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Acceptance of immigrants by majority in Slovakia

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Abstract: One of the most important moments in modern Europe - fall of the Berlin Wall - took place as part of a great historical change, which affected migration flows all around the region. Since the year 1989, “flow” of people crossing Slovakia (Czechoslovakian) borders experienced literally a U-turn. While people had been mostly trying to get from totalitarian rule during the “communist era”, when the borders opened, (Czecho)Slovakia began to welcome back repatriates and foreigners coming to the country with business offers or seeking job opportunities.

After integration of Slovakia into the EU, the “flow” of migrants strengthened, while people coming to Slovakia were mostly migrants heading further to the West. The situation is changing now – still more and more migrants chose Slovakia as their country of destination. However, the Slovak society is not ready yet. Even governmental offices often do not provide proper help and sometimes are even themselves “the problem”.

Key words: immigration, Slovak society, acceptance, general public, government.

Introduction

In the times of the biggest movements of Europe's population, when analysts openly talk about a migrant/refugee crisis, our goal is to present the attitude of Slovakia's public towards immigrants. We will try to answer the following research questions:

1. Can we characterize the official state immigration/immigrants' integration policy of Slovakia as welcoming/open, or rather as closed towards immigrants?
2. Is the general public "immigrants-friendly", i.e. can it be seen as welcoming/open, or rather as closed?

To answer these questions, we will approach the issue from two different perspectives: Since, in democratic countries, government shall be a representation of public's opinion, the parts 2 and 3 of the paper will describe an official state immigration and immigrants' incorporation policy of the Slovak Republic and its effective implementation in practise. While the chapter "2. Statistics" will show the development of the immigration to Slovakia through statistics as a reflection of the country's immigration policy, the part "3. Acceptance by the government" will focus on the acceptance of immigrants by the Slovak government, i.e. what are the migrants' possibilities to access nationality (citizenship), labour market, education, long-term residence, and nationality, as well as how they are protected against discrimination. Thanks to the Migration Integration Policy Index III¹, we will compare particular parts of

¹ HUDDLESTON, Thomas; NIELSEN, Jan; CHAOIMH, Eadaoin Ni; WHITE, Emilie: *Migration Integration Policy Index III*, British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brusel 2011.

the immigration policy of Slovakia with those of policies of the other EU+² countries.

Slovakian public's attitude towards the immigrants will be described in the fourth part of this paper based on recent researches. The last part will describe the situation in the country after the recent events in the Mediterranean regions that raised awareness about the immigration issue in Europe.

Theoretical Approach

Taking into consideration the nature of the paper, our main methods used are to be: comparison and content analyses of secondary resources.

Based on the MIPEX^{3,4} index, an interactive tool, which “measures policies to integrate migrants in all EU Member States, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA”, we will provide description of the effective immigration/immigrants' integration policy of the Slovak Government, and compare its attitude towards immigrants with the other studied countries.

² The index compares 38 countries altogether: EU member states plus some more countries like Switzerland, Norway, Canada, or USA.

³ HUDDLESTON, Thomas; NIELSSEN, Jan; CHAOIMH, Eadaoin Ni; WHITE, Emilie: *Migration Integration Policy Index III*, British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brusel 2011.

⁴ Accessible on internet: <http://mipex.eu/slovakia> [01.07.2015].


In the chapter “4. Acceptance by the public”, we will work with two recent studies focused on the public’s attitude towards immigrants. First of them was focused on “cultural diversity and how it was perceived by grammar school students in Slovakia” and the second describing “experiences of migrants with violence in Slovakia”. These two researches shall provide us with an overview of the actual attitude of the general public towards immigration and immigrants. A method that will be used here: content analyses.

Statistics

Before we describe the situation regarding the acceptance of immigrants, it is necessary to provide figures that would help to picture the recent development of migration (with accent on immigration) from/to Slovakia.

Year of 1989, the year of the Velvet revolution in Czecho-Slovakia, was a milestone in migration for both of the countries to be: While people had been mostly trying to escape the totalitarian rule during the “communist era”, when the borders opened, (Czecho)Slovakia began to welcome back repatriates and foreigners coming to the country with business offers or seeking job opportunities. This can be viewed in the Table Nr. 1. As shown in the Table, this development took place very gradually after the first big wave of emigrants leaving the country towards the West.

Tab. Nr. 1: Cross-border migration of Slovakia (1950-2011)



Source: KÁČEROVÁ, Marcela; HORVÁTHOVÁ, Radka: International Migration of Slovakia – Demographic And Spatial Aspects. In: Slovak Statistics and Demography 2/2014. p. 34.

After accession of Slovakia to the European Union in 2004, the “flow” of migrants strengthened, while people coming to Slovakia were mostly migrants heading further to the West. As shown in the Table Nr. 2, this was also the year, when the country recorded the highest number of applications for asylum.

Tab. Nr. 2: Asylum and Subsidiary protection granted in Slovakia

Year	Number of applications for asylum	Asylum granted	Asylum not granted	Subsidiary protection granted /not granted	Stopped procedures	Citizenship granted
1993	96	1	0		25	0
1994	140	8	2		65	0
1995	359	0	7		190	0
1996	415	2	2		193	4
1997	645	9	4		539	14
1998	506	3	6		224	22
1999	1320	6	76		1034	2
2000	1556	1	23		1366	0
2001	8151	8	30		6154	11
2002	9743	0	09		8053	59
2003	10358	1	31		10656	42
2004	11395	5	592		11782	20

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2005	3549	5	27		2930	2
2006	2849		61		1940	5
2007	2642	4	177	82/646	1693	18
2008	909	2	16	66/273	457	4
2009	822	4	30	98/165	460	1
2010	541	5	80	57/101	361	3
2011	491	2	86	91/47	270	7
2012	732	2	34	104/153	383	0
2013	441	5	24	34/49	352	7
2014	331	4	97	99/41	163	12
2015	109		1	31/14	91	0
Altogether	58 100	51	865	662/1 489	49 381	233

Source: Štatistiky. Accessible on the internet: <http://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20> [15/08/2015].

These figures are especially in relation to the last part of this paper, in which we will assess current situation of the immigration issue in Slovakia.

According to the information provided by the International Organisation for Migration, the records from the following years show decrease of illegal and asylum based migration and threefold increase of legal migration. Even though the growth of foreigners in Slovakia was out of all EU member states the second highest in the years 2004-2008, the proportion of foreigners in the population remains low. Nowadays (2014), foreigners constitute 1,42 % of Slovakia's population (it was 5066 more persons than the year before). Altogether, there have been 76715 persons with residence permit living in Slovakia in 2014.⁵ The number of foreigners living in the country tripled since its accession to the EU in 2004. However, the proportion is still one of the lowest among the EU members.

Most of the foreigners living in Slovakia are citizens of the neighbouring countries, who are bond with the country by work, family and other social ties. Another significant minority is a group of citizens of South-East European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Serbia). Migrants from Vietnam, China, South Korea, and Thailand (once a dynamically developing group of immigrants) represent less than 8% of all the foreigners nowadays (about 6000 persons altogether). Two thirds of all foreigners are citizens of the EU member states (with the biggest group of Czechs). Out of the third countries' citizens (29171 persons, i.e. 0,5% of Slovakia's population), Ukrainians constitute the biggest group, followed by citizens from Serbia, Russia, Vietnam, China and South Korea).

⁵ Migrácia na Slovensku. Accessible on the internet: <<http://www.iom.sk/sk/migracia/migracia-na-slovensku>> [15.08. 2015].

In 2014, 1304 persons crossed Slovakia's state borders into the country illegally. Taking into account the current situation in Europe, it is expected a raise of this number in 2015. However, since the main streams of immigrant coming to Europe from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq in recent months, have taken routes via Hungary and Slovenia, there are no records on a significant increase of the number of illegal immigrants coming to Slovakia yet.⁶

Acceptance by the government

In order to provide a comprehensive overview regarding the issue of acceptance of the immigrants by majority in the country, we have to describe the government's attitude, as government is a representation of the majority originated in democratic elections. Thanks to the MIPEX III (i.e. Migration Integration Policy Index 2015)⁷, we can (and will) compare the situation in Slovakia with other countries. We will focus on the issues as following: access to nationality (citizenship), access to labour market, access to education, access to long-term residence, access to nationality, and protection against discrimination with emphasis on the first field.

Access to Nationality

Conditions for foreigners for nationality (citizenship) to be granted became harsher by passing the last addendum to the Citizenship bill. Waiting

⁶ Migrácia na Slovensku. Accessible on the internet: <<http://www.iom.sk/sk/migracia/migracia-na-slovensku>> [15.08. 2015].

⁷ A rating comparing countries in individual parts of their immigration policies based on 148 different indicators. Accessible on internet: <http://mipex.eu/slovakia> [01.07.2015].

periods for naturalization process to be started are one of the longest in the EU. Applicants have to also follow restrictive and to a large extent subjective conditions. For example, they do not know how well they have to be able verbally to communicate in Slovak, as there is no bill to provide a language standard for this matter and no office neither provide sample questions, nor organize language courses for free. Situation with the necessary knowledge about Slovakia is very similar. The assessment of the knowledge is provided by non-specialized officers, which gives them room for their subjective assessments. The whole procedure can take up to 24 months and is one of the most expensive ones in the EU (663,50 EUR).⁸

Slovak citizenship is automatically granted after birth to a child, whose at least one parent is a citizen of the Slovak Republic, or whose parents are without any citizenship, or whose parents are citizens of other country (countries) and, after birth, the child is automatically granted citizenship of none of them. The gained Slovak citizenship remains untouched even if it is found out later that the the parent-citizen of Slovakia was not his/her parent. If there is no other citizenship known, the Slovak citizenship is automatically granted also to a child born or found on territory of the Slovak Republic, whose parents are not known and if it is not proved that he/she is granted citizenship of any other country.

The Slovak citizenship can be granted to an applicant:

- who, before applying for citizenship, had continuously stayed – based on their permanent residence – on territory of Slovakia for at least eight years;
- who is blameless;
- who has never been expelled by a court;

⁸ HUDDLESTON, Thomas; NIELSSEN, Jan; CHAOIMH, Eadaoin Ni; WHITE, Emilie: Ref. 1, s. 174.

- against whom there is no prosecution pending;
- who has shown his/her knowledge of Slovak language in speaking and writing, as well as his/her general knowledge about Slovakia;
- who meets all his/her obligations towards the state (paying medical and social insurance, paying taxes...)⁹

In case when migrant is a spouse of a citizen of Slovakia, the citizenship application can be submitted after already five years of living in Slovakia, if there are no immigration restriction applied against him/her at the moment. Access to citizenship is eased in case of persons with a significant contribution in favour of Slovakia in economic, scientific, technical, cultural, social or sport fields. The easier access would apply also in case of persons who continuously stayed – based on their permanent residence – in Slovakia for three years before becoming 18 years old, or who continuously stayed in Slovakia for at least 10 years and have already been granted permanent residence.

However, even after being granted citizenship, new status of the new citizens remains very unstable. By Slovak offices, they can be considered (pronounced) as never naturalized, regardless for how many years they have been Slovak citizens, or if they will stay without citizenship. The naturalized citizen can at least keep their original citizenship.¹⁰

According to the index, in general, the best rating was given to Portugal, Sweden, and Belgium. On the tail of the ranking, there are Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia is on the last place.

⁹ *Predpis č. 40/1993 Z.z. Zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky. Ref. 22.*

¹⁰ HUDDLESTON, Thomas; NIELSSEN, Jan; CHAOIMH, Eadaoin Ni; WHITE, Emilie: Ref. 1, s. 174.

Access to labour market

According to the newest MIPEX 2015¹¹ ranking in access of immigrants to labour market, Slovakia is on 37th place out of 38 countries. Since the last MIPEX (III), no change in this field has been made. Therefore, access to labour market remains one of the biggest obstacles for immigrants living in Slovakia, especially for non-EU citizens, who are not granted the equal access, as it is a standard in many EU countries. Non-EU citizens are excluded from public sector, as well as from several regulated professions (unlike in almost all rated countries).

As non-EU qualifications are not being recognized by the Slovak authorities/employers, non-EU immigrants face significant problems while looking for jobs according to their skills. However, even education gained in Slovakia would not help them to public employment services, which are still restricted for non-EU citizens. Immigrants are restricted also in case of unemployment, maternity, disability, and housing benefits and non-EU citizen have to even leave Slovakia, if unemployed.

Access to education

There are neither integration strategies nor any support in Slovakia's schools, which would help immigrants' children to adapt to the new system and to catch up academically. Only children (of parents) with permanent residence can access full schooling and support for disadvantaged students. There are many children, who are excluded from the schooling system at all. There is a state support guaranteed to asylum seekers, but regular immigrant

¹¹ Labour Market Mobility. Accessible on internet: <http://mipex.eu/slovakia> [01.07.2015].

pupils are not protected by any measures. There is no financial or professional support for schools with newcomer pupils provided either.

Concerning multi-cultural education, this has been introduced in 2008 as a cross/curricular subject for all subjects. In order to implement this regulation, training on intercultural education for teachers has been introduced.

Slovak educational system does not take into consideration any new learning opportunities brought by immigration. Only EU citizens can take free lessons in their mother tongue, while non-EU citizens, none are granted. In general, immigrant pupils are put in disadvantaged schools together with low-educated mothers.¹²

Access to long-term residence

The process of granting permanent residence to immigrants is one of the most demanding and discretionary in Europe, MIPEX 2015 says. According to estimations, between two thirds and three quarters of non-EU citizens have lived more than 5 years (as required) in order to become permanent residents. Non-EU citizens must also to pass a “relatively restrictive and discretionary procedure” in order to become permanent residents. It is not possible to prepare properly for the language/integration conditions at renewal, as the authorities “exert wide discretion in implementing them”.¹³

Even being a permanent resident of Slovakia, one’s status is one of the most insecure of all assessed countries, as it still depends on discretionary

¹² Education. Accessible on internet: <<http://mipex.eu/slovakia>> [01.07.2015].

¹³ Permanent residence. Accessible on internet: <<http://mipex.eu/slovakia>> [01.07.2015].

decisions of the administration. Permanent residence can be withdrawn from the immigrant, who applies for a benefit in case of material distress. Another example is withdrawal after leaving the EU beyond 180 days without permission. In general, the procedure of granting the permanent residence is one of those lacking explicit rules, which gives discretion to the administration and means a risk of being abused. Temporary residents on tolerated stay are ineligible for permanent residence.

Protection against discrimination

In spite of existing anti-discrimination law, weak equality policies can be the cause behind the fact that “potential victims are poorly informed and supported to take even the first step in the long path to justice”.¹⁴ Slovakia has implemented significant changes in recent years in order to protect the population against discrimination. About one third of Slovakia’s population knows their rights as discrimination victims. However, low level of trust in police and justice system is the reason why immigrants, who only rarely naturalize, are less likely to report discrimination. In 2013, this phenomenon was an object of a research focused on “experience with violence of migrants in Slovakia”.¹⁵ The researchers paid significant attention to six main fields, where the violence is committed on immigrants: violence and hate conflict, violence at work, human trafficking, home violence, symbolic violence, and institutional violence. Their results confirmed the data from MIPEX 2015.

¹⁴ Anti-discrimination. Accessible on internet: <<http://mipex.eu/slovakia>> [01.07.2015].

¹⁵ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

Among the causes that led to the project, the researchers listed also lack of data. To illustrate the issue, they informed about their astonishing finding that "available police statistics did not show victims by nationality, but foreigners as perpetrators of crimes did recognize specifically". The authors of the research, basic documents of the Government on migration: the 2011 "Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Perspective until the year 2020" and the 2009 "Concept for integration of foreigners in the Slovak Republic". According to the authors, the conceptual framework of public policy sees migration "primarily as a security threat or a utilitarian tool in order to fulfill Slovakia's interests, not as a life situation of potential victims of violence and abuse". According to the current statistical overview, despite the upward trend in the number of residence permits granted between 2004 (22,108) and 2011 (66,191), Slovakia is the third last in the European Union in ratio of third country citizens in the population. Of all the member states of the European Union's position is drawn up on the basis of the share of third countries' nationals in the total population found itself in third place from the end (for Poland aa Bulgaria). In rating based on total number of migrants from third countries, Slovakia ended up even on the second last place (after Malta).¹⁶

Immigrants living in Slovakia in general do not see or experience support from state institutions. The researchers analyzed the question where immigrants look for help and support, if in need, and would bring results as following¹⁷:

¹⁶ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

¹⁷ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

How often do immigrants – forced labour victims – ask for institutional help:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Police	49,2	38,4	12,3
Doctor	20,9	52,7	26,4
Embassy	28,7	63,1	8,2
Aid organizations	64,1	31,7	4,2
Church	69,2	19,7	11,1

How often is adequate institutional help provided to forced labour victims, if they ask for it:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Police	53,8	34,5	11,7
Doctor	24,1	39,3	36,7
Embassy	31,8	51,2	16,9
Aid organizations	56,2	26,2	17,6
Church	69,7	17,3	13,0

How often do immigrants – home violence victims – ask for institutional help:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Police	45,1	42,6	12,3
Doctor	21,1	41,6	37,3
Embassy	31,6	55,3	13,1
Aid	43,8	42,1	14,1

organizations			
Church	56,3	35,8	7,9

How often is adequate institutional help provided to home violence victims, if they ask for it:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Police	56,3	36,1	7,6
Doctor	24,5	31,7	43,8
Embassy	24,5	53,4	23,1
Aid organizations	31,7	41,1	27,2
Church	56,3	32,7	11,0

As the figures show that immigrants trust doctors the most. Police for example is not an institution that would be asked for help or support very often. The lack of trust in police and other institution is caused by the fact, that even if the immigrants ask for help, they only rarely receive an adequate support or help. In general, immigrants trust NGOs (informal institutions) more than any formal institution, as it is shown in the following tables, using data for three most vulnerable groups of immigrants¹⁸.

¹⁸ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

How often is adequate help received from formal institutions:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Altogether	24,7	31,8	43,5
Ukraine	18,8	37,2	44,0
Vietnam	36,2	43,1	20,7
Thailand	35,4	56,9	7,7

How often is adequate help received from non-formal institutions:			
	Never	Sometimes	Often or regularly
Altogether	7,8	13,9	78,3
Ukraine	8,2	13,4	78,4
Vietnam	3,7	33,5	62,8
Thailand	15,6	42,8	41,6

Concerning specific problematic behavior of institutions, immigrants mentioned their experience with¹⁹:

1. Unwillingness to communicate in other than Slovak language, or to arrange translation
2. Refusal to help or to give advice
3. Refusal to communicate at all
4. Humiliation, making fun of

¹⁹ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

5. Intentional misleading or misinforming
6. Abuse of power
7. Asking for a bribe
8. Shouting
9. Threatening
10. Physical violence

Acceptance by the public

When a researcher wants to find out public's opinion on some issue, he/she shall try to get to the most sincere answers. In 2008²⁰, Slovak Center for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture decided to conduct a research addressing the most sincere respondents – pupils (of 8th or 9th grade, i.e. 13-14 years old). They had chosen the 955 respondents based on a principle of representation of the society according to their gender, size of their hometown and region. The researchers measured the overall attitude of the respondents to a cultural diversity in three dimensions:

1. Emotional (what feelings are awoken by cultural diversity);
2. Cognitive (up to what extent are the respondents in need of knowing minorities and migrants); and
3. Conative (up to what extent are young people willing to integrate with culturally different groups).

²⁰ Results of the research were published in 2009 in: GALLOVÁ KRIGLEROVÁ, Elena; KADLEČÍKOVÁ, Jana: Kultúrna rozmanitosť a jej vnímanie žiakmi základných škôl na Slovensku. Nadácia otvorenej spoločnosti – Open Society Foundation, Bratislava 2009

The results showed that, in general, 9-graders rather welcomed cultural diversity, than declined. It means that they are not a priori negatively set towards cultural difference and diversity, or they do not refuse it at least. The researchers pointed out an interesting finding that their attitude was not related to the fact whether there were any minorities or migrants living in their environment, or how often the respondents met them. A positive relation was found in cases when pupils had had an experience directly from their families, or among their friends. The way the pupils see minorities and migrants, is very much influenced by the fact whether they learn about them at schools. At schools, where topics as migration, ethnic minorities, human rights, cultural diversity, the pupils (more than 70 %) saw cultural diversity much more positively than the ones (about 60 %) from schools, where they do not pay attention to these topics. Even though, in general, knowledge of pupils about migrants and minorities is weak, most of them (more than 70 %) do not see as necessary to learn about them more.

In the conative dimension, when asked about willing to meet or even to stand up for members of culturally different groups, the most differentiating factor was gender, as more than 80 % of girls answered positively, while only little more than 54 % boys did. Again, the responses were influenced by having or not having learning about different cultures in the pupils' curriculum.

Apart from that, a general view of pupils toward migrants and minorities is influenced the most by their contact with the groups. The more they meet them (in their family, among friends...), the more tolerant towards cultural diversity they were and the more positive their responses in general were.

In relation to refugees, Slovakia's society is often influenced by prejudice and fears. Among pupils, one third stated that refugees impose danger to Slovakia. However, 70 % respondents said that refugees should be given a chance to start a new life in Slovakia. More than 76 % of 9-graders said

that refugees were people, who had to leave their country, because they were afraid that their life was in danger and that is why we must help them.

However, 45 % respondents said that refugees transmit diseases. Almost one quarter sees refugees positively, while 9,3 % negatively.²¹

When talking about the acceptance by the public in Slovakia, I shall come back to the already mentioned research focused on “experience with violence of migrants in Slovakia”.²² In general, it is not easy to declare an overall satisfaction of immigrants with that how accepted they are in Slovakia, as it can be also seen in the following table:

How much accepted do you feel to be in Slovakia? (in %)					
	1 Fully accepted	2	3	4	5 Not accepted at all
er Altogeth	30,2	26,2	28,0	8,9	6,8
and Eastern South- Eastern Europe	39,7	25,7	22,2	8,0	4,3
and Eastern South- Eastern Asia	15,7	15,8	39,9	12,7	15,9

²¹ GALLOVÁ KRIGLEROVÁ, Elena; KADLEČÍKOVÁ, Jana: Kultúrna rozmanitosť a jej vnímanie žiakmi základných škôl na Slovensku. Nadácia otvorenej spoločnosti – Open Society Foundation, Bratislava 2009

²² BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

Concerning their feelings about whether they have the same rights and duties as Slovak citizens, immigrants replied as following:

Can you say that you have the same rights and duties as Slovak citizens? (in %)		
	...rights	...duties
Yes	46,0	37,6
No	54,0	62,4

When analysing violence committed on migrants, we can distinguish between three main types of violence: physical hate attacks, verbal hate attacks, and hate threatening. The research²³ brought us the following results:

Physical hate attacks experienced by immigrants in Slovakia (in %)	
Groups of migrants according to their descent	Experience with the violence
Altogether	6,1
Eastern Europe	4,6
Eastern Asia	2,0
Muslim countries	9,9
African community	18,7

²³ BLAŽEK, Matej; ANDRÁŠOVÁ, Soňa; PAULENOVÁ, Nina: Skúsenosti migrantov a migrantiek na Slovensku s násilím. IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, Bratislava 2013.

Verbal hate attacks experienced by immigrants in Slovakia (in %)	
Groups of migrants according to their descent	Experience with the violence
Altogether	21,3
Eastern Europe	23,9
Eastern Asia	8,5
Muslim countries	27,1
African community	37,5
Men from Ukraine	36,6

Hate threatening experienced by immigrants in Slovakia (in %)	
Groups of migrants according to their descent	Experience with the violence
Altogether	8,2
Eastern Europe	8,5
Eastern Asia	4,1
Muslim countries	10,3
African community	14,6
Men from Ukraine	12,2

Immigrants coming to Slovakia are coming for work or other economic opportunities. They face violence caused by the majority, even though most of them (70 %) work. They are often threatened or simply ignored by the public. On the other hand, they often do not see it as violence (verbal attacks, threatening), as they compare their situation with the one they were experiencing back at home.

Recent events

Europe is facing a humanitarian crisis caused by failing of the European governments as well as the European Union effectively to approach the hundreds of thousands of migrants coming to their borders on boats or by foot. Some analysts would call it a migrants' crisis, but as most of the migrants are fleeing Syria and Eritrea, they shall be rather considered as refugees. Of course, their status should be confirmed during individual asylum process, but taking into account the percentage of Syrians and Eritreans among the migrants, they shall be called (and treated) more like refugees, so a "refugee crisis" would be more accurate for the current situation.

Position of Slovakia in the crisis is "to refuse and to ignore". When it has been decided in Brussels that all the EU member states should help Italy to redistribute 40,000 Syrian and Eritrean asylum seekers, Slovakia was one of the few countries, which refused the "quotas". According to them, Slovakia was about to arrange an asylum process to about 700 seekers. The government refused to accept any of them. Later, the Slovak government gained the international community's attention (and shame), when they decided to accept a couple of hundreds of Christian families from Syria. The following quota (based on the new numbers of migrants coming to Europe counted by hundreds of thousands) announced later by Brussels as obligatory, was refused by Slovakia as well.

Apart from that, a recent survey²⁴ showed that after unemployment (43,1 %) "problems with immigrants" were stated by 39,7 % respondents after

²⁴ *Prieskum: Najväčším problémom Slovenska je nezamestnanosť*. Accessible on internet: <<http://www.sme.sk/c/7936858/prieskum-najvacsim-problemom-slovenska-je-nezamestnanost.html>> [29.07.2015].

being asked, what are the biggest problems that Slovakia is facing at the moment.

Conclusion

Even though Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) had experienced decades of negative migration, when Slovaks were fleeing the country in order to start a new (free, better...) life abroad, current Slovak Government's and society's attitude is not accepting, not welcoming. The attitude of the government can be seen from the MIPEX ratings, where the country in almost all the fields remains on one of the last places for years. No significant changes are being done and foreigners coming to Slovakia are rather being harassed by the offices, instead of being welcomed and helped to start a new life. Asylums are almost never being granted and any status of immigrants in Slovakia is very fragile. Therefore, based on our research, we can answer the first research question by conclusion that the official state immigration/immigrants' integration policy of Slovakia is openly closed towards immigrants.

As there are only a small number of foreigners living in Slovakia, the majority does not know them and often does not see a necessity to know more about them. Even though young people (mostly from schools with inter-cultural education) are more willing to accept and welcome foreigners in the country, their neighbourhood or school, adults are able to point immigrants out as the second biggest problem of Slovakia. The second research question should therefore be answered negatively as well: the general public in Slovakia cannot be described as "immigrants-friendly", i.e. it is rather closed than welcoming/open. On top of that, the government is not even trying to change this situation.

Slovakia and Europe is standing on doorstep of a new era – the numbers of immigrants fleeing the war zones towards the Old Continent will

only rise – and it is essential for the Government to change its attitude, while there is a time to deal with the situation. On the other hand, it is an obligation of us – the researchers – to provide a possible alternative based on relevant research.

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**Ongoing differences and ongoing transfers? The Role
of Labour market conditions in pension entrances in East
and West Germany**

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Abstract: The German Reunification is an excellent touchstone to analyse the impact of the divergent labour markets on both sides of the Berlin Wall since capitalist pension law was simply transferred to the former socialist system.

In Germany old age incomes rest on individual wage biographies. Apart from individual biographic decisions, this makes individuals dependent from labour market conditions. The labour market conditions are shown to be a result of political decision making and self-perpetuating processes after Reunification.

The changes in power resources of different actors such as the unionists and the Treuhandanstalt had consequences that explain ongoing differences between both parts of Germany. The specific developments in East Germany created winners and losers.

Key words: Pension systems, labour market, West and East Germany.

Introduction: "Now grows together what belongs together"²⁵

Back in 1989, West German government solved monetary challenges in the pension scheme due to the Ageing of the German society, when a new challenge, the Reunification emerged. By chance, both decisions with far-reaching consequences were made at the same date (November, 9 1989): Thus, the passing of a bill with major implications for the pension system (*Rentenreformgesetz 1992*) coincided with the German Reunification.

Pension reforms included first a step by step increase of retirement age, second awards for a postponed and discounts for an earlier pension entrance as incentives for a longer stay in employment. Moreover, several options for early retirement were cancelled. Additionally, the pension reforms of 1992 improved the conditions for parental leave with a better recognition for child care.

The case of Germany is a textbook example for investigating the impacts of the adoption of welfare capitalist rules by a former socialist society. Keeping the institutional context constant allows for a close look on these conditions: Because labour market conditions hardly shape employment biographies, reasons for ongoing divergence in pension income may be explained by different labour market situations.

In the German system pension benefits are linked to developments on the labour market and the overall demographics. Expanding the West German welfare system to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has to be treated like an external shock: An already ageing society was confronted with a fundamental shift in its population and labour force.

²⁵ *Willy Brandt on November 9, 1989.*

In this contribution it will be asked which distributional effect on pension income can be ascribed to the political responses to the German Reunification and the subsequent changes to the German labour market. The empirical analysis focuses on the distinct impact of the Reunification process on different cohorts and patterns of gender inequalities.

“Die Wende”: Simple Adoption as Transformation process

Political transformation and “Blühende Landschaften”

Political transformation in the GDR started back in 1989 with peaceful revolution and subsequent free elections in March 1990. Negotiations between political leaders of the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as well as of the four world leading and NATO powers Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France resulted in the *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany* (so-called two-plus-four Treaty).

On May 1990 the German Reunification was fixed in an agreement on monetary, economic, and social union. Since the inception of the agreement the five states (Länder) of the GDR joined the FRG. The Agreement included the adoption of financial policy, social market economy, social security system, labour, and industrial law with e.g. collective bargaining. One of the most far reaching decisions was the one-to-one exchange of Ostmark to the Deutsche Mark.

The Reunification was a relatively short era of legal transfer that brought the western institutions to the east. Sharing the same institutions and after implementing the same instruments expectations that East Germany reaches the same outcomes emerged. People anticipated at least convergence meant as asymmetric adjustments of the east towards the west. As “blossoming landscapes” (*Blühende Landschaften*) Chancellor

Helmut Kohl described his vision of economic prosperity in the East German states. Proclaimed already in 1990, “Blühende Landschaften” reflects a clear and high goal.

In contrast to other post-communist transformation countries, the GDR was “immediately able to import sound institutions, including political, legal, monetary, banking, and industrial relations systems from its more developed partner” (Burda/Hunt 2001: 2). Optimistic views attended the legal, economic, social, and cultural predominance of the “Western Scheme”. Eastern Germany had profits from the “largesse, labour market, and expertise of a rich neighbour sharing the culture, and language” (Burda/Hunt 2001: 2), subsequently the transformation in East Germany is much different from other post-communist transformation histories.

Even though, the complete adoption of East German people in the western system of social security was a new challenge: To the already faced internal institutional change regarding the greying of society in a pay-as-you-go system the external shock of Reunification must be added. But still, the solution simply was to remain on the path and to pass the bill on the major pension reforms without any changes. The main reason for not re-thinking the pension’s reform was the consensual and strong believe in the performance capabilities of the western national insurance system. Employment rose these years after a period of stagnation; surpluses in the social security system promoted this point of view (Ruser 2011: 134).

In general, east German people were included in the national pension system without having paid any contributions to the scheme:²⁶ Already retired persons benefited from an exchange rate of one-to-one plus

²⁶ Frommert and Himmelreicher specify the amount to 3,8 Million people (Frommert/Himmelreicher 2010: 1).

a pension increase of 30 percent (Ruland 2012: 482).²⁷ Transitional regulations guaranteed the requirements for persons close to retirement with a pension level at least as high as expected including entitlements of special and additional pension insurances up to a maximum limit.²⁸ However, generous transitional arrangements did not apply for younger cohorts.

Reunification related additional expenditures regarding the pension system were paid from pension reserve and financed by an increase in social security contributions instead of tax based funding (Kerschbaumer 2011: 110).

German Pension System

The pension systems consist of three pillars. In Germany, the first pillar is the most essential one. The mandatory national pay-as-you-go system includes the largest part of the German labour force.²⁹ The second pillar, occupational pensions have also a long tradition in the German pension system, but they are far less relevant with regard to pension payments. Voluntary, private pensions have been the smallest pillar. The

²⁷ The rise was needed to achieve a net pension level of 70 percent. In 1989, the mean pension income in the GDR was 426,88 Ostmark what was less than 50 percent of net wages in the same year and compared to western standards low (Schmähl 2007: 551).

²⁸ The GDR had a unity social security system that in 1989 included 90 percent of the population (Frerich/Frey 1993: 271). But, and in contrary to popular opinion, the socialist system was more diverse and provided privileges for selected social groups and professions (Schmidt 2004).

²⁹ Only civil servants, self-employed, and some small professions are excluded.

importance of such pension schemes has only increased as a result of pension reforms of the early 2000s when the German Government implemented strong incentives for private pension provisions by paying subsidies for such plans. Nevertheless, the German pension architecture remains state-centred and dominated by the first pillar. Path dependencies apply especially for pension policies. The reason is long-term durability, investment security, and life planning dimension for pension plans and retirement.

The following results focus on the German national pension insurance (*Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung*). It covers over 80% of the employed population and approximately 90% of Germans are getting some pension income from the German national insurance (Bäcker et al. 2010).³⁰

The greying of Germany's society worsens the relation of contributors and recipients in the pay-as-you-go system. The pension system's funding is based on employers and employees who are obliged to pay contributions to the scheme. These contributions are the primary source for running pension incomes. Despite of benefit entitlements gained individually less contributors and more recipients may jeopardize the current pension level and individual pension income.

Individual pension income depend on life time earnings, timing of entrance (with discounts for earlier and awards for postponed entrance), general pension level, and actual value of pension (set by government

³⁰ The empirical basis is administrative data provided by the German National pension insurance and the Federal Employment Agency. Crucial data constraints are the missing information on the household level and the limitation on old age pensions (no widower, orphans, and disability pensions).

following the development of incomes according to the act on pension adjustments (*Rentenanpassung* § 68 SGB VI).³¹

Pension entitlements in the national system in Germany are based on personal earning points (PEP) of the insured. In the defined-contribution system PEP and wages are linked. The higher the earnings, the higher will be the pension entitlement. However, additional weight is placed on the overall wage development: One PEP reflects the average earning of all insured in one year. Accordingly, the actual value of one PEP depends on the gross wage developments on the labour market.

Low paid or part-time jobs systematically lead to low pension entitlements. In contrast, long, steady contribution records result in higher cumulated PEPs. Periods of unemployment, parental leave or unpaid work – although compensated to a certain degree, in the long run end in below-average entitlements. Since unemployment is unequally distributed among German labour force and child care duties are most often fulfilled by women, disadvantages can be explained by specific social characteristics. Differences in the outcome of insurance biographies may be explained by individual biographical decisions, institutional regulations, or labour market conditions (Czepek forthcoming).

It has been repeatedly stated that the German pension system is organised upon the normative assumption of a standard workers biography (Mückenberger 1985). This assumption refers to the normative ideal of steady, full-time employment from a relatively early age (after the completion of one's education) until retirement. A delayed entry into the labour market (e.g. due to prolonged times of education or training),

³¹ Individual pension income from National Insurance System also rest on the type of pension: Some national pensions have no wage replacement function as old age pensions do have (e.g. orphans pensions).

periods of unemployment, part-time work or so-called *mini-jobs* (450-Euro-Jobs free of social security contributions) are translated not only in immediate economic disadvantages but also have negative effects on the PEP.

Economic and Labour Market Transition

A high rate of unemployment and a low GDP show the ongoing “economic bloodletting” of eastern German economy and the labour market still needs to recover from the “initial shock” (Burda/Hunt 2001: 1-2). More than 25 years after the fall of the wall the era of the introduction of market economy to a socialist regime is over. In post-transformation era the eastern countries became a “problem region” in Germany (Burda/Hunt 2001: 11). Therefore, instead of analysing the Reunification process, nowadays the focus is more on the later economic outcomes such as the dramatic slowdown of productivity or the underutilization of labour as another symptom of the “dysfunctional nature” of the eastern labour market (Burda/Hunt 2001: 3).

For many authors, the main reason for the bad performance of the eastern labour market in Germany is too high wages. After Reunification wages were a result of bargaining conducted by more experienced negotiating partners coming from the west. Aiming an adjustment to western level the wages rose quickly and high from one third to 75 percent of western standards in the middle of the 1990s (Burda/Hunt 2001: 9). Later, after an employer’s revolt in 1993 massive escapes from both sides (employer and employees) led to a stagnation of the eastern wage level.

The *Treuhandanstalt* is a key player in the economic transition process because the privatization and restructuring of state enterprises was its responsibility. Again, mainly economic elites from the west were part of the public trust. The primary task was to restructure and privatise

state enterprises. If priority should be given to restructure or to privatise was a matter of intensive discussions: Restructuring first means to make enterprises more attractive for buyers, but not to restructure under the conditions of competition and funded by the state. Prioritising privatisation in fact resulted in poor outcomes for the *Treuhandanstalt* since pre-existing debts diminished profits of selling off the former GDR enterprises (Praqué 2010: 45-47). Later, the *Treuhandanstalt* was transformed to the *Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben* to control the thousands of contracts regarding the “sell off” of eastern companies. Privatization was “rapid by transitions standards” (Burda/Hunt 2001: 5), even too fast other argue (Roland 2000).

As a result of rationalising and restructuring the state enterprise practiced massive lay-offs led to an enormous growth of unemployment and high amounts of people in job creating programs (*Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen*). The stagnating level of employment and insufficient economic growth did not compensate the surplus of workers. Long-term unemployed and young career starters were confronted with a locked labour market. A preference for monetary transfers instead of services i.e. on-the-job-training, further qualification against mismatches led to obsolete instead of improved human capital (Burda/Hunt 2001: 40). That lowered the chances for labour market integration of unemployed. Social inequality and wage structure converge to western standards (Steiner 2013: 183; Burda/Hunt 2001: 41-43).

Early exits for labour market adjustments were not new: Due to economic crises accompanied with high rates of unemployment – especially of the youth – an alliance of politicians, employers, employees, and unions was forged during the 1980s in West Germany. High legal protection of older worker led to so-called social plans combined with benefits for unemployed and for retirees (Teipen/Kohli 2004). Unsurprisingly, these options were extensively used for East German labour market transformation.

These findings already indicate an increased contradiction or even conflict between short-term political goals (e.g. to ease the pressure on the labour market) and the more long-term imperatives of an aging society. The massive labour market transformation in the eastern part of Germany and the subsequent pressure on the social system worsened the situation.

Demographics: Causes or Consequences?

The domestic migration already starts before Reunification: Thousands escaped from the GDR Regime. Afterwards, only in 1989 to 1991 more than one million people left the eastern states to go west (Burda/Hunt 2001: 5). But for the coming period after Reunification, it is likely that people first left the east to the west because of the promise of prosperity and the “Blühende Landschaften” having had a slow take-off. Today domestic migration is not only result but also the cause of the suffering economy.

Germany yield first successes due to higher rates of employment of the elderly and regarding extended working lives but challenges of an ageing society persist. The uncertain era of political, social, and economic change had a strong impact on reproductive behaviour. The delay of child births and the lack of younger people escaped to the west left a gap in the eastern society. Today birth rates are pretty similar between western and eastern women – even though the historical background and socialisation differs.

The Division of Labour among Gender in West and East Germany

Crompton (1999) states the division of labour among gender to vary across different societies and to change over time. Therefore, a society in a given time can be placed somewhere in the continuum between a male-breadwinner/female-carer model and a double-earner/double-carer model.

Since gender and family policies were quite different during the division of the country, pre- and post-reunification trajectories in the gender division of labour are of great interest: While in the former socialist GDR women's full-time employment was high, western women and men followed a more traditional and conservative division of labour with a male breadwinner and a home caring wife.

In East Germany war reparations to the Soviet union and escapes from the east to the west create a need for workers (Trappe et al. 2015: 232). Activating women for work was firstly institutionalised in 1949 in a granted right for own employment decisions. To push women to work the devaluation of home caring was implemented on a cultural as well as on a legal level with incentives for female employment and better perspectives for higher positions. But still, the division of labour focused on women carrying for children (Trappe et al. 2015). A double burden of work and motherhood in the East was the result. In the 1960s, family policies aimed to improve the compatibility of family and labour only for women. That included free state-funded child care, save re-entry on the former job, and reductions of working hours for mothers. There was no equality, but the female employment rates rose and women in the east still have a higher attachment to work.

In contrast, the economic miracle in the west after World War II allowed a male-breadwinner/female home-carer model. For expanding work force people from Italy, Turkey, and later from the south-east Europe

were enforced to come to Germany for work. Institutional regulations regarding the division of labour and gender issues were a result of conservative family policies: For example, until 1977 western wives legal obligation was housekeeping. Later, generous regulations allowed women relatively long maternity leaves and a return to a comparable but not similar job up to three years after child birth. Additionally, a lack of child care infrastructure led to long periods of labour market absence among western women. Later cohorts of western women re-enter into the labour market only as part-time workers and mini-jobber. Hank and Kreyenfeld (2000) found that the availability for child care is more important for female employment than the costs. Therefore, an ongoing lack of child care infrastructure hinders western women to work.

Rosenfeld et al. (2004) overall assess the gender equality to be greater in the East. Their findings indicate for convergence of a male breadwinner/female part-time worker in both parts of Germany: Western women tend to work more and eastern less. Eastern women have some voluntary as well as involuntary reductions in working hours (Wanger 2011). But these are served also by demand-sided constraints that hit women especially hard (Figure 1; Rosenfeld et al. 2004: 120) .

Results: Convergence, Divergence or divergent Convergence?


Labour Market Participation

Labour market participation is crucial for sufficient pension income. To investigate convergence or divergence between West and East Germany the following results focus on changes over time, regional, and gender differences.

Figure 1 clearly shows two levels of unemployment in West and East Germany: In 2014 the rate of unemployment is 6,7 percent in the west and 11 percent in the east.

After Reunification the rate raised quickly and high among eastern workers. Initially, eastern women were hit especially hard. But since 1995 the eastern men’s rate rose near to the eastern women’s rate that was 19 percent in 2001. The same year the western rates of unemployment were around 8 percent.

Figure 1: Unemployment – Rate of unemployment in West and East Germany by gender, 1991 to 2014, in percent



Note: The rate of unemployment rate is a yearly average of the dependent civilian labour force. Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, 2015.

A rapid decline of unemployment happened since 2005 parallel to a great labour market reform (so-called Hartz I to IV), initialised by the social democratic-greens coalition governed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The new third way policy was controversial and included the introduction and

support of new types of employment (Mini-/Midi-Jobs, fictional self-employment, all with low or without social security contributions), changes in the treatment of unemployment that involved new rigidities for recipients of unemployment benefits and mean-tested social benefits, and new procedures at the Federal Employment Agency. The scientific discussion is as controversial as the political one is: The discussion revolves around the lower rates of unemployment being the result of a successful implementation of the Hartz Reforms, the effect of economic growth or a simple testimony for measurement changes with unemployed people being excluded if they are participants of active labour market instruments introduced these days (Pilz 2009: 177-200). Recently, unemployment in the west is constant while the eastern rate is falling over the last years.

East German's higher rates of unemployment cause a lower level of employment (Table 1). Despite of this fact, in 2014 the labour market participation seems to be quite similar among men: Their employment rate is highest in the age group of 35 to 44 years and part-time work among men is marginal in both parts of the country. Lower working hours is only a little higher among western young men at career start.

In contrast to men, women tend to work to a higher extent in part-time: In 2014, in West and East Germany part-time work is quite common. However, western women still have higher rates of part-time work in all age groups: This is true for the period of family building and caring (25 to 44 years) and even later. In the female 45 to 54 age group 52 percent in the west and only 37 percent in the east work less than regular working hours per week. The reason for western women having a 15 percent higher rate of part-time work is that they re-enter into the labour market after child care only in part-time while eastern women prefer (or need) to work in full-time (Wanger 2011). Matysiak and Steinmetz point out that a lower magnitude of child and husband effects only partly adjust east women's behaviour: East Women face more difficulties to find a job after child birth, but higher husband's earnings increase their risk for labour market

inactivity (Matysiak/Steinmetz 2008: 338-339). Close to retirement female full-time employment is only 19 percent in the west and 27 percent in the east. In general, female employment in this age group is quite low. While around 60 percent of 55 to 64 year old men work in full- or part-time work in the west, with 51 percent the rate is significantly lower in the east as it is for women in both parts of Germany.

Table 1: Employment – Participation on the labour market by age groups, in West and East Germany in 2014, in percent

Age in years	Men				Women			
	Full-time		Part-time		Full-time		Part-time	
	est Germa ny	ast Germa ny	est Germa ny	ast Germa ny	est Germa ny	ast Germa ny	est Germa ny	ast Germa ny
under 15	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,3
15 to 24	6,6	2,8	7,9	3,0	0,0	4,7	3,3	9,4
25 to 34	2,0	9,8	7,6	5,2	0,8	5,6	4,1	2,9
35 to 44	6,2	2,2	3,2	1,2	6,3	1,6	9,1	0,0
45 to 54	2,7	0,9	1,8	,9	5,9	6,5	0,8	5,9
55 to 64	5,0	8,8	3,3	1,7	7,9	5,6	6,4	8,5
65 and older	0,9	0,6	7,9	5,2	0,3	0,2	4,9	2,7

Note: Share of employees in the population. Cross-sectional data.

Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, 2015.


The results are in line with the research on female employment behaviour after Reunification in Germany: The high unemployment rates persist even though the tendency in East Germany is more positive in the last few years. Convergence had ever been between western and eastern men, but currently there is some convergence among women, too. In general, two-earner households have risen already for years (Liebig et al. 2010). Considering the different cultural, social, and economic background this is surprising. In comparison to the past, western women favour part-time work instead of non-work in a male-breadwinner/female-home-carer-model. However, differences after child birth with western women re-entering in part-time and eastern women to prefer full-time work persist.

Wages

Wages are directly transferred into pension income. This makes the mean of wages an important indicator for the impact of ongoing differences between East and West Germany. Furthermore, the general pension level adjustments are based on wage development.

Figure 2 illuminates the development of wages in both parts of the country after Reunification. The dark lines on the first axis show the mean of employee's full-time gross wages. As figure 1 on unemployment, figure 2 reveals a two level scheme with a mean wage more than the double in west rather than in East Germany in 1991 (second axis). But eastern wages rose high and quickly as it was politically required. In 2014 the share of eastern mean wage is approximately 75 percent. With slide variations this is the case since wage adjustments came to a preliminary end in 1996.

Figure 2: Wages – Mean of employee's full-time gross wages by region, in Euro, 1991 to 2014



Source: Statistics of the Federal Statistical Office, 2015.

How can the increase and later stagnation of wages be explained?

Before Reunification, in 1989, the wage level in the eastern part of Germany was only one third of the western level. Political requirement was an adjustment on the living standard and subsequently in wages.

Western union stakeholders replaced eastern abandoned unionist. Their interests were not only driven by political interests towards eastern workers and memberships but they also protected the western workers against eastern worker's competition (Burda/Hunt 2001: 38). Under the external requirements of political legitimation western unionists had additional power to negotiate high wages in East Germany. Their strong position was supported by the weakness of the employer's representatives of yet unprivatised enterprises.

Even though, wage increases were the highest for low skilled workers, this group was threatened the most (Burda/Hunt 2001: 45). At least, higher wages require for higher unemployment benefits – one reason to negotiate higher wages in time of higher unemployment risks. Economist criticise the wages being so high because of reservation wages (Burda/Hunt 2001: 38). Contrary, defenders of the high wage policy argue that high wages were set against the massive escape of workers to the west (Bonin 2005: 148). Burda and Hunt explored that higher wages actually were a successful incentive to stay in the east (Burda/Hunt 2001: 38 and 61-62)

The bargaining system collapsed in 1993 (Burda/Hunt 2001: 37). High wages, subsequent high labour costs, low productivity, and improved job security regulations led to massive employer-sided escapes of the bargaining system (Bonin 2005: 148): At the beginning employers used the standard opting-out regulations only implemented for rare and dramatic cases (Burda/Hunt 2001: 50). Later, escapes of employers and employees being afraid of losing the job resulted in flexible and lower wages (Bonin 2005: 153). Although, the process of wage adjustments towards western standards is stopped, wage politics failed due to ongoing differences in unemployment rates (Bonin 2005: 154). As a response to western institutional transfer the ongoing differences in wage level are a consequence of specific decisions at and developments after Reunification era.

Pension Entitlements

The individual gained pension entitlements are reflected by the PEP as the individual position in wage structure. Comparing West and East Germany, the mean of PEP in the East among men is lower, but not among women (Table 2): Up to 1997 the male mean of PEP varies being sometimes higher or lower in the east than in the west. But in line with the

wage development, the pension entitlements decline in the east. This trend is true for West Germany, too, but weaker. East German men have the greatest losses: In 1993 the mean of PEP was 1,092 and 20 years later it is clearly less than one. In this group the disparity increased (Frommert/Himmelreicher 2010: 3).

Table 2: Pension Entitlements – Mean of PEP by gender, in West and East Germany 1993 to 2014

Year of Entrance	Men		Women	
	West Germany	East Germany	West Germany	East Germany
1993	1,09	1,02	0,693	0,73
1994	*	*	*	*
1995	1,09	1,03	0,723	0,88
1996	1,08	1,08	0,741	0,80
1997	1,03	1,02	0,694	0,88
1998	1,01	1,04	0,724	0,84
1999	1,08	1,07	0,755	0,70
2000	1,01	1,06	0,763	0,81
2001	1,08	1,01	0,772	0,85
2002	1,05	1,01	0,768	0,87
2003	1,00	1,02	0,771	0,81
2004	1,09	1,06	0,765	0,88
2005	1,09	1,05	0,753	0,85
2006	1,08	1,07	0,743	0,86
2007	1,07	1,00	0,735	0,87
2008	1,08	0,97	0,724	0,80
2009	1,00	0,98	0,740	0,83
2010	1,01	0,90	0,705	0,83
2011	1,00	0,93	0,696	0,77
2012	1,00	0,90	0,682	0,87
2013	0,99	0,93	0,674	0,87
2014**	1,05	0,87	0,950	0,75

Note: * Not Available. ** For better comparison a unique effect of an actual pension reform is excluded.

Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2010, 2015.

Note: * Not Available.

Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2010, 2014.

In contrast, women in the east have higher pension entitlements than their counterparts in the west. The differences are bigger than among men. Even though, western women's labour market participation grows, the mean of PEP decreases recently. Frommert and Himmelreicher (2010) found a rising spread in between this group, too. The weakening mean of PEPs of western women even enlarges the difference between both parts of the country. Own, individual pension income gain importance and female employment in West Germany rises too, but the unbalanced gender division of labour, part-time work, social unsecured low paid jobs, and gender inequality on the labour market in both parts of the country harm positive effects on pension income. Due to the lower pension entitlements of women, legal revisions for a better acknowledgement for child care compensate to less (Czepek forthcoming). Additionally, Frommert and Strauß's (2012) cohort analysis about western German women shows that a higher educational level and labour participation do not reduce the gender pension gap.

Reunification brought some special legal provisions for eastern people to compensate for the wage differences: There is a factor to convert the eastern PEPs to western level. The conversion factor always reflects the relation between the mean wage of West and East Germany. The revaluation creates a fictional income that is multiplied with the actual pension value. The actual pension value differs between both parts of

Germany, too. For the mean of earnings in each part of the country, eastern retirees currently benefit because the wage inequality is overcompensated (Frommert/Himmelreicher 2010: 2).

To approximate the information on the mean of gross pension income one can multiply the conversion factors with the pension payment amount (Appendix, Table 3). The result is only different for western and eastern men with a higher mean of gross pension income for male east Germans. Important is that east Germans overall depend more on national insurance outcomes because the second and third pillar of old-age provision is better distributed in the west (Bäcker et al. 2010: 464-465).

In general, simulations indicate for a high labour market dependency of pension incomes: Several scenarios estimating the pension entitlements of future cohorts of entering retirees depend on the prediction of developments on the East German labour market (Steiner 2013: 186): More or less pessimistic views cause different cumulated durations of unemployment and in order to institutional framework lower pension incomes. A disadvantageous labour market trend will lead to a sharp decline in pension entitlements. Whereas, an ongoing positive trend in unemployment rates gives rise to the assumption that these effects may attenuate even with continuing wage differences between West and East Germany.

Conclusions: Ongoing differences and ongoing transfers?

For the FRG the Reunification is about to secure the continuity of institutions (Pierson 2000). While for the GDR the transformation is a radical change in a critical juncture (Beyer 2006). Thelen and Streek characterise the process of dismantling and replacement of institutions as exhaustion (Streek/Thelen 2005: 9). According to DiMaggio and Powell three forms of institutional isomorphism can be distinguished to explain

institutional replacements: Coersive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. For them, institutional isomorphism in organisations is a product of competition for political power and institutional legitimacy rather than for economic efficiency (DiMaggio/Powell 1983: 150) and less efficient organisational forms do persist for political rather than economic reasons (DiMaggio/Powell 1983: 157). Coersive isomorphism is a change as a direct response to a governmental mandate as it happened after peaceful revolutions and the subsequent free elections in GDR in advance of the legal Reunification. Mimetic institutional isomorphism characterises the Reunification process later when East German institutions were based on the model of West Germany. The transfer of western institutions was on the political, social, economic, and even personnel level.

Partial reforms involve the risk of losses of complementarities (Roland 2000: 33) what is the case in East Germany: The pension reform was an adoption of the pension system under different conditions. The unbalanced pension entitlements of East Germans are institutionally compensated by the special legal provision of eastern PEP, although both parts share the same rules: However, the differences in labour market performance and the institutional framework linking employment biographies tight to pension entitlements lead to a shift of risks towards the insured. Later cohorts do not benefit from the generous regulations on transition to retirement during Reunification. But they have to take the risk of (long-term) unemployment and its consequences.

From political economy two perspectives on constraints of reforms are known: Positive political economic focussing on the clash of interest groups and the power balance to be recognised in wage bargaining process with the consequences of massive exists of employers and employees. Normative political economy is more interested in political decision making. The normative perspective deals with uncertainty and reversal costs. Both, uncertainty and reversal costs create path dependencies. Individual uncertainty is about the winners and loser of reforms. Aggregated uncertainty is economic-wide effects of a given reform. (Roland

2000: 31-32). Both theories are able to explain constraints in reforms in Germany:

Poor labour demand is recognized to be a major problem (Burda/Hunt 2001: 48). Snower and Merkl explain the low demand with the low qualification as a result of the transition process (2006: 376). Moreover, the amount of long-term unemployed and the aging of the eastern society show the absence of (young) skilled workers. The poor demand on labour was supported by subsidies for labour saving investments that caused rigidities, now resistant for change (Portes 1994: 1181). The transformation from socialist to social market economy created winners and loser. Justified by this fact, political decision makers tend to protect the losers of the transformation process (Portes 1994: 1181). But the level of social security and welfare had impacts on both central labour market outcomes: Supply and demand. For compensating losers, Roland argues, there must be financial resources, distinguishable winners and losers, and commitment of decision makers (Roland 2000: 32). Today's debates on financial transfers and the "problem region" East Germany show the loss of commitment and the potential run dry of financial support. But "as long as there are many unemployed in eastern Germany, the transfer problem and the problem of lagging GDP per capita will continue to haunt the region" (Burda/Hunt 2001: 11).

Originally, the revaluation of eastern PEPs was limited until the incomes are unified. Against the background of ongoing differences in central dimensions of pension income, the removal of special legal provisions and separated calculation of pensions as well as the shutdown of financial transfers must be set in a distant future.

Today one of the consequences of the incomplete transformation is valid again and it was recognized by Roesler already in 1994 (Roesler 1994: 512): "One of the consequences of not changing the transformation policy despite its poor results has been that the political forces of the far right have won influence in the west as well as in the east of Germany.

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Appendix

Table 1: Pension Income – Approximated mean of Gross Pension Income of National Insurance by gender, in West and East Germany 1993 to 2014

Year of Entrance	Men		Women	
	West Germany	East Germany	West Germany	East Germany
1993	915,84	846,40	373,12	502,09
1994	*	*	*	*
1995	941,64	929,22	436,24	615,90
1996	967,93	961,05	457,31	658,98
1997	967,93	1001,61	448,79	666,66
1998	966,86	1005,63	469,04	698,11
1999	968,99	1007,79	475,44	726,17
2000	975,54	1017,50	464,34	735,88
2001	972,65	1014,53	460,28	728,05
2002	973,54	1035,72	450,89	725,76
2003	949,32	1031,97	450,36	731,70
2004	914,17	1008,08	443,50	721,15
2005	894,62	992,98	432,04	724,46
2006	893,80	1001,56	449,63	734,99
2007	946,71	994,20	476,10	722,26
2008	951,50	994,91	493,90	735,70
2009	946,86	1084,99	509,76	742,13
2010	942,70	971,07	526,90	755,40
2011	956,54	960,64	536,67	754,55
2012	989,60	999,62	543,29	833,57
2013	1007,04	1013,82	557,02	870,89
2014	1082,04	1054,82	619,89	931,83

Note: * Not Available.

Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2010, 2015.

Intercultural relations between the Slovene national minority and the majority population in Italy after the independence of Slovenia

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Abstract: The socio-political changes which took place after the fall of the Berlin Wall had an effect on intercultural relations between the Slovene national minority and the majority population living in the Friuli Venezia Giulia region in Italy in terms of the increased prestige of Slovene culture and language in this area. An improved intercultural dialogue encouraged more members of the majority population to learn Slovene or enrol their children in the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian educational system. At the same time, the Slovene national minority is not at all well equipped for the integration of non-Slovene speakers and learners in its educational system as well as in the community itself.

Key words: Berlin Wall, education, Friuli Venezia Giulia, intercultural relations, Italy, Slovene national minority

Introduction

The central research question of this paper is how the main transformations concerning the intercultural relations between the Slovene national minority and the majority population living in the Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) region of Italy affected the Slovene national minority in terms of linguistic and cultural expression in the traditional Slovenophone settlement area following certain relevant socio-political changes as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to Boileau, Strassoldo & Sussi (1992: 12, 36–37) national minority groups such as the Slovene national minority in Italy can be defined as non-dominant minorities who live in an environment governed by the dominant majority (in this case, namely the Italian national majority). The authors argue that ethnic identity and language are both fundamental criteria which determine the power relations in a society or state. Intercultural relationships can be thus defined in terms of power between these dominant and non-dominant social groups. These groups recognize each other as different on the basis of their history, language and culture. They enjoy cultural autonomy based on the separate structure of organizations and institutions aiming to maintain their respective ethnic and linguistic communities. Minorities possess varying degrees of socio-political power and therefore also different possibilities of articulating and pursuing their collective interests in the processes of socio-political decision-making (Boileau & Sussi, 1981; Bufon, 2004; Nećak Lük 1998; Roter, 2005). This is a central issue in diversity management related to the public use of minority languages in addition to the official language in nationally, culturally and linguistically mixed or multicultural and multi-national environments consisting of several historically present national and linguistic groups such as the cross-border area between Italy and Slovenia.

The phase after the fall of the Berlin Wall was characterized by a transition from “conflict to harmony” of the Italo-Slovene cross-border and intercultural relations (Bufon & Minghi, 2000:119). The democratization and successful political and economic “story” of Slovenia (Bufon & Gosar,

2007: 165; Ramet, 1998) as well as its European integration contributed to a more relaxed socio-political atmosphere where minority rights are discussed within the frame of European and Italian national and local legal provisions (Vidau, 2013, 2015a). In addition, the communication between the Slovene national minority with its kin state of Slovenia is no longer seen as a way of changing political borders, but as a contribution in reducing their effects and implementing integration processes (Bufon & Gosar, 2007: 163). According to Rigo and Rahola (2007: 82), this regional redefinition included multilevel changes: border transformations on a regional level, domestic political factors which directly involved the Slovene minority condition on an internal level and the European Union's integration and enlargement process and cross-border cooperation policies on a broader European level.

The "normalization" of the Italian-Slovene cross-border relationship brought a more spontaneous intercultural coexistence with cooperation activities in different fields (science, education, trade, technology, etc.) and in many projects financed by the EU (e.g. INTERREG projects) and local authorities. O'Dowd (2002: 27-32) defines cross-border interaction as a "new symbolism of open borders and cooperative action" which may create a cross-border "we-feeling" or a sense of common identity as the restoration of cross-border links facilitates the (re)generation of social capital and trust. Favretto (2004: 169) talks of a "rediscovery of the Mitteleuropean legacy" in the 1990s with a revival of historical links and commonalities with ex-Habsburg countries and a new perception of Central European countries as inclusive in Europe. She argues that especially in Trieste, it represented a desire and aspiration to open a new chapter in the life of the city. Still, Bufon and Gosar (2007: 173) point to evidence of various limits, such as the lack of proper infrastructure (lack of transportation corridors and large urban centres) and institutional decision-making to support cross-border communication (i.e. a forum for cooperation between municipalities of the border area, other common social, economic, and cultural institutions, etc.). Nevertheless, if the micro-level is taken into consideration, a high number of ethnically mixed

marriages, widespread kinship networks on both sides of the border, everyday interethnic contacts, and daily migration for work, shopping, school, or informal socializing are characteristic of this cross-border area (Sedmak, Mikolič & Furlan, 2007: 204).

Bufon (1993: 235) underlines that the border population tend to maintain the traditional cultural and social links often rooted in the relatively stable period preceding the appearance of the border. The whole Upper Adriatic region is, according to the author (2002: 177), an area with rather stable geographical and demographic features and long-lasting spatial and social relations: while political borders moved considerably, people and their cultures did not. In the contemporary political framework this border represents a zone of contact more than a line of separation (Bufon 1993: 239). Still, this situation of contact can produce both conflict and coexistence, depending on the political function it assumes (Bufon 2002: 177).

The cross-border region between Italy and Slovenia can be considered an example of how European integration works after the collapse of the bipolar system and a “real laboratory of studying contemporary geo-political transformations” (Bufon & Minghi, 2000: 119). Bufon and Gosar (2007: 161) highlight that Europe is facing the challenge of integrating the many nation-states interests into one operational system which is not an easy task as Europe is still the homeland of nationalism and the continent where political borders and diverse territorial and cultural identities are interrelated.

This area also provides an interesting illustration of some apparently paradoxical processes. Firstly, Bufon and Minghi (2000: 119) argue that the greater the conflict created by the political partition of a previous homogeneous administrative, cultural and economic region, the greater the opportunities for such a divided area to develop into an integrated cross-border region in the longer run. Moreover, cross-border cooperation and integration challenged the established practices between

the different local ethnic groups which had previously lived quite separately (Bufon, 2002: 178). New forms of micro-nationalism and other conservative attitudes of “self-preservation” may come up as a reaction to a more intensive communication between them (Bufon, 2002: 178).

Methodology

The question of how the above mentioned socio-political transformations after the fall of the Berlin Wall affected the Slovene national minority in the FVG region regarding the use of the Slovene language in the regional school system and among the majority population will be argued using two socio-linguistic indicators: the changes in the ethnic and linguistic background of youth attending kindergartens and schools with Slovene as the medium of instruction (Slovene medium schools) and the bilingual kindergarten and school with Slovene and Italian as the medium of instruction (bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergarten and school) and data regarding the Slovene linguistic courses for adults in the FVG region. Both of these show an increased prestige in the Slovene language among the majority population compared to the past. Moreover, relevant and still unresolved sociological features regarding how to improve a minority friendly environment in the Slovene speaking area in the FVG region will be illustrated, such as the perceptions of discrimination and inequality of Slovene language and culture in the public dimension as well as the challenge of teaching Slovene language in schools with Italian as medium of instruction (Italian medium schools).

The paper is based on an analyses of the relevant scientific literature regarding the above mentioned themes. Particular attention is dedicated to the most recent empirical studies. These studies were done mainly in the Slovene related environments in the FVG region, such as Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools or organisations offering Slovene language courses for adults, or among

individuals belonging to the Slovene national community. Some of these studies include a comparison with the Italian national community living in Slovenia and Croatia. On the contrary, there are few studies on the theme of intercultural relations between minority and majority communities in the FVG region conducted among the majority population or Italian medium schools. Thus, the paper will focus mainly on the case study of the Slovene national minority and its point of view.

The Slovene national minority in the Friuli Venezia Giulia region

The Slovene national community in Italy is a border-area national minority in the traditional sense of the term. Its traditional settlement area in the Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) region covers a total of 39 municipalities along the border with Slovenia (Bogatec, 2004). From a formal aspect, according to the list of municipalities drawn up on the basis of the Norms Concerning the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority in Region Friuli Venezia Giulia (Law 38/2001), the presence of this community is documented in a more narrow territory of 32 municipalities in the provinces of Gorizia (Gorica), Trieste (Trst) and Udine (Videm or Viden) in the areas of Benecia (Benečija), Resia (Rezija) and Val Canale (Kanalska dolina).

Slovenes in the provinces of Trieste (Trst), Gorizia (Gorica) and Udine (Videm) have established a thriving network of activities, institutions and associations which focus mainly on cultural and sports activities in the framework of professional institutions or in grassroots associations, parishes and other centres (Kosic, Medeot & Vidau, 2013). Slovene medium kindergartens and schools have been set up in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) and a bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergarten and school centre in S. Pietro al Natisone (Špeter) in the province of Udine (Videm). Media communication in Slovene takes place at the level of public radio and television within the regional

headquarters of Italy's national public broadcasting company RAI and through various forms of print and online media. The Slovene language can be used in the local administration in official documents as well as in place names and road signs in the legally defined area. The Slovene national community also has its political representatives elected to various administrative and political bodies, such as the Italian Senate, the Regional Council of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and other provincial and municipal bodies. There are various legal provisions regulating the minority rights of this community deriving from the post-war international agreements and recent Italian laws. Among these, the most relevant is Law 38/2001 regarding the protection of the Slovene linguistic minority which regulates the different areas of interest related to the public use of the Slovene language and the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian educational system in Italy.

Members of the Slovene national minority in Italy speak both standard Slovene, which is the state and official language in the Republic of Slovenia, as well as its various local dialects or variants (Janežič, 2004; Sussi, 1998). Moreover, they are all fluent in standard Italian and/or its local dialects. In the province of Udine (Videm) there are also examples of individuals who only speak a local Slovene dialect, but due to the lack of educational opportunity in the Slovene language, are not familiar with standard Slovene. They have since been given this opportunity through the establishment of a bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergarten and school centre in San Pietro al Natisone (Špeter) which first operated as a private school, but was subsequently incorporated into the state educational system.

Unfortunately, there are no current estimates regarding the number of members of the Slovene minority in Italy in the twenty-first century. According to the most recent population estimate from 2002, Italy is home to 95,000 members of the Slovene minority, a total of 100,000 speakers of Slovene and a total of 183,000 people who understand the language (Bogatec, 2004). There are considerable differences between the population estimates from the 1970s and the 1990s, according to which

members of the Slovene minority number between 46,882 and 96,000 (Sussi, 1998).

The history of Slovenes now living in Italy is closely tied to the history of the entire Slovene nation and to the history of the Slavic tribes who had settled in this area in the sixth century. The beginnings of a national formation can be traced back to the sixteenth century, to the period of the Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation which marked the consolidation of the Slovene language (Sussi 1998). Slovene national identity in the modern linguistic, social and political sense began developing, for the most part, in the nineteenth century during the period of European movements for the establishment of modern nations and nation states. At that time, the first Slovene reading clubs, societies, and political organizations were formed within the Austrian Empire in Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica). For a short period of time between 1797 and 1866, the regions of Benecia (Benečija) and Resia (Rezija) were joined together with the rest of the Slovene settlement territory under the Habsburg Monarchy, but after that they were annexed to Italy.

The Slovene settlement area of Trieste (Trst), Gorizia (Gorica) and Val Canale (Kanalska dolina) was severely affected by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, which denoted a transition to Italian rule. This shift was followed by a period of forced assimilation which reached its peak during the Fascist period. What followed were various forms of violence launched against institutions, associations and representatives of the Slovene minority and other citizens of Slovene nationality (Stranj, 1992; Sussi, 1998). As a result, Slovenes had already begun developing forms of an illegal anti-Fascist resistance movement by the mid-1920s. From 1941 onwards, this movement found its outlet in the Liberation Front of the Slovene Nation under the auspices of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, an anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist resistance movement. During the post-war period, the Slovene settlement area bordering Italy was divided into several political units. Benecia and Val Canale were immediately re-annexed to Italy. The area of Trieste (Trst),

Gorizia (Gorica) and Istria (Istra), on the other hand, was divided into two parts: Zone A comprising Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) came under Anglo-American administration and Zone B covering Istria (Istra) came under Yugoslavia (Stranj, 1992; Troha, 2003). With the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Gorizia (Gorica) was annexed to Italy and thus separated from its hinterland. As for Trieste (Trst), provisions were made for the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste (Trst), which never actually came into effect. Trieste (Trst) in Zone A and part of Istria (Istra) in Zone B remained divided in this way until 1954, when under the London Memorandum an agreement was reached between the two parties, namely that Zone A with Trieste (Trst) would remain under Italy, and Zone B with Istria (Istra) would remain under Yugoslavia. This delineation was confirmed by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Interethnic tensions were not resolved despite the delineation of the border between Italy and Yugoslavia having been agreed upon at the international level between the two states and the Anglo-American Allies under the above mentioned agreements. The state border could not be perfectly in line with the ethnic border and thus did not satisfy the claims over these territories from various national groups. Ethnically mixed areas with a Slovene population on the Italian side of the border and with an Italian population on Yugoslavian territory remained as they were, thus provoking the need for proper legal protection of minority rights for both national minorities. This was partially resolved with the norms given by the London memorandum and its Special statute. The latter laid down a number of political and social rights for the Slovene minority in Italy, namely the right to use their language in interactions with administrative services and judicial authorities; the right to bilingual public signs and bilingual printed publications; the right to bilingualism in educational, cultural and other organizations; the right to public funding intended for these organizations; and the right to instruction in their mother tongue and the right to preserve the existing Slovene schools (Stranj, 1992; Troha, 2003). The territorial scope of these rights was limited only in the area of

the former Zone A which covered the present Province of Trieste (Trst). This meant that the Slovene population in the area of Gorizia (Gorica) and Udine (Videm) was in a different legal position. In the area of Gorizia (Gorica) certain acquisitions from the period of the Allied Military Government between 1945 and 1947 were preserved (e.g., the public use of Slovene language and bilingual signs in some municipalities with an entirely Slovene population). In the area of Udine (Videm), the Slovene population was not legally recognized until 2001, and until the adoption of the Protection Law 38.

In addition to the already complicated interethnic relations, the ideological and political dimension of the Cold War division between the democratic/capitalist and totalitarian/communist systems emerged and prevailed until the late 1980s. The Italo-Yugoslav border made up a part of the Iron Curtain, thus the issue of minority protection was consequently perceived as ideologically supporting the “enemy” living “inside” each state: the Slovenes in Italy because they were seen as supporters of the Yugoslav regime and the Italians from Istria, Fiume and Dalmazia as related to the previous fascist regime (Rutar, 2005). The Slovene community in Italy used to be in Italian understanding seen as a “Communist” and thus a potential threat to the “Italianità”, to European civilization and to the whole Western world (Kappus, 1995: 36; Mihelj, 2012: 280-282). Thus, it was almost impossible to treat the minority protection discourse outside the ideological contraposition until the recent geopolitical changes in the FVG region in the 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War: the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the independence and democratic transition of Slovenia in 1991 and the EU integration process.

The linguistic background of the population attending the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools in the FVG region

To present the transformations concerning the intercultural relations between the Slovene minority and the majority population in Italy, some data regarding the Slovene language in education in the FVG region must be considered. Education is fundamental for the preservation of minority languages as it is a vehicle of inter-generational transmission, vitality and modernization, not only of language but also of identity, and thus contributes to the maintenance and development of the minority community. Over the last 25 years the educational system with Slovene as the language of instruction as well as the bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergarten and school in Italy experienced a relevant shift from being the educational system for Slovene minority members (and thus minority language speakers only) to being an educational system promoting the learning of the Slovene minority language – which is also the official language of the neighbouring Republic of Slovenia – for the whole regional territory. Thus, the right to education in Slovene has, in practice, evolved from being a right belonging to minority members as legally guaranteed to an opportunity to learn Slovene for the any member of the population who choose to do so. If we consider children in their first year of schooling (aged six) enrolled in all elementary schools in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica), 10 percent are enrolled in Slovene medium schools (data for the school year 2012–2013, Bogatec, 2015: 7). This being the case, Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools in the FVG region are the primary environment where one can observe intercultural relations as members of both the minority and majority population are in attendance there. The classroom can be an observatory of socio-cultural changes as the cultural, linguistic and ethnic changes can be detected in the cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics of the pupils and students (Bogatec & Zudič Antonič, 2012).

Diagram 1: Enrolment in Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools in Italy from 1990/1991 to 2014/2015 in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) and San Pietro al Natisone (Špeter) in the province of Udine (Videm) (Bogatec, 2015a)





Diagram 1 illustrates the trends concerning the enrolment of children in Slovene medium kindergartens and schools in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) and in the bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergarten and school in San Pietro al Natisone (Špeter). The relevant socio-political changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall had an impact, particularly in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica), not immediately, but in the long term (seven to fifteen years after) (Bogatec, 2015: 7–8). Just after 1990, the population decreased for some years. The positive effects of better inter-ethnic and cross-border relations can first be seen in the province of Gorizia (Gorica) where from 1997 onwards the

kindergarten and school population in Slovene schools consistently grew. Later, from 2001 onwards, the negative trend also stopped in the Slovene kindergartens and schools in the province of Trieste (Trst), where the population started to grow from 2006 onwards. The trend in the bilingual kindergarten and school in San Pietro al Natisone (Špeter) is different, as the population slightly but consistently increased from 1990 onwards.

The monitoring done by Bogatec (2015, 2015a) shows that the increased number of pupils in the above mentioned educational system is due to the enrolment of children from mixed Slovene-Italian families, Italian families or families with a migrant background, the latter mainly from the former Yugoslavian area, namely Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. From Diagram 2 it is evident that the share of children from Slovene families is half compared to that of the mid-nineties. The share of children from mixed Slovene-Italian families grew from the mid-nineties until 2003 and then remained stable, while the percentage of children from Italian families increased more than three times. Also, the number of children from migrant families grew. A recent study emphasizes that due to this situation the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian educational system in the FVG region face relevant intercultural educational issues related to multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic classes and to proper intercultural educational approaches which are in some aspects similar to those intercultural issues faced by the Italian medium schools with a high presence of pupils from migrant families (Bogatec, 2014: 27).

Diagram 2: Ethnic background of pupils and students enrolled in Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools in Italy from 1994/1995 to 2014/2015 (Bogatec 2015a)



Similarly, the studies of Pertot (2014) regarding the ethnic and linguistic identity of students attending Slovene medium senior secondary schools in Italy illustrates that the share coming from mixed Slovene-Italian families and Italian families is higher than in the nineties. At the same time a recent study done by the author (Pertot, 2014: 46) concerning the use of Slovene and Italian languages among students in their last year in Slovene medium senior secondary schools in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) show that in the last decade, the percentage of students who declared themselves to be mother-tongue Slovene has decreased (-10 percent). However, Pertot (2014: 46) also mentions that three quarters of these students affirm that Slovene is their mother-tongue and Slovenes are their affiliation group. According to Pertot (2011: 38), this data confirms that “not just the border between Slovenia and Italy fell, but also the borders between the minority, Slovene community, and the majority,

Italian community". She claims that at least some members of the young generation experience new identity options, where the Slovene and Italian elements are in interaction. On the one hand it can be said that the Slovene minority group is evolving towards transculturality as, according to Sedmak (2009: 16, 2009a: 90–91) and Pertot (2014a) they tend to overpass the defined cultural borders and to bring together at least two cultures, their own and that of the environment where they live. The authors discuss "cultural hybridity" and "plural identities" which are characteristic for minority members and can coexist as well provoke internal tensions and contradictions. On the other hand, from other empirical studies it was found that young people attending Slovene medium schools in Italy (Pertot, 2014a: 80; Kopic, 2014: 99) as well as adult members of the Slovene national community in Italy (Sedmak, 2009: 218, 2009a: 90-91) mainly preserve an identification with Slovene culture and language and at the same time a traditionally local identification with the Slovene minority community (Slovene in Italy, member of the Slovene community) prevails which is also geographically defined (from Trieste-Trst, Charst-Kras, Gorizia-Gorica, etc.). This kind of identity tends to remain stable in the long term, as Pertot (2014: 79) observes among students of Slovene medium senior secondary schools in Italy in the period considered between 1989 and 2011.

From the above presented data it can be said that a positive socio-cultural and linguistic evolution of intercultural relations between the Slovene minority and majority populations in the FVG region is a process which gradually developed after the political changes at the beginning of the nineties and afterwards. The increased interest from Italian families in enrolling their children in kindergartens and schools with Slovene as the language of instruction is one of the indicators which suggests a more positive attitude towards the Slovene language (Brezigar, 2015: 156). According to Bogatec (2004: 31) this data can be interpreted as "a gradual bridging of the gap between the majority and minority population". Those parents interviewed who had enrolled their children in Slovene medium schools believe that it has a positive impact on a child's growth, such as the

development of openness and solidarity with other cultures and a sense of equality as well as cultural enrichment (Bogatec, 2008: 68).

The promotion of the use of the Slovene language also among children of mixed Slovene-Italian and non-Slovene families and their inclusion in the Slovene culture can help to preserve the features of the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian educational system in Italy and thus of the minority itself (Bogatec, 2004: 31). Moreover, Jagodic (2015: 204) emphasizes that attracting potential new Slovene-language speakers can gradually slow down or even reverse the negative demographic post-war trends. The gaining of potential new speakers represents a path to follow in order to avoid the gradual disappearance and ultimately extinction of the Slovene minority in Italy (Brezigar, 2015: 163; Jagodic & Čok, 2013: 117).

There are, however, also various risks resulting from new forms of assimilation and the decrease in minority members and Slovene language speakers due mainly to a lack of strategies and policies appropriate for handling the new situation. Parents from Slovene families are concerned about the fact that this situation restricts the knowledge and the use of Slovene language, particularly in informal situations in the school as the use of Slovene tends to shift to Italian (Bogatec, 2008: 70). Indeed, the findings of a recent study suggest that Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian education do not result in a satisfactory linguistic reproduction of the Slovene minority in Italy (Brezigar, 2015: 157).

Moreover, various analyses underline that the proficiency level of Slovene is decreasing and that possibilities for using Slovene are diminishing due to multilingual communication which is making forays into the traditionally Slovene linguistic area, such as schools with Slovene as the language of instruction or Slovene sport associations (Bogatec, 2004: 31; Bogatec & Bufon, 2008: 68–69; Brezigar, 2015: 156–158). Similarly, data regarding the compulsory teaching of the Italian language on the Slovene part of the border indicates a very low level of proficiency (Čok,

2009, in Čok & Cavaion, 2015: 210). This can also be related to the fact that neighbouring languages, namely Slovene in Italy and Italian in Slovenia, suffer from a lack of prestige in the eyes of teenagers on both sides of the border between Italy and Slovenia (Furlan, 2002, in Čok & Cavaion, 2015: 209). Cavaion (2012, in Čok & Cavaion, 2015: 209) argues in her research that in the teaching practice of neighbouring languages, instruments and strategies in cross-border contacts among teenagers and schools should be improved in order to develop a positive attitude towards the learning of these languages and the support of intercultural dialogue.

However, according to recent empirical studies, the real problem is not the multilingual communication itself but the lack of any authority to administer and supervise a strategic approach towards educational issues (Bogatec, 2004: 31; Brezigar, 2015: 158). Opinion leaders among the Slovene minority in Italy interviewed by Brezigar (2015: 157–158) point out that the minority monolingual educational system in the provinces of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) has not adequately dealt with the transition from teaching in the Slovene language (to mostly Slovene pupils or pupils from mixed marriages) to teaching the Slovene language (to a growing population of Italian and in some cases immigrant pupils). Such a situation needs the appropriate institutional and professional support for teachers and educators (Brezigar, 2015: 163) in order to develop teaching skills, proper teaching aids and materials for teaching Slovene to pupils and adults who are not familiar with the language (Brezigar, 2015: 157–158). Moreover, according to Jagodic (2015: 204), it is necessary to have a plan of Slovene-language learning for successful language acquisition as well as to develop the minority language towards revitalization and modernization. The vision of enlarging the traditional boundaries of the minority represents a major challenge for the Slovene minority living in the FVG region (Jagodic, 2015: 206). On the one hand, the traditional concept of ethnic communities has to evolve as this new socio-political frame requires that the Slovene language be addressed and marketed separately from the issues of identity (Pertot, 2007, in Jagodic, 2015: 206). On the other hand, there is also a resistance from the more conservative powers within the

same Slovene community in Italy who would like to maintain the ethnic and linguistic “purity” of the current speakers and traditional Slovene speaking environments (Jagodic, 2015: 206).

Another central question for the Slovene national community in Italy is the intercultural dimension of the private sphere represented by mixed families, where one of the partners is Slovene speaking and the other Italian speaking or a Slovene speaking person whose partner is of a migrant background. Sedmak (2009: 27) and Bogatec (2004: 32) highlight that the mixed marriage should be seen as a vehicle for the acquisition of minority members and not of assimilation as it once was considered in the past. They believe that these families can be potential vehicles of the values of Slovene culture as it is possible in a mixed marriage to preserve, transfer and thus propagate the Slovene language. For Sedmak the question is how to maintain diversity in the long-term as a good legal framework and an effective state support of the minority institutions is not enough. Indeed, Sedmak (2009: 27) discusses the vitality of the Italian national minority in Slovenia and Croatia that even if this minority has a good level of state support for their cultural and linguistic maintenance with a well-developed political rights and rights to use Italian in the public sphere, there is still the “natural historical and demographic negative trend” of the decrease in its members and assimilation with the majority population culture.

Learning and teaching Slovene as a second or foreign language among adults in the FVG region

The growing interest in learning the Slovene language and culture in the FVG region can be noticed also among adults. It can be considered another indicator of the growing prestige of the Slovene language in this Italian area after the fall of the Berlin Wall. From a recent study done on the participants and teachers of Slovene courses in the provinces of Trieste (Trst), Gorizia (Gorica) and Udine (Videm) a steep rise in the number of

Slovene language courses for adults organised both by public and private institutions is evident in the last twenty years (Jagodic & Čok, 2013). Between 2002 and 2012 there were 7.768 participants in these courses (Jagodic & Čok, 2013: 23). Jagodic and Čok (2013: 117) argue that “Slovenian is no more perceived and treated as a problem”, thus this can be interpreted as an indicator of better relationships between the Slovene minority and the majority population of the FVG region.

From the data regarding the ethnic background of adults attending Slovene language courses it emerges that there is a tendency among them to re-establish their connection with the Slovene language as many of them descend from Slovene families (Jagodic, 2015: 195). From the data it is evident that participants generally have at least one parent or grandparent who speaks/spoke Slovene, while others have a Slovene-speaking partner or Slovene-Italian bilingual partner. There are also many cases of learners who have at least one child enrolled in a preschool or school with Slovene as the language of instruction. The perception of Slovene as the language of the autochthonous minority is a common feature of the group of the participants surveyed, even if the main reason for attending a Slovene course is to learn the language of their neighbour on the other side of the border, namely the Republic of Slovenia (Jagodic & Čok, 2013: 27; Jagodic, 2013: 49, 118).

Nevertheless, the learning of Slovene among the majority population presents some problematic questions which require an answer. The above mentioned survey shows that the basic language courses do not, in practice, enable the participants to become fluent Slovene speakers (Jagodic & Čok, 2013). This is a basic question as the knowledge of the minority language should enable the majority population to “experience” the minority culture (Brezigar, Bešter, Medvešek & Žagar, 2012: 65–66). This is due to the system of teaching Slovene itself which should be improved. The current educational offer is rich in courses for beginners, however, there is a lack of intermediate and advanced level courses (Jagodic, 2015: 199). Thus, the linguistic competence acquired appears to

be relatively low. The analysed experiences of teachers outline other various limits such as the need for accreditation of the institutions and the issuing of certificates of language knowledge as well as a lack of training of the teaching staff and lack of a broader promotion of the Slovene language courses at the local level (Mezgec, 2013: 118).

Moreover, the participants in Slovene language courses experience a lack of opportunities to use Slovene in everyday life (Jagodic, 2015: 202). Even if these speakers have a conversation with Slovene minority members, the latter will often linguistically adapt to majority-language speakers, even when they are aware the latter are learning the minority language (Jagodic, 2015: 202). Paradoxically, the author evidences a more consistent use of Slovene in interactions with the citizens of Slovenia in comparison with the Slovenes in Italy. Thus, he suggests the importance of educating native speakers, especially members of the Slovene minority, to be more persistent in the use of the Slovene language with learners, even though they cannot speak the language fluently (Jagodic, 2015: 206). This is related mainly to the status of Slovene in the FVG region as a minority language, thus having traditionally the role of intragroup communication between the members of the minority community. Moreover, the presence of spoken and visual Slovene in public spaces is limited, even if the situation slightly improved due to Law 38/2001 on the protection of the Slovene minority (Vidau, 2013, 2015a). According to Brezigar (2015: 156), an increase in the interest in the minority language does not automatically result in an increase of minority language use. Paradoxically, she observes that more people are able to speak Slovene, but in practice, less actually do so.

The adoption of measures and standards of linguistic performance for both children in the educational system and adults attending language courses, and the establishment of an appropriate institutional and professional support for teachers and educators is, for Brezigar (2015: 163), a fundamental path. Similarly, Jagodic (2015: 205) emphasizes that the need to systematize the educational offer is urgent, for instance by establishing a centre for teaching Slovene as a second/foreign language.

How to improve a minority friendly environment in the FVG region

It can be said that the Slovene minority-majority population relations have certainly improved in the last 25 years due to the socio-political changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. But other data indicates that more work should be done. The removal of the political, legal and physical barriers does not also mean the automatic cancellation of mental and political boundaries as emerged in an empirical study done among the population of the village of Škofije on the Slovene side of the border (Kralj & Renner, 2009: 57). These boundaries refer to the inter-ethnic relations between the minority-majority populations on each side of the Slovene-Italian border as well as between populations on the cross-border level.

Recent empirical studies illustrate that nationalistic and adverse positions of the majority population towards the Slovene minority still survive from the past (Sedmak, Mikolič & Furlan, 2007: 201; Rigo & Rahola, 2007: 86), which still support a sense of discrimination among the Slovene minority members (Medarič, 2009: 184). For the Italian-speaking community Fascism is taboo, minimized and basically repressed, which goes hand in hand with a non-perception of the Other, as emerged in some interviews with informants concerning identities on the Slovene-Italian border (Carli, Sussi & Baša, 2002: 50–51). Indeed, from the results of a study regarding ethnic identities in the FVG region, it emerged that on the one hand the majority of respondents (both of Italian and Slovene community belonging) support the integration of the minority culture in the Italian one, but on the other hand more than half (55 percent) of the respondents belonging to the majority population would experience no regret if they lived in a region without any minority (Segatti & Guglielmi, 2008: 77–79). However, a recent study shows that the perception of being discriminated against among students attending Slovene medium senior secondary schools in Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) has significantly decreased in the last decade, but it is still present among the half of the respondents (Vidau, 2015).

Moreover, Slovene minority members still express their concern about the inequality in the practice of using Slovene in public (in place names, public signs, documents, etc.) by public bodies in the legally defined Slovene speaking area (Kosic & Flego, 2008: 140; Medarič, 2009; Pertot, 2009: 201; Sedmak, Mikolič & Furlan, 2007: 203). In the areas where visible Italian-Slovene bilingualism is used in road signs, names of places and other public signs, the latter are often destroyed in acts of vandalism with Slovene names sprayed over, thus denigrating the expression of multilingualism. This concern about the public use of the mother-tongue can also be related to some features of the collective identity of the Slovene community. A study done by Sedmak (2009a: 72) describes it as characterized by a more intensive need to express their own national identity in the environment compared to the Italian community in Istria, while Medarič (2009: 113) notices a strong awareness of belonging to a minority community.

Members of the Slovene minority in Italy also experience a feeling of being closed off, a lack of interest and knowledge from the majority population towards their community (Kosic & Flego, 2008: 140; Medarič, 2009). In the province of Udine (Videm) there are some cases where certain local majority entities (ex. some majors of municipalities which are legally included in the Slovene speaking area) continue to engage in aggressive politics towards the minority component (Jagodic, 2015: 189). Some studies indicate that the Slovene national community in Italy is in fact less recognisable in the majority population environment than the Italian national community in the Slovene Istria (Medarič, 2009; Sedmak, 2009). The latter can be interpreted considering that a basic knowledge about the Slovene minority is almost entirely absent among the majority population (Vidali, 2009: 10–103). This is due to various factors. First, a one-way bilingualism characterises the Trieste (Trst) area compared with a two way bilingualism which characterizes the Slovene Istria border area (Čok & Cavaion, 2015: 216). Thus, the burden of bilingualism is still almost

exclusively carried by members of the Slovene community who are bilingual as they also speak at least one variant of Italian language, while members of the majority, with rare exceptions, usually do not even have a passive knowledge of the Slovene language (Jagodica, 2015: 189). Nevertheless, the bilingual competences and long-lasting trans-border relations of the Slovene community have as well been advantages in exploiting the border economy related to the service sectors and small business activities, as witnessed by the responses of participants in a study concerning the socio-economic situation in the FVG region (Rigo & Rahola, 2007).

Second, the Italian educational system does not provide for learning Slovene in the kindergartens and schools with Italian as the language of instruction. That being said, the situation is improving somewhat due to a bottom-up process of introducing the teaching of Slovene in some schools thank to the initiative of culturally aware parents and school directors and teachers. Slovene is taught as an optional study programme in two junior secondary schools with Italian as the language of instruction in the province of Trieste (Trst). Nevertheless, Čok and Cavaion (2015: 215) highlight that Slovene is at the very beginning of its introduction into the compulsory mainstream education system and not thus at all “well-equipped” from an organizational and methodological viewpoint. They also stress the importance of promoting tertiary socialization meant as “the development of competence to assess and compare one’s own experiences and values with those of other/foreign people, the turn from ethnocentrism and narrow identifications to ethno relativism, common values and the acceptance of differences existing between various groups” (Čok & Cavaion, 2015: 211).

Third, the institutional bilingualism is less than adequate, even though the public use of the Slovene language is regulated by several pieces of legislation arising from national and regional laws (Jagodica, 2015: 190). Indeed, especially in urban areas of Trieste (Trst) and Gorizia (Gorica) the

majority population has limited possibilities of coming into contact with the minority language (Jagodic, 2015: 190).

Fourth, the behaviour of the Slovene minority itself has to be taken into account. It tends to be closed towards the majority population, which indicators, are for example, the intensity of ethnically mixed partnerships and families as well as a tendency to have relationships inside the minority community (Sedmak, 2009: 210). This behaviour can help partly to its conservation, but not to its recognition in the broader society (Medarič, 2009: 121). Moreover, the less intensive contact between the minority and majority communities can be an indicator of discrimination and prejudices which can be seen in contemporary society in the form of avoiding contact with and maintaining distance from social groups such as linguistic minorities (Ule, 2005, in Medarič, 2009: 121). However, it is up to the minority community to self-promote in the wider environment with strategies, activities and actions aimed at building ties with centres of power as well as to promote the minority's unique cultural and linguistic heritage, as stated by Brezigar (2015: 163).

Conclusions

After the socio-political transformations brought on by the fall of the Berlin Wall in the FVG region and in the cross-border area between Italy and Slovenia one can observe better and more peaceful intercultural relations between the Slovene minority and majority population compared to that of the 20th century. It can be said that these relations have certainly improved in terms of quantity (e.g. number of adults attending Slovene courses, number of pupils enrolled in Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools) and quality (e.g. higher prestige of Slovene language, cooperation oriented political atmosphere). The analyses presented in the paper demonstrates that the Slovene national minority in the FVG region can now express its presence also through the

teaching of the Slovene language in the Italian medium educational system and among the majority population. Moreover, persons from the majority population have the chance and the choice to include Slovene language and culture in their cultural background. They can enrol their children in Slovene medium or bilingual Slovene-Italian kindergartens and schools as well as they can themselves attend a Slovene language course. Thus, all the previously mentioned social changes regarding the status of Slovene language and culture are paths which lead to an intercultural perspective of the regional territory. At the same time, other studies show that the Slovene national minority is not at all well equipped for the integration of non-Slovene speakers and learners in its educational system as well as in the community itself. Due mainly to a lack of strategies and policies appropriate for handling the new situation there is also a risk of developing new forms of assimilation due to the less than proficient learning of the Slovene language and thus a decrease in Slovene language speakers.

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Typology of Dark Tourism Heritage With It`s Implications on Slovenian Future Dark Tourism Products

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Abstract: Dark tourism is the phenomenon of the twenty-first century, but also has a very long heritage.

This is a special type of tourism, which involves visits to tourist attractions and destinations that are associated with death, suffering, accidents, disasters and tragedies venues.

Dark tourism in Slovenia is very poorly developed comparing to the world. Therefore the paper proposes a typology of dark tourism in the world and in Slovenia. The research based on in-depth analysis of literature and fieldwork give a variety of new opportunities based on storytelling for development of this type of tourism in Slovenia, with emphasis on the design of dark and innovative thematic trail.

Key Words: dark tourism, death, typology, dark cultural heritage, storytelling, Slovenia

Introduction

You have to take risks. We will only understand the miracle of life fully when we allow the unexpected to happen.

(Paulo Coelho)

Dark tourism has been recognised as a distinctive tourism phenomenon of the twenty-first century, with increasingly significant numbers of visitors and tourists going to dark tourism attractions and sites, new dark tourism products and attractions emerging, and modern global communication media generating interest in dark tourism attractions, while at the same time affecting the image of destinations. The phenomenon of dark tourism has been examined in academia from the mid-1990s. Since then, study of this phenomenon has increased, and the scales of relevant studies have been enlarged.

Dark tourism in Slovenia is very poorly developed comparing to the world and it is mostly limited only on tourist sites connected with both wars. Therefore the theme is a novelty in Slovenia, as well as in Slovenian professional and scientific literature and is almost unknown comparing to the world. The main purpose of this article is to explore the current situation of dark tourism in Slovenia and propose a typology of dark tourism in Slovenia, which should serve as a basis for further efforts in the design of a new dark tourism products based on the dark heritage in Slovenia, as shown below in the case of witchcraft.

That is why the article proposes a typology of dark tourism heritage sites in Slovenia (and sites in the world) based on in-depth analysis of literature and fieldwork which contains the method of unstructured interviews with curators in Slovene Ethnographic Museum, Museum of Ribnica and Celje Regional Museum as well as the method of observation with participation in a guided tour through the exhibition at Ljubljana Castle: The Barbarism of Torture - an exhibition of torture devices from the 16th to the 18th century.

The term dark tourism was coined by Foley and Lennon (1996: 198) to describe the attraction of visitors to tourism sites associated with death, disaster, and depravity. Other notable definitions of dark tourism include the act of travel to sites associated with death, suffering and the seemingly macabre (Stone, 2006: 146), and as visitations to places where tragedies or historically noteworthy death has occurred and that continue to impact our lives (Tarlow, 2005: 48). Scholars have further developed and applied alternative terminology in dealing with such travel and visitation, including thanatourism (Seaton, 1996), black spot tourism (Rojek, 1993), atrocity heritage tourism (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996), and morbid tourism (Blom, 2000). In a context similar to »dark tourism«, terms like »macabre tourism«, »tourism of mourning« and »dark heritage tourism« are also in use. Among these terms, dark tourism remains the most widely applied in academic research (Sharpley, 2009).

The concept of dark tourism is in contrast to marketing slogans that prefer the broader promotional aspect and call this type of tourism »historic tourism«. Major encyclopaedias of tourism identify »dark tourism« also as »thanatourism«, in which the core meaning of the term relates mostly to visits to the tombs, cemeteries and memorials of prominent people (Gosar, 2015a). In Croatia it is called »mračnjaški turizam« in slovene tourist literature the terminology is not yet clearly defined. The terms »črni«, »temni«, »temačni«, »mračni« tourism are in use.

Although this is a newer type of specialized tourism, we can speak as one of the oldest types of tourism, because death is historically always attracted human inquisitiveness. Some kind of organized »thanato tourism« were already gladiator games in the Coliseum of ancient Rome (Gosar, 2015b). Popular festivals in the past have been a public hanging, beheading and burning of witches. Walking and paid visits to the battlefield at Waterloo in Belgium, the place of Napoleon's last battle between the English nobility had been ongoing since the time of the battle in 1815. Therefore the kind of dark tourism has a very long heritage.

Dark tourism relates to tourist travel, which interprets the heritage through tragedies and conflicts and is raising awareness of dark historical realities, or the heritage of it (Stone, 2013). The central research centre for dark tourism is located at the University of Central Lancashire, in England. The Institute for Dark Tourism Research (iDTR) is led by Dr. Philip R. Stone. According to iDTR, the main contours of dark tourism destinations are to be found in three groups of geographically expressed areas: destination of the death, burial, and/or the tragedies of celebrities, destinations of great battles and falling soldiers, destinations of collective suffering and death.

Visiting such sites can play a significant part in a tourist's experiences, and in turn, that there will most probably be anxiety about the development of these sites as tourist attractions (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005; Ryan, 2007; Sharpley & Stone, 2009; Wilson, 2008). These concomitant aspects of dark tourism have indeed lead to concerns about the morality of commodifying death, disaster, and atrocity (Lennon & Foley, 2000; Seaton, 2009).

All the actions associated with the tourism trips that expose/define the places associated with death, suffering and/or everything that is reminiscent of the grim period of mankind is to be related dark tourism (Stone, 2006). According to researchers of iDTR, dark tourism is a subcategory of the historic tourism, which includes the content of the material and intangible heritage, as both strengthen our historical memory.

At the Faculty of Tourism Studies - Turistica in Portorož in October 2014, at the centenary of the beginning of the First World War held the first international workshop on dark tourism in Slovenia titled Dark Tourism: Post - The First World War, Destinations of Human Tragedies and Relevant Tourism Development Opportunities.

Different shades of black

Dark tourism has been also called place-specific tourism (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005: 4), whereby an individual's experiences are highly dependent on the particular characteristics and associations of a site. In turn, a visitor's experiences at the site of a former prison, for example, and the associated reproductions of the way prisoners lived, the food they ate and so on, may differ from a visitor's experiences at a former battlefield. As such, several researchers have classified dark tourism sites according to their defining characteristics.

Miles (2002) proposed a darker-lighter tourism paradigm in which there remains a distinction between dark and darker tourism according to the greater, or lesser extent of the macabre and the morose. In this way, the sites of the holocaust, for example, can be divided into dark and darker tourism when it comes to their authenticity and scope of interpretation. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. is associated with death, and thus categorised a dark tourism site only, whereas the site of Auschwitz - Birkenau in Poland possesses a unique location authenticity as a former concentration and extermination camp, and thus site of darker tourism.

On the basis of the dark tourism paradigm of Miles (2002), Stone (2006) proposed a spectrum of dark tourism supply which classifies sites according to their perceived features, and from these, the degree or shade of darkness (darkest to lightest) with which they can be characterised. This spectrum has seven types of dark tourism suppliers, ranging from Dark Fun Factories as the lightest, to Dark Camps of Genocide as the darkest. A specific example of the lightest suppliers would be dungeon attractions, such as Jack the Ripper establishments in London Dungeon or The Barbarism of Torture at the Ljubljana Castle, or planned ventures such as Dracula Park in Romania. In contrast, examples of the darkest sites include genocide sites in Rwanda, Cambodia, or Kosovo, as well as holocaust sites such as Auschwitz - Birkenau.

Elements of dark tourism

In recent years, it has been argued that changing socio-economic patterns have led to a move away from mass or conventional tourism, to one of alternative or special interest tourism (Singh, 2004). From this perspective, the perceived benefits of a tourist holiday have shifted from relaxation and indulgence, toward opportunities for study, learning, and a greater experience of the world, with travelers interested more in enriching their lives with experiences as opposed to being passive consumers of entertainment and spectacle. As such, more contemporary tourists are depicted as seeking interactive, high involvement experiences where the providers of such experiential services are required to be knowledgeable, imaginative, and innovative entrepreneurs able to differentiate their tourism products through new activities, trends, and experiences (Andereck et al., 2006; Gilmore & Pine, 2002), thus gaining a competitive edge.

Among the different forms of special interest tourism, such as adventure, ecotourism, and cultural heritage tourism, the search for experiences is dependent on an individual's needs and interests. Adventure tourism generally appeals to people keen to pursue challenging and extraordinary experiences, ecotourism to those who have a strong interest in the environment, and cultural heritage tourism to people with an interest in history and nostalgia.

Likewise, dark tourism is also recognised as a special interest form of tourism appealing to those keen to visit sites or attractions associated with the dark side of human nature, and often tied to death, atrocity, or tragic events of the past (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005; Lennon & Foley, 2000). Furthermore, in recent years dark tourism has been recognised as a distinctive and emergent tourism phenomenon, given the significant numbers of visitors to related attractions and sites, as well as the emergence of many new dark tourism attractions and products. In short,

dark tourism attractions or sites have become increasingly frequent stops on international tourism itineraries (Strange & Kempa, 2003).

New dark tourism products and sites have emerged around the world in recent years, with some related to recent, high profile disasters. Examples of such sites and memorials include the World Trade Centre, Ground Zero site in New York, parts of New Orleans in the United States following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the site in Paris where Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed perished in a car accident, and in the United Kingdom, the locations of serial killings in Soham. The Ground Zero site in New York is today one of the top five tourist attractions for visitors in the city.

Sites under construction include one commemorating the catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 in the Khao Lak National Park, located in Thailand's Phangnga province, one for the 2008 China earthquake in the Chinese city of Chengdu, Sichuan province, and another for the Haiti earthquake of early 2010 or recently earthquake in April 2015 in Nepal. None of these were, or are, being created by destination planners for the purpose of generating tourism revenue, however, most will attract visitors curious to investigate and experience such sites of death and disaster in part because they are widely publicised by the media.

Therefore the elements of dark tourism sites are areas of natural disasters (e.g. volcanic eruption in Iceland, visit Naples and Pompei), the scene of terrorist attacks (an attack on the editorial board of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo January 2015 in Paris), the world-famous cemeteries (Paris Pere Lachaise Cemetery with Jim Morrison and Edith Piaf graves) and the mausoleums (Taj Mahal in Agra, House of Flowers at Dedinje in Belgrade), monuments to war victims and the heroic defenders of (country, nation, ideology) concentration camps (Auschwitz, Jasenovac), prisons (Alcatraz, Canon City Colorado), nuclear disasters (Chernobyl in Ukraine, Fukushima in Japan) and common cemeteries (the Killing Fields in Cambodia) and battlefields (The Isonzo Front, The Battle of Sutjeska).

All the elements of dark stories educate, evoke memories, inform and try to appeal to people and their decisions, which can lead to disasters. Irrespective of whether the effects of disasters are the results of the nature or historical socio-political decisions, which cause a lot of disasters, all share the pain, terror and death. However the reasons for visiting such tourism sites are different.

The reasons for visiting dark tourism sites

Dark tourism may be considered a form of special interest tourism. There are a number of reasons for travelling to dark tourism sites, which most simply can include curiosity, education, survivor guilt, remembrance, nostalgia, empathy, and horror (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005; Baldwin & Sharpley, 2009; Garwood, 1996; Lennon & Foley, 2000; Miles, 2002; Smith, 1996).

However, theoretical and empirical research investigating visitor motivations for travelling to dark tourism sites remains limited. For Ashworth and Hartmann (2005), there are three core reasons for visiting destinations of tragedy and atrocity: curiosity, empathy, and horror, whereas other studies suggest additional reasons, including education, remembrance, nostalgia, and survivor's guilt (Garwood, 1996; Lennon & Foley, 2000; Marcuse, 2005; Miles, 2002; Smith, 1996). Each of these can best be discussed separately as follows:

1. Curiosity

Many tourists are interested in the unusual and the unique, whether this be a natural phenomenon (e.g. Niagara Falls, Škocjan Caves), an artistic or historical structure (e.g. the pyramids in Egypt), or spectacular events (e.g. a royal wedding). Importantly, the reasons why tourists are attracted to dark tourism sites derive, at least in part, from the same curiosity which motivates a visit to Škocjan Caves. Visiting dark

tourism sites is an out of the ordinary experience, and thus attractive for its uniqueness and as a means of satisfying human curiosity. The curiosity tourists have for a dark tourism experience may differ from travelling, for instance, to a theme park or zoo. The intention to visit dark tourism sites is not normally for entertainment, amusement, or enjoyment. The main reason is the experience of the unusual.

2. Empathy

One of the reasons for visiting dark tourism sites may be empathy, which is an acceptable way of expressing a fascination with horror. Ashworth and Hartmann (2005) note that empathy relies upon the capacity of heritage consumers to identify with individual victims of the atrocity. While this identification is assumed to be more with the victims in question, it could equally conceivably be with perpetrators also. In many respects, the interpretation of dark tourism sites can be difficult and sensitive, given the message of the site as forwarded by exhibition curators can at times conflict with the understandings of visitors. For instance, site curators may justify a graphic description as creating empathy with victims, or even helping prevent such events from recurring in the future. Some visitors, however, may indeed be empathising with the perpetrators themselves, and be stimulated to replicate the events (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005).

3. Horror

Horror is regarded as one of the key reasons for visiting dark tourism sites, and in particular, sites of atrocity. Ashworth and Hartmann (2005) note that there is a considerable amount of literature, folk stories, and more recently internet, film and television portrayals of scenes of horror which evoke emotions of fear and fascination in consumers. Relating atrocity as heritage at a site is thus as entertaining as any media depiction of a story, and for precisely the same reasons and with the same moral overtones. Such tourism products or cases as examples are: Ghost Walks around sites of execution or murder (Ghost Tour of Prague, Berlin Story Bunker), Murder Trails found in many cities like Jack the Ripper in

London or the Boston Strangler in Boston. In Slovenia this could be serial killers Silvo Plut and Metod Trobec, who killed and cremated at least five women at his home in Dolenja vas by Polhov Gradec. He was sentenced to death and committed suicide at Dob Prison. His name took Slovenian-Croatian alter rock band (Trobčeve krušne peči), famous writer Svetlana Makarovič wrote a song about him (Balada o Trobcu) as well as the song Za Metoda goriš by Slon in Sadež.

4. Education

In much tourism literature it has been claimed that one of the main motivations for travel is the gaining of knowledge, and the quest for authentic experiences. One of the core missions of cultural and heritage tourism in particular is to provide educational opportunities to visitors through guided tours and interpretation. Similarly, individual visits to dark tourism sites to gain knowledge, understanding, and educational opportunities, continue to have intrinsic educational value (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005). Moreover, a number of sites emphasise the visitors educational expectations in terms of their capacity to learn from past mistakes, for example, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, sites related to the First World War, such as The Kobarid Museum, sites related to the Second World War such as the USS Arizona Memorial in Hawaii and the Bridge over the River Kwai in Thailand.

In turn, many dark tourism attractions or sites are considered important destinations for school educational field trips, achieving education through experiential learning (Marcuse, 2005).

5. Nostalgia

Nostalgia can be broadly described as yearning for the past (Dann and Potter, 2001; Smith, 1996), or as a wistful mood that an object, a scene, a smell or a strain of music evokes (Belk, 1990: 670). Importantly, this remains one of the primary reasons for travelling to heritage parks (Walter, 2009). In addition however, it has also been recognised as a reason for travelling to dark tourism sites, although not perhaps a key or central

motivation. In this respect Smith (1996) examined war tourism sites and concluded that old soldiers do go back to the battlefields, to revisit and remember the days of their youth...one graying veteran summed it up well, »...those of us who have been in combat share something very special...I simply have to be here, to honour those men...« (Smith, 1996: 260).

6. Remembrance

Remembrance is a vital human activity connecting us to our past, with an important role to play in shaping our future in turn, in short, the way we remember defines the way we are in the present (Young, 1993). Remembrance helps people formulate an identity, allowing them to learn from past mistakes, and to go forward with a clear vision of the future.

In the context of dark tourism, remembrance and memory are considered key elements in the importance of sites (Lennon & Foley, 2000; Walter, 2009; Young, 1993). Indeed a number of dark tourism locations have been considered effectively warehouses for memories, with some mandating remembrance in addition to education as a core aspect of their planning. In particular, for several sites associated with the holocaust and the Second World War in Europe cities, commemoration and remembrance as key reasons for their existence. Several sites such as the Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., and the Holocaust Museum in Houston, were established on similar rationales. In the literature, reverence is identified as a key feature of remembrance at many dark tourism sites. For example, the USS Arizona Memorial was built as a site of remembrance to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, around one of the most powerful battleships of the time destroyed in the first minutes of the attack. For the purposes of the memorial, visitors must first view an interpretive film before being able to board skiffs to the memorial. Once there, reverence is encouraged by staff present upon the Memorial structure. Beach style clothing is not permitted upon the Memorial. The ship is clearly visible below the water and a viewing well enables visitors to drop flowers onto the vessel's starboard side (Lennon & Foley, 2000: 105).

7. Survivor's guilt

One of the distinctive characteristics of dark tourism is the type of visitors such sites attract, which include survivors and victim's families returning to the scene of death or disaster. Once again, these types of visitors are particularly prevalent at sites associated with Second World War and the Holocaust. For many survivors of the horror of war, atrocity, and disaster it seems, returning to the scene is cathartic and remains a way of unburdening themselves of guilt given their survival. In a study Braithwaite and Lee (2006) note that some veterans of war have suffered acute stress or trauma for prolonged periods, a condition called Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). One of the diagnoses of PTSD is guilt about their own survival when others did not, or about the behaviour required for survival. It appears that not only war veterans, but prisoners of war of the Japanese, and Holocaust victims and their families, experience this in particular. Returning to the scene of death and atrocity can achieve a therapeutic effect by resolving grief, and can build understanding of how terrible things came to have happened. This can be an unselfconsciously emotional experience (Braithwaite & Lee, 2006).

Such reasons for visiting dark tourism sites or attractions can in turn influence visitors on site experiences. Dark tourism literature frequently refers to dark tourism experiences as both educational and emotional in nature. Since many dark tourism attractions are established to convey important messages to people, visitor experiences are often related to gain of knowledge of the past event (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005; Henderson, 2000; Lennon & Foley, 2000). This type of visitor experience can of course also be found in other cultural heritage or ecotourism attractions, whilst not including many of the distinctive characteristics of dark tourism.

Typology of dark tourism

When analyzing a grave, nuclear in the world, depending on the content we can give the following typology of dark tourism:

- Grave tourism (visiting famous cemeteries, graves of famous individuals, or grand mausoleums of some real cult personality, e.g. Paris Pere Lachaise Cemetery with Jim Morrison and Edith Piaf graves, Taj Mahal in Agra, House of Flowers in Belgrade, Sedlec Ossuary in the Czech Republic, Pierce Brothers Westwood Village Memorial Park in Los Angeles with graves of Marilyn Monroe, Roy Orbison, Jack Lemmon, Farrah Fawcett and other Hollywood stars.)
- War or battlefield tourism (visiting former war places e.g. Napoleon`s battle of Waterloo in Belgium, USS Arizona Memorial in Hawaii, Cu Chi Tunnels in Vietnam, the Bridge over the River Kwai in Thailand...)
- Holocaust tourism (visiting concentration camp memorial sites, memorial museums, former ghettos and sites where the Nazi perpetrators planned it all e.g. The House of the Wannase Conference and Führerbunker in Berlin, United States Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C., Yad Vashem in Jeruzalem, Auschwitz in Poland...)
- Genocide tourism (visiting places of genocide e.g. Rwanda genocide, Toul Sleng Genocide Museum and The Killing Fields in Cambodia, the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina...)
- Prison tourism (Alcatraz Island in the San Francisco Bay, Canon City in Colorado, Ottawa Jail Hostel, Devil's Island in French Guiana...)
- Communism tourism (visiting North Korea, the big four: Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Kim)
- Cold war and iron curtain tourism (seeking out traces and remains of the Berlin Wall)
- Disaster area tourism (visiting places of natural disaster after e.g. hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, tsunami in Thailand, earthquake

in Nepal, sites of volcanic destruction e.g. Pompeii, Montserrat in the Caribbean...)

- Nuclear tourism (visiting sites of civil nuclear disaster e.g. Chernobyl in Ukraine, Fukushima in Japan, sites of nuclear testing e.g. Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and Nevada Test Site in USA, or missile silos e.g. Titan Missile Museum in Arizona. There are also two places where atom bombs were actually used for real: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.)
- Murderers and murderous places tourism (Jack the Ripper in London, Metod Trobec in Slovenia, Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas. Visitors can see the sixth floor of the building from which he fired at US president John F. Kennedy, the Dakota, apartment building in New York City where John Lennon was shot.)
- Slum tourism (visiting impoverished areas e.g. slums in India, Brazil, Kenya, Indonesia...). Prior to the release of *Slumdog Millionaire* in 2008, Mumbai was a slum tourist destination.
- Terrorist tourism (visiting areas e.g. Ground Zero in New York City, The Boston Marathon, the Bardo Museum in Tunis and tourist resort at Sousse in Tunisia...)
- Paranormal tourism (visiting crop circles, UFO sightings, the haunted house in Amityville, paranormal activities in Stanley Hotel in Colorado...)
- Witches tourism (visiting the city of Salem in Massachusetts...)
- Accident tourism (visiting places e.g. Paris tunnel Pont de l'Alma, where the British Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed died in a car accident).
- Icky medical tourism (visiting e.g. Josephinum, medical museum with anatomical wax models in Vienna, the Mütter Museum in Philadelphia, Meguro Parasitological Museum in Tokyo and also all the »Bodies Exhibitions« like »Bodies Revealed«...)
- Dark amusement tourism (visiting amusement parks e.g. the Dungeons exhibitions in London, Berlin, Dracula theme park, ghost tours in London, Prague, Chicago...).

Dark tourism in Slovenia

Dark heritage is also the basis for the development of dark tourism in Slovenia. Military cemeteries and ossuaries, monuments and museums, the theater battles execution and solemn memorial events at the anniversaries are an integral part of the European cultural landscape and society. In the following analysis based on available sources and field work a typology of dark tourism in Slovenia is presented. In Slovenia dark tourist destinations include:

- Cemeteries (Žale Cemetery in Ljubljana, Cemetery Pobrežje in Maribor, Roman Necropolis in Šempeter in Savinja Valley, Doberdob).
- Prisons and penitentiaries (Penitentiary at the Ljubljana Castle, Celica Jail Hostel).
- Museums (The Hospital Franja, Park of Military History in Pivka, Kobarid Museum, Idrija War Museum, War Museum in Logatec).
- Concentration camps (Ljubelj, Mauthausen).
- Memorial sites and monuments (Cerje Monument, Monument for the Battle of Dražgoše, Monument to Pohorje Partisan Battalion in Osankarica, Teharje Memorial Park, The Memorial Church of the Holy Spirit in Javorca, Russian Chapel at Vršič).
- Fortification systems (Vallo Alpino, Rupnik's Line, Fortress Kluže).
- Guided tours of military facilities (Rupnik's Line, The Hospital Franja).
- Remembrance paths – (The Walk of Peace, from Alps to the Adriatic, Circular Path of Military History in municipality of Pivka).
- Shows (The show about First World War at Fortress Kluže performed by Dreizehn Dreizehn Society – 1313. It is a different way of discovering the everyday life of the soldiers on the Isonzo front. Visitors can see tooth extraction, reading the long-awaited love letter, fear, nursing wounded. Every soldier at the front experienced all that, irrespective of their nationality).

- Performing battles (Rupnik`s Line battle in municipality of Žiri, »Liberation of Primorska 1945« battle in the Park of Military History in municipality of Pivka, both performed by Triglav Cultural and Historical Society).
- Hiking along the trails of war memories (Memorial march »Along the Trail of the Cankar Battalion« in Dražgoše, Along the Barbwire of the Occupied City in Ljubljana).
- Post-war killings (Kren Cave mass grave, Kočevski Rog mass grave, The Barbara Pit).

The analysis shows that dark tourism in Slovenia is mainly associated with topics related to the First World War and the Second World War period, comprising conventional museum presentations, visiting places »in situ«, performances and thematic trails in conjunction with the two world wars.

Along the trails of Slovenian »witches«

As already mentioned dark tourism in Slovenia is mainly linked to the horrors of war. Slovenia offers a lot of different opportunities for the development of dark tourism on the basis of dark cultural heritage. One of the topics is heritage of witchcraft. Various examples of heritage of witchcraft in Slovenia will be presented. All of them could be effectively incorporated into a comprehensive (innovative) tourism product.

The first witch process in our country is supposed to be the trial against the noblewoman Veronica of Desenice in 1427, but the charges against her still lacked legally formulated indictment of witchcraft. Only from 1546 on we can speak of true witch processes, when at least six women were brought to court in Maribor on charges of witchcraft. During the following 200 years the region between the Mura and the Drava was the scene of brutal prosecutions; especially the courts of Ljutomer,

Maribor, Hrastovec, and Gornja Radgona were notorious for their austerity. The court records show that on the Slovenian territory approximately 500 individuals were accused of witchcraft. Most of the accused finished their lives on the stake. The number of witch trials peaked in the second half of the 17th century, somewhat sooner in the Styria region (Štajerska) than in the Carniola region (Kranjska). From the Carniola region a number of trial records have been conserved, most from the nineties of the 17th century, when several processes were held in Ljubljana as well. The victims of the worse of the documented persecutions were tried at the regional court under the dominion of Poljane (Predgrad) by the river Kolpa, and its extensiveness was dreadful... In Slovenia 68% of charged for witchcraft were female, and 12% male, while for the remaining percentage the sex is not given. Most of the victims were subjects, only a few were freemen, and even fewer noblemen. The last witch processes were held in 1745 at the courts of Metlika and Gornja Radgona (Košir & Tratnik Volasko, 1995).

Witches in folk tradition

People who believed in witches have always wanted to protect themselves against their harmful effects. Many habits and customs from pre-Christian times are already lost, others are still alive. There was a lot of superstition in Slovenia back in the past.

According to Ovsec (1991) people believed that the witches harm by eggs or bones buried in a field, in the vineyard below the barn or house of the person who wish to injure them. If they want to protect themselves from the harm of buried objects they had to be excavated and thrown away. People believed that blessed egg shells sprinkled around the house chase away snakes, lizards, toads, snails and witches.

Quite widespread is the legend of Pentecost dew, which is supposed to give cows more milk, facial beauty, eye health. Witches, wrapped only in

sheets, accumulate dew in the middle of the night of Pentecost Sunday and then squeeze it in the bottle at home. They also sprinkle their fields that were more fertile. This is supposed to result in worse crop in the fields of other people.

The evening before the day of St. John the Baptist (24.6.), the witches had special power. Because of that they were persecuted by the ringing of blessed church bells. They also burned bonfires to protect the field against them. Many people believed that a witch was born in a red shirt. This shirt was dried and stored by the mother, if she wanted her daughter to become a witch. Otherwise she burned it (Ovsec, 1991).

Witches flew on birch brooms, so the belief was that birch broom on the threshold of a house was warding off the witches and denying them to enter. Good protection against witches was also garlic with which they anointed children in the house. The best defense was prevention. This means people avoided witches and behaved very kindly to them. Good prevention was also the use of blessed water.

The most reliable indicator of witchcraft was a test in the water, while an alleged witch with tied hands and feet was thrown into a river. If she survived and saved herself, she was recognized as a witch and thrown into the fire. If she drowned or started to drown she was declared innocent and freed from evil. On the Slovenian territory was search for witch signs on private parts more common for identifying the witch.

In Slovenia, according to Mencej (2006), the most widely used tool for identifying a witch was the so-called Lucija's chair, which was being built the day of St. Lucy (13 December) until Christmas. Instructions for making such a chair are different. Sometimes it is necessary to use nine kinds of woods, sometimes twelve. It was made only before sunrise, preferably in silence. Person who sat on the chair at midnight mass in the church was able to identify all the witches.

Witches Cave on Slivnica

According to local folklore, there have been frequent sightings of smoke arising from a cave at the top of the mountain accompanied with strange sounds. A karst cave below the summit of Slivnica, known as Witches Cave was described by Janez Vajkard Valvasor in »The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola« (1689) as a hole where storms were made.

Valvasor wrote: »Witches are vermin, easy to find everywhere. On the other side of the lake rises the mountain Slivnica, where the storms are made. Witches, moths and other nasty creatures have their dances and meetings at the top. We see them as tiny flying lights. Generally the landscape around the lake Cerknica is well inhabited with witches. That is why many of them are burned. In these places they are going to stake more than anywhere in the country. So they are carefully hiding. These vermin completely failed to dispel. Under an enormous pile of ash many sparks still remain« (Valvasor, 2009). According to Valvasor there is also a lot of witches around Snežnik, Lož and Planina because »these places are vast wilderness that is full of vermin. This vermin is hanging out with toads, poisonous worms in caves or dark thicket« (Valvasor, 2009).

In a book called The Lake Cerknica (1899) Jožef Žirovnik wrote about Slivnica and Witches Cave: »Although the external appearance of Slivnica is friendly, it is apparently full of malice and wickedness. At the time of a nearby storm is wrapped in a thick fog. Starting from the deep cave, which is on the highest peak, come - according to the old folk beliefs - hail, storm and lightning. Even 220 years ago priests from Cerknica went to the top to bless the cave. Great procession was moved there every year on Pentecost Monday. The priest prayed and sprinkled the cave with holy water. People placed a maypole with a cross on the top. Some of them were even throwing gifts inside that supposedly comfort the evil power. Once they wanted to block the cave with a large rock and close the way for hail and storm that would not be able to get out. For this purpose they moved the rock plate and rolled it toward the cave, allowing it to escape and

headed for jumping into the valley, where almost teared down priests house in Martinjak. The cause of all these disasters were supposedly witches who lived in this cave. When preparing a storm church bell was always ringing and thereby warding off hail and witches« (Žirovnik, 1899).

The congregation of witches was called the »Sabbath«. By admitting his or her attendance to the Sabbath, the accused signed his or her death sentence. Usually these meetings were held on witch mountain tops (the most known in our country are Slivnica, Donačka or Rogaška gora, Klek, Grintavec to a lesser extent), or on crossroads. Witches supposedly anointed themselves with special lotions and flew to these meetings - as themselves, or in the form of an animal - on brooms, on fire-tongs, on animal back, and even inside a barrel. They supposedly assembled in late night hours, convened with the Devil, and made contracts with him. At those occasions witches had sexual intercourse with the Devil, and practiced witchcraft with intent to cause damage. The victims of the processes had also described these meetings as feasts, characterized by heavy drinking and dancing. Most favourable dates for the Sabbath were the eve of Candlemas, the eve of May 1, the eve of November 1, and summer and winter solstices.

Stories of Slovene »witches«

The period from the 16th century well into the last quarter of the 18th century was marked by terrible and cruel violence against the human body. In early modern criminal matters, the process of interrogation and sentencing took place behind closed doors and was strictly separate from the public announcement of the sentence and the punishment. While it became customary for acknowledgement of the crime to be the ultimate evidence, judicial authorities used extremely violent methods of torture to achieve an admittance of guilt. Physical violence against the body was supposed to encourage the acknowledgement of the crime. With the aid of

barbarous tortures, using »harsh interrogation« with various torture devices, the judiciary forced confession, as conviction followed only after the acknowledgement of the crime. Minor crimes and misdemeanours were punished with humiliation punishments. Offenders were publicly exposed, bound to a block or in the stocks, placed in shaming masks, chained to a pillory, locked in a fool's cage, submerged in a river, or forever marked and shamed by having their body parts cut off or being mutilated or branded. Women accused of witchcraft were usually burned at the stake, like in four stories of Slovene »witches« described below.

1. The tragic love story of Veronika of Desenice and Frederick II., Count of Celje

The first process under the accusation of witchcraft in Slovenia took place in 1427 in Celje against Veronika of Desenice. She was the second wife of Frederick II., Count of Celje. Little is known of her early life. It is believed the name Deseniška derives from the village of Desinić in Croatia, where Frederick also had extensive estates. Veronika was minor nobility and Frederick's father Hermann II. greatly opposed to the marriage. The chronicles of the Counts of Celje suggest he had his son arrested and, while holding him prisoner, initiated a trial against Veronika accusing her of witchcraft. She was acquitted by the court, but despite this incarcerated in Ojstrica Castle near Tabor and murdered (supposedly on the orders of Hermann II.) by being drowned. She was buried in Braslovče and a few years later Frederick arranged for her remains to be reburied at the Carthusian monastery at Jurklošter. In her memory also made an endowment to the monastery at Bistra. Her grave was discovered in 2005.

2. The story of Anica at Ljubljana Castle: The Barbarism of Torture - an exhibition of torture devices from the 16th to the 18th century

The exhibition offers a more detailed understanding of the course of criminal procedures of the time, from jail and interrogation to the execution of the sentence, with the aid of costumed characters - the Ljubljana executioner Hans and his victim Anica, who has been accused of

witchcraft in a story that is based on an actual witchcraft trial that unfolded in Ljubljana at the end of the 17th century.

Taking the example of the Penitentiary at the Ljubljana Castle, which opened exactly 200 years ago, visitors will learn how, under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, physical punishment was replaced by detention and the focus shifted from public punishment aimed at serving as an example and a warning to the masses, to rehabilitation of the individual delinquent. Ljubljana of that time was no exception to the rule, with the preserved documents bearing witness to the interrogations that took place behind the walls of the Tranča building in Ljubljana, and to the execution of humiliating punishments in front of the Town Hall, where there once stood a pillary (pranger), a fool's cage and a bench, and at Friškovec, where capital punishment was carried out by executioners dealing the fatal blows.

The exhibition of early modern torture devices, tools and requisites, which were used both to achieve a confession of guilt by means of torture and to administer punishment for minor and serious offences, is intended to shed light on the time of the proliferation of torture practices and cruel punishments, while also serving as a reminder that even today these practices are nowhere near being merely a residue of the distant past. Is today's supposedly civilised society any different at all?

3. The tragic love story of Agatha and Friderich Herberstain, count of Hrastovec Castle

In the 16th century, a young count from Hrastovec, Friedrich Herberstein, fell in love with beautiful Agatha from the Štralek manor. Friedrich's mother opposed to their marriage, therefore the young couple got secretly married in the chapel of Stipler (today, the annex church of St. Mary in Radoha). So, Friedrich's mother accused Agatha of witchcraft. While Friedrich was at war, his mother tortured Agatha and made her throw a new-born baby into the burning stove. Then, she reported the fact to the judge who condemned Agatha to death. Her step-mother demanded that Agatha be beheaded. When Friedrich returned from the war, he could

not find his beloved wife. In his grief, he planted a black cross, a symbol of unhappy love, in the ground where the tragedy happened. Today the black cross can be found in Lormanje in Lenart municipality. The story is described in the book »The Black Cross«, by Ožbalt Ilaunig.

4. The last one on the stake: Marina Šušarek in Ribnica

The Process of Ribnica was a typical witch process, with the usual accusations - from flying on the Sabbath and making contract with the Devil, which was eagerly advocated by the judge, to accusations of causing damage by witchcraft, partly reported by the people from the village. It is also characteristic that it was a group process in which the accused were forced to inform against their colleagues, which resulted in new victims. The process was held for at least two years, from 1700 to 1701, but it might have started earlier, and lasted longer than that. The Process of Ribnica resulted in at least seven victims: Marina Šušarek or Češarek (burned on the stake), Marina Košir (died in jail), Jera Šober (imprisoned, almost certainly burned on the stake), Ana Zbačnik (burned on the stake), Neža Rus (burned on the stake), Lucija Kerznič (died in jail), and Končarica (imprisoned, almost certainly burned on the stake) (Košir, 2001).

Marina Šušarek was forty-two years old, mother of six children, married to the shoemaker. She was accused of witchcraft and put on the witchcraft chair to confess her guilt. After three hours of torture she admitted to be a witch. She had to admit that she was making hail, attended the Sabbath and concluded a pact with the devil. She was sentenced to death. They cut off her head with a sword. Her body was thrown on the stake and completely burned in dust and ashes (Košir, 2001). Records of her trial are kept in the Archive of the Republic of Slovenia.

Conclusion

Dark tourism is a growing phenomenon internationally that has gathered significant attention on the part of the academic literature in the past decade. Including forms of cultural and historical commemoration, but also visits to sites of horror and violence, dark tourism is becoming an important source of income for some destinations. Number of visitors of places of disasters, tragedies and scenes of murder, witchcraft and cursed places is rising sharply. Such places visitors attended previously in history, but this were not called dark tourism.

Irresistibly attractive places of accidents were identified in the tourism industry as a promising market niche. Human inquisitiveness has become a source of income of the organizers of tourist trips, also locals are satisfied who earn some money because of their past disaster.

Dark tourism is the most serious type of tourism and has highly educational role, while provoking endless discussions on how the difficult past could and should be presented to the visitors. The main motive for visiting all those dark memorials is to understand the causes and consequences of various events in order what to do that would never happen again, so find out what happened and understand why this has occurred. Strong motivation for visiting is also to commemorate the victims of a particular historically important area.

Also in Slovenia we have many dark stories (not only dedicated to war) and themes that can be developed into (innovative) tourist products, as shown in the case of witches and witchcraft, which was prepared by the atmosphere of fear, envy and resentment. Usually an unfortunate happening, like hail, or illness, supposedly provoked by witches, or accusations among neighbours, initiated the charges of witchcraft. On most occasions people were not able to explain the reasons for disasters, thus witchcraft was a handy explanation. If prayers wouldn't help, nor amulets, nor church bells, only the stake remained.

The witch processes are classified among the dark phenomena in the history of mankind. These processes were nothing else but legal murders, the accused were burned for the actions which they could not have possibly done. In spite of numerous researches a satisfactory and final explanation for these wide-spread events has not been found. A reasonable explanation would be indeed quite hard to conceive. The idea of »evil«, which the world is trying to eradicate by »fire«, is an old one, constantly reoccurring, and not limited to the past. The timeless conspiracy theory can be easily recognized in it, and whoever dares oppose is in danger of being quite quickly classified as one of the alleged conspirators. Thus the witch processes point out the possible connections with the contemporary history, and open the questions regarding the impulses within ourselves.

Dark tourism is in fact often linked to processes of selected memorialization of past violent events, and to a related production of specific geographies of memory. The question is to what extent it is in fact acceptable to market a tragic event, who should deal with destination images created by the media, to what extent tourist and visitor expectations created by the media can in fact be met, and how managers and curators of dark tourism sites can effectively communicate the message of the site to tourists and visitors.

Debates should also be focused on the modalities of the visits, on the technologies of display implemented to remember and visualize the past, on the ethical issues related to leisure activities in sensitive locations. At the end we can just say: *Memento mori!*

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Transformation of Ecological Aspects of Industrial Symbiosis in Post-Industrial Society

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Abstract: Industrial symbiosis takes place in the social milieu and is addressed in light of opportunities for exploitation of ecologic, economic and social synergies. It is understood as a relationship between two or more social actors, involved in exchange of material resources, water or energy, where each actor follows its own benefits, while contributing to the benefits of other actors and society in general. This article studies the transformation of ecological aspects in post-industrial society based on secondary data. First, we focus on potential identification and classification of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis. Later, we develop an approximation of the general concept of ecological aspects. We establish the way in which ecological aspects in post-industrial society – the society of information and knowledge – transformed as result of different ecologic and social influences. The article links transformation of ecological aspects to an increasing importance of education, environmental protection and science, and the presence of rapidly growing information technology.

Key Words: Industrial Symbiosis, Industrial Symbiosis Networks, Ecological Aspects, Transformation, Post-Industrial Society.

Introduction

Industrial symbiosis represents an interdisciplinary research environment, the primary research field of which belongs to ecology, economy as well as sociology, while related industrial symbiosis research is also being conducted in the field of biology, geography, chemical engineering, logistics, supply chain management and waste management. Some authors (Chertow 2007, Howard-Grenville et al. 2008, Gingrich 2012) define industrial symbiosis as an approach to industrial ecology³²; as synonymous to industrial ecology (Phillips et al. 2005); as subset of industrial ecology (Chertow et al. 2005); activity within industrial ecosystem³³ (Rui et al. 2010); eco-industrial symbiosis representing circular economy on local and regional levels with sustainable effects and approaches to environment (Hartard 2008); or as one of the three levels of industrial ecology research (Hartard 2008). Industrial symbiosis exists in the social milieu and is studied through its opportunities for exploration as well as ecological, economical and social synergies. In fact, it can be categorized into an industrial ecosystem, which we see as environment, in which social actors manage transformation of material/water/energy resources into raw material, while industrial ecology and other fields of research examine this transformation, carried out through industrial symbiosis, on their own. In accordance with the four flows, typical of industrial symbiosis networks, we speak of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in terms of exchange of material resources between social actors. A large post-industrial society with its emphasis on information in light of

³² Industrial ecology is a scientific discipline, interested in material and energy flows in industrial and service activities with the purpose of appropriate use and reuse of these resources (White 1994).

³³ Industrial ecosystem is an integrated system, which provides for an optimized use of energy, material resources and sewage, which are used as raw material for other manufacturing or non-manufacturing processes (Frosch et al. 1989).

new knowledge represented a significant shift in ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis.

Theoretical Framework


Industrial Symbiosis

In its natural environment, symbiosis is linked to the concept of mutualism, where at least two different parties exchange a material resource, energy or information for their mutual benefit (Huber 2012). Chertow (2000) defines industrial symbiosis as a collective approach, which includes physical exchange of materials, energy, water, and byproducts between social actors in different industries with the intention of gaining a competitive advantage. On the other hand, Manahan (1999) defines industrial symbiosis as mutually-dependent relationship between two social actors, which exchange material resources and energy for their mutual benefits, where the intention of each partner is to increase their own benefits as well as the benefits of the other partner. As a paradigm, it can be seen as a relationship between two or more social actors, involved in exchange of material resources, water or energy, where the intention of each partner is to increase their own benefits as well as the benefits of the other partner and society in general. Social or economic actors in the exchange of material resources, water or energy are represented by industrial as well as non-industrial companies. Beside companies, social actors are also local communities, local authorities, educational institutions, research centers, ministries, and government and similar agencies on a national and international level.

Chertow (2000) has defined a minimum criterion of industrial symbiosis, which demands the involvement of at least 3 social actors in the exchange of at least 2 material resources. Following is an example of industrial symbiosis in the sense of physical exchange. A social actor – if a company, then economic actor – named Company 1, sells its waste, produced as result of their primary business activity, to another economic

actor, named Company 2. After processing, Company 2 uses the waste as raw input material for production of another new product, which represents primary activity of Company 2. Company 2 sells by-products resulting from its primary activity to a different economic actor, named Company 3. Company 3 processes the waste and uses it as raw input material for production of a new product. Figure 1 displays a graphic representation of the minimum criterion for the existence of industrial symbiosis.

Fig. 1: Minimum criterion for the existence of industrial symbiosis (Chertow 2007)



There are four flows connecting the actors: information, material, financial and knowledge flow. Information flow runs in both directions, i.e. connects all actors involved. Material flow begins with the partner selling the material resources – in this case from social actor 1 towards social actor 2 and next towards social actor 3. Financial flow usually runs in the opposite direction – in this case from social actor 2 towards social actor 1 and from social actor 3 towards social actor 2. In practice, financial flow can be excluded when only material exchange occurs between the partners.

Knowledge flow is a very important aspect, enabling social actors to exchange know-how and experience. Knowledge flow is multi-directional, same as information flow. The advantages of industrial symbiosis for social actors and society alike apply to ecological, economical, and social areas. In ecological sense it is carried out through joint reuse of used material resources; in economical sense it applies to joint savings from purchasing new material resources and correct disposal of used material resources; in social sense it is visible through joint social concern in terms of established approaches in environmental management and informal networking between social actors, bringing new knowledge and best practice into all other fields of management.


Industrial Symbiosis Networks

Industrial symbiosis can be studied through industrial symbiosis networks, as it represents their integral part. Domenech (2011) provides two definitions of industrial symbiosis, based on different approaches to the research of industrial symbiosis in industrial symbiosis networks. One approach is eco-industrial park, the other is eco-industrial network. Eco-industrial parks are spatially-defined entities, while eco-industrial networks are information centers (Domenech 2011). Hartard (2008) also mentions so-called cooperation of neighbors, representing cooperation between neighboring companies and industrial parks on a local level (Hartard 2008). On the other hand, he defines eco-industrial parks and eco-industrial networks as cooperation between companies within a region (Hartard 2008). Chertow (2000) also names geographical proximity of partners as one of the conditions for industrial symbiosis. Industrial symbiosis networks can be seen as virtual networks, which are present and active on regional, national or international level, where industrial symbiosis can be carried out in accordance with the geographical proximity criterion. Another definition of industrial symbiosis networks compares these networks with eco-industrial parks and industrial ecology (Mirata 2011); while a different definition states that industrial symbiosis and eco-

industrial parks represent key concepts of industrial ecology (Lehtoranta et al. 2011).

Uzzi (1997 in Domenech et al. 2010) focuses on 3 typical characteristics of industrial symbiosis networks: trust between social actors; transfer of information (which also includes transfer of knowledge); and joint resolution of problems. This means that social actors, which act as nodes to connect different elements of industrial symbiosis networks, are more efficient in adapting to social environment with its constant, daily changes depending on current trends in supply and demand. Industrial symbiosis networks connect social actors, which cooperate in carrying out industrial symbiosis in order to fulfill their own economic, ecologic and social goals. Like other networks, they consist of nodes and connections. Social or economic actors will represent the nodes of industrial symbiosis networks and cooperation between these actors will represent the connections between the nodes. The connections are represented by four flows: information, material, financial, and knowledge flow. Material flows are carried out on local and regional levels; whereas industrial symbiosis networks exist on a national or international level. Flows between the nodes can move by different scenarios. In scenario 1 all four flows can move between the nodes; in scenario 2 three flows can move between the nodes; in scenario 3 and 4 only one flow – usually the information flow, which acts as precondition for at least one more flow (material, financial, knowledge) between the nodes. Social actors in industrial symbiosis may only exchange advice and experience, not necessarily material resources. In this case, one of the existing combinations of scenario 2 is possible. Figure 2 shows a scheme of industrial symbiosis networks in the social milieu.

Fig. 2: Industrial symbiosis network as part of social milieu



Extant case studies of industrial symbiosis and of industrial symbiosis networks

The existence of industrial symbiosis world-wide is confirmed by 20 large and internationally acclaimed case studies, which are mentioned in the works by different researchers in the field of industrial symbiosis and industrial symbiosis networks (Onita 2006). Case studies on the practical implementation of industrial symbiosis were performed on four continents, namely Europe, Asia, America and Australia (Onita 2006). All 20 cases of industrial symbiosis represent a form of exchange in material and energy resources between economic partners/companies. Table 1 shows 20 case studies on industrial symbiosis.

Tab. 1: Case studies of industrial symbiosis and industrial symbiosis networks (Onita 2006)

Case study	Country
Alberta	Canada
Golden Horseshoe	
Burnside Industrial Park	
Nova Scotia	
Montreal	
Sarnia-Lambton	
Tilbury Industrial Park	
Brownsville Eco-Industrial Park	USA
North Texas	
Gladstone Industrial Area Network (GAIN)	Australia
Kwinana Industrial Area (KIA)	
Guayama	Puerto Rico
Kalundborg	Denmark
Kawasaki Zero Emission Industrial Park	Japan
Map Ta Phut	Thailand
National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP)	UK
Ora Ecopark	Norway
Rotterdam	The Netherlands
Styria	Austria
Tampico	Mexico
Alsen Cement and Salzgitter Steel Works	Germany

Since 2003 National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) is in place in the UK, which aims to use industrial symbiosis as a solution for re-processing industrial waste into raw material. Unlike research in the field of ecology and economy, industrial symbiosis research is still in its development phase. University College in London deals with industrial symbiosis, industrial symbiosis networks and social network theory from a social perspective. The research resulted in a 2010 doctorate dissertation titled "Social Aspects of Industrial Symbiosis Networks". The dissertation was written as a reaction to the current (developing) status of social research in this area (Domenech 2010). Its conceptual framework includes the key flows, social and discursive dimensions of industrial symbiosis

networks; whereas the research focuses on dynamic analysis of interactions between social actors (Domenech 2010).

Ecological Aspects of Industrial Symbiosis

Ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in general can be interpreted as reasons for implementation of industrial symbiosis, as advantages of industrial symbiosis, as indicators of industrial symbiosis, but also as characteristics of industrial symbiosis. Given the four flows, which can be identified during implementation of industrial symbiosis in industrial symbiosis networks, we can speak of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis when material flow is present or when material resources are being exchanged between social actors. Ecological aspects are general or specific. General ecological aspects include processing of previously used material resources, which come out of the industrial/non-industrial process as waste, re-use of processed material resources as raw material for industrial/non-industrial processes, processing of by-products and other material resources, which are not categorized as waste, in other industrial/non-industrial processes. Because we can name the aforementioned ecological aspects general, this implies that they can be present in all industrial and non-industrial processes, where industrial symbiosis is performed (exchange of material flow between social actors). This complies with ecologic advantages of industrial symbiosis, such as decreasing the use of new material resources, decrease in emissions, exchange of waste and other material resources, and decrease in use of renewable energy sources (Mirata 2011). Specific ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis can be defined as those aspects of ecology, which apply only to individual industrial symbiosis networks within specific industries. For example, if we take a look at industrial symbiosis networks in the steel industry, then material flow is represented by an exchange of specific steel material resources (which can be steel waste and/or

byproducts). Beside steel-type material resources, other materials can be exchanged between the actors.

If researchers interpret ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis as indicators of industrial symbiosis, we can use these aspects to recognize and study:

- new approaches and practice for minimizing any environmental effects,
- development/level of development of industrial symbiosis,
- socio-cultural aspects of industrial symbiosis,
- economic aspects of industrial symbiosis,
- efficiency of industrial symbiosis in individual social actors – status before and after its implementation,
- during the performance of industrial opportunities, opportunities and challenges, which are unrelated to industrial symbiosis, are identified or become visible.


In the framework of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis we can study individual ecological aspects, which are present during implementation of industrial symbiosis within a random industrial symbiosis network, thus depending on the purpose and goals of research. We can also study all ecological aspects, which are present during implementation of industrial symbiosis. Although we only focus on ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in this article, we should also emphasize that ecologic aspects are inextricably linked to economic and socio-cultural aspects. This means that one of the three reasons – ecologic, economic or socio-cultural – is required for performance of industrial symbiosis. When one of the reasons for performing industrial symbiosis is present, we speak of advantages on ecologic, economic and socio-cultural area and related three aspects of industrial symbiosis. All three reasons or only two reasons can be present (with potential combinations between them) – in any case the ecologic, economic and socio-cultural advantages will be visible and all three aspects can be studied. In general, ecological

aspects of industrial symbiosis can be defined as reasons for the performance of industrial symbiosis, which show up as indicators of industrial symbiosis, as well as its advantages and characteristics.

Post-Industrial Society

For post-industrial society we normally use terms, such as society of services, information society, society of knowledge and 21st century society. Daniel Bell was one of the beginners and advocates of post-industrial society, who defined industrial society in terms of the quantity of goods and post-industrial society in terms of quality of life, measured by its services, comfort, health, education, recreation and art – all this is desired and available to everyone (Bell 1979 in Hansen 2001). Through chronology, the concept of "post-industrial" closely follows that of "industrial", which follows the concept of "pre-industrial". Bell (1976 in Hansen 2001) defines pre-industrial sector as one based on economy, which involved agriculture, mining, fishing, wood-processing and other natural activities. Industrial sector was based on using machines and energy; whereas post-industrial sector is based on information processing for the purpose of information and knowledge exchange (Bell 1976 in Hansen 2001). According to classification of sectors into primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary we see post-industrial society as transition into society of services (Cohen 2011). With the occurrence or beginning of society of services, the person itself becomes raw material for processing (Cohen 2011). Thus, in post-industrial society most people are involved in production of services and information instead of manufacture of tangible goods. Figure 3 displays the transition from pre-industrial into industrial and from industrial into post-industrial society.

Fig. 3: Characteristics of transitions from pre-industrial to post-industrial society



English-speaking economists have coined a term in accordance with Fourtié’s idea of "face-to-face" work, which demands a direct contact between the manufacturer and his client (Cohen 2011). Link (2009) describes post-industrial society as radical transformation of economical and political structures, which incited dramatic shifts in societies with a high level of knowledge and highly-educated work force available to advise the government and companies. The key element for post-industrial society is information and service production as well as theoretical knowledge in the tertiary and quaternary sectors; and person, who is appropriately trained and capable of performing complex tasks, demanded by post-industrial society. A job in post-industrial society includes working with knowledge. Bell (1973) calls post-industrial society “society of knowledge”, because the sources of innovation are based on research and development. Knowledge is important in all fields – technology, economy and society. Bell (1973) defines post-industrial society in two ways:

1. Sources of innovation are based on research and development, creating a new relationship between science and technology – theoretical knowledge becomes central;
2. The field of knowledge becomes very important, if we judge according to gross domestic product and the share of people working in this field.

The quality of (processing) information and knowledge, which were critical for post-industrial society and resulted in research and development were also critical for the innovations in scientific and technological fields. This began to change the opinions of experts and the educated and information became more important than the physical strength of a person working at a factory. Post-industrial society also expedited the development of industrial symbiosis in its updated conventional form. From the beginning of post-industrial society, industrial symbiosis was performed through material and financial flow, information flow was performed in oral and written form only, and knowledge flow was pushed into the background; whereas all this is changed later on in post-industrial society. Information flow, supported by information and communication technology, becomes critical for the existence of material and physical flow as well as knowledge flow in industrial symbiosis. Post-industrial society has also impacted the relationship towards natural environment.

Development of Industrial Symbiosis and Transformation of Ecological Aspects of Industrial Symbiosis in Post-Industrial Society

First instances of industrial symbiosis in history can be found in the period of commodity exchange (goods-for-goods), when people exchanged goods (not waste, because material resources for survival were rare at the time). When a person no longer required a material commodity and instead required a different commodity, offered up his commodity for exchange. After the commodity exchange period came industrial symbiosis in the

form of commodity-for-money exchange. In this case, a person sold a commodity he no longer required (could be waste or not) to another person in exchange for money. It is hard to say that the afore-mentioned examples of industrial symbiosis contained any sort of ecologic or social reasons. The primary reason for exchange was survival, later on followed by the need for money, thus we can speak of economic reasons. It is also hard to speak of an optimum use of material resources, which is another characteristic of industrial symbiosis, although such activity was already present in some areas. The advent of industrial society increased the optimum use of (rare) material resources in manufacturing processes and begins to develop industrial symbiosis (although named differently) for its economic benefits.

In 1937 industrial symbiosis is first mentioned and described in the article "Geography of Glass Manufacture at Toledo, Ohio" by Walter G. Lezius (Lezius 1937). In 1947 both industrial symbiosis and industrial ecology are mentioned in the article "The General Principle of Industrial Location" as a "Law of Industrial Ecology" by George T. Renner (Renner 1947). The latter defines industrial symbiosis as merger of two or more different industries, where each industry tries to find an optimum access to material components and material elements (Renner 1947). In 1967 the president of American society for scientific progress writes about cases of industrial symbiosis, in which one industry neutralizes or uses waste from another industry (Spilhaus 1967). 1989 was another inspirational and landmark year for industrial symbiosis, when first research was designed and performed (Chertow 2007) in Kalundborg, Denmark, where companies/economic actors in connection to their local administration developed a complex network for exchange of waste material to be re-used as raw material in industrial processes. The project involved 11 companies and the research included a total of 13 projects (Van Berkel et al. 2008). This and other research, which followed, began to show, mention and achieve its ecologic, economic and social aspects.

Cases of industrial symbiosis before 1937 can be named informal types of industrial symbiosis and can be further divided into preliminary and final form. Preliminary forms include exchange of material goods, while final form includes exchange of goods and financial resources. First examples of a formal type of industrial symbiosis appeared after 1937, when industrial symbiosis was first named as such and included all three aspects. In relation to transformation of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in post-industrial society we speak of a passage or transformation of ecological aspects from industrial society into post-industrial one. Before post-industrial society, only re-processing of waste was seen as ecological aspect of industrial symbiosis, although it wasn't performed for its beneficial environmental effects, but rather for economic reasons. The first mention of environmental aspects and beginnings of ecology can be traced back to the time of Aristotel, but the ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis, as we know today, only began in the post-industrial society. We can say that formation and transformation³ of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in post-industrial society were impacted by the same factors as development of industrial symbiosis and types of industrial symbiosis. Information was a critical element of this transformation of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in post-industrial society: quality of information became more important than quantity thereof; information exchange is supported by information technology; information and knowledge is processed to be used in tertiary and quaternary sectors. At the same time, the increase in the level of knowledge and education inspired a new opinion on natural environment. In the 1960s ecology emerged as a new science, fueled by concerns for the current and future condition of our environment, bringing with it industrial ecology as a new scientific discipline. Industrial ecology was primarily interested in the large environmental impacts of the industry. In post-industrial society, industrial ecology was the one of the first scientific disciplines to begin identifying and researching ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis based on relevant cases of industrial symbiosis, scientific development and ecologic innovations. In this period, industrial ecology connected to and cooperated with other sciences, which support

the research on industrial symbiosis – mostly economy, sociology and biology. The transformation of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis was greatly eased by the development of information society with the rise of computers, hardware and software, thus information society as the synonym for post-industrial society.

Ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis have and will continue to transform under the influence of factors, brought on by new knowledge, new experience and information technology, new demands in environmental protection, and related concern for society in general. Up to the 21st century, ecological aspects in post-industrial society have transformed so much to become indicators of industrial symbiosis as best practice in areas of ecology, economy and social development.

Future Research

Our next step involves a detailed research of industrial symbiosis in light of its importance in industrial symbiosis networks in individual social milieus. With this research we wish to identify and define the conceptual framework of industrial symbiosis networks, which are operating on a regional, national and international level. The research will require a pilot study, which will be our basis for all further research on industrial symbiosis as it will provide an overview of the status of industrial symbiosis in Slovenia, where it is currently in its development stage. Industrial symbiosis and its (informal) forms in Slovenia can be categorized into three groups, which are present on micro level of the social milieu and could be useful for our research. The three groups were designed based on secondary resources on industrial symbiosis, which are available on the websites of companies from all statistical regions of the country. The first group contains companies, which are actively involved in industrial symbiosis and use similar terms to name it, such as eco symbiosis, industrial eco symbiosis, etc. The second group contains companies, which

are involved in so-called final (informal) forms of industrial symbiosis, but use a different term for this type of operation. The third group contains companies, which are thinking about joining an industrial symbiosis venture, understand it as an essential social practice and plan to incorporate it in their future operations. We wish to study the current status of industrial symbiosis in Slovenia within industrial symbiosis networks, which we could form based on information about connections and cooperation between social actors. The primary goals of our research are:

1. identify a general concept of industrial symbiosis in Slovenia,
2. design a conceptual framework of industrial symbiosis networks,
3. identify ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis,
4. determine the impact of ecological aspects on social actors in industrial symbiosis networks.

Primary data will be collected using semi-structured interviews on the micro level, where we will first define relevant social actors, which could provide us with representational and high-quality information. When selecting companies, we will focus on ecologically- and sustainably-oriented companies. Among these companies we will select micro, small, medium and large companies from a list of processing companies, managed by Slovenian Environment Agency – at least five companies from every statistical region. Semi-structured interviews, used for collecting data, will include four sets of questions. An analysis of the interviews we give us an insight into existence and connections between social actors in industrial symbiosis networks, which we had foreseen. Data will be processed in a program for qualitative data processing, which we will select during our research.

The results of this pilot study will provide answers to our current questions on industrial symbiosis in industrial symbiosis networks. It should provide an insight into the current status of industrial symbiosis in our country. As previously mentioned, it will support our detailed research on industrial symbiosis within industrial symbiosis networks in a specific social milieu. Primary goals of the research are:

1. identify socio-cultural aspects of industrial symbiosis networks,
2. determine the impact of socio-cultural aspects on the structure of industrial symbiosis networks, and
3. determine the impact of socio-cultural aspects on social actors in industrial symbiosis networks.

We will try to find answers to questions above through research program, which we are currently developing. Beside the hard and soft sciences, the program will also include important practical applications, such as developing the tools for incorporating industrial symbiosis into natural, technical and socio-cultural environment. The suggested research program would include dynamic complex networks, which form technical, natural, computer and social systems outside their borders. The goal of this program is to develop a theoretical model, approaches and analytical methods, which would enable acquisition of knowledge about the foundations of industrial symbiosis and its characteristics, which should be monitored.

Conclusion

In this article we presented industrial symbiosis as a current and necessary practice, which brings about ecologic, economic and social advantages to the social milieu for social actors as well as society in general. We have presented a general concept of industrial symbiosis and

its placement in industrial symbiosis networks. We also defined ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis and characteristics of post-industrial society, which caused a transformation of ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis. These aspects will continue to evolve under the influence of factors, supported by new knowledge, new information technology, new demands in environmental protection, and the concerns about society in general. Since ecological aspects of industrial symbiosis in post-industrial society in the 21st century have already transformed to such an extent that they indicate best practice in industrial symbiosis in light of ecology, economy and social matters, it would be wise to continue research in this direction, i.e. how social actors recognize and identify individual aspects and what individual aspects represent for social actors in industrial symbiosis networks. First, we will design a pilot study in order to review the condition of industrial symbiosis in Slovenia, where it is currently in its development stage, and provide a foundation for future detailed research on industrial symbiosis.

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