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# Art Education

## Critical Design for Procedures and Platforms of Contemporary Art Education<sup>1</sup>

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Let us look at some characteristic models of pedagogical platforms emerging throughout the XX century.

### Ideologies of Creation: On Epistemology of Poetics

Knowledge about art, determined by *creation of the work* as the centered ‘object’ is poetic knowledge, implying knowledge about creation and existence of the artwork as such. The concept of ‘poetics’, in modern sense, is germane to various arts: poetics of music, performance poetics, poetics of theatre, poetics of cinema, poetics of architecture, poetics of painting or sculpture, new media poetics, etc. The general idea of explication of poetic aptitude from Aristotle’s *Poetics* (Aristotle, 1997) was beneficial in establishing *humanities* derived from studying art works and ways and means of their creation in a particular historical, but abstractly idealized aesthetic *space*. In most general and modern terms, poetics can be defined as a theory or ‘science’ pertaining to creation and existence of a work of art. Ernesto Grassi (Grassi, 1974) defines ‘poiesis’ as *universal creation*. *Technē* is conceived as a specific *poiesis* accomplishing or grasping the reason (logos) for what is being created. *Technē* is a form of knowledge and knowledge-derived workmanship, while *poiesis* is what nowadays implies art in the broadest sense. Poetics is, therefore, a theoretical, pro-theoretical or para-theoretical protocol referring to analysis and considerations of production of a work of art; namely, procedures of imagining, planning, realization and its subsequent existence. Poetics is a theoretical protocol when devised and performed consistently with the established po-

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1 This essay is a shorter overview of the research that I have outlined in the project/book: Šuvaković, M. (2008) *Epistemology of Art*, Tkh Belgrade, Tanzquartier Wiren, PAF St. Erme (France), Antwerp: Advanced Performance Training.

etics and art theory, with anticipated procedures and predictable effects. Poetics is a pro-theoretical protocol when, in the quiescence of creation (painting, music, acting, performing), commonsense intuitions sprout – about techniques of setting the art work up into the world. Pro-theoretical poetics need not be verbalized as science. It is rather a form of *tacit knowledge* (Kuhn, 1984), a token of safety in creating the work of art as a sensible deed. Poetics is a *para-theoretical* protocol when formulated and performed inconsistently, when implying intuitive, anecdotal, biographical or empirical narratives about the artist, about the origins, existence or reception of his work. And, if poetics is rendered as a protocol for analysis of the origins and modes of existence of an art work, it is then, most commonly, also conceived as a prerequisite for sensuous aspects of the work – the aesthetic reception and aesthetic interpretation of the work of art. In other words, the protocols of poetics facilitate conception of the procedural, indeed conventional continuum between the creator, the act of creation, the work itself, reception of the work and contingent discourses about the work of art and ideas about art elicited from the work. If poetics is prerequisite for such a protocol for securing continuum of ‘art’ in particular or general terms, than art needs to be defined as an autonomous field in relation to the protocols of theology, politics, sociology, psychology, theory of sexuality or culture studies. Protocols of poetics determine contingencies of that supposedly ‘solitary’ and ‘self-sufficient’ artworld, grounded in functions of the work of art as the ideal, centered origin of ‘artistic’ and ‘the arts’. While protocols of other *humanities* and art theories, e.g. psychology and sociology of art, feature as lateral, or oblique, or secondary assumptions and premises for determinable ideality or exceptionality of an art work created in accordance with expectations or re-interpretations foremostly pertaining to poetics – poetics itself is conceived as *the primary* and *true* condition of art humanities, indicating through its protocols, procedures, and effects, that the concept of art as a creative practice is grounded on descriptive renderings of autonomous works of art.

Assumed relationships between poetics and art humanities become considerably more intricate with the question: is poetics always and only a discourse external to the work, pertaining to the work, and merely delivering protocols for genuine and ‘close’ reading of the work? Or: is poetics in a way ‘built’ into the art work or built into the close surroundings of the art work as the constitutional interpretation on the part of the artist, addressing the art work and art, as such?

First answer to this question may be negative: poetics is always and only external, a supra-artistic protocol about procedures of creation and modes of existence of a work of art as such. Poetics is thus perceived as a

form of meta-approach to art, revealing what has been going on around and with the work of art, but not as a direct *speech* flowing from art and the artistic creation itself. According to this view, works of art do not emerge from previous awareness of the protocols of poetics as organized and verbalized knowledge about origins and existence of an art work. Works of art emerge from technical knowledge, assumed to be sensuous and empirical, not conceptual, and from unexpected and uncontrolled 'events' or 'miracles' of transformation of *handicraft* into exceptional art work. A work of art is thus seen as 'embodiment' or 'crystallization' of aesthetics. For instance, the theoretician of Post-Impressionism, Expressionism, and Fauvism, Roger Fry, had clearly and formally determined such notions for painting on the level of modernist *immediately-empirical* artistic creation:

With the new indifference to representation we have become much less interested in skill and not at all interested in knowledge (Fry, 2012, p. 8).

While the critic of high Modernism, of the so called post-painterly abstraction, Clement Greenberg, formulated them on the reception level:

Art is a matter strictly of experience, not of principles. (Greenberg, 1961, p. 133)

Poetics is a means of interpretation of works of art in their aspects receptive to immediate sensuous cognition or commonsense reflections and knowledge of protocols, usually, of creation of art in formal terms. With poetics, one enters analysis of 'sensuously representable form' of the art work and its protocols, nevertheless, not in order to solve the *mystery* or the *miracle of creation* of the artwork (which is usually left to aesthetics and philosophy of art or essayist debates), but to demonstrate possibilities of understanding and rendering, as it were, the protocols of formal contingencies in creating an art work, and its formal existence as a 'sensuous phenomenon'. Poetics results in contingent rules as a possible basis for instruction about creating a work of art and setting the work of art up into the sensuous world. Therefore, the dominant modernist (Harrison, 1991) approach is the one proclaiming that all poetical perspectives, formulations and theory are outcomes of *miraculous* and *unfathomable* creation of the art work and its artistic and aesthetical reception. Namely, it is assumed that the work of art as an exceptional creative product always precedes the poetical and therefrom derived scientific and theoretical formulations pertaining to art. Art is thus perceived as a *miraculous* event similar to natural phenomena.

Second answer to the aforementioned question may be positive: poetics is an internal or immanent, art-pursuing protocol on procedures of creation and modes of existence of an art work. This protocol is explicitly or implicitly employed by the artist who creates an art work. Philosopher Richard Wollheim underlines: what is common to all different and incommensurable works of art is intentionality. Wollheim argues that each work of art, as a human product, has derived from certain intentions which can be conceptually and verbally represented and explicated (1974, pp. 112 – 113). Each work of art is, therefore, poetically determined because it is made intentionally. Poetics is identified as constitutive substance of a work of art. *It* precedes the work or emerges in its creation. Poetics is what viewer/listener/reader reveals in the work as a concept. Ultimately, he/she recognizes, experiences or apprehends the work by way of poetics, as the *vector* guiding his/her perception, experience or reception of the art work. *It* is established as the constitutive and functional protocol for creation, existence, and reception of the work of art. If so, the next question reads: what is this constitutive relationship between the work of art and its particular poetics? Namely, how does poetics exist in the work of art? This also raises a question of relations between ‘perceptible’ and ‘conceptual’ in the work of art. The work of art is not presumed to be or posited as an *autonomous object* (thing, situation, event), isolated from specific geographical and historical culture where it was created, displayed, and perceived, where it entered the process of exchange, reception and consumption of art and culture. The work of art exists, and that is an ontological construction, just and only as part of social practices, and, more precisely, of autonomous artistic practices. This implies that a work of art is connected with relations between social and discursive practices wherein it emerges as perceivable. But being perceivable does not imply exclusion of discursive aspects either from the work or its environment – or its artistic, aesthetical, cultural or social figurations, functions and contingencies. To the contrary, it implies that discursive and perceptible create a kind of a phenomenal-discursive *plan* for origination and existence of the work of art in a particular geographically or historically determined society. Therefore is the work of art not only what emerges before our senses – it is also knowledge of art history, culture theory, social customs, habits or modes of identification (Danto, 1987, p. 162). Arthur C. Danto, in his essay *The Appreciation and Interpretation of Works of Art* (1986, pp. 23-46), elaborated a protocol of relations between the art work and direct and indirect interpretations surrounding and situating it (1987, p. 164) in the Artworld. His initial statement reads:

My view, philosophically, is that interpretations constitute works of art, so that you do not, as it were, have the artwork on one side and the interpretation on the other. (1986, p. 23).

The point in Danto's philosophical identification of relations between interpretation and art work is that quite different or largely similar objects become considerably transformed art works under the influence of diverse and differing interpretations. Therefore, he conceives interpretations as functions of transformation of material objects into works of art. Interpretation is, metaphorically speaking, *a lever* helping an object elevate from the real world into the world of art, where it becomes shrouded into often unexpected *garments*. Only in relations with interpretation a material object becomes a work of art. If we seriously consider Danto's claim about the constitutive role of interpretation in defining works of art, it can be argued that interpretative grasp on the part of the artist becomes embedded in procedures of creation of the work and its inception into the world where it has to be recognized as a work of art. Creation of an art work and its introduction into the world of art and culture were often not the same procedure. Identifying protocols of creation with protocols of initiation into the world of art and culture is a matter of the Modern era. It is the consequence of a complex process occurring from Renaissance to the Enlightenment, when a conception of art work as autonomous did ultimately establish itself: art as art. For the works of the past, the procedure of interpretation of cultural work as work of art is a retrospective introduction into the modern concept of art. On the other hand, the question is raised whether procedures of creation of the work themselves possess interpretative capacities. According to Danto, this is obvious in the case of the works which have become 'art' through interpretative decision of the artist to declare and establish objects, situations or daily events as works of art, say, Marcel Duchamp and his *ready-made*: urinal as an art work (*Fountain*, 1917). Nevertheless, can the question of interpretation refer to techniques established in the tradition of modern art: was a painting subjected to interpretation through the process of its creation, or a music piece through the process of its composition and orchestration? If we agree to a statement, formulated entirely outside of the realm of art, in the field of theoretical psychoanalysis<sup>2</sup>, that technique cannot be understood, and thus cannot be properly applied if we do not apprehend its underlying concepts, it can be assumed that every creation, i.e. application of certain artistic techniques, is an interpretation detect-

2 I refer to Lacan's concept of "psychoanalytical technique", transposed to general notion of technique, even technique of creation in art. See: Lacan, 2007, p. 247.

able in the work itself or in the complex relations between the work and discourses of the culture pertaining to it and making it viable and acceptable as a work of art. Accordingly, a protocol can be formulated, defining poetic as immanent in relation to creation and existence of an art work. Poetics is not identified as philosophy, particular humanity or theory on modes of existence of an art work, but as a discursive network connecting or fostering idiosyncratic and open relations between the author, the work, and the world of art. Such poetics need not be 'verbalized': nevertheless it needs to be demonstrated and made public by way of a protocol. Ultimately, it needs to be reduced to a 'concept'. A concept refers to a depictable abstraction of an art work. The poetic manifests by way of the work itself, or in the relations between the work and critical interpretations empowering it to exist as a work of art in a world of art. Translation of the 'poetic' surrounding the art work into a verbal discourse of *exterior poetics*, humanities or art theory, is an auxiliary operation wherein means of creation and existence of an art work in the world of art, in culture and society, are plainly revealed.

Few other questions now emerge: *is poetics what the work originates from?* Or is it rather a mesh of metaphors, an ensuing protocol verbalizing what is in determination derived from *intuitions* and *empirical experience*? Answers to these questions were addressed by the British art historian Charles Harrison, who based them on examples of differentiation between paradigms of *struggle* in the high modernist art world during the 1950s and early 1960s. He saw the modernist culture after the Second World War as a dialectic culture of two voices: (i) the dominant voice of the Greenberg's autonomous and non-discursive modernity, and (ii) the secondary alternative critical voice. The first voice addressed art, mainly of abstract Expressionism, justified with tacit convictions, fixed meanings, differentiated and strong subject, autonomy of art in relation to *theory of ideas* and *ideology*; namely, with confidence that artistic creative acts always precede discursive interventions of criticism, art history and theory. The second voice addressed art, mainly of Neo-Dadaism, Minimalism and Conceptual Art, based on convictions that the first dominant line was mystifying: that beliefs are public conventions related to the worlds of art and culture, that meanings are complex cultural products, that the subject is embedded in culture and bound to the context of public language games with differentiated histories; that art has autonomy, however not absolute but enmeshed in intertextual relations with *theory of ideas* and *politics*; that aspects of discourse and interpretation are essential elements of art, and that they do not come after the creative act, but inhabit various conventions of generating art (Harrison, 1991, pp. 2 – 6).

If we adopt the protocol pertaining to the second critical voice of Modernism, poetics is not identified as ensuing from the work and featuring as interpretation of its origins and existence through verbalization. Poetics is rather identified as an intricate maze of jargons, discourses, theories, knowledge, beliefs, assumptions or standpoints preceding the subsequent work. Through the execution of the work they are reduced to an 'object', perceivable as an 'art work' and a token of exemplification of preceding discourses. Accordingly, a formulated and implemented poetic theorization of art, in terms of the second voice, becomes a form of critical theory, indexing and mapping (Harrison, 1972, pp. 14 – 16) relations between the preceding discourses which manifest themselves in the execution of the work, and interact with it in subsequent representations, explications, or interpretations. This implies an essential and critical turn from interpretation of artistic creation as an ideal and autonomous act, to interpretation of creation as a material social and cultural practice. Critical positioning of poetical discourse as a *source* or, more often, a discursive *grid* filtering procedures of execution of the work, indicates 'alienation' on the part of the artist from the Romantic authentic creator, the locus of inception and subsequent emanation of the work in the world. The implication is that for the artist, the work becomes a *critical instrument*, and not an autonomous *product* of aesthetic disinterestedness.

### **Ideologies of Creation: On the 'Setting Up' Into the World**

*Ideology of creation* is by all means metaphysically justified with the turn from 'empty' or 'absent' to the set up into the world. This is the metaphysical ontological conception of the work of art emerging from the notion of 'setting up' (*Ge-Stell*) the work into the world. A work *is* what has been created: it has been made and launched into the world to be available for reception (as a visual image, as an acoustic event, as a behavioral situation). The work created exists and in this it differs from all contingent – contemplated, desired or mused – objects, situations, or events. This is already present in Hegel's notion of art as an idea acquiring sensuous externality (Hegel, 1998, 2004). For example, Martin Heidegger formulated one of the most wide-ranging concepts of 'setting up' (enframing) in his studies on *technology*:

Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological. (Heidegger, 1978, p. 302).

The outlined procedure of this very *general* reflection on 'action', when applied to artistic concepts, becomes a platform for questioning relations between the work of art, the artist, and art in the world. Heidegger, therefore, in his article „The Origin of the Work of Art“ begins with the following circular scheme of conceived possibilities for a *fundamental ontology* of art:

Origin here means that from which and by which something (*Sache*) is what it is and as it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is the source of its essence. On the usual view, the work arises out of and by means of the activity of the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what he is? By the work; for to say that the work does credit to the master means that it is the work that first lets the artist emerge as a master of his art. The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither of them is without the other. Nevertheless, neither is the sole support of the other. In themselves and in their interactions artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely that which also gives artist and work of art their names – art (Heidegger, 1978, p. 149).

Fundamental ontology of art is philosophical ontology which, in metaphysical terms, questions existence of any human's *work* in the world, for the world and against the world. Certainly, importance of the work of art in relation to the artist, and to art, is being emphasized. This interdependence is necessary, but not symmetrical. The artist, the work of art and art interact as necessary conditions – nevertheless, *solely important* in terms of its presence in the world is *the work of art*. In Heidegger's interpretation, relevance and centrality of the work of art obtained an elaborated conception of *essentiality in presence*: what is as such and *in itself* essential?

The work of art is not *what* it depicts, it is *the other* of 'it' and in its otherness which becomes sensuously manifest as what *is*, it is established as art. The truth of art is not a collection of established facts about a work of art, an artist or art, but is neither a truth of faithful or reliable representations of the sensuously accessible world. The truth of art, in this metaphysical sense, rests on setting up the work in the world *properly*. *The proper way* is action on the part of the artist which renders the work really present in the world. Heidegger has, therefore, emphasized:

The more simply and essentially the shoes are engrossed in their essence, the more directly and engagingly do all beings attain a greater degree of being along with them. That is how self-concealing Being is be-



ing illuminated. Light of this kind joins its shining (*scheinen*) to and into the work. This shining, joined in the work, is the beautiful (*das Schöne*). Beauty is one way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealedness (Heidegger, 1978, pp. 177 – 178).

But what needs to be observed from the outset is that understanding of such ‘pedagogic discourse’ is not affected by characteristic metaphysical oppositions or confrontations with the unknowable, ineffable, or inexpressible. Understanding of this pedagogic discourse derives from ‘spoken’ or ‘shown’ or ‘presented’ *body* relations between *theory and art* in quite specific material conditions and circumstances (institutions, apparatuses or, vaguely, contexts) of centered and de-centered public or private ‘power’ or ‘social gestures’ pertaining to authentic creative acts. In other words, the ‘unknowable’, ‘ineffable’, or ‘inexpressible’ in creative practice do not evolve from some *primordial pre-human chaos* or *quasi-natural all-human existence*. They are material discursive creations pertaining to certain historical and geographic conditions and circumstances of pedagogic practices addressing performance as sensuous incentive. They are means of regulating and deregulating relations between theory, art, and the creative body. Therefore, concerning pedagogy of artistic creation, fundamental questions do not address ‘nature’ or ‘non-nature’ of unknowable, ineffable, or inexpressible. A ‘plausible’ question is: who claims right to summon unknowable, ineffable and inexpressible in creation of an art work, in what circumstances and conditions? Foucault does not expound ‘discourse’ only in terms of sanctioned meaning of speech, but as material regulation, denial, resistance, or stratifications within a particular society:

Here is the hypothesis I would like to propose tonight, to determine the ground – or perhaps quite provisional stage – of the work I do: I suppose that discourse production in each society is controlled, selected, organized, and re-distributed by means of a certain amount of procedures whose role is to diminish its powers and threats, to master its contingencies, and circumvent its agonizing, terrifying materiality (Foucault, 1972, p. 116).

### **Asthetization and Aesthetic Education of Humanity: from *Pedagogy to Artivism***

Among the many didactic and pedagogic demands from ‘art’ was the role performed by ‘verbal’, ‘visual’, ‘acoustic’ or ‘scenic’ in upbringing, education and, certainly, entertainment of the free *citizen* of Europe from the Renaissance to the late Enlightenment and early Romanticism. Never-

theless, the XVIII century age of Enlightenment was fixated on devising complex practices of upbringing, education and entertainment addressing the young and the aging by way of models which are, naturally, liable to Michel Foucault's concept of 'biotechnology' (1997, pp. 73 – 79). Rationalization of practices of management – namely, of shaping human lives – was effective in converging upbringing (discipline), education (appropriation of knowledge and identification with particular lore or skills), and entertainment (regulation of life in regimes of leisure by way of anticipated, desired or sanctioned freedom). For instance, the XVIII century *visual didactics* (upbringing, education, entertainment) was not aimed at exclusive tutoring of artists or intellectuals, but at upbringing, education and entertainment of the *common* citizen who found himself in between contradictions of the private and public 'employment' (Foucault, 1997, p. 307) of reason. In other words, during the age of Enlightenment 'education through art', or education in aesthetic regimes of representation of optimal social reality, had become a means of effective instruction on modes of human life in its ordinary form, as a new and fundamental cosmogony of modernity. Various 'visual products' (paintings, engravings) efficiently (this is the rhetorical component of the archi-matrix of mass media education) mediated different aesthetic situations: human dialog, dress codes, difference in public and private behavior, private closeness or public distance, age divides, casting of gender roles in private and public, or sexual modes of behavior etc. In fact, ethical and political rhetoric – rendered as spiritual and institutional visibility – lead the 'exodus of mankind'<sup>3</sup> from its 'immaturity'. But this 'exodus' was devised on *cunning instruction* to follow orders obediently ('Don't think, just follow the orders' – coming from family, father, master, teacher, commander, employer), emerging as aesthetized practice of education for the sake of tutoring through entertainment in leisure time – during the 'empty intervals' reserved for relaxation from the 'full intervals' of public deeds.

One of the first groundbreaking didactic-philosophical concepts of *all-human aesthetization* was established in the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795-1796) by Friedrich Schiller (1982). The *Letters* ensued from a project of establishing and instruction of a new, or modern, free (male) citizen who, Romanticism hoped, would find a balance between the rational and emotional in *life itself* by way of 'aesthetics' and 'aesthetization'. According to Stewart Martin, (Stewart – Internet source) Schiller's *aesthetic education of mankind* addresses those who are already free, and accomplish actualization in the world by way of education. Here,

3 'Mankind' in Kant's terms as employed by Foucault in his text *What is Enlightenment?* (Foucault, 1997, p. 306).

education *per se* is not education for liberated art or education of artists with a view to freedom of creation, but a *régime esthétique* pertaining to *life itself*, supposedly life of a free citizen. *Aesthetic education of mankind* stands in critical resistance against the Enlightenment's rigid devising of non-aesthetic rationalist didactics pertaining to sense and instrumentality of life. Schiller starts – as well – from Classicist and proto-Romantic references to classical Greek society and its conquest of freedom through play. Namely, a creature that plays (*homo ludens*) ultimately wins freedom beyond nature and state i.e. nature and morals. Instruction and learning allowing for *sensuousness* are vital for his philosophical and aesthetically bound pedagogy. Object of the *sensuous* is outlined in the universal idea of *life*. It refers to material survival and any immediate sensuous actuality (Grlić, 1978, p. 47). Schiller's project, summed up in the motto: „man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays“, addresses one of the paradoxes of aestheticism: aestheticism is postulated as the project of cultural and social politics of management of bourgeois life, nevertheless (at the same time) rendered in its effects and workings as appearing outside and beyond politics or any mode of sociality, whatsoever. Illusion of 'the apolitical' calls for political didactic contingencies of 'aesthetic' or 'aesthetized' world of humanity, as a realm of freedom from the political. The paradox of aestheticism lies in the fact that it *is* politics, but does not look like politics, since it appears as *merely sensuous* which *nevertheless* leads to freedom, conforms modern people to rationality, and brings them to discipline of the free will in a moral sense. A distinguishing political aspect of Schiller's philosophical oeuvre is based on the premise that construction of *true political freedom* is a sublime work of art (Žunić, 1988, p. 37). A strategic paradox of Schiller's concept pertains to intricacies and aspirations to freedom through aesthetic play, in the midst of political instrumentalizations of daily life of the bourgeois society in the late XVIII, and early XIX century. Aspirations to autonomous art, disinterested aesthetics and free play, as it were, exceed political objectives and instrumental pragmatic claims of pedagogic preparation for the 'real life'. On the other hand, gratification of claims for autonomy of art, disinterested aesthetics and freedom of play, comes only from the capacity of pragmatic political acts and selective political projects on freedom of the human individual and, indeed, of humanity immersed in material contradictions of the actual historical, foremost bourgeois society. Dynamics of concealing and revealing playfulness, or political stances of 'aesthetization', is an important aspect of all practices constructed from idealities of aesthetic exceptionality as opposed to life they are addressing.

Art of the XIX and greater part of the XX century displays differences and almost conflictual divisions between *aestheticism in art* as creation of realms autonomous from the society, and *aesthetization of life*, culture and politics by means of art, or by means of various activist/artist practices. Three artistic regimes in terms of *aesthetization of life* during the XX century may, nevertheless, be distinguished. Those three regimes pertain to three different *instrumental* and *metaphysical* functions of artistic education.

*Avantgarde transgressive<sup>4</sup> aesthetization* of social reality (Futurism, Dada, Constructivism, Surrealism, Neo-Dada, Fluxus, and New Tendencies) based on trespassing and violating educational canons, norms and epistemological horizons of art schools and institutions. Certain artistic practices feature leftist self-organization and liberal self-education or leftist-anarchist micro-education outside the public education system or art production.

*Aesthetization of social reality of totalitarian regimes* (Benjamin 2003) (USSR, Third Reich, Fascist Italy, Maoist China) based on politicization as didactic, functional and axiological restructuring of modernist educational canons. Politicization of Modernist canons of art, in the case of socialist realism in USSR or China, refers to strategies and tactics pertaining to artistic practices with a didactic function of executing political-aesthetic interventions into daily life of the 'working class', or 'working people'. Real-socialist politicization of art had led to emergence of artists ready to engage in political practices and work towards clear political goals – optimal projections – of the working class, namely the Communist party as the avant-garde of the working community. Politicization of modernist canons of art, in the case of National Socialist art in the Third Reich and Fascist art in Italy, refers to strategies and tactics pertaining to artistic practices with a didactic function of political aesthetization, rhetorical presentation and ritualization of overwhelming Nazi and Fascist *ideas* in each aspect of the private and public life of the respective nation. Nazi and Fascist politicization of art had led to emergence of artists ready to comply with aesthetic canons and politicized rhetoric of classicist traditional styles, working towards an incontrovertible political and social reality. Artistic education in totalitarian regimes sustains the institutional, canonically established 'academy' or 'art school', bound to opening epistemological horizons of expertise to party instrumentaria.

*Expansionist activist aestheticism pertaining to mass media art production in postmodern* (Jameson, 1992. Welsch, 1997) and *global societies* indicates strategies and tactics of interventionist art in systems and practices

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4 See: Foster (1996) and Bann (1974).

of social control and regulation of life, developed during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, art is being redefined *as one of the practices* of intervention, control and regulation of everyday life in the post-Cold War age of the totalizing media, economic, commercial, political, and military 'integration' of the contemporary world. Contemporary global processes of integration establish new social empires, in different realms of work and communication: computer networks, VR technology and, certainly, global politics, culture and society. Artistic tactics termed *artivism* by the Slovenian sociologist and theoretician of theatre Aldo Milohnič (2005), addresses instable relations between political 'left' and 'right', indeed the relative status of activism in the contemporary Western post-Block world. *Artivism* is rather concerned with local contextualizations and decontextualizations pertaining to political acts as opposed to artistic or aesthetic, then with radical designs – for the 'new worlds' of the Left or the 'old world' of the Right. Procedures of 'politics' and 'art', or 'aesthetization' do not differ morphologically, but in orientation of performance and application of, or expectations from, 'effects'. Artistic education takes place in different deployed regimes: in a) development of academic – university/scholar technical discourses pertaining to art production, b) incorporation of different forms of learning or exercising artistic work in institutional, non-institutional or global-network/Internet cultural systems, and c) self-education as indication of temporary liberalization and fragmentation of 'artistic-collective' in the art worlds, or as indication of temporary renewal of 'artistic-collective' through self-organization and pursuing a pluralist claim for direct democratization of education.

### **The Essential Difference: Research, as Opposed to Creation, Making, Production**

The notion of research emerged in the progress of modern art, when it seemed that poetical platforms of creation as a technical skill of representation turned out to be exhausted. Research in art is seen as an *open activity* embedded in artistic work:

The crucial difference between research art and non-research art, it seems, hence relies on the fact that non-research art starts from set values, while research art strives to determine values and itself as a value. Certainly, simultaneously with setting up the art as research, and self-research as such, the first aesthetics emerges, addressing the problem of art as such, and its place among the works of the spirit (Argan, 1995, p. 154).

The artist is an active agency, and the framework of his work is consciously determined, though all stages in his actions, i.e. research, cannot be predicted: he encounters discoveries and choices of new domains of work. Research in art is often conceived as a heuristic procedure. Heuristics is self-motivated research performed, in lack of precise programs or algorithms, from case to case by way of a method of trial and error. Therefore, what we term 'heuristics' is a research principle or research of research, implying a creative program. Heuristic research is a research in totality of considerations and procedures of searching and finding new, that is, authentic, insights and contingencies of producing an art work. Heuristic research considers possibilities of failure or error, falsity, mistakes and omissions in advance. The path of heuristic research is not grounded on a system of rules, but on disclosure, affirmation, or disposal of the accomplished. Thus is art redirected from 'creating a work of art', as setting up the work in the world, to indeterminate *research*, or a *quest* leading to the unknown and unexpected – authentic and new – while employing both traditional or new media and human relations established by way of art. Research implies a shift from *creation of the work of art (techne + poesis)* to an *art project*. In other words, in pedagogic procedures the 'artist' is not trained to become a creator (master, craftsman, and manufacturer) or even producer (Benjamin, 1982 and 1986), but to become an *author* (Barthes, 1978; Foucault, 1998). In this context, the author is an *entrepreneur*. He appropriates the *strategies* and *tactics* of a designer, i.e. the author who determines 'design' of the platforms and procedures for producing or performing an art work, establishing relations in the world of art, culture and society, along with postproduction interventions or utilizations of archived products of historical or contemporary cultures. This implies a *linear model of the research process*, which can be demonstrated in the following diagram illustrating the progress from a poetical platform to the mode of research work. Contrary to scientific research, which demands definite terms of agreement between preliminary premises of the researcher and ultimate goals of his research, in artistic research a breach in the linear sequence can occur at any point. Thus, specific phases of research in procedures of 'aestheticization' or 'transgressive' confrontations with the limits of research are constantly being re-directed and re-focused.

Art education based on 'research' had been essentially changing throughout the XX century. This change had lead from establishing art in the way of scientific and technical work in the Bauhaus and Soviet art institutes and neo-avant-garde schools (*New Bauhaus* in Chicago or *Ulm School of Design*), to social and cultural research preparing the artist to become a 'cultural worker' or 'artist researcher' into the actualities of con-

temporary life (this more or less refers to all art schools based on courses or departments for new media launched during 1990s and early 2000s, or art schools based on *performance studies* /Schechner, 2006/ or on *curatorial studies*).

A contemporary mode of research, pertaining to transformation of fine into visual arts, and visual into critical cultural practices, was addressed by the conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth in the 1980s. His pursuits were embedded in the post-structuralist understanding of 'cultural' and 'media' texts as visual work, and of signifying functions of art in culture. Kosuth's research is focused on deconstructive procedures and Freud's writings on psychoanalysis. For instance, in an interview following the Vienna exhibition dedicated to Ludwig Wittgenstein (Bourriaud, 1989-90, p. 139) Kosuth referred to epistemology of his theoretical transformations, claiming that his relations to Wittgenstein's philosophy were circular. During the mid-1960s he was interested in and relied on the analytical-critical Wittgensteinian approach to exploring the work of art as an analytical proposition or a theoretical *ready-made*. During the mid-1970s he elaborated a neo-Marxist and anthropological method of interpretation of cultural and social functions of art in society, later to develop (during the late 1970s and 1980s) a 'theory of cultural signification' based on reception of the French post-structuralism in the English-speaking world. Revived interest in Wittgenstein in the late 1980s is retrospective, but nevertheless represents questioning of own historicizations and productions of meaning on the part of the postmodern. Kosuth's shifts from the *background* of analytical philosophy to neo-Marxist anthropology and, afterwards, to poststructuralism, can be understood in terms of the dialectics of development of contemporary art. In an anti-dialectical sense they may be understood: (1) as a search for an ever more general theory of description and production of the processes of transformation of meaning, and (2) as a specific market demand for addressing and reacting to actual artistic and cultural circumstances Kosuth found himself in. Ideas of a neo-Romantic Postmodern based on Expressionist revival, and simulations of image and painting, removed Kosuth's ideology of *art after philosophy* from the fashionable scene of the early 1980s (Kosuth, 1982). A possibility of survival in stern conditions of postmodernity emerged in opening of conceptual art's theoretical body of work to the current post-structuralism wherein Kosuth found a flexible productive model, contrary to theoretical purism and rigor of analytical philosophy, or to ideological reductionism and exclusivity of the neo-Marxist anthropology. His work has semantically become more effective and, in Derridian sense, more transient, while already established modes of research of the context

and functions of art work embraced domains (the unconscious, sexuality, auto-censorship, inconsistency, hidden meaning) previously excluded from his work. Flexibility of the poststructuralist framework well encouraged advanced artistic production, whereas the ideal of confrontation of first-degree and n-degree discourses and characterizations of art work was sustained by procedures of quotations, collage and montage. In current Kosuth's works procedures of quotations, collage and montage feature in place of the *ready-mades* (Welchman, 1989; Wit, 1988). Kosuth contributes to epistemology of art education an elaborated and hybrid model of 'research' in art and culture. Such a model elevates the 'artist' from the position of creator/producer to the position of 'curator' or 'artist-bureaucrat'. The *artist-bureaucrat*, according to the social division of labor, launches his practice on several parallel platforms: (a) solving specific problems – at a level of case study, (b) institutional intervention by way of the 'art work' as an action derived from a project, (c) historizations and de-historizations pertaining to discourses and axiologies of art history, namely, discourses and axiologies of curatorial-bureaucratic mapping of the actual artistic scene, and (d) contingent theory as a meta-language on art or indexing of interventions exercised by projects on a level of case presentations.

The shift from 'creation' to 'research' essentially changes epistemology of work in art, in the sense that epistemology of the nature of the work is changing, from industrial capitalism (processing of raw materials into artifacts) to late capitalism (producing communication, services or appliances). Thus the position of a specific artist (painter, designer, and performer) evolves into the status of an author and, ultimately, an artist-curator or artist-bureaucrat. Each of these transformations, however, requires reforms of the totality or particular elements of art education.

### **Ontology and Epistemology of Research in Art**

Research has been derived from resistance to indisputability of creation in specific artistic disciplines. Beyond the sole and ideal, by way of tradition established „how in art“, questions are raised on its purpose and possibilities of finding out, from that necessary „how“ and essential „why“, some answers based on theoretical practice and practical theory of art. Research is, however, performed in full awareness of the importance of crossing and testing *the field of singularity*, in the sense in which Deleuze's philosophy insists on singularity (Lotringer, Deleuze, 2001) of the artistic act i.e. the fact that there is no universal *idea* (notion, concept, apprehension) beyond the singular event. Every *idea* is always 'idea' on something and for someone, borne in specific circumstances and conditions of cultural positioning of an *artworld* or indeed an *art school*. Thus it can be deemed that *ideas*



imply certain contingencies already engaged or employed in the ambiguous space of work, action, teaching, or learning. Universality is a conceptual or discursive effect of the singular event in language – namely, work, action or performing teaching or learning – bound to ambivalence.

‘Research’ can possess complex forms of manifestation and conduct in practical-theoretical and theoretical-practical terms. In the process of artistic work/education quite different forms of research may be identified.

*Rehearsal* (Schechner, 2002) is – most commonly – an essentially empirical practice of trials in performing a piece, situation or event in a sequence of attempts leading to a *creative moment*. Rehearsal is based on the learning process comprising of repetition of facts with variations, displacements, replacements or introduction of new potentialities or aspects of action in the established or accomplished order of events. Practice or rehearsal is grounded in the belief in importance of the empirical ‘event’, on account of which one identifies and decides on the further possibilities of addressing a particular artistic problem. Rehearsal, as it were, should at a particular moment grasp the unconceived ‘sense’, as something that numerous previous trials and actions did not accomplish, however did anticipate. For example, according to Richard Schechner, practice or rehearsal reduces ‘disturbance’ or ‘reverberation’ in performing a particular piece, turning it eventually into a ‘finished product’, identified as art. Training or rehearsal is what makes artists’ behavior *empirocentric*, meaning: through behavior/acting in a quite singular sequence of events the artist acquires empirical knowledge, further to be developed and modified in new situations. Nevertheless this knowledge as well, admittedly, connects to particular common or tacit rules of the given practice or context of education.

Research is *practice of opening* and *practice of animation* (Bal, 2002) of micro- or macro- concepts (open concepts, travelling concepts, concepts on the move [internet source]) within a particular artistic or theoretical discipline and, subsequently, moving the concepts beyond conventional or canonic borders of the discipline to the ambiguous, shifting and hybrid space of actuality, or narrative spaces of history. On one occasion, cultural theorist Mieke Bal addressed her interest in animated and travelling concepts in cultural theory:

A series of case studies demonstrate the consequences of replacing paradigm- and discipline-based methodologies with an open re-examination of concepts that have a history of ‘travelling’ between disciplines, historical periods and contexts, and even cultures. Under the rubric

‘travelling concepts’ I work on incidental, often commissioned papers.  
(Bal, internet source).

The artist becomes a ‘researcher’ when he begins recognizing, indexing and moving concepts underlying his normally empirical educational or productive activity, between poetics and work. Moving concepts is an operation of confronting thoughts and actions. Therein emerges the essential difference between teaching/learning in the humanities and philosophy and teaching/learning in art. Moving concepts, as an operation confronting thoughts and actions in the humanities and philosophy, is always focused on ‘concepts on...’ humanities or philosophy. Moving concepts, as an operation confronting thoughts and actions in arts, or education in arts, is always focused on ‘concepts in...’ searching for conditions: of performing, exhibiting, i.e. old-fashionedly said, ‘aesthetization’. This is a procedure which, in Duchampian (Cabanne, 1971) sense, refers to inciting or animating ‘critical intelligence’ – conceptually questioning empiri-centric indisputability of the creative artistic act:

Some artists, at any rate, could do that. They didn’t have to group for words or stop being artists when they conceived things. They didn’t conceive things the way theorists do. Even when they stopped doing art (viz. Duchamp), it was for ‘conceptual’ reasons, not theoretical ones.  
(Lotringer, 2001, p. 127)

And this is just a first step toward ‘smart art’, which emerges only when recognized and indexed concepts have been acknowledged, meaning: mapped in relation to other concepts of the surrounding world of art, culture, society or social micro- and macro- relations. Mapping of newly-discovered, as opposed to already existing concepts, is a practice of stirring concepts from their usual positions in epistemological and cognitive maps of art, culture and society. This animation can claim different effects as to nomadic, relative, arbitrary, accidental or erratic shift from concept to concept pertaining to potential signifiers – *operators*. These signifiers – *operators* are of consequence for apprehension of a concept in immediate actions of the artist, but also for establishing the abstract tactics of mystification, demystification or, in Barthesian sense, mythologic (Barthes, 1972) inception of the concept into the receptive or *consumer code* of understanding or experience on the part of the spectator, reader or listener. Therein lies the confrontation of the artist with contingencies of creation, conceiving or animating concepts pertaining to problems which are necessarily changing – namely, find themselves in potentially constant transformation or shift of reference – namely, sense.

Research in art bears analogies to *scientific research* (Andermatt, Conley, 1993; Hansen, 2004 and Kac, 2007). This refers to rational and relational performing of auto-reflective and reflective inquiries on epistemological problems of art, or epistemological problems in art, indeed on epistemological problems with art.

Similarities and differences between art and science are usually observed from the perspective of art or art theory. Instrumental contributions from science are ever expected on the part of the arts. In modern times, however, on the part of science, there are effectively no expectations for contributions from art. This asymmetry of expectations, in political terms, profoundly affects every relation between science and art. I refer to ideological construction of difference between 'knowledge from' science and 'affectations' pertaining to Western art. Therefore, deriving similarities between artistic expression and scientific research commences with art – according to the prevailing politics of the art world – and can be demonstrated if we employ several specific models:

- relation between art and technical-scientific research: the artist explores in a 'rational as scientific' manner certain procedures while employing technical means (media, devices, tools) further to be deployed for creating, performing or producing an art work, e.g. the artist acquires proficiency in using or adapting a specific device to his needs in realization of his work;
- relation between art and technological-scientific research: technological-scientific research in complex and hybrid practices of art is based on artist's proficiency in applying specific and complex multimedia processes of planning, design, execution and production to his own work;
- relation between art and fundamental scientific research: the artist *behaves as a scientist* engaged in a fundamental process of research i.e. develops complex, nevertheless consistent and elaborated models of artistic expression performed in analogy to research in a particular science or humanity (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, medicine, mathematics, linguistics, semiology, logic, informatics, cybernetics);
- relation between art and science is established as an attempt at trans-artistic or trans-scientific synthesis and creation of an inter-field of scientific-research and artistic-research combined;
- relation between art and science as *ready-made*: the artist engages in de-contextualization of firm experimental or consistent theoretical research and analyses and introduces them as isolated samples into

- the context of art, with all due real or fictional references to the initial scientific context;
- relation of art, science, technique, and technology as cultural research: the artist does not approach science as an ‘immanently scientific system’, but as a specific social ideological practice with all its cultural and social effects; in other words, the artist apparently becomes an external user or *cultural worker* who employs, simulates, consumes, applies or performs cultural and social-ideological effects of science in art by way of deemed autonomy of art in culture and society.

Scientific research appears as an ideological theoretical practice enabling the artist to grasp a ‘new result’ with particular effects on science, technique/technology, art, but also on culture and society. In fact, art of the XX century and the new millennium features four characteristic concepts of research. Research on the part of the *avant-gardes*, from Futurism and Dada to Constructivism and Surrealism, projects a utopian vision of a new rational-industrial society based on technological advance, speed and mass consumption. The avant-garde artist is a kind of a techno-Messiah. Research on the part of the *neo-avant-gardes* – art after the informal, Neo-Constructivism, kinetic art, ecological art, electronic music, computer and cybernetic art – carries into effect the utopian vision and thus appears as a concrete utopia. Synthesis of science and art is achieved through articulation of scientific laboratory or experimental research performed by an artist, or an artist collective emulating a scientific team of technocrats.

The neo-avant-garde artist is a kind of an accomplished scientist. Research pertaining to the *postmodern* is connected to electronic information systems (video and TV networks, satellite transmission, PCs and computer networks, cybernetic regulated spaces, holographic images) and inquiries into or, more precisely, *surfing* and *browsing*, *databases* of mass culture, and ecstatic consumption of information. The postmodern artist interested in science is a kind of a producer, cultural worker or, even, sophisticated consumer (Groys, 1999). Scientific research in the *age of globalization* is related to activist i.e. activist intervening and interactive investigations, discoveries and explorations of relative borders between art, culture and society, wherein the artist confronts the very nature – ontology – of a new kind of human work pertaining to transformations of the *glocal* (global/local) life. The artist in the age of globalism is either an *activist* in the critical sense or provider of postproduction (Bourriaud, 2005) services, PR or consumption items in the liberal-market sense.

Models of *problem-solving exercise* evolve from pro-scientific launching of concepts and events pertaining to artistic practice (Duve, de, 1996, p. 49). These models lead to potential realization or implementation of the artistic effect: the work and its micro/macropractic. The concept of student exercise as a solution to a given problem of visualization (design, composition or performance of the work), was appropriated from architectural studies, more precisely from the 'basic course' at the Bauhaus, and consequently employed in the majority of modern-leaning art schools after the Second World War. For instance, the painter and one of the founding teachers, Johannes Itten, grounded on his 'basic course' every further training in arts, architecture, or crafts at the Bauhaus. The students attended this course regardless of whether they were training to become carpenters, architects, designers, or artists. The primary course comprised basic introduction to forms and materials (Itten, 1975, pp. 7 – 8). Research is, therefore, predominantly formal in procedural terms – based on a set of rules mastering a combinatorics of visual elements. The student quickly becomes aware that his formal result does not depend on his 'talent' or 'temporary reflective reaction' to a given problem, but on practicing technical possibilities of performing, from simple to highly complex – tasks. The rationalist platform assumes the place of the concept of students' creative development in endless rehearsals or testing of their reactions to given stimuli.

Research in art is also a *form of investigation* (Kosuth, 1981; Wright, 2007) – certain procedural similarities can be detected with a police investigation, private detective investigation or journalist investigation, inquiry of an agent-investigator from the *non-governmental* sector, or merely the efforts of a sophisticated lover of solving riddles, rebus or crossword puzzles. Investigation is, primarily, a transparent social practice of discovering and disclosing secrets, mysteries or conspiracies, detected violations in micro- or macro-sociality. Artist-as-investigator grounds his work in exploration of the 'hidden from public view' discourse of micro- or macro-society, in collecting, classification, indexing and mapping data pertaining to the problem under scrutiny, while conceiving and presenting the investigation as public discourse. These procedures feature as *ready-made* – investigation methods appropriated from police, journalist or elsewhere employed practice. However, artistic practice of investigation is usually conceived for art contexts and applied to research of non-artistic 'issues' of particular culture or society. The usual intention on the part of the artist is to present ultimate results or specifications of the research trajectories in a way of displaying the art work-as-research. The task of investigation as an artistic practice is to render visible or conceivable particular

issues lying outside the scope of public visibility or recognition. Artistic investigation is, in that sense, a practice approaching *spectacularization* i.e. *affective transparency* in perceiving social secrets and conspiracies. Art as 'investigative journalism' becomes a practice of drawing public attention to social secrets or, rather, traumas with capacity to provoke scandals, change public opinion, instigate reactions from social institutions etc.

Research in art is *transgressive* (Foucault in: Faubion, 1994, pp. 69 – 87 and 123 – 135) 'act' of questioning the canons and normality in art and its canonical theory and respective contexts of culture and society – submitting them, namely, to fundamental redefinitions. Transgression is violation of a law or order: in geological terms, it is penetration and spreading of the sea into the land. Transgression in 'phenomenological' terms refers to infringements indicative of a 'real art', Passover from the pragmatic and instrumental realm of everyday life into arcane realms of the exotic and unknown. Transgression implies entry into an essentially different condition, freed from history and borders, detached, transcendental, silent, metaphysical, undivided and disinterested, because only in such condition, among humans absolved from every social, existential or pragmatic concretization (Mikhail Bakhtin, Jean-Paul Sartre) an ultimately correct understanding of art is ever possible. Heidegger discusses 'the' true work of art: the other phenomenologists the ideal or intentional object as a work of art. Freudian psychoanalysis considers the concept of transgression as, among other things, conjoined with the drive for punishment. The drive for punishment is internal urge pertaining to typical behavior of certain subjects, found in psychoanalytic examination to be seeking painful of humiliating situations to derive pleasure from (moral masochism). Common characteristics in such behavior should ultimately indicate an association with the death drive. Freud explains self-punishing behavior by way of tensions in the structural positions between Ego and particularly demanding Super-ego. There is a controversial claim on the part of Lacanian theoretical psychoanalysis that the only true transgression is ever performed by the very Law that has been violated: "the greatest affair, the only true affair, affair embracing all other (villains') affairs into petit-bourgeois cautiousness, is the affair of civilization, affair of the Law itself" (Žižek, 1984, pp 18 – 19 and internet source). According to Lacan, the ultimate transgression is the ultimate madness, nonsense, traumatic act, the Law itself: the mad Law. Law is not the raw force which provides ultimate harmony and punishes transgression: the ultimate transgression lies hidden in the Law itself. Avant-garde transgressions in art and culture are deviations (subversions, excesses, breaches, advancements, innovations, experiments, revolutions) from dominant power hierarchies. With

art avant-gardes of the late XIX, and early XX century transgressions usually implied two parallel currents: (1) critique (subversion, breach) of dominant discursive institutions of the aesthetic (value of the sensuous, reception), artistic (creation), existential (status and functions of art in a particular society and culture), and political (modes of implementation of social ideology as a power structure); and (2) design of the new as a prevailing determinant of actuality (modernity) or future (utopia, optimal projections). Avant-garde transgression is, therefore, concurrently precursor of the dominant modernist culture, and its immanent critique and subjugation, in the name of the new (avant-garde) or the other (immanent critique, other scene). Georges Bataille established a philosophy of transgression on behalf of the artistic avant-gardes. He diagnosed two transgressions in the discourse of reason. The first pertains to lower elements (cry, scream, silence, and lapse). The second refers to higher elements (disturbs the symbolic code from within, questions the sanctions and legitimacy of sense). In confronting the two transgressions, the rupture (divide, hiatus, distance, dissonance) between high and low is agitated and challenged: „Very sad evening. Dream of starry sky under my feet“ (Georges Bataille – quoted in Hollier 1995, p. 134)<sup>5</sup>. Jacques Derrida suggests that transgressing the rules of discourse implies transgressing a universal law, while Roland Barthes indicates that transgression of value, a pronounced principle of eroticism, expatiates – perhaps indeed resides – in technical transgression of language forms. For Bataille, transgression is an inner experience empowering the individual or, in the case of ritualized transgressions like collective feasts, the society to escape confines of the rational, vernacular behavior informed by profit, production and self-attendance. Transgression displays the power of proscription. Transgression employs the power of proscription. Accordingly, the underlying notion of transgression enters the structuralist thought, transforming it into an ecstatic and decentered discourse. Work with transgression as research and discovery of new informs the artistic work primarily through practices pertaining to individual self-education, or to the microsocial context of self-organized training, as opposed to institutional canons of ‘official’ education.

### **Conclusion: Materialist Theory of Contemporary Interdisciplinary, Transdisciplinary, or Hybrid Art Education**

Discussion of contemporary models of art education indicates that almost every problem in their analysis finds itself confronted with issues which need to be addressed:

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5 Bataille quoted in Denis Hollier, *Against Architecture – The Writing of Georges Bataille*, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1995, p.134.

- relations between autonomy of art and artistic activism – namely, intervening interrelations of art, culture and society;
- relations between practice, theory, and theoretical practice in the teaching process conceived as social struggle;
- relations between the vertical and horizontal organization of the school or educational platform, i.e. relations of invariant, open, and transient pedagogical hierarchies excluding any stable and invariant teaching hierarchy and authority;
- relations between the profession of the artist as an ‘autonomous profession’, as a ‘cluster of open and transformable professions’, and as an ‘anti-profession’ (from ‘anti-artist’ to ‘cultural worker’);
- pursuit of critical contingencies and possibilities for self-education and emancipatory revision of educational processes arrested in the ‘safe refuge’ of unquestioned universal standards.

Therefore, or precisely for this reason, recalling and reconstructing ‘politics’ and ‘political’ (in other words, theoretical politicization in ostensibly non-political historical or current educational practices of art) have gained considerable importance in relation to epistemology of education. Theoretical politicization of epistemology of art education implies theoretical constructions pertaining to the character, functions and effects of its social facets. Theoretical politicization is featured in repeatedly critical, meaning: analytical, activation of contradictory relations between local – minority – knowledge, as opposed to global – dominant – majority – knowledge, through establishing and exerting ‘power knowledge’ in art schools or platforms of learning/studying art. What is at stake is understanding how the ‘power of the exerted’ or ‘projected domination or hegemony of knowledge *on* art and knowledge *from* art’ is effectuated in the relationship of naturalization of universal by means of particular and, naturally, *vice versa*. If due attention is paid to the character of contemporary artistic education, a question needs to be raised on relations between the global and local modes of production, and their fundamental refractions (indeed, ‘networking’) on the singular level and, to be sure, on global projections beyond immanent and transcendent conceptions of artistic *labor*.

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