27
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
R a s o u l  R a s o u l i p o u r
In September 2007, during my first visit to the University of Notre 
Dame, I was invited for a talk at the Eastern Mennonite University in 
Harrisonburg, Va. It was the time when they were opening a centre for 
interfaith dialogue named “Abraham’s Tent.” As a Shia Muslim who is 
familiar with the Holy Qur’an1, I knew about the story of Abraham’s 
sacred guests – it is narrated in the Qur’an in two chapters2 -- but this 
was the first time I noticed that the story is about ‘strangers’ – strangers 
who are ‘sacred’!
[Muhammad], have you heard the story of the honoured guests of Abra-
ham? They went in to see him and said, ‘Peace.’ ‘Peace,’ he said, [adding to 
himself ] ‘These people are strangers.’ (51:24−25)
Here God sets the scene that would become the prime example of 
how one’s love ought to be directed outwardly, by his own encounter 
with Abraham outside his tent one hot Middle Eastern afternoon. As 
we examine the event and look at the manner of speech, the meal pro-
vided, and the attention paid to the strangers, we are shown the extent 
that Abraham was willing to fully give of himself to someone else with-
out making the typical distinctions that we make in our lives in regard 
to other people. 
Now, in the society of this time it would not have been strange to see 
a host be giving and generous to a visitor – it would in fact have been 
“strange and disturbing” if Abraham had not attended to his guests in 
some way or shape, going beyond modern Western norms of simply 
1  The citations in this article are from The Holy Quran, A new translation, trans. Abdel Hal-
eem M.A.S. (New York: Oxford World’s Classics, 2004).
2  Chapters: 15:51−60 and 51:24−37. The story is narrated with some slight differences in 
Genesis 18:4−8.
https://doi.org/10.35469/poligrafi.2020.234 Poligrafi, no. 99/100, vol. 25, 2020, pp. 27–44
P O L I G R A F I
28
offering a kind smile or word. What one must pay attention to is the 
overwhelming gifts that Abraham offers to these strangers that had ap-
peared outside his tent. God saw in Abraham a precious love, one that 
was fixed on the “other” as opposed to itself; he saw a love that took the 
norms of its society and superseded them in every aspect.
Abraham was truly an example: devoutly obedient to God and true in 
faith. He was not an idolater; he was thankful for the blessings of God who 
chose him and guided him to a straight path. We gave him blessings in this 
world, and he is among the righteous in the Hereafter. (16:120−122)
Also,
Who but a fool would forsake the religion of Abraham? We have chosen 
him in this world and he will rank among the righteous in the Hereafter. 
(2:130)
Abraham was one who did not count the cost of his love for the 
total stranger. He adhered to that revolutionary idea that humanity 
was found outside one’s close personal primary group, that it could be 
found in potentially dangerous strangers who were in need. God chose 
him as a model because he saw that the practices Abraham puts into 
play here reveal the “common humanity that runs deeper than custom-
ary distinctions of kin and stranger, friend and enemy.”3 
This story challenges us to redirect our love and look outwards to the 
“other.” Throughout Abraham’s meeting with the strangers, he is una-
ware that he is in the presence of the Divine. This is the point that God 
wants to convey to human beings: We should treat others as though we 
were relating to God because of the dignity that he has imparted to us,4 
our common humanity, and the single family we share through Adam 
in blood and Abraham in faith. Islam itself takes a similar approach 
and sees that in this event “God is portrayed as a guest for whose visit 
one must always be prepared.”5 That preparedness refers to the unselfish 
3  J. Gerald Janzen, Abraham and All the Families of the Earth: A Commentary on the Book of 
Genesis 12−50 (Grand Rapids: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 53.
4  According to the beginning Qur’anic verses, 38:72.
5  Snjezana Akpinar, “Two Responses to ‘Interreligious Dialogue and Spiritual Hospitality’: 
Hospitality in Islam,” Religion East & West 7 (2007): 1, https://issuu.com/drbu/docs/issue7_
art2.
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
29
self-giving love of Abraham that God encountered outside his tent, one 
He wishes replicated in each and every one of us.
In this paper, I explore the causes of humanity’s alienation from God 
and argue the necessity of respecting the basic equality and human dig-
nity of every person that results from God’s creation in order to initiate 
restoration. 
The conflicts in our world today largely find their origin in our al-
ienation from God and one another. This alienation is the result of hu-
man forgetfulness – the root of the Qur’anic word for human, nasy, is 
“forgetful one” – that produces sin.  
Do not be like those who neglect God and God causes them to be oblivi-
ous to their own souls. (59:19)
… they have forgotten God, so he has forsaken them. (9:67)
This alienation from God, the one thing that binds all human groups 
most tightly, causes true alienation from one another. Without remem-
brance – the antidote to forgetfulness – of our relationship with the 
True God, who is the Ultimate Other, we fashion an idol for ourselves. 
So remember Me; I will remember you… (2:152)
Those who have faith and whose hearts find peace in the remembrance of 
God – truly it is in the remembrance of God that hearts find peace. (13:28) 
Worshipping a theological ideology, which focuses on one char-
acteristic of God to the exclusion of another rather than opening to 
the infinite and expansive Mystery of the Divine Other, is also an 
idolatry practiced by extremists in religious traditions. Worshipping 
an exclusivist notion of God has implications not only for religious 
practice but also for global human relationships. When one’s religious 
views cause one to disrespect the religious belief and practice of those 
outside their own tradition, tension naturally occurs. Instead of see-
ing “the other” in their entirety, as another human person who is 
owed dignity and respect, it becomes easy to define them solely by 
how they are opposed to us. Having reduced our understanding of 
their identity to this one distinguishing quality, it becomes easy to 
objectify and manipulate them, and more difficult to establish mean-
ingful, mutual relationships with them. Thus, even as we move away 
P O L I G R A F I
30
from authentic religious practice which draws us closer to God, we 
find ourselves moving further and further away from others in the 
human family. In the process, we dehumanise the other, and conflict 
and injustice ensue.
Abrahamic religions understand that while God is present in the 
world today, there is an unavoidable awareness of separation between 
God and humans that we must struggle to overcome throughout our 
time here in this world. This separation does not come from God’s be-
ing eternal and humanity’s being temporal, rather it results from the 
fact that human beings sin.
The principle components of any religion are orthodoxy and ortho-
praxy – what is right to believe and what is right to do – a combina-
tion that defines the lives of its adherents. In the Abrahamic religions, 
the relationship between orthodoxy and orthopraxy takes on a spe-
cial characteristic. All three of the Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Chris-
tianity, and Islam, are founded on divine revelation. Their beliefs and 
practices, at the core, trace back to a message or command from God 
Himself. According to this tradition, orthodoxy and orthopraxy have 
in God their source and subject. The divine revelation has also shown 
humans to be in a relationship with – Hebrew bərit (covenant), Greek 
diatheke (covenant, testament) Arabic misaq (pledge) – that prescribes 
their behaviours and practices. This relationship between God and 
man is defined by mutual commitment and explicit responsibilities. 
These overarching principles form the framework of a society marked 
by harmony and peace, in which humans fulfil their responsibilities 
toward God through their treatment of the “other.” Thus, these cov-
enants signify that believers have a responsibility and duty to obey, 
have faith in, and revere God. Additionally, just as a son has a re-
sponsibility to care for and protect his siblings, as well as his father’s 
livestock, land and other possessions, the believer has a responsibility 
to maintain and uphold the dignity of his fellow man, even if he is 
not a “brother in faith,” but as a part of God’s creation, “belonging” 
to God, as it were. As the Qur’an enjoins:
Be a community that calls for what is good, urges what is right, and forbids 
what is wrong: those who do this are the successful ones. Do not be like those 
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
31
who, after they have been given clear revelation, split into factions and fall 
into disputes... (3:104−110)
A sense of religious duty has been used to justify acts of violence 
through history, from the bloody “conversions” of the Crusades to ter-
rorist acts on 9/11 and sectarian suicide bombings in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
India, and Pakistan. The same scriptures that reveal the duty toward the 
other also contain instances of seemingly sanctioned violence toward 
the other. The book of Joshua, for example, contains the issues of “the 
ban,” the practice of killing all living things in a conquered city or en-
campment and holy war.6 In the Gospel of Matthew Christ states that 
He has come not to bring peace but a sword,7 and Sura al-Tawba (Re-
pentance) of the Qur’an commands that idolaters be “killed,” “seized,” 
and “besieged.”8
However, each of these cases can be explained in context. Though 
all of these passages seem to advocate violence towards the other, any 
general application of them is an abusive misunderstanding. Of course, 
as history attests, such interpretations have sometimes been applied and 
have often coloured interactions between and attitudes toward mem-
bers of different faiths and ethnic groups. Yet the “other” is not, for 
the true believer, to be regarded with fear or suspicion or murderous 
intent. Rather the other is of infinite value, both as a being created by 
God and a path towards greater relationship with Him. God does allow 
humans to work towards achieving this access to Him and, in essence, 
overcoming the alienation between Himself and humanity. Imam Ali9 
advised his governor to Egypt:
And be aware that people fall under one of two categories: they are either 
your brother and sister in faith, or your equal in creation. (Nahjul Balaqah, 
“Peak of Eloquence,” letter 53)
6  Chapters 1−12.
7  Matthew 10:34−36.
8  Chapter 9: 6, 12−14.
9  Ali ibn Abi Talib (600-661 CE), the first Imam of Shias who was the cousin and son-in-law 
of the Prophet Muhammad. He ruled over the Islamic caliphate from 656 to 661. He was the 
first male who accepted Islam. Sunnis consider Ali the fourth and final of the rightly guided 
Caliphs. Shias consider him and his descendants the rightful successors to the Prophet. This 
disagreement split the Muslim community into the Sunni and Shia branches. 
P O L I G R A F I
32
God would not allow humans to become misguided without ma-
king it clear that there was a path towards repairing this void betwe-
en humanity and Himself. Through the examples put forth within all 
the Divine Scriptures, humans can become illuminated about the path 
that will lead them towards a reunion with God. The Qur’an gives an 
example of how to journey towards becoming closer with God and 
overcoming that alienation. One way to begin viewing how the Qur’an 
reveals its evidence about moving forward in a journey towards union 
with God is to see how the Qur’an views what is sacred and what is not. 
One can find such an example through the passage:
Wherever you turn, there is His Face. (2:115)
The same phrase can be seen in the Bible: 
Behold me; here am I. (Isaiah 65:1)
These passages show that, rather than alienation, wherever one 
turns, God is reflected. This involves seeing the sacredness of the other 
and understanding that Allah is the source of all existence and all co-
smic and human qualities as well as the End to Whom all things return. 
The Qur’an is pointing out very clearly that God is not simply sitting 
on His throne in heaven, but is present wherever you look; because of 
His all-encompassing presence, one must treat what one sees with the 
respect they would show God.
Religion, as some philosophers of religion have defined it, is but a 
“diagnosis and cure.”10 A religion proposes a diagnosis (an account of the 
basic problem) and a cure (how to decisively solve that problem) – one 
basic problem shared by every human person and one fundamental so-
lution that, however adapted to different cultures and cases, is essenti-
ally the same across the board. Religions differ insofar as their diagnosis 
and cures differ. For example some religions are monotheistic and some 
10  Keith Yandel, Philosophy of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). Regarding 
“diagnosis and cure” in some of the non-Abrahamic religions, Yandel says: “According to Ad-
vaita Vedanta, the sickness is our ignorance of our being identical with Brahman and the cure 
is gaining this knowledge. According to Jainism, the sickness is that we think we are ignorant 
and dependent and the cure is learning that we are omniscient and existentially independent. 
According to Theravada Buddhism, our sickness is that we take ourselves to be enduring sub-
stances and the cure is learning that we are only transitory states.” (p. 33)
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
33
are not. Hence some diagnoses are offered in terms of alienation from 
God and cures are presented that concern removing that alienation, 
while other diagnoses and cures make no reference to God. According 
to the Abrahamic traditions, our sickness is sin and the cure is God’s 
mercy and forgiveness, variously tied to our action and repentance or 
not, as the Qur’an says,
Those who remember God and implore forgiveness for their sins if they 
do something shameful or wrong themselves [by transgression] – who forgives 
sins but God? – and who never knowingly persist in doing wrong. (3:135)
So sin can be considered that which causes the separation of huma-
nity and individual humans from God. This is actually a vicious cycle 
– sin separates us from God, separation makes sin more likely, more sin 
increases the separation. 
Moreover, humans are very social creatures. We enjoy being around 
friends, family, and people who share similar traits and values with us. 
For this reason, we tend to form groups that establish our place in so-
ciety. However, the unfortunate effect of forming these “in-groups” is 
that they necessarily define “out-groups.” People in these “out-groups” 
are often shunned by those who are considered part of the “in-group,” 
sometimes with verbal abuse, and even occasionally with physical vio-
lence. The people in these “out-groups” are seen as “strangers,” “aliens,” 
and “others,” designations that can be hard to shake and that can persist 
down through the generations, at least until someone finally chooses to 
conform to what the “in-group” wants them to do or to be. History is 
filled with examples of people, both in the East and in the West, who 
have suffered discrimination because they were relegated to an alien 
status. Interestingly enough, as the world has gotten “smaller” through 
the advent of modern technology and more and more people consider 
themselves to be “world citizens,” the number of “aliens” that are seen 
as outside of the “in-group” has increased. There is no simple solution 
to this problem, unfortunately, as humans always seem to form such 
groups at the expense of others.
In the Qur’an, human beings are not separated into categories based 
on race or language. There is no mention in Surah 49 of the importance 
of one’s lineage or ancestry, but according to piety – those who have 
P O L I G R A F I
34
high ranks with Allah versus those who are sinful and disgraced in the 
eyes of God – for we are all created by God.
People, We created you all from a single man and a single woman, and 
made you into races and tribes so that you should recognize one another. In 
God’s eyes, the most honoured of you are the ones most mindful of Him: God 
is all knowing, all aware. (49:13)
Also,
And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the 
difference of your languages and colours. Verily, in that are indeed signs for 
men of sound knowledge. (30:22)
However, it is important to remember that the relationship of alie-
nation of people from each other and from God is not simply the cause 
of misunderstanding and differences in language. It is deeply rooted at 
the heart of humanity’s relationship to itself and everything else. Ali-
enation can be caused by struggle, oppression or suffering, and that 
is where we find ourselves today. We must realize that conflicts and 
“otherness” can truly cause alienation from ourselves, our fellow human 
beings, and God, as well as the rest of His creation.
We cannot discuss the word “stranger” without mentioning The 
Stranger, Albert Camus’ brilliant novel. The Stranger captures the story 
of a man who does not feel connected to God and cannot see his pur-
pose in this life. While some contend that Meursault, the narrator, may 
suffer from mental illness, more evidence suggests that he suffers from 
an inability to feel or give compassion. Meursault and his story demon-
strate the potential for extreme individualism and violence as a result of 
discrimination and loneliness.
In his article “Camus’ Stranger: His Act of Violence,” Julian Stamm 
attempts to identify the reasoning behind Meursault’s violent act. Be-
fore the murder, Meursault tends to choose to be neutral; instead of 
answering questions or facing tough situations, he passively avoids 
them. When given the opportunity to commit a violent act, he does so. 
Stamm concludes about this act, “Camus clearly implies that this can 
happen to you and to me, that such an act could be repeated over and 
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
35
over again through all time.”11 As Camus may imply, there is certainly 
evidence for the human capacity to commit heinous acts of violence 
against each other. Perhaps, Meursault’s act is the radical potential for 
our free will to go completely awry. Each human is endowed with free 
will, and Meursault’s action demonstrates that there must be a counter-
balance to our free will.
Karen Armstrong presents another choice for Meursault in her TED 
Talk “The Charter for Compassion.” She believes that compassion for 
all people is the gateway to peace and acceptance of others in our world. 
Through a discourse of personal history and extensive research on vari-
ous traditions, Armstrong presents her thesis: “Because in compassion, 
when we feel with the other, we dethrone ourselves from the centre of 
our world and put another person there. And once we get rid of ego, 
then we’re ready to see the divine. And in particular, every single one 
of the major world traditions has highlighted − has said − and put at 
the core of their tradition what’s become known as the Golden Rule.”12
How could we expect to overcome that conflict as a society when 
the conflict can barely be overcome on a person-to-person basis? 
Armstrong’s solution to the conflicts in our world is simple; treat others 
the way you want to be treated. The disconnection between Camus and 
Armstrong directly relates to the larger issue: how do we avoid the fee-
ling of otherness and create a connection with God? Armstrong argues 
that we do that through treating everyone with compassion.
Apparently Rudolf Otto (1869−1937) was the first philosopher to 
talk about “the other” by naming God as “The Wholly Other.”13 Perce-
iving God for him was the numinous experience that evokes fear and 
trembling, a quality of mysticism, the tendency to attract, fascinate and 
compel. The numinous experience also has a personal quality, in that 
the person feels that they are in communion with a wholly other. 
11  Julian L Stamm, “Camus’ Stranger: His Act of Violence,” American Imago 26, no. 3 
(1969): 283, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26302600.
12  Karen Armstrong, “The Charter for Compassion,” filmed February 2008, TED video, 
21:15, http://www.ted.com/talks/karen_armstrong_makes_her_ted_prize_wish_the_char-
ter_for_compassion.html.
13  Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 28.
P O L I G R A F I
36
Martin Buber (1878−1965) and more recently Emmanuel Levinas 
(1906−1995) also speak about ‘the Other.’ Buber coins the ‘I-Thou’ en-
gagement14 and Levinas talks about the ‘Face-to-Face’ relation.15 Here, 
I would like to deal with these two theses:
The book I and Thou by Martin Buber philosophically attempts to 
describe how humans can love others. We constantly categorise each 
other, creating distance between us. Meursault, the main character of 
Camus’s The Stranger, never makes a connection to another being, ne-
ither human nor divine, but Buber’s ideas offer the proper way to do 
so. The underlying philosophy of humanity’s mode of engaging the 
world in Buber’s book is an examination of humanity’s existence that 
entails Meursault’s difficulty in showing compassion towards others. 
He expounds upon Meursault’s inability to connect with others, con-
sidering it a staple problem of modern society and offers a solution 
in the third section of I and Thou. Buber addresses the twofold mode 
of humanity’s relationship with the world. Explained through the two 
terms I-It and I-You, Buber describes the modes of engagement that 
distinguishes the I’s in both expressions. The I in the I-It relationship 
relies on the experience of the objectification of the surrounding world; 
the I in the I-You relationship is purely relational with the world. The 
humans’ twofold mode of existence is further elaborated in part two 
where modern society has shaped man to choose one mode over the 
other. In a predominantly I-It society, Buber argues, man feels alienated 
because of the emptiness brought upon by the lack of relation with the 
world. Ultimately, Buber offers a solution in part three that seeks to 
reform society into a better community by acknowledging the necessity 
of encountering God.
While human encounters with others may be exclusive, Buber argu-
es that in relation to God “unconditional exclusiveness and unconditi-
14  Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1970).
15  Emanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 95. 
Also, I’d like to add that it was only near the completion of my research on this paper that I 
discovered a very inspiring multi-year project on encountering the other as stranger as repre-
sented by people of other religions. The project’s name is: “The Guestbook Project: Hosting the 
Stranger,” which is “an ongoing artistic, academic, and multi-media experiment in hospitality,” 
sponsored by Boston College. It is available online: http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/guestbook/.
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
37
onal inclusiveness are one.”16 It is exclusive in that we relate to the You 
in such a way that we view the universe through God. At the same time, 
the inclusiveness of the “I-God” relationship is brought upon the fact 
that in relating to God, we are relating to His entire universe.
Nevertheless, the same feeling of actually loving another and po-
tentially loving another still exists for the I. Not only is God eternal 
because of His inability to be reduced to an It, but the relation as both 
exclusive and inclusive fosters the actualisation of God within the world 
and makes Him the eternal You.
Through the combined effort of multiple people who have encoun-
tered God, Buber argues, societal reform from a world of I-It to I-You 
can solve the feelings of emptiness and anxiety. Finding God can give 
meaning back to life.
Emmanuel Levinas has a different approach to describing our relati-
onship with the other. For him, the clearest and most potent revelation 
that I am not everything—that everything does not belong to me, and 
that my consciousness does not encompass everything—is the face of 
the Other.17 “Other” here (especially when capitalized) means “someo-
ne else,” “the other person,” “the person I encounter.” If it were not for 
the face of the other person, I might indeed maintain the illusion that 
everything I experience and enjoy (food, landscapes, things) is indeed 
mine. But once I encounter the Other, I realise that there is something 
absolutely and irreducibly apart from myself, and that the world I enjoy 
and seem to possess also belongs to the Other; my possession and sove-
reignty are contested. There is a religious dimension to his thought—
ultimately the Other, who is calling us to service and responsibility, is 
God. He argues, however, that God does not do this directly, but rather 
through the face of the Other— i.e., through the neighbour (“near 
one”), whoever it may be, that I encounter—as well as through scriptu-
re (e.g., the Bible) and through “testimony,” that is, the response within 
16  Buber, I and Thou, 127.
17  However, in a chapter entitled Phenomenology of Eros, describing femininity as a figure 
of otherness, Levinas talks about the manifestation of the beloved “Beyond the Face”; also the 
title of Section IV of the book: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exterior-
ity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & 
Duquesne University Press, 1979), 256−266.
P O L I G R A F I
38
ourselves that (even before we have a chance to analyse or choose it) is 
aroused by the Other.18
Radical conceptions treat the Other as identical to the Self or enti-
rely the opposite. With the recognition that “conceptualizing activity 
is a highly suspect process, [since] conceptualizations of the Other do 
violence to it by forcing alterity to ‘fit’ within predetermined mental 
structures that deprive the Other of its own unique identity.”19 I suggest 
that the most helpful step to take is to avoid the assumption that “the 
Self ” means the known and “the Other” means the unknown. Such a 
perspective leads to misguided statements such as “the Other” is un-
known, therefore…” and similar generalisations. Since all conceptuali-
sations rely, at least on a basic level, on certain primitive assumptions, 
I do not attempt to formulate a proof, but merely offer an alternative 
perspective to many of the radical positions. I propose that alterity can 
best be understood through a paradox: in recognizing the unknown 
within ourselves, we unite with the Other and their unknown qualities. 
The search for satisfaction in God captures this paradox.
Since this paper approaches alterity through a religious perspective, 
it is important to recognise that religious traditions are not constrained 
within any single intellectual paradigm. That is, Christianity and Islam 
emerged prior to the totalising rationality of Modernity and still exist 
through post-modernity. To view such a pre-modern, yet living, religi-
on properly, we must do our best to disassociate Christianity, Islam, or 
other traditions from any one intellectual era or paradigm.
The process of understanding the self and the other is comparati-
ve. Through focusing on similarities and, more importantly, differences 
between others and ourselves, we form identities. Our descriptions of 
others and ourselves involve characteristics and other forms of distinc-
tion to emphasise how we are like or unlike each other. This focus not 
only defines how we view others, but also how we view ourselves. The 
entire system of descriptions turns on what separates one person from 
another. To describe myself as a citizen of the world might have a nice 
18  Richard A. Cohen, ed., Face to Face with Levinas, SUNY Series in Philosophy (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1986), 27.
19  Marsha A. Hewitt, “Alterity and Ethics,” Religion 27, no. 2 (1997): 101–105, https://doi.
org/10.1006/reli.1997.0068.
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
39
ring to it, but it doesn’t give a customs officer any information he might 
need to know. For me to be able to differentiate myself as an individual, 
I must be able to use words that set me apart from others. In this sense, 
the Self is not inherently known, but merely created relative to those 
around it. That is, perspectives on what make us each unique do inhe-
rently that: define us in comparison with others. In this sense, our un-
derstanding of ourselves comes not from within, but from the outside.
Due to this weak ability to understand the Self, Jonathan Smith ar-
gues that the Other becomes “most problematic when he is too-much-
-like-us …The problem is not alterity, but similarity.”20 That is, since 
the definition of the Self comes from comparisons to others, defining 
the Self as unique becomes problematic when the Other is not obvi-
ously so different. This tension, Smith asserts, creates identity issues. 
Curtis Freeman, however, offers a powerful alternative to Smith’s asser-
tions. He writes that an account of alterity is needed wherein “otherness 
is not simply the mirror image of the regnant ideology but something 
radically other. Only from such a standpoint of radical otherness can 
there be the leverage to subvert the structures of representation and 
domination.”21
I suggest that such radical positions fall under the category of “to-
talizing rationality.” We encounter the unknown constantly; we learn 
about foreign cultures on television, meet new people in the classroom 
or at work, and we recognize new thoughts and emotions inside our-
selves. The unknown is not merely foreign cultures or separate religi-
ons. Through recognising that the known and unknown are not merely 
the Self and the Other, respectively, alterity takes on a new dimension. 
While the Other may indeed have qualities we do not understand, re-
cognising the unknown in both the Other and the Self leads to a com-
monality between the two. 
Edith Wyschogrod argues powerfully that, “a moral theory that 
promotes the conditions of agency for others betrays alterity in that 
20  Jonathan Z. Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in To See Ourselves as Oth-
ers See Us: Christians, Jews and “Others” in Late Antiquity, ed. Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. 
Frerichs (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985): 47.
21  Curtis W. Freeman, “Alterity and its Cure,” Cross Currents 59, no. 4 (2009): 404–441, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24461588.
P O L I G R A F I
40
it presupposes the other as a ‘second self ’ to whom the conditions of 
agency are to be extended.”22 Such a radical position, however, ignores 
the fact that including “the unknown” as a quality of both the Self 
and the Other, does not actually make any presuppositions about the 
Other. Such radical positions are untenable insofar as they remove the 
possibility of any commonality between the Self and the Other. Indeed, 
Wyschogrod’s thesis asserts that the only means of connecting with the 
Other are through entirely rejecting the Self. Marsha Hewitt correctly 
notes that “such a view is not only politically problematic as a prescrip-
tion for daily conduct; it is also unsatisfactory. How can one possibly 
see another, feel another’s need and suffering, if one has no sense of self 
that allows one to feel pain and suffering in ways that allow for basic 
human empathy toward the other’s situation?”23
Whereas the alterity theorists I have cited focus on whether or not 
we can extend the traits we find in ourselves to the Other, I suggest that 
we ought to view the dilemma from the opposite perspective. The que-
stion changes from “Which of my qualities can I ascribe to the Other?” 
to “Are there traits in myself that I do not understand even as I con-
demn the unknown of the Other?” In this new perspective, the goal 
of discourse and establishing identities is not to control or be able to 
manipulate. Rather, engagement leads to greater insights about both 
the Other and ourselves that move towards unity. The drive for power 
through knowledge turns against itself when one recognises the Un-
known inherent in himself. This paradox, that through our undefined 
or recognised qualities we are the same as the Other, leads to true unity. 
Indeed, proper religion itself embodies this beautiful uncertainty. Even 
as God is the ultimate Other, unknowable and transcendent, the call of 
religion is to experience satisfaction and hope in Him. Religion calls us 
both toward and away from ourselves through embracing the unknown 
both in God and ourselves. There is a unity in building community 
around the unknown. We are in a world that, because of sin, constantly 
22  Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 71.
23  Hewitt, “Alterity and Ethics,” 103.
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
41
fails to achieve its aim, but at the same time we are creatures of a God 
who does not fail. 
Lisette Josephides offers “moments” of this paradox in action. She 
explains that the Pauline ecclesia in Christianity, for example, was a 
“community of foreigners, founded on missionary activity undertaken 
in the name of charity (caritas, ‘love’) and as a ‘means of summoning 
people of goodwill against xenophobia and racism’ (Kristeva 1993: 23). 
The ecclesia is made up of ‘uprooted wanderers’ assimilated to a group 
new to all (1993: 22).”24 She continues through the “moment” of “the 
exodus of Jews from Egypt and Ruth’s marriage to Boaz (whose chil-
dren founded the lineage of kings) reminds us that ‘divine revelation 
requires a disparity, the welcoming of a radical otherness, the ackno-
wledging of foreignness …’ (1993: 24)”25 In each of these moments we 
encounter the assimilation of foreignness into the Self. I disagree with 
Josephides, however, on the assimilation of the Other. Since the Self 
is not entirely known, the Other need not transition from unknown 
into known to become my brother or sister. I may indeed welcome the 
foreignness of the Other, but she must not assimilate into the known in 
order to become welcome. 
Obviously, paradoxes cannot be entirely elucidated. By their very 
nature they are convoluted and resist explanation. Yet through at least 
recognising the paradox of alterity, I hope that the suppressing rationa-
lity of radical schemes might give way to a moderate understanding of 
otherness. The known and unknown exist in both the Other and the 
Self. Ironically, part of the “known” in both the Self and the Other is 
the fact that each includes the “unknown.” Through an understanding 
of the utter transcendence and otherness of God we can better respect 
the Other and seek to move beyond the negative alterity which divides 
us and creates schisms.
24  Lisette Josephides, “Cosmopolitanism as the existential condition of humanity,” Social 
Anthropology 18, no. 4 (2010): 391, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2010.00121.x: 391.
25  Ibid.
P O L I G R A F I
42
Conclusion
If the human problem is alienation and the solution is reconcili-
ation, the first step is recognising that alienation and its effects, then 
choosing to view the Other as one with equal dignity and deserving 
respect. The otherness of the other is not the problem. We can choose 
to treat the other as an object, an inferior and an enemy, or we can 
choose to treat the other as an equal actor in our shared space and time 
who deserves the same esteem, rights and privileges that we desire for 
ourselves. Such a stance does not require or imply love or special com-
mitment – indeed, it is the recognition of a not-special commitment, 
a commitment owed to every human being, that can become the arena 
of our activity and a foundation for love. 
The process of moving from alienation to relationship, compassion, 
and hospitality first of all involves a process of critical self-reflection, of 
learning to see our unconscious complicity in the structures and pre-
judices which alienate us from one another. The hoped-for fruit of this 
critical self-reflection is an awakening to the value of the other and 
the corresponding discovery of the capacity for relationship with this 
other, born from the acceptance of the other in their very otherness. 
The Other need not transform from unknown into known to become 
my brother or sister. I may indeed accept and respect the otherness of 
the Other. 
Acceptance and respect for the other, even acknowledgement of du-
ties toward the other as a fellow human being, is a necessary step toward 
curing the alienation that afflicts humanity. It is necessary, but not su-
fficient. This recognition is the precondition for love and compassion, 
a disposition which in turn leads us to extend ourselves in hospitality, 
welcoming the stranger in our midst as friend and honoured guest.26 
And it is in extending hospitality that we mysteriously meet God, face 
to face.
26  One of the brilliant philosophers who has made an inspiring contribution to the subject 
of “Hospitality” is Jacques Derrida. See, for example, Gil Anidjar, ed., Jacques Derrida: Acts 
of Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 356–420. Also, John D. Caputo, ed., 
Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 1997).
T H E  O T H E R  A S  M Y  E Q U A L
43
B i b l i o g r a p h y
The Holy Quran, A new translation. Translated by Abdel Haleem M.A.S. New 
York: Oxford World’s Classics, 2004.
Akpinar, Snjezana, “Two Responses to ‘Interreligious Dialogue and Spiritual 
Hospitality’: Hospitality in Islam.” Religion East & West 7 (2007): 23–27. https://
issuu.com/drbu/docs/issue7_art2.
Anidjar, Gil, ed. Jacques Derrida: Acts of Religion. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002.
Armstrong, Karen. “The Charter for Compassion.” Filmed February 2008. 
TED video, 21:15. http://www.ted.com/talks/karen_armstrong_makes_her_ted_
prize_wish_the_charter_for_compassion.html.
Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970.
Caputo, John D., ed. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with 
Jacques Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press, 1997.
Cohen, Richard A., ed. Face to Face with Levinas. SUNY Series in Philoso-
phy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986.
Freeman, Curtis W. “Alterity and its Cure.” Cross Currents 59, no. 4 (2009): 
404–441. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24461588.
Hewitt, Marsha A. “Alterity and Ethics.” Religion 27, no. 2 (1997): 101–105. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/reli.1997.0068.
Janzen, J. Gerald. Abraham and All the Families of the Earth: A Commentary 
on the Book of Genesis 12-50. Grand Rapids: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Com-
pany, 1993.
Josephides, Lisette. “Cosmopolitanism as the existential condition of 
humanity.” Social Anthropology 18, no. 4 (2010): 389–395. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1469-8676.2010.00121.x.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne Univer-
sity Press, 1985.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority. Translated 
by Alphonso Lingis. The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers & Duquesne University Press, 1979.
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. London: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Smith, Jonathan Z. “What a Difference a Difference Makes.” In To See Our-
selves as Others See Us: Christians, Jews and “Others” in Late Antiquity, edited by 
Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs, 3–48. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985.
Stamm, Julian L. “Camus’ Stranger: His Act of Violence.” American Imago 
26, no. 3 (1969): 281–290. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26302600.
P O L I G R A F I
44
Wyschogrod, Edith. Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Yandel, Keith. Philosophy of Religion. London and New York: Routledge, 
1999.