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September 2010

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


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**Matjaž Klemenčič**

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TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES
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MATJAŽ KLEMENČIČ

# Indigenous National/Ethnic Minorities in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian Region, 1921–1938

The article deals with the problems of indigenous national/ethnic minorities in Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region, which came into being as result of drawing of new state frontiers after World War I and dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Characteristically for the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region are ethnically mixed areas settled by indigenous minorities. Some of them have their specific minority rights guaranteed on the basis of international agreements. This article intends to prove that these minorities had to cope with similar incomprehensible problems in the states where they lived as the minorities even today have to cope with. The states very often treated minorities as a disturbing factor, which needed to be eliminated as soon as possible. To achieve this, the states on the one hand neglected economic development in the regions, which were settled by minorities; and on the other hand, they tried to assimilate the ethnic/national minorities through administrative-political reforms and by not supporting the activities of specific minority organizations. Therefore, the minority population began to emigrate from the regions of their indigenous settlement. It is interesting to note that all of the above mentioned facts are also valid for today's era of a united Europe.

Keywords: Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region, indigenous national/ethnic minorities, ethnic conflicts, ethnicity, nationalism

# *Avtohtone narodne/etnične manjšine v alpsko-jadransko-panonskem prostoru, 1921–1938*

*Prispevek obravnava problematiko avtohtonih narodnih/etničnih manjšin v alpsko-jadransko-panonskem prostoru, ki so nastale kot posledica oblikovanja novih državnih meja po prvi svetovni vojni in razpadu Avstro-Ogrske. Za alpsko-jadransko-panonski prostor je tudi danes značilna etnična pomešanost, poseljenost z avtohtonimi manjšinami, večina katerih ima specifične manjšinske pravice zagotovljene na podlagi mednarodnih pogodb. V nadaljevanju prispevka bo dokazano, da so se te manjšine spopadale s podobnimi problemi nerazumevanja njihovih potreb s strani držav, v katerih so živele, kot je to značilno tudi za današnje obdobje. Države so manjšine pogosto imele za moteč dejavnik, ki ga je potrebno čim prej in na takšen ali drugačen način odpraviti. S tem ciljem so na eni strani načrtno zapostavljale gospodarski razvoj z manjšinami poseljenih območij, na drugi pa so poskušale manjšine čim prej asimilirati tudi na podlagi upravno-političnih reform in neustreznega podpiranja specifičnih manjšinskih organizacij. Manjšinsko prebivalstvo se je zato začelo v vse večjem številu izseljevati z območij svoje avtohtone poselitve. Vse navedena dejstva veljajo tudi za današnje obdobje združene Evrope.*

*Ključne besede: alpsko-jadransko-panonski prostor, avtohtone narodne/etnične manjšine, mednacionalni konflikti, etničnost, nacionalizem*

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# 1. Introduction

The article deals with the problems of indigenous national/ethnic minorities in Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region. These groups of population became national/ethnic minorities after the new state frontiers were drawn after World War I.

The term national minority describes parts of national/ethnic groups, which live outside the territory of their own indigenously settled state or peoples without their own state. As the term itself implies, minorities have certain characteristics:

- their size is smaller than the number of the majority ethno-nation of the state where they are citizens;
- they differ from the majority population of the state by ethnic, cultural, linguistic and some times even religious characteristics;
- they try to retain those characteristics which represent the identity of the group and/or their culture, tradition, religion or language;
- they keep long term and close relations and contacts with their mother country (Heckmann 1992, 62; Pan & Pfeil 2000, 263–275).

Many specialists who deal with ethnic minorities describe as autochthonous/indigenous national minorities those minorities who already lived in their regions of settlement (ethnic territory) before the industrial revolution and who became minorities as a result of changes of political boundaries. They differ from so-called alochthonous minorities or immigrant communities (new minorities), which are the result of migrations after the industrial revolution. They are the result of movements from the countryside into cities and/or the movement of population from economically less developed regions into more developed regions (Koter 1993; Klemenčič M. & Harris 2009, XI–XII).

In the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region there are ethnically mixed areas settled by indigenous minorities. Most of them had their specific minority rights guaranteed on the basis of international agreements. This article intends to prove that these minorities had to cope with similar incomprehensible problems in the states where they lived as the minorities have to cope with even today. The states very often treated minorities as a disturbing factor, which needed to be eliminated as soon as possible. To achieve this, the states on the one hand neglected economic development in the regions, which were settled by minorities; and on the other hand, they tried to assimilate the ethnic/national minorities through administrative-political reforms and by not supporting the activities of specific minority organizations. Therefore, the minority population began to emigrate

from the regions of their indigenous settlement. The emigration went in two directions: on the one hand to regions of their "mother" countries, and on the other, overseas (Klemenčič V. 1994). It is interesting to note that all of the above mentioned facts are also valid for today's era of a united Europe.

The available literature on the subject of the problems of ethnic/national minorities in the period from 1918 till 1938 is quite rich and comprehensible. The authors who dealt with the subject dealt with it in great details for the most numerous ethnic/national minorities in the region (German-speaking minority in South Tyrol, Germans in Slovenia, and in Hungary, Slovenes and Croats in Italy, Slovenes in Carinthia); there is, however, lack of literature for smaller minorities (Ladins, Friulians, other minorities in Hungary and in Yugoslavia).

We have to mention also that the official census data on the size of minority populations are not reliable. Author deals with these problems in article itself.

The article does not deal with Jews in this region, because majority of them lived only in certain larger cities and did not demand classical minority rights. It does not deal also with Roma population most of whom at the time did not settle permanently yet.

## 2. Geographical Description of the Term Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian Region

The term Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region was gradually introduced in the beginning of the 1960s when cross-border cooperation among Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Carinthia, and Slovenia first began to intensify in the fields of economy, environment and spatial planning, transportation, culture, tourism and sports. The result of this cooperation was the establishment of the Working Group of East Alpine Lands [*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der östlichen Alpenländer*], which soon was renamed the Working Group Alps-Adriatic [*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpen-Adria*]. At the same time the term Alps-Adriatic region was also introduced as a geographic description of the territory. After the Austrian province of Burgenland and some western Hungarian counties, which were part of the Pannonian region, joined the group in the 1980s (Jurič-Pahor 2010, 189–191), the geographic term Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region was introduced as a descriptor for the area of this Working Group.

Although the membership of the Working Group changed constantly,[1] the term

Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region was firmly established for the region, which today encompasses the republics of Slovenia and Croatia; the Austrian provinces of Burgenland, Carinthia, Upper Austria, and Styria; the Italian regions of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lombardy, Veneto, and Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol); and the Hungarian counties of Baranya, Győr-Moson-Sopron, Somogy, Vas, and Zala. It encompasses ca. 204,000 km$^2$ of southeastern Central Europe. In the beginning of the 21$^{st}$ century 27.5 million people (Statistik Austria 2002, 40; KSH, 2002; SURS 2003, 23; DZS 2002; ISTAT 2001) lived in this territory, while in the beginning of the 1930s there were only some 20.4 million people (ICS 1933; KSH 1932; Publikationsstelle 1943; ÖSZ 1934).

It is important to know that the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region encompasses a number of European physical geographical units. The southern part of this territory lies in Mediterranean Europe (the eastern and northern Adriatic coast) and Sub-Mediterranean Europe (the Friulian Plain and the northern part of the Po Plain. Its middle lies in the high mountain Alpine region of the central and Eastern Alps and the Dinaric Ranges. Its northern portion is part of the southwestern Pannonian Plains and the Danube Valley. Many important Trans-European transportation lines run through this territory, for example, the Brenner and Thörl Maglern Passes connect the Mediterranean with Northern Europe and the Postojna Pass connects the western Mediterranean with Central and Eastern Europe (Klemenčič V. 1993, 19–20; Moritsch 2001). Due to these favorable lines of transport with other parts of Europe many mass population movements have taken place here throughout history. The consequence of these movements is the very picturesque ethnic structure of the region. Peoples which are members of the Germanic (Germans, Austrians), the Romanic (Friulians, Italians, Ladins), the Slavic (Czechs, Croatians, Poles, Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Ukrainians) and the Finno-Ugrian (Hungarians) linguistic groups settled in this territory. Also Roma live dispersed in this territory, especially in the Pannonian and Sub-Pannonian parts; in the past numerous Jewish populations inhabited some cities as well.

The ethnic structure of the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region is very complicated. In many instances regions which are settled by only one ethnic group, are intermingled with ethnically mixed territories where two or more peoples live. Due to such circumstances, the boundaries of the states which were formed in this region after the end of World War I very rarely coincided with ethnic boundaries. This was also true of later changes of the frontiers (after World War II and in the 1990s during the period of the dissolution of Yugoslavia). Such boundaries have often run through ethnically mixed regions or have divided ethnically homogeneous areas of individual peoples (Klemenčič V. 1993, 19–

20). Therefore, the establishment of every new state at the dissolution of Austria-Hungary after World War I also meant the formal establishment of new national minorities. Each newly established state in the region also included in its territory parts of the ethnic territory of at least one ethnic group of its neighboring countries. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (after 1929, Yugoslavia) was multinational.

**Figure 1**
Indigenous National/Ethnic Minorities in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian Region at the Beginning of the 1930s

# 3. The Creation of State Boundaries in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian Region after World War I

Until the end of World War I most of the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region was included in the multi-national Habsburg Empire. Only the southwestern part of the region, the Friulian Plain and the northern part of the Po Plain belonged to the Kingdom of Italy. After World War I the frontiers in the region changed completely, when Austria, Hungary and the Kingdom of SCS were established from the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Determination of frontiers after World War I was very complicated, because compromises were needed among the interests of the Great Powers (France, Italy, Russia, and Great Britain). There were established and signed agreements which had already taken place during the war; there were demands of certain peoples and states; there was the declared principle of self-determination of nations or peoples. Here we have to mention also that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in his famous 14 points wanted Austria-Hungary to be preserved after World War I. He wanted the peoples of Austria-Hungary to develop autonomously, but within Austria-Hungary. In most textbooks it is written that Wilson wanted to achieve borders in accordance with ethnic principles and that he was for self-determination of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[2] It took Wilson till summer of 1918 to change his views. He joined the views of Yugoslav Committee, the Czechs and others that there should be new states established on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy (Pirjevec 2007, 97–98; Lipušček 2003, 4, 139–142; Lynch 1999, 21).

Most of the state frontiers in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region were determined by peace treaties approximately one year after the end of World War I. Statesmen tried to find solutions for some frontier problems for years after the end of World War I and some of them became sources of permanent struggle and misunderstandings between the states. We have to mention especially the frontier between Italy and Austria in the region of South Tyrol and the frontier between the Kingdom of SCS and Italy (the so-called Adriatic question). Italy, as member of the Entente, the wining side in World War I, wanted its allies to fulfill the London Agreement of 26 April 1915, (i.e. the agreement among France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy, on the basis of which Italy entered the war against Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey). The Entente had promised in exchange that Italy would get South Tyrol, Gorizia, Gradiscia, Trieste, Kanal Valley, the southwestern part of Carniola, Istria, the Kvarner Islands and the major portion of Dalmatia. At the peace conference in Paris many discussions took place as far

as South Tyrol and the Adriatic question were concerned. In the end Italy got most of the territories, which were promised to her by the London Agreement. The border between Italy and Austria, which gave Italy the territory of South Tyrol, was determined on 10 September 1919 by a peace treaty which was signed in Saint-Germain-en-Laye; the border between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS was determined by the Treaty of Rapallo on 12 November 1920. No state was happy with the new borders. Especially the border determined by the Rapallo Treaty caused much discontent. The leaders of the Kingdom of SCS were unhappy with the fact that ca. 350,000, or almost one third of all indigenous Slovenes and ca. 150,000 Croats remained in Italy. Italy was unhappy because it did not get all of Dalmatia in accordance with London Agreement. According to Italian nationalists and fascists, it meant that the Italian victory in World War I was "crippled" (Kacin-Wohinz & Pirjevec 2000, 24–36). To pacify the tensions, the government of the Kingdom of SCS agreed in 1924 to the annexation of Rijeka to Italy, although in accordance with the Treaty of Rapallo, Rijeka was to have had the status of a neutral city-state (Pirjevec 1995, 28, 51–52).

There were also many unsolved problems with the demarcation of the borders of the newly established Austrian Republic. The destiny of the Yugoslav-Austrian border in Styria was determined by the military intervention of Rudolf Maister, who in the beginning of November 1918, occupied Maribor and the Drava Valley with his volunteer soldiers, and later also the region up to the Mura River in the north. At the end of November Maister negotiated a demarcation line with Rudolph Passy, who had the mandate of the Austrians. The line mostly coincided with the Slovene-German ethnic border in Styria. This demarcation line was later accepted as the frontier between Austria and the Kingdom of SCS (Ude 1977; Karner 2000, 130–134).

The situation in southern Carinthia, which the Slovenes demanded for themselves on the basis on ethnic and historical reasons, was more complicated. After the military battles which continued until the end of spring 1919, diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference decided that the "Carinthian Question" should be solved by a plebiscite. Austria won this plebiscite in the Klagenfurt area. In Zone A on 10 October 1920, 22,025 people voted in favor of the annexation of this territory to Austria, while 15,279 voted in favor of annexation to the Kingdom of SCS. 10,000 Slovenes also voted in favor of annexation to the Republic of Austria because Austrian authorities guaranteed them minority rights (Klemenčič M. & Klemenčič V. 2006, 29).

The people of the city of Sopron and its environs also decided on the border between Austria and Hungary. A plebiscite took place between 14 and 16

December 1921. The result was in favor of Hungary (Wambaugh 1933, 290–292).

Nobody in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region was happy with the frontiers, which had been drawn in accordance with the interests of the Great Powers. Numerous national/ethnic minorities remained outside of their "mother" countries. The governments of the countries to which they belonged promised to protect their ethnic identities. Austria, as one of the losers of World War I, had an obligation to protect minorities and their ethnic identities in accordance with the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

In spite of promises of protection of minorities and their ethnic identities, the situation for national minorities in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region started to worsen very quickly. Inadequate minority protection very often caused conflicts between minorities and majorities. It also caused temporary conflicts in relations among the states. Under these circumstances cooperation between minority and majority populations was very difficult. The state frontiers in the period between World War I and World War II represented real dividing lines. People and goods were really hindered in crossing them due to laws on crossing the state frontiers which were prescribed by each state. These regimes also hindered almost any cooperation between minorities and their mother countries.

# 4. The Situation of Indigenous Ethnic/National Minorities in Individual States of the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian Region, 1921–1938

## 4.1. Ethnic/National Minorities in Italy

Vast regions inhabited by minority populations were annexed to Italy after World War I. These included 270,000 Germans, 19,500 Ladins, 350,000 Slovenes, 150,000 Croats and ca. 5,000 people who were members of other nationalities (Klemenčič M. 1980, 37). Before 1922, when the fascists took power, Italy was ready to search for solutions to minority questions for some of its minorities. For example, Tommaso Tittoni, then Foreign Minister, who was the leader of Italian delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris (and later President of the Italian Senate during the reign of the Fascists), declared at the end of October 1919: "Peoples of foreign nationality who came under our jurisdiction should know that the thoughts on oppression and denationalization are completely strange to us; their languages and their cultural institutions will be respected,

they will also enjoy all the rights which are derived from our freedom-loving and democratic laws" (Tittoni in Schloch 1965, 298). This was also confirmed in the beginning of December 1919 in a special statement by Italian King Vittorio Emanuele III who also said: "Our liberal traditions will lead us in such a way that we are going to solve the problems of Non-Italian nationalities with the highest respect and also their traditions, local institutions and local self-managements" (Vittorio Emanuele III in Schloch 1965, 298). In spite of those promises, reality was completely different and Italy began to proceed with assimilatory pressures towards minorities soon after the treaties of Saint-Germain and Rapallo were signed.

### 4.1.1. The German Minority in South Tyrol

During the early period after the annexation of South Tyrol to Italy, part of the German speaking South Tyrolese tried to cooperate with the Italian majority. In 1921 when the first general parliamentary elections took place after World War I in Italy, the South Tyrolese social-democrats cooperated with the Italian socialists. This was a result of the fact that the Italian socialists were the only party, which in 1919 voted against the annexation of South Tyrol to Italy. On the other hand, already in autumn 1919, both of the most important German parties of South Tyrol, the Catholic People's Party and the German Liberal Party had united their political activities in the German Union. The German Union received enough votes for four deputies to be elected to the Italian parliament. They were recognized as the formal representation of the German speaking South Tyrolese during the period before the fascists took power in Italy. In spite of some attempts at cooperation the Italianization of South Tyrol had already started in this period. This was evidenced by the denial of the demand of the German South Tyrolese deputies in the Italian parliament to free German speaking South Tyrolese from serving in the Italian Army, and by the "lex Corbino" law, which required that children in Italy must get their education only in Italian schools. There were no Italian schools in South Tyrol yet (Schloch 1965, 301).

The German Union welcomed the victory of the fascists in Italy in October of 1922. Its leaders were convinced that with this victory the situation of the German speaking minority in South Tyrol would improve. In February 1923, representatives of the German Union even reached an agreement with the local leaders of the Fascist Party on ways to solve the South Tyrolese question. The agreement concluded that:

- there would be no nationalization of the property of South Tyrolese;
- the South Tyrolese question would be treated as an exclusively internal Italian

issue and that the German-speaking South Tyrolese would be loyal Italian citizens. In exchange for fulfillment of these demands, the leaders of the Fascist Party promised that they would treat the German speaking South Tyrolese as a special nationality group;

- Italian would be the official language in administration and offices; German minority members could use their own language;
- also, in schools where German was the language of education, Italian would be introduced as a special teaching subject;
- the German-speaking South Tyrolese would establish private schools with German as the language of education, while the Italian authorities would establish Italian public schools;
- the Italian authorities would not dismiss any German speaking official due to poor knowledge of the Italian language;
- the Italian authorities would take into account the right of the members of the German speaking minority to gather and to hold public meetings;
- they would annex the Judicial District Egna/Neumarkt to the Judicial District Bolzano/Bozen (Steurer 1977, 5; Gatterer 1968, 431).

This agreement was never confirmed by the Fascist Grand Council. It was clear that the fascist leaders wanted to hinder possible unrest during the period when they were in the early stages of taking complete power. This was also obvious from their plan of Italianization of South Tyrol which was proposed by Italian Senator, Ettore Tolomeo. This plan foresaw among other things the following:

- the unification of Trentino/Trient and South Tyrol into one province;
- the nomination of Italian secretaries for each of the communes;
- the revision of citizenship;
- restrictions in the regime of border-crossings and the sharpening of conditions for temporary residency of foreign Germans (foreign tourists) in the region of South Tyrol;
- the immigration of Germans to the region of South Tyrol was forbidden;
- the revision of the results of the 1921 Census of Population;
- the introduction of Italian as the exclusive official language;
- the dismissal of German speaking officials or their transfer to provinces in central Italy;
- the abolition of the German Union, "Alpenverein" and daily *Der Tiroler*;
- the Italianization of German locality signs, signs on public offices and the Italianization of "Germanized" family names;
- facilitating immigrant Italians in buying the land in the territory of South Tyrol;
- the abolition of German banks and the establishment of an Italian land-credit bank;

- the establishment of border customs offices in Vipiteno/Sterzing and Dobbiaco/Toblach;
- the means to support Italian language and culture;
- the establishment of Italian kindergartens, elementary schools and high schools;
- the establishment of an Italian Studies Institute for South Tyrol;
- adjustments in the territorial boundaries of Bressanone/Brixen Diocese;
- the introduction of Italian as the language of the courts, etc. (Schloch 1965, 303; Gatterer 1968, 436).

The program of Italianization of South Tyrol, as described above, began to be carried out by the fascist authorities already in the spring of 1923, when the authorities replaced German with Italian topographic signs and signs on public, administrative, judicial and other offices. In autumn 1923 Italian became the official language of the province. The authorities fired all the officials who were not of Italian nationality, who did not read and write the Italian language perfectly and they were replaced with officials of Italian nationality. The usage of the term "Südtirol" for the province or geographic region was forbidden and replaced by Tolomeo's name "Alto Adigge." On 1 October 1923 German was expulsed from the schools with the introduction of "Gentile's Reform" (Klemenčič M. 1980, 39).

The Italian policies succeeded in Italianizing only a few smaller regions near the urban centers by putting the program in place. On the other hand, they did not succeed in Italianizing the countryside or the cities with a majority of German population. This could be explained by the favorable conditions in land ownership for Germans and the relatively good economic situation of a large part of the German speaking population in the cities (Leidlmair 1965, 362–381). The planned establishment of new industrial enterprises did the most in the Italianization of South Tyrol. In March 1935 the highest representatives of Italy and Italian business management met in Bolzano/Bozen (Schloch 1965, 311). At this meeting Benito Mussolini acquainted the representatives of Italian business management with the plans of the Italian government to establish an industrial zone in Bolzano/Bozen. On the directive of the government, large industrial enterprises from Lombardy and Piedmont were to establish branches in the new industrial zone. The consequences of the realization of this plan were first shown by changes in the linguistic structure of the population in Bolzano/Bozen. In the new industrial zone 97% of those who found jobs were Italians and only 3% were Germans and Ladins. Due to the above mentioned employment policy almost 87% of all the members of the German speaking minority were still self-employed or employed in farming and trade. Therefore, Italians who

immigrated into South Tyrol could not buy land. Members of the German minority sold their farms very rarely. For that reason, in 1939 the percentage of Italians employed in farming in South Tyrol remained at only 6% (Gatterer 1968, 556–561; Klemenčič M. 1980, 40–41).

In spite of strong Italianization pressures, South Tyrolese Germans succeeded in keeping their identity and most of the region of their autochthonous settlement until the end of the 1930s. This was also due to the help of Germany which served as a protector of South Tyrolese Germans and helped them in their endeavors to keep their identity. It is interesting to note that the Nazis, before they took power in Germany, did not show any special interest in the question of South Tyrol. In 1931 Hitler emphasized that he would not demand the revision of the border at Brenner, if he were to come to power (Steurer 1977, 8) and Germany did not make such demands even after 1933 when the Nazis came to power. The German minority in South Tyrol received from the German government only substantial financial help for the need of its enterprises, schools and the financing of its political activities. This German policy did not change until after the *Anschluß* of Austria to the Third Reich (Steininger 1999).

### 4.1.2. The Situation of German Linguistic Islands in Northern Italy

The German speaking inhabitants in the linguistic islands in the northern parts of the Veneto region of that day resisted the pressures of Italianization even more strongly than did the South Tyrolese. Most of them lived in the valleys of Sauris/Zahre, Timau/Tischelwang, in Valcanale/Kanalska dolina/Kanaltal,[3] near Assiago and in the commune of Sappada/Pladen near Belluno. These were smaller groups which amounted to a few hundreds or at most a few thousands of German speakers. Most of them (ca. 6,400) lived in Valcanale/Kanalska dolina/Kanaltal, which had been a part of the Austrian province of Carinthia until the end of World War I. In addition to German speakers, 1,682 people who used Slovene as their language of communication and only 10 Italian speakers were counted in 1910 (Wurzer 1970b, 381–386).

After World War I Italian authorities in all the above mentioned regions carried out a policy of Italianization similar to that in South Tyrol. At first they settled Italian bureaucrats, policemen, financial guards and other public officials, and in 1925 introduced Italian as the official language. Because most of the population was not able to speak or write Italian, the authorities introduced translators. They also gradually introduced Italian in the schools and hired Italian teachers as part of "Gentile's" school reform. They gradually also changed all topographic signs and signs in public offices which became only Italian (Veiter 1960, 443–468).

Italians immigrated into all the regions where there were German linguistic islands and, as a result, the ethnic/linguistic structure of the population changed. The most significant were changes in Val Canale/Kanaltal/Kanalska dolina, where the number of Italians between 1921 and 1934 increased from 1,207 to 4,240. At the same time, the number of Germans increased by only 1,300 persons, from 4,158 in 1921 to 5,464 in 1934. The number of Slovenes increased by only 76 persons, i.e. from 1,109 in 1921 to 1,185 in 1934 (Klemenčič M. 1980, 41).

### 4.1.3. The Ladins

The Ladins represent one of the oldest ethnic groups in the regions of today's Italy. The region of their autochthonous settlement encompasses the mountainous valleys of the Italian Dolomites on the borders between the provinces of Belluno, Bolzano/Bozen and Trento/Trient. According to some estimates, there were ca. 20,000 members of the Ladin ethnic group during the interwar period. The Italian authorities treated them as Italians and did not recognize them as a minority due to the fact that the Ladinian language belongs to the Romanic group of languages (Palla 1997, 61–70).

The national and socio-economic question of the Ladins in the interwar period was very closely connected to the question of the German speaking South Tyrolese. The Ladins had also tried to remain under Austria. The representatives of some Ladin communes in October 1918 issued a special declaration to the German speaking South Tyrolese, in which they connected their destiny with the destiny of the South Tyrolese Germans. They wrote in a special declaration among other things: "We are not Italians; we did not count ourselves as Italians in the past, and also in the future would not like to be Italians / … / The destiny of the German Tyrolese is also our destiny! Their future ought to be our future!" (Wurzer 1970a, 195–196). The representatives of the same Ladin communes in February 1919, together with the South Tyrolese, prepared a special resolution which was addressed to the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson (Palla 1997, 64).

In spite of all attempts and endeavors, the geographic area of settlement of the Ladins and the South Tyrolese was given to Italy in accordance with the Peace Treaty on Saint-Germain-en–Laye. The Italian authorities treated the Ladins as Italians, because they defined the Ladin language as a dialect of Italian. In 1921, in spite of sharp protests from the Ladins, Italian was introduced as the language of education with the intention of the complete Italianization of the Ladins. Therefore, it was not surprising that in 1939 more than half of the Ladins opted for Germany (Wurzer 1970a, 196).

### 4.1.4. The Friulians

The historical area of settlement of the Friulians consists of the Friulian Plain from the river Livenza in the west to the river Isonzo in the east and from the Karnian and Julian Alps in the north to the Adriatic Sea on the south. Most of this region, with the exception of areas around the Isonzo River, already belonged to Italy before World War I (Pascolo 1970, 199–201). After World War II the region of settlement of Friulians was divided between the Italian regions of Venezia Giulia/Julijska krajina and Veneto.

Because the Friulian language like the Italian language belongs to the Romanic group of languages, the Italian authorities in the period between two world wars treated them as Italians and did not recognize them as a minority. They based this policy on the conclusion that the Friulian language was only an "informal people's language," which was spoken almost only in the countryside, and to the fact that all Friulians were bilingual or even trilingual. Therefore, the Friulians had always had a dual identity; they were Friulians; at the same time they considered themselves Italians. This dual identity was always present in their political activities as they never considered secession or independence. Their love for "their" country always combined "love towards the little homeland" [*Piccola patria*], i.e. Friuli, and "love towards the large homeland" [*Grande patria*], i.e. Italy and also Austria, previously, when their territory belong to the Habsburg Monarchy (Žabjek 1985, 6–8). Therefore, it was not surprising that the Italians considered the Friulians as a "frontier bulwark" against foreigners on the northern and eastern frontier, meaning the Germans and Slovenes (Stranj 1992, 88).

In spite of the fact that the Italian state did not acknowledge Friulians as a minority during the period between the world wars, they were included as a special linguistic group in the census of 1921 in the newly annexed region of Venezia Giulia. In all of Venezia Giulia at that time they counted 50,589 people with Friulian as their mother tongue. Most of them lived in the province of Gradiscia/Gradiška, where they comprised three quarters of all inhabitants, and in the province of Monfalcone/Tržič, where they comprised more than one quarter of all inhabitants (DGS 1926, 192–208).

Until the fascists came to power in Italy, the Friulians were allowed to use their own language in church. In accordance with the new orders of the fascist authorities aimed at the Italianization of Friuli, the Bishop of Udine/Videm forbade the usage of Friulian (and Slovene) language in the churches. During the same year the priests of Udine/Videm Diocese asked the Vatican Department of

State to help them in reintroducing the Friulian (and Slovene) language in the church. The answer was that they had lived under Italy for half a century and that they ought to have learned Italian by that time. On that occasion the Friulians lost the last possibility to express their national/ethnic identity; especially after the fascist authorities forbade the usage of Friulian language, even in bars, taverns and restaurants (Žabjek 1985, 13–17).

### 4.1.5. The Slovenes and Croats

During the interwar period the Italian authorities put the strongest pressure to Italianize on the Slovene and Croatian populations. Italian policy aimed towards the Balkans, especially centered on annexation of the eastern Adriatic coast. As part of this policy they aimed at Italianization of the autochthonous regions of settlement of Slovenes and Croats, which after World War I had been given to Italy. Therefore, soon after the annexation of the territories the Italian administration wanted to wipe out any expressions of Slovene or Croatian identity, although the Italian politicians had earlier promised to respect their traditions and culture and to provide more schools than they had under the Habsburg Monarchy. The authorities also knowingly allowed the violence of the fascists, such as, for example, setting the Slovene National Home in the center of Trieste/Trst on fire on 13 July 1920. To fulfill the aims of "reintegration policy" towards Slovenes and Croatians, fascism developed its so-called "frontier policy" [*politica di confine*], where "frontier fascism" [*fascismo di frontiera*] was put in place violently (Jeri 1961, 25).

The chief means of inculcating Italian culture into Slovenes and Croats were: forbidding all of their political, cultural and economic organizations; forbidding the usage of Slovene and Croatian languages in public life; the complete Italianization of education; and the Italianization of topographic names and individual names and surnames. By doing this they wished to extinguish all traces of Slovene and Croatian culture in Venezia Giulia. In this context the Italian authorities Italianized all topographic names and by 1933 even 56,000 family names. In 1928 the Italian authorities also put in place a special decree by which they forbade parents to give their new born children names of Slavic origin. By the beginning of the 1930s the Slovene language was retained only in the churches, where Slovene and Croatian languages were used in Slovene and Croatian ethnic territories as liturgical languages. The activities of all former cultural and educational societies also took place in the churches. The only exception was in the Rijeka/Fiume Diocese, where the bishop actively cooperated with the fascists. The bishops of Trieste/Trst and Gorizia/Gorica supported the cultural activities of Slovenes until 1930, when they were forced to resign. In October

1931 the only ethnic Slovene Archbishop, Frančišek Borgia Sedej of Gorizia/Gorica also had to resign (Kacin-Wohinz & Pirjevec 2000, 27–42).

Because the Italian state willfully destroyed Slovene and Croatian owned enterprises in Venezia Giulia by special laws and measures which rendered their operations difficult, more and more Slovenes and Croats decided to emigrate. Slovene and Croatian intellectuals, state officials and small entrepreneurs and artisans first decided to emigrate from Italy and they mostly immigrated to Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1920s also Slovene and Croatian industrial workers and small farmers decided to leave. The poorer groups of the population emigrated especially to Argentina and other South American states. From Venezia Giulia alone ca. 50,000–60,000 Slovenes emigrated during the twenty-five years of Italian control (Kalc 2001, 159–169). The Italian authorities supported the emigration of Slovenes and Croats and on the other hand, also the immigration of Italians into the region with the aim of changing the ethnic structure of the population of this region as quickly as possible.

All political parties, with the exception of the National Fascist Party [*Partito Nazionale Fascista*], were outlawed in November 1926 and thus the Slovenes and Croats started organize illegally. Catholic-oriented Slovenes organized a secret organization which took care of education and maintenance of Slovene national consciousness. The main activists were Slovene priests who were united in the Society of the Priests of St. Paul [*Zbor svečenikov sv. Pavla*]. The fascists considered Slovene priests as the principle enemy and the last hindrance to assimilating the Slovene population. Therefore, they controlled them very strictly; they also persecuted and imprisoned them. The situation of the priests worsened after the Concordat between Mussolini and the Pope was signed in 1929, when the Catholic Church began to cooperate loyally with the Italian state. New Catholic bishops in Venezia Giulia started to support Italianization in the Catholic Church and thus the Slovene priests were forced to disobey their own church leaders if they wanted to keep the Slovene language alive in the church (Ferenc et al 1974, 78–80).

When the foreign ministers of Italy, Galeazzo Ciano, and Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinović, who was at the same time Yugoslav Prime Minister, signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation on 25 March 1937, the leaders of catholic and liberal oriented Slovenes in Italy put together a common delegation, which tried to give Mussolini a memorandum with the minimal wishes of the Slovene minority in Italy. It pertained especially to permission to retain Slovene societies and measures for keeping the Slovene language alive. Mussolini would not receive the delegation, because he could not acknowledge the representation

of a minority whose existence was denied by fascist policy (Kacin-Wohinz & Pirjevec 2000, 69–70).

Fascist led violence also caused more radical means of defending Slovene and Croatian national identity. The members of the younger generation working in secret in 1928 established their own underground educational and cultural organization, TIGR (Trst, Istra, Gorica, Reka). Its aim was to answer the violence and to try to bring the situation of the minority to the attention of the world and Yugoslav public opinion. The Italian police in autumn 1929 succeeded in finding some of the most important collaborators of TIGR. By the spring of 1930 they had arrested 60 of them. A Special Court for the Protection of the State condemned four of them to capital punishment and 28 of them to drastic jail sentences of up to 30 years (Ferenc et al 1974, 97–118).

Many Slovenes und Croats also demonstrated against fascism when the Italian state drafted Slovene and Croatian recruits for the war in Abyssinia in 1935 and during the military intervention of the Italian army in the Spanish Civil War in 1937 and 1938. Every opposition to fascism brought about new arrests and trials. By the beginning of World War II quite a few thousands of Slovenes and Croats had been sentenced to long prison terms (Ferenc et al 1974, 110–118).

## 4.2. Ethnic/National Minorities in Austria

As already mentioned, Austria as one of the losers of World War I, was obliged by the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Articles 62–69) to give national minorities in its territory all necessary protections and rights. During the period when the frontier had not yet been determined, Austria promised to give the Slovenes in southern Carinthia and southern Styria and members of the Croatian and Hungarian minorities in Burgenland all minority rights and to protect their ethnic/national identities.

### 4.2.1. The Slovenes in Southern Carinthia

Austrian politicians gave many promises to the Slovene minority in Carinthia. Austria was afraid of losing most of the territory of southern Carinthia, which was settled by Slovenes. So, for example, the provisional Carinthian Provincial Assembly, during the period of plebiscite propaganda, had promised the Slovenes that they would protect "/…/ their linguistic and ethnic particularities /…/ and that they would pay the same attention to Slovene spiritual and economic development as to that of the German-speaking population of the Land"

(Anderwald & Hellwig 1995, 92). How quickly Austria had forgotten most of its promises was shown on 25 November 1920, when at the meeting of the Carinthian Provincial Assembly, the administrator of the *Land* [*Landesverwesser*], Arthur Lemich, openly declared the fast Germanization of Carinthian Slovenes as the aim. He declared: "We have time only for the period of one human being's lifetime to bring those who were misled back to Carinthianhood; in the time of one generation we must finish the educational job" (Lemich in Haas & Stuhlpfarrer 1977, 34).

Soon after the plebiscite the Austrian authorities started to limit linguistic rights which had been assured the Slovenes of Carinthia already during the Habsburg Monarchy. German became the only official language, all bilingual topographic signs disappeared, and the Carinthian provincial Official Gazette, which had appeared during the Austro-Hungarian period in German and Slovene languages was from November 1918 on published only in the German language. German nationalists began putting pressure on Slovenes, especially those who at the time of the plebiscite had voted for the Kingdom of SCS (Klemenčič M. & Klemenčič V. 2006, 29–30).

The Kärntner Heimatdienst became the main source of anti-Slovene minority activities. This organization had been established before the plebiscite and in 1924 was renamed the Kärntner Heimatbund. The main aim of the Kärntner Heimatbund was to fight against the idea of solving the Slovene minority question by giving them cultural autonomy. It arrived at that idea due to the pressure of the representatives of the German minority in other states, especially the German minority in Yugoslavia. After almost two years of preparations and negotiations, the Carinthian branches of Austrian political parties, without consulting the Carinthian Slovenes, put before the Carinthian Provincial Assembly a draft of a provincial law on the special cultural autonomy of the Carinthian Slovenes. The draft was based on a model which the German government wanted to use to solve the problems of the Danish minority in Germany. It was soon obvious that the draft of the German parties of Austria was put into the provincial parliamentary procedure only to help the German minority in Yugoslavia. It was significant that soon after the Yugoslav elections of 1927 German Carinthian nationalists started to oppose autonomy as it was written in the draft. All political parties which were represented in the Carinthian Provincial Assembly, by a special statement of 17 May 1929, broke off any further negotiations with the Slovene minority and then blamed the Slovene minority for this, although the representatives of the Slovene minority accepted most of the provisions of the proposed provincial law. With this act the idea of cultural autonomy was dead once and for all (Zorn 1974). The period of discussions on cultural autonomy for Carinthian Slovenes also

coincided with a period of strengthened anti-Slovene activities of the Kärntner Heimatbund, which fought for the settlement of as many German families as possible in southern Carinthia. Austria never put any brakes on the activities of the ideologists of Greater Germany. This was evident in March 1938 after the *Anschluß*, when Austria became a part of the German Third Reich.

Pressures on the Slovene minority in Carinthia were also shown in the censuses of population in the First Austrian Republic which took place in 1923 and 1934. The determination of the number of Carinthian Slovenes became a method of pressure on Carinthian Slovenes. In 1923, on the basis of language of communication, which was defined as "the language that the person uses most and in which he/she customarily thinks" (BFS 1935, 1), the census counted only 39,292 or (10.1%) Slovenes. By 1934 their number fell to 26,796 (Grafenauer 1946, 202).

As far as the language of communication is concerned, the accuracy of both censuses is questionable. This can be said especially for the census of 1934, in which the census takers determined the language category "/ … /by the language of the cultural circle to which the individual belongs / … / i.e., exclusively according to the feelings of the individual and not / … / by the mother tongue, greater or lesser capabilities in the certain language usage, the language of usual communication, education or something similar" (Podgorc 1937, 66). Slovene historian Bogo Grafenauer (1946, 202), wrote that, by this way of census taking, Austria renounced "objectivity as the basis for language or ethnic/nationality statistics." It is interesting to note, that this subjective criterion could be used as a tool for assimilation of minorities and that that was also acknowledged by some German specialists as early as the 1930s. So, for example, the German theoretician on minorities, Wilhelm Greve (1938, 31) wrote the following about this subject: "The assimilative strength of Germans is so great that even individuals who were in reality not Germans acknowledged themselves as Germans. The determination of nationality on the basis of declaration, which does not take into account other objective criteria, supports assimilation."

The fact that the number of Slovenes in the official censuses of 1923 and 1934 was too low could also be substantiated by some other estimates. Church statistics estimate that there were 90,000 Slovenes living in southern Carinthia in 1923 (Grafenauer 1946, 216–217). Also, a private census in 1923 taken in 57 out of 77 communes in southern Carinthia shows more Slovenes in southern Carinthia than the official census. They counted 71,452 Slovenes or (88.62%) out of 80,614 inhabitants (Ammende 1931, 305–306, 316; Veiter 1936, 129; Grafenauer 1946, 217).

Similar differences between the results of official Austrian censuses, the estimates and the results of "private censuses" could also be found for the results of the census in 1934. Among the "private censuses" we have to mention the survey on the ethnic situation according to parishes prepared for most of the Slovene ethnic territory in Carinthia, which was prepared in 1934 by Carinthian Slovene students and intellectuals. They used criteria of family language or the language normally used at home. According to this census in Southern Carinthia there were 81,105 Slovenes or 81.02 % of the 100,108 people who lived in this territory. If one added the Slovenes who lived north of Klagenfurt/Celovec, especially in the region between Pörtschach/Poreče and Maria Saal/Gospa Sveta, who were not included in this private census, we could estimate that some 90,000 Slovenes lived in Austrian Carinthia. The same number of Slovenes also appeared in a publication of the Gurk/Krka Diocese, while the Slovene national cadastre, which was made in 1933/34, on the basis of mother or family tongue, showed 97,129 Slovenes in "Slovene Carinthia" (minus the commune of Villach/Beljak) (Grafenauer 1946, 220).

The estimates for the number of Slovenes in Carinthia in 1934 by individual researchers who dealt with ethnic/national struggles in Carinthia differ considerably. Veiter (1936, 116–123) estimated their number at about 55,000, while Fran Zwitter (1937, 13), on the basis of enrollment of children in elementary schools, estimated the number of Slovenes in Carinthia to be approximately 70,000. Grafenauer (1946, 220–222), after calculations, corrected this number to 81,592. Richard Randall (1955, 125) in his doctoral dissertation came to the highest estimate – 120,000 Slovenes. These differences between the official Austrian censuses of population, the "private censuses" and other estimates are not surprising because of the fact that most of the official census commissioners were nazi-oriented teachers. Criticism of the methodology of the 1934 census can be found in the organ of the Carinthian Slovenes, Koroški Slovenec (KS 1934, 1):

> The determination of language for this census was based only on consciousness and not on mother tongue. Whoever was not able to express this consciousness got help from the census commissioners with their 'consciousness.' So, the result of this census, as far as language of the population is concerned, will show only 'consciousness' of the different census commissioners and not that of the people counted.

Dr. Franc Petek, a deputy of the Carinthian Provincial Assembly at that time, also called attention to the suggestive questions which census commissioners asked in his complaint to the League of Nations on 29 September 1934 (Ude 1936, 107).

From the above mentioned examples it is clear that the censuses of 1923 and 1934 in the regions of autochthonous settlements of Slovene, Croatian, and Hungarian minorities in Austria were misused to put pressure on members of the above mentioned minorities. Not only did the gathered data not show the real ethnic situation in the ethnically mixed territories of Carinthia, Styria, and Burgenland; they were in a way part of a general plan for the gradual Germanization or for the systematic "statistical liquidation" of ethnic minorities in Austria.

### 4.2.2. The Slovenes in Southern Styria

In September 1919, the newly formed border between the Kingdom of SCS and Austria in the Styrian sector also left some regions of Slovene autochthonous settlement in Austria. According to the 1934 Austrian census, there were 3,838 inhabitants in Styria with Slovene as their language of communication; of them only a little over a thousand were Austrian citizens. The rest were foreigners, immigrants from Yugoslavia, especially from Prekmurje, who had immigrated to this region mostly before World War I. (Klemenčič M. & Klemenčič V. 2006, 81).

The new border drawn in accordance with the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was finally determined in 1922. It obstructed the flow of people and goods based on a century of tradition of personal and economic contacts. The commerce, which until then had been unhindered, was now a part of the exchange of goods between two countries and, as such, was part of the customs regime. Only smaller amounts of goods flowed uncontrolled through illegal smuggling (Weitlaner & Petrowitsch 2005, 6). Some of the localities on the Austrian as well as the Slovene side of the border lost their economic hinterlands, and therefore, their economic development was impaired. The situation worsened the most in Radkersburg/Radgona; the consequence of the worsening of the economic situation was emigration. It went in two directions, into the industrial regions of Austria or into Maribor and other Slovene cities.

The situation of the Slovene community in Styria differed from the situation in Carinthia. In Carinthia, at least on paper, the Slovenes were assured some minority rights, while the very existence of Slovenes in Styria was not recognized by Austrian politicians and because of that the Slovenes were not even able to organize. The only Slovene organization in the territory of autochthonous settlement of Styrian Slovenes, the Slovene Educational Society, established in 1910, was dissolved in 1919, when its president, a farmer named Matej Pintarič, was killed (Vratuša 1994, 268).

The German School Society Südmark [*Deutscher Schulverein Südmark*] played an important role in the Germanization of the people on both sides of the Yugoslav-Austrian border even after the border between the two newly established countries was drawn. In the period between 1923 and 1929 a teacher of Slovene language in the Radkersburg/Radgona elementary school was mentioned for the last time. The Slovene language was used only in the Evangelical parish; whereas it was mostly not used in the Catholic parish (Vratuša 1994, 270–271).

Slovenes in Austrian Styria during the period between the world wars did not get any help from their mother country or from civic organizations, either. The Yugoslav government demanded corrections of the border in favor of Yugoslavia also at the Styrian section at the peace conference after World War II. However, until 1980s Slovenes in the Republic of Slovenia and their civic societies did not pay to much attention to the problems of Styrian Slovenes in Austria.

### 4.2.3. The Burgenland Croats

When the border between Austria and Hungary was finally determined at the end of 1921, the larger part of formerly western Hungary was given to Austria. The new Austrian federal province of Burgenland was established. This border change did not favor the further development of the Croatian minority, which had lived in this territory for some centuries. The former "western Hungarian Croats" were divided by this new border between Austria and Hungary. About 20 Croatian villages remained under Hungary, while some 80 Croatian villages, with more than 44,500 Croatian speaking inhabitants, were annexed to Austria (Valentić 1977a, 55).

In spite Austria's obligations to protect its national minorities, as prescribed in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the process of assimilation became more and more intensive. The question of education caused numerous conflicts, especially after the Austrian state replaced religious Croatian language schools with state funded schools. Conflicts took place between the majority Austrian German population and the Croatian minority, on the one hand, and also internally within the Croatian minority. One part of the Burgenland Croats defended the further existence of religious schools with Croatian language of instruction (Ivancsics 2004, 110). Due to the pressure of assimilation and worsened possibilities for employment in Burgenland, numerous Burgenland Croatians were forced to emigrate (Gassner 1980, 6). The pressures of assimilation in the interwar period caused the Germanization of selected regions of Burgenland. Already by 1934, the number of Burgenland Croats decreased to ca. 39,300 (Valentić 1977b, 136–137).

### 4.2.4. The Burgenland Hungarians

The 24,000 Hungarians whose areas of autochthonous settlement were given to Austria after World War I, faced a similar destiny. The Hungarian minority was also exposed to the pressures of assimilation. After German was introduced as the official language of the region, numerous public officials and teachers immigrated to Hungary (Kunnert 1970). Assimilation and the worsened possibilities for employment also forced members of the Hungarian minority into mass emigration. It took place in three directions: into Hungary, into economically more developed regions of Austria, especially to Vienna, and to overseas countries. According to the official results of the Austrian census of 1934 the number of Burgenland Hungarians decreased to 10,442 (Kocsis & Kocsis-Hodosi 1998, 194–204).

## 4.3. Ethnic/National Minorities in the Kingdom of SCS (after 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia)

The Kingdom of SCS was founded after World War I and was a result of the post-Versailles system in Europe. It was created from regions which before World War I had belonged to culturally and economically different states. Therefore, the ethno-nations and ethnic/national minorities brought to the new state different sorts of political, cultural and economic heritage and different regional and religious characteristics. Due to many problems in the fields of economics and politics, the politicians of the newly established state did not succeed in regulating inter-ethnic relations. This was exacerbated by the fact that the state was multi-national, and that more than one quarter of its population belonged to various national/ethnic minorities. These minorities were all the peoples who did not belong to the Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene nationalities (Klemenčič M. & Žagar 2004, 99–103).

In the region of Yugoslav Slovenia (at that time more than one third of the Slovene ethnic territory remained outside the frontiers of the Yugoslav state) Germans and Hungarians lived as members of ethnic/national minorities. In Croatia there lived Germans, Hungarians, and Italians; as well as quite a few Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, who had settled in Croatia during the 17$^{th}$ and 18$^{th}$ centuries, when the borders of the Ottoman Empire were changing and Turkish rule was being replaced by the Habsburg Empire.

### 4.3.1. Germans in the Regions of Yugoslav Slovenia and Croatia

With the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the status of the Germans in the regions which became a part of the Kingdom of SCS changed from that of members of the ruling nation into the status of a national/ethnic minority. According to the census of 1921, in the territory of the Kingdom of SCS there lived almost half a million people with German as their mother tongue. In the area of Yugoslav Slovenia there lived ca. 41,000 Germans, mostly in the cities of Lower Styria, in the Kočevje/Gotschee region, in Apaško polje/Abßtaller Feld and in the northwestern part of Prekmurje. In Croatia there lived ca. 124,000 Germans, mostly in larger cities in the northern part of Croatia and in eastern Slavonia and Baranja (Ferenc 2005, 13; Biber 1966, 11–15).

The first months after World War I, were marked by a mass emigration of German officials and other Germans. Due to emigration and the processes of re-assimilation, the number of Germans in Yugoslav Slovenia, (i.e., that part of Slovene ethnic territory which after World War I belonged to the Kingdom of SCS), was reduced from 103,949 in 1910 (KKSZ 1917; KKSZ 1918a; KKSZ 1918b; KSH, 1913) to 41,514 in 1921 (DSU 1932), and in Croatia from 135,187 in 1910 to 123,892 in 1921 (Winkler 1931, 212–213).

Such a large statistical decrease of the number of Germans in Yugoslav Slovenia between 1910 and 1921 cannot be explained only by a mass emigration of Germans after the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. It can also partly be explained by the differences in methodology of the censuses in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy and those in the Kingdom of SCS. In the Kingdom of SCS in 1921 the criterion was mother tongue, while in Austria, from 1880 on, the criterion was the language of communication (Klemenčič V. 1988, 241). The statistical decrease of the German population in Slovenia was also a result of the "re-assimilation" policy of the Slovene authorities. It was influenced especially by the closing of German private schools, by limiting the usage of the German language in public schools, by the administrative abolishment of most of the German cultural societies, by limitations placed on the usage of German in public life, and by legal limitations on the German ownership of property in the border areas.

Just like other ethnic/national minorities in Central Europe, the Germans in the Kingdom of SCS also enjoyed, at least on paper, basic minority rights in accordance with the decisions of the council of the Paris Peace Conference after World War I. In accordance with Article 51 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-

Laye, the Kingdom of SCS accepted and agreed "to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion" (Israel 1967, 1157). The Kingdom of SCS did not put this or any similar provision into its first constitution, the so-called St. Vitus Day Constitution [*Vidovdanski ustav*]. The only article in this constitution which dealt with ethnic/national minorities was Article 16, which guaranteed "minorities of other tribe and language" in principle the right to education in their mother tongue in accordance with the regulations of the special law (Ustava kraljevine SHS 1921, 424). The Law on Public Schools was passed only in 1929, while in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 1931, minorities were not even mentioned (Ferenc 2005, 67).

The transition to the new South Slavic state did not worsen the economic situation of the Germans. The partial nationalization of enterprises and agrarian reform in the beginning of the 1920s affected only a small part of German wealth. In spite of the strong decrease in the number of Germans and the different measures of the state which interfered with the relations in the field of properties, Germans in Yugoslav Slovenia and Croatia preserved their economic well being. The German owners of great estates retained their properties. Germans also owned large industrial and commercial enterprises and many buildings. In comparison with other Germans in the Kingdom of SCS, the Germans in Yugoslav Slovenia were the wealthiest (Biber 1966, 27–28). They owned half of the vineyards in the vicinity of Maribor, Ormož, and Slovenska Bistrica, and more than half of them in the wine growing regions of Haloze, Gornja Radgona and Gornji Cmurek (today's Trate). In Maribor they owned 41% of the apartments and other buildings, in Celje 40% and in Ptuj almost 60% (Suppan 1988, 191).

In the years 1924-25, after the Yugoslav authorities put into effect some measures against the Germans, their representatives tried to convince authorities in Slovenia and Austria to solve their minority situation and the minority situation of the Slovene minority in Austrian Carinthia in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, giving cultural autonomy to both minorities. After it became clear in 1928, that it would not be possible to solve the situation of both minorities by giving them cultural autonomy, the political leadership of Germans in Slovenia itself started to move away from the principle of reciprocity. The leaders of the German minority in Slovenia tried to reach a solution to the German minority question in Slovenia in other ways, e.g. by writing a resolution for the situation of the Germans in Slovenia, or by petitioning the League of Nations as in the case of the closing of the German House in Celje in June 1930 (Cvirn 1998, 87–88).

The leadership of the German minority in Slovenia again tried to revive the idea of reciprocity in the solution of minority questions in Austria and Slovenia again in the mid-1930s. Such attempts were unsuccessful, however, due to the coming of the nazi-ideology and irredentist tendencies.

Most of the members of the German minority in Yugoslav Slovenia and Croatia were happy to see the rise of the Nazis in Germany, because they considered the border between Yugoslavia and Austria as it was drawn at the Paris Peace Conference to be unjust. Hitler's accession to power was welcomed in the newspapers published by the Germans in Slovenia already in the early spring of 1933. Due to their openly friendly attitudes towards the nazi ideology, the authorities in Slovenia gradually disbanded most of the local groups of the Kulturbund, and beginning in the autumn of 1935, they did not allow lecturers from Germany to lecture in Slovenia. In spite of all attempts, the Slovene authorities did not succeed in stopping the nazification of the German minority. It especially intensified after the *Anschluß* of Austria to the German Third Reich in March 1938.

### 4.3.2. Hungarians in Yugoslav Slovenia and Croatia

Similar to the Germans, the Hungarians who were included in the Kingdom of SCS also saw their status change from members of the ruling nation to that of a national/ethnic minority. According to the census of 1921, in the entire Kingdom of SCS there lived ca. 472,000 persons with Hungarian as their mother tongue; of that number 14,897 in the region of Yugoslav Slovenia and 70,555 in the region Croatia and Slavonia (without Baranja), while only 70 in the entire region of Dalmatia (Winkler 1931, 209).

In Slovenia they lived in the eastern part of Prekmurje; in Croatia mostly in the cities along Danube River and in eastern Podravina and western Slavonia. Among the Hungarians there were quite a few owners of large estates, who, due to agrarian reforms lost most of their estates in the Kingdom of SCS. Their land was given to colonists, who came mostly from other regions of Yugoslavia (Erić 1958; Janša-Zorn 1965). Many Slovenes who migrated from regions, which came under Italian rule, moved to Prekmurje. With these measures the authorities tried to change the ethnic structure of regions of autochthonous settlement. This was only one of the attempts to assimilate the Hungarian population as quickly as possible (Kovacs 2004, 149–352).

### 4.3.3. Italians in Yugoslav Croatia

In spite of the fact that Italy gained wide regions of autochthonous settlements of Slovenes and Croatians, an approximately 6,000 member Italian minority remained in Dalmatia which belonged to the Kingdom of SCS. The status and treatment of this minority was the object of continuous quarrels between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS. Italy enjoyed the status of a winning power, which could be ascertained by the Treaty of Rapallo. This treaty demanded that the Yugoslav authorities give members of their Italian minority all possible minority rights, while in the same treaty more than half million a Slovenes and Croats in Italy are not even mentioned (Kacin-Wohinz & Pirjevec 2000, 35).

To somehow mitigate political tensions, the governments of the two states, in addition to the Treaty of Rapallo, also signed the so-called Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Nettuno. The Kingdom of SCS, in the Treaty of Rome of 27 January 1924, recognized the annexation of Rijeka/Fiume to Italy; and Italy promised the same minority status to the "Yugoslav minority" in Italy as was given to the Italian minority in Dalmatia. Italy, in the Treaty of Nettuno of 1925, also guaranteed some minority rights to those Yugoslavs who left for the Kingdom of SCS and to Italian citizens of Slovene and Croatian language. According to both treaties, the level of those minority rights was higher than was the level guaranteed by the Treaty of Rapallo. Although, at least on paper, both minorities, Italians in the Kingdom of SCS, and the Slovene and Croatian minorities in Italy, enjoyed the same level of rights, the reality was different. For example, a few thousand Italians in Dalmatia had almost the same number of schools and as many newspapers as almost half a million Slovenes and Croats in Venezia Giulia (Jeri 1961, 25).

### 4.3.4. Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Ukrainians in Croatia

The Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Ukrainians in Croatia were minorities, which had developed as a result of the movements of population in the 17th and 18th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire lost territories in Central Europe through wars and started to colonize the territories most in the southern part in Pannonian Plains and its surroundings. Most of them lived in Slavonia in the region between the Drava River on the north and the Sava on the south. After the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of new states at the end of World War I, they mostly remained settled in the above mentioned territory. They lived geographically separated from the main areas of settlement of their respective ethnic groups. In the 1930s, according to the Yugoslav census of population, there lived ca. 36,600 Czechs, 7,100 Slovaks, 4,200 Ukrainians, and 3,800 Poles

in Yugoslavia. For them, at least on paper, the provisions on protection of ethnic/national minorities, which the Kingdom of SCS signed with the allied powers, were also valid (Ur.l. 1921, 597–599).

### 4.3.5. The Serb Population in Croatia

The Serb population in Croatia is mentioned in this contribution only as an exception because of their influence later in Yugoslav history. The Serbs were treated as a national/ethnic minority only in the period before 1919, between 1941 and 1945 (during the period of the existence of the Independent State of Croatia), and after 1991, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. During the Yugoslav period they were one of the constituent ethno-nations and also the most numerous ethno-nation (Klemenčič M. 2003, 235–253). They came to the regions of today's Croatia during the period of the violent enlargement of the Turkish Empire in Europe between the 15th and 18th centuries. When the Kingdom of SCS was established, they constituted 17.6 % of the population of Yugoslav Croatia. Most of them lived in Lika, Kordun, the wide region of Knin (the so-called Krajina), Slavonia, and Baranja (Ilić 1995, 329).

We have to mention here, that the settlement of the Serbs in Croatian lands at first did not cause any interethnic conflicts. The first conflicts between Serbs and Croats came only after the Austro-Hungarian Treaty of 1867 and after the Croatian-Hungarian Treaty of 1868 were signed. The real conflicts between the Croats and Serbs erupted only after World War I, especially due to the question of the way the unification of the South Slavic peoples into a single state was realized. It was not surprising that after the establishment of the Kingdom of SCS on 1 December 1918 almost all Croatian Serbs supported the great Serbian policy of the regime of Aleksandar Karađorđević. Due to the almost complete domination of the Serb unitaristic circles in all fields of life in the Kingdom of SCS (after 1929 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the Croatian-Serb quarrels carried on throughout the whole inter-war period. They were the logical consequences of the unbalanced relations between the bearers of economic power (the Slovenes and Croatians) and bearers of political power (the Serbs from Serbia). The greatest unhappiness among Croatians was caused by the provisions of the so-called St. Vitus Day Constitution, which soon began to disturb even some Serbs in Croatia (Horvat, 1989; Klemenčič M. 2003, 239–244). The most respected leader of the Serbs in Croatia, Svetozar Pribićevič, was also disappointed by the policy of his compatriots in Serbia, who were not able to solve the country's nationality question. In 1927, Pribičević with his *Samostalna demokratska stranka* [Independent Democratic Party] joined forces with Stjepan Radić and

his *Hrvatska seljačka stranka* [Croatian peasant Party]. From then on, Pribičević advocated the most tolerant views towards the Croatian national question among all Serb bourgeoisie politicians (Roksandić 1991, 121–122). He completely turned away from the policy of centralism and became a stubborn defender of the search for democratic solutions to the differences in the state.

Some circles among the Croatian and Serb intelligentsias realized that the violent unitaristic policy of the Yugoslav government only deepened the mistrust among the citizens of different "tribes" shortly before the beginning of World War II in Europe. Together these members of the intelligentsia started to try to find a solution to the Croatian question. All the attempts at finding a just solution to the relations between Serbs and Croats were unsuccessful, because Serb politicians and military leaders in Serbia did not want to give up centralism. At the same time radical Croatian groups demanded an independent Croatian state. Compromise was reached only at the end of August 1939, by the signing of the so-called "Cvetković-Maček Agreement", which was named for the president of the Yugoslav government, Dragiša Cvetković, and after the leader the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Maček. In accordance with this agreement, the Croatian Banovina with its own *Sabor* and autonomous government was formed (Boban 1965; Klemenčič M. & Žagar 2004, 121). In spite of all, this agreement did not eliminate the mistrust, which was a result of twenty years of wrong policies in trying to solve the national question in Yugoslavia.

## 4.4. Ethnic/National Minorities in Hungary

After World War I the territories of Hungary were established as an independent state. Similar to Austria and parts of the Kingdom of SCS, it came into being on the ruins of the multi-national Habsburg Monarchy. Its borders, as determined by the Peace Treaty of Trianon of 4 June 1920, intersected the regions of settlement of quite a few nationalities. Members of some neighboring peoples remained within the Hungarian state as members of national/ethnic minorities, while many Hungarians became members of national minorities in neighboring states. In the Hungarian parts of the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region between the two world wars there lived members of Slovene, Croatian, and German ethnic/national minorities, as well as quite a few Roma and Jews. At that time this region was divided among Baranya, Győr-Mason, Sopron, Somogy, Vas, and Zala counties.

After the new borders were drawn, the situation of national minorities in Hungary worsened very quickly. The new borders cut through previously established

economic and cultural ties. They also cut off members of national minorities, especially those in the countryside, from schools and cultural establishments, which remained in their "mother" countries. To better life in the border regions, in the second half of the 1920s, Hungary signed a mutual agreement on border crossing of the population which lived near the boundaries. Such agreements also contributed to the betterment of the situation of national minorities.

### 4.4.1. The Slovenes

According to the census data of 1920, in the regions south of the Raba River (the so-called Rába-vidék; in Slovene: Porabje) in Hungary there lived ca. 6,000 people with Slovene as their mother tongue (KSH 1923, 48–49). The Hungarian authorities did not recognize them as a national minority and tried to Magyarize them. They changed Slovene topographic names into Hungarian. The Slovene language could not be used in public life. The Hungarian authorities for political reasons put restrictions on border crossings of people and all other sorts of cross border communications. The Hungarian Slovenes at that time did not have their own organizations, and their language was retained only with the help of the church. Between the two world wars Rába-vidék was still an economically backward region and people who lived there could not find work outside of farming. Therefore, many people from Rába-vidék decided to emigrate to Western Europe or overseas (Stipkovits 2004, 443–444).

### 4.4.2. The Croats

The Croatian population lived in the border region between Hungary and Yugoslavia in Baranya, Somogy, and Zala counties; and in the region near the Austrian-Hungarian border north of the city of Szombathely. There the border between Austria and Hungary cut through the region of autochthonous settlement of the Burgenland Croats (they were called also western Hungarian Croats). The Hungarian authorities treated the ca. 36,000 Croats similarly to the Slovenes of Rába-vidék or Porabje. They did not recognize them as a national minority. In these regions they forbade the use of Croatian language in schools, public offices and even in worship. Therefore, the Croatian language had disappeared as the language of communication in some villages by the beginning of World War II. Many Croats emigrated to Yugoslav Croatia or overseas (Horváth 2004, 435–437; Cseresnyés et al. 2004, 39–44; Takács 2004, 319–329).

### 4.4.3. The Germans

Germans represented the largest ethic/national minority in Hungary after World War I. In the whole of Hungary there lived ca. 551,000 Germans in 1920 (Winkler 1931, 115); according to some estimates their number was even larger, ca. 650,000 (Tafferner 1970, 408). In the regions of Hungary with which we are dealing in this article, after World War I Germans lived in the regions along the Austrian-Hungarian border; and also in the county of Baranya, north of the city of Pecs – ca. 93,000 in 1930s (Cseresnyés et al. 2004, 51). Although the Hungarian government had promised the Germans that it would protect their ethnic identity, in practice it did not work as promised. Due to the large number of Germans in Hungary and the valuable support of the German state, assimilation did not take its toll to the same extent as it did with other national/ethnic minorities. The economic strength of most of the members of the German minority also played a role, because Germans in the newly established Hungarian state retained their role in farming, as well as in industries and commerce.

## 5. Conclusion

The turmoil in international relations which took place in the entire Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region during the whole period between the two world wars also clearly showed that the outcome of World War I had not brought about the expected relaxation in political tensions in Europe. The new state borders which were drawn at the Paris Peace Conference were considered by many as unjust, due to the lack of respect for the principle of self-determination of nations. They became lines, which in many cases hindered or even made the cooperation of two neighboring states impossible, much less fostering cooperation of minorities with their "mother" nations.

After the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of Austria, Hungary, and the Kingdom of SCS, in the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region numerous German, Hungarian, Slavic and other minorities remained outside their "mother" countries. Lack of respect for minority rights and endeavors to rush their assimilation caused permanent conflicts between majority and minority populations. Attempts of some states at bettering the situation of their minorities in neighboring countries often caused the worsening of international relations. Under such conditions cooperation between minority and majority populations was practically impossible.

The situation of minorities during the period 1921–1938 significantly influenced also the later developments of minorities, especially as far as the decrease of the number of their members is concerned. Important were especially very strong forceful assimilation of minorities and emigration of members of minority populations. Emigration was caused especially by political pressures on minorities and also by the planned hindrances of economic developments of the regions settled by minorities. Emigrants were members of minorities in so-called "fertile" period of their life (ages 18–45). It caused that fertility of minority population was in most cases lower than within majority. This worsened also their situation in the states where they lived.

Although during the period between the two world wars the Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian region remained an area of conflicts, after World War II, (i.e. from 1960s onwards) it became a region of intensive cooperation. And that was in spite of the fact that parts of this region then belonged to the blocs with different economic systems. Some of them belonged to a bloc with a capitalist system (Italy, Austria), while some of them belonged to a bloc where socialist/communist systems prevailed (Hungary, Yugoslavia). The states of the region also belonged to three different world-wide political groupings, which very rarely cooperated on a global level. Italy was member of NATO, Hungary was member of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia was one of the leading countries of the non-aligned movement, and Austria was neutral. The result of the intensive cooperation was the establishment of the Alps-Adria Working group in November 1978 in Venice, which tried to eliminate hindrances to cross border cooperation of peoples, for whom the borders had been real walls in the past.

In spite of all the trends, the states' treatment of autochthonous/national minorities has remained almost unchanged from the period between the wars until today, and it still remains a hindrance for even more intensive cooperation among peoples and states in the region.

# 40 Notes

[1] The establishing document of the Working Group Alps-Adria was signed in 1978 by the Italian regions of Friuli-Venetia Giulia, and Veneto; the Austrian federal provinces of Carinthia, Styria, Upper Austria, and Salzburg; the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, and Croatia; and the German federal state of Bavaria. Between 1981 and 1988 the Italian regions of Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol), Lombardy, and Emilia-Romagna; the Austrian federal province of Burgenland; the Swiss canton of Ticino; and the Hungarian counties of Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala, Somogy, and Baranya also joined (Moritsch 2001, 12–13). Some of them later resigned from membership. In 1999 Salzburg and Emilia-Romagna; in 2005 Bavaria, Ticino, and Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol); and in 2006 Győr-Moson-Sopron resigned from membership (Jurič-Pahor 2010, 191).

[2] President Woodrow Wilson (1918) in Point 10 declared: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

[3] Before World War I the Kanal Valley was a part of the Austrian crown land Carinthia. After it became part of Italy, it was at first annexed to newly established Venezia Giulia and in 1923 it became a part of Veneto.

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ŠTEFKA VAVTI

# "We prefer having fun and enjoying our life!" Slovene postadolescents in bilingual Carinthia – between a zest for life and an enactment of the past?

In narratives of young Slovenes in bilingual southern Carinthia (Austria) a latent tone of sadness is prevalent. The analysis of sequences of their life stories indicates that this phenomenon may be the result of unresolved and unassimilated historical traumas experienced in the past by former generations (parents and grandparents) and passed on to the young generation through a kind of "collective memory". During the narrative their expression of emotions tend to be inappropriate. The postadolescent interviewees told me about their life experiences, about the stigma that they felt being a member of an ethnic minority, and about structural violence, all in an seemingly effortless way of speaking (e.g., laughing). Some of the interviewees emphasised that they are leaving Carinthia to withdraw from the accumulating conflicts and problems. Both minority/majority conflicts and interminority tensions are the problem areas causing stress on part of the interviewees.

Keywords: bilingual Carinthia, young Slovenes, structural violence, trauma, ethnicity

# *"Wir genießen lieber das Leben und haben es schön!" Slowenische Jugendliche im zweisprachigen Kärnten – zwischen Lebenslust und Vergangenheitsinszenierung?*

*In den Lebensgeschichten und Erzählungen junger Sloweninnen und Slowenen im zweisprachigen Kärnten ist eine latente Schwere kopräsent. Meine Annahme ist, dass sie aus (psychologisch) unaufgearbeiteten und ungelösten Traumatisierungen in der Kärntner Geschichte resultiert, die durch das so genannte kollektive Gedächtnis" von der Eltern- und Großelterngeneration an die Kinder weitergegeben werden. Diese Schwere zeigt sich in diversen Gefühlsäußerungen, die nicht zum Inhalt des Gesagten passen. Während also die jungen Menschen leicht und locker über ihr Leben erzählen, sind die dazu ausgedrückten Gefühle nicht immer stimmig: Positive Meldungen und Erlebnisse werden etwa mit traurigem Unterton präsentiert, Stigmatisierungen und Beispiele struktureller Gewalt hingegen werden lächelnd erzählt oder von einem lauten Auflachen unterbrochen. Einige der befragten Jugendlichen planen das zweisprachige Kärnten zu verlassen, weil sie sich zumindest eine Zeitlang "von der Minderheitenproblematik" distanzieren wollen. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden sowohl die volksgruppen-internen Probleme als auch das Verhältnis zwischen Minderheit und Mehrheit in Kärnten thematisiert. Die Flucht und der Wunsch nach einem unbeschwerten Leben sind legitime Verhaltensweisen und Wünsche junger Menschen. Zu denken gibt, dass einige Befragte die "ganze Minderheitensituation" als blockierend für ein zufriedenes und entspanntes Leben sehen.*

*Schlagworte: zweisprachiges Kärnten, slowenischsprachige Jugendliche, strukturelle Gewalt, Trauma, Ethnizität*

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# 1. Einleitung

Im vorliegenden Aufsatz möchte ich anhand von Auszügen aus Interviews mit slowenischen Jugendlichen und Postadoleszenten im zweisprachigen Südkärnten zeigen, welche Rolle das ethnische Selbstverständnis in ihren Lebenswelten einnimmt. Besonderes Interesse finden dabei die Fragen, was Jugendliche in Zusammenhang mit ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit belastet und wie sich in ihren Erzählungen die Zugehörigkeit zu einer ethnischen Minderheit, die in der Vergangenheit verschiedene Stigmatisierungen und Traumatisierungen erfahren hat, manifestiert.

Ich beginne mit einem kurzen Überblick zu den geschichtlichen und demografischen Rahmenbedingungen im untersuchten Gebiet. Sodann gehe ich überblicksartig auf methodologische Fragestellungen und theoretischen Hintergrund ein. Anhand von Interviewauszügen zeige ich schließlich, wie Traumatisierungen in der Eltern- und Großelterngeneration in den Lebensgeschichten Jugendlicher manifest werden können und wie sich (post) adoleszente Kärntner Sloweninnen und Slowenen zwischen dem Genießen des Lebens und der aufgrund geschichtlicher Traumatisierungen als "Schwere" erlebten Ethnizität hin und her bewegen.

# 2. Geschichtlicher und demografischer Hintergrund

Die Sloweninnen und Slowenen in Südkärnten sind jene autochthone Sprachgruppe, die von allen ethnischen Gruppierungen in Österreich auf die längste Siedlungsgeschichte zurückblickt: Die Vorfahren ließen sich nämlich schon vor rund 1400 Jahren in weiten Gebieten des heutigen Österreich nieder. Ein Problem dieser Sprachgruppe ist die seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts einsetzende Assimilation, an deren Entwicklung sowohl objektive als auch subjektive Faktoren mitgewirkt haben. Beide haben mit ungleichen ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Machtverhältnissen zu tun, die im Verlauf der Geschichte in Südkärnten eine Rolle spielten. An dieser Stelle werden nur die wichtigsten Punkte kurz angerissen.

Um 1900 wurden bei der Volkszählung rund 85.000 Slowenen und Sloweninnen gezählt. Die Gebietsansprüche seitens des Königreichs der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg mit Abwehrkampf sowie darauf

folgender Volksabstimmung 1920, bei der sich die Mehrheit in Südkärnten für den Verbleib bei Österreich ausgesprochen hatte, führten zu politischen Konflikten und (strukturellen) Gewalterfahrungen im zweisprachigen Gebiet und ließen in weiterer Folge die Zahl der sich zu ihrer Sprachgruppe bekennenden SlowenInnen deutlich schrumpfen. Während des Zweiten Weltkrieges kam es zu Deportationen zahlreicher slowenischer Familien in verschiedene Arbeits- und Konzentrationslager sowie zum bewaffneten Widerstand der slowenischen PartisanInnen (1942-1945, vgl. u.a. Malle & Sima 1992). Nach dem Krieg gab es neuerliche Gebietsansprüche seitens des ehemaligen Jugoslawien. Die Antwort darauf war schließlich der Artikel 7 des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages von 1955 mit den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutz der kroatischen und slowenischen Minderheit in Österreich, die bis heute nicht zur Gänze verwirklicht sind.

Das Verhältnis zwischen den beiden Sprachgruppen in Südkärnten blieb in der Nachkriegszeit angespannt. Streitpunkte waren vor allem die Minderheitenschulfrage und die Aufstellung der zweisprachigen topographischen Aufschriften.[1]

Die konflikthafte Atmosphäre im vergangenen Jahrhundert führte zur Assimilation vieler SlowenInnen: Während nämlich im Jahr 1910 noch 74.210 SlowenInnen gezählt wurden, gaben 2001 nur mehr rund 12.600 Personen an, Slowenisch und/oder Windisch als Umgangssprache zu verwenden.

Dieser drastische Rückgang hat verschiedene Ursachen: Der Assimilationsdruck im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts ist dafür ebenso verantwortlich wie die Modernisierung und die Notwendigkeit der ökonomischen und sozialen Mobilität, die gerade jüngere Generationen weg aus dem traditionalen ethnischen Umfeld in größere österreichische Städte und ins Ausland führt.

Viele Menschen, die sich während der vergangenen Jahrzehnte assimiliert haben, zeigen noch eine partielle Identifikation mit ihrer Herkunftssprache,[2] in weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung fehlt allerdings eine klare Identifikation mit dem Slowenischen. Zugleich sinkt die Zahl jener Personen, die über eine gute Sprachkompetenz in ihrer Herkunftssprache verfügen.

Zu erwartende demografische Entwicklungen, allen voran die zunehmende Überalterung der Bevölkerung und die Abwanderung aus ländlichen Gebieten, werden in Zukunft ihre Zahl weiter verringern.[3] Zur Abwanderung jüngerer Menschen trägt auch die wirtschaftliche Situation Kärntens bei, zählt es doch im Hinblick auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und den Arbeitsmarkt zum Schlusslicht Österreichs.[4]

## 3. Bemerkungen zum theoretischen Rahmen und zur Methodologie

Ich präsentiere im vorliegenden Aufsatz ein Teilergebnis im Rahmen einer umfangreichen Untersuchung zum Thema "Ethnische Identifikationen slowenischer Jugendlicher im zweisprachigen Kärnten", die ich seit 2009 im Slowenischen wissenschaftlichen Institut in Klagenfurt [*Slovenski znanstveni inštitut v Celovcu*] durchführe. Auf die Themen Identität und ethnische Identifikation sowie Postadoleszenz werde ich im vorliegenden Aufsatz nicht eingehen, da sie in bereits veröffentlichten Publikationen nachzulesen sind (Vavti 2009a; 2009b). Hier geht es mir vor allem darum, die Tradierung der traumatisierenden Vergangenheit auf die nachfolgenden Generationen anhand von Erzählausschnitten Jugendlicher zu diskutieren. Viele Beispiele aus den Interviews beinhalten nämlich Hinweise auf eine latente Schwere, die aus dem Zusammenhang nicht verständlich ist und die nicht zum Gefühlsausdruck in der narrativen Erzählung passt. Diese Schwere könnte somit auch als unbewusste Vergangenheitsinszenierung bzw. als Auswirkung der traumatisierenden Geschichte in den Nachfolgegenerationen interpretiert werden.

Grundsätzlich werden psychische Traumata durch das Durchleben von Ereignissen mit außergewöhnlicher Bedrohung ausgelöst, auf die betroffene Menschen nur mit Ohnmacht und Angst reagieren können. Sie treten insbesondere dann auf, wenn Handeln keinen Sinn macht und Flucht bzw. Widerstand nicht möglich sind (vgl. Loch 2006, 24-29). Im geschichtlichen Überblick habe ich bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass viele SlowenInnen der Großeltern- und Elterngeneration im 2. Weltkrieg ausgesiedelt und in verschiedenen Arbeits- und Vernichtungslagern untergebracht worden sind. Sie sind zu Opfern des Nationalsozialismus geworden – diese Erfahrungen haben sich schließlich auch im "kollektiven Gedächtnis" (Halbwachs 1985; Jurić Pahor 2007) der slowenischen Sprachgruppe im zweisprachigen Kärnten niedergeschlagen.[5]

Aus der Traumaforschung ist bekannt, dass im Verlauf des Lebens der Zusammenhang zwischen Symptom und traumatischen Erfahrungen verloren geht, so dass die Betroffenen sich noch an intensive Gefühle erinnern, ohne sie zu verstehen (Loch 2006, 26). In der Alltagskommunikation tendieren sie zu einem ambivalenten Umgang mit diesen Erfahrungen. So gibt es einerseits das Bedürfnis über bedrohliche Situationen zu sprechen, auf der anderen Seite aber sind diese mit einem Erzählwiderstand belegt. Dieser Widerstand ist teilweise durch Stigmatisierungserfahrungen motiviert. Auf der Textebene manifestieren

sich traumatische Erfahrungen unter anderem auch darin, dass Personen immer wieder an Stellen auflachen, die für Außenstehende nicht komisch sind (Loch 2008, Abs. 2-4).

In diesem Zusammenhang kann auch von einer Verselbständigung von Symptomen bzw. einer Symptomverschiebung ausgegangen werden. Dissoziationen sind eine Möglichkeit, auf traumatisierende Ereignisse zu reagieren (Sachsse 2004; Terr 1997). Hierbei werden bei Überforderung des Bewusstseins bei der Verarbeitung traumatischer Lebenssituationen Erinnerung und traumatische Erfahrung vom Bewusstsein abgespaltet (= dissoziiert), um zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt wieder aufzuleben, z.B. in Form von Vorstellungen und Bildern, Erlebniszuständen oder Reinszenierungen im Verhalten u.ä. (Loch 2006, 29-30).

Die kollektive Identität konstituiert sich durch Geschichten, Mythen, Redeweisen etc., die als Bestandteil des kollektiven (Familien) gedächtnisses an nachfolgende Generationen[6] weitergegeben werden. Rosenthal (1999) hat sich mit der transgenerationalen Weitergabe solcher Erfahrungen innerhalb der Familie auseinandergesetzt: So werden etwa nicht erzählte Anteile der Familiengeschichte von nachfolgenden Generationen mit Phantasien aufgefüllt; diese Konstrukte sind gebunden an die latente Kommunikation durch Mimik, Gestik etc. sowie an die aktuelle Lebenssituation der Nachkommen und deren Gegenwartsperspektive auf die Vergangenheit. Rosenthal (zit. nach Loch 2006, 38) zeigte auf, dass gerade die nichterzählten Anteile in der nachfolgenden Generation besonders wirksam waren/sind. Straub und Grünberg (2001) sprechen in ähnlichen Zusammenhängen von der Gegenwart der Vergangenheit, und zwar dort, wo vergangene Wirklichkeiten gar nicht bewusst repräsentiert werden. Sie gehen davon aus, dass unmerkliche und stillschweigende Tradierungen wirkungsvoller sind als alles, was Worte sagen können (Straub & Grünberg 2001, 7-9 ). Diese unmerklichen, unbewussten Überlieferungen können sich, so Straub und Grünberg, über mehrere Generationen erstrecken. Die Autoren sind überzeugt, dass die Kinder sich zum Schicksal der Eltern verhalten müssen und dass diese Erbschaft ihrerseits ein Trauma darstellt. Meine Annahme ist nun, dass die latente Schwere in manchen Erzählungen, besonders aber die oftmalig raschen Wechsel verschiedenster Gefühlsäußerungen, Ausdruck von latent vorhandenen traumatischen Erfahrungen sein können, die indirekt an nachfolgende Generationen weitergegeben wurden.

Nun noch einige Bemerkungen zum Forschungsansatz: Ich gehe davon aus, dass die Theorieentwicklung und die Beobachtung der sozialen Wirklichkeit unlösbar miteinander verschränkte Prozesse sind. Glaser und Strauss (1979) formulierten

in ihrem Werk, eine Theorie sei ihrem Gegenstand nur dann angemessen, wenn sie aus ihm heraus entwickelt wurde (*grounded theory methodology* – GTM). In Anlehnung an diese Theorie werden hier die Erklärungsansätze aus der Beobachtung der sozialen Wirklichkeit im zweisprachigen Südkärnten heraus entwickelt.[7]

Die soziale Welt, in der sich die befragten Postadoleszenten bewegen, hat für sie eine besondere Sinn- und Relevanzstruktur und beeinflusst ihr Denken und Handeln (Schütz 1974). Die gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen sind demzufolge mit "subjektivem Sinn" behaftet, den Menschen ihnen geben (Bohnsack 1991). Dabei steht die Analyse unbewusster Strukturen im Vordergrund, die im Lebensalltag so selbstverständlich sind, dass sie den Betroffenen oft gar nicht bewusst sind.

Der qualitative methodologische Zugang ist im Rahmen der Einzelfallanalyse angesiedelt und erlaubt es, auf die Komplexität der zu untersuchenden Phänomene im Kontext ihrer TrägerInnen einzugehen. Die Annäherung an das Feld erfolgte durch biographische Forschung (Alheit & Dausien 2000; Rosenthal 1995; Fuchs-Heinritz 2005; Kohli & Robert 1984), sie richtete sich auf das Leben und Zusammenleben in Familie, Dorf und Schule. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass in biographischen Erzählungen auf Erfahrungsstrukturen zurückgegriffen wird, die im Verlauf des Lebens erworben wurden. Rosenthal (1995; vgl. auch Rosenthal & Köttig 2009) sieht etwa das Ereignis, das sich darauf beziehende Erleben und die Erzählung als ein dialektisches Verhältnis, in dem sich Ereignen, Erinnern und Erzählen wechselseitig durchdringen.

Als Erhebungsmethode habe ich das narrative Interview (Schütze 1983; 1999) gewählt, und mit einigen Aspekten des problemzentrierten Interviews angereichert (Witzel 1989). In der erzählten Lebensgeschichte legten die jungen Menschen "ihr Leben" aus der Retrospektive dar (Fischer-Rosenthal & Alheit 1995; Straub 2000). Mit einer stimulierenden Einstiegsfrage wurden die InterviewpartnerInnen aufgefordert, ihre Lebensgeschichte und ihre konkreten Lebenserfahrungen zu erzählen. Diese Narration wurde in einem zweiten Teil mit Hilfe eines Leitfadens durch zusätzliche Fragen ergänzt. Diese wurden möglichst offen gehalten, um weitere Erzähleinheiten zu stimulieren.

Die Erzählungen und die anschließenden Gespräche wurden zur Gänze aufgezeichnet und wörtlich transkribiert. Für die Interviews wurden Jugendliche und Postadoleszente im Alter zwischen 17 und 30 Jahren ausgesucht, die sich zumindest partiell noch mit der slowenischen Sprachgruppe identifizierten und im zweisprachigen Gebiet beheimatet sind.[8]

Es besteht im vorliegenden Aufsatz kein Anspruch auf Repräsentativität, denn es geht mir vor allem um das Begreifen und Verstehen der zu untersuchenden Fragestellung, und zwar wie sich in der erzählten Lebensgeschichte von Jugendlichen und Postadoleszenten Traumatisierungen in der Eltern- und Großelterngeneration zeigen können. Die Beispiele lassen sich nicht auf andere Gruppen übertragen, sie können aber zum Verständnis von ähnlichen Prozessen in anderen Forschungsumfeldern beitragen.

Die Auswertung und Interpretation der Daten erfolgte in mehreren Stufen: Zuerst wurden die transkribierten Narrationen aufmerksam gelesen. Aus den bruchstückhaften Erzählbausteinen und Erinnerungen wurden sodann für die Fragestellung relevante Passagen "herausgefiltert" und einer genaueren Betrachtung bzw. ersten Interpretation unterzogen. Im Rahmen der Feinanalyse wurden diese Stellen schließlich vertieft analysiert, wobei auch grammatikalische Besonderheiten berücksichtigt wurden (vgl. Wodak et al. 1998), so etwa der Gebrauch von Wir-, Du- und Sie-Formen und andere linguistische "Identitäts-Marker", wie etwa persönliche und unpersönliche Pronomen, vor allem aber auch die verschiedensten Formen des Gefühlsausdrucks.

Die Einzelpassagen wurden schließlich auch im Gesamtkontext der Narration verortet, weil sie erst im Gesamtkontext der Erzählung verständlich sind (Bohnsack 1991, 19-20).

Im Rahmen ihrer Lebensgeschichten und in den narrativen Erzählungen sprachen Jugendliche oft von ihrem Wunsch, das Leben schön zu gestalten und es genießen zu wollen. Im Kontext ihrer ethnischen Identifikation aber zeigte sich häufig eine latente Schwere, die sie gerne los werden wollten. Als Interviewerin und im Rahmen der Analyse der Lebengeschichten gewann ich den Eindruck, dass viele der befragten Jugendlichen ihre ethnisch-slowenische Zugehörigkeit zwar als Bereicherung sehen und dies auch immer wieder betonen, zugleich aber ist in den Erzählungen eine latente Schwere kopräsent, die – so meine Annahme – in der Geschichte wurzelt und von der Eltern- und Großelterngeneration durch ihre Lebenserfahrungen als verfolgte ethnische Minderheit und durch entsprechende Traumatisierungen im Verlauf der Kärntner Geschichte an die nachfolgenden Generationen[9] (mit)vermittelt wurde.[10]

Im Rahmen der Feinanalyse von Sequenzen aus den narrativen Interviews (Nohl 2008) zeigte sich sozusagen zwischen den Zeilen, dass die Eltern- und Großelterngeneration schwierige sowie belastende Lebenserfahrungen unbewusst an die Generation der Jugendlichen weitergegeben hatten. Entsprechende Hinweise kommen zwar nicht offen "auf den Tisch", sie wirken

vielmehr unbewusst in den erzählten Lebensgeschichten nach – durch Hinweise auf die Schwere und verschiedene nicht adäquate Gefühlsäußerungen.[11]

## 4. Beispiele und Spuren aus den Interviews

Die befragten jungen Menschen wünschten sich in ihrem Leben vor allem Leichtigkeit und distanzierten sich indirekt, etwa durch plötzlichen Wechsel in die sich distanzierende 3. Person, von belastenden Themen und (geschichtlichen) Ereignissen. Damit grenzten sie sich zum Teil auch von den Erfahrungen ihrer Eltern ab. Einige Jugendliche und Postadoleszente betonten, sie wollen nach beendetem Hochschulstudium nicht mehr nach Kärnten zurückkehren, denn das wäre für sie ein Rückschritt. Nicht selten wurde hervorgehoben, dass sie von den Konflikten in Südkärnten nichts mehr hören wollten, dass ihnen die ewig wiederkehrenden Probleme auf die Nerven gingen u.ä.m. So ist etwa die "Flucht" aus dem Südkärntner Raum – etwa im Rahmen des Hochschulstudiums in einer der größeren österreichischen Universitätsstädte – eine willkommene Möglichkeit um das belastende "ethnische Erbe"[12] eine Zeitlang hinter sich zu lassen.

Augenfällig ist weiter, dass Jugendliche sogar in Passagen, in denen sie von ihrem Selbstbewusstsein sprechen und ihre Ethnizität verbal positiv bewerten, nonverbale Äußerungen aussenden, die in eine andere Richtung weisen.

Im Folgenden zeige ich anhand mehrerer Ausschnitte, die ich für die Feinanalyse ausgewählt habe, wie diese unbewussten Prozesse in den Lebensgeschichten sichtbar werden können.

Die 26-jährige Angestellte, mit der ich im Sommer 2009 ein narratives Interview durchgeführt habe, ist zum Zeitpunkt des Interviews eng in die slowenischen (kulturellen) Vereine im zweisprachigen Südkärnten eingebunden. Sie findet nach erfolgter Schulausbildung in slowenischen bzw. zweisprachigen Bildungseinrichtungen den Arbeitsplatz in einer slowenischen Einrichtung. Dies ist ein Hinweis auf günstige Ausgangsbedingungen für eine starke ethnisch-slowenische Identifikation und Verwurzelung. Die junge Frau weist in ihrer Erzählung immer wieder darauf hin, wie wichtig ihr das Slowenin-Sein ist, zugleich gibt es in ihrer Narration deutliche Brüche.

Im folgenden Ausschnitt erzählt sie, wie aus ihrer Sicht slowenische Jugendliche die Konflikte innerhalb der slowenischen Organisationen erleben:

Meiner Meinung nach schauen sie (*Anm.: die Jungen*) objektiver auf die Dinge. Aber ich

> weiß nicht (*Pause*), meiner Meinung nach wollen die Jungen, dass es endlich zu einer Lösung kommt ... dass-dass-dass sich die Slowenen einig sind. Meiner Meinung nach würde sich das die Mehrheit wünschen. Sie schauen jetzt nicht, ob jemand von der oder von der anderen Organisation ist und ich weiß nicht was, eine politische Partei. .. Meiner Meinung nach, zumindest was ich jetzt sagen kann, dass wir uns wünschen (*betont*), dass es endlich zu einer Lösung kommt, dass sie sich einig sind. Weil dann wird es leichter sein, nicht wahr? Es wird trotzdem schwer (*betont, lacht*), aber wenigstens, dass wenigstens die Slowenen (*betont*) sich einig wären. Das wär schon was. (*Pause*) Meiner Meinung nach würden die in meinem Alter sich das wünschen. Meiner Meinung nach, ja. (*Pause*) So in meinem Kreis . im Freundeskreis wir reden auch nicht mehr viel darüber, weil das eh schon allen auf die Nerven geht und wir sehen, dass es nichts bringt. Wir genießen lieber unser Leben, haben es schön (*lacht*) und reden über andere Dinge und nicht über diese Situation jetzt, weil wir eigentlich eh nicht sehen, dass sich da etwas bessern wird (*resigniert-trauriger Tonfall*). Wir würden es uns wünschen, aber .. im Augenblick nach meiner Meinung ... ich sehe nichts- nicht, dass da was weiter gehen könnte .. in eine positive Richtung. Leider, nein. (*Pause*) Nein. (Int. 11: 13; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).[13]

In diesem Abschnitt spricht die junge Frau über die Haltung der slowenischen Jugend zu den Streitereien ihrer politischen Vertretung(en) und hebt immer wieder den Wunsch der Jugendlichen nach einer Lösung der Konflikte innerhalb der slowenischen Volksgruppe hervor.[14]

Sie spricht dabei nicht nur von sich, sondern vom Kollektiv der slowenischen Jugendlichen und von ihrem Freundeskreis, mit dem sie sich stark identifiziert, was sich im Wechsel von der Sie- zur Wir-Form ausdrückt. Der Wunsch nach einer Lösung der Konflikte ist stark präsent, das zeigt sich etwa in der oftmaligen Wiederholung. Von den slowenischen Organisationen spricht die junge Frau hingegen in der dritten Person (die, sie) und drückt damit Distanz aus. Im betonten "Weil dann wird es leichter sein, nicht wahr? / … / Es wird trotzdem schwer" geht es dann aber nicht mehr um interne Konflikte, sondern um die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Sprachgruppen in Südkärnten und um die Erfüllung von Rechten, die man als "Minderheit mit einheitlicher Meinung" leichter erreichen könnte. Hier wird die junge Frau von der Schwere der Vergangenheit eingeholt, denn der Gefühlsausdruck des Lachens passt nicht zur Äußerung, dass es "trotzdem schwer sein wird".

Augenfällig ist, dass die Sprache im ganzen Abschnitt gebrochen wirkt und viele Wiederholungen sowie längere Pausen aufweist, in denen die junge Frau nachdenkt. Auch ihre Stimme zeigt eine deutliche emotionale Erregung. Besonders gegen Ende des Zitats wirkt sie verärgert, als sie nämlich davon spricht, wie sehr diese internen Probleme den Jungen schon auf die Nerven gehen.

An dieser Stelle aber gibt es einen plötzlichen Wechsel auf eine völlig andere

Gefühlsebene: Die junge Frau betont, dass die Jugendlichen lieber ihr Leben genießen und es schön haben wollen und nicht gerne über belastende Dinge miteinander sprechen. Diese Sequenz wird von einem befreienden Lachen begleitet und könnte als eine emotionale Distanzierung von der Schwere im ersten Teil des Zitates interpretiert werden. Auch hier spricht die junge Frau im Namen des Kollektivs der slowenischen Jugendlichen, indem sie sagt: "Wir genießen lieber unser Leben".

Besonders auffällig ist das Lachen beim Sprechen über schwierige Themen: Hier passt das im Lachen ausgedrückte Gefühl nicht zum Inhalt der Sequenz. Ein Versuch der Distanzierung von den in Kärnten omnipräsenten Problemen, wenn es um die slowenische Sprachgruppe geht? Ähnliche Diskontinuitäten zeigen sich auch in anderen Interviewpassagen, nicht nur von dieser Erzählerin. Am Ende des Zitates schließlich gibt es wieder einen Gefühlswechsel hin zur resignativen Haltung, begleitet von Traurigkeit in der Stimme als sie davon spricht, dass sich ohnedies nichts ins Positive bewegen wird.

Interessant ist weiter, dass es in diesem Abschnitt vor allem um die Konflikte innerhalb der slowenischen Sprachgruppe geht, nicht aber um geschichtliche Traumatisierungen und um Probleme zwischen Minderheit und Mehrheit. In diesem Kontext ist der Hinweis in einem anderen Interview mit einem jungen Studenten interessant, der sagt, dass er derzeit innerhalb der Sprachgruppe das erlebe, was früher einmal im Verhältnis Minderheit/Mehrheit das Problem war: Man spreche nicht mehr miteinander bzw. man streite nur mehr. Diese Geschichte setzt er wie folgt fort:

> Wenn man da keinen-keinen-keinen guten Vorschlag, oder eine Lösung hat .. wird sich das immer weiter fortsetzen ... und du kommst zu keiner konstruktiven Lösung. . Ich denke, wenn das die Leute nicht sehen, nehmen, sehen und dann . naja, dann wird es nie auf einer Seite zu einer Lösung kommen, zu einer konstruktiven guten Lösung, dass du dich wirklich als Minderheit gut verkaufst oder dass du dich irgendwie gut präsentierst. Jetzt gibts nur die Tafeln und nur mehr . und das Extrem ist auch bei den Slowenen (*betont*) nicht nur von außen beziehungsweise von-von-von der Kärntner Regierung (*betont*). Es gibt zwei Seiten, die sich so, so puschen, bis zur, bis zur Spitze, sozusagen. Ich-ich kann sowas (*betont*) leider nicht verstehen! (Int. 15: 9; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Der junge Mann spricht hier von der Notwendigkeit einer konstruktiven Lösung und einer guten Präsentation der slowenischen Sprachgruppe in der Öffentlichkeit. Diese aber sieht er derzeit als gefährdet und kritisiert in diesem Zusammenhang auch die extreme Haltung bei den Slowenen selber. Er spricht durchwegs in der sich distanzierenden Du-Form. Schließlich gebraucht er die Sprache der Konflikttheorie, wobei es um die Eskalation des Konflikts geht und

um extreme Haltungen bei beiden Konfliktpartnern, die sich gegenseitig an die Spitze der Eskalationsleiter "puschen". In der Erzählsequenz gibt es zugleich eine Distanzierung des Erzählers in Form des Hinweises, dass er das leider auch nicht verstehen könne, verschärft noch durch den Gebrauch der distanzierenden Du-Form. Das "Leider" könnte aus dem Slowenischen (leider = na žalost) auch als "darüber traurig sein" übersetzt werden. Warum in diesem Zusammenhang die Traurigkeit? Ist das die Traurigkeit über Probleme zwischen den beiden Ethnien und innerhalb der slowenischen Sprachgruppe, die den jungen Mann beschwert?

In einem späteren Abschnitt spricht er von seiner ethnischen Zugehörigkeit und darüber, was ihm diese bedeutet. Er hebt hervor, dass sie ihm wichtig sei, und setzt dann im Passiv fort, er habe "dieses Volk von den Eltern erhalten und" er sei "in diesen ganzen Konstrukt hinein verwoben worden". Wortgetreu klingt seine Aussage so:

> Mir ist das sehr wichtig (*betont*), weil ich das anders auf einer Seite nicht kenn, mich . ich habe das von den Eltern erhalten (*betont*) . nicht wahr, ich habe dieses Volk erhalten .. beziehungsweise ich hab ganz am Anfang überhaupt nur Slowenisch gelernt, beziehungsweise ich bin, ich bin in das Ganze hinein verwoben worden, in diesen ganzen slowenischen Kondukt-Konstrukt in Kärnten (ibid.; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Auch wenn er die Geschichte später positiv fortsetzt – die slowenische Sprachzugehörigkeit sei ihm wichtig, er sei dadurch sehr offen gegenüber anderen und habe deshalb einen weiteren Horizont – ist im obigen Ausschnitt doch eine Schwere spürbar, die sich in dieser Verwobenheit in den ganzen slowenischen Konstrukt in Kärnten über ihn legt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch der Versprecher von Interesse, denn er sagt zuerst Kondukt – Konduktor könnte als Überträger einer Erbkrankheit übersetzt werden. So beinhaltet dieses "Konstrukt in Kärnten" implizit die Geschichte und die Probleme und Traumatisierungen der vorhergehenden Generationen. Diese hätten quasi ihre negativen Erfahrungen an die nachfolgenden Generationen weitergegeben, wie eine Art "Erbkrankheit". Das ist zugleich auch aus der Aussage "ich habe dieses Volk" – eben mit allem, was dazu gehört, auch mit der traumatischen Vergangenheit – "von den Eltern erhalten" abzuleiten. Slowene zu sein ist im Lebenskontext und Erleben des jungen Burschen zwar selbstverständlich, im öffentlichen Diskurs aber war die Präsenz und Existenz der SlowenInnen im zweisprachigen Kärnten – und ist zum Teil bis heute – schlichtweg nicht erwünscht. Dies manifestiert sich beispielsweise auch in der Endlosdiskussion rund um die Aufstellung der zweisprachigen topographischen Aufschriften. Slowenisch bedeutet in der Öffentlichkeit immer auch Konflikt.[15] Gerade in diesem Kontext verwundert es nicht, dass sich der junge Mann nichts sehnlicher wünscht als die selbstverständliche Präsenz des Slowenischen in der

Öffentlichkeit.

> Mm, ma ... ich wünsche mir im Grunde nur, dass-dass wirklich das Slowenische in Kärnten, dass dies etwas selbstverständlicher wäre. Jetzt was die Ämter anbelangt . uuuund überhaupt im öffentlichen Leben überhaupt. Dass die Leute halt im Grunde, dass-dass auch die Kärntner, was auch eeehm Junge anbelangt und das, dass sie sich nicht schämen (*betont*), dass sie sich im Grunde nicht schämen für die slowenische Sprachgruppe in Kärnten .. und dass dies-dass dies nur eine positive Bereicherung ist, beziehungsweise dass es ist, dass es besteht, und dass das .. ich weiß das slowenische Wort nicht . Bereicherung (*Anm.: sagt es in Deutsch*) (ibid.; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Obige Aussage drückt das Gegenteil von seinem Wunsch aus: Das Slowenische ist in Kärnten nicht selbstverständlich, viele Kärntner wollen die slowenische Sprache in der Öffentlichkeit nicht hören/sehen, einige schämen sich ihrer und verneinen ihre ethnische Herkunft, einige Deutschsprachige distanzieren sich von der zweiten Kärntner Sprachgruppe und sehen in der Präsenz zweier Kulturkreise nicht die Bereicherung sondern den (geschichtlichen) Ballast. Wir können somit auch davon ausgehen, dass in den Interviews zum Teil jene Schwere spürbar ist, die junge SlowenInnen im Kärntner Alltag unbewusst fühlen.

Wie Traumatisierungen aus der Vergangenheit nachwirken können zeigt die folgende Aussage einer jungen Angestellten, die über den Besuch des Konzentrationslagers Mauthausen in der Mittelschulzeit erzählt:

> Auch als wir mit der Schule in Mauthausen waren, war es sehr, sehr schlimm. Das schüttelt dich richtig durch oder wenn du auf diesem jüdischen Friedhof bist. Aber ich möchte, dass auch meine Kinder das einmal sehen, dass dies nicht nur eine Information ist, die in irgendeinem Buch steht, sondern dass sie das wirklich sehen: Aha, das hat es wirklich gegeben. Und das weiß ich noch genau, als wir damals in diesem, diesem KZ waren, war auch eine Gaskammer und ich wollte nicht hinein gehen, weil ich solch eine Angst bekommen habe, .. weil ich gedacht habe, wer weiß, was da noch drin ist, gell. .. Das ist sehr . aber du musst es sehen, dass du es einfach auch verstehst, weißt, siehst, riechst uuund ja. Dieser Moment war zwar wirklich schlimm aber es war, es war gut, dass wir das gesehen haben (*lange Pause*). Ich hab nur diese Panik gehabt, was wenn sie uns jetzt einsperren und vergiften (Int. 20: 13-14, übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Dieses Ereignis erzählt die junge Frau als sie über ihre Großeltern spricht, die zu Hause nie über den Krieg sprechen wollten. Vor allem die Großmutter sei sehr schweigsam gewesen und berichtet den Enkelinnen erst jetzt, mit 86 Jahren, über Kriegsereignisse. Die Großmutter war zwar selber nicht im Konzentrationslager, das Thema aber war in ihrer Familie stark präsent, weil SS-Angehörige häufig rund um das Haus gegangen seien und die Familie kontrolliert hätten. Dies konnte aus der Erzählung der Enkelin rekonstruiert werden.

Die Enkelin beschreibt in ihrer Lebensgeschichte die Geschichte der Großeltern und erinnert in diesem Zusammenhang den Schulausflug in das Konzentrationslager Mauthausen. In der Erzählsequenz sind besonders die starken Angst- und Panikzustände von Interesse, die das junge Mädchen bei der Besichtigung befallen: Ganz plötzlich kommt ihr der Gedanke, dass sie dort eingesperrt und vergiftet werden könnte. Wirken hier die nie thematisierten und verarbeiteten Ängste der Großmutter nach?

Natürlich erleben Jugendliche auch Positives und betonen dies in ihren erzählten Lebensgeschichten immer wieder. Die positiven Auswirkungen des Slowenisch-Seins zeigen sich allerdings vorwiegend außerhalb Kärntens:

> Positiv. Ach ja (*betont*) positiv würd ich aber sagen, no das Positive zeigt sich mehr oder weniger, taucht mehr im Ausland auf (Int. 13: 3, übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Während Jugendliche im zweisprachigen Gebiet Kärntens wegen ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit auch verschiedenartige Probleme bis hin zur strukturellen Gewalt[16] in Kauf nehmen müssen, erleben sie im Ausland die Vorteile der slowenischen Sprachkenntnisse bzw. der Kenntnis einer weiteren Sprache. Dies artikulierten insbesondere jene Jugendlichen, die im Rahmen ihres Studiums ein Auslandssemester in einem slawischsprachigen Land konsumiert hatten, wo die slowenischen Sprachkenntnisse nützlich und vorteilhaft waren. Andere wiederum betonten, dass sie gerade wegen ihrer Sprachkenntnisse bzw. ihrer Zweisprachigkeit für andere StudentInnen interessant seien.

Eine latente Schwere ist auch im folgenden Statement eines jungen Studenten spürbar, der über seine Vorstellungen bzw. sein Erleben der Zukunft in Südkärnten spricht:

> Wie sich das jetzt entwickeln wird daaaaas .. das kann ich jetzt natürlich nicht sagen, aber .. naja, es müsste halt, man müsste an alle appellieren, dass sie das Slowenische weitergeben, dass diese Angst (*betont*) .. eh, dass die verblasen wird, dass das Slowenische jetzt nicht was Böses (*betont*), Bösartiges ist, sondern ein positiver Aspekt, dass es dir nur hilft jetzt, hilft, wenn du mehrere Sprachen beherrscht ... (*hustet*) (ibid.: 12; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Der junge Student appelliert hier an die SlowenInnen, sie sollen das Slowenische an ihre Kinder weiter geben und hofft zugleich, dass dadurch die "Angst verblasen" wird und dass die Kärntner Bevölkerung erkennen wird, dass das Slowenische "nichts Böses" ist. Die Angst ist ein Gefühl mit negativer Konnotation und das obige Beispiel zeigt ihre latente Präsenz im Südkärntner Klima. Auch der Hinweis, dass die Kärntner Bevölkerung das Slowenische als etwas Böses oder Bösartiges

sieht, ist meines Erachtens ein Hinweis auf die Schwere, die implizit im Leben und Erleben des jungen Mannes präsent ist. Gerade in diesem Zusammenhang ist es interessant, dass er beim positiven Hervorheben des Slowenischen nach einer längeren Pause laut aufhustet, so als ob er alles Negative abhusten wollte.

Als er schließlich von seiner Zukunft spricht, ist wieder die Schwere ein Thema:

> Und .. ich weiß nicht, wie .. (*hustet*) das-das man muss dann halt ein Fundament aufbauen den Kindern ein Fundament von klein auf, no, uuuund natürlich .. es ist schwer (*betont*) eine Sprache eh- ehh .. verankern (*Anm.: sagt es auf Deutsch*) . in einem Kind, wenn auch die Umwelt jetzt mehr oder weniger eine andere Sprache spricht no. .. Sagen wir das Deutsch, das wird immer sein, nicht wahr, das ist eh schlecht, weil ja alles . deutsch ist jetzt, mehr oder weniger, jetzt hier in den Medien, im Radio .. das ist natürlich kein Problem, man muss nur die zweite Sprache, da muss man halt eine Lösung finden, dass die sich dann auch gleich, ehh, ins Kind hinein flechtet, wie jetzt das Deutsche (ibid., übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

In dieser Aussage geht es um das Einflechten des Slowenischen, es geht um die Frage, wie im deutschsprachigen Umfeld bei ständiger Präsenz von deutschsprachigen Medien das Slowenische in den Kindern verankert werden kann. Der junge Mann verweist auf die schwierigen gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen, in denen nämlich das Deutsche omnipräsent sei, das Slowenische aber kaum einen Platz finde. Interessant ist weiter, dass er vom Slowenischen als der zweiten Sprache spricht, was implizit beinhaltet, dass das Deutsche in seinem Leben bereits zur ersten Sprache geworden ist. In diesem Zusammenhang ist anzumerken, dass dies von vielen InterviewpartnerInnen in ihren Geschichten so präsentiert wurde, weil die Umgebungsbedingungen für das Verwenden des Slowenischen äußerst kontraproduktiv sind.

Eine junge Studentin, die viel in der Welt herumreist und deshalb verschiedenartige Probleme anderer ethnischen Minderheiten kennenlernt, beginnt ihre Erzählung ganz locker mit dem Hinweis, dass das Leben für sie immer "super" gewesen sei. Im selben Atemzug spricht sie über ihre Erfahrungen mit struktureller Gewalt: Sie beschreibt, wie sie im Kindergartenalter von einer älteren Frau verbal angegriffen worden ist, sie spricht vom Bombenattentat auf ihre einstige zweisprachige Volksschule und über ähnliche Probleme. Im Rahmen dieser Erzählausschnitte lacht sie betont oft laut auf. Als Zuhörerin hatte ich den Eindruck, dass alles gar nicht so super gewesen ist. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die beschriebenen Ereignisse für das kleine Mädchen in Wirklichkeit bedrohlich gewesen sind und auf der kindlichen Seele lasteten, sodass die damit verknüpften negativen und bedrohlichen Gefühle aus dem Bewusstsein verdrängt werden mussten. In diesem Kontext überrascht auch ihre spätere Schlussfolgerung nicht:

> Ich würde gerne an diesen Punkt kommen, wo mir das alles egal ist. Egal, wo ich bin und dass es mir einfach gut geht (*lacht laut*) (Int. 10: 7, übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Für alle jungen SlowenInnen, die ich im Rahmen meiner Studie befragt habe, war es schwierig, eine Antwort auf die Zusatzfrage zu finden, die etwa wie folgt lautete: "Was bedeutet es Dir, eine Slowenin / ein Slowene zu sein?"[17] Auch im Rahmen dieser Frage zeigte sich oft eine Schwere, die die jungen Menschen ausdrückten, indem sie über konkrete Ereignisse und Erlebnisse mit ihrem Slowenisch-Sein sprachen. Eine junge Frau beschreibt etwa die folgende Szene:

> Wenn wir überhaupt so gegangen sind, dass wir mehrere waren, da haben wir schon oft gehört, dass wir slowenisch reden und sie haben hingerufen: 'Ihr Jugos' (*Anm.: sagt es auf Deutsch*) und solche Sachen. Solche Ausdrücke haben sie uns nachgeschrien. Iin .. irgendwie hat das schon betroffen gemacht, weil du dir gedacht hast, wieso denn das? Überhaupt, wenn du so jung bist, verstehst du das nicht so. Du denkst dir, du hast ja nichts gemacht und du bist ja auch, wir sind ja alle Österreicher, irgendwie (*betont*) die gleichen Staatsbürger. Du verstehst das nicht, warum-warum so, woher haben sie das, nicht wahr. Warum? (Int. 11: 6, übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Diese Szene wird zum Teil in der Du-Form präsentiert, die Distanz ausdrückt. Die Interviewpartnerin lässt das Geschehen nicht wirklich an das ICH heran. Damit ist auch der Schmerz nicht so spürbar, von den so genannten Anderen nicht als gleichwertige Österreicherin wahrgenommen zu werden. Das identifikativ-kollektive "Wir sind ja alle Österreicher" wird schließlich durch das "Irgendwie die gleichen Staatsbürger" wieder abgemildert. Hier zeigt sich implizit das ungleiche Verhältnis von Minderheit und Mehrheit: Die SlowenInnen als Staatsbürger zweiter Klasse?

Schließlich erzählt die junge Frau, dass beinahe alle ihre einstigen MitschülerInnen Kärnten verlassen hätten und hebt hervor, sie wollten einfach nicht mehr in Kärnten sein, weil diese Situation nicht leicht sei und ihnen auf die Nerven gehe.

> Ich weiß, dass einfach viele von jenen, die nach Wien oder Graz gegangen sind, sie haben auch wegen dem gesagt, dass sie nicht mehr in Kärnten sein wollten . teilweise auch. Sie wollen heraus, weg von da einmal, weil auch diese Situation ist vielleicht einfach nicht so leicht und sie geht schon auf die Nerven (Int. 11: 8; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Junge Menschen wünschen sich in ihrem Leben mehr Leichtigkeit, Kärnten aber verlassen sie unter anderem auch wegen der ganzen Probleme, die sie hier erleben. Wie aber wollen sie leben? Was wünschen sie sich? Die Antwort bringt die folgende Aussage auf den Punkt:

> Im Grunde, wenn es mir fein vorkommt und gut geht... alles zusammen (Int. 2: 5; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Eine junge Frau, die in der Landeshauptstadt Klagenfurt aufgewachsen ist, hebt zwar ihre Freude über die ethnisch slowenische Zugehörigkeit hervor, im selben Atemzug sagt sie jedoch, dass es ihr bei dieser Politik in Kärnten schwer falle, Slowenin zu sein.

> Und sonst bin ich froh, Slowenin zu sein .. und es kommt mir auch wichtig vor, dass dies sich in Kärnten ehh daaa erhält (*betont*) dass sich das nicht verliert, auch wenn es jetzt schwer ist, Slowene zu sein, bei dieser Politik (Int. 7: 1; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Die angeführen Beispiele zeigen, dass positiven Aussagen zum Trotz dennoch immer wieder eine diffuse Schwere in den Erzählungen kopräsent ist, die junge Menschen im zweisprachigen Südkärntner Raum offensichtlich nicht abschütteln können. Auch im folgenden Beispiel sieht die Jugendliche eine Lösung der Probleme in der "Flucht", im Weggehen von Kärnten, weil viele Jugendliche "damit einfach nichts mehr zu tun haben wollen":

> Ja, schon .. manchmal ist das halt ein Problem, dass die heutige Jugend ganz anders ist als vor Jahren .. und . ich würde sagen, dass sie auch, dass einige damit einfach nichts mehr zu tun haben wollen, und .. ja .. natürlich sind sie selber .. sie selber bewegen sich fort, . wie soll ich das ausdrücken, sie bewegen sich fort, .. sie wollen damit nichts mehr zu tun haben (ibid.; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Wo sind die Prioritäten im Leben junger Menschen angesiedelt? Auf diese Frage antwortet hier stellvertretend für andere eine junge Frau aus einer Mischehe:

> Jo für mich persönlich, dass ich eine Arbeit habe, die eh jo, die für mich interessant ist, wo ich gerne arbeiten gehe und sage, ja ich arbeite gerne .. dann dass ich soziale Kontakte habe, dass ich Freunde habe, .. dass ich mich integriert fühle in-in in irgendwas halt, in die Gesellschaft .. eh (*Pause*). Jo und das denke ich, das funktioniert überall. … Jo, dass ich glücklich bin und zufrieden mit meinem Leben jo (*lacht*) (Int. 8: 6; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Hier ist also Ethnizität kein Thema. Sie hebt ein glückliches Leben hervor, einen interessanten Beruf, die Integration in eine Gemeinschaft und Zufriedenheit mit ihrem Leben. Zum Schluss verweist sie darauf, dass diese Wünsche zur Erfüllung keines konkreten Ortes bedürfen, denn diese Ziele kann sie überall auf der Welt erreichen. Gerade deshalb muss sie auch nicht in Kärnten bleiben oder nach Kärnten zurückkehren. Die junge Frau betont später ausdrücklich, dass sie offen ist für alle möglichen Optionen, nur nach Kärnten zurück wolle sie "eher nicht",

denn das wäre für sie "ein Rückschritt".

In ihrer Erzählung aber hält sie abschließend ein Plädoyer, das sie an alle jene Personen richtet, die sich zu stark auf ihre ethnische Zugehörigkeit konzentrieren und darüber IHR Leben vergessen. Sie spricht von jenen, die gedanklich nur um Probleme der Sprachgruppe kreisen:

> Ich denke, dass einige dann auf andere Dinge vergessen, jo, sie sind sooo versteift nur auf diese Sache .. eh … weil das blockiert, wenn du dich nur mit dieser Frage befasst .. (*mhm*) jo das, das müsste, dass er für die Slowenen was verbessert und so und dann nach Jahren merkst du, dass-dass-dass das nichts gebracht hat, ehm ... deshalb denke ich, dass meine Generation und jüngere, dass sie sich deshalb nicht mehr interessieren für diese ganze Sache (*Pause*). Jo, weil es im Grunde egal ist (*betont*) .. wichtig ist es, dass du selber weißt, dass du (*Anm.: die Sprache*) kannst, dass dies zwar gut ist ... und dass du das einfach nimmst und-und-und das Beste aus dieser Sache machst und nicht, dass du dich nur darauf konzentrierst und alles drum herum vergisst (ibid.; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

Die Aussage ist klar: Die Probleme rund um die Minderheitenfrage blockieren für andere Dinge, die im Leben junger Menschen wichtig erscheinen oder sind. Eine Blockade, weil ein junger Mensch mit dieser Geschichte oder dem geschichtlichen Ballast nicht einfach frei heraus und leichtfüßig das Leben genießen kann? Ich möchte den Abschnitt mit der Aussage einer jungen Studentin schließen, die in einem Studentenklub aktiv mitarbeitet. Sie beschreibt die Probleme, mit denen sie sich bei ihrer studentischen Arbeit konfrontiert sieht: Viele StudentInnen wollen nicht mehr für die Sprachgruppe aktiv sein, sie schauen lieber auf sich, darauf, dass es ihnen gut geht und sie es im Leben "fein haben":

> Und-und für viele Leute halt, ich denke für viele ist das halt nicht die wichtigste Sache .. das ist ... sie sind lieber für andere Dinge aktiv .. und vor allem ist es eh so, dass viele Leute überhaupt nirgends mehr aktiv sind (*lacht*) ... sie schauen nur auf sich und dass es ihnen gut geht, dass sie es fein haben und vielleicht . kommen sie zu den Veranstaltungen, aber sie wollen nichts mehr dafür tun (Int. 9: 5; übersetzt aus dem Slowenischen).

# 5. Zusammenfassung



In den Lebensgeschichten und Erzählungen junger SlowenInnen im zweisprachigen Kärnten ist eine latente Schwere stark kopräsent, wenngleich sie in der Erzählung nicht klar thematisiert und damit ins Bewusstsein gerückt wird. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz diskutiere ich die Möglichkeit, dass sie aus (psychologisch) unaufgearbeiteten und ungelösten Traumatisierungen sowie anderen negativen Erfahrungen in der Kärntner Geschichte, die den Jugendlichen von der Eltern- und Großelterngeneration quasi als "kollektives Gedächtnis" und "geschichtlicher Ballast" ins Leben mitgegeben worden sind, resultiert.

Die Schwere präsentiert sich meistens "verkleidet" und versteckt sich in diversen Gefühlsäußerungen, die nicht zum Inhalt des Gesagten passen. Während also die jungen Menschen leicht und locker über ihr Leben zu plaudern scheinen und erzählen, wie sie es genießen wollen, sind die dazu ausgedrückten bzw. gezeigten Gefühle nicht immer stimmig: Positive Meldungen und Erlebnisse werden etwa mit traurigem Unterton präsentiert, Stigmatisierungen und Beispiele struktureller Gewalt hingegen mit einem Lächeln erzählt oder mit einem lauten Auflachen unterbrochen oder beendet.

Einige der befragten Jugendlichen haben das zweisprachige Kärnten verlassen, weil sie sich von diesen ewig gleichen Problemen rund um die slowenische Minderheitenproblematik distanzieren wollten. In diesem Zusammenhang sind sowohl die internen Probleme als auch das Verhältnis zwischen Minderheit und Mehrheit zum Thema geworden. Andere wiederum sehen in der Rückkehr nach Kärnten einen Rückschritt in ihrem Lebenskontext und in ihrer Lebensplanung. Sowohl die Flucht als auch der Wunsch nach einem unbeschwerten Leben sind legitime Verhaltensweisen und Wünsche junger Menschen. In diesem Kontext ist auch das Betonen, sie wollen das Leben genießen und sich von dieser ganzen "Minderheitensituation" befreien bzw. sich davon nicht belasten lassen, verständlich. Zu denken gibt, dass einige der Befragten diese Situation als Blockade für ein zufriedenes und entspanntes Leben sehen.

# Anmerkungen

[1] Diese Frage ist bis heute nicht wirklich gelöst, vgl. dazu Pandel et al. (2004), Vavti (2002).

[2] Reiterer (2000) merkt in diesem Kontext an, dass heute rund 50.000 bis 60.000 Kärntner zumindest partielle Sprachkenntnisse in Slowenisch haben.

[3] Vgl. dazu auch die Ausführungen von Domej (2008). So waren etwa bei der VZ 2001 rund die Hälfte jener Menschen, die Slowenisch als ihre Umgangssprache angegeben hatten, älter als 65 Jahre. Bei den unter 14-Jährigen gab es nur mehr 1600 Personen mit Slowenisch als "Muttersprache". Vergleiche auch aktuelle demografische Daten zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Kärnten, z.B.: Kärnten schrumpft schneller, in Bendele (2010).

[4] Besonders drastisch steigt die Arbeitslosigkeit von Jugendlichen: Im Februar 2009 waren in Kärnten 3642 Jugendliche unter 25 ohne Arbeit, ein Plus von 47,1% im Vergleich zum Vorjahr, vgl. dazu Grabner (2009).

[5] Vgl. hierzu auch verschiedene Arbeiten von Jurić Pahor (2000; 2007), die zu ähnlichen Fragestellungen Ausschnitte aus der slowenischen Kärntner Literatur analysiert hat.

[6] Zur Diskussion des Begriffes Generation vgl. auch die Arbeiten von Assmann (2006), die die Generationen im familiär-verwandtschaftlichen Kontext vom gesellschaftlichen Generationsbegriff unterscheidet: Letzterer umfasst jene Menschen, die einem gemeinsamen geschichtlich-sozialen Raum angehören und auf ähnliche Erfahrungen zurückgreifen und somit auch ähnliche Haltungen und Lebensstile entwickeln.

[7] Vgl. dazu auch Bohnsack (1991, 8). Zur "grounded theory methodology" vgl. Glaser (2001; 2005). Grundsätzlich gibt es bei diesem Zugang folgende wesentliche Arbeitsschritte: Datenerhebung, Bildung von Kategorien und die Zuordnung von Daten, das Kontrastieren von Fällen bzw. ihr permanenter Vergleich, die Fallauswahl und daraus entstehende Ideen und Konzepte, die im Schreiben von Memos ihren Niederschlag finden: Dabei werden alle Ideen, Notizen, Kommentare usw. schriftlich festgehalten. Wichtig ist, dass die Kategorien erst im Verlauf des Kodierprozesses entstehen und je nach Fortgang der Auswertung erweitert und verfeinert werden, bis eine Sättigung eintritt, d. h. keine neuen Codes mehr auffindbar sind. Zu den verschiedenen Arten des Kodierens vgl. auch Berg & Milmeister (2008).

[8] Im Jahr 2009 wurden 20 Interviews durchgeführt und teilweise ausgewertet. An dieser Stelle wird allerdings nur ein Auswertungsschritt näher betrachtet. Entsprechend der GTM werden 2010 weitere Interviews durchgeführt und ausgewertet, sodass die Ergebnisse hier nicht als endgültig zu sehen sind. Weitere Details sind bei Vavti (2009b) nachzulesen.

[9] Zum Generationsbegriff vergleiche auch die Ausführungen und Diskussion bei Assmann (zit. nach Jurić Pahor 2007, 216).

[10] Ich erwähne in diesem Zusammenhang vor allem die geschichtlichen Ereignisse rund um die Volksabstimmung, die Aussiedlungen vieler SlowenInnen im Rahmen des 2. Weltkrieges aber auch physische und psychische Angriffe in den 1970er-Jahren. Beispiele aus den Interviews verweisen zudem auch auf Erfahrungen struktureller Gewalt in der Generation der befragten Jugendlichen.

[11] Loch (2006) unterscheidet zwischen manifesten Themen in der Biographie und nicht thematisierten, aber kopräsenten Themen, die auf Erlebnisse/Erfahrungen verweisen, deren

Thematisierung vermieden wird bzw. die nicht bewusst sind.

[12] Der Begriff ist natürlich kritisch zu hinterfragen. Vgl. zur Kritik der Ausdehnung des Identitätsbegriffs auf Nation und Ethnie u.a. Keupp (1998, 30).

[13] Die Zitate wurden wörtlich transkribiert, Punkte stehen für jeweils eine Sekunde Pause. Längere Gesprächspausen werden als (Pause) geführt. Fettgedruckte Passagen wurden stark betont. Gefühlsausdrücke, die sich im Tonfall u.ä. äußerten, wurden in Klammern aufgezeichnet.

[14] In diesem Zusammenhang geht es vor allem um die politische Differenzierung zwischen den verschiedenen politischen Lagern bei den Slowenen selber, die in der Geschichte wurzelt und zur Zeit konflikthaft verläuft.

[15] In der Geschichte wurde des Öfteren von einer Endlösung gesprochen, die es erst dann geben wird, wenn eines der beiden Völker nicht mehr existiert. Sinngemäß etwa bei einem Vortrag des SS-Standartenführers Maier-Kaibitsch in Klagenfurt am 10.7.1942 (SZI/SWI, 1942).

[16] In beinahe jeder Erzählung ist auch die Erfahrung struktureller Gewalt Thema, die von Beschimpfungen bis hin zu konkreter Bedrohung gehen kann.

[17] Zur Fragestellung vgl. auch Jurić Pahor (2000).

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MILAN BUFON

# Planning Integration in European Areas of Social and Cultural Contact: a Sysiphean Task?

The article deals with the issue of planning social and spatial integration in the so-called contact areas, where different political and cultural units meet and interlace. The study of such areas copes both with persistent and immanent forms of territoriality of human beings and with more and more pronounced quest for functional social, economic and spatial integration. Both trends lead towards a multi-level and often contradictory relation between different territories and borders, which emerge from the simultaneously developing processes of social and spatial convergence and divergence. For this reason, both theory and practice of planning social and spatial (re)integration in European multicultural and border regions appear to be a difficult, almost Sysiphean task, but nevertheless central to the creation of more stable opportunities for both coexistence and development. The article provides a review of the author's considerations of the social and spatial transformations and it is based on his studies of border and multicultural areas in Slovenia and other parts of Europe. He is suggesting to promote an integrative and multilevel approach that could replace the classic "national" policies in relation to border areas development and minority protection.

Keywords: border and multicultural regions, spatial (re)integration, social planning

# *Planiranje integracije v evopskih območjih družbenega in kulturnega stika: Sizifovo delo?*

*Članek obravnava problematiko planiranja družbene in prostorske integracije v tako imenovanih kontaktnih območjih, kjer se stikajo in prepletajo različne politične in kulturne enote. Proučevanje teh družbenih območij se sooča tako s persistentnimi in človeku imanentnimi oblikami teritorialnosti, kot tudi z rastočimi potrebami po funkcionalni družbeni, ekonomski in prostorski povezanosti. Obe težnji vodita v nastanek večplastnih in velikokrat neskladnih razmerij med različnimi teritoriji in mejami, ki izhajajo iz sočasno potekajočih procesov družbene in prostorske konvergence in divergence. Zaradi tega se tako teorija kot praksa planiranja družbene in prostorske (re)integracije v Evropi nasploh in še zlasti v njenih multikulturnih obmejnih regijah izkaže kot težavno, skorajda Sizifovo delo, brez katerega pa bi verjetno težko zagotovili trajnejše možnosti sobivanja in razvoja. Članek obravnava problem družbene integracije kontaktnih prostorov na podlagi avtorjevih proučevanj obmejnih in multikulturnih območij Slovenije in sosedstva. Avtor se na podlagi analize procesov družbene in prostorske transformacije v teh območjih zavzema za integrativen in večnivojski pristop, ki naj presega klasične "nacionalne« politike v odnosu do obmejnih območij in varovanja manjšin.*

*Ključne besede: obmejne in multikulturne regije, prostorske (re)integracije, družbeno planiranje*

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# 1. Uvod



Sodobni problemi evropskih območij družbenega in kulturnega stika ter s tem tudi vprašanje nadaljnjih možnosti družbene integracije v Evropi po mnenju avtorja pričujočega prispevka temeljijo predvsem na treh temeljnih elementih:

- persistentni teritorialnosti oziroma navezanosti na izvorno kulturno okolje,
- potrebi po funkcionalni družbeni in ekonomski povezanosti ter
- večplastnem in velikokrat neskladnem obstoju različnih "meja", ki se oblikujejo okrog obstoječih družbenih in kulturnih prostorov. Vsi zgoraj navedeni elementi so obenem izraz sočasno potekajočih procesov družbene in prostorske konvergence in divergence, ki ustvarjajo spreminjajoča se razmerja med družbeno-kulturnimi, družbeno-ekonomskimi in družbeno-političnimi sistemi ter s tem vplivajo na transformacijo obsega in kvalitativnih lastnosti tako imenovanih kontaktnih območij, kjer se ti sistemi srečujejo in prepletajo (Bufon 2006a).

Kakor je naglasil že Poulantzas, je bil evropski kulturni in politični prostor v predkapitalističnem obdobju relativno ohlapen in odprt, saj je temeljil na lokalno usmerjeni, pretežno samozadostni ruralni ekonomiji ter skupni religiji in civilizaciji, ki so evropskim kulturnim elitam omogočale dokaj intenzivno medsebojno komunikacijo (Poulantzas 1978). Temu nasprotno opredeljuje kapitalistični, moderni družbeni prostor zlasti pojav meje, saj je prav teritorializacija kulturnih, ekonomskih in političnih procesov prvi pogoj za razvoj sodobnih teritorialnih (nacionalnih) držav (Sack 1980), ki sedaj predhodno različno dimenzionirane kulturne, politične in ekonomske prostore združujejo v enoten sistem. Državna suverenost pa se v ta namen gradi z družbeno-kulturno homogenizacijo, družbeno-ekonomsko standardizacijo in družbeno-politično centralizacijo (Bufon 2004). Državne meje postanejo tako tudi meje ekskluzivnih kulturnih in ekonomskih sistemov, s tem pa se hkrati krepita notranja konvergenca in zunanja divergenca, povečuje se družbena distanca med *"nami"* in *"drugimi"* ter potencialna in dejanska konfliktnost med državami in narodi, med dominantnimi družbenimi skupinami in manjšinami. Prilagajanje družbeno-kulturnih prostorov družbeno-političnim, in obratno, poistovetenje *"demosa"* in *"ethnosa"*, težnja po etnocentrični in nacionalistični prevladi ter asimilaciji, segregaciji in izključevanju "drugorodnih" in zato samoumevno "manjvrednih" iz družbenega življenja, vse to so dogajanja, ki so evropski kontinent v kratkem času potisnila do dveh katastrofalnih vojn in ki so v "izumu" koncentracijskih taborišč in etničnega "čiščenja" dobila morda svojo končno in najbolj jasno obliko.

Glavna značilnost povojnih evropskih integracijskih procesov, ki so želeli biti v marsikaterem pogledu alternativni model državnemu nacionalističnemu ekskluzivizmu, je ta, da so se najprej, a tudi tu ne brez težav, začeli širiti v demokratično dovolj stabilnih zahodnoevropskih državah. Seveda so bili ti procesi tudi ali predvsem izraz širših geopolitičnih razmer in potreb po povojni obnovi političnega in družbeno-ekonomskega reda (Bufon 2005), vendar ne smemo spregledati dejstva, da se je po 60. letih prejšnjega stoletja v zahodnoevropskih državah nekako končalo obdobje klasične industrializacije, ki ga označujeta nefleksibilna ureditev ter koncentracija kapitala in dela v državnih središčnih območjih. Preneha se tako depopulacija perifernih ali marginaliziranih območij, ki pridobivajo nove razvojne priložnosti, s tem pa tudi možnost ponovnega "preporoda" svojih kulturnih, predvsem etnično-jezikovnih specifik, za katere se je zdelo, da jih je državni asimilacijski oziroma homogenizacijski pritisk že povsem "odpravil". To regionalno "prebujanje" je v iskanju novih ravnovesij med državnimi centri in periferijami ter med centripetalnimi in centrifugalnimi družbenimi gibanji, ki so velikokrat dosegala tudi izrazito konfliktnost, navsezadnje privedlo do preoblikovanja dotlej centraliziranih unitarnih (nacionalnih) držav v regionalizirane politično-teritorialne formacije in prenosa marsikaterih pristojnosti na lokalno oziroma regionalno raven. Družbena in kulturna organizacija in komunikacija sta postali tako v razvitem oziroma "zahodnem" delu Evrope proti koncu prejšnjega stoletja vse bolj kompleksni ne le *znotraj* posameznih državnih sistemov, ampak tudi *med* državnimi sistemi, saj je poglabljanje evropske integracije pomenilo tudi odpravljanje klasičnih oblik državne suverenosti ter prenos dela državnih pristojnosti na višjo, komunitarno raven. Enovit klasični državni sistem, ki je temeljil na triadi kultura – politika – ekonomija, se je tako korenito spremenil: *kulturni prostor* se je z državne ravni pomaknil na lokalno oziroma regionalno raven in hkrati, predvsem zaradi večje mobilnosti in razvoja elektronskih oblik komunikacije, prevzel različne nove elemente z globalne ravni; *ekonomski prostor* pa se je z državne ravni razširil na makroregionalno in globalno raven in se tako vse bolj "odlepil" od državnega nadzora in usmerjanja. *Politični prostor* se tem spremembam skuša prilagajati in se giblje v nekakšnem kontinuumu med lokalnim in globalnim, čeprav ostaja primarno navezan na državno raven, zaradi česar je Evropska unija tudi nastala in se razvila bolj skladno s konfederalnim kakor pa federalnim družbeno-političnim modelom.

## 2. Med integracijo in globalizacijo, med prostorom in identiteto

Dodaten problem evropskega kontinenta je bil ta, da je ostajal vse do nenadnega razpada vzhodnega komunističnega "bloka" razdeljen na dva strogo ločena dela, ki sta med seboj komajda komunicirala. Po letu 1990 smo priče dvema sočasnima in protislovnima procesoma. Prvi odpira Evropi doslej neslutene možnosti odpiranja demokratičnim idealom, širi zahodnoevropsko, socialdemokratsko različico kapitalizma na vzhod ter slednji povečuje tržni prostor. Obenem povzroča globoke transformacije družbeno-politične in družbeno-ekonomske organizacije v nekdanjih vzhodnoevropskih državah ter jim omogoča vstop v "klub razvitih", ki ga predstavlja EU. Razpad izrazito centralistično vodenih in zaprtih državnih sistemov na vzhodu je prinesel nove razvojne možnosti zlasti njihovim obmejnim območjem, ki se sedaj odpirajo čezmejni komunikaciji in sodelovanju (Bufon 1996). Marsikatero izmed teh robnih obmejnih območij, predvsem tistih, ki povezujejo oba nekdaj ločena evropska dela, se spreminja v razvojna središča za prometno in trgovinsko izmenjavo ter dokazuje, kako se geografija in prostor periodično nanovo dojemata in interpretirata.

Drugi proces ne vodi k družbeni konvergenci, ampak v obratno smer. To je konservativna reakcija "odpiranju" in mednarodnemu povezovanju, ki želi ohranjati in zavarovati "nacionalni" karakter držav pred "vdorom" vsega tujega in drugačnega, predvsem pa domnevno "neavtohtonega", in se velikokrat srečuje in bije s težnjo po enakopravnosti družbeno in kulturno margineranih ali marginaliziranih. Ta proces povzroča različne družbene in interetnične napetosti, otežuje svobodno gibanje ljudi, idej in dobrin, izraža pa tudi tudi način, po katerem se etničnost uporablja pri konstrukciji različnih "politik", ki se največkrat demagoško in instrumentalno postavljajo v "bran" tako splošni evropski civilizacijski kot posamezni nacionalni integriteti (Miles 1992). Ni naključje, da se tovrstne "politike" običajno porajajo in pridobivajo podporo v obdobjih ekonomske krize in da se sklicujejo na neofašistične oziroma nacionalistične ideološke nastavke.

Oba procesa torej nekako izražata spreminjajoča se družbena razmerja, ki jih v evropski prostor vnašajo integracijski in globalizacijski trendi. Med poglavitnimi kulturnimi komponentami omenjenih trendov je treba omeniti vse bolj izrazito prevlado angleščine kot primarnega jezika ekonomske in siceršnje medkulturne komunikacije ter vse bolj izrazito prevlado ameriških kulturnih modelov in komunikacijskih sistemov (Williams 1997). Do leta 2004 se je zdelo, da lahko EU še nekako "upravlja" svojo kulturno in jezikovno različnost, podpira

enakopravnost in enako zastopanost svojih "uradnih" jezikov ter z ustreznimi programi in politikami razvija tudi številne druge "manj razširjene jezike". Po veliki širitvi, ki je število članic v povezavi dvignilo s 15 na 27, število uradnih jezikov pa z 12 na 23, se zdi potreba po skupnem komunikacijskem jezikovnem instrumentu, ki "pravi" angleščini postavlja ob bok novo, "esperantsko" obarvano evropsko različico, vse bolj nujna, obenem pa je družbeno-kulturna implementacija evropske paradigme "združenosti v različnosti", na kar opozarja tudi zmanjšanje skupnih dotacij za ohranjanje in promocijo manj razširjenih manjšinskih jezikov, za katere je dokaj uspešno skrbel EBLUL (European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages – Evropski urad za manj rabljene jezike), vse bolj oddaljena.

Globalizacija pa prav tako vpliva na kulturne vzorce ter načine mišljenja in življenja. Kot nekakšen konstanten interaktivni proces teži k odpravljanju posebnega, enkratnega in tradicionalnega oziroma k rekonstruiranju vsega tega v smislu lokalne variante obče razširjenega in sprejetega vzorca. V tej luči lahko govorimo o deteritorializaciji družbe in kulture, na kar zlasti opozarjajo kulturni konservativci in aktivisti za zaščito etničnih posebnosti. Čeprav pridobivajo okolja, kjer je zastopana manjša tradicionalna kultura s terciarizacijo in z globalizacijo družbenih odnosov, nove razvojne priložnosti na gospodarskem področju – in velikokrat so prav nekdaj marginalna evropska območja tista, ki danes izkazujejo nadpovprečno visok bruto družbeni proizvod na prebivalca – pa je nedvomno tudi res, da prinaša "odpiranje" teh manjšinskih in nekdaj zaključenih in "varnih" družbeno-kulturnih in družbeno-ekonomskih "mini-sistemov" nove izzive in nove potencialne nevarnosti. Proces industrializacije je manjšinske skupnosti enostransko "prisilil" k modernizaciji, nedominantnim kulturnim območjem je odvzel razvojne možnosti in jih s tem potisnil v marginalizacijo (Bufon 1992). Toda prav družbeno-prostorska selektivnost in hierarhičnost, ki sta značilni za industrijske družbe in sta periferna območja "odrezali" od razvojnih tokov, sta slednje tudi spremenili v varna "zatočišča" za manjšinske kulturne skupnosti. Sodobna odprta in nehierarhična terciarizirana družbeno-prostorska organizacija pa te "varnosti" tradicionalnim kulturnim pokrajinam in manjšinam ne garantira več. Zmanjševanje družbene distance med dominantnimi in manjšinskimi skupinami povečuje etnično in jezikovno mešane strukture ter radikalno spreminja klasične koncepte "zaprte" identitete in pripadnosti, h kateri sta stremeli tako večinska oziroma dominantna kot manjšinska družba (Bufon 2003). Toda navkljub navideznemu odpravljanju pomena prostorske opredeljenosti oziroma pripadnosti, odigrava prostorski dejavnik še vedno ključno vlogo: družbena integracija v smislu zmanjševanja družbene distance in "institucionalizacije" medetničnih odnosov namreč večinoma zadeva le avtohtone skupnosti in prispeva sicer k postopni

"rekonstrukciji" številnih evropskih zgodovinskih multikulturnih regij ter revitalizaciji regionalnih manjšinskih jezikov, ne vključuje pa tako imenovanih "novodobnih" manjšin oziroma priseljenskih skupnosti, ki kljub daljšemu bivanju na območju naselitve ne uspejo pridobiti zares enakopravnega in popolnega državljanskega statusa, razen v primeru njihove "integracije" oziroma asimilacije v eno izmed "priznanih" skupnosti.

Prostorska opredeljenost ali teritorialnost, ki se največkrat navezuje na individualni odnos do prostora, omogoča posamezniku, da svoje kulturno in družbeno "obzorje" pravzaprav "materializira" in okrog sebe zgradi pravcati sistem različnih plasti družbeno-prostorske "domačnosti" in "tujosti" (Bufon 1999a). Zaradi te značilnosti je človekova teritorialnost pravzaprav izraz kolektivne identitete in privzgojenih vrednot, ki se z dolgoletnim bivanjem v določenem okolju prenašajo v prostor in ga preoblikujejo v pravcato "kulturno pokrajino", njene značilnosti pa se prav tako lahko prenašajo na ljudi, ki v njej živijo oziroma se vanjo naselijo in s tem tudi prevzamejo lokalno ali regionalno kulturo in življenjske navade. Različnost, ki jo predstavljajo različne evropske kulturne pokrajine, je lahko mitizirana izvorna "mala domovina", na katero se sklicujejo nostalgični antimodernisti, ali trendovska "butična niša", v katero se zatekajo postmodernisti, ko skušajo ubežati monotonosti "globalizirane vasi". Kraj, lokalnost se tako navezuje na specifičnost, kulturno različnost in *ethnos*, prostor pa na funkcionalnost, skupnost in *demos*, kar seveda predpostavlja obstoj dveh povsem različnih filozofij oziroma sistemov družbene in prostorske percepcije in projekcije (Casey 1997).

Oba pogleda sta prav tako opazna v diskusijah glede narave in politične organiziranosti EU, v skladu s katerima so se tako kritiki kot podporniki te povezave ukvarjali z njeno navidezno odmaknjenostjo od obeh temeljnih kategorij družbene konvergence: od *ethnosa* kot območja identitete in kulturne skupnosti ter *demosa* kot območja upravljanja in politične skupnosti. Zaradi tega "demokratičnega deficita" ostaja EU pretežno birokratsko, "tehnično" telo in ima precej šibke povezave z evropsko populacijo, čeprav so evropske institucije v preteklosti poskusile premostiti to objektivno težavo z udejanjanjem politike tako imenovane "subsidiarnosti", do katere pa države članice niso pokazale kakega posebnega interesa. Debata okrog evropske politične organiziranosti se zato še vedno dokaj prosto giblje med poloma "liberalizma" in "komunitarianizma" (Entrikin 2003). Prvi poudarja racionalno planiranje in modernizacijo, drugi pa družbeno navezanost in solidarnost. Na eni strani imamo prostorsko ekonomijo in težnjo po odpravljanju vseh pregrad prostemu gibanju in pretoku kapitala, storitev, blaga in ljudi, kakor je razvidno iz različnih dokumentov Evropske komisije, in kar naj bi nujno privedlo do evropskega "državljanstva"

s spreminjajočo se in fleksibilno identiteto ter šibko navezanostjo na izvorna območja in regionalne kulture. Na drugi strani pa srečamo kulturno pluralistični model, ki sodi, da so etnične, regionalne in narodne skupnosti primarno okolje individualne in kolektivne pripadnosti ter politične identitete. V tej luči je Evropa združba različnih območij in ozemelj, ki se običajno navezujejo na posebne izvorne kulture različnih dimenzij, ki gredo od lokalnih skupnosti do nacij (Smith 1995). V skladu s tem gledanjem na evropsko stvarnost je cilj združene in integrirane Evrope pravzaprav sekundaren cilju etnične, regionalne in nacionalne avtonomije oziroma poteka vzporedno z njim. Rezultat omenjenega procesa je konfederalna skupna prihodnost ali oblikovanje tako imenovane "Evrope narodov", ki državni pripadnosti predpostavlja kulturno in etnično-jezikovno pripadnost.

Razlike med obema opisanima družbenima in prostorskima konceptoma postajajo še bolj opazne v odnosu do meja. "Tržni", liberalistični model zagovarja odpravo notranjih meja in prenaša vse funkcije varovanja notranjega skupnega sistema na zunanje meje EU, medtem ko ostajajo v kulturno pluralističnem modelu območja "domačnosti" in "tujosti", "vključevanja" in "izključevanja" dokaj jasna, saj so izraz intenzivne kulturne pripadnosti izvornemu okolju. Še enkrat se srečujemo z dilemo, ki jo prinaša razmerje med *ethnosom* in *demosom*: meje pomagajo ustvarjati in vzdrževati različnost na eni strani in skupno pripadnost na drugi, njihovo odpravljanje pa mnogi doživljajo kot nevarnost, da se kulturna različnost in različne kulturne pokrajine "zravnajo" v monoton družbeni prostor z deteritorializiranim skupnim državljanstvom. Mnogi raziskovalci in upravljalci vidijo rešitev te dileme v uveljavljanju regij kot območij, kjer se prekrivajo in prepletajo ljudem najbližji kulturni, družbeni in funkcionalni prostori.

## 3. Regije, manjšine in obmejna območja: kjer se srečujeta konvergenca in divergenca

Vsekakor je evropski integracijski proces bistveno "razgradil" tako imenovani vestfalski sistem, ki so ga v marsikaterem njegovem zapostavljenem ali marginalnem delu razumeli kot "organizacijo sveta v teritorialno ekskluzivne, suverene nacije, vsaka s svojim notranjim monopolom legitimiziranega nasilja" (Caporaso 1996, 34). Čeprav ta "idealni" sistem ni bil nikjer docela prenešen v prakso, pa še vedno vpliva na politično razmišljanje novega tisočletja tudi v Evropi, kjer se je sicer ta sistem rodil in nato najgloblje zakoreninil v modelu nacionalnih držav, a kjer so bili obenem, morda prav zaradi potencialnih negativnih učinkov, ki jih ta sistem vnaša v družbeno in politično življenje, narejeni tudi najbolj odločni

koraki v smeri njegovega odpravljanja ali vsaj nadgrajevanja z inovativnimi oblikami meddržavnega sodelovanja in povezovanja. Ker pa se evropski prostor in še zlasti EU srečujeta z dodatnimi problemi, ki jih vnaša razmerje med regionalizacijo in globalizacijo, se transformacija vestfalskega sistema v Evropi nujno usmerja v razvoj večnivojskega upravljanja družbenega prostora. To je še zlasti razvidno v evropskih obmejnih območjih in v čezmejnih regijah, ki so obenem marginalna območja v okviru državnih sistemov in povezovalna oziroma središčna območja v okviru integracijskih programov EU (Blatter 2003). Značilno za ta območja je predvsem to, da jih opredeljuje visoka stopnja družbeno-ekonomske in družbeno-kulturne povezanosti in soodvisnosti, s katero so uspele premagati državocentrično družbeno marginalizacijo in doseči stopnjo ekonomske razvitosti, ki marsikje presega državno povprečje. Čezmejno povezovanje pa ni bilo koristno le v pogledu odstranjevanja ovir za razvoj družbeno-ekonomskih potencialov, ampak tudi pri premoščanju problema "drugačnosti" in družbeno-kulturne različnosti v EU, saj se evropska kontaktna območja, kakor na kratko opredeljujemo območja stika med različnimi družbenimi in kulturnimi prostori, vse bolj uveljavljajo kot pravcati integracijski "modeli" (Bufon 2006a).

Evropska kontaktna območja so namreč že po svoji naravi večjezična in multikulturna, pa čeprav so v preteklosti to njihovo temeljno lastnost poskusile državne "enonacionalne" politike po eni strani zatreti in odpraviti, po drugi pa instrumentalno izrabljati za svoje "iredentistične" težnje oziroma poskuse aneksije sosednjih ozemelj. Ko se v združeni Evropi odpravljajo notranje politične meje, je tudi vsakršna državna politika, ki bi bila usmerjena v spreminjanje teh meja na škodo sosednjih držav, povsem brezpredmetna, tako kot bi morala doživeti dokončen udarec tudi državna oziroma nacionalistična mitologija "patriotskega umiranja za zemljo in zastavo", ki je skoraj paradoksalno še vedno zapisana v marsikateri državni himni članic EU. Politike meddržavne divergence se tako potencialno vse bolj umikajo politikam meddržavne konvergence, čeprav slednje še vedno nimajo ustrezne institucionalne podpore v programih EU ali posameznih držav te povezave. Največje učinke na meddržavno konvergenco v EU oziroma na sposobnost konkretnega povezovanja ljudi in lokalnih skupnosti imata namreč program *Interreg* ter takoimenovani *Schengenski prostor*, oba pa sta bolj "stranski rezultat" politik odpravljanja družbeno-ekonomskih razlik med državami oziroma redistribucije razvojnih skladov ter potreb po zagotavljanju skupnih varnostnih in policijskih standardov kakor načrtno razvijanje lokalnih integracijskih možnosti v Evropi. Slednje se zato uveljavljajo dokaj spontano in neorganizirano ter utemeljujejo svoj uspeh predvsem na "upravljanju" skupnega funkcionalnega in kulturnega prostora.

To dejstvo zato odpira nove možnosti in priložnosti tudi številnim evropskim obmejnim in multikulturnim regijam in v njih živečim "obmejnim" manjšinam, ki se s povečevanjem čezmejnega povezovanja in medkulturnega dialoga lahko uveljavijo kot nosilci obeh integracijskih procesov na lokalni ali regionalni ravni. Če je po eni strani res, da večinske oziroma dominantne skupine, ne glede na politični odnos, ki ga gojijo do lokalnih in manjšinskih skupin, slednjim ne morejo odvzeti te potencialne integracijske vloge, pa je po drugi strani tudi res, da je možnost dejanske implementacije te vloge še vedno močno odvisna od institucionalnega in širšega družbenega priznanja lokalne stvarnosti in razvoja državno podprtih (re)integracijskih politik. Raziskave, ki so jih predvsem politični geografi opravili v srednjeevropskih in drugih obmejnih območjih (Bufon 2006b), so pokazale, da je intenzivnost čezmejnega sodelovanja in povezovanja zlasti odvisna od treh elementov:

- stopnje družbene urbanizacije na obeh straneh meje;
- stopnje kulturne homogenosti, h kateri bistveno prispeva prav obstoj nacionalnih manjšin na obeh straneh meje in
- obstoja preteklih konsolidiranih teritorialnih enot, ki so oblikovali skupne funkcionalne družbene prostore. S tega zornega kota lahko "spontano" težnjo po čezmejnem povezovanju razumemo tudi kot poskus obmejnega prebivalstva, da ponovno "rekonstruira" tisto regionalno strukturo, ki so jo novejše politične in mejne spremembe "razrezale" na več gravitacijskih, gospodarskih, družbenih in kulturnih območij.

Te nove oblike čezmejnega regionalizma so morda še zlasti pomembne v Srednji Evropi, ker omogočajo ne le lokalno spodbujanje družbeno-ekonomske integracije in ohranjanje kulturne različnosti ob razvoju interetničnega sožitja in sodelovanja, ampak tudi makroregionalno rekonstrukcijo nekoč bipolarno razdeljenega kontinenta (Bufon 1998a). Za srednjeevropska obmejna okolja je značilno, da so v njih zastopane številne nacionalne manjšine in čezmejne multikulturne regionalne skupnosti. Prve so nastale zaradi mejnih sprememb po prvi in drugi svetovni vojni, ko so tudi mednarodne in državne politike težile k prilagajanju državnih prostorov kulturnim oziroma etnično-jezikovnim območjem, in obratno, druge pa so izraz predhodnega tradicionalnega sobivanja različnih etnično-jezikovnih skupnosti v širših funkcionalnih in političnih prostorih. Ta situacija je sprožila v povojnih razmejitvenih in sodobnih integracijskih procesih nekatere skoraj paradoksalne težnje:

- da imajo v takih obmejnih območjih največje potencialne možnosti, da se razvijajo v integrirano čezmejno regijo prav tista družbena okolja, ki so v nedavni preteklosti doživela največje travme zaradi razmejitve stabilnih

upravnih in gospodarskih enot;
- da se prav zaradi različnih še odprtih političnih vprašanj, ki izhajajo iz preteklih vojnih in povojnih dogajanj, funkcionalno družbeno-ekonomsko in družbeno-kulturno lokalno čezmejno povezovanje hitreje in laže uveljavlja kot institucionalno družbeno-politično čezmejno povezovanje;
- da so periferna in manj urbanizirana kontaktna območja, ki so v preteklosti do svojih sosedov vzdrževala odnose "banalne koeksistence" ob skromnih medsebojnih stikih, sedaj tista, ki so po eni strani najbolj zainteresirana za povečevanje institucionalnega čezmejnega povezovanja, da bi s tem pritegnila v območje dodatne družbeno-ekonomske razvojne možnosti, po drugi strani pa v teh kontaktnih območjih povečani družbeno-kulturni stiki s soseščino, ki iz teh procesov nujno izhajajo, povzročajo tudi največje odpore.

Sodobni procesi in transformacije evropskega kulturnega prostora postavljajo v novo luč tudi tradicionalno razmerje med *ethnosom* in *demosom* oziroma med družbeno-kulturnimi in družbeno-političnimi prostori, kakršno se je uveljavilo med oblikovanjem modernih teritorialnih držav. "Posebno" razmerje med narodom in državo v Evropi ponazarja že dejstvo, da se v večjih evropskih jezikih za oba fenomena uporablja tudi isto ime in da se posledično v večjih evropskih državah težko ločuje med državno oziroma državljansko in narodno oziroma etnično-jezikovno pripadnostjo. Sicer je že decentralizacija državne uprave, ki je v Zahodni Evropi potekala vzporedno z regionalno mobilizacijo v 70. in 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja, pripomogla k temu, da je evropski politični in kulturni prostor ob "narodu" in "državi" odkrival obstoj manjšinskih regionalnih skupnosti oziroma tako imenovanih "narodov brez države" ter začel razvijati določene ukrepe v korist tako imenovanih "manj razširjenih jezikov". Po razkroju večnacionalnih držav v Srednje-Vzhodni in Vzhodni Evropi se je evropska raznoličnost še popestrila: ob 31. evropskih narodih, ki so uspeli pridobiti lastno državo, je skoraj prav toliko (29) regionalnih etnično-jezikovnih skupin, ki tega političnega "cilja" niso dosegle in se sedaj z različno stopnjo uspešnosti borijo za lastno afirmacijo, avtonomijo ali celo samostojnost. Regionalnim manjšinam je treba nato prišteti še okrog 25 različnih nacionalnih manjšin, od katerih se vsaka v povprečju nahaja v dveh do treh različnih državah (Bufon 2004). Vse omenjene manjšine skupaj bi lahko v teritorialnem in demografskem obsegu sestavljale državo, kakršna je Francija. Še pomembnejša pa je ugotovitev, da se evropski kontinent od "bojišča" le nekaterih velikih narodov in držav ponovno spreminja v kulturni in jezikovni "mozaik", v okviru katerega so območja kulturnega in družbenega stika prej pravilo kot izjemo.

V takih pogojih etnično "prebujanje" različnih evropskih manjšin ne poteka vedno tudi vzporedno z jezikovnim "preporodom" manjšinskih jezikov, kakor

lahko na primer ugotovimo (v večji meri) pri keltskih skupnostih na Irskem in v Veliki Britaniji ali (v manjši meri) med beneškimi Slovenci v Italiji. To pomeni, da "objektivna" izvorna etnična identiteta, kolikor jo je v sodobnih razmerah sploh še mogoče ugotoviti, ne sovpada nujno s subjektivno identiteto, ki je ne le spremenljiva, ampak največkrat tudi večplastna (Bufon 2003). Institucionalizacija manjšinskih pravic seveda lahko veliko prispeva k večji teritorializaciji manjšinskih skupnosti, saj se večinoma naslanja na historično manjšinsko naselitveno ozemlje, ter navsezadnje tudi k večjemu "prekrivanju" med objektivno in subjektivno pripadnostjo tam živečega prebivalstva, ki mu zakonodaja prav zaradi bivanja v institucionalno določenem "manjšinskem" ozemlju priznava določene kolektivne pravice. Po drugi strani pa tovrstni pristop kritizirajo tako "državljanski modernisti" – ki vidijo v oblikovanju institucionalnih manjšinskih okolij nevarnost prevlade *ethnosa* nad *demosom* oziroma nadaljnje "balkanizacije" evropskega političnega prostora ter v uveljavljanju kolektivnih pravic v posameznih delih državnega ozemlja nevarnost razkroja državljanske enakosti in solidarnosti – kakor "manjšinski modernisti", ki opozarjajo na dejstvo, da se zaradi povečane družbene in prostorske mobilnosti historična manjšinska naselitvena ozemlja vse manj "prekrivajo" z območji, kjer dejansko živijo potencialni pripadniki manjšinskih skupnosti, slednji pa so tudi veliko bolj integrirani v širše družbeno okolje, zaradi česar lahko klasične oblike manjšinskega institucionalnega in teritorialnega varstva predstavljajo bolj nevarnost "folklorizacije" in marginalizacije teh skupnosti kakor pa priložnost za njihovo družbeno uveljavljanje.

Namesto "ločenega" pristopa zato mnogi proučevalci manjšinskih revitalizacijskih politik zagovarjajo "integralni" pristop, ki spodbuja splošne razvojne možnosti na ekonomskem, socialnem, izobraževalnem in kulturnem področju ter s tem implicitno omogoča tudi razvoj medkulturnega dialoga, etnične koeksistence in večjezične prakse v evropskih kontaktnih območjih. Sodobni revitalizacijski programi manjšinskih kultur so zato obenem revitalizacijski programi za periferna ali marginalizirana okolja, v okviru katerih se te kulture nahajajo, kar pomeni, da se lahko družbeno-kulturne razmere v manjšinskih oziroma etnično mešanih okoljih izboljšujejo le sočasno z družbeno-ekonomskimi in družbeno-političnimi razmerami, kakor so dokazali primeri "dobrih praks" v Kataloniji ali Walesu (Williams 2000). Tem splošnim razvojnim možnostim regionalnih manjšin se v primeru nacionalnih obmejnih manjšin pridružujejo še dodatne funkcije "integratorjev" sosednjih funkcionalnih in kulturnih prostorov, kar pomeni, da je treba pri razvijanju politik čezmejnega sodelovanja in povezovanja nujno upoštevati tudi razvojne potenciale, ki jih obmejnim in etnično mešanim območjem vnašajo manjšine in multikulturne lokalne skupnosti. Iz povedanega pa nadalje izhaja, da so tradicionalne *"top-down"* razvojne politike,

pa naj te izvirajo iz državnih ali evropskih centrov oblasti, vse manj uspešne in ustrezne pri celovitem razreševanju in usmerjanju tako kompleksnih družbenih stvarnosti. Tudi v tem pogledu se zdi regionalna (tudi v čezmejnem smislu) raven za razreševanje sodobnih razmerij med centrifugalnimi in centripetalnimi družbenimi težnjami oziroma za upravljanje sočasno potekajočih procesov družbene in prostorske konvergence in divergence vse bolj pomembna in odločilna, mora pa biti ustrezno podprta z usklajenimi meddržavnimi razvojnimi politikami. Žal dogajanja v našem bližnjem in širšem družbenem okolju kažejo na to, da se centralistično naravnane državne politike pri "planiranju" družbene integracije in čezmejnega povezovanja še vedno oklepajo starih in preživelih "nacionalnih" (če ne celo nacionalističnih) kriterijev, ki vidijo v obstoju političnih in kulturnih meja alibi za oviranje procesov lokalne (re)integracije oziroma funkcionalne rekonstrukcije čezmejnih in multikulturnih regij, s čimer se pravzaprav odrekajo vsem tistim razvojnim možnostim, ki jih odpira proces evropskega povezovanja.

## 4. Sklep

Čeprav še vedno ne v zadostni ali optimalni obliki, je v sodobnem evropskem diskurzu in sodobni evropski agendi vprašanje "drugačnih" in "različnih" vendarle pridobilo na pomenu. Nova evropska paradigma "združenosti v različnosti" pravzaprav pomeni globok premik in odmik od klasičnega nacionalizma, ki ima svoje korenine prav v Evropi in je bil nedvomno sokrivec za izbruh obeh svetovnih vojn, zaradi katerih je naposled kontinent tudi izgubil središčno vlogo v svetovni politični, ekonomski in družbeni "arhitekturi". Razvoj integracijskih procesov ob razkroju bipolarne svetovne ureditve sedaj postavlja evropski prostor, s tem pa tudi evropsko politiko, ekonomijo in kulturo, ponovno v ospredje svetovnega zanimanja. Napačno bi bilo, če bi evropsko povezovanje najprej interpretirali in razvijali le kot "banalni" odgovor na potrebo po povojni obnovi, nato pa na izzive svetovne ekonomske globalizacije. Evropska integracija ni in ne more biti le stvar družbeno-ekonomske sfere, temveč mora celoviteje in na inovativen način zajeti tudi ali predvsem družbeno-politično in družbeno-kulturno sfero. Morda prvič v zgodovini se v sodobni Evropi skuša povezovati vsa tri temeljna področja družbenega življenja tako, da bi ta proces ne sledil dosedanjemu vzorcu notranje centralizacije in homogenizacije. Ta novi evropski razvojni model bi lahko dokazal, da svetovna družbeno-ekonomska globalizacija in makroregionalna družbeno-politična integracija na družbeno-kulturnem področju ne vodita nujno v "talilni lonec" in amerikanizacijo načina življenja (Calhoun 2003).

Toda te nove razvojne možnosti in to novo družbeno paradigmo bo treba najprej preveriti in aplicirati v številnih evropskih kontaktnih prostorih oziroma v območjih družbenega in kulturnega stika. Tu ne gre toliko za "upravljanje" meddržavnih prostorov v smislu organizacije in usmerjanja funkcionalnih gospodarskih, socialnih in upravnih enot ter odpravljanja notranjih meja in pregrad čezmejnemu in siceršnjemu pretoku ljudi, blaga, storitev in kapitala, kolikor za "upravljanje" potencialnih konfliktov in potencialnih koeksistenčnih oblik med različnimi narodi, etničnimi in jezikovnimi skupinami, med tradicijo in modernostjo, med *ethnosom* in *demosom*. Odprava teh zadnjih in najbolj persistentnih "meja" bo morala dokončno odpraviti tudi tradicionalno etnocentrično dojemanje družbenih prostorov in družbenih procesov ter nacionalistični ekskluzivizem "drugih" in "drugačnih". Evropsko sobivanje nam pomaga razumeti, da se v okviru EU na relativno kratkih razdaljah srečujemo ne le z različnimi nacionalnimi ali državnimi identitetami, ampak s še številčnejšimi etničnimi in regionalnimi identitetami ter z različnimi jezikovnimi praksami (Bufon 1999b).

Vse bolj tudi odkrivamo in sprejemamo dejstvo, da lahko različne identitete in jezikovne prakse obstajajo v istem upravnem ali družbenem okolju oziroma da meje med različnimi družbeno-kulturnimi prostori niso linearne in določene, temveč conalne in premične, kar seveda ustvarja zelo kompleksen in razčlenjen družbeni prostor, za katerega lahko uporabimo izraz "kontaktno območje". V njem nenehno "prestopamo" različne kulturne meje in zaradi tega so v teh okoljih kulturni prevzemi in izmenjave nekaj povsem vsakdanjega in običajnega. To nenehno "vrenje" na robovih kulturnih pokrajin, ki omogoča tudi njihovo medsebojno oplajanje in prelivanje in se je zdelo ekskluzivnemu nacionalističnemu konceptu morda prav zaradi tega tako nevarno in nezaželjeno, pa ne pomeni, da se bistvene lastnosti evropskih kulturnih prostorov s časom radikalno spreminjajo. Slednji ostajajo namreč presenetljivo stabilni ali se z umikom državnega homogenizacijskega pritiska še celo krepijo ali ponovno "prebujajo". S tem pa se uveljavljajo tudi tradicionalni lokalni ali regionalni teritorialni okviri, ki jim decentralizacija državnega upravnega sistema daje funkcionalno vrednost in uspejo "vliti" svojo kulturno specifiko tudi vsem tistim priseljencem, ki se želijo bolje in globlje integrirati v svoje novo življenjsko okolje.

Z odkrivanjem sodobnih oblik družbene pripadnosti in istovetnosti oziroma lokalnega prostorskega vedenja družbenih skupin se ponovno vračamo k "mejam" in "teritorialnosti". To so družbeni aspekti, ki so zelo blizu lokalnim skupnostim in so jih družboslovci in politični ekonomisti ponovno "odkrili" v 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja pri raziskovanju odnosov med centri in periferijami v Evropi. Preučevanje "mehanizmov odpora" v perifernih območjih ter regionalizma je

lokalne in regionalne skupnosti, ki jih je modernizem industrijske paradigme skoraj povsem "odpisal" in "odpravil", ponovno postavil v ospredje družbenega dogajanja. Zmotno pa bi bilo tem skupnostim pripisati le vlogo ohranjevalcev lastnega avtohtonega ozemlja oziroma svoje izvorne *kulturne pokrajine*, saj prevzemajo v sodobnih razvojnih procesih tudi novo vlogo v povezovanju obmejnih prostorov ter vzpostavljanju koeksistenčnih in integracijskih praks, še zlasti tedaj, ko je treba tudi rekonstruirati nekdanje skupne *funkcionalne prostore* (Bufon 1998b).

Ob koncu bi lahko rekli, da se danes Evropa, domovina nacionalizma ter tisti del sveta, kjer je razmerje med teritorialno in kulturno identiteto najbolj dinamično in potencialno konfliktno (nikjer drugje namreč ni prišlo v zgodovini do tolikšnega števila vojn in tako pogostega spreminjanja politične karte), z vse večjo intenzivnostjo spopada z vprašanjem, ki sicer ni novo, a katerega želijo Evropejci prvič v svoji zgodovini razrešiti na povsem inovativen način, in sicer, kako svoje različne in raznolike interese združiti in skupno "upravljati" v okviru enega samega, čeprav večnivojskega družbenega sistema. Odgovor je torej vse prej kot preprost, in odpira, kakor smo videli, različne protislovne procese in razvojne scenarije. Povsem nanovo bo treba definirati razmerje med potenciali demokratičnega "odpiranja" in "vključevanja" ter kulturnega "zapiranja" in "ločevanja", med lastnostmi "evropskega" in "neevropskega", med "globalnostjo", "nacionalnostjo" in "lokalnostjo" (Bufon 2001). Skratka, temeljno vprašanje, s katerim se srečuje sodobna Evropa in od katerega so odvisne možnosti za razvoj ne le medkulturnega dialoga, ampak že samih integracijskih procesov na našem kontinentu, je, kako bo razmerje med družbeno in prostorsko konvergenco in divergenco vplivalo na obstoj in soodvisnost med evropskimi družbeno-kulturnimi in družbeno-političnimi prostori ter s tem na novo evropsko paradigmo "združenosti v različnosti".

Raziskovanja družbenih in prostorskih procesov in fenomenov v tako imenovanih "kontaktnih območjih" kažejo na to, da je treba nov evropski "skupni dom" zgraditi ne le "z vrha", kakor se je to počenjalo v zadnjih desetletjih, ampak tudi "z dna". Slovenija pa je kot mala država v evropskem merilu tisto okolje, kjer se "dno" in "vrh" srečujeta in prepletata in bi zato lahko rabila ne le kot "model" za raziskovanje učinkov integracijskih procesov na razvoj njenih tako številnih "stičnih" območij, kakor smo v preteklosti že pokazali in dokazali (Klemenčič & Bufon 1994; Bufon & Minghi 2000; Bufon 2002a, 2002b in 2008), ampak tudi kot "model" za uveljavljanje same prihodnje evropske podobe, kjer postaja potreba po proučevanju in usmerjanju oblik družbene in prostorske integracije vedno bolj pomembna in nujna.

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OLGA SKLARLATO / SEAN BYRNE / CHUCK THIESSEN

# The Eu Peace II Fund and The International Fund For Ireland: Transforming Conflict and Building Peace in Northern Ireland and The Border Counties

This article explores interview narratives of 98 Northern Irish participants regarding the impact of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union's (EU) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II) on peacebuilding and development processes in Northern Ireland. The perceptions of community group leaders, funding agency civil servants and development officers are explored. The experiences of these study participants with the EU Peace II Fund and IFI are discussed in the greater context of economic and social development, addressing the legacy of conflict, and peacebuilding and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties.

Keywords: peacebuilding, international economic assistance, Northern Ireland, program evaluation

# *Evropski mirovni sklad II in Mednarodni sklad za Irsko: Transformacija konflikta in vzpostavljanje miru na Severnem Irskem in v mejnih pokrajinah.*

*Članek obravnava pripovedi 98 severnoirskih intervjuvancev o učinku Mednarodnega fonda za Irsko (International Fund for Ireland, IFI) in Programa EU za mir in spravo (EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation)(Mir/Peace II) na vzpostavljanje miru in razvoj na Severnem Irskem. Raziskuje mnenja voditeljev lokalnih skupnosti, uradnikov fundacije in za razvoj odgovornih uslužbencev. Izkušnje sodelujočih v raziskavi z Evropskim mirovnim skladom II in IFI so obravnavane v širšem kontekstu gospodarskega in družbenega razvoja, upoštevaje dediščino konfliktov ter vzpostavljanja miru in sprave na Severnem Irskem in v mejnih pokrajinah.*

*Ključne besede: vzpostavljanje miru, mednarodna gospodarska pomoč, Severna Irska, ocena programa*

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# 1. Introduction

Peacebuilding in countries affected by the legacy of protracted conflict is a process which requires coordinated efforts between the civil society, the government, and the international community. The inherently divisive nature of ethnic conflict affects the social, political and human development of a country and its population. Scholars in diverse fields are currently debating the most effective ways of assisting post-agreement development and peacebuilding processes and posit a number of directions that may be taken by international and national policymakers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and local communities. To this end, peace and conflict studies (PACS) scholars and practitioners have worked on designing integrated peacebuilding approaches and frameworks, and have developed specific mechanisms for addressing and resolving conflicts after the violence has ended (Lederach 1997; Diamond & McDonald 1996; Burrows 1996). PACS scholars working in the conflict transformation paradigm have envisioned conflict which has the potential for constructive change and have sought peace through emphasizing dialogue, building relationships, and engaging social, economic, and political structures "in a joint creative search for a new reality" (Galtung 2007, 14)[1].

PACS research over the past half-century has highlighted numerous peacebuilding resources and approaches (Dunn 2005). Scholarship has brought to our attention new ideas, theories, and research evidence concerning the potential role of external economic assistance and aid as a peacebuilding strategy (Collier 2007; Tarp 2000; Easterly 2008; Riddell 2007). Such issues as the impacts of economic assistance on a divided society with a history of protracted violence, the necessity of regarding the role of economic factors in relation to sociopolitical and psychocultural factors in the process of policymaking and conflict resolution, the importance of grassroots participation and the involvement of middle-range leaders in peacebuilding efforts, as well as the significance of designing comprehensive evaluation of the process of external funding of peacebuilding initiatives have been debated by PACS scholars and practitioners (Byrne 2009; Lederach 1997; Racioppi & O'Sullivan See 2007; UNDP 2009). At the same time, new questions and dilemmas have emerged in this regard. The need for more empirical research on the effectiveness of foreign aid, the mechanisms and strategies of its delivery and coordination has been identified (Killick 2004). The analysis of specific cases such as Northern Ireland (NI) should prove valuable in identifying and further developing best practices.

The protracted NI conflict has devastated local economic and political infrastructures. Pre-partition economic structures were rooted in the 1607 Ulster Plantation and the economic differences that emerged between North East Ulster and the rest of Ireland in the 1800s (O'Leary & McGarry 1996). From 1921 to 1972, populist Unionist politicians ensured that sectarianism divided the working classes by propagating discriminatory economic policies targeted at NI's Nationalists (Bew et al. 2002). The 1960s witnessed the collapse of the shipbuilding and textile industries, with working class Nationalists bearing the brunt of unemployment. In response, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) sought to promote fair access to employment and housing, as well as voting reforms (Dixon 2007). Violent opposition to NICRA's agenda resulted in the Troubles,[2] which continued well into the 1990s. The Troubles devastated NI's economy as the British government failed to address deeply rooted structural problems and the resulting Nationalist alienation (Bew & Patterson 1985). Unemployment and poverty remained high during the 1970s and 1980s, as what was generally known as the 'long war' damaged the infrastructure of local economies (Cox et al. 2000). Poverty and inequality nourished support in Loyalist and Republican neighborhoods for competing paramilitary organizations (Arthur 2001, 35; McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 73). Further, a war economy emerged from the turmoil of the Troubles as paramilitaries were allowed increasing control over economic and political processes (Tomlinson 1995). In response, the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) created frameworks to tackle economic deprivation, marginalization, and unemployment by providing substantial monetary support through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II).

This article investigates the efficacy of economic aid as a peacebuilding tool, as well as its impact on institutionalizing the peace dividend in NI and the Border Counties. While political aspects to the peace process remain predominant in civil and media discourse, PACS scholars are increasingly recognizing how appropriate post-accord economic policy (Addison et al. 2005; Collier 2001, 2008; Jeong 2005; Kamphuis 2005), the legislated reduction of inequalities (Stewart 2008; Smith & Chambers 1991), and support for private sector growth (Haufler 2001) all contribute to an economic context which exerts considerable influence on these same political aspects to the peace process. A report by The Portland Trust, an NGO interested in peacebuilding through economics, concludes that the NI context illustrates that "economic progress is crucial to the political forces that favour peace. Without it, even small acts of sabotage can derail a peace process" (The Portland Trust 2007, 4). While the British government invested a considerable amount of financial resources in Northern

Ireland throughout the period of the Troubles, this massive subvention focused primarily on economic development and addressed only "the symptoms and not the underlying causes of the political and economic crisis" (Byrne 2009, 21). At the same time, the rapidly improving economic conditions in NI coupled with key policy and legislative decisions have served to reduce tensions and disparity in NI and have motivated perseverance during the difficult peace process (Byrne et al. 2008). It remains to be seen, however, how the peace process will fare with the recent economic downturn due to the 2008 recession.

Specifically, this article is organized as follows. First, a brief overview of both funding programs is provided. Second, the role of economic development as a peacebuilding strategy is explored. Third, we summarize the respondents' perceptions of the contribution of economic aid to:

- economic and human development;
- addressing the legacy of sectarianism;
- reducing human suffering; and
- creativity in peacebuilding.

Finally, the key findings are discussed in light of the theory. This study provides the discussion and analysis of potential contributions of economic aid to a peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland and is aimed at the audience of peace builders, including but not limited to practitioners, scholars, politicians, international funding agencies and students of conflict and peace.

## 2. Methodology

Our investigation was implemented during the summer of 2006, when the second author Dr. Sean Byrne conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 98 participants. The interview participants included individuals and community groups from Belfast, Derry, and representatives of community groups on both sides of the border (Northern Ireland: Counties Fermanagh, Tyrone, Armagh, and Republic of Ireland: Counties Cavan, Monaghan, Leitrim, Donegal) that were devastated by the Troubles economically and politically. Belfast was chosen as the capital city of Northern Ireland and Derry as the second largest city in Northern Ireland with a majority of Catholic residents. There are also economic differences west of the River Bann (Derry and the Border counties) as industry and commerce is centered east of the Bann in Belfast.

The respondents were identified from IFI and EU Peace II websites and subsequently contacted and invited to participate in the study. The questions were field tested during a study of Peace I and subsequently reused in this study. The questions posed to the respondents were compiled from a reading of the IFI and EU Peace website information as well as from secondary literature sources on the role of economic aid and the peace process in NI. The questions addressed: access to funds, process of applying to funders, success and evaluation of projects, sustainability of projects and empowerment of applicants, building cross community contact and reconciliation, peacebuilding and development, the Belfast Agreement and the peace process, building trust and equity, and the hopes and fears of the respondents regarding the peace process.

Participants comprised 88 community group leaders who represented a wide a range of organizations working with peace and reconciliation, development, youth, victims, and women. 66 of the participants were from small volunteer-staffed community groups, 12 were from larger community groups, 5 were Peace II development officers, one was an IFI development officer, one was an EU civil servant, two were IFI civil servants, and one was a senior civil servant in the office of the Taoiseach.[3] Interviews lasted approximately 80 to 120 minutes, were conducted in each participant's workplace, and aimed to elicit perceptions of the role of the IFI and the EU Peace II fund in supporting various development and peacebuilding efforts in NI and the Border Counties. Interview data was transcribed verbatim and analyzed inductively to draw themes from the transcripts.

## 3. Peace II and IFI Funding Programs: A Brief Overview

Following the 1994 cease-fire agreement in NI, the European Commission (EC) established a Task Force to explore practical ways in which the EU could assist in the transition towards peace and reconciliation within Northern Irish society (European Commission n.d., 5). The EC initiated a Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in NI and the Border Counties (Peace I) to be implemented in the form of a Community Initiative under the Structural Funds for the period 1995 to 1999 (*ibid.*). Upon the completion of Peace I, the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in NI and the Border Counties of Ireland 2000-2004 (Peace II) was introduced to "promote economic and social development with a special focus on those groups, sectors/activities and areas which have been most affected by the conflict" (*ibid.*, 31). The overall

strategic aim of Peace II was "to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation" (*ibid.*, 30). The objectives of Peace II included both addressing the legacy of conflict and encouraging actions aimed at promoting the emergence of a stable society through implementing the following priorities: economic renewal, social integration, inclusion, reconciliation, locally-based regeneration and development strategies, and cross-border co-operation (*ibid.*, 31-32). The Border region was included in this program as the region that was significantly affected by the Troubles, specifically in terms of commercial development (including cross-border trade and the inflow of foreign direct investment), high numbers of migrants from Northern Ireland who moved to the bordering counties of the Republic of Ireland due to the consequences of the Troubles, and due to isolation and marginalization of communities in the Border region "resulting from severing of social and economic links" (*ibid.*, 19). Overall, Peace II received €531 million from the EU and €304 million from both the Irish and British governments (Buchanan 2008, 393).

The IFI was established in 1986 with a mandate to address "the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and to build reconciliation between people, and within and between communities in Ireland, North and South" (IFI n.d.a, 1). In subsequent years, the IFI has promoted economic and social development, and encouraged contact, dialogue and reconciliation between Nationalists and Unionists throughout NI with financial support from the U.S., the EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In its early years, the IFI concentrated on promoting economic revitalization and reconciliation mainly through supporting economic development projects. Moreover, the Troubles and the partition have led to alienation and "economic and cultural marginalization" of communities in the Border counties (*ibid.*, 5). Since 2006, the IFI has expanded its focus and is now addressing sectarianism and segregation, promoting the integration and reconciliation of society, and working towards a "shared future" for NI and the Border Counties (IFI n.d.b, 4-5). The objectives of the IFI funding for the period of 2006 to 2010 include:

- "helping to build and realize the vision of a shared future" for the communities in NI and Ireland;
- promoting understanding between communities in NI;
- working with communities suffering from economic and social deprivation;
- facilitating the integration of the two communities;
- "building strong strategic alliances with other agencies and bodies active on the ground, ensuring that efforts are complementary, sustainable and mutually reinforcing";
- "helping ensure the long term continuation of its work in NI beyond the

lifetime of the Fund"; and

- "sharing the expertise and learning acquired over twenty years with peacebuilders in other regions (IFI n.d.a., 6). By 2007 the total resources committed to IFI amounted to €845 million (IFI n.d.c, 3).

## 4. Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation through Economic and Social Development

External economic aid has the potential to bolster local economies during difficult post-agreement periods, as well as shape local political processes and policymaking. The political conditionality of external economic aid has been debated by scholars in the fields of international development (Uvin 2004, 56-82; Killick 2004; Lavenex 2008). For example, based on the Rwandan case study, Uvin (1998, 238) discusses the need for "positive conditionality, whereby aid resources are used to strengthen the social and political conditions for improved policies rather than to force governments to adopt such policies". In addition, Uvin (2004, 83) suggests the concept of "positive support", which is aimed at creating conditions for respecting human rights in countries affected by conflict, rather than forcing their governments to respect human rights. The peace projects supported by the Peace II and IFI funds have the potential to create favorable conditions for reconciliation and peacebuilding by encouraging economic and social development and cross-community contact. The fact that development projects can be initiated and designed by local communities is significant because efforts originating at the grassroots level are more likely to reflect the true needs and aspirations of the population. Thus, funding monies can effectively address the legacy of violence and ethnic division between the Unionist and Nationalist communities in NI[4].

Another dilemma with economic development assistance is the sustainability of foreign aid in post-agreement situations (NICRC 2008). While "in the immediate postconflict period international publicity and goodwill is considerable, and so donors are keen to be seen as involved", the gradual decline in aid and assistance follows within several years (Collier et al. 2003, 158). Short-term economic assistance towards rebuilding infrastructure or establishing cross-community projects may ease the strain on local economies and assist communities in transcending the hardships of post-agreement development. However, short-term programs will struggle to address the issues of chronic poverty, generational unemployment, and human suffering caused by the legacy of sectarianism and violence. Moreover, while external aid is critical for providing assistance and

resources in post-agreement contexts, the long-term sustainability of peace and the capacity for growth "hinges primarily on the ability of post-conflict societies to develop institutions for the delivery of public goods" (Elbadawi 2008, 5).

Foreign aid can assist social development and peacebuilding through funding cross-community cooperation projects which encourage building relationships, trust-building, as well as promoting participatory democracy (McCall & O'Dowd 2008). As Jeong (2005, 139) notes, "the participation of local populations in rebuilding their communities gives them a sense of regaining control over their own lives". The involvement of voluntary and community organizations in building peace and reconciliation is significant as it encourages "a culture of cooperation /…/ and a focus on positive-sum or mutual benefit outcomes" (O'Dowd & McCall 2008, 97).

The significance of civil society's peacebuilding initiatives has to be acknowledged, while an integrative framework and vision is needed for directing individual efforts towards overcoming sectarianism and promoting the integration of society. External support for transformative processes can encourage communities to address the legacy of the past and to transform the conflict. In particular, according to Buchanan (2008, 390), "in viewing conflict principally as the result of unequal and oppressive political and social structures, conflict transformation seeks constructive and sustainable social change". Bringing about such change is a complicated process which requires commitment, determination and the strong will of local communities, their government, and the international community. While the international community has the resources which can be invested towards conflict transformation in NI, a clearer and integrative framework for foreign economic assistance funding delivery would increase the effectiveness of such initiatives.

Peacebuilding projects aimed at the reduction of human suffering and the legacy of sectarianism are difficult to evaluate due to their expansive scope and intangible outcomes. While evaluation commonly serves as a guide to improvement, it is also significant in seeking objectivity, identifying and acknowledging the limits for the work performed, for forming appropriate and important questions, and the drawing of conclusions (Weiss 2004). Furthermore, evaluation theories and practices are dynamic and are constantly being tested and adjusted to reflect new developments, contexts, and perspectives (Preskill 2004, 344-345). Thus, evaluation design is constantly changing to reflect current requirements and to address the deep roots of conflict and the legacy of violence (Paffenholz & Rychler 2007, 8).

In Northern Ireland, evaluation of the impact of the Peace funds and the IFI has ended in mixed results. Local social partnership models were created including intermediary funding bodies (IFBs) such as the Community Foundation of Northern Ireland (CFNI) as well as a new delivery structure, the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUP) (European Union 2008). Independent monitoring and assessment by the EU Court of Auditors (2000, 11-12) found that the IFI's evaluation of project applications and post-grant monitoring of projects did not "ensure sound financial management in all cases".

## 4.1. Contribution of Monetary Aid to Economic and Human Development

One of the stated goals of both the Peace II and IFI funds has been the support for economic revival and development in NI and the Border Counties (International Fund for Ireland n.d.a, 6; European Commission n.d., 31). Economic revival is perceived as a basis for further development and the strengthening of communities that were in the past divided by sectarianism and violence. The contribution of Peace II and IFI to reviving local economies and encouraging cross-community cooperation through investing in infrastructure, trade, business operations, and in creating employment opportunities is significant. The respondents were often able to identify specific achievements in these areas at the local level (including road construction, housing, job training, providing training in specific skills, as well as new employment opportunities), but had difficulty assessing their overall impact on peacebuilding and reconciliation. A community leader from County Monaghan discussed the impact of peace funding in the following way:

> I still believe that the EU funding and the IFI have contributed enormously to improving the quality of life, the quality of infrastructure. I am talking about housing, roads and all the basic infrastructure, because there was a huge deficit at the level of basic infrastructure in the south particularly, and there was need for massive investment. (Respondent A).

The Peace II and IFI funds are perceived as improving the general standard of living and addressing the problems of economic deprivation and poverty in Unionist and Nationalist communities by investing in infrastructure, assisting community centers, and creating employment opportunities for participants. A community leader from Derry elaborated on this issue as follows:

> Look at the number of people, regardless of what impact a project has in itself, the number of people that are employed on Peace funded projects. It is a significant cash injection into community despite what it said about the application process. The Peace funds, I do

> think, have been fairly democratic in that people in all areas, and particularly in deprived areas, have been able to access Peace funded projects and work on Peace funded projects. So in terms of an economic boost, I think that definitely yes, in that sort of confidence-building notion of giving people the experience of working on projects (Respondent B).

Overall, many respondents identified various aspects of positive economic development made possible by the financial contributions of the IFI and Peace II funds. Other respondents, however, expressed doubt that economic aid which assists businesses and develops infrastructure actually contributes to building peaceful relations across NI's divided communities.

In terms of human development, the Peace II and IFI funds are aimed at contributing to social inclusion, integration, and reconciliation, addressing the local needs of communities, and encouraging dialogue and cross-border cooperation (IFI n.d.a, 6; European Commission n.d, 31-32). The respondents identified a number of ways that the funds have promoted and encouraged human development across communities in both NI and the Border region. These included community development, capacity building, empowerment, building confidence, and helping to cope with the legacy of violent protracted conflict. While the projects aimed at encouraging human development and community building may have had a strong impact on addressing the long-term divisions between the Unionist and Nationalist communities, the results of such projects are often difficult to quantify and evaluate in the short-term. However, it is crucial to recognize the significance of these projects in the overall framework of peacebuilding efforts.

In terms of capacity building and of assisting community members to acquire new economic skills and qualifications, the Peace II funded projects have contributed to both the economic and human development of members of the Unionist and Nationalist communities. There is an important link between personal growth and empowerment on the one hand and economic recovery and revival on the other hand. Moreover, the social interaction and dialogue encouraged between both communities through the process of establishing cross-community cooperation provides a connection between economic, social and personal capacity building processes. A comment of a community leader from County Fermanagh illustrated this connection:

> Some training programmes, of which we have a very good one for cross border lines persons / … /. So we put those together and young unemployed people equally from each sides of the community and equally north and south of the border, train them in teams of ten. They were all promised jobs before they started their training, so if you like there was a goal there, the goal of the EU money was to get people to interact with each other, the goal we had was

> to train young people for jobs that existed out there. So those two things worked very well together and there were very positive end results from it (Respondent W).

The projects that assist community members in gaining skills and qualifications enhance their employability and encourage them to get involved in economic activities which contribute to the growth of their communities. These programs are especially significant for former prisoners as well as the victims of violence. A community leader from Belfast, for example, reflected on the importance of personal capacity building as an indicator of success in evaluating funded peace projects:

> I think it's fair to say that we have done very well, and our projects, have done very well in getting qualifications. One of the measures that we use, for success alone is by no means the only measure, is the qualification. Even with what qualifications people have got. So you might have, maybe, one person with in some cases two qualifications. So there's a couple of thousand people and more who have got their first qualification ever possibly through the availability of the peace programme, and I think it's a very important contribution to economic development (Respondent F).

Empowering local communities and assisting people in identifying their needs as well as locating available resources is a significant part of human development initiatives. An important observation was voiced by one community group leader from County Cavan: "You couldn't know the needs of the people unless you ask the people themselves" (Respondent K). This reveals a larger general problem associated with the external funding of local projects aimed at promoting peaceful relations and reconciliation between conflicting communities. The funding often supports projects designed outside of the communities and with little knowledge of local conditions, needs, interests, and capacity.

Assisting local communities by providing them with information about existing funding opportunities is also a necessary, but often overlooked, task. A community group leader from County Monaghan shared his concern about the lack of guidance and support for funding applications:

> People didn't take up the funding for the reasons that they weren't at all prepared or enabled to take up the funding, because they had never been used to funding of that scale. They had never even been helped to identify what their needs were because the climate that I grew up in, and the climate that most of my people and my family and everybody else grew up in, there was nothing there. So there was no point in talking about funding and the expectation that was ground into us that if it was there this year it would not be there next year. So there was no trust, whatever, in any of the funding agencies or often in the funding personnel (Respondent A).

A number of community building initiatives were identified by the respondents as crucial in addressing hopelessness within marginalized communities including ex-prisoners and victims of conflict. Some respondents emphasized that there is a need for a better balance between addressing the social and economic needs of the communities. A community leader from Belfast pointed out that while the investments in infrastructure are considerable, "there's very little investment in people" (Respondent O).

One of the important contributions of funded peace projects is to assist the participants in building personal confidence, as well as taking responsibility and control within their sphere of influence. A community leader from Belfast highlighted this issue in her response:

> And also, the confidence /.../. Now people are more able to write, and the other thing that they have is a bit more confidence to be able to say it, and it doesn't really matter that I have spelt that word wrong. Whereas when you're in school or you're in formal education you don't have the confidence to say because the teacher's right and you would have been marked down as wrong. It's hard to measure that confidence building. It's a very important player in economic development too because you're not going to be able to think about going for a particular job, choosing a career, unless you have the confidence to actually see yourself doing that (Respondent F).

Her quote illustrates the difficulty in evaluating and assessing the results of many human development projects aimed at helping community members build relationships, engage in cross-community dialogue, and contribute to capacity building and empowerment.

Funded project personnel have accumulated knowledge and experience in peacebuilding and development initiatives that can be used throughout NI, the Border region, and other conflict-affected contexts around the world. Funding monies have contributed to the creation of a new expertise and the establishment of proven peacebuilding intervention models. A community leader from Belfast developed this point further:

> What we have learned here is readily exportable to other areas / ... /. We've had to do a lot of work in learning what it means in those areas and the benefit for us has been threefold: its been money, we have been able to pay for work, we have been able to do good work, and that's good in itself, our people have been able to learn about how to transfer knowledge, for a new context, about what it means to live in a racially divided society (Respondent E).

## 4.2. Addressing the Legacy of Sectarianism

The legacy of sectarianism is still visible in many areas of life in Northern Irish society including politics, education, religion and in everyday interactions (Hughes et al. 2008). In their interviews, community leaders revealed a number of important points concerning the role of external funding in addressing the legacy of sectarianism in NI and along the Border region.

While IFI and Peace II funding encourages the Unionist and Nationalist communities to come together and engage in dialogue, interaction, and cross-community cooperation, political and social division is still predominant in everyday life. One example of separation within Northern Irish society was provided by a community leader from Derry. She had this to say on the issue:

> I know there is still a feeling that Catholics within the civil service don't get to a certain level, but you will find that a lot of the senior posts, if you do an analysis of all the senior civil servants, they will be all still Protestant. And even thirty years ago before the Troubles, me sitting here as a Catholic would not have happened. When I joined here in 1984, the Principal was Protestant and the two vice-Principals were Protestant, and all the heads of Department were Protestant, there were no Catholics in senior posts. And that's with Derry being majority Catholic (Respondent C).

Several respondents expressed concern that the application process and the distribution of funding reflected sectarian traditions to a certain degree. For example, a community leader from Derry referred to "the equal 50/50 funding" in the following context:

> You have a community in the town which is made up of maximum three hundred people, men, women, and children, and you have a community in this area which is in the region of three thousand five hundred people. But if this community gets five hundred pounds, then this community gets five hundred pounds, now I think that is grossly unfair. I think funding should be distributed and based on need and I think that sort of, because you are a Protestant you get 500, because you are a Catholic you get 500 / … / and visa versa. That can create a new kind of sectarian text (Respondent U).

Other participants worried that by distributing funds between the Unionist and Nationalist communities, the members of both communities might become increasingly aware that they are indeed separated. In the words of a community leader from County Monaghan: "In some sense it reinforces people's identity / … / whether that is a good thing or a bad thing" (Respondent N). Another community leader from County Leitrim developed this point further having stated that the funds have occasionally reinforced sectarianism "because they are making labels" (Respondent T). The concern about labelling people through

funding distribution was also expressed in the comment of a community leader from County Cavan:

> If you go to something that is involved in peace /…/ you have to nearly specify you are Catholic. I mean there is sheets you have to specify how many Protestants and how many Catholics are on that /…/. If that is peace building or is actually highlighting the differences I just don't know, that is one of the questions I would wonder about. Some of the stuff and I don't know who draws up this, I wonder if they have really been developed by people who have lived in the areas or went through some of the stuff (Respondent P).

Despite the efforts of funding agencies to encourage cross-community dialogue and interaction and to promote reconciliation, the respondents noted the strong polarization within society which continues to be divisive in political, social, and economic life. While many communities no longer experience direct hostility or violence, the separation in everyday life is evident. A community leader from County Cavan elaborated as follows:

> I think it is that people just live separate lives, if you are a Protestant you go to your Protestant church, you go to your activity that you organise. Catholics stay in their Catholic schools, they go to their church, they have their own sports their Gaelic or whatever. I think it has always been that separation, and even in terms of relationships or marriage I still don't believe it's acceptable for cross religion marriages. I don't think it is something that would be encouraged (Respondent J).

Another community leader from County Cavan emphasized the influence of parents who have experienced conflict on their children's attitudes towards the communal division:

> You have chaps from down here who possibly have never set foot in the North in their life and probably have never gone further north than Enniskillen, and they are carrying this legacy of conflict in their mind and you are going, but you have never experienced conflict, your parents have experienced conflict, you have adopted somebody else's experience of conflict and you have taken it into yourself for whatever reason and then you are running with it (Respondent D).

A number of perceptions regarding the ability of funding to address the legacy of conflict were depicted in the interviews. Some progress was noted in bringing rival communities together and encouraging interaction through establishing cross-community projects and local peacebuilding initiatives. These projects facilitated increasing communication, interaction and understanding between Protestant and Catholic communities. Empowerment of members of both communities through building capacity, providing skills training, addressing the issues of poverty and hopelessness, and assistance in fulfilling their basic needs has also led to opening up opportunities for addressing the deeper issues of

sectarian legacy and protracted conflict in Northern Ireland. Cross-community initiatives have created space for dialogue and healing. At the same time concerns were raised among respondents with regards to the degree of success of these initiatives in addressing the root causes of the conflict and the underlying issues of division within NI and the Border area.

## 4.3. Peace Projects: Towards the Reduction of Human Suffering

Another important theme discussed by the respondents from various angles was the contribution of economic aid towards developing peace projects aimed at the reduction of human suffering experienced by the members of both communities. The community leaders referred to different sources of conflict causing suffering and hardships in both communities, including poverty, economic deprivation, unemployment, violence, fear, marginalization, alienation, social exclusion, and isolation. For example, a community leader from Belfast shared his perception of human suffering in terms of transgenerational unemployment and deprivation as follows:

> Grandfathers, fathers, sons have no employment, through various reasons, and the conflict being one of them. Looking at it we can then impact and stop that generational underachievement by getting people skills to help their children. It's not ideal, and we never set out that everybody should get a job at the end of it because they have a long way to go. We are talking about people who are at the margins of the margins (Respondent I).

The legacy of violence, racism, and fear, as well as the existing tensions between Unionists and Nationalists causes suffering in local populations. Human suffering is difficult to measure or estimate, but providing concrete examples of activities and initiatives that have contributed to alleviating suffering may be useful in the analysis of the effectiveness of peace projects. For example, a community leader from Belfast talked about the positive changes that he has experienced and witnessed in relation to the reduction of violence and fear within the city of Belfast and the surrounding communities:

> Yes, it has [reduced human suffering], particularly when you look around and there is not the same level of bombing and shooting and people are coming together and people are working together / … /. Working in town, I have seen the damage of bombs, the damage done in terms of people, and their fears of going into town, fear about their children going into town, and also the whole thing about security gates you had to go through and be searched, all of that is gone. Young people are able to go out much more into the city. I remember at one stage if I was going out on the weekend I would go to a hotel out in the country rather than go into the city of Belfast. That has all changed and some of the people of my age who have been through that can now see clearly the difference (Respondent G).

While the peace funding has created some opportunity for dialogue and cross-community trust building activities, some respondents also noted that the funding has once again reminded people of existing divisions between the Unionist and Nationalist communities. A community leader from Derry shared the following insight:

> I think they have also reminded us that there are community tensions, community differences, and separateness. So in a way I think, yes, they have improved the quality of life and reduced suffering. Yes, they have also re-entrenched the notion that we live in separate communities. There is a sense of apartheid, certainly even in this city, which probably isn't as pronounced as it would be in the likes of Belfast for example (Respondent H).

The issues of equality and justice, according to a community leader from Belfast, "lie at the heart of the conflict", and at the same time "lie at the heart of all peacebuilding" (Respondent L). The funding has offered a way to address inequality, hopelessness, and marginalization by providing resources, employment opportunities, and a chance to meet and get to know people from other communities. Moreover, as noted by another community leader from Belfast, the funds have contributed to easing the suffering "by supporting the key people who /…/ are able to articulate at their own level a vision of an inclusive society and imagine the idea of being together in a post-conflict Ireland" (Respondent M). Concerns were also expressed by some respondents who were sceptical about the possibility of reducing genuine suffering through funding assistance and also about the mechanism for measuring suffering and its reduction. In addition, a community group leader from County Cavan discussed the problem of human suffering that may not be evident at a first glance, but yet exists in forms of hidden suffering:

> I suppose I would see in these southern Border counties anyway, and even in the likes of Fermanagh or whatever I don't think you see the same level of suffering or violence or hatred that you would see in the likes of Belfast or Derry, but I think it is still there. I think it is more hidden and it is harder to get at. It is easier to get people who are throwing stones at each other out in the street, than to get this more hidden kind of hatred that definitely does exist (Respondent J).

Overall, the respondents revealed that the human suffering of members of both Unionist and Nationalist communities in NI and in the Border region takes many forms and reflect the existing legacy of sectarianism, marginalization, poverty, and social exclusion within both communities.

## 4.4. Creativity in Peacebuilding

There is no universal set of tools or methods to be used for building peace in societies affected by protracted conflict. While some of the more commonly used strategies include the provision of foreign economic aid to assist in post-agreement economic development, there is also a wide range of peacebuilding opportunities which often lie outside the conventional framework of economic aid. The funded projects that contribute to cross-community interaction and building relationships through dialogue, music, art, storytelling or sports are only a few of the examples of interventions that, in some cases, may be more effective in addressing the legacy of sectarianism and in promoting reconciliation among both communities.

Storytelling projects, according to a community leader from Derry, can be a "very powerful mechanism [which] has a potential for healing way beyond any other process that we know" (Respondent S). He referred to the work of Dan Bar-On who brought together family members of Holocaust survivors and the family members of Nazi perpetrators in Berlin to talk about the past through sharing their stories, and explained how Dr. Bar-On's storytelling model was adopted in Northern Ireland:

> We have run that for several years now, [the project] in which people are sitting and listening to each other's story with respect / … / you don't make any insistence on reconciliation or forgiveness or any of that stuff. There is the basic ground rule of listening to each other with respect / … / and it's an extraordinary process of healing, absolutely extraordinary, and most recently we have people forming groups, from policemen, disabled police officers, paramilitaries, victims to survivors, all sorts of people / … / That's one of the projects we didn't get continuation for, because, do you know why, because it isn't cost effective, didn't get the number through. So you can see how this relates directly back to my earlier frustration. There is the clearest example of where I think funders do not know what they are doing at times (Respondent S).

Music therapy is another creative and fun way to address the difficult problems associated with social isolation and marginalization. For example, a community leader from Belfast shared her experience and vision in easing tension through music:

> It's a fun activity for most children. Particularly when you have adolescents, music is such a vital part of who you are, how you wish to express, how you are feeling. We all use music in that way, to comfort us or to lift us. And most of those types of skills are to appreciate the music around when you are either a child or an adolescent, otherwise people never get to grips with music and their lives. So from that point of view, yes, it's been a big move to alleviating suffering at that level / … / Music therapy is not widely recognised / … / it's largely charitably provided,

> so for an organisation like ourselves to break through into that type of funding scenario and be recognised as one of the therapeutic interventions that can actually help reduce feelings of frustrations or isolation or inappropriate behaviour or whatever in young children and therefore, to help manage that in some way, to me has to be a recognition (Respondent R).

Another intervention supported by the EU and IFI funding assisted members of both Unionist and Nationalist communities to face the legacy of the past through photography. A community group leader from County Cavan shared the following in his story:

> We have had a new county library in Cavan town / … / and one room in it is worth visiting, it is a photographic exhibition from the Troubles. It is absolutely cross-community. So it is on the one hand, a photograph telling you to get rid of or slay all the Unionists and on the other side then shoot all the Shinners, the Sinn Fein. So you have all types of depictions, and it is fantastic. It was the one room on the day of the opening that everybody wanted to visit, and I would say most people did visit before they left. That is creating this understanding of both sides of the traditions and somebody coming to look at this and saying there were rights and wrongs on both sides (Respondent Q).

These examples reveal the potential for creative peacebuilding initiatives to provide a unique opportunity for members of both communities – women, men, children, younger generation and senior citizens – to meet, to learn about each other, to hear the stories of each other, and start the journey of healing through stories, music, and learning from historical photographs. These initiatives do not require substantial resources or significant economic investments. However, they do require commitment, the willingness to participate and learn, and the desire to make an effort towards reconciliation and healing through sharing experience, knowledge, and perceptions of the conflict, as well as developing a shared vision for the future.

## 5. Discussion: Economic Aid and Conflict Transformation

The goal of the IFI's Community Bridges Programme is to tackle the underlying structural roots of conflict that promote sectarianism and violence, and to build reconciliation between both communities on the island. Peace I sought to integrate the unemployed in regions suffering from chronic long-term unemployment, Peace II focused on economic development, and Peace III has supported local residents, volunteers and community groups in their peacebuilding and reconciliation work with polarized communities. The aim of both funders is to encourage economic renewal, cross-border cooperation, social

integration to encourage a peaceful and stable society and promote reconciliation in the region. While the programs are relatively successful the competitive nature of the funding has in some cases promoted competition between both communities and encouraged single identity projects (Byrne & Irvin 2002). Consequently, the IFI and Peace II funds have contributed to the peacebuilding process in NI and the Border region in terms of economic, social, and human development. The economic and social impact of external funding included, but was not limited to, the development of infrastructure, the creation of job opportunities, the encouragement of community development, and assistance for cross-community contact and cooperation. In terms of human development the EU Peace II fund and IFI contributed to capacity building, empowerment, and building confidence among the members of the Unionist and Nationalist communities. In this context the significance of peacebuilding projects was reflected both through their economic development assistance component and through their contribution to reconciliation and conflict transformation. A number of projects focused primarily on economic development and addressed unemployment. However as the projects progressed, cross-community cooperation in the framework of many of them also contributed to mutual dialogue, interaction and relationship-building which has a potential to help build trust that is one of the critical initial steps for working towards reconciliation. Therefore, both the economic development component and the reconciliation component can be considered as complementary rather than competitive elements of these peacebuilding initiatives.

Many respondents stressed the need to focus on the issues of reconciliation and relationship-building among Protestant and Catholic communities within the peacebuilding efforts in Northern Ireland. In this context external financial assistance has the potential not only to contribute to economic development of communities but also to focus their efforts on deeper roots of conflict by helping to bring about reconciliation among community members. The present emphasis of Peace III (Special EU Programmes Body n.d.) on reconciliation and promoting cohesion between communities in Northern Ireland is a promising tendency within the peacebuilding and reconciliation process in Northern Ireland.

While the economic and social impacts of the funding may be more tangible and measurable, the human development component is often intangible and requires special mechanisms to be recognized and assessed. At the same time, economic, social, and human development initiatives are closely linked together in the efforts to build peace, and, perhaps, should be assessed as one holistic component. For example, acquiring skills and qualifications in

the framework of a cross-community training project incorporates all three dimensions of development: individual human growth, social interaction, and building up economic capacity. In particular, cross-border training programs in various fields, from computer skills workshops, to childcare provider classes, to tourism operator and guides training, etc., have contributed not only to participants' personal skills development and increased their employability, but also empowered them by providing the space for networking and building relationships by learning together with the members of the other communities, both Protestant and Catholic. This is reflected in the comment of a community leader from County Cavan: "People come together particularly in rural tourism, they develop linkages thereafter training programmes, and a lot of time would be put into social networking, and become familiar with other providers. The idea that they can do better if they work better together, that develops relationships through business linkages" (Respondent V).

Concerns with project evaluation and the assessment of funding results and success were voiced by a number of community leaders and project administrators. Several specific flaws in the funding process were also identified by the respondents. For example, a number of participants from both Catholic and Protestant communities talked about unfair money distribution process – i.e., allocating funds based on the size of communities and the amount of already available infrastructure, as opposed to doing so according to the needs of communities. The issue of insufficient knowledge of local circumstances and community needs by the funding agencies was also raised. Furthermore, it was noted that little or no work has been done to prepare communities for the application process and to assist them to go through the required bureaucratic procedures; sometimes the deserving communities simply didn't know they were eligible to apply for funds. A concern about sustainability of funding and the long-term commitment to supporting local and cross-community initiatives was also voiced.

At the same time, the means of evaluating the extent to which the projects achieved reconciliation or contributed to peacebuilding presented a challenge to many respondents. Further, it was often easier to assess the results of economic development projects (tangible outcomes), as opposed to projects aimed at human development, community building, or reducing human suffering (intangible outcomes). According to the report on monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding activities prepared for the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPS), "developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across peacebuilding and reconciliation interventions" (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007, vi). A lack of a clear integrative framework for

evaluating various components of the peacebuilding process was also noted by several respondents. Developing this point further, Buchanan (2008, 388) writes that "one of the major weaknesses of the Peace programmes is that there has been no comprehensive evaluation of their performance from the outset, stemming in part from the absence of single overreaching government policy statements (Irish or British) relating to conflict transformation policy and practice". One of the efforts to address this issue was the task given by the SEUPS to PricewaterhouseCoopers to research and develop a generic monitoring and evaluation framework for interventions aimed at conflict resolution, reconciliation, and peace-building (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007).

Lederach (1997, 130-132) outlines three dilemmas in peacebuilding funding and evaluation, which are relevant to assessing the impacts of projects funded by the IFI and Peace II fund. First, the project dilemma reveals the contradiction between projects as concrete measurable units on the one hand and a deep-rooted process of building peace, relationships, and trust on the other hand. Second, the time dilemma recognizes that projects are time-bound versus lengthy, complex, and dynamic processes. Third, the reporting dilemma addresses the need to find the balance between sensitive, delicate, and often confidential projects versus the need for transparency and accountability in reporting. Theory-driven evaluation suggests the construction of a comprehensive program which directs the evaluation process (Weiss 2004; Chen 2004). To this end, Wilmot and Hocker (2007, 83) propose an evaluation strategy based on identifying prospective, transactive, and retrospective goals in the conflict transformation process; these goals change as conflict evolves and as more knowledge and information is accumulated.

The complexity in the evaluation of economic aid initiatives may cause the untimely termination of important projects that could have a strong but not clearly evident potential in contributing to the resolution of conflict and in establishing peace. It is also important to develop best practices and proven models in order to design more effective and efficient approaches to conflict resolution processes which might be modified and exported to suit the needs of other cross-cultural contexts.

When assessing the contribution of funded projects to human development and economic growth in NI and the Border Counties, many of the respondents shared that the key difficulties were associated with quantifying results and achievements, the long-term requirement for achieving sustainable results, and the inability to recognize the small but crucial steps that the project participants made towards peace and reconciliation. The research on a variety of evaluation

strategies and techniques for monitoring peacebuilding projects conducted within the framework of SEUPS has resulted in a recommendation to use the so-called Aid for Peace approach to evaluation and monitoring (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007, xvi). The Aid for Peace approach is based on assessing the needs for peacebuilding and then designing the intervention according to these needs. The four main stages of this approach include peacebuilding needs analysis, peacebuilding relevance assessment, conflict risk assessment, as well as peace and conflict effects assessment (*ibid.*, x-xi).

The IFI and EU Peace II fund have also contributed to creating an exportable model of peacebuilding intervention that involves grassroots initiatives by members of both Unionist and Nationalist communities, as well as cross-community interaction. Referring to the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in NI, Racioppi and O'Sullivan See (2007, 383) also note that the development of partnerships between elected officials, representatives of trade unions, business, agriculture, and other community members, has been a "pioneering approach to broadening input into decision-making processes", and that the funding has encouraged widespread grassroots participation in peacebuilding. Other development and aid programs will also benefit from a wider dissemination of evidence and evaluation results from previously delivered funded projects, since sharing accumulated knowledge can increase the effectiveness of future initiatives (Killick 2004, 26).

The problem of the legacy of sectarianism was discussed by many community leaders, who emphasized the need to address the root causes of the division between Unionist and Nationalist communities, which are still reflected in the everyday separation of civil activities. However, according to several community leaders, the funding process has also contributed to labeling and reinforcing identity divisions. While the peace funding has encouraged cross-community dialogue and interaction, it has made people more aware of the fact that they are indeed on one or the other side in the conflict. According to Anderson (1999, 69), "international assistance can make conflict worse in two ways: it can feed intergroup tensions and weaken intergroup connections. When aid has either of these impacts, it inadvertently exacerbates conflict."

The tensions over the agendas of justice and equality on the one hand and the politics of cultural and identity recognition on the other hand were discussed by the respondents in their comments regarding the structure and the process of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. These tensions are also reflected in the debate by Fraser and Honneth (2003) on the significance and the dilemma of the politics of recognition vs. the politics of redistribution: while these two political

approaches often contradict each other, the concepts of cultural recognition and economic redistribution are both significant and are interrelated. In particular in the context of justice, Fraser (2008, 404) writes that "justice is better viewed as a multidimensional concept that encompasses the three dimensions of redistribution, recognition and representation". This conceptualization of justice, and injustice, is further advanced by the necessity to include a political dimension, and specifically the power of the state, in the analysis (Feldman 2002). It is important to consider these issues in the framework of designing and funding peacebuilding initiatives.

The interviews revealed some differences in the ways Catholic and Protestant respondents perceived the process of funding distribution for peacebuilding projects across Northern Ireland and the Border region. In particular, both groups expressed concern regarding the fairness of some aspects of the funding process and a number of respondents claimed that the other group or community has received more funds or received funds faster or easier. A number of Catholic respondents blamed this on Protestant political and civil service leadership. Several Protestant respondents shared that the possible reason is in the fact that Catholics were more organized in applying for funding, while Protestants are generally more independent and in the words of a community leader from County Cavan tend to be "reluctant to seek outside aid and funding and support" (Respondent P).

Further variations included perceptions about purely economic and softer types of peacebuilding projects: generally the respondents saw more visible immediate effect of peace funding on economic and infrastructure development rather than in the area of cross-border relationship building and reconciliation. It was noted that the contributions of softer projects to peacebuilding were harder to point out and estimate. In addition to that, variations expressed by respondents in the Border areas and in the North indicated that generally the levels of violence and the intensity of conflict were perceived to be higher in Belfast and Derry than in the Border area.

The protracted conflict in NI has led to human suffering through social exclusion, alienation, estrangement, poverty, unemployment, despair, mistrust, marginalization, as well as the legacy of violence and fear. Furthermore, according to Racioppi and O'Sullivan See (2007, 384), "despite a significant reduction in major political violence such as bombings and assassinations, neighborhoods, particularly in ethnic interface areas, continue to be unsafe, with knee-cappings, beatings, and drug-related violence running high". The conflict has caused significant suffering for innocent civilians. Jeong (2005, 160) points out that

"atrocities of violent conflict are mostly inflicted upon civilians, many of whom are females and children / … / as these civilian victims suffer great mental distress and lose their capacity for social trust, rehabilitation is necessary to reintegrate them back into their communities". Reconciliation between former combatants and the victims and survivors of violent conflict is encouraged through arranging opportunities for interaction, dialogue, and collaboration (De Vries & De Paor 2005). However, "both the political and social marginalization of former combatants is problematic to the implementation of peace processes" (Mitchell 2008, 16). Funding cross-community cooperation provides a space for dialogue which can lead to the healing of both communities.

It is also important to deal with the so-called hidden suffering, which is especially complex and difficult to recognize and address. Hidden suffering refers to pain and misery of individuals and communities in Northern Ireland which was caused by the protracted conflict but which is not generally talked about; often it cannot be easily identified or named and sometimes it is openly denied. For example, these are the feelings of fear, hopelessness, hatred, and isolation that are hidden deep inside people's hearts. As a community leader from County Cavan noted, "it is easier to get people who are throwing stones at each other in the street, than to get this more hidden kind of hatred that definitely does exist" (Respondent J). The work of Galtung (1996, 2) on structural (indirect) violence which takes the form of deprivation of material and non-material human needs, denial of human freedoms and alienation that is built into social, economic and political structures provides the framework for understanding and addressing the hidden suffering of individuals and communities.

Over the past decades considerable knowledge of practice on external economic assistance to countries and regions affected by protracted conflict and violence has been accumulated, but it may be argued that best practices standards in this field are still under construction. The contribution of this research to developing best practices in external economic assistance to peacebuilding initiatives has been three-fold. First, it showed the significance of supporting both local economic and human development cross-community projects. The importance of developing infrastructure along with investing in capacity-building, community development and empowerment through learning new skills and promoting personal growth was emphasized. Facilitating interaction and cooperation at the grassroots level can lead to building relationships, trust and more understanding between conflicting groups through sharing their views on conflict, learning from each other's stories and interacting on every day matters (Byrne et al. 2009). This, in turn, can open up space for addressing the deep rooted sectarian division in Northern Irish society.

Second, the issues and problems arising from the evaluation of the process of funding peacebuilding initiatives discussed in the paper highlight both the complexity and the importance of a comprehensive evaluation of these activities. Specifically, such aspects as the relevance of the project to addressing the needs of a particular group or community, developing criteria for assessing both tangible and intangible outcomes of peacebuilding projects, and recognition of small but crucial contributions of local initiatives need to be reflected in the evaluation process.

Finally, creativity in designing community projects and initiatives is identified as one of the significant factors in the post-accord peacebuilding process. Creativity in peacebuilding can be incorporated and expressed in diverse ways. For example, participants described innovative approaches to building peace (e.g. art, music, theater), gave existing approaches a creative twist (e.g. narrative mediation),[5] or combined different approaches and applied them across community divisions (e.g. police diversity training initiatives). Galtung (2004, 160) emphasizes the values of creativity, empathy, and non-violence in working towards conflict transformation. There is a need for recognition and the support of creativity in conflict resolution and post-agreement peacebuilding interventions (Senehi 2009a). By using available funding creatively, it may be possible to not only cut the costs of interventions, but more importantly, to provide alternative tools and resources for reconciliation and the promotion of cross-community contact and dialogue. For example, both communities can tell their stories through art, voice, and music, which may assist communities in accepting that "there were rights and wrongs on both sides", and to move towards seeking processes and strategies of reconciliation and develop a joint vision for a common future (Ryan 2007, 138; Senehi 2009b).

## 6. Conclusion

Building the peace dividend in a country affected by protracted conflict is a task that is difficult to design, carry out, and evaluate, because so many aspects of the conflict are crucial and often intangible. It is important to nurture economic development and growth at both the national and local levels, as well as encourage and support human development and social interaction. Building relationships and trust amongst people is central to reconciliation and peacebuilding. However, the effectiveness of these processes depends on a number of interconnected aspects. These include a comprehensive intervention design conducted in partnership with local communities, national and local

governments, as well as peace researchers and practitioners who have knowledge, experience and understanding of the needs, priorities, and goals of local communities. There is also a need to create an integrative process to analyze and evaluate the role of external funding in peacebuilding and development. Such a process would be based on the assessment of the needs of local communities and available resources, the incorporation of the creativity, and leaving space for adjustments and improvements in the process of conflict transformation.

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[1] See also Lederach (2003).

[2] The term 'Troubles' refers to the period of a violent ethno-political conflict between Protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist communities in Northern Ireland generally dated 1960s-1998. For a detailed review and analysis of the Troubles see Coogan (1996), Bew & Gillesprie (1999).

[3] The term 'Taoiseach' refers to the head of government or the Prime Minister of Ireland.

[4] For discussion of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives in Northern Ireland see Byrne (2001), Hughes & Knox (1997).

[5] For discussion of the method of narrative mediation see Winslade & Monk (2000).

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# Guidelines for contributors

## General

The editorial board of **Treatises and Documents**, **The Journal of Ethnic Studies** welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so- called Alpine-Adriatic-Panonnian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Panonnian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases.

Three issues of the journal are published every year, usually in April, September and December.

Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere.

The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English.

Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include:

- the submitted article, with the title in the language of the article and in English;

- an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should include a brief presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions;
- 3 – 7 key words the language of the article and in English.

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


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