Year 1, No. 3 December 1991

The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence

EDITORIAL	
- Black Hole	-1
By Dominique Cochard	
- Space, Decadence and Optimism	2
By Marko Hren	
A NEW STATE?	
- After Free Elections, No Democracy	3
By Ali Žerdin	
- Reappearance of the Civil Society ?	4
(through the struggle for abortion rights) By Marija Melodić	
- Croatian Refugees: the Loss of Orientation	6
(an interview with Goga Flaker)	
By Dominique Cochard	
- Children in War	8
By Nina Pečnik	
- Most / Voluntary Service Slovenia	9
- The Disadvantages of the Law on COs	9
By Antiša Korljan	
A Roof Above the Streets	10
By Bratko Bibič	-1-1
- Metelkova: a Study Case	
By Alenka Burja	
THE ROTTEN FRUIT	
- Dying for the New European or World Order	12
Interview with Tonči Kuzmanić	
- The Heroic and Poetic Burden of Second-class Spaghetti Western	13
Report of the Scientific Symposium, Ljubljana	
- General Selfishness and Bad Amateurism in Politics	15
An interview with Jan Øberg	
- After Yugoslavia What ?	16
Press review-TFF report	
- Peace Movements, Anteroom of National Revolutions	1/
Out of an interview with Tonči Kuzmanić	17
- One Year of Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA)	
By Marko Hren	
KOSOVO	No. of the last of
- Non-Violence as a Solution	19
Interview With Rexhep Ismajlij	
- Human Rights Report on Kosovo	20
SARAJEVO	
- "WHY?", a New Publication	21
By Ibrahim Spahić	00
- Let It Be Peace	22
Interview with Stefan Milenković and His Family	
UN	
- A Proposal to Stop the War	23
- Blue Helmets in Croatia ?	24
By Doroteja Lešnik	
PROSPECTS	
- European Peace Press Project	25
- Vis, European Demilitarisation Project	25
By the Peace Institute	
- Silence Kills, Let us Speak for Peace	27
LITERATURE	Name of Street, or other Designation of the last of th
- why do these black worms fly just everywhere ?	28
By lela b. njatin	20
- Golgotha - Dubrovnik, It is all of Us	29
By Franjo Likar	

The Intruder*
Year I, No. 3., December 1991
Issued by: The Movement for the
Culture of Peace and Nonviolence
Address: Mestni trg 13
61 000 Ljubljana
Tel. 3861-210374, Fax. 224666
Edited by: Dominique Cochard
Design: Darja Vuga
Demilitary Publishing
Password: Stop the War

*The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence is issuing information abroad from 1984 and has been publishing newsletters in English language from 1985 on: during the years 85, 86, 87 titled Information Bulletin of the Peace Movement in Slovenia and during years 88, 89, 90 The Independent Voices from Slovenia. In 1991 it was renamed to The Intruder. We all hope that The Intruder will remain in the manifestation. With your help, too. Please keep in touch, send us a note, feedback, letters, money, love! If the stars will feel OK, the next issue will be out in March 1992.

EDITORIAL



open questions

Where is the slovenian civil society gone? I don't know wether I lack analytical capacities, education or informations, but what is not doubtful is: I can't understand, neither the processes of this disappearence nor its reasons. Therefore I have no clue concerning the appropriate cure. I am just able to observe.

The last meeting of the Movement for the culture of peace and non-violence had as a main topic on its agenda: "Who are we? What do we want?, to put it in a trivial way. Clear symptom. Simple constatation too: "we are not constituting a counterpower anymore". The syndrom of western apathy is spurting out. Denying the programm of discussions, this small assembly tried to define what would be the ideal, nostalgic of the old good times. The ideal being unreachable creates the best conditions to give up before the beginning, with a very comprehensible fear of difficulties and impotency. Frustration, loss of self-confidence is thus feeding again the state of apathy.

Surely, the war in Slovenia created a shock, which left tracks. Shall we allow ourselves to believe in a necessary and normal transition period?

The extremely quick changes in the situation (both inside Slovenia and in the former Yugoslavia) are requesting a great emotional and intellectual flexibility. Are these supra-human qualities? The need of constant redefinition of lines of actions, positions, is however enormous. If not fulfilled, the chaos is contagiously expanding to all areas.

Furthemore the "small is beautiful" slogan of Slovenia seemed to content the necessary characteristics, in previous times, to enable people to believe in the accessibility and easiness of lobbying, acting, speaking up, and being heard. Why do I witness, nowadays, the opposite situation?: the size of this nation does not allow to produce a sufficient variety to provide new blood to ideas and wills. Is this reactional phenomena of enclosure and suffocation anyhow connected with the separation from the rest of Yugoslavia?

The dryness of this isolation leads to an euphoria of openings to the "shiny, rich, and powerful" (united!) West. Complex of inferiority. Paranoid feeling of being observed. Artificial reactions and irresponsible pretendings: Instauration of a new currency, laws written to please the West, peace activists believing in their potential power to influence the UN policy.... Not being taken seriously by dint of wanting to look serious or important...

Still the massive people's belief is "everything is going to be alright!" with the additional condition "If we get recognised!".

After the promise of Eden through "independence", the next step is "recognition". How far can blindness and naivety lead?

Dominique Cochard, December 18th 1991

Note: This Intruder is not afraid of being observed, therefore all kinds of feed-back (however nasty they can be) will be appreciated as generator of progress and improvements.

EDITORIAL

Space Decadence and Optimism

Fin de siécle. The history repeats. Last Christmas the letter to friends supplementing The Intruder announced that the answer to the question, what will happen in Yugoslavia in 1991 can involve just all answers - all scenarios were open. Now it is clear - the space of Balkans have decided to exercise the worse scenario. It seams that it is releasing the frustration in dissbalanced relations betwee East and West and North and South - Yugoslavia was all four together. The world around us is changing much faster than we can ever realise. What we lack is the ability to observe, reflect and not get disturbed by chaos produced by the change. The state of chaos even offers more opportunity for reconstructions - if only the mind remains clear.

Nobody believed that the potentials for violence on theterritory of Yugoslavia were so high, nobody took the regime of Serbian state against Albanians in Kosovo all over 80ies seriously enough, nobody took military trials and threaths of military coup in Slovenia as an alarming fact. And then, when the worth scenario has happened, everybody feels impotent. In the case of Yugoslavia everybody failled nationally and internationally. The only one who can profit is the US policy which will be in the case of Yugoslavia again after the Gulf most probably called to play the role of the world policeman after Europe and the UN will declare their unability to solve the problem. The decadent athmosphere in Europe, the problems with refugees and rasism, the impotency and even ignorance in dealing with the brutal developments in former Yugoslavia must have been reflecting some much deeper thrauma of the European civilisation then just a shock because of the war in this "sain" continent...

It might be, that centuries of colonial politics of European states are in this century - and particularily with the ap-

pearance of faschism - producing a countereffect. European civilizations were never able to communicate with nations that they confronted during their imperialistic missions. When Columbus 500 years ago by mistake landed on Bahami islands the Arawaks offered his man the hand and sharing. Europeans did not understand the indian culture of sharing. It was just not a part of european

system of values. They wanted to sattisfy their interest. What has followed were centuries of genocide which continued all over Americas. Great Discovery or a lost opportunity for two cultures to meet? Bad experience requests the history to repeat. Europeans will have to learn to accept other cultures with an open hand as Arawaki suggested. Columbus interest was the one of the market economy - his motive was gold, spices and slaves. Market economy destroyed the culture of sharing. The economy of the powerfull (vertical hierarchy of monotheism) replaced the economy of equals (hierarchy of gods and spirits in all appearances of the creation). The market economy now rulles the world and people from the third world are moving in agony to the land of their conquerors. The problem came back to European civilization which will have to learn the principles they missregarded - the principles of sharing. The one who won became a victim.

What can we celebrate then? Where is the line of an optimist? Certainly not the Columbus year, certainly not the new world order, certainly not the unification of Europe or the independency of particular republics in former socialist monolits. But what then? We should maybe celebrate the fact that we are able to see the things more clear. It is bad on the planet all over the place. But at least we know it better. In Serbia after centuries of strong millitary traditon hundreds of thousands of people renounce the war - they know this war is bad. Eventhough the problems are manifesting in most tough way, this brings some positive, deep personal experience of the most important values and truth - the truth of the humble being which found itself in a course of planetary evolution and confronts itself with permanent question - what is the next step? Stoping and looking back might bring more answer than running front blind eyes in a crowd. We have to question seriously the

European culture of posession, statehood, imperialism and power games and find answers in the cultures which were the victims of Europe. 1992 is a good oportunity to work on renouncing the elitist immage of (white, cultural, integralistic, modern ect.) Europe - because of famous 500 aniversary and because of the fact, that the most brutal war on the planet has now been spreading on the "old continent".

19 th December 1991

Marko Hren

TELEGRAPH

A SMALL PEACE CARAVAN will be coming to Yugoslavia. The first step will be Ljubljana, on the 27th of December. It is organised by HCA-French branch

ALBA, an association for Conscientious objection from Budapest is organising a kind of caravan, too, due to go to Vojvodina to support the resisters.

MI ZA MIR is a dutch organisation established in October 1991 by women from various peace and human rights groups. The aims are to put an end to the war in Croatia, prevent it to spread all over ex-Yugoslavia. Help to people seeking refuge in Netherlands.

MARCO PANELLA joined by some russians and czechs, began a hunger-strike, at the moment of occupation of Vukovar. Before Christmas, he will go to the first frontline in Osijek. (Marko Hren just decided to join this hunger strike action.)

SPECIAL THANKS

To all contributors of this issue: writers, photographers, designer who, apart from their hearty collaboration,work professionally for small amounts of money

To all people abroad
who gave feed-back
who diffuse our articles through
their national press or own
means
who supported us morally
who supported us financially

To all readers


MERRY CHRISTMAS HAPPY NEW YEAR

A NEW STATE ?



photo Diego Andrés Gómez

A F T E R FREE



Slovenia was once described as an "island of freedom in Eastern Europe"- a flattering title earned because of many initiatives organised by the republic's healthy civil society. Slovene democracy did survive 10 days of war- there was no curfew, and the parliament was able to convene. But democracy is more than the absence of violence or censorship.

One of the most important pre-war initiatives centred on the complete disarmament of Slovenia. By some estimates, 50 percents of Slovenes wanted demilitarisation before the war. Now Slovene disarmament sounds like a utopian provocation: its advocates are branded as traitors.

Slovene society has been militarized. Police repression is clearly visible. Attitudes to immigrants are marked by intolerance and racism. The democratic spirit of civil society is rapidly disappearing. This is the irony of post-communist Slovenia. After free elections, and the fall of communist rules, the possibilities for free and open discussions have receded. The communications network of the citi-

zens' movements lost its function after

political parties were formally established.

ELECTIONS

Slovenia's pacifist groups have no real influence. But their energy remains: some alternative groups are pressuring to have the former barracks of the federal army in Ljubljana turned into their headquarters. (1) If their request is granted, there will be at least one sign that the democratic spirit of civil society still exists.

Ali Žerdin, Ljubljana

This article has first been published in Yugofax (16th of November)

(1) This project is developed in details in the article: "For a Roof above the Streets".

The

REAPPEARANCE

of

The discussion about the new slovenian constitution raised its boiling-point, its Faust-dilemna.

The only non-consensual point in the whole constitution left both in the constitution commission and among different parties in the parliament was the paragraph about the "human right to decide over birth of one's own children" (reproductive rights) which includes the abortion rights and the duties of the state to provide the facilities (the opportunities) to make this right become truth (1). This result is actually no surprise for anybody, who attended the discussion and arguments in the last two years. Anyway, there exists now a strong pressure towards the ommission of this paragraph in the constitution with the main following argument: Slovenia has a new state, which aims at a very immediate recognition at the international level, desparately needs a new, democratical constitution. As a consequence of the former intraparty agreement on every single constitutional paragraph there should exist a consent of every party in the parliament. So, if there is no agreement on the question of human right to decide over the birth..., including abortion rights, this paragraph should be left out in order to adopt the new constitution and make possible the new elections. Some opinions from the very conservative corner show their "wondering over the excitment around this funny question", because if the adoption of the new constitution could be endangered with "such trifle", Europe should really "laugh at us". On the other side, there was an absolute agreement of all parties before the beginning of constitution-making process that the new constitution should not diminish former rights in any way.

CIVIL

3 3 3 3 3

By Marija Melodić

But what is actually the point of this strife in Slovenia?

Many independant women's groups had already publicly argued for the preservation of this right in the new, post-socialist constitution: first, because the whole legislation on this subject is derived from this constitutional right, second, because they started to comprehend this right as a ground for their political and social rights (this right has been constitutional since 1974), and third, because there exist evidences about very good results of former liberal and social oriented legislative on this question. Very many opponents to the constitutional reproduction rights are claiming that the defenders of this right are making "abortion propaganda" and that abortion is no right but "emergency way out" which does not belong to the constitution. The arguments of the defenders of the preservation are: this is a set of rights, including abortion, and its ommission would put the 51% of the population in the position of second-class citizens. Namely in the case of ommission, there exists the possibility to change the legislative on this question with the simple majority in the parliament. Besides, it is quite obvious that this right has a strong symbolic importance. It does not only represent a danger for the possibilities of abortion, but the symbolic abolishing of the equal position of the women because of quite clear public claims that they should not decide on their own.

Another argument of the opponents to the constitutional reproductive rights is that there exists no European country with such constitutional right: which is very questionable as an argument because of the elderness of most of the european constitutions on one side, because of the rude comparison between different traditions and systems, in another side. Although the opponents of the reproductive rights in the constitution are claiming that they don't want to abolish abortion rights, it is quite obvious that they want to achieve it in another way: one does not need to forbid abortion to make it difficult or impossible; the new christian-democrat government already decided different restrictive measures towards making access to abortion difficult, by centralising or abolishing women'health centers, suspending the liberal director of the universitary women'health center in Ljubljana, making abortion and contraception payable.... Furthermore, the increasing discussions in the medias make women feel more and more guilty about

There are also very goog principle and practical reasons for demanding the preservation of reproduction rights in the constitution. Last but not the least, because there is still a long way to the point where they would be understood as a value as such.

This introduction about the background of the constitutional discussion about abortion might

help to understand why a large demonstration took place in Ljubljana on the 11th of December, with the demand to preserve the reproductive rights plus abortion right .Thirteen independent women's groups, women's initiatives in trade unions, and in parliamentary as well as non-paliementary parties organised the demonstration, in which about 1500 people, men and women, participated. Their banderols and the slogans they cried out were: "Women's rights into the new constitution !, Women's ministery!, Women's parliament!, Abortion without compromise!, There will be new elections once more !, If you decide without us, we will choose against you!,

form the common at the day of demonstration and refused the ommission of the reproduction rights. After the second world war this was the first large women's demonstration in Slovenia. The daily Večer from Maribor rightly called it the "first civil demonstration after the elections in spring 1990".

It was quite obviously that actually nobody-neither in the government nor in the parliament-expected such strong opposition to the commission or reduction of mentioned paragraph on reproductive rights. So far the demonstration was a success of independent women's groups. But however, the big question is to know wether it can provide enough influence to



11 th of December in Ljubljana, 1500 persons... (photo Diana Anđelić)

etc...Their demand was undoubtful preservation of reproduction rights preservation of reproduction rights and participation in the last discussion in the constitutional commission and in the parliament. The session of the parliament was interrupted because of a large part of (oppositional) parliamentory delegates joined the demonstration. It is important to stress that there is only 11% of women in the slovenian parliament and only one woman in the constitutional commission. Despite the strong pressure of the governing parties the women's delegates in the parliament (25 from 240) succeded to

preserve this right in the constitution. The moral dilemna the delegates are facing - to make decision with women - is obviously not clear enough to them.


December 1991

(1). It is very important to stress, that this right did not include only abortion rights (on demand until the 10th week of pregnancy) but, first of all, the social, health and other facilities to make it possible to give birth to desired children. This included the whole net of women's health centers, accessible (free) contraception, abortion on demand, payed out of the health insurance. Not to speak about the free health care for mothers and children, and other social facilities.

CROATIAN REFUGEES: THE LOSS OF ORIENTATION LJUBLJANA: THE GROWTH OF FASCISM*

An interview with Goga Flaker, coordinator of voluntary work in refugees' camps

By Dominique Cochard



All they know is that they don't want to go back to Croatia, and curiously, they even don't want to move to Istria: we never managed to get any explanation for that. So many things are completely irrational... Finally the ones who climbed in the bus for Istria were the ones who were the most strongly against this idea. We just can't understand. Neither of us can understand yet what's happened to those people.

To loose everything, maybe this I can understand what it means. But, to be put somewhere, not knowing where they will be next month or next year, as Slovenia is declaring: "we don't have money, that's enough". The refugees are very scared they could be sent to Italy or any other country...Nothing is stable.

Most of them completely lost orientation, especially children. We didn't understand why they were so happy when we announced we were going for a walk to the castle (which is situated on the top of a hill in the middle of Ljubljana). Once there, we realised: from the castle, they finally could see where they are!

What connections do they still have with Croatia?

They really feel they are not understood by the surroundings and are very often told they are completely forgotten by Croatia. Their first ground was the promise of croatian authorities to send teachers in the camps in order to run normal school for the children, and this hasn't been fulfilled. They don't have any direct contact with Croatia, in any way. I would say that their impression of the drop from Croatia is quite justified, at all levels: when we asked the peace groups in Zagreb to come, visit the camps and help us to find appropriate actions and behaviour with the refugees, they claimed it was not a problem worth to be considered, and surely not a priority.

How do they perceive the war in Croatia, from Ljubljana? Do they think of the time when they will be able to go back?

People believe deep inside they are going to stay for quite a long time. Though they are very touched by the conflict, they somehow are putting the problem aside. Even when they watch TV, it is as if it was concerning another planet, and after all I think it is completely normal, a kind of defence. Nevertheless, I believe it creates



in them an internal conflict: they don't know what to do with themselves, the whole atmosphere is very tensed, they are arguing all the time for very little things, smashing children's faces for no reason.....

They say they can't imagine living with the serbs anymore. There is an incredible hatred in them. I think people working in these camps and the whole civil society should help them to overcome this hatred: this is the most important thing we can do to help them, or try to help. For that you really need a lot of patience, and that's where people from abroad can help a lot. Otherwise, this hatred will spread slowly; it is already beginning.

But, any kind of action has to be taken slowly. Hatred is so big. One day, something incredible happened: we went to the town center with a group of children, we gave them pieces of chalks, and they began to draw on the pavement. I was speaking with somebody for five minutes not paying attention to what they were doing, and suddenly, I discovered the pavement was full of hatred, political system,...symbols. I was really shocked, as well as everybody else. A psychologist, later on, saw the drawings and couldn't believe they have been made by so young children. These signs were so perfectly realistic.

Did it reach the point of pathological trauma?

There are not yet many observations concerning that.

Are they regularly examined by psychologists?

I think that, for the moment, women need more help. Two psychologists willing to work with refugees had to force the way in: when they first rang the camps to propose their collaboration, they have been answered there was no need because some social workers were permanently in the camps. I finally managed to introduce them. They are now coming once a week. That is obviously not sufficient for 600 people.

Anyway the organisational aspect is getting better little by little, rules are established, the Red Cross, the Civil Protection of the Town Hall are helping. It is at least less chaotic. The center for mental health is preparing a project called "therapy to overcome a shock".

What is the reaction of local people towards them?

The situation in Ljubljana is the worse. In small towns they organise themselves better, both local authorities and population. Although I am still a bit critical about the way they work.

It is very often that slovenian volunteers and workers in these camps get angry on refugees, claiming they are behaving like in hotels, everything has to be done for them... I am trying to explain that they are in state of shock, that there is no way to pass them messages through without patience.

Discriminating attitudes can also be observed in the streets: unemployement is rising in Slovenia, therefore slovenian often feel it is not fair that the refugees get a roof and food without working, this at their cost. It is somehow understandable. Therefore, we did not dare trying to find jobs for them. There would be too much pressure on them. And, at the same time, I see all these slovenian families coming to social centers, having nothing at all, even not the subsistence level.

Did you think of developing a kind of inner economy (craft works to be sold on the market)?

We have been suggesting it. There are already some craft workshops, but for now, they only make things for themselves, exchange, or give presents. I am sure it will develop: we put slowly into their minds that they could earn money with such activities. It would also be important for the promotion of the problem, as well in Slovenia as abroad.

The best reaction was the children's one: they decided on their own to produce christmas cards, but they were suddenly desperate because they realised they would not be able to send them to Croatia. We had to persuade them we could spread their cards abroad.

What are the main actions you and the volunteers initiate in the camps?

We have to get them to become active. It is rather a difficult task: as I said earlier the slovenian volunteers working with them are very often getting angry, not finding a way to communicate really with the refugees.

A very significant example of sudden involvment of two refugees stayed in the back of my mind: two teachers from Šibenik (dalmatian coast) were accomodated by friends of mine. My friends became very quickly fed up with these refugees because they were watching TV all day, never participating in any housework. They asked me to get them involved in the camps. The first day they came, having been pushed, they kept standing inactive in a corner of the room all morning. I just warned them that they will anyway have to stay until 4 p.m, and that they might get bored: they looked at me with great anger. When I proposed them to start organising things for children (as they are teachers), the anger in their eyes changed into hatred. In the evening, around 8 o'clock, my friends rang me up a bit worried: "They are not back yet. What did you do with them ?". They just started to work well, are completely in, and feel responsible and useful.

What about the aims?

I firstly and mostly expect a lot from the slovenian people. The most basic thing they can do is to develop in themselves a special patience. I think we will have a growing problem in 1992: the economic situation will get worse in Slovenia, and I grow no illusion that the refugees will go back to Croatia in the coming year. Maybe even more Albanians and Bosnians will come. Therefore, we need to get struc-

tured and build strategies to be able to face fascism, which is already growing. We should not isolate refugees in the camps from the local population, then creating ghettos. We should integrate these croatians in the sloven society, in priority, before training them to go back to Croatia (through actions such as trust-building sessions with local people,..). We are already working this way with the children: they have a lot of activities commonly with a

scout group from Ljubljana, local children are free to join.

The problem is now to get organised enough, that people willing to help will know about us, where to get informed, whom to phone... To achieve this, I am thinking of quiting my regular work.

What about practical involvment of the volunteers, concrete everyday work?

Around 70 volunteers are now working in the camps; it is increasing everyday. Most of them are from the academy, because some lecturers there are cooperating with us, thus advertising our activities, inciting students to take part. These students devote a great amount of their time: most of them spend three days a week with children, beside, they are fundraising, are trying to get material.... One girl is even working there all week, putting her studies aside. During the small trip we had to the castle, I saw volunteers carrying a handicapped man up to the top: in many years of organising voluntary work, I never saw something like that. Until now, the usual volunteer's behaviour was to expect evrything to be organised for them, and have fun. I even remember myself, last year, commenting the passivity of students, and of this new generation in general. This time the reality is completely different: they devote their entire leisure time, do their best to organise themselves.

Who is working with the volunteers to advise them, giving them the necessary strategy to follow? Or do they get a specific education?

There are of course no skilled people concerning refugees. Nobody here knows about this specific problem yet.

There is nevertheless a group of 6 people working with volunteers: 5 professionals (social workers), and one person is working permanently in the office coordinating all activities. These professionals get

4000 Tolars a month (a bit less than 100 DM) for 8 hours daily work. We have meetings once a week: both professionals and volunteers.

We organised lectures at the beginning, also because we were scared as well to handle such problems: group building, psychology, civil protection... Volunteers very quickly stopped to attend: their involvment was of emotional nature, they did not know clearly yet what they wanted, what was the need... Now they have these two months of practical experience, the request for education is coming from them. so, we will begin again, straight after new year.

We also thought of initiating some research work on this specific situation: it would involve people of our group of course, but it would be very good that people from outside the situation would join the team of researchers.

In that regard, did you have any contact with refugee's centers abroad, with which you could share experiences and research?

Not yet, unfortunately.

Are there exchanges between the two centers which are in Ljubljana?

We did try. It did not work. Each center quickly developed jealousy towards the other one. First of all, the two centers are complete different cases: one is situated in barracks at the edge of the town, the other one in two blocks of flats into town. There simply cannot be the same things happening in both: conditions of living and the atmosphere are too different.

* More than half of a million of persons have been displaced from Croatia & Bosnia. Amongst them more than 30 000 refugees came to Slovenia (2.3 million population in total). Slovenia is facing the refugee problem for the first time?

For any further informations:

Association for Preventive and Voluntary Work Linhartova 13 61 000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

Phone: 38 61 - 129 141 / 234

Giro account: Ljubljanska Banka 010 - 727001 -100158 / 47

(Photo Fordof c).



in WAR

By Nina Pečnik, post-graduate student of psychology, Zagreb

Nina Pečnik is involved in the following voluntary and non-institutional activities and initiatives: "First shelter for battered women and children in former Yugoslavia"

To understand the problems of children in war, one must realise that these numbers have the following implications. Children face or have faced the threat on their physical integrity. Not only wounded children have to cope with pain, fear, insecurity. Some face violent deaths or constant menace on the lifes of their parents or close people they know. Some were exposed to fightings, bombings, deprivation of food and water. Many were forced to leave their homes and friends under very stressful conditions. Some are separated from their families. Many are being influenced by the emotional state of their parents, who are often very tensed or overwhelmed by emotions of helplessness and unable to give them the feeling of support and protection. Many experience the fear of separation, enuresis nocturna



photo Diego Andrés Gómes

One can approach the situation of children in Croatia through several facts.

According to the medical headquarters data of november 26th, 37 children were killed and 250 wounded in the war in Croatia. That includes only children who are in hospitals or have received medical treatment.

The number of displaced children can be estimated from the total number of displaced persons, which was over 500 000 by november 26th (official data). At least one third of them are children. That includes 30 000 primary school children and 16 000 secondary school students. At the moment, there are about 40 000 dis-

placed families (women, children and elders) in Zagreb.

The number of children whose parents died in the war is not known yet. According to the official informations there are over 10 000 victims, but the estimated figure is around 30 000. The vast majority of them had children.

All children in Croatia are exposed to direct experience of war. Psychological effect ranges on ly in degrees - from living in the cellars in areas where fightings are continuously taking place, to living in the areas where the occasional air-raid sirenes force them to shelters and cellars.

nightmares, anxiety, inhibition, depression, agression, self-destruction, psychosomatic difficulties, failure in school,....

Different kinds of actions are necessary to meet the growing needs of children in war. Beside providing help for children, helping parents and teachers to understand the specific problems of children, and teach them how to overcome or cope with such difficulties seems to be most urgently needed.

This text has first been published in "Agora", the bulletin of the foundation of conscience, n.0, edited in Zagreb.

Most

VOLUNTARY SERVICE SLOVENIA

is an independant
non-governmental organisation,
which is coordinating
voluntary work in Slovenia
and abroad in connection with
foreign organisations.

MOST:

- supports initiatives of individuals and groups, help them to realise their aims, if based on the principle components of voluntary work: solidarity, self-help, ... for the benefit of the local community.
- collects and give finances to all groups and individuals for non-profit projects in spheres of protection of nature, help to marginal social groups, peace education, conscientious objection, etc
- organises trainings for volunteers and other people in order to spread principle of voluntary work
- spreads informations about voluntary work abroad
- joins international actions convinced that cooperation of people from different nations, religions, culture and political beliefs supports the idea of better understanding between people and non-violent solution of conflicts

At the moment, MOST is initiating several international projects with the Association for preventive and voluntary work in the refugees' centers (see the interview with Goga Flaker):

- An international workcamp for Christmas: prepare both feasts with the refugees, run activities for children...
- An other workcamp in February, stressing more on mediation between refugees and slovenian
- Will follow a medium term projects: 4 international volunteers for 6 months, to work permanently in the camps

MOST will become a branch of SCI-International.

For further informations or financial support, contact:

MOST / VOLUNTARY SERVICE SLOVENIA Aškerčeva 9 61000 LJUBLJANA

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN SLOVENIA

n Slovenia conscientious objectors (COs) were recognized in April this year, when the new law of defence was passed in the parliament. In this article Iwill explain the process of receiving the status of CO. and tell something about disadvantages of the law.

First of all it is necessary to be told that actually not every citizen can be recognized as CO. Namely, the law is written that way, that only those who were not in the army yet can apply for the status. That means that quite a big percentage of slovenian male population still has no right to object in accordance with their conscience. When the youngster receives a call for conscription, he has to declare himself as a CO. In this letter he has to write his reasons for such decision. The reasons, predicted in the law are: philosophical, ethical, religious and humanitarian, while the political ones are not mentioned. After sending the letter, one is called to a kind of commission, which has to decide whether ones' reasons are strong enough or not. The comission make their opinion on the basis of a short letter and of the interview they make with a CO. The alternative service is just as

long as military and it has to be done in the institution of the public importance. The question is: which are such institutions? It is obvious, that in the country, which is involved in the war, also the production of arms is of public importance. Unfortunately, we don't have any experience with people, who decided for such way of serving the country. It was reported that about 150 people decided for alternative service till now. As I told before, the length of both services is equal and that is, I think, the only advantage of civil service. Namely, everything you do in that time is defined by the state: what will you do, where will you live in that time (forbidden to live at home) where will you eat... You even have to wear a special sign on your clothes, what is quite uncomfortable considering the present slovenian public opinion. Namely, the slovenian soldier is becoming a kind of a myth, after Slovenia won the war and now you are a coward if you don't want to be a soldier. Really interesting turn in the way of thinking, because not so long ago Slovenians were known as "military illiterate nation". That was something about them, who are allowed to be CO, but bigger problem is for them, who once served the federal army.

For them there is no chance to get

a status of CO, no matter how long ago they were in the army. We can say that the law doesn't consider the advance of their mind through the years. For them situation is quite hard, because they have no legal way to maintain their basic right to refuse to kill. We suggest them to declare themselves as COs inspite of the law and there was already reported that some of them was sent to the alternative service instead to the military. It gives some hope.

Another problem, which is still unsolved in every European country, is a problem of total objectors. Honestly told, there is no realistic chance to recognize them in the near future. After all you've read you can see that there is no real chance for objection, there is only the opportunity to choose the alternative, civil service. Anyway, after all, we have to say that the situation in Slovenia is not as bad as, for example, in Serbia, where there's no chance to be objector. In case you refuse to go to the army (federal) as " volunteer" you are treated as a traitor. The sanctions, predicted in the law, could be very hard, even death penalty because of being deserter. But, that's another story.

Antiša Korljan

Metelkova

roject

for a roof above the streets

1990,

for

In the beginning of

"Mreža za Metelkovo"

Metelkova Street - was

founded in Ljubljana,

the capital city of

Slovenija, by an initia-

tive of ŠKUC (Student

Cultural Centre) and

Movement for the cul-

ture of Peace and Non-

violence, starting from

experiences of alterna-

tive (sub)cultures and

social movements in

eighties and in regard

to transformed political,

economical, cultural

and social circum-

stances in Ljubljana and

Slovenija. Up to

november 1991, ap-

proximately two hun-

dred individuals, infor-

mal working groups,

institutions and organi-

sations (app. six hun-

dred individual mem-

bers) have joined the

network with the pur-

pose to satisfy some of

their basic needs within

working and leisure

fields of different (es-

Network

September

other minorities emancipation etc.

In short, the main scheduled goal of the network is twofold:

1. to get and to convert the large area of (exjugoslavian) military headquarter barracks on the very edge of the city's centre in an "excentered" area of multicultural creativity in general, and of network's members in particular; i.e. to open up to now blocked large urban space to residents of Ljubljana and their guests by establishing public and working space(s) for differentiated and pluralist (socio) cultural production and leisure activities;

2. to build up a communicative and cooperative network of cultural activities agents and participants in this location and beyond it, i.e. to improve the size, quality and spectrum of exchange of analytically and practically relevant socio-cultural informations, personal contacts etc.; to improve quality and quantity of cultural creativity by developing managerial functions under specific technological, organisational, spatial etc. conditions in this location and beyond it.

In our self-perception, the first goal is seen as a starting point in finding a solution of a great structural lack of cultural working and public spaces infrastructure in Ljubljana, which has been accumulated in parallel to qualitative and quantitative development of socio-cultural creativity and of its agents during the last ten or twenty years, under and against political, ideological, economical, cultural and social conditions of a self-management type of socialism. On the other side, the space infrastructure is a necessary, but not sufficient condition in regard to the other, "logistic" levels of cultural work and leisure activities: this constitutes the reasons for the achievement of the second goal.


Considering the actual socio-cultural situation in terms of space infrastructure and modes of (self)organisation of the most propulsive population, we believe that the realisation of both goals would mean - and is a condition of - an important and necessary step forward in development of already reached degree of a pluralist, democratic and innovative multicultural society, its openness to the others within frames of the city and the country, in a space of inter-regional, transnational and intercity communication and collaboration. Concerning the increasing amount of unemployment Ljubljana and Slovenija, the network project would establish the conditions for a certain degree of self-employment in different fields of socio-cultural activities and accompanying services, which are under-represented in the structure of some basic social and cultural needs of Ljubljana's population in general.

This "multi-meaning" of a network project, articulated with an important role of culture in general and alternative (sub) cultures and social movements in particular in a (peaceful) democratisation of slovenian society, seems to be the main reason for quasi-complete support from the mass and local medias, general and cultural public opinion, a great number of important opposition groups and some of ruling coalition's political parties on republic and local level. According to their public statements, the project is supported by a city urban plan's instance as well.

Bratko Bibič, President of Executive Board Metelkova Network



tablished, alternative, sub-) cultures, all kinds of arts (especially visual arts, theatre and music), non-institutional education, sports and games, publishing, radio broadcasting, social movements, sexual and



To learn about the background of "Metelkova network", you can read the article "for a roof above the streets".

The main starting point for social research "study-case Metelkova" was the process of proceeding demilitarisation in the capital city of Ljubljana as well as in Slovenia. We were especially interested in conversion of the military barracks to the civil objects and all the influence that such conversion would bring in the sense of encouraging the economical, urban planning, social and cultural development in Ljubljana.

While we were preparing this survey it came to the fundamental structural political system changes: independence of Slovenia, military attack, departure of Yugoslav Army from Slovenia, etc..

Above mentioned reasons, time and financial limits, plus the need of "Metelkova network" for planning financial, organisational and marketing projects, led to the limitation of social research mostly to the revision of opinions and attitudes of the members of "Metelkova network".

Therefore the primary starting point of the social research was to establish and analyse working fields of members, their needs for place, their cultural and artistic efficiency, their goals, desires, attitudes, demands, facilities, requirements, opinions, etc.

Generally, we wanted to investigate the relation to the conversion of military building to civil objects, readiness of the members for cooperation in realisation of "Metelkova network" project to accompany their cultural activities and plans, how much place is needed, financial state, attitude towards political questions, cooperation with mass-media, opinion about the magazine M'ZIN, etc.

For the research we used the method of interview questionary, combined with mailing and telephone enquiries. We sent questionaries with all instructions to the addresses of all members of "Metelkova network" in June and made phone calls till the end of october 1991 except during two months of period because of the war.

We gathered all informations with a special computer programm and in statistical data processing captured 127 questionaries.

Now let me present the results:

Members of the "Metelkova network" are mainly: painters, sculpturers, designers, photographers, music and theater groups, New Age's groups. Some of them are even institutionally working groups. The data indicates the the major part of the members of "Metelkova Network" are involved with more than one activity at the same time. Most of the respondents would not mind to work in the same place with such a diversity of activities. It is undiputable that a lot of members have no place to practise their activity or at least not appropriate ones. The activities with which they are entering the network is the only source of living for lot of them. They believe that by gaining a place in Metelkova barracks they would improve the quality of their work. The members of Metelkova are very active in terms of shows, appearances, exhibitions, etc, in their home country as well as in ex-Yugoslavia, and abroad. More than half of the members are gaining money for their activity by themselves, the technical and other supplies they get are rather bad.

Respondents are prepared to finance and maintain the places they will gain. In their opinion, the local government of Ljubljana as well as the state of Slovenia should participate for a great proportion in the adaption of the former military objects. The majority of the members is willing to support "Metelkova network" with their knowledge and their equipment.

Very interesting are the answers on the question "how should Metelkova be organised after gaining the military barracks". Quite different opinions appear: some think that groups must work by themselves, the others support the association of enterprises, only a minority is in favour of self-governing establishment.

An essential motive for being member of the "Metelkova network" is the necessity of getting a place and communicational links. Respondents stated that their creative works must be exposed for as many people as possible, not only for their fans. In their opinion, Metelkova could be an ideal place for communication between different groups. They expect the "Metelkova network" project to be realised in one year or two.

There are some interesting datas in the field of Public Relations. respondents estimate that there is not enough attention from the mass-medias, especially television, for their activities. But in the other hand, it is pleasant to know that the greatest part of members keep their own documentation on their work. Respondents gain informations about their special activities by themselves in professional reviews, with personal contacts, or in mass-medias. The majority accepts the idea that an information-documentation-analytical centre should be established within Metelkova, which would inform them about similar activities taking place outside of the network, offer all informations they need, put in order all documentation and present their creativity outside.

Most of the respondents request the services of Metelkova for Public Relations, but surprisingly, not for management.

Two thirds of the respondents estimate themselves as apolitical and are against the idea that Metelkova would take place with other civil movements in political life. To the question "what would be essential for getting the barracks", half of the questioned people are in favour of an agreement between "Metelkova network" and the government of Ljubljana, the other half for a pessure on the public opinion.

It is evident from the results that the need for getting the place is enormous. Members are claiming about 18 000 square meters for various purposes: ateliers, studios, places for rehearsals, shows and performances, exhibition's hall, show room, warehouse, offices, etc. They are also aware of all special needs: ventilation, waterworks, electricity, ground, the way of conveying, height of ceiling, etc.

About M'ZIN, the quarterly magazine of "Metelkova network":

Respondents accept the name of the magazine, but in their opinion it should be issued monthly. They even think M'ZIN should become a municipal cultural magazine, its price should be higher, its quality better, with the same number of issues (around 1000), and must mostly inform members about different cultural events.

In terms of socio-demographic datas, I must emphasize that the members are mostly from Ljubljana, are high educated (or still students), there are more men than women, and in great proportion are between 20 and 30 years old.

Alenka Burja

DYING


FOR THE NEW EUROPEAN OR WORLD

ORDER

Interview with Tonči Kuzmanić, realised for ASPE (Italian press agency)

What has been (and is) the role of international and european peace movements?

The role of international and european peace movements ought to be twofold: first, strong pressure on different european (and other) governments in order to accept measures which would produce peaceful solutions in Yugoslavia, second, actions



Which is your opinion about the political role of the european community in the crisis?

The relation between the EC and Yugoslavia is possible to observe through the following prism: Yugoslavia was more or less a european product; moreover, a sort of by-product of bloody european history in which Yugoslavia used to play the role of excrement. In this sense, Yugoslavia was and still is a "european truth". But unlike previous times, Europe is now the one trying to "keep" Yugoslavia together by positive or negative means. This way Europe tries to compensate two things: the lost sovereignty, formed by Tito in the previous system, and, the cohesive exter-



nal element which does not exist anymore, causing the disintegration of the state. Differently from previous times, when Europe and Balkans were shaped by these particular powers, Europe is not united. Paradoxically, Yugoslavia is not threatened any more by Europe, for breaking its entity, but it wants to keep it together in accordance

with its own image, and at the moment the first one in the history - when its parts want to disintegrate. Shortly, international factors, which I call here Europe became the internal part of the crisis in Yugoslavia. Its proposals of any kind are parts of the conflict itself. Though I agree with Johan Galtung (Peace researcher, USA) that " the european community has too many vested interests to play the role of a third party", I think the main problem concerning Yugoslavia is that Yugoslavia does not exist anymore. The key point is that, at the end of the twentieth century, we are witnessing the rebirth of the processes of geo-political strategies accompanied by all other remnants connected with that sort of political thinking and acting.

What does the peace movement of former Yugoslavia expect from the EC?

There is nothing like the Peace Movement of former Yugoslavia, and EC - unfortunately - is nothing which is outside of Yugoslavia. The EChascaught itself in an ideological trap of "mediation". It is completely normal that EC is following the similar path as YPA already was. The last hope for the people from the former Yugoslav state is UN, but it seems that its help will also come too late. The yugoslav crisis is becoming a quite obvious symptom of the vanishing of the old, cold-war order. The question is only how many thousands or even "thousands of thousands" of people in Europe should pay "full price" with death, for the processes of "modelling" the new European or World

SPAGHETTI WESTE

Report on the second scientific symposium "Non-Violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia", held in Ljubljana, 24-26 October

The report on the first scientific symposium was published in The Intruder no. 2 he october council took place in Ljubljana at the moment, when there were already a lot of writings on Yugoslavia and war, so it was very clear that we had to do with a new situation. Anyway, with the dangerous ideological phantom still existing, it seems that everything is clear as far as Yugosla-

groups. That can only be, at the most, the partial truth, cannot bear generalisations, can be shown by empirical datas, cannot be considered without the fact that, on the territory of Croatia, in the middle of army operations in Slavonia, there are villages and towns where there is "no war yet". Although these villages and towns are like the other ones: inhabited by the ethnically



John Wayne in The Big Trail, 1930

via is concerned. Because of this situation, Ljubljana's meeting sounded different.

We, first of all, tried to analyse the different sides of the war, which are usually considered as obvious, pushed aside, or made abstract. We decided of this way of doing because this kind of analysis never give an "a priori" interpretation of the events in Yugoslavia.

Let me introduce the Ljubljana's meeting results in four parts, which might inspire our work in the near future. I start with the assumption that we did not meet to praise our already realised inventions and our more or less "definite" solutions and answers on complex questions. On the contrary, we tried to make appear all the details relative to the matter of stereotypes of economic explanation about the polysemantic and stratified war on the territory of splitting Yugoslavia. I suppose that all of us are craving for controversies and new questions of the conflict's net we have to deal with. However, I hope we will not simplify problems, but understand them in their complexity.

Ethnic conflicts?

We will probably agree that, for the moment, the dominant interpretation of conflicts and war is one of "ethnic conflicts", of clashes among these or those ethnic mixed population, there is still "peace". How can one explain it from the ethnic point of view? We should also consider the fact that besides the croats, serbs or montenegrians, being at war in their majority, there are croats on the serbian side and serbs on the croatian side. Shortly, it is worth mentioning that the supposition about the ethnic war is only partially true.

Economy?

The second element of the dominant picture of war and conflict in Yugoslavia is the one speaking about battles which can be explained through economic motivations, i.e. the one presenting the conflict as possible to understand through the categories of "economic rationalism". However it can be practically proven that this does not have to do with oil or other fields, for which YPA, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, fights. The opposite can be claimed: the logic of war in Croatia is not the one according to which one of the sides would get or occupy more for itself. It is a clash which attempts to put the enemy in a situation as bad as possible. If you put it domestically, the question is not for me to get your cow, but to make your cow die. The thesis according to which the "economic rationalism" of the war in Croatia can be relative, is very indirect and stands only in its negative form. Thus it is not a question of what form to have,

but of not allowing the others to have it. In general, we can say that this war is not a problem of "having", but of "being".

In close connection with this sort of "economic understanding" are the anticipated economic sanctions as a possible mean for prevention, i.e the limitation of the ensued conflicts. It is presumed that the economic sanctions will bring to the overthrowing of certain governments, i.e war monger's ways of governing - first of all in Serbia. however it is more likely to presume that economic sanctions would only consolidate (similar to Iran in the Gulf war) the leading group at war, that have difficulties to justify the war - at least at this moment, by the end of october - in a very insecure situation. There is also an open question: the influence of the economic sanctions on YPA. It is a similar case to the assumption that a European army intervention would unfold gordian knot in Yugoslavia. It actually means the opposite. This would make possible the establishing of a necessary homogeneity on the Serbian-Yugoslav side of the front. Shortly, every serious attempt to understand the situation in the disintegrating Yugoslavia can be reduced to a very difficult task of understanding of something which can be named hysteria, or frenzy of sovereignty. In other words, another paradox must be understood: everyone is in a worse position everyday, first of all in a material and economic way, they are weakening, they physically die, but at the same time they feel "very well"; they are even "happy" and feel much better than before, as at last they will become "independent".

The logic of the burden of the war is "heroic" and "poetic", poetic discourse in the sense of Vicoîs theory in his work "Principj discienca nuova". In accordance to the conviction that the one who wins the war is proving to be right. Justice, righteousness and truth win. The paradigm of these heroic deeds and poetic discourse in second-class spaghetti westerns, where the truth appears in time as a rescuing one, and not too late as in Hegel's philosophy.

Dispersion

There is no doubt that it is very difficult to observe the war in Yugoslavia, and particularly to try to find a solution for this situation. One of the crucial reasons is the relatively confused dispersion of the passions, involved interests, indetermination of political parties in these clashes, or the ideologies to come, heterogeneity of the structures of the parties in the war, unequal geographic presence of the battle fields... In order to make at least a small step »

towards the understanding of the situation we should stop thinking of categories of one basic, dominant (army, national, religious, economic...) conflict, from which we can solve all others or at least the biggest part of it. Our thinking should be directed the other way around, in the sense that we do not have to do with a "Big conflict", which can be divided in smaller conflicts following such or such rules. The conflict should first of all be thought as plural: the clash between Croatia and Serbia and/or YPA, historically and logically did not begin as a big one. We should remember the fact that it started in Knin as an extremely individualised rebellion (i.e revolution) with convincing essence of the traditional rebellion and with individuals as well as criminal groups deeds. In august last year, we had to face individual and to a small extent, groups actions for the "occupation of the territories", that cannot be explained by the notion of war (this notion is still open and should be redefined again). Actually the

process had the opposite direction: the turning of individuals and groups conflicts into collective ones and not individualisation of previous collective ones (in the sense of army clashes). In this context, it is a conflict concentrated first of all in a strong individual or group interest, with the large extent of individual army enjoyment (master of death and life), clashes and of course crimes, that only post-festum get the aureole of collective curtain with the national sumption of the war category and in the way of "clearing" the individual and group responsability.

The very strong presence of the brutality element and disrespect of all "rules of war", and international conventions as well, can be partially explained by the following interpretation, in accordance with the extreme strong element to be taken into consideration: this is not covered by the presence of a state form, army form, or by the war form as an explanatory paradigm of events. Other aspects can be interpreted with the same model. Croatia, for example, began to be shaped as a participant at war in August last year passing through the turbulent and contradictory processes, did not give the order to forbid the party's armies until last month. What we call war in Croatia is a big terrain clash of the hostile sides - some blood fraternities- whose source of power is the blood of their dead fellows better than any ideology. No ideology, no democracy or nation can keep them straight, together, like a word given to oneself, i.e one's fellow or relative who died few hours ago.

Military and state centers and groups, that would like to "curb passions", are very often hindrances being worse than the enemy himself, as they stop them from "paying back in kind". These horizontal military groups small fronts are only depending on themselves, and in general they miss the vertical connection. Vukovar and Dubrovnik are typical examples, and they represent the paradigm of war in Yugoslavia in general.

The war for Vukovar and Dubrovnik should be treated first of all as battles for Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and nothing else. Characteristics with which it is tried to explain the ideological sid later on do not function at all. War ability, morality is not coming from those ideologic characteristics, that will only post-festum give the impression of a war for mother country... Taking into consideration destructive power as well- YPA is much stronger. Almost every garrison for any reason (surroundings, self-will, even insanity of commanding officers, shortage of central



military and state government...) has its own "small wars". The war in Croatia should be understood first of all as a chain of these small wars.

Europe as an interior of Yugoslav conflict

It would be very difficult to deny the influence from abroad in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Although it is the "immanence" of "internal" results in Balkans (absence of foreign intervention) which makes it possible for this sort of disintegration of the foundation, on which Yugoslavia (as desirable or created community) existed. Paradoxically we can say that this absence of intervention is a sort of main reason of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Actually, it was a community that was established by the foreign intervention or its threat (real and/or made up). The coincidence of the disintegration of the yugoslavian state community of small nations with the moment when this "foreign menace", at least relatively and temporary did not exist anymore, showing that this probable exterior of Yugoslavia was its first internal element. The absence of the external menace turned to be the absence of its deepest interior. (read also: Europe: an internal part of the yugoslav conflict).

In other words, Europe has intervened in Yugoslavia long ago, even though it did not do it in a military way. This relation can take two directions: Yugoslavia can become "europeanized", but Europe can become "yugoslavianized" too. In both cases, it will be a violent act, as Yugoslavia can only be kept unified by violence, and Europe becoming "yugoslavianized" would probably end up in a worse way.

Peace?

There is something in Yugoslavia that can be called the state of nature. On agenda are

literal problems of survival of millions of people, that are not endangered by hunger, frost, but by the possibility of being killed as well. At the moment we should be modest and realistic, and, ensure a cease-fire, truce, but not Yugoslavia. Times when Yugoslavia was in peace are obviously the past. Tito's state succeeded in this for almost half a century and, as far as history is concerned, this was a big success, although not possible anymore. Probably, it is possible to claim that the war will last as long as Yugoslavia

exists. Everything indicates the war as the last form of the existence of Yugoslavia. The question is actually double:

a) How to prevent the spreading of the war in Bosnia, Sandiak, Kosovo... European troops should be sent in these territories, in order to limit the possibilities for war, if we can not exclude them.

b) The question is not how to achieve the peace, but how to achieve cease-fire, that would enable peace to be established. The key of the crisis is of course Serbia, i.e more exactly said, the relation between Serbia and YPA on one side and Croatia on the other side, taking into consideration that this is a war against Croatia on its territory. That is why we should be persistent in stopping the war, if not permanently, at least in order to establish truce and to delay, postpone the war for some time till the matter calms down, i.e till dynamic relations between Serbia and YPA settles down, so that negotiations and permanent solutions can be found.

Conclusion

however, some logical and historical cycle of development in Yugoslavia is right in front of us. to be "definitely" concluded. Although the state, in accordance to the international law, did not change, Yugoslavia as a common house of different nations and ethnic groups became obsolete, supernumerary, tiresome, and representing only an obstacle for the possible development of its parts. "Post-modern" form of multinational. multicultural. multireligious community can not preserve "premodern" components. Too strong centrifugal forces of "modernism" and "premodernism" are an obstacle for any sort of common life. Spreading of all sorts of conflicts brought the insurmountable differences. Processes of disintegration reach the critical point, so that every, however innocent attempt to keep the "state" together, would definitely finish with this or other sort of dictatorship. As a state, Yugoslavia is, either symbolic or as a content, "phantomatic" creation. It must be buried.

Ljubljana, November 1 st 1991

he situation is very serious and much worse than in September. All connections at the level of the society are destroyed. The worse is that politicians as well as citizens are not aware that there will be no winner in this war. The reality is that they will all loose. National sovereignities brought so much misfortune and pain that you will only get to know in the future, what is going on now.

The most relevant element in this conflict is the one concentrated in the "high political" levels of the different republics or states. A logic appeared according to which national leaders simply have to survive, thus implying keeping the power. This is an imperative which is contented in the existing conflict which is creating new

GENERAL
SELFISHNESS
AND
BAD AMATEURISM
IN
POLITICS

Out of an interview with Jan Øberg, director of the Transnational Fundation for peace and Future research (TFF) in Lund, Sweden.



ones. It is a relative paradox, but in comparison with the former socialist leaders, the present ones are incredibly less mature.

<u>Do you see any possible solution for this conflict?</u>

At the moment I don't figure out any serious possibility of solution. Namely, finding any kind of solution implies to do something right now, and a powerful cooperation between the different parts. No other way is possible. Unfortunately, I don't believe that the present leaderships could do something else than fighting, arguing...

The typical aspect of the Yugoslav conflict is: when one part is proposing an

Jan Øberg came to Yugoslavia in the beginnig of September with some colleagues, in order to lead a research about the conflict in Yugoslavia. They were well informed before arriving, acted completely on their own way, and finally interviewed all kinds of people in different republics. Their main aim was to grasp the complexity of the situation.

Back in November to bring the report (result of september research)

report (result of september research)
called "After Yugoslavia what?",
Jan Øberg is commenting and
analysing the situation.

The following text is not faithful to the exact words used by Jan Øberg, is a kind of summary of his commentaries.

agreement, the other part is approving with weeks or months of delay. Anyway, up to now, when such cases appeared, the agreement was not acceptable anymore for the one who proposed it. Though there were actually extremely constructive ideas proposed, the other part (or the EC) simply stayed deaf.

The other very important problem is that we came to a complete blockade in communications, not only between different audiences, but also between intellectuals. As I learnt, it is not only oligarcy which blocked the communications, but at the same time, the inaction of those who could have been able to build a bridge between the different parts. Those either did not react, or even destroyed the potential bridges.

Sometimes, it seems to me that everybody

is reacting as if they intend to move to another planet, or at least, as if they would never live again in this place. It is simply beyond my understanding. It is very often said that Serbia only cares for a "Great Serbia", being the only ones to react so: it is only partly true. In my opinion, all republics or states, their leaderships, the majority of the population, only care for themselves. This war is exactly the result of this selfishness. It is very similar on the individual level: there is nobody who would have been able to think or act differently in this dominant trend which is spread through propaganda by the scared and introvert leaderships of states or armies.

<u>How do you consider the EC involvment in the Yugoslav crisis?</u>

Not positively at all. Similarly to the previous example of different yugoslav parts trying to agree, the EC is following the crisis very slowly, accepts proposals with at least one month delay. I think that the EC is not used to such conflicts, and simply doesn't have mechanisms which could follow such eruptive developments of a situation. Besides all this, the EC is very divided inside (which is not so clearly understood from the outside).

Therefore the EC couldn't be a third part in Yugoslavia, bring new ideas, or help to calm down. One could observe that the EC just creates an extra-mess, and is always very late compared with the happenings, which are faster and faster. Yugoslavia was, and partly still is treated as a regional problem not globally connected with Europe. This was the biggest mistake. These economical sanctions will just complicate the situation, and won't bring any element of solution. It is even possible that they will lead to the necessity of an armed intervention, which is the most dangerous result one can imagine. The prospective in this case would be even more horrible, also for Europe, if not wider.

<u>Is there any potential "third part" which could intervene in this conflict?</u>

Now this is the time for UN to get involved, though I am afraid they will reproduce the same mistakes as the EC.

What is the main problem of the present situation?

There is no "main problem". It is more a question of trend, of context, more horrible from day to day. Shortly, the main problem is the war itself. The war is the

worse thing possibly happening in life. It is more the sign that all previous ideas, talks, exchanges,... failed. Therefore, it shows a clear necessity to begin something different. When an armed intervention takes place it is a proof that the politicians are bad amateurs, because the first politic's duty is to avoid the war.

Who are the main actors involved in the fights at the moment?

There are four elements: Serbian and Croatian leaderships, Serbian in Croatia, and the Federal Army (YPA). They went so far that the war wouldn't stop even if these four parts would agree. Each of them contents different armed fractions, which will never agree on anything, even not on an ideal proposal. Before any possible agreement, each of these four parts would have to clarify their inside situation. Only then, a kind of cease-fire would be realistic.

What do you think of the picture given in Western countries and presenting the war in Yugoslavia as a fight between communism and democracy?

Western Europe and US medias bet on this simplified explanation. If it would be the reality, we would manage to solve the present problems in an easier way. It is really too simple to be true. But, if it was, why didn't the EC and USA simply recognise Slovenia and Croatia, which supposedly fight for democracy, against communism and totalitarianism taking place in Serbia and Montenegro? Those who spread this clumsy picture will have to answer such annoying questions, otherwise, they will have to name the EC and USA pro-communist institutions, which is not so simple.

<u>In which direction do you see possible exits?</u>

The situation has to be considered in its entire complexity, which is not the case now. The vulgar "victimisation" of Croatia has to stop. Serbia should be given a possibility to clarify its relationship with YPA: it should control it and be responsible for its actions. Only some parts of YPA can become a serbian army.

The surplus should be either converted or sold (if there is no other possibility), though this last solution will remove the problem to another part of the world. The profit should be used for developing the economically destroyed country. If such an army (as now) stays in the Balkans, I am

sure there won't be any peace here for a long time. The most convenient would be to begin with complete demilitarisation of the Balkans. If it doesn't work, then the only possiblity would be to reach a balance of power, which is potentially as dangerous.

I suggest the conversion of the biggest part of arming of YPA: only on this base, or beside it, the solving of the political problems can begin.

Which ones?

Especially the problems of minorities and human rights. The most urgent is the problem of minotities, which made everything begin: it means Kosovo, or Albanians as minority within Serbia, and Serbian in Croatia. Without a solution to be found on this topic, there won't be any normalisation of life, production, work....



PRESS REVIEW

TFF REPORT, published by Transnational Foundation for peace and Future research, Lund (Sweden)

"Yugoslavia for beginners" could be the subtitle. Extremely pedagogic, with all its implications: basic, clear, easy to read, pictured, a bit boring, very useful for a non(or badly)-informed population to grasp the complexity of the Yugoslav conflict.

Also useful because unique case (acknowledged) of this kind. Accessible to all (from 6 to 99)

The Intruder

To get the report or wider informations about TFF:

THE TRANSNATIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR PEACE
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Vegagatan 25, 223 57 Lund, Sweden
Phone: 46-46-145909
Fax: 46-46-144512



PEACE MOVEMENTS, "ANTEROOM" OF NATIONAL REVOLUTIONS

Interview with Tonči Kuzmanić, realised for ASPE (Italian press agency

)Was there a rooted culture of non-violence in Yugoslavia, before the war?

In Yugoslavia as in almost all other so called communist countries non-violence was not a rooted culture. Instead of the culture of civil society, Yugoslavia had a sort of non-violent "foreign policy", so non-violence was something used to be pushed aside the society, and not the inherent element of the "Yugoslav society" itself. As substitution of the rooted nonviolent culture, there was the communist foreign policy of non-alinement, etc. Some results of the lack of civil society and of the non-violent culture at the level of societal structures became obvious in the present war. Besides, Yugoslavia (remnants of Yugoslavia), are still half-industrialised and half-urbanised country. Even urbanisation is carried out in the "peasant way", and yugoslav cities are rather big villages. City-culture is a quite unknown form of culture in Yugoslavia, except in small centers of the adriatic coast and, to some extend, in today's capitals of various republics.

However, simultaneously with the decline of the self-management system in mideighties, we observed the emergence of some kind of civil and non-violent culture. Especially in some urban centers as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Beograd, Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Rijeka, Split...

More or less we should talk about two basic forms of appearance of the nonviolent culture:

 As relatively small subcultural groups (so-called peace movements)

2- At some levels of the public opinion

The most important fact regarding the second form is that at the precise time national movements appeared, the "public opinion" became a main force of "par excellence" violent behaviour. Moreover, from today's point of view, we should underline that the so-called new social movements (which peace movements were a part of) were nothing but the "anteroom" of national revolutions (in Slovenia, Croatia...)

Shortly, the war in Slovenia and now in Croatia has shown that there was no serious rooted non-violent culture before the war. It was, and more or less still is, a matter of small groups or few individuals. Let's hope that as a by-product of the war, non-violent culture will finally come into existence in this part of Europe.

What is the position of the peace movements in the former Yugoslavia and the prospects for the immediate future?

Peace movements in Yugoslavia today are organised on the national level (slovenian, croatian....). There is no common institution or network at the federal or all-yugoslav level, but just some attempts in that direction.

The position of the peace movement in Croatia is pretty different from the serbian one, due to the fact of the roles played by Serbia and Croatia in the war. By helping the deserters and forming different consciousness raising groups, organising demonstrations.... the peace movement from Belgrade (the center for Anti-war

action) is trying to hinder violent policy of the serbian government and Yugoslav People's Army. In Zagreb (or Osijek, Split, Rijeka...), because Croatia is attacked by serbia and YPA, it is extremely hard to defend any peace position, especially in public medias, not to speak about the "quite" natural problem arousing from the presence of strong right-wing movements. Peace movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a position very similar to the bosnian government or state presidency. Namely, the peace-keeping policy of the government creates possibilities for the non-violent future in that part of former Yugoslavia, which is for the time being, still outside of the war. Similar is the situation in Macedonia.

In Slovenia, it is different. "Young slovenian nation-state" with "young slovenian army" is relatively outside of the war. The programm of the peace movement is concentrated on the concept of demilitarisation of the state. But last month, one could observe a strong split inside the slovenian peace movement: between national pro-government oriented fraction and some individuals who are trying to generate a more effective peace platform.... Anyway, there is at least one common thing for all peace movements in Yugoslavia: the necessity of building up cease-fire and prevent the war to spread in other parts (Bosnia, Kosovo, Sandiak, Macedonia, Montenegro..) of the former state. That simple fact might be a sufficient reason for common actions in the

One Year of Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA)

By Marko Hren

A year ago - after many years of the dialogue between the "east" and the "west "- the HCA was lounched. The readers of

The Intruder know the HCA and it is not to repeat in length the objectives of this project. Suffitient to say, that hundreds of groups and individuals were enthusiastic of the idea to create a platform for citizens initiatives to communicate, exchange, reflect, cooperate and articulate their positions v.v. the governmental organizations (i.e. CSCE).

The crisis in Yugoslavia made all existing organizations and networks on national and international, on governmental and non-governmental level fail. None of us was efficient enough to produce a significant improvement of the situation. Of course it was to expect, that a one year old organization can not play a major or even an important role in "solving" such a

complex problem as faced by in Yugoslavia.

Maybe this is the core of the problem of the HCA - that it is not able to place itself in a humble position of an organization which is at its very start - small, childish and without much influence. On contrary - the HCA started right at the begining to pretend to be representative, it started right at the begining with big politics (remember the performance of Lafontaine at the first Assembly in Prague) it entered international arena with big words and big goals. It wanted to become an international assembly over the night.

I think that the following were the biggest mistakes we made lunching HCA October 1990.

- 1. we did define HCA with a very large scope of functions
- 2. we did lunch the organizations as if it can immediately perform all functions we did neither elaborate hierarchy of functions nor the process for reaching the hierarchy of interdependant points of the structure.
- 3. we did not put clear limits and control mechanisms to decision making structures (ICC, presidium, chairs)

I think the hierarchy of functions should be

- 1. network international, particularily developed through the work of comissions 2. network regional/national/local, particularily stimulating regional cooperation and inter-disciplinarity
- 3. decision making on regional/national/ local level - structures and protocols (standards) should be defined in order to build direct democracy mechanisms from below
- 4. decision making on international level

To satisfy the point two (national commitees) we should preview at least few years process. Before proceeding to the next step in the structural growth (and in growth of functionality) HCA should seriously reflect if the previous step was sufficiently completed. HCA should not grow ambitions to "loby CSCE" until it has a good decision making structure on national levels. And a precondition for such structure is a good network and rooted national committees plus well grounded comissions. Before being able to do effective international lobby we have to spend in my view at least five years of good networking and commission work.

For the trans-national assembly of citizens the inner democracy and consensus-seeking is of absolutely vital importance. HCA in the first year has naturally failed to satisfy this condition, since most of top-people have rushed towards being "representatives". It ended up in ex-communication of a part of constituency. In Bratislava we should seriously reflect on one year process, admit our illusions and mistakes, draw a process for the next five years, define stages of growth of the Assembly and ban "representative" structures to act on their own in the future.

The way how HCA structure (particularily its top including chairs, presidium, ICC and International secretariat) behaved in the aproach towards the crisis in yugoslavia offers an alarming example of what HCA should not become. We are willing to present arguments in length, most of them are well documented in our files of correspondance. Our criticism is meant to

be constructive one and we hope to be able to discuss it in Bratislava. To prepare us well for such performance, we invited HCA "representatives" several times to come to Ljubljana and Zagreb - without any positive response from Prague. We have particular criticism of both chairs, we request explanation about decision making procedures, about political arguments presented "in the name of HCA", about fund rising "for Yugoslav peace movements" through HCA - the things we were never consulted about and never presented reports about. Suffitient to say that we - as a civic movement from the country which found itself in war-received no support at all from the HCA structure; on contrary we were rather blocked or excommunicated. As far as i learned this is due to different political views, analysis and arguments. I even heard from secretariat, that majority of presidium members agree with a chair person and not with us. Despite several demands we never received any written message with which HCA "representatives" would argue (or answer) our positions. The differencies in opinion should not lead to excommunication - at least not if HCA tends to become an assembly of citizens. HCAwill either grow as a pluralistic organization or will get lost in the world of semi-privat net-

There is still time to satisfy this goal and Bratislava meeting is a crucial point to reflect the one year work seriously and also to draw clear consequences. I think that the following steps are necessary:

- 1. to define a process of growth (in terms of time and in terms of functionality and structures) of the organization, to be modest in our expectations, considering what we are really able to do well.
- 2. to redefine accordingly the role of structures (ICC, presidium, chairs) with minimal representative nature of their mandate
- 3. to define control mechanisms for representative structures
- 4. to appoint new people in the structures, until the organisation will be enough mature to elect <u>representatives</u>.

As an example let us note, that no work of HCA concerning the Yugoslav crisis was planned, organized or coordinated by comissions or national committees within Yugoslavia. On the level of yugoslavia there is no HCA committe functioning anyway-there are some contact points but no democratic dynamics locally or on federal level. Instead of being even more pluralistic due to the fact that there are no democratic tools yet available within the HCA structures, the top HCA people excommunicated our group simply because

we disagreed with most of what HCA had presented in its papers after the armed conflict started in Slovenia. Unfortunately, the "representatives" of the HCA seem to agree with a chair, who happens to observe Yugoslav crisis from one angle of perception (permanently outside the regions which found themselves under military agression) which produces one particular interpretation of reality. I am afraid that the HCA framework was used for promotion of more or less private policy of a chair. At least the constituencies of the HCA from the north of the former Yugoslavia were never (from August on after we for the first time objected the interpretations of the chairs) aproached by chairs for consultations and

Let's ponder on and be aware that the organization, which does not invest largely into its inner democracy produces more and more frustration, dissatisfaction, contraproductive results and finally is collapsing. We need HCA but not as a club of friends who agree (although this is a nice idea too) - rather as a forum of people who have different analysis, different visions, different views and different proposals.

December 1991.

INTRUDER: You recently lost your job? REXHEPI: I took part in the protest against certain measures: the Serbian state chose some-body to be at the top of the University, thus violating the internal rules, but especially this mandidn'thave to respect any rule. We protested against the principle of this system of police and military, in a pacific way in front of the faculty: we have been all expelled afterwards.

INTRUDER: Your case, together with the alarming information we receive every day about repression of Serbian authorities in Kosovo, makes us believe that warfare between Serbs and Albanians can begin at any point. How do you feel these "expectations" REXHEPI: The war in Kosovo actually lasts for at least one decade. Serbian regime holds there power exclusively by force. There is an incredible amount of victims of Serbian terror in Kosovo, although we do not face a "real" war as they do in Croatia. However, this is only due to the power of Albanian people to struggle with nonviolent means. We have to deal with large popular national movement which believes in nonviolent political changes. In our history we also have experience of another type of struggle but it did teach us -seemingly - that violence can not bring a progressive change. However, there are groups existing in Kosovo, which are getting ready to go for an armed struggle, but until now they are in minority and on the margin of albanian political spectrum. If there will be war in Kosovo, this would not involve Serbia and Kosovo only, but would evolve in a sort of new Balkan war with many states involved.

INTRUDER:Could we talk about racial elements of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs?

REXHEPI: This is an old matter, a long history of two nations who never had a stable state

structure to enable at least relatively peaceful evolution. We know that Serbian state logic for centuries deal with different territorial projects, resuming land, expanding territory etc. Just to name few examples: the Načertanije plan of Garašanin, migration plans of Čubrilović, or the recent plan of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; this all represent a continuity of Serbian state logic, which is built on expansion of the borders. Serbian racism in relation to Albanians must be seen as a part of the game for territory. However, Serbian racism is just a primitive copy of European racisms which were exercised all over the world. Listening to the rhetorics in Serbian parliament you would feel well the racistic substance of the political climate. Unfortunately racism is not left to political elites only but penetrated in civil society if we can talk about civil society at all. We could write books on racism in Serbia but let me just give a few examples. Albanian language can be no more used in post offices in Kosovo, no demands can be filed in albanian language, children can not learn albanian, most of us have lost our jobs

INTRUDER: You do not sound optimistic concerning the Serbian opposition!

REXHEPI: You are right, I'm not optimist. However, there are always options for a different kind of political development. But the precondition for any hope is that serbs would renounce any territorial pretentions. Albanians will not and can not leave Kosovo - they have nowhere to go and it is their home. If Serbian opposition would respect this then a new field of relations would open for the dialogue between the albanians and the serbs. The key question is therefore the territorial pretentions of Serbia - which is in terms of time really absurd and caused the war in Yugoslavia. Switching the focus away from territorial pretensions would make it possible to channel energy to other fields of (co)operation which would be less destructive.

INTRUDER: We often hear reproach (specially from Croatian media) because Albanians did not join in the struggle against Serbia. How do you comment this?

REXHEPI: In Yugoslavia nobody offered any help to others in the past few years. All nations acted with a large portion of egoism. The greatest help albanians can offer to Slovenians and Croatians is to contribute to nonviolent solutions. It is true that Croatia requested several times a help in a struggle against Serbs. But for Albanians this is not a fight which would solve the problem.. Albanian problem is different from the Croatian one. Croats (and Slovenes as well) engaged in the struggle for their independence and forgot about others completely, particularily they forgot about Albanians. It is strange that Croats, who originated the idea of Yugoslavism now want to get rid of it. Of course they have a right to do so, but they should understand that there are others who do not share the same position with them. Croats and Slovenes afforded themselves to play a partial game out of the Yugoslav context. Despite of all, Albanians did help Slovenes and Croats - albanian youth is refusing to serve military, there is a large number of deserters, those who serve military service practice disobediance, they escape - and many die because of that.

INTRUDER: Some comment that Slovenes and Croats (mis)used Kosovo to build independence and then just forgot about albanians. REXHEPI: I would agree. The peace move-

An Interview with REXHEPL ISMAJLIJ

general situa-

tion in Kosovo could be introduced by some numbers: in the last few years more then 100 Albanians died as victims of the terror of Serbian authorities - some of them died in prisons. In the same period about 2500 albanians were prosecuted and more than 700000 suffered police treatment. There are more than 1000 political prisoners of albanian nationality currently in Kosovo, much bigger is the number of those isolated and even bigger the number of emigrants from Kosovo to all parts of the world. During the last year, the Serbian authorities have abolished legitimate representative structures of Kosovo people, dissmissed all university professors of albanian nationality, dissolved Kosovo Academy, disabled the education of more then 200.000 young albanians (introducing serbian language as the sole and obligatory language for all), dismissed great majority of personal of albanian nationality from hospitals Some private attempts to open medical centers occurred, but are just able to deal with prevention because of the lack of material. The health care for Albanians is literally disabled.

We have used the opportunity to discuss these problems with Rexhep Ismajlij, who is delivering lectures at the University of Ljubljana as a guest professor. He holds a doctorate in literature and was professor of general linguistic and history of albanian language, in Priština's university for 20 years. Now he is expelled from Priština university. Before that, his wage was 100 DEM per months. His bibliography of translations (Saussure, Barthes, Martinet, Ducrot, Todorov,), essays ("The plurality of the texts", essay on semiology, linguistic, literature, etc.) and books (specially on history of albanian language) is remarkable and places him amongst the leading Kosovo authors and the biggest worlds' albanologues.

ment in Slovenia did help a lot to Albanians with the promotion in the world. After democratic changes in northern republics neither Slovenian nor Croatian state recognized the national referendum of Albanian people in Kosovo although they talk about the basic right of self-determination all the time. They support albanians to a certain point until they can use them for self-promotion abroad, but when it is to make a clear political step on the level of Yugoslavia, when cooperative action is requested, they simply disapear. Tudjman even declared clearly that kosovo is an inner problem of Serbia.

INTRUDER: Where do you then expect help from?

REXHEPI: We only can get help from movements and individuals who promote nonviolence. It is much more difficult to speak of the states. Our experiences are very bad. In 1913 the foreign powers divided albanian nation as they really wanted without giving us a chance to organize ourselves according to our needs. We got divided and we still remain - we could not built democracy in conditions of permanent oppression. All energy is invested in liberation and unification and it is impossible to discuss democracy at such point. Until there is something which would compensate a common state this frustrating situation will remain blocking us. We of course expect at least understanding from Germany, Austria, France and USA.

INTRUDER: How do you perceive the future of Kosovo - the idea of unification of all albanians is again gaining its popularity?

REXHEPI: This question is reflected from different positions - there is a million of albanians living in Macedonia, there are albanians living in Kosovo and those living in Albania. In Kosovo the national identity is stronger. Albanians in Albania are more cosmopolitan - they have preserved at least minimal urban culture. In Kosovo it practically does not exist. We deal with rural area without significant industrial or urban tradition. This is the ground for the stronger national movement. All Kosovo political programs include national emancipation, while this is not true for Albania. The problem of the differences between albanian from Albania and the ones from Yugoslavia is existing and will become very serious in a near future. First of all, Albanians had a very different development for the last 60 years, depending wether they were living in Yugoslavia or in Albania. In Albania there has been a national state, while in Yugoslavia until the II World War there has only been experiences of genocide and massive expulsions to Turkey, etc. After the war, and until 1966, they still did not have rights on an equal basis with the other citizens of Yugoslavia. After 1966, they had more rights: they had their own universities, developed their culture, etc,...

Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia, these developments were not harmonious at all: for example, there was a big gap between the economic development and the cultural development. There was a unilateral development: mines were exploited without the creation of a real industry which would employ people, give resources for autonomy, in one word it was a colonial economy. On one side the albanian conscientiousness was stronger, enabling the people to see clearly the colonial situation, on the other side, their economic role extremely passive: that is how tensions grew, even among albanians, social and political tensions oriented in a national way.

The economic development in Albania was >>

almost non-existing, lot of people were employed without producing any profit, there was no technology. Anyway, any development was dictated by the state and imposed on people, which were very often displaced and uprooted. In parallel with Yugoslavia, they also progressed in the field of education and stepped towards emancipation, or more exactly "ideologic illuminism". The primary and secondary schools were good, but the problems arouse further on when it was necessary to educate people in modern technologies, modern thought... Lots of intellectuals were jailed. In that field primitive marxism was generating the restrictions. We called it marxism. I don't know if it was. I am not sure. This problem is still not solved, because the freedom of thought came too quickly and too recently.

On the cultural level, it was more liberal in Yugoslavia, the european way of thinking has been introduced: marxism, post-marxism, liberalism, existentialism..., in literature it was quite open too, except for the national one

which was half forbidden.

The albanians of Yugoslavia never experienced the interdiction of religious practise, whatever religion it was concerning, this being in opposition with the situation in Albania. In this regard, the differences are enormous, because they face in Albania this transition period of "euphoria" since the recent liberation of religious conscience.

Shortly, the restrictions in Yugoslavia were initiated for colonialist reasons, while in Albania the different prohibitions were motivated by ideology.

INTRUDER: Back to the question about the possibilities, in the future, to have one united Albanian state?

REXHEPI: This issue has been considered by different political parties, both in Kosovo and Albania. Albania has difficulties with the feeling of national identity, after a long period of marxist "indoctrination" (I don't like this word). Kosovian problem in Albania appears as a fight

between different political parties or groups, in order to get the power. In this regard, the albanian view on Kosovo is very similar to the serbian situation. In Kosovo, the only question is: to be or not to be. Political groups talking about unification in Kosovo are in minority. Nevertheless, the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, in Serbia, the extreme repression they have to suffer, push the Kosovian towards this solution, as the only possible choice. Though lot of Kosovian believe that the problem must be solved by changing the nature of the border, but not the border itself. Make a symbolic border instead of the wall presently existing. I don't think this unification is realistic for the moment: in this situation, I can't be

The unification of an albanian state in Balkans is a great problem. Any struggle to put all albanians in the same state would necessarily involve Macedonia (one million oppressed albanian are living there), Serbia, Bulgaria... finally all Balkans. The problem only could be overcome when the border question will be forgotten, and will begin an attempt to create an albanian state in Yugoslavia: then the albanians will loose the feeling of being second-class citizens in their everyday reality. Once they will have a state they will have to face their own problems (social, economical,....), instead of the serbian one.

INTRUDER: What does the Kosovo question imply for stability in Balkans?

REXHEPI: The stability in Balkans is not only a question of stability of borders, but also stability of development. For example the stability of Serbia won't come out of the creation of an albanian state, a federation, confederation, etc, but only with a more intensive and equal development. The development is blocked by the frontiers problems, the territorial pretensions of Serbia.

Greece has the same position as Serbia: the Greek state has absolutely no tolerance for

other minorities living on its territory. I think this is the most xenophobic state in Europe. Albanians, Turks, Macedonians,... living in Greece have no national rights, only civic rights. Bulgaria is in process of opening, but we can't be sure about that until no decision about the sovietic "commonwealth" is taking place. These are all underdeveloped countries.

INTRUDER: Despite the occupation of Kosovo, is it possible to imagine a progress?

REXHEPI: There is no way to progress in Kosovo, since the economy is completely ruined. The economy is blocked by the serbian state. Albanian only try to survive. The pacifists trials are a way of survival. Anyway, there was no choice, they only had pacifist movements in order to survive. I think that is why all efforts are oriented in this way in kosovo. There is no parallel power: there is the people organizing itself in different ways not to die of hunger, to save the ones victims of Serbian state.

INTRUDER: Would you compare the Serbian politics in Kosovo with apartheid?

REXHEPI: I don't know enough the situation in South Africa to be able to compare, but I don't see a better word to qualify the situation in Kosovo. That is why the youngsters have to emigrate: systematic poperisation of the population, constant repression, impossibility of getting any education, strong threat of being forced to join the army and be sent to the croatian frontline.

December 1991

The discussion was convened and interpreted by Dominique Cochard, Tonči Kuzmanić and Marko Hren.

PRESS REVIEW

Health care situation in Kosovo, edited in October 1991, By International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF)

INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

This report is resulting from a fact-finding mission to Belgrade and Kosovo, led from 15-19 August; the delegation counted 4 members: 2 from IHF, 1 surgeon, 1 journalist.

Serbian authorities behaviour

Through trying to find the reality of medical care of the albanian population in Kosovo, the IHF team demonstrates the brutality (even physical) of the serbian authorities intervention, their total replacement of personnel structure, and the ill will of their justifications when pretending that the doctors:

- used the health care as a vehicle for what they (the serbs) call albanian "separatists politics".
- were neglecting their medical duties
- were generally discriminating the nonalbanian population which led to a mass flow of serbs to Serbia

All these accusations are either denied by figures, or can't be proved by the serbian authorities through facts, cases, names....

Result on medical care quality

As a result, the mission witnessed a complete loss from professional, linguistic and humanitarian points of view. Here the examples, figures, and cases are numerous: hygienic and technical standards, lack of ambulances, no psychiatric treatment..... The IHF mission reports a paralysis of doctors education in University, therefore there is a complete isolation of Albanians from the profession (instruction and exams are now in Serbo-croatian).

A mysterious disease appeared without initiating any investigation (3631 cases of neuro-intoxication): the serbian authorities are claiming this is a "mass hysteria". (For the moment, human rights organisations couldn't agree with each other regarding conclusions concerning this case).

Albanian population:

is avoiding carefully all purged clinics, and often rather risk their health (and the children ones) than consulting "the occupants".

Therefore the few clinics still run by Albanians at the countryside are overloaded, and have neither the equipment nor the money to satisfy the demand.

Finally, some cases of albanian self-organisation through alternative clinics are recorded: improvisation in discos, livingrooms, with examinations for free or small fees.

SARAJEVO



66

WHY

5 5

Why "Why?"? It is intended for peacemakers and people of good will all over Europe and the world. The first publication of this magazine is linked to the peace initiatives which are growing into a peace movement in the city of Sarajevo and in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The principal goals of the citizens here is to stop the war, to stop the suffering of the tens of thousands of innocent victims whose testimonies take one's breath away. This magazine shall therefore record events and reactions of the people from public, cultural and political life. It will be a source of information showing the dimension of people's resistance to the war in Yugoslavia which has so far been hidden by the scenes of suffering and death. Why Sarajevo? It is the center of Yugoslavia. The town bears witness of numerous and unbreakable links of Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Jews, Yugoslavs, Montenegrians, Albanians, Slovenians, Macedonians, Gypsies, Austrians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Romanians, Russians, Turks, Ukrainians, Vlachs as well as their connections with the cultures and customs of other peoples.

PUBLICATION
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
AND
PEACE
SARAJEVO

(summary of its editorial)

So once a month, "Why?" is going to write about all violations of human rights; to inform the public about activities of peace movements and organizations in Yugoslavia and abroad; and to present documents adopted at peace gatherings. We hope for the only outcome worthy of human beings. but in spite of different views and approaches, all of us shall try to find answers to the question "why?". We are therefore issuing this magazine, in English and Serbo-croatian, to search for the answers and solutions together.

The editorial board expects your support and cooperation.

Ibrahim Spahić (Chief editor, President of the centre for peace)

"Why?" is issued by Citizens' Forum, Dobrovoljačka 3, 71000 SARAJEVO (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Tel. 3871-214 884, Fax. 3871-216 238

LET IT BE

DE ACE

How do you as a family feel in this time of war and peace? How does the situation affect you?

Z. Milenković, father: The family is the basic unit in any society, and if a society is a sum of all families, for it to be sound it is necessary for the families to be sound in the first place. We believe in defining clearly the relations within our family as well as those with the society.

And now a question for the pillar of the family: Women seem to be the only authentic power struggling for peace regardless of their different political, ideological or even human departure points or objectives. What is your experience of the present situation in Yugoslavia?

Lidija Milenković, mother: If anybody, a woman may be said to have the right to state her opinion in the matters of war because she gives and cherishes life. This situation is imposed upon us. Death is forced upon us as the only choice. We, as a family, are not physically endangered, we are artists and we do not have to take part in the events. But it is inevitable that we are affected. On my part I am trying to transfer onto my children the viewpoints I acquired in my childhood, the beliefs I live by. One of them is that there are not two nations in the world that cannot live together and that love is not the only form of relationship between peoples (and we were told once that these relations are almost lover-like and if there is no love there is no life together). I think respect, understanding, and economic interests can be an even better basis. As for this war, it seems so outdated, so out of place, as if it were artificially grafted. This war belongs to the middle ages. And ours is a different

What is the role of an artist in the situations like this?

Stefan milenkolić: I play all over the world and I carry with me the message of peace. I think that artists are not the only ones who protest but their voice can be heard.

Stefan
Milenković
(14 years old)
s already a
world famous
violonist and
also the
ambassador of
the YU
Children's
embassy to the
UN.

Excerpts from the talk with Stefan Milenković and his family Realised by "Why?", Sarajevo.

Do you have a personal message?

Stefan Milenković: Simply, let it be peace. This state is unnatural, uncoceivable. I have played before many politicians, statesmen and I am playing and I shall play...

So you are trying to say that beauty remains and supports the world?

L. Milenković, mother: This is the relationship between the eternal and ephemeral. But it is difficult to say anything original in this situation. Everything has already been said sometimes and in someplace. We are now going through a moment in time when politics is totally dominant. But when you look at history, what remains behind the work behind the great civilizations? Not their politics, but their art. There are some artists in Yugoslavia, however, who are in favour of this war however it may sound. Our relationship towards is clear and pure. Behind us we have great talent and serious work, nothing else. But they are different artists in yugoslavia. They use various non-artistic means, crutches to climd the ladder of success, and they, naturally, have different attitudes towrds the daily politics.

Z.Milenković, father: Art and politics have a lot in common, though. They are both composed of the rational and emotional component. It is the proper ratio of the two that makes either of them successful. In politics, the rational dominates. If this rational element is controlled (not overwhelmed) by emotions, the results are good. And art, music in particular, is dominated by emotions, but unless it is controlled by the rational, it cannot be great art.

And now a question for the youngest member of the family. I know you are good at computer games. They say you always win. What do you think about this war? Who shall win?

Filip Milenković (11 years old): There is no reason for anyone to win. In fact, let the one who started this war be the looser.

The peace negotiations in the Hague dominate current discussion throughout Yugoslavia, especially among the peace movements (however weak it may be). They are of the utmost importance for everybody in the country yet it has been clear for some weeks that no progress is being made. Unfortunately the reasons for this impasse are seldom discussed, even within the peace movements.

In fact, there is no real possibility of these negotiations succeeding.

- First, peace treaties have very seldom been formulated and signed while a war is going on.
- Second, a peace treaty presupposes some form of enduring agreement about the political, social and legal context of the origins of the war. Such an agreement is almost certainly impossible to achieve when the most urgent priority is to stop the fighting.

UK

are intellectuals from all parts of Yugoslavia who recognize the most urgent task today is to stop the war and that necessitates a cease-fire proposal that keeps all options open for the future. It would be quite inappropriate for us to prescribe the future for millions of people. What we do have is a responsability for each other as human beings that goes beyond the borders of our own regions. It is in this light that the proposal is made.

the affected population.

d) International guarantees to all the Yugoslav republics that they can represent and protect by legal means, their minorities in other republics; as was provided by article 7 of the Austrian State Contract of 1955, which stated that Yugoslavia had the right to protect legally the Slovenian and Croatian minorities in Austria upon their request. Such guarantees are not required for Bosnia-Hercegovina, which according to its constitution, is the state of all three nations which inhabit here.

e) International observers(initially perhaps, UN or CSCE peace-keeping forces) in the areas of Croatia with aserbian majority or a mixed population where the fighting has been concentrated; and in areas where is an immediate danger of conflict, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak and Kosovo. They would also

A PROPOSAL TO STOP THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

-Third, the parties to peace negotiations are not always the same as those involved in the war(eg the settlement after the First World War)

- Fourth, the versions of a peace treaty devised in the Hague are too lengthy and too ambitious to allow any possibility of agreement by the parties involved. Every additional word multiplies the possibilities of misunderstanding and rejection among the seven parties at at almost exponential rate.

- Fifth, and most apposite in the Yugoslav case: parties which have demonstrated a dozen times that they are unable to formulate the conditions for a cease-fire are almost certainly unable to reach the kind of agreements needed for even a moderately stable peace.

This is why the real goal for the present has to be the achievement of a *cease-fire*, but one which meets certain essential conditions:

- First, it must be able to provide a more or less stable situation for some years. (This is necessary because the parties involved need a long period for serious negotiations to construct a lasting peace).

- Second, the cease-fire has to allow for *any* of the possible ultimate situations

Third, it must contain elements which each of the parties can regard as part of their own programmes, so that all will be motivated to accept it without military intervention..

Winter is the best period of the year to stop the fighting, because the climate will minimise the intensity of operations in any case. This is why discussion about such a cease-fire must begin(which they have not yet) and be completed as soon as possible.

The cease-fire agreement could contain the following clauses:

a) Withdrawal of Yugoslav Federal Army troops (JNA) to the barracks from which they launched their current intervention; beginning of the demilitarisation of all the republics, including the gradual dissolution of the JNA and of all paramilitary forces, and international control and monitoring of the disarmament process; financial aid to provide pensions and requalification for ex-JNA professionals.

b) Suspension of all federal institutions. This would give freedom of action, both domestically and internationally, to the republics constituted within Yugoslavia, while preserving the possibility of reactivating at least some of the federal institutions following a final agreement.

c) Agreement that the borders as acknowledged by the constitution of 1974 are not to be touched or formally discussed for three years. This would permit any one party to claim the right to negotiate border changes in the future, while providing a temporary guarantee of security for the other party. Any eventual borders changes will require the consent of both republics, in agreement with a referendum among

monitor the immediate return of refugees to their own areas.

f) Constitution of a temporary committee to continue peace negotiations. This would consist of representative from all republics from the two "autonomous provinces" (as defined in the 1974 Constitution) after free elections in those regions. The committee's tasks would include activating those federal structures necessary to administer inter-republican communications on economic and political matters, and to deal with the federal legacy.

Proposal of substitution of paragraph e), by Zarko Puhovski:

e) UN peacekeeping forces in the areas of Croatia with a serbian majority or a mixed population where the fighting has been concentrated. These forces have to control areas mentioned above as a whole (from the border as described in c) to the actual ceasefire line) and to replace (in the police function) temporarily all the military forces in such areas which should be disarmed within two months after the arrival of the peacekeeping forces. The function of these forces would be to secure and guarantee order and the immediate return of all refugees to the areas under their control. The withdrawal of UN forces as a whole will be possible only after - and as a part of - a final agreement about the future of Yugoslavia. International observers should be sent immediately to the other areas where is an immediate danger of conflict, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak and Kosovo.

took quite some time for United Nations to intervene in the Yugoslav deep crisis. After the conflict in Slovenia which

ended due to Brioni declaration (July 7th 1991) and after the escalation of a total war in Croatia, the security council finally adopted a resolution (September 25th, number 713), according to which a special emissary of the United Nations for Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, was sent to the areas in conflict. At that moment, the blue helmets were still not on the agenda of the Security Council.

The further events helped to move the UN towards its more radical involvement in the armed confrontations in Croatia, which for a long time were regarded as an internal affair of the Yugoslav state. The first one was an official demand of the Yugoslav presidency (or what remained from it), aimed to the UN, to intervene in the Yugoslav conflict by sending peace troops to Yugoslavia. The second decisive event happened in Nordwijk, where the member states of the European Community decided to request the UN intervention in Croatia. This demand was put forward by France, United Kingdom and Belgium in the Security Council.

Cyrus Vance as a special emissary was observing the situation in the conflicting croatian territories with the task to report to the general secretary Perez de Cuellar about the possibilities for the intervention of the "blue helmets". Namely, there are two preconditions for UN further actions that have to be implemented:

1- A cease-fire between the Yugoslav Federal Army troops, Croatian military, and all other para-military serbian, montenegrian and croatian units.

2- All parties involved in the armed conflict should agree that UN Peace-keeping forces intervention is a necessary step towards a lasting peace and also a promoter of further political negotiations.

Mr Vance concluded his mission on December 11th and reported to Perez de Cuellar that an agreement, signed by Milošević, Tudjman, and Kadijević on November 23rd in Geneva about the cease-fire restoration was not respected. Therefore, a Peace-keeping force operation in Yugoslavia cannot be recommended yet. With the eventual coming of the "blue helmets" to Yugoslavia, many other indistinct factors are also present:

■ 1- financial aspect

According to Perez de Cuellar, around 10 000 soldiers should participate in such actions during the first year. That would cost 200.000.000 US\$. UN could only cover 1/10th of the sum. A slovenian national daily newspaper added that in



By Doroteja Lešnik Peace Institute, Ljubljana

accordance with the present estimations, only French, canadian and Italian soldiers could compose peace troops since only these states:

- are willing to be politically involved
- have military troops already prepared
- are willing to pay for their coming to Yugoslavia

Because of different reasons, the involvement of the poor East European countries, USA and Soviet Union, Germany and Austria, non-aligned countries, is put under a big question.

2-Location of the Peace-keeping force

The peace troops would be deployed partially throughout the republic of Croatia along the republic border with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, partially on the conflicting areas with the serbian population on one hand, with the troops of Yugoslav federal army on another hand, and probably also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. there would be different systems of deployment and they would request also adequate ways of operation for maintain-

ing cease-fire in all areas. in addition to that observation squads should be regularly deployed into areas that could be potentially in trouble (Bosnia for example).

3- Duration of the mission

The previous experiences of the UN peace troops interventions proved that:

a-Peace-keeping operations usually cost a lot of money

b-The operation can last for many years, if not decades.

c-Peace-keeping usually only freeze certain relations, positions and the situation as a whole.

Among many missions which were sent to the Middle East, india, Congo, Yemen..., let me mention only the "European one", the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which is perhaps the closest case to the Yugoslav conflict. It was established to prevent the recurrence of fighting among the two Cypriot ethnic communities, Greek and Turkish, and two states, Greece and Turkey, involved in the conflict. UNFICYP was established and started to operate in June 1964 and is still having the same role in Cyprus, namely to "maintain a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish Cypriot forces". An estimated cost until 1984 was 470.500.000 US\$ (1).

For the first time it would be also a UN intervention in the conflict which is an "internal" conflict of one of the UN member state. Would that change the structure of the International Community, and the World Organisation in its most sensitive principles: territorial integrity and sovereign equality of the states and non-interference in their internal affairs?

4- Parties involved in the conflict

From the very beginning of the armed confrontations in Croatia, one of the biggest problem for achieving any ceasefire was in fact that para-military units, armed groups and individuals were operating on their own, without any civilian or political control. War in Croatia was therefore many times described as a rural war, a war between villages, families even individuals. In this respect, it is not only unrealistic to expect that cease-fire could take place in a short term, but one problem which could also emerge with the arrival of "blue helmets" is the possible hostility of these armed groups towards "foreign soldiers".

(1) THE BLUE HELMETS, United Nations Publications, 1985.

Ljubljana, December 1991

PROSPECTS

THE EUROPEAN PEACE PRESS PROJECT

By a group of students from Rijeka (Croatia)

Croatia has by all means been strucked by a dreadful war led by any legally allowed or forbidden instruments. The story already repeats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have been informed about that. You also probably know that on the territory of the really non-existing state of Yugoslavia, another "war" is going on for several years now. The "media war". It resulted in a complete polarisation of the public opinion on the relation East-West, alleviated in once "neutral" republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. This promotion of "reality" combined with open propaganda is considerably contributing to develop hatred among citizens of different republics. The gap at this moment is hardly filled up.

Yet we truly hope that something can still be done. We propose the introduction of a special TV news and a weekly newspaper. The "European Peace Press" project that would be edited by reporters and journalists of eminent European and world TV networks, news agencies and newspapers. The TV news would be emited daily (or weekly) according to arrangements in all republics. The same principle goes for the distribution of the newspaper. The "European Peace Press" center would be situated in a town on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia or in one of the european cities, depending on the circumstances and possibilities. It should be stressed that the TV news goes on Channel 1, since not

everybody can reach other channels. The linguistical differences would be taken into consideration. The EPPO news and the weekly newspaper should be an official initiative of the european Radio-diffusion, Eurovision, EC and Haag peace conference. All republics should be obliged to broadcast the EPPO news.

The aim of this project is to enable access to informations as much as possible given through a neutral and objective angle, thus trying to develop critical attitude and tolerance among citizens. That would increase the possibility of dialogue and help to stop this silly war.

The European Project on the island Vis,

in the Form of a Concrete Peace Action and a Key Study

Why?

Among other reasons, which have a finger in the pie, is the fact that I was born on the island, that a lot of our friends are living on it and we used to work on peace there. During the time of being on the island, which was and still is fully militarized, we would make different plans and would also dream about the possible future of Vis without military...

The Island is situated in Croatia, Dalmatia, 28 miles from Split in the direction to Italy, so to speak, in the middle of the Adriatic sea. Vis has about 3 000 inhab-

itants, fishermen and peasants, and one of the most beautiful nature and the richest historical resources in the Adriatic sea. The reason for opening this project is of course the War in Croatia and Dalmatia. Moreover, the island Vis is one of the most military endangered points in the region as a whole.

According to its natural geo-strategic position during the history, the island became known as "the key of the Adriatic sea". It was important in the Greek (it was the first Greek colony in this part of Europe established in the 4th century B.C.) and Roman times, as well as in the times

of Venice, Napoleon, Italy, Austrohungarian empire... The island is still full of historical tracks and it is a real living monument of the past times.

As an outcome of the communist defence concept of Yugoslav People's Army, after the second World War Vis became extremely strongly fortified in order to defend Yugoslav coast and territory from NATO forces (Italy). There was no entryway for the foreign tourists or citizens until 1989. In the present war circumstances, the entirety of destroying weapons situated on the island is turned over towards the Adriatic Coast (Croatia) and »

it operates as a permanent threat against inhabitants of the island at the same time. Relatively quick decaying processes of the Yugoslav state and YPA are opening completely new questions. Vis was and still is a Croatian, Dalmatian island with Croat population (except the YPA staff) who is now forced to play a hostage role in strifes among Croatia, Serbia (Montenegro) and YPA. Vis is also a very important geo-strategic point for the battle for Dubrovnik and it could be extremely important for the forthcoming disposition

of military forces in the Adriatic sea.

The main problem concerning the island in this situation is: 1- how to find out a possibility of honorable retreat for YPA, 2- how to prevent any kind of setting of new armed forces on the island. Namely, the mentioned geo-strategic position, the military thinking and acting resulted for the island in becoming not only a symbol but - unfortunately - even the notion of military oppression as such. No matter whose oppression it was, the results were similar: underdevelopment, migration (from 13000 inhabitants in the 20s and 30s to 3000 in the 90s).

In the present war cirsumstances the problem is twofold.

- **I.** It is imposible to "liberate" the island without destroying it (and the whole population too)
- 2. It is very hard to expect YPA's abandoning the occupied island in the situation where state and army are collapsing. Namely, in this situation Vis is quite a safe and comfortable place for the army (far away from the coast, unarmed and peaceful inhabitants...).

In searching solutions at the level of Croat-Serb-YPA conflict we expect the problem of the island to be among the latest by turns. Many "international forces" display interest for the island: Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, YPA. In this moment the YPA is probably the main interested party, because there are no real possibilites to retreat and the kind of relationship to be established between YPA and Serbia (Montenegro) in the future is still not clearly defined. So, this Croatian island is presently occupied by the relatively nervous YPA officers. Simultaneously, Vis is shadowed by the events which took place in Dubrovnik and elsewhere in Croatia: it is left to itself. As a matter of fact, we are extremely afraid of the "black possibility": the croatian military forces trying to "liberate" the island generating a total destruction of it. Our experiences with this war in Croatia up to now are so horrible that we are, so to speak, forced to count with the worse outcome, not only as one among other possibilities, but as the

most probable future "solution".

There is only one exit from this situation in our minds: an attempt to bring the problem (the conflict) to the international level. In other words:

- 1. an independent, civil-based action at the island itself;
- 2. simultaneously, internationalisation of the conflict at the "high level politics" with the help of the peaceful people and institutions from the island, Croatia, the rest of Yugoslavia, Europe and UNO. More precisely, we need help from important European institutions, influential politicians, researchers, peace activists and, finally, people from EC monitoring missions who are already in Yugoslavia and in Dalmatia.

In order to ensure the starting steps for the internationalisation of the demilitarization project we want to organize a meeting at the island with the following content:

- a) presentation of the existing situation and the current problems with strong underlining (consciousness raising) of dangerous possibilities of an armed battle for the island (media support action);
- b) presentation of the first draft of the demilitarization project of the island Vis (this letter of intention is a part of the project);
- c) discussions about: similar experiences from all over the world regarding concrete situation at the island (ideas for the further development of the project, possible examples of the island Åland...);
- d) formulation and first finalisation of the project
- e) institutionalisation of:
 - research project team
- the committee for the demilitarization of the island

f) discussion over the future steps towards:

- Yugoslavia as a declining state
- YPA as a remnant of the previous state
- Serbia and/or Montenegro as a possible occupational force
- Croatia as a state to which the island "belongs"
- Europe as a possible interesting conflict party (the idea of the

Vis as a European island!)

g) discussion about the possible forms of different actions (direct civil action as an opportunity for European civil engagement at the level of peace, ecologic... movements and other alternative organisations...).

What are our aims?

1. The island should be totally demilita-

rized. According to the fresh Slovenian (and Yugoslav) experiences we are extremely keen to make clear distinctions between two possibilities: the aim is not demilitarization of the island from the YPA but prevention from any kind of future militarization.

The very key point concerning this topic could be the international recognition of the demilitarized status of the island Vis from the side of following governments and institutions: Croatia, perhaps of the rest of Yugoslavia (depending on the future situation), Italy, European Community and United Nations.

2. Any kind of weapons should be forbidden on the island. The prospectives of the project are in the direction of peace making politics projects which include centres for peace studies and disarmament, schools peace and training camps, ecological "tourism", archeological research-camps, schools in traditional fishing skills, researching and implementing of the projects on the problems of the pollution of the Adriatic sea, exploitation of the potentiality of sun and wind energy...). Namely, the island has the best possible natural position for all those activities. In short, the idea of searching for the atlernative concepts of living in relative harmony with natural and historical resources and environment.

What do we expect from you?

- a) your (international) support and searching for other influential persons and institutions, various international organisations which might be helpful to our project;
- b) to suggest ideas about international protection for the island and its inhabitants in war circumstances or in circumstances of YPA occupation;
- c) to share your experiences with us in searching for the answers to our questions (how to take influence on the state-level political action, how to organize civil based defence, how to bring together civil and high political actions, how to speak in favour of demilitarization and simultaneously not to produce endangering feelings among individual soldiers and officers...); d) moral and also possible material (financial) support and concrete help with the organisation of the project;
- e) to help us find ways for the institutionalisation of the project as a European project, as a common project of different European movements, organisations and individuals interested in this kind of civil action, peace research and nonviolent conflict resolution;
- f) ideas and help in the campaigning for

the idea among the interested people and organisations...

Without large international participation and support in the project there is no possibility even to start it, because of the war in which every action, either "within" or "out" of Yugoslav circumstances, would be understood as "taking part" for or against somebody and would block the project from its very beginning.

In other words, we are kindly asking you to join us in our great challenge. Perhaps it is the first and the last opportunity to set up this kind of projects. In the past, the island Vis had no possibilities (nature of the previous system, objective position somewhere in between two military blocks...), in the future it could be only a piece of stone, the entire island having disappeared in the fire of the war in Balkans.

We desperately need your support. We, and the inhabitants of the island would be extremely grateful to you.

According to the war circumstances we have to organize and to promote the project of demilitarization of the island as soon as possible: January or February 1992. First of all, we require your personal presence at the island at the time of the promotion of this project which intends to be all-European. Unfortunately, for the time being we have no opportunity and possibility to pay your travel costs, but we can compensate it by the first-class sea food and the beautiful nature once on the island. Please let us know if you are prepared to join us as soon as possible. We also ask you to inform all your friends and potentially interested adherents about the idea and project of Vis as a demilitarized European island. Every person among you, supporting us and coming to the island might be extremely important not solely from the point of view of this project, but also for the island and its inhabitants. This is a project which cannot start without your participation.

Ljubljana, November 1st 1991.

Thank you very much in advance: Marko Hren, Tomaž Mastnak, Vlasta Jalušič, Gregor Tomc, Tonči Kuzmanić.

For participation, or further informations, please contact:

Tonči Kuzmanić (Peace Institute) Mestni trg 13 61000 LJUBLJANA (SLOVENIA) Tel. 3861- 109 741 Fax. 3861- 210 374

SILENCE KILLS, LET US SPEAK FOR PEACE

There are many of us who will not accept the atrocities of war in what used to be Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We want to unite our voices and cry out the need to stop the violence, in the name of all the dead, the wounded, exiled, and drafted.

We declare Dec. 20th the Day of Peace for former Yugoslavia.

Please, support our declaration by:

- Public manifestations
- Petitions to your MPs regarding active contribution to peace in former Yugoslavia.
- Informing medias about peace activities
- Organising cultural events with the slogan "Silence kills, let's speak for peace".

Several women from Ljubljana engaged in action to break through tha apathy and silence concerning the war in Croatia. Early December they organized a first public forum to discuss the relations of the governement and the civil society in SLovenia concerning the refugees from Croatia. They drafted a declaration to protest against the meassures of Slovenian governement which restricted the flow of refugees into Slovenia. The declaration requested Slovenian authorities to accept everyone who is forced to live their homes because of the war situation in the neighbouring countries. In adittion, it appealed the governement to find ways to get foreign help for refugees and to engage more actively in peace process for former Yugoslavia. The declaration was then widely signed and signatures still get collected. At the same time a support was echoed to all antiwar and peace movements in former Yugoslavia and speaches by people from Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia were delivered.

There was a big need comming as a result from the discussion, to continue talks on possibilities for peace action. This is why we joint efforts with majority of peace initiatives in Ljubljana and prepared a <u>Day for peace for former Yugoslavia on 20</u>. December 1991 to initiate a regular, once per week forum on peace activity.

The activities during The Day of Peace were as following:

- -a session of poetry in Pen Club with the promotion of the anthology of antiwar poetry -candles for victims of war at the central square in Ljubljana
- -public forum discussion on two topics
 - 1. My contribution to war

2. My contribution to peace

During the Day of Peace a declaration of support to the movements in Serbia which are collecting signatories for the referendum against the war was made public.

DECLARATION OF SUPPORT TO SERBIAN MOVEMENTS REQUESTING REFERENDUM IN SERBIA TO END THE WAR

Many grassroots peace initiatives and protests against violence all over former Yugo-slavia proove that the war is not fought in the name of people.

The initiative which originated in Novi Sad and spread all over Serbia, to collect 100.000 signatories for the referendum against Serbia sending soldiers abroad republic Serbia, seem to us of crucial importance, since it is loyal to the principles of legality and nonviolence. There is a number of initiatives in Serbia who until now collected over 60.000 signatories. We call for a wide support for Serbian antiwar movements and to spread information about their work. Peace movements are those who build bridges already in the time of war and these links will serve as a basis to rebuilt the trust and cooperation amongst people who are determined to live in the neighbourhood.

Citizens Initiative "Silence kills, let's speak for peace" Movement for the culture of peace and non-violence, Ljubljana In cooperation with:

Organised women's groups of Slovenia different peace groups from Slovenia, Zagreb, Rijeka, Novi Sad, Belgrade,

Sarajevo, Titograd and Skopje.

LITERATURE

WHY

DO

THESE

BLACK

WORMS

FLY

JUST

EVERYWHERE

) lynia

AM

MYSELF

ONLY

ACCIDENTALLY

my childhood was full of strories about the war. past war, of which the heavy blow didn't cease to suffocate my mother. her stories were not a hymn to the heroism. she escaped from torturing, fled from the wall of hostages, survived the concentration camp - and yet she was always retelling her own disbelief about having deluded death.

the fear from violent, out of hatred and vengeance arising death, was the only fear i could never live with. i wrote in the school papers: "my biggest wish is, there would never be a war". but my mother has always asked me, from the time i became aware of myself, asked me to burn her body after her death. "i don't stand the thought to be devoured by worms", she was explaining her vision of inevitable absurd. i was feeling this absence of reason during the entire life as an unfinished though invincible wall of intolerance and as impenetrable glasses of unconcern. now i don't even know anymore when the absurd adopted a face and began to walk around here. i remember it the most persisting was my bullet-proof jacket, when on the street next to mine a helicopter was shut down; persisting was my helmet, when shooting under my window was taking place; persisting dragged me away, when a missile exploded above me; persisting protected me from the panic of the people i had been spending hours and hours in the shelter with, later on persisting became a filter put in front of a TV-set screen. persisting is just a rampart against the emotions that try to break through as a mountain torrent into me, to tear me up and drag away into the flood of war. on friday goran with his friends came from osijek. they were showing off video tapes with destroyed town, they were displaying pictures of dead bodies, they were reciting missives of the attacked ones, they were singing...." to document, not to interpret" he said, being composed and submitted as never before. he is also persisting. he travels incessantly through the enemy-encirclements, taking the war from osijek to zagreb, rijeka, hungary, czechoslovakia, germany - and afterwards he goes back. to persist.

we were facing each other, two empty mirrors, from which the images were erased by persistence, we were exchanging speechless words and just feeling, how slowly, but in perseverantly increasing number, we get bit by worms. our encounter was simple, short and completely inexplicable, so as death.

lela b. njatin, november 16th 1991

Translation: Krištof Jacek Kozak

(DIE HAUSERS)*

*From the brochure Noise Slawonische Kunst n.4 (Osijek - Zagreb)

BILLA

Guns spitting fire and smoke on the oleander blossoms along the old tram rails; shell fragments are whizzing around the orange trees at the Pile City Gate. A curse heavy with hatred is directed to St Vlaho, patron saint of Dubrovnik, and barrels of all calibers are aiming at the flag on which we read the letters "Libertas".

The face of the white angel from miloševo has darkened; the warriors whose cannons are aiming at Dundo Maroje are the same that span cannonballs on the Studenica and Sopočani monasteries. From the same position the students of mythological allegories carried out a successful attack on the Sistine chapel and they acted according to the command in this case of the said Michelangelo Buonarotti.

At the same time, across the street at the Trafalgar Square, Lord Carrington is sipping his jug of Rochester beer with the golden crown; the rumour has it that even William Shakespeare doesn't frequent him in his dreams any longer. And thus tiny passions shoot from all weapons, the cuirassiers of death sing their requiem to the Athens of the Adriatic. The whole of the sunny Stradun is packed into tiny and dark holes. The poets, too, have hidden themselves from fire and smoke. The insipide taste of humiliation enters the pores of Gundulić's hymn to liberty.

But it happened, however, that one Orpheus peeped out, just to check - who know what... Of course, they shot him before he had time to wonder.

And now, in the vast expanses of divine love, he is submitting his transcendental report about the white cloud or smoke which, like an adultery, inhaled its sulfuric taste into the green treetop of the orange at Pile.

How strange this picture seems on the other side of time and men, on the other side of evil and forgiveness... Touched by the whiteness of their cherubic sin, the meaning and nothingness sink into the warmth of amorous unification.

Franjo Likar

DUBROVNIK -IT IS ALL OF US

This text has first been published in "Why?", Sarajevo.

Union of Peace Initiatives from Slovenia
(Koordinacija mirovnih iniciativ iz Slovenije)
Center za kulturo miru in nenasilja
/Movement for the Culture of
Peace & Nonviolence
Medškofijski odbor študentov
/InterBishops Conference of Students
Ženska frakcija SDP
/Womens' fraction SDP

Most // Association for Preventive and Voluntary Work

Committee of Anti-War Campaign Zagreb (Odbor anti-ratne kampanje Zagreb)
Zelena Akcija
/Green Action

Društvo za unapredjenje kvalitete života /Assotiation for Improvement of the Quality of Life Demokratski forum Rijeka /Demokratic Forum Rijeka

Center for Peace Sarajevo (Centar za mir Sarajevo)

Društvo Slobodne misli /Assotiation of Free Thought

Centar za Ijudska prava i mir /Center for Human Rights and Peace Udruženje prijatelja djece i mira /Union of Friends of Children & Peace Narodni Mirovni Pokret /Peoples' Movement for Peace

Center for Anti-War Action Novi Sad (Centar za antiratnu akciju Novi Sad)

Center for Anti-War Action Beograd (Centar za antiratnu akciju Beograd)

Ženska Stranka /Womens' Party

Citizens Committee for Peace Titograd (Gradjanski odbor za mir Titograd)

League for Democracy Skopje (Liga za demokratiju Skopje)

Marko Hren, Mestni trg 13,
YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,
tel., fax. 061- 224666, 210374

Milan Knep, Jurčičev trg 2, fax. 061- 314169
YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tel. 223864, 211136

Sonja Lokar, Tomšičeva 5, YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
tel. 061- 161140, fax. 215855

Angelca Murko Pieš, Komenskega 7,
YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slo., tel. 324189, fax 329196

Mateja Kožuh, Tel. 061- 324059, fax. 323955
Aškerčeva 9, YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,
Tel. 061- 217113, Fax. 061-153304

Linhartova 13, YU-Ljubljana, Fax. 061- 129141 /234

Zoran Oštrić, Radnička c. 22, P.P. 876, YU- 41000 Zagreb, Croatia tel., fax 041- 610951 Draženka Dobrić, 041-677574 / privat Vesna Janković -c/o ArcZin 041- 214507 Zlatko Pejić, Ilica 72/I P.P. 117, Yu-41000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel. 041-426352, fax. 041-428771 Šura Dumanić, tel. fax. 051- 713291, Rijeka, Croatia

Ibrahim Spahić, Dobrovoljačka 11,
Yu- 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia & Hercegovina
tel. 071-214884, fax. 071-216238, privat 071-38247
Nermin Butković, same address
privat 071-652806
Zdravko Grebo
Miodrag Živanović, Banja Luka
tel. 078-12754, fax 071-12766, privat 071-55613
Duško Tomić Medjaši kod Bjeljine,
Tel. 071-646937, 076-53176
Vasvija Oraščanin
C/O Movement for the Culture of Peace
and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Slavenka Ljubić, Maksima Gorkog 10
Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina
tel. 021-278887 privat 021-619019
Svetlana Berisavljević, Stevana Mokranjca 24
Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, tel. 021-319204
privat Bulevar maršala Tita 20,
Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, Tel., fax. 021-57797

Stojan Cerović, chair, fax: 011-342646 c/o Vesna Pešić, Prote Mateje 6, Yu-11000 Beograd, Serbia tel. 011-431298, fax 681989 Svetozara Markoviča 4, 011-334706 Lina Vučković, privat 011-384706

Hercegovačka 15, YU-81000 Titograd, Montenegro tel., fax. 081-41914 Miodrag Viahović, tel. 081-11789 Rade Bojović, tel. 081-612049

Djordji Marjanović, 091-518589