Ontological Foundations of the Consumer Society: Heidegger and Marcuse 
Martina Volarevic 
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Croatia mzezelj@ffos.hr 

Damir Sekulic 
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Croatia dsekulic@ffos.hr 
©2022Martina Volarevicand DamirSekulic 
Abstract. This paper analyses the ontological foundations of the con­sumer society in Heidegger’s thinking of positionality (Ge-stell), and compares that with Marcuse’s exposition of the phenomenon of late capitalistsociety.Thecomparisonshowsanumberofsimilarities:both attributeatotalitariancharactertothemechanismoftheconsumerso­ciety,bothbelievesuchasocietyhasanegativeeffectonman,andboth find a solution in artistic experience. The presented analysis remains significant because it touches on contemporary ecological dilemmas. 
KeyWords: MartinHeidegger,HerbertMarcuse,consumersociety,po­sitionality, technology, productive apparatus, art 

Ontološki temelji potrošniške družbe 
Povzetek. ClanekanaliziraontološketemeljepotrošniškedružbevHei­deggrovem mišljenju razpoložljivosti (Ge-stell), ki ga primerja z Mar-cusejevo obravnavo pojava poznokapitalisticne družbe. Primerjava pokaže vec podobnosti: oba mehanizmu potrošniške družbe pripišeta totalitarni znacaj, prepricana sta, da ima takšna družba slab vpliv na cloveka, in poišceta rešitev v umetniškem izkustvu. Pomen pricujoce analize je tudi v tem, da se dotakne sodobnih ekoloških dilem. 
Kljucnebesede: MartinHeidegger,HerbertMarcuse,potrošniškadruž­ba, razpoložljivost, tehnika, proizvodna sredstva, umetnost 

Introduction 
The basic idea of the paper is an analysis of contemporary society un­derstoodasacontemporarytechnocraticaffluentsociety. Moreprecisely, 
https://doi.org/10.26493/2630-4082.54.139-167 
the paper aims to present its ontological foundations and their effects 
as they appear in contemporary society. Heidegger’s thinking of posi­
tionality (Ge-stell) as the ontological foundation of contemporary con­
sumer society is taken as the theoretical basis, which is followed by con­
fronting Heidegger’s interpretation with Marcuse’s criticism of late cap­
italism. Since Marcuse was Heidegger’s student, the paper will also in­
vestigate the extent to which Marcuse inherits Heidegger’s thought pro-
cess.MarcusehimselfacknowledgesHeidegger’sinfluenceonlyinhisfirst 
work ‘Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism’ (re­
published in Marcuse 2005, 1–33), which for him was an unsuccessfulat-
tempt to connect existential philosophy and Marxism. Under the influ­
enceofideologicalopposition,MarcuseabandonsHeidegger’sexistential 
philosophy, considering it only apparently concrete. He maintains that 
the concreteness of the existential analytic of the Being of being-there 
(the Being of Dasein; Da-sein: there-being) dissipates in the secondary 
transcendental philosophy in which existentials are neutralised and be­
come abstractions, e.g. being-there (Dasein)is sociallyand sexuallyneu­
tral,deathwhichisaninexorablefactbecomesanunsurpassablepossibil­
ity, and historicity is not tied to a concrete material and cultural situation 
(pp. 163–167). He considers the late preoccupation with the question of 
technology as a possibleexceptionto Heidegger’s work, but the hermetic 
nature of the text thwarts its understanding. What is grasped he criti­
cises for fatalism, because the acting forces are understood as self-acting 
agents, ‘forces in-themselves’ removed from the context of power rela­
tions in which they are constituted and which give them their function. 
The paper focuses on contact points between Heidegger’s and Mar­
cuse’s expositions of the foundations, causes and consequences of con­
temporary technocratic consumer society, which is interesting to exam­
ine because Marcuse himself denies Heidegger’s influence on his work 
after 1932 and does not declare a similarity between his one-dimensional 
society and Heidegger’s inauthenticity of existence (Marcuse 2005, 172). 
Marcuse’s analysis of late capitalist society fruitfully complements Hei­
degger’s thinking of technology as it provides a multitude of examples. 
Concreteness and political commitment distance Marcuse’s discursive 
style from the generality of traditional philosophical exposition.¹ 
¹ For more on the nuanced relationship between Heidegger and Marcuse, see e.g.: 
Abromeit andCobb(2004,7–8),Abromeit (2004,131,137–143),Kellner(2001,2–4),Bru­
jic (1968, 240, 261), Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 5–7, 16, 49, 67), Feenberg (2004, 73), 

Heidegger’s Thinking of Technology 
Heidegger confronts two endpoints of the possibility of constructing that which presences: traditional manufacturing production based on the Greek p..µs.. and (modern) serial automated production. Tradi­tional production is bringing-forth (Vor-her-bringen),² which brings be­ing into presence, while contemporary production is challenging (Her-ausfordern),whichisadeformationoftraditionalproduction–deforma­tion, because its production method understands that which presences exclusively as raw materials that can be extracted and stockpiled, which obscures the possibility of accessing Being. The blurring of the access to Being occurs because man never accesses that which presences as being in its Being but considers it only from the perspective of exploitation. 
Traditional bringing-forth is an aspect of caring in which being-there (Dasein) makes a work using ready-to-hand equipment. The work is ex­emplary ready-to-hand because itbears in itself not only the reference of its usability but also the reference to the equipment and materials used in its making. Bearing in itself the reference to the equipment and ma­terials, the work gathers in itself the whole of equipment of its making. In making the work, man discloses nature in the form of natural prod­ucts throughthe reference to materials;heis referred to the naturalbeing 
‘Heidegger and Marcuse: A Dialogue in Letters’ (1998, 263–264), Kellner (1998, 35), and Brayford (2021, 611–613). 
² Heidegger associates the essence of technology with the ancient Greek term p..µs.., bringing-forth, instead of t...., often translated as technique or technology. Further­more, he insiststhat t.... meansneither art (if itisnot settingBeingintowork) nor ar­tisanalcraft production but is exclusively related to allowing something to appear as that whichpresences.Assuch,t.... isprimarilytheoreticalknowledge,notunlike.p.st.µ.. Therefore, it is not a consequence of a mere observation of present-at-hand beings but meanstheexactopposite –goingbeyondtheimmediatelygivenpresent-at-hand,under­taking the effort of reaching so that Being appears in the individuality of beings (Hei­degger 1983, 168). Thus, for Heidegger, modern technology separates itself from the an­cient Greek t....,which is amodeof ....e.a that allows beings to be seen. ...µs.. (bringing-forth, Vor-her-bringen) is for Heidegger also a form of bringing beings into presence,butsinceitisrelatedtopracticalcraftproduction,itismoresuitablefordescrib­ing modern technology. The distinction becomes unclear if one compares the German translations of the ancient Greek terms ‘bringing-forth’ (Vor-her-bringen),which is the translation of p..µs..,and t....,which translates to ‘produce’(Hervorbringen). Like­wiseunclearisthetransitionfromthetheoreticalunderstandingoft.... totheassertion that t.... is concealed in building production, whether it is the traditional tectonic el­ement of architecture or engineeringconstruction (Heidegger 2000, 160). Cf. Riis (2018, 161–164). 
that needs processing. In this way, nature in the form of natural products which become materials in the making penetrates into the surrounding world of the caring being-there (Dasein). The essence of the revealing function of being-there’s (Dasein) caring about the work is its disclosure of innerworldly beings in their Being, brought together in the references of the work (Heidegger 1967, 70–72; 1979, 260–262). Heidegger considers the above definition of bringing-forth to be correct but insufficient be­cause it does not penetrate into the essence of technology. To get closer tothinkingoftheessenceoftechnology,producingshouldbethoughtbe­yond causality in the form of the referential structure of the in-order-to and the instrumentality of equipment. To approach the essence of tech­nology, Heideggerinterprets themakingofaworkonthebasisofthean­cient Greek term a.t... (which translates as Verschuld, responsibility or guilt),whichcarriesthemeaningofthatwhichisresponsibleforsomething else or that to which something else is indebted. In accordance with such an interpretation, Aristotle’s four causes are presented as four ways of re­sponsibility. The equipment maker gathers three ways of responsibility: the aspect (causa formalis, e.d..), the matter (causa materialis, ...)and the end (causa finalis, t....) (Aristotle 2018, 192a–195b). These ways are responsible for the lying athand (Vorliegen)ofthe presence (Anwesen)of that which presences because they bring the produced into its presence. It follows from the above that the complete arrival (vollendete Ankunft) is the principal characteristic of responsibility, which is therefore an ac-tiveletting(Ver-an-lassen),whatactivelyletsthatwhichisnotpresencing into presence.³ 
Plato tells us what this bringing is in a sentence from the Sympo­sium (205b): ‘Every occasion for whatever passes over and goes for­ward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poiesis, is bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen].’ [Heidegger 1977b, 10]4 
Thiskindofbringing-forth, p..µs.. (Her-vor-bringen)goesbeyondar­tisanal handcraft manufacture and concerns all aspects of artistic pro­duction but also the bringing-forth of nature, f.s...5 F.s.. is the most 
³ Cf. Feenberg (2005, 33–36) and Ihde (2010, 42–50). 
4 Was dieses Bringen ist, sagt uns Platon in einem Satz des »Symposion« (205 b): »Jede 
Veranlassung für das, was immer aus dem Nicht-Anwesenden über-und vorgeht in das 
Anwesen, ist p..µs.., ist Her-vor-bringen« (Heidegger 2000, 12). 5 Cf. Young (2002, 40), Feenberg (2005, 6–8, 30–31), Batovanja (2007, 107), Ihde (2010, 33, 
62), and Glazebrook (2000, 199–205). 
original bringing-forth becauseit is self-emerging and has its cause in it­
self. Bringing-forth is only that making which is revealing (Entbergen), 
bringing the concealed forth into unconcealment (....e.a).6 It is reveal­
ing because it brings forth that which is not yet lying at hand and which 
becomes what it is made to be by gathering in advance its aspect, matter 
and end (Heidegger 2000, 16–21). 
For Heidegger, the challenging of modern technology is also a form 
of revealing; however, revealing not directed towards positioning a new 
lying at hand but towards the unlocking, distributing and storing of en­
ergy.7 It challenges natural energy into positioning (Stellen)which ex­
tracts it by revealing and requisitioning (bestellend). In its challenging 
extraction, the positioning is regulation (Steuerung)and securement 
(Sicherung) that would secure the greatest possible efficiency. What is 
availableforfutureuseisaccumulatedinthestanding-reserve(Bestand).8 
Since what is usable is stored in it, the standing-reserve is causally moti­
vated, directed towards predicting and conquering predetermined con­
sequences, which are used to secure further consequences. Positioned in 
the standing-reserve are pieces (Bestand-Stück) of the same, which need 
to be distinguished from parts: parts make up a whole, e.g. equipment 
which makes up the whole of equipment in the traditional bringing-
forthofawork,whilepiecesareisolatedbecausetheydonotcomplement 
each other but rather multiply sameness. Interchangeable and equivalent 
pieces make up the inventory of the standing-reserve, each of which is 
waiting for an opportunity to be used. The equivalence of pieces in the 
standing-reserve leadstothedisappearanceofdistance,becauseifevery-
thing is of equal value, there is no longer a need to distinguish between 
what is near and what is distant (Heidegger 1994, 26, 36–37). The mode 
of Being of pieces is interchangeability, in the sense of discarding each 
being after a single use in order to replace it with a seemingly improved 
6 Cf. Pejovic (1959, 160), Pejovic (1979, 155), Feenberg (2005, 40–43), and Batovanja (2007, 
107). For more on f.s.. as ‘truth,’ see Glazebrook (2000, 165–179). Also see Riis (2018, 
32–41). 7 See Young (2002, 38, 49–52), Holden (2009, 2–3), Feenberg (2005, 12, 72–73, 130–135), 
Batovanja (2007, 112), and Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005, 13). 8 Cf. Guigon (1993, 20), Achterhuis (2001, 7), and Batovanja (2007, 109). About this 
problem, see also: Richardson (2012, 331–335), Dreyfus (1993, 305), Young (2002, 46), 
Borgmann (2005, 429),Holden (2009, 4), Feenberg(2005, 2, 21–22, 38–40),Dreyfus and 
Wrathall(2002,xiii),Dreyfus(2002,167),Riis(2018,23–32),andBrayford(2021,610–611). 
one. One cannot talk about the constancy of objects. because inventory pieces of the standing-reserve only have the constancy of availability – theyarestoredinthestanding-reserveuntilincludedinthecirculationof the requisitioning of the orderable. The consequence of such consumer behaviour is the atrophy of tradition because the perpetuum mobile of substitutability(Ersetzbarkeit)terminatesthesubsistenceofthatwhichis worth preserving. The absence of that which is valuable enough to pass on to the next generations leads to the disappearance of any tradition because the old is equated with the obsolete (Heidegger 1986, 366–370). 
Even in the phenomenon of fashion, what is essential is no longer embellishment and adornment (fashion as embellishment has thus become just as anachronistic as mending), but instead the replace-ability of models from season to season. [Heidegger 2012b, 62]¹° 
Pieces accumulated in the standing-reserve defy traditional modes of representing or producing (Herstellen). Theessential differenceis that what is stored in the standing-reserve is forced into requisitioning,while what is represented in producing freely, concernfully approaches. The challengingofmoderntechnologyreplacestheepochofobjectness,dom­inant at the beginning of the Modern Age, with the epoch of orderabil­ity. Through planning oriented towards exploitation, modern technol­ogy transforms objectness into standing-reserve in which it secures be-ingsneededinthefuture. Therequisitioningoftheorderablereducesthe relation to beings to the consumption of the inventory of the standing-reserve, the consequence of which is the disappearance of the objectness of objects. Hence, today there are no more objects but only beings ready tobeconsumed(Verbrauchen).Contemporarymandoesnotunderstand innerworldybeingsintheirBeing,norintheModernAgeconceptualop­positenessofobjects;forhim,thetotalityofthesubsistingisacommodity available for everyday consumption.¹¹ 
Yetanairliner thatstandson the runway is surely an object.Cer­tainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as 
. Heidegger uses two terms – Gegenstand and Objekt –that are properly translated into English as ‘object.’ In this chapter, ‘object’ refers to the term Gegenstand. 
¹° Sogar im Phänomen der Mode sind nicht mehr Putz und Zier wesentlich (daher ist die ModealsPutzebensounzeitgemäßgewordenwiedieAusbesserung),sondernvonSaison zu Saison die Ersetzbarkeit der Modelle (Heidegger 1986, 369). 
¹¹ Inthiscontextcf.Dahlstrom(2018,47–51),Wrathall(2018,16–22)andResta(2021,16–19). 
standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. [Heidegger 1977b, 17]¹² 
Requisitioning(Bestellen)positionsanddrawsinpiecesofthestanding-
reserve; they stand inittobeable toengageand participateinfurther 
requisitioning. The positioning of requisitioning is a challenging-forth 
that forces that which presences into a self-positioning which conscripts 
(Gestellung) it. Everything positioned is only available for future use and 
waits in the standing-reserve for its requisitioning. Thus, conscription 
anticipates future requisitioning, and accordingly plans and exploits in­
dividual positionings. The chain of orderability is a circulation of the 
positioned which only takes its place in the sequence of effects of req­
uisitioning. It follows from the above that orderability does not create 
anything that would have independent constancy like an artisanal hand­
craft product; rather, the continuity of orderability is the only constancy 
of requisitioning. The order positions that which presences as constant, 
and this constant has the constancy of the pieces in the standing-reserve 
available for further orderability. As such, requisitioning has a universal 
character and tends to position the whole of what presences as standing-
reserve. In its orders, it gathers all types of positionings and possibilities 
of linking individual positionings in the circulation of chains of order-
ability. Requisitioning also sucks in nature, which is no longer a limit 
to technology but a fundamental piece of the inventory of the standing-
reserve, and as such has a certain constancy (Heidegger 1994, 28–32). 
Positionality(Ge-stell)requisitionseverything positionedinthestand­ing-reserve as pieces of its inventory. It stands at the foundation of ev­ery requisitioningandthusdetermines the wayinwhichevery thingthat presences, whether overtly or covertly, presences as a piece of standing-reserve. It is a self-gathering collection (Versammlung) of positioning from which all that is ordered receives its essence out of the standing-reserve. This means that the circulation of requisitioning is appropri­ated (ereignen) in positionality, and it is responsible for the presence of all which presences being understood as standing-reserve. Positionality constantly pulls that which can be ordered into the circulation or requi-
¹² Aber ein Verkehrsflugzeug, das auf der Startbahnsteht, istdoch einGegenstand. Gewiß. WirkönnendieMaschineso vorstellen.Aberdannverbirgtsie sich in dem, was und wie sie ist. Entborgen steht sie auf der Rollbahn nur als Bestand, insofern sie bestellt ist, die Möglichkeit des Transports sicherzustellen (Heidegger 2000, 17). 
sitioning and assigns it to standing-reserve.¹³ That is why, for Heideg­ger, positionality is plundering (Geraff), in its positioning reaping all which presences into requisitioning; it is the gathering of reaping (Raf-fen). The positioningof positionalityin requisitioningis the gathering of self-circulatingimpulse(Trieb).¹4 Theessenceofpositionalityistheplun­deringdrive(Getrieb)thatdrivesthecontinuousorderabilityofthewhole ofstanding-reservethroughself-circulation.Theplunderingofposition­ality amasses into the drive of the machine drive which imposes upon the whole of standing-reserve to persist only through the machine. The essence of the machine is determined from positionality because it po­sitions and challenges forth the circulation of the machine on the basis of the circulation of drive that constitutes the essence of positionality. Positionality thus determined is the essence of technology, and it is re-sponsibleforthe emergence ofmachinesthat produceenergy. Therefore, positionality is responsible for the emergence of the first industrial revo­lution, which extracts energy from solid fuels for the steam engine, and the second, which uses electricity. Through the machine drive, position-ality by ordering establishes a completely new type and regime of posi­tioning, which has nothing in common with the tools and self-propelled mechanisms of traditional bringing-forth. The essential difference be­tween manufactural powered tools and the machine is that the products of the machine are ready for a further conducting along and are not pro­duced tosubsist andbe used(Heidegger1994, 33–35). 
Within the reign of positionality, man is challenged forth to partici­pate in requisitioning; he is the executer (Angestellte) of requisitioning. In other words, the revealing of requisitioning can only happen if man is challenged to unlock natural energy. He is attributed to positionality and doesnotdifferessentiallyfromthe otheravailablepiecesofthe standing-
¹³ Cf.Pejovic(1959,161),Dreyfus(1993,305–306),Young(2002,37,44–45),Godzinski(2005, [3]–[5]), Dreyfus and Wrathall (2002, xiii), Richardson (2012, 326–329), Guigon (1993, 20), Glazebrook (2000, 240–247), and Riis (2018, 11–22). See also: Davis (2018, 139–141) and Sommer (2021, 24–29). 
¹4 By using the terms impulse (Trieb), drive (Getrieb) and instinct (Instinkt)in the analysis of positionality, Heidegger tries to emphasise the automatism of action and the human inabilitytocontrolit. Positionalitydriveshumanstocertainactions,anditscommanding power can be equated with the inevitability of the impulsivity of the instinctual. Man is thus deprived of freedom of will and subordinated to his animal nature. He is animal rationale in full sense, because in his actions he is guided by a hypertrophied calculating reason that tries to calculate the whole of the subsisting (Heidegger 2000, 82–83). 
reserve’s inventory. Man becomes human material imposed upon for the purpose of orderability, and so he belongs to the standing-reserve more originally than any other material. Although man is reduced to the or­derer of the standing-reserve, and thus no more than human material equally subjugated to positionality, he imagines himself as the master of Earth (Heidegger 1994, 30).¹5 
Man is influenced by the opinion that the whole world is his work, 
the result of his careful planning, mathematical calculation,¹6 automa­
tion and storing in the standing-reserve.¹7 Planning drives him to take a 
¹5 Heidegger considers the philosophical origin for the Modern Age positioning of man as theruler of nature in thetext ‘TheAge of the World Picture.’He believes that the Carte­sianpositioningofmanastheonewhorepresentsisatthebasisofthepositioningmanas the master of Earth. For modern metaphysics, man is the measure of the Being of being because the Being of being is equated with representedness (Heidegger 1977a, 124–130). Heidegger returns to the definition of man as the representer in the text ‘Why Poets?,’ whereheelaboratestheideathattheModernAgepositionsmanastherepresenterbefore theworldandtherebyexcludeshimfromtheworld.Astherepresenter,manbecomesthe one to whom the entirety of the world is given as representation in consciousness. Two possibilities of representation are available to him: either it is a theoretical representa­tion that ends with the representedness of being in consciousness, or it is a producing representation that produces the object from the represented. Heidegger labels the man who produces objectsbasedon representationsastheassertingproducer (durchsetzende Hersteller) because he changes what is found subsisting in order to adapt it to his needs (pp. 388–394). In both texts, man is defined as superior to the whole of nature, which he exploits to the limit and which is completely subordinated to the command of his will. Cf. Glazebrook (2000, 112–117) and Brayford (2021, 610–611). 
¹6 The demand for calculability dominant in technology also affects human natural lan­guage. Language takes the form of a formalised language which directs man to the technological-calculating. Under the influence of such language, speech is information which safeguards its procedure by means of information theories. Man gradually aban­donsnaturallanguage,understoodbyinformationtheoryasalackofformalisation(Hei­degger 1985, 251). 
¹7 Heidegger elaborates man’s delusion of being the ruler, and not the subject of position-ality in the course of his university lectures What is Called Thinking? Positionality as the essence of technology rules man behind the scenes and its rule remains unfathomable to him. It is not unfathomable only to the man who is involved in the production pro­cess in one way or another. The essence of technology was likewise unfathomable to the thinking of previous generations of philosophers and the majority of the contemporary oneswho arenotabletolearntothink. Eventhough theirphilosophiestouch on theeco­nomic, political, social andmoral aspectsof technologyand machineproduction, Hegel, andespeciallyMarx,werenotabletoreachitsessence.Thereasonforthisisthat,intheir thinking, they had to move in the shadow of the essential nature of technology and did not achieve the freedom to grasp and adequately think this nature through. Since they are all philosophers of the metaphysical forgetting of Being (whether historical or con­
stand and becomeeither the servant orthe master ofhis plan. Assoonas heacceptstheworldashiswork,whichtakesshapeaccordingtohisplan, he is no longer able to hear the claim of Being (Heidegger 2006, 42–43). Thatwhichpresencesisgiventomanonlyastheobjectofhiscalculations and orderability, and he does not reach the open of the unconcealment of the Being of being. The obstructed way into the open turns man away from the pure relationofBeing,which is why he parts from the open. Positionality positions the essence of that which presences beyond its es-sentialorigin,beyond....e.a,andwhetherthatwhichpresencesisgiven asunconcealmentinrelationtootherwhichisconcealedceasestobeim­portant.Therefore,astheessenceofBeingittransposesBeingoutsidethe truth of its essence, so, in positionality, Being, ousted from the truth of itsessence,isreducedtostanding-reserve. TheoustingofBeingfromthe truth of its essence is the danger, because Being has banished itself by forgetting its essence (Heidegger 1994, 54–55). 
Positionalityisnotthedangerbecauseitistheessenceoftechnology and because threatening and dangerous effects can arise from tech­nology. The danger is positionality, not as technology, but rather as beyng. Whatessencesofdangerisbeyng¹8 itselfinsofarasitpursues thetruthofitsessencewiththeforgettingofthisessence.[Heidegger 2012a, 59]¹. 
Positionality is the extreme danger because in it man cannot reach the unconcealment of the Being of being. Within positionality, man is only a follower of positionality’s commands, one of the pieces of the standing-reserve,whichendangersthehumanessence.Manhasbecomeanobeyer 
temporary), they lacked the fertile land for the thinking that Being provides (Heidegger 2002a, 20–27). Cf. Glazebrook (2000, 240–247). 
¹8 HeideggerintroducesthetermBeyng(Seyn)toemphasisetheneedtodistinguishthehis­torical Being and Being in itself. The historical Being encompasses all historical embod­iments of attempts to think Being. The beginning of the original appropriation of Being and man to each other happened in pre-Socratic thought, and occasionally the possibil­ity of its continuation opens up in history. The possibilities of continuation are mostly missed because the history of philosophy is dominated by a metaphysical understand­ing of Being that supresses the possibility of continuation of the original appropriation (Heidegger 2005, 16–20). 
¹. DasGe-Stellistnicht deshalbdie Gefahr,weilesdas Wesender Technik istund weilvon der Technik bedrohliche und gefährliche Wirkungen ausgehen können. Die Gefahr ist das Ge-Stell nicht als Technik, sondern als das Seyn. Das Wesende der Gefahr ist das Seynselbst,insofernesderWahrheitseinesWesensmitderVergessenheitdiesesWesens nachstellt (Heidegger 1994, 62). 
of positionality’s orderability and thereby lost his freedom and dignity. The unconcealment of the concealed has always by appeal (Zuspruch) driven man to revealing. Man is by appeal determined in his essence by destining (Geschick)which sends (schicken) him towards revealing. Man is free to decide whether he will respond to the appeal and listen to the nearnessofunconcealment,orturnadeafearandcontradictit.Ifmanig­norestheappealandhisdestining,theBeingofbeingisgiventohimonly astherepresentednessofrepresentation,whichincontemporaneitytakes the form of the requisitioning of the orderable of the standing-reserve. Whenman listens and responds,hefreely movestowardthe realmof ap­peal, in which the unconcealment of the Being of being dawns on him. In this way, he is freed from sinking into the requisitioning of the order­ableofpositionalityandbecomesfreeforamoreoriginalrevealing. From such a more original revealing he perceives an alternative possibility of determining his own essence. He can be the one who in freedom pon­ders the concealing disclosing, and with such thinking is able to bring in the saving power in the midst of the danger. In the more original think-ing,manrevealsthesavingpowerbecauseheisabletoperceivethehigh­est dignity of his essence. Man perceives he ought to allow himself to be claimed (Anspruch) for bringing into nearness the unconcealment of the concealed (Heidegger 2000, 26–30, 32–34).²° 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also. 
LetusthinkcarefullyaboutthesewordsofHölderlin.²¹ [...]Butthe 
²° With regards to this passage, cf. Young (2002, 50–55), Borgmann (2005, 429), Mitcham (1994, 53), Holden (2009, 4–5), Feenberg (2005, 14–15, 21–22, 135–140), and Batovanja (2007,111–113).Seealso:Richardson(2012,23,324,337–341,350–358),Dreyfus(1993,310), Dreyfus(2002,171),Turnbull(2009,12),Brockelman(2008,38–44),andCampbell(2011, 11–17). 
²¹ Inhiswork,HeideggerextensivelyinterpretsHölderlin’spoetry.Hedevotedamonograph to the analysisof Hölderlin’s poetry entitled Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (Heidegger 1981)andtaughtfor threesemesters on Hölderlin’s hymns: ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’ in 1934 (Heidegger 1999), ‘Remembrance’ in 1941 (Heidegger 1992) and ‘The Ister’ in 1942 (Heidegger 1993). His interpretation often develops into forming his own terminology basedon Hölderlin’s poetry, e.g. the termsof the holy, earth,sky,mortal, divine language and poetry. This is in accordance with Heidegger’s position that poetry provides a pre­cursor to thinking coming close to Being. The interpretation of Hölderlin is significant for the consideration of Heidegger’s concept of technology because it gives an insight into the flip side of the world of technology. Namely, it is precisely the terminology that HeideggerabstractsfromHölderlin’spoetrythatprovidesaguidelineforabandoningthe 
verb ‘tosave’ says more.‘To save’istofetch somethinghomeinto its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing. [Heidegger 1977b, 28]²² 
In the work of art, being comes forth into unconcealment, which is possible only because (in the work) being opens up in its Being. Uncon­cealment is directed toward the workofart as aprivilegedkindofbeing thatprovidesaprominentpossibilityofsetting truth.²³ The workofart is best suited for setting truth into the openbecauseitis inimitablyunique. Its bringing-forth brings into presence being that was not before nor will be ever again. The setting of unconcealment in the work of art discloses beinginitsBeingandbringsforththeunconcealmentofbeingasawhole. The unconcealment of the whole of being opens up the approach to the self-secluding Being. In the work of art, the beautiful is the happening through which the unconcealment of an individual being gives the un-concealment of being as a whole, in which the self-concealing Being is illuminated (Heidegger 1977a, 41–49). 
Truth happens in van Gogh’s painting. That does not mean that something present is correctly portrayed; it means, rather, that in the manifestation of the equipmental being of the shoe-equipment, that which is as a whole – world and earth in their counterplay – achieves unconcealment. [Heidegger 2002b, 32]²4 
The createdness does not exhaust the reality of the work because the fullness of the reality of the work is realised only by preserving the work. 
calculating-planning requisitioning of pieces of the standing-reserve. Unfortunately, the extensivenessofthematerialmakesitimpossible topresentinthispaperhowHölderlin’s poetry offers an alternative to the world of technology. 
²² »Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst Das Rettende auch.« Bedenken wir das Wort Hölderlins sorgsam.[...]Aber»retten«sagtmehr.»Retten«ist:einholeninsWesen,umsodasWesen erst zu seinem eigentlichen Scheinen zu bringen (Heidegger 2000, 29). 
²³ It is necessary to highlight Heidegger’s insistence on the definition of truth as ‘uncon­cealment’ (....e.a) and the terminological preference for the latter. Namely, in order to clearly terminologically separate the traditionally dominant definition of truth as cor­rectness (Richtigkeit),which consists in the accordance of a statementwith a matter, and truth as the givenness of beings in the unconcealment of their Being, truth thought as unconcealment Heidegger most often addresses as unconcealment (Heidegger 1988, 1– 9). 
²4 Im Gemälde van Goghs geschieht die Wahrheit. Das meint nicht, hier werde et-was Vorhandenes richtig abgemalt, sondern im Offenbarwerden des Zeugseins des Schuhzeuges gelangt das Seiende im Ganzen, Welt und Erde in ihrem Widerspiel, in die Unverborgenheit (Heidegger 1977a, 43). 
Man is the one to whom the work is entrusted for preservation, and only to him is the unconcealment – laid down in the character of the work – opened up in the work. In order to be able to grasp the unconcealment of being in the work, man has to step out of his everyday actions. He is helped by the particular nature of the work; it is a special kind of the produced that cannot be equated with ready-to-hand beings because it does not contain references for use. The astonishment provided by the work of art secures restraint from usual actions, which is a preparatory step for inabiding (Innestehen) in the openness of being. Preserving the work is inabiding in the openness of being which happens in the work. Thework needsman because only heisable to grasp theunconcealment of being in its Being in the work, which leads to the self-secluding Be­ing. The preserver of the work is only the man disposed to ecstatic self-involvement (Sicheinlassen) in the unconcealment of being. He has dis-closedness (Ent-schlossenheit) at his disposal to move out of his captivity (Befangenheit)bybeingtotheopennessofBeing.Withhisdis-closedness, he exposes himself to the openness of beings placed in the work. His preservationoftheworkistheknowledgeofwantingtoabideinthetruth of the work. The preserver tends to share his knowledge with others so they, too,wouldbedrawnintobelongingtothetruththathappensinthe work (Heidegger 1977a, 50–56).²5 
If, however, a work does not – or does not immediately – find pre­servers who respond to the truth happening in the work, that does not mean that a work can be a work without preservers. If it is in otherrespectsawork,italwaysremainstiedtopreservers[...].[Hei­degger 2002b, 41]²6 
Poetry(Dichtung)encompassesthevarietyofartisticcreationsinturn­ing away from everydayness. Such bracketing of the ‘at first and most often’ makes the usual present-at-hand and ready-to-hand beings non-beings. It creates a place of radical otherness in the midst of being which enables the advent of truth in the work because it facilitates access to the 
²5 On this subject, see e.g.: Godzinski (2005, 7), Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005, 12), Drey­fus (2002, 171), Batovanja (2007, 112), Borgmann (2005, 424, 429), Dreyfus and Wrathall (2002, xii), and Riis (2018, 100–112). 
²6 Wenn aber ein Werk die Bewahrenden nicht findet, nicht unmittelbar so findet, daß sie derimWerkgeschehendenWahrheitentsprechen,dannheißtdieskeineswegs,dasWerk sei auch Werk ohne die Bewahrenden.Es bleibt immer, wenn anders es ein Werk ist,auf die Bewahrenden bezogen [...] (Heidegger1977a, 54). 
unconcealment of being. Radical otherness is the opposite of everyday­ness, which has lost the power to disclose the truth of being and thus preserve Being.²7 
Because it is the setting truth into the work, poetry is the most opti­mistic possibilityof leaving the world of technology, in which the danger of the forgetfulness of Being reigns more expressly than ever before. The dangerisatitshighestlevelintheageoftechnologybecausemandoesnot grasp beings as beings but always only disposes of them as pieces of the standing-reserve.SincethenearnessofBeingisattainedbywayofuncon­cealment of being, more precisely, unconcealment of Being of individual beings, if man lacks the relationship with beings, he is left without the possibilityofaccessingBeing. In the ageof technology, art, insofar as it is the setting the unconcealment of being into the work, is an oasis giving hope that man can be the one he needs to be – the listener of Being.²8 

Marcuse: The Aporias of Advanced Industrial Society 
Marcusedetects thefoundation ofthe productive apparatusof advanced capitalism in ideology. The productive apparatus is the last stage of the realisation of the historical project of organisation and transformation of nature as the material of subjugation. This means that natural science projectsnatureinaccordancewiththeneedsoftheproductiveapparatus, which equates nature with natural resources as the material of mastery and organisation. Since science retains its truth regardless of its techno­logicalapplication,andthemachineisindifferenttoitssocialuse,society turnsouttoberesponsibleforthescientific-technologicaltransformation of nature and the establishment of the scientific-technological totality of the historical world. In other words,neutral science projects a mere form thatcanbedivertedtoanarbitrarygoal.Althoughessentiallyneutral,sci­ence does not take place in an ideological vacuum, and always provides explanationsandcalculationsfromacertainpositionintheworld.Inlate capitalism,technologyappearsasaformofsocialcontrolanddomination that subjects science to the instrumentality of method. The application of natural science to optimise the productive process is a consequence of 
²7 Cf. Riis (2018, 112–114) and Tan (2022, 15–17). 
²8 For more on Heidegger’s relationship to art, see e.g.: Pejovic (1979, 156), Dreyfus and Wrathall (2002, xiv), Pejovic (1959, 167–168), Richardson (2012, 354), Guigon (1993, 24– 25), Borgmann (2005, 425, 429), Turnbull (2009, 26), Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005, 14), Mitcham (1994, 52), Dreyfus (2002, 168), and Tan (2022, 29–31, 58–62). 
the social mode of production, which means the exploitation of nature and man is man’s work, ‘[t]he technological apriori is a political apriori’ (Marcuse 2007a, 157). 
Inordertoemphasisethetotalitarianismofthescientific-technological system,Marcuseusestheword‘technicity’thatdenotesthenetworkingof a system of instrumentality, which depends on another system, a system of expediency of ends. The machine, the instrument, exists only within a technological totality, only as an element of technicity. As such, technic­ity should be distinguished from technology (Fr. technique), which de­notes an individual activity or a certain sociohistorical form. In his ex­position, Marcuse equates technicity with Heidegger’s definition of the worldhood of the world in the sense of the disclosedness of the referen­tial whole that connects equipment into a closed referential whole. The onticalnon-thematicnatureofthereferentialwholeandtheultimateend of human well-being (Heidegger 1967, 64–66) is understood by Marcuse as the precedence of the project of an instrumental world to the creation of technologies which serve as instruments of the ensemble of technic­ity. He believes that the conceptual grasping of the technical ensemble should precede acting upon it, because only the transcendental grasping of the existential character of technicity discloses ultimate technological ends repressed by the social development of the technology of industrial society (Marcuse 2011, 136–137). 
The productive apparatus shows a totalitarian character manifested in its tendency not to stop at the exploitation of nature but to proceed to the exploitation ofthe totality of society. Namely, the productive appara­tus has outgrown the referentially interconnected ensemble of tools and instruments that can be separated at will, and has become a system of universaldominationwhichdeterminesinadvancethefinalproduct,the tools used, the operations serving it and – together with them – the nec­essary occupations and skills. The absolute nature of the apparatus does not stop at determining the entirety of the productive process but also aimsatdeterminingtheaspirations,attitudesandneedsoftheindividual (Marcuse 2007a, 150–162).². 
The productiveapparatus has the abilitytoinfluencethe needs ofindi­viduals because human needs are historically conditioned. Only the ba­sicanimalneedsofindividualself-preservationandspeciesreproduction are necessary, while all other human needs depend on the historical mo­
². Cf. Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 57, 68–72). 
ment. Historical conditioning means that throughout history, in accor­dance with the progress of civilisation, man constantly adds new needs to hissurvival. Manisinneed of allthe produced objectshehas inte­grated into his survival, and he cannot do without them until he replaces them with their more advanced versions. A dependence on the newly produced object is established through use, while historical productiv­ity does not make needs any less real and the necessity to satisfy them creates an equal compulsion on the individual. The flexibility of man’s drive-apparatus, in which it is always possible to incorporate new needs, opens up spaceformanipulation,so ultimatelysocialinstitutionsand in-terestgroupsdeterminewhatwillbecomeahumanneed. Marcusepoints out that it is incredibly important to be able to detect the false needs that perpetuate toilwithouttheirsatisfactionraisingthequalityofhumanex­istence. The gratification that comes from satisfying them is not dimin­ishedbythefactthattheyarefalseneeds. Thereinliesthereasonfortheir persistence, because man easily identifies with them and finds fulfilment in them. It is particularly problematic to determine who is meritorious tobetheauthorityforassessingthe legitimacyofneeds,becauseonlythe requirement to satisfy vital needs is irreducible, while all other needs are historically conditioned (Marcuse 2007a, 5–10).³° 
Freechoiceamongawidevarietyofgoodsandservicesdoesnotsig­nifyfreedomifthese goodsand services sustain socialcontrols over a life of toil and fear—that is, if they sustain alienation. [Marcuse 2007a, 10] 
Social control based on new needs is extremely efficient, and the sur­vival of the existing situation depends on the uninterrupted continua­tion of production and consumption. In order to achieve the continu­ity of consumption, society has to systematically manipulate the human psyche; in its unconscious as well as its conscious dimensions. Advertis­ing propaganda binds the merchandise the individual buys, the services he enjoys and the status symbols he carries to instinctual gratification (Marcuse 2009, 190–191). With its productivity, the system transforms the human surrounding world into a world filled with produced objects. Man identifies himself with the objects of satisfaction of new needs, and they thus become an extension of his mind and body. The filling of the 
³° More on this issue in e.g., Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 67) and Brayford (2021, 612– 614). 
world with objects created for the sole purpose of providing man with a more comfortable existence eliminates any opposition to the existing system. Although man’s existence in such a society is pleasant, he is not free. Marcuse calls the unfreedom in advanced capitalist society ‘demo­cratic unfreedom.’ Democratic unfreedom is a comfortable unfreedom in which man does not suffer the discomfort of the denied satisfaction. Unfreedom instead manifests itself in the restraint of his individuality. Propaganda that imposes new needs leads to the identification of man with the consumption of objects of satisfaction, and he ultimately builds an image of himself through the consumptionof products,products that become symbols of a certain identity. Unfreedom in the sense of subor­dination to the productive apparatus is perpetuated by comfort. If the system works for the general welfare, raising the quality of life of all so­cial groups and interests, any resistance is irrational. A high quality of lifeindicatesthatnon-conformismisuselessbecauseitsconsequencecan only be a loweringstandard oflivingand usurpation of the smoothfunc­tioning of the system. In this way, advanced capitalist society rationalises man’s unfreedom as enslavement in the productive apparatus (Marcuse 2007a, 3–20).³¹ 
For in reality, neither the utilization of administrative rather than physical controls (hunger, personal dependence, force), nor the change inthe character of heavywork, nor the assimilationofoccu­pational classes, nor the equalization in the sphere of consumption compensate forthe factthatthe decisions over life and death,over personal and national security are made at places over which the individuals have no control. The slaves of developed industrial civ­ilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves [...]. [Marcuse 2007a, 35–36] 
Under the influence of Freud, Marcuse forms the performance princi­ple, which he considers to be the historical version of the reality princi­ple dominant in late capitalist society. Freud himself considers the plea­sure principle as the discretion of the psychic apparatus to avoid pain and ensure pleasure, thus removing increased tension. The reality prin­ciple is the adaptation of the pleasure principle to the social context, be­cause the pleasure principle itself does not tolerate delay of gratification and is therefore socially unacceptable. Unlike the pleasure principle, the 
³¹ Cf. Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 43, 62, 74) and Brujic (1968, 255–256). 
reality principle achieves pleasure in a socially acceptable way by pur­posefully changing reality in accordance with the satisfaction of needs. MarcusebelievesthatinFreud’smetapsychology,thetransitiontothere­ality principle is necessary due to the scarcity of means of satisfaction. Needs can only be satisfied with constant renunciationin toil, and there­fore drives must be suspended by repression. Likewise, Marcuse believes that the scarcity of means is not a biological determinant but a conse­quence of political manipulation. The ruling institutions require exces­sive repression to maintain their dominance. Surplus-repression in late capitalist society is so extensive that it changes the very reality principle into the performance principle. Under the influence of the performance principle, Marcuse wants to emphasise, society stratifies accordingto the rival economic performances of its members (Marcuse 1955, 35–50). 
Unlikecontemporaryconsumersociety,traditionalsocietyrequiresre­pression which leads to sublimation due to the polymorphism of libido. The polymorphism of libido is Freud’s concept (Freud 1968, 89–91) by whichheclaimsthatatthebeginningofhumanlife,the wholebodyisan erogenous zone (the so-called polymorphous perversity), and that other erogenous zones (oral, anal and genital) separate during life. This possi­bility of substituting erogenous zones is a condition for man to find sex­ual satisfaction beyond bodily discharge. Sublimation (Freud 1955, 457) opensthe wayfor mantosatisfy hissexual drive in asocially usefulway, in the form of artistic or intellectual production. Freud himself believes that society exploits man’s possibility of sublimation, needlessly narrow­ingthepatternsofsociallyacceptablesexualgratificationandthusensur­ing a sufficient amount of energy for building society. In Eros and Civi­lization, Marcusestillagreeswith Freud and discussesthe sociallycondi­tioned surplus-repressionthat needs to be gradually overcome (Marcuse 1955,20,37–40,87–88).Heabandonsthisviewbyintroducingtheconcept ofrepressiveinstitutionaliseddesublimation,whichexpressesthesocially motivated increase in sexual freedom; ‘sexuality turns into a vehicle for the bestsellers of oppression’ (Marcuse 2007a, 81). The liberation of sex­uality in socially useful forms is the basis for the alignment of individual satisfaction and social goals (pp. 75–85). 
The reflex of reducing sublimation in late capitalist society is the con­version of higher into popular culture. The transformation takes place under the pretext of eliminating the traditional elitism of higher culture and increasing satisfaction. According to Marcuse, the availability of the artistic,whichisincludedineverydaylifeasadecorativeaspectofgoods, has a number of negative consequences for society. Widely available re­productionsofworksofartaresooftenencounteredthatseeingthemhas become completely automated, thus erasing the effect ofamazement that leads the individual to questioning reality. Works of art should criticise and refute reality with their negative power, but the availability of art as a commodity disperses that power. In contrast to the consumer society, the fundamental function of art in traditional society was to transcend reality and depict possible worlds that provide an alternative to reality. The work of art provided a fulfilment of illusory fantasies in a form that did not pretend to be realised. Despite this, art creates a tension between possibility and reality because in the artistic form real circumstances are disclosed in their truth. Through building fictitious possible worlds, the disclosedartistictruthdisclosestheshortcomingsofreality,andtherefore artistic images carry in themselves the power of the negative that refutes the existing order (Marcuse 2007a, 57–69). 
Thepresentedmechanismsofthefunctioningoflatecapitalistsociety³² resultintheemergenceofaone-dimensionalsociety.One-dimensionality manifests itself in the disappearance of the transcendent second dimen­sion of unrealised possibilities. This is due to the system that eliminates all alternatives, the realisation of which requires a radical overturn of the existing. The political creators of one-dimensionality manipulate the members of society whom they have convinced that they live in ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (Voltaire 2006, 14–15, 22, 87–88) and that there is no need to overcome it. Efficient productive-economic coordination prevents the establishment of a significant opposition to the whole in advanced industrial society (Marcuse 2007a, 5–13).³³ 
³² In contrast to theman of theone-dimensional welfaresociety,the Modern Age individ­ual, amemberofthemiddleclass establishedbythecivilrevolutions inthesixteenthand seventeenthcenturies,agreeswithafundamentallydifferentworldviewandvaluesystem. He is the arbiterof his own standardsand values, settinghimself up as themeasure of all things.TheModern Agecitizenrejectsexternalauthoritiesbecausehebelievesthatwith his mind, as a rational being, he is capable of independently determining the values and moral laws to which he agrees.He had to break through the traditionalChristian system of ideas and values and question the values he agrees to on the basis of his free ‘common sense.’ His questioning creates a permanent opposition in society and thus realises the two-dimensionality of society. Liberalist society is considered the most suitable for such new individualistic rationality. The fundamental taskof society is toenablehim toact in accordance with the newly acquired freedom of thought and to remove the restrictions on his reasonable actions(Marcuse 2004, 40–46). 
³³ The problem of one-dimensionality in Marcuse is also discussed in e.g.: Marcuse (2011, 
Theincessantdynamicoftechnicalprogresshasbecomepermeated withpoliticalcontent,andtheLogosoftechnicshasbeenmadeinto the Logos of continued servitude. [Marcuse 2007a, 163] 
Although one cannot dispute the achievements of advanced society to reproduce and protect human life by organising man’s struggle with na­ture and other men, such a society should be overcome. The continuous quantitativeprogressthroughwhichproductivepossibilitiesoutgrewthe system created a qualitative change. Marcuse declares a society that in­sists on continuing work when it has become an ‘unnecessary necessity’ as a sick society, because its fundamental institutions and structures do not allow the use of available material and intellectual resources for the mosteffectivedevelopmentandsatisfactionofindividualneeds(Marcuse 2009, 188–189). Rationality is at the same time political irrationality be-causealthoughitisrationaltomaintain a system of high productivity, such stabilisation by productivity is irrational when it becomes destruc­tivetothefreedevelopmentofhumanneedsandabilities.³4 Whentheau­tomationofproductionfreesmanfromthenecessityofworkbyreducing work to marginal time, the need for the survival of advanced industrial society vanishes. Automationliberates individual energy to fill time with activities free from the necessity of work to satisfy needs. Over time, the discrepancy betweenthe productivecapabilitiesof the automatedsystem of production and the political insistence on oppression would become apparent, which would call into question maintaining the repression of the consumer society. Therein lies the foundation for a new human free­dom, onethatcannotbedefined in traditionalterms because itincludes entirely new liberties which can only be expressed negatively in tradi­tional vocabulary: economically, as freedom from the daily struggle for existence;politically,asliberationfromcontrollingpolicies;intellectually, as restoration of individual thought that is absorbed into mass commu­nication and imposed views (Marcuse 2007a, 6–10). 
Marcuseusestheconceptofthedialecticofliberationtodenotelibera­tion from anybad, false system.Itisnecessary to demand therealisation of the transcendent project if it is in accordance with real possibilities and if it provides a superior perspective for existence. In the affluent so­
132–135), Marcuse (1955, 4), Kellner (1998, 5), Schutzbach (2022, 53–56), Feenberg (2005, x–xi, 17, 85–86), and Aronson (2014). 
³4 Cf. Kellner,Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 37–38), Feenberg (2004,74),Gandesha (2004, 196), andBrayford(2021,611–612). 
ciety, the problem is that even though the material basis for qualitative change exists, the subjective need is lacking. Change can only occur if a self-consciousness that transcends the existing conditions by converting the behaviour of man emerges in the unfree society. Marcuse detects the problemina ‘secondnature’ ofman,producedbycapitalismandthecon-sumer economy, which binds man to the commodity form – possessing, consuming,renewing, buying,selling – and which has in asense become a ‘biological’ need. Thus, the ‘second nature’ resists any revolutionary or qualitative change and abandoning dependence on the market and be­comes the bearer of ‘the counterrevolution³5 anchored in the instinctual structure’ (Marcuse 1969, 11).³6 
The repressed instinctual impulse which he refers to is morality as a prerequisiteforsolidarity,humanity,willandfaith.Byestablishingmoral­ity as the foundation, a new temperament and consciousness emerges which is guided by the drive for liberation and which is capable of ex­posing the ideological manipulation of the affluent society. The liberat­ing forces within the existing society would retain the technological ap­paratus of capitalism, but introduce a qualitative change by organising production from the immediate producers. The new morally conscious individual changes the existing institutions, which also changes the in­terpersonal relations that abandon the aggressive competitive patterns (Marcuse 2007a, 24, 45).³7 
Achievingthenewfreedominvolvesthesacrificeofloweringstandards becausemaintaining excessivecomfort requirescontroland domination. Work to satisfy vital needs cannot be eliminated, but it should be car­ried out in accordance with the new goals of satisfying only vital needs, thus reducing itsscope.Inorder formembers of society toagree to the restriction of satisfaction, a fundamental change in the relationship be­
³5 In his later works, Marcuse rejects the term ‘revolution’ (and ‘counterrevolution’), con­sidering it evokes negative connotations of the already achieved revolutionary changes that have only replaced one system of servitude by another. Also, the new society can be equated with socialism only if socialism is defined by taking life in itself as a social goal, which is shown in practice as the abolition of labour, the termination of the struggle for survival and the liberation of human sensibility. Such a new society shares nothing with the existing transitions from capitalism to socialism, reduced to the planned develop­ment of the productive forcesandtherationalisationof naturalresources (Marcuse 2016, 176–184). 
³6 Cf. Brujic (1968, 252–254). 
³7 Cf. Kellner,Pierce,andLewis(2011,14,50,59–61),Feenberg(2004,79),andBrujic(1968, 251). 
tween material and intellectual needs is necessary (Marcuse 2007a, 235– 242, 252–256). 
Theemergingsocietyisasocietyofpacifiedexistenceinharmonywith nature because limiting production eliminates violence against nature. Accordingto Marcuse,pacificationdenotes the disappearance ofrelating to nature and society based on scarcity and the struggle for survival. In a pacified society, instead of toil, the play of the productive imagination³8 reigns,whichprojectsthepossibilitiesofafreeexistence.³. Insuchasoci­ety, production becomes a creative process based on imagination-driven freeshapingofreflection. Theliberationofimaginationintroducesanew 
³8 Marcusetakesovertheuseofimaginationasamediatingfacultybetweenunderstanding and sensibility from Kant, who gives the imagination (Einbildungskraft)a central role in human reason. For Kant, according to Marcuse, placing the imagination at the centre is at the same time an act of freedom. Marcuse substantiates his position by asserting that in the first critique only the cognitive subject is free as a self-conscious transcendental apperception of the ‘I think.’ In the second critique, the moral subject is free, but the re-lationshipbetweenthefreedomofthemoral subject andnaturalnecessityremainsprob­lematic. The shortcomings of the first and second critiques are overcome in the third, in which natural necessity and human freedom are reconciled in the aesthetic dimension. Marcuse finds in Kant’s definition of the naturally beautiful the potential for forming it­self in its freedom in an aesthetically meaningful way. According to Marcuse, this view can be equated with Marx’s position that man forms the world in accordance with the laws of beauty. The need for the beautiful can be manifested as a drive for a peaceful, harmonious environment that makes it possible to fulfil the aesthetic-erotic need. Such an interpretation of Kant deviates considerably from the conventional understanding. Kant himselfplacesfreedom asthesubject of thephilosophyof morals,thepracticalleg­islation of reason that determines what ought to be. The moral subject with his power of the will (bracketing pleasure) makes a moral judgement based on an apriori maxim. In contrast to practical reason, the power of judgement is positioned as an intermediate member in thedomain ofpleasureand displeasurewhich connects thefieldof under­standing’s theoretical knowledge of nature with the reason’s practical area of freedom. It is an intermediate member because it reduces the empirical diversity of nature to a tran­scendental principle, presenting a lawfulness for the purposiveness related to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Through the four moments of the judgement of taste, the power ofjudgementestablishestheprinciples ofsubsumption ofthesensuous,empirical under the transcendentalprinciples of disinteresteddelight (interesseloses Wohlgefallen). Freedomis thematisedbyKantonly inrelation to the freedom of activity of the imagina­tion, which approaches play. In contrast to such aestheticjudging of the reason, in moral legislation the reason is required to be rigorous and to remove all purposiveness asso­ciated with pleasure (Marcuse 2007b, 153–154, 159–161; Kellner 2007, 35, 48; Kant 1986, 106–108, 180–184). 
³. See Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis (2011, 73–75), Brujic (1968, 256), and Feenberg (2004, 75– 77). 
aesthetic-eroticqualityintosociety,whichshouldbeunderstoodinterms of a sensuous desire for life that encourages non-repressive sublimation. Emphasisingthenew aesthetic-eroticqualitydoesnotimplyabandoning rationality, but theproductiveimagination asa link betweenthe theoret­ical and the practical harmonises reason and sensibility. The erotic mo­ment permeates the emerging morality of solidarity but also transvalues the productive apparatus,which is now directed toward a free realisation of human possibilities. The aesthetic, which is a spiritual form of sensi­bility,becomes amodeofhuman existence as aformofbeautiful living. Suchanewfreesocietythatgivesprimacytotheactivityoftheproductive imagination is capable of projecting a world that satisfies man’s sensuous desire for life. The new ethos of society directs the consciousness of indi­vidualstowardsaestheticgoalsthatmanifestthemselvesintheformingof realityaccordingtotheprinciplesofartisticproduction,butthisdoesnot meanthatrealitywillbecomefilledwithdecoratedproducts.Instead,the artistic ethos for Marcuse stands for an orientation towards art (Marcuse 1969, 30–37).4° 
Art wouldrecapture some of its more primitive ‘technical’ connota-tions:astheartofpreparing(cooking!),cultivating,growingthings, giving them a form which neither violates their matter nor the sen­sitivity [...]. [Marcuse 1969, 32] 
Inasocietycreatedbyart,theformsofrealityareprojectedbythepro­ductive imagination that envisages unrealised possibilities of existence, whichcanbecomeprojectsofthescientific-technologicaltransformation of the world. Thus, in the new society, a harmonious relation of sensibil­ity and rationality would take place in the complementary interweaving of technology and art, work and play; play as a non-repressive form of free time exercise which opens up space for exploring one’s own prefer­ences.SeeKellner,Pierce,andLewis(2011, 50,63–64,72)andKellner(1998, 34). In this way, free time filled with intellectual content in accordance with non-repressive sublimation would enable the self-determination of the individual (Marcuse 2007b, 128, 147). 

Conclusion 
There are many linksbetweenHeidegger’s thinking ofthe age ofmodern technologyandMarcuse’sexpositionofmaturecapitalistsociety.Bothset 
4° Cf. Schutzbach (2022, 6–9, 77–84). 
forth similar analyses of the consumer worldview that dominates con­temporary society, which is particularly interesting due to the authors’ ideologicalopposition. Whatremainsdifferentisthemethodologyofap­proach, which shows itself as a confrontation between Heidegger’s onto­logical orientation and Marcuse’s sociological Marxism. 
Heidegger believes that contemporary society is characterised by a re­latednessthatperformsaplannedmanagementandsecurementofmeans foroptimalefficiency. Thesecuredmeansdonothaveconstancybecause they are accumulated as available for further consumption. If the con­stancy of objects is reduced to availability, there are only consumable goods that circulate in the cycle of the requisitioning of the orderable. Sinceitisall-encompassing,man,likeeverythingelsesubsisting,isforced into its circulation. Man loses his freedom and dignity if reduced to a requisitioner. Positionality is the ontological basis of the requisitioning of the orderable that drives everything which presences into circulation and accumulates the secured in the standing-reserve. Positionality is the extremedangerformanbecauseinithecannotgrasptheunconcealment of the Being of being. Heidegger questions the possibility of surpassing the dominance of positionality because it is the Being of the age of com­pletion of metaphysics, which cannot be surpassed by individual efforts but onlyovercome, gotover(Verwinden). Even the individual who has become aware of the restrictive nature of the network of socio-economic imperativesdoesnotagreetoabandonit,becauseitwouldmeanrejecting progressinthesenseofagreeingtothelimitationofproductionandcon­sumption (Heidegger 1986, 128). Heidegger assigns art a privileged place as the onethat opens agap ofthe nearness of Beingin the realityofposi­tionality’s rule.The workofart has aprivileged status becauseitdiscloses being in its Being, which leads to the nearness of Being. In order to dis­close the unconcealment, the work of art needs man, because only he is capable of grasping the unconcealment of being in its Being, which leads to the self-secluding Being. The man who participates in such a disclo­sure has to be especially attuned to ecstatic self-involvement in uncon­cealment. 
Marcuse approaches the exposition from a Marxist-social point of view, analysing the productive apparatus, which he sees as the histori­cal project of organisation and transformation of nature as the material of subjugation. The productive apparatus, like Heidegger’s positionality, has totalitarian tendencies; it tends to master and organise the whole of society. Also, just like in Heidegger, man is subordinated to the produc­tive apparatus, which manipulates human needs at the behest of inter­est groups and social institutions in order to achieve the continuity of production and consumption. Marcuse mostly departs from Heidegger’s analysis with his projection of an alternative reality of a pacified society. He believes that maintaining the existing system will prove to be polit­ically irrational because highly automated production does not require oppression. The material foundations for freedom exist, but the subjec­tive self-consciousness of the need for change is lacking. In order for liberation to be possible, a morally conscious individual who is capable of exposing ideological manipulation is needed. A conscious individual creates a new society by changing existing institutions and retaining the capitalist productive apparatus. In that society, production is reduced to the extent necessary for the satisfaction of primary needs. Thus, like Heidegger, he also concluded that change necessitates abandoning ex­cessive production and consumption, and he observed the reluctance of individuals to accept the lowering of the standard of living caused by it. Furthermore, both of them think art plays a key role in stepping out of the consumer society, as Marcuse finds the essential determinant of the new society in the liberation of the imagination, which brings an aesthetic-erotic quality. In practice, the aesthetic-erotic quality means that the productive imagination represents the possibilities of existence that can become a project of transforming the world. 
The topicality of their texts written in the second half of the last cen­tury is telling. Today, the negative consequences of consumer behaviour paradigmsareobvious,rangingfromthedestructionofnaturetotheself­alienated individual. Individual solutionsof green policies are proving to be insufficient because none of the measures have so far succeeded in slowing down the devastation of the Earth. A global solution requires sacrifices for which contemporary society is still not ready. Even though there is a certain level of self-awareness about the shortcomings of the consumerworldview,thecontemporaryindividualisnotwillingtoaban­donthecomfortoftheiremptyexistenceinthenameofaglobalsolution. 
References 
Abromeit, John. 2004. ‘Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Encounterwith MartinHei­degger.’InHerbertMarcuse:ACriticalReader,editedbyJohnAbromeitand 
W. Mark Cobb, 131–151. London: Routledge. 
Abromeit, John, and W. Mark Cobb. 2004. ‘Introduction.’ In Herbert Marcuse: ACritical Reader, edited by John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, 1–39. Lon­don: Routledge. 
Achterhuis,Hans.2001. ‘Introduction:AmericanPhilosophersofTechnology.’ In American Philosophy of Technology: The EmpiricalTurn, editedbyHans Achterhuis,1–9. Bloomington,in,andIndianapolis,in:IndianaUniversity Press. 
Aristotle. 2018. Physics. Indianapolis,in, and Cambridge: Hackett. 
Aronson,Ronald. 2014. ‘MarcuseToday.’BostonReview,November27. https:// www.bostonreview.net/articles/ronald-aronson-herbert-marcuse-one -dimensional-man-today/. 
Batovanja,Vesna.2007. MartinHeidegger:mišljenjekojesevišenerazumijekao metafizika. Zagreb: Breza. 
Borgmann,Albert.2005.‘Technology.’In ACompaniontoHeidegger,editedby Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall,420–432.Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brayford, Kieran M. 2021. ‘How to Live a Life of One’s Own: Heidegger, Mar-cuse and Jonas on Technology and Alienation.’ Philosophy and Technology 34:609–617. 
Brockelman, Thomas. 2008. Žižek and Heidegger: The Question Concerning Techno-Capitalism. London and New York: Continuum. 
Brujic, Branka.1968. ‘Zatvoreni svijet rada i šanse revolucije.’ In Herbert Mar-cuse, Covjek jedne dimenzije: rasprave o ideologiji razvijenog industrijskog društva, translated by Branka Brujic, 239–267. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša. 
Campbell, Timothy C. 2011. Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben. Minneapolis,mn, and London: University of Min­nesota Press. 
Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 2018. ‘Im-Position: Heidegger’s Analysis of the Essence ofModern Technology.’In HeideggeronTechnology,editedbyAaronJames Wendland, Christopher Merwin, and Christos Hadjioannou, 39–56. Lon­don: Routledge. 
Davis,BretW. 2018.‘Heidegger’sReleasementFromtheTechnologicalWill.’In Heidegger on Technology, edited by Aaron James Wendland, Christopher Merwin, and Christos Hadjioannou, 133–148. London: Routledge. 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1993. ‘Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics.’ In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, edited by Charles B. Guigon, 289–316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2002. ‘Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology.’ In Hei­degger Reexamined. Vol. 3, Art, Poetry, and Technology, edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, 163–173. London: Routledge. 
Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Mark Wrathall. 2002. ‘Volume Introduction.’ In Hei­degger Reexamined. Vol. 3, Art, Poetry, and Technology, edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, xi–xvii. London: Routledge. 
———. 2005. ‘Martin Heidegger: An Introduction to His Thought, Work and Life.’ In A Companion to Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark 
A. Wrathall, 1–15. Oxford: Blackwell. Feenberg,Andrew.2004.‘HeideggerandMarcuse.’InHerbertMarcuse:ACrit­
ical Reader, edited by John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, 67–80. London: Routledge. 
———. 2005. Heidegger and Marcuse. London: Routledge. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1955. ‘Das Unbehagenin der Kultur.’ In GesammelteWerke in Einzelbänden, vol. 14,421–506. Frankfurt am Main:S.Fischer. 
———. 1968. ‘Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie.’ In Gesammelte Werke in Einzelbänden, vol. 5, 29–145.Frankfurt am Main:S. Fischer. 
Gandesha,Samir. 2004. ‘Marcuse, Habermas,andthe Critique of Technology.’ In Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, 188–208. London: Routledge. 
Glazebrook,Trish.2000.Heidegger’sPhilosophyofScience.NewYork:Fordham University Press. 
Godzinski, Ronald Jr., 2005. ‘Enframing Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technol­ogy.’ Essays in Philosophy 6(1): 9. 
Guigon, Charles B. 1993. ‘Introduction.’ In The Cambridge Companion to Hei­degger, edited by Charles B. Guigon, 1–41. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­sity Press. 
‘Heidegger and Marcuse: A Dialogue in Letters.’ 1998. Translated by Richard Wolin.InHerbertMacuse,Technology,WarandFascism,editedbyDouglas Kellner, 261–267. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse 1. London: Rout-ledge. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1967. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer. 
———.1977a. Gesamtausgabe.Vol. 5,Holzwege. FrankfurtamMain:V.Kloster­mann. 
———. 1977b. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans-latedbyWilliam Lovitt. New York andLondon: GarlandPublishing. 
———. 1979. Gesamtausgabe.Vol. 20, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbe­griffs. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 1981. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 4, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 1983. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 40, Einführung in die Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main:V.Klostermann. 
———. 1985. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 12, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———.1986. Gesamtausgabe.Vol. 15, Seminare.FrankfurtamMain:V. Kloster­mann. 
———. 1988. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 34, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 1992. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 52, Hölderlins Hymne »Andenken«. Frank­furt am Main:V.Klostermann. 
———. 1993. Gesamtausgabe..Vol. 53, Hölderlins Hymne »Ister«. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 1994. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 79, Bremen und Freiburger Vorträge. Frank­furt am Main:V.Klostermann. 
———. 1999. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 39, Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 2000. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 2002a. Gesamtausgabe.Vol. 8, Was heisst Denken. Frankfurt am Main: 
V. Klostermann. ———. 2002b. Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2005. Gesamtausgabe.Vol. 70, ÜberdenAnfang.FrankfurtamMain:V. Klostermann. ———. 2006. Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 11, Identität und Differenz. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. 
———. 2012a. Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking. Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell. Studies in ContinentalThought. Bloomington,in,andIndianapolis,in:IndianaUni­versity Press. 
———. 2012b. Four Seminars. Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell and François Raffoul. Bloomington,in, and Indianapolis,in: Indiana University Press. 
Holden,James.2009. ‘Introduction:Heidegger’sQuestions.’ Writing Technolo­gies 2(2): 1–8. 
Ihde, Don. 2010. Heidegger’s Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1986. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Ditzingen:Reclam. 
Kellner,Douglas.1998.‘Technology,WarandFascism:Marcuseinthe1940s.’In Herbert Marcuse, Technology,WarandFascism, editedbyDouglasKellner, 1–38. CollectedPapers of Herbert Marcuse 1. London: Routledge. 
———.2001.‘HerbertMarcuseandtheVicissitudesofCriticalTheory.’InHer­bertMarcuse, Towards a CriticalTheory of Society, editedbyDouglasKell­ner, 1–33. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse 2. London: Routledge. 
———. 2007. ‘Introduction: Marcuse, Art, and Liberation.’ In Art and Libera­tion, edited by Douglas Kellner, 1–70. London: Routledge. 
Kellner, Douglas, Clayton Pierce, and Tyson Lewis. 2011. ‘Herbert Marcuse, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation.’ In Herbert Marcuse, Phi­losophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation, edited by Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce, 1–75. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse 5. London: Routledge. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1955. Eros and Civilization. Boston: Beacon. 
———. 1969. An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon. 
———. 2004. Technology, War, Fascism. London: Routledge. 
———. 2005. Heideggerian Marxism. Lincoln, ne: University of Nebraska Press. 
———. 2007a. One-DimensionalMan. London: Routledge. 
———. 2007b. Art and Liberation. London: Routledge. 
———. 2009. Negations. London: MayFlyBooks. 
———. 2011. ‘From Ontology to Technology.’ In Herbert Marcuse, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation, edited by Douglas Kellner and Clayton Pierce, 132–140. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse 5. London: Rout-ledge. 
———. 2016. ‘Liberation from AffluentSociety.’ In The Dialectics of Liberation, edited by David Cooper, 175–192. London: Verso. 
Mitcham,Carl.1994.ThinkingthroughTechnology:ThePathbetweenEngineer­ing and Philosophy. Chicago,il,andLondon: TheUniversityof Chicago Press. 
Pejovic, Danilo. 1959. ‘Martin Heidegger i pitanje o bîti umjetnosti.’ In Obiti umjetnosti, translatedby DaniloPejovic and Danko Grlic, 155–171. Zagreb: Mladost. 
———. 1979. ‘Martin Heidegger.’ In Suvremena filozofija Zapada, 143–159. Za­greb: Nakladnizavod Matice hrvatske. 
Resta,Caterina.2021. ‘The Age ofthe TotalitarianDominationof Technology.’ In Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy: Technology, Living, Society & Science, editedbyCarmineDiMartino,3–22.ContributionstoHermeneu-tics 8. Cham: Springer. 
Richardson, John. 2012. Heidegger. London: Routledge. 
Riis,Søren.2018. Unframing Martin Heidegger’s Understanding of Technology: OntheEssentialConnectionbetweenTechnology,Art,andHistory.Lanham, md, Boulder,co, New York, London: Lexington. 
Schutzbach,Lukas.2022. There Is an Alternative: With Herbert Marcuse and MarkFisherTowardsaPoliticalAestheticsofNeoliberalism.Berlin:J.B.Met­zler. 
Sommer, Christian. 2021. ‘The Perfectionof Gestell and the Last God: Heideg­ger’sCriticismofTechno-Nihilism.’InHeideggerandContemporaryPhilos­ophy: Technology, Living,Society &Science, editedbyCarmineDiMartino, 23–33. Contributions to Hermeneutics 8. Cham: Springer. 
Tan, Ian. 2022. Wallace Stevens and Martin Heidegger: Poetry as Appropriative Proximity. American Literature Readings in the 21st Century. Cham: Pal-grave Macmillan. 
Turnbull, Neil. 2009. ‘Heidegger and Jünger on the ‘Significance Of The Cen­tury’: Technology as a Theme in Conservative Thought.’ In Writing Tech­nologies 2(2): 9–34. 
Voltaire. 2006. Candide and Other Stories. Translated by Roger Pearson. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wrathall,MarkA. 2018. ‘TheTaskofThinkinginaTechnologicalAge.’In Hei­deggeron Technology, editedbyAaron JamesWendland,Christopher Mer­win, and Christos Hadjioannou, 13–38. London: Routledge. 
Young,Julian. 2002. Heidegger’sLaterPhilosophy. Cambridge:CambridgeUni­versity Press.