry constitutes figurative representation, either through musical elements or through impersonation.

When in the *Poetics* Aristotle characterises these compositions as *mimēseis*, he clearly refers to the very same figurative elements of them as Plato. Consider first music for *aulos* and *kitbara* (and other instruments). In a very brief and sole treatment of it in Chapter I, Aristotle characterises it as a kind of poetry that does *mimēsis* by employing only harmony and rhythm, but not *logos*, discourse. Pointing out that dance does *mimēsis* by means of rhythm alone, he specifies that “dancers too do *mimēsis* of characters, affections and actions through rhythms put into movement” (*Po.* 1, 1447a27–28), thereby implying that musical composers and performers also do *mimēsis* of this kind. Just as Plato, therefore, Aristotle considers musical poetry as *mimēsis* of characters, affections and actions *insofar as* it constitutes *figures* of these by virtue of its acoustic and kinetic *likeness* with them (as mentioned earlier, this understanding of music is more extensively presented in Book VIII of the *Politics*).

As to tragedy and comedy, in Chapter II of the *Poetics* they are classified as *mimēseis* that employ both verbal and musical elements in distinct parts; however, Aristotle is mainly concerned with them as verbal compositions. Like for Plato in *Republic* III, as seen above, for Aristotle tragedy and comedy are *mimēseis*, *insofar as* they constitute a poet's (virtual) or actor's (actual) impersonation of individuals about whom the poet speaks, and therefore, *figurative* representation of these individuals.

We may assume that other kinds of poetry, mentioned in the *Poetics* only in passing – for example composition of dithyramb or nomes (both kinds of musical poetry, performed by chorus) – are for Aristotle *mimēseis* by the same criteria, *i.e.* *insofar as* they constitute figurative representation through harmony and rhythm or also through discourse (*i.e.* by impersonation), or again, *insofar as* they constitute non-figurative representation through discourse.

It may be added that various important arguments in the *Poetics*, which declaredly concern poetry in general, can apply *only* to poets' *figurative* representation. Thus in Chapter I, Aristotle defines poetry as *mimēsis* "in rhythm, discourse and harmony", comparing it with two other activities, to which he refers to as *mimēsis* "by making images with colours and shapes" and *mimēsis* "through voice"; the two activities are painting and, presumably, vocal mimicry, which both constitute *figurative* representation, pictorial and vocal (*Po.* 1, 1447a18–23). And again in Chapter IV, Aristotle indicates two causes of poetry: the first is the congeniality of *mimēsis* to humans from childhood (as suggested, children take their first lessons through doing *mimēsis*) and the second is the pleasantness of *mimēmata* for everybody, which is illustrated with pleasantness of painted figures, and therefore with figurative representation (*Po.* 4, 1448b4–9). None of these arguments seem to be relevant for poets' non-figurative presentation through discourse.

***Mimēsis* as a Distinctive Feature of Poetic Discourse?**

And finally, if we grant Aristotle the thus extended understanding of poets' *mimēsis*, which includes their figurative as well as non-figurative representation, a problem arises in his account of poetry. In fact, non-figurative representation through discourse does not seem to be found only in poetry; any narration and discourse, inasmuch as it refers to, or brings before the mind, whatever it is about, constitutes a non-figurative representation of this; presumably, it can thus be characterised as *mimēsis* (of this subject matter) in Aristotle's sense. But if that is so, Aristotle's insistence in the opening polemics that *mimēsis*, rather than verse, fundamentally distinguished the discourse of poetry from other kinds of discourse (such as medical and naturalist) seems to be ungrounded. If *mimēsis* involves also non-figurative representation through discourse, should then not Empedocles' discourses on nature be considered as *mimēseis* of nature? Or again, on this understanding of *mimēsis*, should not a historian's discourse, which consists, for example, of narration about "what Alcibiades did and what happened to him" (*Po.* 9, 1451b11), not be considered as a *mimēsis* of Alcibiades; just as Homer's narration about what Odysseus did and what happened to him counts as a *mimēsis* of Odysseus?

In fact, when in Chapter 9, Aristotle famously compares the poet with the historian, he does not say that only the former does *mimēsis*, but defines the difference between the two in other terms: as he argues, the historian speaks of things that have happened, whereas the poet speaks of things

that can happen (*Po.* 9, 1451b4–5). Accordingly, Homer's narration about Odysseus will in some sense count as a discourse about “things that can happen”. While this argument cannot be examined here, it is important to note that *mimēsis* is not mentioned as a feature that distinguishes poetry from history.

And as a matter of fact, while all Aristotelian instances of *mimēsis* that denote non-figurative representation through discourse refer to poetry, there are a few post-Aristotelian instances of *mimēsis* that do refer to *historical* discourse and clearly denote non-figurative representation through discourse. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*fl.* I BC) discusses thus Herodotus' and Thucydides' “*mimēsis* of characters and affections” (*Epistula ad Pompeium Gemium* 3.18.1–2): by this, he must mean *non-figurative* representation of characters and affections through narration (for even though both historians occasionally impersonate the individuals about whom they narrate, such impersonation cannot be referred to as “*mimēsis* of characters and affections”).²⁰

It must be concluded, then, that insofar as Aristotle counts also non-figurative representation through discourse as *mimēsis*, his indication of *mimēsis* as a feature that distinguishes poetry from medical, naturalist and historical discourse is flawed. Admittedly, it may seem pretentious to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency in the core of his account of poetry. Yet, strong evidence for such inconsistency is in my view provided in Chapter 24 of the *Poetics*, where Aristotle surprisingly introduces a different definition of poets' *mimēsis* through discourse. Having turned from the discussion of tragedy to the subject of epics, Aristotle singles out Homer as being superior to other poets of epic compositions, suggesting that Homer is the only one who “does not ignore what he must compose as himself. A poet must in fact speak as himself as little as possible; for he is in fact not a *mimētēs* because of this. Other poets are on the whole acting as themselves, doing *mimēsis* briefly and rarely; whereas he, having made a brief preamble, at once introduces a man or a woman or some other character; and none of them are characterless, but each of them has a character” (*Po.* 24, 1460a6–11).

The argument is in striking contrast with the earlier claims in the *Poetics* about poets' *mimēsis*. Aristotle here argues that a poet (of epics) *must* avoid narrating as himself and justifies this requirement by claiming that a poet is not a *mimētēs* by virtue of such narration, but (as is implicit) only by virtue of impersonation. According to the argument, therefore, Homer's narrating *as himself* about ancient forms of government, or again about noble men and their actions, *cannot* be *as such* characterised as a *mimēsis* of them. The argument seems to be a patent revision of the earlier claim that poets'

narration *as such* constitutes *mimēsis*, and thereby also the implicit rejection of the earlier understanding of non-figurative representation through discourse as *mimēsis*.

Conclusions

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle proposes to replace verse with *mimēsis* as a defining feature of poetry; however, as I have tried to show, at the same time he displays a rather lax understanding of what poets' *mimēsis* consists. If Aristotle considers also non-figurative representation through discourse as *mimēsis*, other kinds of compositions that Aristotle does not count as works of poetry will have to be characterised as *mimēseis*, for example historical discourses; if, on the other hand, Aristotle does not consider non-figurative representation through discourse as *mimēsis* (as in Chapter 24), some compositions that Aristotle counts as works of poetry, for example epic compositions that do not involve impersonation, cannot be characterised as *mimēseis*.

In the reflection of poetry and literature after Aristotle up until the present, the term *mimēsis* has continued to feature, just as it has continued to designate different concepts from one author to another. However, none of these authors seem to follow Aristotle in considering *mimēsis* as a defining feature of poetry. By providing the definition of poetry as *mimēsis* in rhythm, discourse and harmony, Aristotle presumably aims to neatly differentiate poetry from other human practices; yet, his attempt has here appeared too ambitious.

NOTES

¹ The noun “poetry” is a habitual translation of the Greek *poiēsis*, from which it is derived. The Greek term, however, had a wider application than “poetry” does: *poiēsis* included both recited and musical (vocal, instrumental, or combined) composing, as is clear also from the kinds of poetry listed by Aristotle above.

² “Socratic discourses” were the dialogues featuring Socrates, of which only those by Plato and Xenophon have been preserved. Aristotle’s suggested inclusion of some kinds of prose compositions (because of their *mimēsis*) in poetry seems to have been a daring one, given that these compositions lack what was commonly considered the very distinctive feature of poetry: metre. However, Aristotle does not discuss the matter further.

³ The wide acceptance of this view is testified in *Oxford English Dictionary*: “mimesis, n. [...] b. Imitation; *spec.* the representation or imitation of the real world in (a work of) art, literature, etc. Sometimes used with reference to Aristotle *Poetics* 1447a or Plato *Republic* 598b [...]”.

⁴ Marušič 95–179.

⁵ Among the many studies of the notion of *mimēsis*, the less known work by Ledda has in many aspects been the basis for my account of *mimēsis*.

⁶ This ontological distinction has been pointed out already by Russell 101, followed by Ledda 19, n.36.

⁷ Here I adopt Burnyeat's translation of *phylakes* in place of the traditional "guardians"; see Burnyeat 257, n.3. As he points out (following Malcolm Schofield's suggestion), the *phylakes* are not only a defensive organ (against the external aggression), but exercise also internal control and repression (in case of disobedience of the law; *Rep.* III, 415e and IV, 424b–d); the latter aspect is better rendered with the term "guards".

⁸ Some in my view illuminating studies of these questions are Goodman 21–26, Doležel and Ledda 18–24.

⁹ Marušič 95–128.

¹⁰ See *Rep.* III 400b1 and 400c4. Another reference to Damon is made in *Rep.* IV 424c6.

¹¹ The account is presented in *Rep.* III 398c6–401a8, and *L.* II 655a4671b1, VII 795d6–e1 and 813a5–817e3. The general acceptance of the account is indicated at *L.* II 668a6–7 and 668b9–c2.

¹² Plato as well as Aristotle speak of musical and verbal composition as if poets were at the same time performing what they are composing. In accordance with this view, we may consider composing as a kind of virtual performance of what is being composed.

¹³ *Rep.* III 399a5–c4; cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* VIII 7, 1342b12–14.

¹⁴ In the argument, the question of Chryses' historical existence is never raised; he is not treated any differently from existent (unspecified) individuals, who are also considered as objects of *mimēsis* (*Rep.* III 395b8–396e2).

¹⁵ *Contra Halliwell* 51, n.35.

¹⁶ As suggested earlier on, Homer's performance and thus his enacting the character Chryses can be understood as virtual (as opposed to an actual performance, for example, by a rhapsode).

¹⁷ This episode from the *Iliad* (XI 630, 639–640) is quoted in *Ion* 538c2–3 as an example of Homer's speaking about medicine.

¹⁸ Cf. Oxford English Dictionary: "represent, v. [...] 2. a. To bring clearly and distinctly before the mind, esp. (to another) by description or (to oneself) by an act of imagination".

¹⁹ *Non-figurative* representation is not to be confused with the earlier discussed non-figurative *mimēsis*, such as the woman's *mimēsis* of her husband's adultery considered above: non-figurative *mimēsis* consists of an activity that is of the same kind as the activity imitated and constitutes neither a figure nor a non-figurative representation of it.

²⁰ Cf. Dionysius Halicarnassus, *De Thucydide* 45, 37–39. In earlier instances of *mimēsis* that refer to historical narration (*Duris*, IV–III BC), it is not clear whether or not they denote non-figurative representation. Cf. Gray.

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Classical Roots of the Modern Authorial Concept

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Contemporary theoretical debate on the “death” and eventual “resurrection” of the author (from structuralism and psychoanalysis to feminism and postcolonial studies) mostly refers to the model of the “romantic” author as an original genius, creating from the inner-self (E. Young), the unacknowledged “legislator of the world” (P. Shelley). It is evident that this model profoundly determined modern European literatures until the 20th century, when (literary) theory began to scrutinize it thoroughly and question it in different ways. The roots of such understanding are heterogeneous and partly extend to classical philosophy and literature. This paper will try to revise philosophical discussions on authorship (from Plato to Longinus) and certain aspects of Greek and Roman poetry (from Hesiod to Ovid) to explore how much and in what ways later views on authorship are indebted to antiquity. It will also try to ascertain whether it is adequate to explain the development of the modern authorial concept by means of a linear scheme stretching from semi-anonymous rhapsodist to self-confident Romantic genius. Especially in Ovid’s love poetry one can find a surprisingly high degree of authorial awareness and playful presence in the text, which can challenge any simplified linear understanding of the authorial concept in the history of Western literatures.

Keywords: literary theory / ancient aesthetics / Greek literature / Latin Literature / author / authorship

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One could not but agree with Charles Taylor’s observation that in the Western cultural tradition authors are more highly appreciated than in most other civilizations (Bennett, *The Author* 4). Generally it is assumed that the concept of an author as a creator of a (certain kind) of text, its *inventor* or originator that holds some kind of proprietary rights and a certain authority over its interpretation, was not consolidated before the 18th century. Such an author would therefore be an individual, solely responsible for the unique creation, someone who produces something new or even unexpected, and at the same time controls his work in its entirety, knows exactly what it means and is capable of fixing its interpretations.

Indeed, such an understanding of authorship is exactly that which is institutionalized today; it is carried out *in practice* while its validity is watchfully guarded by legislation and authorial rights. Very much in opposition to this is that the notion of a “great” Author seems to be deeply questioned *in theory*. Philosophy and other disciplines have shaken such understanding by softening the specific concept of the subject on which it relies, and at the same time by relaxing the concepts of unity and accessibility of texts. During the lively discussion which was substantially intensified by Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault at the end of 1960s, special attention was paid to the question of the emergence of the modern authorial concept. Some researchers have emphasized the relevance of earlier periods, such as the Renaissance, when the pattern of an “absolute artist” was formed.¹ Yet most analyses of the origin of the modern author have focused heavily on the 18th century – not only on (pre)romantic ideologies that articulated the changes in the perception of authorship, but also on the expansion of the literary market and the differentiation of literature as a social (sub)system that actually generated such changes.²

At the same time that authorship was gradually becoming legally and financially regulated, in the accompanying discourse of philosophical aesthetics discussion on the autonomy of literature was taking place, and this was crucial for shaping of the modern authorial concept.³ The distinction between innovation and imitation was made more pronounced, with innovation becoming what was truly appreciated. In his notable essay *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759), the English poet Edward Young decisively revalued once-equivalent procedures of textual production.⁴ Young maintains that the real author is an original, autonomous and independent genius that creates from the inner self, while imitation is a method unworthy of such an author – nothing more than theft. The concept of originality was taken even further in Romanticism, evolving into the cliché of a poet who is “ahead of his time”. The true poet was supposed to be so original that his environment would inevitably neglect him, and only future generations would reveal his real (trans-historic) value.

The search for the origins of the modern author in the (pre)romantic ideologies – as long as it remains fully bound with the context of contemporary economic, medial and legal innovations – remains reasonable and productive. But it would be overly hasty to infer from this that the historical evolution of Western authorship can be described adequately by some kind of *linear scheme*, stretching from the half-anonymous rhapsodist in the oral culture to the narcissistic romantic genius that creates *ex nihilo*.⁵ Such a presumption, though efficient and therefore tempting, is highly problematic. By careful reading of influential theoretical fragments on literary

authorship (from Plato to Longinus) and of certain Greek and Roman poetic texts (from Homer and Hesiod to Ovid), I will explore how much and in what ways later views on authorship are indebted to Greek and Roman literature and philosophy.

Theories of Authorship in Classical Philosophy and Poetics

The pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus (460–370 BC) is believed to have first formulated the so-called *divine inspiration theory*. Democritus assumes that a truly good poet creates in the throes of a passionate zeal, ecstasy that is close to madness; and this ecstasy comes directly from the divine forces and not from the poet himself. Such inspiration theory, which remains fragmentary in Democritus's writings, was later more coherently articulated – as well as questioned – by Plato. In Plato's supposedly early dialogue *Ion*, Socrates persuades a rhapsodist that the poet himself is without any skill and only draws inspiration “by power divine”:

For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses [...] they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only [...] and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. (*Ion* 534b–d)

Therefore, poets deserve no credit for their creations, which are not the result of their poetical skills; actually it is quite possible that the most beautiful song is sung “by the mouth of the worst of poets” (*Ion* 534a). The author as an individual person is eradicated, and he becomes nothing more than a mediator, a herald, of God's own messages. Socrates emphasizes greatly the *non-reasonable* nature of the creative process.⁶ In Plato's *Phaedrus*, the connection between creation and madness (which has substantially marked modern discussions on creativity and authorship), is even more explicit: the sane, sober poets are doomed to failure.

Socrates' arguments in both dialogues – as long as we naïvely read them verbatim – can partly be understood as a refined means of paving the way for the notorious expulsion of poetry from Plato's “ideal polis”. In the 10th book of *The Republic*, the poet is finally “unmasked” as a cheater with no proficiency. His products are merely copies of a second order and therefore lack any connection with reality – they are far removed

from truly being. It is interesting that the divine source of inspiration is no longer mentioned in *Politeia*. Of the poet's skill nothing but charlatanism remains: he does not know anything worth mentioning about the things he imitates. Imitation itself is represented as a kind of a game, addressing the worthless part of the human soul, the one which is subject to irrational emotions. Even if Socrates' (Plato's) statements need to be interpreted with exceptional care, his censorial condemning of poetry definitely unveils creative ecstasy and its connection to divine revelation (truth) as a complicated problem.⁷

Therefore it seems quite surprising that in his *Poetics*, Plato's great disciple Aristotle deals with literature explicitly, but says almost nothing about its author. Though it is quite possible that Aristotle was occupied with this question in another text, perhaps in the lost tri-partite dialogue *On the poets* (*Peri poietón*), in the *Poetics* the only passage mentioning the sources of author's creativity is the following one:

Hence poetry implies either a happy gift of nature or a strain of madness. In the one case a man can take the mould of any character; in the other, he is lifted out of his proper self.

(Aristotle, *Poetics* XVII, 1455a)

This lapidary description does not implicate the privileging of either of the creative strategies mentioned above. Also, the source of the madness (*manikón*) is not really explained. Regardless, the overall spirit of *Poetics* allows us to surmise that Aristotle is inclined towards the rational grounding of the creative process, defined as *mimesis*. Something similar can be said for another influential account of the nature of creativity by the Roman poet Horace who in his versified *Ars poetica* attempts to unite harmonically two opposite poles. The great Augustan lyricist emphasises that both a natural gift and acquired skills are important for the poetic art:

Whether good verse of Nature is the fruit,
Or form'd by Art, has long been in dispute.
But what can Labour in a barren foil,
Or what rude Genius profit without toil?
The wants of one the other must supply
Each finds in each a friend and firm ally.

(*Ars Poetica* 408–412)

It is true that Horace mentions that Greeks had talent and eloquence bestowed upon them by the Muse, but at the same time he bitterly mocks the fanatically “possessed” poets that repudiate any skill as unimportant. He explicitly criticizes Democritus for casting out all the sane poets

from the summits of the mountain Helicon – for him, a *genius* without work, effort and learning remains a highly suspicious and problematic category.

Similar dilemmas are the subject of the famous essay *On the Sublime* (*Peri hypsus*) by Longinus, a thinker who was – symptomatically – been “discovered” by the Pre-Romantics.⁸ Longinus occupies himself with the somewhat elusive concept of a (sublime) genius, a visionary of noble spirit and deep introspection. On closer inspection, five components (sources) of sublimity appear: the first two, namely the capability of great ideas and inspired sensitivity, are supposed to be mostly *innate*, while the other three – the working out of figures, nobility of expression and good composition – are completely learnable, acquirable. Longinus does not really give any account for what “innate” might mean, and inspiration theory passes through an interesting metamorphoses in his essay.⁹

It seems that the most influential classical discussions of authorship twirl among the oppositions *skill / inspiration, reason / irrationality* and *mimesis (imitation) / mediation*, all of which are derived from the initial ontological dilemma, the dispute over the real *origin* of the authorial work. Inspiration theory in its utmost shape seems to be a problem – perhaps because it is not easy to harmonize it with the practical, empirical experience of the creative process. Even if the convention of referring to the Muses remains a practice, the divine connection, the nature of a genius and the role of the ecstatic madness become increasingly questionable. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to notice that the irrational *enthousiasmós*, originally grounded in inspiration theory, remains a component which no one is willing to dismiss completely; it retains much of its appeal even for thinkers who evidently lean towards more rational accounts of creativity.

There is no doubt that these theories profoundly influenced later reflections on authorship.¹⁰ Girolamo Vida’s views on the poet as a creature of divine origin, Scaligero’s poet as a creator of new reality, *alter Deus*, Petrić’s emphasizing of manic enthusiasm in creation, Castelvetro’s condemning of plagiarism, and even Fracastoro’s essential anthropological turn – as he relocates the source of ecstasy into the *immanence* of the sole creative process – all these renaissance discussions are deeply indebted to classical authors. Even the most radical Romantic views of the artist – a poet as a mysterious expressive source of poetry, a herald of spring, love and happiness (Novalis), a man with a broad soul, exceptional sensitivity and enthusiasm (Wordsworth), with an imagination that dissolves known to create new wholes (Coleridge), the “legislator [...] of the world” (Shelley) – in the greatest part remain inside the certain delineation of possibilities

which were anticipated by classical thought, even if this through was not carried through to extreme consequences.

“Authorship” in Classical Literary Texts

Prior to or parallel to theoretical reflection, authorship issues have also been articulated in literature. Through thematization of poetry and its creator, the poet, they entered literary discourse quite early. In most cases, it is possible to discriminate between the problems on the level of *ontology* (regarding the source of poetic inspiration and the nature of the poet’s personality) on one hand, and the closely related *axiological* problems which tackle the social position, value and function of the poet (poetry) on the other. While addressing the Muses as the ultimate source of the poet’s inspiration or praising the magical powers of poetry seems to be a routine part of the epic world, it is only gradually that the textual “praising” of a poet/author is being developed. As shall be seen, the space for such self-thematizing has actually opened wide in lyrical poetry.

The oldest known authorial “signature” in world literature stands at the beginning of Hesiod’s *Theogony* where, side by side with the Muses, their disciple appears as well: “And one day they taught Hesiod glorious song while he was shepherding his lambs under holy Helicon” (Hesiod, *Theogony* 22–23).¹¹ Together with Apollo, the Muses are adopting their standardised role here:

So said the ready-voiced daughters of great Zeus, and they plucked and gave me a rod, a shoot of sturdy laurel, a marvellous thing, and breathed into me a divine voice to celebrate things that shall be and things there were aforetime; and they bade me sing of the race of the blessed gods that are eternally, but ever to sing of themselves both first and last. (Hesiod, *Theogony* 31–33)

Obviously, the song is not really sung or invented by the poet; rather, it is dictated from the Muses. A subject is not an autonomous source of his creation, and he does not invent a poem by himself – on the contrary, his text is “dictated” by Zeus’s daughters.

In a similar manner, the Muses had already inspired Homer, who never appears in the text in such a way.¹² Yet the inspiration convention is articulated exceptionally clearly in the second book of *The Iliad* where the Muses are explicitly mentioned as the writers of the text, while the singers only hear the voice, themselves knowing nothing.¹³ On the other hand, from certain passages in *Odyssey* it is possible to infer that the poets, even

though chosen and thought by the Muses, do retain a certain amount of individuality. But anyway, the world of the heroic epic, with its inexorably sharp bronze in charge, cannot really be a favourable nursery for subtle authorial self-thematizations. It was not before the rise of the lyric Muse (with Mimnermos, Sappho, Anacreon and Callimachus) that the Homeric militaristic value model could be subverted and the vast realm of new subjectivity and intimacy opened.

Before tackling the poetry of Roman elegists who broadened this space to the extreme, another important theme that sprang up in Greek poetry should be mentioned. Teognis and especially Pindar have opened up the topic of immortal poetic glory and durability of great artworks. In his odes and fragments, Pindar praises lyrical art as a divine gift with magical powers and at the same time elevates song into a medium which enables the few chosen greats to survive for centuries, while “even deeds of might for lack of song fall into deep darkness” (7th *Nemean ode*). In his masterly *Exegi monumentum*, this idea was enhanced by Horace, who actually created one of its most influential formulations. The ode already employs a typical trick: on the rhetorical level the “monument” (namely, the object of canonisation) is actually the poems, but through the back door their author – a poet, born in a poor rural family, ascending socially by means of his artistic skills – is entering to the scene as well. The variation of this pattern was often to be seen later; it actually marks the modern fascination with the literary author.

Authorship issues have achieved a vividness unsurpassed for a long time in Roman poetry. Especially the elegists of the Augustan period opened up a whole new chapter in the history of textual presence of the author. As early as with Catullus, lyrical poetry in Rome abandoned public affairs to retreat into the privacy where the central position is occupied by the figure of the idolatrously adored woman-goddess.¹⁴ A similar view adopted by Tibullus, who deepens the themes of intimate love and withdrawal from depressing reality. Through the cult of a *domina*, the poet is textually constructed as a poet-lover writing about his shifting love luck. The space for thematizing the poet’s fame, person, and social position is now wide open. By both Catullus and Tibullus, the authorial themes are only briefly indicated, but in the works of Propertius, another elegist who wittily varies the cult of the queen of heart, a new, important emphasis can be found. Propertius turns his girl into the only source of his poetic inspiration. In this way, he can rid himself of the “divine” baggage and at the same time preserve the ecstatic element in the creative process:

You ask, how do I write so many songs of love,
how my soft book comes forth, the talk of all.
Not Calliope nor Apollo sings me this;
my girl herself is all my inspiration. [...]
Whatever she has done, whatever she has said,
vast histories spring from nowhere into being.

(*Elegies* II/1: 1–4, 15–16)

In the increasingly playful Roman elegy, the old conventions fall apart and become no more than material for a witty playing out that is taken to the outermost edge by Ovid. The *poeta lascivus* (ab)uses the conventional authorial repertory (Apollo, Muses, Aphrodite, inspiration theory, creative madness), leaving open the possibility to understand it all as a ludicrous ironization of poetic clichés: “And poets are called sacred, and beloved of the gods: / there are also those who grant us divine inspiration” (*Amores* III/9: 17–18). Humorously combining it with the elegiac cult of ladylove, Ovid even alludes to the philosophical dispute over mimesis:

The poet’s creative licence embraces everything,
nor are his words obliged to be true to history.
and you ought to have seen that my praise of the woman
was fiction: now your credulity has hurt me.

(*Amores* III/12: 41–44)

Very often, Ovid deals with the social status of a poet, nostalgically (and nevertheless ludicrously again) looking back to the Greeks.¹⁵ He tackles with even greater passion the topic of poetic immortality, claiming impishly that it is the actual aim of the poets.¹⁶ On countless occasions, the lyrical subject praises himself together with his artefacts. The “canonisation” process, which Ovid does not hesitate to show in his texts, includes the poet with his biography and even his ladylove: “My gift then’s to celebrate worthy girls in my song: / those that I wish, are made famous by my art” (*Amores* I/10: 59–60). Again moving a step ahead of Propertius, Ovid invents a *wanna-be* Corinna: “I know one who spreads it around she’s Corinna. / What wouldn’t she give for it to be so?” (*Amores* II/17: 27–30) and finally, he goes on to regret his praising of his ladylove because his eager “trumpeting” of her beauty has “prostituted” her.

Ovid’s notorious narcissism and his straightforward admiration of his own genius, which displeased the rhetorician Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* X), attract this clever poet to the excessive textual presence. It hardly comes as a surprise that the denominator “Naso”, Ovid’s textual signa-

ture, appears as early as in the first verse of his first collection of poetry, the motto to *Amores*. Actually, “Naso” constantly enters his texts, often in the exposed positions such as in *Ars amatoria* where he suggests both to women and men who win the love game the inscription “we were taught by Naso”; and recommends usage of verses from his previous collection in the seduction process:¹⁷

and someone will say: ‘Read our master’s cultured song,
in which he teaches both the sexes: or choose
from the three books stamped with the title *Amores*,
that you recite softly with sweetly-teachable lips ...

(*Ars amatoria* III: 341–344)

Ovid’s authorial awareness and self confidence are immense. If the textual Propertius is ready to proudly set himself in the row of “great men of Rome” as a “great and glorious poet” in his first book of *Elegies*, Ovid, this supreme verse expert, does not hesitate to glorify himself as a champion of elegiac poetry: “It’s acknowledged the elegy owes as much to me, / as the epic owes to famous Virgil” (*Remedia amoris* 395–396) and even as a founder of the new genre; namely the author of *Heroides* (versified letters of mythical heroines to their lovers) “invented that form unknown to others” (*Ars amatoria* III: 346). The poet’s personality, life, skill and creative procedures enter the very *centre* of Ovid’s love elegy without any doubt.¹⁸

Conclusion

From this condensed overview it is quite obvious that *authorial issues* were addressed on surprisingly high levels in both classical literature and accompanying theoretical discourse. Their variety can be well illustrated with the opposition between predominantly *inspirational* and predominantly *mimetic* views – that is, the opposition between understanding a poet as a divinely inspired, ecstatic creator, or predominantly as a skilful craftsman. The same duality seems to be inherent in several terminological couplings that substantially marked the discussion on authorship. While the original Greek singer *aoidos* was connected to divine inspiration and preserves the prophetic dimension (later on so dear to Romantics), the professional master of the word *poietes*, appearing in the classical age, is secularized. Quite similar is the later philological antithesis with the crazing, divinely enraptured *poeta vates* on the one hand and the erudite, scholarly *poeta doctus* on the other. Finally, the same can be said about the cou-

pling *Dionysian / Apollonian*, actualised by Nietzsche’s interpretation of the myth of Dionysus that rehabilitated creative madness. These dichotomies can provisionally be illustrated with such a scheme:

	divine source		collective (intertextual) production
INSPIRATION	aidos poeta vate Dionysian	poietes poeta doctus Apollonian	MIMESIS (imitation) <i>intellect / skill</i>
	secular source		individual (unique) production

As can be seen, both of the imagined poles are differentiated from inside as well. While the mimetic pole is set between options that the authorial work is understood mostly as a collective act, bound to the existing tradition, or as a completely individual, unique creation, at the inspiration pole the dilemma is whether the source of inspiration is divine or secular. In general, the kernel of classical comprehension of authorial production gradually seems to be moving toward more secular and more individual views. In practice, it is very hard to find very clear manifestations of inspirational view, but the same goes for the utilitarian view that would completely deny the moment of geniality: even if the poet is understood chiefly as an imitator, he has never been reduced to the level of a sole craftsman. An echo of the (divine) inspiration theory has never completely died away, and the understanding of the production of an artwork as a distinctive process has remained a constant of Western thought.¹⁹

This is why the irrational element remains relevant or even constitutive for poetry even when the idea of “divine dictate” dissolves or petrifies as a mere convention, a possible object of playful self-referentiality, such as in Ovid’s transgressive love poetry. With his narcissistic, excessive thematizing of the poet and his role, Ovid ironically subverts generic patterns, stereotypes and even the authorial theory. The astonishing evolutionary curve whose highest point is definitely marked by Ovid’s elegy clearly presents the ancient understanding of authorship in all its complexity. Authorial awareness comparable to Ovid’s will only evolve after a long time in modern literatures – to enable the author, indeed in another context and in a slightly different manner, to re-enter the centre of the literary work as its genial originator.²⁰ Variety, evolution and inner tensions of authorship issues in classical literature and philosophy obviously demonstrate that schematically linear, continuity-based accounts of history of the Western author simply do not endure.

NOTES

¹ Such a pattern is inscribed into history of literature and visual arts through biographical anecdotes (C. M. Soussloff, *The Absolute Artist* 43–72).

² As early as in the 17th century, the most modern part of Western Europe has gradually been reorganized into a society of mass consumption, and literary works – under the conditions of growing welfare and literacy – have been turned into widely accessible commodities. Until the end of the century, when newspapers and periodicals had become indispensable, the mass market for literature had also become operative. In Britain particularly, the progress of printing and book-selling took place quite early, and the need for legislative solution of authorial rights (copyright) led to the “Statute of Anne” in 1710, which enthroned the author as a legal category. The authorial right gained the status of proprietary right, and the author’s work was turned into a commodity. It is important to note that the author as a legal category has not come into being as a product of reflection in philosophy or poetics, but in the interest of business and trade (Rose, *Authors and Owners*).

³ Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*.

⁴ The 13th century Franciscan monk St. Bonaventura discriminates four (equivalent) types of textual producers: *scriptor* who literally copies the words of others, *compilator* who merges the quotations, *comentator* that adds comments, and *auctor* who uses his own words.

⁵ The notion of the coherent “romantic author” itself can also be viewed as merely a construction of 20th century theorists that intended to shake the “tyranny of the author”. Such a thesis was developed in Ken Ruthven’s *Faking Literature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 (Bennett, *The Author* 71).

⁶ The same goes for its performance: during the recitation, the singers (rhapsodists), ornamented with colourful clothes and golden wreaths, “under the power of music and metre”, are out of their minds, they are inspired and possessed (*Ion* 534a).

⁷ The question of “meaning” of Plato’s texts remains highly complicated – because of their literary, dialogic structure, uncertain identification of (philosopher) Plato with the protagonist of dialogues Socrates, and especially because of the irony in Socrates’ discourse. According to many interpreters, literal understanding of the “expulsion of the poets” is completely false (Kocijančič, *Platon* II: 997–1002).

⁸ Authorship of the essay as well as the identity of its writer remains unclear. The text itself most probably originates from the 1st century.

⁹ When Longinus recommends the creative imitation of great poetic predecessors, he maintains that from the creative genius of ancient writers some kind of emanation is entering the spirit of those that compete with them, such as from some kind of sacred orifices (*On the sublime* XIII).

¹⁰ Each of them has its own complex reception history which can not be discussed here – even though these histories are far from trivial.

¹¹ Such a “signature” of course already presupposes a specific degree of fixation of both the text as an accomplished entity and an individual as its (main) creator.

¹² With Homer as an assumed individual author of both great epics, the situation is even more complicated because of the problem of the transmission of stories in the oral culture, leaning on a completely different concept of authorship. In *The Singer of Tales* (1960), Albert Lord claims that Homer is *at the same time* very individual and a part of the oral tradition. He might have raised both texts to a new level, but he inherited much more than just the plots. In oral culture, each individual performance is unique but at the same time essentially traditional. In fact “collective authorship”, even if sometimes obscured,

has remained a common practice in later periods as well (cf. Stillinger, *Multiple Authorship*; Lessig, *Free Culture*).

¹³ “And now, O Muses, dwellers in the mansions of Olympus, tell me / for you are goddesses and are in all places so that you see all / things, while we know nothing but by report ...” (*The Iliad* II: 484–486).

¹⁴ Such a sublimation is unprecedented. A woman gains fatal power over the poet, and Catullus’ Lesbia becomes a prototype of later “queens of heart”.

¹⁵ “Poets were once the concern of gods and kings: / and the ancient chorus earned a big reward. / A bard’s dignity was inviolable: his name was honoured, / and he was often granted vast wealth” (*Ars amatoria* III: 405–408).

¹⁶ Cf. *Ars amatoria* III: 403–404. More seriously the theme sounds in the finale verses of Ovid’s epic masterpiece *Matamorphoses* (XV: 871–879).

¹⁷ Of course, he also advises that readers read “Naso” when recovering from love: “You read your Ovid then, when you learnt about love; / now the same Ovid’s to be read by you” (*Remedia amoris* 71–72).

¹⁸ Which is, according to Bennett, one of the key features of the Romantic author (*The Idea of the Author* 659).

¹⁹ The *euphoric* dimension has never completely abandoned the modern understanding of authorship – even before it came back in the Romantic vision of a poet as a visionary, isolated from the world.

²⁰ Most often quoted in this respect is probably Wordsworth’s revised prologue to *Lyrical Ballads* from 1802 (Bennett, *The Idea of the Author* 654).

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The Author is Dead. Long Live the Author!

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Although the 1960s and 1970s brought about explicit declarations of the death of the author (Barthes) and sought other concepts to replace it (e.g. Michel Foucault's authorial function), the author survived. Where does our inability to locate and define an author of literature come from? My hypothesis is that an answer can be found through analysis of the heterogeneous nature of our subject, to be more precise, in an analysis of his/her two roles - empirical author and author as a function who is, according to Foucault, located on the threshold of a text or a discourse.

*The paper deals with two autobiographical texts by the Slovene writer Lojze Kovačič - descriptions of the author's experiences in primary school as he described them in novels *Basel* and *Otroške stvari* (*Childish Things*).*

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / autobiography / autobiographical literature / Kovačič, Lojze

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Introduction

Roland Barthes declared the death of the author and shifted the attention to the role of the reader in 1968. His statement was just one of the most famous results of an ongoing crisis of the romantic concept of an author, which has changed our perception of literary texts to a certain point, but failed to erase the author completely. Tomaž Toporišič has taken this crisis of an author as the starting point of his analyses of the playwright's role in the theatre of the 1980s and 1990s. Although the playwright seemed to be obsolete and although the dramatic text could be written by performers themselves, so-called post-dramatic texts (for instance texts by Elfriede Jelinek and Sarah Kane) brought about renewed popularity of playwrights and thus of the author. In his own words, "the playwright has survived again and again the chain of his/her own crises, and has at the same time found himself/herself in an unbearable position between expressions 'to end' and 'to begin'" (Toporišič 269). Where does

this vicious circle of endings and new beginnings stem from? Is it a consequence of the heterogeneous nature of our subject? To be more precise, of its two roles: 1) the empirical author, and 2) the author-function, which is a part of a discourse or is set at its threshold?

At the end of his paper “What is an Author?” Michel Foucault proposed some directions for future research.

Is it not possible to re-examine, as a legitimate extension of this kind of analysis, the privileges of a subject? Clearly, in undertaking an internal and architectonic analysis of a work [...] and in delimiting psychological and biographical references, suspicions arise concerning the absolute nature and creative role of the subject. But the subject should not be entirely abandoned. It should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme of an originating subject, but to seize its functions, its intervention in discourse, and its system of dependencies. (314)

Foucault thus advocates that we should analyse an author both in his/her empirical form as well as in his/her role inside a discourse. My analysis will deal with two fragments of autobiographical novels by Slovene author Lojze Kovačič. They both describe his first encounters with educational system when he entered alimentary school in Basel. The first novel, entitled *Basel*, was written from February till April 1983 and the second one *Otroške stvari* (Childish Things) in March 2003. The choice of autobiography is on the one hand due to the fact that it presupposes the strong role of an empirical author and, on the other, that it ensures a more or less invariable story. Differences between the two texts should thus show the role of an author-function. The results of our analysis should give ground to further exploration of an autobiography and reliability of it, and at the same time pose questions about the role of empirical author in non-autobiographical fiction. Before we start dealing with both texts, however, we have to explain our choice, which rests on the features of autobiography.

The Fictional and Pragmatic Nature of Autobiography

Although there has been an ongoing debate on how to define autobiography in the generic sense and there have been different terms proposed – from autobiographical fiction or literature to the novel as autobiography (see Koron) – I will use the term autobiography as a designation of different kinds of texts in which “a protagonist speaks himself about his own life” (Leben 84). Both Alenka Koron and Andrej Leben, who are trying to install autobiography in a system of literary genres, stress a mixture of fiction and reality, fiction and non-fiction ... as its main feature. It comes as no surprise

then that *Leben* suggests a method of empirical literary science to be the most suitable for analysing autobiography as it gives special attention to the empirical author as literary producer as well as to his relationships to literary protagonists and narrators (literary post-processing) (*Leben* 89).

In our case, of course, the author, narrator and protagonist are basically the same person in different roles inside literary discourse. The empirical author's experience stays the same although we might have to consider the possibility that a change in the author's attitude towards his past can also change his memory or experience that is imprinted on it. The narrator-protagonist is invented by and for each text separately and is thus probably on the threshold of a literary discourse. It creates it, but at the same time it is a part of it and is hence modified by it. In this sense an autobiography is especially suitable for our purpose as it seems that both authorial roles that are of our interest are very much evident and accentuated in it. We should thus be able to come to a somewhat clear image of them, their features and limits.

Basel

Lojze Kovačič was born in Basel to a Swiss mother and Slovene father. His father refused Swiss citizenship and his family was hence deported back to Yugoslavia in 1938. The novel *Basel* describes the author's first return to his home city in 1972, after 36 years of exile. He wanders around and visits numerous houses where his family lived, streets and edifices that marked his childhood, and his sister Margrit who stayed in Switzerland and never left the city. The novel was written in 1983 and published six years later.

An interesting fact that one notices right at the beginning is an unusual switch in the narrator's perspective. The novel starts and finishes with a first-person narrator, which is common in autobiographies; however, in *Basel* the narration almost instantly shifts into a third-person one, creating a distance between the narrator and the protagonist regardless of the temporal proximity of the action. This gives the impression of an objective narrator who states the facts and could explain protagonists' feelings, actions etc., but as the story unfolds we realize that only the author's feelings and thoughts are being described, whereas with other protagonists the narrator limits himself to descriptions of their actions. In other words, the choice of a third person narrator makes for an autobiographical narration that would presuppose a first-person narrator and an impression of quasi-objectivity.

The second thing, which probably stems from existentialist and modernist narrative patterns, is the frequent use of ellipsis, which results in strands of observations and pieces of memory that remain unexplained and at the same time seem more authentic.

In a fragment about his elementary school the narrator goes to the most traumatic points of his experience immediately after the first description of the place. The latter is in complete contrast with the fact that he was first transferred to the front row because he could not learn anything; later even his family could not teach him and finally he was transferred to the *Hilfsschule* (a class for children with special needs).

Place de l'Etoile. Look, there is only a small, pink and washed up sacred-profane building with two small towers left from that huge red-brick school that looked like a gothic cathedral with two towers where a small bell was announcing intermissions. (*Basel* 169)¹

His memories end as abruptly as they started when the protagonist and his companion leave the place and are back to their reality. *Basel* is like a pile of impressions from the past and present that have no order or perspective, but nevertheless create the author's identity, upon which he reflects on the train while travelling back to Yugoslavia. He asks himself: "From which experience have I learnt something? And which are those that will stay and be the basis of my repentance?" (*Basel* 187)²

The answer to these questions were sought by Lojze Kovačič in his last project – two novels *Otroške stvari* (Childish Things) and *Zrele reči* (Mature things) where he tried to draw the line under his life – which was unfortunately interrupted by his death on 1 May 2004.

Childish Things

Childish Things is the last novel written by Lojze Kovačič. He finished it in March 2003 and only two months later it was published with Academic Press in Ljubljana. Although the description of his elementary school and his first days in it is three times as long as in *Basel*, the story is practically identical. There are a few inconsistencies, e.g. in *Basel* he mentions two schoolteachers in the *Hilfsschule*, in *Childish Things* only one; in *Basel* he does not describe the loss of his new satchel, and in general he adds more details in *Childish Things*. Nevertheless, our perceptions of the two fragments differ because of the way they are told.

The most obvious distinctions are: 1) the consistent first-person narration, and 2) the chronological and causal plot in *Childish Things*. In other

words, the author's late novel is closer to traditional autobiography as "a protagonist speaks himself about his own life" (Leben 84) and shows us an image of the world that tries to be whole. No wonder, since Kovačič called his last novel *Postscript I*, thus indicating that he probably wanted to round up his life experience and come to some conclusions.

A more subtle, but probably also more a powerful distinction between the two fragments is the fact that in *Childish Things* Kovačič uses a set of metaphors and indications to announce the future events and to present the protagonist's own feelings. The fragment hence starts with a hairdresser and his father giving him a haircut and changing him into someone he does not know. Excitement at the first day of school mixes with a glance of *Hilfsschule* and the feeling that he is confined to the institution against his will:

This was already my third involuntary arrival in a foreign institution, but my aversion really started with this last one. They took us in twos to the side wing in front of the doors in a hallway where there was another untidy door that led to the Hilfsschule attended only by imbeciles and cripples and had an entrance from the side street by wooden stairs. (*Otroške* 126)³

This impression of confinement becomes more accentuated as he cannot learn anything and the community gradually excludes him. He thus starts missing school and going to the Rhine River. He can let his imagination loose again and he feels free from the restraints of the society, but at the same time he realises he will never be able to be a successful part of it. Although he realises that beauty and money distinguish people one from another he knows that "this wish will never come true, even when I am hundred years old and seriously ill" (*Otroške* 139). The exclusion finally manifests itself in his banishment from a normal class. Although frightened and humiliated he finds his means to survive by scaring off other kids during intermissions. At the end he also describes his return to Basel and his disappointment when his old school, the object of his traumatic experience, turns out to be no more than a single-storey building.

An Author and His Roles

It is tempting to infer from what has been described that one should distinguish the two roles of an author. First, an empirical author with his/her memory that is being described and is thus more or less invariable, and second, an author-function that arranges a particular text or discourse. In our case the empirical author, Lojze Kovačič, describes his traumatic memory of alimentary school in Basel, however, he does that each time

through a different approach. In *Basel* he wants to record his impressions as he would like to observe whether he has changed in these 36 years of exile and perhaps notice the roots of his destiny; in *Childish Things* he seems to have all the material set and he is editing it, looking for causes and consequences, writing his chronology in such a way that it would finally make sense.

However, this last statement warns us against our first assumption. Clearly, without an intention of empirical author or authors there can be no production of text. Furthermore, with a traditional way of writing – I disregard here modern experiments with so called authorless texts written by text algorithms – an author has to choose the basic parameters, such as a form of narrator, of narration, etc.

Auto poetic texts are probably the most reliable way to investigate this theme, so let us look at one of them by Lojze Kovačič. It is entitled *Literatura ali življenje* (Literature or Life) and was written on a theme that was discussed at the Vilenica literary festival in 1995. Kovačič, among other things, gives us two main reasons for his writing. “First: to express my misfortune. Second: to find an appropriate form that might fit chaos.” (*Literatura* 31)⁴ Immediately he continues with his credo:

There is a conviction that I have had from the first day of my writing, thus I could say I am writing under its dictate. The conviction that *literature should never be ashamed of itself before life*. And that *bad literature should* – especially if one is its author – *always blush before good* [literature]. (*Literatura* 31)⁵

Lojze Kovačič thus not only described his own memories in his work but also tried to find an appropriate form that would fit chaos, i.e. life. In other words he wanted to introduce some order and round up his existence. He tried to do that in *Childish Things*, more precisely in an unfinished project of *Postscript I and II*. According to this, one might say that the empirical author is not only the source of literary material but also the one that defines the basic parameters of a narration (narrator, protagonists, general artistic orientation). However, at this point we are already at the threshold of a discourse. As we have shown in an analysis of both fragments, the choice of a narrator and thus a point of view is crucial for their differences. The choice of a third-person narrator and modernist technique of narration in *Basel* results in its objective and distanced atmosphere, whereas a first-person narrator who foretells the tragic destiny of the author using narration patterns of realism probably creates a stronger emotional impact on a reader. At the same time we have to acknowledge the author’s remark that he searches for the right form to suit his existence and that the quality of his work cannot be predicted and directed.

Following Foucault we can say that an author's function in our case is to choose a subject and the basic parameters of a narration. With the latter he already intervenes in a discourse; however, he is also dependent on an author-function which starts with the same intervention and works inside the discourse and abiding its own rules. The result is thus unpredictable, even more so when we also take a recipient's response into account. Kovačič describes these dependencies in a following way.

You face them [readers] and they question you mercilessly – why have you eased the pain or covered the mess with an epithet, adjective or only with a choice of expression – and thus you realize again and again that both writing and reading stem from the same impulse. It is not enough to write a good book, you should write your heart out and let all your stars burn in flame. (*Literatura* 27)⁶

But all these questions which we usually address to the empirical author should actually be directed to an author-function as a choice of particular words is probably as, if not actually more, dependent on the rules of a discourse itself.

Should we then repeat, following Barthes, that “we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (Barthes 148)? One could think of a machine or even a person who writes according to set rules and facts. Articles from press agencies would probably make for a fine example. Of course we can argue that this set of rules has also been set by someone or a group of people who can thus be considered empirical authors, but still we have to admit that such kind of subjectivity is less noticeable, if we can notice it at all. In spite of this, Barthes's inference is wrong. Dependence on the empirical author is even used by Kovačič, and here we have to agree with him, to defend literature against modern electronic media:

Behind every incident there has to be a human being who reshapes it in himself, in his dreams and consciousness, chemically, architectonically, to define its gravity in its nucleus and cover. Everything else that we cannot reshape in the depths of our being, doesn't touch us and stays on the outside, just a piece of information, a deserted stubble field, which spreads further with every following piece into the far distance and indifference. (*Literatura* 12)⁷

Not only the empirical author is dependent on the author-function, on language and recipient's response; it is also the language, a piece of information, a recipient and hence an author-function that is dependent on the empirical author. We can thus speak of interdependence that should be at the core of our interest.

Conclusion

I realize that my paper raises more questions than provides answers. The analysis should further investigate the role of an empirical author in a non-autobiographical fiction, in fiction written by a group of authors, changes that might occur with translations where different rules of the destination language and recipients' expectations might play an important role etc. All these have to be left for some future occasion as I would like to conclude by answering my original question.

Where does the recurring crisis of an author stem from? Is it a consequence of a heterogeneous nature of our subject?

As our analysis has shown the answer is positive. The recurrence of the crisis of the author is a consequence of its very nature. As neither an empirical nor author-function are complete in itself we tend to discard one of them as redundant and obsolete, but, as they are absolutely dependent on each other, we can never get rid of either of them completely. Doubtlessly their proportion varies from text to text, genre to genre – in the case of autobiography one might say that the empirical author has a dominant role – and they overlap at the threshold of a discourse, which further complicates the matter – but this does not make our work impossible. One should go to the other extreme and compare literature with machine generated texts in order to define the limits of an author-function, find the degree of an empirical author that changes such texts into literature and, of course, to further test the interdependence of our two roles.

Nevertheless, at this point we can conclude that an awareness of a fact that an author has a heterogeneous nature can prevent us from going to extremes – declaring his/her death or praising his/her genius – and urge us to investigate the complexity of positions that are or could be created in the middle.

NOTES

¹ Translations from Slovene by Gašper Troha.

“Place de l’Etoile. Glej, od velikanske, gotski stolnici podobne šole iz rdečih opek z dvema stolpoma, v kateri je mali zvon oglašal odmore, je ostala samo nekakšna majhna, roza izprana sakralna-profana bajta z dvema turenčkoma.”

² “Iz katerih izkustev sem se nekaj naučil? In katera so, ki so se odbrala, da bodo podlaga mojemu kesanju?”

³ “To je bil že moj tretji prihod v tuji zavod, v katerega sem moral, a moj pravi odpor se je zares začel šele tukaj. Odvedli so nas v dvostopih v stransko krilo, pred vrata na hodniku, kjer so bila na koncu še ena, zanemarjena vrata, za katerimi je bila pomožna šola,

ki so jo obiskovali sami bebci in pohabljeni in v katero se je prišlo iz stranske ulice po lesenih stopnicah.”

⁴ “Prvi: da izrazim svojo nesrečo. Drugi: da bi kaosu našel formo, ki bi se mu mogoče prilegala.”

⁵ “Eno prepričanje me preveva od prvega dne pisanja do danes, tako da lahko rečem, da že ves čas pišem pod njegovim diktatom. Prepričanje namreč, da *se literatura nikoli ne sme sramovati pred življenjem*. In da *mora slaba literatura* – posebno kadar si jo zagrešil sam – *venomer zardevati pred dobro*.”

⁶ “Iz oči v oči se soočaš z njimi, neizprosno te povprašujejo po vsem – zakaj si nekje z epitetom, adjektivi ali zgolj s tonom pridušil to ali ono nesrečo ali godljo – in tako vsakokrat znova zveš, da tako branje kot pisanje izhajata iz istih pobud. Ni dovolj, da spišeš samo dobro knjigo, marveč da si tudi izpišeš srce iz prsi, da pustiš, da zagorijo vse tvoje zvezde.”

⁷ “Za vsakim pripetljajem mora biti zmeraj človek, ki tak dogodek predela v sebi, v snu in budnosti, kemično, arhitektonsko, da precizira njegovo težo v jedru in lupini. Vse drugo, česar ne moremo predelati v globini svojega organizma, se nas ne dotakne in ostaja zunaj nas, zgolj informacija, pusto strnišče, ki se z vsako nadaljnjo informacijo širi v nedogled in vseenost.”

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Heterobiography, Hypocriticism, and the Ethics of Authorial Responsibility

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Arguing that “heterobiography” (fictional autobiographies of historical individuals) places the subject at the centre of complex relationships between the historical, the fictional, the critical, the legal and the ethical, this article discusses some of the crucial questions that these texts raise.

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / death of the author / De Man, Paul / autobiographical literature / heterobiography / authorial responsibility

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In Peter Carey’s *True History of the Kelly Gang* the notorious Australian outlaw Ned Kelly writes two versions of a letter in which he gives an account of his history of poverty and persecution by the police, and then remarks: “Thus were I drawn into this occupation as author” (318). One of these letters is to his as yet unborn daughter, so that she may have the story directly from the voice of her father, and she may know her origins – unlike Ned, whose father’s silence over his history and “the Great Transportation” leaves the children alone and “ignorant as tadpoles spawned in puddles on the moon” (334). The other letter is addressed to Donald Cameron, a Member of the Legislative Assembly who, unlike the law and the police, seemed prepared to listen to his story (he wasn’t). On the one hand, Ned’s authorship would transmit the cultural, historical, and personal memory of his Irish-Australian family to endow his daughter with an awareness of her identity; on the other, having his own story heard by the law would grant Ned himself the legal subjecthood he had been denied (he had been made an outlaw that could be shot on sight by anyone). The first letter binds him *morally* to telling the truth about himself; the second requires that he do so *legally*. We might see this as an only slightly complicated version of Lejeune’s “autobiographical pact”, according to which the author of an autobiography undertakes, in

a kind of legal contract with his reader, to speak sincerely in a referential form of writing and to guarantee the coincidence of author, narrator and character in the proper name printed on the cover of the book (Lejeune 26).

Ned Kelly's first-person words are of course in fact not Kelly's, they are Carey's (even if they are based on letters written by Kelly himself):¹ the (fictional) autobiography is of another, historical individual, and I shall call it *heterobiography*.² In the heterobiographical situation, where the author speaks in the first person as someone else whom we recognise as having existed historically, the autobiographical pact no longer applies. However, one effect of heterobiography, precisely because of the impossibility of holding the author (the name on the cover) responsible for the factuality of the first-person narrative (by the narrator-character), is to throw into even sharper relief the link between author and words. Carey's choice of an outlaw as his protagonist further highlights this link in the legal context (which Lejeune's pact also gestures to), where one cannot speak as another, take on another's first person voice, and assume the responsibility of the other's words. In law, the relationship of identity and the tie of responsibility between a subject and his/her words is direct, exclusive, and based on intention. Impersonating another may thus be seen as both legally and morally reprehensible, except in licensed situations (such as the theatre, art). It is the interaction between the legal and the ethical in relation to authorship and authorial responsibility, especially as they concern literary criticism, that I am concerned with here.

One of the strongest objections to Lejeune's autobiographical pact is surely Paul de Man's essay "Autobiography as De-facement". De Man accuses Lejeune of stubbornness ("and I call his insistence stubborn because it does not seem to be founded in argument or evidence,") (71) in considering the reading pact as a legal, cognitive, and "representational" one, continuously leaping from the "contractual" to the ontological plane, disregarding the fact that language is a system of tropes ("The name on the title page is not the proper name of a subject capable of self-knowledge and understanding, but the signature that gives the contract legal, though by no means epistemological, authority,") (71). It is in this context that de Man arrives at what may be his most famous – even notorious – statements on the subject. He attacks the notion of a "simpler mode of referentiality, of representation, and of diegesis" that autobiography would possess over fiction, and asks: "But are we so certain that autobiography depends on reference [...]?" On the contrary, in the most striking apparent reversal of logic, he argues:

We assume that life *produces* the autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer *does* is in fact governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the resources of its medium? And since the mimesis here assumed to be operative is one mode of figuration among others, does the referent determine the figure, or is it the other way round: is the illusion of reference not a correlation of the structure of the figure, that is to say no longer clearly and simply a referent at all but something more akin to a fiction which then, however, in its own turn, acquires a degree of referential productivity? (68–69)

As we know, Paul de Man's biographical link of responsibility to his own words came back to haunt him posthumously with the discovery of the collaborationist newspaper articles he had written during the Nazi occupation of Belgium.³ And indeed, de Man's illustrations of his theoretical considerations in "Autobiography as De-facement" through a close reading of images of disfiguration and mutilation in Wordsworth, as well as the frequent appearance of figures of violence and dismemberment in his writing, were then taken by some critics (for example, Corngold) to be the index of de Man's continued violent, fascist mindset. It isn't surprising thus that de Man – the ironically unwitting protagonist of this paradoxical return of the biographical author "back to centre stage" (Burke 1) and of what some may see as a very apt example of modern hubris and downfall – has become the more or less veiled subject of, or occasion for, several fictions hinging on crime and academia, such as Gilbert Adair's *The Death of the Author* (1992) and John Banville's more recent *Shroud* (2002).

The former in particular enacts and literalises, within the structure of a parodic detective novel, the paradoxical condition of the "death of the author" (the reference is of course to Roland Barthes's famous essay by that title). Its protagonist Leopold Sfax, thinly disguising Paul de Man, writes autobiographically about his youth (in France rather than Belgium), his collaborationist writing under Nazi occupation, his post-war emigration to America, his academic career, his anxiety of being discovered, his denial of the tie between author and words (in the novel, the "death of the author" is a theory intentionally and specifically invented by Sfax as post-facto alibi), the type of language used, including some direct citations, and how it may give rise to accusations of violence (Sfax comments on his own "intemperance of language" which "more than one hostile commentator" describes as "fundamentally fascist in nature, shot through with ideological nihilism and amorality," 102). Killed by one of his students, Sfax continues to write after death, making the "death of the author" a "literal" event biographically as well as theoretically.

There are a number of questions arising from all this which would be interesting to pursue but which I can only sketch briefly here. One would concern the fraught debate on whether the biographical revelations on de Man simply exposed, once and for all, the fundamental ethical vacuity, critical hypocrisy, and theoretical equivocations of the deconstructionist project; or, conversely, whether de Man's critical writings over several decades following the war elaborated in fact a difficult reflection on his early journalistic pieces (a reflection on the relationship between language and ideology), without the solace of the act of public confession and the rite of abjuration and denunciation of earlier mistakes which would expose guilt, but whose function, ultimately, would be to cleanse and exculpate. A related question would be whether those critiques that seized on authorial biography to condemn a theory of radical linguistic and literary autonomy were engaging in some form of self-righteous academic scavenging (gloating, hypocritical criticism, or, we might say, *hypocriticism*: criticism aimed at reiterating and promoting one's own cause in what could be seen as opportunistic exploitation of someone else's disgrace⁴); or, otherwise, whether such critiques were simply pointing to the ineluctability of an ethical link of responsibility between the author and his/her words, and therefore to the inescapable impasse or even bankruptcy of theoretical positions that deny this. Another, related question would thus be whether it is possible to dissociate literary criticism (exercised exclusively on the text) and biographical questions (this is the context of de Man's controversial assertions that "considerations of the actual and historical existence of writers are a waste of time from a critical viewpoint" ("Form and Intent" 35), and that "death is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament" ("Autobiography as De-facement" 81)); or whether this disjunction is at all possible. This in turn raises two more questions: whether the validity of a theory of reading depends on the moral stature of its proponent; and, as is crucially brought into focus by the heterobiographical situation, whether an author ever has a right (a right based on biographical fact) to speak as another historical being: to "usurp" someone else's voice and words – at best, to give voice to another, as if that voice (one's own) were the other's. Taken together, the biographical link to one's words and the requirement of morality for the author risk leading to various forms of essentialism (can Pound be a good poet if he was fascist? can a white writer represent the voice of a negro slave? – see for example the controversy around William Styron's *The Confessions of Nat Turner*); but then one would also have to ask: what when a subject had no chance of self-representation in his or her own life, in his or her own voice – the slave, the illiterate, the outlaw whose voice is not allowed to be heard by the law? What if it is only through the voice of

the other that theirs can be heard, even if only as the reverberation of an echo?⁵ Carey speaks as Ned Kelly – fictionally – because Kelly wasn't able to get his words listened to – historically, legally.

The theme of the requirement of the author's assumption of moral responsibility will also bring to mind Sartre's demand in the immediate post-war period that writers be committed; that they ask, what would happen if everyone read my words? (14) and act accordingly. Words are loaded pistols (15); they are not innocent, and their effect is the author's responsibility just as much as the shot is the responsibility of the one who pulls the trigger. Far from de Man's insistence on the unbridgeable gap between word and world, Sartre invites the writer to restore a meaning, truthfulness and integrity based in reference to the words corrupted by the propaganda of war (216–19). It is this correspondence between word, world and authorial intention that grounds – in what we might call a Sartrean “pact” – the writer's necessary commitment.

The two cases of heterobiography that I am using here are very different, but they mirror each other in significant ways: an outlaw condemned and executed for his historical, factual criminal acts and whose autobiographical words of justification were disregarded in life by the law, but have later made him an official national hero in Australia (refusal to listen to him in life, sanctification in death); a critic whose written works were highly regarded during his life until his words came back to haunt not only his reputation, but also the validity of his critical theories and the motivation of the writings he authored. In both cases, there is a silence: in one case, that of the author (de Man never “confessed”, at least in public, though he wrote on confession (*Excuses (Confessions)*), and it is the public silence, more than the fact of having written the articles, that appears to many as the greater guilt); in the other, in the gap between author and addressee, when Ned's words fall on the deaf ears of the law. It is out of this silence that Adair and Carey write, lending a voice (parodic in Adair's case) to the historical person-narrator-character, and it is the silence that generates the heterobiography and the ethical questions that the genre poses. It appears thus that the heterobiographical first person is located at the point of encounter of the literary, the historical, the fictional, the critical, the theoretical, the legal, the ethical, and that it raises questions about all these, and their interrelations.

Adair's *The Death of the Author* was received by many as a mocking attack on de Man and deconstruction; the quotes on the back cover describe the book as “a brilliant black satire on cultural cultishness” (Philip Howard, *The Times*), “a serious critique of a dodgy intellectual movement” (Lucasta Miller, *Financial Times*), and a “dazzling satire of literary-critical

pretension” – the pretension, that is, of deconstruction, a “fashionable technique” which assumes that “text means anything the reader wants it to mean, the author’s intentions are nothing, text does not really have authors” (Anthony Quinton, *The Evening Standard*). Yet the intricate, acute, stylish slipperiness of the novel seems to have taken on board much of the lesson of Paul de Man and of deconstruction – about undecidability, about aporia, about the self-voiding nature of literary and critical writing.⁶ Right at the end, undercutting any pretension to seriousness that might have lingered, Sfax (who, in a blatant literalisation of the “death of the author”, continues writing despite the fact that he has been killed) calls the book “mendacious and mischievous and meaningless”. We may wonder: should we refer these adjectives metatextually to the book we have just finished reading (Adair’s), or to the tale-within-the-tale (Sfax’s autobiography)? Or maybe even to the key of this *roman à clef* (de Man’s biography)? Is Adair’s book a stand against deconstruction and the person of de Man, or a joke perpetrated upon the attacks that have been levelled at them? Or, more neutrally, simply (in fact not so simply at all) an amusing, witty tale on the serious question of the possible implications of the theory and on the polemical debate which raged around the “de Man affair”? In seeking an answer to these alternatives, the question we are asking, in effect, concerns the personal position of the Author Adair – and I use “Author” in the sense in which Barthes uses it, which would be equivalent to asking: what is the “true meaning” of the book, what do the book and its Author “mean to say”? (Let us not forget that Barthes didn’t “kill” the author as such, but only as a particular construct of a certain, mainstream, traditional type of academic criticism that sought to authorise itself and its interpretations through the authorial *vouloir dire*.) Whichever personal position we decide to ascribe to the Author Adair, if we want to ascribe one at all, this short novel does bring to the fore the ethical aspect of the authorial function, the question of the writer’s responsibility towards his/her own writing, and it does it by exploiting those very techniques that are, or at least appear to be, under attack, such as the construction of textual aporias, the intricate weaving of intertextual webs, the reversal of causality whereby the first murder in the novel is shown to be the consequence of the second and “why” and “because” are used interchangeably (48–49, 59, 129).

Have I any posthumous last words? Not really. As I have discovered to my disappointment, death *is* merely the displaced name for a linguistic predicament, and I rather feel like asking for my money back – as perhaps you do too, Reader, on closing this mendacious and mischievous and meaningless book. (135)

Is it us, the readers, that have misjudgedly parted with a five-pound note (the price on the cover of my paperback edition of *The Death of the Author* is £4.99), to get in exchange a penny and a cheap, worthless book? Should we ask for our money back? Was all the fuss worth it? Or aren't the values at stake worth at least the market value of the book? (*The Death of the Author* has been out of print for several years now, clearly considered by its publishers not to be worth reprinting; the online price of a second hand copy at the time of the conference at which this paper was presented (*The Author: Who or What is Writing Literature?*, Slovenia, September 2008) reached £188.51; the Reader that had initially bought it and was now prepared to sell it had clearly done well not to ask for the money back.) There seems to be more than tongue in cheek here. Have we been framed in what Derrida, referring to the indecency of hasty condemnation and even jubilation by some when the “de Man affair” broke out, calls the *petit jeu médiocre* of detective fiction (“Comme le bruit” 214), a genre, almost by definition, based on a structural and narrative bad faith? Has the real crime been perpetrated – by Adair – against our sensibilities? Writing about Poe’s *The Murders in the Rue Morgue* (one of the stories woven into the rich intertext of Adair’s novel) Shawn Rosenheim argues that the story may be taken

as an index of a deeper bad faith on the part of the whole genre, in its frequent imbalance between the detective story’s protracted narrative setup and its often unsatisfying denouement. Some readers of detective fiction have an embarrassing feeling that its typically gothic revelations are incommensurate with the moral weight suggested by the genre’s narrative form. In this sense, too, Poe’s orangutan is an emblem of the story’s readers, who – their attention solicited by an unworthy narrative dilemma – find the real crime has been practiced on their sensibilities. (68)

What, then, is the real “crime”? Is the book itself cheating us? Both the criminal and the critical (etymologically cognate words⁸) involve judgement, evaluation, choice, ability to discriminate – Ned Kelly asks, precisely, for the law’s discrimination before it chooses to incriminate. Doesn’t “criticism” – intended as a literary, aesthetic and ethical activity performed on the words of another – demand less haste on our part, better care and rigour in the avoidance of *hypocriticism* (criticism with a hidden agenda – something that critics of Paul de Man were ready to attribute to him)? In other words, what is our role and our responsibility, as critics? (Derrida writes of how even the most reductive readings are carried out in the name of “ethics”, without regard for the most elementary rules of discussion: “la lecture différenciée ou l’écoute de l’autre, la preuve, l’argumentation, l’analyse et la citation.” (“Comme le bruit” 225))

Let us turn again to Ned Kelly: words may be loaded pistols, as Sartre says, but what if they miss, and no one hears the shot? Ned does try autobiography, but when the law refuses to listen to his words (indeed, when the law, by decreeing that he should be shot on sight, legalises the possibility of his words not even having the chance to be uttered), his recourse is finally, and literally, to the loaded gun. In this failure of listening lies perhaps the crux of the matter: that the author's autobiographical responsibility for his words risks failure – a literal falling on deaf ears – if the other to whom the words are addressed refuses to listen, to accept, evaluate, discriminate in the plurality of their possible meanings – and, yes, in the manner of their possible links to the biographical person, finally to reach a decision that will inevitably be personal, contingent, and has the inherent possibility that it may not be correct, but which must seek not to be *hypocritical*. The tie of responsibility, that is, is located not (not only) on the author's side of the autobiographical pact but (also) equally binds the reader/listener/critic.

This may appear – and in several ways it is – as an elaborated version of the “birth of the reader” that for Roland Barthes is generated by the “death of the author”. In Barthes's rethinking of the relationship between Author, Text and Reader/Critic, the Author (now author, or better: scribe) no longer controls the meaning of his writings, and the Critic (now simply “reader”) no longer decrees the worth and value of the Work (now Text), but is free to play with its productive polysemy. In heterobiographical texts, hinging as they do around the historicity of their protagonists, the consequence of reintroducing the centrality of “responsibility” is that the *requirement* for the reader/critic to engage with the polysemy of the text concerns not only its meaning (its *vouloir-dire*), which must remain open, but, more widely, what Barthes had excluded: the complexity of the historical and ethical situations that both writers and readers respond to. The very etymology of the word “responsibility” (from the Latin *respondere*, to answer, respond, promise in return) entails a responding, an answering (for), thus a dialogue and a sense of obligation. As readers, we too are asked to accept our own productive and dialogic responsibility.

Thus accepting the weight of authorial responsibility also requires a complementary burden of responsibility for the reader. This is a requirement in which we may well hear echoes of Derrida's argument that it is the “ear of the other” that signs the autobiographical (*The Ear of the Other* 51), an ear that must lend itself, must not play deaf. Adair's *The Death of the Author* is dedicated to “the Reader”. On the one hand the dedicatee may be the non-biographical, depersonalised entity that is supposed to be born from the death of the author; on the other, however, given the French/Belgian

critic's difficulty with the pronunciation of the fricative dental sounds "th" [θ] and [ð], which become [t] or [d], "the reader" is turned into [de'ri:da], i.e. the Anglicised (mis-)pronunciation of Derrida's name, effectively dedicating the book to the French deconstructionist philosopher.

If reasserting the notion of authorial responsibility (against such prescriptions as de Man's conclusion that "considerations of the actual and historical existence of writers are a waste of time from a critical viewpoint", or Barthes's de-historicising the writer/reader) places an equal burden on the reader/critic (against such simplistic positions that would limit this to "the author must tell the truth and be held to his words"), it would appear then that we reach a kind of aporetic predicament, and that the issue cannot be resolved through a simple notion of integrity.

For the two heterobiographical texts discussed here, we may encapsulate the aporias as follows: in the case of Adair/Sfax/de Man, the reserve and silence of the culprit that does not want to *cheapen* his guilt through the easy relief of public confession may turn out to be the best way to hold on to one's own integrity, and it may be the result of a continued inner debate over one's morally troubling past — or it may not, it may simply be a case of trying to escape undetected: we shall never know for sure. Conversely, in the case of Carey/Ned Kelly, integrity may reside in pretending to be another — a criminal — and speaking in their voice, on the one hand taking on the responsibility to give them a voice while, on the other, abdicating the responsibility to be answerable for the accuracy of their first-person narrative, even at the risk of appropriating their story, substituting a truth with another; where responsibility, that is, would reside in the integrity of a fiction that, insofar as it is fiction, makes it impossible for the author to guarantee the truthfulness of his words — which doesn't necessarily mean lying or misrepresentation of the truth, but it may: we shall never know for sure.

It is on this insoluble double either/or, ending in "we shall never know for sure", that I am going to conclude these thoughts on "this occupation as author", because I cannot offer any definitive way out of the impasse of authorial or reader responsibility (it would be impossible), and can only point to the inescapability of the aporias that prevents an easy solution (ethical and aesthetical) to such thorny and varied issues as the legal, epistemological and ontological implications of the "autobiographical pact", the traditional assumptions of superiority of truth over fiction and of confession over silence — all aspects that may seem to be heterogeneous to one another, but which the heterobiographical text brings together. "We shall never know for sure": this shouldn't make us give up in despair, or gladly abandon, the notion of responsibility, but make us see it as even more crucial and more central to our activity as literary critics.

NOTES

¹ These are the letter to Donald Cameron MLA (who had opposed in the Legislative Assembly the Felons Apprehension Act) to ask for redress of the injustice Kelly claimed was being perpetrated against him and his family, but which was not published in the papers, as Kelly had hoped; and the 58-page long Jerilderie letter, which he planned to have privately printed in Jerilderie, where he robbed the local bank (this plan failed too, as the printer managed to escape and the letter was later handed in to the police). The autograph of the Cameron Letter has been lost, and it only exists in a copy made by a clerk. The original of the Jerilderie Letter is in the State Library of Victoria (where Kelly's famous armour is also held). A facsimile with transcription is at <http://www.slv.vic.gov.au/collections/treasures/jerilderieletter/jerilderie00.html> (accessed 2.2.2009). A list and transcription of all of Ned Kelly's known letters and notes can be found at <http://www.ironoutlaw.com/html/writings.html> (accessed 2.2.2009).

² I have used this term before, for example in "‘Allowing it to speak out of him’: The Heterobiographies of David Malouf, Antonio Tabucchi and Marguerite Yourcenar".

³ These can be read in de Man, *Wartime Journalism*. The companion volume *Responses on Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism*, eds. Hamacher, Hertz, and Keenan, gathers several reactions to these pieces, both supportive and accusatory of their author.

⁴ Jacques Derrida denounces: "il s'agit toujours de sauter sur une occasion [...] On ne résiste plus à la tentation d'exploiter à tout prix une aubaine" ("Comme le bruit" 220).

⁵ Marguerite Yourcenar describes *Mémoires d'Hadrien* (another example of heterobiography) as "portrait d'une voix" (527).

⁶ The biographical fact that Adair is the translator of Georges Perec's *La disparition* (as *A Void*), further demonstrates his interest in complex and challenging ethical, literary and technical questions.

⁷ The highest price found online at the time of writing this is £59.10, still a significant gain on the initial cost.

⁸ "Crime," Latin *crimen-criminis* (judicial decision, charge, indictment), from the base of *cernere* (cf. p. p. *cretus*) (to sift, distinguish, decide); "critic," Greek *krinesthai* (from which *crinein*, to separate, decide, judge), both from the Indo-European root *(s)q(e)rei. See Oions, *s.v.*

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Otherness and the Question of Authority

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Comparisons among cultures open up new perspectives. This paper is a comparative discussion of western Europeans and how they came to terms with the otherness of Natives in the New World and how that called into question their own authority as authors and indeed their worldview. This representation of the Natives is a recurrent theme. Often this representation and “translation” involved an overcoming of or coming to terms with other “barbarous” cultures as well as an inheritance from a previous empire or a rival. Questions of being there, of the rhetorical contract between writer and reader, and the typology of the Old and New World are among my concerns over the truth and lies that the authors and readers of travel accounts must negotiate. This might be an ethnology of reading or a use of ethnology to see the otherness within or the dramatic tension between self and other that writers and readers then and now experience.

Keywords: literature and ideology / Western culture / American natives / cultural imperialism / otherness

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Comparisons among cultures open up new perspectives. Here, I shall present a comparative discussion of western Europeans and how they came to terms with the otherness of Natives in the New World and how that called into question their own authority as authors and indeed their worldview. This representation of the Natives is a recurrent theme. Often this representation and “translation” involved an overcoming of or coming to terms with other “barbarous” cultures as well as an inheritance from a previous empire or a rival. Figures like Columbus, Caminha, Las Casas, Vitoria, Montaigne, Léry, Raleigh, Shakespeare, Aphra Behn and others raise issues of their own authority in terms of being eyewitnesses to encounters with Natives and slaves or as those who represent the strangeness of the Americas. Making familiar the strange and the strange the familiar occur simultaneously in some texts. Customs, women, cannibals all recall Herodotus, Pliny, Tacitus and other antecedents. Theorists like Tzvetan Todorov and Michel de Certeau have discussed otherness in the context of new world travel accounts, but I shall attempt to do so from a more overtly

comparative point of view. Moreover, I shall try to widen the discussion beyond their interests in Cortés and Montaigne. Questions of being there, of the rhetorical contract between writer and reader, and the typology of the Old and New World will be among my concerns over the truth and lies that the authors and readers of travel accounts must negotiate. This might be an ethnology of reading or a use of ethnology to see the otherness within or the dramatic tension between self and other that writers and readers then and now experience. First, I wish to provide some context for otherness.

Background

Otherness is something we can come to recognize in ourselves. We are sometimes alienated from ourselves in the sense that we are conscious of our estrangement from nature or the precariousness of life and the untold certainty of death. Even if we were to stay in the same place and not go far, we would see the cycle of life and death and understand our being a part from, while being a part of, nature.

If a person were to live in a circumscribed space and was to observe nature, he or she would see birth, growth and death, witness peace and violence, especially in the countryside. Nature is a book that yields many points of view and can give evidence for many ideas about life. The same would be true about observing people alone and in groups. None of this is surprising, but it is worth remembering that otherness is not in and of itself exotic or distant but constitutes an aspect of ourselves.

When a child learns to read, he or she encounters in print a re-enactment in a different mode of the acquisition of language. Infants encounter the world without being able to articulate words for the first months of their lives. They hear sounds and then imitate and apply them to the world about them. In time they build sentences, paragraphs and narratives in speech and writing. They come to learn that words represent and refract the world symbolically but are not the world.

In a sense language attempts to integrate us into the world through description and understanding, but it also reminds us of our alienation from the world. If our thoughts and being were one and the same with the world, we would not need language. Language is, then, a tool to understand the world, but is also a means of expressing the estrangement that human consciousness feels from the natural environment. In learning to read, if a child had only two books, and assuming this was a child who grew up with a Western education some time in the past five hundred years, then he or she might read the *Bible* and a book of Greek and Roman myths, so let us suppose this volume to be Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

In those two books, the child, who might have more basic redactions of those works until a certain age, could find the fall of Adam and Eve, who came to eat of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, and of the various transformations in life and death of figures among the Greek and Roman mortals who play out a drama of transformation. These changes in the *Bible* and Ovid show that life is not stable, secure and unified, but, rather, unstable, insecure and divided. But in the *Bible* and Ovid there are transformations that try to mend this Judeo-Christian and pagan sense of alienation. In Ovid, transformations occur that save the mortal from a situation or death and may even take a human and make him or her an animal or plant that can escape a dilemma or threat in the human world. The stories of Philomela and Adonis are such instances.

In the *Bible*, the tragic fall in the Garden of Eden reveals alienation from nature in which sin and the shame of the human body as something estranged in nature are discovered. Yet the *Bible* is a divine comedy even if it also contains many human falls and tragedies in the *de casibus* sense. The shape of the *Bible* is both typological and comic. The typology is, for example, between the Garden of Eden and the New Jerusalem that heaven promises. Jesus of Nazareth is the new Adam. The cross of the crucifixion is a new version of a tree of sin and death like the tree whose fruit so tempted Adam and Eve. But the killing of Christ on a cruciform, a human-made shape like a tree and derived from a tree, is a sin that brings death in order to free humans from lasting shame and death in the natural world because God enables Christ's redemption of that sin and death.

The human fall from grace in the garden is a kind of othering of the person from the person. Because of this division of the self from the self, what we might call the divided self, estrangement is part of the personality, at least as it is constructed in Western culture and in Christianity in particular. A sense of shame and guilt, for better or worse, enters into a child's view of the world. Quite possibly, adults inculcate this remorse, consciously or not, into their children.

The re-enactment of the fall is puberty or adolescent, which intensifies any milder or more latent sexual feelings a child might have. This sexual awakening, if it may be called that, is like Eve and Adam discovering the awkwardness of their bodies as they are revealed through their disobedience toward God in the garden. The body comes to mean shame, which is a very difficult thing in the face of the overwhelming urge of sexual desire. How can this body, so alienated from nature, want to seek another body to reproduce another body, which will also be born into innocence but also into original sin? It is the death of the body of Christ as a human sacrifice as the son of Man, but also in the development of theology, as the son

of God, that redeems the fallen human body that began with the choice of Eve and Adam in a solitary then social act of disobedience and rebellion against the unalienated garden into which God had planted them.

The Fall becomes a matter of knowledge (epistemology) and being (ontology) and has a moral dimension (good and evil). The betrayal and killing of Christ is also an instance of humans betraying humans and, in their later tellings and theology, a human turning against God. By crucifying the son of God and the son of man, Pilate, a representative of the political power of the Roman empire, allows for the violence of division among people. This is an evil deed that comes from human sin. The death, paradoxically, is a redemption and purification that enables God through Christ to allow a sacrifice to redeem humankind. Typologically, God asks Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and here He sacrifices his own son. The second coming of Christ at the Last Judgement means an atonement, an unothering, of those who will be saved. The damned, of course, go on in the hell of alienation for eternity, but those who achieve salvation become part of a divine comedy as they overcome the otherness and self-division of fallenness and sin.

But there is a pagan side to Western culture. And the child struggles with the pleasures of the body and desires that adults will, and certainly in the doctrine of Christian religion, try to downgrade, discipline or even demonize. Sex becomes a form of negative otherness. It is something, especially outside the institution of marriage, that is seen as a shame, sin, and aberration. But for the pagan, especially for pagan gods like Zeus, who is described as taking the form of a swan when raping Leda, the violence and the pleasures of sex and sexual conquest are seen in another light. In the pagan world, and this is how in *Leda and the Swan* W. B. Yeats represents the “feathered glory” of Zeus’ act, as rape is a prerogative of the god of gods, but Tarquin’s rape of Lucretia (Lucrece), even if he is a king, means banishment and the end of the Roman monarchy in favour of the republic.

In shame, Lucrece kills herself, and Brutus, more than her husband Collatine, at least in Shakespeare’s *Rape of Lucrece*, avenges this heinous act. The reader of Shakespeare’s poem is, however, not only introduced to the moral lesson and indignation of the rape but also experiences the rhetoric of seduction that Shakespeare uses in representing the temptation and lust of Tarquin. In fact, Tarquin knows that his lust for Lucrece is wrong but cannot help himself. She feels tainted and violated and becomes a sacrifice for Rome. Why she has to die is a matter of ideology and depends on views of rape and sex that are made to make women feel alienated from themselves through no fault of their own. And so the young reader, like

the adult reader, sees that we can become others to ourselves, divided from what we are, are said to be, or hope to be in many different ways.

In Ovid as well as in the *Bible*, knowledge is sexual almost from the start. The gods seduce mortal women, and Eve gives in to the urge to eat the fruit. Temptation is everywhere and the structures of narrative, theology and society are set up in such a way as to lecture children and adults in their shortcomings, their fall from the world and themselves. Innocence and experience allow for an ambivalence of pleasure and displeasure. Uncovering the body is, like discovery generally, a movement from ignorance to knowledge. Columbus' uncovering of the New World is often expressed in terms of clothed European bodies and naked Native bodies. There, desire and innocence are mixed together.

How much is recognition and how much misrecognition is always difficult to say. So much depends on points of view. The child is innocent but fallen from nature. Culture teaches him or her to revel in the body and to feel shame for having a body and certainly one that has sexual urges. The pagan and Christian selves are divided. In many cultures, there may be equivalents in different refractions and configurations. Here, I shall concentrate on ethnographic otherness, something more to do with travel to other places and peoples. It is good to remember that this hypothetical person who barely travelled and read only two books was already a stranger to himself or herself. Now to be a stranger in a strange land intensifies the question of otherness. It is to such a brief discussion that I now turn.

Being There and the Eyewitness

I have made much of childhood, and it is possible to say that what constitutes a child has changed a good deal over time. In the nineteenth century, Victor Hugo said: "Christopher Columbus only discovered America. I discovered the child" (qtd in Heywood 26). This was part of the Romantic invention of innocence in childhood that is also found in William Wordsworth and that William Blake explores in relation to what follows in *Songs of Innocence and Experience*. But here we begin with marvels and eyewitness reports of adults in strange places set out by Herodotus.

The strangeness of experience of other countries is something that Herodotus reports in his *Histories*. He is very much what we might call and ethnographer, discussing the customs of others. In one case, he highlights the breaking of usual gender roles among the Greeks among one group of women. In Book 4, his description of the Amazons is one that stresses difference and alterity:

It is reported of the Sauromatae, that when the Greeks fought with the Amazons, whom the Scythians call Oior-pata or “man-slayers,” as it may be rendered, *Oior* being Scythic for “man,” and *pata* for “to slay” – It is reported, I say, that the Greeks after gaining the battle of the Thermodon, put to sea, taking with them on board three of their vessels all the Amazons whom they had made prisoners; and that these women upon the voyage rose up against the crews, and massacred them to a man. (4.110)

Here are women who can overcome men in an overwhelming and ruthless fashion, something that Herodotus explains with their name – man-slayers. Although they do not know how to sail and drift after the Greek men are dead, they take control when they arrive in Scythia: “the first herd of horses which they fell in with they seized, and mounting upon their backs, fell to plundering the Scythian territory” (4.110). Having massacred, the Amazons plunder. The strangeness of all this Herodotus emphasizes: “The Scyths could not tell what to make of the attack upon them – the dress, the language, the nation itself, were alike unknown whence the enemy had come even, was a marvel” (4.111). The marvellous and the wondrous are part of facing the unknown. The Scyths make assumptions about the Amazons and act accordingly: “Imagining, however, that they were all men of about the same age, they went out against them, and fought a battle” (4.111). What happens is a surprise to them, so that they come to see their own misrecognition.

What they found on the battlefield was something quite different from what they expected. Herodotus reveals this with understatement and discretion: “Some of the bodies of the slain fell into their hands, whereby they discovered the truth” (4.111). Their reaction might be conventional in one sense, that these men, having discovered that their adversaries were women, considered the question in terms of kindness to the opposite sex and not a recoiling in horror or shock or a desire to dominate them through physical or sexual violence. “Hereupon they deliberated, and made a resolve to kill no more of them, but to send against them a detachment of their youngest men, as near as they could guess equal to the women in number, with orders to encamp in their neighbourhood, and do as they saw them do” (4.111). The strategy is one of balance and traction, but there is also another twist that avoids confrontation: “when the Amazons advanced against them, they were to retire, and avoid a fight – when they halted, the young men were to approach and pitch their camp near the camp of the enemy” (4.111). There is almost a comic element to the men fleeing and then coming near again so they can get used to each other. Herodotus makes the strategy of the mating ritual explicit: “All this they did on account of their strong desire to obtain children from so no-

table a race” (4.111). Ultimately, the Scyths pay the ultimate complement to these women, so strange to them, at least in the economy of sex and reproducing the group or nation. Their very difference from other women makes them “notable”.

This initial strangeness leads to a rapprochement. As the Amazons realized the youths meant them no harm, they find the camps approached nearer to each other each day. This allows them to make the discovery: “both parties led the same life, neither having anything but their arms and horses, so that they were forced to support themselves by hunting and pillage” (4.112). In otherness comes sameness or at least difference in similarity.

Well before Columbus said that he and his men communicated with the Natives by speech or signs, Herodotus relates the two. Scyths and Amazons have to negotiate in a situation of strangeness: “At last an incident brought two of them together – the man easily gained the good graces of the woman, who bade him by signs (for they did not understand each other’s language) to bring a friend the next day to the spot where they had met – promising on her part to bring with her another woman” (4.113). Sign language is a part of the encounter with radical difference early on. There is a sense of shared communication and of trust in it: “He did so, and the woman kept her word. When the rest of the youths heard what had taken place, they also sought and gained the favour of the other Amazons” (4.113). She is as good as her unspoken pledge, and this became an example for the meeting and mating of the Scyths and Amazons.

From this difference a new culture arises. They seem to be equals: “The two camps were then joined in one, the Scythians living with the Amazons as their wives” (4.114). But if anything in this narrative, Herodotus has made the women more unusual and capable. Here is another instance: “and the men were unable to learn the tongue of the women, but the women soon caught up the tongue of the men” (4.114). Without the women, there could be no full communication. “When they could thus understand one another, the Scyths addressed the Amazons in these words – ‘We have parents, and properties, let us therefore give up this mode of life, and return to our nation, and live with them. You shall be our wives there no less than here, and we promise you to have no others’” (4.114). And so while the men promise to have them as wives alone, they underestimate the otherness of the Amazons when they think they will go home with them and change their way of life. Herodotus highlights the alterity: “But the Amazons said – ‘We could not live with your women – our customs are quite different from theirs. To draw the bow, to hurl the javelin, to bestride the horse, these are our arts of womanly employments we know

nothing” (4.114). The nature of their status as warrior and hunter comes up again. In rejecting the idea of being domesticated in Scythia, they show that the Scythian men will have to come closer to the Amazon culture: “Your women, on the contrary, do none of these things; but stay at home in their wagons, engaged in womanish tasks, and never go out to hunt, or to do anything” (4.114). These men have to give up on the gender roles with which they have been raised: “We should never agree together. But if you truly wish to keep us as your wives, and would conduct yourselves with strict justice towards us, go you home to your parents, bid them give you your inheritance, and then come back to us, and let us and you live together by ourselves” (4.114). This new domestic and cultural arrangement is a new situation without traditional domesticity. The Scythians have to leave behind their notions of gender roles and see things anew. They have to accept a new otherness within them and their group.

The women are not finished with their conditions even though the young men complied with their earlier ones. The Amazons tell their young returning husbands: “We are ashamed, and afraid to live in the country where we now are. Not only have we stolen you from your fathers, but we have done great damage to Scythia by our ravages. As you like us for wives, grant the request we make of you. Let us leave this country together, and go and dwell beyond the Tanais” (4.115). These young men also comply to this request, so that the Amazons set out how and where they will live. Their home will become a stranger to them.

Crossing the river they found a new land in three days and this new home became something stable. Herodotus is presenting a history and a tradition: “The women of the Sauromatae have continued from that day to the present to observe their ancient customs, frequently hunting on horseback with their husbands, sometimes even unaccompanied; in war taking the field; and wearing the very same dress as the men” (4.116). There is no sense of weakening of the otherness of the Amazons. They are not contained or assimilated into a Scythian male world. Instead, they have been warriors who set the terms for their new culture and homeland and continue to avoid conventional gender roles and domesticity. Herodotus does not put this into the past as a myth but as a living tradition to which he turns his ethnographic eye even if he is taking this from the reports of others.

Being interested in ethnography, Herodotus ends this section on the Amazons with observations about language and customs: “The Sauromatae speak the language of Scythia, but have never talked it correctly, because the Amazons learnt it imperfectly at the first” (4.117). Even though Herodotus has made the Amazons into better linguists than the male Scythians, they were not speaking their Native language and so build

that into the language of their new home. It is a little curious that the Scythians themselves could not have corrected this shortcoming because it was originally their language and one might assume that children would learn their mother tongues from their fathers as well. Herodotus is adept with the detail: “Their marriage-law lays it down that no girl shall wed till she has killed a man in battle” (4.117). This is a strange condition of marriage, and would be in Greek or Scythian society, but makes some sense in the context of a society of women warriors who have been threatened by and have had to fight men. Rather than comment on this or censure the Amazons, Herodotus adds another detail: “Sometimes it happens that a woman dies unmarried at an advanced age, having never been able in her whole lifetime to fulfil the condition” (4.117). This observation is more factual, and the otherness here is accepted within the logic of Amazon society. They have their husbands, who have listened to them, but they must still kill men in order to marry men. This strangeness rests like a contradiction, but as long as the men listen and agree, as they have in Herodotus’ narrative, then all is fine. The men bend and compromise, and in turn they have been linked in a new arrangement with the Amazons. Herodotus does not include any ravings of threatened masculinity or any attacks on women who would not be women. They may be marvellous and strange, but they are notable. Alterity need not be something terrible to be denounced.

Columbus also comes to terms with others who do not share the same dress and customs and who seem to have a different way of looking at the body and war. In writing about his first encounters with indigenous peoples, he says: “The people of this island, and of the other islands which I have found and of which I have information, all go naked, men and women, as their mothers bore them, although some women cover a single place with the leaf of a plant or with a net of cotton which they make for the purpose”. (6) This is the boldness of being naked and the somewhat modesty of taking some cover. As if Eve had realized she were naked after eating of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. Columbus switches from nakedness and cover to war: “They have no iron and steel or weapons, nor are they fitted to use them, not because they are not well built men and of handsome stature, but because they are marvellously timorous” (6). Their character is pliable and not fierce, quite unlike the Amazons in Herodotus. According to Columbus, “They have no other arms than weapons made of canes cut in seeding time, to the ends of which they fix a small sharpened stick. And they do not dare to make use of these” (6). Their weapons are not threatening to Columbus, who finds innocence and pliability in them. They are not fierce, which is perhaps

prelapsarian, but they also do not pose much of a threat in war if their technology is taken into consideration.

Columbus has his ethnographical side. He tries to express in some times as an eyewitness. He writes about the topics of women, monsters, property, race and climate. In Columbus' account, men, except the king, seem content to be with one woman. He also, perhaps quite conveniently, thinks that the Indians share and do not seem to value property as a private possession. Having expected (as others did) to see monsters, Columbus admits that he has not (14). But Columbus reports something he has not witnessed: the mating of Cannibals and Amazons, those that eat men and those who can do without them: "As I have found no monsters, so that I have had no report of any, except in an island 'Quaris', the second at the coming into the Indies, which is inhabited by a people who are regarded in all the islands as very fierce and who eat human flesh" (16). The danger of these fierce flesh-eaters is combined with the threat of women warriors, which does not seem to have concerned Herodotus as much as it does Columbus: "These are those who have intercourse with the women of 'Matinino', which is the first island met on the way from Spain to the Indies, in which there is not a man." (16) Columbus then does get into a kind of ethnological zone which seems more descriptive and dispassionate, so the registers of language and tones shift within sentences and passages. He continues: "These women engage in no feminine occupation, but use bows and arrows of cane, like those already mentioned, and they arm and protect themselves with plates of copper, of which they have much" (16; see Hart 1994). Like Herodotus, Columbus tries to make sense of other cultures and genders while establishing the authority of his own text. For Columbus, the echoes of Herodotus, however intended, create a network of textual authority and even tradition that place his text of the shockingly new – this is the New World after all and it got in the way of Asia – within a familiar framework that Herodotus helped to establish with his history and ethnology.

There are other eyewitness accounts that also call attention to textual authority and writing.

Pedro Álvares Cabral is another good example. His voyage included a journey to the New World, Africa and Asia. Brazil was to be a key colony for the Portuguese, who claimed it during Easter week of 1500. Pero Vaz de Caminha, one of the crew of Cabral, recorded the events of the voyage. Caminha represents themes that Columbus had reported in the New World. For instance, he brings up the innocence that made it easy to convert the Natives, the nakedness of the inhabitants, the Native signs that indicate gold and other riches, the will of God and salvation. Even before

Cabral's ships left Brazil for India, Caminha, who held the position of writer for the fleet, wrote a letter to King Manuel. Here, he described the stay in Brazil. Caminha, who seems to have sailed on Cabral's ship, says that he is taking the middle way: "may Your Highness take my ignorance for good intention, and believe that I shall not set down here anything more than I saw and thought, either to beautify or to make it less attractive" (Caminha 5). He presents himself as a reliable eyewitness, a stance much taken at this time (see Caminha, Hart 2003, rpt. 2008). Another instance of an early explorer is Binot de Paulmier de Gonneville, whose relation of the voyage to Brazil in 1504, is the oldest account in French concerning an eyewitness report of the New World. This narrative wrestles with some of the same issues as Columbus' writing does. For Columbus, in the account of his first voyage, the Natives thought the Spanish gods. Gonneville thought that the indigenous people he encountered considered the French to be angels. Like the aboriginals that Bernal Díaz described in his account of Hernán Cortés' conquest, those Gonneville meets were much taken by the power of writing. Moreover, Jacques Cartier maintained that the Natives thought the French to be gods. Like Gonneville, Cartier planted a cross as a sign of possession. There becomes a ceremonial use of the audience. The French pattern of taking possession, which Gonneville used, involved Natives symbolically or literally as part of the audience during the ceremony of planting the cross. The authority of the text was political as well as ethnographical and was as much for rivals as well as other peoples encountered anew. The French were making claims in face of the Spanish and Portuguese and Spaniards (see *Les Français* 1946; *Voyages au Canada* 1981).

Other important ways of considering otherness is translation, that is, the assimilation of the work of another culture into another. For instance, Richard Eden used translation to advocate English colonization and then the imperial union of Spain and England. Another instance of considering alterity is the use of eyewitness accounts of the conflict between the French and Spanish in Florida, such as Thomas Hacket's translation of Jean Ribault and Nicolas Le Challeux's narrative. Translations can be used for different political, religious and other ideological purposes. Eden explores potential alliance of England with Spain. Ribault and Le Challeux are French Protestants whose texts helped to produce the Black Legend of Spain.

The Black Legend and Columbus were two important aspects in creating and questioning authority, antecedents and origins in texts about the New World. The charges Richard Hakluyt the Younger took from Bartolomé de Las Casas against the Spaniards in the Americas were dire. They included

allegations of depopulation and devastation of between 12 million men, women, and children over the course of 40 years. These accusations were familiar because they appeared in earlier European sources. Among these texts were English and French versions of Las Casas. Hakluyt translated passages from Las Casas's description of Hispaniola, cruelties that included the author's testimony. Las Casas's condemnation also occurred in a marginal heading that stressed his status of an eyewitness to the cruelty: "I have seene all the aforesaide thinges and others infinite" (Hakluyt, *Discourse*, 56). Hakluyt's section on Las Casas left off with the Spanish attacking the Indians with their dogs and making a pact to kill 100 Natives for every Spaniard they killed. Hakluyt also understood that even in his own Anglican world and with his ties to French Protestants like Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, he needed to be balanced in matters of religion in relation to European and international politics. Thus, Hakluyt supplemented this description of atrocities, by turning to another authority, this time Johannes Matellus Sequanus, a Catholic, who confirms the words of Las Casas, a member of a Catholic religious order (Hakluyt 59, see Hart 2001).

André Thevet was important among the French for providing early knowledge of the Indies. Like Oviedo, a Spaniard who wrote a key text in the 1520s, Thevet emphasized eyewitness accounts. Often writers after Columbus in various western European languages showed the anxiety over originality. Who was there first became a motivated question for explorers and writers after Columbus. There were many responses to Columbus. For example, his successors praised him and supplemented him. They also claimed to have additional kinds of knowledge and undermined him as the discoverer of the New World. Sometimes they attempted to ignore him (see Hart 1996). Truth and lies, the lack of reliability and the claim of authority worked in tension in the texts of Thevet and his predecessors, contemporaries and successors.

Other Issues and Conclusions

The rhetorical contract between the writer and the reader is something key to the context of these ethnographical texts. Rhetoric was used to persuade others, whether monarchs or courtiers or readers, for or against exploration, expansion, settlement, and empire (see Hart 2005). Rhetoric, or art of persuasion, is also the relation between speaker and audience, writer and reader. What that connection is, depends on a tension between authority and the play the reader has, that is, how much give and take is involved in the textual interplay of production and reception.

It is not as though the audience always approved of expansion or plans to change patterns from the past. A royal council in Spain rejected Columbus' petition. During December 1486 and January 1487, the Columbus commission, composed of *letrados* (mainly university-educated lawyers at court) and *sabios* (men learned in cartography and astronomy) rejected Columbus's arguments for the support of his voyage. Moreover, they passed their findings along to Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish sovereigns. The audience was not always receptive to persuasion. The learned and leaders in Spain, or Europe did not necessarily embrace expansion and empire and when they did so, they approached the idea with care. Even after the landfall in the western Atlantic, Columbus and the Crown of Spain fought over governance, ownership and profits in regard to the new lands. The writers of these accounts also show ambivalence in European representations of the lands and peoples of the New World, representing the Natives as fierce and paradisaical. Verrazzano is as much like this than Columbus. The idealization of the land and its peoples is redolent of paradise. Sometimes the indigenes appear as barbarians. There is a kind of mix of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel and the riches of Asia. At other times, the New World is an innocent place that helps to judge in a kind of typology the corruption and shortcomings of the Old World. This could take the form of a Christian critique of riches and power. Some church intellectuals used this tradition to call up the absurd and cruel aspects of European expansion into the New World. During December of 1511 in Hispaniola, one of the members of the Dominicans, Antón Montesino, preached two sermons that were critical of the abuses of the Natives in the place where Columbus had first landed. The sermon attacked the governor and the established settlers of the colony as infidels. Montesino enraged the son of Christopher, Diego Columbus, who appealed to the king, who ordered the Castilian provincial of the Dominican order to correct the situation. This actual reaction is different to a parallel fictional account of a similar context but written later. Lope de Vega's *El Nuevo Mundo descubierto por Cristóbal Colón* (c. 1598–1603) represents the Indian king, Dulcanquellín saying to Columbus' brother, Bartolomé, that a gentle, peaceful Christianity is a kind of advocacy that will convert the Natives (see Hart 2005 ch. 3). Words, oral and in texts, became a ground of contention in interpreting the New World.

Each of the texts of the New World involves the authority of earlier learning, the status of the author or the patron, or the eyewitness. There is in all this a typology of the Old and New World. In *Utopia* (1516), Thomas More uses Vespucci's voyage as part of the context for Raphael Hythlodæus' account. One aspect of the fiction of finding Utopia is that

Raphael and his friends stayed behind at the fort in Brazil after Vespucci left. Thomas More emphasizes how the generosity of a Native ruler allowed these Europeans to survive and what excellent institutions the aboriginal commonwealths had. More also uses a typology between the Old and New Worlds to satirize Europe. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo's *Natural History of the West Indies* (1526) addresses Charles V. In this work, he also emphasizes the importance of experience and eyewitness accounts and supports his view with an appeal to classical authority. Oviedo advocates an observation of nature rather than on other books. Still, he appeals to the authority of Pliny, who, in his *Natural History*, included firsthand observations and accurate scholarly citations of the sources for the stories that he had read or heard.

In *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies* Las Casas speaks of himself as a witness and an eyewitness to the terrible events in the Indies. In the Synopsis, he says: "Some years later, he observed that not a few of the people involved in this story had become so anaesthetized to human suffering by their own greed and ambition that they had ceased to be men in any meaningful sense of the term" (Las Casas 3–4). Jean de Léry's *History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil* (1580 ed.) presented the Natives in Brazil as a way to criticize the French at home. During the Wars of Religion, Brazil became something of a touchstone for Léry. In 1574 Léry had published his account of the siege of Sancerre. He had been there during those horrors. The typology was thus: he was an eyewitness who had lived through hardship in the Old World and New. In "Des Cannibales" (1580), Montaigne uses Plato's representation of Solon's account of Atlantis, to criticize French and European expansion and commerce in the New World. In the exploration of cannibals, Montaigne concentrates on the French and Europeans in relation to the New World. In "Des Coches", Montaigne focuses on the Spanish and asks why the new lands could not have been conquered under the Greeks and Romans. That way the Europeans would have brought the peoples virtue rather than teach them European avarice and cruelty. Montaigne motive sometimes aims for a plain and true narrative of the New World. This stance sometimes led him to qualify the use of rhetorical and narrative embellishment. In one instance, he establishes the credentials of someone who worked for him as a witness. "This man who I had, was a simple and plain man, who was in a proper condition to bear true witness, for refined people are more curious and notice more things, but they gloss them, and to add to the value of the interpretation, and to persuade, they cannot prevent themselves from altering the History a little." (Montaigne, *Essais*, I, 169) It is possible that Montaigne mimics the travel literature he discussed. This is

the view of Michel de Certeau, who thinks of Montaigne's essay on cannibals as having the same structure as a travel account. De Certeau says that this essay includes the "outbound journey", the depiction of "savage society", and the "return voyage" (de Certeau 69–70; see Hart 2005). The relation between then and now has many layers of interpretation as writers are readers who are also read and written about. Authors have as their other the readers within them, not to mention those without, so authority has a readerly dimension.

There is, of course, extensive scholarship on other among these figures and so the questions of authority and authorship and the nature of their texts are much debated. Oviedo can serve as an example. Oviedo attracted controversy. Tzvetan Todorov describes him as a historian who is a conquistador (Todorov 1992: 148) and a xenophobe and racist (151). J. H. Elliott represents an Oviedo as someone who thinks Columbus deserves better recognition (Elliott 1992: 11); who is a natural historian full of wonder (21) who respects Pliny too much (32); who supports direct personal observation over traditional authority (40); who is a sceptic, like Léry, about Amerindian conversion (43). For Anthony Pagden, Oviedo is an example of a European observer who describes things that looked alike as identical (Pagden 1986: 11) and a natural historian who has a low opinion of the Natives and whom Humboldt calls the Pliny of the New World (Pagden 1993: 56). There are layers upon layers, then, in relation to author and audience then and now (see Hart 2005).

As we have seen there were controversial figures like Oviedo and Thevet, who was cosmographer to the king of France. Oviedo had lobbied for a similar post in Spain three decades before. Thevet claims to provide valuable advice and insisted on his unique ability to combine astute observations of the New World with strong scholarship.

Whereas Jean de Léry and François de Belleforest ridiculed his scholarship and character, Ronsard and Du Bellay esteemed his work. In so many ways, Spain had led the way in the discussion of the New World. Francisco de Vitoria was a key figure in asking difficult questions of his country's involvement in the New World. For instance he asked by what right (*iuris*) the barbarians were subjected to Spanish rule. He also considered what powers in temporal and civil matters did the Spanish monarchy have in regard to the "Indians". He also explored spiritual and religious matters what powers the monarchy or church had or did not have in relation to the "Indians". This self-criticism complicated the notion of the authority of church, sovereign and state (in this case Spain). Walter Raleigh also shows ambivalent and intricate attitudes in *The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Bewtiful Emphyre of Guiana* (1596). Here, he tends toward the anti-

Spanish and pro-Native position of the literature of the Black Legend. He argues that the Spanish conquest was an illegal act that killed twenty millions. Still, his argument is also one of out-conquering the Spaniards and finding even more gold than they did. In the body of this text, Raleigh developed the need to observe the Spanish example of colonization while using its own methods to subvert it.

More than nine decades later, in 1688, Aphra Behn published a novel, *Oroonoko*, which showed another dark side of colonization. This book exposes the inhumanity of slavery. This work is a defence of a noble African prince who was enslaved and is full of ambivalence. The narrator and the characters create an ambivalent narrative landscape.

It seems to invite the question whether the narrator is a character or an expression of Aphra Behn in something approaching a memoir in the form of a novella, romance, or travel narrative. The Dedication claims to be a representation of Behn's experience in Surinam. Personal experience and fictional expression mix and are part of a social as well as literary movement.

Truthfulness, fictions and outright falsehoods are some important things that the authors and readers of travel accounts must negotiate. In *Gulliver's Travels* Jonathan Swift has the king of Brobdingnag call the English vermin. Olaudah Equiano's *The Life of Olandah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African* (1789; rpt. 1814) autobiography is also critical of Europeans. In the Dedication of 1792, Equiano (ca.1745–ca.97), addressing the House of Lords and the House of Commons, sounds like Gulliver describing the Europeans, and especially the English, as vermin because he remembers with horror the first sight of a European. Even at the conclusion of his narrative, Equiano continues to press for the end of the cruel practice of slavery.

The truth of one culture or empire can be called into question. Narratives of helping others or of superiority can be turned on their heads. The authority of the authors comes under scrutiny in representations of the other in the encounter with new cultures. In Western Europe and in the Atlantic World, authors and readers came to question the authority of Europeans at home and away in a typology that complicated textual, cultural and political life. The awakening of otherness in the child and in sexuality, the otherness from within, can also be intensified in the ethnological urge of texts about other cultures.

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I is Someone Else: The Subject of a Poem in Process, Subject in the Process of a Poem

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The article thematises the discursive power of poetic discourse by discussing some (historical) moments in theory which treat poetry as transformative. It focuses on the authorial lyric subject and on the poetic self becoming the other, while seeking to touch on some problematic points which can stimulate further debate on the concept of the lyric subject.

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / poetry / authorial function / lyrical subject

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This otherness, this “Not-Being-us” is all there is to look in the mirror, though no one can say how it came to be this way.

J. Ashbery, *Self-portrait in a convex mirror*

The title of the article recalls two manifestos which are widely considered landmarks of literary studies and the humanities and social sciences in general – the famous text by Barthes, *The Death of the Author* (1968), and Foucault’s lecture *What Is an Author?* (1969). It has been established that in these texts, and in general, both authors promote the complete erasure of the author and subject from literature and other discourses. Subsequent interpretations have included, more or less justifiably, Barthes’ theories on the death of the author within the paradigm of the death of the subject. Also, at the beginning of the lecture, Foucault, perhaps misleadingly announces, if not the death, then the evanescence of the subject, when he says, that the act of writing “creates a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears” (26). But both concepts re-emerge in Barthes and Foucault. After all, at the end of his life, Foucault returned to the issue of the subject.¹

It is true that in *The Death of the Author* Barthes dethrones the author as the Modern-Era institution of individualistic capitalist ideology and the

associated positivistic literary history, based on a search for the author's intentions and a prescribed single meaning, burdened with psychological biographism. At the same time, to Barthes, bringing down this institution signifies the beginning of the "era of the reader". Even from this point of view, the present reading (already distant enough) of such ideas, born in the spirit of "the linguistic turn", when language itself was spoken everywhere, preceding the subject, is not **thought through if limited only** to the disappearance of the subject. In addition, by enthroning the reader, Barthes establishes a new subject. Naturally, we should bear in mind that in the subsequent post-structuralist loosening of the (literary) text as a hermetic, self-contained structure into an infinite inter-text, the new subject remained for a long time only an implicit theoretical dispositif, because the "loosening" was limited primarily to the field of a language-system-code, and subjectless, anonymous and autonomous iterability, and did not become widespread in theories of discourse and utterance which focus on intersubjectivity in the radical historicity of discourse.² So in *The Pleasure of the Text* (1973) Barthes distanced himself from his radical position and even returned to the author as the reader's phantasm – the image of the author in the text – which the reader needs as much as the author needs the reader. However, this image is not a representation of the author, or its projection; it is the reader's construct (*Le Plaisir*, 38). This text tackles the issue of the articulation of the subject even more clearly, and highlights the problem of defining the literary subject in the spirit of a "materialistic" theory of the subject (82), essentially emphasising the problem of understanding the literary subject as substance and identity. As Barthes says, subject as identity does still emerge in the text, "not as an illusion", but as "fictive identity", because in the act of reading "a certain pleasure is derived from a way of imagining oneself as individual". However, this does not revolve around "the illusion of a unity", but around "the theater of society in which we stage our plural" (83). In *The Pleasure of the Text* there is also a metaphor about the text – not as a fabric, but interweaving, text as a process, where the subject–spider dissolves in its web. (86) Subject in the process of a text, subject of a text in process? This question does not open new horizons, as literary theory and criticism have examined the process of literary text at least since Ingarden. (see Juvan, *Literarna* 134)

In Foucault's lecture, the image put forward by Barthes is reflected in the examination of the concept. Foucault stresses the need to return to the question of the subject and appeals to both the academicism of the positivistic tradition and the growing conservatism of structuralistic modernity. A return to the subject is needed "not in order to reestablish the theme of an originating subject, but to grasp the subject's points of

insertion, modes of functioning and system of dependencies” (39). The author function, which he introduces, was seen by many interpreters as erasing the author and the subject within the order of discourse; however, it is only “one of the potential specifications of the subject functions” (40). Actually, Foucault endows the author with new power, calling the author the founder of discursivity at a time when there was general animosity toward the concepts of authorship and author. He maintains that all discourses with author functions possess a plurality of self, whereby the author function is provided not only by one of the selves, but by the very author function, as it enables a dispersion of simultaneous selves. Therefore, the author function is one of the subjective points in the discourse, having an “editing” role. Therefore, we should not seek the author in the real author or (fictitious) speaker. (34) With Foucault, the author function, which is understood as an intra-discourse function, is located on the boundary between the reality outside the discourse and the discourse, on the edge of the discourse, and always presents a split, distance, difference.

A similar notion of the author function in terms of the editing principle, but on a completely different philosophical and theoretical basis, can be found in Bakhtin’s concept of the exotopy (“outsideness”) of the author with regard to a depicted world. With Bakhtin, the author function translates into the so-called pure or primary author, which is the depicting-presenting principle, *natura creata creans*, and is in the work *as a whole*. Authorial outsideness- exotopy arises from the premise of dialogism and polyphony as prerequisites for the existence of literature. To Bakhtin, the author as a discursive function always, including in poetry, directs all words into others’ voices, including the image of the author and to other “authorial masks”. (Bakhtin, *The Problem of the Text* 110)

These introductory schematic theoretical notes are interesting for several reasons. Despite having in principle resolved the issue of the relationship between the literary subject and empirical author in elaborate systems of literary theory, the issue of the so-called lyric subject at the less theoretical level, i.e. at the level of the reader, reviews, essays and teaching, is still closely linked with the issue of the author and the autobiographical dimension of a poem. The concepts of subject in poetry promoted by literary criticism have usually been based on a selection of eternal “axioms” developed either by (simplistically) re-interpreting the Romantic paradigm, or the extreme anti-humanistic model, the “paradigm of the signifier”. If the issue of categorising the subject is always *work in progress* and is, as Sartre says, above all a project, which can always become something else (Klepec 13), modern literary theory has fixed the concept of the so-called lyric subject onto the position of the speaker whose speech is not com-

municated through any other speech authority. The unified, single-layer position, the *origo* of the text, is also at the core of the traditional belief in the monologism of poetry.³ The lyric subject understood in this respect, which has been linked to both basic paradigms, is in many cases essential for defining poetry as genre. (e.g. Wolf 27–28) However, this did not go beyond the scope of two paradigms.

On the one hand, some most recent theoretical texts, particularly under the influence of literary pragmatics, to a large extent affirmatively examine K. Hamburger's theory of the lyric subject, which supposedly equates the so-called lyric "I" with the real, existing subject – the poet.⁴ The lyric subject which Hamburger postulates as the subject of the statement is usually understood as real, as non-fictional, but his statements as fictional. All theories disregard the specifics of Hamburger's subject of the statement.⁵

Naturally, such an interpretation is problematic. Firstly, due to its psychologistic biographical and psychological references. Secondly, it rejects the fictitiousness of literary discourse. Thirdly, because, should it consider the fictitiousness of lyric utterances, it is limited to representational concepts of poetry (and language) and fails to grasp its performative and transformative power. It fails to capture the moment of processuality, eventness (of text-discourse and its subject), and the specifics of poetic utterance and reference.

However, the unsurpassed reception topos, based on the (trivialised) Romantic understanding of poetry as exclusively a confessional form of trans-textual individual inner self, does not present the only problem in contemporary discourse on poetry. In the spirit of "phenomenological reduction", systems of literary theory have most often limited the lyric subject to a uniform, monologic, solely elocutionary fictitious instance in a hermetic text, seen from the perspective of language as a system based on the sign, and not of discourse in its eventness. In this respect, the most radical are those views of the subject in poetry based on the misunderstood call by Mallarmé for the "*elocutionary* disappearance of the poet" in the text. They interpret the depersonalisation of the elocutionary position in modern poetry as its complete desubjectivisation. In their opinion, the subject disappears from the poem when the latter no longer has anthropomorphic form, which is most often realised through the first-person subject of the utterance, the lyric persona.

The reason the concept of the lyric subject in literary theory seemed increasingly problematic and useless should probably be attributed to the fact that it emerged in philosophical traditions which understood the subject in the sense of (unified) identity and substance. Relying on the exami-

nation of the configuration of text as discourse focusing on its dynamism, lack of fixity, and its processuality, and (non-egological) theories of the subject discussing the same concepts we should reconsider and seek to redefine the levels where a subjectivity configuring the poetic discourse is simultaneously created by and within this discourse, first in the very act of creation, and then in the chain of further actualisations of a text. This would provide some logical starting points for the reconceptualisation of the lyric subject.

Barthes' concept of the dissolution of the subject in the text, Foucault's theory on the author function as one of the subject functions which enables and manages the plurality of self in (literary) discourse, and particularly Bakhtin's principle of exotopy and polyphony applied to poetry, (which with the help of Beveniste's theory of enunciation and Ducrot's theory⁶ of polyphony could be developed so as to make it possible to establish two configurative, most often overlapping fields of the subject of uttering and utterance), are only three relevant ways to begin thinking about the articulation of lyric subjectivity. Here, these theoretical views have been used as a background for the consideration of the lyric configuration which takes the position of, at least apparent, centralisation in Baudelaire's binary poetics of *vaporisation and centralisation of the self*. Rimbaud's "*I is someone else*" sheds light on the issue in several ways. Even if we focus only on those examples in the history of poetry where it is possible to discuss the overlap of different articulation fields of poetic subjectivity in a way which creates an authorial subject–persona,⁷ we can distinguish a clear enough historical evolution of autopoetic poetic texts, meta-poetic contributions by authors, and some theories of poetry which more or less explicitly thematise the becoming of the *other* of the poem in the performative and transformative dynamics of *poiesis* based on the oscillation between identity and otherness, in each case in a given historical context. This tendency has been in opposition to the identificatory author thesis which flourished with the expressive aesthetics of Romanicism. By presenting some historical moments which thematise the transformative dispositif of poetry, "*I is someone else*", some problematic points will be introduced which can serve as a starting point for re-examining the configuration of the subject in poetry.

With the creation of a genre triad according to the dialectical principle, the understanding of lyric poetry as a subjective form of poetry was finally established. The final synthesis of romantic conceptions was given by Hegel in *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (1835–1838). According to Hegel, it is the individual subject that represents the content of a lyric work of art, while the lyric poem is a singular way in which, through this content, the mind comes to consciousness of itself. (Hegel 518) Lyric poetry cre-

ates a closed, self-reflexive subjective world, external circumstances being only an excuse for the expression of the mind. The proper source of lyric poetry is inner subjective life (527) and, sometimes, the lyric poem can be merely a “tra-la-la, singing” (ibid.), since the role of “external” musicality is to emphasize the inner musicality of the soul (543) and to satisfy it through the music of words. (527) Although a lyric poem is a representation of subjectivity, in Hegel’s text there is no explicit discussion of the connection between the person of the lyric subject/persona and the author. There is discussion of the expression of subjectivity in the sense of it permeating the whole text. (525) We can, of course, presuppose this connection in Hegel. In his introduction to his discussion of lyric poetry, we can notice certain elements that do not exactly speak in favor of the identificatory author thesis. According to Hegel, the creating subject of epic poetry disappears in the presented objective world it depicts. The subject of lyric poetry can avoid this alienation of himself by absorbing into himself the entire world of objects and stamping them with his own inner consciousness. (516)⁸ The self-alienation of the subject, which has been the topos of lyric poetry since antique theories, is at first completely rejected by Hegel. In lyric poetry, the spirit descends into itself out of the objectivity of the subject-matter, looks into its own consciousness and, instead of the external reality of the matter, displays this consciousness in the spirit’s subjective disposition (ibid.). But immediately after this, self-alienation is implied, namely the self-alienation presupposed by *mimesis* itself - as *poiesis*. Poetic expression must not remain merely “the casual expression of an individual’s own immediate feelings and ideas”, but has to become the “language of the poetic inner life”, which does belong to the poet as an individual, but has to acquire a clear universal validity. (ibid.) Hegel sees this validity in the authenticity of feelings and correctness of observations. But the confessional nature of poetry, in as much as we read this thought in view of this, is here not meant as direct, but indirect: poetic discourse communicates *poetic inner life*, lyric poetry *presents* – “it vividly invents and finds the appropriate term”. (517) It objectifies and purifies: “poetry makes our heart a subject of its transformation, but it does not stop at ejecting content from the subject, separating it from its direct connection with the subject, but makes it into an object purified of all incidental moods in which the liberated inner life, at the same time, returns to itself in a calm self-consciousness and is with itself.” (ibid.) Here, it is the lyric *mimesis* that is thematised as the *agent*; what is thematised is its active nature bestowed on it by the *poiesis* itself. (cf. Ricoeur, *Krog* 67–78) Hegel, therefore, implicitly dismisses the identity between inner life and its representation; inner life can only be identical with itself, but such inner

life is dumb and without representations. (517) Poetry as an act creates and changes, transforms. (532–533) Here, difference is connected to feeling; for, as Hegel says, the heart that before *poiesis* merely felt, now also apprehends this feeling. What is implied, then, is also the cathartic role of lyric poetry. In this passage of *Aesthetics*, we can discern all the elements that took various places in the subsequent theories of the lyric subject and lyric poetry, forming two paradigms we could name confessional-authentic and autonomous-autotelic: subjectivity, affectivity, confession – which seem to be reflected by considering the transformative nature of *poiesis* – self-reflectivity, emphasis on the sensorial and graphic configuration level. When discussing types of lyric proper, in particular dithyrambic poetry, Hegel says also that a subject “in his ecstasy, is directly absorbed into the Absolute” (544). Such elevation, says Hegel, does not mean that a subject delves into concrete content, but that “an undefined enthusiasm fills the poet in his tendency to enable us to feel and directly observe that which is unsayable for our consciousness” (545). Here, Hegel interprets poetic enthusiasm not only as the subject’s ecstasy, as a (transcendental) tendency to immerse himself in infinity (544) and the Absolute, but also as a (immanent) tendency to make the unsayable felt. Hegel relates the element of enthusiasm and the unsayable to rhythm. It seems that, in this, he calls attention to the double role of rhythm – its mediating and expressive function – saying that rhythm serves the subjective imagination in the enthusiasm of representation. This element can be related to Schleiermacher’s theory of style and Novalis’ theory of poetic presentation, *Darstellung*, to which I shall shortly return.

Hegel thus weaves the unsayable, which has been the topos of poetic modernity since Romanticism, into the historical thread of theories of (divine) poetic inspiration, from Democritus, Plato, Horace, Quintilian, and Cicero, to Renaissance reinterpretations, among which the most famous and influential was Ficino’s theory of *furor divinus*. Here, the transformative dispositif of poetry is interpreted as transcendent and even depersonifying. Some Renaissance theories introduced the first theoretical examination of the writer’s individuality, which was, however, until the late Renaissance linked to the Neo-Platonist doctrine of poetic enthusiasm and divine inspiration, when the inter-textual and reception topos of the individualised and idealised figure of the Poet-Author, based on the ideal of Dante and Petrarca and their lives, was finalised.⁹ With *furor poeticus*, the individualised person of the poet rises above the others. On the basis of the supranatural origin of poetic inspiration in a poetic act, the persona should then coalesce with the higher order of the impersonal or suprapersonal, to be, at least in an ideal theoretical model, absorbed in the Neoplatonist One

in mystical ecstasy. The individualisation of the poetic genius, which establishes the difference between the image of the poet and other images, results in or should in theory result in another difference that should lead to depersonification. If the self does not disintegrate, then at least the I=I identity principle does. The dialectic between the individualisation (that resulted in the formation of the authorial lyric persona, while giving rise to the inter-textual topos of the figure of the inspired Poet), and the transformation in the ecstasy of the poetic act – which arises from the assumed divine source of inspiration – is often dialogically reflected in the vivacious polyphony of Renaissance poetry, in Ronsard, for example, where in the elocutionary position, the identity of the authorial subject often slips. Most often, the lyric persona is divided into the authorial persona and its metamorphosis into mythological subjects. This divides the diegetic frame on several levels, while shedding light on the split between the subject of the utterance/enounced and subject of the enunciation. (cf. Dauvois 46–58 and 90–03)

The theory of divine poetic inspiration on the Dionysian basis also resonates with Nietzsche and his discussion about poetry in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872). He clearly outlines several significant presuppositions: firstly, poetry cannot be a subjective form of art; subjectivity as understood by contemporary aesthetics is a deception, as every art in order to become art requires redemption from the “I”, complete objectification. (66) And secondly: poetry is essentially tied to the spirit of music, while the poetic creative process arises from the musical, which is in essence Dionysian. Thus the lyric poet in the creative act first becomes entirely one with “the primordial oneness of his painful contradictory nature and produces the reflection of this oneness as music” (68) in a Dionysian process. This “mystical state of self-alienation” is the reason that “the images of the lyric genius are nothing but himself”, while he continues to act as a “moving central point”. (71) In the lyric poem there is no epic protection against “unifying with its own figures”; the world created by the lyric genius is thus the objectification of himself, according to Nietzsche. Following Nietzsche’s logic, objectification in the transformative Dionysian process is of an already objectified creative subject. Therefore, the “I” depicted in this way is not the same as the identity of the empirical “I”, but is “the single ‘I’ of true and eternal being in general, the ‘I’ resting on the foundation of things”. (71) This should not be understood only through the prism of the transformation and alienation of the subject in the poetic and mystical experience – as the poetic act is interpreted by Nietzsche – but also with regard to the specific structuring of the lyric discourse. The presenting subject is objectified by being dispersed

in lyric diegesis, while remaining the *moving central point*. Within this figural framework, which presents “a world of images and metaphors” with a “colour, causality, and speed entirely different from that world of the plastic artist and the writer of epic” (70), the lyric genius can also present his image of “non-genius”, his “subject” as Nietzsche puts it. (71) It is here that we encounter the following meaningful note: “If it now seems as if the lyrical genius and the non-genius bound up together with him were one and the same, and as if the first spoke that little word ‘I’ about himself, then this illusion could no longer deceive us, not at least in the way it deceived those who have defined the lyricist as the subjective poet.” (72)

With Nietzsche, the transformative dispositif of poetry, which is conveyed in the phrase “*I is someone else*”, is thematised in two ways: as a dispositif of depersonalisation, and self-alienation and, (although implicit) a dispositif of a dialogisation. The former results in the dispersal of the subject, which Nietzsche refers to as lyric genius, in discourse. One of the positions of articulation is also the *lyric “I”* which can be authorial. In this respect it is important that the *lyric genius* act as an integrating instance, a moving central point, of the entire configuration. Therefore, it can be understood in terms of Foucault’s author function as one of the subject functions, and in terms of Bakhtin’s pure author. The integrating instance: 1) is an instance of speech; 2) is dispersed in elements of the fictitious diegetic world; and 3), which is particularly significant, as its foundation in the spirit of music is emphasised, we may suppose that it seeps into other places of the *energeia* of the text, into layers which are examined within the framework of literary form in traditional theories.

The transformative dispositif thematised by the theories that I have noted can also be interpreted differently, in the light of examinations of the subject advanced by F. Schleiermacher, Novalis, F. Hölderlin, J. P. Sartre, M. Frank and to some extent, D. Henrich, in the 20th century – in terms of the dialectics of pre-reflexive (immediate) and reflexive consciousness. According to these considerations, poetic discourse represents the central site of the dynamics between the so-called immediate and reflexive consciousness, above all, in the first three thinkers, but also in Frank, who proceeds from them.

All these authors, each in their own way, but with similar conclusions, review the reflexive model of consciousness. The identity of a rationalistic or idealistic subject cannot be founded on empirical consciousness; the subject in a reflexive model can never be identical to itself, since, in such theoretical “self-positioning”, there is, on the one hand, a reflecting I-subject and, on the other, a reflected I-object. In-between, there is always a gap, delay, lack, that creates non-identity, which is why this

model cannot encompass the immediacy of the self-presence of being-me (familiarity, homeliness with oneself) in a pre- or non-reflexive state, in which the split between the subject and object has not yet taken place. (cf. Novalis, *Fichte* 3–7, Hölderlin 26–27, Bowie 196–200, Frank, *L'Ultime* 87, Jovanovski 106). For Schleiermacher, this non-reflexive modus is immediate self-consciousness; for Hölderlin it is being; for Novalis feeling or self-feeling; for Sartre pre-reflexive consciousness; and for Henrich, familiarity with oneself. The origins of such understanding lie in Fichte's insights into the problematic nature of reflexive consciousness and "I-ness", even though he was not able to transcend this model. (cf. Frank, *L'Ultime* 30–35) On the basis of these examinations of early Romanticism and German Idealism, Manfred Frank derived his theory of the subject or individual, which he based precisely on the dialectics between reflexive consciousness which is positional,thetic, established by ocular logic of realisation of its own mirror reflection and pointing to the subject and the object; and pre-reflexive consciousness, which is undivided, in the sense of an undifferentiated unity of subject and object. (Frank, *L'Ultime* 49) Here, it is also of the essence that Frank shows how Schleiermacher's understanding of an individual as unrepeatable, unsharable, irreducibly singular and eventful (Frank, *L'Ultime* 12, 89–90, 93) and the conceptualisation of immediate self-consciousness, which represent one of the theories in the historical line of non-egological theories of the subject, are related to Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory of language, text and style. In the latter, one can discern an anticipation of philosophical and linguistic theories of discourse. Schleiermacher's theory of text, similar to Bakhtin's and Benveniste's later theories of discourse, realises that any text has two levels (*Estetika* 289, *Problemes* II 59–65): the level of language as a code, a system of signs, and the level of individuality, the unrepeatable nature of an utterance. The immediate consciousness of an individual as irreducibly singular and temporally and eventfully structured is, in the text, articulated by style. It is evident that style can be manifested only at the level of text as discourse-utterance-enunciation and not language as code. Regarding Schleiermacher's conception of style, Frank finds that if the level of signs and even types of utterance is what is "sayable" then style is the "unsayable", the *energeia* of the subject of the text. (*The Subject* 80, 92).

In addition to Schleiermacher's theory, Novalis's differentiation between two modes of self-consciousness, reflection and feeling, and his insight into the structure of the individual is fundamental to Frank's synthesis of the theory of the subject. As with Schleiermacher, who links the articulation of immediate consciousness to artistic creation, Novalis's thought on the subject ties in with his understanding of poetry and theory

of poetic presentation, *Darstellung*. (cf. Jovanovski) Novalis sees the individual as an essentially split identity (Fichte 25), which cannot be fundamental, but is manifested as a process of oscillation between identity and non-identity, between the I and non-I (Fichte 164): “The I signifies that negatively known absolute – what is left over after all abstraction – what can only be known through action and what only realizes itself through eternal lack [...] The I becomes effective and determinate in itself only in its *opposite*.” (Fichte 168) This oscillation, which signifies the eventful and processual implementation of the absolute I as a synthesis of two modes of consciousness – reflection and feeling – in poetry, is connected to the process of romanticisation, which Novalis examines and realises in his so-called transcendental poetry. (cf. Jovanovski) Romanticisation is “qualitative potentiation”, where “the lower I is identified with the better I.” (*Svet so* 202) In this respect, it can be linked to the above-mentioned theories of inspiration from another historically philosophical context, insofar as it is a transformative dispositif. If the subject takes form in the authorial lyric persona, such a subject is “qualitatively increased” through poetic transformation. Similarly to Hegel, Novalis argues, “poetry is the presentation of the soul, the inner world in its entirety”. (*Svet so* 196) But Novalis also says that poetry “abandons the identical to present it”. (Fichte 3) It perhaps presents it within the scope of what Schleiermacher calls style, and Frank in the unsayable *energeia* of the text. Moreover, Novalis’ theory of *Darstellung*, particularly in relation to the issue of the subject in terms of the dialectics of reflection, does not only stimulate the examination of examples where there is obviously an authorial lyric persona, but a consideration of the configuration of subjectivity in lyric discourse in general.

What are the implications of the group of theories of immediate consciousness or dialectics between the reflexive and non-reflexive subject mode, which, within the framework of poetic theory, can be understood as a new landmark in the interpretation of the transformative dispositif of poetry, on the examination of the lyric subject from the point of view which is the focus of this article? How is the authorial lyric subject configured in terms of the subject of the utterance-lyric persona in the light of these theories? Can we claim that this articulation of a field of lyric subjectivity reflects the mirror image of personal identity as a temporary (illusory) moment in reflexive consciousness? Or is the authorial lyric persona already configured through the transformational sieve of the dynamic process of the poem where, according to Novalis and Frank, the dialectic process of reflexive and pre-reflexive consciousness takes place in the most fundamental way? If the latter is manifested as a constituent

element of the entire lyric discourse, other “subject points” should and must be found, where the dynamics of this subject in process is articulated. Schleiermacher’s theory of style and Novalis’s *Darstellung* point to some sensible directions.

If we focus only on the authorial lyric persona, the issue can be partly clarified with Ricoeur’s theory of the constitution of personal identity on the basis of the configuration of narrative identity, where temporality is key. This process is one of the stages of constituting the subject in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the subject or selfhood.¹⁰ Following the principle of disharmonious harmony, narrative operation configures the narrative identity of the person in discontinued dialectics between the *idem*- permanent, fixed identity of sameness, based on the principle of sedimentation, and the *ipse*- emerging identity of ipseity based on the principle of innovation. It is only the latter, as identity-non-identity that, in addition to its dialectics with sameness, can finally presuppose the dialectics of selfhood and otherness. Thus, otherness is manifested as constitutive of ipseity, and enters it. The ipseity of selfhood implicitly includes otherness, so that the one cannot be thought without the other. Selfhood, the subject, can only establish a relationship to otherness through ipseity. (*Soi-même* 13–14, 167–197) The essence of narrative identity through which Ricoeur metaphorically and literally approaches the problem of the constitution of personal identity – and which is not to be understood merely in the sense of the identity of narrative texts, but literary texts in general (*Krog* 8–9) – is therefore precisely the dialectics of ipseity and sameness which is actually already the dialectics of otherness and sameness.

If we consider the series of auto-reflective poetic texts and meta-poetic essays which have accompanied poetic creation throughout history and which, in various ways, implicitly or explicitly thematise the realisation that the “*I is someone else*”, but which we could not present in this text, it is perhaps reasonable to assume the following: even if we conceded to the thesis that an authorial lyric subject in the sense of narrative lyric identity, which is constituted in the process of a lyrical text, according to the minimised principle of narrative fragments-events, can be understood as an illusory moment of reflexive consciousness, we should understand it as an emerging identity of ipseity. The very nature of the structuring of poetic discourse presupposes the minimising of the harmony principle in the dynamics of harmony and disharmony, which, based on his reading of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, Ricoeur postulates as a configuration model of literature. Innovation, which is the principle of emerging ipse, ipseity, in the process of a poem, is often supported by metaphorical discourse, which represents the high-point of semantic innovation. This is done by abolish-

ing the descriptive referential function of poetic discourse, says Ricoeur, in a way that re-describes (redécrit) reality by articulating aspects of it that can be expressed only through evocation and not directly via descriptive language, emerging only in a tense, dynamic relation between the ruins of the literal semantic suitability of a metaphorical utterance and its new (illogical) unsuitability. (*La métaphore* 289–301) This theory of metaphor, which as Ricoeur himself says is actually a theory of poetic discourse (*La métaphore* 301), is, of course, not without reference to Novalis's *Darstellung* theory, which “abandons the identical to present it”. Analogously, we could perhaps transfer the principle of a metaphoric re-description (of the world) to the question of the authorial subject. In poetic discourse, the autobiographical lyric persona, too, implies an irresolvable tension between identity and difference in a way that always creates a “double reference”. (*La métaphore* 288)

We can say that the figurality of poetic discourse presents the poetic fabula (*mythos*), which is built by portraying operations, where disharmony prevails, and thereby the ipse principle. The disharmonious dispersion of the structure of poetic utterance accompanies or takes in the identity-ipse of narrative lyric identity-persona, the lyric subject, which emerges through various moments of presentation so that sedimentation into idem cannot take place. These moments are (non-identical) presentation of momentous selves/personae, which are established through the poem-process. The thesis on the emerging ipseity of authorial lyric persona-subject seems sensible also if the narrative structure of the fabula of poetic discourse prevails over the figurative-metaphorical. This is one of the main characteristics of a strong current in contemporary poetry, including Slovenian. It can be said that for poetry in general, the ipse principle applies. However, these narrativising tendencies in poetry urge us to re-consider the established views of the lyric subject, which often seem completely useless in these cases.

According to Ricoeur, a relationship to the otherness of the other is established only through the identity-ipse of the self. In it, the authorial *I-other* of a poem seeks and perhaps sees *the other of the other*, speaks to it. In his Bremen speech, Paul Celan describes the dialogic essence of a poem, which is always oriented toward the other, with a metaphor of a poem which is like a bottle thrown in the sea – it is en route to an “open place”, to the “you”.

Thus, let me end by mentioning the aspect of the title phrase “*subject of a poem in process, subject in the process of a poem*”, which also considers the re-constitution of the subject in respective events in the life of a text, if, according to Iser, the constitution of the subject occurs with the (read-

er's) constitution of the meaning of the text. (Iser 236– 246) This thesis from *The Act of Reading* can be linked to Benveniste's postulate that the subject in language, in the speech act, is constituted each time. From this perspective, in the relation *I is someone else* the intersubjective and inter-discursive dimension of the I as a linguistic form – *shifter* – which is always an element of the pair *I-you* emerges. But in Benveniste's theory of enunciation, this does not name any lexical unit and refers only to the individual speech act in which it is spoken and where it marks the speaker. (Benveniste, *Problèmes* 283) In Benveniste's theory, this speaker, *l'énonciateur* (enunciator) should not be confused with *le sujet parlant* (speaking subject). In this sense *I-you* are not representational, but indicative, as the reality to which it directs is a reality of language and discourse. (*Problèmes* 283–284) However, in Benveniste's theory of discourse, this *I* is not only the subject of the utterance/enounced, but the subject of enunciation/uttering. If we transfer this theory to poetry, the subject understood in this way is not a lyric persona, Bakhtin's lyric hero, or one of Foucault's dispersed egos – but the *I-you* of enunciation, the subject-poem itself, the subject of the process-activity of the poem, which “makes an I from the whole text and transforms the reader's I in the process” (Meschonnic, *Politique* 192). Thus a “radically historical”, “trans-historical” and “trans-subjective”¹¹ po-etics of poetry takes place where in the event of a poem two subjects in process always meet.

Translated by Tina Škoberne

NOTES

¹ Cf. M. Foucault. *L'hérméneutique du sujet. Cours du collège de France 1982–1981*. Paris: Seuil, 2001.

² Barthes' citation of Nietzsche in the *Pleasure of the Text*, which repudiates the rule of the reader, is meaningful: “We have no right to ask who it is who interprets. It is interpretation itself, a form of the will to power, which exists (not as ‘being’, but as process, a becoming) as passion.” (Le plaisir 83) English translation: *The Pleasure of the Text*. (trans. by Richard Miller) New York: Hill&Wang, 2000.

³ Poetry is considered essentially monologic e.g. with J. Petersen, (*Wissenschaft von der Dichtung*, 1939), partly with M. Bakhtin, D. Lamping (*Das lyrische Gedicht: Definitionen zu Theorie und Geschichte der Gattung*, 1989).

⁴ K. Hamburger. *Die Logik der Dichtung*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. 1957 (1968). Hamburger is more or less affirmatively examined or referenced by several authors, including L. Jenny: “Fictions du moi et figuration du moi.” In: *Figures du sujet lyrique*. Paris: PUF, 1996. 99–111; D. Combe: “La référence dédoublée.” In: *Figures du sujet lyrique*. Paris: PUF, 1996. 39–63; A. L. Lujan Atienza: *Pragmática del discurso lírico*. Madrid: Arco Libros, S. A., 2005. 143–152.

⁵ Hamburger tries to postulate the subject of the statement (her own English translation on which she insists) as a linguistic and structural element. (Hamburger 58) By doing so Hamburger draws a general difference between the subject of the statement in her sense and the subject of the utterance put forward by theories of information, or discourse pragmatics as we would say today. Her theory of statement seeks to establish it as a theory of the hidden structure of language (56), while communication and information theory examine the speech situation. So the transmitter in information theory should not be equated with her subject, as the former is faced with a receiver, while the latter is faced with an object. So, in Hamburger's statement system of language, the statement is formed on the relation subject-object.

⁶ Oswald Ducrot. *Le Dire et le dit*. Paris: Minuit, 1989.

⁷ In this article, I use the expression the lyric subject in its standard meaning – in the sense of the lyric speaker, meaning the same as the expression “lyric persona”. I understand all these concepts or expressions in the sense of the subject of the utterance, i.e. an instance within the diegetic frame – the presented world of the text. Cf. Balžalorsky 68

⁸ This point is actually thematised by numerous modern theories of poetry which attempt to distance themselves from the conception of “lyric” as a subjective genre by considering lyric discourse as a transfer to the subject end, with subject and object being intra-discourse structural functions e.g. with K. Hamburger, by theorising the statement based on the subject-object relation, where the lyric statement is transferred to the subject end; in J. Kos with a claim that “lyric reality turns back to the subject as its mirror image.” (Kos, *Lirika* 54)

⁹ As J. Lecoq argues in his extensive monograph on the emergence of literary personality in the Renaissance, the medieval literary subject was foremost the product of the text, while in the Renaissance, Boccaccio in his theoretic-critical text *Genealogie deorum gentilium libri XV* (1360–1374), establishes a new model of literary personality, which does not predominantly emerge from the elements of the literary text, but actual biographical data about the author. This meant a significant shift, which influence the entire development of meta-literary as well as intertextual perception. From the Renaissance on the person of the author is not only literary, but has become existential. Dante and Petrarch are not only Dante in Petrarch from *The New Life* and *Canzoniere*, but inspired geniuses with idealised, unique, extra-textual existence. Cf. Lecoq 236–270.

¹⁰ Frank criticises Ricoeur's model of self-consciousness, because it is based on reflexive logic. (*The Subject* 5)

¹¹ Expressions of Henri Meschonnic, who uses them in most of his works (e.g. *Pour la poétique I, II, III, IV, Critique du rythme, Politique du rythme, La rime et la vie, Poétique du traduire*, etc.), where he develops a poetics of discourse, theory of rhythm and the poetics of translation.

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The Author as the Psychological, Intellectual, and Moral Unity in the Slovenian Novel of the Last Third of the 20th Century

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In the Slovene novel of the last third of the 20th century the majority of literary protagonists deal with a question of relationships between an individual and society. Literary work hence puts up a moral and ethical mirror to the current society. In images of authors in various Slovene novels it is possible to reveal reflections of mentality of a novelist as a spokesman of national aspirations and the indicator of a condition of modern society and culture. The factor of "author's will" in itself is indissolubly connected with the act of creation of a literary work. The artistic image always depends on a subjectivity of its own creator. In each literary work the author solves many important moral, historical and philosophical questions both for itself and the society. Thus, in private stories and personal problems a modern novel allows us to understand the general development of the society and culture of Slovenia on a way to democratic transformations at the end of the 1980's and during the strengthening of the new state in the 1990's.

Keywords: literary theory / author / authorship / autobiographical literature / Slovene novel / 20th cent.

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In order to find an answer to the question of who or what writes the literature, it is probably first of all well to identify one of the many possible meanings of the word "literature". The meaning of the word is crucial. I have in mind not literature as the totality of written works and utterances that have appeared in the course of cultural development, nor, of course, special literatures, which have become an integral part of progress. Rather, I mean so-called belles-lettres, even though today it is difficult to

speak about beauty as a distinguishing feature of contemporary literature, which often tries to locate itself between chaos and negation. While giving research into literacy and the text its due, I would like to emphasize the priority of a literary work as a deliberate imaginative, aesthetic unity. After all, if we overly emphasize a functional, formalistic approach to literary material, we run the risk of reducing the author's role to a batch of writing techniques or a method, like rules for drawing up legal documents or semi-automated formulae for writing romance novels. Indeed, in the case of such types of literature we can speak about the verifiable death of the author. Such texts, composed by someone in the past, have forever lost their internal – spiritual, if you will – bond with the source that generated them, and while they function independently, they are not alive. In this way they become devoid of the uniqueness characteristic of a masterpiece that is able to fascinate very different people around the world. Both external preconditions and internal features of the author's self or individuality merge to form the integrated entity that is a work of literary art.

The shaping of a literary work into a complex of separate, quite independent elements, and its organization as a finished whole is possible only in the presence of a certain binding substance that can only be a human. Mikhail Bakhtin especially emphasized this point in the early 1920s, in particular in *The Author and Hero in Aesthetic Reality*, in which his philosophical aesthetics are grounded. According to his concept, this binding substance is the protagonist of a literary work. At the same time, Bakhtin consistently advances the idea that in order for it to be cast into a work of literature, prose must be aesthetically reworked by a creative individual, its author, after which it reflects an image of the consummated creative act. Within its distilled logic, abstracted from the author, it cannot locate any consummating and architectonically ordering points. According to Bakhtin, “the hero's consciousness, his feeling, and his desire of the world (his object-directed emotional and volitional attitude or posture) are enclosed on all sides, as if within a band, by the author's *consummating* consciousness of the hero and his world ...” (Bakhtin 1990 13). Roland Barthes' much later pronouncement of “the death of the author” could not, in my opinion, trump the Russian scholar's thesis. Following Bakhtin, we hold that the author is “a unique active forming energy”.

Author-protagonist relations are multifaceted, not always straightforward, and as a rule have to do with not only so-called “grammatical” (Barthes) aspects, but also with imaginative, cognitive, and ethical ones. It is frequently by means of his protagonist that the author tries to resolve many vital moral, historical, and philosophical questions. Sometimes the author rejects an objective, “outside position”,¹ and his stance approxi-

mates that of the protagonist to such an extent that the border between them is obliterated. The two become barely distinguishable as, for example, in works with an autobiographical orientation, where the author and protagonist not only share thoughts and feelings but a biography as well. Nonetheless, the protagonist's *I* can never become the author's *I*, since a dose of fantasy and the taste of creativity are always present.²

It stands to reason that the factor of "the author's volition" is integrally connected with the act of creating a literary work. The artistic image always depends on its creator's subject. In each literary work the author addresses many vital personal or societal moral, historical, philosophical, and other questions. Even "pure" verbal recordings of private feelings, emotions, and sentiments suppose the possibility of repeat or secondary actualization in its original imaginative unity, in the author's or another's perception, after some time has passed. The possibility remains that a written text's aesthetic existence is fundamentally determined by its internal imaginative unity as defined by the author. This unity appears even when, for example, the author compiles separate stories, plots, and images in one cycle, causing the reader to apprehend them as an imaginative-aesthetic unity. In this sense, the modern novel, having moved beyond genre borders and conventions, has a very wide array of "grammatical" and other formal possibilities, but at the same time the author and his concept remain the organizing source of thoughts and images.

In the last third of the twentieth century, the novel remains one of the most popular genres in Slovenia. Many factors, both internal and external, have contributed to its robust and successful development in these years.

Given its integration into the European context, Slovenian literature has never been a closed system. Because of this, the novel rapidly absorbs the latest literary innovations from without. At the same time, it carries on its proper artistic experiments.

The confident, steady development of Slovenian society in this period, punctuated by crucial, determining events, gave writers opportunities to reflect and ponder reality. Even the fateful years of 1990 and 1991, when the Slovenian people demonstrated an enviable unity of aspiration, can be described as a natural transition to a new level of development. Writers garnered great merit as they gradually dispensed with prohibitions and stereotypes, overcame political and ideological taboos, restored historical justice, and bore the burden of preserving national identity. The Slovenian novel served a national constitutive function and lived and breathed anticipation of change. It was in the novel that the society approached its chief goal, independence of the country, which took place in the early 1990s.

Given its polyphonic form, the contemporary novel possesses a wide variety of tools for studying the phenomenon of man, constantly adding new techniques to its own arsenal and developing ever more refined strategies. The reader is invited into a research laboratory, where he can witness and assist in the author's (and life's) experiments on humans.

Contemporary novelists are for all intents and purposes unfettered by genre conventions. A wide variety means, even those once considered incompatible, are employed on all levels of artistic canvases. The Slovenian novel provides clear confirmation of this. Fiction and documentary (e.g., Drago Jančar, *Northern Lights*, 1984), popular and elite (e.g., Dimitrij Rupel, *The Lion's Share*, 1989), prose and poetry (e.g., Jože Snoj, *Gavžen Hrib, or a Novel about a War Childhood*, 1982), tradition and experiment conjoin and interact in it. Thus, for example, Andrej Blatnik planned the anti-utopian novel with an adventure story, *Torches and Tears* (1987, reprint 2004), primarily as an experiment and constructed it on a postmodernistic novelistic model.

However, the Slovenian novel of the last third of the twentieth century no longer conducts experiments for their own sake, but displays the author's desire to grasp reality, often that of his or her own life.

As is likely the case in other contemporary literatures, so-called hybrids proliferate in the contemporary Slovenian novel, combining and toying with the features of various genres. Practically no "pure" examples of the novelist genre survive. This situation demonstrates the writer's complete freedom in choosing forms and techniques, as well as the maturity of the receiver, the reader, who has outgrown the need for genre "conventions", and, rather, is interested in new, unusual combinations that give additional food for thought and, of course, for the heart.

Thus, through private stories, personal problems, and intimate challenges, the contemporary novel facilitates understanding of the society and culture's general development and the foundation of a new state in the course of democratic changes from the late 1980s to early 1990s.

Slovenian novelists' constant attention to the inner world has spurred a flowering of the so-called autobiographical novel in precisely this period.³

The autobiographical novels of such writers as Lojze Kovačič, Vitomil Zupan, Marjan Rožanc and others have already become classics. From the writers of the middle generation in this period Franjo Frančič and Andrej Morovič deserve to be mentioned.

If we specifically consider the role of the author in Slovenian autobiographical novels, we can distinguish the following types (Sozina 2002).

First, there are novels in which the image of the author plays an especially important role as the organizing principle, acting like the images of

other characters in a work. In such novels the author purposely reveals his presence, his will, and knowledge. For him the human life at any stage of development is inexhaustibly rich; therefore, he, together with his protagonist, are scrupulous researchers of what transpires within themselves and in the world. The author's emotional-volitional reactions, setting a general rhythm⁴ for the entire novel, are frequently reinforced with an effective rationale that relies on literary citations, examples from history, philosophers' meditations, and various digressions that fill out the image of the protagonist. A striking example of this is Vitomil Zupan's trilogy (*Minuet for a 25-String Guitar*, 1975; *Leviathan*, 1982; *The Comedy of a Human Texture*, 1980).

Different kinds of author-protagonist relations play out in those novels where the writer disappears behind a narrator or the image of a protagonist-storyteller, as happens, for example, in Marjan Rožanc's autobiographical novels (*Butterfly*, 1981; *Sentimental Story Times*, 1985). Autobiography in these cases serves only as a basis. The openness of feelings and depth of the introspection further emphasize the author's desire not to analyze his or her own development as a person and writer, but to explore society from an active civic perspective.

The protagonist in Andrej Morovič's (b. 1960) autobiographical novel *Bomba la petrolia* (1989) also rebels against the prevailing value system, trying to find himself and his place in the underground. The story about the protagonist's wanderings is full of irony and even sarcasm about his relation to reality and his life (drugs, conflicts with state authorities, adventures, etc.). Like a battery, he stores visual and sound signals within and then simply transfers them to the reader, who must arrange them himself.

The prominent Russian literary scholar L. Ia. Ginzburg suggests in *The Literary Character (O literaturnom geroe, Leningrad, 1979)* that increased interest in the documentary (and hence, high points of the autobiographical genre) usually occurs in "times of open borders".⁵ The Slovenian novel confirms this. Authors who previously did not write in the genre turn to it then. Thus, in 1999, following *Gavžen hrib*, in which the autobiographical component is very strong, although the mythopoetic source predominates, and in other works that are hardly autobiographical, Jože Snoj finished the novel *Mr. Pepi, or an Early Search for a Name* (2000). In it, Snoj preserves the manner of his individual poetic vision while continuing in the best creative tradition of the Slovenian classic of autobiography, Lojze Kovačič. Kovačič's works are characterized by the absence of fiction as such. With few exceptions, life itself is the material of artistic creation. The creative writer's credo could well be defined as "Don't invent anything,

there is nothing more rich, varied, and interesting than life itself'. This is true of Kovačič's novels, where form is subordinate to the principle of fidelity to the truth of life (i.e., the trilogy *Newcomers*, 1984–85, or the novel *Childish Things*, 2003), as well as for works that are real formal experiments of a modernist kind (i.e., *Five Fragments*, of which only the first two were published, 1981).

Kovačič has shown in his works that pure autobiography, simple description of one's own life, may turn from a para-literary genre into a high quality piece of literature, while still preserving its value as historical witnessing. The description of what the author has actually seen and heard, conveyed with a genuine gift for exact and concise witnessing to facts, is aesthetically enhanced.

A special type of author-protagonist relation is observable in Kovačič's autobiographical novels.⁶ Its distinctive feature is that despite the author's desire to look at himself through the protagonist's eyes, from a position exterior to that of his own as creator (as Rožanc does, for example), he invariably returns to within his protagonist, as into himself. He cannot locate relatively stable ground outside of his protagonist, and so he continues to evaluate events in the protagonist's life from within the protagonist. Even when using neutral, third person narration, as in the novels *Reality* and *Five Fragments*, for instance, the writer is unable to distance himself from the protagonist's inner *I*. In these novels, the author's role as the psychological center consolidating various phenomena of reality into a whole of himself, is apparent.

At the heart of the novel *Reality*'s plot are actual events from the writer's life. He spent six months in a penal battalion while serving in the army. Kovačič does not directly declare the identity of his own destiny and his protagonist's, as he does it in other novels. At the same time, he does not wish outwardly or inwardly to remove himself from the protagonist.

All events in the novel, characterizations of other personages, descriptions of settings, and so forth are conveyed through the protagonist's individual, subjective perception, and in no wise impartially. All information is imparted strictly within the spatio-temporal context of the protagonist's life.

The faceless narrator continually emphasizes that the protagonist "didn't trust for a second in the existence [...] of a reality from beginning to end". Probably for this reason this objective reality is left undeveloped in the novel. The concept of the image of a protagonist is a purely subjective perception of the world, frequently erroneous, but real to an individual person.

Through the course of the novel's events, the main theme is human fear and freedom, which are concretized in more private themes: relations between soldiers, army regulations, societal changes connected with historical events and cataclysms, and interethnic relations. At the same time, there is no special intention to develop these themes in some objective fashion, though there is a generalizing claim. Certain remarks and reasoning on common themes are nonetheless delivered through the protagonist's context, and it is here that the all-encompassing author, whose creative energy is essential for the completion of the protagonist's image, reveals himself. The author also shows himself ironically, from mild teasing to bilious sarcasm.

Author-protagonist relations in which the former does not strive to detach himself from his hero, whose internal perspective supplies the entire artistic space, are not unique. They are apparent, for example, in the autobiographical novel *Motherland, Pale Mother* (1986), by Franjo Frančič, a writer of another generation (b. 1958).

Lojze Kovačič and Franjo Frančič share a fidelity to the autobiographical genre and a difficult lot at the beginnings of their lives. We might posit that such author-protagonist relations at least in part due to certain psychological traumas that the writer wishes to overcome through his creative work.

The special sensitivity to surrounding reality, the search for and awareness of self and mission in the world, and escape from routine that characterize the contemporary Slovenian novel presuppose a particular mental state, a propensity to inner tensions. It should be noted that psychological interests are traditional for the Slovenian novel. However, with the development of modern science, in particular psychoanalysis, with the increasing influence of Eastern philosophies and doctrines, and the growth in the general awareness of such matters – not only on the part of writers but also of readers – the traditional psychological component of the Slovenian novel has risen to a new level.⁷

The author's mission as a psychological unity is important in non-realistic novels as well; for example, Jože Snoj's *Gavžen Hrib* (1982) or the anti-utopian diptych by Berta Bojetu. In her novels *Filio Isn't Home* (1990) and *The Bird's House* (1995), the writer describes two systems of aggressive patriarchal society that are isolated from the external world and tries to discredit this society, in which the person is humiliated and deprived of civil rights. In the first novel, there is an island; in the second one, it is a forgotten place in mountains. The author does not appear on the novels and does not conspicuously influence the (first-, second-, and third-person forms of) narration, which consists of heterogeneous and separate parts.

However, besides the plot and protagonists, a certain force is present, binding all these separate elements in an indivisible, psycho-emotional whole. The female protagonists in the novels are hardly capable of revolting against the existing order. But the diptych itself becomes such a revolt. Suffering and humiliation and the heartlessness of others become serious tests for those seeking fidelity and pure relations and patiently awaiting the end of their torments. Through their destinies the author tries to prove to the reader that love conquers fear, that spirituality is more valuable than surface beauty, that power and knowledge continue to contend as the two forces capable of changing the world.

Another manifestation of the author, that of an intellectual whole, is most prominent in works of a postmodernist stripe. Clear examples are the novels *Torches and Tears*, by Andrej Blatnik (1987) and *The Lion's Share*, by Dimitrij Rupel (1989). The poetics of the novels are based on their multiple levels (palimpsests), irony, gaming with literary material before the reader's eyes, the principle of the "already seen and heard" freedom of making all sorts of connections, leveling of utterances, and intertextuality. The most varied parts of the pan-European cultural context are used: some are cornerstones of the civilization; others are simple stereotypes, both positive and negative. The authors also wield fleetingly significant ideas and utterances that are relevant to a given moment. For this reason, when Blatnik's novel was reprinted in 2005, he disposed of some associations and allusions whose meanings had been lost. At the same time, in addition to the intellectual, these writers try to appeal to contemporary readers' spiritual treasuries.

In the Drago Jančar's novel *Head Noise* (1998), the witnessing of a survivor of the Livada prison uprising and the silence of ancient stones merge in a unified narration by the author's volition. The prison revolt is compared to the Masada siege of over two thousand years ago, which ended in mass suicide. The theme of the crime, a revolt against injustice, and the punishment emphasizes the moral aspect. The prison's "self-government" degenerates into the tyranny of a new power, which drowns in its own baseness, cruelty, and license; characters' feelings and acts are frequently compared to those of animals. But these same people have other potentials as well. The author has little interest in the observance or necessity of external norms of the human behavior, as established by the standard moral codes. The object of his attention is inner power, will power, the power of belief, and aspirations for justice, including on the part of the criminal protagonist, Keber.

Individualized structures prevail in the Slovenian novel of the last third of the twentieth century. At the same time, the problem of the literary

I is inextricably linked with the development of the general concept of self in public consciousness. The reader, and by extension the public, is presented with moral questions in literary works. By means of authors' images in various Slovenian novels, in their embedded psychological, intellectual, and moral principle, it is possible to uncover reflections of a novelist's mentality as he plays the role of spokesman for national aspirations, of indicator of the condition of contemporary society and culture. Threads of analogies, correspondences, contrasts, and similarities extend from literary works in all directions, into the depths of the literary past and across the breadth of contemporary life. The period a time for the Slovenian novel effectively to overcome all kinds of taboos, ideological and aesthetic, but it certainly did not witness the author's death. Instead, after a lengthy era of limitations and struggles with external hindrances, this period has brought to Slovenian writers a sense of total freedom and enjoyment of creative flight.

NOTES

¹ Bakhtin introduced this term in his work "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" (Bakhtin 1990 15). See also Bakhtin 2000 41.

² It is remarkable that Bakhtin did not see a basic difference between biography and autobiography.

³ This notion is variously understood. Different scholars have frequently instilled it with contradictory senses: For some, a simple congruence of the author's name and the name of the main character is enough, even with some fantasy; for others, it is necessary that narrated events actually took place in the author's life. The question of what is considered an autobiographical work requires thorough study, and such are already under way; for example, there was an international conference on "Slovenian autobiography" in April 2009 at the Institute of the Slovenian Literature and Literary Sciences, Scientific Research Centre of Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

⁴ The governing rhythm is a unified tone that infuses all utterances, drawing all of them to, as it were, a single emotional and volitional denominator.

⁵ Perhaps the modern annihilation of aesthetic boundaries is reflected in discussions about the crisis (the death) of the author.

⁶ In addition to the above-mentioned, also *Deček in smrt* (Boy and Death) (1968), *Resničnost* (Effectiveness) (1972), *Basel* (1989), *Kristalni čas* (Crystal Time) (1990), and other autobiographical works.

⁷ It, of course, remains not everywhere, but even in many so-called mass or, perhaps better put, "cash" opuses.

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The Dynamics of the Mediating Processes in Literature

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In the article I discuss various processes of production and reception on the basis of literary works that, due to their influence, function as an authority and thus open up new intertextual responses. My research focuses on the concepts of "influence" and "intertextuality", as well as on the concept of "literary reception", which integrates both aforementioned concepts.

The theme linking the literary works in question and their intertextual relations is that of evil and guilt as it emerges in reading the Book of Job.¹ I will highlight the motif of sin and the figure of Satan. The emphasis will be on the literature of Thomas Mann and Goethe's masterpiece Faust. A detailed analysis of these works also reveals the history of the approaches with which we are confronted during the process of reading.

Keywords: literary theory / intertextuality / literary influence / literary reception / thematology

UDK 82.091

International Literary Processes – “Influence” and “Intertextuality”

The notion of “influence” is one of the oldest literary processes. The term first referred to astrology, as the influence of stars on people, and it is later also found in literature. Gvozden Eror discusses this in the book *Genetički vidovi inter(literarnosti)* (The Genetic Aspects of Inter(literariness) (2002), where his findings are summed up in the following words: “The concept of literary influence has been generally accepted since the end of the 19th century; predominantly it was defined as the ‘form of appearance’, i.e. the manifestations of interrelations between different literatures and grasped through the aspect of causal relations on the genetic level.” (Erar 92) The most significant attribute of an instance of literary “influence” is causality, which is understood as the developmental process of individual themes, motifs, literary figures, etc. The author receives foreign ideas, motifs and themes, and weaves them into his work, remodelling them in his own way, and thus assuring them their own value. Perhaps the best known

example of such influence is found in Dante's *The Divine Comedy* (*La Divina Commedia*), which was strongly influenced by Virgil with his style and understanding of the world:²

Tu se' lo mio maestro e ' mio autore;
tu se' solo colui da cu' io tolsi
lo bello stilo³ che m' ha fatto onore.

(*Inferno* I, 85 – 87).

Dante was mainly influenced by Virgil's choice of themes,⁴ but in his poetry we also find other kinds of influence; in addition to conceptual influences (religious, philosophical, aesthetic) we also find influences on material, form and style⁵ (summarised from A. Ocvirk: *Teorija primerjalne literarne zgodovine* (Theory of Comparative Literary History (1936). Today, Dante's poem still influences many poets and writers, who discover in *The Divine Comedy* new possibilities for representing the afterworld or the after-life, and with its help also analyse society, the world and history.

According to Harold Bloom's definition, we can talk about an influence only when there are two strong poetical authorities involved in the process: "Poetic Influence [...] always proceeds by misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation. The history of fruitful poetic influence [...] is a history of anxiety and self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, wilful revisionism without which modern poetry as such could not exist." (30)

A poet's partial misunderstanding of his predecessors is a function of time, distance, ignorance of language, etc.⁶ Thus, the newly made work has its own identity. We become aware of that when we compare Goethe's and Mann's *Faust / Doctor Faustus*: "Mann's swerve away from Goethe is the profoundly ironic denial that any swerve is necessary. His misinterpretation of Goethe is to read precisely his own parodistic genius, his own kind of loving irony, into his precursor." (Bloom 54) Everybody who is under the influence of someone weaves into his work not only the ideas and themes of his model, but he also interlaces – sometimes on purpose, and sometimes, again, unintentionally – the spirit of his own epoch, time and place. Thus, each literary work depends on many viewpoints of the context that influenced its formation.

We can say that a literary work is a consequence of various causes. However, we must ask ourselves whether Hermerén's definition of "influence" still applies: "A influences B with a". As Jay Clayton ascertains: "Once the chain of influence extends beyond one link, should we not begin to talk of intertextuality rather than influence?" (38) The answer is in no way simple, and for this reason I will provide a thorough presenta-

tion of the concept of “intertextuality” and certain problems that appear with it. Finally, I will return to the question raised and offer a fundamental distinction between “influence” and “intertextuality”.

The notion of “intertextuality” in literature appeared very late. We can trace it back to the works of Julia Kristeva, who introduced the term in literary science with the assistance of Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue and Saussure’s research of anagrams.⁷ The author understands “intertextuality” as each “inter-action textuelle qui se produit à l’intérieur d’un seul texte. Pour le sujet connaissant, l’intertextualité est une notion qui sera l’indice de la façon dont un texte lit l’histoire et s’insère en elle” (Pfiester 212), which underlies the dynamism of mediatory processes. Kristeva reveals that literary works mutually complement each other and that we can understand them correctly only with a good knowledge of the literary tradition. In her theory, Julie Kristeva understands all texts as intertextual relations, and is interested in the ontological characteristics of texts: their structure, meaning, historical attachment, etc. According to Kristeva, every text is built as a mosaic of quotations; every text is the absorption and transformation of another text (see Eror 239).

Thomas Mann’s *Joseph and His Brothers* (*Joseph und seine Brüder*) is a great deal less understandable if we are not familiar with the author’s reading of and transferral of ideas from the midrashim (Micha Josef bin Gorion). In Mann’s novel, Joseph represents a person who can resist temptation – Potiphar’s wife – not because of his own strength (he is not the image of a Greek hero), but only when he sees in a vision his father’s disappointed face. As Terry R. Wright ascertains: “The midrash [...] provides a mediating narrative framework between the terse verses of Genesis 39 and Mann’s elaborated novel.” (Wright 153)

Marko Juvan uses the term “intertextuality” as a general expression; for a particular, explicit form of intertextuality the term “citation” is used. Citation is thus “a strategy of writing, that with its [...] figures and genres consciously relies upon activating of cultural memory” (Juvan 285). In Juvan’s opinion, a literary text that would “without attachment to foreign background lose its semantics and aesthetic figure” is classified as citation (245). There are many different indices that suggest a citation, while the phenomenon of general intertextuality is more difficult to define as it is not externally recognisable. A text is a “citation” only when it can be confirmed with certainty that the author wilfully referred to some other text, while also counting on the reader’s ability to recognise the reference to the original text.

A citation can be popular or elitist. Elitist-hermetic citation represents an attachment, where the message is – because of its imprecise, even

obliterate pointers – more difficult to understand. Most postmodernist metafiction is written in this manner. On the other hand, a popular citation is more easily recognised by the reader, as it takes material from classic repertoire known to everyone: In his poem Dante frequently summarises events described in the *Holy Bible*:

O Saul, come su la propria spada
quivi parevi morto in Gelboè,
che poi non sentìpioggia nè rugiada!

(*Purgatorio* XII, 40–42)

Based on his research and explanation of the relationship between “intertextuality” and “citation”, French author F. Goyet concludes that the term “inter-text” refers to another text which never appears by itself: the hidden text, the text beyond the text; while the quotation explicitly refers to a text which appears in its presence. Thus, the quotation appears in its explicitness, while the inter-text functions as the implicit textuality (see Eror 262). We notice that the term “intertextuality” defines concealed characteristics of texts, while “citation” is presented as an obvious characteristic of texts. Once again we can stress that “literary texts have always referred not only to reality (*imitatio vitae*), but also to previous other texts(imitation veterum)”⁸ (Pfister 210). What is, therefore, the fundamental distinction between “influence” and “intertextuality”?

The significant difference between the terms arises from the relationships to which the texts are subjected. An “influence” indicates every one-way effect of text A on text B, while “intertextuality” can be illustrated with a model of a dialogue (Bakhtin), indicating two-way interactions between texts A and B. The relationship between them is the following: “influence” implies the necessity of temporal sequence, while this is not a requirement of “intertextuality”.

A very important characteristic of “influence” is causality: features in text B are the effect of a cause in text A (A being the primary text). Thus, “influence” links causality with the hierarchical superiority of the primary text. On the other hand, in “intertextuality” causality is deconstructed – text A is appropriated and/or implicated by text B.⁹

The difference between the two expressions originates from the understanding and research of methods that transfer elements (ideas, motifs, themes) from one text to another. An “influence” recognises the diversity and originality of text B, but in so doing does not analyse the process of how the newly arising text reworks elements of the original text. In this way, an author adapts foreign elements according to his needs, his literary work. Unlike “influence”, “intertextuality” analyses all of the methods,

forms and functions that are taken by text A into text B. “Intertextuality” is primarily concerned with the reception of elements from the primary text (text A) in its new transformation (text B).

A very important distinction between “influence” and “intertextuality” is brought about by the relationship between the author and the readers. The author is not a “guarantee for an identity of text” anymore (from Roland Barthes onward); this role is taken over by the reader, who is de-subjected.¹⁰ “Influence”, on the other hand, tries to re-establish intersubjective relations: the author of text A influences the author of text B. We notice that in this case the “guarantee for an identity of the text” is the author.

A significant difference between both terms is often dependent upon a different view of the primary text (text A). With “influence” text A is “writing with a signature”, meaning that we know the author of this literary work.¹¹ A different aspect is revealed when we study “intertextual” literary work; in this case, text A can be anonymous codes, conventions, assumptions.¹²

The Shift from Author to Reader – the Beginning of a New Literary Paradigm

The terms “influence” and “intertextuality” define a particular mode of writing texts. At the same time, they analyse the role that the author and the reader have in a literary work. Along with the study of both concepts changes in the relationship author–work–reader appear, which represent the beginning of a new literary paradigm in literary science.

While traditional literary science was primarily concerned with the author, modern literary science has stressed the role of the literary work as a text.¹³ Thus Julie Kristeva understands “intertextuality” as a way of writing and not as much as a way of reading (see Rajan 61). Consequently, in Kristeva the reader does not possess a particular value, which indicates her interest in and treatment of the text itself (its originality is, however, already problematic – see note 9). In devoting attention only to the text, Kristeva overlooks one special characteristic of text: every text has active and passive intertextual relations. Passive intertextual relations are formed by a “historically and culturally different reader who situates what claims to be an autonomous representation of reality on the horizontal and vertical axes¹⁴ of its own intertextuality” (Rajan 69).

Studying “intertextuality” enables Kristeva a deeper insight into the structure and history of the text but at the same time, due to her narrow scope of research, her reflections on literature remain somewhat unrealised.

In contrast to Kristeva, Roland Barthes recognises the significance of the reader and therefore focuses his research on the study of the reader's role: Barthes's theory of "intertextuality" is therefore based on "the reader as the organizing center of interpretation" (Clayton and Rothstein 21). Thus the new literary paradigm places the third factor of the triad in the spotlight: the reader or receiver, along with his circumstances of reception. Barthes shifts the emphasis from the "writing subject" to the reader and his cultural identity.¹⁵ The significance of Barthes's work lies in emphasising the reader rather than the work.¹⁶ As he says: "A text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology" (Barthes 23).

With Barthes declaration about "the death of the author" we witness the disappearance of the reader. According to Barthes, reading is therefore understood as a process that takes place "nowhere and to no one" (Rajan 73). The author sees a significant factor in anonymous citations, stereotypes, etc., which refer to (inter)textuality rather than to a person.

Michael Riffaterre follows this and defines "intertextuality" as "general characteristics of texts and their reception" (Juvan 143). Riffaterre thus limits the expression "intertextuality" to literature, for only through intertextual links can we understand the meaning and particularities of texts. Riffaterre understands "intertextuality" as a "means of force" – with its aid the literary work guides the reader's interpretation of the text. Riffaterre demands that the text be read hermeneutically, because only this way does the literary text have a precisely defined meaning. With his study of reception, Riffaterre had an important influence on the theoreticians of the "Constance School", whose adherents dedicated their attention to the research of the reader's creative reading of the text. Amongst the most visible representatives of this school were Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser.

In Jauss's view: "Der Sinn eines literarischen Werks ist nicht mit dem Werk selbst einfach gegeben, sondern konstituiert sich erst in der Rezeptionsgeschichte" (qtd. Bürger 139). His study of literature and the aesthetics of reception led Jauss to the following conclusion: the influenced author is always also a reader, and "influence" is therefore a special form of creative reception. The term "influence" is conditioned by the author's horizon of expectations, his social, existential and aesthetic needs, as well as his perceptions of national literature. In Jauss's opinion, the newly arising literary work can therefore "ein literarisches Werk kann Probleme voraufgegangene Werke aufnehmen und neue Lösungen vorschlagen, es wird von Zeitgenössischen Rezipienten im Rahmen bestimmter Erwartungen rezipiert (oder nicht rezipiert), und es kann über die Epoche seines Entstehens hinaus wirksam bleiben"¹⁷ (Bürger 140). At

this point, Jauss introduces the concept of the “horizon of expectation”, including the communicative and social-formative function of art, i.e. the interrelations between work and reader: “The social function of literature manifests itself in its genuine possibility [...] where the literary experience of the reader enters into the horizon of expectations of his lived praxis, performs his understanding of the world, and thereby also has an effect on his social behaviour” (*Die Mythe* 39). Moreover, “a literary work with an unfamiliar aesthetic form can break through the expectations of its readers and at the same time confront them with a question, the solution to which remains lacking for them in the religiously or officially sanctioned morals (*Die Mythe* 44). As we shall see, this questions posed in the literary works articulate the way of the human emancipation.

It is precisely in the process of reading that the “secluded reader”¹⁸ is enabled to become a “historical power”. In this way, Jauss significantly modifies the role of the “secluded reader”, because he represents him as an active link in the process of the beginning and formation of the literary work.

The Significance of Mediation in the Formation of the Literary Work

By using the terms “influence” and “intertextuality” we research various relationships between texts, and in so doing we must take into account the many factors that influence the formation of a new literary work. Here mediators¹⁹ play an important role (see Eror 214).

Translation is the most frequent agent for the extension and mediation of literary works between linguistic communities. Here we must pay attention to the fact that a translation can never entirely replace the original. Nonetheless, translations must preserve the essential characteristics and features of the original. Modifications made through many translations and adaptations influence the success of some literary works in the world. We should point out that with the term “mediation” we most frequently refer to the functioning of “a certain literature and its readers in another (linguistic) community including the writers in the role of readers”²⁰ (Eror 221).

In his book *Genetički vidovi inter(literarnosti)*, Gvozden Eror summarises Daniel-Henry Pageaux, stating that the mediator acts as a transporter of ideas and knowledge, disposing of a wide scope of literary genres, sub-genres and forms (see Eror 218).

Mediation therefore enables ideas, themes and motives, as well as literary forms, styles and genres, to decant from one literary work to another, or to establish intertextual relations. The expression “mediation”, there-

fore, occupies the central passage in the intertextual relation of two texts: text A – mediator (e.g., translation) – text B.

Thematology – the Dynamic of Motifs and Themes between Literatures

The meaning of the literary work is formulated with the help of other literary works. Motifs and themes are therefore not immanent components of one text, but are formed through interpretative treatments. This is why thematology is connected with the terms “influence” and “intertextuality” in a special way. Every literary work has its own characteristics, but one literary work follows the original more precisely, and another less precisely.²¹ Marko Juvan distinguishes two types of citation perspectives: assimilation²² (in accordance with the source material) and dissimilation²³ (a digression from and rejection of the source material).

Yves Chevrel ascertains that the myth is characterised by its ability to be modified through the centuries, staying at the same time the same story (see Chevrel 18). His thought leads us to the conclusion that literary works are “holders of myths” (as motifs, themes and materials²⁴) because they take them over, set them forth and even give them their primary form. At the same time, however, our engagement with them is important for understanding the individual culture.

While Chevrel understands “myth” as “material” (German: “Stoff”) for formation, Jauss’s interpretation of myth is somewhat different. Thus Jauss recognises myth already in Genesis, where, in his opinion,

handelt es sich [...] zweifellos um eine Mythe, wenn darunter nicht nur eine denkwürdige geschichtliche Tat, sondern eine Erzählung verstanden wird, die ein Ereignis vor aller Geschichte verewigen soll, das in seinem Ausmass das Ganze der Welt betrifft, das Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott [...] einschliesst und eine elementäre Frage damit beantwortet, dass sie durch jenes anfängliche Ereignis ein für alle Mal vorentschieden worden sein. (*Toward* 26)

Therefore, the myth that is told by Genesis is, according to Jauss’s definition, “antwortet offenbar in erster Linie auf die nahegelegte Frage, wie und um welchen Preis der Mensch das Wissen von Gut und Böse erlangt haben mag”²⁵ (*Toward* 26).

[...] Aber der erste Mensch ist noch nicht, was er erst werden soll: das ‘animal quarerens cur’. Sieht man darin eine Bestimmung seiner zukünftigen Mündigkeit, so kommen ihm auf dieser Bahn seiner Emanzipation wenigstens drei gute Feen

zu Hilfe: die Philosophie, die Wissenschaft und [...] die ästhetische Erfahrung.
(*Der fragende* 551)

The path of emancipation leads from Adam to Job, more precisely, to the inter-relations between the main figures of the *Book of Job*.

Die Erzählung von der ersten Übertretung eines Gebots durch den ersten Menschen und ihren unabsehbaren Folgen antwortet offenbar in erster Linie auf die nahegelegte Frage, wie und um welchen Preis der Mensch das Wissen von Gut und Böse erlangt haben mag. [...] Die grossen Fragen nach den Bedingungen des Menschlichen Daseins jenseits des Paradieses [...] sollen gleichwohl allesamt mite in und derselben Antwort autoritativ zum Verstummen gebracht werden. Die lapidare Antwort von Gen. 3 [...] hinterlässt indes den stärksten Anreiz, weiterzufragen, sei es in dem legitimen Bedürfnis, zu erfahren, welcher Sinn denn nun dem menschlichen Tun unter den verhängten Bedingungen zukommen soll, sei es in der illegitimen Neugier, Frage zu stellen, die von der mythischen Antwort unterdrückt werden, wie zum Beispiel: Warum hat Gott dem ersten Menschen gerade das Wissen von Gut und Böse vorenthalten? (*Toward* 26-27)

In the continuation the article will demonstrate how particular examples²⁶ from world literature answer this question.

The Function of Question and Answer

Asking – posing questions and searching for their answers – is a fundamental principle that brings us to the path of understanding.²⁷ The beginnings of asking are associated with overcoming the fears and horror with which humans are faced. Job's lamentations to God are certainly to be understood in this way: "Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery, and life unto the bitter in soul; Which long for death, but it cometh not; and dig for it more than for hid treasures" (Job 3:20-21). In the end, God's omnipotence and benevolence are revealed to the Old Testament patriarch; Job addresses God in chapter 42, verse 4, where he admits his own ignorance, on the one hand, and God's divine wisdom and inconceivability, on the other hand: "Hear, I beseech thee, and I will speak: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me" (Job 42:4; my emphasis).

Bultmann's assertion – with which Jauss also agrees – is that "Verstehen ist kein kontemplativer Akt, in dem der Interpret nurmehr seine Subjektivität auslöschen und seinen geschichtlichen Standort vergessen müsste, um zu der objektiven Erkenntnis einer Sache zu gelangen. Verstehen ist stets an einer bestimmten Fragestellung, an einem 'Vorausfinden der Befragung' orientiert und mithin vor einem Vorverständnis der Sache

geleitet, das in einem Interesse der Fragenden begründet ist” (*Toward* 468). The comprehension of a literary work is thus an active process that is directed through asking. Posing questions already indicates the expectations that an interpreter or reader has of a text. This is why expectations and prejudices participate in the formation of an interpretation/comprehension of an artistic work.

The *Book of Job* foregrounds the problem of theodicy, according to which divine justice is concealed behind the cruel reality of the world. Theology, on the other hand, rejects human argumentation in favour of God and his (incomprehensible) deeds; furthermore, amongst other things it rejects the canon of justice and recurs to the irrational nespoznavnost of the God’s will (see Jauss, *Estetsko* 271).

In the biblical text God asks the first question of Satan: “Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil?” (Job 1:8). The question instantly indicates that the relationship between God and Job is that of a master and his subject, while at the same time also putting God’s attitude towards Satan, one of “the sons of God”, into the same relationship.

At this point it would make sense to pose the question as to what place Satan has here, and whether perhaps Satan at this very point becomes “a being which puts questions”.²⁸ Here the Bible highlights the role of Satan for the first time and raises him above the other angels by means of putting him in an equal dialogue with God. This can be clearly observed in his counter-question, which later on triggers a bet: “Doth Job fear God for nought?” (Job 1:9). Satan’s fall, which is only hinted at in *The Book of Job* is thus in a certain sense linked to the beginning of asking. Therefore, Jauss is entirely justified in changing Satan’s name from a common name to proper name.²⁹

The *Book of Job* presents the central question of theodicy along the lines mentioned above: “Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery, and life unto the bitter in soul?” (Job 3:20). The Bible does not provide a precise answer to this question anywhere, but instead raises new questions about even more intrinsic relations between the God’s will and the evil (see Jauss, *Estetsko* 273). The extensiveness of this questions is reflected in the conversations of Job’s friends about guilt: “Who ever perished, being innocent? or where were the righteous cut off?” (Job 4:7). From this line, one can draw the conclusion that everyone who suffers must be guilty of something. In the end Job also apparently accepts this conclusion: “If I be wicked, why then labour I in vain?” (Job 9:29).

The questions of evil and guilt that are raised in *The Book of Job* therefore remain unsolved and leave room for various interpretations.

Ecclesiastes (1:18) links wisdom to pain and suffering: “For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow”, but nevertheless “the desire for knowledge” still remains. In his *Confessions*, Augustine states that longing for knowledge and experience is the greatest of all temptations:

Beyond the lust of flesh [...] there is in the soul a certain vain and inquisitive greed that works through all the senses [...]. This greed cloaks itself in the name of ‘research’ and ‘knowledge’. As this greed exists in the desire to become acquainted with things [...] it is named in the Word of God the ‘lust of the eyes’³⁰ [...] Pleasure pursues things that are beautiful, that sound or smell or taste agreeable, or are smooth to the touch; whereas curiosity seeks both these things and their opposite, wishing only to try them out, not driven by a desire to undergo the unpleasant sensation but by a lust for personal knowledge and acquaintance. (249)

The sin and punishment that arise from the desire for knowledge are best illustrated by the myth³¹ of Faust. Ziolkowski states that the first change in understanding of the myth of Faust was brought about by a work of an unknown author *Historia von D. Johann Fausten, the Notorious Sorcerer and Nigromancer*: “Faust is driven initially by the desire of knowledge. [...] In earlier stories it was simply assumed that Faust must be in league with the devil in order to gain his magical power” (Ziolkowski 56). In this work for the first time certain motifs emerge that are characteristic of later works: a pact with the Devil, signed in blood; the name of the devil (Mephisto); Faustus’s desire to understand the basic elements on which the world is built, a task in which only Satan can help him, etc.

In the continuation we will see how these elements were taken over by Goethe and Thomas Mann in their masterpieces, we will link them to the Old Testament story of Job and see how they respond to the question raised about evil and guilt.

The influence of *The Book of Job* on Goethe’s dramatic masterpiece *Faust* is above all evident in numerous key elements that form this pre-romantic poem. Many researchers of Faust have drawn attention to the similarities of the prologue in heaven and *The Book of Job*. Both protagonists are innocent, as they do not know about the bet between God and Satan/Mephisto. At the same time, one further detail should be pointed out: in both Faust and *The Book of Job* the Lord is above Satan and Mephisto. He is the one who sets the rules of the game – in *The Book of Job* Satan is only allowed to act in a limited way (Job must not die), whereas God allows Mephisto only as much “destructiveness, inasmuch as it is in benefit of man and thus whole mankind” (Janko 35).

It is also interesting that in both works God provokes Satan. As we have already observed, in *The Book of Job* God asks Satan a question: “Hast

thou considered my servant Job?” (Job 1:8). In *Faust*, too, one can see that it is God who asks about Faust: “Kennst du den Faust?” (Goethe 20). From their dialogue we can notice that “in this prologue God (Lord) and Mephisto are equal dialogue partners”³² (Križman 23). The same applies to the relationship between God and Satan in *The Book of Job*, as discussed above.

Further similarity between both books is also seen in the fact that God appoints Job/Faust as his servant. In *The Book of Job* this is even more evident than in *Faust*, where God says: “Mein Knecht!” (Goethe 20). Even if Faust serves God despite being “verworren”, God is satisfied with him since “[e]s irrt der Mensch, solange er strebt” (Goethe 21). Through the latter words the reader can anticipate one of the possible answers to the theodicy question that emerges in *The Book of Job*.

Goethe’s drama on humanity therefore offers an answer to the newly posed Mephistophelean question: This world - was it created for the good fortune of a human kind? (see Jauss, *Estetsko* 276). The answer to that question is given at the end of the drama, where Faust utters the following (for Mephisto fatal) words: “Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück / Genieß ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick” (Goethe 515). Hasselbach’s assertion that “bei Goethe [ist] der aus sträflicher Lebens- und Neugier handelnde Faust zum Wahrheitsucher geworden” (Hasselbach 41) corresponds to the views of Hans Robert Jauss: with Faust’s fate the possibility of human self-fulfilment appears and with it also the concealed ideal of the created divine world (according to Jauss, *Estetsko* 277), and because of this Faust can only find redemption in his infinite longing.

A new interpretation of a Faustian theme (as well new views of the problem of guilt and evil) is seen in the modernist³³ work of Thomas Mann, *Doctor Faustus*.³⁴ The notion of “sin” is placed in the framework of the idea of the self-responsible individual: “Im Faustus ist vorgeführt, wie sich die Idee des selbstverantwortlichen Individuums in allen Bereichen der bürgerlichen Kultur auflöst” (Hasselbach 44). Therefore, in the novel Satan never appears with a proper name, yet his origin does not remain unknown, since he describes himself with the words: “Wenn ich bin [...] so kann ich nur Einer sein” (Mann 307). With these words the author depicts Satan’s arrogance and presumptuousness, as such expressions are usually used to describe God and his all-embracing presence. The protagonist of the novel, Adrian Leverkühn, perceives him as a cunning man, which can be observed in their only dialogue (Chapter XXV).

In spite of this, Satan is present throughout the masterpiece in a quiet, and thus even more meaningful, way.

Thomas Mann – in a slightly comic manner – highlights another important quality of Satan: the dreadful chill surrounding him: “Könnt Ihr denn das Unwesen nicht abstellen, diesen eisigen Zug?! – Leider nicht. Es tut mir leid, dir hierin nicht gefällig sein zu können. Ich bin nun einmal so kalt” (Mann 309). Most likely Thomas Mann was influenced by Dante’s depiction of hell, where Lucifer is surrounded by eternal ice. In Mann’s novel *Doctor Faustus* cold metaphorically points to the lack of warmth between human beings and shows the state of the individual in contemporary society. Satan does not know love and mercy: for a long time he seduces Adrian to his path (for example with the prostitute). For that very reason Mann condemns him to eternal cold and to dreadful heat at the same time: “[I]hr Wesen [Wesen der Hölle] oder, wenn du willst, ihre Pointe ist, daß sie ihren Insassen nur die Wahl läßt zwischen extremer Kälte und einer Glut, die den Granit zum Schmelzen bringen könnte” (Mann 336).

Adrian’s choice of profession has a decisive influence on his links to Satan, as “his journey into the depths of musical creativity is a journey into the ultimate profanity, into that which lies altogether outside language and which is beyond communication. In short, it is a journey into the demonic, a journey into hell. For hell [...] has, like music, the quality of being unspeakable” (Pattison 9). The continuous seeking of perfection in his creations in the end drives Adrian to madness. The artist’s illness meaningfully hints at the decay of the modern subject and his self-destruction, which is why Leverkühn’s last work of art has the telling title: *The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus*.

The novel by the German novelist provides a different answer to the question of evil and guilt. Goethe’s Faust finds a solution (he never fully satisfies his wishes), whereas Mann’s Faust never finds one. As Hasselbach summarises: “die künstlerische Produktivität [ist] die Befriedigung seiner (Leverkühn’s) irdischen Lust, und der Wahnsinn seine Strafe” (Hasselbach 42). “The possibility of human “self-fulfilment” (as indicated in Goethe’s *Faust*), and consequently Leverkühn’s salvation, remains unfulfilled, as the author – according to Theodor Ziolkowski – describes “the self-destructive course of Germany in the early twentieth century” (Ziolkowski 149).

According to Bloom’s interpretation, every literary work is an incorrect interpretation of the original text, yet his assertion can not fully hold true for the literary works discussed. The *Book of Job* does not answer the theodicy question of evil and guilt, whereas Goethe and Mann engage in a search for possible solutions and offer them to the reader.

Conclusion

The article deals with processes that form a literary work. The analysis of three books (The *Book of Job*, and Goethe's and Mann's *Faust*) indicates how at least two significant literary processes interweave in these works: "influence" and "intertextuality". "Influence" appeared early in literature (we discussed the influence of Virgil's poetic style on Dante), but it is also noticeable in contemporary German literature (Thomas Mann modelled an image of hell according to Dante's 32nd canto of *Inferno*).

A more contemporary understanding of relationships between (literary) texts is "intertextuality". The term appeared for the first time in the works of Julie Kristeva, who pointed out that literary works complement each other and that we can only understand them properly with a good knowledge of the literary tradition. One form of intertextuality is citation, which appeared in the literature discussed in the title of Mann's novel *Doktor Faustus*.³⁵ At the same time, the novel can not be understood without reference to *Historia von D. Johann Fausten, the notorious Sorcerer and Nigromancer*, from which the author summarises all of the crucial elements (in this case we talk about extended intertextuality)

Research of literary works indicates that the reader's reception of a text essentially affects the comprehension of particular literary works (reception aesthetics). We looked closely at questions that originate in the reading of *Job* (questions of evil and guilt) and answers that are offered by Goethe (the possibility of the hero's salvation) and by Thomas Mann (Leverkühn's desire to succeed drives him to insanity). Both literary works offer dissimilar answers because of a differing understanding of the individual, who attains independence in Mann's novel (written in the middle of the 20th century) and thus becomes a self-sufficient subject, while in so doing jeopardising his own basis.

NOTES

¹ The Holy Bible is quoted from the King James Version (1913).

² In his poem Dante consciously takes recourse to Virgil, who was regarded in the Middle Ages as an authority in this field. From its beginning, the expression "authority" has been strongly connected with the term "auctor", as it indicates an author whose words are respected and valued (e.g., Cicero, Aristotle, Roman and Greek poets). Their works have thus gained in worth and efficacy, and in the Middle Ages the relationship between them and the world was allegorical. As Donald E. Pease ascertains: "to experience an event in allegorical terms was to transpose the event out of the realm of one's personal life into the realm of applicable authority. Following such a transposition, the event became impersonal" (Pease 106). With the discovery of the New World the meaning of "auctor" was lost – the "new man" appeared, who, in contradiction to the medieval "auctores" (whose

authority was based on God's revelation), named himself as the authority of his own words and wove part of his personality into his stories.

³ As Barthes states, medieval rhetoric was drawn from Cicero's and Quintilian's essays. In its discussions it dealt with ornaments and figures, "colors", and later also with poetics (*artes versificatoriae*); style was divided into the three types of "Virgil's cycle" (representing the figurative classification of three styles): *gravis* (sublime), *humilis* (plain/simple) and *mediocrus* (middle); with regard to two types of ornaments, style is further divided into *facile* and *difficile*. For the sublime style medieval artists modelled themselves on Virgil's *Aeneid*, where the ruling warrior is foregrounded (Hector, Ajax, etc.); representative of the plain/simple style is the idle herdsman, as found in *Bucolics* (Tityrus, Meliboeus); *Georgics*, with its narrative of the peasant (Triptolemy), creates the middle style (Barthes 39–40).

⁴ In the first canto of the *Aeneid*, Virgil foretells the famous ascension of Julius Caesar ("Then Caesar from the Julian stock shall rise / Whose empire ocean, and whose fame the skies / Alone shall bound; whome, fraught with eastern spoils, / Our heav'n, the just reward of human toils, / Securely shall repay with rites divine; / And incense shall ascend before his sacred shrine. / Then dire debate and impious war shall cease, / And the stern age be soften'd into peace" (*Aeneid* I, 468–474)) which influences the description of Christ's greatness in Dante's *Comedy*.

⁵ In the *Divine Comedy*, the influence of the Roman poet the most evident in the imitation of the epic (sublime) style. At the same time, Virgil's influence on Dante grows stronger, in the words of Colin Burrow, at the moment when Virgil abandons Dante at the end of Purgatory (Burrow 81).

⁶ Hegel understands world history as the progress of universal spirit through the elementary stages to absolute spirit. The essence of this progress is that the spirit is also aware of itself in the other existence and that he always retains identity with himself. World history is paralleled, in Hegel's opinion, by the history of individual forms of absolute spirit: art, religion and philosophy. The content of these three forms is the same (absolute spirit / truth / idea / God), they differ only in the manner of description of their object – the Absolute. In summary, we can say that Hegel observes sameness in variety (identity in differences).

As a method, Foucault's archaeology reveals an absence of sameness. The history of a concept, in the author's opinion, is not a history of its progressive improvement, but a history of its heterogeneous field of constitution and validity (see Foucault 1969). From this point of view, Foucault reveals that modern historiography functions with "creative corrigendum". One of the most significant traits of new history is, therefore, the removal of the discontinuous, which includes mutations, transformations, incisions and ruptures.

⁷ The author treats this in more detail in the discussion *Sémiotikè: Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (1969).

⁸ The authors or texts were proclaimed as authorities, and so their way of interpreting reality is taken as commonly valid.

⁹ It is necessary to point out that authority (of influence) therefore no longer functions as authority – the author or text that is used again in another text loses his/its authority.

¹⁰ The author, who, along with the reader, creates the vehicle for intertextuality is also de-subjectified.

¹¹ We talk about the influence of Virgil's *Aeneid* on Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

¹² The extreme example of this possibility is reference to nonexistent texts, mystifications, perhaps the most beautiful example of which is found in Borge's prose (e.g., in *La biblioteca de Babel*).

¹³ When the text prevails in its intertextual structure and reception, the number of receptions multiplies to infinity and it is not necessarily for the text to be understood as a

(concluded) literary artwork/work: on the contrary, comprehension goes from “the work to the text” (Barthes); the text is no longer a concluded work - it becomes discourse. We notice, therefore, that we arrive at a transformation of the understanding of text: the ‘literary artwork’ thus here already becomes a problematic (and questionable) expression.

¹⁴ When imitating historical and social realities, the text (which is characterised by passive intertextuality) destroys both itself and the reality that it presents. Thus a gap arises between reality and imitation, in which the text can behave as “a reading and the object of its reading” (Rajan 68). A literary work formed in this way by intertextual relations thus encourages its own reading anew.

¹⁵ With identity is linked the autonomous consciousness of the individual, which is the source of all events and thinking. The concept of subjectivity deals with the relation between the individual and language; at the same time - by means of ideology, dialogue or language - the concept of subjectivity substitutes human nature with the concept of people. As ideology, dialogue and language are the decisive factors in constituting the identity of the individual, identity becomes a consequence of these factors and not the reason for them.

¹⁶ At the end of the 1960s, the field of philosophy underwent changes; one of the first philosophers to introduce these changes into his treatises was Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Wahrheit und Methode, Truth and Method*). According to him, the interpretation of any literary work is always predetermined by our preliminary understanding. He stresses that understanding is always historical and that prejudice – the interpreter’s preliminary understanding – is something that can not be eliminated. Thus, in a certain way, the reader participates in the creation of the work, adding personal or historical subjectivity. In his work, Hans Robert Jauss has recourse to Gadamer, and in collaboration with Iser’s aesthetics of effect establishes reception aesthetics. Roland Barthes, however, includes himself in the third methodological paradigm – the reader – with his essay “The Death of the Author” (1968).

¹⁷ Jauss’s theoretical work *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics* (1998) discusses the functions of question and answer in the example of *The Book of Job*, as in his opinion besides the three components of the hermeneutic process (understanding, interpreting and application) these functions have a decisive influence on the understanding of a literary work.

¹⁸ In Jauss’s opinion (*Estetika* 450), the reader does not stand just like a reading individual, isolated in the social space; on the contrary, it is through the experience gained during reading that he participates in the communicative process. (ibid.)

¹⁹ From the point of view of the previous chapter, a mediator is not a subject, but simply a point where intertextuality takes place.

²⁰ Eror understands the “interliterary” as an area with obvious terminological similarities. In his opinion, we can therefore observe, for example, that the word “plagiat” (English: plagiarism) in every language indicates a small group with an equivalent, but not synonymous, Latin stem.

²¹ Here it is again necessary to stress that an “influence” (as in Bloom’s definition mentioned above) represents a creative correction of an earlier work on the basis of its incorrect interpretation.

²² John Milton predominantly uses the assimilative perspective in *Paradise Lost*; a poem that is a biblical tale of the banishment from paradise based on the *Holy Bible*.

²³ Dissimilation, or a total deviation from the biblical tale, is observed in the work by Isolde Kurz, *Die Kinder der Lilith*.

²⁴ In *Genesis* the myth of the creation is connected with the motifs of paradise lost, forbidden fruit and the desire for knowledge (Gn 3,5: “[...] in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil”). These motifs

are of crucial significance for all of the subsequent treatments of this myth (Milton: *Paradise Lost*, etc.)

²⁵ In connection with this, in *Paradise Lost* Milton ascertains that the first great realisation should be “seem I to thee sufficiently possessed / Of happiness, or not, who am alone / from all eternity? for none I know / Second to me or like, equal much less. / How have I, then, with whom to hold converse, / Save with the creatures which I made, and those / To me inferior, infinite descents / Beneath what other creatures are to thee?” (*Paradise Lost* VIII: 404–411) (Milton 2003 208)

²⁶ The problem of evil will be addressed in the case of *The Book of Job*, which raises some questions to which we will seek answers in Goethe’s masterpiece *Faust* and Mann’s novel *Doktor Faustus*.

²⁷ In *Genesis* (Gn 1-3) only God has the right to ask, Adam being in the role of a servant. Adam becomes an equal partner in the dialogue only when he rises from his role of servant into a position equal to God: thus Adam opposes God and is consequently exiled from paradise.

²⁸ In the Bible, Satan has many synonyms: most frequently he is referred to as “snake”, “satan/Satan”, “devil”, while writers also use the synonym Lucifer in reference to him. “Satan” denotes the fallen angel, the rebel and the tempter – Satan as a proper name is used for the first time in the *Bible* in the First Book of Kings (1 Kings); “a satan” as a common name may denote a rebellion of an angel of God, but in such cases Satan’s acts are still within the framework of God’s actions and plans (as is evident in *The Book of Job*: 2, 1).

The name Lucifer means “Light-Bringer” – writers perceived Satan as one of God’s sons/angels, but Dante already uses this name to depict a rebellion in heaven and Satan’s final defeat (*Inferno* XXXI, 142).

²⁹ The change from a common name to a proper name in Jauss’s work is not as obvious as it is in Slovene and English translations because of a particularity of German grammar.

³⁰ At this point, Augustine uses the expression *curiositas*, for which the Slovenian translation – *radovednost* – is not entirely suitable. The word originates from the Latin word *cura* (“care”) and therefore *curiositas* is the opposite of carefreeness. In antiquity, the expression had a negative connotation, and for this reason the motif of punished curiosity is often present in the literature of the time (e.g., Apuleius: *Lucius and the Donkey* in *Metamorphoses*).

³¹ The Faustian myth developed in a different manner than other myths (the creation of the world, Prometheus, etc.), as it is based on the life of a real person. According to the facts, he was born around 1480 and was of ill repute. He was also known as a sodomite and a magician (see Ziolkowski 43– 49).

³² This is only a seeming equality, which appears on the level of the dramatic-dialogic form. In the form of an exchange of messages it is, in fact, created by God; he starts the conversation and sets “the rules of the game”.

³³ Thomas Mann’s novel *Doctor Faustus* was written in 1947 and belongs to the period of modernism, yet it evidently also comprises certain preoccupations of the expressionist movement and its literary innovations. According to Thomas Anz, expressionist works from the 1920s are characterised by a vision/utopia of a better world and a new man (a consequence of WW I), and later also by “Erfahrungen der Ohnmacht und Orientierungslosigkeit, der Isolation und Entfremdung, des Ekels und der Angst” (Anz 135). These are also the qualities of Mann’s hero, Adrian Leverkühn.

³⁴ Mann bases his novel on the literary work *Historia* from the 16th century, and not on the Goethe’s dramatic poem *Faust*.

³⁵ Mann quotes the title of Goethe’s literary masterpiece (Latin “Faustus”), even though he does not actually take recourse to the work in his novel.

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