95 
RAZPRAVA	O	ZNAČAJU	CILJNO	USMERJENEGA	
NAČRTOVANJA:	kRITIkA
DISCUSSING	THE	NATURE	OF	OBJECTIVES-BASED	
PLANNING:	A	CRITIQUE
Pregledni znanstveni članek
Review paper
Na proces oblikovanja strategije, kot ga dojema večina zahodnih vojsk, je močno 
vplival Clausewitz, ki je politični namen razlagal kot končni cilj vojne. Ne glede na 
vse njegove zasluge in prispevek k teoriji vojne pa se zdi takšen pogled na nastajan-
je strategije preozek za vojaško delovanje, ki smo mu bili priča v Iraku in še vedno 
tudi v Afganistanu. V protiuporniškem delovanju vplivajo na postavljanje političnih 
ciljev in uporabo vojaških sredstev številni dejavniki, tako da oblikovanje strate-
gije pogosto vzbuja videz neurejenega in težavnega procesa, ki temelji na poskusih 
in napakah. V članku avtorja podrobno osvetlita temo in predstavita svojo kritiko 
vsesplošnega ciljno usmerjenega pristopa k oblikovanju strategije.
Vzročnost, strategija, načrtovanje, napovedovanje, formalizacija.
The process of strategy development as seen by most Western militaries is very 
much shaped by Clausewitz, who regarded the political aim the ultimate goal of war. 
Despite all his merits and contribution to the theory of war, Clausewitz’s approach 
to strategy development appears to be too narrow for the military engagements we 
saw in Iraq and still see in Afghanistan. In counter-insurgency operations both the 
formulation of political goals and the application of military means are influenced 
by so many factors that strategy development often appears as a messy and painful 
process of trial-and-error. The authors expand on this issue and deliver a critique to 
the wide spread objective-based approach to developing strategy.
Causality, strategy, planning, prediction, formalisation.
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
Key words
Zoltán Jobbágy
László Szegő
Sodobni	vojaški	izzivi,	november	2011	–	13/št.	3
Contemporary	Military	Challenges,	November	2011	–	13/No.	3
DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.13.3.6
96 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Zoltán Jobbágy, László Szegő
Introduction For the last two centuries armed forces have been trained and conditioned to 
realise predefined objectives at every stage and every level of war. This approach 
to strategy development can greatly be attributed to Clausewitz, for whom strategy 
meant nothing more than “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” 
(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 207). This rather rational, causal construct, with a clear and 
concise link between military means and political end, did not hinder him in em-
phasising that in strategy “everything [had] to be guessed at and presumed” 
(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 211). For Clausewitz, strategy meant a unifying structure to 
the entire military activity that decided on the time, place and forces with which the 
battle had to be fought. Consequently, even in Clausewitz causal construct, strategy 
meant “numerous possibilities, each of which [would] have a different effect on the 
outcome of the engagement.” (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 228). The sheer number of pos-
sibilities explains why he equated strategy with surprise and argued that “no human 
characteristic appears so suited to the task of directing and inspiring strategy as the 
gift of cunning.” (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 238).
Although Clausewitz regarded the political aim the ultimate goal (end, effect) of 
war, he equally argued that the multitude of conditions and considerations prohibits 
its realisation through a single act. As a result, the political end must be decom-
posed into military means of different importance and purpose. This instrumental 
focus explains his conviction that “only great tactical successes [could] lead to 
great strategic ones” and his claim that, in strategy, “there [was] no such thing as 
victory”. (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 270, p. 434). Political results at the strategic level 
mostly come from victories fought at the military tactical level. More politics at the 
strategic level hence leads to the ability to exploit military victories gained at the 
tactical level. This was the very reason for him as soldier to claim that in strategy 
“the significance of an engagement is what really matters” (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 
617). Despite all the merits and contribution of Clausewitz to the theory of war, his 
approach to strategy development appears to be too narrow for today’s military en-
gagements, such as those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.
His strong influence on Western military schools of thought resulted in the common 
understanding of strategy as a link between military means and political ends or, in a 
more generalised version, between cause (means) and its effect (ends). Consequently, 
strategy is understood as a plan that expresses clear cause-and-effect assumptions. 
It provides a rationale for those actions that assumedly help realise political goals. 
Strategy is thus seen as a rational or planning activity in which means are related to 
ends in a focused and rigid manner despite the fact that, in most cases, strategy might 
change should new means become available or different ends appear to be preferable 
(Betts, 2000; Builder, 1989).
No doubt, war is non-linear in nature, which stands for the brake-down of causality 
and its underlying ends-means rationality. Counter-insurgency operations, which are 
high on the agenda in Afghanistan, are frustratingly non-linear. Both the formula-
tion of political goals and the application of military and other means are influenced 
 97 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVES-BASED PLANNING: A CRITIQUE
by the interplay of so many factors that an approach based on rational planning can 
only have limited utility. In these cases strategy does not resemble similarity with an 
elegant forced march, but appears as a messy and painful process of trial-and-error. 
There are dynamic processes in which military means and political ends become 
confused. The result is that the means employed and the ends achieved cannot always 
be delineated sufficiently (Mintzberg, McHugh, 1985).
 1 STRATEGY AS EQUATION
Despite the clear non-linear character of recent wars the traditional military approach 
to strategy development can best be described as an engineering one. Strategy is seen 
as a rigid framework that rests on ends-means calculation in which the emphasis is on 
how to synchronise between means applied and ends sought. In most cases a clear defi-
nition of ends is followed by a proper organisation of available means for which objec-
tives are set, options narrowed and choices made. According to this approach strategy 
is appraised in terms of ends rather than means and assumes deliberate, rational and 
goal-attaining entities. Goals are articulated as objectives and come as a result of a 
general consensus. They are assumed to be ultimate, identified, well-defined, and suf-
ficiently few that make them both manageable and measurable. The focus is on how 
well those specific and established objectives are achieved at every level of military 
operations (Feld, 1959; Beinhocker, 1999; Robbins, 1987; Pirnie, Gardiner, 1996).
Clausewitz stated in accordance that “the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and 
the destruction of his fighting forces the means.” (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 637). Hence, 
the essence of this sort of strategy can be pressed into a very simple equation:
Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means
Ends are equivalent to military objectives, ways to military strategic concepts and 
means to military resources. Strategy focuses on ways in order to employ means 
to achieve ends. It is a plan of actions in a synchronized and integrated framework 
that helps achieve various objectives at theatre, national, and/or multinational levels 
(Dorff, 2001; Lykke, 2001; Department of Defense, 2001).
This approach indicates the military as a self-sufficient system that contains the 
necessary means both to determine and attain objectives. Planning is seen as a 
balancing act between the two and supported by the following two assumptions.
1. The enemy opposition is often regarded as something that falls outside the 
system. It is seen as an environmental peculiarity that can be overcome. The 
enemy is simply not allowed to affect clear reasoning, drawing up and pursuit of 
objectives. War is often subdivided into various headings such as strategy, ope-
rations and tactics and often, competence in one area does not mean competence 
in the other.
2. The military is seen as a rational machine in which decisions are governed by 
prediction and control. A high degree of stability and calm is required in order 
 98 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
to provide a basis for the rational patterns of orders as the total body of available 
information is analysed and reduced. War is a series of discrete actions in which 
events come in a visible and serial sequence.
In other words, strict military discipline makes it possible that “nothing occurring 
in the course of its execution should in any way affect the determination to carry it 
out.” (Warden, 1989; Wylie, 1967; Feld, 1959, p. 21). The fundamental design of 
this approach contains neatly delineated steps with objectives placed at the front end 
and operational plans at the rear. The process of planning starts normally with setting 
objectives as quantified goals, followed by the audit stage in which a set of predic-
tions about the future is made. Predictions delineate alternative states for upcoming 
situations, which are also extended by various checklists. In the subsequent evalu-
ation stage the underlying assumption is that similar to firms that make money by 
managing money, armed forces can make war by managing war. Several possible 
strategies are outlined and evaluated in order to select one. The following operation-
alisation stage gives rise to a whole set of different hierarchies, levels and time per-
spectives. The overall result is a vertical set of plans containing objectives, alloca-
tion of resources, diverse sub-strategies and various action programs. The last stage 
of scheduling is equivalent to the establishment of a programmed timetable in which 
objectives drive evaluation in a highly formal way as everything is decomposed into 
distinct and specified elements. The basic assumption is that once the objectives are 
assembled strategy as an end-product will result. This approach rests on decom-
position and formalisation in which strategy development often resembles similar-
ity with mechanical programming (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, Lampel 1998; Mintzberg, 
1994; Mintzberg, 1990; Cleland, Ireland, 1990).
 2 PREDICTION AND FORMALISATION
Due to its linear design this approach promotes inflexibility through clear directions 
as it attempts to impose stability. Although everything is built around existing cat-
egories emphasising a planned, structured and formalised process, it contains two 
possible pitfalls such as predictability and formalisation:
1. Predictability means that it presupposes a course of events and an environment 
that can be stabilised and controlled. Although even in war it becomes possible 
to predict certain repetitive patterns, forecasting any sort of discontinuity is prac-
tically impossible. Thus, a quick reaction outside the formalised design is often 
better than the extrapolation of current trends and hoping for the best.
2. Formalisation concerns a process that often detaches thinking from action, 
strategy from tactics, and formulation from implementation. It requires hard data 
in the form of quantifiable measures. Strategy is seen as a semi-exact science in 
which courses of actions are put into dry numbers. This approach can give room 
for “strategising and artistic expressions by talented generals.” (Mintzberg et. 
al. 1998; Mintzberg, 1994; Robbins, 1987; Beinhocker, 1999; Smalter, Ruggles, 
1966; Mintzberg, 1990; Daven, 2004, p. 17).
Zoltán Jobbágy, László Szegő
 99 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The result is that strategy is defined by attributes such as “clarity of objective, ex-
plicitness of evaluation, a high degree of comprehensiveness of overview, and […] 
quantification of values for mathematical analysis.” (Lindblom, 1959, p. 80). These 
characteristics are further reinforced by the influx of various scientific tools in the 
form of operations research techniques that attempt to blend the relative predict-
ability of advanced military technology, modern mathematics and rapid data pro-
cessing tools. Although such techniques make it possible to estimate the probabil-
ity of hitting a target with certain confidence, their power soon erodes when facing 
problems that cannot be easily translated into quantifiable formulas. Aggregating 
military activities into measurable data is technically possible, but the subsequent 
re-aggregation of analytic results is often unsatisfactory, even for the analysts them-
selves. Consequently, it is at odds with the more complex and constantly changing 
attributes of the effects landscape (Millett, Murray, 1988/89; Mankins, 2006).
 3 ROLE OF OBJECTIVES
Objectives can best be described as “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals 
towards which every military operation should be directed.” (Joint Publication 1-02, 
2001, p. 308). The essence of objectives-based planning is that higher-level objec-
tives are decomposed into specific tasks and activities down to the lowest possible 
level. Thus, objectives, tasks and actions are linked hierarchically from top to bottom 
and across the width and breadth of operations. Clausewitz emphasised that “[n]o 
one starts a war … without being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve … and 
how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its opera-
tional objective.” (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 700). Objectives-based planning relies on 
the process of identifying objectives, analysing various courses of actions that ends 
with a plan. Activities become linked around common elements and, theoretically, 
everybody can see his or her contribution to the overall effort. Obsolete activities can 
be filtered out and eliminated, activities and resources elaborated based on substitu-
tion and scarcity (Kent, 1983; Smalter, Ruggles 1966; McCrabb, 2002; McCrabb, 
2003; Joint Publication 1-02, 2001).
Forces are tasked to achieve objectives, which constitute the backbone against which 
campaigns are planned, executed and assessed. It is a construct in which “series 
of secondary objectives … serve as means to the attainment of the ultimate goal” 
(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 228). Objectives flow from top down in a way that national 
security objectives form the basis for applying national power in order to secure 
national goals and interest:
1. National military objectives guide the application of military power in various 
regions of the world.
2. Campaign objectives on a regional operational level guide the successful prose-
cution of military campaigns.
3. Military campaigns are again decomposed into operational objectives in order to 
position and deploy forces.
DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVES-BASED PLANNING: A CRITIQUE
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4. Operational tasks and functions serve to achieve operational objectives (Thaler, 
Shlapak, 1995; Kent, Simons, 1991).
Strategy has the basic purpose of linking these levels in a coherent and clear 
framework since achieving a supported objective is partly a statement of supporting 
objectives. The result is that objectives cascade downwards as strategy at one level 
becomes objective at a level below. This hierarchy defines weight amongst objectives 
over time at the level needed to attain a higher level objective in any given situation. 
Strategy links the hierarchy of objectives and provides the framework for achieving 
them. At each level objectives and strategies are accompanied by a set of processes 
and actions defined by various criteria and constraints. This sort of strategy devel-
opment places a premium on mass information since execution requires that those 
involved have access to all relevant aspects. Unfortunately, the non-linear nature of 
war as detailed earlier is mostly inaccurate, untimely and incomplete with key pieces 
missing or hard facts lacking (Thaler, Shlapak, 1995).
Objectives are well suited to the traditional levels of modern wars in which national 
security objectives and national military objectives are on the strategic level, 
expressed in political-military terms and serve as a framework for the conduct of 
campaigns and major operations on the operational level. Tactical level battles and 
engagements are fought in order to achieve higher level objectives. Thus objectives 
at each level are linked to a source or actor within the hierarchy. They proceed from 
the general towards the particular in a deductive fashion until those actions that help 
attain higher level objectives are identified. This hierarchical design puts emphasis 
on vertical relationships despite the fact that although some aspects may be quan-
tifiable, but some more remain uncertain. The broad assumption is that lower-level 
objectives help attain objectives on a higher level as the output from one objective 
serves as input for others (Pirnie, Gardiner, 1996).
 4 INSURGENTS AND IRREGULAR FORCES
Although objectives-based planning presupposes that objectives are defined in a 
clean and coherent way, there is always a risk that the hierarchical order breaks 
down. National military objectives may not be articulated in a sufficiently clear 
and concise way, which hinders the proper articulation of campaign objectives, 
which again cannot contribute to coherent operational objectives. The result is that 
the entire process shifts towards hedging against the worst case, and can eventu-
ally end up with completely inappropriate options. A good example for confusion 
of this kind was the bombing campaign during Operation Allied Force in which 
the final campaign plan, with its phased and incremental nature, left the planners 
mostly confused regarding the effect their actions should have on the enemy. 
Joint Publications 1-02 defines strategy as the “art and science of developing and 
employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion 
to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational objectives” (Polumbo, 2000; 
Joint Publication 1-02, 2001, p. 383).
Zoltán Jobbágy, László Szegő
 101 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Fighting insurgents and other irregular forces means asymmetry, which increases 
the difficulty to identify useful and coherent objectives that can guide military 
actions. Although an adequate intelligence support infrastructure is a prerequi-
site for selecting an appropriate strategy, the feedback loop required for planning, 
execution and assessment can easily break down. The result is that accurate infor-
mation does not flow rapidly with consequences ranging from superfluous repeti-
tion of actions to dangerous negligence (Thaler, Shlapak, 1995; Lindblom, 1959). 
Despite the supposed neat and streamlined design of objectives it is most likely that 
absence of clear guidance from higher echelons in the form of objectives will in-
creasingly become the rule not the exception. More often, those who should define 
objectives will be in great need and may demand to get objectives suggested from 
below (Brocades Zaalberg, 2006). This may pose a crucial challenge in cases in 
which national and theatre level objectives are not well defined or there is no clear 
causal relationship between military options and desired political results. Due to the 
complexity involved, the relationship between military means and political ends can 
either be subject to uncertainties or poorly understood (Lindblom, 1959).
The situation decision-makers might face can become so highly variable and change 
so rapidly that the entire hierarchical design can get out of balance with no definite 
and well-understood inputs to objectives. The assumed clear policy guidance in the 
form of objectives can often be ambiguous as various fields may overlap or become 
contradictory. Furthermore, policy makers often have to juggle numerous values 
simultaneously without always making their rank order clear (Brocades Zaalberg, 
2006).
Consequently, even with this well structured, engineering-oriented, semi-scien-
tific approach, it becomes impossible to express and describe objectives with the 
required detail. Another problem is that objectives expressed on the highest level 
tend to be abstract in nature. Although they often rely on direct and clear causality, 
their relevance soon erodes as we move down the hierarchy. (Thaler, Shlapak, 1995; 
Pirnie, Gardiner, 1996; Betts, 2000; Richards, 1990).
As a precaution, menus of objectives are often suggested to provide a certain baseline 
for times when the expected guidance from above is either insufficient or unclear. 
Instead of thinking in a single and rigid plan it is believed that a spectrum of plans 
forming a pool of various strategic concepts can provide for useful strategies in 
the case the situation changes, or fails to proceed as assumed originally. However, 
waging war stands for a complex optimisation problem; therefore it is very ques-
tionable whether it becomes ever possible to establish a sufficient pool of flexible 
and non-committal objectives that can cover the vast array of emerging possibilities 
(Wylie, 1967).
Strategy development based on political ends translated into political objectives 
can best be described as a maximising approach since it attempts to control every-
thing that may happen on the effects landscape. Despite the discrepancy between 
DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVES-BASED PLANNING: A CRITIQUE
 102 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
the relative rigidity and linear character, and the increasing complexity of situations 
found in operations world-wide, the temptation to stick to this approach is as strong 
as ever (Ho How Hoang, 2004; McCrabb, 2001; NATO Strategic Commanders, 
2001).
The biggest shortcoming of the objectives-based approach is its limited ability to 
adapt, which is discouraged as much by the articulation of objectives as by the sepa-
ration between formulation and implementation. Its very essence is to realise specific 
objectives as the focus is on realizing rather than adapting them. Focusing on ob-
jectives is quantitative since it mostly deals with static states and not the transitions 
between possible states. It is a step-wise and incremental approach that proceeds 
hierarchically through the various levels of war, despite the fact that such links can 
become weak or even disappear as events unfold. Non-linearity stands for dynamic 
and constantly changing processes, in which events are also influenced by what 
common wisdom would term external circumstances or luck. It is also mentioned 
that a comprehensive understanding of objectives is needed, which requires that 
commanders must look at both above and below their respective levels (Mintzberg, 
Waters, 1985; Pirnie, Gardiner, 1996; Senglaub, 2001; Chakravarthy, 1997; Lykke, 
2001).
However, such demand can easily put commanders under increased pressure and 
lower overall performance. Objectives-based planning attempts to see the end 
from the beginning and by going into ever finer detail it reflects linear causality. 
Unfortunately, war seen as a non-linear phenomenon indicates much messiness. 
Thus, there are serious limitations for such an approach:
1. By going step-wise through the tactical, operational and strategic levels, objecti-
ves-based planning suggests that objectives simply add together and war can be 
seen as a sum, and not the product of many factors.
2. Instead of creating options and opening up new possibilities by discovering 
niches, objectives-based planning shuts down or at least limits the chance of 
exploiting emergent opportunities.
3. In sum, objectives-based planning means that we “pursue relatively singular 
strategies and thus occupy only one spot on the landscape”, but do not employ 
any mechanism that provides for protection “when the landscape unexpectedly 
changes” (Beinhocker, 1999b, p. 100, 102).
Clausewitz’s contribution to strategic thinking is unquestionable. However, his goal-
seeking approach excludes a whole range of other aspects such as logistic, social 
and technological issues, which must be considered as equally important in military 
operations. However, this focus should not come as a surprise since he believed 
that every human activity is a rational undertaking and governed by reason, which 
explains why he understood strategy as an objective-oriented, goal-seeking phenom-
enon (Howard, 1979; Millett, Murray, 1988/89).
Conclusion
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Zoltán Jobbágy, László Szegő