The Movement for the Culture of Peaceand Nonviolence Year 1, No. 3 December 1991 III I III—— - Black Hole 1 By Dominique Cochard - Space, Decadence and Optimism 2 By Marko Hren 1 - After Free Elections, No Democracy 3 By Ali Žerdin - Reappearance of the Civil Society ? 4 (through the struggle for abortion rights) By Marija Melodič - Croatian Refugees: the Loss of Orientation S (an interview with Goga Flaker) By Dominique Cochard - Children in War 8 By Nina Pečnik - Most / Voluntary Service Slovenia 9 - The Disadvantages of the Law on COs 9 By Antiša Korljan A Roof Above the Streets 1 O By Bratko Bibič - Metelkova: a Study Čase 11 By Alenka Burja - Dying for the New European or World Order 1 2 Intervievv with Tonči Kuzmanič - The Heroic and Poetic Burden of Second-class Spaghetti VVestern 1 3 Report of the Scientific Symposium, Ljubljana - General Selfishness and Bad Amateurism in Politics 1 5 An intervievv with Jan 0berg - After Yugoslavia What ? 18 Press review-TFF report - Peace Movements, Anteroom of National Revolutions 1 7 Out of an intervievv with Tonči Kuzmanič - One Year of Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA)- 1 7 By Marko Hren , - Non-Violence as a Solution 1 8 Intervievv With Rexhep Ismajlij - Human Rights Report on Kosovo 20 Ul'Ul i' - "WHY?", a New Publication 21 By Ibrahim Spahič - Let It Be Peace 22 Intervievv with Stefan Milenkovič and His Family |TTTHnBS33CTHES8E3ESSna53S&&38KBHIflMBSHHBai - A Proposal to Stop the War 23 - Blue Helmets in Croatia ? 24 By Doroteja Lešnik I I I I I I I I — - European Peace Press Project 25 - Vis, European Demilitarisation Project 25 By the Peace Institute - Silence Kills, Let us Speak for Peace 27 nu I I UH I - why do these black vvorms fly just everywhere ? 23 By lela b. njatin - Golgotha - Dubrovnik, It is ali of Us 29 By Franjo Likar EMasHggaa The Intruder* Year I, No. 3., December 1991 Issued by: The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence Address: Mestni trg 13 61 000 Ljubljana Tel. 3861-210374, Fax. 224666 Edited by: Dominique Cochard Design: Darja Vuga Demilitary Publishlng Password: Stop the War *The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence is issuing information abroad from 1984 and has been publishing newsletters in Englishlanguagefrom 1985on:dur- ing the years 85, 86, 87 titled Infor¬ mation BuHetin of the Peace Move¬ ment in Slovenia and during years 88, 89,90 The Independent Voices from Slovenia. In 1991 it was re- named to The Intruder. We ali hope that The Intruder vvill remain ii) the manifestation. With your help, too. Please keep in touch, send us a note, feedback, letters, money, love! If the stars vvill feel OK, the next issue will be out in March 1992. C 0 N T E N T S Jack hole or open questions Where is the slovenian civil society gone ? I don’t know wether I lack analytical ca- pacities, education or informations, but what is not doubtful is: I can’t understand, neither the processes of this disappearence nor its reasons. Therefore I have no clue conceming the appropriate cure. I am just able to observe. The last meeting of the Movement for the culture of peace and non-violence had as a main topič on its agenda: “Who are we ? What do we want ?, to put it in a trivial way. Clear symptom. Simple constatation too: “we are not constituting a counter- power anymore”. The syndrom of westem apathy is spurting out. Denying the programm of discussions, this small assembly tried to define what would be the ideal, nostalgic of the old good times. The ideal being unreachable creates the best conditions to give up before the beginning, with a very comprehensible fear of difficulties and impotency. Frustration, loss of self-conftdence is thus feeding again the State of apathy. Surely, the war in Slovenia created a shock, which left tracks. Shali we allow ourselves to believe in a necessary and normal transition period ? The extremely quick changes in the situation (both inside Slovenia and in the f ormer Yugoslavia) are requesting a great emotional and intellectual flexibility. Are these supra-human qualities ? The need of constant redefmition of lines of actions, positions, is hovvever enormous. If not fulfilled, the chaos is contagiously expanding to ali areas. Furthemore the “small is beautiful” slogan of Slovenia seemed to content the necessary characteristics, in previous times, to enable people to believe in the accessibility and easiness of lobbying, acting, speaking up, and being heard. Why do I witness, nowadays, the opposite situation?: the size of this nation does not allo w to produce a sufficient variety to provide new blood to ideas and wills. Is this reactional phenomena of enclosure and suffocation anyhow connected with the separation from the rest of Yugoslavia ? The dryness of this isolation leads to an euphoria of openings to the “shiny, rich, and powerful” (united!) West. Complex of inferiority. Paranoid feeling of being observed. Aitificial reactions and irresponsible pretendings: Instauration of a new currency, laws written to please the West, peace activists believing in their potential power to influence the UN policy.... Not being taken seriously by dint of wanting to look serious or important... Stili the massive people’s belief is “everything is going to be alright !” with the additional condition “If we get recognised !”. After tire promise of Eden through “independence”, the next step is “recognition”. How far can blindness and naivety lead ? Dominique Cochard, December 18th 1991 Note: This Intruder is not afraid of being observed, therefore ali kinds of feed-back (however nasty they can be) will be appreciated as generator of progress and improvements. 71 V 1 T O Space Decadenee and Optimism Fin de siecle. The history repeats. Last Christmas the letter to friends supple- menting The Intruder announced tliat the answer to the question, what will happen inYugoslaviain 1991 can involvejust ali answers - ali scenarios were open. Now it is clear - the space of Balkans have de- cided to exercise the worse scenario. It seams that it is releasing the frustration in dissbalanced relations betwen East and West and North and South - Yugoslavia was ali four together. The world around us is changing much faster than we can ever realise. What we lack is the ability to observe, reflect and not get disturbed by chaos produced by the change. The State of chaos even offers more opportunity for reconstructions - if only the mind remains clear. Nobody believed that the potentials for violence on theterritory of Yugoslavia were so high, nobody took the regime of Serbian State against Albanians in Kosovo ali over 80ies seriously enough, nobody took military trials and threaths of military coup in Slovenia as an alarming fact. And then, when the worth scenario has hap- pened, everybody feels impotent. In the čase of Yugoslavia everybody failled - nationally and internationally. The on!y one who can profit is the US policy which will be in the čase of Yugoslavia again after the Gulf most probably called to play the role of the world policeman after Eu- rope and the UN willdeclare their unability to solve the problem. The decadent athmosphere in Europe, the problems with refugees and rasism, the impotency and even ignorance in dealing with the brutal developments in former Y ugoslavia must have been reflecting some much deeper thrauma of the European civilisation then just a shock because of the war in this “sain” continent.. It might be , that centuries of colonial politics of European States are in this century - and particularily with the ap- pearance of faschism - producing a countereffect. European civili- zations were never able to com- municate with nations that they confronted during their imperial- istic missions. When Columbus 500 years ago by mistake landed on Bahami islands the Aravvaks offered his man the hand and sharing. Europeans did not under- s tand the indian culture of sharing. It was just not a part of european system of values. They wanted to sattisfy their interest. What has followed were centuries of genocide which continued ali over Americas. Great Discovery or a lost opportunity for two cultures to meet ? B ad experience requests the history to repeat. Europeans will have to learn to accept other cultures with an open hand as Arawaki suggested. Columbus interest was the one of the market economy - his mo¬ tive was gold, spices and slaves. Market economy destroyed the culture of sharing. The economy of the powerfull (vertical hierarchy of monotheism) replaced the economy of equals (hierarchy of gods and spirits in ali appearances of the creation). The market economy now rulles the world and people from the third world are moving in agony to the land of their con- querors. The problem came back to Euro¬ pean civilization which will have to learn the principles they missregarded - the principles of sharing. The one who won became a victim. What can we celebrate then? Where is tire line of an optimist? Certainly not the Columbus year, certainly not the new world order, certainly not the unification of Europe or the independency of particu- lar republics in former socialist monolits. But what then? We should maybe cel¬ ebrate the fact that we are able to see the things more clear. It is bad on the planet - ali over the plače. But at least we know it better. In Serbia after centuries of strong millitary traditon hundreds of thousands of people renounce the war - they know this war is bad. Eventhough the problems are manifesting in most tough way, this brings some positive, deep personal ex- perience of the most important values and truth - the truth of the humble being which found itself in a course of planetary evo- lution and confronts itself withpermanent question - what is the next step? Stoping and looking back might bring more answer than running front blind eyes in a crowd. We have to question seriously the European culture of posession, statehood, imperialism and power games and find answers in the cultures which were the victims of Europe. 1992 is a good oportunity to work on renouncing the elit- istimmage of (white, cultural, integralistic, modern ect.) Europe - because of famous 500 aniversary and because of the fact, that the most brutal war on the planet has now been spreading on the “old conti¬ nent”. 19 th December 1991 Marko Hren telegraph A SMALL PEACE CA RAVAN will be coming to Yugoslavia. The first step vvill be Ljubljana, on the 27thof December. Itisorganised byHCA-French branch. ALBA, an association for Conscientious objec- tion from Budapest is organising a kind of cara- van, too, due to go to Vojvodina to support the resisters. Ml ZA MIR is a dutch organisationestablished in October 1991 by women from various peace and human rights groups. The aims are to put an end tothevvar in Croatia, prevent it to spreadall over ex-Yugoslavia. Help to people seeking ref- uge in Netherlands. MARCO PANELLA joined by some russians and czechs, began a hunger-strike,atthe moment of occupation of Vukovar. Before Christmas, he vvill go to the first frontline in Osijek. (Marko Hren just decided to join this hunger strike action.) ry ■■■■ ■ ■ ■ " ■■■■■ ■ b a i ■ i | SPECIAL THANKS \ > i J To ali contributors ofthis issue: ] i writers, photographers, designer i 1 who, apart from their hearty 1 j collaboration,work professionally j i for small amounts of money , i i To ali people abroad i who gave feed-back t 1 who diffuse our articles through ' their national press or own i means t i who supported us morally > who supported us financially ■ i > To ali readers < MERRY CHRISTMAS HAPPY NEW YEAR Slovenia vvasonce described asan“island of freedom in Eastem Europe”- a flatter- ing title earned because of many initia- tives organised by the republic’s healthy civil society. Slovene democracy did survive 10 days of war- tliere was no curfew, and the parliament was able to convene. But democracy is more than the absence of violence or censorship. ELECTIONS Slovene society has been militarized. Police repression is clearly visible. Atti- tudes to immigrants are marked by intol- erance and racism. The democratic špirit of civil society is rapidly disappearing. This is the irony of post-communist Slovenia. After free elections, and the fall of communist rules, tlie possibilities for free and open discussions have receded. The Communications netvvork of the citi- zens’ movements lost its function after poIiticalpartieswereformallyestablished. Slovenia’s pacifist groups have no real influence. But their energy remains: some alternative groups are pressuring to have the form er barracks of the federal army in Ljubljana turned into their headquarters. (1) If their request is granted, tliere will be at least one sign that the democratic špirit of civil society stili exists. One of the most importantpre-war initia- tives centred on the complete disarma- ment of Slovenia. By some estimates, 50 percents of Slovenes wanted demilitari- sation before the war. No w Slovene disar- mament sounds like a utopian provoca- tion: its advocates arebranded as traitors. Ali Žerdin, Ljubljana This article has first been published'in Yutofax (16th of November) (1) This project is developed in details in the article: "For a Roofabove the Streets". 3 photo Diego Andres Gomez The REAPPEARANCE »I The discussion about the new slovenian constitution raised its boiling-point, its Faust-dilemna. The only non-consensual point in the whole constitution left both in the constitution commission and among different parties in the parliament was the paragraph about the “human right to decide over birth of one’s own children” (reproductive rights) which includes the abortion rights and the duties of the State to provide the facilities (the opportunities) to make this right be- come truth (1). This result is actually no surprise for anybody, who attended the discussion and arguments in the last two years. Anyway, there exists now a strong pressure towards the ommission of this paragraph in the constitution with the main following argument: Slovenia has a new State, which aims at a very immediate recognition at the international level, desparately needs a new, democratical constitution. As a consequence of the former intraparty agreement on every single constitutional paragraph there should exist a consent of every party in the parliament. So, if there is no agreement on the question of human right to decide over the birth...., including abortion rights, this paragraph should be left out in order to adopt the new constitution and make possible the new elections. Some opin- ions ffom the very conservative corner sho w their “ wondering over the excitment around this funny question”, because if the adoption of the new constitution could be endangered with “such trifle”, Europe should really “laugh at us”. On the other side, there was an absolute agreement of ali parties before the beginning of consti- tution-making process that the new con¬ stitution should not diminish former rights in any way. C I V I L S 0 CIE T Y By Marija Melodič But what is actually the point of this strife in Slovenia ? Many independant women’s groups had already publicly argued for the preserva- tion of this right in the new, post-socialist constitution: first, because the whole leg- islation on this subject is derived ffom this constitutional right, second, because they started to comprehend thisrightasaground for their political and social rights (this right has been constitutional since 1974), and third, because there exist evidences about very good results of former liberal and social oriented legislative on this question. Very many opponents to the constitutional reproduction rights are claiming that the defenders of this right are making “abortion propaganda” and that abortion is no right but “emergency way out” which dqes not belong to the constitution. The arguments of the de¬ fenders of thepreservation are: this is a set of rights, including abortion, and its ommission would put the 51% of the population in the position of second-class citizens. Namely in the čase of ommission, there exists the possibility to change the legislative on this question with the sim- ple majority in the parliament. Besides, it is quite obvious that this right has a strong symbolic importance. It does not only represent a danger for the possibilities of abortion, but the symbolic abolishing of the equal position of the vvomen because of quite clear publicclaims that they should not decide on their own. Another argument of the opponents to the constitutional reproductive rights is that there exists no European country with such constitutional right: which is very questionable as an argument because of the elderness of most of the european constitutions on one side, because of the rude comparison between different tradi- tions and systems, in anotlier side. Al- though the opponents of the reproductive rights in tire constitution are claiming that they don’t want to abolish abortion rights, itisquiteobvious thatthey wantto achieve it in another way: one does not need to forbid abortion to make it difficult or impossible; the new Christian-democrat government already decided different re- strictive measures tovvards making access to abortion difficult, by centralising or abolishing women’health centers, sus- pending the liberal director of the universitary women’health center in Ljubljana, making abortion and contra- ception payable.... Furthermore, the in- creasing discussions in the medias make women feel more and more guilty about it.... There are also very goog principle and practical reasons for demanding the pres- ervation of reproduction rights in the con¬ stitution. Last but not the least, because there is stili a long way to the point where they would be understood as a value as such. This introduction about the background of the constitutional discussion about abortion might A ls!l£W STATE V help to understand \vhv a large demonstration took plače in Ljubljana on the llth of De¬ cember, with the demand to preserve the reproductive rights plus abortion right .Thirteen independent vvomerfs groups, women’sinitiatives in tradeunions, and in parliamentary as well as non-paliementary parties organised the demonstration, in which about 1500people, men and women, participated. Tlieir banderols and the slo- gans they cried out were: “Women’s rights into the new constitution !, Women’s ministery!, Women’s parliament!, Abor¬ tion without compromise !, There will be new elections once more !, If you decide without us, we will choose against you !, form the common at the day of demonstra¬ tion and refused the ommission of the reproduction rights. After the second world war this was the first large women’s dem¬ onstration in Slovenia. The daily Večer from Maribor rightly called it the “first civil demonstration after the elections in spring 1990”. It was quite obviously that actually no- body - neither in the government nor in the parliament - expected such strong opposi- tion to the commission or reduction of mentioned paragraph on reproductive rights. So far the demonstration was a success of independent women’s groups. But however, the big question is to know wether it can provide enough influence to 11 Ih of December in Ljubljana, 1500 persons... (photo Diana Andelič) etc...Their demand was undoubtful pres- ervation of reproduction rights preserva- tion of reproduction rights and participa- tion in the last discussion in the constitu- tional commission and in the parliament. The session of the parliament vvas inter- rupted because of a large part of (oppositional) parliamentory delegates joined the demonstration. It is important to stress that there is only 11% of women in the slovenian parliament and only one woman in the constitutional commission. Despite the strong pressure of the govem- ing parties the women’s delegates in the parliament (25 from 240) succeded to preserve this right in the constitution. The moral dilemna the delegates are facing - to make decision with women - is obviously not clear enough to them. December 1991 (1). It is very important to stress, that this right did not include only abortion rights (on demand until the 1 Oth week of pregnancy) but, first of ali, the social, health and other facilities to make it possible to give birth to desired children. This included the wholenetof wom- en’s health centers, accessible (free) contraception, abortion on demand, payed out of the health insur- ance. Not to speak about the free health čare for mothers and children, and other social facilities. V m. KLEW STATIE CROATIAN REFUGEES: THELOSS OF ORIENTATION LJUBLJANA: THE GROVVTH OF FASCISM* An interview with Goga Flaker, coordinator of voluntary work in refugees’ camps What is the refugees perception of Ljubljana, as a plače of exile ? Ali they kno w is that they don ’ t want to go back to Croatia, and curiously, they even don’t want to move to Istria: we never managed to get any explanation for that. So many things arecompletely irrational... Finally the ones who climbed in the bus for Istria were the ones who were the most strongly against this idea. We just can’t understand. Neither of us can understand yet what’s happened to those people. To loose everything, maybe this I can understand what it means. But, to be put somewhere, not knowing where they will be next montli or next year, as Slovenia is declaring: “we don’t have money, that’s enough”. The refugees are very scared they could be sent to Italy or any other country...Nothing is stable. Most of them completely lost orientation, especially children. We didn’t understand why they were so happy when we an- nounced we were going for a walk to the castle (which is situated on the top of a hill in the middle of Ljubljana). Once there, we realised: from the castle, they finally could see where they are ! What connections do thev stili have with Croatia? They really feel they are not understood by the surroundings and are very often told they are completely forgotten by Croatia. Their first ground was the prom- ise of croatian authorities to send teachers in the camps in order to run normal school for tire children, and this hasn’t been ful- filled. They don’t have any direct contact with Croatia, in any way. I would say that their impression of the drop from Croatia is quite justified, at ali levels: when we asked the peace groups in Zagreb to come, visit the camps and help us to find appro- priate actions and behaviour with the refugees, they claimed it was not a prob¬ lem worth to be considered, and surely not a priority. How do thev perceive the war in Croatia, from Ljubljana ? Do thev think of the time when thev will be able to go back ? People believe deep inside they are going to stay for quite a long time. Though they are very touched by the conflict, they somehow are putting the problem aside. Even when they watch TV, it is as if it was concerning another planet, and after ali I think it is comp!etely normal, a kind of defence. Nevertheless, I believe it creates By Dominique Cochard BSBSSBB ■ — in them an internal conflict: they don’t know what to do with themselves, the whole atmosphere is very tensed, they are arguing ali the time for very little things, smashing children’s faces for no reason. They say they can’t imagine living with the serbs anymore. There is an incredible hatred in them. I think people working in these camps and the whole civil society should help them to overcome this hatred: this is the most important thing we can do to help them, or try to help. For that you really need a lot of patience, and that’s where people from abroad can help a lot. Otherwise, this hatred will spread slowly; it is already beginning. But, any kind of action has to be taken slowly. Hatred is so big. One day, some- thing incredible happened: we went to the town center with a group of children, we gave them pieces of chalks, and they be- gan to draw on the pavement. I was speaking with somebody for five minutes not paying attention to what they were doing, and suddenly, I discovered the pavement was full of hatred, political system,...symbols. I was really shocked, as well as everybody else. A psychologist, later on, saw the dravvings and couldn’t believe they have been made by so young children. These signs were so perfectly realistic. Pid it reach the point of pathological trauma ? There are not yet many observations con¬ cerning that. Are thev regularlv examined bv psv- chologists ? I think that, for the moment, women need more help. Two psychologists willing to work witli refugees had to force the way in: when they first rang the camps to propose their collaboration, they have been ans wered there was no need because some social workers were permanently in the camps. I finally managed to introduce them. They are now coming once a week. That is obviously not sufficient for 600 people. Anyway the organisational aspect is get- ting better little by little, rules are estab- lished, the Red Cross, the Civil Protection of the Town Hall are helping. It is at least less chaotic. The center for mental health is preparing a project called “therapy to overcome a shock”. What is the reaction of local people to- wards them ? The situation in Ljubljana is the worse. In small towns they organise themselves better, both local authorities and popula- tion. Al though I am stili a bit critical about the way they work. It is very often that slovenian volunteers and workers in these camps get angry on refugees, claiming they are behaving like in hotels, everything has to be done for them... I am trying to explain that they are in state of shock, that there is no way to pass them messages through without pa¬ tience. Discriminating attitudes can also be ob- served in the streets: unemployement is rising in Slovenia, therefore slovenian often feel it is not fair that the refugees get a roof and food without working, this at their cost. It is somehow understandable. Therefore, we did not dare trying to find jobs for them. There would be too much pressure on them. And, at the same time, I see ali these slovenian families coming to social centers, having nothing at ali, even not the subsistence level. Did vou think of developing a kind of inner econom v (craft works to be sold on the market) ? We have been suggesting it. There are already some craft workshops, but for now, they only make things for themselves, exchange, or give presents. I am sure it will develop: we put slowly into their minds that they could earn money with such activities. It would also be important for the promotion of the problem, as well in Slovenia as abroad. The best reaction was the children’s one: they decided on their own to produce christmas cards, but tliey were suddenly desperate because they realised they would not be able to send them to Croatia. We A K LEW STATl£ V had to persuade them we could spread tlieir cards abroad. What are the main actions vou and the volunteers initiate in the camps ? We have to get them to become active. It is rather a difficult task: as I said earlier the slovenian volunteers working with them are very often getting angry, not finding a way to communicate really with the refu- gees. A very significant example of sudden involvment of two refugees stayed in the back of my mind: two teachers from Šibenik (dalmatian coast) were accomodated by friends of mine. My friends became very quickly fed up with these refugees because they were watch- ing TV ali day, never participating in any housework. They asked me to get them involved in tlte camps. The first day they came, having been pushed, they kept standing inactive in a corner of the room ali morning. I just warned them that they will anyway have to stay until 4 p.m, and that they might get bored: they looked at me with great anger. When I proposed them to start organising things for chil- dren (as they are teachers), the anger in their eyes changed into hatred. In the evening, around 8 o’clock, my friends rang me up a bit vvorried: “They are not back yet. What did you do with them ?”. They just started to work well, are com- pletely in, and feel responsible and useful. What about the aims ? I firstly and mostly expect a lot from the slovenian people. The most basic thing they can do is to develop in themselves a special patience. I think we will have a growing problem in 1992: the economic situation will get worse in Slovenia, and I grow no illusion that the refugees will go back to Croatiain the coming year. Maybe even more Albanians and Bosnians will come. Therefore, we need to get struc- tured and build strate- gies to be able to face fascism, which is al- ready grovving. We should not isolate refu¬ gees in the camps from the local population, tlien creating ghettos. We should integrate these croatians in the sloven society, in prior- ity, before training tliem to 'go back to Croatia (through actions such as trust-building sessions withlocal people,..).We are already working this way with the children: they have a lot of activi- ties commonly with a scout group from Ljubljana, local chil¬ dren are free to join. The problem is now to get organised enough, that people willing to help will know about us, where to get informed, whom to pitone... To achieve this, I am thinking of quiting my regular work. What about practical involvment of the volunteers. concrete evervdav work ? Around 70 volunteers are no w working in the camps; it is increasing everyday. Most of them are from the academy, because some lecturers there are cooperating with us, thus advertising our activities, inciting students to take part. These students devote a great amount of their time: most of them spend tliree days a week witli children, beside, they are fundraising, are tiying to get material.... One girl is even working tliere ali week, putting her studies aside. During the small trip we had to the castle, I saw volunteers carrying a handicapped man up to the top: in many years of or¬ ganising voluntary work, I never saw something like that. Until now, the usual volunteer’s behaviour was to expect evrything to be organised for them, and have fun. I even remember myself, last year, commen t ing the passi vity of students, and of this newgeneration in general. This tune the reality is completeiv different: they devote tlieir entire leisure time, do their best to organise themselves. Who is rvorking with the volunteers to advlse them, giving them the necessarv strategv to follovv ? Or do thev get a specific education ? There are of course no skilled people concerning refugees. Nobody liere knows about this specific problem yet. There is nevertheless a group of 6 people working with volunteers: 5 professionals (social workers), and one person is work- ing permanently in the office coordinat- ing ali activities. These professionals get 4000 Tolars a month (a bit less than 100 DM) for 8 hours daily work. We have meetings once a week: both professionals and volunteers. We organised lectures at the beginning, also because we were scared as well to handle such problems: group building, psychology, civil protection... Volunteers very quickly stopped to attend: their involvment was of emotional nature, they did not know clearly yet what they wanted, what was the need... Now they have these two months of practical experience, the request for education is coming from them. so, we will begin again, straight after new year. We also thought of initiating some re- search work on tliis specific situation: it would involve people of our group of course, but it would be very good that people from outside the situation would join the team of researchers. In that regard, did vou have anv contact with refugee’s cen ters abroad. with which vou could sliare experiences and rese- arch? Not yet, unfortunately. Are there exclianges between the two centers vvhicli are in Ljubljana ? We did try. It did not work. Each center quickly developed jealousy towards the other one. First of ali, the two centers are complete differentcases: one is situated in barracks at the edge of the town, the other one in two blocks of flats into town. There simply cannotbe the same things happen- ing in both: conditions of living and the atmosphere are too different. * More than half of a million of persons have been displaced from Croatia & Bosnia. Amongst them more than 30 000 refugees came to Slovenia ( 2. 3 million population in total). Slovenia is facing the refugee problem for the first time ? For any further informations: Association for Preventive and Voluntarv Work Linhartova 13 61 000 Ljubljana, Slovenia Phone: 38 61 - 129 141 /234 Giro account: Ljubljanska Banka 010 - 727001 - 100158/47 (Photo For dof c). A KLEW STATLE V N i -o; rtnr in WAR By Nina Pečnik, post-graduate študent ofpsychology, Zagreb Nina Pečnik is involved in the following voluntary and non-institutional activities and initiatives: “First shelter for battered women and children informer Yugoslavia" To understand the problems of children in war, one must realise that these numbers have the following implications. Children face or have faced the threat on their physical integrity. Not only vvounded children have to čope with pain, fear, insecurity. Some face violent deaths or constant menace on the lifes of their par- ents or close people they know. Some were exposed to fightings, bombings, deprivation of food and water. Many were forced to leave their homes and friends under very stressful conditions. Some are separated from their families. Many are being influenced by tire emotional State of their parents, who are often very tensed or overwhelmed by emotions of helpless- ness and unable to give them the feeling of support and protection. Many experience the fear of separation, enuresis nocturng. One can approach the situation of chil¬ dren in Croatia through several facts. According to the medical headquarters data of november 26th, 37 children were killed and 250 wounded in the war in Croatia. That includes only children who are in hospitals or have received medical treatment. The number of displaced children can be estimated from the total number of dis¬ placed persons, which was over 500 000 by november 26th (official data). At least one third of them are children. That in¬ cludes 30 000 primary school children and 16 000 secondary school students. At the moment, there are about 40 000 dis¬ placed families (women, children and elders) in Zagreb. The number of children whose parents died in the war is not known yet. Accord¬ ing to the official informations there are over 10 000 victims, but the estimated figure is around 30 000. The vastmajority of them had children. Ali children in Croatia are exposed to direct experience of war. Psychological effectranges on ly in degrees - from living in the cellars in areas where fightings are continuously taking plače, to living in the areas where the occasional air-raid sirenes force them to shelters and cellars. nightmares, anxiety, inhibition, depres- sion, agression, self-destruction, psycho- somatic difficulties, failure in school,.... Differentkinds of actions are necessary to meet the growing needs of children in war. Beside providing help for children, helping parents and teachers to under¬ stand the specific problems of children, and teach them how to overcome or čope with such difficulties seems to be most urgently needed. This text has first beeti published in "Agora ”, the bulletin of the foundation of conscience, n.O, edited in Zagreb. 8 A KlEW STAT LE V photo Diego Andres Gomez Most VOLUNTARYSERVICE SLOVENIA is an independant non-governmental organisation, which is coordinating voluntary work in Slovenia and abroad in connection with foreign organisations. MOST: - supports initiatives of individuals and groups, help them to realise their aims, if based on the principle componenets of voluntary work: solidarity, self-help, ... for the benefit of the local community. - collects and give finances to ali groups and individuals for non-profit projects in spheres of protection of nature, help to marginal social groups, peace education, conscientious objection, etc - organises trainings for volunteers and otherpeople in order to spreadprinciple of voluntary work - spreads informations about voluntary work abroad - joins international actions convinced that cooperation of people ffom different nations, religions, culture and political beliefs supports the idea of better under- standing between people and non-violent solution of conflicts At the moment, MOST is initiating sev- eral international projects with the Asso- ciation for preventive and voluntary work in the refugees’ centers (see the intervievv with Goga Flaker): - An international vvorkcamp for Christ- mas: prepare both feasts with the refugees, run activities for children... - An other workcamp in February, stress- ing more on mediation between refugees and slovenian - Will follow a medium term projects: 4 international volunteers for 6 months, to work permanently in the camps MOST will become a branch of SCI- International. For further informations or financial sup- port, contact: MOST / VOLUNTARY SERVICE SLOVENIA Aškerčeva 9 61000 LJUBLJANA CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN SLOVENIA n Slovenia conscientious objec- tors (COs) were recognized in April this year, when the new law of defence was passed in the parliament. In this article Iwill explain the process of receiving the status of CO. and teli something about disadvantages of the law. First of ali it is necessary to be told that actually not every Citizen can be rec¬ ognized as CO. Namely, the law is written that way, tliat only those who were not in the army yet can apply for the status. That means that quite a big percentage of slovenian male population stili has no right to object in accordance with their conscience. When the youngster re- ceives a call for conscription, he has to declare himself as a CO. In this letter he has to write his reasons for such decision. The reasons, predicted in the law are: philosophical, ethical, religious and hu- manitarian, while tlie political ones are not mentioned. After sending the letter, one is called to a kind of commission, which has to decide whether ones' reasons are strong enough or not. The comission make their opinion on the basis of a short letter and of the intervievv they make with a CO. The alternative Service is just as long as military and it has to be done in the institution of the public importance. The question is: which are such institutions? It is obvious, that in the country, which is involved in the war, also the production of arms is of public importance. Unfortu- nately, we don‘t have any experience with people, who decided for such way of serv- ing the country. It was reported that about 150 people decided for alternative Service till now. As I told before, tire length of both Services is equal and that is, I think, the only advantage of civil Service. Namely, everything you do in that time is defined by the State: what will you do, where will you live in that time (forbidden to live at home) where will you eat... You even have to wear a special sign on your clothes, what is quite uncomfortable con- sidering the present slovenian public opinion. Namely, the slovenian soldier is becoming a kind of a myth, after Slovenia won the war and now you are a coward if you don‘t want to be a soldier. Rea)ly in- teresting turn in the way of thinking, be- cause not so long ago Slovenians were known as “ military illiterate nation “.Tliat was something about them, who are al- lowed to be CO, but bigger problem is for them, who once served the federal army. For them there is no chance to get a status of CO, no matter how long ago they were in the army. We can say that the law doesn‘t consider the advance of their mind through the years. For them situa- tion is quite hard, because they have no legal way to maintain their basic right to refuse to kili. We suggest them to declare themselves as COs inspite of the law and there was already reported that some of them was sent to the alternative Service instead to the military. It gives some hope. Another problem, which is stili unsolved in every European country, is a problem of total objectors. Honestly told, there is no realistic chance to recognize them in the near future. After ali you‘ve read you can see that there is no real chance for objection, there is only the opportunity to choose the alternative, civil Service. Anyway, after ali, we have to say that the situation in Slovenia is not as bad as, for example, in Serbia, where there‘s no chance to be objector. In čase you refuse to go to the army ( federal ) as “ volunteer “ you are treated asa traitor. The sanctions, predicted in the larv, could be very hard, even death penalty because of being deserter. But, tliat' s another story. Antiša Korljan A KLEW STATI: 7 I k o v f or roof Ei bove the Istreets In the beginning of September 1990, “Mreža za Metelkovo” Network for Metelkova Street - was founded in Ljubljana, the Capital city of Slovenija, by an initia- tive of ŠKUC (Študent Cultural Centre) and Movement for the cul- ture of Peace and Non- violence, starting ffom experiences of alterna¬ tive (sub)cultures and social movements in eighties and in regard to transformedpolitical, economical, cultural and social circum- stances in Ljubljana and Slovenija. Up to november 1991, ap- proximately two hun- dred individuals, infor- mal working groups, institutions andorgani- sations (app. six hun- dred individual mem- bers) have joined the network with the pur- pose to satisfy some of their basic needs within working and leisure fields of different (es- tablished, alternative, sub-)cultures, allkinds of arts (especially visual arts, theatre and mušic), non-institutional edu- cation, sports and games, publishing, ra¬ dio broadcasting, social movements, sexual and other minorities eman- cipation etc. In short, the main scheduled goal of the network is twofold: 1. to get and to convert the large area of (ex- jugoslavian) military headquarterbarracks on the very edge of the city’s centre in an “ex- centered” area of multicultural creativity in general, and of net- work’s members in particular; i.e. to open up to now blocked large urban space to residents of Ljubljana and their guests by establishing public and working space(s) for differenti- ated and pluralist (socio) cultural pro- duction and leisure ac- tivities; 2. to build up a com- municative and coop- erative network of cul¬ tural activities agents and participants in this location and beyond it, i.e. to improve tlie size, quality and spectrum of exchange of analyti- cally and practically relevant socio-cultural informations, personal contacts etc.; to im¬ prove quality and quantity of cultural creativity by develop- ing managerial func- tions under specific technological, organi- sational, spatial etc. conditions in this loca¬ tion and beyond it. j In our self-perception, the first goal is seen as a starting point in finding a solution of a great structural lack of cul¬ tural working and pub¬ lic spaces inffastructure in Ljubljana, which has been accumulated in parallel to qualitative and quantitative devel- opment of socio-cul¬ tural creativity and of its agents during the last ten or twenty years, under and against po- litical, ideological, economical, cultural and social conditions of a self-m an agement type of socialism. On the other side , the space infrastructure is a nec- essary, but not sufficient condition in regard to the other, “logistic” levels of cultural work and leisure activities: this constitutes the rea- sons for the achieve- mentofthe secondgoal. Considering the actual socio-cultural situation in terms of space infra¬ structure and modes of (self)organisation of the most propulsive popu- lation, we believe that the realisation of both goals would mean - and is a condition of - an important and neces- sary step forward in de- velopment of already reached degree of a pluralist, democratic and innovative multicultural society, its openness to the otliers within frames of the city and the country, in a space of inter-regional, transnational and inter- city communication and collaboration. Concerning the in- creasing amount of un- o t empioyment in Ljubljana and Slovenija, the network project would establish tlie conditions for a cer- tain degree of self-em- ployment in different fields of socio-cultural activities and accom- panying Services, which are under-represented in the structure of some basic social and cultural needs of Ljubljana’s population in general. This “multi-meaning” of a network project, articulated with an im¬ portant role of culture in general and alterna¬ tive (sub) cultures and social movements in particular in a (peace- ful) democratisation of slovenian society, seems to be tlie main reason for quasi-com- plete support from the mass and local medias, general and cultural public opinion, a great number of important opposition groups and some of ruling coali- tion’s political parties on republic and local lev el. According to their public statements, the project is supported by a city urban plan’s in¬ stance as well. Bratko Bibič, President ofExecutive Board V 10 A LE W STAT LE ^ o To learn about the background of "Metelkova network", you can read the article ‘for a roof above the streets". The main starting point for social research “study-case Metelkova” was the process of proceeding demilitarisation in the Capi¬ tal city of Ljubljana as well as in Slovenia. We were especially interested in conver- sion of the military barracks to the civil objects and ali the influence that such conversion would bring in the sense of encouraging the economical, urban plan- ning, social and cultural development in Ljubljana. While we were preparing this survey it came to the fundamental structural politi- cal system changes: independence of Slovenia, military attack, departure of Yugoslav Army lfom Slovenia, etc.. Above mentioned reasons, time and fi- nanciallimits,plus the needof “Metelkova network” for planning financial, organi- sational and marketing projects, led to the limitation of social research mostly to the revision of opinions and attitudes of the members of “Metelkova network”. Therefore theprimary starting pointof the social research was to establish and ana- lyse vvorking fields of members, their needs for plače, their cultural and artistic effi- ciency, their goals, desires, attitudes, de- mands, facilities, requirements, opinions, etc. Generally, we wanted to investigate the relation to the conversion of military building to civil objects, readiness of the members for cooperation in realisation of “Metelkova netvvork” project to accom- pany their cultural activities and plans, how much plače is needed, financial state, attitude towards political questions, coop¬ eration with mass-media, opinion about the magazine M’ZIN, etc. For the research we used the method of interview questionary, combined with mailing and telephone enquiries. We sent questionaries with ali instructions to the addresses of ali members of “Metelkova network” in June and made phone calls till the endofoctober 1991 exceptduring two months of period because of the war. We gathered ali informations with a spe- cial Computer programm and in statistical data processing captured 127 questionaries. Now let me present the results: Members of the “Metelkova network” are mainly: painters, sculpturers, designers, photographers, mušic and theater groups, New Age’s groups. Some of them are even institutionally working groups. The data indicates the the major part of the members of “Metelkova Netvvork” are involved with more tlian one activity at the same time. Most of the respondents would not mind to work in the same plače with such a diversity of activities. It is undiputable that a lot of members have no plače to practise their activity or at least not appropriate ones. The activities with which they are entering the netvvork is the only source of living for lot of them. They believe that by gaining a plače in Metelkova barracks they vvould improve the quality of their vvork. The members of Metelkova are very active in terms of shovvs, appearances, exhibitions, etc, in tlieir home country as vvell as in ex-Yu- goslavia, and abroad. More tlian half of the members are gaining money for tlieir activity by themselves, the technical and other supplies they get are rather bad. Respondents are prepared to finance and maintain the places they vvill gain. In their opinion, the local governmentof Ljubljana as vvell as the State of Slovenia should participate for a great proportion in the adaption of the former military objects. The majority of tlie members is vvilling to support “Metelkova netvvork” vvitli their knovvledge and their equipment. Very interesting are the ansvvers on the question “hovv should Metelkova be or- ganised after gaining the military bar¬ racks”. Quite different opinions appear: some think that groups must vvork by tliemselves, tlie others support the asso- ciation of enterprises, only a minority is in favour of self-governing establishment. An essential motive for being member of the “Metelkova netvvork” is the necessity of getting a plače and communicational links. Respondents stated that their Crea¬ tive vvorks must be exposed for as many people as possible, not only for their fans. In their opinion, Metelkova could be an ideal plače for communication betvveen A different groups. They expect the “Metelkova netvvork” project to be real- ised in one year or tvvo. There are some interesting datas in the field of Public Relations. respondents es- timate that there is not enough attention from the mass-medias, especially televi- sion, for their activities. But in the other hand, it is pleasant to knovv that the greatest part of members keep their ovvn documen- tation on their vvork. Respondents gain informations about their special activities by themselves in professional revievvs, vvithpersonal contacts, or in mass-medias. The majority accepts the idea that an in- formation-documentation-analytical cen¬ tre should be established vvithin Metelkova, vvhich vvould inform them about similar activities taking plače out- side of the netvvork, offer ali informations they need, put in order ali documentation and present their creativity outside. Most of the respondents request the Serv¬ ices of Metelkova for Public Relations, but suiprisingly, not for management. Tvvo thirds of the respondents estimate themselves as apolitical and are against the idea that Metelkova vvould take plače vvith other civil movements in political life. To the question “vvhat vvould be es¬ sential for getting the barracks”, half of the questioned people are in favour of an agreement betvveen “Metelkova netvvork” and the government of Ljubljana, the other half for a pessure on the public opinion. It is evident from the results that the need for getting the plače is enormous. Mem¬ bers are claiming about 18 000 square meters for various purposes: ateliers, studios, places for rehearsals, shovvs and performances, exhibition’s hali, shovv room, vvarehouse, offices, etc. They are also avvare of ali special needs: ventilation, vvatervvorks, electricity, ground, the way of conveying, height of ceiling, etc. About M’ZIN, the quarterly magazine of “Metelkova netvvork”: Respondents accept the name of the magazine, but in their opinion it should be issued monthly. They even think M’ZIN should become a municipal cultural magazine, its priče should be higher, its quality better, vvith the same number of issues (around 1000), and must mostly inform members about different cultural events. In terms of socio-demographic datas, I must emphasize that the members are mostly from Ljubljana, are high educated (or stili students), there are more men than vvomen, and in great proportion are be¬ tvveen 20 and 30 years old. Alenka Burja LviLEW STAT15 7 | FOR THE NEW EUROPEAN OR WORLDI What h as been (and is) tlie role of international and european peace move- ments? The role of international and european peace movements ought to be twofold: first, strong pressure on different european (and other) gov- ernments in order to accept measures which wouldpro- duce peaceful Solutions in Y ugoslavia, second, actions towards the concrete (material, finan- cial,...) help to underdeveloped peace movements in Yugoslavia. The fact that there were not stronger or larger demon- strations for peace organised by european peace movements, is at the same time incredible and frightful. It is as if Yugo- slavia was too close to Europe; maybe is it hard to demonstrate against ourselves ? Or is there a lack of “foreign intervention” in Yugoslavia to clarify who is right and who is wrong ? Or, perhaps, european peace movements have the same prob- lems as yugoslav ones: nationally organ¬ ised peace movements have problems among themselves as well as different european govemments have. However the absence of stronger peace action in Eu¬ rope (East and West) is an extremely per- ilous sign. It seems to me that Europe - as Slovenia presently - is just trying to “for- get” what is really going on in Croatia. Which is vour opinion about the political role of the european communitv in the crisis? The relation between the EC and Yugo- slavia is possible to observe through the following prism: Yugoslavia was more or less a european product; moreover, a sort of by-product of bloody european history in which Yugoslavia used to play the role of excrement. In this sense, Yugoslavia was and stili is a “european truth”. But unlike previous times, Europe is now the one trying to “keep” Yugoslavia together by positive or negative means. This way Europe tries to compensate two things: the lost sovereignty, formed by Tito in tire previous system, and, the cohesive exter- nal element which does not exist anymore, causing tlie disintegration of the State. Differently from previous times, when Europe and Balkans were shaped by these particular powers, Europe is not United. Para- doxically, Yugoslavia is not threatened any more by Europe, forbreaking its entity, but it vvants to keep it together in accordance with its own image, and at the moment - the first one in the history - when its parts want to disintegrate. Shortly, international factors, which I call here Europe became the intemal part of the crisis in Yugosla- via. Its proposals of any kind are parts of the conflict itself. Though I agree with Johan Galtung (Peace researcher, USA) that “ the european community has too many vested interests to play the role of a third party”, I think the main problem concerning Yugoslavia is that Yugoslavia does not exist anymore. The key point is that, at the end of the twentieth century, we are witnessing the rebirth of the proc- esses of geo-political strategies accom- panied by ali other remnants connected with that sort of political thinking and acting. What does the peace movement of former Yugoslavia expect from the EC ? There is nothing like the Peace Movement of former Yugoslavia, and EC - unfortu- nately - is nothing vvhich is outside of Y ugoslavia. The EC hascaught itself in an ideological trap of “mediation”. It is completely normal that EC is follovving the similar path as YPA already was. The last hope for the people from the former Yugoslav State is UN, but it seems that its help will also come too late. The yugoslav crisis is becoming a quite obvious symp- tom of the vanishing of the old, cold-war order. The question is only how many thousands or even “thousands of thou- sands” of people in Europe should pay “full priče” with deatli, for the processes of “modelling” the new European or World Order. - Interview with Tonči Kuzmanič, realised for ASPE iltalian press agency) P ti ti PQ ti < * 0 M H ti 0 ti P ti 0 H 0 ti ti ti ti S H ti h cfi ti * H H H ti ti 0 < ti 0) 0 ) co < ti o » p ti o o ti 0) < ti o Reporton the second scientific symposium “Non-Violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia”, held in Ljubljana, 24-26 October Tlie reporton the first scientific symposium was published in The Intruder no. 2 _he october council took plače in Ljubljana at the moment, when there were already a lot of writings on Yugoslavia and war, so it was very clear tliat we had to do with a new situa- tion. Anyway, with the dangerous ideo- logical phantom stili existing, it seems that everything is clear as far as Yugosla- groups. That can only be, at the most, the partial truth, cannot bear generalisations, can be shown by empirical datas, cannot be considered without the fact that, on the territory of Croatia, in the middle of army operations in Slavonia, there are villages and towns where there is “no war yet”. Although these villagesand towns are like the otherones: inhabited by the ethnically John Wo\ne in The Big Trail, 1930 via is concerned. Because of this situa- tion, Ljubljana’s meeting sounded differ- ent. We, first of ali, tried to analyse the differ- ent sides of the war, which are usually considered as obvious, pushed aside, or made abstract. We decided of this way of doing because this kind of analysis never give an “a priori” interpretation of the events in Yugoslavia. Let me introduce the Ljubljana’s meeting results in four parts, which might inspire our work in the near future. I start with the assumption that we did not meet to praise our already realised inventions and our more or less “definite” Solutions and an- swers on complex questions. On the con- trary, we tried to make appear ali tlte details relative to the matter of stereotypes of economic explanation about the polysemantic and stratified war on the territory of splitting Yugoslavia. I sup- pose that ali of us are craving for contro- versies and new questions of the conflict’ s net we have to deal with. However, I hope we will not simplify problems, but under- stand them in their complexity. Kthnic conflicts ? We will probably agree that, for the mo¬ ment, the dominant interpretation of con¬ flicts and war is one of “ethnic conflicts”, of clashes among these or those ethnic mixed population, there is stili “peace”. How can one explain it from the ethnic point of view ? We should also consider the fact that besides the croats, serbs or montenegrians, being at war in their ma- jority, there are croats on the serbian side and serbs on the croatian side. Shortly, it is worth mentioning that the supposition about the ethnic war is only partially true. Economy ? The second element of the dominant pic- ture of war and conflict in Yugoslavia is the one speaking about battles which can be explained through economic motivations, i.e. the one presenting the conflict as possible to understand through the categories of “economic rationalism”. However it can be practically proven that this does not have to do with oil or other fields, for which YPA, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, fights. The opposite can be claimed: the logic of war in Croatia is not the one according to which one of the sides would get or occupy more for itself. It is a clash which attempts to put the enemy in a situation as bad as possible. If you put itdomesticalIy, the question is not for me to get your cow, but to make your cow die. The thesis according to which the “economic rationalism” of the war in Croatia can be relative, is very indirect and stands only in its negative form. Thus it is not a question of what form to have, but of not allowing the others to have it. In general, we can say that this war is not a problem of “having”, but of “being”. In close connection with this sort of “economic understanding” are the antici- pated economic sanctions as a possible mean for prevention, i.e the limitation of the ensued conflicts. It is presumed that the economic sanctions will bring to the overthrowing of certain governments, i.e war monger’s ways of goveming - first of ali in Serbia. however it is more likely to presume that economic sanctions would only consolidate (similar to Iran in the Gulf war) the leading group at war, that have difficulties to justify the war - at least at this moment, by the end of october - in a very insecure situation. There is also an open question: the influence of the eco¬ nomic sanctions on YPA. It is a similar čase to the assumption that a European army intervention would unfold gordian knot in Yugoslavia. It actually means the opposite. This would make possible the establishing of a necessary homogeneity on the Serbian-Yugoslav side of the front. Shortly, every serious attempt to un¬ derstand the situation in the disinte- grating Yugoslavia can be reduced to a very difficult task of understanding of something which can be named hysteria, or frenzy of sovereignty. In other words, another paradox must be understood: everyone is in a worse posi- tion everyday, first of ali in a material and economic way, they are weakening, they physically die, but at the same time they feel “very well”; they are even “happy” and feel much better tlian before, as at last they will become “independent”. The logic of the burden of the war is “heroic” and “poetic’, poetic discourse in the sense of Vicots theory in his work “Principj discienca nuova”. In accordance to the con viction that the one who wins the war is proving to be riglit. Justice, right- eousness and truth win. The paradigm of these heroic deeds and poetic discourse in second-class spaghetti vvestems, where the truth appears in time as a rescuing one, and not too late as in Hegel’s philosophy. Dispersion There is no doubt that it is very difficult to observe the war in Yugoslavia, and par- ticularly to try to find a solution for this situation. One of the crucial reasons is the relatively confused dispersion of the pas- sions, involved interests, indetermination of political parties in these clashes, or the ideologies to come, heterogeneity of tire structures of theparties in the war, unequal geographic presence of the battle fields... In order to make at least a small step » towards the understanding of the situation we should stop thinking of categories of one basic, dominant (army, national, reli- gious, economic...) conflict, ffom which we can solve ali others or at least the biggest part of it. Our thinking should be directed the other way around, in the sense that we do not have to do with a “Big conflict”, which can be dividedin smaller conflicts following such or such rules. The conflict should first of ali be thought as plural: the clash between Croatia and Serbia and/or YPA, historically and logi- cally did not begin as a big one. We should remember tire fact that it started in Knin as an extremely individualised rebellion (i.e revolution) with convincing essence of tlie traditional rebellion and with indi- viduals as well as criminal groups deeds. In august last year, we had to face indi- vidual and to a small extent, groups ac- tions for the “occupation of the territo- ries”, that cannot be explained by the notion of war (this notion is stili open and should be redefined again). Actually the process had the opposite direc- tion: the turning of individuals and groups conflicts into collec- tive ones and not individualisa- tion of previous collective ones (in the sense of army clashes). In this context, it is a conflict con- centrated first of ali in a strong individual or group interest, with tlie large extent of individual army enjoyment (master of death and life), clashes and of course crimes, thatonly post-festum get tire aureole of collective curtain with the national sumption of the war category and in the way of “clearing” the individual and group responsability. The very strong presence of the brutality element and disrespect of ali “rules of war”, and international conventions as well, can be partially explained by the following interpretation, in accordance with the extrenre strong element to be taken into consideration: this is not cov- ered by the presence of a State form, army fornr, or by the war form as an explanatory paradigm of events. Otlrer aspects can be interpreted with the same model. Croatia, for example, began to be shaped as a participant at war in August last year passing through the turbulent and contra- dictory processes, did not give the order to forbid the party’s armies until last montlr. What we call war in Croatia is a big terrain clash of the hostile sides - some blood fraternities- whose source of power is the blood of their dead fello ws better than any ideology. No ideology, no democracy or nation can keep them straight, together, like a word given to oneself, i.e one’s fellow or relative who died few hours ago. Military and State centers and groups, that would like to “curb passions”, are very often lrindrances being worse than the enemy himself, as they stop them from “paying back in kind”. These horizontal military groups small fronts are only de- pending on themselves, and in general they miss the vertical connection. Vukovar and Dubrovnik are typical examples, and they represent the paradigm of war in Yugoslavia in general. The war for Vukovar and Dubrovnik should be treated first of ali as battles for Vukovar and Dubrovnik,and nothingelse. Characteristics with vvhich it is tried to explain the ideological sid later on do not function at ali. War abilit y, morality is not coming from those ideologic characteris¬ tics, that will only post-festum give the impression of a war for mother country... Taking into consideration destructive power as well- YPA is much stronger. Almost every garrison for any reason (surroundings, self-will, even insanity of commanding officers, shortage of central military and State government...) has its own “small wars”. The war in Croatia should be understood first of ali as a chain of these small wars. Europe as an interior ofYugoslav conflict It would be very difficult to deny the influence from abroad in the disintegra- tion of Yugoslavia. Although it is the “immanence” of “internal” results in Balkans (absence of foreign intervention) which makes it possible for this sort of disintegration of the foundation, on which Yugoslavia (as desirable or created com- munity) existed. Paradoxically we can say that this absence of intervention is a sortof main reason of the disintegration of Yu- goslavia. Actually, it was a community that was established by the foreign inter¬ vention or its threat (real and/or made up). The coincidence of the disintegration of the yugoslavian State community of small nations with the moment when this “for¬ eign menace”, at least relatively and tem- porary did not exist anymore, shovving that this probable exterior of Yugoslavia was its first intemal element. The absence of the extemal menace turned to be tlie absence of its deepest interior.( read also: Europe: an internal part of the yugoslav conflict). In other words, Europe has intervened in Yugoslavia long ago, even though it did not do it in a military way. This relation can take two directions: Yugoslavia can become “europeanized”, but Europe can become “yugoslavianized” too. In both cases,itwillbeaviolentact,asY ugosla via can only be kept unified by violence, and Europe becoming “yugoslavianized” would probably end up in a worse way. Peace ? There is something in Yugoslavia that can be called the State of nature. On agenda are literal problems of survival of millions of people, that are not endangered by hunger, frost, but by the possibility of being killed as well. At the moment we should be modest and real- istic, and, ensure a cease-fire, truce, but not Yugoslavia. Times when Y ugoslavia was in peace are obviously the past. Tito’s State succeeded in this for almosthalf acentury and, as far as history is concerned, tliis was a big success, although not possible anymore. Probably, it is possible to claim that the war will last as long as Yugoslavia exists. Everything indicates the war as the last form of the existence of YugosIavia. The question is actually double: a) How to prevent the spreading of the war in Bosnia, Sandiak, Kosovo... European troops should be sent in these territories, in order to limit the possibilities for war, if we can not exclude them. b) The question is not how to achieve the peace, but how to achieve cease-fire, that would enable peace to be established. The key of the crisis is of course Serbia, i.e more exactly said, the relation betvveen Serbia and YPA on one side and Croatia on the other side, taking into consideration that this is a war against Croatia on its territory. That is why we should be per- sistent in stopping the war, if not perma- nently, at least in order to establish truce and to delay, postpone the war for some time till the matter calms down, i.e till dynamic relations between Serbia and YPA settles down, so that negotiations and permanent Solutions can be found. 14 rim RornrK itruit Conclusion however, some logical and historical cycle of developinent in Yugosla- via is right in front of us, to be “definitely” con- cluded. Although the State, in accordance to the international law, did not change, Yugoslavia as a common house of different nations and ethnic groups became obsolete, supernu- merary, tiresome, and representing only an obstacle for the possible development of its parts. “Post-modern” form of multinational, multicultural, multireligious community can not preserve “pre- modern” components. Too strong centrifugal forces of “modernism” and “pre- modernism” are an obstacle for any sort of common life. Spreading of ali sorts of conflicts brought the insurmount- able differences. Processes of disintegration reach the critical point, so that every, however innocent attempt to keep the “state” together, would definitely finish with this or otlier sort of dictatorship. As a state, Yugoslavia is, either symbolic or as a content, “phantomatic” creation. It must be buried. Ljubljana, November 1 st 1991 Out of an interview with Jan 0berg, director of the Transnatianal Fundation for peace and Future research (TFF) in Lund, Sweden. Jan 0berg came to Yugoslavia in the beginnig of September with some colleagues, in order to lead a research about the conflict in Yugoslavia. They were well informed before arriving, acted completely on their own way, and finally interviewed ali kinds of people in different republics. Their main aim was to grasp the complex- ity ofthe situation. Back in November to bring the report (result of september research) called “After Yugoslavia what ?", Jan 0berg is commenting and analysing the situation. The following text is not faithful to the exact words used by Jan 0berg, is a kind of summary ofhis com- mentaries. he situation is very serious and much worse than in September. Ali connections at the level of the so- ciety are destroyed. The worse is that politicians as well as citizens are not aware that there will be no winner in this war. The reality is that they will ali loose. National sovereignities brought so much misfortune and pain that you will only get to know in the future, what is going on now. The most relevant element in this conflict is the one concentrated in the “high politi- cal” levels of the different republics or States. A logic appeared according to which national leaders simply have to survive, thus implying keeping the power. This is an imperative which is contented in the existing conflict which is creating new ones. It is a relative paradox, but in com- parison with the former socialist leaders, the present ones are incredibly less ma¬ ture. Do you see anv possible solution for this conflict ? At the moment I don’t figure out any serious possibility of solution. Namely, finding any kind of solution implies to do something right now, and a powerful co- operation between the different parts. No other way is possible. Unfortunately, I don’t believe that the present leaderships could do something else than fighting, arguing... The typical aspect of the Yugoslav con¬ flict is: when one part is proposing an agreement, the otlier part is approving with weeks or months of delay. Anyway, up to now, when such cases appeared, the agreement was not acceptable anymore for the one who proposed it. Though there were actually extremely constructive ideas proposed, the other part (or the EC) sim- ply stayed deaf. The other very important problem is that we came to a complete blockade in Com¬ munications, not only between different audiences, but also between intellectuals. As I learnt, it is not only oligarcy which blocked the Communications, but at the same time, the inaction of those who could have been able to build a bridge between the different parts. Those either did not react, or even destroyed the potential bridges. Sometimes, it seems to me that everybody Tlili' IIOTTISK FRU1T is reacting as if they intend to move to another planet, or at least, as if they would never live again in this plače. It is simply beyond my understanding. It is veiy often said that Serbia only cares for a “Great Serbia”, being the only ones to react so: it is only partly true. In my opinion, ali republics or States, their leaderships, the majority of the population, only čare for themselves. This war is exactly the result of this selfishness. It is very similar on the individual level: there is nobody who would have been able to think or act differently in this dominant trend which is spread through propaganda by the scared and introvert leaderships of States or ar- mies. How do vou consider the EC involvment in the Yugoslav crisis ? Notpositively at ali. Similarly to the pre- vious example of different yugoslav parts trying to agree, the EC is following the crisis very slowly, accepts proposals with at least one month delay. I think that the EC is not used to such conflicts, and simply doesn’t have mechanisms which could follow such eruptive developments of a situation. Besides ali this, the EC is very divided inside (which is not so clearly understood from the outside). Therefore the EC couldn’t be a third part in Yugoslavia, bring new ideas, or help to calm down. One could observe that the ECjustcreatesanextra-mess, and is always very late compared with the happenings, which are faster and faster. Yugoslavia vvas, and partly stili is t reated as a regional problem not globally connected with Eu- rope. This vvas the biggest mistake. These economical sanctions will justcomplicate the situation, andwon’tbring any element of solution. It is even possible that they will lead to the necessity of an armed intervention, which is the most dangerous result one can imagine. Theprospectivein this čase would be even more horrible, also for Europe, if not wider. Is there anv potential ‘‘third part” which could intervene in this conflict ? Now this is the time for UN to get in- volved, though lam afraid they will repro- duce the same mistakes as the EC. What is the main problem of the present situation ? There is no “main problem”. It is more a question of trend, of context, more horri¬ ble from day to day. Shortly, the main problem is the war itself. The war is the worse thing possibly happening in life. It is more the sign that ali previous ideas, talks, exchanges,... failed. Therefore, it sho ws a clear necessity to begin something different. When an armed intervention takes plače it is a proof that the polit icians are bad amateurs, because the first poli- tic’s duty is to avoid the war. Who are the main actors involved in the fights at the moment ? There are four elements: Serbian and Croatian leaderships, Serbian in Croatia, and the Federal Army (YPA). They went so far that the war wouldn’t stop even if these four parts would agree. Each of them contents different armed fractions, which will never agree on anything, even not on an ideal proposal. Before any possible agreement, each of these four parts would have to clarify their inside situation. Only then, a kind of cease-fire would be realistic. What do vou think of the picture given in VVestern countries and presenting the war in Yugoslavia as a fight betvreen com- munism and democracv ? Western Europe and US medias bet on this simplified explanation. If it would be the reality, we would manage to solve the present problems in an easier way. It is really too simple to be true. But, if it vvas, why didn’t the EC and USA simply rec- ognise Slovenia and Croatia, which sup- posedly fight for democracy, against communism and totalitarianism taking plače in Serbia and Montenegro? Those who spread this clumsy picture will have to answer such annoying questions, oth- ervvise, they will have to name the EC and USA pro-communist institutions, which is not so simple. In vvhich direction do vou see possible exits ? The situation has to be considered in its entire complexity, which is not the čase no w. The vulgar “victimisation”of Croatia has to stop. Serbia should be given a possibility to clarify its relationship with YPA: it should control it and be responsi- ble for its actions. Only some parts of YPA can become a serbian army. The surplus should be either converted or sold (if there is no otherpossibility), though this last solution will remove the problem to another part of the world. The profit should be used for developing the eco- nomically destroyed country. If such an army (as novv) stays in the Balkans, I am sure there won’t be any peace here for a long time. The most convenient vvould be to begin vvith complete demilitarisation of the Balkans. If it doesn’t work, then the only possiblity vvould be to reach abalance of povver, vvhich is potentially as danger¬ ous. I suggest the conversion of the biggest part of arming of YPA: only on this base, or beside it, the solving of the political problems can begin. Which ones ? Especially the problems of minorities and human rights. The most urgent is the problem of minotities, vvhich made every- thing begin: it means Kosovo, or Albanians as minority vvithin Serbia, and Serbian in Croatia. Without a solution to be found on this topič, there won’tbe any normalisa- tion of life, production, work.... PRESS KKVIEVV TFF REPORT, published by Transnational Foundation for peace and Future research, Lund (Svveden) “Yugoslavia for beginners” could be the subtitle. Extremely pedagogic, vvith ali its implications: basic, clear, easy to read, pictured, a bit boring, very useful for a non(or badly)-informed population to grasp the complexity of the Yugoslav conflict. Also useful because unique čase (ac- knovvledged) of this kind. Accessible to ali (from 6 to 99) The Intruder To get the report or wider informations about TFF: THE TRANSNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND FUTURE RESEARCH Vegagatan 25,223 57 Lund, Svveden Phone: 46-46-145909 Fax: 46-46-144512 TFF 16 'mir- ROTIRA' RRU1T PEACE MOVEMENTS, “ANTEROOM” OF NATIONAL REVOLUTIONS Interview with Tonči Kuzmanič, realised for ASPE (Italian press agency )Was there a rooted culture of non-vio- lence in Yugoslavia, before the war ? In Yugoslavia as in almost ali other so called communist countries non-violence was not a rooted culture. Instead of the culture of civil society, Yugoslavia had a sort of non-violent “foreign policy”, so non-violence was something used to be pushed aside the society, and not the in- herent element of the “Yugoslav society” itself. As substitution of the rooted non- violent culture, there was the communist foreign policy of non-alinement, etc. Some results of the lack of civil society and of tire non-violent culture at the level of societal structures became obvious in the present war. Besides, Yugoslavia (rem- nants of Yugoslavia), are stili half-in- dustrialised and half-urbanised country. Even urbanisation is carried out in tire “peasant way”, and yugoslav cities are rather big villages. City-culture is a quite unknown form of culture in Yugoslavia, except in small centers of the adriatic coast and, to some extend, in today’s capitals of various republics. Ho wever, simultaneously with the decline of the self-management system in mid- eighties, we observed the emergence of some kind of civil and non-violent culture. Especially in some urban centers as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Beograd, Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Rijeka, Split... More or less we should talk about two basic forms of appearance of the non- violent culture: 1- As relatively small subcultural groups (so-called peace movements) 2- At some levels of the public opinion The most important fact regarding the second form is that at the precise time national movements appeared, the “pub¬ lic opinion” became a main force of “par excellence” violent behaviour. Moreover, from today’s point of view, we should underline that the so-called new social movements(whicli peace movements were a part of) were nothing but the “anteroom” of national revolutions (in Slovenia, Croatia...) Shortly, the war in Slovenia and now in Croatia has sho wn that tlrere was no serious rooted non-violent culture before the war. It was, and more or less stili is, a matter of small groups or few individuals. Let’s hope that as a by-product of the war, non- violent culture will finally come into ex- istence in this part of Europe. What is the position of the peace move¬ ments in the fonner Yugoslavia and the prospects for the immediate future ? Peace movements in Yugoslavia today are organised on the national level (slovenian, croatian....). There is no com- mon institution or network at the federal or all-yugoslav level, but just some at- tempts in that direction. The position of the peace movement in Croatia is pretty different from the serbian one, due to the fact of the roles played by Serbia and Croatia in the war. By helping the deserters and forming different con- sciousness raising groups, organising demonstrations.... the peace movement from Belgrade (the center for Anti-war action) is trying to hinderviolentpolicy of the serbian government and Yugoslav People ’ s Army. In Zagreb (or Osijek, Split, Rijeka...), because Croatia is attacked by serbia and YPA, it is extremely hard to defend any peace position, especially in public medias, not to speak about the “quite”natural problem arousing from the presence of strong right-wing movements. Peace movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a position very similar to the bosnian government or State presi- dency. Namely, the peace-keeping policy of the government creates possibilities for thenon-violentfuture in thatpart of former Yugoslavia, which is for the time being, stili outside of the war. Similar is the situation in Macedonia. In Slovenia, it is different. “Young slovenian nation-state” with “young slovenian army” is relatively outside of the war. The programm of the peace movement is concentrated on the concept of demilitarisation of the State. But last month, one could observe a strong split inside the slovenian peace movement: be- tween national pro-govemment oriented fraction and some individuals who are trying to generate a more effective peace platform.... Anyway, there is at least one common thing for ali peace movements in Yugoslavia: the necessity of building up cease-fire and prevent the war to spread in other parts (Bosnia, Kosovo, Sandiak, Macedonia, Montenegro..) of the former State. That simple fact might be a suffi- cient reason for common actions in the future. One Year of Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) By Marko Hren A year ago - after many years of the dialogue between the “east” and the “west “- the HCA was lounched. The readers of The Intruder know the HCA and it is not to repeat in length the objectives of this project. Suffitient to say, that hundreds of groups and individuals were enthusiastic of the idea to create a platform for citizens initiatives to communicate, exchange, re- flect, cooperate and articulate their posi- tions v.v. the govemmental organiza- tions (i.e. CSCE). The crisis in Y ugoslavia made ali existing organizations and networks on national and international, on govemmental and non-governmental level fail. None of us was efficient enough to produce a sig- nificant improvementof the situation. Of course it was to expect, that a one year old organization can not play a major or even an important role in “solving” such a complex problem as faced by in Yugosla¬ via. Maybe this is the core of the problem of the HCA - that it is not able to plače itself in a humble position of an organization which is at its very start - small, childish and without much influence. On contrary - the HCA started right at the begining to pretend to be representative, it started right at the begining with big politics (remember the performance of Lafontaine at the first Assembly in Prague) it entered international arena with big words and big goals. It wanted to become an interna¬ tional assembly over the night. I think that the follovving were the biggest mistakes we made lunching HCA October 1990. » tujo ko rim' eruit 17 1. we did define HCA with a very large scope of functions 2. we did lunch the organizations as if it can immediately perform ali functions - we did neither elaborate hierarchy of functions nor the process for reaching the hierarchy of interdependant points of the structure. 3. we did not put clear limits and control mechanisms to decision making structures (ICC, presidiunt, chairs) I think the hierarchy of functions should be 1. network - international, particularily developed tlirough the workof comissions 2. netvvork - regional/national/local, particularily stimulating regional coop- eration and inter-disciplinarity 3. decision making on regional/national/ local level - structures and protocols (standards) should be defined in order to build direct democracy mechanisms from below 4. decision making on international level To satisfy the point two (national commitees) we should preview at least few years process. Before proceeding to the next step in the structural growth (and in growth of functionality) HCA should seriously reflect if the previous step was sufficiently completed. HCA should not grow ambitions to “loby CSCE” until it has a good decision making structure on national levels. And a precondition for such structure is a goodnetvrarkandrooted national committees plus well grounded comissions. Before being able to do ef- fective international lobby we have to spend in my view at least ftve years of good networking and commission work. For the trans-national assembly of citizens the inner democracy and consensus- seeking is of absolutely vital importance. HCA in the first year has naturally failed to satisfy this condition, since most of top-people have rushed towards being “representatives”. It ended up in ex-com- munication of a part of constituency. In Bratislava we should seriously reflect on one year process, admit our illusions and mistakes, draw a process for the next five years, define stages of growth of the As- sembly and ban “representative” struc¬ tures to act on their own in the future. The way how HCA structure (particularily its top including chairs, presidium, ICC and International secretariat) behaved in the aproach towards thecrisis inyugoslavia offers an alarming example of vvhatHCA should not become. We are willing to present argumentsinlength, mostof them are well documented in our files of correspondance. Our criticism is meant to I be constructive one and we hope to be able to discuss it in Bratislava. To prepare us well for such performance, we invited HCA “representatives” several times to come to Ljubljana and Zagreb - without any positive response front Prague. We have particular criticism of both chairs, we request explanation about decision making procedures, about political argu- ments presented “in the name of HCA”, about fund rising “for Yugoslav peace movements” through HCA - the things we were never consulted about and never presented reports about. Suffitient to say that we - as a civic movement from the country which found itself in war - received no support at ali from the HCA structure; on contrary we were rather blocked or excommunicated. As far as i learned this is due to different political views, analysis and arguments. I even heard from secre¬ tariat, tirat majority of presidium members agree with a chair person and not with us. Despite several demands we never re¬ ceived any written message with which HCA “representatives” would argue (or answer) our positions. The differencies in opinion should not lead to excommunica- tion - at least not if HCA tends to become an assembly of citizens. HCAwill either grow as a pluralistic organization or will get lost in the world of semi-privat net- works. There is stili time to satisfy this goal and Bratislava meeting is a crucial point to reflect the one year work seriously and also to draw clear consequences. I think that tire following steps are necessary: 1. to define a process of growth (in terms of time and in terms of functionality and structures) of the organization, to be modest in our expectations , considering what we are really able to do well. 2. to redefine accordingly the role of structures (ICC, presidium, chairs) with minimal representative nature of their mandate 3. to define control mechanisms for rep¬ resentative structures 4. to appoint new people in the structures, until the organisation will be enough mature to elect representatives . As an example let us note, that no work of HCA concerning the Y ugoslav crisis was planned, organized or coordinated by comissions or national committees within Yugoslavia. On the level of yugoslavia there is no HCA committe functioning any way - there are some contactpoints but no democratic dynamics locally or on federal level. Instead of being even more pluralistic due to the fact that there are no democratic tools yet available within the HCA structures, the top HCA people ex- communicated our group simply because we disagreed with most of what HCA had presented in its papers after the armed conflict started in Slovenia. Unfortunately, the “representatives” of the HCA seem to agree with a chair, who happens to ob- serve Yugoslav crisis from one angle of perception (permanently outside the re- gions which found themselves under military agression) which produces one particular interpretation of reality. I am afraid that the HCA framework was used for promotion of more or less private policy of a chair. At least the constituen- cies of the HCA from the north of the former Yugoslavia were never (from August on after we for the first time ob- jected the interpretations of the chairs) aproached by chairs for consultations and advice. Let’ s ponder on and be aware that the organization, which does not invest largely into its inner dernocracy produces more and more frustration, dissatisfaction, contraproductive results and finally is collapsing. We need HCA but not as a club of fr iends who agree (although this is a niče idea too) - rather as a forum of people who have different analysis, dif¬ ferent visions, different views and dif¬ ferent proposals. December 1991. INTRUDER: You recently lost your job? REXHEPI: I took part in the protest against certain measures: the Serbian State chose some- body to be at the top of the University, thus violating the intemal rules, but especially this man didn ’t have to respect any tule. We protested against the principle of this system of police and niilitary, in a pacific way in front of the faculty: we have been ali expelled aftenvards. INTRUDER: Your čase, together with the alamiing information we receive every day about repression of Serbian authorities in Kosovo, rnakes us believe that warfare be- tween Serbs and Albanians can begin at any point. How do you feel tliese “expectations”? REXHEPI: The war in Kosovo actually lasts for at least one decade. Serbian regime holds there power exclusively by force. There is an incredible amount of victims of Serbian terror in Kosovo, although we do not face a “ real” war as they do in Croatia. However, this is only due to the power of Albanian people to struggle with nonviolent means. We have to deal with large popular national movement which be- lieves in nonviolent political changes. In our history we also have experience of another type of struggle but it did teach us -seemingly - that violence can not bring a progressive change. Hovvever, there are groups existing in Kosovo, which are getting ready to go for an armed struggle, but until now they are in minority and on the margin of albanian political spectrum. If there will be war in Kosovo, this would not involve Serbia and Kosovo only, but would evolve in a sort of new Balkan war with many States involved. INTRUDER:Could we talk about racial ele- ments of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs? REXHEPI: Tltis is an old matter, a long history of two nations who never had a stable State » TlilS ROTTITK LTvUlT 18 K G S G G G structure to enable at least relatively peaceful evolutioo. We know that Serbian State logic for centuries deal with different territorial projects, resuming land, expanding territory etc. Just to name few examples: the Načertanije plan of Garašanin, migration plans of Čubrilovič, or the recent plan of Serbian Academy of Sci¬ ences and Arts; this ali represent a continuity of Serbian State logic, vvhich is built on expansion of the borders. Serbian racisrn in relation to Albanians must be seen as a part of the game for territory. However, Serbian racisrn is just a primitivecopy ofEuropean raci sms vvhich vvere exercised ali over the world. Listening to the rhetorics in Serbian parliament you would feel well the racistic substance of the political cli- male . Unfoitunately racisrn is not left to political elites only but penetrated in ci vil soci- ety if vve can talk about civil society at ali. We could write books on racisrn in Serbia but let me just give a few examples. Albanian lan- guage can be no more used in post offices in Kosovo, no demands can be filed in albanian language, children can not leam albanian, most of us have lost our jobs.... INTRUDER: You do not sound optimi Stic con- ceming the Serbian opposition! REXHEPI: You are right, I’m not optimist. I lovvever, Ihere are alway s options for a differ¬ ent kind of political development. But the pre- condition for any hope is that setbs vvould renounce any territorial pretentions. Albanians will not and can not leave Kosovo - they have nowhere to go and it is their home. If Serbian opposition would respect this then a new field of relations would open forthe dialogue between the albanians and the serbs. The key question is therefore the territorial pretentions of Serbia - vvhich is in temis of time really absurd and caused the war in Yugoslavia. Switching the focus away from territorial pretensions would make it possible to channel energy to other fields of (co)operation which would be less destructive. INTRUDER: We often Irear reproach (spe- cially from Croatian media) because Albanians did not join in the stmggle against Serbia. How do you comment this? REXHICPI: In Yugoslavia nobody offered any help to olhers in the past fevv years. Ali nations acted with a largeportion of egoisnt. Tire great- est help albanians can offer to Slovenians and Croatians is to contribute to nonviolent Solu¬ tions. It is true that Croatia recjuested several limes a help in a stmggle against Serbs. But for Albanians this is not a fight vvhich would solve the problem.. Albanian problem is different from the Croatian one. Croats (and Slovenes as well) engaged in the stmggle for their inde- pendence and forgot about others completely, particularily they forgot about Albanians. It is strange that Croats, who originated tlie idea of Yugoslavism now want to get rid of it. Of course they have a right to do so, but they should understand that there are others who do not share the same position with them. Croats and Slovenes afforded themselves to play a partial game out of the Yugoslav context. De- spite of ali, Albanians did help Slovenes and Croats - albanian youth is refusing to serve military, there is a large number of deserters, those who serve military Service practice disobediance, they escape - and many die be¬ cause of that. INTRUDER: Some comment that Slovenes and Croats (mis)used Kosovo to build inde- pendence and then just forgot about albanians. REXHEPI: I would agree. The peace move- ment in Slovenia did help a lot to Albanians with the promotion in the world. After demo- cratic changes in northem republics neither Slovenian nor Croatian State recognized the national referendum of Albanian people in Kosovo although they talk about the basic right of self-determination ali the time. They support albanians to a certain point until they can use them for self-promotion abroad, but when it is to make a clear political step on the level of Yugoslavia, when cooperative action is re- quested, they sintply disapear. Tudjntan even declared clearly tliat kosovo is an inner prob¬ lem of Serbia. INTRUDER: Where do you then expect help from? REXHEP1: We only can get help from move- ments and individuals who promole nonvio- lence. It is much more difficult to speak of the States. Our experiences are very bad. In 1913 the foreign povvers divided albanian nation as they really wanted without giving us a chance to organize ourselves according to our needs. We got divided and we stili remain - we could not built democracy in conditions of pemianent oppression. Ali energy is invested in liberation and unification and it is impossible to discuss democracy at such point. Until there is some- thing vvhich vvould compensate a common State this fmstrating situation vvill remain blocking us. We of course expect at least understanding from Germany, Austria, France and USA. INTRUDER: Hovv do you perceive the future of Kosovo - the idea of unification of ali albanians is again gaining its popularity? REXHEPI: This question is reflected from different positions - there is a million of albanians living in Macedonia, there are albanians living in Kosovo and those living in Albania. In Kosovo the national identity is stronger. Albanians in Albania are more cos- mopolitan - they have preserved at least rnini- mal urban culture. In Kosovo it practically does not exist. We deal with rural area without significant industrial orurban tradition. This is the ground for the stronger national movement. Ali Kosovo political programs include national emancipation, vvhile this is not trne for Albania. The problem of the differenccs betvveen al¬ banian front Albania and the ones from Yu- goslavia isevisting and vvill bcconte very scrious in a near future. First of ali, Albanians had a very different developmentforthelast60years, depending vvether they vvere living in Yugo- slavia or in Albania. In Albania there has been a national State, vvhile in Yugoslavia until the II World War there has only been experiences of genocide and massive expulsions to Turkey, etc. After the vvar, and until 1966, they stili did not have rights on an equal basis vvith the other citizens of Yugoslavia. After 1966, they had more rights: they had their own universities, developed their culture, etc,... Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia, these develop- ments vvere not harmonious at ali: forexample, there vvas a big gap betvveen the economic development and the cultural development. There vvas a unilateral development: mineš vvere exploited vvithout the creation of a real industry vvhich vvould employ people, give resources for autonomy, in one vvord it vvas a colonial economy. On one side the albanian conscientiousness vvas stronger, enabling the people to see clearly the colonial situation, on the other side, their economic role extremely passive: that is hovv tensionsgrcvv, even among albanians, social and political tensions orien- ted in a national vvay. The economic development in Albania vvas » NON—VIOLENCE S O LUTION fin Intervieui uiith R E X H E P I I S tl R J L I J general situa¬ tion in Kosovo could be introduced by some numbers: in the last few years more then 100 Albani¬ ans died as victims of the terror of Serbian authorities - some of them died in prisons. In the same period about 2500 albanians vvere prosecuted and more than 700000 suffered police treatment. There are more than 1000 political prisoners of albanian nationality currently in Kosovo, much bigger is the number of those isolated and even bigger the number of emigrants from Kosovo to ali pariš of the vvorld. During the last year, the Serbian authorities have abolished legitimate representative struc- tures of Kosovo people, dissmissed ali university professors of albanian nation- ality, dissolved Kosovo Academy, disa- bled the education of more then 200.000 young albanians (introducing serbian lan¬ guage as the sole and obligatory language for ali), dismissed great majority of per- sonal of albanian nationality from hospi- tals Some private attempts to open medi- cal centers occutred, but are just able to deal vvith prevention because of the lack of material. The health čare for Albanians is literally disabled. We have used the opportunity to discuss these problems vvith Rexlieplsmajli j . vvho is delivering lectures at the University of Ljubljana as a guest professor. He holds a doctorate in literature and vvas professor of general linguistic and history of albanian language, in Priština’s university for 20 years. Novv he is expelled from Priština university. Before that, his vvage vvas 100 DEM per months. His bibliography of translations (Saussure, Barthes, Martinet, Ducrot, Todorov. ), essays (“The plurality of the texts”, essay on semiol- ogy, linguistic, literature, etc.) and books (specially on history of albanian language) is remarkable and places him amongst the leading Kosovo authors and the biggest vvorlds’ albanologues. almost non-existing, lot of people were em- ployed without producing any profit, there was no technology. Any way, any development was dictated by the State and iniposed on people, which were very often displaced and uprooted. In parallel with Yugoslavia, they also pro- gressed in the field of education and stepped towards emancipation, or more exactly “ideologic illuminism”. The primaiy and sec- ondaty schools were good, but the problems arouse further on when it was necessary to educate people in modem technologies, mod¬ em thought... Lots of intellectuals were jailed. In that field primitive marxism was generating the restrictions. We called it marxism. I don’t know if it was. I am not sure. This problem is stili not sol ved, because the freedom of thought came too quickly and too recently. On the cultural level, it was more liberal in Yugoslavia, the european way of thinking has been introduced: mancism, post-marxism, lib- eralism, existentialism.„, in literature it was quite open too, except for the national one which was half forbidden. The albanians of Yugoslavia never experien- ced the interdiction of religious practise, whatever religion it was conceming, this being in opposition with the situation in Albania. In this regard, the differences are enormous, be¬ cause they face in Albania this transition period of “euphoria” since the recent liberation of religious conscience. Shortly, the restrictions in Yugoslavia werc initiated for colonialist reasons, while in Alba¬ nia the different proliibitions were inotivated by ideolog}'. INTRUDER:Back to the question about the possibilities, in the future, to have one united Albanian State ? REXHEPI:This issue has been considered by different political parties, bolh in Kosovo and Albania. Albania has difficulties with the feel- ing of national identity, after a long period of marxist“indoctrination”(Idon’tlikethisword). Kosovian problem in Albania appears as a fight PRESS REVIEW Health čare situation in Kosovo, edited in O dober 1991, By International Helsinki Federationfor Human Rights (IHF) INTERNATIONAL (Miuuiunm FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS This report is resulting from a fact-finding mission to Belgrade and Kosovo, led from 15-19 August; the delegation counted 4 members: 2 from IHF, 1 sur- geon, 1 joumalist. K between different political parties or groups, in order to get the power. in this regard, the albanian view on Kosovo is very similarto the serbian situation. In Kosovo, the only question is: to be or not to be. Political groups talking about unification in Kosovo are in minority. Nevertheless, tlie development of the situation in Yugoslavia, in Serbia, the extreme repres- sion they have to suffer, push the Kosovian towards this solution.as the only possible choice. Though lot of Kosovian believe that the prob¬ lem must be solved by changing the nature of the border, but not the border itself. Make a symbolic border instead of the wall presently existing. 1 don’t think this unification is realis- tic for the moment: in this situation, I can’t be optimistic. The unification of an albanian State in Balkans is a great problem. Any struggle to put ali albanians in the same State would necessarily involve Macedonia (one million oppressed albanian are living there), Serbia, Bulgaria... finally ali Balkans. The problem only could be overcome when the border question will be forgotten, and will begin an attempt to create an albanian State in Yugoslavia: then the albanians will loose the feeling of being second-class citizens in their everyday reality. Once they will have a State they will have to face their own problems (social, economical,....), instead of the serbian one. INTRUDER: What does the Kosovo question imply for stability in Balkans? REXHEPI: Tite stability in Balkans is not only a question of stability of borders, but also stability of development. For example the sta- bility of Serbia won’t come out of the creation of an albanian State, a federation, confedera- tion, etc, but only with a more intensive and equal development. The development is blocked by the frontiers problems, the territorial preten- sions of Serbia. Greece has the same position as Serbia: the Greek State has absolutely no tolerance for other minorities living on its territory. 1 think this is the most xenophobic State in Europe. Albanians, Turks, Macedonians,... living in Greecehavenonationalrights,only civic rights. Bulgaria is in process of opening, but we can’t be sure about that until no decision about the sovietic“commonwealth”istakingplace. These are ali underdeveloped countries. INTRUDER: Despite the occupation of Kosovo, is it possible to imagine a progress? REXHEPI: There is no way to progress in Kosovo, since the economy is completely ru- ined. The economy is blocked by the serbian State. Albanian only try to survive. The paci- fists trials are a way of survival. Anyway, there was no choice, they only had pacifist move- ments in order to survive. I think that is why ali efforts are oriented in this way in kosovo. There is no parallel power: there is the people or- ganizing itself in different ways not to die of hunger, to save the ones victims of Serbian State. INTRUDER: Would you compare the Serbian politics in Kosovo with apartheid ? REXHEPI: I don’t know enough the situation in South Africa to be able to compare, but I don’t see a better word to qualify the situation in Kosovo. That is why the youngsters have to emigrate: systematic poperisation of the popu- lation, constant repression, impossibility of getting any education, strong threat of being forced to join the anny and be sent to the croatian frontline. December 1991 The discussion was convened and interpreted by Dominique Cochard, Tonči Kuzmanič and Marko Hren. Serbian authorities behaviour Through trying to find the reality of medical čare of the albanian population in Kosovo, the IHF team demonstrates the brutality (even physical) of tlie serbian authorities intervention, their total re- placement of personnel structure, and the ill will of their justifications when pre- tending that the doctors: - used the health čare as a vehicle for what they (the serbs) call albanian “separatists politics”. - were neglecting their medical duties - were generally discriminating tlie non- albanian population which led to a mass flow of serbs to Serbia Ali these accusations are either denied by figures, or can’t be proved by the serbian authorities through facts, cases, names.... Result on m edical čare quality As a result, the mission vvitnessed a com- plete loss from professional, linguistic and humanitarian points of view. Here the examples, figures, and cases are numer- ous: hygienic and technical standards, lack 0 s o u of ambulances, no psychiatric treatment. The IHF mission reports a paralysis of doctors education in University, therefore there is a complete isolation of Albanians from theprofession (instruction andexams are now in Serbo-croatian). A mysterious disease appeared without initiating any investigation (3631 cases of neuro-intoxication): the serbian authori¬ ties are claiming this is a “mass hysteria”. (For the moment, human rights organisa- tions couldn’t agree with each other re- garding conclusions conceming this čase). 4^^ Albanian population: is avoiding carefully ali purged clinics, and often rather risk their health (and the children ones) than Consulting “the occu- pants”. Therefore the few clinics stili run by Alba¬ nians at the countryside are overloaded, and have neither the equipment nor the money to satisfy the demand. Finally, some cases of albanian self-or- ganisation through alternative clinics are recorded: improvisation in discos, living- rooms, .... with examinations for free or small fees. □ s A R A J K V O Why “Why ?” ? It is intended for peace- makers and people of good will ali over Europe and the vvorld. The first publica- tion of this magazine is linked to the peace initiatives which are growing into a peace movement in the city of Sarajevo and in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The principal goals of the citizens here is to stop the war, to stop the suffering of the tens of thousands of innocent victims whose testimonies take one ’s breath away. This magazine shall therefore record events and reactions of the people from public, cultural and political life. It will be a source of information shovving the di- mension of people’s resistance to tire war in Yugoslavia which has so far been hid- den by the scenes of suffering and death. Why Sarajevo ? It is the center of Yugo- slavia. The town bears witness of numerous and unbreakable links of Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Jews, Yugoslavs, Montenegrians, Albanians, Slovenians, Macedonians, Gypsies, Austrians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Romanians, Russians, Turks, Ukrainians, Vlachs as well as tlreir con- nections with the cultures and customs of other peoples. PUBLICA1TON FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE SARAJEVO (summary of its editorial) So once a month, “Why ?” is going to write about ali violations of human rights; to inform the public about activities of peace movements and organizations in Yugoslavia and abroad; and to present documents adopted at peace gatherings. We hope for the only outcome worthy of human beings. but in spite of different views and approaches, ali of us shall try to find answers to the question “why ?”. We are therefore issuing this magazine, in English and Serbo-croatian, to search for the answers and Solutions together. The editorial board expects your support and cooperation. Ibrahim Spahič (Chief editor, President of the centre for peace) “Why ?” is issued by Citizens’ Forum, Dobrovoljačka 3, 71000 SARAJEVO (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Tel. 3871-214 884, Fax. 3871-216 238 LET IT BE How do vou as a familv feel in this time of war and peace ? How does the situation affect vou ? Z. Milenkovič, father: The family is the basic unit in any society, and if a society is a sum of ali families, for it to be sound it is necessary for the families to be sound in the first plače. We believe in defining clearly the relations within our family as well as those with the society. And now a guestion for the pillar of the familv: Women seem to be the onlv au- thentic power struggling for peace re- gardless of their different political, ideo- logical or e ven human departure pointsor objectives. What is vour experience of the present situation in Yugoslavia ? Lidija Milenkovič, mother: If anybody, a woman may be said to have the right to State her opinion in the matters of war because she gives and cherishes life. This situation is imposed upon us. Death is forced upon us as the only choice. We, as a family, are not physically endangered, we are artists and we do not have to take part in the events. But it is inevitable that we are affected. On my part I am trying to transfer onto my children the viewpoints I acquired in my childhood, the beliefs I live by. One of them is that there are not two nations in the world that cannot live together and that love is not the only form of relationship between peoples ( and we were told once that these relations are almost lover-like and if there is no love there is no life together ). I think respect, understanding, and economic interests can be an even better basis. As for this war, it seems so outdated, so out of plače, as if it were artificially grafted. This war belongs to the middle ages. And ours is a different world. What Ls the role of an artist in tliesituat ions like this ? Stefan Milenkovič (14 years old) s already a world' famous violonist and also the ambassador of the YU Children’s embassy to the UN. 22 Stefan milenkolič: I play ali over the world and I carry with me the message of peace. I think that artists are not the only ones who protest but their voice can be heard. S A Excerpts from the talk with Stefan Milenkovič and his family Realised by “Why ?”, Sarajevo. R A J E Do vou have a personal message ? Stefan Milenkovič: Simply, let it be peace. This State is unnatural, uncoceivable. I have played before many politicians, statesmen and I am playing and I shall play... So vouare trvingtosav that beaut vremains and supports the world ? L. Milenkovič, mother: This is the rela¬ tionship between the eternal and ephem- eral. But it is difficult to say anything original in this situation. Everything has already been said sometimes and in someplace. We are now going through a moment in time when politics is totally dominant. But when you look at history, what remains behind the work behind the great civilizations ? Not their politics, but their art. There are some artists in Yugo- slavia, hovvever, who are in favourof this war however it may sound. Our relation¬ ship towards is clear and pure. Behind us we have great talent and serious work, nothing else. But they are different artists in yugoslavia. They use various non-ar- tistic means, crutches to climd the ladder of success, and they, naturally, have dif¬ ferent attitudes towrds the daily politics. Z.Milenkovič, father: Art and politics have a lot in common, though. They are both composed of the rational and emotional component. It is the proper ratio of the two that makes either of them successful. In politics, the rational dominates. If this rational element is controlled (not over- vvhelmed) by emotions, the results are good. And art, mušic in particular, is dominated by emotions, but unless it is controlled by the rational, it cannot be great art. And now a guestion for the voungest member of the familv. I know vou are good at Computer games. Thev sav vou always win. What do vou think about this war ? Who shall win ? Filip Milenkovič (11 years old): There is no reason for anyone to win. In fact, let the one who started this war be the looser. V o The peace negotiations in the Hague dominate current discussion throughout Yugoslavia, especially among the peace movements(however weak it may be). They are of the utmost importance for everybody in the country yet it has been clear for some weeks that no progress is being made. Unfortunately the reasons for this impasse are seldom discussed, even within the peace movements. In fact, there is no real possibility of these negotiations succeeding. " First* peace treaties have very seldom bcen formulated and signed wliilc a war is going on. , ' - Second, a peace treaty presup- poses some form of enduring agreement about the political, social and legal con- text of the origins of the war. Such an agreement is almost certainly impossible to achieve when the most urgentpriority is to stop the fighting. U K We undersigned are intellectuals from ali parts of Yu- goslavia who recognize the most ur- gent task today is to stop the war and that necessitates a cease-fire proposal that keeps ali options open for the future. It would be quite inappropriate for us to prescribe the future for mil- lions of people. What we do have is a responsability for each other as hu¬ man beings tliat goes beyond tlte bor- ders of our own regions. It is in this light that the proposal is made. the affected population. d) International guarantees to ali the Yu- goslav republics that they can represent and protect by legal means, their minori- ties in other republics; as wasprovidedby article 7 of the Austrian State Contract of 1955, which stated that Yugoslavia had the right to protect legally the Slovenian and Croatian minorities in Austria upon their request. Such guarantees are not re- quired for Bosnia-Hercegovina, which according to its constitution, is the State of ali three nations which inhabit here. e) International observers(initially per- haps, UN or CSCE peace-keeping forces) in the areas of Croatia with aserbian ma- jority or a mixed population where the fighting has been concentrated; and in areas where is an immediate danger of conflict, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak and Kosovo. They would also A JflOPOSAL TO STOP THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA -Third, the parties to peace nego¬ tiations are not always the same as those involved in the war(eg the settlement after the First VVorld War) ' • - Fourth, the versions of a peace treaty devised in the Hague are too lengthy and too ambitious to allow any possibility of agreementby theparties involved. Every additional word multiplies tlie possibilities of misunderstanding andrejection among the seven parties at at almost exponential rate. - Fiftli, and most apposile in the Yugoslav čase: parties which have dem- onstrated a dozen times that they are un- able to formulate tlie conditions for a cease-fire are almost certainly unable to reach the kind of agreements needed for even a moderately stable peace. This is why the real goal for the present has to be the achievement of a cease-fire , but one which meets certain essential con¬ ditions: - First, it must be able to provide a more or less stable situation for some years. (This is necessary because the par¬ ties involved need a long period for seri- ous negotiations to construct a lasting peace). ggggggg - Second, the cease-fire has to al- lo w for any of the possible ultimate situa- tions. mHHg - Third, it must contain elements which each of tlie parties can regard as part of their own programmes, so that ali will be motivated to accept it vvithout military intervention.. Winter is tlie best period of tlie year to stop the fighting, because the climate will minimise the intensity of operations in any čase. This is why discussion about such a cease-fire must begin(which they have not yet) and be completed as soon as possible. The cease-fire agreement could contain the following clauses: a) Withdrawal of Yugoslav Federal Army troops (JNA) to the barracks from which they launched their current intervention; beginning of the demilitarisation of ali tlie republics, including the gradual dissolu- tion of the JNA and of ali paramilitary forces, and international control and monitoring of the disarmament process; financial aid to provide pensions and requalification for ex-JNA professionals. b) Suspension of ali federal institutions. This would give freedom of action, both domesticalIy and internationally, to tlie republics constituted within Yugoslavia, wliile preserving the possibility of reacti- vating at least some of the federal insti¬ tutions follovving a final agreement. c) Agreement that the borders as acknowl- edged by the constitution of 1974 are not to be touched or formally discussed for three years. This would permit any one party to claim the right to negotiate border changes in the future, while providing a temporary guarantee of security for the other party. Any eventual borders changes will require the consentof both republics, in agreement with a referendum among monitor the immediate return of refugees to their own areas. f) Constitution of a temporary committee to continue peace negotiations. This would consist of representative from ali repub¬ lics from the two “autonomous provinces” (as defined in the 1974 Constitution) after ffee elections in those regions. The com- mittee’s tasks would include activating tliose federal structures necessary to ad- minister inter-republican Communications on economic and political matters, and to deal with the federal Iegacy. Proposal of substitution of paragraph e), by Žarko Puhovski: e) UN peacekeeping forces in the areas of Croatia with a serbian majority or a mixed population where the fighting has been concentrated. These forces have to con¬ trol areas mentioned above as a whole (from the border as described in c) to the actual ceasefire line) and to replace (in the police function) temporarily ali the mili- tary forces in sucli areas which should be disarmed within two months after the ar- rival of the peacekeeping forces. The function of these forces would be to se- cure and guarantee order and the immedi¬ ate return of ali refugees to the areas under their control. The withdrawalof UN forces as a whole will be possible only after - and as a part of - a final agreement about the future of Yugoslavia. International ob- servers should be sent immediately to the other areas where is an immediate danger of conflict, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak and Kosovo. took quite some time forUnited Nations to intervene in the Yu- goslav deep crisis. After the conflict in Slovenia which ended due to Brioni declaration (July 7th 1991) and after the escalation of a total war in Croatia, the security council finally adopted a resolution (September 25th, number 713), according to which a special emissary of the United Nations for Yugo- slavia, Cyrus Vanče, was sent to the areas in conflict. At that moment, the blue hel- mets were stili not on the agenda of the Security Council. The further events helped to move the UN towards its more radical involvement in the armed confrontations in Croatia, which for a long time were regarded as an internal affair of the Yugoslav State. The first one was an official demand of the Yugoslav presidency (or what remained from it), aimed to the UN, to intervene in the Yu- goslav conflict by sending peace troops to Yugoslavia. The second decisive event happened in Nordvvijk, where the member States of the European Community decided to request the UN intervention in Croatia. This demand was put forward by France, United Kingdom and Belgium in the Se- curity Council. Cyrus Vanče as a special emissary was observing the situation in the conflicting croatian territories with the task to report to the general secretary Perez de Cuellar about the possibilities for the intervention of the “blue helmets”. Namely, there are two preconditions for UN further actions that have to be implemented: 1- A cease-fire between the Yugoslav Federal Army troops, Croatian military, and ali other para-military serbian, montenegrian and croatian units. 2- Ali parties involved in the armed con¬ flict should agree that UN Peace-keeping forces intervention is a necessary step to wards a lasting peace and also a promoter of further political negotiations. Mr Vanče concluded his mission on De¬ cember llth and reported to Perez de Cuellar that an agreement, signed by Miloševič, Tudjman, and Kadijevič on November 23rdinGeneva about thecease- fire restoration was not respected. There- fore, a Peace-keeping force operation in Yugoslavia cannot be recommended yet. With the eventual coming of the “blue helmets” to Yugoslavia, many other in- distinct factors are also present: 01- financial aspect According to Perez de Cuellar, around 10 000 soldiers should participate in such actions during the first year. That would cost 200.000.000 US$. UN could only cover l/10th of the sum. A slovenian national daily newspaper added that in By Doroteja Lešnik Peace Institute, Ljubljana accordance with the present estimations, only French, canadian and Italian soldiers could compose peace troops since only these States: - are willing to be politically involved - have military troops already prepared - are willing to pay for their coming to Yugoslavia Because of differentreasons, the involve¬ ment of the poor East European countries, USA and Soviet Union, Germany and Austria, non-aligned countries, is put under a big question. ^ 2- Location of the Peace-keeping force The peace troops vvould be deployed partially tliroughout the republic of Croatia along the republic border with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, partially on the conflicting areas with the serbian popula- tion on one hand, with the troops of Yugo- slav federal army on another hand, and probably also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. there vvould be different systems of de- ployment and they would request also adequate ways of operation for maintain- U K ing cease-fire in ali areas. in addition to that observation squads should be regu- larly deployed into areas that could be potentially in trouble (Bosnia for exam- ple). 0 3- Duration of the mission The previous experiences of the UN peace troops interventions proved that: a- Peace-keeping operations usually cost a lot of money b- The operation can last for many years, if not decades. c- Peace-keeping usually only freeze cer- tain relations, positions and the situation as a vvhole. Among many missions which were sent to the Middle East, india, Congo, Yemen..., let me mention only the “Eu¬ ropean one”, the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which is perhaps the closest čase to the Yugoslav conflict. It was established to prevent the recur- rence of fighting among the two Cypriot ethnic communities, Greek and Turkish, and two States, Greece and Turkey, in¬ volved in the conflict. UNFICYP was established and started to operate in June 1964 and is stili having the same role in Cyprus, namely to “maintain a buffer zone betvveen the lines of the Cyprus N ational Guard and of the Turkish Cypriot forces”. An estimated cost until 1984 was 470.500.000 US$ (1). For the first time it vvould be also a UN intervention in the conflict vvhich is an “internal” conflict of one of the UN member State. Would that change the structure of the International Commu- nity, and the World Organisation in its most sensitive principles: territorial in- tegrity andsovereign equality of the States and non-interference in their internal af- fairs ? 0 4- Parties involved in the conflict From the very beginning of the armed confrontations in Croatia, one of the big- gest problem for achieving any cease- fire was in fact that para-military units, anned groups and individuals were op- erating on their own, vvithout any civilian or political control. War in Croatia was therefore many times described as a rural war, a war betvveen villages, families even individuals. In this respect, it is not only unrealistic to expect that cease-fire could take plače in a short term, but one problem vvhich could also emerge vvith the arrival of “blue helmets” is the pos- sible hostility of these armed groups to- vvards “foreign soldiers”. (1) THE BLUE HELMETS, United Nations Publi- cations, 1985. Ljubljana, December 1991 24 V R O S V E C T S THE EUROPEAN PEACE PRESS proJECT By a group of students from Rijeka (Croatia) Croatia has by ali means been strucked by a dreadful war led by any legally allowed orforbidden instruments. The story already repeats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have been informed about that. You also probably know that on the territory of the really non-existing State of Yugoslavia, another “war” is going on for several years no w. The “media war”. It resulted in a complete polarisation of the public opinion on the relation East-West, allevi- atedin once “neutral” republics of Bosnia- Herzegovina and Macedonia. This pro- motion of “reality” combined with open propaganda is considerably contributing to develop hatred among citizens of dif- ferent republics. The gap at this moment is hardly filled up. Yet we truly hope that something can stili be done. We propose the introduction of a special TV ne ws and a weekly nevvspaper. The “European Peace Press” project that would be edited by reporters and journalists of eminent European and world TV net- works, news agencies and nevvspapers. The TV news would be emited daily (or weekly) according to arrangements in ali republics. The same principle goes for the distribution of the nevvspaper. The “Eu¬ ropean Peace Press” center would be situated in a town on the territory of ex- Yugoslavia or in one of the european cities, depending on the circumstances andpossibilities. Itshouldbe stressedthat the TV news goes on Channel 1, since not everybody can reach other channels. The linguistical differences would be taken into consideration. The EPPO news and the weekly newspaper should be an offi- cial initiative of the european Radio-dif- fusion, Eurovision, EC and Haag peace conference. Ali republics shouldbeobliged to broadcast the EPPO news. The aim of this project is to enable access to informations as much as possible given through a neutral and objective angle, thus trying to develop critical attitude and tol¬ erance among citizens. That would in- crease the possibility of dialogue and help to stop this silly war. The European Project on the islarui Vis, in the Form of a Concrete Peace Action and a Key Study ^Whv? Among other reasons, which have a finger in tire pie, is the fact that I was bom on the island, that a lot of our friends are living on it and we used to work on peace there. During the time of being on the island, whieh was and stili is fully militarized, we would make different plans and would also dream about the possible future of Vis without military... The Island is situated in Croatia, Dalma- tia, 28 miles from Split in the direction to Italy, so to speak, in tire middle of the Adriatic sea. Vis has about 3 000 inhab- itants, fishermen and peasants, and one of the most beautiful nature and the richest historical resources in the Adriatic sea. The reason for opening this project is of course the War in Croatia and Dalmatia. Moreover, the island Vis is one of the most military endangered points in the region as a whole. According to its natural geo-strategic position during the history, the island became known as “the key of the Adriatic sea”. It was important in the Greek (it was the first Greek colony in this part of Eu- rope established in the 4th century B.C.) and Roman times, as well as in the times of Venice, Napoleon, Italy, Austrohungarian empire... The island is stili full of historical tracks and it is a real living monument of the past times. As an outcome of tire communist defence conceptof Y ugoslav People’s Army, after the second World War Vis became ex- tremely strongly fortified in order to de- fend Yugoslav coast and territory from NATO forces (Italy). There was no entry way for the foreign tourists or citizens until 1989. In the present war circum¬ stances, the entirety of destroying weap- ons situated on the island is turned over towards the Adriatic Coast (Croatia) and » 25 it operates as a permanent threat against inhabitants of the island at the same time. Relatively quick decaying processes of the Yugoslav State and YPA are opening completely new questions. Vis was and stili is a Croatian, Dalmatian island with Croat population (except the YPA staff) who is now forced to play a hostage role in strifes among Croatia, Serbia (Montenegro) and YPA. Vis is also a very important geo-strategic point for the bat- tle for Dubrovnik and it could be extremely important for the forthcoming disposition of military forces in the Adriatic sea. The main problem conceming the island in this situation is: 1- how to find out a possibility of honorable retreat for YPA, 2- how to prevent any kind of setting of new armed forces on the island. Namely, tlie mentioned geo-strategic position, the military thinking and acting resulted for the island in becoming not only a symbol but - unfortunately - even the notion of military oppression as such. No matter whose oppression it was, the results were similar: underdevelopment, migration (front 13000 inhabitants in the 20s and30s to 3000 in the 90s). In the present war cirsumstances the problem is twofold. 1. It is imposible to “liberate” the island without destroying it (and the whole population too) 2. It is very hard to expect YPA’s aban- doning the occupied island in the situation where State and army are collapsing. Namely, in this situation Vis is quite a safe and comfortable plače for the army (far away from the coast, unarmed and peace- ful inhabitants...). In searching Solutions at tlie level of Croat- Serb-YPA conflict we expect the problem of the island to be among the latest by turns. Many “international forces” display interest for the island: Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, YPA. In this moment the YPA is probably the main interested party, because there are no real possibilites to retreat and the kind of relationship to be established between YPA and Serbia (Montenegro) in the future is stili not clearly defined. So, this Croatian island is presently occupied by the relatively nervous YPA officers. Simultaneously, Vis is shadowed by the events which took plače in Dubrovnik and elsevvhere in Croatia: it is left to itself. As a matter of fact, we are extremely afraid of the “black possibility” : the croatian military forces trying to “liberate” the island generating a totaldestruction of it. Ourexperienceswith this war in Croatia up to now are so hor- rible that we are, so to speak, forced to count with the worse outcome, not only as one among other possibilities, but as the most probable future “solution”. There is only one exit from this situation in our minds: an attempt to bring the problem (the conflict) to the international level. In other words: 1. an independent, civil-based action at the island itself; 2. simultaneously, intemationalisation of the conflict at the “high level politics” with the help of the peaceful people and institutions from the island, Croatia, the rest of Yugoslavia, Europe and UNO. More precisely, we need help from im¬ portant European institutions, influential politicians, researchers, peace activists and, finally, people from EC monitoring missions who are already in Yugoslavia and in Dalmatia. In order to ensure the start ing steps for the intemationalisation of the demilitariza- tion project we want toorganize a meeting at the island with the following content: a) presentation of the existing situation and the current problems with strong un- derlining (consciousness raising) of dan- gerous possibilities of an armed battle for the island (media support action); b) presentation of the first draft of the demilitarization project of the island Vis (this letter of intention is a part of the project); c) discussions about: similar experiences from ali over the world regarding concrete situation at the island (ideas for the further development of the project, possible ex- amples of the island Aland...); d) formulation and first finalisation of the project e) institutionalisation of: - research project team - the committee for the demilita¬ rization of the island f) discussion over the future steps towards: - Yugoslavia as a declining State - YPAasaremnantoftheprevious State - Serbia and/or Montenegro as a possible occupational force - Croatia as a State to which the island “belongs” - Europe as a possible interesting conflict party (the idea of the Vis as a European Island!) g) discussion about the possible forins of different actions (direct civil action as an opportunity for European civil engagement at the level of peace, ecologic... move- ments and other alternative organisa- tions...). gj VVhat are our aitns? 1. The island should be totally demilita- O S P H C rized. According to the fresh Slovenian (and Yugoslav) experiences we are ex- tremely keen to make clear distinctions between two possibilities: the aim is not demilitarization of tlie island from the YPA but prevention from any kind of future militarization. The very key point conceming this topič could be the international recognition of the demilitarized status of the island Vis from the side of following governments and institutions: Croatia, perhaps of the rest of Yugoslavia (depending on the fu¬ ture situation), Italy, European Commu- nity and United Nations. 2. Any kind of vveapons should be for- bidden on the island. The prospectives of the project are in the direction of peace making politics projects which include centres for peace studies and disarmament, peace schools and training camps,.ecological “tourism”, archeologi- cal research-camps, schools in traditional fishing skills, researching and imple- menting of the projects on the problems of the pollution of the Adriatic sea, exploi- tation of the potentiality of sun and wind energy...). Namely, the island has the best possible natural position for ali those ac- tivities. In short, the idea of searching for the atlernative concepts of living in rela- tive harmony with natural and historical resources and environment. [ What do we expect from vou? a) your (international) support and searching for other influential persons and institutions, various international organi- sations which might be helpful to our project; b) to suggest ideas about international protection for the island and its inhabit¬ ants in war circumstances or in circum- stances of YPA occupation; c) to share your experiences with us in searching for the ans wers to our questions (how to take influence on the state-level poli tičal action, ho w to organize civil based defence, how to bring together civil and high political actions, how to speak in favour of demilitarization and simultane- ously not to produce endangering feelings among individual soldiers and officers...); d) moral and also possible material (fi- nancial) support and concrete help with the organisation of the project; e) to help us find ways for the institution¬ alisation of the project as a European project, as a common project of different European movements, organisations and individuals interested in this kind of civil action, peace research and nonviolent conflict resolution; f) ideas and help in the campaigning for T S 26 the idea among the interested people and organisations... SILENCE KILLS, LET US SPEAK FOR PEACE Without large international participation and support in the project there is no possibility even to start it, because of the war in which every action, either “within” or “out”of Y ugoslav circumstances, would be understood as “taking part” for or against somebody and would block tlie project from its very beginning. In other words, we are kindly asking you to join us in our great challenge. Perhaps it is the first and the last opportunity to set up this kind of projects. In the past, the island Vis had no possibilities (nature of the previous system, objective position somevvhere in between two military blocks...), in the future it could be only a piece of Stone, the entire island having disappeared in the fire of tlie war in Bal¬ kan s. We desperately need your support. We, and the inhabitants of the island would be extremely grateful to you. According to the war circumstances we have to organize and to promote tlie project of demilitarization of the island as soon as possible: January or February 1992. First of ali, we require your personal presence at the island at the time of the promot ion of this project which intends to be all-Eu- ropean. Unfortunately, for the time being we have no opportunity and possibility to pay your travel costs, but we can com- pensate it by the first-class sea food and the beautiful nature once on the island. Please let us know if you are prepared to join us as soon as possible. We also ask you to inform ali your friends and poten- tially interested adherents about the idea and project of Vis as a demilitarized Eu- ropean island. Every person among you, supporting us and coming to tlie island might be extremely important not solely from the point of view of this project, but also for the island and its inhabitants. This is a project which cannot start without your participation. Ljubljana, November 1 st 1991. Thank you very much in advance: Marko Hren, Tomaž Mastnak, Vlasta Jalušič, Gregor Tomc, Tonči Kuzmanič. For participation, or further informations, please contact: Tonči Kuzmanič (Peace Institute) Mestni trg 13 61000 LJUBLJANA (SLOVENIA) Tel. 3861- 109 741 Fax. 3861- 210 374 There are many of us who will not accept the atrocities of war in what used to be Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We want to unite our voices and ciy out the need to stop the violence, in the name of ali the dead, the wounded, exiled, and drafted. We declare Dec. 20th the Day of Peace for former Yugoslavia. Please, support our declaration by: - Public manifestations - Petitions to your MPs regarding active contribution to peace in former Yugoslavia. - Informing medias about peace activities - Organising cultural events witli the slogan “Silence kills, let’s speak for peace”. Several women from Ljubljana engaged in action to break through tha apathy and silence concerning tlie war in Croatia. Early December they organized a first public forum to discuss the relations of the governement and the civil society in SLovenia concerning the refugees from Croatia. They drafted a declaration to protest against the meassures of Slovenian governement which restricted the flow of refugees into Slovenia. The declaration requested Slovenian authorities to accept everyone who is forced to live their homes because of the war situation in tlie neighbouring countries. In adittion, it appealed the governement to find ways to get foreign help for refugees and to engage more actively in peace process for former Yugoslavia. The declaration was then widely signed and signatures stili get collected. At the same time a support was echoed to ali antiwar and peace movements in former Yugoslavia and speaches by people from Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia were delivered. There was a big need comming as a result from the discussion, to continue talks on possibilities for peace action. This is why we joint efforts with majority of peace initiatives in Ljubljana and prepared a Dav for peace for former Yugoslavia on 20. December 1991 to initiate a regular, once per week forum on peace activity. The activities during The Day of Peace were as follovving: -a session of poetry in Pen Club with the promotion of the anthology of antiwar poetry -candles for victims of war at tlie central square in Ljubljana -public forum discussion on two topics 1. My contribution to war 2. My contribution to peace During the Day of Peace a declaration of support to the movements in Serbia which are collecting signatories for the referendum against the war was made public. DECLARATION OF SUPPORT TO SERBIAN MOVEMENTS REQUESTING REFERENDUM IN SERBIA TO END THE VVAR Many grassroots peace initiatives and protests against violence ali over former Yugo- slavia proove that the war is not fought in the name of people. The initiative which originated in Novi Sad and spread ali over Serbia, to collect 100.000 signatories for the referendum against Serbia sending soldiers abroad republic Serbia, seem to us of crucial importance, since it is loyal to the principles of legality and nonviolence. There is a number of initiatives in Serbia who until now collected over 60.000 signatories. We call for a wide support for Serbian antiwar movements and to spread information about their work. Peace movements are those who build bridges already in the time of war and these Iinks will serve as a basis to rebuilt the trust and cooperation amongst people who are determined to live in the neighbourhood. Citizens Initiative “Silence kills, let’s speak for peace" Movement for the culture of peace and non-violence, Ljubljana In cooperation with: Organised women’ s groups of Slovenia different peace groups from Slovenia, Zagreb, Rijeka, Novi Sad, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Titograd and Skopje. O P P C T 27 L 1 T E E A T U E E WHY DO THESE BLACK WORMS FLY JUST EVERYWHERE AM MYSELF ONLY ACCIDENTALLY my childhood was full of strories about the war. past war, of which the heavy blow didn’t cease to suffocate my mother. her stories were not a hymn to the heroism. she escaped from torturing, fled from the wall of hostages, survived the concentration camp - and yet she was always retelling her own disbelief about having deluded death. the fear from violent, out of hatred and vengeance arising death, was the only fear i could never live with. i wrote in the school papers: “my biggest wish is, there would never be a war”. but my mother has always asked me, from the time i became aware of myself, asked me to burn her body after her death. “i don’t stand the thought to be devoured by vvorms”, she was explaining her vision of inevitable absurd, i was feeling this absence of reason during the entire life as an unfinished though invincible wall of intolerance and as impenetrable glasses of unconcern. now i don’t even know anymore when the absurd adopted a face and began to walk around here. i remember it the most persisting was my bullet-proof jacket, when on the Street next to mine a helicopter was shut down; persisting was my helmet, when shooting under my window was taking plače; persisting dragged me away, when a missile exploded above me; persisting protected me from the panic of the people i had been spending hours and hours in the shelter with, later on persisting became a filter put in front of a TV-set screen. persisting is just a rampart against the emotions that try to break through as a mountain torrent into me, to tear me up and drag away into the flood of war. on friday goran with his friends came from osijek. they were showing off video tapes with destroyed town, they were displaying pictures of dead bodies, they were reciting missives of the attacked ones, they were singing....” to document, not to interpret” he said, being composed and submitted as never before. he is also persisting. he travels incessantly through the enemy-encirclements, taking the war from osijek to Zagreb, rijeka, hungary, czechoslovakia, germany - and afterwards he goes back. to persist. we were facing each other, two empty mirrors, from which the images were erased by persistence, we were exchanging speechless words and just feeling, how slowly, but in perseverantly increasing number, we get bit by worms. our encounter was simple, short and completely inexplicable, so as death. lela b. njatin, november 16th 1991 Translation: Krištof Jacek Kozak (DIEHAUSERS )* *From the brochure Noise Slawonische Kunst n.4 (Osijek - Zagreb) 28 Guns spitting fire and smoke on the oleander blossoms along the old tram rails; shell frag¬ mente are v/hizzing around the orange trees at the Pile City Gate. A curse heavy with hatred is directed to St Vlaho, patron saint of Dubrovnik, and barrels of ali calibers are aiming at the flag on which we read the letters “Libertas”. The face of the white angel from miloševo has darkened; the warriors whose cannons are aiming at Dundo Maroje are the same that span cannonballs on the Studenica and Sopočani monasteries. From the same posi- tion the študente of mythological allegories carried out a successful attack on the Sistine chapel and they acted according to the com- mand in this čase of the said Michelangelo Buonarotti. At the same time, across the Street at the Trafalgar Square, Lord Carrington is sipping his jug of Rochester beer with the golden crovvn; the rumour has it that even William Shakespeare doesiTt frequent him in his dreams any longer. And thus tiny passions shoot from ali vveapons, the cuirassiers of death sing their requiem to the Athens of the Adriatic. The whole of the sunny Stradun is packed into tiny and dark holes. The poets, too, have hidden themselves from fire and smoke. The insipide taste of humiliation enters the pores of Gundulič’s hymn to liberty. But it happened, however, that one Orpheus peeped out, just to check - who know what... Of course, they shot him before he had time to wonder. And now, in the vast expanses of divine love, he is submitting his transcendentalreport about the white cloud or smoke which, like an adul- tery, inhaled its sulfuric taste into the green treetop of the orange at Pile. How strange this picture seems on the other side of time and men, on the other side of evil and forgiveness.... Touched by the whiteness of theircherubicsin, the meaning and nothing- ness sink into the warmth of amorous unifica- tion. / W lk - -M F \IS Franjo Likar This text has first been published in “Why ?”, Sarajevo. 0 Union of Peace Initiatives from Slovenia (Koordinacija mirovnih iniciativ iz Slovenije) Center za kulturo miru in nenasilja /Movement for.the Culture of Peace & Nonviolence Medškofijski odbor študentov /InterBishops Conference of Students Ženska frakcija SDP /Womens‘ fractionSDP Most /Association for Preventive and Vo!untary Work Marko Hren, Mestni trg 13, YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, ' tel.,fax. 061-224666, 210374 Milan Knep, Jurčičev trg 2, fax. 061-314169 YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tel. 223864, 211136 Sonja Lokar, Tomšičeva 5, YU 5 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia tel. 061- 161140, fax. 215855 Angelca Murko Pleš, Komenskega 7, YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slo., tel. 324189, fax 329196 Mateja Kožuh, Tel. 061 - 324059, fax. 323955 1 Aškerčeva 9, YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,*- Tel. 061- 217113, Fax. 061 -153304 Linhartova 13, YU-Ljubljana, Fax. 061-129141 /23^ 0 Committee^of Anti-War Campaign Zagreb (Odbor anti-ratne kampanje Zagreb) Zelena Akcija * /G reen Action - ■ Društvo za unapr£djepje kvalitete života 1 /Assotiation for Improvement of the Quality of Life Demokratski forum Rijeka /Demokratic Forum Rijeka 0 Center for Peace Sarajevo * (Centar za mir Sarajevo) Društvo Slobodne misli /Assotiation of Free Thought Centar za ljudska prava i mir /Center for Human Rights and Peace Udruženje prijatelja djece i mira /Union of Friends of Children & Peace . Narodni Mirovni Pokret /Peoples’Movempnt. for Peace 0 Center for Anti-War Action Novi Sad (Centar za antiratnu akciju Novi Sad) 0 Center for Anti-War Action Beograd (Centar za antiratnu akciju Beograd) Ženska Stranka /Womens' Party Zoran Oštrič, Radničkac. 22, P.P. 876, YU- 41000Zagreb, Croaitia tel., fax 041-610951 Draženka Dobrič, 041 -677574 / privat ■ Vesna Jankovič -č/o ArcZin 041-214507 Zlatko Pejič, Iliča 72/I P.P. 117, l Yu-41000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel' 041-426352, fax. 041-428771 Šura Dumanič, tel. fax. 051 - 713291, Ffijeka, Croatia Ibrahim Spahič, Dobrovoljačka 11, Yu- 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia & Hercegovina x tel. 071-214884, fax. 071-216238, privat 071-38247 Nermin Butkovič, same address •5 privat 071-652806 Zdravko Grebo Miodrag Živanovič, Banja Luka tel. 078-12754, fax 071-12766, privat 071-55613 i Duško TomičMedjaši kod Bjeljine, Tel.. 071-646937, 076-53176 • Vasvija Oraščanin C/O Movement for the Culture of Peace. y ' and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Slovenia Slavenica Ljubič, Maksima Gorkog 10 Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodiria tel. 021-278887 privat 021-619019 Svetlana Berisavljevič, Stevana Mokranjca 24 Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, tel, 021-319204 privat Bulevar maršala Tita 20, Yu-21000 NoVi Sad, Vojvpdina, Tel., fax. 021- 57797 Stojan Cerovič, chair, fax: 011-342646 , , c/o Vesna Pešič, Prote Mateje 6,_ Yu-11000 Beograd, Serbia / tel. 011-431298, fax 681989 Svetozara Markoviča 4, 011-334706 Lina Vučkovič, privat 011-384706 0 Citizens Committee for Peace Titograd (Gradjanski odbor za mir Titograd) Hercegovačka 15, YU-81000 Titograd, Montenegro tel.; fax. 081-41914 Miodrag Vlahovič, tel. 081-11789 Rade Bojovič, tel. 081-612049 0 League for Democracy Skopje (Liga za demokratiju Skopje) ^ Djordji. Marjanovič, 091-518589