

Veber's Philosophy within the Context of the European Thought

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POVZETEK

VEBEOVA FILOZOFIJA V KONTEKSTU EVROPSKE MISLI

Avtor v članku poskuša umestiti Veberovo filozofijo v kontekst evropske filozofije. Veberovo delo primerja z idejami (neo)sholastike, predmetnostne teorije (Meinong in graška šola), fenomenologije (Max Scheler) in nekaterimi drugimi. Avtor trdi, da je bil Veber v tesnem stiku z najmodernejšimi filozofskimi tokovi svojega časa in da je na njih zelo hitro reagiral. Sprejel je nekatere njihove komponente in jih vključil v svoje raziskovanje in svoj pogled. Veber je bil ustvarjalen in izviren filozof, ki se je iz meinongovca razvil do pogleda, ki je blizu Brentanu in (neo)sholastiki.

Ključne besede: Meinong, predmetna teorija, krščanstvo, (neo)sholastika, stvarnost, fenomenologija

ABSTRACT

The paper tries to place Veber's philosophy within the context of the European philosophy. It compares Veber's work with the ideas of (neo)scholasticism, object theory (Meinong and the Graz School), phenomenology (Max Scheler) and some others. The author claims that Veber was in close touch with the most modern philosophical strands of his time and reacted to them very quickly. He adopted some components of them and incorporated them in his own research and view. Veber was a creative and original philosopher who developed from the Meinongian view to a view close to Brentano and (neo)scholasticism.

Key words: Meinong, object theory, Christianity, (neo)scholasticism, reality, phenomenology

Introduction

In this paper, I shall compare some moments of Veber's thought with the moments of the philosophies of important (European) philosophers. The relevant names in the mentioned tradition are the following: Brentano, Meinong and the Graz School, Roman Ingarden (aesthetics), Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger.¹ I shall briefly reflect Veber's thought compared to existentialism. I shall also consider Veber's view on faith and religion, their relation to science, and Veber's relation to (neo)scholasticism. All this is intertwined with his changing philosophical stance towards Christianity.

Let us firstly outline the framework and core of Veber's philosophical endeavor. The constant characteristic of all Veber's philosophy throughout its development and changes is the central place of (philosophical) psychology. "Veber is, in all his works, above all a psychologist." (Trstenjak, 1972: 36, compare also p. 53.) Psychology is the heart of all his thinking. All his ideas, even in social philosophy or sociology, have a psychological fundament. He always starts with the analysis of relevant experiences (and their objects) and upon that basis he builds the moments of his complete philosophical view: from epistemology, through ethics and aesthetics, philosophy of religion, social philosophy to his theory of universe, which includes his theory of reality or empirical ontology and metaphysics (theory about entities not immediately given to us, foremost God), where the second is being founded on the first. (Cf. Veber, 1939.)

One of the most important threads of his philosophy is the consideration of knowledge and factuality, which may be seen as a driving force of its development. Veber's philosophical development is usually divided into three phases: the object theory phase, the phase when he created his philosophy of a person as a creature at the crossing of the natural and the spiritual world, who as an active, not merely passive subject possesses her own causal powers, and the third phase, when he supplemented his earlier philosophy with the theory of a special side of our experience which he called hitting upon reality. It is a direct experience of reality, a special kind of intentionality, which is however fundamentally different from presentational intentionality, which only is according to Veber taken into account by the object theory or phenomenology. The questions of knowledge and factuality are closely connected in Veber's philosophy since, *pace* Veber, knowledge is a kind of, we may say, justified experience which object is a factual entity. Hence, if we want to understand what knowledge is, we must face the challenge of comprehending factuality. There are five stages to be noted in the development of his epistemology. The first two belong to his object theory phase, the third belongs to his person phase, the fourth is characterized by his distinguishing and exploring factuality and validity with regard to the thought about God, and the basis of the fifth phase lies in his theory of hitting upon reality. In *An Introduction to Philosophy* and *The System of Philosophy*, that is in the year 1921, Veber believes that factuality ("truth_f"), which we do present, is a property of the objectives (his word is 'fact'), but we do not present the factuality of that factuality (that is why he distinguishes between the merely objective truths

¹ Veber claimed that he met Heidegger in Graz: "I know Martin Heidegger already from the days when I was a schoolboy. We attended together the lectures of A. Meinong at university in Garz." (Cf. Veber, 1943.) The quotation is from Veber's report about the dissertation written by Vladimir Kruno Pandžić "The problem of truth in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger" (cf. Pandžić, 1942). Pandžić in the dissertation expressed his thanks to Veber, his supervisor, but also to Eugen Fink, "my very learned friend", who introduced Pandžić in Heidegger's philosophy and who supervised the making of the plan and main thoughts of the dissertation, and to Heidegger himself, who surveyed the plan and the main thoughts of the dissertation. (Cf. Pandžić, 1942: 5.)

and the truths that are in addition transcendental truths). In 1923, in *The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy* and in the work *Science and Religion*, he already rejects such a view. There is something that makes things factual, but that is a complete unknown X. Therefore we cannot even say what kind of entity that factuality is. Some people would probably demand the following formulation: if X is an ultimate mystery, we should not claim even that it is an entity. In *The Problems of Presentation Production* (1928) Veber claims that factuality is not a property since that would lead to a *regressum ad infinitum*. *Philosophy* (1930) related internally correct experience to personal will. In *The Book about God* (1934) he develops the thesis that factuality depends on the act of God. In *The Question of Reality*² (1939) he importantly modifies, develops and enriches the thesis that we do not present reality, with his theory of immediate experience (hitting upon) of reality.

Veber's stance towards Christianity and (neo)scholasticism

Another characteristic of Veber's philosophy is its increasing approaching to the Christian view. Later Veber's philosophy is becoming more and more Christian in the sense that it is pointing in the same direction as the Christian philosophy. Young Veber is at least as a philosopher quite critical regarding Christianity. In his first book *Introduction to Philosophy* (1921) he refuses freedom of the will as a fiction, he refuses the possibility of the existence of the subject of an experience, the soul, without experience, he writes the word *God* with a small initial, and he claims that as all entities in the universe also god is grounded on the sense data (in the sense of Meinongian objects), thus claiming that god is only a dependent object of a higher order. He talks about hagiotic emotions and strivings, not about religious experiences, and he calls the proper object of those experiences sanctity (or as a negative value/ought, nothingness). On some other places he uses the words *transcendence* or *the great unknown*.

In his book from 1923 *Faith and Science*, he distinguishes between primary and secondary religion. The primary religion is a believing in some other world, in transcendence, but it is totally non determinative. The empty walls of transcendence of the primary religion are painted by the narratives of particular confessions, which represent the secondary religions. Every true secondary religion is based on the primary religion. Veber in *Faith and Science* argues that beliefs constituting the secondary religion are not justified, in his vocabulary they are heteronomous, not autonomous. In polemics with Veber Aleš Ušeničnik (1868–1952) claimed that Veber was inconsistent in claiming that beliefs of a historian are justified, while in the *Bible* stated claims of a believer are not. Both beliefs are justified by the evidence from the checked and reliable sources. There is no principle difference between claims of historiography and claims from or grounded in the *Bible*.

All this started to change in 1925 and is in condensed form presented in his philosophical anthropology from 1930 titled *Philosophy. A Principled Doctrine of Man and His Place in the Creation*. In this book Veber makes first steps in direction of discovering a special type of immediate experience of reality. In this his attention is primarily focused on the subject of experiences and he speaks about hitting upon a person, a spiritual substance. He introduces for instance substantial emotions, directed to substances, as distinguished from emotions directed towards accidents. Love is an example of the substantial emotions. We love the spiritual substance of a person itself, regardless the

² In the following text QR. The book has a 48 pages long summary in the German language titled *Die Frage der Wirklichkeit*.

qualities of that person. In *The Question of Reality* from 1939 Veber spreads immediate hitting upon reality on all kind of substances, not limited to subjects of experience. In *Philosophy* Veber distinguishes between two kinds of sciences about man: natural sciences and sciences assuming the existence of a spirit <Geist> as distinguished from mere psychological life. For Veber in 1930 the spirit is already something different from the psychological life. In early Veber, this important difference does not play any role. *Geisteswissenschaften* assumed the existence of the spirit, because the subjects of their research are not possible without the spirit, they can be created only by the spirit. Linguistics, jurisprudence, history are examples of such sciences. According to Veber, no language, no law, no history is possible without the spirit, because only the spirit can create them. But all above mentioned sciences deal with the spirit only indirectly, by dealing with its creations. Only philosophy deals with the spirit as such, with the essence of the spirit itself. According to Veber essential characteristic of the spirit is the freedom of the will, which is at that time by Veber understood as a kind of agent causation³. Spiritual substances, persons, are the only subjects having their own causal power, which for Veber is the freedom of the will.

In *Philosophy*, Veber already presents three sketches of arguments for the existence of God: 1. The existence of human persons "demands" the existence of the absolute Person. 2. Prayer and cult are elementary emotions. They have their own object, God. It is not reasonable to suppose that they are always incorrect. Therefore God exists and God is a person (for we can pray only to person). 3. Joy and sadness get their meaning through love and respect, two basic emotional relations among humans. The last two get their meaning only through prayer and cult, through elementary relation of man to God. If we have no doubts about the meaning of love or respect and of the factuality of a human person, which are the domain of love and respect, we shouldn't have them about the existence of God either. Earlier hagiotic emotions are transformed in emotions directed towards God, who is a Christian personal God. He uses the word God, not anymore transcendence, the great Unknown etc. Latter in 1934 in *The Book about God* Veber presents five arguments for the existence of God: from truth, from validity, from value, from person and from intuition of essences. Veber's main idea is that from the analysis of all five entities follows that there is God. All five "facts" demand the existence of God, who is an existence *sui generis*. Veber already in *Philosophy*, but more clearly in his book about St. Augustine and in *The Book about God* distinguishes between factuality and validity. Factuality changes through time, validity does not. 'Our tree in the garden is green' is true in spring, but not in winter.⁴ 'Blue is different from white', 'A part is smaller than a whole' are valid always. There are two versions from both facts (both, truth and validity, are for Veber facts in the sense that they are such entities that it is far

³ Yet we should know that Veber in *Philosophy* holds the view that every person is good or bad already in herself (regardless of her good or evil actions) and that in the core cannot be changed. Good or bad action can merely non essentially sooth or impair matters. This view is similar to the view held by Benussi that every person has a personal core, nucleus, which cannot be changed. (I owe this information to L. Albertazzi.)

⁴ In Brentanian manner we should say: *Our green tree in the garden is factual in spring, but not in winter.* Truth in *The Sistem of Philosophy* is an attribute of facts, because at that time Veber was thinking inside the Meinongian proposition-like ontology of objectives (Veber's name for them was 'dejstva', 'facts'), where the truth of objectives is primary and existence or subsistence of all other objects is derived from it. But later Veber abandoned this framework and turned to ontology of things, where the truth and validity pertain originally to things. Facts or objectives are at best shadowy phenomena which truth or validity is derived from the factuality or validity of entities that do not belong to the category of objectives (facts).

from reasonable to deny their existence): 1. They both "demand" Prefactuality and Prevalidity. 2. They are both such that a) they are independent of human mind, and b) they are not reason independent, they cannot be without any reason. This reason is Reason, God and Prevalidity and Prefactuality are aspects of God. So we can see that Veber is a realist about truth_r and validity regarding human reason, but idealist regarding the Reason. The same is true about demonstrative spatiality and temporality.

In the proof from value the second and the third proof from *Philosophy* are actually joined. The way from persons: a human person is the only empirically given proper substance which is the only subject of a proper activity: persons are active, but to things something only happens. From the fact of this person and activity Veber concludes that there must be some Presubstance and Praction.

The last way to God summarizes the other four proofs. It turns out that all the proofs or ways are in the essence only variants of the essentialistic way to God. The essences of factuality, validity, value and person demand corresponding Preessences which are *pace* Veber actually moments of God. Therefore it is not a surprise that Veber ended the book with the quotation of the famous words from Anselm's *Proslogion* (*Prosl.* c.1).

We can discern Veber's attitude towards (neo)scholasticism or (neo)thomism from his two papers on Aleš Ušeničnik, neoscholastic philosophical scholar and, together with Veber, the leading philosophical person in Slovenia of that time. In 1921 Veber wrote a short review of Ušeničnik's *Introduction to Philosophy*. He criticized Ušeničnik and scholasticism from two aspects: epistemological and ethical. According to Veber the ultimate criterion of truth in scholasticism is *evidentia*. But a scholastic thinker cannot explain what this *evidentia* consists of. He can offer only metaphorical descriptions (such as talking about *reflexio completa*), which are however scientifically not sufficient. Secondly: according to scholasticism, one cannot accept any (justified) ethics without knowledge about God. To Veber's that time opinion already the common sense of an ordinary man refuses that. Seventeen years later, in the *Festschrift* for Ušeničnik (70th anniversary) (cf. Veber, 1937–38; Žalec, 2004), Veber accepts the points he refused in 1923. The central claim of the paper is that scholasticism is very relevant philosophy for the modern times and that this can be clearly seen by reading Ušeničnik's texts. Without accepting of *reflexio completa* and therefore of spirit there is no understanding of phenomenal consciousness. *Reflexio completa* makes possible the identity of the knowing entity and of the known entity and thus it supplies a foundation of knowledge. *Reflexio completa* is needed also because knowledge is always the knowledge of knowledge. Another relevance of scholasticism is that it offers a very clear and plausible theory of the (intuition of) essences, which was an important topic of the phenomenology of the time. Veber accepted and praised the constituents of Ušeničnik's (neoscholastic) view: immediate knowledge of the objective reality which has a sensational nature, freedom of the will (which he characterizes as a *reflectio completa* of willing); morality can be grounded only in God and only from God the unshakable moral obligation can originate; wisdom grows from religion; psychology testifies for the elementary moral experience and for the elementary religious experience which are strongly connected. And already psychology gives a higher developmental position to the religious experience compared to the moral one. Ušeničnik's thesis that religion is higher than morality is justified as axiologically as from the developmental aspect. Veber accepts two miracles: transition from nonliving existence to life, and from animalic existence to spiritual existence. He mentions also the correctness of Ušeničnik's thomistic cosmological and teleological views. He stresses the importance of the realistic sense and of intuition to get on in matters where mere reason and analysis are not sufficient. Veber's main claim is that neo-

thomistic philosopher Ušeničnik all the time held the ideas which Veber didn't accept at the beginning. But he nevertheless accepted them because his own, independent consequent scientific work and attitude forced him to do so. In short, neothomistic philosophy is vindicated by modern philosophical and psychological scientific research (conducted by Veber).

Veber and Meinong

Hitting upon reality and penetrative experiences

Meinong distinguishes between penetrative feelings and contemplative feelings (cf. Meinong 1968; 1978). The first are based on judgments and judgment-like supposals, for the second shadowy assumptions are sufficient basis. They are heirs of the *Vorstellungsempfindungen* of the earlier Meinong's treatments (cf. Findlay: 311). In fact, Meinong's distinction is not limited only to feelings. To the penetrative experiences belong thoughts, value-feelings and knowledge-feelings. To the contemplative experiences belong presentations, neutral thoughts, aesthetic feelings and sensuous liking or dislike. (Cf. Findlay: 311–12.)

What's the essential and fundamental difference between Meinong's penetration and Veber's hitting upon reality? It's in the object. Veber's reality is an entirely different ontological category than Meinong's factuality *<Tatsächlichkeit>*. Meinong's factuality is a property, Veber's reality is a substance. Meinong's factuality categorically belongs to phenomena. Facts, objectives, are phenomena with the property of being factual or non-factual (or of such and such possibility). Now, somebody could object: Veber mixed psychology with ontology. The answer: We are dealing with empirically, that is psychologically grounded ontology. By Veber's approach we get ontological categories from psychological investigations. Veber claimed that he had actually discovered the psychological story about distinction between substance and accident. There are two fundamental groups of categories: substantial and nonsubstantial. To the first, realities (substances) and real accidents, we come through hitting upon them. All other entities are phenomena, accidents, and we come to them through presentation. We are dealing with two fundamentally different ontologies when comparing late Veber and Meinong: substance ontology, where substances, things are real and primary, and ontology of facts, states of affairs or propositions, where sentence-like entities are those which are true or which obtain, and the factuality of all other things is actually derived from the facts or states of affairs they constitute. In the frames of Brentano's school we can speak about Brentano's Aristotelian reistic ontology and Meinong's ontology of facts or objectives. Veber started as Meinongian and finished as Brentanian.⁵

But one could say: Objectives are only objects of thoughts, not of feelings. But also feelings are penetrative. We may add that for Meinong all perceptions and all true experiences are in fact existential judgments. (Cf. Meinong, 1906:110; Trstenjak, 1954: 255)

Hitting upon reality and genuinity of experience

Veber never mentions that Meinong used the words 'penetration to factuality' or 'hitting upon factuality', although he criticizes Meinong's theory of intending of factuality quite at length in his *System of philosophy*. But there is another distinction we find by

⁵ A similar observation was given already by W. Baumgartner (cf. Baumgartner, 1992).

Meinong with which Veber explicitly dealt. This distinction among experiences pertains to the act of experience and can be made without reference to its object. It is the difference between genuine and nongenuine experiences. Imagination, memories, neutral thoughts belong to genuine experiences, a perception with the "open eyes", judgments are genuine or serious experiences. Objection to Veber: By Veber's distinction hitting upon/presentation we are actually dealing with Meinong's distinction between genuine and nongenuine experiences. We can shell from the text of QR several arguments for the thesis that the distinction genuine/nongenuine experience of *x* is not identical with the distinction hitting upon *x*/presentation of *x*. (Cf. Žalec 1998: 196–204):

The first argument rests on cases where the expressiveness of hitting upon varies while the expressiveness of genuinity remains unchanged. Veber brings forward the cases with the same kind of sensations or with different kinds of sensations. I touch and I see the same thing *x*. The expressiveness of touching is bigger than expressiveness of seeing, but the genuinity of both is the same. The same result we get if we compare peripheral sensations with organic sensations (for instance observing my leg and sensing pins and needles in my leg). We get examples of the kind also in the cases of the same kind of sensations. For instance by seeing mud the feeling of hitting upon is much more expressive than by seeing something beautiful. But the genuinity of both is the same. Or observing the sky above me and feeling the ground under my feet. Genuinity is the same, but expressiveness of hitting upon is much higher by the latter sensation than by the first. It would be horrible if it was the same. But also the tactile sensation itself can fall on the level of such non-hitting sensation, for instance by sinking into a swamp.

The second argument rests on the premise that we are dealing with two different kinds of passivity in the case of genuinity and in the case of hitting upon. Genuinity is an example of psychological passivity. By the nongenuine presentation we must be much more active than by the genuine. The distinction is therefore between an active and a passive presentation. The hitting upon is passive as well. But it is different kind of passivity. This kind of passivity is passivity in the presence of the surrounding world which resists to us, which shows to us as an obstacle. The psychological passivity is related only to the subject of experience, for instance to the person who experiences something, the passivity of hitting upon depends on the surrounding world of the being that hits upon it.

The third reason: There are cases of hallucinations which are genuine, but there is no hitting upon moment. Veber brought forward an example of a patient in a hospital who hallucinated that a dangerous snake was in the room. Her experience was very genuine because she was terrified. But when asked to localize the snake, she was not able to do it. Veber's explanation: She was not able to do it because there was no hitting upon moment in her experience. Here we must add, to make Veber understandable, that in QR he argues that hitting upon reality and spatial and temporal localization are equivalent: there is no first without the second and *vice versa*.

The difference between the genuine and nongenuine experience is not only in the act (as Meinong claimed), not only in *how* we experience an object, but in the object itself. It is the content/object difference, not the difference in act. (Cf. QR: 114.)

In cases of many objects there exist several different genuine sensations, but we experience only one reality. So there is something additional to genuinity, something what tides these sensations together and what we experience as such. This is the substance of the object we hit upon. We can touch a stone, see a stone, feel its coolness, but all these different objects of our different sensations belong to the same stone. They are accidents of the same substance.

Veber also distinguishes between nongenuine and genuine hitting upon. The first is only a representative of the second. But the acceptance of the distinction provides the basis for the argument that the difference genuine/nongenuine extends through all sides or kinds of experience, therefore also over the hitting upon moment of experience, and therefore it is not the same as the difference between hitting upon and presentation. Presentation, but also hitting upon as well can be both genuine and nongenuine.⁶

Aesthetics

Veber belongs with his *Aesthetics* (1925) to the school which representatives share the central idea that the object of an aesthetical experience is a figure <*Gestalt*>, and this was articulated mostly by thinkers more or less closely connected with the Graz school of philosophy and psychology. Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels (who was the first who clearly and explicitly formulated the problem of figure, although many essential ideas had been in a more complete way formulated already in Meinong's writings published before Ehrenfels's relevant texts), W. Schmied-Kowarzik and S. Witasek are some relevant important names. Veber created a relatively complete system of aesthetics in this tradition.

Veber's aesthetics is the most important Slovene philosophical aesthetics. *Aesthetics* appeared in 1925. Veber developed his original aesthetics in the frames of the Meinongian object theory. He considers aesthetical entities from four aspects: the genetic, the descriptive-analytical, the normative and the teleological (functional). *Pace* Veber the proper object of a positive or a negative aesthetical emotion is beauty or ugliness respectively. These values are grounded on the so called unreal, that is ideal figures <*Gestalten*>. An experience of beauty is correct if and only if it is autonomous and it is an experience of a beauty, which is grounded on the factual unreal figure.

When compared to the aesthetics of the Graz School, Veber's aesthetics at times features a more speculative drive. So, for instance, Veber argues that what is specific to artistic feelings compared to non-artistic aesthetical feelings is that they are founded on hagiotic feelings directed to transcendence. In this speculative surplus Veber is maybe closer to Roman Ingarden, for instance, than to aesthetics of Graz school, although of course his approach is no doubt rooted in the mentioned school. Besides, we should not forget Veber's ideas relevant for aesthetics after *Aesthetics*. Veber's aesthetics from *Aesthetics* is not all his aesthetics. Other relevant Veber's works on this topic are: Veber 1927 (aesthetical values), 1930 and especially 1939. But after *Aesthetics* Veber has never again considered aesthetical topics directly, for their own sake, but always by the way or in examples for illustrating his other theses.

Social philosophy

Veber's most important works in social philosophy and philosophy of culture are *Fundamental Ideas of Slavic Agrarism* (1927) and *Nationalism and Christainity* (1938). Some of his articles defending cooperative ideas were collected and published in the book *Cooperative Thought* (1978). In the last book Veber criticizes the view which considers the economic prosperity of society as the highest value. Its collectivistic variant is socialism, its individualistic form is capitalistic individualism. The cooperative view is a

⁶ For critical view on Veber's achievement see Sajama, 1994, 175–186: "Hence we can hardly say that Veber with his concept of *hitting upon* added anything essential to Meinong's object theory." (Sajama, 1994: 186.)

kind of humanism and considers economic prosperity only as a means, never as a goal. In the book from 1927 Veber was under the influence of the famous Russian sociologist P. A. Sorokin, one of the leading partisans of agrarism of the time. Veber referred to the Croatian translation of Sorokin's book which appeared in Zagreb in 1924 under the title *Ideologija agrarizma <Ideology of Agrarism>*.

Phenomenology and existentialism

Anton Trstenjak, a great connoisseur of Veber's work, argued that Veber's idea of hitting upon reality connects Veber with the European thinkers who argued for the thesis that we do not experience being by means of content, as an object, but somehow differently, or that being is not an object. Jaspers, G. Marcel, Sartre, Dilthey (Trstenjak, 1996: 352) and Heidegger are those persons who Trstenjak considered in this respect (Cf. Trstenjak, 1954; 1972b.)

There are many parallels between the work of Max Scheler and Veber.⁷ The four layers of the universe (nonliving entities, plants, animals, persons), the falling in of the boundary between nonpsychic and psychic sphere with the boundary between spheres of living and nonliving entities, the special experience of a person: for Scheler (1979) a person is not an object, we do not experience persons as we experience things and beings. Veber (1930; 1939): we do not present persons, we hit upon them. As for Scheler as for Veber love is an emotion directed to a person itself, not to her qualities. For Veber love is an emotion directed to substance, not to accident directed emotion; Scheler quoted Goethe's words that he loved Lilly too much to be capable to observe her. The similarities are also between the hierarchies of the value: hedonistic at the bottom, hagiotic, spiritual or religious at the top. When speaking about the value experiences, both Scheler and Veber use metaphors related to visual sensations and their objects (colors). They both speak about reality as an obstacle. They both ascribe the moving, driving force to drives <Triebe>, not to intentional or spiritual experiences. However, there are also important differences. Most important: Scheler's hegelian monistic spinozism from *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (one substance with two aspects, physical and psychical, and God in the process of becoming through man) is very far from Veber who developed from Meinongian to Christian view closer to Brentano and scholasticism. Veber was always a dualist, Scheler more a panteist, as Maks Robič remarked already in 1930, when he observed that Veber's philosophical anthropology from *Philosophy* was work in trend, mentioning Scheler, who was like Veber a metaphysician, and a "positivist" Plessner (Cf. Žalec, 2000: 256).

Conclusion

Through his philosophically active life Veber was in a close touch with the contemporary European thought (the one dominating foremost Austrian and German area). He started by Meinong, but the braid of his intuition and his investigations lead him gradually away from Meinong's philosophy. Objectives and phenomena are not primary; substances and subjects are primary. From Meinong to philosophy similar to Brentano, Scheler and (neo)scholasticism. Veber's philosophy can be observed as vindication of a kind of scholasticism by the way of modern (at that time) philosophical psy-

⁷ Ošljaj (2000) considered some similarities between Veber's ideas from *Philosophy* (1930) and Scheler's *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, but his essay is limited only to the two above mentioned books, so the problem of the hitting upon reality was not considered.

chology and philosophy grounded on it: objectivism and realism; stressing the sensuous, empirical, posterior nature of our knowledge; ontology of substances occupying the leading place; ways to God (where the doctrine about act and contingency played an important role). Veber's philosophy is another way to truths of scholastics. Veber adopted many ideas of several different thinkers, but he always incorporated them in his own research. He fitted up several ideas, but the whole was original, not only a copy of some philosophy. He was philosophically creative enough to do that. That is why we cannot just say for his way and work: This is in essence just Meinong, or Scheler, or Brentano, or (neo)scholastics ... He was always in a trend but enough autonomous and of own capacity to develop his original way. Because of the last two of his attributes his acquaintance with and his being a part of trends was positive. Autonomy in heteronomy, that was Veber and that was his philosophy. Is there any difference between the two?

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