26
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
GOOD SPORTSPERSON – GOOD HUMAN
BEING
DOBER ŠPORTNIK – DOBER ČLOVEK
Milan Hosta
Abstract
“What is the nature of the good human being?” is a question
asked time and again since Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In the
human quest for flourishing as a good human being, according
to MacIntyre, man has to fulfill two basic conditions: the ability
of rational reasoning and the awareness of dependency on
other people. The good cannot be achieved without the
pursuit of and harmonizing with the good of the social and
cultural environment only within which one can flourish.
A good human being is one who benefits her or himself and
others. This is a matter not only of being good in any given role
one has, for judgments we make about that role are always
judgments about human flourishing as a whole. 
When we apply this thesis to the field of sport we can say that
a good sportsperson is the individual who satisfies the concept
of the good human being. This can be realized when the role
of the sportsperson is seen as only one of the roles the person
has in life as a human being. Being a good sportsperson not
only involves good skills, which does not necessarily show a
good personality, but is also seen under a broader
understanding of human flourishing qua good human being. 
While focusing on the virtues and the rational dependency of
man, the paper includes a consideration of the sportsperson
as an individual, sport as an institution and society as the
environment in which all participants, regardless of their role
in sport, have to communicate and co-operate. This is the
paradigm that allows the sportsperson to flourish as a good
human being, and the social foundation for people to flourish
in all their beauty and magnificence.
Key words: philosophy, ethics, good, society, sportsperson, well-
being, relationships
Contact address: 
University of Ljubljana 
Faculty of Sport
Gortanova 22
SI – 1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
Tel.: +386 1 5207741
Fax.: +386 1 5207730
E-mail: Milan.Hosta@sp.uni-lj.si
Izvleček
Racionalni evdajmonizem utemeljen z Aristotelovo Niko-
mahovo etiko vedno znova budi vprašanja po človekovi naravi
dobrega. V želji, da bi človek uspeval v vsem svojem sijaju kot
dobro človeško bitje mora po MacIntyre-jevi teoriji izpolnjevati
dva temeljna pogoja; sposoben mora biti samostojnega
kritičnega presojanja, hkrati pa se mora zavedati odvisnosti od
drugih. Tako človek v iskanju dobrega  vedno svoje dobro na
nek način uskladi z dobrim družbenega oz. kulturnega okolja
v katerem uspeva. 
V športu to pomeni, da dober športnik ni samo tehnično ali
taktično športno odličen, temveč je tudi moralno zrela
osebnost. Tako svojo vlogo v športnem okolju utemelji znotraj
širšega oz. vseobsegajočega lastnega življenjskega konteksta.
Na ta način dobrega športnika opredeljujemo hkrati po
njegovi športni vlogi in vlogi človeka, ki uspeva kot dobro
človeško bitje. Tak športnik pa se vedno zaveda tudi svojega
poslanstva in zgleda, ki ga daje mladim. 
Z osredotočenostjo na vrline, samostojnost in hkratno
soodvisnost človeka, v razpravi zajamemo športnika kot
posameznika, šport kot inštitucijo in družbo v širšem pomenu.
Tako pokažemo, da morajo vsi udeleženi, ne glede na vlogo
v športu sodelovati in komunicirati, da uskladijo svoje dobro s
širšim, splošnim dobrim. To je edini način, da športnik uspeva
kot dober človek in to je hkrati tudi temelj, da družba nudi
okolje v katerem človek sploh lahko uspeva v vsej svoji lepoti. 
Ključne besede: filozofija, etika, dobro, družba, športnik, bla-
ginja, odnosi
(Received: 10. 10. 2002 – Accepted: 10. 12. 2002)

27
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
Modern man is strongly aware that overall ethical
renaissance is unavoidable to survive. The post-
modern thought that anything goes is driving us
towards the opposite, yet we strive for the basic
universal ethical principles to live by. More than
metaphysical or theological ethical systems that
postulate the existence of God, we nowadays trust
in social conventions that, on the basis of agre-
ement, constitute ethical norms and sanctions. This
paradigm easily leads to moral cultural relativism,
and as such the agreements fail or cannot
effectively reach the private dimensions. And on
the individual level, emphasis is placed on human
moral consciousness and personal responsibility,
requiring morally and rationally mature individuals.
Sport can be seen as a cultural category, reaching
both the private and public spheres. In other words
– sport is a matter of an individual and a society
and for this fact it is a part of the big picture of
humanity. Being conscious of oneself and others
one has to accept some norms and find those
highest moral values or duties which give direction
to every action we take
1
. By participating in sport
one explores its own nature, body and mind,
interferes with other individuals, society and nature,
and in doing so one transforms the things and
relations around oneself. By taking the res-
ponsibility of transformation, we have to take the
responsibility for its consequences, too. It is very
rarely (if not impossible) that the sportsperson is
the only one involved in the transformation. As we
are rational beings we have to be aware of the
unintended consequences of our actions.
We will try to show that there exists a paradigm that
can embrace both individual and social dimensions
and lead toward an environment enabling human
beings to flourish qua good human beings. Our
focus is on substantiation of virtue ethics, and on
showing that the role of a sportsman is one of the
roles human being has in living the life of eudai-
monia
2
. Therefore, we will not consider the internal
moral norm systems of sport that have been dealt
with by many contemporary works of sport ethics.
However, if we succeed in substantiating the ideas
of eudaimonia (both individual and social), then we
can claim that the internal logic of sport is not
independent of the social well-being and that it has
to follow the virtues and aims of the society. 
Besides the critical examination of concepts, it is
important to examine arguments, to see if they are
good or bad. For if we want to solve a problem, we
have to know which are the good arguments. And
at the end, is it not important that we know what
we ought to know or what we ought to do (Hare,
2001)?
1. Virtue ethics and eudaimonia
“What is the nature of the good human being?” is
a question asked time and again since Aristotle’s
virtue ethics. Eudaimonia is his answer, and if we
are true to ourselves we can only agree. 
In the human quest for flourishing as a good human
being, according to MacIntyre
3
(1999), humans
have to fulfil two basic conditions: the ability of
rational reasoning and the awareness of
dependency on other people. In the search for our
final aim (eudaimonia) we need to develop an
understanding of our initial animality that is an
unavoidable part of our personality. Corporeality
(bodilyness) as a necessary and unavoidable form
of human life may provide us with basic impulses
to live by the natural animal principles. However,
MacIntyre’s point is that this is not sufficient in
order to flourish as a good human being. Through
rational reasoning
4
, which distinguishes us from
being mere animals, we become aware of our
mutual dependence as social beings. And if we
continue the understanding of ourselves, we can
follow MacIntyre’s thoughts and say that human
beings develop from the totally dependent phase
of frail infancy and childhood, through the
adolescent rebellion, into responsible rational adult
human being (or at least wishing to be). And from
the magnificent adult phase of independent
practical reasoner we return to more or less frail
and sickly phase of elderly. Confessing this, we
establish the importance of the early and late phase
of human life, infancy and elderly. Apparently,
according to psychologists, early phase is of high
importance in forming the personality charac-
1 Not every action is morally significant, therefore, what is meant here
is the world-outlook which every developed rational human being
should have. 
2 Eudaimonia: Greek word for the highest good; kind of rational striv-
ing according to perfect virtue, that lasts through the entire life (by
Gantar in Aristoteles, Nicomachean ethics, 1994); final purpose or aim
of the human being i.e. flourishing qua good human being.
3 MacIntyre Alasdair; neo-aristotelian moral philosopher.
4 Rational reasoning is understood here as reasoning with expression
in the form of language, while as animal science shows today human
beings are not the only rational animals.

28
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
teristics for the rest of the life
5
. Also the morality as
the highest personal and social disciplinization and
human articulation has roots in childhood. While,
speaking generally, bodily development is in the
domain of genetic and environmental influence,
intellectual development is more of a personal
inquiry and cultural impact; moral development
with the possession of virtues and lack of vices
(regardless of any body or mind qualities) is that by
which we judge human beings and give them the
prefix “good”. With not much risk we can claim that
the moral consciousness is the parameter of the
human development. Tall or small, ugly or beautiful,
smart or dumb, rich or poor, in order to flourish as
a good human being, and to be recognized as such
humans have to be morally successful. If this is
really so, then we can demonstrate that the state of
eudaimonia is relative to individual, or better said -
it is an inner state of harmonized living, and can be
reached, regardless of the non-moral values, by
following the pattern of moral virtues that are more
or less the same all over the world, and as such have
become socially universal.  
We will postulate rational reasoning as granted for
adult human beings and will focus on awareness of
dependency on other people, while, as seen later,
it is a key issue for the praxis of sport.
2. Obvious dependency
Let us state that the possession of virtues and the
lack of vices create a social environment in which
everyone would like to live. In fact the atmosphere
of such a society would stimulate the co-operation
and positive relationships between individuals. As
Bond remarks: “We are social creatures by nature,
living in mutual dependence, and we are better off
as co-operating and contributing members of a
community or communities, where friendliness,
willing mutual support, and good feeling prevail,
than we are as mere individuals, each isolated and
in competition with others for the goods of the
world,” (Bond, 1996, p. 127). Good social relations
are an essential part of the personal good (i.e.
eudaimonia) of each and every individual member.
Therefore it is in the interest of every responsible
rational human being to ensure that such com-
munities, according to Bond
6
, “come into being
and be sustained.”
Being rational we understand that in real life it is
impossible to possess only virtues and have no vice.
In fact, if this was possible we would lose or, more
precisely, overcome the dialectic with which we
recognize something to be virtue or vice. But this
does not mean that we cannot strive for the best
possible world we can create. In fact, from Aristotle
on, this is our final aim; it is our personal and social
good.
If we are to understand the all-embracing
7
mutual
dependency, we first need to recognize the basic
characteristics of the three phases in human deve-
lopment as individual. This is a general distinction
of developmental stages of individual that we use
in this context to describe the common charac-
teristics of different kinds of dependency. 
2.1. Dependent infancy and childhood
Human beings are mammals incapable of surviving
the early period of life on their own. The phase of
infancy and childhood is recognized as an impor-
tant socializing process that is necessary to survive
in any given community. Within this we can count
the basic instructions how to assure the safety of
living, how to satisfy the biological needs and how
to communicate with other members of the society
in the form of language. The development of
rational reasoning is also a necessary task in this
period, while it is a foundation of successful co-
operation and communication, which is necessary
to assure the personal and social well-being. 
In the phase of infancy and childhood, individuals
are highly dependent on adults and elderly, and are
more receivers then givers. In this relationship of
receiver and giver, the mere economic rules are not
appropriate. It is not simply about giving something
and then expecting to, sooner or later, directly
benefit from the input. This is a much more com-
plex relationship. When the giver is aware of the
role of the educator then (s)he gives in order to
5 When looking on the works of philosophers from this perspective,
we can support the MacIntyre’s claim that there is not enough focus
on the philosophy of the childhood or oldness.
6 Bond, E. J.: In his book Ethics and Human Well-being he expounded
the view called communalism. In short it is explained by Bond (p. 221)
as: “ ...no, we are not isolated and selfcontained individuals (although
we are separate), and yes, our attachments and our mutual dependency
are genuine and real, a part of a human nature,” and the commitment
through both aretaic and deontic morality to common good is justified. 
7 This approach leads further on to ecological theories, and is worth
keeping it in perspective while studying sport ethics.

29
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
benefit the receiver without further calculation. The
aim is to help the new member of the society to
develop in such a way, that they would contribute
later in the phase of rational independency, by
flourishing as a good human being, and that is the
pay-off to society, for there is no good society
without good individuals.
The individual in this phase has to learn about
goods in general and in particular from other
members of society to whom we first encounter as
teachers. Each of us, in order to develop our
abilities as independent reasoners, has to make the
transition from accepting what we are taught by the
earliest teachers to making our own independent
judgments about goods, and justify them rationally
(MacIntyre, 1999).
The role and function of a parent is important in this
phase. It is to bring the child to that point at which
it is educable by the various members of other
kinds of teachers. So the child develops indepen-
dency, and other members take part in educating
and providing the goods and environment needed
for their eudaimonia. Rule-following will often be
the way of such education (MacIntyre, 1999).
2.2. Rational concealing independency 
We, as adult rational reasoners, often forget the fact
that we are highly dependent on others for our
well-being. We are a part of the big picture of
humanity that is partly constitutive of an even
bigger picture of nature. If “body” is our personal
nature, “nature” is our common body. We may call
it a large network of relations, much of which we
are not aware. We will use MacIntyre’s thoughts to
describe this concealed dependency. Each
member of the society is disabled in some way and
degree and has its own peculiar talents and
possibilities. “Each therefore needs others to take
note of her or his particular condition. And this is
one of the points at which it is important to
remember that there is a scale of disability on which
we all find ourselves.” (MacIntyre, 1999 p. 73).
In different periods of our life we are differently
disabled. So, to overcome such disabilities we have
to be able to think of possible futures we are
expecting as taking judgments and actions in our
life. The only way in doing this is to encounter co-
operation and good relationships with other mem-
bers of the society and to reach some degree of
shared understanding and interests. Within this,
different sets of goods and consequentially dif-
ferent modes of well-being can be achieved, and it
is up to individual rationality, which way of reaching
eudaimonia one chooses. Common independent
reason leads us to the virtues we should posses and
vices we should avoid. 
From the independent reasoner assuming the role
of the educator
8
we expected to develop some
range of intellectual and moral virtues. Only then it
is possible to adequately care for and educate
others. The same virtues are used also to “ade-
quately protect ourselves and each other against
neglect, defective sympathies, stupidity, acquisi-
tiveness, and malice” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 98).
2.3. Dependent elderly
Not only then is the first phase of human existence
obviously dependent. Through the aging process,
we become again more or less dependent on
others in old age. We cannot provide the environ-
ment we need to flourish without help from others.
Physical and intellectual functions are in decline. In
fact, most old people die from disease, and are in
need of social and medical care. 
What matters is not only that they need help. It is
also expected from them who are no longer
children or disabled by age, to recognize in the old
what they are moving towards. And these reco-
gnitions need not be a source of fear. As MacIntyre
(1999, p. 146) elaborates “For such recognitions are
a condition of adequate awareness of both the
common needs and the common goods that are
served by networks of giving and receiving and by
the virtues, both of independence and of acknow-
ledge dependence. Yet that awareness cannot itself
be achieved without those same virtues.”
It may be that in the old age, we are more re-
ceivers than givers, living the “payback” time of
contri-buting to social eudaimonia through the
virtues expressed before. We are then receiv-
ing environ-mental feedback that contributes
personal eudaimonia even when sickly or in
any other way disabled by age. The energy that
8 We can say that every member of the society is in some way the
educator of others. Therefore, everyone should possess moral and
intellectual virtues. But for those taking the role of primary educators
(parents, teachers etc.) it should be self-understood that they are highly
aware of those virtues and the importance of the role they have.

30
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
was uncalcula-tedly given to contribute to com-
mon goods was not wasted or lost. It was trans-
formed in some way, and by the law of “what
goes around comes around”
9
we are sooner
or later, through the complex nets of relations,
again at the end of the receivers. 
There is one more thing that should be given a
thought. The old people should through their
experiences and rationality develop a thinking
pattern – a kind of wisdom – and possess specific
knowledge or a life doctrine of what is important to
maintain or to set the life of eudaimonia (personal
and social). In this respect they are still givers and
are contributing the important share of common
well-being. 
2.4. Acknowledge dependency 
The stages through which we must go in learning
to become practical independent reasoners and
the recognition of distinction between structures
that contribute and/or inhibit our individual and
communal life give us reason to acknowledge our
dependency. We therefore recognize that the good
for each cannot be achieved without the pursuit
and harmonization of the good of the social and
cultural environment.
To conclude the part of acknowledged obvious
dependency, we will again refer to MacIntyre
(1999) and his explanation of just generosity. This
virtue requires us to be uncalculating in this sense
that we can rely on no strict proportionality of
giving and receiving. There is no rule that assures
that we will benefit or receive from those whom we
give.
3. Playing and having different roles in
sport and eudaimonia 
Each sport practice is defined by prescribed rules,
and competitive sport has especially emphasized
this. The resultant institutionalization and standar-
dization of modern sport has lent itself to theories
of the autonomy of sport. However, we should see
sport also as situated in the wider network of values
in a given society.
The very essence of sport – agens movens – is in a
certain way physically active human being, and as
such, sport is just one amongst other human
activities. In this respect sport becomes one prac-
tice among many, and to be a sportsman is just one
of the short-term roles a person can choose. To
judge the good life we refer to individual and social
eudaimonia, and that is the main aim of this work.
Therefore we will explain the roles that a person
can play in sport in the context of virtue ethics. We
suggest that playing any role in sport is merely a
part of playing the main role of life – one and only
one. And we judge the well-being of a person by
all the roles played as one. 
3.1. Soft de-autonomization of sport
We suggest that sole reliance on the concept of
autonomy regarding ethics is misleading, and lends
sport false character. We argue that on this phi-
losophy (better – ideology) sport comes into con-
flict with its own inherent morality. As an alternative
we offer a soft de-autonomization
10
of the sports
world. 
The autonomy of sport is manifested in many ways.
It is obvious and logical that competitive sport
became highly institutionalized and standardized
activity. As rule governed, sport is in some way the
world of its own. When one enters the competitive
sport, one also enters the “game” of rules. These
are not only the rules of particular sport these are
the rules of sporting life. When the work-out is over,
the sporting life continues. The rest is not simply a
rest; it is a part of the training process. The food is
not just food; it is a part of energizing process. The
social activities are part of image management
process etc. Dedicated sportsperson can easily live
the life of sport only. The values of sport become
de facto the values of life, moral and non-moral. 
As W. Morgan (Breivik, 2000) suggests: “Studies of
the political and social reality of elite sport suggest
that sport is not autonomous institution and
therefore not a healthy organism. Sport is rather,
especially at elite level invaded and exploited by
other social institutions like market, business, media,
and also education and politics.”
9 Mutual reciprocity.
10 With the notion soft de-autonomization we support the autonomy
of sport as autotelic activity, but not solely as such.

31
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
It is easily to see that sport is the world of its own.
But to regard sport as only autotelic activity is
misleading. There is always also a motive from
outside that inspires us to enter the world of sport.
And what can that motive be?
Since we are rational beings, our final aim,
according to Plato is to reach the idea of highest
Good or as Aristotle would say, to live the life of
eudaimonia. Let us assume that this can always
serve as a motive (conscious or otherwise). When
we apply this thesis to the field of sport, we can say
that a good sportsperson is the individual who
satisfies the concept of the good human being. This
can be realized when the role of the sportsman is
seen as only one of the roles the person has in life
as a human being. And that, we think, is the core
of the thesis, why sport cannot be justified only
through its autonomy. Neither do we wish to justify
sport as an instrument for external values (to sport)
such as health, morality etc. which are questionable
arguments. We wish to offer an argument that is
based on individual that is striving towards long-
lasting overall well-being (i.e. eudaimonia), for there
is no argument we can think of that a rational
dependent human being can deny this.
3.2. Dependent young sportsperson
Since we referred to dependent infancy and child-
hood earlier, we will now focus on young sports-
person. It would have been interesting to explore
how and when the child’s play becomes sport, but
for this occasion let us agree that the young
sportsperson is the one who is involved either in
school physical education or in any other sport
institution as an active participant. 
In this stage the others play important part in
enabling us to move from a high level of depen-
dency to that of the independent sportsperson. To
the roles of those, we will refer as teachers and as
institutions later on. Let us focus now on the role of
youngsters.
To transfer into independent human beings, we
have to learn how to stand back in some measure
from our present desires. Since sport is rule-
governed activity one has to learn to reach the end
only within the permitted means. We can say the-
refore that the rules force us to act in accordance
with them and that our ends can be reached only
in rule-abiding way. That requires the ability of
rational reasoning while striving to fulfil our needs
and desires. This is only possible, if one develops
the ability to stand back, and consider through the
awareness of possible consequences what is the
best way to reach the desired end. So, in order to
win in sport we have to choose the way of winning.
And that is the moral decision that we have to learn
and cope with rationally in our early years. 
Reasoning with others is the second part of trans-
formation towards independency. In order to be-
come independent we have to, paradoxically, re-
cognize our dependency. What do we mean by
that? There is no sport without others and therefore
one also needs to observe the social community. It
is not hard to recognize the importance of respect
given to others involved in sport. While this is a
freely chosen activity, one can also freely choose
not to engage in sport, or to engage only so far as
one feels good. The decision will certainly be based
on the desire to contribute one’s eudaimonia and
if one cannot achieve that within the sporting
community, the decision will be not to participate.
And if there are no participants, no sports game is
possible. The young sportsperson needs to develop
knowledge or feeling to what extend his eudai-
monia is limited and compatible with other players’
eudaimonia. Regarding this the virtues of tempe-
rateness and empathy comes forth. Also the reco-
gnition of flourishing social environment as fun-
damental for individual well-being is crucial.
Therefore the respect for the game itself, as Butcher
and Schneider (2001) suggest, is important. Aiming
towards the good game can be understood as
harmonizing one’s desire through rational reason-
ing considering possible futures and others desires,
and at the same time taking respect towards
internal values of the activity itself. 
Thirdly, for the young sportsman to flourish it is
important to trust other participants on the field as
well as to those out of the field (i.e. coach, referee
or judge, parents, organizers etc.). Regarding trust,
honesty, justice and responsibility are the virtues in
question. Institutionalized competitive sport is a
continuous process that requires proper training
and attitude in order to achieve good game.
Responsibility is what youngsters learn when the
success of a team is dependent on each individual.
Commitment to practice is what is expected from
the one that enables it (coaches, club etc.).
Therefore responsibility to others is also in question.
Honesty and justice are fundamental for every

32
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
social community to flourish. While virtues in
question are not in focus here, we will leave this
open to some other discourse. 
In conclusion, in the stage of dependency the
young sportsman needs to recognize the mutual
dependency of his and others’ well-being. Respect
has to be shown to be one of internal goods of the
game. Trust, temperateness and responsibility are
the virtues (amongst others) one need to develop
while striving towards individual and social well-
being. 
3.3. Rational independent adult sportsman
Being a rational independent adult sportsman that
has gone through the described stage of young
dependency is only half way towards the aim – that
is to flourish qua good human being. Why only half
way, we ask ourselves? If we are to know how the
individual is to flourish, we need to recognize the
virtues one ought to possess. Even more, we need
to know how and in what way others are to live and
flourish. What are then the virtues of adults, adult
sportsmen?
First, we suggest, is the recognition of the sports
world as part of the World. By that we mean soft
de-autonomization of sport. The very essence of
sport – agens movens – is in a certain way phy-
sically active human being, and as such sport is just
one amongst other human activities. In this respect
sport becomes one practice among many, and to
be a sportsman is just one of the short-term roles
or activities a person can choose.  With soft de-
autonomization we argue that doing sport is not
taking a break from the life itself. It’s not only a
game. It is a game and we play it. And it is the way
we play it that shows our virtues as practical
reasoners. If we are able to play by the true ethos
of the game, then a good game is likely to occur,
and that should be our goal – to contribute to a
good game, unless of course some other external
motives are left to be satisfied, as it is with the elite
sport. Then we cannot talk about the soft de-
autonomization of sport but rather of instrumen-
talization and commercialization. 
Secondly, acknowledgement of dependence is the
key to independence. The sportsman has to realize
that the environment in which sport exists is a
product of social interactions combined with
political and economical interests. Sport as a social
phenomenon and competitive activity postulates
the presence of others. All sports games are
possible only with agreement of two or more
people. We depend on others. We make friend-
ships and high fives with people we do not know
anything about before playing sport games with or
against them. Their will to play is what is important
to us. We depend on sport facilities that one has to
build in order to satisfy the standardization of the
sports world. We need the requisites that we are
not able to produce ourselves. If we are involved in
sport competition or league system then the
institutions are working in our way. We could also
argue that much of a professional sport activity is
dependent on media support and so on. The
acknowledged social or communal dependency
brings mutual recognition of it. 
Thirdly, we emphasize that one ought to be able to
step back from its result achieving desires. Ma-
ximalization of all required skills and abilities is not
possible without the minimalization of some “less”
important things. Since sport is mostly concerned
with physical abilities, proper school education is
often on the second list. In this respect the awa-
reness of possible futures steps forward. Physical
abilities (body itself) are too fragile to build a career
solely on this foundation, but they who succeed are
giving us dreams and hope. Being unable to
distinguish between reality and fantasy, between
real expectations and utopia is a failure. In media
we mostly see the few that are successful and
nothing about the “fallen heroes” left alone, lost on
their way towards eudaimonia. We should
recognize that their failure is also the failure of a
community. The clear sign of failure in elite sport,
even in the cases of successful careers, are the
programmes of re-socialization, reintegration etc.
Reintegrate who? Re-socialize who? Re-humanize.
Is it that the true nature of elite sport is ethically
contestable? Maybe this is the symptom of post-
modern “anything goes” disease? Who is left, after
Nietzsche’s death of the God, to tell us what to do
and what is good? It is rational dependent human
being.
To conclude, we will borrow the words of Bond
(1996, p. 159) that points out the importance of
communal well-being: “If people (sportsman) were
to act strictly as individuals, each one pursuing his
or her own personal interests exclusively, forgetting
… social virtues …, the result would be unhappy
social atmosphere, full of adversarial competition,

33
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
which in the long run is of no benefit to anyone.” As
he adds that this is largely the today’s situation, we
ought to recognize the potentials that sport com-
petitions have in contributing to such atmosphere. 
3.4. The sport teacher 
When we speak about teachers, we mean all those
in sport that are involved in some kind of
knowledge or skill transfer onto others. This may be
the academically educated professionals, an elite
sportsman as a role model, parents and coaches or
a simple guy in the neighbourhood giving kids
some instructions etc. As it is described through
stages of becoming independent adult human
being and flourish as a good human being in
general, so it is with sport. To paraphrase MacIntyre
(1999, p. 77): others play an important part in
enabling us to move from sport infancy to that of
the independent sport practitioner. The child learns
through its experiences in order to satisfy its desires
– it must please adults. If the child is to become an
independent sport practitioner, “the adults have to
teach it that they are pleased not because it acts as
they expect but by acting so the child achieves what
is good and best, whether this pleases them or not.”
(MacIntyre, 1999 p. 84) Is it not this what we as
physical education teachers are preaching to the
kids? And is this not exactly what is sometimes lost
in the institutionalized competition based sport?
Here we could go on with the reflection on Kant’s
categorical imperative that the persons should
never be treated as mere means to the end, but let
this be the issue for another discourse. 
According to MacIntyre (1999, p. 89) “all teaching
requires some degree of care for the student qua
student as well as for the subject matter of the
teaching”. Therefore the distinction between
external and internal values of sport is important.
Fair Play as Respect for the Game (Butcher &
Schneider, 2001) is a great justification of internal
values of sport, and since sport itself is a
competitive practice, we must do what we can to
preserve the pursuit of internal goods and the
virtues that go with them. 
Virtues of the teachers are, of course, at least the
virtues that ought to be taught to enable the good
sport. The one we should emphasize here: trust.
McNamee (1998, p.150) is arguing that “what is
presumed is that the coach always acts in the
interest of the performer, and, indeed, of the sport”.
Based on this, parents trust coaches and children
follow the instructions they are given. With no trust
there is no co-operation, there is no fundamental
element of flourishing society. Teachers must be
aware of the power they have. They play a great
role (other members of the society are not to be
excluded here) in enabling such circumstances that
children can develop and flourish in their full
magnificence. They, especially, are the ones that
should not be calculating in giving, while children
should not feel like they owe
11
us something. The
relation of giving and receiving between a teacher
and a child should be unconditional, and the role
of institutions is to satisfy the needs of the teacher,
and so create the environment in which individuals,
regardless of their role, as well as society can
flourish.
We will conclude this part with the thought, (Bond,
1996 p. 127) which we think is a neat description
of a wisdom that the teacher should possess, and
what the children should take for granted as it is in
our nature: “we cannot achieve eudaimonia, the
fulfilment of our own individual natures, all on our
own, but only as participating members of a good
community. It is therefore in the interest of anyone
and everyone to ensure that such a community, with
its good social relations, so necessary for happiness,
come into being and be sustained.”
4. The role of sport institutions
To become an effective (good) practical reasoner
one cannot achieve this without being in some
measure a political reasoner. As MacIntyre (1999)
claims, to reason together about the common
good is to reason politically. When he tries to
describe the form of political society that is
necessary for a human flourishing, he suggests that
in such society it is taken for granted that every
member is in some way or degree disabled and
dependent on others. And how the needs of those
are met is not a special interest, but rather the
interest of the whole political society.
11 If they owe us something, it is their will to develop into a rational
human being that acknowledges its dependency on others, and to
contribute to social eudaimonia by focusing also on their own well-
being.

34
Hosta, M. (2002). Good sportsperson – good human being KinSI 8(2), 26–34
Because of the family’s lack of self-sufficiency
12
and the inability of the state to provide a political
framework informed by the just generosity
necessary to achieve the common goods of
network of giving and achieving, MacIntyre (1999)
is emphasizing the importance of the associations
and relationships that are intermediate between
nation – state and nuclear family. This framework
will serve us as a basis for sporting society. In this
respect we will refer to sports clubs and other forms
of associating interests in sport as intermediate
institutions that are playing an important role in
reaching the common good. 
Sport institutions are formed through the network
of receiving and giving. It is a form that enables
individual to recognize the importance of one’s
good as constitutive element of common good.
Ability to reason practically about the common
good is indispensable. We “treat someone else as
someone for whom we have a regard because of
what, one way or another, they contribute to our
shared education in becoming rational givers and
receivers …” (MacIntyre, 1999 p. 141). 
Sport institutions play a great role in the social life
of many people. The discussion of moral and
political significance of institutions is necessary, and
is compulsory in studying MacIntyre. But for the
purpose of this paper we are just giving the
orientation and concept he is offering. 
5. Conclusions
The substantiation of morality is successful only
then, when one feels the duty to act in proper way.
This is only possible, if we succeed to uncover that
the human being is a part of unavoidable con-
tinuous process or relation, from which there is no
way out. Only two choices are left: either one acts
according to the duty, or one becomes guilty
(Stres, 1999).
We tried to show, following MacIntyre’s theory of
mutual dependency of human beings, and the
duties that arise from the acknowledge depen-
dency
13
, that human being cannot flourish as a
good human being regardless of the circumstances
and the surrounding environment conditions. We
need to possess moral virtues that are necessary to
communicate and co-operate with others. To reach
the eudaimonia, social and individual, we have to
recognize that without one there is none. If the
morality is the maturity parameter of “rational
animal”, then we have no choice in being moral or
not. There is no escape from our human nature, no
escape from one’s consciousness. Can we at least
choose the level of being moral? Does this make
sense, since our final aim is eudaimonia? Can we
be moral only in some roles that we are given in
society, or do we have to be the best we can in
every act we do? Is this in our nature? If we talk
about virtues, we postulate vices. Does the
maximization of one not lead to declination of
other until it reaches the unavoidable turning point,
and we are better off always trying to keep the
balance somewhere in between? Is it not so in
sport, too? 
And finally, what is beyond morality, and how to
get there?
References
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12 MacIntyre: Dependent Rational Animals. (p. 134):  “Virtues of
acknowledged dependence cannot be achieved within the family, at
least so far as the family is conceived of as a distinct and separate social
unit.”
13 Especially in the stage of rational concealing dependency.