XENOPHOBIA AND 
POST-SOCIALISM
E DITED BY M OJCA PAJNIK





XENOPHOBIA AND POST-SOCIALISM
EDITED BY: MOJCA PAJNIK
PROOF-READING (EXCEPT THE TEXT OF V. J.): MICHELLE GADPAILLE
DESIGN: IRENA WÖLLE
PRINT: STANE PEKLAJ
© MIROVNI INŠTITUT, 2002
THE PUBLISHING OF THIS BOOK WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
EDITION: POLITIKE
EDITOR: ALDO MILOHNIĆ
SUB-EDITION: POLITIKE SYMPOSION
EDITOR: MOJCA PAJNIK
PUBLISHER: PEACE INSTITUTE
INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES
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XENOPHOBIA and post-socialism / [edited by] Mojca Pajnik. -
Ljubljana : Peace Institute, 2002. - (Edition Politike.
Sub-edition Politike symposion)
ISBN 961-6455-02-8
1. Pajnik, Mojca
118730240

CONTENTS
MOJCA PAJNIK
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE OTHERS AND THOSE DIFFERENT
TONČI A. KUZMANIĆ
POST-SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE REINVENTION OF POLITICS
IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR
XENOPHOBIA AND SLOVENIAN MEDIA: HOW THE IMAGE 
OF THE OTHER IS CONSTRUCTED (AND WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE)
VLASTA JALUŠIČ
XENOPHOBIA OR SELF-PROTECTION? ON THE ESTABLISHING 
OF THE NEW SLOVENE CIVIC/CITIZENSHIP IDENTITY
MARIA MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO
THE PROBLEM OF XENOPHOBIA IN THE CONTEXT OF POPULISM
AND EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT
TANYA LOKSHINA
HATE SPEECH IN RUSSIA: OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
AND MEANS FOR COUNTERACTION
ALEXANDER VERKHOVSKY
ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN NATIONALIST,
XENOPHOBIC AND ANTI-WESTERN TENDENCIES IN 
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
LAURA LAUBEOVA
ANTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES
7
17
37
45
73
89
109
127



INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE OTHERS
AND THOSE DIFFERENT
M OJCA PAJNIK
Why discuss xenophobia and post-socialism? The foreword to this
book will begin by trying to answer this question, which led us, the
researchers and activists of the Peace Institute, to organize an inter-
national seminar on the subject in October 2001. Secondly, the basic
conclusions including concrete proposals of the seminar will be pre-
sented and thirdly, the content of the articles presented in this vol-
ume, will be briefly introduced. 
The period after 1989 can be characterized as an epoch that con-
tributed to a substantial change in the process of comprehending
the meanings of “domestic” (also “pure” or “national”), on the one
hand, and of “foreign” on the other hand. The obvious shift from arti-
ficially cultivated principles of solidarity, unity and brotherhood to the
well preserved dichotomic idea of “the west and the rest” resulted in
enormous changes, visible especially in the rise of new radical phe-
nomena and their concomitant new manifestations. This shift has
brought new ways of thinking and acting. 
After more than a decade of experience with post-socialist sys-
tems, there is no doubt about the close linkage between post-social-
ism and xenophobia. Different manifestations of what should be
comprehended and what is continuously being reproduced as “ours”
emerged out of both phenomena. What is “domestic” is being glori-
fied; the struggle for “our” values and morals and also the fight for
“our” nation or supranation (the big other) are aggressively pushing
aside everything and everybody that endangers this cosy domesti-
city. “Ourness” par excellence is finding its way out through the polit-
ical establishment and the mass media. Xenophobia in post-socialist
societies functions in the service of the “protection” of what is “ours,”
what is “genuine.” On the one hand it justifies itself, while being, on
7

the other, justified by “us”: “we” are using the very mechanisms of
xenophobia that serve the larger idea of protection. And what is
actually being protected? The belief is that “we” as individuals and
“our” pure values of civilization are being protected from “the others,”
their barbarism, faulty morals and savage values. And who are
these “others” and those who are “different”? They are immigrants,
Roma, Jews, Chechens, the mentally ill etc. One specific impact of
xenophobia and related phenomena, such as more or less direct
racism, nationalistic populism, chauvinism, various anti- manifest-
ations (e.g. anti-Semitism), can be, speaking from an individual pos-
ition, best determined as an assault on individual integrity. As a
result we talk about people in categories. Obviously, classification is
in its very process of (re)production, in the service of creating div-
isions along dichotomies such as “good-bad,” “better-worse,” “ours-
theirs,” “we-them,” “civilized-barbarian” and so forth. Secondly, mani-
festations of these phenomena have significant social implications:
being more or less openly expressed and practised by political elites,
they are becoming a source of rising populisms and nationalisms.
These are the issues that should be of great concern to us in the
period of post-socialism as new manifestations of these phenomena
are constantly emerging; as soon as “we” feel our domesticity threat-
ened in someway, there will be someone to blame. The victimization of
the non-visible enemy is in a sense ironic or even grotesque but in its
realistic implications exceeds the brutality of the darkest nightmares.
In the processes of post-socialist development xenophobia appears
in different guises, and in varied embodiments. Moreover the sad
fact is also that this is happening legally. In the first “transit decade”
xenophobia was seen as something of short duration, whereas today
it should be seen in its deeper dimensions, which far exceed any pos-
sibility of accepting arguments that justify xenophobia and link xeno-
phobic reactions to “naiveness,” “harmless protection” and even to
“natural responses.” Of course, there is nothing natural in the rejec-
tion itself, moreover excuses such as naturalness in responses only
make manifest what is being denied: xenophobia itself. Xenophobia
can be understood within the realm of what is perceived as anti-dem-
ocratic, that is, as posing a threat to democratic development not
only at national but also the international level.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
8

Yesterday “we” (the positively positioned social construct) gathered
forces against refugees; today the emerging “We” is enchaining
gays, immigrants, the handicapped and Jews. Who is next? Who will
be the scapegoat and the victim of “our” interests tomorrow? If at
the beginning of the 90s we were speaking about xenophobia mainly
in relation to those “others,” today the voice that speaks as “we” is
also bothered by those who are “different.” This may be one of the
theoretically important “qualitative” shifts that show that we are
facing the emergence of new forms of xenophobia. If before “we”
reacted against the “others” in the sense of the “other’s” ethnic ori-
gin, religious belief or race, today we are also reacting against
those “different”: gays and lesbians, drug users, the mentally ill and
so on. “We” have to be protected; our values have to remain
untouched; our morals uncorrupted. The purification of “our” world
opens a space for different kinds of nationalism which are also
becoming part, sometimes a major part of the contemporary polit-
ical establishment. 
These are the major concerns that stimulated the Peace Institute
to organize the international seminar on “Xenophobia and Post-
socialism” in Ljubljana, 3–7 October 2001. In general the goals were
to analyse and compare concrete experiences regarding xenopho-
bia and to propose strategies for overcoming its manifestations.
Theorists and activists from Central and Eastern Europe came to
Metelkova in Ljubljana where extensive discussions of the situations
in Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Russia, Slovakia, Poland,
Slovenia took place. The necessity of different approaches to study-
ing these phenomena was pointed out; at the theoretical level, the
differences between barbaros and ksenos were highlighted and
served as a tool to stimulate thinking about the emerging
dichotomies in contemporary societies; xenophobia in written and
spoken language was debated, and the positions from which one
reacts to the “other” were analysed. Following practical examples,
the group tried to evaluate the general political atmosphere, dis-
cussed the role of mass media that (re)produce xenophobia and out-
lined xenophobia on the level of the parliament and political parties.
I NTRODUCTION
9

Thoughts about the emergence of post-socialist “subjects” (parties,
movements, associations) and their hostile relations to “foreigners”
were put forward. Xenophobia in relation to immigrants and
examples of hatred in religion and churches were debated. In addi-
tion, specific manifestations of xenophobia were linked to the EU
and its enlargement process, while the analysis of legal instruments
and alternative forms as methods of counteraction were brought
forward. All this brings us to the conclusion that the rationale
behind the meeting was, as Tonči Kuzmanić said in his introduction
to the seminar, “not one of joy and celebration, but rather one of con-
cern and sorrow.” 
In its work the group combined open presentations, followed by
discussion, with facilitated workshops addressing common concerns
that could serve as background for future initiatives both from the
group and from individuals in their efforts against xenophobia. In
summing up the results of the workshop, let us briefly review some
of its important findings. The group discussed the gap between “our
visions and present realities” with regard to xenophobia and post-
socialism and produced a list of the following concerns from differ-
ent levels of social life:
1
•manifestations of institutional discrimination practised by institu-
tions such as politics, the police, the courts/law, registration pol-
icies, the visa regime; 
• political decision-making structures with respect to their politics of
exclusion and the lack of political will of those in power;
•absence of enforcement of legislation to protect vulnerable
groups; absence of coherence and transparency of legal acts; 
•absence of multicultural training; the education system perpetu-
ates images and stereotypes, while promoting a version of history
which excludes minorities;
• police lacking the training to work with vulnerable groups;
•denying employment by discrimination according to race, gender
and ethnicity;
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
10
1
What follows is a partial list. For more detailed information about the workshops and
the whole evaluation of the seminar see <www.mirovni-institut.si>.

•media-promoted intolerance which results in a lack of awareness
of the racism present in language and images; besides, there is a
lack of commitment from the media;
•public lack of interest in minority groups;
• public spaces insufficiently open to diversity;
•discrimination which is privately tolerated (e.g. access to clubs,
organized violent attacks);
• a discriminatory national border system and detention system for
refugees;
• absence of gender equality;
• absence of equality for gays and lesbians.
The next issue that the group discussed was the idea of how to
“overcome the gap between the present situation and the society we
aim for.” The following, as the outcome of previously addressed con-
cerns is a summary of the results of the discussion; the needs are
thus to:
•demonopolize political structures and ensure political participa-
tion of diverse groups;
•adopt anti-discrimination measures in different areas within the
legal system, while ensuring enforcement and monitoring of their
implementation;
•provide obligatory programs for learning intercultural compe-
tence (for police, civil servants, teachers and media);
•promote tolerance, non-discrimination, diversity and human
rights in the school system;
•organize training for journalists and enforce the journalists’ code
of ethics;
• promote independent media and stimulate media diversity;
• stimulate the media to promote diversity and use the media as an
advocacy tool (e.g. to campaign for liberal attitudes, to run anti-
racist campaigns);
• provide campaigns for educating citizens; to involve local commu-
nities in intercultural events, solidarity actions and humanitarian
projects.
The next important result of the seminar is the table of recom-
mendations that was put forward by the members of the group bear-
I NTRODUCTION
11

ing in mind what we, as activists, scientists and NGO representa-
tives, can do with regard to xenophobia. What follows are some
examples of and ideas for the necessary concrete future work in the
fields of media, public administration and governmental policy and
NGOs:
2
After this simple introduction to seminar’s origins and a brief
introduction to its results, and proposals for future work, let us now,
finally, pay brief attention to the articles published in this book.
These articles highlight different important, even vital aspects of
manifestations of xenophobia: both theoretical implications and
practical examples stimulate thinking about the larger implications
of xenophobia. Furthermore, the complexity of the phenomenon is
significantly explored, while the practical implications highlight con-
cerns about future democratic development in post-socialism. Tonči
A. Kuzmanić, in his article entitled “Post-socialism, Racism and the
Reinvention of Politics,” introduces “classical” (biological) racism on
one hand, a concept closely connected with nature as a consequence
of utilitarian projects in history, and, on the other hand, today’s
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
12
2
For the complete list of short, middle and long term objectives of possible future work
in different fields, see <www.mirovni-institut.si>.
MEDIA
• provide coordinated,
quick response to
local xenophobic
incidents
• decide on region-wide
monitoring of dis-
criminatory texts 
and images
• organize contests
for journalist (e.g.
best article award,
“top ten hate-speech
champions”)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND GOVERNMENTAL
POLICY
• advocate legislative
changes
• provide diversity
training  courses for
public administration
• promote and co-pro-
duce multicultural
education programs 
NGOS
• create an international
response network
against xenophobia
to launch concrete
projects
• organize public events
to promote diversity
• propose anti-discrim-
inatory measures
within the legal system  

racism that functions mainly on the basis of culture. The previous
level of manifestations of racism—the “natural” one—is something
that now functions socially. Furthermore, the author explains why
and how we should understand racism and xenophobia as hierarch-
ical phenomena; before launching the second part of the paper,
where an interview is used as a form through which the author
answers questions, he explores the area of politics and introduces
ideas for opening up political space with a special emphasis on
equality. 
In his article “Xenophobia and Slovenian Media: how the Image of
the Other is Constructed (and What it Looks Like),” Igor Ž. Žagar
briefly shows the similarities in media argumentation in the case of
Bosnian refugees in Slovenia at the beginning of the 90s and during
the “immigrants’ crisis” of 2001. The author provides a descriptive
rhetorical analysis to show that both refugees and immigrants are
presented as social vermin. The author demonstrates how a xeno-
phobic media discourse operates and on what type of argumenta-
tion it thrives: a selected media article is presented and its argu-
mentation explored and deconstructed. Focusing on the text, Žagar
shows how the author of the column uses various linguistic features
(e.g. argumentative techniques and rhetorical strategies) to make
his hypothetical and concocted story convincing. The author con-
cludes by pointing out an important observation, that xenophobia is
generated not just through loud manifestations and militant slogans,
but also by using soft words and promoting the image of normality. 
In her detailed analysis titled “Xenophobia or Self-protection? On
the Establishing of the New Slovene Civic/Citizenship Identity,”
Vlasta Jalušič presents an analysis of the elements of xenophobia
and hate speech in the Slovene print media during the first three
and a half months of 2001. This discriminatory media discourse was
obviously related to other discourses, namely the discourse of some
state officials, and the supposedly “common people” discourse used
by certain civil initiative groups that resisted the settlement of immi-
grants. The author indicates some characteristic elements of the
media discourse, such as emotionalization, assumption of immi-
grant and state culpability, its stress on hostility towards the state,
victimization of the “autochthonous” inhabitants, the presentation of
normalization and also denial of xenophobia and racism as “normal
I NTRODUCTION
13

and understandable” reactions. A significant conclusion of this art-
icle is that the actual denial of xenophobia is a basic characteristic
of hate-speech under post-socialism: it involves self-legitimization
and presents xenophobic reactions as arising out of self-defensive
necessity. 
The article of Maria Marczewska-Rytko titled “The Problem of
Xenophobia in the Context of Populism and European Enlargement”
is a valued contribution, as it reflects today’s manifest reality: the
rise of extreme forms of nationalism in the processes of EU enlarge-
ment. The author briefly provides her understanding of populism as
involving reliance on a strong leader who gains power by winning
popular support for the struggle against a non-existent enemy. She
presents the ideal populist vision of the world—that is, a small com-
munity based on principles of brotherhood and social solidarity;
populism finds its grounding in the idealization of the people and
society; it places great importance on national values; it glorifies the
sense of national identity and at the same time adopts a hostile atti-
tude towards the “others” who undermine the basis of such an ideal
society. The author highlights examples of new populism in Western
Europe, specifying the situations in Switzerland and Austria, while
also providing a quick overview of the populist movements of J. M.
Le Pen in France and S. Berlusconi in Italy and concluding with the
presentation of new populism in Poland. 
The xenophobic attitude towards the “others” in Russia is repre-
sented by Tanya Lokshina’s article “Hate Speech in Russia:
Overview of the Problem and Means for Counteraction.” The article
explores various manifestations of racism as practised by public
officials and various representatives of the authorities. The author
brings to light the problems of lack of public dialogue, and of the
weak reaction of different social groups and NGOs to xenophobia in
Russia. National xenophobia under Russian post-socialism shifted
from the peoples of the near abroad to Russia’s own “aliens”; xeno-
phobic reactions are practiced especially against Chechens,
Azerbaijani, Jews and so on. The article gives several examples that
point to overtly xenophobic attitudes among Russia’s top executive
power leaders, e.g. “A good Chechi is a dead Chechi.” The second
part of the article explores a substantive analysis of mechanisms to
combat xenophobia: Lokshina proposes forward legal mechanisms
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
14

to combat hate speech, debates the persecution of organizations
and the media and last, but not least, discusses alternative forms for
combating xenophobia.
Alexander Verkhovsky, in his article “Role of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Nationalist, Xenophobic and Anti-Western
Tendencies in Contemporary Russia,” points to the existence of rad-
ical nationalist groups in the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian
orthodox fundamentalism stands, as the author shows, for restor-
ation of autocracy, and restrictions against Jews, and is based on
complete rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights.
The state has actually absorbed the Church’s proposals, and by
according it privileges, has legitimized its fundamentalist attitudes.
Moreover, by accepting its proposals, as the article shows, the state
adopts discriminatory measures by classifying religious associ-
ations according to criteria, obviously favouring the Church itself.
Furthermore, the author explores the fundamentalists’ anti-Western
and anti-global orientation and actions and discusses the practical
application of such analysis for Church and state. 
In her article titled “Antiracist Legislation and Policies in the EU
and their Impact on the Accession Countries,” Laura Laubeova pre-
sents an overview of major antiracist/antidiscrimination mechan-
isms that are relevant primarily for the Accession countries. The
author stresses the fact that NGOs and other civil society actors
have become absolutely necessary in the struggle against racism in
all its forms, and WCAR in Durban has proved that this is so. The
text provides an overview of major antiracist instruments and pol-
icies in Europe. The article also reviews the basic ideas behind vari-
ous essential theoretical explorations of the diverse mechanisms of
racism, an account which may help us to comprehend the complex-
ity of the phenomenon.
Let us conclude by making reference to the necessity of thinking
about xenophobia and post-socialism both theoretically and practic-
ally; answers to questions about this phenomenon are to be found
both in theory and in the content and contexts of its actual per-
formance and practice. Articles in this book are themselves proof of
the complexity of xenophobia and all its forms; they are also proof
that these phenomena need to be deconstructed, comprehended in
all their complexity, and, of primary importance, they need to be
I NTRODUCTION
15

addressed with a strongly expressed concern regarding contem-
porary post-socialist development. We confidently anticipate that
the book will stimulate thinking about the importance of the phe-
nomenon and provide some ideas on how to approach it. 
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
16

POST-SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE
REINVENTION OF POLITICS
T ONČI A. KUZMANIĆ
Here I will try to make two rather short and abstract interventions.
I will try to deal with the transition at the level of the very heart of
the problem of racism and xenophobia in the last decades, particu-
larly in connection with post-socialism. According to my under-
standing, this very transition comprises the basic core of the prob-
lem of racism and xenophobia today, which is especially interesting
for an understanding the situation in Central and Eastern Europe.
First of all I should present my thinking in the form of two over-
simplifications on the basis of which I will speak here (see figure 1
and figure 2).
Racism as Natural
(Naturally Real & Naturally Given)
However, the transition under discussion is, first of all, a transition
from a “classical,” “usual,” “ordinary” (biological, neurological, physi-
ological) thesis and self-understanding of racism, to a radically
changed form of racism and xenophobia functioning on the basis of
culture (cultural differences). Of course this is nothing especially
new within the given research field; it has already been emphasized
on numerous occasions. On the basis of this transition “from nature
to culture” and the shaping of the new appearance of racism, it is
possible to speak about the very new form, which in the literature
often appears as “cultural racism.”
1
What is the point here and, above all, what is at stake here? The
basis on which “classical” racism used to function (at least from the
nineteenth century onward) as physiological, biological, neurologic-
al racism was—at first glance—something very closely connected
17
1
See K. Malik, The Meaning of Race (London: Macmillan, 1996); T. Kuzmanić, Bitja s pol
strešice (Hate Speech in Slovenia, Ljubljana: Open Society Institute, 1999).

X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
18
Transition from “natural” 
(biological, neurological, psychological) 
definitions of 
racism and xenophobia
to
Cultural 
and 
social 
definition of 
racism and xenophobia
Redefinition from natural 
to cultural is based on 
extreme enlargement of elements 
consisting of 
(all previous “natural” elements +)
• Language
• Religion
• Life-style(s)
• Taste(s)
•
•
•
Ad infinitum
Endlessly opened chain 
of signifiers 
(everything could be the “basis” 
for cultural racism) 
FIGURE 1: TRANSITION FROM “NATURAL” TO CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DEFINITION OF
RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA
C
U
L
T
U
R
A
L
R
A
C
I
S
M

P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
19
Nature: biology, neurology, psychology
Natural space = space of differences
Inequality = “naturally founded”
Politics = forbidden
Society: culture, religion, language etc.
Social/cultural differences
Social space = space of differences
Inequality is                   founded
Politics = forbidden
(Re)solution?
Beyond natural, social and cultural
Political space = space of equality
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
R
A
C
I
S
M
1
ST
STEP
S
O
C
I
A
L
AND
/
OR
2
ND
STEP
C
U
L
T
U
R
A
L
R
A
C
I
S
M
3
RD
STEP
socially
culturally 
AS REAL
REALITY
AS REAL
REALITY
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
R
E
A
L
I
T
Y
S
O
C
I
A
L
AND
/
OR
C
U
L
T
U
R
A
L
R
E
A
L
I
T
Y
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
S
AS VIRTUAL
REALITY
FIGURE 2: LOGIC OF FUNCTIONING AND FOUNDING OF INEQUALITY AMONG PEOPLE

with “nature.” Of course with both natures: with nature as well as
with “nature” as the constructed entity being the core of the self-
legitimization (ideological “last reality,” the most real of all realities)
of these times. According to this theory, nature and “nature,” human
beings used to be (they were) racially different, owing to the fact that
they were black or white. Besides, they had this or that colour of
eyes, this or that shape of noses or ears, this or that blood group and,
consequently and later, this or that kind of IQ.
What is interesting to emphasize at this point is the very historical
fact that this concrete kind of “classical,” ordinary (biological, physi-
ological) racism was not a direct European product. It was not even
invented in Europe.
2
It came to Europe and was not the invention of
National Socialism and Hitler’s generation, as it is usually complete-
ly misunderstood.
3
This was a racism incubated in the United States
in (or most probably during the second half of) the nineteenth cen-
tury. Not because of America as such, or owing to the fact that
racism is by definition a non-European phenomenon, but above all,
owing to the fact of the long-standing theory and practice of slavery
within the United States.
Moreover, and this is something which should be extremely strong-
ly emphasized: this, so to speak “ordinary racism,” was not the prod-
uct merely of everyday lives and of ordinary people’s minds. Rather,
it was a scientific product of the time. It was the result of the first
medical, phrenological, anthropological, sociological and similar sci-
entific, above all utilitarian projects and/or utilitarian practices.
Almost each scientific man (absent women in science) of the time
used to function as pioneers on various field(s) of human endeavour,
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
20
2
Of course, observing the problem over a longer period of time, for example during the
couple of centuries from Columbus onward, this form of racism could (and should) also
be grasped as part of the highly celebrated “European culture.” Specifically starting
with the Spanish conquest, where the “red race” was literally invented precisely out of
the terrible backwardness of the Europeans who came to the coast of today’s USA and,
on seeing people painted with red, named them the “red race.” Columbus’s soldiers and
“researchers” simply saw the ritual of indigenous people being painted red.
3
The main Nazi contribution to the already existing matrix of classical (ordinary, bio-
logical) racism was twofold. Firstly, the invention (actually implementation of the
already existing category) of the Aryan race. On the other side was their use of “Jews”
more or less in the same form as it had already been functioning within the so uncrit-
ically celebrated “cultural Europe” for centuries. The main point of the holocaust was,
of course, the readiness to “accomplish the historical task” of burning millions of inno-
cent Jews, Roma, Slavs, communists and so on.

not just and not solely that of science. Rather they were the uncrit-
ical partisans and pioneers of the early capitalist “work processes”
activities as such, i.e. business activities based on the Homo faber
way of (not) thinking and arguing.
4
Their science and scientific
approach (just as they are today) were not directed towards purely
scientific aims, but towards the productivity of society, of social
machinery and the social fabric. These early scientists were the engin-
eers of society as well as of the social, trying to group various signs
and signifiers of various peoples, groups of people, of their behav-
iour, in order to place them at the disposal of the productive social
(work) processes. Speaking in terms of the history of the so-called
western world(s), this situation at the level of “race relations” lasted
until 1945. The Homo faber logic still functions today; the role of the
scientist remains similar to what it used to be. The main difference
is that after WW II it was—at least in Europe—almost impossible to
continue to speak of racism as being shaped on the classical, ordin-
ary basis, which means being based within biology (physiology) or,
in the last instance, being based on arguments dealing with nature.
Of course, 1945 was not the end of (our?) history. My thesis is that
after 1989 and after the fall of the Berlin wall, an almost identical
race matrix resurfaced. I said almost, since—and that is the most
important point—the new, let’s call it post-socialist race matrix in
place after 1989 was not working at the level of nature and accord-
ing to biology, neurology and physiology. Rather, it had begun to
function mainly on the basis of culture.
It means that in comparison with previous times, we are facing
quite different, if not extremely more complex phenomena. Some-
thing which once upon a time was founded directly within nature
(race was “natural fact”), something which ought to be anchored in
our bones, blood and genes, something which was possible to see, or
at least to grasp at first sight, is now disappearing. Actually, it is
starting to glide, to float. In comparison with the “good old, heroic ra-
cist times,” when “black was black, since s/he was Niger by nature,”
today’s racism is (literally) becoming something which could be
termed “free floating, cultural racism.” Racism is free floating in the
sense that it is almost completely impossible to anchor it. It is quite
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
21
4
Max’s Frisch novel Homo Faber is a brilliant example of this quintessentially modern
creature, being so important for an analytical way of thinking at the point of racism.

impossible to make any kind of coherent connection between its—
let’s put it in Hegelian parlance—appearance and its substance. It is
rather something being “based” (if it is still possible to speak about
a basis in this revolutionary inverted/changed context) on an end-
less and—here is the main point—a priori open chain of signs, signa-
tures and significance. All these, new (actually it was always the
same, but “nature” was covering this uncovered situation of today)
signs, these free floating signifiers are mainly rooted in culture.
But what does culture mean at this point? Something radically
complex was opened up and simultaneously oversimplified. The cul-
ture in the case is “The Culture,” being directly connected to this or
that kind of collective racism producing subject. Here it means an a
priori opened signifier, something which could and must be endless-
ly enlarged (or closed) and which consists of things like language,
religion, lifestyle, taste and so on. “The Culture” is again sunk in its
very origin towards cult and it is functioning, first of all as “The Cult”
in which taste and aesthetics play the game alongside ethics and pol-
itics. Everything is one, undivided mixture of entirety. This Cult
Culture first of all could also embrace the largest kinds of signs, such
as, for example, civilization(s) could be.
5
In order to produce racist
difference today, it is no longer necessary to be of “different colour.”
Mostly it is enough to practice another way of life, which is not the
same as the dominant social form of life in a particular environment
“should be” and one could be racially different. Sometimes it is easy
to produce racist difference even on the basis of differences between
gays, lesbians and the “straight” population. Since the barriers
among races are no longer naturalized, the fixed lines of differences
are no longer clear, and the very concept of race as well as that of
difference(s), has undergone revolutionary transformation. Among
the other consequences proceeding from this situation is that we, as
researchers, scientists and activists are also in a situation in which
we have lost any kind of “secure” thinking or analytical anchor. We
are, so to speak, floating together with the signs, appearances, and
substances with which we are trying to deal. Similarly one could say
of our concepts and research abilities that they too are floating, at
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
22
5
Huntington’s “theory” dealing with cultural conflicts and crashes is basically a cultur-
ally racist one. See S. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisation?” Foreign Afairs 72, no. 3
(summer 93): 22–49.

least over the last decade. Not to speak about the unhappy (scientif-
ic as well) conscience being at work after the invention of “new rhet-
oric” or postmodern revolution at the level of the remnants of the so-
called social sciences. All that and much more regarding other
aspects ought to provide a reason why we should—if possible, of
course—stop “using” (actually being used by) the old way of thinking
and of using (the old) categories. First of all, including biological,
neurological, physiological when dealing with racism.
Racism as Social
(Socially Real & Socially Given)
Let me open up something which could be called a new space for
understanding racism and xenophobia, from which, one would
probably be enabled to seek solutions for our troubled situation—
especially within post socialism(s).
How does one approach the problem of racism and xenophobia in
post-socialist circumstances? It is obvious, especially if one reads the
literature from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that the
structure itself of the phenomena of racism and xenophobia is a
very simple one: it is strictly and radically hierarchical. The struc-
ture of racism is the structure of hierarchy on the level of the
researched object(s). Thus, if one speaks of race and racism, he or
she is speaking within this or that kind of hierarchy. Better, the very
hierarchy among various people, social groups and—consequently—
races, is the essence of race and racism. Regardless, the point deal-
ing with the understanding of racism is that racism is not on the side
of the “race itself.” Moreover, it is not on the side of the analyzed
object, but it is (if it is spatially anywhere at all) on the side of the ana-
lyzing subject, so to speak, on the side of the analytical (scientific as
well) view itself.
To put in another way: how can one understand the banal sentence
that the very structure of racism and xenophobia is hierarchical?
That is precisely the central problem. I will try to explain this point
by distinguishing three distinct levels of the problem, or probably
better, by making three distinct stages within which my explanatory
emphasis can be understood.
Speaking of the old (classical, ordinary) and new (cultural)
racisms, I have just presented the first step of my analysis, or
approach, if you prefer (see figure 2).
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
23

For the time being I’m at the second level, trying to speak of the
very logic of the function of racism, now within a “social” and not a
“natural” context. On the first, “natural” level, as emphasized, we
had something which is whether “heavy,” “hard” or “real” as only
“nature” could be. That kind of object definitely could not (not yet
and not yet visible!) be floating. It was more or less fixed, strict. It
could be connected with biology, nature, but it must be permanent,
visible, so to speak, possible to grasp. It must be anchored in nature
or at least it must be trapped (in the sense of un-free, out of free
mind) in natural laws or within the laws of nature. Any possibility of
the very existence of something which could be defined as the “free
object” of scientific research was by definition impossible.
Something like a hypothesis dealing with the uncertainty at the level
of the object (here race) could not exist.
As emphasized in the second period of the formation of racist dis-
course, culture is becoming the very basis from which everything in
this racist discourse and practice starts and against which it resists
as well. Nature is no longer of interest; the natural position and func-
tion of nature overtake society and culture. But not as something
completely cut off from nature, but rather as something literally nat-
uralized. For example, more natural than nature itself is, so to speak,
thinking that we (human beings) are social and cultural by nature.
How do we grasp this situation in which human beings are not nat-
ural but social and cultural by nature, just to mention Acquinas’ def-
inition?
In dealing with the inter-play of the laws of culture (no longer
heavy laws of nature or natural laws), which means primarily the
laws of society being today founded in culture (in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries there were founded on nature, natural society),
we are in fact dealing with something which is functioning simultan-
eously on at least two levels: that of reality (nature, materiality) and
in a way, appearing as something existing/functioning at the level of
cultural, social, or more precisely, at the level of virtual reality.
The very difference and transition between the two, between the
first, let’s call it “natural” level and the second level, let’s call it the
social level no longer based in nature, but now in culture, we usually
think somehow as follows: We, “the people” are different, of course.
We don’t have the same possibilities or abilities; we come from vari-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
24

ous parts of the world; we speak various languages; we believe in
thousands of gods or counter gods; we are male or female, and we
are “cultural.” The next step in our self-understanding, which should
now be grasped, is that these sorts of “natural” differences are, of
course, “normally,” and even “naturally” “transformed.” The very
problem we are facing is situated on this second level of thinking
about and perceiving the problem itself. The previous level (the “nat-
ural” one) is something which is now (observed from the position of
the second level) functioning socially, and no longer “naturally,”
which in our civilization from the nineteenth century onward means
as “real,” social, and even economic in nature. But—and here is the
point—all this no longer functions in our heads as differences being
produced conceptually—conceptually in the sense of being produced
“by us,” produced from me and you, from this or that kind of public
discourse (media, medicine, scientific or legal discourses), but as the
differences between me and you in terms of social power, social pos-
ition, social, political and legal rights. This must now be seen as
something real and independent from me and you, from our very
perception and thinking activity.
The basic problem I would like to emphasize at this point is that,
once attained, this second level of our way of perception, that of
thinking and acting, actually appears as something which has by
definition already come to an end. As if we could not have any add-
itional possibility to think, let alone to act. We think primarily in
these ways and in more or less similar terms. My main point is that
the circulus vitiosus within which we are more or less revolving is
closed because, first of all, we don’t or still don’t have possibilities for
initiating the third step of understanding and/or acting.
Reinventing Politics
What is the third step? The third step, which could be the place and
space for possible resolution in the future, is something which I’m
going to term the political space or, rather, political action on the
basis of (a priori) political equality. At this point my hypothesis is
that the very problem of our civilization, especially visible in post-
socialism(s) (owing to its brutality and novelty), is the lack of politi-
cal space. When we speak of political space today, we are actually
speaking of politike techne, political technology to put it in
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
25

Aristotelian terms. But not about politics. What does it mean? It
means that instead of having the potential to resolve racist, xeno-
phobic and similar problems at the level of political equality, we are
trying to resolve all these problems at the level, for example, of the
social and society, or of the law, which is not the same as politics.
One thing is and we could be happy if we have the level of law, which
produces this or that form of equality among members of society.
But this is not the same as politics.
This third step or level is of course the virtual level and virtual real-
ity is not something that can be equated with law, with equality
before the law. It is equality a priori, being guaranteed to all “mem-
bers” of the society by the state. Regardless of whether or not they
are citizens, and if this guarantee does not exist, one could not speak
even of the state (and not solely in legal terms), since, the very
essence of the definition of the state is that it is the state of equal/ity
(isonomy in ancient Greek). Speaking of equality, one should think
of this equality in terms of political space, of political beings within
which he or she should be a priori politically equal among them-
selves—regardless all differences in status, “race,” sexual orientation
and so on.
The solution to transcending the first two steps (the “natural” and
“social” ones), and to opening up possibilities towards the third (polit-
ical) one should proceed from a recognition that the first two steps
function as circulus vitiosus, from which there is no exit. Exit means,
of course within the world of temporality and not an absolute exit or
exit as such. In order to transcend this situation, we should open the
new, third, virtual space, that space of politics. This political space
could not be opened at the level of society. Political space is not the
same as social space. Political space (if it is spatial at all) is some-
thing radically different from and even opposed to social space as
such. The very definition of social space in this context could be—and
that is the highest any “social position” could offer—a liberal one: “liv-
ing with differences and as different and simultaneously politically
pretending that differences do not exist.” One of the possible defin-
itions of the third, political level ought to be “living with differences,
of course, but as equal.” Equal at the level of the law, of rights as well
as at the political level. Moreover, remaining different at the level of
the social and not vice versa. That is the point.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
26

Politics of Margins
Question: It seems to me that in your last sentence you take political
space in its ideal, liberal sense. But liberalism doesn’t work in prac-
tice, as we all know. Even in the political space, recent public policy
shows that you cannot treat different people equally before the law.
Policies, therefore, should be specific. How would you include this
aspect?
Answer: I should disappoint you. My position is not a liberal one,
and as far as I can see, liberalism is still functioning—especially with-
in post socialism(s). Although I’m quite often in favour of this or that
liberal action, attitude or stance, I’m not a liberal. Liberalism is, in
my view, an antipolitical and radically social position/ideology, with
which I can go along from time to time, mainly at the level of polit-
ical technology. The second point is that you are only partly right.
My position here is not solely ideal: it is something more. It is obvious
that in order to find the probable solution for the problem of racism
(xenophobia) within the given circumstances, I’m actually trying to
renew something which could be termed the positive impact of vari-
ous utopias. My position regarding utopia at this point actually rep-
resents an attempt to produce topos, which is—strictly speaking—not
from the real world. Of course, if for the “real” you could think only
of the “social world,” which is usual for ordinary people today as well
as for social scientists. At the same time you are completely right: for
me reality consists not just of something which already is, which
exists here and now, but simultaneously of something that could be,
especially if we speak about the politically equal relationship among
human beings. To put it another way around, the very possibility (in
the sense of potentia) is for me something which is even more real
that the reality itself, which is, at least for me, by definition an object
of political action and/or transformation. The emphasis is on the
political (action, non violent [r]evolution), and not on the social,
which through the violent negation of politics has usually resulted in
revolution or in coup d’etat! This is exactly why I’m speaking about
politics as something which could appear unreal for various kinds of
social beings. This “for social beings” in my terminology means for
those beings being definitely trapped exclusively within social real-
ity, with no possibility of thinking, not to speak of acting, beyond
their own horizons, of their cemented social reality.
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
27

One of the very central features by which we can make a serious
designation about human beings is that they are—and that is the
essence of the definition of the human being—capable of “produc-
ing” various forms of (natural, social, political, virtual) realities.
Moreover, reality in this context is not to be understood as some-
thing already produced, or in use/function. The reality I’m trying to
address is always that reality connected with the desire of the indi-
vidual or of collective political subjects. One could put it also in the
form of time: the reality I’m projecting is somewhere in front of us,
or not-yet being in function—here and now.
And now a quite direct answer to your question. Yes, you are right
from the position of the already existing situation/society. At the level
of existing society, at the level of the mainstream, which is just
another name for what society is about, of course, it is impossible
politically to “be equal.” Equality is certainly not characteristic of the
social, not to speak about society. Society functions exactly on the
opposite basis. Namely on that of inequality, on the one side, and on
the lies promising (desire-production) the equality, which is by defini-
tion impossible at the level of the social and that of society. But—and
here lies the difference between us—it is possible to “be equal,” also
politically equal, on the margins of the mainstream or of society. The
problem is how to understand this “on the margins.” It is not identical
to being outsider, or excluded, but first of all living as a political being
or animal or acting from the political (nonviolent) position which is a
position counter to that of society, to that of the mainstream. You can
be, for example, “equal” in this place—in Metelkova. But not just
because Metelkova is a safe heaven, but because Metelkova meant
and means permanent political, permanent counter social action
against the mainstream. To put it in more empirical language: it is
certainly true that through this kind of political action, an island of
political equality, capable of the radical negation of the second
(social) step, is functioning in Metelkova. Moreover, the very power of
which we can speak in the given circumstances in Ljubljana is con-
centrated in or around Metelkova and not within the social reality of
the social. The social mainstream functions not on the basis of power
(which is political and not social human ability) but on the basis of
force. Violence and force are the signs around which society revolves
and functions, power or counter (counter to the social and society)
power is the sign of political beings.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
28

Question: I want to move to Metelkova. I mean for everyone, it is
paradise.
Answer: Sure, but this would not be a move through space as one
might mistakenly think. It is nothing comparable with moving from
Prague to Ljubljana, or from Cankarjev Dom to Metelkova within
Ljubljana. It is, instead, another kind of move, one dealing not with
time and space but with a kind of life, with the sort of life preferences
and attitudes, of thinking and acting. Probably I can sketch an
answer to your question in this way: try to stop being, perceiving,
behaving, especially thinking of yourself in terms of a social being.
Be just a political animal, zoon politikon. That is the catch. Be what
you are, if you are, don’t be what society or the social is expecting
from you—here is the point.
Question: This story seems to me similar to that of the third wave.
It is also something about globalization and the arguments of these
anti-globalist people. My question will be what is with the new ideol-
ogy of labour or of social democrats in this context? Basically you
can expand this anti-globalization or globalization on the political
level of the modification of social democrats.
Answer: If I have correctly understood your question, my answer
can be quite simple: the whole corpus of social democracy, of social
democratic ideology actually stopped here—at the place where I
started opening political “space.” It is still trapped within various
“idiotisms” of the social. It is very important to understand that the
social democratic position (just as with the position of the so-called
social critique as such) is basically trapped within a Machiavellian
(actually Botterian) reduction of politics to the reason of the state
(raggione dello stato).
6
Within this picture, the main presupposition
for all kinds of social critique as well as for all kinds of social utopias
and/or social realities (including socialism, communism and liberal-
ism) is this or that kind of “destruction of politics” or, in my language,
antipolitics. That was the position of Hobbes, of Bottero, of Hegel
and Marx, of Mill and Weber, of Schmitt and Heidegger, of Marcuse 
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
29
6
See for example N. Macchiavelli, Il principe e altre opere politiche (Milano: Garzanti [I
grandi libri], 1981).

and Adorno.
7
My position in this context is trying to be democratic,
but it is no longer social democratic. It could be at certain points simi-
lar to this or that position of social democrats in Germany or else-
where, but basically my position is that of political democracy and
not of social (this one is no longer sufficient). Strictly speaking, ref-
erence to social democracy today is possible only if one has no idea
(or does not want to have any) of differences between polis and
oikos. Moreover, between social and political or, better, if one has no
idea that democracy is a human phenomenon proceeding from the
political “hemisphere” of human life and not from that of the social.
In other words, social democracy is something like “wooden iron,” or
an explicit acknowledgement that somebody speaking of politics has
no idea what politics is about. Consequently, my position is also not
that of the third way. For us, researchers dealing with racism, xeno-
phobia and similar nasty human phenomena, the very idea of the
third way is something which had quite deep and dangerous roots in
the European extreme right and their ways of thinking and acting.
Including those of National Socialism.
As far as globalization is concerned, I would agree with you.
Furthermore, the position from which I’m trying to argue was not
even seriously thinkable before the last era of globalization (for me
globalization means the globalization of the social, of social reality).
From this point of view you are right, since before the globalization
of social reality it was not possible to think of politics and political
action properly as a counter position to the social. After long cen-
turies of the dominance of social thinking (politically speaking it
means not-thinking), which went through Hobbes, Machiavelli,
Weber, Parsons, before globalization it was only possible to think
politics in terms of (the) state.
For thinking politics today, the state is no longer sufficient. More
over, it is—that is the position of the liberal and conservative global-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
30
7
See for example G. W. F. Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/M.: Ullstein
Buch, 1970); M. Heidegger, Kraj filozofije i zadaća mišljenja (Das Ende der Philosophie
und die Aufgabe des Denkes) (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1996); T. Hobbes, Leviathan (London:
Penguin Classics, 1985); idem, On the Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); C. Schmitt, Tri razprave (Ljubljana: Krt, 1994); idem, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985); M. Weber, Political
Writings (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

ists as well as that of anarchists—something which is backward,
unnecessary and which should disappear or be abolished, if one
borrows Marx’s language.
According to me, today one should oppose globalization exactly for
political reasons and not for social ones, not to speak in the name of
economic reasons and such like. What does this mean? It means that
I’m arguing against globalization emphasizing a somehow inverted
Hobbesian ideology of sovereignty. Not only nor primarily understood
as the sovereignty of the state, but rather—which one could see also in
a complementary way—on the basis of the political sovereignty of the
individual. Against the “social” line of anti political thinking, I’m trying
to employ the political line, starting with Aristotle, and “finishing” with
the position of Hannah Arendt.
8
To put it in another way, I’m speaking
of two forms of sovereignty: the one which is less important, but
necessary, is the sovereignty of the state, and the one which is more
important is the sovereignty of individuality. I’m trying to combine
both and from that position to challenge globalization. I’m not anti-
globalist a priori; I’m anti-globalist because I’m a political being,
whose presupposition for political life and equality is the very exist-
ence of the state. There is no doubt, that this is an anti-globalist pos-
ition par excellence. Namely, what is going to be globalized is neither
politics, nor states, nor political equality and freedom, not to speak
about democracy. It would be rather the social (system) trying from
the beginning to destroy the very possibility of political thinking, then
of political acting (criminalisation of anti-globalism in terms of ter-
rorism—Bush as an example) and, at the end, any possibility for the
survival of the political animal and political equality. As has already
been established in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the Aristotelian zoon politikon
is the greatest danger for all social systems as such. The social system
and the globalization of the social system is nothing other than the
globalization of virtually the whole economy, media and of various
forms of dominance of social inequality against which we can fight
solely through political action based on political equality and directed
towards political equality. The problem of our generation is incredibly
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
31
8
See for example Aristotel, Fizika (Zagreb: SNL, 1987); H. Arendt, Between Past and
Future, Crisis in Culture (London: Penguin, 1986); idem, Elemente und Urspruenge
totaler Herrschaft (Muenchen & Zuerich: Piper, 1991); idem, Vita Activa (Ljubljana: Krt,
1996).

complicated: how to fight the given situation. My answer: through
political equality and for political equality.
Question: Politics has always been a part of the social sphere. If we
are making new politics, it could include the danger that one day, if
this utopia were achieved, that political sphere would somehow con-
sume social life. Social life is an attempt to achieve better society
with less xenophobia, less racism and so on.
Answer: You are repeating your social science lessons from your
process of education. I went through the same system, in which a
human being, as a “social being” used to be presented as something
natural. How mistaken, and how dangerous. The “social being” is
nothing natural, but merely an incorrect translation of St. Thomas
Aquinas with regard to Aristotles’ zoon politikon.
9
Moreover, the
social being, the social system, and all pertaining to the social are
the direct invention of early modern times (from somewhere
between the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries) until today.
Anyway, you are right, the principal position from which I can
speak in my way is the position not of a critic of the social sciences,
but of an accomplished critique of them. Besides, my aim, from
which one may think that he or she could understand my position, is
not a good or better society (mine is not a Weberian or Marxist posi-
tion). My position is rather different: the thesis is that Society (includ-
ing the social system with the social sciences and social beings) is
going to end. This “end” of society means in my parlance the same
as would the realization of globalization or of global society. The
very realization of global society is something which I’m designating
as the end of society or as the realization of the Social. The realiza-
tion of the social is the end of the Social and society, in the sense that,
once realized, it could no longer form part of human desires. Quite
the contrary, this very realized society would become the target of
political renewal, if not of political (and not social any more, as it was
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) revolution. As I already
emphasized: what is globalizing is society as a form. Once global-
ized, realized, society is over.
The second point is that I’m not speaking about “new” politics, but
just about politics. As a matter of fact, today’s “civilizations” have no
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
32
9
See for example T. Aquinas, Selected Political Writings (Worcester: Basil Blackwell,
1987).

idea about politics. Politics was invented and then, in one or another
way, forbidden (and not forgotten) for almost two thousand years.
The reinvention of politics in its antipolitical form, first on the level of
science, took place in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries where
for the first time Aristotle was translated into Latin—as already men-
tioned, in an incorrect way. His zoon politikon was “translated” as the
social animal (animal socialis), which was the decisive act of the social
(scientific) creative period lasting until our times. The second reinven-
tion of politics, also in an antipolitical form, took place during the
time before the French revolution. A similar appearance of politics
(mainly in the form of antipolitics) recurs repeatedly whenever this or
that group of human beings, organized in this or that way, are trying
to produce (and that is the aim) the good life (not the good society,
which is not the same) based on political equality among members.
In addition to your question: no, there is no danger that politics
could “consume society”; politics has already been eaten by society.
Those childish tales about anarchy, matriarchy and so one proceed
precisely from that kind of social non-thinking. The basic problem of
our civilization is not how to consume society from the position of
politics, or the other way around, but how to stop both totalitarian-
ism, in the sense of how to balance various human capacities, that of
his/her social and political life. Paradoxically, in the age of global-
ization we are, so to speak, forced to reinvent the Aristotelian dis-
tinction between polis and oikos. Society and globalization are enti-
ties based on an oikos ideology, and which, without balance from the
side of politics (political equality of individuals, their political sover-
eignty), could destroy the very possibility of human life on earth.
Question: I’m sorry, can I still stick to the liberal concept because
I’m in a more practical position. I want, for instance, to influence my
government and public policies. Is it possible to read this and aim at
implementation, at really going into public policies not politics, but
really going into education, equalities in employment, to use these
arguments?
Answer: Not so easily. I would prefer to put my answer in a
metaphorical way. The Marxist way of thinking used to be as follows:
“something is wrong with our society; something is wrong with our
world. So, we (always collective social work and not political action)
should change it. How to change it? In order to change it, we should
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
33

go to the very heart of the system (our society) in order to cut it off.
Once alter the heart of the system, its order, and the whole society
will be changed. If we destroy class differences (that was understood
as the very heart of the system, exploitation as the beating of its
heart), then all other differences (between sexes, nations, races)
would also—more or less automatically—be. . . .” Our experience after
the October revolution, the Yugoslavia revolution and other socialist
revolutions is that this kind of logic should be termed “Obla-di, Obla-
da” logic. A rather similar logic was also functioning in 1968, via the
so-called marches through the institutions. If your question is target-
ing the problem whether or not—in order to change something—“we”
should go to the very center of the system (to the system of force
itself, government) and then change the system, my answer is clear.
Of course, not. If you prefer this “we” form of discussion (I don’t),
then “we” should stay where we already are. This means on the mar-
gins. But not on the margins of politics or on the margins as such,
but—and that is the point—on the margins of the social, on the mar-
gins of (mainstream) society. The crucial point is as follows: “we” are
not any more marginalised in the sense, that we are the passive
objects of someone’s “politics of marginalization.” Quite the con-
trary. “We” choose (this act is the act of self-production into the polit-
ical subject) to be marginalised. Moreover, we are not merely proud
of being marginalised, but we even know that we are trying to pro-
duce not an alternative, or second or parallel society (to borrow the
language of Vaclav Benda from the sixties) but to produce political
space outside of society, a space which can not be controlled by the
mainstream, by the agents of the social. Political space in this desig-
nation is, of course, a counter space regarding the mainstream
social system. To put this in a Foucaultian way, power is not in the
center; power is rather on the margins of the system.
10
Or, better, to
criticize Foucault: what “we” are to open is not the relationship
between two powers, two forms of power or among various kinds of
powers; “we” are targeting another kind of relationship. Not that
within powers, or among powers, but that between power on one
side and force on another. What we are going to “make” and what
we are becoming capable of “producing,” if remaining at the count-
er position to mainstream society is not force, counter force, but
power. Only staying outside of the existing total society—whose total-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
34

ity and totalitarianism is even prima vista given in global media self
presentations—“we” are not gaining, but becoming powerful.
Regarding the mainstream way of social functioning or the society
itself, our potential powerfulness functions as a power and/or coun-
ter force.
Let me show you this situation at the level of the concrete example.
Just take a look around. For the time being we are in a completely
marginalised, semi-destroyed ex-Yugoslavian army barracks in the
center of Ljubljana. Regardless of a situation in which neither the
tables nor the central heating is functioning in this large room (a
former arsenal), the very central TV Media (national TV-Slovenia),
representatives par excellence of the mainstream of society are here.
They are “covering” our meeting. Why? Why they are coming here?
Why they are now and here, for God’s sake? Because we are force-
ful? Because we are violent? Because we are strong? Because we are
beautiful? Or probably, because they love us? No, no, no. Definitely
not. Nevertheless, they are here, which means that we definitely are
something, or better someone’s. Who (if not what) then are we? How
can we answer this crucial question? We represent something which
is radically missing from the mainstream and from the social system
as such. We are not in possession of power (power can not be pos-
sessed, as force can); we are powerful. That is the reason why the
media are coming to us. What are they doing here? They are trying
to find something new. The Social and the social system are some-
thing old; they are dying. He or she, or better it, desperately needs
new ideas as a vampire desperately needs new blood. That is the rea-
son why the cameras are here today. They are looking for new
power, but power is not something which can be possessed. We are
not powerful because we possess power. Power is something which
comes to us from society. They are giving us power precisely
through the use of force and our not readiness to take part in their
social games, which means games of force and violence. The differ-
ence between them and us is the very point. The problem is not how
to enter in but how to remain outside. Politically speaking, the split
between social in and out is the position enabling the very preser-
vation of democracy.
P OST- SOCIALISM, RACISM AND THE R EINVENTION OF P OLITICS
35
10
See for example M. Foucault, Riječi i stvari (Les mots et les choses) (Beograd: Nolit,
1972).



XENOPHOBIA AND SLOVENIAN MEDIA:
HOW THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER IS
CONSTRUCTED (AND WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE)
I GOR Ž. ŽAGAR
When the war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, back at the beginning
of 1992, “the stream of refugees . . . flooded moral obligations as well
as the capabilities of economically exhausted Slovenia. . . .”
1
Even
reputable intellectuals from the left of the political arena were
asserting that refugees from Bosnia confronted us with a dilemma
whereby we had to decide “between the humanitarianism and the
responsibility towards our country (as we could become a ‘dumping
ground for the residues of the ethnic cleansing’).”
2
Refugees from
Bosnia were supposed to “cause more and more disorder,” “disturb
the habits of the local population,” generate “national tensions” and
be “potential law-breakers.” Their medical condition was seen as
“very poor” and it appeared that “smaller epidemics [might] break
out,” not to mention the fact that “[refugees] live on a different cul-
tural level and state of civilization, the same holds for their pattern
of behaviour. . . .”
3
How does all that sound in 2001? Well, to the average Slovenian citi-
zen it must feel much like reading yesterday’s newspaper. Yet all
those “descriptions” were recorded eight years ago, when we
(Marjeta Doupona Horvat, Jef Verschueren, and myself) were pre-
paring the first edition of The Rhetoric of Refugee Policies in Slovenia
(published, though, as late as 1998, and reprinted in November
2001).
4
And, to avoid possible ambiguities and misunderstandings, I
have to stress that those pleasant words were supposed to describe
37
1
Delo, 28 April 1992.
2
Delo, 30 March 1993.
3
All quotes are taken from M. D. Horvat, J. Verschueren and I. Ž. Žagar, Retorika
begunske politike v Sloveniji (The Rhetoric of Refugee Policies in Slovenia) (Ljubljana:
Open Society Institute, 1998).
4
A part of this paper was also used as a foreword to the second edition. 

Bosnian refugees, not displaced persons, exiles, illegals, migrants,
immigrants, foreigners, aliens, strangers, incomers, expatriates,
non-natives or new arrivals, who “are putting a tremendous pres-
sure on our borders” nowadays. All these extraordinary efforts for
Slovenian state borders have brought about some interesting trans-
formations and historical revisions: Bosnian refugees, once descri-
bed by some media and state institutions in exactly the same deroga-
tory manner (see above) as is today applied to the so-called illegal
transgressors of Slovenian state borders, have all of a sudden
become “our own, ours.” “Our own,” since we once lived in the same
state (eight years ago, the opposite arguments were used: although
we once lived in the same state, we are not obliged to accept them),
“our own” to such an extent that the illegal transgressors of
Slovenian state borders are hardly ever referred to as “refugees” by
the media, despite the fact that they meet every criterion set by the
UN and the Geneva convention.
Suddenly, only Bosnian refugees are entitled to be called
“refugees,” the ones who once fled from the war in Bosnia. Words
are supposed to break no bones, but one obviously has to run away
from something to be called a refugee—something, for example, like,
escape from the Bosnian war, almost palpable (and close) enough
for Slovenians to notice. Refugees also have certain rights, the rights
granted by international law and international conventions. During
the long-lasting media debates about the Bosnian refugees,
Slovenians have learned that lesson well. Nevertheless (or maybe,
precisely because of that), the Slovenian state has conveniently
merged the definition of “refugee” with that of “asylum seeker”; con-
sequently, all those who do not seek asylum in Slovenia are not
granted the status of refugees, with all its concomitant rights.
To cut a long story short, refugee has become a word overbur-
dened with meanings, a word which consequently cannot be applied
to just anybody. Especially not to the unknown, the uninvited, the
“vacantly gazing,” to untidy and muddy newcomers with unknown
intentions, crawling across Slovenian national borders. It is fasci-
nating how ruthlessly meticulous the people’s rhetoric can be in the
choice of words, but these (new) refugees are mostly referred to as
prebežniki (migrants), i.e. people who are migrating across
Slovenian territory for some unknown reason and are, presumably,
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
38

headed to the west. The word prebežniki therefore implies that they
somehow found themselves on Slovenian territory unexpectedly, by
coincidence. Moreover, they have violated Slovenian law, illegally
penetrating the Slovenian national border. Is it also possible, how-
ever, that migrants run away from something, just as refugees do?
Both Slovenian counterparts to these words, prebežniki and begunci
have the same root, namely beg (escape, run, get away). This does not
accord with the Slovenian point of view, for Slovenians have chosen
to call those people “migrants,” thus clearly indicating that their stay
in Slovenia is coincidental, temporary and short-term (or at least
that they would like to see it as such). For that reason, the term
“immigrants” seems, of course, much less appropriate (and has also
been much less in use), as it implies that somebody has immigrated
to some particular place, reached his final destination and is about
to stay there for good.
Yet, while the Slovenian term prebežniki still links those people to
their situation and destiny, their leaving behind the political and eco-
nomic insecurity in their own countries, the term “illegals,” largely
used by Slovenian media, clearly places them in the criminal under-
ground. An illegal is a person who, in the first place, broke the law,
that is did something illegal. Also, the term “illegals” no longer
implies that these people are fleeing from something. The one who
sees refugees as illegals sees only people who have broken the law,
and should be treated accordingly, using force and extreme meas-
ures, if necessary.
Nevertheless, it is slightly unusual that the term “foreigners” is
readily used to denote people who have illegally crossed Slovenian
state borders. They are foreigners, certainly. But so are those who
legally came across the Slovenian state border using their valid for-
eign passports. Foreigners—as a legal category—have always existed
and will always exist. And foreigners are those who have no valid
travel papers as well as those who do. When such a neutral term—
neutral until now, at least—is suddenly being used to describe a
group of people as specific as refugees or migrants, it clearly reveals
some basic unease and ambivalence experienced by Slovenians with
respect to foreigners in general. As long as they come to enjoy their
vacations, with valid passport, they are acceptable and they will be
overwhelmed by what Slovenians call traditional Slovenian hospital-
X ENOPHOBIA AND S LOVENIAN M EDIA
39

ity. On the other hand, when foreigners creep out from muddy
ravines on their way to the West, Slovenian hospitality shows the
other side of the coin: intolerance and dislike. Another word for such
an attitude is xenophobia, although Slovenians tend to avoid that
expression. As we have already seen in the case of the term
“refugee,” words can easily be overburdened with meanings.
Despite that, words do have their particular meaning(s) and their
specific history, no matter what we would like to ascribe to them.
Let’s take a look at an(other) example. In the Republic of Slovenia,
said to be a social state, governed by the rule of law, the Center for
Removal of Aliens was recently established.
5
If you have not blushed
with shame hearing these five words, if you find them natural and
quite appropriate, let me explain a thing or two: we usually eliminate
or remove insects, filth, litter or garbage, stains, heaps of snow,
peels, pips, stalks, tumours and other malfunctioning body parts.
Not only do we consider the removed and eliminated item useless,
obsolete and obstructive, we simply want to get rid of it—for good, er-
adicating it from the face of the Earth. To remove or eliminate people
is hardly acceptable for any society that wants to be called or calls
itself “civilized.” It is somehow considered in bad taste, even
démodé—at least since the end of WW II—if you cannot figure out
any other “rational” reason yourself. Since removals or eliminations
of unwanted people are usually carried out by organized crime, and
governments do not (or, at least, do not want to) belong in the same
category, unwanted foreigners are, of course, “deported”—deport-
ation being the common (legal) term, implying leaving the country’s
territory by force. After “removal or elimination,” however, it would
make more sense to search for them in dustbins, sewers or even in
free-floating fumes.
Slovenia does not remove or eliminate foreigners in such an
absolute and extreme manner. It is probably just the choice of words
that is slightly awkward and clumsy, of course. But that is exactly my
point: when the government word-peddlers begin to accept such ver-
bal acrobatics and ventriloquism as something natural, as some-
thing that is not only their job, but rather something that they are—
so they believe—called to do (and as something that “nobody does
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
40
5
The Slovene term odstranjevanje can be translated as removal or elimination.

better than themselves”), then the basic meanings of words become
dependent on their goodwill alone. Apart from that, there can be
only slips of the tongue, misunderstandings and malevolent imputa-
tions. However, if we award them the benefit of the doubt and accept
the possibility that Center for Removal of Aliens is just a misunder-
standing or an unfortunate slip of the tongue, aren’t such slippages
even more telling than carefully chosen words? Don’t they tell us
more about what those speakers (really) have in their minds? Can’t
misunderstandings at least suggest how else to understand what has
been explicitly stated?
Yes, of course, but I am afraid that the unfortunate name of the
center was not simply an example of an innocent misunderstanding
or a slip of the tongue, but rather a more “global” and universal
belief that, after all, we are not all equal. Evidence to corroborate
this claim comes from a seemingly completely different sphere of
activity: when in Slovenia a solution was sought to the problem of
animal fat, a by-product of processing animal leftovers, putatively
infected by mad-cow disease (BSE), into bone meal, a serious sug-
gestion was put forward that the questionable animal fat should be
used to produce toilet soap for poor countries. To avoid any possible
misunderstandings: that suggestion was advanced here, in Slovenia.
In its own way, it was quite innovative. Some EU countries, on the
other hand, openly suggested that poor countries struck by famine,
could be given the meat from BSE infected cows. This solution could
possibly have yielded some positive demographic effects as well, I
am sure.
Obviously, there is still an ever-widening deep gap between “us”
and “them.” The only forum for analyzing how “they” are seen by
“us” involves speech, language, tongue. Nevertheless we have to be
careful. A tongue is a very sly and tricky thing. It is always there for
us to fool around with, idle and squashed in there among the teeth,
or stretched and strained, used to negate and to deny or, on impulse,
confined within the mouth. Despite all these qualities, despite the
mighty elasticity, stretchable all the way to the ineffable, the tongue
retains its corners and pockets of meaning, in a kind of palimpsest,
that enables us to dissect and analyze (and then, if necessary, inter-
pret and evaluate) each and every kind of speech—be it sophisticat-
ed academic diction or vulgar babbling and gibbering.
X ENOPHOBIA AND S LOVENIAN M EDIA
41

That is exactly what I will try to show in the second part of this
paper; I will concentrate on just one text, Alojz Ihan’s column in the
Saturday supplement of the national daily newspaper Delo.
6
The col-
umn is titled (Ob)vladamo—(Put) under control or We manage. In the
first part of his text, Ihan claims (among other things) that the right
place for the introduction of “cosmopolitan atmosphere and racial
tolerance”—is the city. In a city, he continues, “the variety of nations
and cultures even feels relaxing” but “in a village it is different.
When you meet someone in a village, you should greet him, look into
his eyes and know him, or else it gets awkward—some ancient
defence mechanisms activate. I do believe that kind, rustic women
burst into tears when they see a chocolate-coloured African in the
fields. But I do not believe we are talking xenophobia here, just sim-
ple reflexes.”
Since I’m a philosopher by training, allow me to play the innocent
and wonder about certain things Ihan has written: I really wonder,
for example, why kind rustic women should burst into tears when
they see a chocolate-coloured African in the fields. They might be
surprised or dazzled when they see a black person where mostly
white people live, but why should they burst into tears? What has
happened, after all, is that they have “seen” a person of a different
colour, nothing more. And that person (according to Ihan’s drama-
tization) has not done anything to them—has not threatened them,
attacked them or hurt them. That person was just there, that is all. 
But—was he or she really “there”? Nobody has ever reported a
case of crying rustic women gazing at chocolate-coloured Africans,
wading among the furrows. However, Ihan used various linguistic
features to make his entirely hypothetical and concocted story sound
intriguing, believable and convincing: Instead of “if they see . . . in the
fields,” which would be clearly hypothetical, within the register of the
probable, though not yet accomplished, he writes “when they see . . .
in the fields,” clearly implying that he is writing about something
that has happened or that happens all the time. Additionally, he uses
the plural, “kind, rustic women,” instead of the singular, “a kind, rus-
tic woman,” as if there had been several similar cases. Last but not
least, his narration begins with “I do believe”: “I do believe that kind
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
42
6
Delo, 10 February 2001.

rustic women burst into tears when they see a chocolate-coloured
African in the fields.” Now, what exactly do we believe when we begin
our statement by saying “I do believe”? Something not proven
beyond any doubt, something we have heard about and which we
think could or should be true. If we could prove what we claim to
believe, if we saw it or heard it, we would not only believe it, but know
it, instead.
The yarn about the wailing rustic women staring at the black
chaps in the fields is therefore placed before the readers as true,
already overheard by the author, and as a piece of hearsay widely
talked about. The use of the plural (rustic women) and the particu-
lar adverb of time (when) both make the story even more credible.
Yet, that is not all. The real beauty of “I believe that” lies in its pro-
tective role: when somebody professes to believe something, it
means that he only thinks that something could be true, but, by no
means, claims to know whether it is really so. This is a handy and
cosy rhetorical strategy, as the speaker can easily renounce his
standpoint, if necessary.
And why does Ihan believe that kind, rustic women weep at the
sight of the chocolate-coloured Africans? Because we are talking
“simple reflexes,” says he, and not xenophobia. What kind of “simple
reflexes” he had in mind, he didn’t bother to explain. Which is unusu-
al, because those reflexes are supposed to be “simple” and therefore
easily explicable—especially when the person discussing these “sim-
ple reflexes” holds a PhD in medicine.
In case we are in fact talking reflexes, that is. It is much more like-
ly that we are dealing with a special argumentative “technique,”
invented for the common folk, where we put forward a conclusion
and hope that our listeners won’t ask for the argument. Because
there is none. Or is there?
At the beginning of the quoted passage, Ihan claims that there are
differences between a city and a village: “When you meet someone
in a village, you should greet him, look into his eyes and know him,
or else it gets awkward—some ancient defence mechanisms acti-
vate.” Yet, if this is so—when you meet someone in a village, you
should greet him and look into the eyes—then why didn’t Ihan’s rus-
tic women do just that? Why didn’t they look the chocolate-coloured
Africans they found in the fields right in the eyes and greet them?
X ENOPHOBIA AND S LOVENIAN M EDIA
43

Why did they burst into tears instead? Could it be that the order of
events in Ihan’s description of human relationships in the country is
in fact the opposite of what he wants his readers to believe: that you
should first know someone, and only then greet him (and look him in
the eyes)? And, if you do not know that person, you simply don’t greet
him. And, on top of everything, if that person’s skin is of a colour dif-
ferent from yours, you even start crying.
But then, if this be so, there is absolutely no difference between
Ihan’s village and Ihan’s city, where we also greet only people we
know (except that we do not cry as much when we see chocolate-
coloured Africans, lemony Japanese and ruby-red Indians). That, of
course, demolishes his main distinction between a village and a city.
The distinction is that on which he founded his whole heart-breaking
tale, featuring tearful, rustic women and strangely coloured aliens
creeping all over our native soil.
Let us sum up: Ihan postulated a distinction between a city and a
village to point out how human relations in the city are different
from those in the village. That fear, distrust and tears are the elem-
entary reactions of the village locals when encountering an alien.
That distinction—established by Ihan, in his words and with his argu-
ments—has proven non-existent and groundless in the end, following
his own line of argument, his own setting and his own dramatization. 
All that is left is a bad taste in the mouth and an unpleasant feel-
ing that Ihan’s writing is no more than a “simple reflex,” nicely
candy-coated with rhetoric, the sort of thing one can consume with
one’s Saturday morning coffee and a hot croissant. And that is
exactly how xenophobia is generated: not with loud manifestations
and militant slogans, but with soft words, describing an image of
normality—the difference being that the image in question is really
being constructed, not described.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
44

XENOPHOBIA OR SELF-PROTECTION? ON THE
ESTABLISHING OF THE NEW SLOVENE
CIVIC/CITIZENSHIP IDENTITY
V LASTA JALUŠIČ
This study investigates firstly the elements of xenophobia and hate
speech in the Slovene print media in the first three and a half
months of 2001, through articles dealing with the issue of what are
termed “illegal immigrants.” I analysed writings marked by a style
which is named here the discourse of the victim, while at the same
time taking into account the broader discursive context. The second
part is devoted to certain selected texts and newspaper columns,
reviewing their assessment of the presence or non-presence of xeno-
phobia and the reasons for the situation surrounding this in
Slovenia.
1
The analysis of print media writing on “illegal immigrants” centres
on the so-called “poetic” function of journalistic discourse and the
media, especially in what is known as the popular press.
2
I am work-
ing from the point that the majority of the press today has the char-
acteristic of being popular press, especially in the post-socialist en-
vironment. Yet despite its focus on media creations, this analysis
reaches beyond the media proper. Media discourse can be seen as
one of the centres for formulating the “reality” of an immigrant “pol-
45
1
The analysis was made on the basis of material collected from the Slovene print media
from January 2001 to April 2001, and included the following newspapers: the dailies
Devnik, Delo, Večer, and Slovenske novice, the weeklies Mag, Mladina, Nedeljski
Dnevnik, Jana, and Ona, and the monthly Glamur (290 texts).
2
B. Luthar, Poetika in politika tabloidne kulture (Ljubljana: ZPS, 1998), pp. 139–143.
The term poiesis—creation—as distinct from praxis—is within this context borrowed
from H. Arendt interpretation of the Greek term. Poiesis is a specific form of human
activity linked to the craftsman’s attitude to the world. Its protagonist is Homo faber and
his relationship towards the world as an object. The world (including people and events)
is here always understood as an object which is fabricated, created, re-created and
experimented upon. The main problem of the poetic way of functioning in the world is
the denial of the plurality of people. See H. Arendt, Vita Activa (Ljubljana: Krtina, 1996),
pp. 139ff.; idem, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 197–226.

icy,” and of immigrant politics in the broadest sense.
3
It does not set
the tone merely for the state and institutional attitude towards immi-
grants, but also the “policy,” conceived as a web of established and
emerging relationships between people with regard to the issue of
“immigrants.” Yet although the media discourse is the main creator
of their general framework, it is not the only one and is not inde-
pendent of other public discourses which make up the context of
political consensus. This analysis therefore attempts to point to a
wider framework of debate on immigrants, and primarily to the
debate on xenophobia. This particular debate shows us that at the
very heart of formulating the “immigrant policy” there has on the
one hand been the establishing of a consensus on the attitude of
Slovenes to “others” and at the same time “to themselves,” in the
sense of a reinforcing and determining of one’s own Slovene and
“European identity,” which is without doubt explicitly linked to “cul-
ture” and “being cultivated.”
Déjà vu
The public mood, which at the turn of 2000/2001 was created as an
“illegal immigrant crisis,” was similar to the mood and events
formed as a longer-term process either through the “refugee crisis”
in Slovenia of 1992 and 1993,
4
through individual “excesses” from the
puzzle known as the “Roma problem” or through occasional debates
on the accommodation and moving of refugees from and into
refugee centres around Slovenia.
These events demonstrated that at a given moment the various
elements of the discriminatory public discourses and policies in con-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
46
3
The media construction of reality, which signifies the active creation of a public and
political agenda, does not here simply formulate the dominant public opinion and the
apparent consensus on a subject, but also—in the mutual complementing of media and
other discourses—actively lays down the foundation, the primary principles and the
legitimacy for the implementation of national and local policies. The media poiesis, one
of the main components for creating public policy, acts as a motor for the discourse of
“normality” and the normalisation of certain problematic methods of public acting.
Through methods of differentiation and distinction it successfully delineates the bound-
aries of “acceptability” for the main line of collective political acting—both by individu-
als and institutions.
4
Refugee crisis was created after the arrival of several larger groups of war refugees
(given the so called temporary refugee status) from the reigns of former Yugoslavia
arrived to Slovenia.

nection with refugees homogenise and produce the problem and
“crisis,” which then (through the support of the public media cre-
ativity) has no trouble legitimising policy deviations from certain
fundamental principles (including those of human rights). And these
deviations then remain in force as entirely acceptable extraordinary
measures.
5
Although a kind of repetition, the “immigrant crisis” saw the fin-
ishing touches and further legitimacy applied to the explicitly
restrictive measures of Slovenia’s migration policies from the begin-
ning of the nineties. These measures derived from the “original sin”
in the establishing of the Slovene state itself (the exclusion of not
such a small number of inhabitants from former Yugoslav republics
from citizenship despite the pre-plebiscite promises), from the atti-
tude to refugees from the former common state and from interpret-
ations of EU demands in connection with migration policy. At the
same time the Slovene identity here made a still more radical separ-
ation inwards from “others” and perpetuated the logic of the iden-
tity of the victim, which opened up the possibility of legitimising a
range of policies which stem from the argument of the Slovene
nation being under threat. In everyday public discourse and the
media there was a mushrooming in the communication of preju-
dices about “others” and hate speech, which not only had the char-
acter of xenophobia with elements of racism, but also appealed to
communal action against the settling and arrival of the so-called
immigrants. This led to explicit threats and attempts by various
players to really act on their own, off their own bat, and outside the
legal and institutional framework of the state. Words often went
beyond their (apparent) confines of the symbolic. Precisely this is
one of the most problematic dimensions of hate speech, which first
forms negative images of others and those different, and then sym-
bolically denies their human existence and—ultimately—tends
towards the actual destruction of the “other.”
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
47
5
Such processes were described by K. Erjavec, S. B. Hrvatin, and B. Kelbl, Mi o Romih
(We About the Roma) (Ljubljana: Open Society Institute Slovenia, 2000); and M. D.
Horvat, J. Veschueren, and I. Ž. Žagar, Retorika begunske politike v Sloveniji (The
Rhetoric of Refugee Policies in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Open Society Institute Slovenia,
1998). Numerous analyses of policy and media activity by the Austrian Freedom Party
(with Haider as a leader) showed that in Austrian politics this party indeed had a func-
tion of creating the legitimacy of “deviations,” which then became mainstream policy.

Illegal immigrants and the people
The main period for the formulation of the media discourse on the
so-called illegal immigrants was the autumn of 2000. In just 35 days,
Delo, Slovenske novice, Dnevnik, Primorske novice, Sobotna priloga,
Večer and Primorski dnevnik carried a total of 162 pieces, or 4.6
items a day, on this topic.
6
Migrants who arrived in Slovenia without
personal documents or valid visas were dubbed the following names:
illegal migrants, illegals, illegal immigrants, foreigners, “tourists”
from distant countries, a colourful band from all corners of the
world, refugees, those unused to personal hygiene, a mass and more.
They made use primarily of the following verbs: crowding, escaping,
swamping, pressing, besieging, flooding (as in “The region along the
Mura is flooded with immigrants from abroad,” Dnevnik, 30 October
2000).
7
Debates began on the excessive liberalism of the asylum law,
which allows the “abuse of the asylum procedure,” such that
Slovenia has supposedly become a favourite transit country for il-
legal immigrants, “because word has got around that we are at least
a three-star transit hotel for illegals.”
8
Non-governmental organisations (such as Amnesty International
and others) already drew attention in the autumn of 2000 to the poor
living conditions in the asylum centres and in what were called the
centres for the removal of aliens (legal name), primarily in
Ljubljana. At the same time, media articles started to give wide cov-
erage of the so-called “voice of the people” from the neighbourhoods
of the asylum centres, providing a dominant formulation of the
immigrants’ image, and describing what kind of people these illegal
immigrants are (what they do, what dangers they bring with them,
how they threaten the local population—not just physically, through
their presence and potential diseases, but also economically, swal-
lowing up the taxpayer’s money). Considerable attention was given
them by the crime and incident reporters, and the “illegals” were 
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
48
6
B. Kelbl, “Analiza diskurza slovenskih medijev” (The Analysis of Slovene Media
Discurse) (paper presented at the round table in Menza pri koritu, Metelkova,
Ljubljana, 2001, unpublished).
7
Ibid.
8
I. Puc, Mag, 31 January 2001.

criminalised and dehumanized.
9
The print media wrote about the
daily police “hunt” for illegals. The expression rapidly took root.
10
The director of the police, Marko Pogorevc, spoke about the “hunt
for illegals.” A TV broadcast was made, showing a police “hunt for
illegals.”
11
Some inhabitants of areas with detention centres and
those around the Ljubljana Asylum Seekers’ Home and Centre for
the Removal of Aliens in Šiška district (what was called the Šiška
civil initiative) started to organise themselves, and great media
attention was focused on them.
12
November saw the first response from the Office for Intervention,
an informal civil group at the Metelkova alternative arts centre in
Ljubljana, with the holding of a round table on illegal migration. At
this some people pointed out in particular that the media’s manner
of reporting was promoting hatred of asylum seekers. The second
half of December 2000 saw the passing, via fast-track procedure, of
amendments and supplements to the asylum act of 1999, which had
been declared too liberal: Croatia was (unjustifiably) declared a
“third safe country,” the so-called “abuse of the institution of asylum”
was defined, and for reasons of “abuse of the institution of asylum”
the rapid rejection of the asylum procedure itself and expulsion of
migrants were made possible.
Soon after the New Year, interior minister of the new government,
visited the Ljubljana Asylum Seekers’ Home, and there (together with
representatives of non-governmental organisations dealing with the
refugee problem) held a press conference. This became the starting
point for an even more intensive media and general going-over of
the so-called illegal immigrant problem. On 18 January at a session
of the government, minister Bohinc said that “the number of illegal
crossings of the border in 2000 marked an increase over the pre-
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
49
9
“The once peaceful refugees have now become thieves, robbers and even rapists. Most
prominent among them are the asylum seekers, for while they are waiting for the appli-
cation to be approved they simply loaf around, meanwhile receiving pocket money” (Ž.
Hojnik, Delo, 3 November 2000).
10
An item in Delo stated, for example “But Thursday’s hunt was smaller than usual” (20
October 2000).
11
Kelbl, “Analiza diskurza slovenskih medijev.”
12
Centre for the Removal of Aliens was the official naming of this institution in the Law
on asylum from 1999, and has been later, after the indignation of some intellectuals,
renamed to Centre for Aliens.

ceding year of as much as 91 percent . . . the government has deter-
mined that the unlawful crossing of the state border threatens the
stability of internal relations, and if such a situation were to con-
tinue, it would represent a threat to the national security of
Slovenia.”
13
Soon after that, the interior minister in a quick manoeuvre tem-
porarily moved the residents of the Ljubljana Asylum Seekers’ Home
and the Centre for the Removal of Aliens to the village Goričko close
to the Hungarian border (as a result of a hygiene inspection, the so-
called “bedbug scandal”). The local residents started to protest, and
this received wide coverage in the media. The residents of the village
where they sent or wanted to move the immigrants demanded the
immediate return of the immigrants to Ljubljana, or else they
threatened even road blocks, village guards and so forth. On 1
February, without any prior public notice, early in the morning the
police took the immigrants from Vidonci back to the Asylum
Seekers’ Home in Ljubljana, and there the “civil initiative” reacted
similarly to the way people had earlier at Vidonci village. The civil
initiative collected a thousand signatures for removal of the immi-
grants “to the fringes.”
14
While the interior minister was giving indi-
cations of the long-term resolving of the asylum seekers’ accommo-
dation problem, the residents of various locations protested against
any kind of settling of immigrants, and against the state itself.
At the beginning of February, alongside the non-governmental
organisations, groups of intellectuals and researchers also started
to draw the attention of the government and the prime minister to
the “improper representation of the problem of immigrants.”
15
At
the same time the mood was crucially altered by the announced
demonstration by the informal group Office for Intervention. Thus it
was the interior minister Bohinc himself who started to appeal to
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
50
13
“Ilegalni prebežniki ogrožajo Slovenijo” (Illegal immigrants threaten Slovenia), Delo, 19
January 2001.
14
Dnevnik, 30 January 2001.
15
Dnevnik, 30 January 2001.
From 3 to 6 February the media published several appeals from groups and non-gov-
ernmental organisations who were protesting at and drawing attention to xenophobia,
at the same time as calling on the state to act, in the expectation that “those represen-
tatives of the state with the highest responsibility will at the earliest opportunity show
their unequivocal commitment to tolerance, against hatred of foreigners and that
Slovenia’s strategy towards immigrants and asylum seekers will be based on this prin-
ciple” (Delo, 6 February 2001).

local residents for tolerance: “Cases where the local authorities
encourage residents to take to the streets do not contribute to resolv-
ing the problems. . . .”
16
He expressed concern after he received a let-
ter from the Office for Intervention. The immigrants suddenly no
longer posed a primary threat to national security (they simply had
to be distinguished from asylum seekers), and asylum seekers were
not criminals, but “merely seeking refuge.”
17
Then the appeals for tolerance were joined by those from head of
state Milan Kučan and prime minister Janez Drnovšek, and this
established a new structure for the debate. Kučan rejected the “voice
of the people.” He stated that it was not true that “the refugees—at
least the voice of the people would suggest—have more rights and
more protection than our people.” He spoke of people “whom some
force had scattered around the world,” who had “lost everything at
home,” while we “still have something.”
18
Drnovšek, too, appealed
for tolerance, especially promising the tolerance of the state
towards residents: “Nowhere will the government solve by force the
problems linked to the accommodation of illegal immigrants and
asylum seekers . . . they will try everywhere, in dialogue with the
local communities, to resolve these problems by agreement . . . but
more systematically, and not blindly as has been the case recent-
ly.”
19
At the same time, in the main daily paper Delo it was immedi-
ately and explicitly stressed, that “foreigners are not automatically
guilty of criminal offences,” and that “the Slovene state is not cover-
ing as many costs as is portrayed . . . so money cannot therefore be
a reason for intolerance towards foreigners.” Concerning criminal
acts, the following was also noted: “In the assessment of the criminal
police office, the percentage of their [the immigrants] criminal acts
was negligible.” And at the same time: “Statements by affected citi-
zens that in the neighbourhoods where immigrants and asylum
seekers are accommodated, there is increased crime, threats to chil-
dren, the old, girls and so on, are misleading, according to the infor-
mation received from the Ministry of the Interior.”
20
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
51
16
“MNZ zavrača govorice o selitvi tujcev” (Ministry of Interior denies rumours of moving
foreigners), STA, Delo, 31 January 2001.
17
Večer, 2 February 2001.
18
“Milan Kučan o beguncih” (Milan Kučan on the refugees), Dnevnik, 6 February 2001.
19
T. S. Natlačen, Delo, 7 February 2001.
20
Ibid.

Some analysts and commentators dubbed this change a “media
U-turn,”
21
not just because of the appeals for tolerance, but also
because of the manner of writing about the immigrants. This was
evident in the individualisation of the image of the immigrants (by
presenting individuals and their tragic stories) and in the turning
around of intolerant rhetoric “into its opposite.”
22
Yet this so-called
“media U-turn” provoked a variety of reactions: from praise
23
to
total criticism (most of the articles in Mag, some commentaries in
Nedeljski dnevnik and certain reactions from intellectuals). At the
same time a broad debate started in the media on xenophobia and
on the possible causes of it. On 21 February there was a demonstra-
tion in Ljubljana for solidarity with the immigrants, organised by the
Office for Intervention. This also aroused quite a variety of reaction,
chiefly in connection with the assessments of whether there was
xenophobia in Slovenia and how much there was.
At the beginning of March the frequency of items about immi-
grants in the print media fell, but at the end of March and beginning
of April it again increased owing to the renewed debates on deten-
tion centres and the protests by local residents against the possible
settling of immigrants in their communities. In Ljubljana district
Šiška, and towns Maribor, Ribnica and Kočevje the reactions
already seen were repeated. In May the government drafted sup-
plements to the asylum law, with which it further tightened the pro-
cedure for obtaining asylum. Through the introduction of visa
requirements for Iranians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stricter control of
the border and consistent application of the new article on “abuse of
the asylum procedure” the number of illegal immigrants in the
accommodation centres was “automatically” reduced, while at the
same time the public’s attention was diverted to other topics, such as
the announced referendum on an in vitro fertilisation law.
The people as “innocent victims”
I should now attempt to show the basic strategy which epitomised,
recreated and legitimised the xenophobic voice of the people in the
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
52
21
See A. Kotnik, “Sovražna retorika medijev” (Xenophobic Rhetorics of the Media),
Medijska preža (MediaWatch) (Ljubljana: The Peace Institute) 10, (winter 2001): 2–3.
22
Ibid.; D. Pušenjak, “Katarza slovenskih medijev” (Catharsis of Slovene Media), Medijska
preža (MediaWatch) (Ljubljana: The Peace Institute) 10, (winter 2001): 2–3.
23
See Pušenjak, “Katarza slovenskih medijev.”

media. It was marked not only by a stigmatising of the “other,” but
also by the formulation of a narrative of the victim, in which the
“other” (in this case the immigrants) is completely minimised and
destroyed, becoming a means of forming the relations and debate
between local communities and the state, or a means of de-legitimis-
ing the state as the “representative of the people.” Here through the
presentation of the “opinions of those affected,” who think with
“good common sense,” and through the communication of prejudice,
the media texts in the first instance create a consensus on the threat
from immigrants. On the textual level the journalist is monitoring
the “voice of the people,” which he/she summarises in all its emotion
and writes up in special reports, here and there adopting a cynical
pose towards it. One of the variations for encapsulating the voice of
the people was in the letters to the editor, with several letters being
written by the same person or even by the initiators of action against
the settlement of immigrants, such as B. Oblak.
So what does the “voice of the people” represent? It stands out pri-
marily as a condensation of fear and a sense of threat. It presents to
us how the residents “fear” that “foreigners from distant lands would
pee in the basements of apartment blocks, steal from the local stores,
break into weekend homes, fight with knives or in some other way
disturb the local people.”
24
They speak of how “crime in Šiška . . . has
literally blossomed” and how they are threatened by “infectious dis-
eases.”
25
“All the foreigners are becoming an excessive burden for
our country,” “all the costs have to be paid by us penniless citizens,
who ourselves are already living on the edge of poverty,” while
“every tenth Slovene is hungry.”
26
Residents have problems with
their water supply “because the local mains supply is now over-
loaded.”
27
“The illegals can swamp little Slovenia.”
28
“The residents
of Šiška have already pointed out many times that because of the
asylum centre they are scared to let their children play outside, that
the immigrants drop litter, that there is a lot of crime in their neigh-
bourhood and that they feel like second-class citizens. . . .”
29
The res-
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
53
24
I. Križnar, Mag, 14 February 2001.
25
B. Oblak, taken from Nedeljski dnevnik, 7 January 2001.
26
“Letter to the editor,” Nedeljski dnevnik, 14 January 2001.
27
Večer, 27 January 2001.
28
Writes F. Majcen in a letter to the editor, Večer, 3 February 2001.
29
Večer, 5 April 2001.

idents of the Goričko border area . . . live in fear of the ever more vio-
lent immigrants, who come here from neighbouring Hungary.”
30
The people of Bloke “first of all . . . put up with soldiers for five years,
then had four years of refugees, and don’t want the illegals.”
31
“The
four-year presence of Bosnian refugees aroused an antipathy to for-
eigners among the Bloke people,” “at night they did not dare go out,
and especially women felt uncomfortable near the refugees.” The
Bloke residents say: “Isn’t it enough that everything good, including
roads, bypassed us and that we have been occupied by the army?
Now they want to force
32
foreigners on us.”
33
Slovenske novice pub-
lished a piece entitled “Will the Bloke people again groan in dis-
may?”
34
This narrative, which none of the media in Slovenia managed to
avoid, shows either the Slovenes as a whole or the residents of areas
where immigrants have been accommodated, as victims of the
refugee and immigrant policies of the state. The strategy encapsu-
lates the narrating of the “experience with refugees” from the begin-
ning of the nineties, and then in some standardised template pres-
ents the “suffering” of the local inhabitants. There is a clear dualism
set up between the residents (suffering subjects) and the state as the
reviled centre, localised in Ljubljana, which simply takes from the
people and gives nothing, while their neighbourhoods are under
threat. The problem of the immigrants in fact takes a back seat—it
becomes insignificant and instrumentalised in the binary relation-
ship of residents–the state, local community–the centre, Slovenes–the
authorities, democracy–arbitrary rule, justice–injustice and so on.
The victims in the narrative of illegal immigrants are therefore not
the immigrants themselves. The role has been assumed by individual
groups of scattered local residents, who acquire their uniformity
and special cultural and social character/identity precisely in the
relationship towards the immigrants and towards the state’s policy.
The “voice of the victim people” draws attention to the apparently
“intolerable conditions” in which those “affected” find themselves, to
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
54
30
I. Gerenčer, Delo, 29 January 2001.
31
Dnevnik, 24 January 2001.
32
Transl. note: the original Slovene verb posiliti=violate, rape.
33
Ibid.
34
V. Kerman, Slovenske novice, 29 January 2001.

suffering villages and residents, and begins to function as the lan-
guage of the “civil society” against the state.
35
In the case of the
forming of “events” from the “immigrant crisis” we witnessed a con-
densing of the relationship towards the new state. Hatred of the
immigrants as “others” coincided with hatred of the state as the
Other. This Other then assumes the role of “culprit” for the troubles
(it is incapable of resolving the “crisis”) and also for xenophobia. In
a latent form this hatred has been shown in the conflict between the
centre and the periphery, and in the logic of not in my backyard. But
in the “immigrant crisis” it became transparent, and formulated a
plausible story which in the end—and this is most interesting—every-
body believed. A consensus was therefore established among both
the xenophobes and among numerous people who had come out (or
at least thought they had) against xenophobia. The conclusion held
which could be condensed into the sentence that it is “the state” (and
not the civil society) which is “guilty” of xenophobia (or whatever we
want to call it) in Slovenia. Society had behaved and responded “nor-
mally.”
The smuggling, criminal state
“The state” is criticised from various points of view.
36
Firstly as the
authorities, set against the “suffering local residents,” who are suf-
fering not only because of the immigrants, but also, or perhaps pri-
marily, because of the attitude of the authorities/the state to them:
for it is “the state” which is settling refugees on them, and in such a
way that “the decision on temporary accommodation of asylum
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
55
35
Thus far (primarily in the Yugoslav situation in the eighties, but also in the post-
Yugoslav situation) we have had to deal chiefly with the constant feature of Slovene civil
society nationalism, in which the function of victim is played by the Slovenes and their
culture as a whole (relative to the Yugoslav state). Yet after 1991, as a “semiotic system
of the civil society,” Slovene nationalism was formed “through an especially discursive
history, which has resulted in the ‘arbitrary’ division of society into those who have
earned inclusion and those who have not” (J. C. Alexander, “Citizen and Enemy as
Symbolic Classification. On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society,” in Where Culture
Talks, Exclusion and the making of Society, ed. M. Founier and M. Lamont [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992]: p. 291). But this formation—at least in the beginning—
did not contain any anti-state sentiment.
36
The term “state” has had different meanings although the way the term was used in the
public showed that the implication often was obviously “government.” This also shows
the typical non-distinction between both terms—probably the consequence of the com-
munist legacy and short post-Yugoslav and post-communist period.

seekers and other immigrants was taken without their agreement.”
“The local residents of Šiška, enraged at the ‘chicanery of the state,’
have already given notice of a blockade of Celovška Street and of
city passenger traffic.”
37
“The unannounced return has once more
aroused mistrust and fear among the local residents of Šiška, who
have for some time demonstrated organised opposition to the
accommodation of immigrants.”
38
If the illegal immigrants are crim-
inals, the state has assumed the role of “smuggler,” since it is oper-
ating on the sly, and not informing local authorities of the moving
and accommodating of immigrants: it has cheated the residents, not
taken them into consideration and settled the refugees without their
assent. A state which “smuggles” refugees may easily be delegit-
imised, just as a smuggler of immigrants may at the same time be
criminalised: so if the state is protecting migrants, criminal tenden-
cies may be ascribed to it.
“Whatever the state doesn’t like, it sends to us in Prekmurje”;
39
“they will bring us diseases, so why don’t they bring us their nuclear
waste as well.”
40
“The politicians themselves have created fertile
ground for the arrival of illegal immigrants.”
41
“We local people . . .
do not believe that the state will honour the agreement,”
42
“our gov-
ernment does not protect its own citizens,”
43
“the government
underestimates the people of Bela Krajina.”
44
Mr. Oblak, of the so-
called Šiška initiative, states that the “state is abusing . . . trust.”
45
Under the title “The state more intolerant than the people,”
46
follow-
ing state and other appeals for tolerance, there is a presentation of
the views of people from Prosenjakovci, to whom “no one, least of all
the state, has in the end even said thank you.” The state “has not trou-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
56
37
N. Žolnir and I. Gerenčer, Delo, 2 February 2001.
38
Ibid.
39
M. Dora and L. Cjuha, Nedeljski dnevnik, 28 January 2001.
40
Summing up the people of Vidonci in an article by M. Dora, Nedeljski dnevnik, 18
January 2001.
41
Večer, 26 March 2001.
42
I. Gerenčer, Delo, 29 January 2001.
43
M. Vodišek, “Letter to the editor,” Delo, 1 February 2001.
44
M. Dimitrič, Delo, 1 February 2001.
45
H. Kocmur, Delo, 2 February 2001.
46
I. Gerenčer, Nedelo, 4 February 2001.

bled itself much over the will of the people,” “the state has done vir-
tually nothing . . . so is now impotent and is becoming intolerant
towards the people.” The state “has the people of Vidonci by the
throat.”
47
From words to deeds
The criminalisation of the state enabled legitimate resistance in a
crisis situation, especially if the state was protecting not its own
inhabitants and their rights, but the immigrants. There were
appeals for “the state of Slovenia occasionally also to protect its own
citizens, who have only one state,”
48
or: “Why do our authorities not
protect their own citizens, why through their apathy do they leave us
distressed?”
49
When certain politicians appealed for tolerance, and
when journalists in certain media also changed their manner of
writing, the pressure grew. The state was supposedly being discrim-
inatory towards its own inhabitants, and by appealing for tolerance,
it was supposedly cultivating a “dubious compassion.”
50
Meanwhile
“The politicians themselves have created fertile ground for the
arrival of illegal immigrants.”
51
They should stop and think about
the fact that “in certain parts of Slovene cities you no longer hear
Slovene words.” Politicians “are doing nothing for the survival of the
Slovene nation, since they are far enough away from the areas on
which they are forcing foreign culture.” And “is it not absurd that
politicians, who are natural enemies of differently thinking
Slovenes, are appealing for tolerance towards foreigners.”
52
“We
should also be asking how many immigrants from the former
Yugoslavia have stayed here. If the ministry cannot provide clear
answers, my view is that our political leadership is also wound up in
criminal activities. . . .”
53
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
57
47
T. Doneva, Mag, 31 January 2001.
48
M. Vodišek (a frequently published correspondent on the subject of immigrants in the
newspapers), “Letter to the editor,” Delo, 16 February 2001.
49
I. A. Stanič, “Letter to the editor,” Mag, 14 February 2001.
50
M. Vodišek, “Letter to the editor,” Delo, 16 February 2001.
51
F. Majcen, “Vaši odmevi” (Your responses), Večer, 26 March 2001.
52
Ibid.
53
I. A. Stanič, “Letter to the editor,” Mag, 14 February 2001.

In a state which does not look after its people, and even attacks
them, the people are thereby justified in using self-defence, or self-
protection (the title of the quoted letter to the editor is “Xenophobia
or self-protection?”). So what then? “If by 3 February the state, as is
set out in the agreement between it and the municipality of Grad,
does not move the immigrants from the Vidonci centre, the munici-
pality will stop supplying the centre with electricity and water, and
will also stop supplying food and other care and provisions for the
immigrants.”
54
The people of Bloke are “determined to fight the set-
tling of illegals with every means.”
55
“We will take a path that no one
has so far. We will use the harshest of measures. . . .” “Bojan Oblak,
leader of the civil movement for removing the immigrants, men-
tioned that ‘we would, if necessary, physically prevent the return of
such a large number of illegals.’”
56
The intolerable circumstances, once identified as such (the Asylum
Seekers’ Home, which “finally exploded”),
57
and of course through
na-tural justice, establish the right to resist. Local residents regard-
ed the settling of refugees as an occupation, and “they will resist
occupation.”
58
“Are we Slovenes xenophobic?”
The theory of normality
The question “Are we Slovenes xenophobic?” started to appear in the
media at the beginning of February, and was put to numerous
respondents, primarily experts. Through the debate on xenophobia
the “Slovenes” as a self-establishing imaginary collective first gained
the chance for autoreflection on their new citizenship and civic iden-
tity. It is indicated precisely by this apparently “naïve” question on
xenophobia amongst the Slovenes.
The question itself does not offer many options for response, and
in fact makes it possible for the hypothesis of xenophobia amongst
the Slovenes to be legitimately rejected. It is a question of belief, and
in fact is asking, “can we really believe (as some people tell us) that
we Slovenes are xenophobic?” The rhetorical question derives from
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
58
54
I. Gerenčer, Delo, 29 January 2001.
55
M. Povše, Dnevnik, 24 January 2001.
56
H. Kocmur, Delo, 2 February 2001.
57
B. Oblak, summarised in Nedeljski dnevnik, 7 February 2001.
58
K. Klanjšek, Dnevnik, 24 January 2001.

the imaginary “we,” of which both the questioner and respondent are
constituent parts. It implies that “we all know” who the Slovenes are
(that is, an essentially “cultivated nation” that wishes no harm to any-
one). From the debates it was clear that in the affirmative answer to
the question, this common place was rejected. For if “we” Slovenes
are xenophobic, then the two of us—the questioner and respondent—
are also part of a xenophobic collective. So how could we then even
ask about xenophobia? Viewed from this imaginary place, it is not at
all possible to say that the Slovenes are xenophobic.
59
And if they “in
fact” are not, then someone has misled them, and the real “culprit”
must be found for the suspected or actual xenophobia.
Responding to a (differently posed) question on xenophobia could
in fact enable a reflection on the notion of being cultivated, of “inno-
cence” and the original democratic nature of the Slovene people in
their own state and of Slovene nationalism itself as something posi-
tive per se. But responding to the question on xenophobia on that “in
essence” level for the most part set up a narrative on the Slovenes as
innocent and unsuspecting people that had in fact been surprised by
something very strange with this xenophobia. The response to the
question on xenophobia can in general be divided into five categor-
ies. These clearly illustrate the variants of reflection and reasoning
on xenophobia and racism in the Slovene post-socialist scene. The
fifth response from the texts referred to here does not belong in the
same category, and represents a different, more reflective attitude,
for it does not answer the question posed in the same way.
First response: So-called xenophobia
According to I. Guzelj, a journalist on Mag, there is no xenophobia in
Slovenia. The described threats and protests by local residents “test-
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
59
59
The national “we” is always a construct which automatically excludes those who might
doubt the existence of this “we.” The imaginary nature of the community does not mean
that it does not have real effects. By answering “of course we Slovenes are xenophobic”
we would—in terms of psychoanalytic discourse—be admitting the terrible fact that our
construct of the Slovene is based on the exclusion of “those others,” and therefore by
admitting the effect of the “real” would be showing what was the core of being Slovene.
By answering “of course you Slovenes are (xenophobic)” it would be showing (from the
point of view of a respondent for whom it is doubtful whether they would automatically
agree to the imaginary inclusion in this “we”) the absolute logic demonstrated in the
talk of “us, the Slovenes,” from which you can be excluded only if you are not a Slovene
(still or any more). As for the gender dimension of the construct of the Slovene (transl.:
Slovenec—masculine noun=(male) Slovene) I shall not go into that at all here.

ify to the healthy logic that the maintenance of the current level of
security and order . . . is a basic civilisational right of any member of
an ordered society.”
60
This is the logic of healthy normality against
what is not normal or natural. In his letter to the editor B. Oblak
speaks of the “normal reaction of people to abnormal circum-
stances . . . the state has actually broken down.”
61
These are extreme-
ly civilised protests, in which people (in intolerable circumstances)
are fighting for human rights (the Šiška initiative adopts the label
“civil initiative”). The problem is primarily with the “rights of citi-
zens,” who because of the asylum seekers are in “intolerable cir-
cumstances.” A similar argument is presented in Slovenske novice by
M. Bauer, who says that “the people in Goričko are not stupid, they
don’t believe absolutely everything from the mayor, and besides,
they still remember similar refugee stories. They came from what
was once the south of the country for a few days, and stayed for
years. . . . If the foreigners don’t leave Vidonci, the local people will
try to starve them out. Which is of course scandalous, but under-
standable. . . . A lot of this is all wrong, because some people just have
rights, while others just have duties” (clearly the asylum seekers
have “only rights” and the local people “only duties”). But, “what in
the name of God, Allah, Buddha or the animist deities can these for-
eigners do for us to accept them more willingly and easily.
Nothing.”
62
This is apparently the question which we should be ask-
ing publicly, but are not, through fear of being accused of xenopho-
bia: “Because we are so stuck up, we are scared someone might
accuse us of chauvinism, racism and whatever else is in that pack-
age.” So clearly the Šiška residents “know very well that a blockade
is the only way for them to perhaps avoid unwanted and frequently
problematic neighbours.”
63
It is true, therefore, that it is scandalous,
what the residents are demanding, but everything can be under-
stood and one can sympathise with them, for the foreigners them-
selves do nothing for us to be able to “like them more,” and because
of other cowards who are scared of accusations of racism, and
because of the treacherous government, the local people clearly
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
60
60
Mag, 7 February 2001.
61
Mag, 21 February 2001.
62
M. Bauer, “Nič!” (Nothing!), Slovenske novice, 30 January 2001.
63
Ibid.

have no choice. The residents are in fact courageous, active citizens
and are only expressing and fighting for what apparently all of us
are thinking privately.
64
The reaction of the “indigenous people”
65
is entirely “understand-
able,” and from the local point of view it is a normal and natural
reaction to violence and violation,
66
for the state has not provided
for their protection. Moreover, “the state is helping to spread
rumours about the xenophobia of those who were the first to draw
attention to the violation of fundamental human rights to a decent
life.”
67
And at the same time, “humanitarian organisations and
experts, through their activities in the fight against xenophobia are
protecting the inaction of the state.”
68
This is “so-called xenophobia,”
to which “Slovene citizens are apparently susceptible in massive
numbers,” and which has been “put about by certain sociologists.”
69
In truth it is therefore those who talk of xenophobia who are intole-
rant, since because of them “there will clearly be no reconciliation in
Slovenia for a long time.” This will be made sure of by the “duty dis-
cord-sowers” with the “assistance of government structures.” The
point is, “the Slovenes and the ones who no longer feel Slovene, or
rather never did (for this involves after all free choice of identity),
having pilloried themselves and others with xenophobia.”
70
Xenophobia has therefore been produced by the “self-proclaimed,”
“free-spirit” and “progressive” civil society and self-proclaimed sci-
entists. In this connection there is also a dubious credibility in
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
61
64
The majority of extremist right-wing political parties in Western democracies adopt the
position of public expression of what apparently “everyone thinks,” but for the sake of
politically correct democratic language “do not dare to say”—this involves primarily
subjects relating to immigrants and minorities. “Expression of the secret thoughts of the
masses” was, for example, the main strategy in the election campaigns fought by par-
ties such as the Austrian Freedom Party of Jörg Heider. 
65
As they are called in Mag, 7 February 2001.
66
The metaphor of rape (posilstvo=violation/rape) in racial/nationalist discourses is fre-
quently used to indicate the extreme humiliation and violation of the nation victim. It
was very widespread in the post-Yugoslavia wars, and had tragic real consequences.
67
T. Doneva, Mag, 7 February 2001.
68
Ibid.
69
B. Oblak, “Letter to the editor,” Mag, 21 February 2001.
70
I. Puc, Mag, 21 February 2001.
Here can be seen the exclusionary function of the question on xenophobia, where who-
ever answers yes, either no longer belongs, or even never belonged to the Slovene col-
lective, to that imaginary “we.”

Slovene public opinion polls. So one after another everyone is sus-
pect who talks about xenophobia, including public opinion pollsters.
On the other hand the author cites certain other “researchers,” such
as “Dr. Zvone Žigon,” who “pessimistically point out that Europe
already senses that it cannot absorb such cultural diversity.”
71
So if
“Europe senses,” then it would in fact be better to admit “that it [xeno-
phobia] is in our blood.”
72
The so-called xenophobia (if it exists) is
therefore something natural and normal. In another context it is
described thus: “Are we Slovenes egoistic pigs, because we don’t like
these people, the illegals and asylum seekers, anywhere? No. Hatred
of foreigners is a genetic law. They have it, let us say, in Iran, too.”
73
Thus there is no need to worry, as a natural phenomenon xenopho-
bia is legitimate, it is omnipresent, including in Europe,
74
and the
Slovenes, even if they/we are xenophobes—but they/we aren’t,
because xenophobia is an invention—they/we are not abnormal.
Second response: We Slovenes are normal
(xenophobia is a deviation from normality)
But if you thought that a view similar to this position was held just by
local residents in action and some more extreme tabloid journalists,
you would be seriously mistaken. This conviction was—in a modified
form—much more widespread. It was supported by certain intellec-
tuals, who in fact—or so it seemed at first glance— wanted to criticise
xenophobia.
The main strategy employed here, too, was—alongside the ques-
tioning on xenophobia—providing proof of the “normality” of people,
or rather the normality of the Slovenes in relation to the suspected
latent or visibly radical evil. Behind this for the most part—I would
not say always—lurked a direct or indirect justification of xenopho-
bia and racism. In the discourse on xenophobia the local residents,
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
62
71
Ibid. 
The journalist provides an incomplete quotation from a scientist who in terms of biblio-
graphy is concerned almost exclusively with the Slovene identity, Slovene minorities
and emigration. 
72
Ibid.
73
M. Bauer, Slovenske novice, 30 January 2001.
74
The argument of “Europeanness” was frequently used in justifying xenophobia: for
example in apparently quite innocent conversations, on hearing that the Slovenes were
not (according to the public opinion polls) any more xenophobic than “Europe,” the
questioners gave visible signs of relief.

that is Slovenes, protesting against the settling of immigrants, are
presented for the most part as “perfectly ordinary, cultivated
people,”
75
who wish no argument with anyone, or at least up until
recently they did not.
B. Oblak, the main player in the “civil initiative,” presents himself,
for example, as a “perfectly ordinary family man, a computer engin-
eer, who had been drawn into events . . . rather by coincidence and
mostly through his official duties as president of the residents’ coun-
cil.”
76
And he says: “The resistance of certain local communities
against the planned (or already existing) long-term or temporary
accommodation of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers is not xeno-
phobia, but the expression of disagreement with the existing attitude
of the government. . . . It is an entirely normal reaction by people to
abnormal circumstances. . . .”
77
T. Doneva writes about Bojan Oblak
in Mag, “a resident from the other side of Celovška Street, who for
some time has been striving to resolve an intolerable situation.”
78
One of the more interesting and intellectually coloured ideas of
the normality and naturalness of anti-foreign discomfort or racism
as a “reflex” in connection with the immigrants was published in
Delo. In the article “We master (and govern)”
79
Alojz Ihan in this con-
nection wrote about the “reflex behaviour” of people when they see
in their fields “a chocolate coloured African.”
80
For the “farmers’
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
63
75
All the nationalist movements in the area of former Yugoslavia conducted wars in the
name of culture and a higher level of culture of one’s own nation. Culture, as I. Čolović
says, is “one of the main references of aggressive ethnic nationalism” (“U ime kulture.
Politička pozivanja na kulturu,” in Interkulturalnost versus rasizam i ksenofobija, ed. B.
Jakšić [Beograd: Forum za etničke odnose, 1998], pp. 25–31). The July newspaper debate
on erecting a mosque in Ljubljana, which provoked a Slovene anti-Muslim and racist
outpouring of “heartfelt culture” is just one of the outstanding examples (see “Right to
reply,” Delo, 25 and 27 July 2001).
76
Mladina, 5 March 2001. 
Official duty, ordinariness, the family-man quality of the civil initiative player should
point to his normality, which through “healthy logic” can in no way lead to anything evil
or have any evil consequences. It is intriguing to read these arguments together with
the thesis of H. Arendt on the “banality of evil” in connection with the national socialist
“bureaucrat” and family man Eichmann, which argues that evil is not embodied in the
sick and “inhuman,” but in fact the most normal, dutiful and tradition-respecting mem-
bers of society become the protagonists of social evil.
77
B. Oblak, “Letter to the editor,” Mag, 21 February 2001.
78
Mag, 31 January 2001.
79
Delo, 10 February 2001, Sobotna priloga (Saturday Supplement).
80
An excellent linguistic analysis and critique of this text was written by I. Ž. Žagar in
Dnevnik, 26 April 2001 (Lebensraum). See also his text in this volume.

wives burst into tears” and certain “ancient defence reflexes” de-
velop.
81
In his opinion the reactions of the villagers “does not involve
xenophobia, but simple reflexes.”
82
Certain other people also made a note of “normality.” The Mladina
journalist J. Aleksič, in his typically high-tension reportage style dur-
ing a visit to Vidonci composed the following: “In general, to begin
with I can say about this that I didn’t get the feeling obtained by the
average viewer of the evening TV news—in other words the feeling
that this involved some sick, xenophobic demented rednecks who
would quite happily torch the building up on the hill.
83
The people in
this part of the Prekmurje region are actually very scared, and fear
all too often doesn’t just fuel the imagination, but also exaggerated
words and threats. . . . In the building a few hundred metres ahead
along the road various refugees have already been accommodated
there for years. Mainly from Bosnia, but of course never anywhere
near such a numerous human bomb as right now. . . .” So in brief, the
journalist did not get the feeling that this involved “sick xenophobic
demented rednecks.” On the contrary, the residents are completely
normal. If we are looking for xenophobia, then by this conviction we
must be expecting something sick, some weirdly sick and (most prob-
ably) at first glance evil people, whose very features tell you that they
are dangerous, for at any moment they might launch into some Ku
Klux Klan action. Xenophobia is understandable as an illness, and
as something that can be felt, seen and determined in people as a
“disturbance.” And local residents can at least be understood (as
long as you are normal).
In one part of his report the journalist writes the following por-
trayal of his emotional experience of the journalistic research situ-
ation: “Herds of anorexically skinny Africans, shivering Iranian
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
64
81
In place of the apparently politically correct syntagma of the “chocolate coloured
African” we could easily read the word zamorc (=negro, also even “nigger”), but Ihan
does not use it. It is interesting that a few months later (July 2001) the Ljubljana police
“read” in the same way as Ihan the behaviour of skinheads in attacking Ignacio
Bintchende. Here, too, it was not supposedly a sign of racism. The lads were “simply”
having a fight. In connection with this, in his “deputy’s question” parliamentary deputy
Jelinčič used the word zamorci (negroes).
82
A. Ihan, “(Ob)vladamo” (We master (and govern)).
83
With his use in Slovene of the adjective redneckovski [sic] the writer is presumably think-
ing of white conservatives such as in the deep south of the USA, and of the link to the
Ku Klux Klan.

Rambos and coughing and wheezing adolescent women of indeter-
minate age, without exaggerating, literally surrounded me, and
when they started literally to rattle off at me in broken English and
occasionally impressive German a machine-gun fire of accusations
about the impossible conditions, I remembered with a heavy heart
the theory of the beehive, which earlier Mr. Franc had impressed
upon me.”
Third response:
Just a sudden outbreak of xenophobia
The next view is not uniform, but is a mirror-image opposite of the
position that maintains that xenophobia is indeed xenophobia. In the
first two responses it was already observed that those who say there
is no xenophobia, are creating an image of shocked surprise, which
asks how is it possible that in what “we” (Slovenes?) say and do,
“they” (anti-xenophobes?) see xenophobia? In the third view, too, the
basic perception of the situation is shocked surprise—but not as a
denial of xenophobia, but in the sense of a question, how is it pos-
sible for xenophobia to appear so suddenly (among such cultivated
people as the Slovenes)? “What has happened to the Slovenes, that
they have become so openly hateful of foreigners who are escaping
through Slovenia?”
84
Here a view of themselves opens up for the
Slovenes. The horrified J. Šmidovnik writes in Delo that he is “con-
vinced . . . that many other people in this country are also horrified;
he would like to believe that even the majority of Slovenes have
always been good and friendly people—not just to each other, but
also to foreigners.”
85
Šmidovnik, who believes that the Slovenes
were always and still are “friendly,” must ask himself about the
cause of the xenophobia, which clearly does not sit happily with
friendliness.
86
Where is the reason for the xenophobic evil? Whence
this sudden change? What has caused people to change overnight?
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
65
84
J. Šmidovnik, Delo, 10 February 2001.
85
J. Šmidovnik, “Vladavina vaških straž” (Rule of the village guards), Delo, 10 February
2001, Sobotna priloga (Saturday Supplement).
86
It is interesting that nowhere in his statements does the author provide proof of this
“friendliness.” And how could he? The notion of the “friendliness” of some nation can
only be a belief, a polite self-evident phrase serving the imaginary construct of the col-
lective. Šmidovnik takes this as the “precondition” of the Slovene identity in contrast to
those who say that the Slovenes traditionally hate themselves and precisely for this rea-
son (of course!) have an antipathy towards others.

What is this devil leading us into temptation? “And this now, when we
have gained our own state, with which we can settle problems in our
own way. . . .”
The answer lies, at first glance paradoxically, of course in the state:
“I think the blame lies squarely on the Slovene state. These are the
consequences of mistaken actions by the state, which was not com-
mitted, or not committed enough, in dealing with such a serious
problem. . . . Our state has clearly not devoted sufficient attention to
this problem.” And someone else is guilty: “The information media
have shown this situation in its worst light. . . . The impression creat-
ed by the media has been such that the immigrants are to blame for
all the dangers. In this way they firstly aroused fear, and then hatred
of people—primarily of the immigrants, and then of the state, which
has forced them upon us.” So there are two main culprits: the state
and the media. Evil cannot lie in the residents, who are “in essence”
traditionally friendly, and the reason for their behaviour must be
hidden elsewhere.
Fourth response:
Xenophobia is caused by others
One letter to the editor states the following: “I agree that hatred of
foreigners does not belong in a democratic country, where human
rights should be respected. But I wonder, is this year’s campaign
against xenophobia not somewhat exaggerated. . . . In the eyes of the
media and the Slovene public the residents near the foreigners’ cen-
tre have suddenly become xenophobes and racists. . . . All those who
talk so much today of intolerance of foreigners in Slovenia, could
also ask themselves about intolerance in Slovenia in general . . .
arrogant attacks on the Church and believers, especially on the
Archbishop of Ljubljana . . . there is still no mention in the textbooks
that we Slovenes also had our own (fratricidal) holocaust. . . . Here a
person asks themselves, how are we Slovenes supposed to be toler-
ant towards foreigners, when we can’t even be tolerant towards each
other?”
87
The argument of exaggerated claims of xenophobia and warnings
of xenophobia is also characteristic of certain liberal or even rad-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
66
87
G. Blažič, “Letter to the editor,” Večer, 3 April 2001.

ical/alternative authors.
88
It is interesting to note that here they con-
cur with the non-critical existentialist responses to the question
about xenophobia. The prototype of this kind of interpretation is the
text “On xenocide or the latent xenophobia of the country” by B.
Vezjak in Večer of 12 February 2001, which states (in the subheading)
the following: “The national policy saw immigrants as a subject of
removal a long time before it started dealing with this literally, when
in fact it ‘symbolically’ equated them with revolting insects” (here the
writer is aiming at the mayor of village Prosenjakovci, who is equat-
ed with the state). Thus “the state’s repressive policy towards for-
eigners is latently xenophobic . . . it would prefer to shove them out
into the night. . . .” Here it is not the “media construction of the prob-
lem” that is guilty of xenophobia, as it is with some other writers, but
simply the “mechanisms of the state’s actions.” Those who produced
the “culpability discourse” (NGO’s and certain sociologists) and who
are accusing the local residents, are making a mistake. The follow-
ing needs to be asked: “Are objections to the settling of immigrants
in their residential neighbourhoods enough for some individual or
even group to be labelled cultural racist or xenophobe? And are they
enough for us to speak tout court about the growth of xenophobia in
general in Slovenia?” This supposedly involves for the most part a
“suspected hatred,” for there were similar reactions to the construc-
tion of a drug addicts’ commune and waste dumps. The Slovenes are
“like stay-at-home people, especially sensitive about the defence of
their living space [in German Lebensraum]” and behind this
“defence mechanism stands a special psychological character pro-
file.” As with Ihan, who speaks of “reflexes,” stress is given here to
“defence mechanisms,” to something therefore which should func-
tion regardless of human will. For this reason “the view of xenopho-
bia could be relativised, although no one wishes to justify actions of
this kind.” What happened is therefore excusable and understand-
able, and the stigmatisations were premature. The trump card of
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
67
88
At the time this study was being completed (July 2001) the main daily paper Delo, for
example, published a commentary by B. Jež, which through a quasi-analysis of analysis
and statistics on intolerance again speaks of the exaggerated claims of racism and
xenophobia, and above all advises and lectures sociologists that they must “watch out”
[sic!] in the application of their research. This is similar to B. Oblak’s doubts about their
“objectivity” in the “hidey-hole of two million” (B. Jež, “Drugi in drugačni” (Others and
those different), Delo, 12 July 2001).

xenophobia was used by the state (state secretary at the interior
ministry B. Bugarič, who “is continually pointing to xenophobic local
residents”), in order to cover up its own xenophobia.
Fifth response:
The state is to blame, not the people
There were quite a few analyses and critiques which not only
stressed the danger of xenophobia, but spoke of fascism and the
danger of an outbreak of violence against foreigners. D. Pušenjak
for example argued that “fascism in Slovenia is thriving and devel-
oping, in line with all the rules as if from some textbook, while the
state is sitting there doing nothing.”
89
But hatred of/toward the state
does not seem too much of a problem to him. He even states: “It is
also our common fortune that the local residents, who are unwit-
tingly and unwillingly making a nest for fascism because the state
will not intervene, are not acting against the refugees as much as
against the state, when they take their rights into their own hands.
Sooner or later the state will have to move.” Rare are those who
speak out against this: “It is the smallest, poorest, marginalised civil
society from Metelkova which is standing up against selfishness in
the purest sense of the word. Metelkova is the cathedral of the high-
est civil awareness and civil wisdom.”
90
Writings such as those of
Pušenjak also warn of the possibility of an outbreak of violence
against foreigners: “When there is the first paedophile assault, rape
or perhaps just the first fight, not even necessarily caused by any for-
eigner, the accommodation centres will be torched.”
91
D. Štrajn also
saw the danger of actual violence in the words and threats. He wrote
that it seemed that “it was only a matter of a short time before the
enraged populace would descend with torches and pitchforks on the
locations where the examples of global poverty are more impris-
oned than not.”
92
In his opinion, xenophobia and racism cannot be
justified, whatever the direct causes for its outbreak: “It can certain-
ly be said that people who have been consumed by paranoia
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
68
89
Nedelo, 11 February 2001.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Dnevnik, 10 February 2001.

because of those two or three hundred poor wretches . . . ‘are not
themselves guilty’ of not being informed or that various state bodies
have screwed things up for them; and of course here too we have not
been let down by that great culprit for everything wrong with us: a
lack of strategy. But whatever the cause of xenophobia, local resi-
dent aggression, incomprehensible racism and so on, xenophobia is
what it is: a disgrace and even greater damage to a nation that is
suffering from it to such an extent as ours.”
93
Some such angles on the subject also analysed the February media
U-turn in connection with xenophobia. Yet even for the majority of
the most critical views, the reason for xenophobia and racism is pri-
marily the policy of the state: “I do not believe that in Slovenia intoler-
ance of foreigners is so prevalent, but I do know that it can easily be
provoked. The sense of threat is so great that a very small stimulus is
needed to activate intolerance. And most certainly these events
speak of a primitivism which is partly ‘native’ and partly induced.”
94
The state bears prime responsibility for the reactions of the people,
or as B. Brumen states: “Here . . . in every textbook on migration and
work with asylum seekers it says that the basic principle of settling
these people is dispersion. But then in the middle of the night they
take 400 people to a village with 40 inhabitants. For this reason I
appeal against the demonisation of the villagers of Vidonci. . . . In
these circumstances of course they were scared, as would anyone
anywhere else in Slovenia.”
95
So in the end we are dealing with nor-
mality. Moreover, “whoever has been in Šiška knows that the only
demand from the local residents was that the centre should only
accommodate as many people as it had room for.” This claim, made
in March, was seen to be at least uninformed and highly under-
standing, sympathetic and tolerant towards the sentiments of the
local residents. In reality the residents of Šiška, headed by Oblak,
were demanding much more. In April the newspapers reported that
they had not given up “their demand for the earliest possible complete
removal of immigrants from their neighbourhood at all costs.”
96
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
69
93
Ibid.
94
B. Lešnik, “Večer round table,” Več er, 3 March 2001, Sobotna priloga (Saturday Supplement).
95
Ibid.
96
H. Kocmur, with the subheading “Time given by the Šiška residents to the state for
vacating the centre has run out,” Delo, 6 April 2001.

Conclusion
The elements that characterised the public (media) discourse on
immigrants and xenophobia in Slovenia in 2001 were as follows:
•emotionalisation—a policy of creating crises and scaremongering
in the public arena;
• laying blame on immigrants and the state;
•victimisation of the “indigenous” local residents (emphasising the
excessive rights of the immigrants and sympathy towards immi-
grants as a problem);
• emphasised hatred of the state;
• legitimisation of possible “defensive” activities, threats to the state;
•normalisation and socialisation of xenophobia and racism as a
“normal, understandable aberration” or biologically conditioned
response.
It would be possible to agree with the already noted assessments
that in the first half of February there was a “media U-turn” and that
there were several attempts to deal with the question of the immi-
grants and the issue of racism and xenophobia with greater sensi-
tivity. But these changes in the media simply involved a re-shuffle: it
established a relativising discourse on xenophobia and racism; in
actual fact it prevented any self-reflection by the people of Slovenia.
Just the question “Are we Slovenes xenophobic?”, as it was formulat-
ed by the majority of questioners, self-questioners, commentators
and other writers, demanded (despite a few critical voices) by its own
logic an answer in the negative.
The actual denial of intolerance and racism is one of the basic
characteristics of hate speech today—it involves a self-legitimisation
which denies that an action (aimed against others or those different)
is intolerant, xenophobic or racist, and presents it as acting out of
self-defensive necessity. Numerous writers who have debated xeno-
phobia have tried to justify it: so that in actions such as the threats
of residents to blockade streets or set up village guards, they “did not
see” elements of xenophobia, or rather they tried to normalise them
through the suspicion that “every xenophobia has its (external)
cause.” Xenophobia was supposedly provoked, with some going as
far as to say that the state deliberately provoked it. The causes of
actions which were assessed as being xenophobic, lay somewhere
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
70

else: for example in the incapacity of the state, in the media, in mis-
taken policies, genetic make-up, reflexes, ancient defence mechan-
isms, the psychological profile of the Slovenes, in a number of regis-
ters, and so on and so forth.
The fact that the direct actions of the residents were often or even
for the most part not aimed directly against the immigrants, but
against the state, does not mitigate the situation. A truly charged
“dialogue” with the state this spring in Slovenia created an atmos-
phere that was the basis for an impermeable and increasingly
restrictive “immigrant policy” that was “adapted to Europe.” In this
the media firstly played the role of mediators of consensus. When
there was public criticism of the media discourse as well as the poli-
cy and speech of certain state officials, the media also split into
those that opposed the claims of xenophobia or spoke about it being
exaggerated, and those that agreed with the claims of xenophobia
and tried to analyse it. Although it is not possible to make sweeping
generalisations, it is nevertheless possible on the basis of collected
material and the above analysis to assert that the first group com-
prises Mag, Slovenske novice, Nedeljski dnevnik, and partly—in view
of certain important individual writers—also Delo, Večer and
Mladina. The second group comprises chiefly Dnevnik and Mladina
and partly—again in view of individual writers—Delo and Večer). It
was chiefly Mag and Slovenske novice that led the field in heaping
abuse on those who spoke in public about xenophobia. It was pri-
marily here that certain writers concocted the theory of some sus-
pected anti-xenophobic (global left-wing) conspiracy between the
state, sociologists and non-governmental organisations, and tried to
criminalise them all in one package. The women’s magazines such
as Ona, Jana and Glamur, veered mainly towards a sympathetic dis-
course and for the most part did not adopt or create xenophobic
opinions—in this particularly Glamur published some critical reflec-
tions and presentations.
It can be said in general that the main strategy of mainstream
debates after February—despite the “catharsis” (Pušenjak)—was the
normalisation or denial of xenophobia, through the following asser-
tions:
• we Slovenes are not generically xenophobic, and if we are, we are
firstly towards ourselves;
X ENOPHOBIA OR S ELF- PROTECTION?
71

•xenophobia is for the most part accidental and insubstantial,
latent and isolated, and should not be blown out of proportion;
•intolerance is increasing only towards the Romanies and “those
different,” and intolerance towards “others” has fallen;
•racism is an extremely marginal phenomenon—even normal and
natural, if there are enough people of a different skin colour in
such a small country as Slovenia, for this arouses special reflexes
(here racism is expressly biologically understood, while cultural
racism cannot be);
• sociologists and others exaggerate in their assessments of intoler-
ance, xenophobia and racism, while public opinion polls are
biased and suspect;
• in reality “we” Slovenes are better than the European Union, since
there they are just as xenophobic, if not more, and they already
have more restrictive immigration policies, even towards Slovenes.
By way of illustration may I append this epilogue—a quotation
from the column of a leading and influential commentator for
Slovenia’s main daily paper, Delo:
So we understand each other: the public should be sensitive to every such attack
of racism, although we should retain our senses and acknowledge that in Slovenia
there are no such racial disturbances as have been raging in the towns of northern
England. For various civil society groups are making such a hue and cry that you
would think the state itself should be hauled before the court in The Hague for perse-
cution of blacks, Jews or homosexuals. . . . The fact is that Slovenia is characterised
by a high level of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, and in this respect ranks in the top
third of a scale of forty-three countries. . . . But let us take a look: since 1995 there
has been a decline in intolerance towards “others,” with the exception of Romanies,
while there has been an increase in intolerance towards “those different”. . . .
Racism is therefore an extremely marginal phenomenon, for there really is very little
different skin here anyway. But it would not be wise to make a big song and dance
about xenophobia and our other vices, for in the past we have been far more intoler-
ant of each other, and were happy enough fighting amongst ourselves. Sociologists
should therefore watch out in the application of their research, for Slovenia is a
hidey-hole of two million, and not comparable to the population mass of Great Britain
or Germany. . . . We could in fact permit ourselves the assertion that Slovenia is
becoming an increasingly open society, more so than the European Union, which
will keep its borders closed to our workforce for another seven years.
97
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
72
97
B. Jež, “Drugi in drugačni” (Others and those different), Delo, 12 July 2001.

THE PROBLEM OF XENOPHOBIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF POPULISM AND
EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT
M ARIA M ARCZEWSKA-RYTKO
Preliminaries
There has been a noticeable rise in radical right-wing populism on
the European political scene since the 1980s.
1
The populist policy of
Euro-scepticism is associated with the parties representing this
trend.
2
Although they have not attracted the majority of the elect-
orate in particular countries, they are capable, as the Austrian
example clearly shows, of causing much confusion in international
relations. In the context of the increasingly united Europe, the
answer to the question of whether the populist movement and pop-
ulist ideas are an integrating or a disintegrating factor becomes
important. In the broader context, it is a question about the model of
democracy to which we aspire.
3
It is also a question about ways of
solving social-cultural problems, because the unification of Europe
73
1
According to Hans-Georg Betz, parties are “right-wing first in their rejection of indi-
vidual and social equality and of political projects that seek to achieve it; second in their
opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups; and third in their appeal to
xenophobia, if not overt racism and anti-Semitism. They are populist in their unscrupu-
lous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disen-
chantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common
sense.” H.-G. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York:
Houndmills, Macmillan, 1994), p. 4. Cas Mudde writes that e.g. nationalism, exclusion-
ism and the strong state constitute the main features of right-wing extremism. C.
Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester-New York, 2000), p. 24.
2
Cf. P. Taggart, “New Populist Parties in Western Europe,” West European Politics 1
(1995); P. Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden
in a Comparative Perspective (Macmillan, 1996); R. Herbut, “Partie polityczne w państ-
wach demokratycznych,” in Politologia wrocławska. Księga jubileuszowa z okazji 30-
lecia Instytutu Politologii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, ed. K. Dziubek, T. Łoś-Nowak
and K. Paszkiewicz (Wrocław, 2000), p. 80; P. Taggart, “The Populist Politics of
Euroscepticism” (paper presented at the conference in Seattle, 28 May–1 June 1997).
3
Cf. M. Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political
Studies XLVII (1999): pp. 2–16; W. Sadurski, Racje liberała: eseje o państwie liberalno-
demokratycznym (Warsaw, 1992).

involves not only economic and political integration, but also the co-
existence of European nations. The process of integration is accom-
panied by growing awareness of the ethnic differences, different
traditions, and unique cultural identities of European nations.
4
This
applies to both the post-communist countries and the countries of
Western Europe. Jerzy Jedlicki observes that in recent years we
have witnessed rising hostility towards all “others” and increased
violence motivated by xenophobia.
5
As Martin A. Lee writes: “In
Western Europe today, there are 50 million poor, 18 million without
jobs, and 3 million homeless. By every measure, post-communist
Eastern Europe is faring much worse. Such conditions are ripe for
exploitation by neofascist demagogues who have successfully
tapped into widespread post-Cold War uncertainties by scapegoat-
ing foreigners and denouncing economic globalization. Immigrants
and asylum-seekers are routinely depicted as a threat to national
identity and financial stability at a time when the European work
force is reeling from high unemployment, stagnating wages and cut-
backs in social services.”
6
There are also terminological problems. There is no general
agreement among scholars as to an unambiguous definition of
populism and its usefulness on the threshold of the twentyfirst cen-
tury.
7 
Generally speaking, populism makes a direct appeal to the
people or nation, rejecting existing state institutions and the system
of values promoted by cultural and political elites. Populism, denot-
ing a policy based on social dissatisfaction, tends to rely on a strong
leader, who gains power by winning popular support for the strug-
gle against a non-existent enemy.
8
Ryszard Herbut is right when he
writes that a populist leader tends to take advantage of any favour-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
74
4
Cf. A. Siciński, Przeciw rasizmowi i nietolerancji w Europie,
<http://wiedzaizycie.pl/96013200.htm>.
5
E. Siedlecka, Czy ścigać za słowa, <http://www.freepress.org.pl/pp43.htm>.
6
M. A. Lee, “Reawakening the Beast,” Intelligence Report (fall 2001): pp. 40–41.
7
Cf. J. Dzwończyk, Populistyczne tendencje w społeczeństwie postsocjalistycznym (na
przykładzie Polski) (Toruń, 2000); P. Kozłowski, Szukanie sensu, czyli o naszej wielkiej
zmianie (Warsaw, 1995); J. Hausner, Populist Threat in Transformation of Socialist
Society (Warsaw, 1992); M. Marczewska-Rytko, Populizm. Teoria i praktyka polityczna
(Lublin, 1995).
8
M. Marczewska-Rytko, “Problem of Populism in East-Central Europe,” in The Future of
East-Central Europe, ed. A. Dumała and J. Z. Pietraś (Lublin, 1996), pp. 485–490.

able circumstances, usually a crisis, to promote his own party, or, in
fact, his own person.
9
This charismatic type of leadership is deter-
mined by the tendency to defend social groups threatened by the
effects of modernisation initiated by the elites, which are regarded
as alienated from society. The concept of populism tends to be asso-
ciated with the concepts of ethnocentrism and xenophobia.
Ethnocentrism can be defined as a worldview, according to which
the dichotomic division into “us” and “them” constitutes the basis of
social life and the criterion for evaluating the surrounding world.
Here, “us” constitutes an idealised group, and “them” are seen as a
threat and a source of evil. Usually, such an attitude leads to defen-
sive isolation and conflict.
10 
Xenophobia, on the other hand, consists
in the creation and propagation of such an image of the community
(often the motherland) in which there is no room for “others,” whose
influence on the cultural ethos, usually highly deceitful, is seen as
destructive to a given culture.
11
In the period of universal chaos, differentiation of social groups,
the disintegration of culture into closed sub-cultures, and the disap-
pearance of the sources of norms, populism aspires to liberate indi-
viduals from a state of emptiness and anomy. Thus, the diagnosis for-
mulated by Cardinal Miloslav Vlk is quite convincing: “The rootless-
ness and alienation of the contemporary man: the world of appear-
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
75
9
R. Herbut, “Partie polityczne w pánstwach demokratycznych,” p. 80.
10
Cf. A. Krzemiński, “Etnocentryzm,” <http://www.niniwa.cad.pl/ETNO.htm>. H.-G. Betz
writes that “by the early 1990s, a majority of the Western European population sup-
ported a number of xenophobic views. At the same time, the ‘immigrant problem’
became one of the most important political issues with governments and political par-
ties coming under mounting public pressure to offer effective solutions.” H.-G. Betz,
Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, p. 103.
11
Cf. R. Okraska, “Szukanie obczyzny: na manowcach ksenofobii i ideofobii,”
Zakorzenienie 5 (1999). C. Mudde writes that “everything what is considered ‘alien,’ or
deviating from their [extreme right political parties] own nation and conventions, is por-
trayed as negative and is perceived as threatening,” and later “most attention in the
xenophobic party literature is paid to the threat of (mass) immigration and the creation
of a multi-cultural society. All parties portray an image of a ‘flood’ of immigrants which
is out of control and which is kept hidden by ‘the Establishment.’ Immigrants are seen as
competitors, since they take away jobs, money and houses from the ‘own people’.” C.
Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, pp. 172–173, 188. According to Ernest Gellner,
“by linking dislike of the Other to citizenship rights, nationalism turns xenophobia from
what may, in favourable circumstances, be a mere human foible, into a destructive, dan-
gerous force.” E. Gellner, “Nationalism and Xenophobia,” in New Xenophobia in Europe,
ed. B. Baumgartl and A. Favell (London-the Hague-Boston, 1995), p. 7.

ances offers a shelter from deep uncertainty, an easily accessible
home, liberation from mysteries, questions, anxiety and loneliness,
promising, at the same time, ‘a better tomorrow.’ However, this world
can only be entered through the renunciation of one’s own reason,
conscience and responsibility, which are surrendered to the super-
ior carriers of a given ideology.”
12
The yearning for a community,
the appeal to values, and the discovery of one’s own identity in order
to fulfil the need for roots constitute the main points of reference of
contemporary populism. As Ryszard Kapuściński rightly observes,
populist leaders take advantage of the “natural tendency of the
uprooted (and uprooting gives rise to agonising fear and confusion)
to find an identity, promising to fulfil their dream.”
13
Pascal
Bruckner speaks about the same relationship in a different way:
“Fearing the future, fearing the unknown, fearing the loss of one’s
own identity or failing to realise it, fearing the ‘other,’ yearning for
the former glories, the ‘average man’ tries to find relief in belonging
to a mass and being faithful to the leader, who acts towards him in
accordance with the principles of ‘reverse psychoanalysis,’ reinforc-
ing all his frustrations and aggression to prevent the realisation of
his personal independence.”
14
These problems correspond with the crisis in political communi-
ties, manifesting itself in distrust towards the ruling elites.
15
They
are perceived as incapable of meeting the expectations of the citi-
zens, or of solving problems connected with the process of European
integration. Consequently, it can be heard that “the time has come to
put an end to the influence of various interest groups and give the
society a bigger role to play in the decision-making process.”
16
Other scholars raise similar problems. For example, Paweł
Kozłowski writes that “the basis of democracy, according to a popu-
list, is a simple man, the government should be in the hands of sim-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
76
12
M. Vlk, Nie żyć w kłamstwie i nienawiści (Lublin, 2000), pp. 14–15.
13
R. Kapuściński, “Współczesne patologie władzy a banalność zła,” in Sacrum i kultura.
Chrześcijańskie korzenie przyszłości, ed. R. Rubinkowicz and S. Zięba, (Lublin, 2000), p.
94.
14
Cit. in N. Popov, Serbski dramat (Warsaw, 1994), p. 9.
15
A. W. Jabłoński, “Społeczeństwo obywatelskie–wprowadzenie do analizy politolog-
icznej,” Politologia wrocławska, pp. 43–46.
16
E. O. Ericksen, “Towards the Post Corporate State?” Scandinavian Political Studies 4
(1990): p. 358.

ple people . . . the rule of the simple people. Power should be exer-
cised by the people, intermediary institutions distort it, and profes-
sional politicians become degenerate and live off the people. The
postulated return to democracy is, to some extent, a return to the
Greek ideal—direct participation and involvement of all.”
17
It can be
observed that the return to this ideal is possible only in a commu-
nity based on the principles of brotherhood and social solidarity.
The ideal of the populist vision of the world is a small community
based on the principles of brotherhood and social solidarity. Each
individual aspiring to government should rely on the concealed val-
ues inherent in the nation, the people, and the society.
Distrusting politicians, populists put all their trust in the ordinary
people. Consequently, the will of the people is supreme in relation to
the traditional institutions and elites. The will of the people is identi-
fied with justice and morality. Populism, with its distrust of intellec-
tuals, always emerges together with the ideology of social enmity
towards the existing social order established by the stable ruling
class. The idea that whatever the people want must be right leads to
a rejection of professionalism, of constitutional limitations, or of the
existing legal system.
This idealisation of the people and the society is accompanied by a
depreciation of the elites. In the light of the above, P. Kozłowski’s sug-
gestion is hardly surprising: “In populism, the basis of activity is to
be found in the will rather than in qualifications and competence:
everyone can govern as long as his intentions are honest. Populism
is distinguished by distrust and dislike of politics and professional
politicians, the repulsion is supported by a moral sanction and eth-
ical condemnation: ‘an honest man does not meddle in politics.’”
18
Distrust and dislike of professional politicians lead to all kinds of
conspiracy theories. The populists point to secret plots and conspir-
acies aimed against the nation. Foreigners, Jews and Freemasons
pose a threat to the community because they undermine its basis by
introducing their own culture. On the other hand, those who occupy
higher positions in the social hierarchy are represented as dishon-
est. Ryszard Kapuściński writes that “the perception of the OTHER
as a threat, as a representative of alien and destructive forces was
shared by all nationalistic, authoritarian and totalitarian regime of
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
77
17
P. Kozłowski, Szukanie sensu, czyli o naszej wielkiej zmianie, p. 115.
18
Ibid., p. 118.

our epoch. It is a universal cultural phenomenon and, unfortunately,
no civilisation proved immune to the pathology of hatred, contempt,
and destruction instilled by leaders and ideologists.”
19
These fea-
tures are characteristic of new populism as a whole.
New populism in Western Europe
We shall begin our brief review with Switzerland, generally regard-
ed as a country with a stable political system.
20
In the elections of
1995, the People’s Party won 14.9% of the vote.
21
The representation
of particular political parties in the National Council and the
Council of the Cantons after the elections of 24 October 1999 is
shown in the table 1.
TABLE 1
THE REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Political Party % National Council 
Council of Cantons
200 seats 46 seats 
People’s Party 22.5 44 7
Schweizerische Volkspartei
Parti Suisse de I’Union Démocratique du Centre
SVP 
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz 22.5 51 6
Parti Socialiste Suisse 
SPS 
Radical-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz 19.9 43 18 
Parti Radical-Démocratique Suisse
FDP 
Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz 15.8 35 15 
Parti Démocratie-Chrétien Suisse
CVP 
Source: <http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/switzerland.htm>.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
78
19
R. Kapuściński, “Współczesne patologie władzy a banalność zła,” p. 96.
20
H.-G. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 21–22; U. Altermatt,
“Xenophobie und Superpatriotismus. Die populistische Anti-Überfremdungsbewegung
in der Schweiz der sechziger und siebziger Jahre,” Fashismus in Österreich und inter-
national. Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 1980/1981 (Wien, 1982), pp. 167–193; M. Ebel and P.
Fiala, Sous le consensus de la xénophobie. Paroles, arguments, contextes (1961-1981)
(Lausanne, 1983); U. Altermatt, Sarajewo przestrzega. Etnonacjonalizm w Europie
(Kraków, 1998), p. 250.
21
U. Altermatt, Sarajewo przestrzega, p. 251.

The high position of the People’s Party, in which the populists play
a major role, is particularly interesting. Table 2 shows the influence
of the openly populist parties.
TABLE 2
THE INFLUENCE OF THE OPENLY POPULIST PARTIES
Political Party % National Council
Council ofCantons
200 seats 46 seats 
Schweizer Demokraten 1.8 1 - 
SD 
Lega dei Tiscinese 0.9 2 -
LdT 
Freiheitspartei der Schweiz 0.9 - -
FPS 
Source: Ibid.
TABLE 3
THE RESULTS OF THE LATEST ELECTIONS
Political Party % National Federal
Council Council
183 seats 64 seats
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österrichs 33.2 65 24
SPÖ 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 26.9 52 14
FPÖ 
Freedom Party 26.9 52 26
Österreichische Volkspartei
ÖVP 
Source: <http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/austria.htm>.
Perhaps the greatest confusion on the international political scene
was caused by the Austrian Freedom Party headed by Jörg
Haider.
22
Beginning with 5% support in 1983, the party steadily
increased its influence among the electorate. In subsequent elec-
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
79
22
H.-G. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 11–13, 49–52; E.
Wakolbinger, “Austria. The Danger of Populism,” New Xenophobia in Europe, pp. 10–27.

tions to the National Council the party won 9.7% (1986), 16.6% (1990),
22.5% (1994) and 21.9% (the early elections in 1995), to find itself in the
company of the leading political forces in the country after the most
recent elections (see table 3).
The election success of the Freedom Party, its participation in the
coalition government, and its ideas caused heated discussions
among politicians and scholars. The EU member countries, appre-
hensive of having a populist party in power, imposed political sanc-
tions on Austria. There were different opinions regarding the char-
acter of that party and the decision of the European community. For
example, the editor-in-chief of the Austrian daily Die Preisse, Andreas
Unterberger, wrote that “if that party, regardless of its incohesion
and populist flexibility can be regarded as having any ideological
identity at all, then I would situate it somewhere in between the
Thatcherite wing of the British Tories, the Northern League of
Umberto Bossi, the French Gaullist Pasqua, who, amidst anti-
European slogans, turned away from Jacques Chirac, the American
Republicans, and the Bavarian CSU. As long as it was in opposition,
Haider’s FPÖ, was characterised by populism, and, depending on
what could attract more votes at any given time, it was either pro—
or anti-European.”
23
It can be argued that the problem can be
reduced to the fact that, having entered the government coalition,
the party signed a declaration supporting the process of expansion
of the European Union. On the other hand, many of the party mem-
bers are opposed to that declaration.
24
Hans Rauscher is partly right when he writes that “the Austrians
expect that those at the top will finally take care of them and guar-
antee their most beloved security. . . . That is why one third of the
voters support Haider. They cannot appreciate his Nazi nostalgia,
they buy his slogans against foreigners . . . the workers are the
biggest losers of both European integration and globalisation. It is
they who lose most as a result of increased competition. And Haider
promises them a better socialism, or, strictly speaking, national
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
80
23
A. Unterberger, “Melanż wielu barw,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 26–27 February 2000, p. 17. Cf.
A. Pelinka, “Sto dni czarno-niebieskich,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 13–14 May 2000, p. 8.
24
Cf. A. Rubinowicz, “I za, i przeciw,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 March 2000, p. 10; “Fragmenty
Deklaracji koalicji Partii Ludowej i Partii Wolności,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 February
2000, p. 8; Declaration. Responsibility for Austria—A Future in the Heart of Europe,
<http://www.fpoe.at/english/declaration.htm>.

socialism. He promises the workers secure jobs by isolating the
country from abroad, from the Union, from imports from Third
World countries, and, most of all, by closing the borders to foreign-
ers.”
25
On the other hand, he is wrong when he gives the name of
national socialism to what is simply populism.
26
Another populist movement is the National Front in France.
Founded in 1972, it became a protest movement against the influx of
immigrants and economic problems. The National Front champions
peace and order, family and the motherland, tradition and reli-
gion.
27
A return to traditional values is seen as a remedy for the
problems facing French society. Its ideal is a strong national state.
28
Consequently, the National Front exhibits a negative attitude
towards European integration and NATO institutions. It supports
the preferential treatment of the French and the imposition of
restrictions on the number of immigrants.
29
It was founded by Jean-
Marie Le Pen, a charismatic leader inspired by the ideas of
Poujadism.
30
Opinions regarding Le Pen are highly diversified. For
example, “For some Le Pen is a clown, making use of comic gestures
and wanton rhetoric. For others, an irresponsible populist who criti-
cises the basis of the republican system, and always juxtaposes the
number of the unemployed to the number of foreigners who must be
removed from France.”
31
In the elections of 1981, the party won only
0.2% of the vote. In 1986, electoral support rose to 9.9% and the
extreme right won 35 seats in the National Assembly. As a result of
changes in the election law, the number of its deputies in the
National Assembly was reduced to one. In the elections of 1993, the
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
81
25
H. Rauscher, “Modre oczy Jörga Haidera,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 9–10 October 1999, pp.
22–23.
26
Cf. P. Johnson, “That’s Populism, Not Fascism,” World Press Review, October 1994, pp.
51–52.
27
Front National, Pour la France; Programme du Front National (Paris, 1985); H.-G. Betz,
Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 13–17, 52–55.
28
The Front National Real Politics! <http://www.front-nat.fr/anglais/indexc.htm>.
29
B. N. Grindel, “Anti-Immigrant Agitation in 20th Century France; the National Front as
an Example of Long Held Political Beliefs” (paper presented at the international con-
ference ISSEI, Bergen, 14–18 August 2000).
30
J. M. Le Pen, Nadzieja. Rozważania o Francji i Europie (Warsaw, 1994); Encyklopedia
politologii, t. 4, Myśl społeczna i ruchy polityczne współczesnego świata, ed. M.
Marczewska-Rytko and E. Olszewski (Kraków: Zakamycze, 2000), p. 293.
31
R. Sołtysik, “Klęska na życzenie,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 7–8 June 1997, pp. 12–13.

Front won 12.7% of the vote, and in the presidential elections in 1988
Le Pen gained the support of 14.4% of the voters. In 1995, his electoral
support was much the same (15%). The position of the National Front
in the National Assembly is shown in the table 4.
TABLE 4
1997 ELECTIONS
Political Party % National
Assembly
577 seats 
Parti Socialiste 23.5 241
PS 
Rassemblement pour la République 15.7 134 
RPR 
Front National 14.9 1
FN 
Source: <http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/france.htm>.
In Italy, there are two political parties representing the populist
movement: the Northern League and the Forza Italia.
32
The
Northern League was founded as a party of protest against the polit-
ical establishment compromised by a series of corruption scandals,
and their brethren in the south of Italy. In the parliamentary elec-
tions of 1994, the party won 8.5% of the vote. The Forza Italia move-
ment headed by the Milan media mogul Silvio Berlusconi was
formed in the spring of 1994.
33
Having won the elections with 21% of
the vote, Silvio Berlusconi became the prime minister. The Forza
Italia formed a coalition government together with the Northern
League and the neo-fascist National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)
34
which ruled the country for 7 months.
In the elections of 21 April 1996, the above-mentioned parties won
considerable electoral support (see table 5). The year 2001 was the
year of S. Berlusconi’s great victory.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
82
32
H.-G. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 7–10, 47–49.
33
Forza Italia, <http://www.forza-italia.it/english/english.htm>.
34
The Latest News from Alleanza Nazionale,
<http://www.alleanza-nazionale.it/index2_eng.htm>.

TABLE 5
1996 ELECTIONS
Political Party % Chamber
of 
Deputies
630 seats 
Forza Italia 20.6 123 
FI 
Alleanza Nazionale 15.7 93
AN 
Lega Nord 10.1 59
LN 
Source: <http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/italy.htm>.
Drawing the ideological portrait of the Northern League, Zbigniew
Mikołejko writes: ”The leader of the Northern League Umberto
Bossi, after ‘the three-day march towards the sea,’ declared
Padania’s independence in Venice in September. Padania is a non-
existent country, which never existed but is assumed to emerge from
the supposed historical, cultural, and socio-economic identity of the
people of the Padana Valley. Although such myths are assumed to
have a long history, their real origins can be traced to the contem-
porary bourgeoisie of Venice, Lombardy and Piedmont.”
35
Similar tendencies can be observed in other countries: Parties of
Progress were formed in Denmark (2.4% of the vote in the elections
of 11 March 1998), Norway (15.3% of the vote in the elections of 15
September 1997) and Sweden; in Finland, the Party of the Rural
Population was formed (after success in the 1980s, its role is now
marginal); the Flemish Bloc plays an important role in Belgium (9.9%
of the vote in the elections of 13 June 1999), as well as the Front
National (1.5% in the elections of 1999); in Germany, The
Republikaner.
36
New populism in Poland
In ideological terms, elements of the populist tradition have often
been combined with elements of Christian-nationalist or socialist
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
83
35
Z. Mikołejko, “Niepodległość utopii,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 7–8 December 1996, pp. 23–24.
36
Cf. H.-G. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, pp. 17–21; C. Mudde, The
Ideology of the Extreme Right, pp. 25–115.

traditions in Poland.
37
The canon of populist values has become the
basis for different kinds of populism (in the institutional sense), and
populist tendencies can be observed in different social and political
currents.
38
Its practical aspects have been determined by the need
for solutions proposed by populists and social consent.
“Self-Defence” emerged as a form of defending the people who
took bank loans and as a result of rising interest rates were unable
to repay them (hence the slogan “we will not abandon the land
where our debt was born”). Very soon the movement, which in the
early stages of its development became notorious for physically
removing the representatives of the establishment on wheelbarrows
and organising roadblocks, turned into a political movement. It
declared that “no negotiations with the representatives of the ruling
elites make any sense, since they are determined to realise foreign
interests. We must organise resistance against the plunderers of
national property. . . .”
39
Other documents of the movement also con-
tain slogans attacking the establishment. In one of the interviews,
Andrzej Lepper, the leader of “Self-Defence” said: “I and ‘Self-
Defence’ as a whole want to live in Poland, not in the country sold out
to foreigners.”
40 
In the elections of 23 September 2001, “Self-
Defence” won considerable electoral support, almost 10% of the vote.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
84
37
Cf. J. Raciborski, “Determinanty procesu krystalizacji preferencji wyborczych,” in
Polska scena polityczna a wybory, ed. S. Gebethner (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 121–125; S.
Gebethner, “Osiemnaście miesięcy rozczłonkowanego parlamentu,” in Polska scena
polityczna a wybory, pp. 28–30; R. Gortat, “Czy stabilizacja sceny politycznej?” in Polska
scena polityczna a wybory, pp. 49–53.
38
See also M. Marczewska-Rytko, “Populist Movements in the Process of Transformation
in Poland—1989–2000,” in Approaching a New Millennium: Lessons from the Past—
Prospects for the Future, ed. D. Apollon, O.-B. Fure and L. Svåsand, (Bergen, 2000), CD.
39
The Appeal to the Polish People proclaims “The present ruling caste does identify itself
with the fate of the nation, and carries out tasks imposed upon it by foreign economic
and political centres. . .” (“Merkuriusz. Biuletyn Partii i Ugrupowań Politycznych,” 1993,
no. 4, p. 19). In the Declaration of  23 September 1993, the group commented upon the
election results in the following way: “Some of the main manipulators . . . working
towards Poland’s loss of independence have become members of parliament. These
views [expressed by the Western centres, that little or nothing will change in the direc-
tion of transformations] must be based on some grounds. These are dangerous signals,
indicating that the tired and economically deprived Polish society has again been sub-
jected to clever manipulation. . . . ” (“Merkuriusz. Biuletyn Partii i Ugrupowań
Politycznych,” 1993, no. 18, p. 7).
40
Jacek Żakowski’s interview with Andrzej Lepper, “Nie chcemy dużo: jakieś 60 bilionów,”
Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 August 1993, pp. 10–11.

The documents of the “Polish Agreement” (Porozumienie Polskie)
Party, formed before the presidential elections in 2000, refer to
threats to Polish national identity and the nation from the European
Union. In a letter to Poles abroad, Jan Łopuszański identifies the
imminent dangers: “In the present situation there are threats to
Polish property, Polish jobs, Polish industry, agriculture and trade,
as well as to Polish scientific potential. The attributes of national sov-
ereignty are being handed over to supranational organisations.
Polish patriotism is treacherously destroyed, to be replaced by the
models of consumer civilisation.” The presidential candidate finds
this situation horrifying and so believes that “it is our duty to inter-
rupt this process of the destruction of our Nation and State.” And
this, according to him, requires “a referendum on Poland’s accession
to the European Union,” in which “the nation, increasingly aware of the
dangers will reject the temptation of giving up the responsibility for
the Nation’s future to foreigners.”
41
Similar arguments are advanced
by political groups on the extreme right of the Polish political scene
and by Radio Maryja backed by the Polish Catholic Church.
42
Many
nationalistic groups point to the threats to Polish national identity.
They do not accept the integration process, which they regard as
contrary to Poland’s national interests and Polish cultural and na-
tional identity. There are also other opinions. For example, another
presidential candidate, Andrzej Olechowski, declares that “xeno-
phobia . . ., hostility towards others and the belief that they want to
harm us, threaten our cooperation, solidarity and cohesion. . . . It
dims our sight and leads to false conclusions. A person who fears
others will not leave his house, when his neighbours tell him that it is
on fire.”
43
It seems that the problem of Jedwabne and the reception of Jan
Tomasz Gross’s Neighbours offered an opportunity for a broader
look at the problem of xenophobia in Poland. In the editorial discus-
sion published in Res Publica Nowa, Marcin Król stated that “if many
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
85
41
“Polska Scena Polityczna. Vademecum Partii i Ugrupowań Politycznych,” List do
Polonii, 2000, no. 10, pp. 9–10.
42
Cf. J. Kornaś, “Problem przystąpienia Polski do Unii Europejskiej w świetle poglądów
środowisk narodowych,” in Polska między Zachodem a Wschodem w dobie integracji
europejskiej, ed. M. Marczewska-Rytko (Lublin, 2001).
43
A. Olechowski, “Przejdźmy do konkretów,”
<http://www.olechowski.pl/new/ksenofobia.htm>.

Western countries tolerate marginal neo-fascist movements, then in
Poland, after the exposure of the massacre in Jedwabne, it turned
out that such attitudes are more widespread.”
44
Even if we decide
that his emphasis is not quite right, the importance of placing the
debate in a larger historical and geographical context is manifest.
Paweł Śpiewak points to the need for a discussion on national prob-
lems, on the problem of patriotism, since the dominant conception of
the nation is based on the idea of exclusion. It can also be observed
in anti-Semitism, not only the active and openly declared anti-
Semitism, but also anti-Semitism on the level of cultural models.
45
In
this context, certain observations of Jürgen Habermas are particu-
larly valuable. He deemed it necessary to create a new patriotism,
liberated from ethnic and cultural ties. This postulated patriotism
would denote participation in the same public institutions, voting in
the same elections, and making joint political choices. Thus, civil
patriotism would replace ethnic and cultural patriotism. Comment-
ing on this question, J. M. Rokita observed that “the history of the
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the history of totalitarian-
ism, the two world wars, point to the necessity of building the com-
mon good, which is the transnational good . . . it is perhaps more
important than the national interest.”
46
Marek Zaleski’s observa-
tion acquires a special significance in this context: “Fundamentalism
manifests itself not only on the occasion of Jedwabne but has been
with us for at least the last ten years, when the questions of liberal
democracy or problems connected with the entry to Europe have
been discussed. It is as if the Poles had a special mission of saving
Europe plunged in the sloth of liberalism. After all, the Poles were
the defenders of Christianity, Christ of the nations, and now they
have the Pope with his vision of evangelisation and ecumeny on the
global scale. That is why they have special rights, they are in posses-
sion of a special interpretation of the history of the Church and his-
tory of the world as a whole. This mode of thinking will always get in
the way of a serious discussion of not only the sin of anti-Semitism
but also of our future, ourselves, and our place in Europe.”
47
What
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
86
44
“Akt skruchy i co dalej?”, Res Publica Nowa, July 2001, p. 6.
45
Ibid., p. 8.
46
J. M. Rokita, “Czy zjednoczona Europa oznacza kryzys patriotyzmu?”
<http://republika.pl/fotomedia99/rokita.html>.
47
“Akt skruchy i co dalej?”, p. 9.

solutions can be adopted then? Of course, we can believe in the
power of the truth. However, what is important is discussion, educa-
tion, a critical view of the past, a closer look at the glorified values,
and the discovery that the heating up of imaginary conflicts between
different social groups fosters all kinds of populist tendencies.
Concluding remarks
The above considerations suggest certain conclusions. First of all, at
the beginning of the twentyfirst century, populist movements consti-
tute a part of the European political scene. They attach great impor-
tance to national values, the sense of national identity, and at the
same time adopt a hostile attitude towards the “others.”
Second, populist parties advance a bi-polar vision of the world,
with a wise, worthy and deceived nation at one end, and the political
elites bringing the country to ruin at the other. An important role is
played here by the theory, or rather theories of plots and conspir-
acies.
Third, the fears evoked by the integration process and the ongoing
processes of globalisation offer a perfect opportunity to populist
politicians. They support continuing state control and the paternal-
ism of the state, as well as a return to religious values and the nation-
al tradition. As a result of the above processes, uprooted groups turn
their attention to the state, which is expected to restore the cohesion
of the previous systems and to provide protection. The populist
vision seems to alleviate the fear of the disappearance of traditional
values among universal values.
Fourth, a Europe moving towards unity must adopt some models to
counteract the negative phenomena outlined above. Various solu-
tions are proposed, from administrative prohibitions and provisions
of the penal code to social ostracism. However, such proposals are
not approved by many groups within society. At the same time,
according to the predominant view, the most effective measure is
moral protest: consistent and unambiguous condemnation of all
racist acts and xenophobia.
T HE P ROBLEM OF X ENOPHOBIA
87



HATE SPEECH IN RUSSIA:
OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
AND MEANS FOR COUNTERACTION
TANYA L OKSHINA
Introduction
Public racist statements and comments as well as incitements to
ethnic and religious hatred/hostility (i.e. hate speech) are becoming
ever more widespread in Russia in recent years. Such an up trend
has been observed not only in marginal circles but also in the main-
stream, even among high-profile state servants and politicians.
There seem to be several reasons for the growth of hate speech in
Russia. Among them we can particularly note the over-all expansion
of racist feelings in society and a decline in tolerance in relation to
“other” cultures and religions in the context of the difficult social and
economic situation of the larger part of the population. Another
important reason is the connivance of public officials with regard to
open manifestations of racism, as well as manipulation of racist
views among the public by individual representatives of the author-
ities with the purpose of achieving their political goals. Misjudgment
and underestimation of the problem of hate speech by journalists
and editors, a weak reaction of society in general and of the NGO
community in particular are also factors conducive to further de-
terioration of the situation.
The combination of these negative factors results in a lack of pub-
lic dialogue on hate speech and related issues. The current situation
is paradoxical: while dissemination of hate speech is advancing with
alarming speed, practically everyone pretends that nothing out of
the ordinary is taking place in the country. Consequently, many of
those who spread hate speech move on from words to action, par-
ticularly youth groups of skin-heads and such. The number of inci-
dents of violence against representatives of ethnic and religious
minorities in different localities across the country is increasing at a
89

distressing pace. The longer such a situation persists, the more dif-
ficult will be the task of changing the attitude of the public towards
this dangerous phenomenon and remedying the harm.
Hate Speech/Xenophobia
and the Russian State
On the federal level, war propaganda or incitement to discrimin-
ation and violence are not carried out, at least not openly. In 1999,
the militaristic rhetoric among top federal officials during the first
days of the Balkan crisis never ventured beyond repetitive warnings
of a “threat of the third world war,” and their strong statements at
the onset of military actions in Dagestan and, later on, in the
Chechen Republic, were addressed exclusively to “terrorists,” “ban-
dits,” “Islamic extremists,” and so forth.
At the same time, it should be noted that fervent appeals to mili-
taristic values in connection with military actions in Chechnya
(“fight the war until the victorious end!”) began to be used quite
actively by the federal authorities as a factor in political life.
Vladimir Putin succeeded in gaining unanticipated popularity par-
ticularly owing to the fact that he had positioned himself as a sup-
porter of “decisive actions.”
1
Moreover, in 1999, the federal-level mass-media was riddled with
statements and comments of a more than radical nature. By way of
an example, the host of a prominent analytical program regularly
broadcast by the ORT Channel (country-wide coverage, state-con-
trolled) publicly suggested that the entire territory of Chechnya be
subjected to “carpet-bombings” and that it should be “cover[ed] with
asphalt.”
2
It should be stated that the position of the authorities and the mass-
media bodies corresponded to general public feeling. In 1999, accord-
ing to sociological surveys, 64% of the Russian population approved
of the actions of the military in Chechnya, and 55% were against
negotiations with the Chechen leaders. By January 2000, this trend in
public opinion was only reinforced: 67% and 62% respectively.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
90
1
See the Collection of Reports of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Human Rights in Russian
Regions–1999, <www.mhg.ru>, Section “Ban on Propaganda of War and the Instigation
of Discrimination and Violence.”
2
A. Ivanov, “Will They Drop an Atomic Bomb on the Terrorists?” Argumenty i Fakty 37
(1999).

Public opinion is certainly sensitive to the influence of state power
and especially to that of the mass-media. However, in this case, one
can observe a very vivid contrast with the public attitude dating
back three years from 1999 to the period of the first Chechen war,
when practically the same percentage of people that now approve of
the campaigns had negative feelings about the military action. This
very contrast allows us to suggest that it is more likely that the
authorities captured the attitude of the public, than that they formed
the requisite public opinion.
To develop this point further, we shall refer to a very thorough art-
icle by Lev Gudkov “Antisemitism in the Post-Soviet Russia”
3
that
sums up the results of numerous relevant surveys by the VTSIOM
(All-Russian Center of Research in Public Opinion) up to 1997, not
only in relation to Jews but concerning other traditionally “attention-
getting” ethnic groups.
The author states that in the 1990s national xenophobia shifted
from the peoples of the near abroad to Russia’s own “aliens.” The
Chechens have been at the top of this list since 1993, that is long
before the first war and even much before the start of organized,
pre-war propaganda. Let us note that in 1997, in response to the
question “which peoples inflame national hatred?” 57% of respond-
ents referred to the Chechens, 38% to other peoples of the Northern
Caucasus, 24% to the Azerbaijani (referring to those residing in the
territory of Russia). Only then did the ranking include the so-called
external “enemies,” and in a very unobvious sequence at that: the
Estonians, the Georgians, the Tajiks. It is also interesting that the
Azerbaijani, known to the great majority of the population of
Russian localities as a people trading at clothing and farm markets,
proved to be perceived far more negatively than the Vietnamese,
also represented mostly at clothing and farm markets, but still men-
tioned by only 2% of respondents. Xenophobia, therefore, has no
absolute character; on the contrary, it is clearly directed.
Interestingly enough, Jews proved to be far behind on the list of
“enemies”: only 6% of respondents indicated them. (By way of com-
parison, 4% of respondents referred to the Russians.) Antisemitism
now seems to be an ideological phenomenon rather than an every-
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
91
3
Collection of articles Intolerance in Russia: Old and New Forms, ed. G. Vitkovskaya and
A. Malashenko, (Moscow: Moscow Center Carnegie, 1999), p. 196.

day-life problem. Indeed, in 1997, in answer to the question “How
would you feel if your sister, daughter married a Jew?” 55% of
respondents chose the answer “I would have nothing against it,”
which, taking into consideration the formulation of the question, test-
ifies to a relatively high level of tolerance.
It is also worth noting that of all the social layers in Russia, the
most xenophobic ones are students of vocational and training
schools, students of troubled high schools, and surprisingly enough,
officials and professionals with higher education and of mature age.
It is rather sad to observe that the proverbial Soviet intelligentsia
has fallen that low.
Going back to more current statistics, by 2000, as many as 70% of
Muscovites entertained negative feelings towards the Chechens.
4
Notably, after the August 2000 explosion in the Pushkinskaya Square
underpass, 65% of Muscovites started supporting the idea of having
all members of Caucasus-origin ethnic groups deported from
Moscow; 57% of respondents demanded that terrorists’ locations be
attacked with the use of all available weapons.
5
Although over the course of 2000, as in the 1990s, the authorities
did not openly propagate war, discrimination or violence, there was
no serious official effort made to check propagation of the senti-
ments described above. It suffices to recall the statements made by
some politicians and officials following the aforementioned terrorist
act in Pushkinskaya Square.
Admittedly, the remarks initially made by the President of the
Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, were balanced and appropriate:
Speaking about the terrorist act, I should point out that it would be a mistake to
search for an ethnic or Chechen connection, or any other connection of that sort in
the course of investigating this crime. . . . It is not right to brand an entire ethnic com-
munity. The criminals and terrorists have neither nationality nor religious affiliation.
6
However, while speaking on the subject of international terrorism,
President Putin eventually linked the terrorist act to Chechnya: 
Clearly, mankind has not produced any other cure (for terrorism) than an adequate
response. We must bring our effort in the Northern Caucasus to its logical comple-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
92
4
T. Muzaev, “When There is no Tap Water,” Russkaya Mysl, no. 4338, 2000.
5
I. Buldakova, “Balanced Comment On Pogroms,” Argumenty i Fakty 33 (2000).
6
Cited from a report carried by the Lenta.ru website, (9 August 2000).

tion: the terrorists must be gotten out of their lair. People in the Russian Federation’s
other territories must be protected against such acts.
Unlike the Russian President, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov had as
early as the night following the underpass explosion, no doubt that
there was “clear evidence of a Chechen connection” to the terrorist
act. Admittedly, he then added: “Of course, one must distinguish
between the rascals and normal people.”
7
Since the early 1990s, a number of open nationalists have been
occupying top positions of power in the country.
In 1994 the State Committee of Print (currently, the Ministry of
Print) was headed by Boris Mironov—a genuine Nazi. He used to say
openly about himself, “I am a hard-core nationalist,” and when
accused of being a fascist proudly replied, “If Russian nationalism is
fascism, then I am a fascist.”
8
Among his publications, there is book
On the Indispensability of a National Revolt, whose opening para-
graph runs as follows:
Kikes have captured Russia and hold it in their greedy sticky hands. They stole the
power, courts, money, oil, gas, energy, plants, factories, TV, radio, newspapers . . .
torment the Russian people, drive it to destruction with hunger, clod, fear, unemploy-
ment, extreme poverty, eradicate Russian national spirit, Russian national conscious-
ness, and turn the Russian youth into their slaves.
Admittedly, this piece of art came out only in 1999, long after the
end of Mr. Mironov’s ministerial career. However, the very fact that
such an odious and grotesque character managed to stay in the
office of Minister of Print for almost a full year testifies to a very
high tolerance among Russia’s top executive power leaders to
nationalism in all forms.
Today, the authorities maintain a more decent front and there are
no ministers publicly professing such ideas. Unfortunately, this can-
not be said of regional leaders. The biggest hate speech champion
among Russian governors was indubitably the great crusader
against Zionism and relentless persecutor of the Meskheti Turks,
Nikolai Kondratenko, the former Governor of Krasnodar Region.
Among his many verbal gems, the following is illustrative:
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
93
7
Cited from a report carried by the Lenta.ru website, (8 August 2000).
8
Quoted from A. Verkhovsky, A. Papp and V. Pribylovsky, Political Extremism in Russia
(Moscow, 1996).

I have always called for a rebellion. However, the Russian people refused to listen
to me and went to the polls. 37% of voters cast their ballots for the Communists, and
60% for the Jews! . . . Look closer at what is happening in Moscow. One can
already see a new Zionist, à la Kazan state taking shape. That is why we do not have
Russians in high-level positions? Today’s Moscow appears to have room enough to
accommodate the Israeli Mossad, the American CIA, NATO, etc.
9
Upon the expiration of his second term, Kondratenko left guber-
natorial office, allegedly owing to pressure from the federal center.
The pressure, if there was such, came from behind closed doors, and
the mass media could refer only to certain unconfirmed rumours in
this respect. In any case, from the gubernatorial office Kondratenko
proceeded straight to the Federation Council (Upper House of
Parliament), where he proudly represents Krasnodar region to this
day.
The top hate speech governor for the year 2000 was the then-newly
elected head of the Kursk region, Mikhailov, who stated in his after-
election interview to Kommersant-Daily that the fact that he had
managed to defeat Rutskoy, his main opponent in the election race,
signified that President Putin was on his side, also struggling against
Jewish dominance. To quote:
Do you know what AJC stands for? It means the All-Russian Jewish Congress.
Today we are dealing with a whole organization here, rather than with some individu-
al. You know who Rutskoy [Mikhailov’s main opponent in the election race] is, but
you probably do not know that Boris Berezovsky has been backing him. And now we
are the winners in this region. I believe this is indicative of a new effort underway to
eventually liberate Russia from all the rot that has accumulated over the past decade.
This is where we are allies with, rather than opponents of, the Russian President. To
underscore, Vladimir Vladimirovich is a Russian man. So am I. For your information,
Rutskoy’s mother, Zinaida Iosifovna, is Jewish.
10
Undoubtedly the President did not appreciate this remark.
However, no official critique followed. Instead, the presidential
plenipotentiary representative for the Central federal district held a
closed meeting with Mikhailov. After that meeting, at which no jour-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
94
9
Quoted from the Collection of Reports of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Human Rights in
Russian Regions–1999, <www.mhg.ru>, Section “Ban on Propaganda of War and the
Instigation of Discrimination and Violence.”
10
E. Kondratyeva, “From Governor to Anti-Semite–National Discord,” Kommersant, 7
December 2000.

nalists were allowed and on which the plenipotentiary never com-
mented, Governor Mikhailov publicly sent his “regrets to A. V.
Rutskoy and his mother” and assured the public that he treated
members of all ethnic communities with respect.
11
His apology indi-
rectly testifies to the fact that pressure must have been exerted over
the too eloquent and unreserved Governor. But again, this pressure
was covert.
The Mikhailov case can, of course, be viewed as a standard ex-
ample of how Russian authorities handle manifestations of anti-
semitism and other forms of xenophobia. The federal executives’
position on those sorts of pronouncements was in that case quite
explicit. However, it was voiced by a presidential representative
rather than by the Russian President himself. Also, the plenipoten-
tiary met with Mikhailov after a delay of several days, a fact read by
the mainstream mass media as too lengthy a pause or even as an
indication of confusion. Notably, the Prosecutor General’s Office
refused to open an investigation into the case, explaining that
Mikhailov’s remarks “were an isolated occurrence,” “had no conse-
quences,”
12
and that Mikhailov himself had publicly expressed his
regrets over the matter.
13
In addition, the regional prosecutor’s
office refused to see any signs of an offence in the given case.
14
Two
State Duma deputies (from the CPRF and “Unity” factions) tabled a
motion to have a special statement passed condemning all anti-
Semitic manifestations and calling on the President of the Russian
Federation to look into the developments in Kursk.
15
But the State
Duma has been persistently refusing to put the issue on the agenda—
four refusals up to August 2001.
The Parliament also represents a truly fascinating field for hate
speech research. One of the most infamous stories connected with
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
95
11
A report carried by the Strana.ru website (15 January 2000). Notably, this failed to pre-
vent another incident in the same vein. The former Vice-Governor, Sergey Maksachev,
was beaten in the regional administration building. Maksachev’s attackers were from
the newly elected governor’s staff (with one of those, according to the victim, introduc-
ing himself as a GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) lieutenant general and Deputy
Governor Vasily Oleinikov), and accompanied their assault with antisemitic invective.
12
This description of the assault on Maksachev is incorrect, for obvious reasons.
13
E. Kondratyeva, “Governor to Anti-Semite–National Discord,” Kommersant, 7 Decem-
ber 2000.
14
“Asked and Was Forgiven,” Tribuna, 25 December 2000.
15
A. Sadchikov, “Jews Are the Engine of Progress,” Izvestiya, 23 November 2000.

the former State Duma (Lower House of Parliament) is the case of a
then-deputy General Makashov, who made very strong antisemitic
statements at a meeting in October 1998. A relevant criminal suit
was filed but the case never moved to trial (the charges were modi-
fied and resubmitted several times; several expert evaluations were
carried out, etc.). Meanwhile, several months later, in February of
1999, he spoke at an assembly of the Cossack Army of the Don and
specifically declared that the Movement in Support of the Army, led
by him, could also justly be called the Movement against Kikes.
Another leader of this movement, V. Ilyukhin, who also headed the
national Security Committee in the former Duma, in the course of
hearings on the issue of President Eltysin’s impeachment, stated
that one of the reasons for Eltsyn’s “anti-people” politics is that Jews
are among the members of the RF Government. Despite the fact that
the situation with Makashov and Ilyukhin caused quite an outcry in
democratic circles and among the mass-media, the CPRF, to which
both Ilyukhin and Makashov belong and which they, accordingly,
represent in the Duma, refrained from coming out with a univocal
condemnation of its members’ anti-Semitic statements. Instead, the
CPRF leaders uttered general comments on the inappropriateness
of “disrespectful treatment of any people” and disapproval of anti-
semitism together with “Zionism and Russophobia.”
16
Makashov did
not make it into the new Duma but Ilyukhin succeeded once more in
becoming a Duma Deputy, along with some other sadly notorious
figures. For example, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the LDPR
(Liberal Democratic Party of Russia whose faction is represented in
the State Duma) and Vice-Speaker of the State Duma, who once organ-
ized a rally under the slogan, “A good Chechi
17
is a dead Chechi.”
18
Or some deputies from the CPRF fraction, such as the already
proverbial Pyotr Romanov, Vice-Speaker of the Duma, who in 1995
participated in the work of the Russian People Union (a small black-
hundred organization that referred to itself as a direct heir of the
pre-revolutionary Russian People Union), or Yuri Nikoforenko, who
recently stated that “the Zionist circles of China were interested” in
the dismissal of E. Nazdratenko, Governor of the Primorye Territory.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
96
16
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 February 1999.
17
“Chechi”—a derogatory slang term referring to Chechen combatants fighting the fed-
eral forces.
18
I. Buldakova, “Balanced Comment on Pogroms,” Argumenty i Fakty 33 (2000).

It should be noted, though, that in every new convocation of Parlia-
ment, the number of avid nationalists is lower than in the previous
one.
At the same time, we are also quite distressed by the fact that with-
in the framework of election campaigns candidates strive to manipu-
late racist feelings in society in order to enhance their popularity
with the electorate, and such attempts on their part are growing
both in frequency and in frankness.
For example, in 1999, during the Parliamentary campaign and
regional election campaigns, the candidates’ ethnicity was often
used as in nationalistic speculations. In Novossibirsk, Perm and
Sverdlovsk regions, antisemitism was used as a means to defeat
opponents. Moreover, in many regions, anti-Semitic leaflets were
spread with the aim of discrediting the leader of the election bloc:
“Motherland—The Entire Russia,” Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
Reports of regional human rights organization-partners of the
Moscow Helsinki Group comprise extensive data on the activities of
extremist groups and on crimes committed on the grounds of racial
and ethnic hatred. The Russian National Unity (RNE) is the
strongest and most visible group, and skin-head activity has been on
the rise. It is significant that the RNE sometimes find support among
regional and local authorities. In the Briansk Region, for example,
members of the local RNE branch are in the gubernatorial public
chamber.
19
In the spring of 2000, in the Saratov Region, RNE agents
were elected (with 38 votes in support and only one against) to sit on
the public advisory council with the Saratov mayor and on the pub-
lic council with the regional Duma.
20
It is evident that Russian law-enforcement bodies frequently cover
up for extremists. A vivid case of such collaboration took place in
Oryol. As was reported by a correspondent for the human rights
periodical Express-Chronicle, Alexander Romanov, representative of
the local Regional Department of the Federal Security Service (FSB)
stated that the appeals to “Kill the Kikes!” that regularly appear in
the city of Oryol “have nothing to do with Jews.” The Oryol FSB
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
97
19
See the Collection of Reports of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Human Rights in Russian
Regions–1999, Briansk regional report.
20
M. Shirokova, “RNE Assumes Power in Saratov,” Kommersant, 11 July 2000.

believes that “such inscriptions neither manifest extremism nor
inflame national hatred.”
21
As concerns incidents involving violence towards or undignified
treatment of representatives of ethnic minorities, their major part in
1991–1997 and their significant part in 1998–2000 are related to
activity of the militant organizations identifying themselves as “Cos-
sacks,” calling for the revival of this estate and fighting for special
and group privileges for all members of the movement. Cossack
organizations of Krasnodar and Stavropolye actually demand that
the respective regional authorities restrict the rights of persons of
Caucasus origin or even deport such persons. At the same time,
Cossack units, both independently and in cooperation with police,
carry out document checks in the streets and markets, detain people
and search them and their cars. Such activities are often accompan-
ied by threats and acts of violence towards representatives of ethnic
minorities. Despite the frequency of these incidents and the extreme
nationalist orientation of leaders and members of Cossack units,
federal and regional authorities support them in various ways, give
them power mandates and attempt to integrate them within the
power system. In a number of regions, Cossack organizations
receive direct and indirect financial support from the authorities. In
some regions, special normative acts were passed, endowing
Cossack units with the right to carry out joint actions with law
enforcement bodies.
22
Religious xenophobia is also quite relevant to the situation in
Russia. Even more so, a level of hate speech which would be unac-
ceptable with regard to national relations, would be, on the other
hand, quite “normal” when directed against religious minorities, the
so-called “sects.” Direct propaganda aimed at their discrimination
can be found even in the programs of centrist parties (for example,
“Motherland—The Entire Russia”). This fascinating topic, however,
deserves a separate study and we will, therefore, refrain from dis-
cussing it in this paper. Instead, we shall turn our attention away
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
98
21
Quoted from A. Verkhovsky, A. Papp and V. Pribylovsky, Political Extremism in Russia
(Moscow, 1996).
22
The relevant acts are listed in the Report of the “Memorial” Society Compliance of the
Russian Federation with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. The Report was published in March 2001 and can be found at
<http://www.memo.ru>.

from an elaboration upon the situation with hate speech to the ac-
tual means that can be used to combat it.
Legal Mechanism to Combat Hate-Speech
PERSECUTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL
The basis is provided by Article 282. Article 282 reads:
1. Actions directed toward incitation of ethnic, racial, or religious hostility, humili-
ation of ethnic dignity, as well as promotion of the ideas of exclusiveness, superiority
or inferiority resulting from religion, ethnic or racial affiliation, if such actions are com-
mitted publicly or involve the use of mass media—shall be punished with a fine in the
amount of from five hundred to eight hundred minimum wages or in the amount of
the salary or other personal income of the convict earned within the period from five
to eight months; or with restraint of liberty for a term of up to three years; or with
imprisonment for a term of from two to four years.
2. The same actions committed:
a) with resort to violence or the threat of violence;
b) by a person abusing his/her official position; 
c) by an organized group—shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 
from three to five years.
The Constitution and the laws on mass media, organizations and
rallies reproduce almost literally the same formula for the prohibit-
ed actions.
It is important that, as compared with the old Article 74 of the
Criminal Code of RSFSR, the publicity of the actions and the need to
prove intent are noted; however, the corpus delicti is still unclear.
What kinds of actions incite hostility still needs to be clarified, as
well as what actions do not. It is hardly likely that the legislator
meant that such utterances as “All Armenians are stupid,” or “All
Jews are traitors” made publicly, in the street should constitute a
criminal offence. This lack of clarity has for years been the subject
of discussion, and finally the General Prosecutor’s Office came up
with its “Methodological Recommendations.”
23
In some respects, the
Recommendations have made the issue clearer; in others, they have
only made the situation more complicated.
The positive inputs include the following points:
• the accrual of the consequences of the inciting actions is not required;
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
99
23
Methodological Recommendations no. 27-79-79 of 23 June 1999, “On the Use of Special
Knowledge in Cases and Materials on Incitement to Ethnic, Racial, or Religious
Hostility,” unpublished, the author’s archive.

•incitement of hostility must be distinguished from statement of
facts (although it should be noted that there is room for doubt as
to the universal recognition of some facts);
•in the event that punishable ideas are expressed openly, an inves-
tigator or a prosecutor may evaluate them without special qualifi-
cations, i.e. without obtaining an expert opinion (which, in Russian
practice, often only complicates the case: the court or the investi-
gators obtain two opposite expert opinions, and have to drop the
case on this basis);
•on the other hand, disguised utterances now also qualify as pun-
ishable;
• a list of categories of utterances has been provided that should be
regarded as inciting hostility; however, this list, along with the
examples of correct wording, contains a number of clearly
ambiguous cases—see below.
The negative aspects include the following:
• the concept of “direct intent” has been reconstituted; 
•“a statement of absolute opposition and incompatibility of the
interests of an ethnic or religious group with those of another”—
however, it is clear that most religions try to convert followers of
other religions; 
•“relating grieves and calamities of the past, present, or future to
the existence and targeted activities of definite ethnic, racial, or
religious groups”—this imposes unthinkable restrictions on histor-
ical science and thus departs from the idea of a simple statement
of facts being distinguishable and non-punishable.
On the whole, there is no clear-cut solution to the collision between
suppressing hate speech and upholding freedom of speech and
expression. Concomitant with the transition from a condition of total
disregard of this freedom to its constitution in Russian society, a rele-
vant discussion has been sparked. It is still going on, albeit no new
arguments have been offered.
There is a choice to be made between models: between that of the
United States where the First Amendment has unconditional prior-
ity, and those pertaining to most of Europe where clear legislative
restrictions are in place. These include explicit prohibition of parti-
cular actions related to the Nazi past, denial of the Holocaust or the
use of fascist symbols.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
100

The American experience in its pure form is in any case impos-
sible to reproduce in Russia, since this would mean a manifest dis-
regard by Russia of its international obligations resulting from the
country’s participation in the International Pact on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Convention on Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified long ago by the Soviet
Union and binding on Russia as the Soviet Union’s successor.
Moreover, in accordance with Part 4 of Article 15 of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation, international treaties “constitute an inte-
gral part” of Russia’s legal system. 
Under the above documents of international law, each member
state assumes the obligation to implement decisive and effective
measures to ban racial discrimination and its incitement in any
form and by any individuals, groups or organizations. Each member
state must declare a punishable crime any dissemination of ideas
based on concepts of racial superiority or hatred, and any acts of
violence arising therefrom, as well as provision of any assistance to
racist activities, including financing thereof. All organizations and
any propagandistic activities fostering or inciting racial discrimin-
ation must be declared illegal and banned. All individuals must be
guaranteed effective protection by the State against racial discrim-
ination. However, these obligations are followed by no list of specific
bans. For instance, the ban on denying the Holocaust is an initiative
of individual countries. Russia should also formulate its own list of
prohibited actions. As we can see, this issue is now regulated only at
the level of departmental instructions, which is not a solution, since
the instructions have nothing to do with courts and generally involve
a regulation of the lower tier.
At the same time, specification at the level of the law is highly prob-
lematic, since society still lacks even a shadow of consensus. The
courts are also affected by this lack and evade definite decisions, so
no precedents are established.
In those cases when law enforcement agencies take steps against
extremist groups, they try to avoid bringing charges on incitement
of ethnic hostility or discrimination. As a rule, in such cases, rare as
they are, suits are brought under other articles, such as “hooligan-
ism,” or “causing bodily injury,” etc. The investigators are usually
reluctant to consider the organized nature of such crimes and their
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
101

relation to the activities of extremist groups. Thus, the above-men-
tioned Article 282 is practically dormant. Article 239 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation (“Setting up of an Association
Encroaching Upon Individuals and their Rights”) is virtually never
used either. Neither is paragraph “e” of Article 63 of the Criminal
Code ever invoked—the paragraph that establishes as an aggravat-
ing circumstance the committing of a crime for reasons of ethnic,
racial, or religious hostility.
By way of example, we can refer to the following case (only one of
many): In October 2000, a trial was held in St. Petersburg of skin-
head racists who had mercilessly beaten up a Chinese national a
year before. The skinheads Rumyantsev, Razin, and Grebnev (the
last one is also the leader of the St. Petersburg regional branch of
the National Bolshevik Party) were declared guilty and sentenced to
various terms of imprisonment.
However, an amnesty was immediately granted to the convicts,
since Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
(incitation of ethnic, racial, or religious hostility) while covering,
among other things, violent actions against the victim and not cover-
ed itself by the amnesty, had not figured in the indictment.
The ineffectiveness of investigators and courts must be addressed
through a process of clarifying of their objectives. There are the fol-
lowing options: One idea strongly promoted by a prominent expert
and human rights activists, Lev Levinson, is to move Article 282 to
the category of private prosecution, thus depriving investigators of
the right not to initiate a case. (However, numerous other experts in
the human rights community are not happy about this suggestion,
as it diminishes the status of the crime, thus perceptibly relieving
prosecutors from taking the initiative.) Another idea, more popular
in the Russia human rights and academic milieux, is to divide the
two crimes currently covered by Part 1, Article 282 and referred to
as “incitation of ethnic, racial, or religious hostility” into two sub-
groups:
•negative references to nations, ethnic or religious groups that
humiliate their ethnic or religious feelings;
•calls for violent actions, discrimination or humiliation by racial,
ethnic or religious features.
The punishment for the first sub-group could be limited to meas-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
102

ures unrelated to imprisonment (fines, etc.)
24
while crimes of the
second sub-group could indeed be punishable by imprisonment.
Such a measure could also be a response to the opinion popular
with both rank-and-file policemen and judges that it is wrong to put
people behind bars “for words.” At the same time, this would be a
nod to the First Amendment, a certain compromise that at this stage
appears reasonable since it creates an opportunity to apply Article
282 in a consistent manner and removes the effect of impunity.
However, there are political concerns. In the view of a number of
human rights organizations operating in the Russian Federation,
including the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Memorial, the very
possibility of a broad interpretation of Article 282 may in certain
conditions make for restrictions on freedom of speech and other
abusive practices. For instance, in some Russian Regions (the Krasno-
dar Region, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan),
human rights or ethnic minority rights activists have received
threats of prosecution under Article 282 from officials.
PERSECUTION OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MEDIA
Persecution of organizations and media is based on the respective
laws (on civil associations, mass media, political parties, trade
unions, rallies). The procedure for their closure is rather complex.
The situation in the field of application of prohibitive measures
provided by civil law is hardly better than in the field of criminal law.
The effective Law On Mass Media in its Article 4 prohibits “abuse
of the freedom of speech,” i.e. dissemination of the same ideas of vio-
lence, incitement of hostility and the like referred to above. Article
16 of this law prescribes a procedure for applying sanctions against
a publication that infringes on the requirements of Article 4. Termin-
ation of media against the will of their owners is possible only
through a court procedure. The very filing of a suit by the “registra-
tion authorities” is only possible after repeated violations within 12
months by the media of Article 4 of the Law On Mass Media, for
which the violator has been warned in writing at least twice. As a
rule, the accused media challenge every such warning in the court;
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
103
24
Another option is to treat such offences as administrative, introducing a relevant art-
icle into the Administrative Code.

consequently, before the court rules on such a challenge, the hear-
ing of a suit for termination of the media is impossible. Also, faced
with a threat of termination, a media body can take a new name,
with the same editorial staff, the same owners, the same address
and the same team of authors. Such, for example, was the story with
an extremist publication Den’ (Day), which resurfaced unchanged
under the title Zavtra (Tomorrow). There is another even easier way
to avoid termination: changing some of the owners. In both cases—
after a change of name or of composition of the owners—the paper
is subject to re-registration, and denial of or delay in the re-registra-
tion over a clearly prescribed period are punishable. After such a
re-registration, a new periodical comes into existence, the warnings
automatically become void, and the whole extremely complex pro-
cedure has to be started from the beginning.
On the positive side, such easy transformations of their legal sta-
tus are only practicable for marginal media. For big media, re-incorp-
oration means major administrative and subscription problems.
In those rare instances when cases against media reach the stage
of a court hearing, the defendants have many opportunities to delay
the hearing by not showing up, filing concocted petitions for new evi-
dence, etc.
Putting an end to the activities of extremist civil associations is
also very difficult. Articles 41–45 of Chapter V of the Law On Civil
Associations regulate the responsibility of civil associations for
breaches of the laws of the Russian Federation, including suspen-
sion of the association’s activities and its liquidation. Both such sus-
pension and liquidation can only be effected through a court pro-
cedure after repeated written warnings, “if such warnings have not
been challenged in the court in accordance with the due procedure
or have been recognized by the court as legally ungrounded.”
Both prosecutor’s offices and offices of the Ministry of Justice
keep voicing their concern over the too sophisticated procedure for
suspension and liquidation of extremist civil associations. One more
difficulty that is faced in practice is that illegal activities of civil asso-
ciations’ members caught in the act—and certainly such activities
are not in their Charter; not a single civil association has ever
attempted to include in its Charter any kinds of activity prohibited
by the Constitution and federal law, a fact which has not at all hin-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
104

dered some civil associations being involved in exactly those kinds of
activity—are not at all easy to relate to the activities of the associ-
ation as a whole, the more so if there are no relevant program docu-
ments—resolutions, records of meetings, etc. In such cases the asso-
ciation’s leaders simply dump the unlucky functionary and disavow
any responsibility.
In reality, no media or organization’s closure through court pro-
cedures has been achieved to date. To address this collision in
regard to organizations, the bill On Countering Political Extremism
is being drafted. (Similar provisions are also contained in the new
bill On Political Parties.)
According to Articles 13 and 14 of this bill, an organization can be
banned if its leaders, a division or even a single member was
involved in extremist activities with the leaders’ knowledge and the
leaders did not denounce such activities of their organization’s
member. Notably, the ban also intends to make impossible the recre-
ation of the organization upon pain of criminal prosecution (how-
ever, no specific details have yet been drafted).
Such innovations in themselves can only be hailed. In the afore-
mentioned case of General Makashov, whose statements have never
been denounced by the leaders of his party, the CPRF, conviction of
Makashov (had it taken place) would have led to a ban on the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation. In practice it would
have forced the CPRF to disavow Makashov without even waiting for
the trial in order to avoid such a risk.
However, Article 3 of the bill that provides a definition of political
extremism effectively places on an equal footing such offences as at-
tempted coup d’etat, separatist rebellion and chauvinist propaganda.
In our view, such confusion is intolerable in the Criminal Code
where they are crimes of totally different gravities. It is apparent
that purely propagandistic actions should also be classified accord-
ing to their gravity—along the lines of our proposals on Article 282
of the Criminal Code.
How could sanctions against organizations be graded? For example,
as follows: Violent actions should surely entail a ban. “Soft” nation-
alistic propaganda, considerable fines. “Hard” propaganda, suspen-
sion for a period to be established by the court, or a ban, depending
on the gravity of the offence.
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
105

It should be also noted that the bill makes no reference to mass
media. In our opinion, this is only just, since a mechanism of this
kind for media closure would be at clear variance with the concept
of freedom of speech.
MEANS OTHER THAN LEGAL
However, apart from legal innovations, there exists the issue of
defining a general policy in relation to radical nationalism (moder-
ate hate speech is a different issue).
As long ago as 1998, a concept of suppressing extremism with all
legal methods was offered in a report by the Informatics for
Democracy Center (INDEM). The authors suggested that the exist-
ing legal base was sufficient, and the problem was in the lack of
political will. Official implementation of the concept has never been
initiated. However, some developments did begin.
The most numerous examples of “strong-will decisions” were pro-
vided by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The Moscow Organization of
the Russian National Unity lost its registration on two charges: mem-
bership of minors and membership of citizens of the Moscow
Region, i.e. citizens of a different constituent of the Russian
Federation. Obviously, the same charges could have been put for-
ward against a multitude of other organizations of all orientations.
The more prominent newspapers shut down recently—Shturmovik
and Russky Poryadok—were closed on formal grounds and not
because of their contents. The RNE and the National Bolshevik
Party (the NBP) were expelled from their offices on accusations of
their failure to observe fire safety rules (for comparison, the editor-
ial office of the authoritative paper Kommersant that spoke against
Luzhkov was suspended in the same manner).
Also, there are cases of plain violations of law. For instance, again
in Moscow, in May 1999, a street praying service organized by
“Pamyat” National Patriotic Front was dispersed: the municipal
authorities had withdrawn their previously issued permission for
this action only two hours before it was supposed to start.
A peculiar way to counter hate speech should be also mentioned:
it is the practice of banning any symbols that can be interpreted as
Nazi. Such a ban is contained in the federal law of 1995 on perpetu-
ation of the memory of Victory in the WW II, and in a number of
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
106

regional laws, including the Moscow law. This ban helped restrict the
circulation of national-radical press: it is easier for the police to sort
out symbols than texts. However, the ban still remains somewhat
unclear; in particular, it is not clear whether the symbol of the RNE
that looks very much like a swastika is illegal.
The above-mentioned examples all represent “negative” manifest-
ations of strong will, which, on the other hand, can also be exercised
from a positive perspective. Compelling meaningful declarations on
the unacceptability of nationalism in all forms could make a good
start. Admittedly, Putin has already made a number of declarations
on the subject, but those statements have always remained quite gen-
eral, while with regard to specific cases the authorities are, as a rule,
passive (the trend of comportment which we illustrated above in the
example of Governor Mikhailov). We hope that from general declar-
ations the State will proceed to concrete statements and actions.
Another important positive manifestation of strong political will
could be in the development and implementation of educational pro-
grams targeting the growth of tolerance in society. After all, nation-
alism and xenophobia certainly strive on the traditionally low edu-
cational standards in our country. To remedy this situation the State
should promote research addressing the roots of the problem and
implement effective educational programs for children, youth,
adults and, particularly, civil servants and journalists. A country-
wide public campaign receiving certain support from the State and
addressing precisely the moderate forms of hate speech can also be
very useful. (One of the pilot projects currently implemented with
the support of the Open Society Institute by the Moscow Helsinki
Group in cooperation with three other NGOs—Center for
Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Glasnost Defense
Foundation and Panorama Information and Research Center—sup-
ports thorough monitoring of manifestations of hate speech in mass
media in the federal center and in 5 selected regions, in order to
develop, on the basis of the monitored findings and their analysis,
effective regional-level and federal-level campaigns.)
A very encouraging development is that such measures as support
for research, educational programs and public actions, as well as
assistance to victims of political extremism, regular monitoring of
social tension, psychological assistance for refugees, etc. are actual-
H ATE S PEECH IN RUSSIA
107

ly outlined in the Federal Program Formation of Tolerant Conscious-
ness and Prophylactics of Extremism in the Russian Society (com-
monly referred to as the Tolerance Program)
25
in the items titled
“The Individual, the Family, and Society.” This long-awaited
Program, initially formulated as early as the fall of 1999, was finally
passed by the Government in August 2001. We certainly hope that
the State will now start putting into practice the Program’s provi-
sions. At the same time, it is self-evident that the Program’s imple-
mentation will be hindered by grave budgetary difficulties.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
108
25
The Program’s full text can be found at <www.tolerance.ngo.ru>.

ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
IN NATIONALIST, XENOPHOBIC AND
ANTI-WESTERN TENDENCIES IN
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
A LEXANDER V ERKHOVSKY
Not Nationalism, but Fundamentalism
Much has been written about nationalism in the Russian Orthodox
Church (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tzerkov—RPTz) and to dwell on
the theme briefly will suffice. Aggressive Russian nationalism is
quite widespread in our country and it would be unwise to assume
that it is unrepresented in the RPTz too, as well as in any broad pub-
lic association not rigidly demanding that its members emphatically
renounce nationalism.
There is also a deplorable pre-revolutionary vestige involving the
close link of many Church bishops and clergy with Black Hundred
(Chyornaya Sotnya) organizations. Moreover, that link has been in
no way openly condemned, and a large number of Black Hundred
members have been canonized in the last decade, including at the
time of mass canonization of new martyrs at the Jubilee Bishops’
Council in August of 2000.
1
Since the time in 1991 when in several monasteries sermons
ceased mentioning Patriarch Alexy II because of his conciliatory
speech before the American rabbis, the RPTz leaders have not
dared to speak directly against anti-Semitism, which serves as a
major component of Russian ideological nationalism. There is no
mention of anti-Semitism in “The Bases of the Social Concept of the
Russian Orthodox Church” adopted at the Jubilee Council.
All that certainly does not mean that RPTz is a nationalist and anti-
Semitic body. The very same “Bases” directly condemn nationalism.
2
109
1
A short list of saint members of Black Hundred can be found in “Torzhestvo Istiny”
(Triumph of Truth), Rus Pravoslavnaya (Orthodox Rus) 9 (2000).
2
An English translation of “The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox
Church” is accessible at <http://www.orthodox.org.ru/sd00e.htm>.

But the RPTz bishops’ inconsistent position (the reasons for which
we shall not discuss here) allows members of the Church to collab-
orate with aggressive nationalist (and, certainly, extremely anti-
Western) groups.
There is a multitude of such facts, especially those concerning the
Russian National Unity (Russkoye Natzionalnoye Edinstvo—RNE),
the largest nationalist organization that only conventionally is an
Orthodox one, but actively cooperates in many regions with RPTz
clerics.
3
Yet there is no proof of direct approval of such cooperation
on the part of the RPTz bishops.
Thus, one can say that the RPTz as a public association represent-
ed by its leaders does not support radical nationalist groups. But
that is not as important compared to the fact that the Church itself
contains such groups.
The reference is to a whole number of Orthodox brotherhoods
holding extremely nationalist ideological positions. Like the similar
extra-Church groups, such brotherhoods are not supported by the
bishops, but it is impossible to “expel” anybody from the Church for
political views and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working
actively.
4
Nationalism or anti-Westernism for such brotherhoods is only a
derivative from their general world outlook position and a more cor-
rect term for it would be “Russian Orthodox fundamentalism.” That
world outlook based on extremely mythologized notions about the
pre-revolutionary Orthodox monarchy is widespread in the Church.
Actually it is a simplified and aggressive form of nostalgia for “the
Golden Age” negated by the revolutionary epoch and rejected by
post-Soviet modernization.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
110
3
The facts on this theme can be found, in particular, in the following published sources:
Vyacheslav Likhachyov and Vladimir Pribylovsky, Russkoye Natzionalnoye Edinstvo.
Politika, istoriya i ideologiya (Russian National Unity. Politics, History and Ideology)
(2000); Alexander Verkhovsky, “Tzerkov v politike i politika v Tzerkvi” (Church in Politics
and Politics in Church), Politicheskaya ksenofobiya v Rossii (Political Xenophobia in
Russia) (1999); Albert Shatrov, “Karayushchiye namestniki Boga” (God’s Punishing
Representatives), Nezavisinaya Gazeta–Religii (Independent Newspaper–Religions), 4,
1998; “Fashizm I religiya” (Fascism and Religion), Information and Analysis Bulletin of
“Anti-Fascist” Public Fund, no. 6, 1998.
4
For more details about politicized Orthodox brotherhoods see Alexander Verkhovsky,
op. cit.; Stella Rock, “Fraternal Strife: Nationalist Fundamentalists in the Russian
Orthodox Brotherhood Movement.” The report has not yet been published.

Without trying to analyse this phenomenon within the report
framework, we shall note only that “Russian Orthodox Fundamen-
talists” (hereafter—simply fundamentalists) stand for restoration of
autocracy, restrictions against the Jews and confessions other than
the Orthodox one, the imperial principle of state structure, the RPTz
status as the state church, complete rejection of the concepts of
democracy and human rights (in particular, as concerns freedom of
conscience), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the
country and struggle against it beyond its borders, rigid paternal-
ism of the state in all areas and compulsory imposition of “Orthodox
values” in everyday life, culture and even the economy.
These positions are so widespread that the Patriarchate can act
only against their most extreme manifestations. Those fundamen-
talist circles that are at least partly moderate already coexist with
the Patriarchate more or less peacefully. Moreover, fundamentalism
in the RPTz has been on the rise since the early 1990s and there are
no grounds to believe that this rise will stop in the near future. There
is not enough space here to describe the developments in relations
between fundamentalists and the Patriarchate (among the adminis-
trative staff of which, by the way, they are also represented). One
can say that since the early 1990s the unstable balance has been
gradually shifting in favour of fundamentalism.
5
It is fundamentalism, not nationalism as such, that is the basic anti-
liberal and anti-modernist phenomenon generated by the Church.
Religious Xenophobia—Church as
a Source of a Wider Xenophobia
The aspiration to curb proliferation of other religions in the country
is one of the major public positions of the Orthodox Church. It is
quite natural as such, as it stems from the aspiration to convert as
many people as possible to the Orthodox faith and to save their
souls. In practice, one can see that the motivation is not always the
one mentioned. Or, at least, it is not the only one.
As early as 1993, the RPTz actively supported a campaign for rad-
ical restrictions on foreign missionaries’ activities. Those missionar-
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
111
5
That process, in the period from the early 1990s till the spring of 1999, was described in
Alexander Verkhovsky, op. cit.

ies were seen by the Church as “hunters for souls” trespassing on the
canonic territory of the RPTz. At that time it was possible to prom-
ulgate such a view, and quite admissible for an Orthodox Church
member, in society as a whole. Yet, a secular society (including
almost all preachers) does not care about the division of canonic ter-
ritories between orthodox Churches. A secular state has no consti-
tutional grounds for preventing somebody from “hunting for souls”
or breaching the boundaries of religious jurisdictions.
As Yeltsin’s administration at that time agreed with such an
approach, the RPTz, overcoming its natural hostility towards
Communists, was compelled to make use of the support rendered by
the Communist-patriotic opposition. It has been using it ever since,
and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), nur-
turing its traditionalist great power ideology more attentively than
the Communist one, has been willingly rendering that support.
It is impossible to say that the RPTz approves of the program of
the CPRF. But the Church leaders and the leaders of the CPRF and
other “Communist-patriotic” organizations in the second half of the
1990s even had joint semi-political structures.
6
With the coming of
Putin into power the Patriarchate put a substantial distance between
itself and the opposition, but it is not ready to get rid of its support
altogether. Meanwhile, the very fact of their collaboration works in
favour of xenophobic and anti-Western tendencies personified by
the CPRF and similar organizations.
In the first place, the Patriarchate is brought closer to those organ-
izations precisely by the attitude toward non-Orthodox (predomi-
nantly foreign) preachers. This is the way Metropolitan Kirill
(Gundyayev), Head of the Department of External Church Relations
(Otdel Vneshnikh Tzerkovnykh Svyazey—OVTzS), and in fact the
number two men in the Church, personifying the liberal-conserva-
tive wing of the RPTz, spoke as recently as this year:
We believe that the struggle against sectarianism by means of making religious le-
gislation more strict is unpromising. . . . Because in the case of sectarianism we
refer not simply to freedom of choice—we refer to the attempts of known forces to
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
112
6
The reference is to the All-World Russian National Congress and the Russian Zemstvo
(Local-Government) Movement. See more details about these organizations in
Alexander Verkhovsky, op. cit.

divide our society spiritually and to add to the existing national, property and political
div-isions of today also religious ones.
7
If one takes into account that the overwhelming majority of those
who now are called “sectarians” in Russia belong to the religious as-
sociations brought to Russia from abroad tens or hundreds of years
ago, it is clear that the “known forces” are somewhere abroad too.
It is frequently said that the RPTz bishops fight non-Orthodox bod-
ies first of all because they are afraid of competition. Allegedly it is
due to the fear that the Moslems or the Baptists, who presently are
not engaged in active proselytism, are subject to incomparably less
condemnation than the rapidly multiplying Jehovah’s Witnesses. This
judgement is sufficiently reasonable, but it is not enough. In fact, in
1993 when a major competitive threat was posed by the “indigenous”
White Brotherhood and Mother-of-God Centre, the demands were to
introduce restrictions against foreigners regardless.
But whatever the bishops’ motives, the rhetoric, as one can see
even in the example of Metr. Kirill, is obviously of an isolationist
nature. And if one adds the fact that “sects” of Western origin obvi-
ously prevail in Russia over “sects” of Eastern origin, it is additional-
ly possible to say that the anti-sectarian rhetoric is of an anti-
Western nature.
It is easy to find much more cutting statements among those
voiced by fundamentalist activists in the RPTz and their patrons
among the bishops. But it is precisely the position of the very mod-
erate Metr. Kirill which is indicative.
The State Digests the Church’s Proposals
Since 1999 anti-Western sentiments have been going strength in Rus-
sian society in general. Neither are they alien to Putin’s administra-
tion. Therefore it is not surprising that anti-sectarianism motivated by
the confrontation with the West has now found semi-official support.
On 5 June 2001 a draft concept of state policy in the religious
sphere was published and sufficiently advertised,
8
one of its authors
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
113
7
Alexander Korolyov, “Opasno putat religiyu s politikoy” (It’s Dangerous to Mix Religion
with Politics), Trud (Labor), 14 March 2001.
8
“The Concept of the State policy in the Sphere of Relations with Religious Associations
in the Russian Federation.” The complete text, many relevant publications and almost
all the discussion on the issue are accessible at the site of the second author of the draft,
that is the Institute of State-Confessional Relations created in 2000. 
See <http://www.state-religion.ru>. See the Concept text itself at 
<http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi-action=show&obj=1270.htm>.

being the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian
Federation for Moscow. Our task is not to analyse that document as
a whole, but it is important to note some aspects.
The declared purpose of the Concept is to develop the provisions
of the law of 1997, “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Assoc-
iations,” concerning the division of religions into the “traditional”
ones and the rest, those provisions having since remained at the
level of statements in the Preamble to the Law. The Concept proposes
legalizing and regulating the privileges of “traditional” religions and
the practice of state cooperation with them. As for the naturally aris-
ing question of which religions will be defined as the “traditional”
ones, the Concept gives a principally anti-law and discriminatory
answer: religious associations should be sorted according to three
criteria: the number of their adepts, their historical contribution to
the development of the country and their actions “as a creative and
unifying spiritual force of the Russian society aiming to maintain
peace and stability in the Russian Federation.”
The motivation for the proposed reform with its general conserva-
tive-xenophobic orientation is also very important. Here is an almost
complete list of problems noted in the draft:
• manifestations of a spiritual crisis of the contemporary Russian society in all
spheres of its life, a devaluation of the system of traditional moral values, a world out-
look disorientation of a part of the society, a loss of moral guidelines in many areas
of modern culture, a weakening of spiritual and moral bases of the institution of fam-
ily and other negative social consequences;
• presence of threats to the preservation and development of the cultural identity
and the spiritually indigenous nature of the peoples of Russia;
• aggravation of problems related to the manifestations of religious enmity and the
activation of religious extremism in the society;
• foreign religious expansion into Russia as an element of external policies of a
number of foreign states.
This wording, despite its streamlined form, is generally reminis-
cent of the rhetoric coming from the leaders of the Communist-patri-
otic opposition of the 1990s, not the Church leaders.
One should admit, though, that such rhetoric was weakened dur-
ing editing. In particular, the clause dealing with “foreign religious
expansion” disappeared in the course of further editing.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
114

During the editing, yet another important amendment took place:
the phrase “traditional religion” was in almost all cases replaced
with “traditional religious organization.” The reason for the amend-
ment is transparent: the state intends to interfere in jurisdictional
disputes inside the confessions. This fact is of much practical import-
ance, first of all for the Moscow Patriarchate in its struggle with
splits, and for the so-called “moderate” Muftiates which are under
great pressure from the young and more radical (religiously and
politically) Moslem associations.
Here we now find ourselves on the border between the confession-
al policy and the anti-terrorist one. But it should be understood that
the opportunity for such interference will hardly be used for the sole
purpose of combating extremists alone. A good example is a year-old
story concerning the election of the Chief Rabbi of Russia, who was
distinguished, not just by his confession (the new Chief Rabbi is a
Hasid, while the previous one was not), but also by his loyalty to the
Kremlin.
After the Concept was published and gained the support of official
propaganda and the leaders of the main “traditional” religious asso-
ciations,
9
a discussion about amendments to the Law of 1997 prompt-
ly began. The hearings in the State Duma were held as early as July
6. The choice of title for the hearings was sufficiently impressive: “The
Problem of Legislative Support to the State-Church Relations in the
Light of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.”
The recommendations
10
approved at the hearings are permeated
with the very same xenophobic spirit as is the Concept quoted above,
and in case of their adoption they will entail discriminatory and pos-
sibly repressive consequences. And, although there was no vote
taken at the hearings, it is reasonable to assume that Metr. Kirill, act-
ing as one of the key speakers, is in general solidarity with the rec-
ommendations.
In particular, it is proposed “to accelerate the work on preparation
of a draft law on counteraction to religious extremism.” Understand-
ably the state is concerned about the proliferation of the so-called
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
115
9
See also at <http://www.state-religion.ru>.
10
The complete text is accessible at 
<http://strana.ru/society/religion/2001/07/09/994682962.html>.

“Wahhabism,”
11
but the State Duma will not adopt a law narrowly
directed precisely against just this, as has already been done in
Daghestan, and that means, undoubtedly, that it will be possible to
use the future law against the most diverse religious associations.
In the conclusion of this chapter it should be added that the Con-
cept quoted above is not the only one. Some days after its appear-
ance, an alternative draft prepared under the guidance of Prof. Nikolai
Trofimchuk by the Russian Academy of State Service (Rossiyskaya
akademiya gosudarstvennoy sluzhby—RAGS) was published.
12
That
draft was written in less xenophobic terms and does not lobby for
RPTz interests, but it also raises serious doubts. The personality of
the author also gives cause for concern: Mr. Trofimchuk recently
served as co-author of a book titled Expansion
13
maintaining a the-
sis about the geopolitical expansion of the West by means of reli-
gious missionary activities and, accordingly, about the need for cul-
tural (“axiological”) isolationism and active support for the
Orthodox missionary activities on the part of the state.
14
“INN Jihad”—First Campaign
Firstly, the Orthodox fundamentalists are basically against liberals
and Westerners, which two groups are perceived by them as
almost identical. Secondly, the concept of “the worldwide Kike-
Masonic conspiracy” with its spear-point aimed precisely against
Russia is to some extent characteristic of practically all Russian
nationalists including the Orthodox ones. When the theme of “glob-
alization” became popular in the West and subsequently in Russia,
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
116
11
The use of the term in Russia is not in conformity with its meaning in the Arab world.
In Russia it is used to mean any militant Islamic fundamentalism, but evidently intro-
duction of a legislative ban on Wahhabism will also hurt quite peaceful Moslems who
are attracted to fundamentalist concepts, not Islam in the forms in which it has trad-
itionally existed in the territory of the USSR.
12
See the complete text at <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1269>.
The most important excerpts were also published in NG-Religii: “Kak vystraivat vza-
imo’otnosheniya vlasti I konfessiy v novom veke” (How to build mutual relation between
the authorities and the confessions in the new century), NG-Religii, 27 June 2001.
13
N. A. Trofimchuk and M. P. Svishchev, Ekspansiya (Expansion) (2000). The text is also acces-
sible at <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1165>.
14
See also N. A. Trofimchuk, “Gosudarstvo i missionerskaya deyatelnost” (The State and
the Missionary Activities), 28 March 2001, 
<http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1197>.

those assumptions naturally gave birth to a specific Orthodox anti-
globalism.
It had its beginnings with statements against the commodity bar
code, in which our fundamentalists, prompted by like-minded Greek
fundamentalists, discovered the number 666.
15
Hegumen (presently
Achimandrite) Tikhon (Shevkunov), Father Superior of Sretensky
Monastery in Moscow, as early as 1998 became the main messenger
of new trouble coming from the West which has come to be regard-
ed as nothing less than the advance of the Anti-Christ.
16
Considering
that Sretensky Monastery is one of the Church’s largest publishing
houses, the propaganda has proven to be quite successful. In the
Church’s press and parishes they started to have passionate discus-
sions about whether it was admissible for Orthodox believers to buy
bar-coded goods.
Then they started to discover “the Seal of Anti-Christ” in all kinds
of code designations in general, primarily those on magnetic cards.
Moreover, the taxpayer’s individual number (Individualniy Nomer
Nalogoplatelshchika—INN), which according to the plan of the
Ministry of Taxes would be issued to each resident of the country,
was considered the most obvious case. Ultimately, in the conscious-
ness of the majority of fundamentalists, INN merged inexplicably
with the bar code and a belief spread that “the Number of the Beast”
was somewhere inside INN as well.
A powerful campaign was unleashed against INN in the autumn of
1999. Hundreds of parishioners, monks and even fathers superior of
monasteries were signing petitions with the demand not to introduce
INN. The motivation in all cases was Apocalyptic, so that passions
immediately began to run high. An observer aptly called that move-
ment the “INN Jihad.”
17
Certainly, the actions both in favour of the
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
117
15
It is not appropriate to go into details of the bar code here. It is enough to say that the
presence within it of three sixes is a variety of optical illusion.
16
See, for example Hegumen Tikhon (Shevkunov), “Amerikantsy ob Antikhriste: s nim
nam bolshe vezyot” (Americans about Anti-Christ: We are more lucky with him),
Pravoslavnoye knizhnoye obozreniye (Orthodox Book Survey), June 1998.
17
That definition was produced two years later by Sergey Grigoryev, Editor-in-Chief of the
Russian Line, webserver, one of the active fundamentalists not supporting the cam-
paign. See S. Grigoryev. “Chego khotyat protivniki INN?” (What do the opponents of
INN want?), Russkaya Liniya (Russian Line), 2 December 2000,
<http://www.rusk.ru/News/00/12/new02_12a.htm>.

canonization of the family of the last Emperor, Nicholas II, and
against “the heresy of ecumenism” proceeded concurrently, and
often in confusion with the protests against INN. But the “INN Jihad”
was aimed directly against the policy of the state authorities, that
fact giving it extra impetus in the radical environment and creating
an additional problem for the leaders of the Church.
The Synod tried to stop the new campaign by making a comprom-
ise proposal. The Synod’s Decision of 7 March 2000 ruled that INN
was not “the Seal of Anti-Christ,”
18
but repeated the assertion that
the bar code contained the number 666. Without arguing against the
introduction of INN in essence, the Synod actually asked the author-
ities to show condescension to the most superstitious among the
believers, and for that purpose to introduce—neither more, nor
less!—a system of bar codes different from that in the rest of the
world.
“INN Jihad”—Second Campaign
It was no surprise that the Synod’s decision did not stop the cam-
paign, but it was surprising that the campaign was actually sus-
pended for a few months. Starting in the autumn, after the Bishop’s
Council fulfilled the fundamentalists’ main demand to canonize
Nicholas II and his family, the “INN Jihad” was resumed on a much
larger scale.
At that time references to the authority of some elders, primarily
of all to that of Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov), Confessor of Troitse-
Sergiyeva Laura, that is the main monastery (and the main
Ecclesiastical Academy) of the country, became the strike-force.
Fathers superiors of monasteries were taking more active stands
and were joined by some (differently oriented) politicians tradition-
ally lobbying for the interests of RPTz and, of course, radical nation-
alists. Hearings on that theme, titled “Globalization and personal
codes as an issue of world outlook choice of a contemporary
human,” were held in the State Duma on 23 January 2001.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
118
18
“Uvazhat chuvstva veruyushchikh. Khranit khristianskoye trezvomysliye” (To respect
the Believers’ Feelings. To preserve sober Christian thinking), Statement of the Holy
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, 7 March 2000, 
<http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr00 3083.htm>.

A summary of the opinions voiced since the autumn of 2000 pro-
duces a quite homogeneous picture. It was alleged that, firstly, the
number 666 is “implanted” in the bar code including the one used in
taxation-related document circulation. Secondly, the act of giving a
person a unique number to stay with him or her for an entire life
substitutes his or her Orthodox Christian name. Thirdly, uniform
computer registration leads to total control over the people; the
introduction of INN is just another step on the path towards such
control. And, fourthly, computer systems are all compatible accord-
ing to global standards, thus making possible the inclusion of the
registry of Russian citizens in the world registration system con-
trolled by the mystical global forces of evil—by the West, “the new
world order,” “the world Jewry leaders,” or directly by Anti-Christ.
19
One has to admit that the bar codes were not mentioned then as
often as before, and that attention was focused on the idea that glob-
alization leads unswervingly to the kingdom of Anti-Christ, while the
mission of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church was to defend
national and religious identity in the face of such a dangerous trend.
Therefore it was not so important whether INN was literally “the
Seal of Anti-Christ,” nor whether there were sixes in the bar code.
The important thing was not to take a step backward in global con-
frontation.
20
In addition there were occasional calls “to escape into the wilder-
ness,” cases of refusal to give the Eucharist to those parishioners
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
119
19
Although seldom, argument no. 5, the most realistic one, was sometimes invoked: cre-
ation of a unified taxpayer database makes taxpayers vulnerable not only to the state,
but to the bandits as well, as all such databases soon find their way on to the black mar-
ket.
20
See, for example The open appeal to President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin,
Minister of Taxes and Charges G. I. Bukayev and the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation from Orthodox priesthood, church clergy and laymen of Vladimir-
Suzdal Eparchy (Diocese) of the Russian Orthodox Church, 20 December 2000.
Published at the website of the Movement “For the Right to Live without INN,”
<http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/text002.htm>; “Yarko vyrazhenniy demonicheskiy
kharakter . . . ” (A Clearly Evident Demonic Nature . . .) The Appeal of the brothers of
Svyato-Vvedensky Monastery of Optina Pustyn to the Orthodox Christians, Rus
Pravoslavnaya (Orthodox Rus), 1, 2001; “Globalizatziya i lichniye kody kak problema
mirovozzrencheskogo vybora sovremennogo cheloveka” (Globalization and personal
codes as an issue of world outlook: Choice of a contemporary human), Russian Line
News, 27 January 2001, <http://www.rusk.ru/News/01/l/new27_01al.htm>; V. Petrov, INN
i plany “knyazey tmy” (INN and the Plans of “the Princes of Darkness”), Russian Bulletin
server, <http://www.rv.ru/super/2001/2/diablos.htm>.

who “accepted INN” etc., and thus some grounds emerged for accus-
ation of a split. Some went so far as to make barely disguised calls to
overthrow the authorities.
21
Such radical moods among the fighters against INN caused a
delimitation within the ranks of the Orthodox anti-globalists.
Comparatively moderate opponents of globalization believed that
INN was not the boundary at which it was necessary to make a final
stand. More precisely, they believed it was both possible and neces-
sary to bargain with the state on that issue, but that it was not worth-
while to bring relations with the authorities to a sharp conflict and
to subject themselves to the risk of real persecution for the sake of
INN.
Elder Archimandrite Ioann (Krestyankin), a person of the greatest
authority among the conservatives, produced the most convincing
arguments in favour of a moderate position. In his especially video-
recorded late January appeal, an unusual event in itself, he gave this
reminder: “And what can be said about control and total spying, with
which they frighten simple-minded people so much? When and in
what state was there no secret office? All was . . . and all is . . . and
will be . . . but nothing prevents a believer from seeking the salva-
tion.” In the same appeal Elder Ioann spoke sharply against the INN
fighters’ split-provoking manner of speech.
22
Many Orthodox fundamentalist leaders including Archim. Tikhon
(Shevkunov), once the initiator of that entire campaign, an implac-
able opposition activist Konstantin Dushenov, Editor-in-Chief of Rus
Pravoslavnaya (Orthodox Rus) newspaper, Sergey Grigoryev, Editor-
in-Chief of Russkaya liniya (Russian Line), and others also showed
solidarity with him. But they added an additional argument that a
refusal to be obedient to the state was obviously un-patriotic, as it
implied that Putin’s regime was a God-fighting one. And that went
(and goes) counter to the hopes they pinned on Putin as “their” presi-
dent. Yet their arguments were accompanied by emphasis that in
general the opposition to liberal and anti-Christ globalization must
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
120
21
Celibate Schema Priest Nikolai (Uskov), “Pravoslavnych zagonyayut v ugol” (The
Orthodox Believers are being driven into the Corner), Rus Pravoslavnaya (Orthodox
Rus), 12, 2000.
22
Archimandrite Ioann (Krestyankin) on INN, Pravoslavie.Ru., 1 February 2001,
<http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jumal/society/ioannkrestyankin.htm>.

be continued. As far as one can judge, Archim. Kirill (Pavlov) took a
similar position.
23
Few have stayed in the ranks of the staunch fighters. It is neces-
sary to mention a Petersburg priest, Alexey Masyuk, and the Editor-
in-Chief of Svyataya Rus (Holy Rus) newspaper Konstantin Gorde-
yev (these two have actually become the leaders of the Movement
“For the Right to Live without INN”), as well as Father Rafail
(Berestov), an Athos Mountain Elder. With such obvious disequili-
brium among their forces, the outcome of the struggle was pre-
determined.
A broadened session of the Theological Commission held on 19–20
February 2001 in Troitse-Sergiyeva Laura adopted a Final Document
which definitely denied any Apocalyptic meaning in bar codes and
INN and condemned the split-bound spirit of the fighters against
INN, while as concerns the threat of globalization it said only that
“processes of globalization . . . may be used by a malicious will to
enslave people and human communities.”
24
Respectable Orthodox Anti-Globalism . . .
The radicals were defeated and since then have exhibited almost no
activity.
25
But in compensation the more moderate Orthodox anti-
globalists are still active.
In addition to the above-mentioned figures, these include many of
the elders and fathers superior of monasteries. This can be seen
even by reading the officially published statements made at the
Theological Commission session,
26
though not all judgements at
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
121
23
See, for example Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov), his speech in a Radonezh broad-
cast on 29 January 2001, Pravoslavie.Ru,
<http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jurnal/society/arhim tihon_radonezh.htm>; Archimandrite
Amvrosy (Yurasov), “Antikhrista boimsya, a Boga–net?” (We are afraid of Anti-Christ,
but do we fear God?); Sergey Grigoryev, “Chego khotyat protivniki INN?” (What do INN
opponents want?); Konstantin Dushenov, “Tzarsky put” (Tzar’s way), Rus Pravoslavnaya
(Orthodox Rus), 1, 2001.
24
Its text is accessible at <http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nrl02206.htm>.
25
Even the information campaign has been waged relatively weakly. It is possible to learn
about it at “Stoyanie v istine” (Perseverance in truth) <http://www.voskres.ru/truth>
and Svyataya Rus (Holy Rus) <http://kongord.narod.ru> sites.
26
Vestnik “Russkoy Linii” (Russian “Line Herald”), 6, 2001,
<http://www.rusk.ru/News/01/2/new24_02a.htm>.

odds with the opinion of the Patriarchate were published.
27 
Archim.
Kirill (Pavlov), who was absent from the session, did not sign the
Final Document either.
28
There are also quite a few principled anti-globalists among the
Bishops, who, in a disciplined way, have been implementing the
instructions of the Patriarchate to prevent the proliferation of “INN
Jihad.” As the volume of the report is limited, there will be no exam-
ples given, even more so because Patriarch Alexy II and Metropoli-
tan Kirill who are considered almost liberal have been speaking
regularly since early 1999 on the topic of confrontation between lib-
eral Western values and the traditional national-Orthodox values of
Russia.
29
Metr. Kirill then drew the following conclusions from theoretical
discourses: “Civil rights and freedoms . . . remain in our view an
unconditional value,” but “liberal values in politics, economics and
social life should be considered by us as admissible only under the
condition of resolute renunciation of establishment of the principles
of liberal axiology as applied a human personality,” and, to be more
specific, the Church insists on “establishment of the system of values
traditional to Russia in the sphere of upbringing, education and for-
mation of inter-personal relations.”
30
Accordingly, the balance existing between liberal values and trad-
itional ones must be shifted in favour of the latter.
31
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
122
27
Interview by Konstantin Gordeyev in Blagovest (Church Bells Ringing) newspaper of
Samara. “Stoyaniye za pravdu” (Perseverance for Truth), 
<http://www.voskres.ru/truth/econtrol/INN/gord3.shtml>.
28
Archimandrite Kirill Hasn’t Signed the RPTz Final Statement on INN. NG-Religii, 28
February 2001.
29
The discussion was initiated by an article by the Patriarch: The Patriarch of Moscow
and All Russia Alexy II. “Mir na pereputye” (The World at Crossroads), NG-Religii, 23
June 1999. We have already had an opportunity to write about that period: Alexander
Verkhovsky, “The Religious Factor in the Presidential Campaign and in the Formation
of Ideology of the New Rule,” National-Patriots, Church and Putin. Parliamentary and
Presidential Campaigns 1999–2000 (Moscow, 2001).
30
Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, “Norma very kak norma zhizni”
(Norm of faith as norm of life), Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent newspaper), 16–17
February 2000.
31
Metr. Kirill spoke about that on 21 March 2001 at a seminar at the Center for Strategic
Developments. See Blagovest-Info, no. 12, 2000.

Formulas contained in “The Bases of the Social Concept of the
RPTz” written under the control of Metr. Kirill (and adopted by the
Bishops’ Council in August of 2000 without discussion) are soft
enough, but quite definite:
The spiritual and cultural expansion fraught with total unification should be
opposed through the joint efforts of the Church, state structures, civil society and
international organizations for the sake of asserting in the world a truly equitable and
mutually enriching cultural and informational exchange combined with efforts to pro-
tect the identity of nations and other human communities.
. . . Invariably open to co-operation with people of non-religious convictions, the
Church seeks to assert Christian values in the process of decision-making on the
most important public issues both on national and international levels. The Church
strives for the recognition of the legality of religious worldview as a basis for socially
significant action (including those taken by state) and as an essential factor which
should influence the development (amendment) of international law and the work of
international organizations.
Certainly, there is nothing reprehensible in the fact that RPTz as a
religious association wants society to take its faith into account as
much as possible. For us it is the tone in which the Church is being
voiced by its leaders that has significance. It is clear that RPTz has
so far been a sufficiently disciplined structure, especially at the epis-
copacy level, and usually neither the bishops, nor even the majority
of politically active laymen let themselves make significant devia-
tions from the line designated by the Synod. The anti-globalist pos-
ition of the Synod’s leading members that has gradually taken shape
over the last two years gives more freedom to fundamentalists.
. . . And Its Practical Applications
for Church and State
It’s no surprise that in the existing atmosphere decisions made by
the session of the Theological Commission in February have merely
transferred the discussion about INN to more respectable channels.
On 3–4 May 2001, the Saint Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy,
headed by Bishop Konstantin (Goryanov), together with two secular
institutes, held a conference titled “Spiritual and Social Problems of
Globalization.” The conference adopted a final document,
32
which
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
123
32
The document has been published at the site of the Movement “For the Right to Live
without INN” at <http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/mfo09.htm>.

all Orthodox anti-globalists could well sign. The document was thor-
oughly drafted and has already become a theoretical basis for fur-
ther development of the movement. Therefore it is worthwhile to
give a rather full citation from it:
1. The ideology of globalization is in opposition to the Christian world outlook and
incompatible with it; it takes root and is propagandized in secular society and the
Church through the efforts of the world elite and it expresses its interests.
Globalization becomes an embodiment of the utopian idea of mondialism about cre-
ation of a unitary, supranational and rigidly controlled community on Earth. . . .
2. The conference ascertains a principal conceptual distinction between the
processes of economic integration and technological progress and the global con-
centration of power. The latter is the essence of the ideology of mondialism using the
planet-wide introduction of information-financial technologies as a tool to achieve
world leadership.
3. The historical calling of Russia as a country preserving the Orthodox faith,
culture and traditions is not recognized and is rejected by the mondialists. Yet the
values mentioned are important for the whole world. The Russian Orthodox Church
and the state have become the main obstacle in the path of aspirations for world
domination. . . .
4. Changes in the traditional system of values, destruction of national culture,
Christian moral sense, primitivization of the people’s thinking and universal work to
make them accustomed to “voluntary-compulsory” acceptance of digital identifiers
(personal codes) replacing a human name in all state-public relationships are
presently the main manifestations of the globalization process in the Russian
Federation. . . . As Confessor of Svyato-Troitskaya Sergiyeva Laura Archimandrite
Kirill (Pavlov) noted with justice and precision, “By accepting INN a person is
incorporated into the system of evil.”
It is possible to find some differences in this document as com-
pared to the Final Document of the February plenary session of the
Theological Commission, but on the whole we find that it merely
reformulates, with more definitiver resolution, the provisions of
“The Bases of the Social Concept.” It is not surprising that no repri-
mands, at least no public ones, have come from the Synod. Neither
has the Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga Vladimir
(Kotlyarov) objected, although he is considered to be one of the most
liberal bishops of RPTz.
Thus, fundamentalist anti-globalism, albeit not in its most radical
forms, has been in fact legitimized in RPTz. Now one has only to wait
for a new stage of its activation.
A quite definite political resonance is also evident. First, on 15
February 2001 the Duma rejected a draft law “On the Basic Docu-
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
124

ments of the Russian Federation Certifying the Identity of a Citizen
of the Russian Federation,” because it suggested innovations such as
a citizen’s personal code and magnetic record of passport data. The
draft was not saved even by the fact that it was submitted by a wide
and authoritative group of deputies ranging from liberals to
Communists. A new draft submitted to the Duma in April does not
contain anything “mondialist.”
Secondly, the above-considered draft “Concept of the State Policy
in the Sphere of Relations with Religious Associations” has
appeared. Certainly, it is a purely secular document, but its aggres-
sively xenophobic and anti-Western spirit is quite in tune with the
Saint Petersburg document quoted. And Metr. Kirill who approved
the draft made no remarks concerning its inadmissible tone.
Thirdly, a resolution on “Digital identification of a person (INN,
personal codes etc.) as a basis of the globalization process and its
assessment by public and religious organizations” made at Duma
hearings of 22 May 2001 reproduces in full the identical final docu-
ment of the Saint Petersburg conference.
33
There remains one last, but very important circumstance.
Recently official propaganda has begun openly to favour funda-
mentalism. The reference is to the religious department of the actu-
al official propaganda website Strana.Ru which openly promotes
the views of Archim. Tikhon (Shevkunov). Probably this is done part-
ly for the purposes of state manipulation of intra-Church conflicts,
but some more principled rapprochement also exists.
34
For example,
Strana.Ru has published a whole manifesto drafted by Archpriest
Vladislav (Sveshnikov), Confessor of the Union of Orthodox Citizens,
a wide Orthodox-nationalist coalition.
35
It says, in particular:
Never before have the European West and America been feeling so openly hostile
to Russia as at present.
R OLE OF THE RUSSIAN O RTHODOX C HURCH
125
33
The final document is also published at the site of the Movement “For the Right to Live
without INN,” <http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/text021.htm>.
See other materials from the hearings at <http://mfolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/list03.htm>.
34
For more details about it see Alexander Verkhovsky, “Dilemma Kirilla i Mefodiay” (A
Dilemma of Cyrill and Methodius) Russkaya Ideya (Russian Idea), 29 March 2001.
35
“Prot. Vladislav Sveshnikov predlozhyl kontzeptziyu vozrozhdeniya Rossii” (Arch. Vladi-
slav Sveshnikov proposed a concept of revival of Russia), Strana.Ru, 25 March 2001,
<http://strana.ru/society/religion/2001/03/25/985524595.html> and
<http://www.strana.ru/special/dossier/2001/03/25/985533435.html>.

One of the most necessary and difficult tasks for contemporary Russia is what may
be called the search of true friends and true services to them for a joint opposition to
the International of the so-called “new world order,” which to the people understand-
ing the issue spiritually is the ground for the beginning of the Apocalyptic times.
This resembles in some respects, contemporary Russian foreign
policy (at least before 11 September 2001), but the state, of course,
usually prefers to cut off the extremes. And at the end of August 2001
the openly fundamentalist religious department of Strana.Ru was
closed.
Certainly, the state uses the Church, but RPTz is a force too signifi-
cant to let itself be used without any initiative on its own part. And
Church initiatives with an anti-liberal, xenophobic and anti-Western
orientation have become increasingly noticeable over the last two
years.
In the field of ideology, the Patriarchate is moving closer to the
fundamentalists, while the state is moving closer to the Patriarchate.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
126

ANTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES
IN THE EU AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE
ACCESSION COUNTRIES
L AURA L AUBEOVA
Introduction
The accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are
in the process of harmonising their legislation with the European
Union in all sectors, including minority protection and human rights
observance, as stipulated in the Copenhagen criteria and accession
agreements. Owing to different historical experiences and a lack of
democratic tradition, the post-communist countries have not yet
managed to adopt and implement anti-discrimination clauses and
sufficient measures for protection of minorities. Both the inter-
national commitments, including those enacted before 1989, and the
newly adopted legislation often seem to have a very low potential for
enforcement and implementation (mainly owing to previous neglect
of minority policies, paternalism, and abuse of the equality and soli-
darity concepts under communism; continuing prevalent ethnocen-
tric and xenophobic public opinion; low awareness of minority
issues among policy makers and public administration officers;
inability of educational systems to cope with these negative phe-
nomena, etc.).
One of the most discriminated groups in Europe is the Roma. The
fall of communist rule in CEE in 1989 brought official recognition of
the Roma as an ethnic minority group, but also led to the growth of
racism, racially motivated attacks against the Roma, and the emer-
gence of extreme right political parties which included anti-Roma
measures in their political programs (as a solution to the “gypsy
question” [sic]). The Roma have had to face high unemployment,
inappropriate and ineffective education as well as hidden discrim-
ination on the part of state and public administration, providers of
public services and other institutions. Racism and discrimination
have been among the main reasons behind the immigration of the
127

Roma to the EU countries. The issue of “economic” migration has
forced the EU countries to adjust their immigration policies; conse-
quently, the Roma have been blamed for blemishing countries’
accession prospects and have faced increased discrimination
despite efforts to facilitate the process of repatriation after their
return.
Postmodernist thought has shown that eurocentrism, xenophobia,
racism, superiority and prejudice are no longer “normal” and “nat-
ural” (neither is the division between “us” and “them,” as some socio-
biology experts claim)
1
but all these have to be eliminated, or at least
to have their impact minimized, if Europe wants to survive.
The recently held WCAR in Durban in September 2001 reminded
Europeans that racism is one of the most pernicious features of
human society, and that Europe still owes a lot to the third world
countries that used to be the subjects of European colonization and
exploitation.
2
On the other hand, the EU has adopted concrete
antiracist measures that (together with a determination to enforce
these) may serve as a positive example not only for the EU accession
countries but also for other parts of the world.
3
One of the most
problematic issues in our region is the denial of racism together
with a myth of post-communist exceptionalism, often expressed in
phrases like: “there is no racism here; it is only xenophobia,” and
“what is applicable elsewhere has no relevance here because the situ-
ation here is really specific” etc.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
128
1
Cf. van den Berghe, “Does race matter?” in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Ellis Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and
Ethnic Relations (London: Routledge, 1996) entries on race, race relations, racism, socio-
biology; Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and Leon Kamin, Not In Our Genes: Biology,
Ideology and Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 1990); Kenan Malik, The Meaning
of Race (Macmillan, 1996).
2 More details on the UN World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Other
Intolerance are available at <http://www.un.org/WCAR/>,
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/>, <http://www.racism.gov.za/>, and
<http://www.icare.to>—“caucases pages.”
3
Also promising are recent developments in the field of EU immigration policies; see
details in European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, Brussels, 22
November 2000, Com (2000) 757, and Migration: An Economic and Social Analysis by
Stephen Glover et al. UK Home office, RDS occasional paper no. 67, 
<www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/index.htm>.

Allow me to quote Mary Robinson, who, in her opening speech at
the NGO Forum in Durban, said:
4
Racism—as you all know—manifests itself in an extraordinary multiplicity of guises
and mutations. It may have deeply entrenched and institutionalised structures so that
anyone of a given complexion or ethnicity starts off in life with multiple strikes against
them. . . . Racism. Transmuted into xenophobia, means that “the stranger,” the
refugee, the migrant worker, the so called “undocumented alien” and their children—
are treated with contempt or derision, are humiliated, and denied their basic human
rights. Racism transformed into genocidal hatred, can mean that one’s neighbour
and erstwhile friend becomes a frenzied attacker, someone prepared to injure or
even kill. One of the most positive aspects of the World Conference for me has been
the clear evidence of an emerging alliance between governments and civil society on
follow up to this Conference.
Mary Robinson’s last sentence in particular shows that the role of
civil society in the struggle against racism and all its forms has
become unquestionable, and that the current process of drafting the
so called National Action plans, in accordance with the WCAR final
documents, should not be allowed to fall into disuse by nation state
governments but should be widely promoted and supported by civil
society.
I would like to mention here several positive aspects that emerged
from the WCAR in Durban:
• The UN conference for the first time in history provided space for
the Roma to raise their voice and formulate their demands.
5
•The conference acknowledged that institutional racism and other
forms and transmutations of racism are still deeply embedded in
all societies and that they should be confronted by nation states
governments and civil society.
• A parallel conference on racism and public policy brought experts
from all over the world who managed to provide expertise that can
serve as a starting point for antiracist policy drafting and enforce-
ment.
6
•The Central and Eastern European NGO Caucus managed to
articulate their requirements both in the preparatory stages (e.g.
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
129
4
Address of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, Durban, 28
August 2001.
5
Details available at <www.icare.to>—Caucases pages: Roma and Travellers.
6
Details are at <www.unrisd.org>.

at the meeting in Warsaw in 2000) as well as at the official part of
the WCAR in Durban.
In this paper I will present an overview of major antiracist/antidis-
crimination mechanisms and instruments that are relevant prima-
rily for the EU accession countries: the EU Race Equality directive;
ECHR (Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights);
CoE mechanisms; ICERD, etc. Additionally, I will try to highlight dif-
ficulties with their enforcement and implementation in PC Europe,
and we may see if these difficulties apply to all the post-communist
countries, and what are the major differences and specifics in re-
spective countries and regions. I will mention one example of a prom-
ising policy in the Czech Republic.
In order to understand the issue of racism and discrimination in
its complexity, I will make a final overview of the main definitions
and levels of racism.
Major antiracist instruments
and policies in Europe
The end of the Cold War together with growing globalisation has
had a substantial impact on interethnic relations, including the “eth-
nic revival” trends, in the EU member countries, which increasingly
have had to face and address issues of racism, xenophobia, and
related discrimination against minorities and immigrants. Conse-
quently, Europe has adopted new policies to enhance minority pro-
tection and to facilitate anti-discrimination law enforcement. Non-
governmental organisations, active in the field of minority protec-
tion and human rights observance, as well as civil society generally,
have played a positive role in both policy design as well as imple-
mentation. The involvement of civil society is not surprising in coun-
tries with democratic traditions and can serve as an effective inspir-
ation for the CEE countries. NGOs have a high potential for positive
influence on and contributions to the establishment of coherent
mechanisms that can survive electoral processes and populist po-
licies in the region.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
130

1. RACE EQUALITY DIRECTIVE
On 29 June 2000, the Council of the European Union adopted
Directive 2000/43/EC, “implementing the principle of equal treat-
ment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin” (the
“Race Equality Directive” or “Race Directive”).
7
The directive is the
product of a ten-year campaign by Starting Line Group, a broad net-
work of non-governmental organisations coordinated by the
Migration Policy Group, and presents Europe with an historic
opportunity to make a lasting contribution to the struggle for racial
equality.
8
Within three years, all EU member states should conform their le-
gislation to implement its principles. Also, the Directive is now part
of the acquis communautaire, the body of law which all states wish-
ing to join the EU must adopt. Therefore, each EU candidate country
will have to enact legislation and educate its judges, prosecutors and
other public officials about these new legal standards.
9
Among the
Directive’s most significant features are the following:
10
• The scope of discrimination: The Directive expressly includes both
“direct” and “indirect” discrimination within the scope of prohibit-
ed action. Indirect discrimination occurs “where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a
racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with
other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is object-
ively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that
aim are appropriate and necessary.” Some rules, though neutral
on their face as to ethnicity, in fact may disproportionately disad-
vantage members of certain minority groups who have a ten-
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
131
7
An important note must be made here that is relevant mainly to post communist coun-
tries where “race” has a strong biological connotation. As mentioned in point (6) of the
Directive preamble, “The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine
the existence of separate human races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this
Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories.”
8
Details on this NGO coalition strategy can be found in “Uplifting Standards” in NGO
News, A regional Newsletter for CEE and NIS NGOs, no. 19, autumn 2001, Freedom
House, pp. 8–9 (can be ordered at <fh@freedomhouse.hu>).
9
The EU has explicitly stated that the Directive “is part of the acquis communautaire”
(endnote 2) and that “adoption of the Community acquis in the area of equality is a sine
qua non for accession since it is essentially a question of human rights. . . .”
10
More details also available in Roma Rights, Newsletter of the ERRC, no. 1, 2001, Access
to Justice, pp. 63–66.

dency to wear long skirts or head scarves. By including “indirect”
discrimination within its ambit, the Directive reaches a broad
swath of discriminatory policies and actions which, though not
motivated by overt and readily provable racial hatred, nonetheless
“disadvantage” members of racial or ethnic minority groups. In so
doing, it goes beyond the current, more limited conceptions con-
tained in, for example, the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court. The directive
also prohibits harassment, instruction/incitement, and victimisa-
tion. Harassment occurs “when an unwanted conduct related to
racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect of vio-
lating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”; instruction
or incitement to discrimination and violence; and victimisation (i.e.
“adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a com-
plaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing the principle” or non-
discrimination).
• Public/private actors: The Directive applies to “both the public and
private sectors, including public bodies.” Thus eliminating the
“state action” hurdle which has hampered anti-discrimination law
enforcement in other contexts, e.g. the European Convention on
Human Rights, do not as clearly apply to discrimination by private
parties.
•Positive action: The Directive leaves open the possibility for states
to adopt “specific measures to prevent or compensate for disad-
vantages linked to racial or ethnic origin.” Roma have historically
suffered discrimination in housing, education, employment and
other fields. This measure makes it possible for governments to
employ a range of devices to achieve more adequate representa-
tion. These could include employment recruitment efforts targeted
at historically underrepresented minority groups, as well as hiring
codes and educational admissions criteria which make clear that
diversity at the workplace is in itself a desired goal. While a rule
guaranteeing “absolute and unconditional priority” for certain
groups is not permissible, the European Court of Justice has
approved an affirmative action policy providing that, where two
applicants are equally qualified, historically underrepresented
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
132

applicants should be given preference, unless reasons specific to
another applicant tilt the balance.
11
• Burden of proof/evidence: The Directive makes it practically feas-
ible for many victims to prove the discrimination they have suf-
fered in two principal ways. First, the Directive shifts the burden of
persuasion in civil cases by requiring that, once a prima facie case
of discrimination has been established, “it shall be for the respond-
ent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal
treatment.” Second, the Directive provides that indirect discrimi-
nation may be “established by any means, including on the basis of
statistical evidence.” As a practical matter, statistical evidence may
often be the best or only way of proving indirect discrimination—
i.e. of showing that an apparently neutral provision puts members
of a minority group at a particular disadvantage “compared with
other persons.”
•Enforcement bodies: By requiring that states designate a body
capable of “providing independent assistance to victims or dis-
crimination in pursuing their complaints,” the Directive opens the
way to the establishment of effective enforcement bodies capable
of taking legal action to secure equal treatment. I would also like
to mention here the “ECRI general policy recommendation no. 2:
Specialised bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism
and intolerance at national level”
12
(adopted by the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI], a Council of
Europe body). The document provides seven basic principles on
the establishment, the functioning and the execution of powers of
specialised bodies in the field of equal treatment and non-discrim-
ination. The recommendation has no legally binding force, but
member states of the Council of Europe must consider the recom-
mendations in good faith. The recommendation is likely to become
the main point of reference for the establishment of specialised
bodies in this field, including those bodies that will be set up under
the EU Directive.
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
133
11
Roma Rights, Newsletter of the ERRC, no. 1, 2001, Access to Justice, p. 68.
12
ECRI general policy recommendation no. 2: Specialised bodies to combat racism, xeno-
phobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance at national level, CRI (97) 36 of 13 June 1997.

The role of NGOs will be vital in the enforcement process; let me
quote from the Roma Rights newsletter: “Notwithstanding the major
step forward the Directive represents, civil society actors must act to
ensure its effective implementation both in the EU and in the candi-
date countries. While the EU will no doubt invest resources toward
this end, it will need help from the non-governmental community in
highlighting the significance of this development, and the nature of
the legal and institutional changes required; as well as in capacitat-
ing lawyers, other advocates and government officials to make use
of this new legal tool in their anti-discrimination work.”
13
“Indepen-
dent legal and advocacy expertise from the NGO sector will be
needed to ensure that ambiguous and potentially broad-ranging
provisions are applied in a manner most favourable and accessible
to discrimination’s victims. Questions are sure to arise concerning,
inter alia, the effectiveness of the sanctions required, the independ-
ence and functions of the government enforcement bodies to be
established, and the scope of ‘disadvantage’ needed to constitute a
prima facie case of discrimination. Absent sustained NGO input, the
Directive’s potential to transform anti-discrimination law in Europe
may not be fully realized.”
14
2. EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MONITORING RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA
(EUMC), VIENNA
The EUMC was established on the basis of EU Council Regulation
no. 1035/97 of 2 June 1997.
15
In article 3.3 of the regulation it states
that the EUMC shall be concerned with the extent, development,
causes and effects of the phenomena of racism and xenophobia. The
EUMC has the overall aim of providing the European Parliament,
the European Commission and the 15 Member States with reliable
and comparable data and statistics on racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism. In addition, EUMC has been working on an operational
definition of the following four basic terms: racism, xenophobia, anti-
semitism, islamophobia. The reason is that the member states, as
well as the accession states, should ultimately agree to a more or less
comparable understanding of the four terms, which for the moment
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
134
13
Roma Rights, Newsletter of the ERRC, no. 1, 2001, Access to Justice, p. 64.
14
Ibid., p. 64.
15
More details available at <http//:www.eumc.at>.

is not the case. Nevertheless, the recent legal instruments which
have been adopted by the European Council oblige the member
states to adapt their internal legislation also. It is hoped that this will
trigger a convergence process of understanding.
As a member of the EUMC Rapid Response Network (RAREN) in
2001, I have tried to contribute to these efforts and provide a view
from the CEE region. .
3. PROTOCOL NO. 12 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR)
Another significant development providing opportunities for
enhanced action in the field of racism and discrimination was the
adoption in June 2000 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe of Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention on Human
Rights (“Protocol no. 12” or “the Protocol”), broadening the scope of
the Convention’s Article 14 on non-discrimination, which presently
prohibits discrimination only in the enjoyment of the rights already
enshrined in the Convention. Unlike the Race Directive, however,
this Protocol comes into force only after ten states have ratified it.
There is another aspect that may hinder the ECHR’s impact on the
region that we are discussing here. The majority of post-communist
countries that aspire to enter the EU are full members of the Council
of Europe and the UN. There is a marked tendency for mechanisms
of the Council of Europe and the UN to be taken less seriously by
governments of the post-communist countries than the mechanisms
and instruments of the EU. This kind of negative motivation (If you do
not adopt EU legislation, you will not be allowed to join us) seems to
be more effective than appeals to human rights and justice. However,
Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union states that, “The Union
shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms . . . as general principles of Community law.”
Similarly, a high EU official stated: “The EU is committed to the
respect and the promotion of the universal principles set out in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, complemented by the
International Covenant on civil and political rights and economic,
social and cultural rights. Its activities are also based on the com-
mitments engendered by the main international and regional instru-
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
135

ments for the protection of Human Rights. These instruments
enshrine common values regarding fundamental freedoms and
democratic principles which are universal, indivisible and interde-
pendent.”
16
4. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (ICERD)
The Race Discrimination Convention defines discrimination broad-
ly to include both direct and indirect discrimination. Article 1(1) of
ICERD defines “racial discrimination” to include “any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent,
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nulli-
fying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”
Pursuant to Article 14, individuals or groups of individuals alleging
violation of the Convention may file a communication with the
Committee seeking redress, after first exhausting all domestic rem-
edies. Communications must be filed within six months of the final
domestic decision in the case. To date, the Committee procedure has
been under-utilized.
5. NON GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES: PROJECT TO IMPLEMENT
EUROPEAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
The Project to Implement European Anti-Discrimination Law, fund-
ed by the Open Society Institute, and administered by three NGOs
17
is a three-year initiative which started in January 2001. It covers the
15 EU member states and 11 candidate countries (Turkey and 10 in
Central and Eastern Europe). In close cooperation with local NGOs
and individuals, the Project aims to make the most of the historic
opportunity for enhanced anti-discrimination litigation and advoca-
cy created by the recently adopted EU Race Directive and Protocol
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
136
16
Quoted from: “The Respect of Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities in the
Context of the Enlargement of the European Union,” speech by Ramiro Cibrián, Head
of Delegation of the European Commission to the Czech Republic, Prague, 9 May 2000,
speech at the Panel Discussion on the Protection of Minorities in Europe. 
17
The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), Migration Policy Group (MPG) and
Interights.

no. 12 to the ECHR. The project has three principal initiatives, each
designed to promote the Directive’s effective application and the
Protocol’s timely entry into force:
18
•training/capacitation of judges, lawyers, NGO anti-discrimination
advocates, government officials, members of parliament and rep-
resentatives of specialised bodies to ensure that key actors
throughout the continent are sufficiently informed about the legal
obligations flowing from the Directive and the Protocol and know
how to make creative use of it;
19
•legislative advocacy before individual governments and relevant
EU institutions to ensure that the requirements of the Directive—in
a nut-shell, the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination le-
gislation and the establishment of effective enforcement bodies—
are swiftly and adequately complied with, and that Protocol no. 12
to the ECHR is speedily ratified by at least the minimum ten states
required for its entry into force;
•test litigation before selected constitutional and Supreme Courts,
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice, to ensure the adoption in judicial caselaw of the various
elements of the Directive and the Protocol.
All three Project components aim to identify the principal legal
and institutional needs in each country; therefore a detailed ana-
lysis of existing legal provisions and relevant jurisprudence pertain-
ing to racial and other forms of discrimination in the 26 countries
covered by the Project is being undertaken.
6. CASE STUDY: SUPPORT FOR RACE AND ETHNIC EQUALITY
PROGRAMME IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic is a typical example of a post-communist coun-
try that does not share the colonial past, and related burden of guilt,
with the more developed democracies. This may hinder antiracist
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
137
18
Quoted from the ERRC newsletter Roma Rights, no. 1, 2001; and the Freedom House
Newsletter NGO News, no. 19, autumn 2001.
19
One of the trainings was held in Prague, 25–28 April 2002, Implementing European
Anti-Discrimination Law workshop, targeted at lawyers, government officials and
activists for following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Spain, and
United Kingdom. More information is available at 
<www.migpolgroup.com> or <www.interrights.org>.

efforts, namely identification, recognition, and minimizing of the
impact of racism through effective legislation and policies. This fact
does not preclude it from successful cooperation in policy drafting
with countries that have had long experience with race relations
issues, such as the UK.
In April 2001, the governments of the Czech Republic and the UK
started a joint project aiming to promote race and ethnic equality in
the Czech Republic. One of the project’s main aims is to prepare the
way for the implementation of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29
June 2000, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between
Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, which all member
states of the European Union will be expected to incorporate into
national law by 19 July 2003. The proposals, in the format of a report
and recommendations, which will be submitted to the government
and/or responsible state institution after 31 March 2002 will com-
prise:
•Definition of a comprehensive anti-discrimination policy in the
Czech Republic: The relevant document (Report) will review
domestic anti-discrimination legislation and its enforcement,
including anti-discrimination policies in the private sector (if any).
Further, it will look at anti-discrimination legislation in selected EU
member states. The purpose of the report is to indicate whether
and which amendments to the existing anti-discrimination laws,
policies and measures are required.
•Definition of a strategy to strengthen capacity to combat discrim-
ination: the report and recommendations will focus on how to
improve and foster the institutional and administrative capacity of
the state to tackle discrimination and to promote equality. The
study will consider the pros and cons of two basic options for
improving the institutional and administrative capacity to tackle
discrimination:
(i) setting up a specialised body at the national level (e.g. a nation-
al commission for racial equality, ombudsman against ethnic dis-
crimination etc.) to combat discrimination and intolerance;
(ii) analysing institutional and operational arrangements within
the framework of existing institutions (i.e. ministries, including the
beneficiary) and formulating recommendations, in particular on
how to improve its co-ordination role with ministries.
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
138

On the basis of analysis and in line with the future policy pro-
posals/decisions of the government, the report will focus in detail on
the practicalities for adoption and implementation of one of the two
options:
•Preparation of draft amendments to laws and/or new laws linked
to strengthening the legal protection of minorities and to tackling
all forms of discrimination (priority given to racial discrimination),
on the basis of the studies above and with regard to government
policies, and working with the government office (department of
human rights), including measures to promote the institutional
framework for such activities. The proposals will be submitted to
the Human Rights Commissioner who will be responsible for pre-
sentation to the Government.
•Elaboration of an awareness raising campaign strategy to
increase awareness and understanding of the impacts of discrim-
ination (setting immediate targets and an outline of delivery mech-
anisms/instruments, plus medium-term goals to be achieved)
aimed at (a) public administrators and (b) the general public.
• Implementation of a series of regular consultative round-table dis-
cussions to assess the situation of the Roma community, the forms
of discrimination faced and the effectiveness of government meas-
ures to combat discrimination. The round-tables will serve both as
workshops for the exchange of opinions among government offi-
cials, opinion-makers and representatives of the Roma commu-
nity, as well as a means of disseminating information on govern-
ment policies in this area.
A positive aspect of the above programme is that there is cooper-
ation with the NGO sector, namely the project mentioned in the
above chapter and administered by the ERRC and other European
NGOs. A potential risk of the project is that its results may not be
accepted by the general public nor politicians because the media
and other public opinion shapers seem to be more or less ignorant
of these anti racist efforts.
Theoretical framework
Political theory, mainly in the field of theorising multiculturalism
does not intersect with practical political and social solutions. A
major task ahead for any theorist of public policy is to account for
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
139

and provide practical solutions for discrepancies between progres-
sive normative prescriptions, formulated both in political philosophy
as well as in the body of law, and insufficient mechanisms for their
implementation. The gap is even more evident in international law,
which only offers general principles of conduct of states and sets
minimum standards for the protection of minorities, thus leaving
concrete measures to the goodwill of national governments,
20
or
provides broad definitions of racial discrimination that are difficult
to transform into de facto racial equality.
21
Policy makers should be aware of and follow the impact of the aca-
demic discourse based on research in political science, law, and soci-
ology, on the practical activities in the fields of policy-making, law-
making, law enforcement and public administration, especially
when targeting the Roma. For this purpose it is useful to analyse vari-
ous models of interethnic relations focusing on theorising of multi-
culturalism. Charles Taylor argues that the politics of ethnic recog-
nition can promote participatory citizenship and the search for a
common good, while Will Kymlicka maintains that, in some circum-
stances, group differentiated rights may be required in order to put
into operation some basic liberal principles.
22
A critique of the
“false” liberal universalism is reflected in some political theories of
integration that analyse the cultural, economic, and political
domains of integration.
23
The complex and contested concept of equal opportunities that
assumes shared meaning but in further exploration often proves to
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
140
20
Patrick Thornberry, “An Unfinished Story of Minority Rights,” in Diversity in Action.
Local Public Management of Multiethnic Communities in CEE, ed. Anna-Maria Biró and
Petra Kovacs (Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 1998),
pp. 45–75.
21
Atsuko Tanaka and Yoshinobu Nagamine, The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Guide for NGOs (London–Tokyo:
MRG-IMADR, 2001).
22
Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining Politics of
Recognition (Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
23
Rainer Babock, The Integration of Immigrants (Strasbourg: Chronicle of Europe, 1994),
Document CDMG (94) 25E, and H. Antony, Nationalism and National Integration
(London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989); R. Baubock, Transnational Citizenship. Membership
and Rights in International Migration (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Bikhu Parekh,
Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (London:
Macmillan, 2000).

be “superficial or erroneous”
24
is being complemented by the debate
over affirmative action, positive action or special differentiation
according to the needs of the targeted groups.
Special focus should be placed on theories and definitions of
racism. The critical race theory, one of the recent legal philosophies
among US lawyers, understands racism broadly and shows its rela-
tion to law: “Racism is viewed not only as a matter of individual preju-
dice and everyday practice, but as a phenomenon that is deeply
embedded in language and perception. . . . Concepts such as justice,
truth and reason are open to questions that reveal their complicity
with power. This extraordinary pervasiveness of unconscious racism
is often ignored by the legal systems.”
25
The exploration of various
mechanisms and forms of denial of racism may help us to compre-
hend the complexity of the phenomena in terms of the need for
recognition.
26
Recognition of denial and subsequent recognition of
racism itself may offer valuable insights if complemented by multi-
disciplinary approaches to the consequences of psychological, cog-
nitive, social psychological, socio-economic, political, and sociologic-
al explanations of racism.
An important and complex issue is the interconnectedness
between racism and economic interests. The definition of racism
should thus include notion of power relations and cover also cases
where the skin colour (or religion, or culture) can play minor role,
despite its strong stigmatising effect, i.e. relation where mainly eco-
nomic and power interests are at stake.
27
Definitions of racism range from biological determination to cul-
tural essentialism and social pathology labelling and are abundant
A NTIRACIST LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN THE EU
141
24
Barbara Baginole, Equal Opportunities and Social Policy: Issues of Gender, Race and
Disability (London: Longman, 1997).
25
Steven Vago, Law and Society, Sixth edition (Uppersaddle River, New Jersy: Prentice
Hall, 2000), p. 68.
26
Stanley Cohen, Denial and Acknowledgement: the Impact of Information about Human
Rights Violations (Jerusalem: the Hebrew University, 1995), pp. 87–118.
27
I am hinting at the neverending discussions between “experts” who claim that the prob-
lems connected with e.g. Roma minority are actually social and economic problems,
and other experts who claim that these are problems connected with racism. In reality,
both groups are partially right as the issue is too complex and often involves both
aspects.

in dictionaries and sociology books.
28
I would like to highlight the
basic distinctions that have practical implications. Apart from the so
called “scientific racism of the nineteenth century” that focuses on
the natural hierarchy and can still be found in much academic writ-
ing,
29
the most common form is so called “common-sense” or “popu-
lar” racism based on prejudice and stereotypes targeted at groups
who are either physically or culturally different. The most pervasive
and damaging form is that of institutionalised or structural racism.
This can be found in most hidden forms: School authorities may
believe that minority students who choose to come to mainstream
schools must adapt to school norms. There is no thought of the
school adapting in any fundamental way to the students. Thus, for
example, well intended “multicultural” education can be perceived
as assimilation, including the bridging and enrichment classes that
produce “coconuts” (people with black skin and white insides).
30
Another example is the hidden racism in textbooks stereotyping
members of certain minority groups or using insensitive language.
Much research has been done on institutional racism in police work,
housing and employment policies.
In coping with racism, xenophobia and other related forms of
intolerance, it is necessary to work with a variety of variables at
many different levels. Being aware of the reasons for and conditions
of various forms of racism can help us to plan appropriate policies
and work methods. There are several levels at which one accounts
for racism and its forms: psychological, cognitive, social psychologic-
al—intergroup relations, structural and institutional.
Conclusion
Design and enforcement of effective mechanisms and instruments
against racial discrimination, racism, xenophobia and related forms
X ENOPHOBIA AND P OST- SOCIALISM
142
28
E.g. Ellis Cashmore, Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations (London: Routledge, 1996);
Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society
(London: Macmillan, 1996); Mike O’Donnell, Race and Ethnicity (New York: Longman,
1991).
29
E.g. R. Herrnstein and Ch. Murray (1994, 1995) The Bell Curve as analysed in Stephen
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 1996.
30
This expression is very common in the South African context; however it is also fre-
quently used by Roma in the Czech Republic, e.g. by Ivan Veselý, president of the Dzeno
association.

of intolerance presuppose interdisciplinary analysis, encompassing
aspects of international politics and international law, as well as
analysis of policies preventing racial discrimination from a histor-
ical perspective. Local experience and public opinion are affected by
global tendencies, and although there are many factors specific to
the post-communist region, research has shown that racism takes
universal forms and that the response to it should therefore also be
more or less universal.
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143