ACTA HISTRIAE
30, 2022, 1
UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185ACTA HISTRIAE 30, 2022, 1, pp. 1-262
UDK/UDC 94(05) 
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper
Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria
ACTA HISTRIAE
30, 2022, 1
KOPER 2022
ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
ISSN 1318-0185                UDK/UDC 94(05)             Letnik 30, leto 2022, številka 1
e-ISSN 2591-1767
Darko Darovec
Gorazd Bajc, Furio Bianco (IT), Stuart Carroll (UK), Angel Casals Martinez (ES), 
Alessandro Casellato (IT), Flavij Bonin, Dragica Čeč, Lovorka Čoralić (HR), Darko 
Darovec, Lucien Faggion (FR), Marco Fincardi (IT), Darko Friš, Aleš Maver, Borut 
Klabjan, John Martin (USA), Robert Matijašić (HR), Darja Mihelič, Edward Muir 
(USA), Žiga Oman, Jože Pirjevec, Egon Pelikan, Luciano Pezzolo (IT), Claudio 
Povolo (IT), Marijan Premović (MNE), Luca Rossetto (IT), Vida Rožac Darovec, 
Andrej Studen, Marta Verginella, Salvator Žitko
Urška Lampe, Gorazd Bajc, Lara Petra Skela, Marjan Horvat, Žiga Oman
Petra Berlot
Urška Lampe (angl., slo.), Gorazd Bajc (it.), Arnela Abdić (angl.)
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper / Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria© 
/ Inštitut IRRIS za raziskave, razvoj in strategije družbe, kulture in okolja / Institute IRRIS for 
Research, Development and Strategies of Society, Culture and Environment / Istituto IRRIS 
di ricerca, sviluppo e strategie della società, cultura e ambiente©
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, SI-6000, Koper-Capodistria, Garibaldijeva 
18 / Via Garibaldi 18, e-mail: actahistriae@gmail.com; https://zdjp.si/
Založništvo PADRE d.o.o.
300 izvodov/copie/copies
Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije / Slovenian 
Research Agency, Mestna občina Koper
Hong Kongški guverner Sir Henry Arthur Blake in Qingov uradnik Cen Chunxuan 
( ) / Hong Kong Governor Sir Henry Arthur Blake and a Qing official 
Cen Chunxuan ( ) / Il governatore di Hong Kong Sir Henry Arthur Blake e 
un ufficiale di Qing Cen Chunxuan ( ) (Wikimedia Commons).
Redakcija te številke je bila zaključena 31. marca 2022.
Odgovorni urednik/
Direttore responsabile/
Editor in Chief:
Uredniški odbor/ 
Comitato di redazione/
Board of Editors:
Uredniki/Redattori/
Editors:
Prevodi/Traduzioni/
Translations:
Lektorji/Supervisione/
Language Editors:
Izdajatelja/Editori/
Published by:
Sedež/Sede/Address: 
Tisk/Stampa/Print: 
Naklada/Tiratura/Copies:
Finančna podpora/
Supporto finanziario/
Financially supported by:
Slika na naslovnici/
Foto di copertina/
Picture on the cover:
Revija Acta Histriae je vključena v naslednje podatkovne baze / Gli articoli pubblicati in questa rivista sono inclusi nei seguenti indici di citazione 
/ Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in: CLARIVATE ANALYTICS (USA): Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), 
Social Scisearch, Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), Journal Citation Reports / Social Sciences Edition (USA); IBZ, Internationale 
Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur (GER); International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) (UK); Referativnyi Zhurnal Viniti 
(RUS); European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS); Elsevier B. V.: SCOPUS (NL); DOAJ.
To delo je objavljeno pod licenco / Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza / This work is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC 4.0.
Navodila avtorjem in vsi članki v barvni verziji so prosto dostopni na spletni strani: https://zdjp.si.
Le norme redazionali e tutti gli articoli nella versione a colori sono disponibili gratuitamente sul sito: https://zdjp.si/it/.
The submission guidelines and all articles are freely available in color via website http: https://zdjp.si/en/.
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
Volume 30, Koper 2022, issue 1
VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS
Vid Žepič: Kužni privilegiji v občepravni doktrini in evropskih civilnih kodifikacijah ........
Privilegia pestis nella dottrina del diritto comune e nei codici del diritto civile europeo
The »Plague Privileges« in the Legal Doctrine of the ius commune and in the 
European Civil Codifications
Mario Novak & Tamás Hajdu: Život i smrt u zaleđu kvarnerskog zaljeva tijekom srednjeg 
vijeka: bioarheološka analiza ljudskih koštanih ostataka iz Triblja, iskopavanja 2015. godine. 
Bioarheologija srednjovjekovne populacije iz Triblja .................................................................
La vita e la morte nell’entroterra della baia del quarnero medioevale: analisi 
bioarcheologiche dei resti di ossa umane a Tribalj, scavi nel 2015. 
Bioarcheologia della popolazione medievale di Tribalj 
Life and Death in the Hinterland of Kvarner Bay During the Middle Ages: 
Bioarcheological Analysis of Human Bone Remains from Tribalj, Excavations 
in 2015. Bioarcheology of the Medieval Population from Tribalj 
Loris De Nardi: Una modalità di contribuzione indiana per i domini italiani meridionali 
degli Asburgo di Spagna? I donativi extra-assembleari del 1629, 1630 e 1637 ...........
An Indian Contribution Modality for the Southern Italian Domains of the 
Habsburgs of Spain? The Extra-Assembly Gifts of 1629, 1630 and 1637 
Indijski model dajatev za južno-italijanske dominione Habsburgov v Španiji? 
Izredne dajatve v letih 1629, 1630 in 1637
Vanja Kočevar: Generalni mandat cesarja Ferdinanda II. o verskih razmerah na Kranjskem 
iz leta 1631: (ne)prilagoditev kranjskih elit na protireformacijo in katoliško prenovo .............
Il mandato generale dell’imperatore Ferdinando II del 1631 relativo alla situazione religiosa in 
Carniola: il (dis)adattamento delle élite carniolane alla controriforma e alla riforma cattolica
The 1631 General Mandate of Emperor Ferdinand II on the Religious Situation in Carniola: 
(Non-)Adaptation of Carniolan Elites to the Counter-Reformation and Catholic Revival
Nikola R. Samardžić & Marija V. Kocić: Naples and Sicily after 
Utrecht and Rastatt 1713–1714. From the British Perspective  ..........................................
Napoli e Sicilia dopo Utrecht e Rastatt 1713–1714. Dalla prospettiva britannica 
Neapelj in Sicilija po Utrechtu in Rastattu 1713–1714. Iz britanske perspektive
1
23
UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767
67
43
101
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
Remzi Avci: Writing the Orient: The Representation of the Ottoman 
Society in the Travel of Eduard Sachau (1845–1930) ...........................................................
Scrivere sull’Oriente: la rappresentazione della società ottomana nel 
viaggio di Eduard Sachau (1845–1930) 
Pisanja o Orientu: upodobitev otomanske družbe v potopisu Eduarda Sachaua (1845–1930)
Yizheng Zou: The collaboration of Chinese and British radicals 
and the role of Hong Kong in modern Chinese history ........................................................
La collaborazione tra i radicali cinesi e britannici e il ruolo di 
Hong Kong nella storia della Cina moderna 
Sodelovanje kitajskih in britanskih radikalov ter vloga Hong Konga v 
moderni kitajski zgodovini
Manca G. Renko: Razredni boj proti nacionalizmu. Primer Trsta med 1888 in 1914 ....
La lotta di classe contro il nazionalismo. L‘esempio di Trieste 1888–1914
Class Struggle vs. Nationalism. Example of Trieste 1888–1914
Iskra Iveljić & Miha Preinfalk: From the Habsburg to the Karađorđević Dynasty.
The Position of Croatian and Slovenian Nobility in the Yugoslav State ......................
Dagli Asburgo ai Karadjordjevic. La posizione della 
nobiltà croata e slovena nello stato jugoslavo
Od Habsburžanov do Karađorđevićev. Položaj hrvaškega in 
slovenskega plemstva v jugoslovanski državi
Egon Pelikan: Odstavitev zadnjega slovenskega škofa v 
Julijski krajini – Frančiška Borgie Sedeja .............................................................................
La deposizione dell’ultimo vescovo sloveno della Venezia Giulia – Francesco Borgia Sedej 
Removal of the Last Slovene Archbishop in Venezia Giulia – Frančišek Borgia Sedej
Tomaž Ivešić: Exchanging the “Progressive Experiences” in a Transnational Perspective: 
Nationality, Economy and Federalism in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s ....
Scambiare “l’esperienza progressista” nella prospettiva transnazionale: nazionalità, 
economia e federalismo in Jugoslavia e Cecoslovacchia negli anni sessanta
Izmenjava “progresivnih izkušenj” v transnacionalni perspektivi: nacionalnost, 
ekonomija in federalizem v Jugoslaviji in Čehoslovaški v šestdesetih letih
215
161
239
185
141
121
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
141
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS 
AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG IN MODERN CHINESE HISTORY
Yizheng ZOU
The Institute for China’s Overseas Interest, Shenzhen University, China, Nanhai Ave 3688, 
Shenzhen, Guangdong, P.R. China, 518060
e-mail: yizhengzou@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
This study used the British colonial archives, old Hong Kong English and Chinese 
newspapers, and Chinese revolutionary archival documents. British radical journalists 
and the English press collaborated with Hong Kong Chinese revolutionaries and 
launched several revolutionary activities, which led to the killing of the Chinese 
revolutionary leader Yeung Ku Wan and the involvement of the British Hong Kong 
colonial government. The British government was also concerned about the tensions 
between Chinese revolutionaries and the Qing government and made Hong Kong an 
important place in the campaign to overthrow the Qing government.
Keywords: China, Hong Kong, Revolution, Yeung Ku Wan, British radical, Journalism, 
Qing government
LA COLLABORAZIONE TRA I RADICALI CINESI E BRITANNICI E IL 
RUOLO DI HONG KONG NELLA STORIA DELLA CINA MODERNA
SINTESI
Lo studio ha utilizzato gli archivi coloniali britannici, i vecchi giornali inglesi 
e cinesi di Hong Kong e i documenti d’archivio rivoluzionari cinesi. I giornalisti 
radicali britannici e la stampa inglese hanno collaborato con i rivoluzionari ci-
nesi di Hong Kong e hanno svolto diverse attività rivoluzionarie, che hanno avuto 
come conseguenze l’uccisione del leader rivoluzionario cinese Yeung Ku Wan e il 
coinvolgimento del governo coloniale britannico di Hong Kong. Una delle preoc-
cupazioni del governo britannico era rappresentata dalle tensioni esistenti tra i 
rivoluzionari cinesi e il governo Qing, rendendo Hong Kong una città importante 
nella campagna per far cadere il governo Qing.
Parole chiave: Cina, Hong Kong, Rivoluzione, Yeung Ku Wan, Radicale britannico, 
Giornalismo, Governo dei Qing
Rec ived: 2019-07-25                            DOI 10.19233/AH.2022.07
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
142
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
INTRODUCTION1
The Boxer Movement’s attacks on foreign missionaries started in the late 19th 
century and led to the invasion of Peking by the Eight-Power Allied Forces and the 
withdrawal of the Qing government from the city. At the time, the British economic 
interests in China were focused on the Yangtze River Basin, such as Shanghai and 
Wuhan. British Chinese policy also considered a large proportion of the interests 
in this region, although Hong Kong also had a certain position in the British policy 
considerations for China. As a former colony occupied by the United Kingdom from 
China, Hong Kong has had a complex and far-reaching impact on the development 
of Chinese history. In fact, as early as the beginning of the 20th century, Hong Kong 
posed a greater threat to China’s political stability. This threat actually came from 
a conspiracy of a group of Chinese revolutionaries and British radicals. Light has 
been shed on the relationship between Sun Yatsen and Hong Kong Chinese elites, 
particularly Ho Kai, around 1900 (Choa, 2000). Moreover, scholars have disclosed 
that Chinese elites, such as Ho Kai, were involved in a double allegiance towards 
the Chinese and British governments, viz., disloyalty in the eyes of the Hong Kong 
colonial government (Fung, 2005; Law, 2009). In addition, John Carroll argued that 
Chinese elites collaborated with the British colonial government in the making of 
modern Hong Kong (Carroll, 2009). Nevertheless, the relationship of Chinese revolu-
tionary and British radicals in modern Hong Kong history has not been fully studied 
and its impact on modern Chinese history has not been reviewed. Zou provided a 
picture of how Tse Tsan Tai communicated with Australian and British supporters 
of the revolution and planned to seek asylum (Zou, 2013). However, a grand view 
of how Chinese and British radicals endeavoured to promote revolution under the 
protection of the British colonial government has not yet been provided. The author 
argues that the British and Hong Kong colonial government policy of defending the 
sovereignty of and interests in Hong Kong provided a loose space for Chinese and 
British radicals to collaborate in Chinese revolutionary activities; as a result, Hong 
Kong played an important role in modern Chinese political development. 
Regarding the relationship between Chinese revolutionaries and the British gov-
ernment, Yang Tianshi and Zhang Yufa both asserted that the British government 
had an economic interests-based foreign policy towards Chinese revolutionaries 
(Yang, 2002; Yan, 2010). British diplomats would oppose or sit watching on various 
occasions (Yan, 2010), which is why scholars have portrayed this British foreign 
policy as negative or non-interventionist (Deng, 2012). John Y. Wong pointed out 
that the philanthropic British Prime Minister and impartial British democracy saved 
Sun Yatsen from being shipped back to China for execution by the Qing government 
1 This article is funded by the research grant of Shenzhen University – Lingnan University Joint 
Centre for the Greater Bay Area and International Studies (CGIS). My great thanks to the help and 
support of Professor LAU Chi-pang, Professor Mark Hampton, my wife, and the anonymous review-
ers for their comments.
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
143
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
(Wong, 2004). Wong’s observation expanded scholarship implying that the British 
political convention benefitted Chinese revolutionaries.
As result of Yeung’s connections with the British in Hong Kong and the relatively 
loose policy of reform, the study of political assassination could uncover the nature 
of Hong Kong and Chinese reformers in Sino-British relations around the turn of the 
twentieth century. Robert Bickers, who studied British settlers and British conces-
sions in China during the first half of the twentieth century, noted that the group 
of different British-owned interests and opinions regarding British foreign policy 
towards China subsequently influenced Sino-British relations (Bickers, 1999). Chan 
Lau Kit-ching focused on twentieth century Hong Kong in Sino-British relations, 
including the aforementioned revolutionary network in Sino-British relations. She 
asserts that the British and Hong Kong governments failed to resolutely curb the 
expansion and development of Hong Kong reformers; rather, with tolerance, the 
reformers were sheltered and even assisted. In the case of Yeung Ku Wan, she em-
phasizes that the Hong Kong government and the Colonial Office were subject to the 
decisions of the Foreign Office, the final decrees of which were shaped by British 
Minister to Peking, Ernest Satow (Chan Lau, 1990). 
In this article, the author describes the complex international political struggle 
behind a political murder. The first section discusses the assassination of the Chinese 
revolutionary leader Yeung Ku Wan by the Qing government; the second section reveals 
the involvement of the Hong Kong governor, who sympathized with the Chinese revo-
lutionaries in the political assassination investigation and asked the British government 
to exert pressure on the Chinese government; the third section points out that Chinese 
and British radical journalists and British businessmen in Hong Kong were in solidarity 
with the case and even launched revolutionary activities to exact their revenge; and 
finally, the author emphasize that the British in Shanghai made concessions, and Lon-
don believed that Yeung Ku Wan’s case was less important than other British interests 
in Shanghai and control of other port cities. The British minister did not believe that 
murdering a Chinese reformer and the violation of British territoriality in Hong Kong 
were sufficiently serious to challenge the Qing government, so official protest should 
be abandoned.2 To secure British interests in China, the British Foreign Office had to 
downgrade the urgency of Yeung’s case, but it still protected the sovereignty of Hong 
Kong, thus providing a haven for Chinese revolutionaries. 
THE QING GOVERNMENT MURDERED YEUNG KU WAN
Yeung Ku Wan, the top leader of the Reform Party in South China, threatened the se-
curity of the Qing Guangdong government. Therefore, the Qing government had a strong 
motive to arrest and murder Yeung Ku Wan. Yeung was the leader of the 1895 Guangzhou 
Uprising, which was an attempt to overthrow the Qing. He fled to South Africa after the 
revolution failed (Tse, 1924, 10).
2 Ernest Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne December 7th 1904 (CO 129/330, 365–366).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
144
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
His name was on record with the Qing government, while Sun Yatsen’s name, 
Sun Man, was on the record as being wanted for arrest. Yeung Ku Wan chose 
to continue the revolution. He remained confident of success when he led the 
Huizhou Uprising and committed the assassination of Tak Sau, the Two Guangs 
Viceroy (Tse, 1924, 18–19).
Shi Jianru, a member of the Revive China Society, reported to Yeung Ku Wan 
at the time. After the assassination of Tak Sau failed, Shi Jianru went to Hong 
Kong and met secretly with Yeung Ku Wan at Yeung’s house (Yang, 1955, 27). 
Shi had been persuaded by his uncle to return to Guangdong for family business 
reasons. However, his family sent Shi Jianru to the government because Shi’s 
brother did not want to be implicated in Shi Jianru’s revolutionary activities. Shi 
Jianru went to the Qing government and pled guilty (Yang, 1955, 27). Shi Jianru 
Fig. 1: Photograph of Yeung Ku Wan (first row, second from the left) and Sun Yatsen 
(second row, third from the left) in Japan (Wikimedia Commons).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
145
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
finally provided the information that the Qing government needed,3 which was 
entirely different from what the Nationalists propagandized about Shi Jianru, a 
hero (Deng, 1957).
When the Hong Kong government managed to obtain the record of Shi Jianru’s 
confession, it was proof that the Qing government considered Yeung Ku Wan a 
principal criminal and planned to eliminate him and his threat. It was possible that 
Yeung Ku Wan could have been extradited to Guangdong at the request of the Qing 
government if it claimed that Yeung Ku Wan was a Chinese national, although he 
was a British subject. However, the British Hong Kong governor, Blake, believed 
that there was no extradition treaty between Hong Kong and China.4
3 Blake H.A. to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan, British National Archives at Kew 
(CO 129/305, 507–509).
4 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 495).
Fig. 2: Hong Kong Governor Sir Henry Arthur Blake and a 
Qing official Cen Chunxuan ( ) (Wikimedia Commons).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
146
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
In 1900, Yeung Ku Wan did not know that Shi Jianru, who was aware of his ad-
dress, had disclosed his secret involvement with the revolutionaries. Assassinating 
a British subject in a British colony was not wise behaviour on the part of the Qing 
government. When Yeung Ku Wan was in Hong Kong, Tak Sau had been demoted 
to governor of Guangdong from his position of Two Guangs Viceroy. Li Ka Cheuk 
was the commandant of the Canton City Guard in Canton. Thus, Tak Sau and Li Ka 
Cheuk had strong motives to remove Yeung Ku Wan and directed a series of attempts 
on his life in British Colonial Hong Kong.
Tak Sau and Li Ka Cheuk regarded Yeung Ku Wan’s life work as a reformer 
intimidating to the Qing, particularly the Guangdong government. In 1895, the Qing 
government offered a reward on Yeung Ku Wan’s head of 1,000 taels.5 Yeng Ku 
Wan’s daughter Jinxia also reported overhearing one murderer say that he had secret 
information indicating that the head of Yeung Ku Wan was worth 100,000 taels 
(Yang, 1955, 13). If Yeung Ku Wan’s life meant such a vast sum of money, it proved 
that the Guangdong government would pay a very heavy price to get rid of him, even 
if the act challenged British territorial rights. At least three plots to murder Yeung 
Ku Wan between 1900 and 1901 were uncovered.
In September 1900, four revolutionaries – Kong Kung Hi, Lu Lian, Wang Geting 
and Lu Tai – fled to Hong Kong from Huizhou with the failure of Huizhou Uprising.6 
When they were in Hong Kong, Kong Kung Hi was hired by the Qing government to 
murder Yeung Ku Wan sometime in November 1900.7 Kong Kung Hi, a witness at 
the later trial of the murder suspect, claimed that a Qing official came to Hong Kong 
and promised to reward him with 20,000 HK dollars and a position as a government 
official were he to kill Yeung Ku Wan.8 Ng Lo Sam, a Hong Kong police agent, 
was the middleman who introduced Kong Kung Hi to the Qing government official. 
Kong Kung Hi admitted that he took some money from the Qing official, but he also 
met with and disclosed this plot to Yeung Ku Wan. Kong Kung Hi asked Yeung Ku 
Wan to escape with him to Thailand, but Yeung Ku Wan rejected the idea, and Kong 
Kung Hi went to Thailand.9
Five days after Kong Kung Hi fled to Thailand upon the failure of the first assas-
sination attempt, Ng Lo Sam hired another killer from mainland China: a notorious 
thief named Ma Wong Hoi and his gang. In November 1900, Henry May, the British 
Superintendent of Police, learned of this association and warned Ng Lo Sam against 
involvement with Ma Wong Hoi. May testified that Ma Wong Hoi left Hong Kong on 
November 30 and that he had received an apologetic letter from Ng Lo Sam stating 
that he had asked Ma Wong Hoi to leave, had never wished to cause trouble and 
would not do so again.
5 Zhongxian Shangge ( ) (Chinese Mail ( ), 10. 12. 1895, 4).
6 The Story of Yeung Ku Wan in a Prosecution ( ) (Chinese Mail ( ), 16. 8. 
1911, 3).
7 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 518–519).
8 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 518–519).
9 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 519).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
147
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
However, it was later disclosed by Kong Kung Hi that, on January 4, 1901, Ng Lo 
Sam met Li Ka Cheuk, who hired him to assassinate Yeung Ku Wan. Subsequently, 
they left with a team of killers on the evening of January 7 and arrived in Hong Kong 
on the morning of January 8.10 A team of assassins led by Chen Linzai shot Yeung 
Ku Wan at his home on January 10. The other killers were Tung Cheung, Li Kwai 
Fan and Tsui Fuk.11 The killers embarked on the gunboat Kin Yui from Guangzhou 
and fled back to Guangzhou in the same gunboat without clearance through customs. 
The Hong Kong police boat did not catch up with the gunboat (Yang, 1955, 21).12
The lawless actions of the Qing government were well covered, and frightened 
Chinese residents who lived in Hong Kong feared being witnesses, even in a British 
court. As a result, it took nearly two years for the Hong Kong police to obtain suf-
ficient evidence, and they arrested only one suspect in this complicated situation. 
Revolutionaries including Kong Kung Hi caught Li Kwai Fan on April 5, 1903, 
and turned him in as one of the killers. Li Kwai Fan had no address in Hong Kong 
and spent his time in a brothel and casino.13 Li Kwai Fan was hanged on June 17, 
1903, although he and his lawyer never admitted that the defendant himself had 
been involved in the murder and claimed that the witnesses were not trustworthy. 
However, the judge said that, although the prisoner claimed that he did not commit 
the murder, it could mean that he did not kill Yeung Ku Wan in person but could still 
have been involved in the murder.14
The final report from the British noted Li Kwai Fan had confessed his complicity 
with the assassins up until a few minutes before the murder. Another fish seller said 
that Li Kwai Fan persuaded him to kill Yeung Ku Wan on January 10, 1901, the day 
of the murder, but he rejected the offer. Nevertheless, that evening, he went to have 
a look at Yeung Ku Wan’s residence and saw two men go upstairs. Li Kwai Fan was 
watching outside, standing guard. Another witness testified that Li Kwai Fan was 
merely the lookout for the assassins. Regarding the witnesses, one said that he heard 
Li Kwai Fan talk about the assassination of Yeung Ku Wan. Li might have killed or 
assisted in killing Yeung Ku Wan (Zhongguo, 1968) guo min dang dang shi shi liao 
bian zuan wei yuan hui, 1968). Yau Ma Tei fisherman Tan Zong also confessed that 
Li Kwai Fan told him that he had killed Yeung Ku Wan, and he kept this secret until 
April 1903, when a policeman in Hong Kong asked him about the murder. He had 
been afraid to disclose the truth even after two years (Zhongguo, 1968).
Although the remaining suspects were not brought to the Hong Kong court, wit-
nesses left evidence that Qing government soldiers, including Chan Linzai, were the 
true murderers who shot Yeung Ku Wan. Zhou Yunpei said that he was a cook on a 
ship, and he knew Li Kwai Fan. He also said that he had a brother who was the killer. 
10 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 506).
11 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 507).
12 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 506).
13 The Gage Street Murder (China Mail, 21. 5. 1903, 5).
14 The Gage Street Murder Trial–Sentence of Death (Hong Kong Daily Press, 22. 5. 1903 2–3); Murderer 
of Yeung Kui Wan Hanged (China Mail, 17. 6. 1903, 4).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
148
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
Li Ka Cheuk found two letters from his brother and finally killed his brother. He had 
read the two letters beforehand, one of which asked him to go back to Hong Kong; 
the other one was from Henry May. The ‘brother’ whom Zhou Yunpei mentioned 
might have been a man named Chen Linzai. He claimed that Chen Linzai shot Yeung 
Ku Wan. The killers received 2,000 taels as a reward and the rank of fifth official 
(Zhongguo, 1968).
Fisherman Wang Sheng said that, before the assassins killed Yeung Ku Wan, they 
wanted to borrow his boat. Wang Sheng did not lend his boat to them. Later, they 
came back and said that they had killed Yeung Ku Wan and had no further need of his 
boat (Zhongguo, 1968). It was also said that these witnesses dared not tell the police 
the truth in 1901 because they feared revenge from the Guangdong government. 
However, they and their families would still be in trouble if they became witnesses 
with their testimony, unless they had no relatives or wives in Guangdong who could 
be used for leverage (Zhongguo, 1968).
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES
Yeung Ku Wan was shot four times. At the hospital, it was determined that 
surgery would be futile, and he later died of exsanguination. Three bullets were 
later extracted from his body (Liu, 1947). Yeung Ku Wan’s last words begged the 
British government to discover the identity of the assassins from Kong Kung Hi 
and address this injustice to his family.15 Before Yeung Ku Wan died, he men-
tioned Lu Lian, Lu Tai, Kong Kung Hi and Wang Geting. On his deathbed, Yeung 
Ku Wan told Henry May that, if he knew where the four people were, they would 
find the assassins. Governor Blake and Henry May, as the superintendent of the 
Hong Kong Police and colonial secretary (and later governor), attempted to arrest 
the suspects. In addition, the Hong Kong government offered a reward of 500 HK 
dollars for information leading to the arrest of the murderer. Under a request from 
the Hong Kong police, Lu Lian, Kong Kung Hi and Wang Geting went to Hong 
Kong, where they learned that Chen Linzai and Li Kwai Fan were the killers. 
Chen Linzai was going to be a witness in Hong Kong back in 1903 but was killed 
by the Qing government; Li Kwai Fan was arrested by Kong Kung Hi and Lu Lian 
at Dabeipu.16
The death sentence for Li Kwai Fan did not bring the end of the case be-
cause Governor Blake still wanted to extradite all of the criminals complicit in 
the murder.17 Both Blake and May sympathized with revolutionary activities in 
Guangdong, so they attempted to protect and help Yeung Ku Wan, who was a Brit-
15 The Story of Yeung Ku Wan in a Prosecution ( ) (Chinese Mail ( ), 16. 
8. 1911, 3).
16 The Story of Yeung Ku Wan in a Prosecution ( ) (Chinese Mail ( ), 16. 
8. 1911, 3).
17 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 495).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
149
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
ish subject. Yeung’s father had been born in Singapore, the capital of the British 
Straits settlements of what is now Malaysia (1826-1959).18 They also expected 
the Qing Guangdong government to compensate Yeung Ku Wan’s family with 
50,000 HK dollars and a promise that senior government officials, including the 
acting viceroy, Tak Sau, would be dismissed by the Qing government.19
There was no extradition treaty between China and Britain in 1903, and it was 
impossible for the Hong Kong government to extradite Chinese national suspects 
to Hong Kong courts, although Hong Kong Chinese witnesses had occasionally 
been invited by the Qing government to identify suspects in Chinese courts.20 
Governor Henry Blake was clearly cognizant of these legal obstacles, but he obvi-
ously felt irritated by the “grave outrage that has been committed upon the ter-
ritoriality of this Colony” and “the serious menace that the action of the Chinese 
Authorities involves against all residents of whatever nationality or standing in 
this Colony”.21 When the Guangdong government breached British territoriality 
in Hong Kong, Blake was seriously shocked; thus, he begged the British govern-
ment “most strongly to urge that the extradition” occur of Tung Cheung, Yeung 
Tsing Kai and Ng Lo Sam.22 Blake was keen to receive approval from the British 
government on the decision for extradition, so he sent complete testimonials to the 
British Colonial Office. In addition, he also proposed to the British government 
to exert “the strongest possible pressure” on the Chinese government at Peking to 
instruct the viceroy of Two Guangs to extradite the suspects.23 Moreover, Blake 
also expected British government to pressure the Chinese government to dismiss 
government officials implicated in the murder.24
Governor Blake completed his tenure in Hong Kong in 1903, and Henry May, 
the colonial secretary, stepped into the role of administrator in Hong Kong. Unfor-
tunately, he did not receive news of the vehement protest that the British Minister to 
Peking, Ernest Satow, made at the time but thereafter only the negotiation over the 
case details with Satow’s personal analysis.25 As a result, Henry May discussed the 
case with the consulate-general in Canton, C.W. Campbell, and decided only to sue 
Tung Cheung and Ng Lo Sam in a Chinese court, with the presence of Campbell in 
Canton.26 Governor Matthew Nathan came one year later, in 1904, and discovered 
that the whole intricate case of Yeung Ku Wan was almost in a dead end. One of the 
assassins whom Henry May wanted to prosecute in Canton, Tung Cheong, died in 
1904, and only Ng Lo Sam was left as suspect for any further action that Governor 
18 The Late Yeung Ku Wan (China Mail, 16. 1. 1901, 2).
19 From May F. H., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/321, 353–358).
20 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 495).
21 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 496).
22 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 496–497).
23 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 497).
24 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 498).
25 Ernest Satow to the Officer Administrating the Government July 11th 1904 (CO 129/326, 354–359).
26 C.W. Campbell to Ernest Satow July 11th 1904 (CO 129/326, 501–502).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
150
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
Nathan could take.27 Nathan reviewed the documents of Yeung’s case and failed 
to take “further action in this murder case beyond suggesting to Sir Ernest Satow 
the advisability of making some representation at Peking which will make clear 
the serious view taken by the Hong Kong government of any attempt by Chinese 
officials to violate British territorial rights”.28 Nathan also attached the opinion of 
Henry May and Campbell, who concurred that “nothing will be gained by taking 
further action” with regard to the murder.29
Henry Arthur Blake became the governor of Ceylon after he left Hong Kong, 
so he could do nothing about the unexpected result – not to mention his suggestion 
to British government to force the Chinese government to hand over the suspects. 
However, it left a question of why there was the smell of gunpowder in the period 
of Governor Blake but an anti-climactic ending in the period of Governor Nathan. 
There were at least a handful of suspects and witnesses that Nathan could inves-
tigate further, such as Ng Lo Sam, Yeung Thing Kai, Tsui Fuk, and Li Kacheuk. 
The account and available information from the Hong Kong government essentially 
influenced British foreign policy towards a case involving the breach of territoriality 
and the intimidation of residents. The author must point out the evolution of the role 
of the press in this incident in the first five years of the twentieth century. 
THE POWER OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL ENGLISH PRESS
Governor Blake’s strong response in light of Yeung’s death was not rare. In fact, 
before Blake formed his suggestion to the British government, he faced serious 
pressure from the British colonial Hong Kong English press, which pushed him to 
make progress in handling the case of Yeung Ku Wan. The Hong Kong English press 
had a few thousand English readers at most in 1901, but their editors were radical 
journalists and supporters of Yeung Ku Wan’s reform movement. As early as 1895, 
British radical journalists who were familiar with the revolutionaries, particularly 
Tse Tsan Tai, published revolutionary news and announcements to promote local 
support for the Chinese revolution. In other words, the special relationship between 
Tse Tsan Tai and British journalists formed an invisible but important power behind 
the words in the newspapers.
Immediately after the murder, there appeared a series of letters from Chinese elite 
readers in Hong Kong Telegraph, China Mail, Hong Kong Weekly Press, and the Hong 
Kong Daily Press asking for justice for Yeung Ku Wan. In the “Notes and Comments” 
column of the Hong Kong Telegraph on January 15, 1901, one commentary seriously 
criticized the Hong Kong police, pointing out that the Hong Kong police force was 
“barely strong enough to properly patrol the city”, and it could not bring anybody to 
27 From Nathan M. to Alfred Lyttelton, Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/324, 352–357).
28 From Nathan M. to Alfred Lyttelton, Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/324, 356).
29 From Nathan M. to Alfred Lyttelton, Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/324, 357).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
151
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
the Hong Kong court for the case of Yeung Ku Wan”.30 In the Hong Kong Telegraph, 
a correspondent in Canton also pointed out that the Qing government likely murdered 
Yeung Ku Wan because “the murder will be rewarded for his dastardly crime”, which 
was the “policy of the Canton officials regarding reformers”, including commission-
ing certain officials to hunt down reformers and destroy them, as well as hiring secret 
agents to watch reformers in British colonial Hong Kong.31 Furthermore, the same 
letter provoked the readers of the paper, who were mostly Christian, to believe that 
the Guangdong government regarded “the Christians as in some way connected with 
reform, and in the eyes of the officials reform means treason”.32 The English press not 
only publicized anger, concern and anxiety, but it also encouraged the Hong Kong 
government to make forceful resolutions in handling Yeung’s case:
30 The Policy (Hong Kong Telegraph, 15. 1. 1901, 2).
31 The Murder of Mr. Yeung (Hong Kong Telegraph, 15. 1. 1901, 3).
32 The Murder of Mr. Yeung (Hong Kong Telegraph, 15. 1. 1901, 3).
Fig. 3: Photograph of Tsen Tsan Tai (Wikimedia Commons).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
152
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
“Yeung Ku Wan…was a British subject, having been born and educated in 
this Colony. His father was also a British subject, and was born in Singapore. It 
is alleged that the murder was instigated by the Chinese Government through its 
representative at Canton; that only recently the Acting Viceroy Tak Sow issued a 
proclamation offering a handsome reward for Yeung Ku-wan, dead or alive… This 
is a serious allegation to make, and if the information has not already been sup-
plied to the British authorities our correspondent should at once communicate with 
the Captain Superintendent of Police…to bring home the charge of murder to the 
property parties…Our correspondent suggests that His Excellency the Governor, 
holding the Acting Viceroy responsible, should demand the immediate production 
of the murders and that the British Government should adopt active measures to 
obtain redress.”33
The voice was loud and strong, particularly considering that it was the most sig-
nificant article in six columns of news reports, while 75 percent of the newspapers 
were full of varieties of advertisements.34 Hong Kong government officials read 
English newspapers every day and, from time to time, sent newspaper clippings 
to the British government. Readers also felt safe using the English press to pass 
their opinions on to the British Hong Kong government and mould consensus with 
other audiences. Four weeks after the death of Yeung Ku Wan, his friends were 
still frightened and feared donating money directly to Yeung Ku Wan’s wife and 
children.35 Nevertheless, they still wanted to help Yeung Ku Wan, so one of their 
representatives advocated that: first, people send donations to the Hong Kong Daily 
Press anonymously, without any information to trace the donors; second, that the 
Hong Kong government should “keep a strict watch on all suspicious Cantonese 
visitors” to protect the reformers in Hong Kong; third, Hong Kong detectives 
should be more efficient in arresting the authors of this murder; and fourth, the 
Hong Kong government should increase the bait from five hundred dollars to one 
thousand dollars to induce the accomplices of the assassins.36 Upon receiving such 
information, the Hong Kong police soon increased the bait from five hundred dol-
lars to two thousand dollars.37 
Simultaneously, after reading the news reports in the English press, the acting 
chairman of the China Association Hong Kong branch, R. Chatterton Wilcox, wrote 
an uncompromising report to the China Association in London (China Association, 
1903, 19). In the report about Yeung Ku Wan’s murder, the Hong Kong committee 
felt that the Chinese government seriously challenged British interests and ex-
pected the Foreign Office to make a strong protest to the Qing government (China 
Association, 1903, 19–20). Wilcox, together with his British merchant committee 
33 The Late Yeung Ku Wan (China Mail, 16. 1. 1901, 2).
34 The Late Yeung Ku Wan (China Mail, 16. 1. 1901, 2).
35 The Late Yeung Ku Wan (Daily Press, 8. 2. 1901, 2).
36 The Late Yeung Ku Wan (Daily Press, 8. 2. 1901, 2).
37 The Capt.Supt. of Police, Regarding the Offer of a Reward for the Arrest of the Actual Murderer, Murder of 
Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/305, 524).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
153
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
members who were doing business in Hong Kong and the Guangdong area, felt that 
the deliberate invasion, with obvious “ignorance of internationalized law” by the 
Qing government, must be punished, so the “sanctuary of Hong Kong can never be 
violated with impunity” (China Association, 1903, 19–20). The China Association 
was very influential in the Foreign Office, and the Marquess Lansdowne replied 
that he would carefully consider the matter after reading Governor Sir Blake’s 
despatch (China Association, 1903, 21).
After the death of Yeung Ku Wan, Tse was busy working with radical journal-
ists. In May 1901, Tse discussed the freedom and independence of China with the 
editor of the Hong Kong Daily Press, Alfred Cunningham, who later organized 
revolutionary activities, including seeking the approval and support of the Com-
mander of British Troops in China and Hong Kong, Major-General Sir William 
Julius Gascoigne (Tse, 1924, 20–23). In November 1901, he also reached agree-
ment with G.E. Morrison, the representative of the London Times in Peking, who 
showed friendly sympathy and support by saying, “I am quite willing to help you 
and shall do my best to further and support the movement. My support means the 
support of the Times, and the support of the British people. My policy is the Times 
policy” (Tse, 1924, 21).
Unfortunately, all of these collaborations with British radical journalists van-
ished into smoke after the failure of the January 1903 Damingshun Heavenly Re-
bellion. Afterward, Tse Tsan Tai avoided publishing radical correspondence about 
overthrowing the Qing government publicly in the English press because he had to 
care for his large family.38 Nevertheless, the media skills and power that he learned 
from revolutionary propaganda helped him to found the South China Morning Post 
in 1903 as a platform for Chinese to express their opinions more freely in British 
colonial Hong Kong (Zou, 2015). 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COMPROMISED
Considering that this case would be a situation in which the Qing government 
violated British sovereignty, Hong Kong governors, including Sir Henry Arthur 
Blake and Sir Matthew Nathan, would be more likely to represent this matter. 
Beginning in 1901, Governor Blake sent reports and Hong Kong newspaper clip-
pings to the Foreign Office to attempt to force the Qing government to punish the 
criminals. It was the first time in 1901 that the British government reviewed the 
case of Yeung Ku Wan as a whole. After the death of Yeung Ku Wan in 1901, British 
Minister Ernest Satow was not influenced by the Hong Kong English press and did 
not consider the political assassination to be a priority in defence of British territo-
rial rights, but he only asked Canton Consul-general James Scott to “do the best he 
can, but not to let it interfere with more important matters” (Ruxton, 2006). After 
the investigation by James Scott, Satow concluded that the evidence was insuf-
38 Tse Tsan Tai to C.C. Greenway, 9. 11. 1903 (Greenway Family Papers, CY Reel 271, 321).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
154
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
ficient to warrant the British minister to take action against the Qing government.39 
Before Satow’s suggestion about the policy regarding Yeung Kuwan’s case in 1901, 
Governor Blake had influenced the British Foreign Office to consider protesting to 
the Qing government. Nevertheless, to Satow, who was busy handling post-Boxer 
Rebellion issues, including the treaty, ports, railways and taxes, the Yeung Ku Wan 
case was not a British cardinal interest.
Upon receiving Blake’s despatch in June 1903, the Secretary of State Colonial 
Office Joseph Chamberlain not only simply ordered that “we should ask F.O. 
[Foreign Office] to put it strongly to the Chinese government” but also sent 
the F.O. a “proposed application for extradition, [which] should be given to the 
Governor of Hongkong”. The Secretary of the Foreign Office, the Marquess of 
Lansdowne, concurred with the Secretary of Colonial Office Joseph Chamberlain 
that the British government should pressure the Chinese government, but the dif-
fering wording assumed various degrees of threat. The Marquess of Lansdowne 
declined the motion of Blake and Chamberlain to extradite Chinese suspects to a 
Hong Kong court, although he supported the suggestion of pressuring the Chinese 
government to dismiss Tak Sau and Li Kacheuk, and he requested compensation 
from the Canton government.40
Hong Kong Governor Blake, Peking Minister Ernest Mason Satow and the 
Marquess of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Secretary of State, Foreign Of-
fice, all concurred that the Chinese government should not violate British territorial 
rights. The new Hong Kong governor, Matthew Nathan, also hoped that the case 
of Yeung Ku Wan would “be brought to the notice of the Central Government of 
China with a view to that Government discouraging by such means as may be in 
its power any attempt of Chinese Provincial Officials to violate British territorial 
rights in the future”.41
Although the British and Hong Kong governors would have liked to protect the 
territorial rights of Hong Kong, a parallel reform movement in Shanghai signifi-
cantly disturbed the handling of the Yeung Ku Wan case. Subao was an influential 
newspaper publishing articles on overthrowing the Qing government and a serious 
irritant to the Qing government. Nevertheless, because Subao was a newspaper 
in the Shanghai Concession, the Qing government had to negotiate with foreign 
representatives from different countries to press for extradition of arrested Chinese 
journalists who maligned the imperial family. The British not only disliked the 
action of the Qing government in arresting Chinese in the Shanghai Concessions, 
but it also believed that the journalists had the right to express themselves freely 
in the press (Wang, 2009). While the Subao case became a much larger event than 
the case of Yeung Ku Wan in Britain and China, the influences of the Subao case 
39 Murder of Yeung Kui Wan February 20th 1902 (CO 129/314, 201–203).
40 Foreign Office to Under Secretary of State Colonial Office, Murder of Yeung Kui Wan August 19th 1903 
(CO 129/321, 273–274).
41 M. Nathan to Ernest Satow, Murder of Yeung Kui Wan November 17th 1904 (CO 129/330, 368).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
155
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
attracted not only common readers but also parliament members in Britain, who 
continued to pressure the British government to intervene in the Subao case but 
not the case of Yeung Ku Wan. On August 4, parliament member James Weir asked 
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Cranborne to decline to surrender 
the Subao case prisoners to Chinese authorities because of the Qing government’s 
practice of torturing radical journalists to death.42 Although Lord Cranborne could 
not immediately grant the request,43 the next day, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour 
replied to another member of Parliament’s repetitive question about protecting the 
Chinese journalists in the Subao case that Ernest Satow had been “instructed by 
telegraph that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the prisoners should not 
be surrendered”.44
As a result, although there was pressure from the China Association, particularly 
from its Hong Kong Branch, the Marquess of Lansdowne did not approve former Gov-
ernor Blake’s suggestion to extradite Chinese officials for judgement in British Colonial 
Hong Kong. In contrast, he speculated about the legal arrangement between the Qing 
and British governments, declining to turn in the two Chinese Subao journalists to the 
Qing government on the grounds that lower level administrators and representatives of 
the British and Chinese governments had reached an earlier deal. Consequently, Britain 
compromised in the case of Yeung Ku Wan by agreeing to abandon the option of extradi-
tion of the Chinese government of lower level official suspects to the Hong Kong court.45 
The compromise protected the Subao revolutionaries. Without the extradition of suspects 
from Guangdong, Yeung’s case entered an impasse, with the failure to gather enough 
evidence or suspects for a trial. Within one year, more suspects died or disappeared, 
which prevented the British Hong Kong governor, Mathew Nathan, from pushing the 
case forward. He could only hope that the Qing government would refrain from violating 
Hong Kong’s territoriality.46
Bearing this point in mind, Satow wrote to the Marquess of Lansdowne that 
“the serious view taken by the Hong Kong government of any attempt by Chinese 
officials to violate British territorial rights has been frequently made clear to the 
Chinese government”, and the evidence in the case of Yeung Ku Wan could not be 
used to “prove serious misconducts” of the central government of China, not to 
mention that it was a case that happened “nearly four years ago”.47
Before arriving at the aforementioned conclusion, Satow attempted to use evi-
dence to analyse the viability of the case:
42 Surrender to the Chinese Authorities of the Prisoners in the Supao Sedition Case (Hansard HC Deb, 4. 8. 
1903, Vol 126, cc1439–cc1440).
43 Surrender to the Chinese Authorities of the Prisoners in the Supao Sedition Case (Hansard HC Deb, 4. 8. 
1903, Vol 126, cc1439–cc1440).
44 Imprisoned Chinese Journalists at Shanghai (Hansard HC Deb, 5. 8. 1903, Vol 126, c1586).
45 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, August 19-31st 1903, (FO 17/1718,600-607); Marquess of Lansdowne to 
Mr. Townley, Affairs of China. Further Correspondence August, 1903 (FO 405/135, no page).
46 Governor M. Nathan to Colonial Office November 17th 1904 (FO 17/1718, 714).
47 Ernest Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne December 7th 1904 (CO 129/330, 365–366).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
156
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
The most reliable witnesses were dead or withdrew testimonies;48
The known assassins or suspects were dead, had disappeared or been banished;49
The observation of the acting attorney general of Hong Kong, B.B. Sharp, was 
that there were groups of people who conspired to murder Yeung Ku Wan, but he 
did not have sufficient evidence at the time to “warrant proceedings against them” 
on murder.50
Satow did not believe that he had enough evidence to question the Qing govern-
ment in 1904.51 He assumed that Britain could not ask the Qing government to pun-
ish their officials simply on suspicion.52 The British government finally concluded 
that there was not sufficient evidence to link this murder with the Qing government. 
It would be almost impossible to investigate the case, so they had to order the Hong 
Kong government to drop the matter.53
In comparing two influential political assassination cases during the era, es-
sential differences arise between that of Yeung Ku Wan and that of the fake body of 
reformer Hong Quanfu. First, the Hong Kong government sent witnesses to Canton 
to prosecute accused Qing government officials in the latter case. Second, the Brit-
ish government concluded that there was not sufficient solid evidence to charge 
officials in the Guangdong government for the murder of Yeung Ku Wan because 
they wanted to repair the relationship with the Qing central government after the 
Boxer Rebellion, rather than risk losing relations over a Chinese revolutionary 
leader, a British subject who arranged the rebellion to blow up the Viceroy Yamen 
and sought relevant indemnity for the rebellion.54
CONCLUSION
As an intrinsic territory of China, Hong Kong became a Trojan horse within 
the Qing government after being colonized by the British. Although there were 
various uprisings and riots in the second half of the 19th century, the capitalist 
revolutionary movement that was required for the establishment of the Republic 
for China had been difficult to produce. Unexpectedly, in the colony of Hong 
Kong, the early fire of the Chinese revolution emerged, although the Qing 
government tried to extinguish it. The Chinese revolutionaries cooperated with 
British radical journalists to promote the revolution. They were supported by 
the governor of Hong Kong and the Chinese Association in Yang’s assassination 
case and exerted pressure on the British government to influence British policy 
48 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 494–495).
49 Blake, H.A., to Chamberlain. J., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/317, 495–498); C.W. Campbell to 
Ernest Satow July 11th 1904 (CO 129/326, 501–502).
50 Opinion of Hon. B.B. Sharp, K.G., Acting Attorney General of Hongkong (CO 129/317, 504).
51 From Nathan M., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/324, 356).
52 From Nathan M., Murder of Yeung Kui Wan (CO 129/324, 359).
53 From Foreign Office to the Secretary of States, Murder of Yeung Ku Wan (CO 129/330, 362–369).
54 Ernest Satow Telegram No. 114 May 10th, 1904 (FO 17/1718, 660–665).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
157
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
towards Chinese revolutionaries in Hong Kong, viz., at least not to collaborate 
with Qing government to arrest the revolutionaries. However, it must be clarified 
that the British failed to support the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries and 
only protested to the Qing government, which uncovered that the nature of the 
protest was because the Qing government’s assassination had violated the sover-
eignty of the British government and the security interest of British businessmen 
in Hong Kong and not supportive of Chinese nationalist revitalization. In light 
of this fact, the early revolutionaries obtained a sheltered space in Hong Kong, 
from which it could carry out small-scale democratic revolutions and implicit 
democratic initiatives and gradually evolve the sparks of revolution into a raging 
fire that overthrew the Qing government.
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
158
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
SODELOVANJE KITAJSKIH IN BRITANSKIH RADIKALOV TER VLOGA 
HONG KONGA V MODERNI KITAJSKI ZGODOVINI
Yizheng ZOU
Inštitut za čezmorske interese Kitajske, Univerza Shenzhen, Kitajska, Nanhai Ave 3688, Shenzhen, Guang-
dong, P.R. Kitajska, 518060
e-mail: yizhengzou@gmail.com
POVZETEK
Članek navaja, da so kitajski in britanski radikalci sodelovali pri spodbujanju 
sodobne kitajske revolucije v britanskem kolonialnem Hong Kongu okoli leta 1900. 
Veliko pozornosti je bilo posvečene kantonskemu revolucionarnemu aktivistu Sun 
Yatsen, katerega vpliv v Hong Kongu je bil omejen in mu ni uspelo tekmovati z 
najvišjim voditeljem družbe Revive China. Medtem ko je bil Sun Yatsen izgnan iz 
Hong Konga, sta Yeung Ku Wan in Tse Tsan Tai zasnovala več vstajnih uporov iz 
svoje baze v Hongkongu, da bi izpodbijali vlado Qing-a, ki so potekali pod pokrovi-
teljstvom britanskih radikalnih novinarjev. Članek prikazuje naraščajoči politični 
pomen Hong Konga od 20. stoletja dalje po izbruhu kitajske revolucije. Prikazuje 
naraščajočo napetost med kitajskimi oblastmi in revolucionarji, ki je povzročila 
podporo kitajske revolucije z strani angleškega tiska in britanskih radikalov. Smrt 
vodilnega revolucionarnega voditelja Yeung Ku Wana je prav tako vplivala na 
britansko reakcijo na intervencije kitajske deželne vlade v Hong Kongu. Poleg tega 
je britanski kolonializem v Hong Kongu ponujal zatočišče revolucionarjem v imenu 
obrambe britanske suverenosti v Hong Kongu.
Ključne besede: Kitajska, Hong Kong, revolucija, Yeung Ku Wan, britanski radikalci, 
Novinarstvo, Qing-ova vlada
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
159
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bickers, Robert (1999): Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 
1900–1949. New York, Manchester University Press.
Carroll, John Mark (2009): Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials 
in Hong Kong. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Chan Lau, Kit-Ching (1990): China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895–1945. Hong 
Kong, Chinese University Press.
China Association (1903): Annual Report. London, China Association.
China Mail. Hong Kong, China mail Group, 1845–1974.
Chinese Mail. Hong Kong, Chinese Mail Co. Limited, 1872–1941.
Choa, Gerald Hugh (2000): The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai: A Prominent 
Figure in Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong. Hong Kong, Chinese University 
Press.
CO 129 – United Kingdom, Great Britain Colonial Office. Hong Kong, Original 
Correspondence. Microfilm, stored in the University of Hong Kong Library, 
1842–1951.
Deng, Guoping (2012): The Influence of British Embassy Staff to the Revolution of 
1911. Master’s Thesis, China, Sichuan Normal University.
Deng, Muhan (1957): Shi Jianru Shilue (Brief Biography of Shi Jianru), and Liao, 
Pingzi, Shi Jianru An Shiyi (Supplement to the Case of Shi Jianru) in Chai, 
Degeng, Xinhai Geming (1911 Revolution). Shanghai, Shanghai Ren Min Chu 
Ban She.
FO 17 – United Kingdom, Foreign Office. China, General correspondence before 
1906. Microform, British National Archive at Kew, 1815–1905.
Fung, Chi Ming (2005): Governorships of Lugard and May: Fears of Double Al-
legiance and Perceived Disloyalty. In: Lee, Pui-tak (ed.): Colonial Hong Kong 
and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration. Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press, 69–88.
Greenway Family Papers – The Historical Archival documents of Greenway Fa-
mily. Australia, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, 1817–1903.
Hansard – The official report of all Parliamentary debates United Kingdom, Parli-
ament, 1688–.
Hong Kong Daily Press. Hong Kong, Daily Press, 1864–1941.
Hong Kong Telegraph. Hong Kong, Hong Kong Telegraph, 1881–1951.
Law, Wing Sang (2009): Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong 
Kong Chinese. Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press.
Liu, Chengyu (1947): Records of Former Premier’s Stories ( ). Guo-
shiguan Guankan ( ), Journal, Nanjing, No.1, 44–56.
Ruxton, Ian (2006): The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Envoy in Peking 
(1900–06). North Carolina, Lulu Press.
Tse, Tsan Tai (1924): The Chinese Republic: Secret History of the Revolution. 
Hong Kong, SCMP Limited.
ACTA HISTRIAE • 30 • 2022 • 1
160
Yizheng ZOU: THE COLLABORATION OF CHINESE AND BRITISH RADICALS AND THE ROLE OF HONG KONG ..., 141–160
Wang, Min (2009): The Western Powers and Subao Case ( ). 
Historical Research ( ), 2, 119–132.
Wong, John (2004): The Truth of Kidnapped Sun Yatsen in London 
( ). Shanghai, Shanghai Bookstore.
Yan, Liang (2010): Zhang Yufa: Interests Drove Foreign Powers Interfere with 1911 
Revolution. Southern Urban Daily,10/23, Guangzhou, B16.
Yang, Bafan (1955): Yeung Ku Wan Family History – family historical archival 
document. Hong Kong, stored by Yeung Hing On.
Yang, Tianshi (2002): Economic interests and British policies concerning China du-
ring the 1911 Revolution. In: Sun, Xiang (ed.): The 1911 Revolution and China 
in the 20th century. Beijing, Chinese historical association, 1960–1980.
Zhongguo (1968) – Zhongguo guo min dang dang shi shi liao bian zuan wei yuan 
hui: Guo Min Ri Ri Bao Hui Bian (Collection of Commonwealth Daily). Taibei, 
Zhongguo guo min dang dang shi shi liao bian zuan wei yuan hui.
Zou, Yizheng (2013): Xiezantai Sixiang Fazhan he Aodaliya de Lianxi 
 (The Evolution of Tse Tsan Tai’s Thought and 
His Connection with Australia). (Zhuanji Wenxue) The Journal of Biographical 
Literature, 10, 51–65.
Zou, Yizheng (2015): English Newspapers in British Colonial Hong Kong: The Case 
of the South China Morning Post (1903–1941). Critical Arts, 29, 1, 26–40.