21
RAZPRAVE / ARTICLES 
Pr egledni	znans tv eni	članek/ Article	(1.02)
Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly	83	(2023)	1,	21—32
Besedilo	pr eje t o/R eceiv ed:01/2023;	spr eje t o/ Accep t ed:04/2023
UDK/UDC:	17.02:27-184.3
DOI:	10.34291/B V2023/01/Pla t o vnjak	
©	2023	Pla t o vnjak	e t	al.,	CC	B Y	4.0
Ivan Platovnjak and Arto Mutanen
On Religious Knowledge
O verskem védenju
Abstract :	 The	 paper	 is	 a	 philoso phic al	 analy sis	 of	 r eligious	 kno wledg e.	 The	 article	
e x ami n es	 r el i gi ous	 kn o wl edg e	 b y	 c omp ari ng	 i t	 t o	 sci en tific	 and 	 ma th ema tic al	
kno wledg e	 as	 w ell	 as	 mor al	 kno wledg e.	 Scien tific	 kno wledg e	 is	 based	 on	 per-
cep tions,	 whe ther	 these	 ar e	 dir ect	 per cep tions	 or	 per cep tion s	 pr oduced	 b y	 a	
scien tific	e xperimen t.	W e	 analy z e	 r eligious	 per cep tion	b y	 c omparing	it	t o	per-
cep tions	 in	 science	 and	 in	 mor al	 epis t emology	 in	 which	 per ce p tions	 ar e	 c alled	
m or al	 pe r c e p tions.	 In	 m or al	 e pis t e m olog y 	 and	 r e lig ious	 e pis t e m olog y , 	 the 	 in-
t erpr e t a tion	 of	 per cep tions	 t ak es	place	 in	 a	 cert ain	 a tmospher e	 which	 is	not 	
s t a tic	 and	 giv en	 but	 de v eloping.	 All	 these	 per cep tions	 ha v e	 a	 similar	 me thodi-
c al	 r ole 	 in	 knowledg e 	 acquisition.	 The 	 paper 	 giv es	a	 me thodic al-c onceptual 	
analy sis	 of	 r eligious	 kno wledg e,	 but	 a t	 the	 same,	 it	 sho w s	 tha t	 the	 r eal	 op tion	
is the path of permanent discipleship.
Keywords:	 Mor al	 per ception, 	 r eligious	 per ception, 	 mor al	 knowledg e, 	 r eligious 	
knowledge, moral and religious atmosphere
Povzetek : Z a	 v ern i k a	 j e	 v er a	 v	 Bo g a	 tr d en 	 t emel j 	 ži vl j en j a. 	 S 	 fi l o z o f sk eg a	 vi d i k a	 j e	
pomembno	 t emelje	 v er o v anja	 sis t ema tično	 pr oučiti.	 V	 prispe vk u	 s t a	a v t orja 	
opr a vila	 filo z of sk o	 analiz o	 v er sk eg a	v édenja.	V er sk o	 per cepcijo	 s t a	analizir ala 	
t ak o ,	 da	 s t a	 jo	 primerjala	 s	 per cepcijami	 v	 znanos ti	 in	mor aln i	 epis t emologiji	–	
v	 t ej	 se	imenujejo 	 mor alne	 per cepcije. 	 V	 mor alni 	 in	 r eligio zni 	 epis t emologiji 	
njiho v a	 r azlag a	 pot ek a	 v	 določeni	 a tmos f eri, 	 ki	 ni	 s t a tična	 in	 dana, 	 t em v eč	 se 	
r az v ija.	 V se 	 t e 	 pe r ce pcije 	 imajo	 pr i	 pr idobiv anju	 v é de nja	 podobno	 me t odično 	
vl o g o . 	 Na	 k o n cu 	 me t o d i čn o -k o n cep tu al n e	 an al i z e	 v er sk eg a	 v éd en j a	 s t a	 a v t o rj a 	
pok az ala,	da	je	pr a v a	mo žnos t	pot	tr ajneg a	učenče v s tv a.
Ključne besede :	 Mor alna	 per cepcija,	 v er sk a	per cepcija,	 mor alno 	 v édenje,	v er sk o 	
v édenje,	mor alna	in	v er sk a	a tmos f er a

22 Bogoslovni vestnik 83 (2023) • 1
1. Introduction
1
F aith	 in	 God	 is	 an	 essen tial	 part	 of	 r eligious	 lif e.	 In	 f act,	 f or	 a	 belie v er	 f aith	 in	 God	
is	 the 	 firm	 f ounda tion	 of	 lif e .	 It	 is	 philosophic ally	 import an t	 t o	 s y s t e ma tic ally	 e x a-
mine	 the	 f ound a tions	 of	 r eligio us	 f aith.	 In	 this	 paper ,	 w e	 will	 f ocus	 our	 a tt en tion	
on	 the 	 epis t emology 	 of	 f aith.	 Basic ally , 	 ther e 	 ar e	 thr ee 	 diff er en t 	 appr oaches	 t o	 r e-
lig ious	 e pis t e m olog y , 	 nam e ly : 	 fide ism , 	 r e f or m e d	 e pis t e m olog y , 	 and	 e v ide n tialism 	
(Dougherty	 and 	 T w eedt	 2015).	 Acc or ding	 t o 	 fideism,	 ther e	 is	 no 	 need 	 t o 	 ha v e	 an y 	
supporting	 e vidence	 f or	 r eligious	 belie f .	 Such	 a	 non-support ed	 r eligious	 belie f	 is	 a 	
r a tional	 one.	 E viden tialis ts	 assu me	 tha t	 r eligious	 belie f s	 need	 t o	 be	 support ed	 as	
usual beliefs. Of course, it is a problem to know what kind of evidence is needed 
t o	 ju s tif y	 r eligio us	 belie f s.	 Specific a tion	 of	 wha t	 kind	 of	 e vidence	 is	 needed	 giv es	
a	 diff er en t	 kind 	 of	 e viden tialism. 	 R e f ormed 	 e viden tialis ts	 ar e	 be tw een 	 fideis ts	 and 	
e viden tialis ts. 	 The y	 do	 not	 assume	 fideis ts’	 assump tion 	 tha t	 r eligious	 belie f s,	in 	
g ener al,	 ha v e	 a	 specific	 s t a tus	 which 	 en t ails	tha t	 ther e	 is	no 	 need 	 f or	 e vidence, 	
but, at the same, they accept that some religious beliefs, which might be called 
basic	r eligious	belie f s,	need	no	e vidence.	(Dougherty	and	T w eedt	2015)
R eligious	 epis t emology 	 is	an	 import an t	 specific 	 t opic	 which	 has	 diff er en t 	 aspects 	
(Oviedo 	 2022).	 The	 pr oblem	 c onnect ed 	 t o 	 the	 ques tion 	 be tw een 	 fideism,	 r e vised 	
eviden tialism	 and	eviden tialism	 brings	f orth	 the 	 g ener al	 epis t emologic al	 pr oblem. 	
However ,	 ther e	 ar e	 import ant	 epistemological 	 questions	 that	 need 	 to 	 be	 discussed 	 in 	
order to understand religious epistemology properly. In the following, we will con-
sider	 questions	 about	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 r eligious	 epistemology	 and 	 r eflect	these 	
both	 t o	 the 	 g ener al	 pr oblems	of	 epis t emology 	 as	w ell	 as	t o	 mor e 	 specific	 ar eas	in 	
epistemology ,	 such	 as	 mor al 	 epistemology	 (Campbell 	 2019),	 the	 epistemology	 of	 math-
ematics	 (Hintikk a	1973)	 and	 the 	 philosoph y 	 of	 science 	 (Hintikk a	2007;	 Niiniluoto	 2018). 	
2. Phenomenology of Religious Perception
In	 the	 phenomenologic al 	 analy sis	 of	 r eligious	 epis t emology ,	 a	 fundamen t al 	 notion 	
is	 r eligious	 per cep tion.	 R eligious	 per cep tion	 is	 not	 a	 specific	 per cep tion	 but	 a	 class 	
of	 per cep tions	 with	 v ar ying	 epis t emologic al	 r oles.	 Such	 a	 div er sity	 of	 r eligious	 per-
cep tions	 enables	 the	 analy sis	 of	 the	 gr o w th	 of	 r eligious	 kno wledg e.	 Ho w e v er , 	 the 	
analysis of the growth of religious knowledge is extremely complex. To do such 
an analysis we will use more general epistemological theories as indicated above.
A	 g ood	 basic	 e x ample 	 of	 r eligious	 per cep tion	 is	 the	 ea ting	 habits	 of	 Chris tians.
2
 
People usually prepare and eat their food quickly. They do not think about the 
1 
This	 paper 	 w as	 writt en	 as	 a	 r esult	 of	 w ork 	 within	 the 	 r esear ch	 pr ogr am 	 “R eligion, 	 e thics, 	 educ a tion, 	 and 	
challeng es	of	modern	socie ty	(P6-0269)” ,	which	is	financed	b y	the	Slo v enian	R esear ch	Ag ency	(ARR S).
2 
A	 similar 	 pr actice 	 is	 also	 pr esen t 	 in	 Islam.	 Muslims	 thank 	 God	 f or 	 the 	 gift 	 of	 f ood	 and	 ask 	 f or 	 His	 blessing 	
be f or e	 and	a ft er	 meal s	 (some	 onl y	 a ft er). 	 In	 thi s	 w a y ,	 the y	 sho w	 thei r	 a w ar eness	 tha t	 al l 	 f ood	 i s	 a	 gi ft	
from God. It is also recommended for believers to eat slowly and in peace. It is also important that they 
ea t	 in 	 a	 moder a t e	 w a y	 (Jeglič	 2022a,	 154).	 A	 g ood	 e x ample	 of	 r eligious	 per cep tion	 is	 the	 ea ting	 habits	
of	 Je w s	 (righ t eous	 Isr aelit e)	 t oo.	 F or	 e x ample,	 see	 the	 Book	 of	 T obit,	 which	 t ells	 a	 s t or y	 of	 a	 righ t eous	

23 Ivan Platovnjak et al. - On Religious Knowledge
f ood	 or	 ea ting ,	 but	 r a ther	 the	 think	 about	 man y	 other	 things,	 oft en	 lis t ening	t o 	
the	 r adio	 or	 w a t ching	 TV	 or	 some thing	 on	 their	 smart	 phone 	 while	 the y	 ea t.	 But	
ea ting	is	a	 special	 kind	of	 ev ery da y	pr actice 	 tha t	 c an	 c onnect	 us	t o	 something 	
tr anscenden t al.	 Chris tians,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 f aith	 in	 God	 the	 Cr ea t or	 and	 F a-
ther, who has revealed himself fully through Jesus Christ in the power of the Holy 
Spirit,	 ar e	 c alled	 t o	 a	 deeper	 a w ar eness	 of	 ho w	 ea ting	 c an	 also	 c onnect	 them	 t o	
Go d 	 an d ,	 th r o u gh 	 h i m,	 t o 	 al l 	 cr ea tio n 	 an d 	 h u man i ty . 	 T o 	 d o 	 th i s,	 th e y	 ar e	 i n vi t ed 	
to prepare, in peace and in the presence of the Triune God, the food they are 
about	 t o	 ea t	 and	 e v er y thing	 else	 tha t	 is	 necessar y	 be f or e	 the	 meal.	 Aft er	 pr epar-
ing the meal and placing it on the table, they sit down. They calm themselves 
before they eat and drink. They become aware of what is in front of them and of 
their desire for food. They also become aware of the presence of the Triune God 
at this meal and through all that they will consume. As they begin to eat, they 
surrender themselves to the smell, touch and taste of the food in their mouths 
and in their swallowing. They allow themselves to be moved by the grace of the 
Holy	 Spirit	 as	 God 	 the	 F a ther	 giv es	 them	 the	 f ood 	 t o 	 nourish 	 and 	 sa tis f y	 them	 (Mt 	
5:6,45),	 “ dying ”	f or 	 them	 (Jn	 12:24)	 so	 tha t	 the y 	 migh t	 liv e.	 The y 	 ar e	 mo v ed	 b y 	
His	c ar e	 f or 	 them 	 (Mt	 6:25-34)	 and	by	 His	minis try 	 t o	 them 	 thr ough	 f ood	 (Mt 	
20:28).	 (Pla t o vnjak 	 2021)	 Thus	 the 	 meal	 is	not 	 only 	 a	 meal,	 but	 it	 enables	 them 	
t o	per ceiv e	tha t	which	is	not	per cep tible.	
When	 Chris tians	 appr oach	 ea ting	 and	 f ood	 open	 t o	 c on t empla tion, 	 which	 in	 the 	
br oades t	 sense	 means	 “t o 	 look	 f or	 a	 long	 time	 with 	 admir a tion 	 and	 w onder ” 	 (Her-
r aiz	1998,	338−339),	the y	 arriv e	a t	r eligious	 per cep tion.	 This	 is	 not	 simply	 looking 	
in the everyday sense, but is an awareness of God, not as He is in Himself, but as 
He	 is	 pr esen t	 thr ough 	 His	 gr ace	 in	 man	 and 	 all	 cr ea tion,	 and 	 thr ough 	 the	 endow ed 	
virtues	 of	 f aith,	 hope	 and	 lov e	 (Aumann	 2003;	 Jeglič	 2022b).	 Con t empla tion,	 which 	
in v olv e s	 man’ s	 f aculty 	 of	 imagina tion	 and	 all	 of	 his	 e x t e rnal	 and	 in t e r nal	 se nse s,	
enables	Chris tians	 t o	 g az e,	 t as t e 	 and	per ceiv e 	 each	 thing 	 mor e 	 deeply , 	 and	t o	 in-
w ar dly	 t as t e 	 the 	 activ e	 pr esence	 of	 the 	 triune	 God	 in	 them	 and	 the 	 g oodness	 and 	
beauty	 with	 which	 He	 per v ades	 them 	 (Spiritual Exercises	 230‒237;	 T omlinson	 2011; 	
Pla t ovnjak	 2018).	 The	 pr esence	 of	 the	 tr anscenden t	 c an	 thus	 be	 per ceiv ed 	 by	 Chris-
tians	 if	 the y	 ar e	 open	 t o	 the 	 a w ar eness	 tha t	 is	 made	 possible 	 b y	 their	 c onnection 	
t o	 their 	 r eligious	 tr adition	 and	 thr ough	 a tt en tiv eness	 and	 f ocus	 with	 all	 their 	 bodi-
ly	 and	 spiritual	 senses	 on	 all	 things.	 Such	 a	 Chris tian	 r eligious	 per cep tion	 is	 not, 	 of 	
c our se,	 limit ed 	 t o 	 f ood,	 but	 is	 possible	 in	 r ela tion 	 t o 	 e v er y thing	 tha t	 e xis ts,	 t o 	 all	 of 	
nature, to every human being, to all events, to all forms of art, and so on. 
Eventually, this generates deeper religious knowledge as can be seen in how 
the	 Bible	 under s t ands	 f ood:	 “ The	 Bible	 does	 not	 sa y	 much 	 about	 f ood,	 but	 it	 mak es 	
it	 clear	 tha t	 it	 pla y s	 a	 v er y	 import an t	 r ole	 in	 man’ s	lif e,	 in	 his	 r ela tionship s	 with 	
other s	 and 	 with 	 God:	 man	 c annot	 liv e	 without	 f ood,	 nor	 c an	 he	 liv e	 on 	 f ood 	 alone. 	
So ,	God	ins tructs	Adam	and	E v e	t o	ea t. ”	(Pla t o vnjak	2021,	83)
Isr aelit e,	 who	 w as	 especially	 kno wn	 bec ause	 of	 his	 acts	 of	 charity	 in	 c onnection	 with	 f ood	 (Skr alo vnik	
2022a,	278–290).

24 Bogoslovni vestnik 83 (2023) • 1
Al s t o n 	 ( 1991,	 13) 	 gi v es	 e x amp l es	 wh i ch 	 d emo n s tr a t e	 th e	 r el i gi o u s	 p er cep tio n s 	
tha t	 t ak e	 place	 in	 r eality .	 “ One	 da y	when 	 I	 w as	 a t	 pr a y er	 /…/	 I	 sa w	 Chris t	 a t	 m y 	
side	 −	 or ,	 t o	 put	 it	 be tt er ,	 I	 w as	 c onscious	 of	 Him,	 f or	 I	 sa w	 no thing	 with	 the	 e y es	
of	 the 	 body 	 or 	 the 	 e y es	of	 the 	 soul	 /…/. ”	 E v en	 if	 such	 per cep tion	 is	not 	 a	 usual 	
sense	 per cep tion,	 Als t on	 char act eriz es	 “the	 a w ar eness	 is	 e xperien tial	 in	 the	 w a y	
it contrasts with thinking about God, calling up mental images, entertaining prop-
ositions,	r easoning ,	eng aging	in	o v ert	or	c o v ert	c on v er sa tion,	r emembering. ”
3. On Epistemology
In	 epis t emology 	 the 	 fundamen t al	ques tion	 is	“Wha t	 is	knowledg e? ”	 or 	 “Wha t 	
does	 the	 sen t ence	 ‘ A	 know s	 tha t	 p’	 mean? ”	 The	 basic	 ans w er	 is	 known 	 as	 the	 clas-
si c al 	 n o tio n 	 o f	 kn o wl ed g e	 wh i ch 	 sa y s	 th a t	 kn o wl ed g e	 i s	 w el l 	 j u s tifi ed 	 tru e	 b el i e f	
which is rooted in Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus.	 In	 1963	 Ge ttier	 published	 a	 short	
paper	 which	 demons tr a t ed	 tha t	 ther e	 ar e	 essen tial	 mis t ak es	 in	 the	 classic al	 noti-
on of knowledge. The paper restarted intensive research in epistemology which 
has	 chang ed	 our	 under s t andin g	 of	 the	 char act er	 of	 kno wledg e.	 (Hendrick s	 2006)
T o	 t ackle	 the 	 so-c alled	 Ge ttier 	 c ases	 some 	 epis t emologis ts	 ha v e 	 emphasiz ed 	
r eliability 	 o v e r 	 jus tifiability .	 Ho w e v e r , 	 r eliability 	 r e f e r s	t o	 me thods	 of	 k no wledg e 	
acquisition	 which	 is	 s tudied	 s y s t ema tic ally	 in	 the	 philosoph y	 of	 science	 (Hin tikk a	
2007;	 Hendrick s	 2006).	 So ,	 the	 philosoph y	 of	 science	 has	 a	 deeper	 c onnection	 t o	
epis t emology	 than	 is	 usually	 r ec ogniz ed	 in	 epis t emology .	 This	 ob ser v a tion	 is	 im-
port an t	 f or	 us	 since	 w e	 ar e	 primarily	 in t er es t ed	 in	 an	 analy sis 	 of	 the	 c ons truction	
of	r eligious	kno wledg e	or	the	acquisition	of	r eligious	kno wledg e.
In the philosophy of science, it is generally accepted that at least some of the 
ob ser v a tions	 ar e	 theor y -laden	 which	 means	 tha t	 these	 ob ser v a tions	 as	 based	 on	
some	 theor y .	 Th e	 analy sis	 of	 the	 theor y -ladenness	 has	 sho wn	 tha t	 the	 notion	 of	
theor y -ladenness	 is	a	 sc aled	 notion	 meaning	 tha t	 some 	 ob ser v a tions	 ar e	 mor e 	
deeply	 theor y -laden	 than	 other s.	 The r e 	 ar e	 some 	 ob se r v a tions	 c alle d	dir ect	 ob-
ser v a tions	 which	 pr esuppose 	 only 	 some 	 c oncep tual	 skills	 t og e ther 	 with	 some 	 kind 	
of 	 c ommon-sense	 theor e tic al 	 fr ame w ork. 	 Other	 ob ser v a tions	 ar e	 mor e	 deeply 	
theor y 	 dependen t	 such	 as	the 	 ob ser v a tion	 of	 electr ons.	 How e v er , 	 the 	 de t ailed 	
analy sis	 of	 the	 pr oblem	 of	 theor y -ladenness	 of	 ob ser v a tions	 is	 s till	 under	 discus-
sion.	(Hin tikk a	2007;	Halv or son	2018)	
The	 pr oblem	 of	 kno wledg e	 acquisition	 has	 been	 an	 import an t	 pr oblem	 in	 the	
philosoph y 	 of	 science 	 since 	 the 	 1960s.	 The 	 pr oblem	 has	 been	 f ormulat ed	 as 	
whether there can be a logic of discovery, but also directly as a problem of the 
logic	 of	 scien tific	 inquiry	 (P opper	 1959;	 Simon 	 1973;	 Hin tikk a	 2007;	 Hendrick s 	
2001).	 Acc or din g	 t o	 Hin tikk a	 (2007),	 the	 e xis t ence	 of	 the	 logi c	 of	 disc o v er y	 is	 not	
a	 pr oblem	 bec ause 	 scien tific 	 pr actice 	 demons tr a t es	 the 	 e xis t ence 	 of	 logic.	 The 	
problem of philosophers is to explicate the logic. There is no consensus on what 
the	 logic	 of	 scien tific	 inquir y	 is, 	 but	 modern	 science	 has	 been	 based	 on	 the	 de v el-

25 Ivan Platovnjak et al. - On Religious Knowledge
opmen t	of	e xperimen t al	science.	(Hin tikk a	2007;	Hendrick s	2001)
Hin tikk a	 has	 de v eloped 	 a	 model 	 of	 scien tific	 inquir y	 which 	 he	 c alls	the	 In t er-
r og a tiv e	 model	 of	 inquir y	 which	 is	 r oot ed	 in	 the	 Socr a tic	 ques tioning	 me thod.	 The 	
f ounda tional	 idea 	 is 	 e x tr emely 	 simple: 	 the 	 logic 	 of	 kno wledg e 	 acquisition	 is 	 jus t 	
the	 logic	 of	 ques tioning	 and 	 ans w ering. 	 Tha t	 is,	 the	 logic	 of	 scien tific	 inquir y	 is	 the 	
me thod	 of	 Socr a tic 	 ques tioning.	 Aris t ot elean	 logic 	 de v eloped	 the 	 theor y 	 of	 the 	
Socr a tic	 ques tioning	 me thod. 	 (Hin tikk a,	 Halonen 	 and 	 Mut anen	 2002)	 The	 logic 	
Hin tikk a	 de v elop s	 has	 a	 close 	 c onnection	 t o	 the 	 w ell-kno wn	 me thod	 of	 analy sis 	
and	s yn thesis	(Niiniluot o	2018;	Hin tikk a	and	R emes	1974).
The 	 fundamen t al	 idea	 of	 the 	 In t err og a tiv e 	 model	 is	tha t	 ques tions	 sear ch	 f or 	
n e w	 i n f o rma tio n 	 i n	 th e	 r easo n i n g	 p r o cess. 	 T h e	 s tr a t egy	 o f	 q u es tio n i n g	 sh o w s	 th e	
inquir er	 wha t 	 in f orma tion	 is	 needed	 in	 the 	 r easoning 	 pr ocess.	 The 	 inquir er	 decides 	
the	 ques tion 	 and 	 the	 na tur e,	 or	 the	 object	 of	 inquiry	 decides	 the	 answ er . 	 The 	
e v alua tion	 of	 the	 r easonability	 of	 cert ain	 ques tions	 c an	 be	 e v alua t ed	 only	 on	 the	
le v el	 of	 the	 whol e	 r easoni ng	 pr ocess,	 i.e.,	 e v al ua tion	 is	 based	 on	 the	 s tr a t egy	 of	
the whole process.
The strategy is based on the analysis of the object of inquiry which is a certain 
phenomenon. 	 The	 analy sis	 is 	 seeking	the	 essen tial 	 f act or s 	 of 	 the	 phenomenon 	
and	 the	 kno wn	 r ela tionship s	 be tw een	 the	 f act or s.	 In	 na tur al	 science,	 these	 r ela-
tionship s	 ar e	 g ener ally	 f ormula t ed 	 in	 ma thema tic al 	 languag e,	 but	 it	 is	also 	 pos-
sible	t o 	 ha v e	 only	 qualit a tiv e	 analy sis	 of	 the	 phenomenon 	 as	the	 e x amples	 of 	
though t	e xperimen ts	in	 diff er en t	fields	 of	sciences	demons tr a t e.	F or	e x ample,	 in	
philosoph y ,	 such	 though t	 e xperimen ts	 ar e	 c ommonly	 used.	 In	 e thics	 F oot	 (1967)	
in tr oduces	 so-c alled 	 tr olle y	 e x amples	 which 	 ar e	 used 	 in	 g ener a ting	 a	 be tt er	 un-
derstanding of ethics. Especially the trolley examples open the dialogue on the 
f ounda tions	of	e thic al	kno wledg e	(T aur ek	1977).
Though t	 e xperimen ts	 c annot	 be	 in t erpr e t ed 	 in	 a	 v acuum.	 The	 In t err og a tiv e 	
model	 e xplic a t es	 the	 r ole	 of	 theor y	 in	 r a tional	 r easoning.	 Mor eo v er ,	 if	 epis t emic	
ques tions	 ar e	 t ak en	 e xplicitly	 in t o	 the	 In t err og a tiv e	 model,	 then	 the	 logic	 of	 knowl -
edg e	 acquisition	 bec ome	 e xplic a t ed	 (Hin tikk a,	 Halonen	 and	 Mut anen	 2002).	 It	 is	
especially important to recognize that the role of theory is changing during the 
r easoning	 pr ocess.	 The	 theor y	 which	 is	 needed	 in	 in t erpr e ting	 the	 ob ser v a tional	
and	 e xperimen t al	 additional	 in f orma tion	 v aries	 depending	 on 	 the	 ques tion	 t o	 be	
solved. The same also takes place in moral epistemology in which the basic mor-
al	 ob ser v a tions	 ar e	 simple 	 and	dir ect	r eactiv e 	 a ttitudes	 which	 ar e	 c onnect ed	 t o 	
“pr actices	 of	 punishing	 and	blaming ”	 (Str a w son	 1962,	 1).	 The 	 pr actices	 include 	
so me	 mo r al 	 a ttitu d es	 o r	 g en er a t e	 a	 cert ai n 	 mo r al 	 a tmo sp h er e	 i n 	 wh i ch 	 th e	 mo-
r ality	 of	 individuals	 migh t	 c ome	 in t o	 f or ce	 (Blackburn	 2002).	 The 	 mor al	 a tmo-
spher e	 r e f er s	 t o	 a	 cert ain	kind	of	mor al	sensitivity	and	hence	 it	does	not	pr esup-
pose 	 a 	 s t r ong 	 t he or e tic al	 f ounda tion.	 The 	 m or al	 a t m osphe r e 	 c an	 be 	 built 	 up	 v ia 	
emotions	which	c ons titut es	mor al	seemings	(K auppinen	2015,	181).
K auppinen	 t ak es	 the	 notion	 of	 mor al	 in tuition	 as	 a	 cen tr al	 notion	 in	 mor al	 phi-
losoph y . 	 The	 notion 	 of 	 in tuition 	 has	 se v er al 	 diff er en t	 kinds	 of 	 in t erpr e t a tions	 in 	

26 Bogoslovni vestnik 83 (2023) • 1
philosoph y .	 H o w e v e r , 	 K a uppine n	 g iv e s 	 a 	 v e r y 	 im por t a n t 	 in t e r pr e t a tion	 w hic h	 c a n	
be	 seen	 as	 a	 k e y	 notion	 in	 the	 acquisition	 of	 mor al	 kno wledg e.	 The	 in t erpr e t a tion 	
c an	be	under s t ood	 in	 a	K an tian 	w a y .	K an t	in t erpr e t ed	in tuition	 which	 is	c onnect-
ed	 t o	 c ons tructiv e	 thinking:	 Co ns truction	 is	 the	 tr ansition	 of	 a	 f ormal	 g ener al	 no-
tion	 t o	 a	 singula r	 c ase	 of	 it;	 in	 the	 tr ansition	 ther e	 is	 no	 r e f er ence	 t o	 e xperience.	
In fact, this has the same logic as in an experiment or in a thought experiment in 
science.	(Hin tikk a	1973;	2007)	
Moral knowledge is not just knowledge of facts even if moral knowledge con-
sider s	 ho w	 t o	 liv e	 w ell	 and	 hence	 mor al	 kno wledg e	 is	 of	 pr actic al	 v alue.	 Mor ality	
is 	 something	 which 	 is 	 pr esen t	 but	 not	 f actual.	 The	 K an tian 	 notion 	 of 	 tr anscendence 	
char act eriz es	 mor ality	 in	 a	 deep 	 sense. 	 Pihls tr öm	 (2014,	 54;	 59)	 speak s	 about 	
transcendental guilt which characterizes moral freedom and responsibility in the 
c on ting en t	 r eality .	 So ,	 mor al	 per cep tion,	 or	 mor al	 seemings,	 r e f er s	 t o	 some	 tr an-
scendental facts.
4. From Phenomenal Analysis to Religious Knowledge
As	 w e	 sa w	 abo v e 	 when	 w e	 analy sed	 it	 fr om	 the	 per spectiv e	 of	 the	 Chris tian	 f aith, 	
ea ting	 is	no	 long er	 some thing	 mundane	tha t	 in v olv es	 nothing	 special.	 Thus,	 f o-
cusing	 our	 a tt en tion	 on	 ea ting	 opens	 a	 ne w	 w orldvie w .
3
	 While	 pr eparing	 the	 f ood 	
w e	 allo w	 our selv es	 t o	 see	 the	 f ood	 as	 a	 gift.	 The	 r eligious	 in t erpr e t a tion	 of	 wha t	
happens	 a t	 the 	 meal	 does	 not	 pr esuppose 	 a	 s tr ong 	 theologic al	 theor e tic al	 fr ame-
work. It is good enough that we allow a religious atmosphere to be present in the 
moment.
4
 Similarly, as a moral atmosphere religious atmosphere does not presup-
pose	 a	 s tr ong	 theor e tic al 	 f ounda tion;	 it	 r e f er s 	 t o 	 r eligious 	 sensitivity	 which 	 mak es 	
r eligious	 per cep tion	 possible.	 E v en	 if	 the 	 mor al	 a tmospher e 	 is	 a	 c ollectiv e 	 notion, 	
the	 sensitivity	 of	 it	 v aries	 fr om	 per son	 t o	 per son.	 Some	 people	 migh t	 need	 some	
specific 	 en vir onmen t, 	 such	 as	 a	 chur ch	 or 	 f or es t, 	 t o	 r eceiv e	 it.	 R eligious	 per cep tion 	
supposes that the mind is open to a religious atmosphere. However, this open-
ness is not something which we have or have not, but it is also a skill-based ability 
which	 c an	 be	 tr ained	 via	 some 	 e x er cises	 such	 as	 c on t empla tion.	 (Pla t o vnjak 	 2021) 	
Con t empla tion	 mak es	 it	 possible	 t o	 r ec ognise	 the	 pr esence 	 of	 the	 tr anscenden t. 	
Ho w e v e r , 	 e v e n	 if	 c on t e mpla tion	 is	 the or e tic ally 	 or 	 c once p tually 	 pr imar y 	 it	 is	 e pis-
temically secondary which is a basic idea behind the method of analysis and syn-
thesis: 	 the 	 epis t emic 	 or der 	 of	 the 	 things	 w e 	 enc oun t er 	 is	opposed	 t o	 the 	 theo-
r e tic al	or der	as	alr eady	Aris t otle	r ec ogniz ed.
Con t empla tion, 	 which	 c an	 be	 learned, 	 c an	 enable	 an y one 	 t o	 learn	 r eligious 	
seeing and perceiving in ever greater depth. This learning can begin with a deep-
3 
About	 the	biblic al	c onnection	be tw e en	f ood	(ea ting)	and	kno wledg e	see	Skr alo vnik	2022b,	77–82.
4 
The human need for food is a natural desire, which is not sinful, but it must not become the criterion 
and 	 g oal 	 of	 human	 l i f e.	 If	 such	 a	 desi r e	 bec omes	 a	 gui del i ne	 i n	 l i f e,	 i t	 l eads	 t o	 (r el i gi ou s)	 dea th .	 A	 desi r e 	
such	 as	 this, 	 which	 trick s	 lif e	 in t o	 succumbing	 t o	 ph y sic al	 in fluences	 r a ther 	 than	 obe ying	 God’ s	 will, 	 mus t 	
be	under s t ood	as	apos t as y	(idola tr y)	(Skr alo vnik	and	Ma tjaž	2020,	505–518).

27 Ivan Platovnjak et al. - On Religious Knowledge
er	 per cep tion	 and	kno wledg e 	 of	 the 	 body , 	 which	 is	an	 e x t ernal	 object, 	 but	 also 	
some thing 	 in t ernal,	 its	 parts	 and	 its	 w orkings	 (e. g.,	 br ea thing , 	 heartbea t, 	 f eeding , 	
w alking , 	 e t c.).	 Our	 e xis t ence	is	limit ed	t o	 the 	 body , 	 but	 w e 	 ar e	 not	 jus t	ph y sic al 	
beings. Every human being transcends his or her body because he or she has 
within him or herself a capacity of spirit that enables him or her to transcend him 
or	her self .	(Globok ar	2019)
Ch ri s tian s	 b el i e v e,	 o n 	 th e	 b asi s	 o f	 th e	 Bi b l e,	 th a t	 e v er y	 h u man 	 b ei n g	 i s	 cr ea t ed 	
acc or ding	 t o	 the	 imag e	 and	 lik eness	 of	 God	 (Genesis	 1:26)	 and	 is	 thus	 able	 t o	 be-
lie v e	 in	 Him	 and 	 en t er	 in t o	 a	 per sonal	 r ela tionship	 with	 God.	 God,	 as	 Cr ea t or	 and	
F a ther ,	 giv es	 e v er y	 per son	 e v e r y thing	 he	 or	 she	 needs	 t o	 liv e 	 his	 or	 her	 lif e	 fully ,	
ev en	 if	 he 	 or 	 she 	 does	 not	 believ e	 in	 Him	 (Mt	 5:44-48),	 bec ause 	 each	 one 	 is	a 	
pr oduct	of	 His	 in finit e	 lo v e	 and	 is	 His	 child	(1	 Jn	 4).	 In	 the	 same	 w a y ,	 He	 giv es	 His	
Spirit	 t o 	 all,	 so 	 tha t	 the y	 ma y	 be	 able	 t o 	 r ec ogniz e	 His	pr esence	 and 	 action 	 and 	
freely and consciously choose to live with faith in Him and with all their brothers 
and	sis t er s	and	all	cr ea tion	(R om	1‒2).	
There is a danger that if one does not accept the religious atmosphere then 
the exercises in perceiving things remain merely empty rituals. So, religious per-
cep tions	 ar e	 “theor y 	 dependen t ”	 a t	 leas t	 in	 the 	 same 	 sense 	 as	 mor al	 per cep tions. 	
Of course, in moral theory, there are some theorists who suppose that the theo-
r y	 depe ndence	 is	 deeper .	 F or	 e x ample,	 Harman	 (1977)	 giv es	 the	 w ell-kno wn	 c a t	
e x ample 	 whose 	 in t erpr e t a tion	 acc or ding 	 t o	 Harman	 pr esupposes	 the 	 whole 	 of 	
our	 theor e tic al 	 r epert oi r e. 	 W e	 wi l l 	 not	 agr ee	 with	 Harman	 her e.	 W e	 wil l 	 r el y	 on 	
the 	 g ener al	 theor y 	 of	 human	 r easoning , 	 which	 is	e xplic a t ed	 b y	 Hin tikk a’ s	 In t er-
r og a tiv e	model,	in	which	ther e	is	no	need	t o	mak e	such	s tr ong	assump tions.
The idea is that religious knowledge is, as is true of usual human knowledge, 
developing and fallible. In fact, the fallibility is also in moral epistemology quite 
g ener ally	 accep t ed. 	 Alr eady	 Moor e	 (1903,	 x)	 said 	 tha t	 mor al 	 in tuition 	 is	f allible. 	
Mo o r e	 sai d 	 th a t	 mo r al 	 i n tu i tio n s	 ar e	 n o t	 p o ssi b l e	 t o 	 p r o v e	 o r	 d i sp r o v e	 b u t	 i n tu-
itions	 migh t	 be	 either 	 true	 or 	 f alse.	Tha t	 is, 	 our 	 mor al	 in tuition	 migh t	 giv e	 mis-
t ak e n	 in f or ma tion.	 The 	 r ole 	 of	 mor al	 in tuitions	 in	 the 	 g r o w th	 of	 mor al	 k no wle dg e 	
is thus in need of further analysis. 
In tuitions	 ar e	 some times	 said	 t o	 be	 self -e viden t.	 This	 migh t	 en t ail	 tha t,	 a t	 the	
same, they are assumed to be self-evident truths. However, here the problem is 
the 	 notion	 of	 self -evidence.	 Pur e,	 or 	 nak ed, 	 obser v a tions	 ar e	 assumed	 as	self -
e viden t	 truths	 b y	 a	 naïv e	 r ealis tic	 in t erpr e t a tion	 of	 per cep tion.	 Ho w e v er ,	 t oda y	 it	
is	 g ener ally	 accep t ed 	 tha t	 dir ect	 ob ser v a tions	 also 	 migh t	 be	 f alse	 (F orr es t er	 2017). 	
In	 the	 philosoph y	 of	 science,	 this	 means	 tha t	 ther e	 is	 no	 firm	 basis	of	 our	 kno wl-
e dg e ; 	 the 	 me thodolog y 	 has	 t o	 t ak e	 the 	 unce r t ain ty 	 se r iously 	 (Hin tik k a, 	 Halone n 	
and 	 Mut anen	 2002).	 In	 f act,	 logic al 	 positivis ts	 assumed 	 tha t	 ob ser v a tions	 w er e 	
true	and	hence,	g a v e	a	firm	basis	f or	scien tific	kno wledg e.
The	 idea	of	 mor al 	 kno wledg e	 is	similar:	mor al 	 kno wledg e	 mus t	be	 able	 t o	 be 	
constructed in uncertainty. The self-evidency remains the self-evidency in logic 
and	 in	 ma thema tics.	 The y	 ar e	 not	 self -e viden t	 in	 the	 sense	 tha t	 e v er y one	 r ec og-

28 Bogoslovni vestnik 83 (2023) • 1
niz es	 the 	 truth	 or 	 f alsity 	 of	 ma thema tic al	 or 	 logic al	 pr opositions, 	 but	 tha t 	 the 	 truth 	
or falsity can, in principle, be guaranteed independently of empirical evidence. In 
mor al 	 philosoph y	 the	 situa tion	 is	similar:	the	 method	 of	 though t	 e xperimen ts 	
pla y s	a	c ons tructiv e	r ole	in	the	c ons truction	of	mor al	kno wledg e.
In	 r e ligio us	 kno wledg e	 the	 situ a tion	 is	 similar .	 Ther e	 ar e	 no	 dir ect	 and	 truth ful	
ob ser v a tions	 of	 God 	 or	 of	 r eligious	 f acts. 	 The y	 ar e,	 mor e	 or	 less,	 theor y	 depen-
dent. The theory is not well formulated theory as in natural sciences or mathemat-
ic s, 	 but 	 a	 de libe r a t e d	 and	 e xpe r ie n tial	 v ie w 	 of	 lif e , 	 w hic h	 be g ins	 w ith	 a	 r e lig ious 	
atmosphere and ends with deep religious faith as the fundament of life and real-
ity and even theological knowledge. The deep religious faith recalls the atmo-
sphere of ancient Greek in which there was no immanent tension between values 
and	 f acts: 	 human	 in t ellect	 w as	 looking 	 a t	 the 	 g ood	 of	 the 	 human	 being	 which	 w as 	
in balance with the macrocosms. 
It	 is	 pos sible	 t o	 e x er cise	 the	 skill	 of	 r eligious	 per cep tion.	 The	 mer e	 per cep tion	
is	 not	 g ood 	 enough,	 ther e	 is	 a	 need 	 f or	 deeper	 under s t anding	 (Hor v a t	 and 	 R os z ak 	
2020).	 Ho w e v er , 	 e x er cising 	 per cep tual	 skills	 is	not	 jus t	learning	 t o	 per ceiv e, 	 it	 is 	
also 	 learning	 t o 	 in t erpr e t. 	 The	 in t erpr e t a tiv e	 skills	 ar e	 de v eloped 	 b y	 analy zing	 dif-
f er en t	 kinds	 of	 situa tions	 whic h	 is	 the	 c ase	 in	 e xperimen t al	 science,	 in	 analy zing	
diff er en t	 kinds	 of 	 though t	 e xperimen ts 	 in	 mor al 	 philosoph y	 (Br o wn 	 and 	 F ehig e 	
2019),	and	in	r eligious	epis t emology	(Pla t o vnjak	2021;	Als t on	1991).	
5. Identification
Let us consider the following everyday example. An agent perceives that there is 
a book on the table. Basically, we interpret this such that the perceiver is standing 
ne x t	 t o 	 the	 t able,	 and 	 he/ she	 has	 a	 dir ect	per cep tion 	 which 	 demons tr a t es	 tha t 	
ther e	 is	 a	 book	 on	 the	 t able.	 A	 Wittg ens t einian	 in t erpr e t a tion	 of	 this	 c ould	 be	 tha t 	
the agent sees the object as a book. However, it is not easy to say what it precise-
ly	 means	 t o	 sa y	 tha t	 someone	 sees	 some thing	 “ as	 F ”	 (wher e	 F	 is	 some	 qualifier).	
Hin tikk a	 (1969)	 giv es	 the 	 f ollo wing 	 in t erpr e t a tion	 of	 seeing.	 Saarinen	 (1983)	 giv es 	
the	f ollo wing	e x ample	which	giv es	the	pr ecise	meaning	of	per cep tions:
The	 sen t ence	“ Johns	 sees	tha t	 Mar y	runs”	 is	 in t erpr e t ed	 as	 f ollo w s:	In	 all	 pos-
sible	 w orlds	 which	 ar e	 c ompa tible	 with	 wha t	 John	 (actually)	 sa w ,	 Mar y	 runs.	 The	
in t erpr e t a tion	 migh t 	 sound	 unimport an t.	 But	 it	 t ells	tha t 	 in	 f act	 John	 sees	 tha t 	
Mar y	 runs, 	 and	 a t	 the 	 same 	 it	 does	 not	 mean	 tha t	 the 	 ob ser v a tion	 implies	 tha t 	
the observed is true. The observed thing need not be a factual thing. The funda-
men t al	 f act	 in	 obser v a tion,	 acc or ding	 t o 	 Hin tikk a’ s	 in t erpr e t a tion,	 is	 tha t	 the	 object 	
ob ser v ed 	 is	 iden tified 	 per cep tually . 	 The	 per cep tual 	 iden tific a tion 	 need 	 not	 be	 an-
chor ed	 t o	 f actual 	 truth 	 but	 t o	 the	 ob ser v a tional 	 space	 of	 the	 ob ser v er . 	 This	 allo w s 	
us	 t o	 under s t and	 ho w	 ob ser v a tional	 err or s	 t ak e	 place.	 Ho w e v er , 	 this	 mak es	 it	 pos-
sible	 t o	 me thod ic ally	 t ak e	 in t o	 acc oun t	 the	 uncert ain ty	 of	 per cep tion	 in	 the	 c on-
s truction	of	kno wledg e.

29 Ivan Platovnjak et al. - On Religious Knowledge
The 	 iden tific a tion	 of	 running	 Mar y	 t ak es	 place 	 per cep tually .	 T o	 c ons truct	 pr op-
er	 kno wledg e 	 fr om	 the 	 per cep tion	 one 	 has	 t o	 me thodic ally	 tr ans f orm	 fr om	 the 	
per ceptual	 truth	 t o	 f actual	 truth	 which	 is	 iden tified	 f actually	 (Hin tikk a	 1969).	 How -
e v er ,	 ther e	 is	 no	 in f allible	 w a y	 t o	 mak e	 such	 a	 tr ansition.	 Of	 c our se, 	 scien tific	 pr ac-
tices	 ar e	 r eliable	 means	 t o	 do	 such	 a	 tr ansition.	 Her e	 w e 	 f ace	 the 	 pr oblem 	 of	 r eal-
ism which has been discussed in the philosophy of science for decades or even 
millennia	(Niiniluot o	1999).
In	 r e ligious	 pe r ce p tion	 the 	 situa tion	 is	 similar .	 The 	 pe r ce p tion	 is, 	 as	 pe r ce p tion	
in	 g e ne r al, 	 unce r t ain.	 Ho w e v e r , 	 the 	 log ic al	 s tr uctur e 	 of	 r e lig ious	 pe r ce p tion	 is	 lik e	
the logic of seeing. Hence a structurally similar argument can be applied to jus-
tif y	 r eligious	 per ception. 	 As	w e	 ha v e	 seen,	the	 theor y	 dependence	 of	 r eligious 	
per cep tion	 is	 similar	 t o	 tha t	 in	 e xperimen t al	 science:	 the	 theor y	 dependency	 in-
cr eases	 when 	 the	per ceptions	 bec ome	 mor e	 c omple x.	 A t	 the	same	 time,	 this 	
means	tha t 	 r eligious	 epis t emology 	 is	not 	 a 	 closed	 s y s t em, 	 but	 it	 c an	 be	 jus tified 	
r a tionally	 in	 a	r e asonable	 hum an	 c ommunity .	 Of	 c our se,	 as	in	 science,	also	 in	 r e-
ligious life the deeper truths become more and more complex which supposes 
deeper	 (theologic al)	 kno wledg e. 	 Ho w e v er ,	 as	in	 art,	 the	 r eligious	 c ommunity	 is 	
open. All humans can become members of a religious community. Experiencing 
religious reality supposes only an open mind and deepening faith. So, in religious 
epis t emology ,	 ther e	 is	 no	 need	 f or	 r adic al	 r ela tivism.	 Ho w e v er ,	 a	 cert ain	 moder-
a t e	 r ela tivism	 mus t	 be	 accep t ed, 	 but	 in	 this	 w a y 	 an	 open	 dialogue 	 be tw een	 diff er-
en t	human	c ommunities	is	main t ained.
Usually ,	 the	 iden tific a tion	 of	 the	 per cep tual	 object	 c onsider s	 so-c alled	 “ dir ect	
per ception. ” 	 How ev er ,	 w e	 ha v e	 t o 	 discuss	 per ception 	 mor e	 closely . 	 In	 the	 phi-
losoph y 	 of	 science, 	 it	 w as	 usual	t o	 c onsider 	 theor e tic al	 languag e	 and	obser v a-
tional	 languag e.	 The	 objects	 r e f err ed	 b y	 ob ser v a tional	 languag e	 w er e	 though t	 t o	
be	 able	 t o	 be	 per ceiv ed	 dir ectly .	Theor etic al	 objects, 	 by	 de finition, 	 ar e	 theory 	
dependen t	 and	 hence	 not	 dir ectly	 per ceiv able.	 (Suppe	 1977)	 Hin tikk a’ s	 In t err og-
a tiv e 	 model	 allo w s	 us	 t o	 c onsider 	 the 	 t opic 	 mor e 	 fle xibly:	 The 	 dis tinction	 be tw een 	
ob ser v a tional	 and	 theor e tic al	 languag e	 is	 not	 an y	 mor e	 c a t eg orial	 but	 a	 pr actic al	
dis tinction	 in	 which	 the 	 r ole 	 of	 the 	 en tity 	 or 	 the 	 pr operty 	 de t ermines	 its	theor y 	
dependence.
Als t on	 (1991)	 has	 a	 similar	 classific a tion.	 He	 sa y s	 tha t	 an	 ob ser v a tion	 migh t	 be	
ab solut ely	 immedia t e,	 media t ely	 immedia t e,	 or	 media t ed.	 The	 fir s t	 is	 some	 kind	
of	 dir ect	 a w ar eness	 of	 the	 object.	 The	 sec ond	 is	 lik e	 usual	 dir ect	 per cep tion.	 The	
thir d	 is	 per cep tion	 in	 which	 the	 per ceiv er	 per ceiv es	 some thin g	 fr om	 which	 he	 or	
she	 per ceiv es	 the	 object	 itself . 	 As	 an	 e x ample,	 Als t on 	 giv es	 the	 f ollowing:	 “ as	 when 	
I	 t ak e 	 a	 v apor 	 tr ail	 acr oss	 the 	 sk y 	 as	 an	 indic a tion	 tha t	 a	 je t	 plane 	 has	 flo wn	 b y . ” 	
In	 the 	 philosoph y 	 of	 science 	 ther e 	 has	 been	 a	 similar 	 discussion	 (Suppe 	 1977; 	
1987).	 Hin tikk a’ s	 In t err og a tiv e	 model 	 al lo w s	 us	t o	 ha v e	 a	 much	 mor e	 fle xibl e	 in-
t e r pr e t a tion	 in	 which	 the 	 pe r ce p tion	 is	r e la tiv iz e d	 t o	 its	 r ole 	 in	 the 	 in t e r r og a tiv e 	
pr ocess.	 The 	 In t err og a tiv e 	 model	 has	 thr ee 	 theor e tic ally 	 diff er en t	 kinds	 of	 per cep-
tion.	 Th e	 fir s t	 is	 dir ect	 per cep tion	 in	 which	 the	 per cep tion	 is	 not	 a t	 all	 theor y	 de-
pe nde n t.	 Only 	 the 	 c onc e p tual	 de pe nde nc y 	 of	 pe r c e p tion	 holds	 w hic h	 is	 spe c ifie d 	

30 Bogoslovni vestnik 83 (2023) • 1
by	 the	 model 	 r ela tiv e	 t o	 which	 per ception	 is	 made. 	 The	 sec ond 	 is	 the	 iden tific a tion 	
which 	 means	tha t	 the	 per ceiv ed 	 pr edic a t e	 or	 object	 is	de fined 	 r ela tiv e	 t o 	 some 	
theor y	 and	 r ela tiv e	 t o	 some	 per cep tual	 par ame t er s.	 The	 thir d	 is	 usual	 theor y	 de-
pendency 	 in	 which	 per cep tion	 is	r ela tiv e 	 t o	 the 	 underlying 	 theor y 	 and	 scien tific 	
inquir y .	(Mut anen	and	Halonen	2018)
W e	 ha v e 	 analy sed	 r eligious	 per cep tion	 such	 tha t	 ther e 	 is	no	 need	t o	 assume 	
strong theory dependency. It is enough that the perceiver accepts the religious 
atmosphere which means that his or her worldview is religious. Hence according 
t o	 Hin tikk a’ s	 model, 	 the 	 r eligious	 per cep tion	 is	 dir ect	 per cep tion.	 Of	 c our se, 	 as	 w e 	
ha v e 	 r ec ogniz ed, 	 the 	 deeper 	 r eligious	 per cep tions	 migh t	 be	 s tr ongly 	 theor y 	 de-
penden t	–	in	principle,	ther e	is	no	upper	bound	of	theor y	dependency .	
6. Closing Words
W e	 ha v e	 analy z ed	r eligious	 per cep tion	 and	r eligious	 epis t emology	 as	a	 par allel 	
pr ocess	 with	 g ener al	 epis t emology 	 and	per ception	 and	with	 mor al	 per ception 	
and moral epistemology. The analysis shows several important aspects which 
ar e	 w orth	 further	 s tudy ,	 especially	 the	 ques tion	 of	 r eligious	 r ealism	 which	 opens	
ne w	 ques tions	 f or	 further	 s tudy . 	 In	 the	 analy sis	 of	 r eligious	 r ealism,	the	 notion 	
of	 imagina tion	 migh t	 be	 used	 mor e	 s y s t ema tic ally .	 “ The	 idea	 being:	 if	 y ou	 c an	 do	
it	 in	 imagina tion, 	 y ou	 c an	 do	 it	 in	 r eality .	 If	 y ou	 c an	 imagine	 e x changing 	 ide n titi-
es,	 then	 y ou	 c an	 imagine	 doing 	 tha t	 in	 r eal	 lif e. ”	 (K earne y	 in	 Mar celo	 2017,	 788)	
However, the study of religious epistemology and religious realism must not take 
the 	 f or m	 of	 pr oud	 se lf -c on fide nce .	 Be lie v e r s	 mus t	 r e c og niz e 	 “the 	 fr ag ility 	 of	 the ir	
f aith”	 (Pla t o vnjak 	 and	S v e t elj	 2018,	 381)	 which	 en t ails	tha t 	 r eligious	 kno wledg e 	
is	ne v er	 r eady -made 	 and	cert ain.	 Hence	 the 	 r eal	 option	 is	“t o	 t ak e	 the 	 pa th	 of 	
permanen t	 ‘ disc ipleship’”	 (381)	 which	 allo w s	 us	 not	 t o	 t ak e	 the	 seemings	 as	 self-
-e viden t	 but	 be	 “ a w ar e	 tha t	 wha t	 he	 sees	 and	 hear s	 is	 not	 only	 wha t	 he	 ‘ sees	 a t	
fir s t	sigh t ’”	(382)	is	not	all	tha t	ther e	is.	
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