39 Sodobni vojaški izzivi, november 2013 – 15/št. 3
Contemporary Military Challenges, November 2013 – 15/No. 3
VARNOSTNI	IZZIVI	V	JUGOVZHODNI	EVROPI
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
Anton Bebler
SECURITY	CHALLENGES	IN	SOUTH	EASTERN
EUROPE
Namen tega članka je opredeliti glavne varnostne izzive v Jugovzhodni Evropi. 
Mešanica izzivov se je od konca hladne vojne in vojn v nekdanji Jugoslaviji korenito 
spremenila v korist nevojaških groženj. Zdi se, da se je izteklo obdobje verskih in 
ideoloških vojn ter preoblikovanja državnih mej na Zahodnem Balkanu. Mir v regiji, 
ki je bil zagotovljen od zunaj, sta podprla dva mednarodna protektorata. Zatiranje 
oboroženega nasilja se ni odrazilo v dolgoročni stabilnosti, saj se na Balkanu znotraj 
skupnosti še vedno razraščajo nacionalizem, nestrpnost in sovraštvo. Kljub precej 
izboljšanim meddržavnim odnosom možnosti za medetnične konflikte in nadaljnjo 
drobitev v nekdanji Jugoslaviji še niso v celoti izčrpane. Med najočitnejše nevojaške 
grožnje spadajo organizirani kriminal, korupcija, naravne in ekološke nesreče, 
podnebne spremembe in šibka varnost preskrbe z energijo. Vključitev celotne 
Jugovzhodne Evrope v evro-atlantske povezave je pri tem najboljša obljuba, zato 
obstaja pričakovanje, da bo Jugovzhodna Evropa sčasoma postala regija demokraci-
je, blaginje in stabilnosti.
Regionalna varnost, Jugovzhodna Evropa, Balkan, vojaške in nevojaške grožnje.
The purpose of this article is to identify the principal security challenges in South 
Eastern Europe. The mix of challenges has changed radically since the end of the 
Cold War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in favour of non-military threats. 
The era of wars of religion, ideology and redrawing of state borders in the Western 
Balkans seems to be over. The tranquillity in the region, imposed from the outside 
has been buttressed by two international protectorates. The suppression of armed 
violence did not add up to long-term stability as the underbrush of nationalism, in-
tolerance and inter-communal hatred still survives in the Balkans. The potential for 
interethnic conflicts and for further fragmentation in the former Yugoslavia has not 
DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.15.3.3
40 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Anton Bebler
Key words
Introduction
yet been fully exhausted in spite of much improved interstate relations. Prominent 
among the non-military threats to security are organized crime, corruption, natural 
and ecological disasters, climate change and weak energy security. The inclusion 
of the entire South Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures offers the best 
promise. There are thus good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the 
South Eastern Europe will eventually become a region of democracy, prosperity and 
stability.
Regional security, South Eastern Europe, Balkans, military and non-military 
threats.
During the two last decades, parts of Southern Europe have prominently figured as 
the most turbulent on our continent and a notable source of insecurity spilling over to 
other parts of Europe. On the other hand, regional security in South Eastern Europe1 
(SEE) has been tangibly influenced by geopolitical developments in the wider Euro-
Atlantic area. The shifts in power relations among major extra-regional powers have 
impacted on the (in)balance between conflict and cooperation within in the region. 
Since the end of the “Cold War” and the wars in the Western Balkans, the chief 
sources of insecurity in SEE have evolved considerably. In the new mix, non-military 
challenges have in the last decade gained primacy over military ones. The question 
is whether the overall evolution of regional security could be positively assessed in 
spite the still present non-negligible intraregional conflict potential.
1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
SEE overlaps partly with the regions of Eastern Mediterranean, Central Eastern 
Europe and the Black Sea. The central part of SEE – the Balkans has contained 
a unique and the most heterogonous mixture of peoples and ethnic minorities in 
Europe (culturally, linguistically and religion-wise per square mile) (Johnsen, 1995, 
pp. 9-60). Consequently SEE has never become a coherent region in cultural, political 
and economic senses having clearly lacked its own center of gravity. The high sen-
sitivity of its elites to external influences and to the shifts in relations among major 
extra-regional powers stands out as the second salient feature of SEE as region. In 
these respects, SEE has differed very appreciably from other European regions, par-
ticularly Scandinavia. Not incidentally, the geopolitical fault line stretching from 
SEE eastward, all the way to the Pacific, was branded by Z. Brzezinski the “Eurasian 
Balkans” (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 7-25, 29-45, 99-108).
The geopolitical instability in SEE has had deep historical roots. The Balkans has 
long merited the distinction as the most volatile part of the European continent. 
Throughout the 19th and 20th century, wider social upheavals and wars between 
1 For the purpose of this article South Eastern Europe encompanies the countries between Slovenia in the 
Northwest, Moldova in the Northeast and Greece and Cyprus in the South.
 41 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
continental powers stimulated or provoked in the Balkans local, rebellions, revo-
lutions, coup d’états, state breakdowns, warfare within the region, terrorism and 
other forms of violence. The latest bouts of armed violence and wars in the Balkans 
took place in 1991 – 1995 and in 1998-2003 (Blank, 1995). The former upsurge 
was largely triggered by otherwise positive developments in the Euro-Atlantic area – 
the end of the “Cold War”, the breakdown of Eastern European and of the Soviet 
communist regimes, the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the ensuing transition 
towards democratic political systems and market economies. 
Social instability, economic difficulties and political unrest have very significantly 
contributed to an explosion of interethnic conflicts. Their severity has been further 
magnified by modern mass media and often exploited by ruthless politicians. Political 
instability accompanied by violence has led since the 1970’s to the fragmentation of 
Cyprus, Moldova, two Yugoslavias (SFRY, FRY) and subsequently three ex-Yugo-
slav republics. The process of “balkanization” doubled the total number of de facto 
existing states in SEE from eight to sixteen. The Balkan wars produced up to 130 
thousand estimated deaths, with the most tragic results in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
with about 100 thousand deaths, in Croatia and in Kosovo. In addition, they created 
two to three million refugees and displaced persons. The wars also left thousands 
illegal cashes of small arms and ammunition which have supplied the black market 
controlled by organized crime. By rough estimates, the wars has left at least a million 
planted anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines. Although de-mining activities, 
supported financially by the USA and several EU members, have been quite suc-
cessful there are still several hundred planted mines in several areas of B & H and 
Croatia. There are also thousands of dangerous remains of cluster bombs in rural 
Serbia, the results of NATO bombing in 1999 (ITF Annual Report 2012, p. 49, 63).
SEE has won the distinction of the only region in Europe which has been the theatre 
of several UN peace-keeping missions and of the first NATO’s “out-of-area” military 
intervention. In 1995, following unsuccessful attempts by UN, CSCE/OSCE and 
EEC/EU (Burg, 1995, pp. 47-86) and only after considerable hesitation a USA-led 
coalition of Western powers decided to impose peace on the Western Balkans by 
force. The end of armed hostilities was finally achieved in 2003 in Croatia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
The consequences of political fragmentation and armed conflicts in the Western 
Balkans had caused huge dislocation and losses in the region’s countries, their human 
capital, industrial and agriculture production and infrastructure (Altmann, 2004, pp. 
69-84). In some parts of the Western Balkans, war losses, the breakdown of previ-
ously integrated transportation and energy systems, economic fragmentation and the 
loss of export markets had reduced the region’s combined GNP to the pre-1990 level. 
The very unevenly distributed damage has greatly increased the intraregional differ-
entials in GNP p. c. (Batt, 2004, pp. 7-19) and in the levels of unemployment. In the 
poorest SEE states, the latter have become the highest on the continent. The Balkan 
wars had led to a big increase in the governments’ sponsored or tolerated trafficking 
42 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
in war materials. The wars also contributed to a spill-over of organized crime into 
Western Europe. High unemployment and poverty in parts of the region have stimu-
lated corruption, organized crime, illegal migration and numerous kinds of illegal 
trafficking, particularly in narcotics and small arms.
The tectonic geopolitical shifts in the early 1990s and the crisis of neutralism and non-
alignment led to a radical political and military realignment in SEE. With the greatly 
reduced Soviet/Russian influence practically the entire region has become political-
ly and economically oriented towards the West. The end of the NATO/Warsaw pact 
confrontation and the lack of large-scale mineral, energy or other natural resources 
led to a very considerable decline of the region’s geopolitical importance. SEE has 
ceased to be an object of overt contests for political and military domination by su-
perpowers. The region has gained instead the international notoriety as a source of 
troubles and a costly nuisance. 
According to the statistics on armed conflicts around the world, recently compiled 
by the Uppsala Peace and Conflict Research Project (Harbom, 2009, pp. 577-580), 
among all continents Europe has experienced the deepest drop since the last peak in 
the early 1990s. The real value of this positive finding should however not be over-
estimated. Similarly as elsewhere, although less intensively than in Asia and Africa, 
a considerable conflict potential still remains on or close to our continent. This is par-
ticularly true of South Eastern Europe and also and more so of the adjacent regions in 
the Mediterranean, Northern and Southern Caucasus and in the Near East. In addition 
to power politics, unresolved interstate territorial and political disputes, domestic re-
ligiously-coloured extremism, competition for energy, water and other scarce natural 
resources, external meddling etc. the conflict potential in Europe’s Southern neigh-
bourhood has been enhanced by several aspects of globalization, including its mass 
information effects, and by, in the long-run the inevitable progress of individual 
and collective emancipation which internally destabilize established authoritarian 
political orders, particularly in multinational and multiconfessional societies.
2 THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION
The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability in the 
Balkans, as has been manifested since 2001 by the local outbursts of violence in 
Kosovo, Serbia, on the Kosovo-Serbia border, in Macedonia and by the paralyzed 
central government in Bosnia & Herzegovina.
The “European Security Strategy”, adopted by the European Council in 2003, posited 
as the main global threats to the EU members: the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, failed states, terrorism and organized crime, cyber security, energy 
security and climate change (Vasconcelos, ed., 2009, pp. 38-41, 64-67). Other EU 
documents mention also as real or potential problems the unresolved conflicts among 
and within neighbouring states and securing the EU external borders. The actual 
situation in SEE and even more so the public perception of security threats differ 
Anton Bebler
43 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
substantially from these official EU assessments. Respondents in public opinion 
surveys in most European states have been generally more concerned with other 
aspects of human insecurity, such as unemployment, crime, drug abuse, corruption, 
environmental damage, natural disasters (floods, fires) traffic accidents etc. than with 
the threats highlighted in the official EU and NATO documents (SJM, 2009, p. 494, 
2012, table V7).
Once imposed from outside the tranquillity in the region has been buttressed in the 
Western Balkans by two international protectorates - in B & H and Kosovo. In B & 
H, the NATO-led SFOR has been replaced by the much smaller EUFOR, supported 
by a small NATO special unit and rapid intervention capability. In Kosovo, NATO 
maintains also about 6,000 military personnel in the multinational KFOR, while EU 
runs the 2,300-strong mission EULEX which include international police, prosecu-
tors, prison officials, administrative overseers etc. Since 1975 the line of demarca-
tion between two parts of Cyprus has been guarded by the UN peacekeeping mission 
UNFICYP, today with about 600 soldiers. Two decades since a local mini-war 
caused by the secession of Transnistria, there are today about 1,500 Russian military 
personnel, among them 335 “peace-keepers” in Moldova (Military Balance, 2013, 
pp. 103, 203). 
Although much less intense than during the Cold War, the rivalry between USA and 
the Russian Federation for the influence in SEE has been revived. The Russians have 
since been using energy exports and sizeable parastate investments as their main 
tools, particularly in the energy sectors in Serbia and the Republic Srpska in B & H as 
well as in industry and real estate in Montenegro. A brigade-size military outpost in 
Moldova, a large naval and air base on the Ukrainian territory in Crimea, the Russian 
Navy in the Black Sea and a rotating squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean mark the 
decreased Russian military muscle in SEE and its immediate vicinity, compared with 
the Soviet pre-1991 levels. There are also some US and Russian operational tactical 
nuclear weapons still present in or close to SEE. The US military presence in SEE 
has, on the other hand, moderately increased largely due to the volatility in the Near- 
and Middle East. In addition to the USN Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the US 
Air Force’s presence in Italy, Greece and Turkey USA has built up a substantial land 
base Bondsteel in Kosovo and acquired the rights to use military training and transit 
facilities in Romania and Bulgaria. In July 2011 USA concluded an agreement with 
Romania on placing on its territory a battery of antiballistic missiles. These activities 
presage SEE’s future role in the declared US and NATO’s Theatre Missile Defence 
against potential threats from Iran (while the Russians view this development very 
differently and as a threat to them). 
One important aspect of security in SEE since the end of the “Cold War” has been 
a very considerable change in the levels of defence spending, military manpower, 
stocks of conventional weapons, arms production and exports. These movements 
were reflected in the holdings of heavy conventional weapons prior, soon after and in 
2011 the incomplete implementation of the CFE Treaty due to disagreements between 
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
44 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
NATO and the Russian Federation (see Table 1). The table shows that the former 
Communist-ruled states drastically reduced their defence outlays, both for political 
and economic reasons. This applies not only to the two former WTO members 
(Romania and Bulgaria) but also to the former non-WTO states not included into 
CFE- to Albania and to seven ex-Yugoslav states. The present levels in the latter are 
as follows (see Table 2). 
Tanks Artillery Aircraft
Romania 2,960 1,375 437 3,928 1,475 899 505 430 69
Bulgaria 2,209 1,475 80 2,085 1,750 311 335 234 42
Greece 2,276 1,735 1,462 2,149 1,878 3,353 458 650 282
Turkey 3,234 2,795 2,494 3,210 3,529 7,807+ 355 750 354
Source: The Military Balance 2013, 2013. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
pp. 118-119, 141-142, 168-169, 183-185. Goldblat, J., 1994. Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and 
Agreements. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute: London: Thousand Oaks: New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
pp. 176-177.
Active Reserve MBTs
Serbia 28,150 50,150 212
Croatia 18,600 21,000 72
Bosnia & Herzegovina 10,550 - 316
Slovenia 7,600 1,700 45
Macedonia 8,000 4,850 31
Montenegro 2,080 - -
Kosovo 2,500 800 -
Total 78,445 78,521 883
Source: The Military Balance 2013, 2013. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
pp. 117, 120, 154-155, 157, 170, 173.
In the group of ex-Yugoslav states most reductions took place after the termination of 
Balkan wars. The drawdown produced much lower totals of military manpower and 
heavy conventional weapons compared with those in the 1980s in the defunct SFRY. 
Table	1
Table	2
Anton Bebler
45 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Active armed forces have been roughly reduced by half, while those of the reserves 
and heavy conventional weapons by, at least, two thirds. On the other hand, the 
two older NATO members (Turkey and Greece) have continued with high defence 
spending inter alia due to the unresolved disputes over Cyprus and the airspace 
over the Aegean Sea. This policy in Greece has contributed significantly to its near 
bankruptcy. 
Another aspect of regional security has been related to the existing nuclear installa-
tions. There are today only five operating nuclear power stations in the region and 
a small number of nuclear research reactors. Although all SEE states adhere to the 
NPT regime, the problem of nuclear safety (including the disposal of nuclear waste) 
however exits. Its acuteness has been reduced by the shutting down, under the EU 
pressure of four out of six older Soviet-built reactors at Kozluduy in Bulgaria. 
There are in the region three de facto existing states whose legal status has been 
contested – the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Republic of Transnistria and 
Republic of Kosovo. The latest addition to the list – Kosovo remains an internally 
very weak state, lacking the control over its entire territory and population and de 
facto an international protectorate. The unsettled situation of the three states provides 
grounds for new potential conflicts in the region. Moreover there have been recently 
public threats by and accusations of secessionist intentions against some prominent 
politicians and public figures in the Republic Srpska in Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
in Sandzhak and Voivodina in Serbia. So the potential for sharp interethnic conflicts 
(also in Macedonia) and for further fragmentation in the ex-Yugoslav space (Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia) has not yet been fully exhausted. Low-level 
armed clashes generated by vigilante militias or by armed civilians could still occur 
in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. (Bugajski, 2013, pp. 149-150) 
Moreover, among the six internationally recognized ex-Yugoslav states there remain 
a number of unresolved and very sensitive issues, including the problems of succes-
sion such as contested segments of interstate borders on land, on the Danube and in 
the Adriatic Sea. 
In the adjacent region of Transcaucasia there are additionally three flashpoints of 
sharp interstate tensions. In 2008, they resulted in a mini war in Georgia and in 2012 
in deadly border shootings on the demarcation line between Armenian and Azeri 
forces. These armed conflicts have directly involved not only three secessionist and 
internationally practically unrecognized parastates – Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh but also the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. All three “frozen conflicts” remain on Europe´s security and political 
agenda (Bebler, ed., 2012).
Among other political issues in the Balkans, one should mention the situation of 
underprivileged ethnic minorities, particularly of the Roma whose population has 
been fast growing in the Balkans. In autumn 2011, the Roma became targets of 
racist attacks in 14 Bulgarian towns. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 152) Moreover, there is in 
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
46 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
the region, at least, a half million refugees and displaced persons. SEE has recently 
witnessed mass unrest, violent demonstrations and vandalism provoked by economic 
troubles, high unemployment and political dissatisfaction in Albania, Serbia, Croatia 
and Greece. Official data on unemployment rates show 45 percent in Kosovo, 32 
percent in Macedonia, 27 percent in Bosnia & Herzegovina and 20 percent in Serbia 
indicating very difficult social and political conditions in the Balkans. Those diffi-
culties have been magnified by deficient state building and often divided and poor 
leadership. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 144) Greece has also been under strong pressure of 
illegal migration, principally from the Near- and Middle East. From among up to 
120,000-150,000 estimated irregular migrants across the Mediterranean, at least, a 
third reaches the EU via South Eastern Europe. The increased flow caused by wars 
in North Africa and the Near East has led to troubles and subsequent militariza-
tion along the short EU external border between Greece and Turkey. On the other 
hand, the newest EU member states - Romania and to a lesser extent also Bulgaria 
“exported” into the rest of the EU a part of their own social insecurity when, e.g. a 
large number of their Roma migrated to and overstayed in illegal encampments in 
Italy, Spain and France. Severe police countermeasures produced political ripples in 
EU institutions while the flood of other Romanian job seekers in Spain posed addi-
tional problems for the freedom of movement of persons within EU.
SEE has been exposed to a number of other non-military challenges to security. 
Some of these have originated in SEE itself, while some have been imported from 
or linked to similar phenomena in states outside the region. Prominent among 
non-military challenges are organized crime and corruption. According to some 
analysts, they have the potential of becoming the gravest threat to regional security 
(Grahovac, 2012). Organized crime from the Balkans, often in cooperation with 
Italian and other extra-regional criminal organizations has been active in bank and 
post office robberies, in various forms of smuggling and illegal trafficking, including 
in humans, human organs, drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, tobacco products etc. It 
has been estimated that about three quarters of heroin (mostly from Afghanistan) 
and a considerable part of cocaine (from Latin America) enters Western Europe via 
SEE. The single biggest source of light weapons illegally exported from SEE has 
been reportedly the Russian-protected and internationally unrecognized Republic of 
Transnistria in Moldova.
Since the termination of the last wars the Balkans – previously a hotbed of political 
terrorism – have lost a good deal of this notoriety and become mainly a transit or 
hiding area for terrorists and indicted or sentenced criminals. However, there have 
been individual acts of terrorism in Sarajevo in October 2011 and in Burgas in July 
2012 as well as arrests of presumed Islamic extremists in Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
in Sandzhak. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 151)
Among real or potential non-military security threats which affect SEE (and other 
parts of Europe) one should mention also natural and ecological disasters, climate 
change and energy security (Kovačević, 2011, pp. 62-64). Parts of the region have 
Anton Bebler
47 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
suffered recently from devastating floods and forest fires. The Russian-Ukrainian 
squabbles over gas transit have exposed the fragility of energy security in SEE. 
The interruption of gas supply in winter 2008/2009 hit worst the city dwellers in B 
& H. The already high dependence of SEE on imports of carbon fuels is likely to 
further increase. Several competing projects of trans regional gas pipelines, notably 
Russian-promoted Southern Stream and the EU-backed Nabucco, envision crossing 
SEE. If and when implemented these very demanding undertakings will strongly 
impact on energy security not only of SEE but also of EU at large (Altmann, 2011, 
pp. 37-41).
3 SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY
The political conflicts on Cyprus and in Moldova, as well as between Macedonia 
and Greece have testified to the Balkan elites’ very low ability to find pragmatic 
solutions through compromise and mutual accommodation and to assure regional 
stability. So far, none of the regionally generated initiatives of enhanced coopera-
tion has proven viable. The efforts to infuse from the outside the cooperation with 
and among the region’s states have been more promising (Delevic, 2007, pp. 31-72). 
These efforts have resulted since the 1990s in a web of international organizations, 
almost exclusively Western in origin. This web has included the “Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe”, CEFTA, SECI, NATO’s “Partnership for Peace”, “South 
East Europe Initiative, Regional Cooperation Council”, et al.
The international record of dealing with the sources of instability and insecurity in 
SEE has highlighted the complexity of its problems which defy quick one-dimen-
sional solutions and the underestimated links between the region’s security and the 
security in other parts of Europe. There is a need for a robust international action to 
improve the economic and social situation in most of the Balkans while avoiding 
the vicious circle of the region’s external dependency. Foreign military and police 
presence will be still needed, probably for many years to come. The ability of the in-
ternational community to help manage numerous problems could be best enhanced 
by further strengthening the EU’s and NATO’s role and influence in SEE. The NATO 
Strategic Concept of 2011 stresses the aim of “facilitating Euro-Atlantic integration 
of the Western Balkans … [in order] … to ensure lasting peace and stability based 
on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations” (NATO, 
2011, p. 31). 
Despite numerous hurdles, the EU and NATO have actively fostered multifaceted 
regional cooperation, particularly among the ex-Yugoslav states (Rupnik, 2011, 
pp. 17-30). Since 2008, the net of EU stabilization and association agreements has 
been extended to cover the entire region, except Kosovo. These agreements have 
served as steps in bringing closer to and eventually admitting all remaining Balkan 
states into the ranks of EU members. The admission of Croatia and Albania into 
NATO in 2009 also contributed to the stabilization in the region. In 2013, Croatia 
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
48 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
entered the EU, while Turkey, after a very long waiting period became an official 
candidate and started pre-accession negotiations which were for some time stalled 
largely due to the Cyprus problem. Serbia and Montenegro entered the groups of 
candidates in 2012, while Macedonia’s candidacy (both to the EU and NATO) 
remains in limbo due to Greece’s ridiculous veto over Macedonia’s name. Albania, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and also Kosovo (within the context of UN Security Council 
Resolution no. 1244/99) remain potential future candidates although the implemen-
tation of the EU’s Thessalonica promise to embrace in its ranks the entire Balkans 
keeps being delayed due to financial and economic crisis in the Eurozone and to the 
enlargement fatigue among the old members. (Grabble, Heather, 2013, pp. 109-113) 
The NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 reconfirmed Macedonia’s candidacy, 
welcomed Montenegro’s progress towards NATO membership, praised Bosnia 
& Herzegovina’s membership aspirations, expressed support for Serbia’s Euro-
Atlantic integration and for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue as well as 
for further consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo. In the decades to come, 
the process of EU and NATO enlargement indeed provides the best hope for progress 
of SEE regional security.
However, a note of caution would be in order. The promised inclusion of the entire 
region into the European Union is not around the corner. Even when it happens it 
would be security-wise insufficient. The record shows that despite the simultaneous 
membership of both states in the European Union, it took Great Britain and Ireland 
more than three decades to reach a symbolic reconciliation and conclude compro-
mise within the Good Friday Agreement on Ulster. After a similarly long simultane-
ous membership in the EU and NATO, the conflict between Great Britain and Spain 
over Gibraltar still remains unresolved. Sixty years of two countries’ membership in 
NATO have not stopped the arms race between Greece and Turkey and did not bring 
closer a resolution of the Cyprus problem. The admission of the Republic of Cyprus 
in the EU also did not advance its resolution and perhaps made it more difficult. 
Today, more than 60 years since the country’s joining NATO and the European 
Communities, the relations between the two main national communities in Belgium 
are worse than they have ever been. 
The historic record also shows that in the 1860s, late 1870s, early 1880s, in 1908-
1913, 1914-1921, 1937-1945, 1947-1949, mid-1970s, late 1980s, in 1991-1995 and 
1999-2003 the flare-ups of violence have almost regularly punctured the periods 
of relative peace in the Balkans. The last time peace did not come from within the 
region, but was imposed by the West’s military intervention. The underbrush of na-
tionalism, intolerance and inter-communal hatred unfortunately still survives in the 
Balkans. In some Balkan countries, the societies became more nationally and reli-
giously segregated than they were a quarter of century ago. This is particularly true 
of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. This is why, in order to break 
with the negative pattern of the last 150 years, the Balkan elites need to show much 
wiser and more responsible behaviour than their predecessors did. 
Bibliography
Anton Bebler
 49 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The present security situation in the region is certainly better than it was at the turn 
of the century. It was due to a number of encouraging developments. The extra-re-
gional sources of conflict in, over or about SEE have been radically reduced. The 
Western Balkans is no longer Europe’s powder keg as it was in 1914. The era of wars 
of religion, ideology and of redrawing state borders in the Balkans seems to be over. 
Compared to the early 1990s, the relations between ex-Yugoslav states have greatly 
improved. The latest achievement – the agreements on normalization between Serbia 
and Kosovo has come about with the help of active prodding and mediating involve-
ment by the European Union. The Brdo Process initiated by Slovenia promises to 
further develop and intensify regional cooperation. Most countries in the region have 
undergone radical transformation of their political orders. Instead of authoritarian 
and, among them also totalitarian regimes of the late 1980s the region is composed 
today of, in various degrees, democratic political systems. And democracies almost 
never fight wars among themselves. Moreover, the considerable demilitarization in 
most Balkan states has greatly reduced their warfare capabilities. The Balkan elites 
have hopefully also learned from the negative experience of the last two decades 
and of its harmful consequences. Unlike in 1990-1991, the hottest potential trouble 
spots in the Western Balkans are today under international surveillance in the form of 
present foreign troops, civilian controllers and two de facto protectorates. In addition, 
the countries of the region are recipients of considerable financial assistance and de-
velopmental loans. There is also a web of the above-mentioned regional cooperation 
schemes, including those in security and defence matters. The SEE states themselves 
contribute today their peacekeepers to a number of NATO, EU and UN stabiliza-
tion and observation missions in Europe, the Mediterranean, Transcaucasia, Near 
and Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. All this provides good reasons for mod-
erately optimistic expectation that the Balkans will become eventually a region of 
democracy, prosperity and stability enhancing and not diminishing the security on 
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Anton Bebler