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Primož ŠTERBENC*

AFGANISTAN: KAKO RAZUMETI ODNOS TALIBANOV DO ŽENSK**

Povzetek. V Afganistanu je avgusta 2021 islamistično gibanje talibanov po 20 letih zahodne vojaške prisotnosti drugič prevzelo oblast, potem ko je v državi prvič vladalo med letoma 1996 in 2001. Po drugem talibanskem prevzemu oblasti se je mednarodna skupnost spraševala, ali bodo »študenti« ponovno uveljavljali brutalne politike do žensk, kakršne so izvajali v obdobju svoje prve vladavine. Kljub temu da so talibani nakazovali, da bi bil njihov odnos do žensk tokrat lahko manj restriktiven, pa so na koncu znova uveljavili zatiranje ženskega spola. Negativen odnos talibanov do žensk je rezultat vpliva različnih, medsebojno prepletenih oziroma komplementarnih dejavnikov: etničnega, religijsko-ideološkega, socializacijsko-političnega in medkulturnega. Brez upoštevanja teh dejavnikov ni mogoče ustrezno razumeti talibanskih politik do žensk. Vendar pa se zdi, da zahodni akterji ne razumejo teh kompleksnih ozadij in posledično uvajajo kontraproduktivne sankcije proti talibanskemu režimu, pri čemer tudi niso sposobni samokritično oceniti posledic svoje dolgoletne in problematične vojaške prisotnosti v Afganistanu.

Ključni pojmi: Afganistan, talibani, ženske, Paštunvali, Deoband, Zahod, kultura

Uvod

Potem ko v Afganistanu zahodne vojaške sile, na čelu z enotami iz Združenih držav Amerike (ZDA), ki so bile od leta 2001 prisotne v državi, skoraj 20 let niso mogle zlomiti oboroženega odpora islamističnega gibanja talibanov, so talibani 15. avgusta 2021 brez boja zavzeli še prestolnico Kabul in tako pridobili nadzor nad tako rekoč celotno deželo pod Hindukušem (izjema je bila dolina Pandžšir, locirana severovzhodno od Kabula). ZDA in zahodne zavezniške države so do 31. avgusta 2021 umaknile svoje vojaške

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enote in druge vladne uslužbenke iz Afganistana, pri čemer so tudi pomagale evakuirati 120.000 Afganistancev in tujcev, vključno z uradniki »Islamske republike Afganistan«, zahodno podpirane vlade, vzpostavljene leta 2002, ki je kolapsirala ob odhodu zahodnih enot. Svet je lahko opazoval, kako so tisoči Afganistancev panično poskušali zapustiti državo oziroma ubežati vladavini talibanov, pri čemer so se nekateri v obupu celo oklepali kril letal, ki so vzletala s kabulskega letališča (Beyond Emergency Relief, 2021: 1; Yousaf in Jabarkhail, 2022: 117).

Ob drugem talibanskem prevzemu oblasti v Afganistanu se je pozornost sveta v bistveni meri osredotočala na vprašanje, ali bodo talibani ponovno uveljavljali skrajne politike, kakršne so izvajali med svojo prvo vladavino med letoma 1996 in 2001. Tedaj so namreč izvajali brutalna javna kaznovanja, uveljavljali skrajne oziroma najstrožje razlage islamskega prava pri urejanju vsakdanjega življenja, zagrešili zločine proti religijskim manjšinam (predvsem šiitskim Hazarom) in zatirali ženske (Cole, 2003: 780–796; Goodson, 2001: 419–424; Rashid, 2000/2001: 29; Taliban Rule, 2021: 4).¹

Mednarodno skupnost je še posebej zanimalo, ali bodo talibani tudi med svojo drugo vladavino vodili tako brutalno politiko do žensk. Prisotna so bila določena pričakovanja, da bodo novi-stari oblastniki Afganistana tokrat s pripadnicami nežnejšega spola vendarle ravnali drugače. Razlog za to je bil v tem, da so talibani v pogajanjih z ZDA, ki so potekala od leta 2018,² pri-

¹ *Ženske, razen zelo redkih izjem (delo v zdravstvu in sodelovanje z mednarodnimi humanitarnimi organizacijami), niso smele biti zaposlene. Poleg tega niso smele zapustiti svojih domov, razen v spremstvu svojih tesnih moških sorodnikov (mož, oče ali brat) in popolnoma zakrite (v burki). Dekleta niso smela hoditi v srednje šole. Ženske so lahko zdravstveno oskrbe le zdravnice ženskega spola, pa še te so se svojih ženskih pacientk ob pregledu lahko le minimalno dotikale. Moški in ženske so morali biti oskrbljeni v zdravstvenih ustanovah, ločenih na podlagi spola. Talibani so tudi začeli omejevat delo ženskih zdravnic, medicinskih sester in farmacevtk. Ženske niso smele biti oblečene v »modna, okrašena, oprijeta in privlačna oblačila«. Ženske niso imele enakih pravic kot moški pri dedovanju, razvezah, skrbništvu nad otroki in v drugih zadevah družinskega prava (Goodson, 2001: 419–423; Rashid, 2000/2001: 29, 105–107, 218).*

² *Ameriški predsednik Donald Trump se je od samega začetka svojega predsednikovanja odkrito zavzemal za umik ameriških enot iz Afganistana, sredi leta 2018 pa je postajal glede izpolnitve tega cilja vse bolj nestrpen. Zaradi velike predsednikove želje po umiku so ZDA septembra 2018 začele bilateralna pogajanja s talibani z namenom sklenitve mirovnega sporazuma, čeprav so s tem odstopile od svojega poprejšnjega dolgotrajnega vztrajanja, da mora v pogajanjih sodelovati tudi afganistanska vlada. V času pogajanj so se ameriški in talibanski pogajalci osredotočali na umik ameriških enot iz Afganistana in na zagotovila talibanov, da se bodo borili proti terorizmu, medtem ko so Američani skozi leto 2019 postopoma zavestno izločili področji strukture države in ustave iz vsebine pogajanj, ker naj bi se z njima ukvarjali na poznejših pogajanjih med samimi afganistanskimi stranmi. Posledično sporazum, ki so ga ZDA in talibani 29. februarja 2020 podpisali v Dohi, ni vseboval nobenih določil o pravicah oziroma statusu afganistanskih žensk. ZDA so kljub svojim močnim pogajalskim adutom (želja talibanov, da bi bila nova oblast mednarodno priznana in da bi prejela finančno pomoč iz tujine) uspele doseči le to, da so talibani pristali na pogajanja z afganistansko vlado, kar so poprej ostro zavračali. Administracija je s tem, da je pristala na bilateralna pogajanja s talibani in določila umik ameriških enot iz Afganistana, pomembno oslabilo pogajalsko moč afganistanske vlade. Pogajanja med talibani in afganistansko vlado,*

dobili nekaj mednarodne legitimnosti, poleg tega pa so se »novi« talibani iz preteklosti nekaj naučili in so posledično precej bolj spretno komunicirali z javnostmi ter uporabljali propagando in družbene medije. Posledično so se začetne izjave talibanskih voditeljev osredotočale na odpuščanje in vključevanje (Akbari in True, 2022: 627; Yousaf in Jabarkhail, 2022: 118, 120).

Toda talibani so nato v letu in pol bolj ali manj spet uveljavili politike do žensk, kakršne so obstajale med njihovo prvo vladavino, kar je pomenilo ponovno vzpostavitev spolnega apartheida na področjih izobraževanja, zaposlovanja in prisotnosti v javnem prostoru. Talibani so tako marca 2022 zaprli srednje šole za deklice, medtem ko so morali biti tisti razredi na fakultetah, ki so bili še odprti, ločeni na podlagi spola. Decembra 2022 so nato ženskam prepovedali obiskovanje javnih in zasebnih fakultet (Akbari in True, 2022: 625–626; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 3–4, 11).³

Talibanske oblasti so tudi prepovedale zaposlovanje žensk, razen v zelo omejenem obsegu (zdravstvo in deli osnovnega šolstva). Poleg tega v talibanskem kabinetu (vladi) in na vodilnih položajih v upravi ni niti ene ženske. Podjetja, ki so jih vodile ženske, so bila bistveno omejena, večinoma pa zaprta. Decembra 2022 je bilo ženskam prepovedano tudi delo za afganistanske in mednarodne nevladne organizacije. Končno so talibani omejili temeljne svoboščine žensk, vključno s pravico do gibanja, združevanja in izražanja. Ženskam je bilo sporočeno, da se od njih pričakuje, da ne bodo zapuščale svojih domov, razen v »nujnih« primerih. Če zapustijo dom, morajo biti zakrite od nog do glave (nositi burko), če pa potujejo v kraj, ki je oddaljen več kot 72 kilometrov, mora biti z njimi moški spremljevalec. Ženskam je zelo otežen dostop do (tudi reproduktivne) zdravstvene oskrbe. Novembra 2023 so talibani ženskam prepovedali vstop v parke, telovadnice in javna kopališča (Akbari in True, 2022: 626; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 4, 7).

Vse te ukrepe so talibani uveljavili, kljub temu da so (bili) soočeni z znatnim pritiskom mednarodne skupnosti. Zahodne države so namreč že takoj po drugem talibanskem prevzemu oblasti z namenom, da bi dosegle rahljajne brutalnih politik, ekonomsko močno pritisnile na talibanski režim, saj so ustavile vso donatorsko pomoč (le-ta je zagotavljala sredstva za 75 odstotkov vseh državnih izdatkov), zamrznile afganistanska finančna sredstva v

ki so se začela septembra 2020, so bila pogosto prekinjana in se vsebinsko niso premaknila tako rekoč nikamor. Po nastopu Bidnove administracije januarja 2021 so se ZDA osredotočile na umikanje ameriških enot iz Afganistana; Biden je namreč v temelju zagovarjal stališče, da ZDA niso odgovorne za usodo vlade in ljudi v Afganistanu (Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 2020; Getting the Afghanistan Peace Process, 2019: 7–8; Kiely in Farley, 2021; Taking Stock, 2020: 2, 9–12; What Future, 2021: 1–3).

³ *Junija 2022 so talibani izdali manifest, ki je določal, da so lahko ženske in deklice deležne le islamskega izobraževanja, in sicer jih lahko poučujejo moški sorodniki znotraj svojih domov (Akbari in True, 2022: 626).*

tujih bankah in uvedle ostre ekonomske sankcije, zaradi česar je afganistanska ekonomija doživela pravi šok, ogromna večina afganistanskega prebivalstva pa se je znašla v revščini (velik del celo na robu preživetja).⁴ Če bodo talibani vztrajali pri svojih politikah do žensk, bi se lahko Afganistan soočil s še nadaljnjim slabšanjem ekonomskega položaja ter velikim zmanjšanjem ali celo ustavitvijo donatorske pomoči (Beyond Emergency Relief, 2021: 4–6; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 1, 10).

Namen pričujočega sestavka je opredeliti oziroma razložiti dejavnike, ki generirajo brutalne politike talibanov do žensk. Odnosa talibanov do žensk namreč ni mogoče razumeti brez upoštevanja značilnosti zelo specifičnega kulturno-religijskega okolja, v katerem se dogaja, poleg tega pa tudi upoštevanja političnega ter (zgodovinskega in sodobnega) medkulturnega konteksta. V percepciji zahodnih akterjev (politiki, mediji, civilna družba oziroma nevladne organizacije, širša javnost) in njihovih reakcijah na talibanske politike v Afganistanu je namreč pogosto mogoče zaznati pomanjkanje zavedanja o teh specifikah in kontekstih, posledično pa zahodni svet hitro pristopa k problematičnim in celo kontraproduktivnim politikam, izvirajočim iz konvencionalnih percepcij in razlag, ki so rezultat dogajanj oziroma razvoja v zahodnem zgodovinskem, kulturnem in političnem okolju.

V okviru razlage talibanskih politik do žensk je mogoče postaviti hipotezo, da nanje vplivajo naslednji dejavniki: paštunski etnični izvor; islamsko-deobandska religijsko-ideološka doktrinarna usmerjenost; ginefobija, izvirajoča iz specifičnega institucionalnega in mentalnega okolja, v katerem se je socializiral velik del talibanov; intratalibanski politični kontekst; reakcija na agresivno vdiranje zunanjih, kulturno drugačnih akterjev v afganistansko tradicionalno kulturno okolje. Težko je mogoče domnevati, kateri izmed teh dejavnikov ima večjo oziroma manjšo težo, tudi zaradi tega, ker se v smislu učinkov večkrat prepletajo, oziroma zato, ker so politike talibanov do žensk najverjetneje rezultat kompleksne kombinacije oziroma interakcije teh dejavnikov. V nadaljevanju bodo ti dejavniki opredeljeni oziroma razloženi.

⁴ Do sedaj do velike humanitarne katastrofe v Afganistanu ni prišlo zaradi tega, ker so donatorji zaradi strahu pred lakoto in regionalno nestabilnostjo leta 2022 začeli izvajati manj kaznovavno politiko (izvzeta iz sankcij in velika humanitarna pomoč) (Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 3).

Paštunski etnični izvor talibanov

Pri razlagi odnosa talibanov do žensk je treba najpomembnejšo pozornost posvetiti njihovem (izključno) paštunskemu⁵ etničnemu izvoru.⁶ Vendar pa je treba pri tem upoštevati še nadaljnjo delitev znotraj paštunske etnije, in sicer delitev na plemenske ruralne Paštune in bolj sofisticirane oziroma elitne urbane Paštune. Talibani (in praviloma njihovi vrhovni voditelji)⁷ namreč večinsko izhajajo iz plemenskih ruralnih paštunskih predelov Afganistana. Plemenski ruralni Paštuni, ki so poimenovani tudi kot Paštuni *nang* (Paštuni »čast«), so nehierarhično organizirane in egalitarno usmerjene skupine, ki živijo na bolj goratih, nizko produktivnih območjih. Bolj sofisticirani urbani Paštuni, ki so označevani tudi kot Paštuni *qalang* (Paštuni »davki«), pa živijo na namakanih in bolj produktivnih območjih (Ahmed, 1980: 117–118; Ahmed, 1983/1991: 7–8; Goodson, 2001: 421; Roy, 1998/2001: 208; Taking Stock, 2020: 32; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 20; Yousaf in Jabarkhail, 2020: 122).

Ruralni Paštuni (Paštuni *nang*) v svojem življenju oziroma v vseh vidikih svojega delovanja težijo k upoštevanju pravil, izhajajočih iz nespremenljive idealnotipske družbene organizacije, ki temelji na nenapisanem in nenatančno določenem paštunskem zakoniku oziroma »načinu Paštunov« (*Paštunvali*).⁸ Paštunvali je zajet v pregovorih, pesmih, metaforah in kratkih zgodbah ter je splošno uporabljan v pogovorih med ljudmi na vseh družbenih ravneh. Pregovori, ki jih vsebuje Paštunvali, razlagajo norme in običaje (predvsem ruralne) paštunske družbe. Paštun (predvsem ruralni) mora upoštevati pravila, izhajajoča iz Paštunvalija oziroma iz paštunskih konceptov.⁹

⁵ Paštuni so vzhodnoiranska etnična skupina in tvorijo 42 odstotkov afganistanskega prebivalstva. Živijo na jugu in vzhodu Afganistana (poleg tega pa tudi na severozahodu Pakistana). Vse od nastanka neodvisne afganistanske nacije v 18. stoletju so tradicionalno vladajoča etnična skupina. Druge večje etnične skupine v Afganistanu so Tadžiki (27 odstotkov prebivalstva), Hazari (devet odstotkov) in Uzbeki (osem odstotkov) (Južnič, 1983: 306; Rashid, 2008: xviii; Saikal, 2004/2012: 21, 95; Vogelsang 2002/2008: 26–36).

⁶ Pomen paštunskega etničnega izvora talibanov pri razlagi njihovega odnosa do žensk oziroma drugih njihovih politik poudarjajo na primer Goodson (2001: 424), Yousaf in Jabarkhail (2022: 122) ter analitično poročilo mislišča International Crisis Group (Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 20). Ahmed (2002: 38) izrecno poudarja, da na odnos talibanov do žensk in manjšin bolj kot islam vpliva njihov paštunski etnični izvor.

⁷ Mula Mohamed Omar, ki je talibane vodil med njihovo prvo vladavino v Afganistanu, in Hibatulah Ahundzada, ki jih vodi med drugo vladavino, (sta) izhajata (izhajala) iz paštunskega ruralnega dela Afganistana (Rashid, 2000/2001: 23; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 12).

⁸ Tudi sofisticirani, urbani Paštuni menijo, da je način življenja oziroma kultura ruralnih Paštunov najbližje idealu, in to kljub temu da družba *qalang* zavestno postavlja mejo, do katere lahko vrednote družbe *nang* vplivajo na njen elitizem in hierarhijo (Ahmed, 1980: 118).

⁹ Paštunski način življenja je najbolj specifičen od načinov življenj ljudstev na indijskem podkontinentu. Na ta način življenja je odločilno vplivala izjemna zahtevnost bivanja v revnem goratem svetu, kjer sta imela zmeraj največji pomen zdravje in ohranjanje fizične moči (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 16–17).

Najbolj temeljni koncepti Paštunvalija so: *badal* (zakon maščevanja); *mel-mastia* (gostoljubje do gostov); *nanavati* (velikodušnost do sovražnikov, ki so se podredili); *džirga* (skupščina starešin, ki odloča o specifičnih zadevah, kar preprečuje, da bi družba, ki nima formalnega prava, padla v anarhijo). Vendar pa sta v vsakdanji realnosti dva najbolj pomembna koncepta *tarburvali* (rivalstvo in sovražnost med moškimi sorodniki oziroma bratranci) in *tor* (ohranjanje nedolžnosti in dobrega imena ženske) (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 11–13; Ahmed, 1980: 88–91).¹⁰

Odločilna pomembnost koncepta *tor* govori o tem, da je pašunska (predvsem ruralna) družba tradicionalna patriarhalna družba, v kateri je vloga ženske strogo omejena. Svet ruralnih Paštunov je svet moškega – neposreden ekvivalent besede »Pašto« je »moškost« (*saritob*). V tej družbi ženske nimajo skoraj nobenih pravic – tako nimajo niti pravic, ki jim jih sicer zagotavlja islam (pravice do dedovanja, razveze, soglasja glede poroke). Položaj žensk dobro odlikava pregovor iz Paštunvalija: »Za žensko hiša (*kor*) ali grob (*gor*)«. Njihovo življenje je namreč fizično težko in monotono, saj morajo skrbeti za otroke, vzdrževati hišo in živali, hoditi po vodo, kuhati obroke ter skrbeti za starejše sorodnike. Čast moškega Paštuna naj bi bila najbolj odvisna od ravnanja ženske iz njegove hiše – ženska naj bi mu služila in mu bila zvesta. V tem smislu pregovor iz Paštunvalija pravi: »Mož je drugo ime za Boga« (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 15, 48, 61; Ahmed, 1980: 202, 291; Ahmed in Ahmed, 1981: 31–32, 45; Ahmed, 1983/1991: 26).¹¹

Bistveni del odnosa (predvsem ruralnih) Paštunov do žensk je strogo upoštevanje zakona osamitve (ločevanja) žensk (*parda*).¹² Ko deklice pri sedmih letih začnejo vstopati v puberteto, jih do njihove poroke ločijo od vseh moških, z izjemo najbližjih moških sorodnikov. Temu pravilu je prilagojena vsa notranja prostorska struktura gospodinjstva. Tudi po poroki ženske lahko le v zelo omejenem obsegu zapustijo svoj dom – tako nikakor ne smejo obiskati druge vasi brez soglasja svojih mož ali same nakupovati. Monotonost življenja žensk se prekine zgolj v redkih trenutkih – ko se zbirajo ob vaškem izviru ali ko obišejo svoje ženske sorodnice. Nedolžnost in osamitev (ločevanje) žensk sta dva zakona, ki ju pašunska družba strogo spoštuje, saj imata vitalni pomen za pašunsko družbeno organizacijo. Kazen za nespoštovanje je skrajna, in sicer izločitev iz družbenega življenja

¹⁰ *Tor* dobesedno pomeni »črno« in določa, da mora biti ženska, ki ima razmerje izven zakonskega stanu, skupaj s svojim ljubimcem takoj ubita s strani svojega tesnega moškega sorodnika (Ahmed, 1980: 202).

¹¹ Paradoksalno pa Paštuni v simbolnem smislu ženski pridajajo izjemno velik pomen, in sicer njeni vlogi matere (*mor*). Tako pašunski pregovor pravi: »Nebesa ležijo ob nogah matere« (Ahmed, 1980: 203).

¹² Goodson (2001: 420) poudarja, da ločevanja (osamitve) žensk ne zahteva islam. Vendar pa Crandall (2012: 16, 27) navaja, da je bil med muslimansko vladavino v severni Indiji (od 11. do 18. stoletja) eden od muslimanskih običajev tudi zapiranje žensk v njihove domove.

(Ahmed, 1980: 223, 231, 242, 291–292; Ahmed in Ahmed, 1981: 32; Goodson, 2001: 419–420; Griffin, 2001: 60).

V paštunski (predvsem ruralni) družbi na splošno obstaja dvom do izobraževanja. Pismenost in izobrazba namreč v konceptualnem smislu implicirata zavračanje tradicionalnih običajev, izvirajočih iz ustne, nepismene in akcijsko usmerjene družbe, in sta pogosto v neposrednem nasprotju z njimi. Izobraževanje naj bi celo pomenilo odstopanje od idealnega družbenega modela ter naj bi bilo brezplodno zapravljjanje časa in energije. Znotraj takšnega negativnega pogleda na izobraževanje pa obstaja še močan predodek do izobraževanja žensk, povezan z željo po ohranjanju osamitve (ločevanja) žensk. Ruralni Paštuni se namreč v svojem delovanju želijo približati idealnemu družbenemu modelu. Tudi če v določeni meri od njega odstopajo, pa niso pripravljeni popuščati glede pravil, ki se nanašajo na ženske, zato izkazujejo močan odpor do njihovega izobraževanja – idealna ženska naj bi se namreč naučila zgolj vodenja gospodinjstva (Ahmed, 1980: 319–321, 326; Ahmed in Ahmed, 1981: 31).¹³

Islamsko-deobandska religijsko-ideološka doktrinarna usmerjenost

Za razumevanje brutalnega odnosa talibanov do žensk je treba upoštevati tudi specifične religijsko-ideološke izvore oziroma doktrinarne usmeritve talibanskega gibanja. Njegovo začetno jedro je namreč tvorila skupina 30 Paštunov, ki so bili izobraženi v deobandski medresi (srednji šoli) v afganistanski južni pokrajini Kandahar. Po umiku sovjetskih enot (1989) in padcu komunistične vlade (1992) so bili člani skupine zaskrbljeni zaradi zločinov, ki so jih v Afganistanu izvajali voditelji različnih vojaških formacij, zato so se začeli vojaško organizirati in si nadeli oznako *talibani* (»študenti«). Dejansko vojaško težo so lahko pridobili zaradi podpore Pakistana¹⁴ – pakistanska obveščevalna služba ISI je leta 1994 v sodelovanju z voditeljem pakistanske sunitske islamistične (deobandske) stranke *Džamiat E Ulema Islam* (JUI) Fazlurjem Rahmanom začela vojaško organizirati študente (talibane) iz deobandskih medres na zahodu Pakistana, ki so jih obiskovali tisoči mladih paštunskih beguncev iz Afganistana; te medrese so postale glavna

¹³ V ruralnih paštunskih predelih Pakistana (je) obstaja(l) celo odpor do osnovnošolskega izobraževanja deklic (Ahmed, 1980: 325; Ahmed in Ahmed, 1981: 31). Mednarodne nevladne organizacije si že desetletja prizadevajo za to, da bi v ruralnih paštunskih delih Afganistana prepričale starše, naj svoje deklice pošljejo v oddaljene srednje šole, še posebej po puberteti. Vse do danes mnogi starši tega niso pripravljeni storiti. Nekoliko več pripravljenosti staršev za izobraževanje deklic obstaja, če obstaja alternativno šolanje, organizirano v lokalni skupnosti in bližje domu (Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 20).

¹⁴ Pakistan v Afganistanu tradicionalno vidi strateško zaledje v primeru vojne z Indijo, pri čemer zaveznike išče med afganistanskimi Paštuni. Islamabad prek povezovanja z afganistanskimi Paštuni tudi želi nevtralizirati paštunski nacionalizem – iredentizem, ki bi lahko ogrozil ozemeljsko celovitost Pakistana (Šterbenc, 2015: 149).

rekrutacijska baza talibanov.¹⁵ Ti študenti so se pridružili izvorni skupini talibanov. Skupna vojaška formacija talibanov, ki so se ji še dodatno pridružili tisoči študentov iz pakistanskih deobandskih medres, je do septembra 1996 prevzela nadzor nad Kabulom in pretežnim delom Afganistana ter začela uveljavljati skrajno restriktivne politike do žensk (Davis, 1998/2001: 43–44, 50, 55, 60; Lieven, 2011/2012: 406–407; Rashid, 2000/2001: 21–29; Roy, 1998/2001: 205; Saikal, 2004/2012: 221–227).

(Začetno) jedro in večino pripadnikov talibanskega gibanja so torej vedno tvorili afganistanski paštunski študenti iz deobandskih medres v Afganistanu in predvsem Pakistanu.¹⁶ Poleg tega so vodstvo gibanja med njegovo prvo vladavino v Afganistanu tvorili predvsem člani afganistanske deobandske usmerjene duhovščine, tudi po drugem talibanskem prevzemu oblasti pa v vladi prevladujejo izšolani deobandski kleriki. Tudi aktualni vodja talibanov Hibatulah Ahundzada je v gibanju pridobil vpliv kot (deobandsko usmerjeni) religijski svetovalec in kot sodnik, ki je skrbel za notranjo disciplino (Afghanistan's Taliban, 2021; Davis, 1998/2001: 15; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 12).¹⁷

Zaradi deobandske usmerjenosti talibanov je treba opredeliti izvor in doktrino šole Deoband. Le-ta je bila kot izobraževalna institucija (medresa) ustanovljena leta 1867 v kraju Deoband, lociranem 120 kilometrov severovzhodno od Delhija v tedanji britanski Indiji, sčasoma pa se je razširila na večji del indijskega podkontinenta.¹⁸ Izhajala je iz sunitske pravne šole Hanafi, kateri tradicionalno sledijo indijski muslimani.¹⁹ Mogoče je reči, da je pravna šola Hanafi v izhodišču najbolj liberalna od štirih sunitskih pravnih

¹⁵ V Afganistanu je 27. aprila 1978 z državnim udarom oblast prevzela afganistanska komunistična partija, ki je želela z radikalnimi levo usmerjenimi reformami spreminjati tradicionalno ruralno afganistansko družbo, zaradi česar se je proti njej že kmalu začel oborožen odpor v paštunskih in nepaštunskih delih države, kar je vodilo v vojno. To je povzročilo beg 400.000 afganistanskih beguncev v Pakistan. Vojna se je še močno zaostrila po sovjetski prokomunistični invaziji na Afganistan decembra 1979, kar je do leta 1988 povzročilo prihod treh milijonov afganistanskih beguncev v Pakistan (Saikal, 2004/2012: 184–185, 189–200; Tanner, 2002: 230–244).

¹⁶ Poleg prevladujočih študentov iz deobandskih medres (»resničnih talibanov«) je talibansko gibanje vključevalo (vključuje) tudi nekdanje paštunske monarhiste in komuniste, ki so se odrekli sekularnim ideologijam, ter paštunske islamistične borce proti sovjetski okupaciji (džihadiste), ki so oportunistično vstopili v talibansko gibanje (Davis, 1998/2001: 55; Maley, 1998/2001: 15–16).

¹⁷ Afganistansko duhovščino (razpoznavni znak njenih članov sta naziva mavlavi ali mula) so večinoma izšolale deobandske medrese (Maley, 1998/2001: 14–15).

¹⁸ Ob 100. obletnici ustanovitve šole (1967) je obstajalo že 8934 deobandskih medres v večjem delu nekdanje britanske Indije, v pomembni meri tudi v Pakistanu. Deobandske medrese so tradicionalno obiskovali tudi študenti iz Afganistana (Metcalf, 1982: 135–137).

¹⁹ Obstajajo štiri sunitske pravne šole: Hanafi, Maliki, Šafi in Hanbali. Med seboj se razlikujejo glede vprašanja, katere pravne vire lahko pri svojem odločanju uporabi jurist. Vse priznavajo štiri vire: Koran; suno oziroma normativno prakso preroka Mohameda (temelječo na tistem, kar je prerok rekel, naredil ali tiho odobril), izhajajočo iz zapisanih poročil (hadis); neodvisno presojo (idžtihad) v obliki analogije s Koranom in suno (kijas); in soglasje juristov o tem, kaj je obvezujoče pravo (idžma). Razlikujejo se glede

šol, kajti znana je po svoji racionalistični tendenci, poleg tega pa velik poudarek pridaja osebnosti svobodi posameznika oziroma nasprotuje temu, da bi jo neutemeljeno omejevali vlada ali skupnost.²⁰ Šola Hanafi je tudi edina pravna šola, ki kot vir pravnega odločanja priznava juristično preferenco (istihsan), h kateri lahko jurist pri iskanju rešitve pristopi v primeru, če bi bilo strogo odločanje po analogiji s Koranom in suno (kijas) v nasprotju z idealoma poštenosti in pravičnosti (Fayzee, 1949/1974: 33, 35; Jalal, 2008: 123; Kamali, 1999: 122, 124; Metcalf, 1982: 20, 39, 88, 135–136, 141).

Vendar pa je šla šola Deoband kljub svojemu hanafitskemu poreklu v izrazito konservativno oziroma protimoderno smer, in sicer zaradi nevalgičnega konteksta britanske kolonialne nadvlade nad Indijo.²¹ Konservativnost šole se je odražala predvsem v tem, da so njeni teologi oziroma juristi pri razreševanju praktičnih vprašanj pravo striktno aplicirali na takšen način, da so uporabljali instrument posnemanja oziroma konformnosti (*taklid*), kar je pomenilo, da so pri svojih razlagah sledili sodbam svojih »prednikov« (*salaf*) – sodbam, ki so jih hanafitski juristi sprejeli v bolj ali manj oddaljeni preteklosti.²² Pomembno je bilo, da deobandski juristi pri odločanju o tem, kaj je pravno dovoljeno, niso poskušali razširiti polja dovoljenega z upoštevanjem javnega interesa (istislah) ali načela prikladnosti (istihsan).²³ Tudi Koran in suno so kot pravna vira razlagali v skladu z razlagami »prednikov«. Podobno so se pri izvajanju neodvisne presoje oziroma intelektualnega napora (idžti-had) omejevali na upoštevanje že obstoječih sodb v okviru tradicije šole

(stopnje) priznavanja javnega interesa (istislah), juristične preference (istihsan) in še nekaterih drugih manj uveljavljenih pravnih virov (Fayzee, 1949/1974: 14–21, 33–35; Kamali, 1999: 118–130).

²⁰ Šola Hanafi je na primer edina izmed sunitskih pravnih šol, ki dopušča ženskam, da se lahko poročijo brez soglasja skrbnika (druge šole zahtevajo soglasje skrbnika za veljavnost poroke) (Kamali, 1999: 124).

²¹ Šola Deoband je nastala kot izrazito religijsko reformno gibanje, katerega namen je bil povečati moč muslimanov v Indiji, ki so bili izpostavljeni britanski kolonialni nadvladi. Izhodiščna misel reformnega gibanja je bila, da si je nemuslimanski sovražnik lahko podredil muslimane zaradi tega, ker so slednji postali moralno pokvarjeni oziroma so skrenili s prave poti zgodnjih muslimanov. Zato naj bi bila rešitev v zavračanju sodobnih običajnih religijskih praks in v posnemanju prakse iz avtentičnega besedila (Koran in suna) ali idealiziranega zgodovinskega obdobja (vračanju k »pravemu islamu«). Na ta način so reformisti želeli okrepite občutek za pomen lastne kulture in samospoštovanja indijskih muslimanov. Deobandiji so poudarjali osrednji pomen religijskega prava, kar naj bi bil učinkovit odgovor na impliciten ali ekspliciten izziv, ki ga je predstavljala tuja kultura; želeli so razviti psihološki odpor proti britanski kulturi. Reformisti so si Deoband kot lokacijo za ustanovitev šole izbrali zato, ker so v tem kraju živeli ljudje, ki so bili naklonjeni skripturalistični reformi (Metcalf, 1982: 3–6, 76, 91–92, 253–254; Rahnama, 1994/2005: xxxv).

²² To pa ni pomenilo, da so zgolj papagajsko ponavljali odgovore na pravna vprašanja oziroma mehansko poiskali odgovore, kajti za vsako vprašanje je obstajalo več možnih odgovorov. Pri iskanju odgovorov so morali upoštevati specifične kontekste (Metcalf, 1982: 142).

²³ Skozi zgodovino muslimanskega sveta je prav upoštevanje javnega interesa (istislah) vladarjem in juristom omogočalo, da so lahko prevzemali pobudo in sprejemali vse potrebne ukrepe (vključno z novo zakonodajo) za zagotovitev dobrobiti za ljudstvo (Kamali, 1999: 123).

Hanafi.²⁴ Mohamed Kasim Nanavtavi in Rašid Ahmad Gangohi, vodilna teologa izvorne medrese v Deobandu, sta tudi nasprotovala poučevanju racionalnih znanosti (logika in filozofija), in sicer zaradi njunega nasprotovanja grški filozofiji in »novi filozofiji« Zahoda (Mas'ud, 1969: 79–80; Metcalf, 1982: 101, 140–142).

Rigidnost šole Deoband je razvidna tudi iz utemeljevanja deobandskih učenjakov, da je bil človek ustvarjen za to, da uboga pravo, medtem ko naj pravo ne bi bilo ustvarjeno za to, da bi služilo človeku. Strog pristop pri razlagi prava je mogoče razbrati iz formalnih pravnih mnenj (fatev), ki so jih v 19. stoletju sprejemali deobandski juristi v zvezi z vprašanji, povezanimi z izobraževanjem in družabnim življenjem – seveda ob sklicevanju na sodbe hanafitskih juristov iz preteklosti. Tako so nasprotovali učenju angleškega jezika, ker bi znanje angleškega jezika lahko vodilo k seznanjanju z znanostmi, ki so v nasprotju z islamskim pravom, k druženju z nereligioznimi osebami in k nedovoljenemu služenju sredstev za preživetje. Tudi nošenje zahodnih oblačil (klobuk, majica, hlače) so prepovedovali, ker naj bi bil musliman na ta način podoben zahodnjakom, kar naj bi bil greh. Tudi športi (nogomet, hokej na travi, tenis) naj ne bi bili dovoljeni, kajti pri njihovem praktičiranju naj bi bili odkriti deli telesa, ki bi morali biti zakriti. Iz fatev je že mogoče zaznati restriktiven odnos do žensk oziroma nasprotovanje druženju (mešanju) pripadnikov obeh spolov, kar je danes sestavni del zapovedi, ki jih je izdalo talibansko gibanje. Obiskovanje kinematografov naj bi bilo prepovedano, ker naj bi vsebovalo več grehov, med njimi zabavo, petje, ples ali gledanje plesa, mešanje obeh spolov, kazanje slik, nemoralnost ter prikazovanje žensk, ki pojejo in plešejo (Mas'ud, 1969: 28–75, 80).

Tovrstna rigidnost oziroma konservativnost (protimodernost) šole Deoband je neizogibno vodila v restriktiven odnos do žensk, o čemer priča na primer to, da je splošno razširjen priročnik za ženske, ki ga je v 19. stoletju izdala šola, navajal, da je vse znanje, ki ga potrebuje ženska, naslednje: abeceda; pisanje pisem; preproste religijske dolžnosti; zgodbe, povezane s preroki; praktični nasveti glede kuhanja, skrbi za bolne in vodenja gospodinjstva (Metcalf, 1982: 211). V tem smislu Dupree (1998/2001: 150) poudarja, da so bili mladi člani talibanskega gibanja, ki so bili v deobandskih medresah vzgojeni v prepričanju, da so nezakrite ženske moralno problematične, ob svojem prihodu v Kabul leta 1996 prepričani, da morajo kot branilci islama mesto očistiti greha, kot ga izkazujejo kozmopolitske kabulske ženske.²⁵ Cole (2003: 794) pa navaja, da je afganistanska neodeobandska

²⁴ Deobandski juristi so s takšnim izvajanjem neodvisne presoje v bistvu obšli temeljni namen instrumenta neodvisne presoje. Kot razlaga Kamali (1999: 121), je namreč njegov namen prilagajanje prava realnostim družbenih sprememb.

²⁵ Roy (1998: 208–209) talibane opredeljuje kot fundamentalistično gibanje. Cole (2003: 775–776) pa v kontekstu talibanske vladavine v Afganistanu poudarja, da radikalna fundamentalistična gibanja

duhovščina podprla mnenje talibanskega gibanja, da del Korana, ki pravi: »Ostanite v svojih hišah ...« (33: 33), velja za vse ženske, in ne le za žene preroka Mohameda, kot pravi konvencionalna oziroma zdravorazumska razlaga.²⁶

Specifična socializacija »študentov« in intratalibanski politični kontekst

Deobandske medrese na pretežni del pripadnikov talibanskega gibanja niso vplivale zgolj v smislu protimoderne doktrinarne usmerjenosti »študentov«, ki se med drugim odraža v restriktivnem odnosu do žensk, temveč tudi prek specifične socializacije, ki je ustvarjala sovražen odnos do pripadnic nežnejšega spola. Medrese, za katere je bilo od samega začetka značilno, da so zahtevale zelo disciplinirano oziroma asketsko življenje gojencev,²⁷ so (bile) namreč izključno moške institucije. Potem ko so po letu 1978 iz Afganistana zaradi vojne v begunska taborišča v Pakistanu prišli trije milijoni ljudi, so v svoj izobraževalni proces sprejemale afganistanske paštunske dečke, še posebej sirote in sinove iz zelo revnih družin. Ti dečki, ki niso poznali svojih mater ali pa so bili ob vstopu v medrese ločeni od ženskih članic svojih družin, v času izobraževanja niso imeli stika z ženskami. Zato niso mogli (zares) spoznati žensk in razviti spoštovanja do njih, kar je vodilo v določeno ginefobijo oziroma mizoginijo. Mnogi paštunski dečki, ki so bili v begunskih taboriščih v Pakistanu prikrajšani za normalno življenje moškega ruralnega Paštuna, tudi niso mogli psihološko razviti svojega običajnega moškega samospoštovanja, kar so potem kompenzirali s poudarjenim občutkom večvrednosti od žensk in celo sadizmom do njih (Cole, 2003: 796; Goodson, 2001: 417; Griffin, 2001: 60; Maley, 1998/2001: 14; Metcalf, 1982: 105–106).

Zaradi tega ni naključje, da (so) v času obeh talibanskih vladavin v Afganistanu restriktiven oziroma brutalen odnos do žensk (tudi in predvsem do tistih, ki živijo v mestih) še posebej zagovarjajo (zagovarjali) navadni pripadniki talibanskega gibanja – nekdanji begunci v Pakistanu

zagovarjajo neopatriarhalno protimodernost, pri čemer še posebej napadajo tiste elemente modernosti, ki prispevajo k vstopanju žensk na javno področje.

²⁶ Konvencionalna razlaga se pri tem sklicuje na stavek iz predhodnega verza: »O prerokove žene, ve niste kakor druge ženske ...« (33: 32) (Cole, 2003: 794; Korán, 2014).

²⁷ Gojenci medres so morali obljubiti, da bodo predani svojemu študiju in ubogljivi do učiteljev. Če so zamujali k pouku, niso dobili hrane, če pa niso zadovoljivo delali, so bili preprosto izključeni. Z izjemo petkov, ki so bili prosti dnevi, ter vsakoletnih enomesečnih počitnic, so morali neprestano delati – med drugim so se morali na pamet (mehansko) učiti Koran v arabščini. Medrese so sicer vsakemu gojencu zagotovile knjige in brezplačen pouk ter nekaj osnovnih potrebščin (obleka, olje in vžigalice za luč, zdravstvena oskrba v primeru bolezni). Ob koncu 19. stoletja so medrese ustanovile internate, v katerih so bili gojenci strogo nadzorovani (Griffin, 2001: 60; Metcalf, 1982: 105–106).

in gojenci deobandskih medres. Ker pa le-ti v odločilni meri zagotavljajo bojno moč gibanja, jih vodstvo preprosto mora upoštevati. Povedano drugače, tudi v primeru, če je vodstvo v določeni meri pripravljeno popuščati oziroma dajati koncesije v odnosu do žensk, tega ne more storiti,²⁸ ker bi s tem resno tvegalo razpad kohezivnosti gibanja ter celo upor in prestopanja navadnih talibanov v še bolj radikalne organizacije.²⁹ V času prve talibanske vladavine v Afganistanu se je tudi dogajalo, da navadni talibani niso bili pripravljene spoštovati nekaterih odločitev vodstva, ki so bile nekoliko prijaznejše do žensk.³⁰ V času druge vladavine nekateri bolj pragmatični talibanski ministri zagovarjajo blažitev politik do žensk, vendar pa vodja gibanja Hibatulah Ahundzada vztraja pri restriktivnih politikah, in sicer tako zaradi njegovih lastnih stališč kot tudi zaradi utrjevanja podpore, ki jo ima med navadnimi talibani. Pomembno je tudi upoštevati, da je za talibansko gibanje pomembno, da se njegov »emirat« pri nekaterih vprašanjih (še posebej pri odnosu do žensk) vidno razlikuje od prejšnjih republikanskih oblasti, in sicer prek uresničevanja »islamskega prava« in »afganske kulture« (Afganistan's Taliban, 2021; Akbari in True, 2002: 629; Dupree, 1998/2001: 150–151, 157–158; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 11–12; Yousaf in Jabarkhail, 2022: 129).

Reakcija na agresivno vdiranje zunanjih, kulturno drugačnih akterjev v afganistansko tradicionalno kulturno okolje

Akbar Ahmed poudarja, da je skozi zgodovino intenzivnost zunanjih pritiskov utrjevala odločenost ruralnih Paštunov, da zaščitijo tradicionalne družbene strukture in vrednote v osrčju paštunskega geografskega prostora. Tako je med 16. in 20. stoletjem ruralna paštunska družba v konfrontaciji

²⁸ Talibansko notranje ministrstvo je marca 2022 razglasilo, da je sprejelo odločitev o odprtju srednjih šol za oba spola. Vendar pa je bila nato ta odločitev abruptno preklicana, kar se je zgodilo zaradi pritiska zagovornikov trde politike do žensk, prihajajočega iz vrst navadnih pripadnikov gibanja. Slednji poudarjajo, da so se dve desetletji borili za ideale in da zato po zmagi ne bodo spreminjali svojih ideoloških stališč (Akbari in True, 2022: 629; Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 11–12).

²⁹ Nekateri navadni talibani so prebegnili v vrste še radikalnejše »Islamske države – Pokrajine Horasan« (veja »Islamske države« v Afganistanu in Pakistanu), ki zgodovinsko deluje predvsem na vzhodu države ter rekrutira predvsem med salafisti v mestih Kabul in Nangarhar. Če bi gibanje popuščalo pri svojih politikah do žensk, bi bilo teh prestopov lahko še več. »Islamska država – Pokrajina Horasan« talibane obtožuje, da so pripravljene opuščati islamske politike ter vabi talibane k prestopom. Ideološko gledano obstaja napetost med salafisti in deobandiji (Afganistan's Security Challenges, 2022: 8–10; Afganistan's Taliban, 2021; Taliban 2.0, 2023: 42).

³⁰ Šlo je predvsem za nadlegovanje oziroma kaznovanje žensk na ulicah, pri čemer so prednjačili pripadniki talibanske religijske policije. Navadni člani talibanskega gibanja so zaradi nepravilnega oblačenja pogosto pretepali starejše ženske, ki niso izhajale iz njihovih družin, s čimer so celo kršili tradicionalna paštunska pravila, po katerih se ženske ne sme dotakniti moški, ki ne izhaja iz njene družine (Dupree, 1998/2001: 157–158; Goodson, 2001: 420).

z zaporednimi agresivnimi imperialnimi sistemi ohranjala tradicije religije in Paštunvalija. Zgodovinski spomin ruralnih Paštunov temelji na prepričanju o neprekinjenem vzorcu imperialne invazije in njihovega plemenskega odpora. Tako so ruralni Paštuni, ki so bili vedno mojstri gverilskega bojevanja, porazili vojske Mogulov (17. stoletje) in Britancev (19. stoletje).³¹ Bistveno je poudariti, da je soočenje z britanskim kolonialnim pritiskom na dva načina vplivalo na njihovo razmišljanje: po eni strani je okrepilo odločenost vzpostaviti pašunski idealni družbeni model,³² po drugi strani pa je ustvarilo negativen odnos, prežet s sumničanjem, do zunanjega sveta in njegovih razvojnih obrazcev. To je pomenilo, da so ruralni Paštuni začeli popolnoma zavračati dvajseto stoletje, kakršnega so v njihovih očeh predstavljali Britanci. Šele tri desetletja po odhodu Britancev se je sumničenje do zunanje modernosti spremenilo (Ahmed, 1980: 57–71, 92).

Tudi modernizacija v obliki zagotavljanja pravic žensk, ki so jo uveljavili poznejši agresivni zunanji akterji in afganistanski akterji, ki so sledili tuji ideologiji, je vzbudila podobno sumničenje afganistanskih pašunskih in nepaštunskih islamistov do same modernizacije oziroma pravic žensk. Tako so prevzem oblasti s strani afganistanskih komunistov (1978),³³ prisotnost sovjetskih sil v Afganistanu (1979–1989) ter vladavina komunističnih oblasti po sovjetskem odhodu (1989–1992) po eni strani vodili k temu, da so ženske v Kabulu in drugih velikih vladno nadzorovanih mestih dobile največje pravice v zgodovini Afganistana,³⁴ vendar pa so po drugi strani v percepciji protikomunističnih islamističnih borcev in tradicionalnih pašunskih struktur povzročili povezovanje komunizma z modernizacijo, kar je v postkomunističnem obdobju vodilo v spodkopavanje statusa žensk in vnovično odpravljanje njihovih pravic.³⁵ Tako je že tadžiško dominirana islamistična vlada Burhanudina Rabanija, ki je med letoma 1992 in 1996 nadzorovala

³¹ *Afganistanski Paštuni so v prvi afganski vojni (1839–1842) prizadejali strahovit poraz Britancem, ki so pred tem zasedli Kabul. Januarja 1842 je od članov britanske kolone, ki je zapustila Kabul in je stela 4.500 vojakov in 12.000 civilistov, na cilj v Džalalabadu prišel en sam Britanec; velika večina ostalih je bila pobitih, majhen del pa je prišel v ujetništvo. Britanci so se maščevali na takšen način, da so septembra 1842 po ponovnem zavzetju Kabula oplenili mesto in uničili dele starodavnega bazarja (Ahmed, 1980: 92; Ewans, 2001: 45–50; Vogelsang, 2002/2008: 247–253).*

³² *Ahmed (1980: 69–70) poudarja, da Paštun celo po invaziji na njegovo ozemlje ne sprejme poraza. Umakne se v gore, ko pa sovražnik, ki požiga in razstreljuje pašunske vasi, odide, se vrne, bolj kot kdajkoli odločen, da bo nadaljeval svoj način življenja.*

³³ *Velika večina prebivalcev Afganistana ni vedela nič o marksizmu in leninizmu, razen tega, da gre za »brezbožno« ideologijo, ki je tuja islamu (Saikal, 2004/2012: 190).*

³⁴ *V tem obdobju so ženske tvorile večino študentske populacije na univerzi v Kabulu, delale v vseh poklicih, postale pripadnice paravojaških enot in zasedale visoke položaje v vladi (tudi v politbiroju) (Goodson, 2001: 417).*

³⁵ *Za mlade borce proti sovjetski okupaciji, ki so jih islamistične odporne skupine rekrutirale v begunskih taboriščih v Pakistanu, je nadzor nad ženskami postal simbol razlik med komunističnimi vladami in mudžahedini (Goodson, 2001: 417).*

Kabul in pretežen del države, začela proces odpravljanja pravic žensk, medtem ko je bilo talibansko gibanje po zavzetju glavnega mesta in večjega dela države leta 1996 še bolj represivno do pripadnic nežnejšega spola. Talibani so odpravili vse pridobitve, ki so jih ženske dobile v času komunistične vladavine (Cole, 2003: 793; Goodson, 2001: 416–417).

Mogoče je reči, da je bila brutalna politika do žensk med prvo vladavino talibanov v določeni meri posledica tega, da je vdor komunistične ideologije in Sovjetske zveze v Afganistan pri ruralnih Paštunih zopet povzročil odločenost, da bodo (ponovno) uveljavili tradicionalne družbene strukture v skladu z narekom Paštunvalija, poleg tega pa je vzbudil sumničenje do samih ženskih pravic, ki se jih je povezovalo s tujo ideologijo in sovjetskim agresorjem. Tovrsten proces, ob delni modifikaciji (poudarek se iz religije prenese na etničnost), predvideva sociološka teorija kulturne obrambe, ki jo je razvil Steve Bruce. Le-ta pravi, da če obstaja ljudstvo s skupno religijo, ki mu dominira zunanja sila (z drugačno religijo in tudi nereligiozna), potem religijske institucije dobijo dodatni pomen kot branilke kulture in identitete ljudstva. V tem primeru se namreč skozi religijsko identiteto izraža etnični ponos in se skuša doseči »etnična čast« (Bruce, 1996/2002: 96, 123).³⁶

Seveda je mogoče argumentirati, da je do podobnega procesa v percepciji ruralnih Paštunov (talibanov) prišlo tudi ob njihovem drugem prevzemu oblasti, kajti velik obseg pravic žensk, na katerega so naleteli v Kabulu in v drugih velikih mestih, je bil uveljavljen v času 20-letne prisotnosti novega agresivnega zunanjega akterja, ZDA in drugih zahodnih sil, v Afganistanu.³⁷ Paštunski talibani torej drugič odpravljajo pravice žensk tudi zaradi tega, ker jih povezujejo z imperialnima ZDA in Zahodom. Ta percepcijski proces je še toliko močnejši, ker so Američani v času svoje prisotnosti v Afganistanu do Paštunov dejansko nastopali zelo agresivno oziroma brez upoštevanja paštunskih kulturnih običajev.³⁸ Dodati je treba, da so posledično tudi

³⁶ *Sovjetska zveza je bila uradno ateistična, Paštuni pa so strogi sunitiski muslimani. Saikal (2004/2012: 284) poudarja, da so po mnenju Paštunov Duranijev (Paštunov iz južnega Afganistana) vsi paštunski običaji posvečeni, ker naj bi bili povsem v skladu s pravili islama. Paštunske in muslimanske stvari naj bi bile identične.*

³⁷ *Talibani so afganistansko državo, ki je bila vzpostavljena po letu 2001, imeli v temelju za nelegitimno, ker naj bi bila marioneta ZDA, odvisna od ameriške vojaške in finančne pomoči. Nikoli tudi niso sprejeli afganistanske ustave iz leta 2004, ker naj bi bila »napisana v senci ameriških bombnikov« (Taking Stock, 2020: 4–5, 28).*

³⁸ *Američani so že med rušenjem prvega talibanskega režima (oktober–december 2001) borcem pro-ameriškega tadžiško-hazarško-uzbeškega »Severnega zavezništva« dovolili oziroma omogočili, da so izvajali poboje paštunskega prebivalstva. Američani so po začetku talibanskega odpora z letalskimi napadi povzročali veliko število civilnih žrtev med paštunskim prebivalstvom. Ameriške posebne enote so po letu 2009 izvajale »nočne operacije«. Ponoči so vdirale v hiše v paštunskem delu Afganistana; pri tem so pogosto povzročale smrti civilistov. Poleg tega so vdirale v zasebne prostore žensk, s čimer so kršile zapoved ločevanja žensk, s tem pa so povzročile aktiviranje zakona maščevanja (badal), kot ga predvideva Paštunvali. Končno so Američani nepaštunskim etničnim skupinam (še posebej Tadžikom) omogočili, da so pridobile*

(prvenstveno ekonomski) pritiski, ki jih ZDA in druge zahodne države po odhodu iz Afganistana izvajajo na drugi talibanski režim z namenom zavarovanja pravic žensk, v veliki meri kontraproduktivni, saj zgolj povečujejo odločenost (večjega dela) talibanov, da bodo kljub (percipirani) še nadaljnji agresiji Zahoda vztrajali pri lastnem kulturnem vzorcu.³⁹ Povedano drugače, pravice žensk v Afganistanu bodo lahko uveljavljane kvečjemu kot rezultat zelo postopnega avtohtonega razvoja, in ne kot rezultat zunanjih pritiskov.⁴⁰

Sklep

Na podlagi analize oziroma razlage obravnavanih dejavnikov je mogoče ugotoviti, da so talibanske politike do žensk dejansko rezultat kombiniranega vpliva teh dejavnikov. Kot že nakazano, pa je težko oceniti, v kolikšni (večji ali manjši) meri posamezni dejavniki vplivajo (so vplivali) na talibanski odnos do žensk. Talibanska brutalna politika do žensk je (bila) namreč posledica kompleksnega prepletanja etničnega, religijsko-ideološkega, socializacijsko-političnega in medkulturnega dejavnika. Kljub temu pa je mogoče vsaj v določeni meri bolj niansirano razčleniti vlogo posameznih dejavnikov. Temeljni vpliv v smislu izrazite konservativnosti oziroma rigidnega sledenja tradicionalnim in anahronističnim (retrogradnim) vedenjskim vzorcem vsekakor generirata etnični (paštunstvo) in religijsko-ideološki (deobandizem) dejavnik. Vendar pa interakcija med tema dejavnikoma vsebuje določeno ambivalentnost. Po eni strani z generiranjem rigidnosti komplementarno utrujeta nepopustljiv odnos pripadnikov talibanskega gibanja do žensk, po drugi strani pa med njima obstaja določeno nasprotje, kajti mladi paštunski dečki zaradi specifične socializacije v deobandskih medresah v svojem načinu razmišljanja niso razvili omejenega spoštovanja do žensk, ki ga kljub svoji tradicionalistični rigidnosti narekuje paštunski kulturni vzorec. Rezultat kombiniranja rigidnosti in razhajanja glede omejenega spoštovanja žensk je tako rekoč najslabši možen odnos do ženskega spola, ki je značilen za navadne člane talibanskega gibanja. Le-ta pa

dominanten družbenopolitični položaj, ki ni bil v skladu z njihovim proporcionalnim deležem v afganistanskem prebivalstvu (Ali, 2021: 100–104; Šterbenc, 2015: 144–147).

³⁹ *Že med svojo prvo vladavino so talibani zahodne pritiske obravnavali kot agresijo proti islamu, kar je še krepilo njihovo prepričanje, da Afganistan ogrožajo zunanje sile. Vendar pa so bili odločeni, da se ne bodo odvrnili od »Alahove religije« (Dupree, 1998/2001: 159). Tudi analitično poročilo mislišča International Crisis Group izpostavlja, da bodo zahodne kritike talibanskih politik do žensk zgolj okrepile stališča trdorokcev v gibanju, kajti talibani verjamejo, da njihov družbeni model predstavlja grožnjo zahodni kulturni hegemoniji (Taliban Restrictions, 2023: 20–21).*

⁴⁰ *Afganistanski (paštunski) oblastniki, navdahnjeni z zahodnimi vplivi, so med letoma 1901 in 1978 že uveljavili nekatere pravice žensk, in sicer prvenstveno v Kabulu in nekaterih drugih mestih. Vendar pa je to zunaj Kabula generiralo obtožbe, da prihaja do vdiranja tuje kulture, ki je sovražna do islama (Dupree, 1998/2001: 158; Goodson, 2001: 416–417).*

odločilno vpliva na voditelje talibanov, ki so ga po eni strani zaradi imperativa ohranjanja kohezivnosti in moči gibanja prisiljeni upoštevati, po drugi strani pa ga lahko izkoriščajo v smislu uveljavljanja prevlade lastnih ultra-konservativnih stališč nad manj konservativnimi stališči v kontekstu vsebinskih razhajanj znotraj vodstvenih struktur.

Etnični dejavnik (paštunstvo) ima seveda bistveno vlogo tudi pri vplivu medkulturnega dejavnika. Ob siceršnjem učinku, ki ga kot rezultat različnih medkulturnih trkov predvideva sociološki koncept kulturne obrambe, specifična in celo unikatna zgodovina Paštunov še dodatno krepi njihovo odločenost v smeri uveljavljanja paštunskih kulturnih vzorcev po trkih z zunanjimi, kulturno različnimi akterji ter tudi intenzivira njihovo sumničenje do pritoklin modernosti, ki jih prinašajo zunanji akterji. V relativno zelo kratkem obdobju zadnjih štirih desetletij je bil zgodovinsko generiran percepcijski obrazec imperialne invazije in paštunskega plemenskega odpora v zavesti ruralnih Paštunov aktiviran kar dvakrat, zato je njihovo intenzivno in vztrajno zavračanje pravic žensk, ki (in kot) sta jih uveljavila sovjetski in zahodni zunanji napadalec, povsem logičen oziroma pričakovani odziv.

Zaradi navedenega bi nadaljevanje zahodnega pritiska (tokrat »na daljavo«) zelo verjetno zgolj krepilo odločenost talibanskega gibanja, da vztraja pri svojem sedanjem odnosu do žensk. Poleg tega zahodni ekonomski pritiski temeljijo na logiki, ki velja na Zahodu (velike ekonomske težave naj bi nekoga prisilile v spremembo politik), vendar pa le-te večinoma ni mogoče aplicirati na ruralne Paštune oziroma talibane. Kot opozarja Ahmed (1973/2020: 15, 42, 46; 1980: 98), njihov način razmišljanja namreč vsebuje določen fatalizem,⁴¹ iracionalnost⁴² in pa izjemno vztrajnost,⁴³ zaradi česar se ne bodo kar tako vdali pritiskom. Kot poudarjata Yousaf in Jabarkhail (2022: 125), se talibani tudi zavedajo, da so k odhodu iz Afganistana prisilili najmočnejšo silo (ZDA) in zavezništvo (NATO) na svetu, zaradi česar po zmagi ne bodo (bistveno) spreminjali svojih stališč. Mogoče je tudi domnevati, da zmago pripisujejo Bogu, in da bodo zato vztrajali na svoji, »Bogu všečni« poti.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Pregovor iz Paštunvalija pravi: »Celo če greš daleč stran, vzameš svoj del usode s seboj« (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 15).

⁴² Paštuni se zavedajo svoje iracionalnosti in radi omenjajo naslednji pregovor: »Pašto je polnorost« (Ahmed, 1980: 98).

⁴³ Pregovor iz Paštunvalija pravi: »Počasen in vztrajen zmaga« (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 42).

⁴⁴ Pregovor iz Paštunvalija pravi: »Če Bog želi obvarovati človeka, ga bo obvaroval celo v leujem žrelu« (Ahmed, 1973/2020: 40).

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*Pavel VUK**

PRISPEVEK COLINA GRAYA K SODOBNI STRATEŠKI MISLI IN TEORIJI STRATEGIJE**

Povzetek. V članku kritično obravnavamo delo Colina Graya ter njegov izvirni prispevek k znanosti, teoriji strategije in sodobni strateški misli. Grayevo razumevanje strategije velja za univerzalno teorijo strategije, teorijo, ki nam omogoča razgrniti ključne sestavine strategije ne glede na čas, kraj, vojskujočo se stran, tehnologijo ali področje. Čeprav je veljal za Clausewitzevega privrženca, je trdil, da je teorija strategije živa tema, s katero se je treba nenehno ukvarjati in jo razvijati. Svoje razmišljanje je usmerjal v iskanje odgovorov na vprašanje, kako je mogoče teorijo strategije uporabiti pri oblikovanju strategije za reševanje trenutnih razmer. Članek prinaša v slovenski prostor analitični pogled na razumevanje sodobne teorije strategije ter vrednost za njeno znanstveno proučevanje kot tudi upoštevanje praktičnih načel.

Ključni pojmi: strategija, teorija strategije, strateška misel, Colin Gray, strateška zgodovina

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Uvod

Zgodovina strateške misli je povezana s številnimi avtorji, ki so prispevali k znanstvenemu razumevanju strategije z vidika teorije, prakse, zgodovine in politike. Eno vidnejših imen v tem strateškem panteonu je tudi Colin Gray. Njegov prispevek k strategiji lahko primerjamo s prispevkom Samuela Huntingtona v sorodni disciplini politične znanosti. Tako kot je Huntington v 50. in 60. letih prejšnjega stoletja pomembno prispeval k preoblikovanju politične znanosti, še posebej s poudarjanjem pomena političnega reda in kulture, so tudi Grayevi prispevki k strategiji primerljivi – razvijal je teorijo strategije kot predmet znanstvenega proučevanja, analiziral strategije in konflikte v sodobnem in zgodovinskem kontekstu, prispeval k razumevanju jedrske in konvencionalne strategije. Z metodološkega

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** Pregledni znanstveni članek.

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vidika je bil predvsem empirik, ki je razumel, da je zgodovina delavnica strategije,¹ v kateri se ta oblikuje in preizkuša, njeno razumevanje pa služi kot vodilo pri doseganju strateških zmag, ki lahko vplivajo na izid vojne ali na doseg predvidenih strateških ciljev. Grayevo znanje o diplomatski in vojaški zgodovini, mednarodnih odnosih, geopolitiki in še posebej o strateških študijah je bilo ogromno, vendar je v svojih delih vsak premislek uporabil preudarno in specifično. Lahko bi rekli, da je pri znanstvenem delu in metodični znanosti sledil nemškemu zgodovinarju Leopoldu von Rankeju, zlasti njegovi zahtevi, da je treba biti zvest dogodkom in njihovim dejanskim potekom na temelju virov, ne pa jih prilagajati zahtevam ideologije in družbenih pritiskov tistega časa ali razlagam, ki so nastale desetletja ali stoletja pozneje, potem ko bi jih generacije zgodovinskih interpretacij zavrgle ali celo spremenile (na primer Gray, 2014: 79–134). Na način, ki spominja na filozofijo zgodovine Robina Georga Collingwooda, je bila Grayeva uporaba znanstvenih metod celovita, niansirana in zavezana dokumentiranim virom (Thayer, 2021: 128). Gray je v strateško misel vnašal, tako kot pred njim vojaški strateg John Boyd, ontološke in epistemološke razprave iz različnih zgodovinskih obdobj ter uvidel vrednost in posledice teh razprav za strategijo. Svojo teorijo je razvijal tudi ob spoznanjih znanih logikov, fizikov in filozofov, kot so Karl Gödel, Werner Heisenberg, Karl Popper in Thomas Kuhn, ki so poudarjali neizogibno značilnost negotovosti v vsakem miselnem sistemu. Naj omenimo samo nekaj najpomembnejših Grayevih znanstvenih monografij, ki so narekovale strateško misel po koncu hladne vojne in v začetku 21. stoletja: *Modern Strategy* (1999), *Strategy and History* (2006), *The Strategy Bridge* (2010), *Perspectives on Strategy* (2013), *Strategy and Defence Planning* (2014), *The Future of Strategy* (2015), *Strategy and Politics* (2016), *Theory of Strategy* (2018) in *Nuclear Strategy* (2020).

Gray se je v svoji dolgi in produktivni znanstveni karieri ves čas sprijemal z vprašanji, kako najbolje razumeti prihodnje vojne in strategije, potrebne za njihovo vodenje, kar hkrati predstavlja tudi osrednji izziv vojaške znanosti in vojaške stroke. Njegova dela, kot navajata Mahnken in Potter (2021: 122), ponujajo protiutež strateškemu fadizmu in fetišizaciji tehnologije², ki sta pogosto značilni za razprave o vojni in miru. Tudi po Grayevi smrti so njegova razmišljanja o strategiji in prihodnosti vojn še vedno aktualna ter vredna tako znanstvenega proučevanja kot tudi upoštevanja praktičnih načel. Svet, ki ga vse bolj opredeljujejo tekmovanje med ZDA in

¹ Gray (2010b: 24) je pogosto poudarjal, da je treba splošno teorijo strategije razumeti kot imanentno, izhajajočo iz strateške zgodovine naše preteklosti.

² Fadizem v tem kontekstu razumemo kot modne, hitre, kratkoročne in največkrat tudi ne dovolj premišljene politične odločitve (primer populistične politike). S fetišizacijo tehnologije pa izpostavljam problematiko prekomernega povzdigovanja superiornosti, predvsem pametne tehnologije, kjer sta upravljava tako varnost kot tudi etičnost njihove uporabe v družbenem okolju.

Kitajsko, vsiljiva Rusija, bojevite regionalne sile, kot je Severna Koreja, ter novi načini vojskovanja, zahteva temeljit razmislek o prihodnosti oboroženih spopadov. Grayeva dela, njegova razmišljanja in poučni nasveti lahko pri teh razmislekih predstavljajo dobro izhodišče za izobraževanje strategov, za raziskovalce, oblikovalce in izvajalce strategij, politične odločevalce; lahko pomagajo voditi teoretike in praktike skozi meglo kontestnega miru.

Članek temelji na tekstualni in diskurzivni kvalitativni analizi eklektične mešanice konceptov, metod in pristopov, ki jih je Gray pri svojem raziskovanju najpogosteje zagovarjal, med njimi zgodovinsko metodo, regresivno in indicirano metodo ter induktivno sklepanje. Z eklektičnim metodološkim pristopom lahko najbolje pojasnimo obsežnost in izvirnost Grayevega prispevka k znanosti, razvoju teorije strategije in strateškemu mišljenju. Z analizo hkrati tudi razkrivamo in poudarjamo logiko in moč argumentacije pri razlagi in razumevanju abstraktne teorije strategije. Članek z opredeljevanjem kontinuitet, konceptualnih povezav kot tudi morebitnih diskontinuitet nenazadnje prispeva tudi k sistematičnosti oziroma urejenosti in rekonstruiranju Grayevih razmišljanj in dognanj.

V članku sistematično analiziramo sodobno teorijo strategije in strateško misel 21. stoletja, ki je v literaturi slabo raziskana, zlasti z vidika holističnega prikazovanja problema in pomena za razvoj strateških študij, ki spadajo v širše področje temeljne znanstvene discipline političnih ved. Takšen pristop pa po drugi strani predstavlja tudi izhodišče za dobro strateško razmišljanje, razumevanje dinamike politike, strategije in vojne ter način razmišljanja o tej dinamiki, ki se razlikuje od deterministične miselnosti, prevladujoče v strateškem diskurzu šestdesetih in sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja.

Splošna teorija strategije

Strategi in njihovi kritiki izraz teorija pogosto uporabljajo nepremišljeno, pri čemer se namerno izogibajo ali preprosto ignorirajo dejstvo, da je največkrat različno razumljena in obravnavana. Naravoslovni raziskovalci s teorijo običajno mislijo na skupek trditev, celo na eno samo imperialno trditev, katerih resničnost je mogoče preveriti. Kljub pomenu znanstvenih metod pa je področje strateških študij specifično, saj je težko postaviti preverljive trditve, ki bi ob vsakem znanstveno verodostojnem preizkusu dajale enak rezultat. Svetovne zgodovine z vso njeno zapletenostjo in negotovostjo vzrokov in posledic namreč ni mogoče uporabiti za strogo preverjanje hipotez po osnovni eksperimentalni metodi naravoslovnih znanosti, kjer je treba poskuse nadzorovati. Gray (2010b: 22) pravi, da je takšna zamisel, če jo apliciramo na izvajanju strategije, blizu absurda, saj je vojskovanje nasilno in ima le malo možnosti nadzora. Kljub temu je verjel (prav tam: 23), da imamo vedno možnost poskušati razumeti naravo in spreminjajoči se

značaj strategije in da je mogoče oblikovati izdelek strateškega raziskovanja kot teorijo strategije, v katero lahko zaupamo.

Ob tem teoretičnem izhodišču se zastavlja vprašanje pomena teorije, če sta vojna in strategija sami po sebi praktični dejavnosti. Če poenostavimo: vojna in strategija sta zapleteni, nelinearni dejavnosti, v okviru katerih vrsta dejavnikov medsebojno vpliva na rezultate. Hkrati pa je vojna, kot nas opozarja Sunzi (2012: 5), stvar življenja in smrti, pot do obstanka ali uničenja, tako za posameznika kot za skupnost – je ključni element družbenopolitičnega življenja (Lonsdale, 2021: 117), katerega uspeh je sicer pomemben in včasih odločilen, vendar ga je težko razumeti in nadzorovati. Prav tako je treba poudariti, da je izvedba strategije v praksi velikokrat slaba ali napačna, kar je moč pripisati medsebojnemu vplivu številnih dejavnikov, ki vključujejo človeške omejitve, igro trenj, institucionalne navade itd. V tem kontekstu je treba omeniti še enega stratega, znanega kot ameriškega Clausewitz, Bernarda Brodieja (1973: 452), ki v svojih razmišljanjih paradoksalno izjavi, da je strategija zapleten, a hkrati presenetljivo preprost koncept, ki ga je treba le razumeti. Njegova preprostost je v tem, kar je – v pretvorbi politike v dejanja. Strategija je študija in vodnik, kako to pretvorbo izpeljati, doseči cilje in biti pri tem učinkovit. A tako kot v mnogih drugih vejah politike se tudi pri strategiji zastavlja vprašanje o uresničljivosti in delovanju zamisli. Ta zapletenost ne prispeva k praksi strategije, temveč otežuje njeno razumevanje in oblikovanje, kar pa aksiomatično pomeni, da uspeha ni mogoče napovedati.³

Strategija, pa naj gre za varnostno, obrambno ali vojaško, mora torej odgovoriti na precej preprosto vprašanje: »Kako lahko dosežemo naš cilj?« To vprašanje pa se ob natančnejši proučitvi spremeni v Pandorino skrinjico, iz katere pobegne nabor številnih novih vprašanj, ki se nanašajo na prepoznavanje uspeha in ciljev, oblikovanje izhodiščnih predpostavk, nabor tveganj, s katerimi so povezane odločitve, identifikacijo razpoložljivih virov, neuspešnost strategije in podobna. Teorija strategije pomaga strategu pri oblikovanju pristopa k določenemu problemu, vendar mora biti ta v prvi vrsti pretvorljiva v dejanja – pretvoriti mora politične cilje v uporabo vojaške sile ali grožnjo z njo. Wylie (1967: 1) in Gray (2015: 28) zagovarjata stališče, da je strategija intelektualna dejavnost, a hkrati tudi globoko človekovo prizadevanje, ki zahteva osebne in birokratske spretnosti: je raven prizadevanj, ki narekujejo vedenje akterjev instrumentov nacionalne moči, s katerim se realizira vsaj del pričakovanih posledic, ki jih narekujejo cilji politike. V tem kontekstu je strategija pravzaprav stvar vseh, saj je na kocki preveč, da je ne bi prepoznali kot legitimno in pomembno javno zadevo. Do te točke

³ V zadnjih desetletjih je moč opaziti vpliv poslovnega sveta in njegovega razumevanja strategije kot načrta za uspeh tudi na vojaškem področju. Takšna, čeprav privlačna, »poslovna« (zlo)rava konteksta v politični in družbeni komunikaciji močno spodkopava (tradicionalno) vlogo strategije tako pri razvoju teorije kot tudi pri oblikovanju in izvajanju varnostnih in vojaških strategij.

je vsaka strategija le ideja v glavah strategov ali miselni eksperiment (nem. Gedankenexperiment), kot temu pravi Khan (na primer Aligica in Weinstein, 2009: 69), in besede na papirju. Čeprav je to dejstvo, kot navaja White (2021: 133), na meji filozofskega, se ga je treba zavedati. Strategija ima v različnih političnih in tehnoloških obdobjih različne oblike, je zapleten predmet, prepleten s številnimi dejavniki in vidiki, ki jih je treba opredeliti in pojasniti, če ne želimo zavajati njenih uporabnikov, izvajalcev. Toda brez poznavanja teorije, kot pravi Hayek (v Keegan, 2005: 25), ostanejo vsa dejstva neslišna.

Gray (2010b: 15) navaja, da obstaja le ena teorija strategije; njena naloga je izobraževati stratege, ki morajo vzpostaviti most med politiko in delovanjem (izvrševalci). S teorijo bi se morala pojasniti splošna narava strategije in razložiti elemente, ki jo (so)oblikujejo, predvsem pa odgovoriti na štiri temeljna vprašanja:

- (1) kaj je strategija,
- (2) kako se strategija oblikuje in kdo jo oblikuje,
- (3) kako se strategija izvaja,
- (4) kaj strategija počne - posledice.

Teorija strategije bi torej morala služiti strategom kot pomagalo pri njihovem izobraževanju in razumevanju pomena strategije in strateškega razmišljanja, ne more pa naučiti samega procesa oblikovanja strategije. Gray (2010b: 155; 2016b: 59) je podobno kot njegov vzornik Clausewitz (2004: 83) zagovarjal tezo, da strategov ni mogoče usposobiti, lahko pa jih izobrazimo v smislu izboljšanja njihovega delovanja v različnih strateških vlogah. Problem, kot pravi Payne (2020: xv), je v oblikovanju odziva proti še neznanemu nasprotniku, v še neznanem kontekstu, pri še neznanih vložkih, česar se zaradi številnih spremenljivk ni mogoče vnaprej naučiti. Teorija strategije predstavlja vodilo strategu, ki pa ga je treba razumeti v kontekstu političnega cilja, za katerega je bila strategija zasnovana. Zgodovina lahko daje lekcije, ki lahko vodijo stratega in nakazujejo različne možnosti, vendar mora strateg vedno delovati v trenutnem, aktualnem kontekstu ter glede na čas in okoliščine primerno spremeniti ter prilagoditi zasnovo strategije. Ni mogoče vzeti uspešne strategije iz preteklosti in jo nespremenjeno uporabiti v sedanjih ali prihodnjih okoliščinah.

Primeri iz zgodovine so osrednjega pomena predvsem za ponazoritev in primerjanje različnih pristopov k uporabi in veljavnosti teorije v praksi s prakso (Gray, 2006) ter prepoznavanje kontinuitete ali razlik med uspešnimi in neuspešnimi strategijami skozi različna zgodovinska obdobja. Vendar pa ta razlikovanja ne pojasnjujejo, kako pripraviti dobro strategijo. Preteklost je sicer skladišče znanja, ki ga je treba uporabiti za usmerjanje (kaj se lahko zgodi in kako se to zgodi), vendar je pri tem treba ohranjati objektivnost, saj je zgodovina, kot navaja Howard (1968: 2), lahko včasih

razsvetljuječa, včasih navdihujoča, lahko pa je tudi zavajajoča.⁴ Zato splošna teorija strategije, čeprav empirično izhaja iz razumevanja celotnega poteka strateške zgodovine, nima in niti ne more imeti normativnega, temveč zgolj pojasnjevalni značaj (Gray, 2014: 125). Celotna predstava strateških izkušenj v velikem toku časa predstavlja namreč le podatkovno bazo, o kateri je mogoče oblikovati samo splošna stališča.

Napovedi dramatičnih sprememb v slogu vojskovanja ali revolucije v vojskovanju zaradi nove tehnologije ali trenutne mode morajo biti podvržene dvomu. Gray je na svojih predavanjih pogosto trdil, da je bil pomen boja proti uporništvu v zadnjih desetletjih precenjen in da to ni prihodnost vojskovanja. Sprememb v značaju vojne, zlasti tehnoloških, ne bi smeli precenjevati pri ocenjevanju možnosti strateškega razmišljanja. Osnove strategije, ki jih sestavljajo politika, teorija in kontekst, kažejo, da ni mogoče predvideti, katera strategija bo »dovolj dobra« za prihodnje varnostne izzive. Strateg, ki so ga morda spodbudili optimistični politiki, se preprosto ne sme ujeti v past napovedovanja prihodnjih dogodkov, okoli katerih bi bilo treba zgraditi strategijo. Predvsem pa je pomembno, pravi Gray (2020: 10), da vsi, zlasti pa vojaški načrtovalci, nikoli ne pozabijo, da je odločitev za začetek vojne vedno igra na srečo in da zgodovinski podatki ne kažejo, da so drzne odločitve za začetek vojne običajno nagrajene z vidnim uspehom.

Politika mora določiti realne cilje glede uporabe vojaške sile, grožnje z njeno uporabo in učinkov le-te. Z zgodovinskega vidika ni veliko razlogov za optimizem. Čeprav je, kot ocenjuje White (2021: 135), večina sil »dovolj dobra« za kratkoročne operacije, vojaški in politični sistemi v številnih zahodnoevropskih državah (še) niso primerni za boj z enakovrednim nasprotnikom, čeprav se grožnje razvijajo oziroma so tam že eskalirale. Sodobni viri glede vsake nove grožnje – naj bo to Kitajska, Rusija ali kaka druga država – poudarjajo potrebo po strateški prožnosti v primeru kakršne koli mogoče konfrontacije. V tem kontekstu je Gray poudarjal tudi pomen poznavanja nasprotnikovih zmožnosti, politične volje in odločnosti za oblikovanje kompetentne strategije in njene pretvorbe v uporabo sile ali grožnjo z njo.

⁴ *Metaforično bi lahko to pokazali na Natovi strategiji, znani kot »prožen odziv« iz leta 1967, sredstvih, ki so jih Natu zagotovile članice zaveznišva in načinih izvajanja obrambe Zahodne Evrope. Glede na takratna sredstva se nobena država članica Nata ne bi mogla zoperstaviti sovjetski invaziji na Zahodno Evropo za več kot en ali dva dni. Ne glede na taktično usposobljenost Natovih sil je preprosta aritmetika, ki je izračunala porabo streliva glede na raven zalog, pokazala na njihovo pomanjkanje. Poveljstvo Nata bi za zaustavitev napredovanja Varšavskega pakta moralo uporabiti taktično jedrsko orožje, saj bi bila alternativa temu popolna kapitulacija Nata. To preprosto dejstvo je kazalo na precejšen razkorak med načini in sredstvi za dosego zahtevanih ciljev. Posledica tega je bilo izjemno tveganje, če bi v Evropi prišlo do vojne (o tem glej tudi White, 2021: 135). Tudi vojni v Afganistanu (2001) in Iraku (2003) sta pokazali, da dolgoročni politični cilji in vojaška sredstva za njihovo uresničitev niso bili dovolj usklajeni. Navedeno dokazuje, da je pri oblikovanju strategije treba slediti teoriji, ki narekuje njeno oblikovanje tako, da bo dovolj dobra za doseganje ciljev, ki jih določa politika.*

Ker se številni zgodovinarji in politiki, pa tudi nekateri strategji, bolj osredotočajo na vojskovanje kot na vojno, je Gray pogosto opozarjal na glavno nevarnost razumevanja strategije, ki izhaja iz privlačne moči samega vojaškega instrumenta. Uporaba sile se namreč največkrat zamenjuje s posledicami njene uporabe (ang. the use of force is confused with the use made of force). Gre za majhno razliko na papirju, vendar veliko v razumevanju (Gray, 2006; 81). S tega vidika bi moral biti predmet proučevanja teorije strategije, podobno kot to zagovarja Osinga (2007: 11), bolj osredinjen v razmišljanja o oblikovanju učinkovite strategije ter premišljeni in pravilni uporabi sile, ki lahko vselej narekuje potek zgodovine.

Ob teh intelektualnih in praktičnih izzivih ima splošna teorija strategije več vlog. S pomočjo sheme, izrazoslovja, konceptov, konstruktov in načel teorija strategije zagotavlja intelektualno orodje in skupni jezik za opredelitev in razlago tega, kar opazujemo pri strateškem vedenju. Ta se sčasoma razvije v skupek znanj in razumevanja, ki nam pomaga vsaj do neke mere urediti številne dejavnike, ki se v strategiji prepletajo. Omogoča nam prepoznavanje težav in tudi iskanje rešitev. Poleg tega nam splošna teorija strategije zaradi svoje univerzalne narave pomaga razumeti preteklost in se pripraviti na prihodnost. V zvezi s slednjim je Gray, ki je pri tem delil misli Bernarda Brodieja, vztrajal, da mora biti teorija strategije teorija za delovanje. Ne glede na to, kako popolna je lahko teorija strategije, ima vrednost le, če neposredno ali posredno krepi strateško prakso. Vrednost teorije strategije, s katero bi se nedvomno strinjal tudi Gray, je opredelil že Clausewitz (2004: 83):

Teorija postane vodnik ... osvetli mu pot, olajša njegove korake, vzgaja njegovo presojo in ga obvaruje pred stranpotmi ... Teorija obstaja zato, da ni treba vsakemu na novo razvrščati in predelovati, temveč najde stvar urejeno in osvetljeno. Namenjena je izobraževanju bodočega poveljnika (v vojni), ne pa njegovemu spremljanju na bojišču.

Dimenzioniranost strategije

Gray je poleg redkih znanstvenikov razmišljal o procesu strategije celostno; menil je, da je za razumevanje strategije potrebno poznavanje vseh dimenzij strategije (Gray, 2013: 191–205). Čeprav se je v poznejših letih, tudi zaradi kritik o nerazumljivosti,⁵ oddaljil od pristopa dimenzij, ta še vedno velja za uporabno in prilagodljivo teoretično orodje za razumevanje

⁵ Gray se je zavedal, da so njegova dela zapletena in težko razumljiva, kar so mu očitali tudi številni recenzenti njegovih del (na primer Bickel, 2004: 321–322). Ne glede na kritike je vztrajal na prefinjenosti jezika, saj je bil prepričan, da je le na ta način možno v celoti izraziti kompleksnost številnih proučevanih konceptov ter razumeti njihovo dimenzioniranost.

dimenzioniranosti strategije. Na podlagi del Clausewitza (2004) in Howarda (1979) je Gray v delu *Modern Strategy* opredelil 17 dimenzij strategije. Razvrstil jih je v tri kategorije: ljudje in politika, priprava na vojno in sama vojna.⁶ Lonsdale (2021: 118) uporabnost pristopa dimenzij k razumevanju teorije strategije in strateške misli razume na tri načine. Prvič, dimenzije dodatno izboljšujejo naše teoretično razumevanje strategije. Na ta način je Gray zapleteno dejavnost strategije razčlenil na njene najpomembnejše sestavne dele. Drugič, s pedagoškega vidika dimenzije omogočajo študentom strategije razumevanje pomena elementov procesa strategije ter celovit strukturiran pristop k analizi študij primerov. Tretjič, v okviru teorije za delovanje (praksa strategije) lahko dimenzije kot nekakšen kontrolni seznam strateškemu praktiku omogočijo, da pomembni vplivi na strategijo ne bi bili prezrti.

Namen Grayevega pristopa k proučevanju strategije na podlagi dimenzij je bil izpostaviti in povezati glavne elemente strategije ter vplive nanjo. V Grayevi teoriji obstaja namreč pomembno načelo, da mora biti vsaka dimenzija ustrezno upoštevana tako v strateški misli kot praksi. Pri tem pa opozarja, da lahko neuspešnost katere koli dimenzije privede do strateškega neuspeha (Gray, 1999a: 25). Že bežna primerjava in relacije med šestimi različnimi dimenzijami, kot so čas, geografija, nasprotnik, doktrina, ekonomija in logistika, lahko pomenijo precejšnje težave ravno zaradi nenehnega spreminjanja njihovih vrednosti.

Upoštevanje dimenzij prepozna Lonsdale (2021: 118) kot koristno za raziskovalce in praktike na področju strategij, ker strategijo celovito zaobjamejo in so, tako kot vsaka dobra teorija, ki predstavlja zapletenost sveta na dostopen in urejen način, preproste v razumevanju. Zapletenosti namreč ne bi smeli pojasnjevati s še večjo zapletenostjo; to ne prispeva k boljšemu strateškemu razumevanju, temveč povečuje intelektualno zamagljevanje vojne (ang. fog of war). V tem je prednost Grayevega pristopa dimenzij, ki ga je mogoče preprosto prilagajati in razvijati skozi proces oblikovanja in izvajanja strategije ter s tem izboljševati strateško razumevanje. Hoffman (2021: 112) celo poudarja, da ta razmišljanja o celostnem razumevanju strategije veljajo za ključen intelektualen prispevek Graya k strateškim študijem.

Razmišljanje o dimenzioniranosti strategije, ki jo je skozi desetletja raziskovalnega dela proučeval in snoval, je Grayu omogočilo izoblikovanje osmih temeljnih premislekov kot osnove strateškega razmišljanja v teoriji

⁶ V kategorijo ljudje in politika je vključil ljudi, družbo, kulturo, politiko in etiko. V kategorijo priprave na vojno je zajel ekonomijo in logistiko, organizacijo (vključno z obrambnim načrtovanjem in načrtovanjem sil), vojaško administracijo (vključujoč rekrutiranje, usposabljanje in oboroževanje), informacije in obveščevalne podatke, teorijo strategije ter doktrino in tehnologijo. V tretjo kategorijo, ki jo je poimenoval vojna, je uvrstil vojaške operacije, vodenje (politično in vojaško), geografijo, trenja (vključujoč priložnosti in negotovosti), nasprotnika in čas (Gray, 1999a: 24).

in praksi vsakega stratega. Čeprav na področju človekove dejavnosti ni ničesar zagotovljenega, bodo strategji, ki se zavedajo teh premislekov, povečali verjetnost, da bo njihova strategija »dovolj dobra«. Reševanje konkurenčnih napetosti, ki so neločljivo povezane z oblikovanjem in izvajanjem strategije, je težavno delo in le malo je takšnih, ki so to večšino proučevali in poučevali tako predano in intenzivno kot Gray. V Tabeli 1 predstavljamo in pojasnjujemo pomen teh premislekov za stratega pri oblikovanju strategij.

S temi premisleki je Gray (2015: 7–22) vnesel v strateško misel transzgodovinsko vrednost (dobre) strategije kot trajne človekove funkcije, stalno povezane s človekovo naravo. Tudi Hoffman (2021: 112) je prišel do podobnega zaključka, ko pravi, da bo strategija, vključno z dimenzioniranostjo, ohranila svojo uporabnost, dokler bodo varnostne skupnosti imele interese in dokler se bodo morali oblikovalci politik in vojaški poveljniki zoperstavljati varnostnim izzivom in usklajevati vire za doseganje zelenih političnih ciljev.

Strateški most: teorija za prakso in uporaba zgodovine

Gray si je prizadeval razumeti povezavo med politiko in ukrepanjem ter opredeliti vzorce ukrepanja, neukrepanja in trenj. Poskušal je zagotoviti okvir, v katerem bi lahko ocenili, kaj je strategija in kako se ta pretvori v vojaško delovanje. Razumevanje Tukidida in Clausewitza je bilo temeljnega pomena za Grayev pristop. Na podlagi njunih del mu je uspelo razviti teorijo strategije ter ustvariti koncept strateške zgodovine (na primer Gray, 2007b). Gray je menil, da je eno najnevarnejših prepričanij v zvezi s teorijo strategije to, da je bila dosežena relativno brezčasna modrost (Gray, 1971: 790).⁷ Poudarjal je potrebo po načrtu B (ali C ali D), ki mora slediti sprejeti odločitvi o uporabi sile. Vojaški uspeh ni odvisen le od zmogljivosti vpletenih sil, temveč tudi od prilagodljivosti poveljstva teh sil in njihove sposobnosti prilagajanja različnim okoljem in okoliščinam. Vojskovanje v »napačni vojni« hitro razkrije pomanjkljivosti v strategiji katere koli države (Gray, 2007a: 107). Samo dejstvo, da so sile odlične na enem področju

⁷ *To modrost, ki je lahko le relativna in podvržena dilemam medsebojno tekmujočih, a hkrati dopolnjujočih se teorij mednarodnih odnosov, po Grayu bolje poudarja teorija realizma, ki so jo zagovarjali Tukidid, Kautilja, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, Aron, Kissinger. Njihova vizija za razliko od drugih teoretskih paradig bolj priznava doslednost človeške narave, upošteva trajne predpostavke o svetu, kot sta mednarodna anarhija in mahinacije moči ter se izogiba »pastem« novih transformacijskih teorij (Gray, 1999c: 162). Gray je po svojih nazorih spadal med klasične realiste, poudarjal je pomen moči in vojaške varnosti v mednarodnih zadevah, vlogo države kot najpomembnejšega akterja v mednarodnem prostoru in relativno moč kot najpomembnejši cilj. Zaradi teh prepričanij je bil deležen precejšnjih kritik, ki so večinoma prihajale iz vrst liberalnega internacionalizma. Kritiki so večinoma zavračali njegov realističen pogled na vojno in varnost, še bolj pa trditev, da je vojna še naprej primeren instrument politike (glej na primer Owens, 2020).*

*Tabela 1: KLJUČNI PREMISLEKI STRATEGA PRI OBLIKOVANJU STRATEGIJ
(PO GRAYU)*

Kontekst in kultura	Prvi in temeljni vidik za stratega je dobro poznavanje okolja in konteksta, v katerem se bo strategija izvajala. Med pomembnejše vire je Gray uvrstil politični, vojaški, družbeno-kulturni, geografski, tehnološki in zgodovinski kontekst. Čeprav strateška kultura ni niti trdno določena niti odločilna, predstavlja povod ali okvir za prepoznavanje problemov in oblikovanje rešitev. Dobra strategija predpostavlja določeno razumevanje »nasprotnega« in mora vključevati razumevanje ustreznih zgodovine, geografije, sociologije in antropologije.
Kompromis in civilno-vojaški svet	Civilno-vojaška interakcija je pri razvoju strategije ključna za strateški uspeh, a hkrati tudi velik vir napetosti. Predstavlja mesto, kjer se združujejo cilji politike in operativne možnosti. Na koncu morajo oblikovalci politike pretehtati strateška vprašanja v strukturiranih razpravah, ki odpravljajo osebne, organizacijske in nacionalne iluzije ter domišljavost. Morajo se soočiti s partikularnimi interesi birokracije, natančno prepoznati strateške možnosti in se odločiti na podlagi nepopolnih informacij. Strateg, ki vzpostavlja pregovorni most med politiko in vojaškimi sredstvi, mora sprejeti zgodovinsko dejstvo, da povsem racionalne metode niso pravilo pri oblikovanju strategije. Naravna podlaga za nastanek strategije so preplet politike, kompleksnosti, negotovosti in omejitev. Strategije se razvijajo v podporo doseganju ciljev politike in jih določa politika.
Konkurenčne strategije	Strategija mora biti konkurenčna. Konkurenčnost pomeni, da se strateg zaveda, da vsaka strategija deluje v okolju odnosov in notranjih nasprotij, v katerem si druge strani prizadevajo za svoje interese. Konkurenčna strategija spoštuje izbire in možnosti ter relativne prednosti in slabosti, tako lastne kot nasprotnikov.
Skladnost	To je bistvo strateške funkcije, pri kateri strateg izkoristi razumevanje, ki izhaja iz konteksta, ter kognitivno ustvari strateški koncept in logiko, ki obljublja, da bo dosegel cilje politike v okviru dodeljenih sredstev in omejitev, ki so zanje določene. Dobra strategija mora imeti notranjo logiko, ki povezuje cilje politike z načini in sredstvi za ustvarjanje zelenih strateških učinkov. Ustvarjanje in ohranjanje skladnosti je tisti del strateške prakse, kjer se odraža ravnovesje in notranja logika v formuli cilji/načini uporabe/sredstva.
Omejitve	Strategija se oblikuje in izvaja v dejanskem svetu, v okolju, prežetem z omejitvami. Najbolj evidentne med njimi so čas, informacije in viri. Vojna na splošno in še posebej operacije so konkurenčne, zato je treba odločitve sprejemati v kontekstu, ki nagrajuje hitro in pravočasno ukrepanje. S predvidevanjem, ugibanjem, genialnostjo, odločanjem in upravljanjem s časom kot najpomembnejšim virom lahko ustvarimo in ohranimo prednost. Enako velja tudi za informacije. Bistvo strategije je v sprejemanju odločitev, kompromisov in tveganj, ki jih povzročata negotovost.
Nepredvidljivost	Ta premislek odraža vlogo naključja v človekovem delovanju – nepredvidljivost življenjskega okolja postavlja zahteve po preudarnosti pri sprejemanju tveganj in prilagodljivosti pri strateškem razmišljanju.
Nenehno ocenjevanje in prilagajanje	Zaradi prepleta nepredvidljivih razmer in konkurenčnosti je potrebna dodatna komponenta: stalno ocenjevanje aktivnosti in nenehno merjenje napredka. Zato je treba o strategijah razmišljati kot o prilagodljivi kategoriji. Oblikovanje strategije je ponavljajoča se dinamična dejavnost.
Vzročnost	Razmislek, osredotočen na kritično in vzročno logiko strategije, se nanaša na oblikovanje »načina uporabe«, ki povezuje cilje in sredstva. »Način uporabe« je strateški koncept, ki predstavlja nepreverjeno hipotezo, s katero je mogoče verodostojno doseči cilje politike v okviru dodeljenih sredstev in obstoječih omejitev. Dobra strategija mora vzpostaviti vzročno-posledično logiko, ki povezuje načine in sredstva za doseganje zelenega cilja politike in strateških učinkov.

Vir: prirejeno po Gray, 1999a: 20, 58; Gray, 2009a: 36–149; Gray, 2010a: 159–178; Gray, 2011b: 37–45; Gray, 2013: 202; Gray, 2015: 7.

vojskovanja, še ne zagotavlja splošnega uspeha; nasprotnik ima v vsakem spopadu vedno svojo težo. Oblikovanje strategije v vakuumu, samo za namene doseganja »odličnosti«, je nevarno in povsem neutemeljeno. Če ima nasprotnik boljšo strategijo ali če celo pozna strategijo druge strani, pridobljeno bodisi s prevaro bodisi z utemeljenim ugibanjem, bo uspeh težko, če ne celo nemogoče doseči. Slabe strategije ne bodo rešile niti najučinkovitejše sile; strategija v takem primeru ne bo delovala. Nasprotno pa lahko dobra strategija z izkoriščanjem notranje dinamike uspe, tudi če so sile, ki so na voljo, le »primerne«. Teorija sicer daje strategom trdne temelje, na katerih lahko delajo, vendar mora njena praktična uporaba odražati prilagodljivost, ki jo zahtevajo realne okoliščine.

Čeprav vsa Grayeva dela vsebujejo pomembne elemente splošne teorije, je svoja spoznanja na področju teorije strategije objavil v svojem najpomembnejšem delu *The Strategy Bridge*, strateškem mostu, kjer se srečata teorija in praksa. Med njima, pravi Gray (2010b: 22), ne sme biti napetosti – teorija strategije mora služiti potrebam v svetu (praksi), svetu, ki ga oblikujejo in celo poganjajo ideje (teorija). Gray je pogosto poudarjal, da so strategije pravzaprav teorije, kar pomeni, da so domnevne razlage tega, kako je mogoče doseči zelene učinke z izbranimi vzroki tveganj, groženj in dejanj, uporabljenimi v določenem zaporedju (Gray, 2014: 30).⁸ Ta zamisel, da je strategija teorija ali hipoteza, ki jo je treba šele preveriti, je ključni del dobre strateške logike, saj sili stratega, da razmišlja o vzročni povezavi med cilji in sredstvi, ki jo v praksi preveč pogosto spregledamo. Slednjega pa Grayu ne moremo očitati. Murray (2014) ob kritičnem vrednotenju tega dela celo poudarja, da je v njenem jedru predstavljen tehten argument, ki jasno osvetli problem strategije. V tem smislu predstavlja delo tudi koristno izobraževalno orodje za razmišljanje strategov, tako vojaških kot civilnih, ki so ali bodo v prihodnosti vključeni v strateško odločanje.

Z metodološkega vidika je Gray, čeprav se je zavedal omejitev, pri analiziranju strategij vztrajal na induktivnem sklepanju, kar je razvidno tudi iz pogostosti rabe zgodovinskega pristopa (glej na primer Gray, 2010b: 23, 58).⁹ Njegovo razumevanje in pogled na vojno in strategijo je izhajal iz

⁸ V določenem smislu je tudi strateško (obrambno) načrtovanje lahko le teoretična naloga. S tem ko uradniki izdelajo načrt za ukrepanje, izražajo prepričanje in upanje, da bo določeno ravnanje prineslo zelene rezultate. To konsekvencialistično razmišljanje »če – potem« je pravzaprav teorija v praksi (Gray, 2010b: 22). Dokler se potek prihodnjih dogodkov ne razvije, se glavni obrambni načrtovalec in poveljnik, ki sta lahko ena in ista oseba, odločata in delujeta le na podlagi teorije o uspehu (Gray, 2009b: 44).

⁹ Zastavlja se vprašanje, ali zagovarjanje induktivnega pristopa vsaj delno pojasnjuje njegovo stališče do zavračanja možnosti uporabe jedrskega orožja. Ne glede na izkušnje strategije odvracanja lahko z vidika odsotnosti jedrskih izmenjav vidimo, da je jedrska strategija bolj omejena na deduktivno kot pa induktivno sklepanje. Za Graya, ki je osredotočen na zgodovinske okoliščine, to predstavlja nestabilno podlago za teoretiziranje o uporabi jedrskega orožja za politični učinek (glej na primer Lonsdale, 2021; Mahnken in Potter, 2021).

zgodovinske perspektive oziroma prepričanja, da človekova narava – zlasti boj za oblast in morebitno zatekanje k nasilju pri doseganju tega cilja – ostaja nespremenljiva, ne glede na politične ali tehnološke dosežke družbe. Pravzaprav je Gray pričakoval, da se bo zgodovina ponavljala v nerednih ciklih, v katerih je vojna trajna značilnost svetovne politike, kar so drugi avtorji (na primer Blankshain in Stigler, 2020; Golby, 2020) znali pogosto kritično ovrednotiti in mu očitati spregled pomembnih značilnosti diskontinuitete in sprememb v mednarodni politiki.

Človeška izkušnja se nikoli ni in se verjetno nikoli ne bo podredila urejenim spremenljivkam, vzročnemu determinizmu ali neki idealizirani razvojni stopnji. Zato mora biti prava modrost v strategiji praktična, ker je strategija praktična dejavnost (Gray, 1999b: 7) in v tem je Gray videl vrednost zgodovine. Razumevanje preteklosti je bil za Graya prvi korak k ocenjevanju prihodnje vojne in strategije (Mahnken in Potter, 2021: 123). Kljub močnejši optosti na induktivno sklepanje Gray (2012: 4–9) izrecno pravi, da je strategija geštalt (aktiven proces ob zavedanju in odgovornosti akterjev kako obvladati okolje in celostno ukrepati na spremembe); čeprav je njegova teorija strategije precej normativna, je vendarle namenjena bolj izobraževanju kot pa predpisovanju norm ravnanja, kjer se ponovno zbliža s stališčem Clausewitzja. S tem pristopom je bil Gray velikokrat deležen kritik, saj se je izogibal številnim sodobnim teoretičnim in metodološkim trendom na področju političnih ved; pravzaprav je zavestno zavračal sodobno družboslovno znanstveno metodologijo v korist klasične teorije (na primer Olsen in Gray, 2011: 290).

S teorijo strategije naredi Gray strategijo dostopno, hkrati pa poudari zapletenost in težave pri preučevanju in prakticiranju strategije. Grayev pogled na proces strategije ponazarjajo različne sheme. Najprej se zavzema za model strategije po načelih cilji (ang. ends), načini uporabe (ang. ways), sredstva (ang. means), ki je sicer preprost, vendar zajema jedro strateškega procesa. Nadalje nadzor, silo, most in učinek opredeljuje kot štiri ključne termine v strategiji, pri čemer predstavlja strateški učinek »glavni koncept« v tej namenski družbenopolitični dejavnosti. Tretjič, strateško okolje predstavlja kot kontekst za oblikovanje in izvajanje strategije, na katerega vplivajo politični, družbeno-kulturni, gospodarski, tehnološki, vojaški, geografski, zgodovinski in drugi dejavniki. Četrto, Gray opredeli sedem vrst strategij in njihovih alternativ: neposredne/posredne; zaporedne/kumulativne; napadalne/manevrske; vztrajne/obhodne; prisilne/surove; ofenzivne/defenzivne; simetrične/asimetrične. Pri iskanju racionalnega odgovora na vprašanje o uporabi sile ali zgolj njene grožnje se mora strateg vedno vprašati o posledicah njihovega delovanja za politiko (Gray, 2010b: 7, 38, 66, 178, 238, 250).

Gray je proučeval tudi ravni strategije ter njihov medsebojni vpliv v procesu pretvorbe vojaške moči v politični učinek. Pri tem je vztrajno poudarjal,

da mora splošna teorija vključevati tako veliko (splošno) kot tudi vojaško strategijo (Gray, 2010b: 19). Ker je disciplina strateških študij osredotočena na vojno, ki se sama po sebi razlikuje od drugih družbenopolitičnih dejavnosti, je razumljivo, da predstavljajo v literaturi o strategiji levji delež prav vojaške dejavnosti. To pa nas ne sme zavesti pri razumevanju njunega hierarhičnega razmerja, v katerem velika strategija zagotavlja kontekst za vojaško strategijo in ne obratno, kar nas opominja na upoštevanje celostne narave strategije. Velika strategija je usmerjanje¹⁰ in uporaba vseh sredstev varnostne skupnosti, vključno z njenim vojaškim instrumentom, za namene politike, o kateri odloča politika (Gray, 2010b: 29).¹¹ Grayeva izjava, da so »vse strategije velike strategije«¹² je še danes odmevna, saj poudarja pomen (med)institucionalnega (ang. agential) konteksta¹³ v vojaških okoljih; to je v strateški praksi pogosto zanemarjeno. Tako kot večina strategov (na primer Liddell Hart, 1954; Howard, 1979; Yarger, 2008) je tudi Gray menil, da prava velika strategija zahteva konceptualizacijo vseh elementov nacionalne moči, ne le njene vojaške moči. Kot nereformirani clausewitzijanec se je močno zavedal, da strategijo določa in o njej odloča politika, zato je ob tej konceptualizaciji pogosto poudarjal tudi vidik zamenljivosti moči, saj je z mejami zamenljivosti mogoče manipulirati in jih je včasih mogoče premakniti dlje, kot bi pričakovali. Vsaka kompetentna strategija bi morala po Grayu (2010b: 155) omogočiti iskanje alternativnih sredstev in metod, ki jih v osnovi njeni

¹⁰ Pri tej opredelitvi velike strategije Hoffman (2021: 112) kritično izpostavi izraz »usmeritev«, saj je treba strategijo pojmovati tudi v smislu »razvoja«. Razvojna substanca strategije, ki je v praksi pogosto sprejgledana ali nezadostno izpostavljena, daje vladi vhodna izhodišča za načrtovanje potrebnih zmogljivosti instrumentov nacionalne moči. Velike strategije so lahko anticipativne in dolgoročne, saj si prizadevajo tudi za razvoj instrumentov moči države z oblikovanjem novih vladnih institucij (agencij) in posem novih pristojnosti ali oblik moči nacionalnega arzenala. Njihov namen je tako več kot le usmerjanje celovite uporabe obstoječih državnih orodij za doseganje določenih ciljev.

¹¹ Čeprav se lahko pripeti, da vojaška moč v veliki strategiji (na primer med veliko vojno) prevlada, mora biti vojaška strategija povezana z drugimi instrumenti moči (diplomatskimi, gospodarskimi, obveščevalnimi, kibernetiskimi). Številne strateške aktivnosti so se izjalovile ravno zaradi tega, ker velika strategija ni bila uravnotežena (Gray, 2010b: 19).

¹² Gray je še posebej po koncu hladne vojne začel verjeti, da bi lahko velika strategija služila kot kompromis med dvema različnima znanstvenima taboroma. En tabor, strateške študije, je poudarjal, da je vojaška strategija kljub relativnemu miru v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja še naprej pomembna. Drugi tabor, varnostne študije, je trdil, da vojaška moč ni več pomembna in da je treba varnostno agendo razširiti z drugimi oblikami varnosti. Gray je med tema dvema taboroma prepoznal vlogo velike strategije v smislu kompromisa za sprejemanje razširitve varnosti, ne pa demilitarizacije (Gray, 2011a: 17). To kompromisno razumevanje velike strategije je Graya nekoliko ločilo od drugih znanstvenikov, ki sledijo glavnemu toku akademskega pristopa na tem področju in pod vplivom mednarodnih odnosov široko opredeljujejo veliko strategijo kot okvir, v katerega se umešča zunanja politika (glej na primer Brands, 2014: 86).

¹³ Vojna je vedno več kot le vojaško tekmovanje; vanjo so neločljivo vključene tudi nevojaške oblike moči. Strategija v agencialnem kontekstu pomeni za vojaške stratege pomemben opomnik, da lahko politika, ki jo zastopajo, za vodenje vojne uporablja tudi druge metode in instrumente moči (gospodarske, diplomatske), zato je ključno, da institucije, ki imajo te različne oblike moči v rokah, ne smejo delovati v nasprotju z drugimi (Milevski, 2021: 81).

snovalci niso predvideli, da bi se lahko v realnem času prilagodili nujnosti izziva. To ne pomeni, da so vsa vojaška ali strateška sredstva popolnoma zamenljiva, ampak da mora biti strateg ustvarjalna oseba, izbrana tudi zaradi svoje sposobnosti zamišljanja različnih poti do uresničitve političnih ciljev.

Gray je dajal precejšen poudarek v teoriji strategije izpodbijanju pretirane veljave operativne ravni, ki se je globoko zasedrila v sodobni vojaški doktrini. Konceptualno gledano, operativna raven usklajuje taktične ukrepe in jih povezuje s strateškimi cilji. Geografsko predstavlja vojskovališče, znotraj katerega taktične dogodke ponovno usklajuje poveljnik na operativni ravni. Kljub tej uveljavljeni praksi Gray izraža zaskrbljenost, da dobiva operativna veščina nesorazmerno prednost pred strateškim učinkom, ki ga lahko celo nadomesti. Vojaški poveljniki se, kot je primer Napoleona, bolje počutijo na operativni ravni kot na strateškem mostu. Weiss (2021: xvii) po drugi strani opominja še na prepogosto prakso vojska, da vrhunske taktike (tudi zaradi pridobitve višjega čina) neposredno in brez ustreznega razumevanja in vedenja o razvijanju strateški misli postavlja na mesto strategov in svetovalcev politikov.¹⁴ Takšna miselnost in praksa bi lahko po Grayu povsem zapostavila razumevanje simbiotičnega odnosa med taktično in strateško ravno (Gray, 2010b: 20). Po spoznanjih Graya je strategija veliko zahtevnejša od politike, vojaških operacij in celo taktike. Medtem ko sta taktika in vojaške operacije domena vojske, politika pa v domeni oblikovalcev politike, se strategija razteza med politično in vojaško stranjo strateškega mostu. V današnjem času, na kar še posebej opozarja Hoffman (2021: 112), je opazen veliki manko strategov – tistih, ki se posvečajo izključno delu na področju strategije. Tudi posluha za razvoj strateške misli v institucijah za strateške študije (če takšne v posameznih državah sploh obstajajo) ni prav veliko, zato vlogo strategov pri oblikovanju strategij najpogosteje prevzemajo kar uradniki in vojaški strokovnjaki z različnih področij dela. Gray je to pragmatičnost pri oblikovanju strategije naslovil z osmimi dejavniki, ki kažejo na to, kako pomembna in zahtevna je ta dejavnost. Izpostavil je potrebo po razumevanju narave strategije, oceno nasprotnika, zagotovitev uspešne pretvorbe strateškega učinka ter upoštevanje človekovega delovanja, kompleksnost, trenja in kontekst civilno-vojaških odnosov (Gray, 2010b: 246).

¹⁴ Weiss (2021: xvii) je na primer prišel do spoznanja, da vojske na splošno raje in pogosteje spodbujajo vrhunske taktike. Vendar strokovnjaki na področju taktike, ki so navajeni zanemarjati teorijo, težko razumejo potrebo po celovitejšem in bistveno širšem pogledu na strategijo. Zato je njihova vloga v generalštabu, kjer ima razumevanje vojne najširši učinek, omejena tako z vidika lastne intelektualne sposobnosti kot tudi z vidika razumevanja procesov oblikovanja vojaške in obrambne politike, prežetih s frekvenco sestankov in zasledovanjem rokov. Takšne kadrovske prakse pogosto tudi onemogočijo kakovosten strateški razmislek o pravi naravi vojne. Brez zavestnega prizadevanja za sprejemanje teorije taktični poveljniki težko postanejo učinkoviti strategji. Navsezadnje je najboljši način, kako ceniti teorijo, ta, da jo preučujemo, uporabljamo in vsake toliko časa tudi ustvarjamo.

Tudi s tega vidika je Grayev doprinos precejšen, saj strategom ponuja določeno pomoč v izobraževanju o strategiji in pri razmišljanju na bolj strateško usmerjen način. Gray to imenuje »strateški čut«, ki ga izostrujejo trije dejavniki: formalno izobraževanje, izkušnje in sposobnosti posameznika (Gray, 2010b: 172). Čeprav je vsaka strategija kompleksna in potencialno podvržena nelinearnosti, bi morala imeti po Grayu (2016a) jasno prepoznavno smer (ang. story arc). V tem kontekstu je treba razumeti odgovornost stratega do procesa oblikovanja strategije, ki mora biti v prvi vrsti racionalen in urejen ter zagotavljati konceptualizacijo, koordinacijo in usklajenost vseh ukrepov na vseh ravneh. Pri iskanju strateškega uspeha so Grayu (2010b: 211) pomembni strateško izobraževanje, voditeljstvo, bojna moč in priložnost, seveda pa se pri tem nikoli ne sme zanemariti pomena konteksta, saj je uspeh, kot pravi Murray (2014: 4-7), lahko posledica tudi nasprotnikove nesposobnosti.

Sklep

Gray je uporabil integriran okvir za strateško analizo, ki je temeljil na obsežnem poznavanju vojaške zgodovine in strategije, da bi ocenil odnose med politiko, strategijo in vojskovanjem. Osredotočil se je zlasti na posledice grožnje s silo ali njene uporabe v mednarodnih odnosih. S svojimi prizadevanji o razumevanju teorije strategije je v mednarodne odnose in strateške študije ponovno uvedel upoštevanje geopolitike. V številnih delih je razpravljal o vprašanih s področja politike, strategije, doktrine in strukture sil. Od drugih znanstvenikov na področju strateških študij se je razlikoval predvsem po svojem prepričanju, da je strategija nepogrešljiva, zapletena in v svojem bistvu ontološko institucionalna.

Gray se je morda bolj kot kateri koli teoretik poglobil v samo naravo strategije. Prav v niansah njegove teorije je mogoče najti veliko pogledov. Izpostavimo lahko njegove dileme o politiki (politics vs. policy), vojni in strategiji, vojni in miru itd. V vsakem od teh primerov je Gray jasno opredelil ločeno naravo vsakega od pojavov, hkrati pa je natančno opazoval njihova prekrivanja in medsebojna vplivanja. Vendar pa je pri teoretiziranju kompleksnosti in subtilnosti strategije v svojih delih, zaradi zavedanja o dimenzioniranosti strategije, lahko frakcioniral strategijo na njene bistvene sestavine in procese. Gray je v svojih delih poudarjal, da je strategija neučrejen in nelinearen proces, ki ga je treba pogosto izvajati pod stresom in negotovostjo, vendar bolje in hitreje od nasprotnikov. Razumna strategija ni iluzija ali napuh; je preprosto najboljše zdravilo in najboljše zavarovanje vsake politike pred katastrofo.

Čeprav je bil podvržen številnim kritikam, v katerih mu je bil pogosto očitán ponavljajoč se ali selektivno zgodovinski pristop ter združevanje

idej strategov z njihovimi dejanji na način, ki je vodil do tавтоloških argumentov, je bil ves čas svoje raziskovalne kariere, ki je trajala od leta 1970 do njegove smrti 2020, osrednji lik in protagonist sodobne strateške misli. V strokovnih krogih je prepoznan izviren in ustvarjalen avtor z neizmernimi sposobnostmi za analiziranje zapletenih strateških vprašanj, prepoznavanje njihovega bistva in jasna globoka spoznanja, ki so pogosto izzivala konvencionalne modrosti. V celoti gledano vsa Grayeva dela več kot zaslužno najdejo svoje mesto na »strateških« knjižnih policah poleg treh del, ki jih je Gray cenil nad vsemi drugimi: Sunzijevo *Umetnost vojne*, Tukididovo *Peloponeško vojno* in Clausewitzovo *O vojni*. Nedvomno je Grayev prispevek k splošni teoriji strategije bistveno izboljšal razumevanje narave in procesa strategije ter prispeval k razvoju strateškega čuta pri tistih, ki bi radi izvajali najbolj pomembno in težavno družbeno-politično dejavnost – oblikovanje strategij.

Naj bo vsem snovalcem strategij eno od vodil tudi Grayeva poučna misel: skromna strategija je draga, slaba strategija, če je v igri preživetje, pa je skoraj vedno usodna. Ta misel bi morala tako politike kot stratege, ki se nahajajo v skupni kategoriji odgovornosti, vseskozi usmerjati k prizadevanjem, da se politični in strateški interesi držav vodijo po poti zagotavljanja čim večje varnosti.

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Janez BEŠTER*

MANAGERSKE NAPOVEDI IN DEJANSKI UČINKI PANDEMIJE COVID-19 NA SLOVENSKA PODJETJA**

Povzetek. Napovedovanje poslovnih rezultatov podjetij je zahtevno že v običajnih razmerah poslovanja, povečana kompleksnost in vsestranska negotovost, ki jo je prinesla pandemija COVID-19, pa sta to nalogo managerjev dodatno otežili. V članku primerjamo napovedi managerjev 154 slovenskih podjetij, ki smo jih anketirali spomladi 2020 ob zaključku prvega vala epidemije, z dejanskimi poslovnimi rezultati teh podjetij v letih 2019, 2020 in 2021. Ugotavljamo, da med poslovnimi rezultati podjetij v letu pred pandemijo ter anketnimi napovedmi managerjev ni statistično značilnih povezav, da pa so bili managerji uspešni v napovedovanju učinkov pandemije na njihove poslovne rezultate v letih 2020 in 2021.

Ključni pojmi: podjetja, management, napovedovanje, učinki, pandemija, finance, kazalniki, COVID-19

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Uvod

Od samega začetka je bila največji izziv pandemije COVID-19 izjemna negotovost. Najprej v zvezi s samim potekom pandemije z epidemiološkega stališča glede hitrosti širjenja okužb, resnosti poteka bolezni, nepredvidljivih mutacij virusa SARS-CoV-2, ponavljanja širjenja okužb v valovih, možnostih učinkovitega zdravljenja ter omejevanja širjenja okužb z različnimi ukrepi. Vlade držav, zdravstveni sistemi, podjetja in posamezniki so morali sprejemati odločitve v razmerah nepopolnih informacij in brez predhodnih izkušenj s podobnimi dogodki.

Negotovost z zdravstvenega stališča, ki je prinesla številne do takrat v večini sveta nepojmljive omejevalne ukrepe, kot je polno zaprtje družbe, se je tako neposredno in takoj prelila v gospodarstvo. Države so se soočile z vprašanjem pričakovanih makroekonomskih posledic, z identifikacijo najbolj ogroženih sektorjev gospodarstev oz. kategorij podjetij ter z iskanjem učinkovitih ukrepov za obvladovanje negativnih posledic lastnih omejevalnih ukrepov za zajezitev širjenja epidemije.

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Na podjetniški ravni so bile razmere še zahtevnejše, saj so se mnoga podjetja soočila z izzivi, ki so neposredno ogrožali njihovo preživetje. Management je moral kljub izjemni negotovosti in pomanjkanju zanesljivih informacij najprej čim boljše oceniti naravo in obseg pričakovanih učinkov (težav in priložnosti), ki so bili posledica same pandemije in predvsem omejevalnih ukrepov držav ter prekinitev v globalnih verigah vrednosti, nato pripraviti nabor ustreznih in učinkovitih ukrepov za njihovo obvladovanje ter izdelati različne scenarije možnega poteka obvladovanja razmer. Šele na tej podlagi je management lahko ocenil najverjetnejše učinke na njihove tekoče in prihodnje poslovne rezultate.

Sposobnost managementa, da v tako negotovih in kompleksnih razmerah pravilno napove bodoče poslovne rezultate, preverjamo na vzorcu 154 slovenskih podjetij, katerih anketne napovedi iz obdobja po zaključku prvega vala epidemije v Sloveniji spomladi 2020 primerjamo z dejansko realiziranimi poslovnimi rezultati teh podjetij v letih 2020 in 2021.

V tem kontekstu si v pričujočem članku zastavljamo dve raziskovalni vprašanji:

1. ali so bile anketne napovedi managerjev po zaključku prvega vala epidemije COVID-19 v Sloveniji odvisne od preteklih poslovnih rezultatov (leto 2019) njihovih podjetij in finančne kondicije, s katero so ta vstopila v obdobje pandemije;
2. ali so managerji anketiranih podjetij ob zaključku prvega vala epidemije COVID-19 v Sloveniji pravilno napovedovali učinke pandemije in spremljajočih omejevalnih ukrepov države na njihove poslovne rezultate v letih 2020 in 2021?

Pregled relevantne literature

Pandemija COVID-19 je na začetku leta 2020 presenetila in temeljito pretresla celotno svetovno gospodarstvo. Poskusi držav, da bi z izjemno rigoroznimi in dotlej nepredstavljivimi ukrepi zaježile širjenje virusa SARS-CoV-2 in s tem preprečile preobremenitve zdravstvenih sistemov ter zmanjšale število smrtnih žrtev, so predvsem v prvem valu spomladi 2020 ohromili velik del gospodarstev in javnega življenja nasploh (Onyeaka et al., 2021).

Sledile so težave v svetovni trgovini, prekinitev v globalnih verigah vrednosti, nihanja na finančnih in blagovnih trgih, negotovosti na trgih dela in podobno. Ukrepi držav, ki so bili primarno namenjeni omejevanju zdravstvenih posledic epidemije, so na drugi strani povzročili gospodarske težave celotnim nacionalnim gospodarstvom, številnim podjetjem in tudi posameznikom (Mena et al., 2022; Meyer et al., 2022).

Da bi države omejile tveganja prenehanja poslovanja številnih podjetij, izgubo delovnih mest in poslabšanje konkurenčnega potenciala nacionalnih

gospodarstev, so izvajale različne ukrepe za podporo gospodarskim subjektom, ki so vključevali predvsem obsežne pakete neposredne finančne pomoči, različne kreditne sheme in davčne olajšave (Valla in Miguet, 2022). Kljub temu se je na globalni ravni bruto domači proizvod leta 2020 skrčil za 3,1 %, od večjih gospodarstev pa je leto s pozitivnim predznakom (2,3 %) zaključila le Kitajska (IMF, 2022). Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (2022) je za leto 2020 objavil celo 5,5-odstotni realni padec bruto domačega proizvoda v Sloveniji.

OECD (2022) je v analizi ukrepov posameznih držav v zvezi s pandemijo COVID-19 ugotovila, da je bila njihova pripravljenost na morebitno pandemijo s stališča človeških in finančnih stroškov povsem nezadostna in predvsem v manj razvitih državah tudi pogosto neustrezna (Cirera et al., 2021). Hitri in obsežni paketi finančne pomoči so občutno povečali stopnje zadolženosti držav, kar v kombinaciji z ekspanzivno monetarno politiko odpira zahtevna vprašanja obvladovanja javnih financ, servisiranja dolgov in pričakovanih inflacijskih pritiskov v prihodnjih letih (ECB, 2021).

Tako npr. študija učinkov pandemije na ravni EU (De Vet et al., 2022) ugotavlja, da je imela pandemija izjemno obsežne učinke na gospodarstva držav članic, hkrati pa so bili izjemni tudi ukrepi, s katerimi je EU skušala te učinke omejiti. Najbolj prizadeti so bili sektorji, ki so najbolj odvisni od osebne interakcije kupcev in izvajalcev storitev, kamor spadajo predvsem turizem, letalski promet, kreativne industrije in kultura.

Podobne ugotovitve v smislu izjemnih učinkov pandemije na nacionalna gospodarstva in podjetja v različnih dejavnostih podajajo tudi avtorji, ki se ukvarjajo z analizo učinkov pandemije ter odzivov držav in podjetij na izzive, ki jih je ta prinesla, v drugih delih sveta:

- Belitski et al. (2021) analizirajo primere ZDA, Združenega kraljestva, Kitajske, Avstralije, Španije, Italije, Indonezije, Nemčije, Indije in Kanade,
- Hurley et al. (2021) na ravni dveh milijonov malih in srednje velikih podjetij v Združenem kraljestvu,
- Sonobe et al. (2021) izbrane azijske države,
- Dai et al. (2021) mala in srednje velika podjetja na Kitajskem,
- Tressel in Ding (2021) podatke 17.000 podjetij, ki kotirajo na borzah v 24 državah v zvezi z likvidnostjo, solventnostjo in odvisnostjo njihovih karakteristik ter verjetnosti preživetja od sektorja, v katerem delujejo,
- Fernández-Cerezo et al. (2021) razlike učinkov na manjša in velika podjetja v odvisnosti od njihove lokacije na vzorcu 4.004 španskih podjetij,
- Connell Garcia in Ho (2021) francoska podjetja in odvisnost negativnih učinkov od starostne strukture delovne sile ter razpoložljivih finančnih sredstev iz obdobja pred pandemijo.

Izjemna negotovost, s katero so se podjetja soočila po razglasitvi pandemije marca 2020 ter prvih polnih zaporah javnega življenja, je na eni strani sprožila intenzivne poskuse kvantifikacije ekonomskih učinkov različnih omejitev v poslovanju podjetij in življenju prebivalstva nasploh, po drugi strani pa se je težavnost predvidevanja na ravni podjetij ravno zaradi povečane negotovosti poslovanja bistveno povečala (Pohlman in Reynolds, 2020).

Izhodiščni problem vseh ekonomskih napovedi je bil sploh na začetku pandemije v nesposobnosti epidemiološke stroke, da pravilno napove sam potek epidemije v posameznih državah in regijah. Ioannidis et al. (2022) tako navajajo, da so bile napovedi epidemiološke stroke neuspešne zaradi težav z zajemom podatkov, napačnih predpostavk modelov, visoke občutljivosti ocen, neupoštevanja specifičnosti epidemije COVID-19, pomanjkljivih preteklih podatkov o uspešnosti razpoložljivih ukrepov, pomanjkanja transparentnosti, neupoštevanja večdimenzionalnosti problema, pomanjkljive strokovnosti v ključnih disciplinah, črednega načina razmišljanja, selektivnega poročanja in podobnih pomanjkljivosti.

Posledično je tudi ekonomska stroka hitro spoznala, da ima na voljo zelo pomanjkljive epidemiološke podatke in napovedi, hkrati pa tudi sama ni imela pripravljenih ustreznih modelov za napovedovanje ekonomskih učinkov tako skrajnih in nenadnih dogodkov. Estrin et al. (2020) so že konec leta 2020 ugotovili, da ekonomisti enostavno nimamo izdelanih ustreznih modelov za učinkovito in kakovostno obravnavo tako ekstremnih razmer, saj so se razmere poslovanja podjetij spreminjale iz tedna v teden, predvsem modeli napovedovanja povpraševanja pa so popolnoma odpovedali.

Ross in Ross (2020) navajata, da je anketa strokovnjakov za predvidevanje ekonomskih učinkov pokazala, da so ti v napovedih boljši od preprostih napovednih in avtoregresijskih modelov, vendar pa je izjemno povečanje negotovosti povzročilo neprimerljivo visoke razpore v vrednostih napovedi – višje kot med gospodarsko krizo leta 2009.

Zhang et al. (2022) po drugi strani na primeru Kitajske ugotavljajo, da tudi sami analitiki niso imuni na spremenjene delovne razmere, ki jih je prinesla pandemija. Tako je razpršenost njihovih napovedi odvisna od razmer, v katerih živijo. Napovedi analitikov, ki so živeli v območjih s polnimi zapori javnega življenja, so bile manj razpršene kot napovedi analitikov, ki so živeli zunaj teh območij. Avtorji razloge za to pripisujejo učinku zmanjšane pozornosti in hkrati ugotavljajo, da po drugi strani med obema skupinama analitikov ni bilo razlik v stopnji pesimizma oz. optimizma.

Za vse navedene študije velja, da so napovedi in ocene učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih omejevalnih ter spodbujevalnih ukrepov držav pripravili raziskovalci in statistični analitiki različnih finančnih in drugih specializiranih ustanov (O'Trakoun, 2022; Ferrara in Sheng, 2022). Nobena od teh

študij sistematično ne preverja anketnih napovedi managerjev z dejanskimi rezultati njihovih podjetij v letih 2020–2021, in to je vrzel v raziskovanju ekonomskih razsežnosti pandemije COVID-19, ki jo pričujoči članek vsaj v določeni meri zapolnjuje.

Metodologija in baza podatkov

Statistična analiza temelji na anketnih napovedih managerjev 154 slovenskih podjetij ter finančnih kazalnikov, ki smo jih izračunali na osnovi javno dostopnih zaključnih računov teh podjetij za leta 2019, 2020 in 2021 (Dun&Bradstreet, 2022).

Medtem ko smo finančne kazalnike za leto 2019 (leto pred nastopom pandemije) uporabili za test povezave med poslovnimi rezultati proučevanih podjetij v predhodnem poslovnem letu na eni ter napovedmi managerjev na drugi strani, pa smo osrednjo pozornost namenili preverjanju točnosti napovedi managerjev, ki smo jih primerjali z dejanskimi poslovnimi rezultati v letih 2020 ter 2021.

Anketne napovedi managementa glede učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države

Napovedi managerjev o pričakovanih težavah njihovih podjetij zaradi pandemije COVID-19 ter spremljajočih (omejevalnih ter spodbujevalnih) ukrepov države smo zbrali v anketi ob zaključku prvega vala epidemije v Sloveniji spomladi 2020. Anketa je obsegala 65 vprašanj, vendar v tem članku obravnavamo odgovore anketiranih managerjev na eno samo vprašanje:

»Kako pričakujete, da vas bo prizadela tokratna gospodarska kriza, ki bo posledica COVID-19 (izberite najprimernejši odgovor):

- a. V njej vidimo odlično poslovno priložnost za naše podjetje.
- b. Ne bo nas prizadela – ne bo zaznavnih negativnih ali pozitivnih učinkov na naše poslovanje.
- c. Zmerno, vendar se že uspešno prilagajamo.
- d. Zelo, okrevanje pričakujemo v naslednjem letu.
- e. Zelo, pričakujemo večletno postopno okrevanje.
- f. Zelo, obstoj podjetja je resno ogrožen.
- g. Pričakujemo stečaj podjetja.«

Zaradi nizkih frekvenc odgovorov med anketiranimi, ki so bili najbolj optimistični – napovedali so bodisi pozitivne ali nevtralne učinke, smo te združili v eno skupino (frekvenci: 11 (a) in 7 (b)). Enako smo storili tudi s tremi najbolj pesimističnimi skupinami anketiranih – tistimi, ki so bodisi

navedli, da pričakujejo večletno postopno okrevanje, da je ogrožen obstoj podjetja, bodisi da pričakujejo stečaj (frekvence: 24 (e), 8 (f) in 0 (g)).

Odgovore anketiranih managerjev smo tako združili v štiri skupine, v vrstnem redu od najbolj optimističnih do najbolj pesimističnih napovedi in jim prisodili sledeče ordinalne vrednosti:

1. pozitivno ali nevtrarno (a + b),
2. zmerno negativno (c),
3. zelo negativno, okrevanje 2021 (d),
4. zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje (e + f + g).

Anketo smo izvedli v obliki spletnega vprašalnika, pri čemer smo poziv k sodelovanju v raziskavi poslali na javno dostopne naslove elektronske pošte izbranih podjetij oz. njihovega managementa. Od 1.188 podjetij, katerih strežniki niso avtomatsko zavrnili naših elektronskih sporočil (predpostavljamo, da je bilo elektronsko sporočilo tehnično uspešno dostavljeno), je anketni vprašalnik zadovoljivo izpolnilo 207 managerjev naslovljenih podjetij, kar predstavlja 17,42-odstotni odziv.

Po deskriptivni analizi anketiranih podjetij smo izločili podjetja iz primarnih (kmetijstvo, lov, gozdarstvo in rudarstvo) ter infrastrukturnih dejavnosti (oskrba z vodo, ravnanje z odpadki in odpadki, saniranje okolja), saj smo ugotovili, da iz vsebinskih razlogov pandemija nanje ni imela bodisi nikakršnih učinkov ali pa so bili ti posledica povsem drugih dejavnikov, kakršni veljajo za podjetja, ki so izpostavljeni običajni tržni konkurenci.

Po izločitvi še dodatnih podjetij, za katera nismo uspeli pridobiti celovitih podatkov iz javno objavljenih zaključnih računov za leta 2019, 2020 in 2021, je v bazi, ki je predmet naše analize, ostalo 154 opazovanih enot, ki so predmet naše nadaljnje obravnave. 81 (52,6%) od teh podjetij je bilo iz predelovalnih dejavnosti, 14 (9,1%) iz gradbeništva in 59 (38,3%) iz storitvenih dejavnosti. Glede na število zaposlenih je bilo 18 (11,7%) podjetij z 10 ali manj zaposlenimi, 44 (28,6%) z 11 do 50, 65 (42,2%) z 51 do 250 ter 27 (17,5%) z več kot 250 zaposlenimi. Po lastniški strukturi je bilo skoraj tri četrtine podjetij (113; 73,4%) v pretežni slovenski lasti, dobri dve desetini (33; 21,4%) v pretežni lasti tujega kapitala ter manjši delež (7; 4,5%) v pretežni lasti slovenske države in njenih paradržavnih skladov (za eno podjetje podatka o večinskem lastništvu nismo uspeli pridobiti).

S stališča primerljivosti odgovorov anketiranih managerjev podjetij na obravnavano anketno vprašanje je potrebno izpostaviti, da je anketiranje potekalo v obdobju sedmih tednov, saj je bilo glede na preobremenjenost managementa podjetij z obvladovanjem zelo specifične in zahtevne situacije v podjetjih zelo težko pridobiti njihovo takojšnje sodelovanje v anketi. Anketiranje je potekalo od konca meseca maja 2020, po formalnem zaključku prvega vala epidemije v Sloveniji, ko so bili poslani prvi pozivi

podjetjem za sodelovanje v anketi, do prve polovice julija 2020, ko smo prejeli še zadnje izpolnjene ankete.

Pretežna večina anketiranih je ankete izpolnila v juniju, vendar vseeno velja omeniti, da se je stopnja negotovosti in razpoložljivosti informacij kljub formalnemu zaključku prvega vala epidemije v Sloveniji pred samo izvedbo anketiranja v določeni meri še vedno spreminjala iz tedna v teden. Zato ni mogoče trditi, da so imeli vsi anketirani v času izpolnjevanja svojega lastnega anketnega vprašalnika na razpolago povsem enake informacije kot drugi anketiranci v vzorcu in da se tudi dejanska situacija (tako na trgu kot s stališča obljubljenе ali dejanske pomoči države) med anketiranci ni razlikovala.

Finančni kazalniki podjetij

Napovedi anketiranih managerjev glede posledic pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države v naši analizi primerjamo z dejanskimi poslovnimi rezultati njihovih podjetij. V ta namen smo pridobili celotne zaključne račune proučevanih podjetij (AJPEŠ; Dun&Bradstreet, 2022) in izračunali nabor enajstih izbranih finančnih kazalnikov za leta 2019, 2020 in 2021:

- prihodki od prodaje (PROD),
- število zaposlenih (ZAP),
- neto dolg (NDOLG),
- stroški dela (DELO),
- prihodki od prodaje na zaposlenega (PROD/ZAP),
- dodana vrednost na zaposlenega (DV/ZAP),
- poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke za obresti (EBITDA),
- dobičkonosnost sredstev (ROA),
- dobičkonosnost lastniškega kapitala (ROE),
- neto dolg na EBITDA (NDOLG/EBITDA),
- bruto povprečna mesečna plača na zaposlenega (PPLACA).

Z namenom izločitve vpliva drugih dejavnikov (kot so dejavnost, velikost podjetja, relativna razmerja v vrednostih kazalnikov do drugih podjetij v vzorcu in podobno) smo v analizi uporabili kazalnike odstotnih sprememb v navedenih kazalnikih, in sicer za leta 2020/2019 in 2021/2019.

Uporabljene statistične metode

Poleg standardnih deskriptivnih statistik (frekvence, povprečja, mediane) smo v analizi zaradi ordinalne odvisne spremenljivke (napovedi managementa glede učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države

- lestvica od 1 do 4), ki ne izpolnjuje pogojev normalne porazdelitve, kot tudi zaradi porazdelitev vrednosti neodvisnih spremenljivk (finančni kazalniki), ki ravno tako ne izpolnjujejo navedenega pogoja, uporabili neparametrični Kruskal-Wallisov test rangov za neodvisne vzorce.

Natančneje smo razlike med pari posameznih skupin anketirancev glede na ordinalne vrednosti njihovih napovedi učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države primerjali z Dunnovim post hoc testom parov skupin, ki za izračun p -vrednosti uporablja konzervativno Bonferronijevo korekcijo napake.

Rezultati

Rezultate statistične analize podajamo v treh razdelkih. V prvem ugotavljamo, ali so bile anketne napovedi managerjev statistično značilno povezane s preteklimi poslovnimi rezultati njihovih podjetij (leto 2019), v drugem preverjamo uspešnost napovedi managerjev v odnosu do dejansko realiziranih poslovnih rezultatov v letu 2020 in v tretjem še v odnosu do dejanskih poslovnih rezultatov v letu 2021.

Poslovni rezultati podjetij za leto 2019 in napovedi anketiranih managerjev glede učinkov pandemije

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Kot je razvidno iz tabele 1, Kruskal-Wallisov test rangov absolutnih vrednosti izbranih finančnih kazalnikov proučevanih podjetij za leto 2019 ni potrdil statistično značilnih razlik med skupinami podjetij z različnimi napovedmi pričakovanih učinkov pandemije (na ordinalni lestvici: 1 - pozitivno ali nevtralno, 2 - zmerno negativno, 3 - zelo negativno, okrevanje 2021 in 4 - zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje) niti pri enem od enajstih finančnih kazalnikov.

Na osnovi analize teh finančnih kazalnikov proučevanih podjetij tako ugotavljamo, da napovedi anketiranih managerjev glede pričakovanih učinkov pandemije niso bile statistično značilno odvisne od preteklih poslovnih rezultatov oz. lastnosti teh podjetij, ki so zajete v javno objavljenih poslovnih izkazih (npr. od njihove velikosti, produktivnosti, dobičkonosnosti, stopnje zadolženosti, povprečnih plač), ampak so bile rezultanta dejavnikov, ki jih navedeni finančni kazalniki ne zajemajo.

Ali so bile te napovedi anketiranih managerjev dejansko uspešne in so se zato odrazile v njihovih bodočih poslovnih rezultatih, pa ugotavljamo v naslednjih razdelkih, v katerih te primerjamo z relativnimi spremembami vrednosti finančnih kazalnikov v letih 2020 in 2021 glede na leto 2019.

Tabela 1: FREKVENCE, POVPREČJA RANGOV TER MEDIANE PO SKUPINAH
 PODJETIJ TER KRUSKAL-WALLISOV TEST RANGOV IZBRANIH
 FINANČNIH KAZALNIKOV ZA LETO 2019

finančni kazalniki	pričakovani učinki pandemije / statistika	(1) pozitivno ali nevtralno	(2) zmerno negativno	(3) zelo negativno, okrevanje 2021	(4) zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje	Kruskal-Wallisov test	
						statistika	vrednost
PROD	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	2,308
	povpr. rangov	80,9	77,2	85,5	68,7	df	3
	mediana	9842569,5	9393143,0	16337103,0	8220333,0	p	0,511
ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	2,905
	povpr. rangov	82,0	75,9	87,6	69,3	df	3
	mediana	67,9	90,2	92,5	63,1	p	0,407
NDOLG	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	2,144
	povpr. rangov	69,4	80,8	81,9	70,2	df	3
	mediana	-23853,5	162681,0	1094430,5	117081,5	p	0,543
DELO	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	3,957
	povpr. rangov	85,0	76,2	87,6	66,8	df	3
	mediana	2714689,0	2833311,5	2872034,5	1661917,0	p	0,266
PROD/ ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	0,844
	povpr. rangov	74,8	80,4	77,6	72,2	df	3
	mediana	107770,2	134312,1	128303,8	109409,8	p	0,839
DV/ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	4,524
	povpr. rangov	98,1	75,9	75,1	72,0	df	3
	mediana	52918,9	40972,4	41520,2	43311,0	p	0,210
EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	1,872
	povpr. rangov	88,6	75,5	81,1	72,5	df	3
	mediana	1385629,0	915424,0	1175898,0	599605,0	p	0,599
ROA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	7,550
	povpr. rangov	103,9	76,2	70,9	71,8	df	3
	mediana	9,6	5,6	4,1	4,4	p	0,560
ROE	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	6,145
	povpr. rangov	98,7	79,0	69,4	69,6	df	3
	mediana	18,7	11,2	8,1	8,0	p	0,105
NDOLG/ EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	3,955
	povpr. rangov	61,6	81,7	83,0	71,7	df	3
	mediana	0,0	0,9	1,2	0,3	p	0,266
PPLACA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	6,325
	povpr. rangov	99,6	76,1	78,9	67,0	df	3
	mediana	2117,5	1694,0	1852,0	1605,5	p	0,097

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Odstotne spremembe izbranih finančnih kazalnikov v letu 2020 glede na leto 2019 v odnosu do anketnih napovedi managerjev

Statistično značilne razlike v odstotnih spremembah vrednosti v letu 2020 glede na leto 2019 smo potrdili za deset od enajstih proučevanih finančnih kazalnikov (tabela 2). Edini kazalnik, pri katerem med skupinami podjetij z različnimi vrednostmi napovedanih učinkov pandemije nismo potrdili statistično značilnih razlik, je bil kazalnik povprečna mesečna bruto plača na zaposlenega.

Za kazalnike:

- prihodki od prodaje (PROD, $\chi^2(3) = 24,701, p = 0,000$),
- število zaposlenih (ZAP, $\chi^2(3) = 13,975, p = 0,003$),
- stroški dela (DELO, $\chi^2(3) = 14,063, p = 0,003$),
- dobičkonosnost sredstev (ROA, $\chi^2(3) = 15,077, p = 0,002$) in
- dobičkonosnost lastniškega kapitala (ROE, $\chi^2(3) = 14,074, p = 0,003$)

ugotavljamo, da so razlike med podjetji z različnimi vrednostmi napovedi pričakovanih učinkov pandemije visoko statistično značilne, hkrati pa je zanje značilno, da tako povprečne vrednosti rangov kot mediane (z manjšo izjemo pri dobičkonosnosti lastniškega kapitala, pri čemer to ne velja za nominalni vrednosti napovedi učinkov 1 in 2) konsistentno padajo glede na stopnjo problematičnosti napovedanih negativnih učinkov pandemije.

To pomeni, da so podjetja z (bolj) negativnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije dejansko počasneje rastla (praviloma celo nazadovala - negativne vrednosti mediane) kot podjetja z (bolj) optimističnimi anketnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije, hkrati pa so bolj nazadovala ali vsaj počasneje napredovala po merilih dobičkonosnosti poslovanja (negativne vrednosti mediane).

Nasprotno velja za kazalnika:

- neto dolg (NDOLG, $\chi^2(3) = 12,585, p = 0,006$) in
- neto dolg na EBITDA (NDOLG/EBITDA, $\chi^2(3) = 8,448, p = 0,038$),

pri katerih tako povprečne vrednosti rangov kot mediane konsistentno rastejo glede na stopnjo problematičnosti napovedanih negativnih učinkov pandemije. To pomeni, da je bil prirast neto dolga v letu 2020 glede na predhodno leto največji pri podjetjih z najbolj pesimističnimi napovedmi (4), medtem ko je večina podjetij z manj negativnimi (3 in 2) in s pozitivnimi ali z nevtralnimi napovedmi (1) celo zmanjšala svojo neto zadolžitev.

Enako velja za neto dolg na EBITDA, ki kaže na sposobnost podjetja, da servisira svoj dolg iz obstoječih likvidnih sredstev ter ustvarjenega denarnega toka iz poslovanja. Sposobnost servisiranja dolga se je poslabšala pri

Tabela 2: FREKVENCE, POVPREČJA RANGOV TER MEDIANE PO SKUPINAH PODJETIJ TER KRUSKAL-WALLISOV TEST RANGOV Odstotnih Medletnih Sprememb Izbranih Finančnih Kazalnikov: 2020/2019

finančni kazalniki	pričakovani učinki pandemije / statistika	(1) pozitivno ali nevtravno	(2) zmerno negativno	(3) zelo negativno, okrevanje 2021	(4) zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje	Kruskal-Wallisov test	
						statistika	vrednost
PROD	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	24,701
	povpr. rangov	93,7	91,5	60,9	51,5	df	3
	mediana	3,0	-2,0	-10,7	-18,2	<i>p</i>	0,000
ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	13,975
	povpr. rangov	104,5	81,9	71,2	58,1	df	3
	mediana	4,6	-0,3	-2,5	-5,6	<i>p</i>	0,003
NDOLG	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	12,585
	povpr. rangov	62,6	70,0	80,8	100,2	df	3
	mediana	-45,0	-27,3	-9,1	15,5	<i>p</i>	0,006
DELO	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	14,063
	povpr. rangov	90,5	87,8	65,6	57,5	df	3
	mediana	7,3	5,1	-1,1	-3,1	<i>p</i>	0,003
PROD/ ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	17,846
	povpr. rangov	82,5	91,4	61,9	57,1	df	3
	mediana	-3,4	-1,6	-8,0	-12,2	<i>p</i>	0,000
DV/ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	13,585
	povpr. rangov	68,6	91,2	64,1	63,4	df	3
	mediana	-3,3	7,8	-2,4	-1,4	<i>p</i>	0,004
EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	14,130
	povpr. rangov	84,2	88,1	72,6	53,7	df	3
	mediana	18,2	9,1	-6,8	-32,5	<i>p</i>	0,003
ROA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	15,077
	povpr. rangov	89,2	88,1	68,8	54,5	df	3
	mediana	0,3	-1,7	-27,0	-47,5	<i>p</i>	0,002
ROE	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	14,074
	povpr. rangov	88,0	88,4	66,0	57,2	df	3
	mediana	-3,9	-1,6	-31,9	-50,1	<i>p</i>	0,003
NDOLG/ EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	8,448
	povpr. rangov	64,0	71,4	81,7	95,3	df	3
	mediana	-52,4	-31,3	-10,3	44,5	<i>p</i>	0,038
PPLACA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	4,563
	povpr. rangov	73,8	85,2	71,6	67,3	df	3
	mediana	1,0	4,0	1,9	0,6	<i>p</i>	0,207

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019 ter 2020; n = 154.

podjetjih z najbolj negativnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije (4), pri drugih skupinah podjetij pa se je izboljšala, in sicer najbolj pri skupini podjetij z napovedanimi pozitivnimi ali nevtralnimi učinki (1), nekoliko manj v skupini z napovedanimi zmerno negativnimi učinki (2) ter še nekoliko manj v skupini z napovedanimi zelo negativnimi učinki – okrevanje v 2021 (3)

Za kazalnike:

- prihodki od prodaje na zaposlenega (PROD/ZAP, $\chi^2(3) = 17,846$, $p = 0,000$),
- dodana vrednost na zaposlenega (DV/ZAP, $\chi^2(3) = 13,585$, $p = 0,004$) ter
- poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke za obresti (EBITDA, $\chi^2(3) = 14,130$, $p = 0,003$)

sicer velja, da Kruskal-Wallisov test potrjuje visoko statistično značilne razlike med skupinami podjetij z različnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije, vendar iz povprečij rangov ter vrednosti median povezava očitno ni enosmerna. Zato za natančnejšo primerjavo razlik med skupinami podjetij z različnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije uporabimo Dunnov post hoc test razlik v povprečnih vrednostih rangov po parih skupin (tabela 3).

Tabela 3: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: PROD/ZAP (2020/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-8,946	11,721	-0,763	0,445	1,000
1 × 3	20,633	13,297	1,552	0,121	0,724
1 × 4	25,406	13,140	1,933	0,053	0,319
2 × 3	29,579	9,653	3,064	0,002	0,013
2 × 4	34,352	9,436	3,640	0,000	0,002
3 × 4	4,773	11,334	0,421	0,674	1,000

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Iz popravljenih p -vrednosti (Bonfferonijeva korekcija) je razvidno, da so statistično značilne razlike v spremembah produktivnosti, merjene s prihodki od prodaje na zaposlenega, le med skupino podjetij z oceno 2 (napovedani zmerno negativni učinki) na eni strani in skupinama z oceno 3 (napovedani zelo negativni učinki, okrevanje v 2021) ter 4 (zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje) na drugi strani (tabela 4). To pomeni, da se je prodaja na zaposlenega statistično značilno manj zmanjšala skupini podjetij z napovedanimi zmerno negativnimi učinki (2) kot obema skupinama z napovedanimi zelo negativnimi učinki (3 in 4).

Tabela 4: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: DV/ZAP (2020/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-22,634	11,721	-1,931	0,053	0,321
1 × 3	4,456	13,297	0,335	0,738	1,000
1 × 4	5,118	13,140	0,389	0,697	1,000
2 × 3	27,089	9,653	2,806	0,005	0,030
2 × 4	27,752	9,436	2,941	0,003	0,020
3 × 4	0,662	11,334	0,058	0,953	1,000

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Enako velja za drugi testirani kazalnik produktivnosti – dodana vrednost na zaposlenega, saj so statistično značilne razlike med istima dvema paroma skupin (tabela 5).

Tabela 5: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: EBITDA (2020/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-3,926	11,721	-0,335	0,738	1,000
1 × 3	11,589	13,297	0,872	0,383	1,000
1 × 4	30,566	13,140	2,326	0,020	0,120
2 × 3	15,515	9,653	1,607	0,108	0,648
2 × 4	34,492	9,436	3,655	0,000	0,002
3 × 4	18,977	11,334	1,674	0,094	0,564

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Za kazalnik poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke za obresti, smo statistično značilne razlike potrdili le med skupinama podjetij z oceno 2 (pričakovani zmerno negativni učinki) ter skupino z oceno 4 (zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje). Skupini podjetij s pričakovanimi zmerno negativnimi učinki (2) se je poslovni izid iz poslovanja celo izboljšal, skupini podjetij z najbolj negativnimi napovedmi (4) pa poslabšal – razlike med obema skupinama podjetij so bile statistično značilne.

Ugotavljamo, da so bile napovedi anketiranih managerjev glede pričakovanih učinkov pandemije po merilu relativnih sprememb v vrednostih izbranih finančnih kazalnikov v letu 2020 glede na predhodno leto uspešne, saj so statistično značilno in vsebinsko smiselno povezane z relativnimi spremembami vrednosti desetih od enajstih testiranih finančnih kazalnikov.

Tabela 6: FREKVENCE, POVPREČJA RANGOV TER MEDIANE PO SKUPINAH
 PODJETIJ TER KRUSKAL-WALLISOV TEST RANGOV Odstotnih
 Medletnih sprememb izbranih finančnih kazalnikov:
 2021/2019

finančni kazalniki	pričakovani učinki pandemije / statistika	(1) pozitivno ali nevtravno	(2) zmerno negativno	(3) zelo negativno, okrevanje 2021	(4) zelo negativno, večletno okrevanje	Kruskal-Wallisov test	
						statistika	vrednost
PROD	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	13,142
	povpr. rangov	87,8	86,6	74,1	53,9	df	3
	mediana	12,5	11,3	6,3	-9,3	<i>p</i>	0,004
ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	14,874
	povpr. rangov	102,0	82,0	76,5	54,3	df	3
	mediana	10,7	0,3	-0,7	-5,8	<i>p</i>	0,002
NDOLG	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	13,161
	povpr. rangov	69,9	69,2	75,8	102,5	df	3
	mediana	-44,3	-32,7	-16,8	17,4	<i>p</i>	0,004
DELO	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	6,379
	povpr. rangov	87,6	82,5	77,0	60,7	df	3
	mediana	13,6	13,3	9,2	3,8	<i>p</i>	0,095
PROD/ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	3,996
	povpr. rangov	71,7	83,7	78,4	65,7	df	3
	mediana	1,8	9,0	6,6	-3,3	<i>p</i>	0,262
DV/ZAP	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	3,608
	povpr. rangov	67,1	82,3	82,1	68,0	df	3
	mediana	2,5	10,1	8,7	-2,4	<i>p</i>	0,307
EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	9,617
	povpr. rangov	76,6	84,0	84,6	56,3	df	3
	mediana	12,7	17,1	19,1	-20,6	<i>p</i>	0,022
ROA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	11,482
	povpr. rangov	76,9	86,7	79,2	54,8	df	3
	mediana	-6,6	9,4	5,4	-38,8	<i>p</i>	0,009
ROE	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	9,931
	povpr. rangov	74,7	86,4	79,4	56,8	df	3
	mediana	-12,1	4,2	1,0	-47,3	<i>p</i>	0,019
NDOLG/ EBITDA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	6,281
	povpr. rangov	63,1	74,5	76,7	93,4	df	3
	mediana	-74,5	-30,8	-25,1	19,8	<i>p</i>	0,099
PPLACA	N	18	74	30	32	χ^2	1,231
	povpr. rangov	68,3	78,8	82,1	75,3	df	3
	mediana	6,3	11,0	9,9	10,7	<i>p</i>	0,746

Vir: lastna anketa 2020 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019 ter 2021; n = 154.

Odstotne spremembe izbranih finančnih kazalnikov v letu 2021 glede na leto 2019 v odnosu do anketnih napovedi managerjev

Statistično značilne razlike v odstotnih spremembah vrednosti v letu 2021 glede na leto 2019 smo potrdili za šest od enajstih proučevanih finančnih kazalnikov (tabela 6):

- prihodki od prodaje (PROD, $\chi^2(3) = 13,142, p = 0,004$),
- število zaposlenih (ZAP, $\chi^2(3) = 14,874, p = 0,002$),
- neto dolg (NDOLG, $\chi^2(3) = 13,161, p = 0,004$),
- poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke za obresti (EBITDA, $\chi^2(3) = 9,617, p = 0,022$),
- dobičkonosnost sredstev (ROA, $\chi^2(3) = 11,482, p = 0,009$) in
- dobičkonosnost lastniškega kapitala (ROE, $\chi^2(3) = 9,931, p = 0,019$).

Za prva navedena kazalnika (prihodki od prodaje ter število zaposlenih) podobno kot pri analizi odstotnih sprememb v njihovih vrednosti med letoma 2020 in 2019 ugotavljamo, da tako vrednosti rangov kot mediane od najbolj optimistične do najbolj pesimistične skupine anketiranih podjetij, glede na njihove napovedi pričakovanih učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države, konsistentno padajo.

Nasprotno velja za neto dolg, pri katerem je izjema le vrednost povprečja rangov najbolj optimistične skupine anketiranih podjetij, sicer pa tako vrednosti povprečnih rangov kot mediane od najbolj optimističnih do najbolj pesimističnih podjetij rastejo.

Pri ostalih treh finančnih kazalnikih, pri katerih smo potrdili statistično značilne razlike med skupinami podjetij z različnimi napovedmi pričakovanih učinkov pandemije ter spremljajočih ukrepov države, povezava ni več enosmerna, ampak odseva večjo kompleksnost razmerij, zato uporabimo Dunnov post hoc test razlik v povprečnih vrednostih rangov po parih skupin (rezultati v tabelah 7, 8 in 9).

Dunnov post hoc test razlik v povprečnih vrednostih rangov je pokazal statistično značilne razlike pri vseh treh kazalnikih (poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke za obresti (EBITDA), dobičkonosnost sredstev (ROA) in dobičkonosnost lastniškega kapitala (ROE)) le med dvema skupinama podjetij – tistimi z napovedanimi zmerno negativnimi (2) ter podjetji z napovedanimi najbolj negativnimi učinki (4). Vrednosti vseh treh finančnih kazalnikov so višje za podjetja z napovedanimi zmerno negativnimi učinki.

Tabela 7: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: EBITDA (2021/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-7,416	11,721	-0,633	0,527	1,000
1 × 3	-7,989	13,297	-0,601	0,548	1,000
1 × 4	20,361	13,140	1,550	0,121	0,728
2 × 3	-0,573	9,653	-0,059	0,953	1,000
2 × 4	27,777	9,436	2,944	0,003	0,019
3 × 4	28,350	11,334	2,501	0,012	0,074

Vir: lastna anketa 2021 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Tabela 8: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: ROA (2021/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-9,799	11,721	-0,836	0,403	1,000
1 × 3	-2,256	13,297	-0,170	0,865	1,000
1 × 4	22,101	13,140	1,682	0,093	0,556
2 × 3	7,543	9,653	0,781	0,435	1,000
2 × 4	31,899	9,436	3,381	0,001	0,004
3 × 4	24,356	11,334	2,149	0,032	0,190

Vir: lastna anketa 2021 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Tabela 9: REZULTATI DUNNOVEGA POST HOC TESTA RAZLIK V POVPREČNIH VREDNOSTIH RANGOV PO PARIH SKUPIN ANKETIRANIH PODJETIJ GLEDE NA NJIHOVA PRIČAKOVANJA POSLEDIC PANDEMIJE: ROE (2021/2019)

skupina (a) × skupina (b)	test stat.	std. napaka	std. test stat.	p	popr. p
1 × 2	-11,643	11,721	-0,993	0,321	1,000
1 × 3	-4,644	13,297	-0,349	0,727	1,000
1 × 4	17,910	13,140	1,363	0,173	1,000
2 × 3	6,998	9,653	0,725	0,468	1,000
2 × 4	29,552	9,436	3,132	0,002	0,010
3 × 4	22,554	11,334	1,990	0,047	0,280

Vir: lastna anketa 2021 in podatki iz zaključnih računov podjetij za 2019; n = 154.

Diskusija in sklep

Z analizo odgovorov 154 anketiranih podjetij na vprašanje o pričakovanih učinkih pandemije in izbranih enajstih finančnih kazalnikov teh podjetij za leta 2019, 2020 in 2021 tako odgovarjamo na uvodoma zastavljeni raziskovalni vprašanji in ugotavljamo, da:

- napovedi anketiranih managerjev glede pričakovanih učinkov pandemije niso bile statistično značilno povezane s preteklimi poslovnimi rezultati njihovih podjetij,
- so bile te napovedi praviloma statistično značilno in vsebinsko (smerno) smiselno povezane z relativnimi spremembami desetih od enajstih testiranih finančnih kazalnikov v letu 2020 glede na leto 2019 ter šestih od enajstih finančnih kazalnikov v letu 2021 glede na leto 2019.

Prva ugotovitev je presenetljiva, saj je logično pričakovanje, da krizno obdobje lažje preživijo podjetja, ki jih ta doseže v boljši finančni kondiciji (kot npr. ugotavljata Connell Garcia in Ho, 2021). Tako bi npr. pričakovali, da bodo imela podjetja z boljšim preteklim poslovnim izidom, večjim presežnim denarnim tokom, boljšo sposobnostjo servisiranja dolga tudi bolj optimistične napovedi glede pričakovanih učinkov ekstremnega dogodka, kot je bila pandemija. Vendar naša analiza kaže, da so bili ključni dejavniki »problematičnosti« pandemije za posamezna podjetja zunaj domene finančne analize zaključnih računov podjetij oz. njihovih preteklih poslovnih rezultatov.

Nasprotno, potrdili smo statistično značilne in praviloma vsebinsko (smerno) smiselne povezave med napovedmi anketiranih managerjev ter relativnimi spremembami njihovih dejanskih poslovnih rezultatov leta 2020 glede na leto 2019. Tako so podjetja z bolj pesimističnimi anketnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije v letu 2020 glede na predhodno leto doživela večje krčenje prihodkov od prodaje, večje krčenje števila zaposlenih in večje zmanjšanje dobičkonosnosti kot manj pesimistična podjetja. Najbolj optimistična podjetja so celo povečala prihodke od prodaje ter število zaposlenih glede na predhodno leto. Obenem so povečala dobičkonosnost sredstev, ne pa tudi dobičkonosnosti lastniškega kapitala (vendar so imela najmanjše zmanjšanje vrednosti tega kazalnika). Neto zadolžitev in neto zadolžitev glede na poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke od obresti, sta se glede na leto 2019 povečala le v skupini podjetij z najbolj pesimističnimi napovedmi učinkov pandemije, medtem ko sta se v drugih skupinah relativno zmanjšala, najbolj v najbolj optimistični skupini.

Za oba kazalnika produktivnosti (prihodki od prodaje na zaposlenega ter dodana vrednost na zaposlenega) ter poslovni izid iz poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo in odhodke od obresti, velja, da povezave med

napovedmi in relativnimi spremembami teh kazalnikov niso tako konsistentno enosmerne. Natančnejši vpogled v razlike med pari posameznih skupin namreč razkrije, da statistično značilne razlike pri teh kazalnikih potrdimo le med skupino z napovedanimi zmerno negativnimi učinki in najbolj pesimističnima skupinama. Podjetja z zmerno negativnimi učinki so namreč statistično značilno bolj kot ti dve skupini povečala svojo produktivnost, hkrati pa so imela tudi značilno višje vrednosti poslovnega izida iz poslovanja, povečanega za amortizacijo in odhodke od obresti.

Navedeno pomeni, da je večina anketiranih managerjev zelo uspešno napovedala smer in stopnjo problematičnosti pričakovanih učinkov pandemije za njihova podjetja. Glede na izjemnost pandemije, ki je nastopila povsem nepričakovano, hkrati pa povzročila izjemne omejitve v poslovanju podjetij, gibanju ljudi, kot tudi prekinitve v delovanju globalnih verig vrednosti, je takšna uspešnost napovedi managerjev presenetljiva.

Primerjava relativnih sprememb finančnih kazalnikov za leto 2021 glede na leto 2019 v odnosu do anketnih napovedi anketiranih podjetij je statistično značilne razlike pokazala pri šestih od desetih finančnih kazalnikov, ki smo jih potrdili za statistično značilne že pri odstotnih spremembah leta 2020 glede na 2019. To pomeni, da je vsaj del razlik v poslovni uspešnosti podjetij, ki jih je povzročila pandemija v letu 2020, vztrajal tudi v letu 2021.

Na osnovi analize našega vzorca 154 anketiranih podjetij tako ugotavljamo, da so na podjetniški ravni pretekli poslovni rezultati slab napovedovalec pričakovanih učinkov izjemnih dogodkov, kot je bila pandemija COVID-19, da so v takem primeru (lahko) odločilni »izvenbilančni« dejavniki in da so bili anketiranih managerji slovenskih podjetij kljub nepredvidljivosti in kompleksnosti izjemnih dogodkov uspešni v oceni učinkov na njihovo tekoče in bodoče poslovanje.

Nazadnje velja ponoviti, da je anketiranje potekalo v časovnem razponu sedmih tednov, da zato ni mogoče trditi, da so imeli vsi anketirani v času izpolnjevanju anket za svoja podjetja na razpolago povsem enake informacije kot drugi anketirani v vzorcu in da se tudi dejanska situacija (tako na trgu kot s stališča obljubljenе ali dejanske pomoči države) med anketiranimi predstavniki podjetij v sedmih tednih anketiranja ni spreminjala. Ali bi izvedba anketiranja v krajšem časovnem obdobju (npr. v tednu ali dveh) lahko dodatno izboljšala kakovost naših ugotovitev, ne vemo.

Med glavnimi omejitvami izpostavljamo še velikost vzorca, ki ne omogoča nadaljnje poglobitve analize glede na dejavnost podjetij, saj je bilo število podjetij v posameznih dejavnostih (dve- in še posebej trimestrnih SKD-skupinah) premajhno za uporabo standardnih statističnih metod. Tako ne vemo, ali so bile med podjetji iz različnih dejavnosti statistično značilne razlike tako v samih napovedih pričakovanih učinkov pandemije glede na pretekle poslovne rezultate kot v uspešnosti teh napovedi glede na dejanske

poslovne rezultate v letih 2020 in 2021. Nadaljnja analiza razlik med podjetji v posameznih dejavnostih bi bila mogoča z metodologijo študije primerov, ki pa metodološko in vsebinsko presega okvire tega članka.

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INTERPELACIJA UČENCEV IN UČENK V NOSILCE ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC: RETORIČNA ANALIZA UČNE PRIPRAVE^{1**}

Povzetek. V pričujočem članku s pomočjo diskurzivne analize primera učne priprave ugotavljam, na kakšen način so učenci in učenke interpelirani v zamišljeno skupnost nosilcev in nosilk človekovih pravic. Ideološki proces interpelacije je mogoče spremljati skozi rabo jezika, ki je mesto in orodje izvajanja pedagoške prakse. Za analizo tega je uporabljena retorična metoda, izhaja joča iz Aristotelovega retoričnega aparata, s katero so analizirani trije različni momenti interpelacije skozi diskurz – vzpostavitev sentimentalne podobe »univerzalne skupnosti«, vzpostavljanje ločnice do časovno in prostorsko oddaljenih družb, ki domnevno kršijo človekove pravice, ter »samostojno« izrekanje obsodbe kršenja pravic. Z analizo procesov interpelacije skozi jezikovno rabo v pedagoškem procesu so obenem prikazani nepredvideni, neeksplicitni in pogosto kontradiktorni učinki te rabe, skozi katere se nakazuje razpoka, inherentna sami ideologiji človekovih pravic, ki s sklicevanjem na univerzalnost vzpostavlja in reproducira specifične načine izključevanja.

Ključni pojmi: interpelacija, človekove pravice, učna priprava, diskurzivna analiza, retorika

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Uvod

Diskurz človekovih pravic, ki ga je mogoče opredeliti kot osrednji moment ideološkega horizonta modernih zahodnih družb, se nikakor ne nanaša le na pravno, temveč na širše družbeno-ideološko področje. Kot je prikazal Balibar, ravno ideološki horizont diskurza človekovih pravic sam vzpostavlja ločnico med »nami«, ki smo nosilci človekovih pravic »po

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naravi«, in »drugimi«, ki niso upravičeni do teh pravic, čeprav naj bi bile univerzalne (Balibar, 2007). Obenem se kot glavna ideološka ločnica med »civiliziranim Zahodom« in »neciviliziranimi« drugimi deli sveta vzpostavlja ravno zahodocentrični očitek domnevnega nespoštovanja človekovih pravic v drugih delih sveta. Ideološko vzpostavljanje te ločnice, ki je tolikanj bolj zakrito z domnevno univerzalnostjo človekovih pravic, se med drugim reproducira in konstruira tudi skozi pedagoški proces šolske institucije kot ideološkega aparata države (glej Althusser, 2000). Pričujoči članek predstavlja diskurzivno analizo primera učne priprave s temo človekovih pravic, ob čemer predpostavlja, da je skoznje mogoče spremljati postopek ideološke interpelacije učencev in učenk v zamišljeno skupnost² nosilcev človekovih pravic. Za analizo je izbrana učna priprava za učno uro utrjevanja znanja pri predmetu zgodovina, namenjena 9. razredu osnovne šole (glej Učna priprava). Izbor učne priprave je po eni strani povezan z učno vsebino – obravnavo človekovih pravic –, po drugi strani pa z njeno skladnostjo s sodobnim pedagoškim diskurzom, ki kot normo pedagoškega procesa postavlja »inoviranje« (priprava je tako nastala v sklopu Inovacijskega projekta OŠ Blaža Kocena Ponikva in je kot primer dobre prakse objavljena na spletni strani projekta (glej Strokovni prispevek, 2016)).

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Pedagoški proces kot institucionalizirana praksa z eksplicitno zastavljenimi vzgojnimi in izobraževalnimi cilji, ki naj jih doseže pri učencih, je izrazito komunikacijski proces: znanje in spretnosti, ki jih predvidevajo cilji učnih načrtov, se namreč v šoli v veliki meri oblikujejo prav skozi komunikacijo med učiteljem in učenci. Pedagoški proces tako lahko opredelimo kot učinek posebne oblike jezikovne rabe oziroma, upoštevajoč njegov institucionalni okvir in specifično družbeno dejavnost, pedagoškega diskurza (glej Žagar, Žmavc, Domajnko, 2018: 21, 23). Pri tem jezikovna raba nikoli ni le v funkciji prenašanja določene vednosti, temveč proizvaja sebi lastne učinke, ki (pogosto tudi nezavedno) vplivajo na vse udeležence komunikacijskega procesa. Ob takšnem pojmovanju jezikovne rabe analiza pedagoškega diskurza ponuja plodna tla ne le za razumevanje usvajanja in oblikovanja znanja, temveč tudi konstruiranja »družbeno zaželenega učenca«, kot ga opredeljujejo vzgojno-izobraževalni cilji, v praksi.

Na pomembnost ideološke analize jezikovne rabe v pedagoškem procesu sta denimo odmevno opozorila Apple in Christian-Smith, ki sta šolske učbenike definirala kot nosilce t. i. uradnega znanja, ki nikakor ni nevtralnno, temveč odvisno od stalnih bojev različnih družbenih skupin in posameznikov za oblikovanje učbeniških besedil (torej za to, katero znanje bo prepoznano kot uradno), pa tudi za določanje njihovih pomenov in njihove

² Izraz si sposojam iz Andersonovega dela *Zamišljene skupnosti* (glej Anderson, 2007), pri čemer ga ne vežem več le na narod, kot Anderson.

rabe (Apple in Christian-Smith (ur.), 1991: 2). Z dekonstrukcijami takšnih partikularnih interesov in selektivnih tradicij v učbenikih se je ukvarjalo kar nekaj študij, ki so preučevale reprezentacije spola, razreda, etnične, verske ali rasne pripadnosti v učbenikih in podobno (glej Apple in Christian-Smith (ur.), 1991; Hickman in Porfilio (ur.), 2012, vol I in II; Bruillard *et. al.* (ur.), 2005; in drugi). V slovenskem prostoru sta z diskurzivno analizo učbenikov z vidika reprezentacije tujcev in tujosti analizirala Vogrinčič Čepič in Čepič (2003), z vidika diskurzivne podobe Evrope, vključno z reprezentacijami kolonializma in kolonialnih praks, pa Žmavc in Žagar (2011). Raziskovalne pozornosti je bilo deležno tudi analiziranje jezikovne rabe pedagoškega procesa zunaj učbenikov. Tako denimo odmevni zbornik *An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis in Education* (Rogers (ur.), 2011) prikazuje možne pristope preučevanja vzgojno-izobraževalnega diskurza z metodo kritične analize diskurza, ki omogoča vpogled v vzpostavljanje odnosov moči med različnimi družbenimi skupinami in vlogami. V slovenskem prostoru gre izpostaviti študijo *Učitelj kot retorik: retorično-argumentativni vidiki pedagoškega diskurza* (Žagar, Žmavc, Domajnko, 2018) o pomenu jezikovne rabe učitelja, ki utemeljuje tudi vlogo učitelja kot retorika. Razumevanje jezikovne rabe učitelja kot v temelju retorične, torej v funkciji prepričevanja, je tudi podlaga pričujoči analizi.

Ideološkost procesa jezikovne rabe je mogoče zajeti z Althusserjevim konceptom interpelacije, ki zajema prepoznanje individuov kot subjektov ideologije (glej Althusser, 2000). Ideološko prakso šole kot »ideološkega aparata države« (*ibid.*) je tako med drugim mogoče spremljati na ravni konstruiranja učencev in učenk v samem pedagoškem diskurzu. Pričujoči članek se ukvarja z vprašanjem, na kakšen način lahko besedilo pedagoškega procesa entiteto družbeno zaželenega učenca vzpostavlja in vanjo interpelira dejanske učence kot udeležence komunikacijskega procesa. Vprašanje bo obravnavano skozi analizo primera izbrane učne priprave, ki ponuja vpogled v učiteljevo načrtovanje izvedbe učne ure in s tem v načine konstituiranja entitete »zaželenih« učencev skozi njeno besedilo, kljub temu da nimam dostopa do dejanske izvedbe učne ure na njeni podlagi, niti ne vem, ali se je dejansko odvila. Čeprav ta nemožnost analiziranja izvedbe besedila učne priprave skozi dejansko interakcijo med učiteljem in učenci močno zamejuje pričujočo analizo, samo besedilo učne priprave vendarle omogoča ugotavljanje njegovih učinkov in oblikovanje določenih sklepov.

Izbrana učna priprava s temo človekovih pravic bo obravnavana kot besedilo procesa prepričevanja; analizirana bo z uporabo retoričnega pristopa, naslanjajočega se na Aristotelov retorični aparat. Pri učni uri gre namreč za učiteljevo (eksplicitno ali implicitno) utemeljevanje določenih stališč ali trditev, ki občinstvu, tj. učencem, (še) niso samoumevna, s ciljem, da izjaviteljevo (učiteljevo) stališče občinstvu (učencem) postane sprejemljivo. Pri

tem gre za povsem institucionalizirano prakso, saj učiteljevo utemeljevanje poteka v funkciji realizacije in legitimacije učnih ciljev, eksplicitno zapisanih v učnem načrtu. Grška klasična retorika, ki se je zgodovinsko vzpostavila kot družbena in agonalna praksa³ javnega prepričevanja, tako ponuja ploden metodološki okvir analize učne ure, kjer učitelj prek prepričevanja učencev poskuša dosegati institucionalno zastavljene učne cilje. Retorika je tako razumljena kot tehnika prepričevanja, torej v jedru kot tehnika vzpostavljanja oblastnega razmerja (in nikakor ne kot nevtralen aparat iskanja »resnice«).

Medtem ko retorično prepričevanje lahko poteka na različnih ravneh jezikovnih rab in na različne načine (glej spodaj), pa v temelju zahteva ideološko prepoznanje, torej interpelacijo, tudi kadar samo prepričevanje ni uspešno: interpelacija tako predstavlja tiste momente diskurza, ki tega delajo za samoumevnega ter s tem določajo mesta znotraj diskurza tako izjavitelju kot občinstvu. Ta moment ideološke interpelacije se denimo zgodi že ob samoumevnosti deiktivnih izrazov, kot sta *jaz* in *ti* (glej Pêcheux, 1982), ob navidezni samoumevnosti pogosto zamolčanih predpostavk argumentov (glej Šumić-Riha, 1988: 42–47), ob samoumevnem zakoličevanju pomenov izrazov, ki so vselej večpomenski (prim. Bahtin, 2007; Lecercle, 2006) – kot primer je v nadaljevanju predstavljena naturalizacija človekovih pravic) – itd. Interpelacija torej steče na vseh tistih mestih v diskurzu, ki subjekte umeščajo na določena mesta v njem in v določene odnose med seboj, iz katerih se prepoznajo kot subjekti. Če je torej interpelacija notranji moment vsakega diskurza kot družbene prakse, tudi prepričevanja, ne gre za prekrivajoča se koncepta. Prepričevanje je lahko tudi neuspešno, a se bo skozenj kljub temu vselej odvil proces interpelacije kot notranje značilnosti vsakega diskurza.

Če je učna priprava opredeljena kot proces prepričevanja, pa je treba opozoriti na sledeče: prepričevanje predpostavlja določeno nestrinjanje. Toda nikjer v izbrani učni pripravi morebitno nestrinjanje ali drugačen pogled učencev nista predvidena. Nasprotno je en pogled na snov skozi celotno besedilo predstavljen kot edini možen in samoumeven, torej se na nobeni točki ne vzpostavi možna zarez ali dvom, ki bi lahko vodil/-a v polemizacijo obravnavanega stališča ali oblikovanje drugačnega pogleda nanj. V celotnem besedilu priprave torej umanjka ekspliciranje *stásis*, izhodišča prepričevalnega procesa, ki v retorični terminologiji pomeni prvo točko nestrinjanja in ključno vprašanje, ki ga je treba raziskati v procesu prepričevanja (Kvintilijan, 2015: 3.6, 206, 218–221). *Stásis* je v obravnavanem primeru sicer mogoče rekonstruirati za nazaj (»Kršenje človekovih pravic je treba obsoditi.« »Ni ga treba obsoditi.« → »Ali je treba obsoditi kršenje

³ V nasprotju denimo z rimsko retoriko, ki je predvsem v funkciji pomiritve nasprotij – retorika konsenza (glej Žmavc, 2009: 3).

človekovih pravic?«), čemur bi sledila razčlenitev opredelitve človekovih pravic in različnih možnosti njihovega utemeljevanja. A med učno pripravo *stásis* umanjka, besedilo pa ga celo predstavlja kot neobstoječega. To umanjkanje eksplikacije *stásis* ima samo na sebi retorični učinek: obravnvano problematiko predstavlja kot »neproblematiko«, kot naravno samoumevnost, ki ji vendarle nihče ne more nasprotovati. Tako lahko kljub zamolčanju nestrinjanja besedilo razumemo kot prepričevanje, saj je njegov namen (in v učnih ciljeh eksplicirani cilj) doseči, da se učenci strinjajo s ciljem učne ure in ga ponotranjijo, zamolčanje nestrinjanja pa kot le še enega od retoričnih učinkov.

Metoda

Analiza diskurza, torej jezika v rabi, je (vsaj od t.i. lingvističnega obrata v humanistiki in družboslovju) uveljavljeno področje raziskovanja, znotraj katerega so se oblikovale številne in raznolike metode. Dandanes močno priljubljena je denimo šola kritične analize diskurza (glej Faircough, 1995), ki raziskuje umeščenost in poseganje diskurzivnih praks v širše družbenopolitične strukture moči in ideologijo (a slednjo razume v ožjem smislu kot tu, tj. v smislu svetovnega nazora ali političnega prepričanja). Pomembno področje raziskovanja je tudi jezikovna pragmatika, ki odpira zelo raznolik nabor tem in raziskovalnih možnosti (od denimo različnih implicitnih pomenov in njihove rekonstrukcije do performativnosti jezika idr.), in se, sledeč nekaterim pogledom, prepleta z metodo retorike (glej Verschueren, 2000). Prav tako se na področju analize diskurza znova uveljavlja metoda retorične analize, katere temelji segajo že v obdobje antike.

V pričujoči raziskavi bo, kot rečeno, uporabljena metoda retorične analize, ki preučuje proces prepričevanja v diskurzu. Pri tem omogoča analiziranje momentov ideološke interpelacije predvsem zaradi svojih izhodišč: prvič, da je besedilo vselej treba analizirati kot umeščeno v specifično, enkratno družbeno situacijo, in drugič, da je potrebno analizirati načine, na katere se občinstvo in izjavitelj pozicionirajo v besedilu oz. na kakšen način jih to konstruira. Na koga je besedilo naslovljeno in na kakšen način, sta dve ključni vprašanji retorične analize (tako je denimo eden od vidikov prepričevanja postavljanje argumentov, s katerimi se določeno občinstvo že strinja, tako da se oblikuje občutek skupne identitete med impliciranim izjaviteljem in impliciranim občinstvom) (Leach, 2000: 210). Pozicioniranje občinstva (v tem primeru učencev) in identifikacija z diskurzivno konstruiranimi skupnostmi (v tem primeru skupnost nosilcev človekovih pravic) sta tako pomembna elementa retorične analize in obenem ključna momenta ideološke interpelacije. Zato retorično analizo vidim kot najprimernejšo metodo za analiziranje diskurzivnih momentov interpelacije.

Aristotel sredstva prepričevanja razdeli na tista znotraj tehnike, ki se jih poslužuje in ustvarja izjavitelj, in tista zunaj tehnike, ki so že dana, izjavitelj pa se jih lahko zgolj posluži (denimo zakoni in odloki, javna pričevanja, priznanja, pridobljena z mučenjem, različne listine itd.). Sredstva prepričevanja znotraj tehné, ki jih oblikuje izjavitelj, Aristotel deli na tiste, ki prepričujejo racionalno (z argumentacijo), tiste, ki prepričujejo s konstruiranjem osebe izjavitelja, in tiste, ki prepričujejo z vplivanjem na čustva občinstva – elementi, ki so v klasični tradiciji poimenovani *logos*, *ethos* in *pathos*. Pri *logosu* gre predvsem za uporabo argumentov, ki pa so znotraj retorike spet v funkciji prepričevanja, ne razumskosti ali iskanja »resnice«; ključen je torej njihov učinek na občinstvo, morebitna veljavnost argumentov je drugotnega pomena in zgolj, v kolikor je v funkciji prepričevanja občinstva; entimemi kot retorični silogizmi tako denimo niso namenjeni dokazovanju univerzalnih in obćih resnic, temveč dokazovanju verjetnosti mogočega, ne nujno resničnega. Pri *ethosu* gre za to, kako se skozi besedilo vzpostavi domneven značaj izjavitelja, ki pa je povsem neodvisen od njegovih dejanskih lastnosti, temveč zopet izključno konstruiran z namenom prepričevanja občinstva – v tem vidiku se grška retorika denimo razlikuje od rimske, ki poudarja predhodne značajske lastnosti, izražene v družbenem delovanju govorca.⁴ Aristotel vidike, s katerimi prepričuje *ethos*, dalje deli na *phronesis* – praktična vednost, razumskost, dobro poznavanje teme govora, *arete* – vrlina, iskrenost in *eunoia* – dobronamernost, prijaznost, spoštljivost v odnosu do občinstva; vsi trije elementi *ethosa* se oblikujejo skozi samo besedilo, so le učinek besedila na občinstvo! Tudi pri *pathosu* gre za vzbujanje čustev pri občinstvu, le da ta čustva tokrat niso usmerjena na izjavitelja. Razlikovanje med navedenimi tremi elementi ni vselej samo-umevno, temveč v nekaterih primerih predstavljajo različne vidike istega retoričnega momenta.⁵

⁴ Navedeno velja za grško klasično retoriko. V rimski retoriki *ethos* nasprotno poudarja že konstruirani značaj govorca, ki se odraža predvsem v njegovem družbenem delovanju (prednikih, zasedanju javnih funkcij, njegovih vrlinah, cenjenih v takratni družbi ipd.) (Žmavc, 2009: 147–151).

⁵ Konceptualizacija teh elementov se pri različnih avtorjih lahko tudi močno razlikuje. Tako denimo nekateri etotični in patotični argument razumejo kot argumentacijsko zmoto (npr. pragma-dialektiki), drugi kot legitimen način argumentiranja. Med slednje sodi denimo Tindale, ki meni, da argumentacije, ki bi po takšni delitvi spadala k *logosu*, nikakor ne moremo zamejiti zgolj nanj. Ker jo s kriterijem sprejemljivosti notranje konstituira njen učinek na občinstvo, ker je razumskost vselej odvisna od tega, za koga nekaj velja kot razumsko, in ker se argumentacija nanaša na to, kar je verjetno, ne kar je nujno, ima argumentacija, če jo razumemo v vsem njenem družbenem kontekstu, vselej tudi patotične in etotične elemente. Deduktivno in induktivno dokazovanje (*logos*), torej entimem in paradeigma (primer), vselej zahtevata vključenost občinstva: entimem kot retorični silogizem tako po svoji lastni formi zahteva od občinstva, da argument tudi izkusi v duhu («en thymo»). Paradeigma, torej primer, ki je lahko fiktiven ali zgodovinski, je prav tako del argumentacijskega procesa – kar pomeni, da v proces argumentacije lahko sodi tudi del besedila *narratio* (Tindale, 1999: 8–14). V retorični analizi sta dalje tudi etotični in patotični argument povsem legitimni obliki prepričevanja – tako je denimo *argumentum ad hominem* lahko pov-

Obravnavanje učne priprave kot retoričnega besedila omogoči analizirati specifično prepletenost med uporabljenimi argumenti (*logos*), vzpostavljanjem avtoritete učitelja in s tem sprejemljivosti argumentov (*ethos*) ter čustvenim učinkom besedila na občinstvo (*pathos*). Ti elementi prepričevanja so nujni pogoj, da učni proces sploh steče in učinkuje. Pri tem, kot rečeno, ne gre za besedilu zunanje entitete, temveč se skozi besedilo v relaciji drug do drugega šele vzpostavijo. Koncepti *ethosa*, *pathosa* in *logosa* tako ne ponujajo vnaprej danih vsebinsko zapolnjenih tematik, s katerimi je mogoče prepričevati, temveč elemente, ki se vselej izumljajo in prilagajajo kontekstu oz. situaciji izjavljanja ter, nasprotno, posegajo v slednjo in jo spreminjajo. O tem govori retorični koncept *kairos*, ki opredeljuje prilagajanje času izjavljanja, širši situaciji, v okviru katere je določena izjava ustrezna, določeno izrekanje primerno itd., oziroma ima drugačne učinke, kot bi jih imelo v drugačni situaciji, v drugačnem času. V nadaljnji analizi bo *kairos* upoštevan v dveh vidikih. Prvi bo besedilo umestil v kontekst njegovega nastanka, v njegov institucionalni in didaktični okvir; ta dva namreč določata didaktična načela, ki jim sledi učna priprava. Drugi (obravnavan nekoliko kasneje) bo besedilo umestil v zgodovinski kontekst, neposredno vezan na temo učne priprave, ki pa je v njej povsem zamolčan. Prikazano bo, da ima odsotnost tega konteksta v besedilu prav tako izrazite retorične učinke kot tisto, kar je v njem eksplicirano.

Z uporabo navedenih konceptov se pričujoča analiza osredini na določitev momentov v procesu prepričevanja, ki vzpostavljajo »zaželeno« občinstvo kot končni cilj pedagoškega procesa. Proces, če je uspešen, torej vselej vzpostavlja oblastno razmerje, s tem da šele konstituira element občinstva »po svoji podobi«. Z retorično analizo bo ugotovljeno, kako z retoričnimi sredstvi prepričevanja učitelj dosega cilj pedagoškega procesa, torej prepričati učence, da sprejmejo glavno tezo učne priprave (ki obenem predstavlja enega od učnih ciljev). Pri tem bo analiza upoštevala tri od petih stopenj oz. kanonov klasične retorike, in sicer *inventio* (določitev vsebine, s poudarkom na iznajdbi argumentov), *dispositio* (razporeditev vsebine, organizacija in ureditev delov besedila) in *elocutio* (ubesedovanje); ker je obravnavano le besedilo učne priprave, ne njena izvedba, o četrtni in peti stopnji (*memoria* – pomnjenje in *pronuntiatio* – izrekanje) ne moremo govoriti.

sem legitimen argument, in ne argumentacijska napaka, kot je pogosto veljalo v teorijah argumentacije (Tindale, 2004: 2. poglavje). Dalje imajo same figure ubesedovanja lahko argumentacijsko usmeritev: kot pokaže Fahnestock, v nekaterih primerih, odvisno od konteksta, nekatere retorične figure niso zgolj v funkciji stilističnih okrasov besedila, temveč inherentno tvorijo lasten argument (2011: 101, 103, 105 idr.).

Umestitev besedila v širši didaktični kontekst

Retorični koncept *kairos* besedilo obravnava z vidika procesa njegovega izrekanja (oz. zapisovanja), torej nujno upošteva širši kontekst, v katerem besedilo nastaja. V primeru izbrane učne priprave sta najprej relevantna institucionalni in didaktični okvir, ki s svojimi načeli v veliki meri določata didaktične pristope in usmeritev, ki jim priprava sledi. Brez razumevanja tega okvira torej ne moremo razumeti učiteljevih jezikovnih izbir.

Neposredni intertekstualni kontekst, v katerega se umešča besedilo izbrane učne priprave, predstavlja veljavni učni načrt pri predmetu zgodovina za osnovno šolo (*Učni načrt*, 2011). Ta namreč določa učne cilje, ki naj jih učenci pri predmetu usvojijo, ter formulira didaktična priporočila, ki naj jim učitelji sledijo. Z vidika tu obravnavane teme – človekovih pravic je za pričujočo analizo relevantno vključevanje slednjih v formulacije učnih ciljev. Nekateri od teh so tako denimo eksplicitno vključeni v obravnavano učno pripravo (denimo »[učenec] zna obsoditi zločine proti človeštvu, genocide, holokavst in druge oblike množičnega kršenja človekovih pravic« (*Učna priprava*: 1) je oblika cilja iz učnega načrta »[učenci] obsodijo zločine proti človeštvu, genocide, holokavst in druge oblike množičnega kršenja človekovih pravic« – str. 26). Nekateri drugi relevantni cilji učnega načrta sicer niso eksplicirani v učni pripravi, a jim ta implicitno sledi, denimo cilj: »[Učenci so zmožni] obsoditi politične sisteme, ki ne spoštujejo človekovih pravic.« Tako so vzgojni cilji učne priprave, ki obravnavajo odnos učencev do človekovih pravic, predpisani z uradnim učnim načrtom. Vendarle pa bo v nadaljevanju prikazano, da ideološki procesi rabe jezika v njej presejajo zgolj moralne opredelitve do kršenja človekovih pravic in proizvajajo učinke, ki v učnem načrtu niso predvideni.

Drugi, manj neposreden vidik didaktičnega konteksta, predstavlja širši pedagoški diskurz, v katerega se vpenja izbrana učna priprava, ki je nastala v okviru Inovacijskega projekta OŠ Blaža Kocena. Inovacijski projekt so oblikovali in izvedli štirje predmetni učitelji na šoli in ravnateljica, vanj pa je kot konzulentka vključena tudi predstavnica Zavoda RS za šolstvo dr. Komljanec (*Strokovni prispevek*: 1). Kot je zapisano na spletni strani projekta, je njegov namen spodbuditi h kritičnemu mišljenju in aktivnosti učencev, pri čemer je kritiziran domnevno tradicionalen model pouka, pri katerem naj bi bili učenci »manj aktivni, niso tako kreativni in inovativni.«

Z odprtim učnim okoljem, novimi oblikami in metodami dela ter z boljše načrtovanim medpredmetnim sodelovanjem in timskim delom želimo doseči, da bi bilo znanje učencev trajnejše in vseživljenjsko, da bi pri učencih spodbujali kritično mišljenje, samostojnost, kreativnost, inovativnost ter pozitiven odnos do učenja in znanja. *Odprti učni prostor*

omogoča fleksibilno prilagajanje okoliščinam in potrebam učencev ter različne oblike sodelovanja med učenci. Učenci sodelujejo tudi pri načrtovanju pouka, reflektiranju in vrednotenju znanja. Učitelji jih vodijo in usmerjajo. Vse to vpliva na večjo motivacijo učencev, samozavest in komunikacijske sposobnosti. (Zakaj smo se vključili v projekt; poudarki so v originalu)

Navedeni citat jasno odraža sodobni pedagoški diskurz, ki vzpostavlja striktno distinkcijo med domnevno tradicionalnim in sodobnim učnim pristopom, pri čemer naj bi slednji temeljili na zmanjševanju poudarka na transmisiji deklarativnega znanja ter njegovem povečevanju na domnevno aktivnejših in netrasmisijskih didaktičnih strategijah (Štefanc, 2011). Slednje zajemajo denimo skupinske, parne ali individualne učne oblike namesto frontalnih in čim pogostejše kombiniranje različnih učnih metod. Kot pokaže Štefanc, je opisano distanciranje do »tradicionalnih« pristopov neutemeljeno, tako z vidika njim pripisanim lastnostim (domnevna pasivnost učencev, zaviranje kreativnosti ali kritičnega mišljenja) kot z vidika striktnega ločevanja med različnimi formami znanja – kot pokaže Štefanc, namreč nikakor ne moremo trditi, da gre pri »tradicionalnih« didaktičnih pristopih le za prenos deklarativnega znanja, ne pa za usvajanje proceduralnega ali strateškega. Štefanc sklene, da

ima vsako znanje deklarativno, hkrati pa tudi proceduralno, strateško in vrednotno razsežnost, ob čemer je kot znanje nujno vselej vsebinsko; prav vsebinska razsežnost je namreč tista, ki ima procesni in strateški potencial. Zato prizadevanja, ki temeljijo na verjetju, da je učence mogoče naučiti »procesnosti« in »strateškosti«, tako da se jima daje večji pomen ali poudarek kot domnevno manj pomembnemu deklarativnemu znanju, didaktično ne morejo biti produktivna. (Ibid.: 116, 117)

Novodobni pedagoški diskurz je torej mogoče zavrnilo tako z vidika didaktične ustreznosti kot z vidika pojmovanja znanja. V pogosti uporabi izrazov, kot so »inovativnost«, »kreativnost«, »samostojnost«, ter poudarjanju usvajanja spretnosti in veščin (namesto znanja) prav tako ni težko prepoznati težnje po funkcionalizaciji znanja, inherentne neoliberalnemu diskurzu, ki je v zadnjih desetletjih prešel tudi v sfero javnega šolstva (glej Laval, 2005).

V konkretnem primeru obravnavane učne priprave se takšne »inovacije« pedagoškega procesa najizraziteje odražajo v nekaterih izbirah učnih metod in oblik, ki naj bi, sledeč predpostavki širšega pedagoškega diskurza, spodbujale »aktivnost« učencev, denimo skupinsko delo in projektno delo (ki se zaključijo z menjavo vlog, tako da učenci postanejo »učitelji« in predstavijo

snov učencem nižjega razreda – več o tem v analizi). Pri tem naj poudarim, da izbira tovrstnih učnih metod ni nujno problematična sama na sebi – problematičen je ideološki kontekst, v katerega se te izbire umeščajo, in njegove predpostavke, da so takšne metode samoumevno ustrežnejše in sodobnejše od denimo metode razlage. Prav tako je v primeru učne priprave mogoče zaznati odraz težnje po funkcionalizaciji znanja, saj je pri glavnih vzgojno-izobraževalnih ciljih poudarek na spretnostih in zmožnostih, ne na znanju (le dva od petih ciljev se začneta z »učenec zna«, a se to znanje navezuje bodisi na operacionalizacijo – zna predstaviti svoje znanje – bodisi se veže na moralno držo – zna obsoditi).

A če je sledenje novodobnemu pedagoškemu diskurzu v učnem procesu didaktično neproduktivno in prej ideološko kot strokovno utemeljeno, ima vendarle učinke na konstituiranje »zaželenih« učencev skozi pedagoški proces. Pri tem je opredelitev tega »zaželenega« učenca kot produkta učnega procesa po eni strani transparentna in formalizirana v ciljih, zapisanih v učnem načrtu; po drugi strani pa je proces njegovega vzpostavljanja njegovim udeležencem zakrit in ga je šele potrebno natančno analizirati in konceptualizirati. To bo v nadaljevanju opravljeno na primeru izbrane učne priprave. Analiza po vrsti sledi njeni strukturi.

Uvodni del učne priprave

Izbrana učna priprava načrtuje učno uro utrjevanja znanja iz zgodovine za 9. razred. Kot glavno tezo prepričevalnega procesa je mogoče glede na celotno besedilo smiselno prepoznati enega od navedenih glavnih učnih ciljev, dobesedno navedenega iz veljavnega učnega načrta za zgodovino za osnovne šole: »[učenec zna] obsoditi zločine proti človeštvu, genocide, holokavst in druge oblike množičnega kršenja človekovih pravic« (*Učni načrt*, 2011) – doseganju tega cilja z njegovim utemeljevanjem in legitimiranjem namreč sledi vsak od delov učne priprave.

V uvodnem delu učitelj učencem prikaže videoposnetek, ki govori o človekovih pravicah, v njem izpostavljene človekove pravice pa naj si učenci sproti zapisujejo. Nato učitelj napove predvidene cilje učne ure. Navedba učnih ciljev je sklepno dejanje uvodne motivacije; s tem naj bi učitelj učni proces naredil transparenten, kar je tudi ena od eksplicitnih teženj Inovacijskega projekta (»Učenci sodelujejo tudi pri načrtovanju pouka, reflektiranju in vrednotenju znanja« – glej zgornji citat). Cilj prepričevalnega procesa je torej učencem že v začetku predočen, toda – in to je ključno! – v nobeni točki procesa jim ni predstavljen kot potencialno sporen, kot nekaj, kar je šele treba utemeljiti. Nasprotno, predstavljen je kot dan, samoumeven in samozadosten, čeprav lahko skozi analizo prepoznamo, da je celotna učna priprava namenjena temu, da ga učenci ponotranjijo. V kolikšni meri

lahko v tako zastavljenem prepričevanju govorimo o »reflektiranju in vrednotenju znanja«, naj ostane retorično vprašanje.

Video, ki so ga učenci pogledali v okviru uvodne motivacije, je pripravila Fundacija enakovrednega življenja (glej *Video: Temeljne človekove pravice*). Video v angleščini s slovenskimi podnapisi predstavi nekaj temeljnih človekovih pravic in utemeljuje, zakaj so te pravice temeljne. Pri tem je edini del učne priprave, v katerem je mogoče rekonstruirati element *logosa*, torej razumskega prepričevanja, in iz njega rekonstruirati argumentacijski proces, torej navedbe premis, ki naj bi vodile k določenim sklepom. Za pravico do življenja je denimo povedano: »Prva temeljna človekova pravica [...] je: Vsak posameznik, vsako človeško bitje ima enakovredno pravico do življenja. To pomeni, da je naše življenje enakovredno vsem drugim ob rojstvu.« In nekoliko kasneje: »Ne moremo trditi, da ima nekdo več življenja kot nekdo drug. To življenje kot življenjska sila obstaja enakovredno v vsakem bitju. Zato je to prva temeljna pravica.« Sklepanje lahko zapišemo nekoliko bolj shematično:

Prva temeljna človekova pravica je pravica do življenja. (A)

To pomeni: Vsako življenje je enakovredno drugim. (B)

Ne moremo trditi, da ima kdo več življenja kot nekdo drug. (C)

To življenje je enakovredno v vsakem bitju. (B)

Zato je to [pravica do življenja] temeljna pravica. (A)

Premisa C je za utemeljevanje vsebine prve temeljne pravice povsem irelevantna, saj enaka količina ne pomeni nujno enake vrednosti. Da so si življenja med seboj enakovredna, je definicija temeljne pravice do življenja – enakovrednost se lahko vzpostavi zgolj skozi neko pravico, ki to enakovrednost zagotavlja, in nasprotno, pravica po definiciji pomeni, da za njene nosilce velja enakovredno. Gre torej za krožno sklepanje, saj A predstavlja tako premiso kot sklep, premisa C pa je za argument povsem irelevantna. Sklepanje je torej utemeljeno samo v sebi.

A čeprav bi z vidika logične analize opisano argumentacijo lahko označili za napako v sklepanju, ima z vidika retorične analize vsekakor določene učinke na občinstvo. Krožnost argumentacije, čeprav gre za napačno sklepanje, ravno skozi »napačnost« argumenta pravico do življenja predstavlja kot utemeljeno v sami sebi: argument sam jo naturalizira in postavlja za samoumevno. Občinstvo se tako kot pripadnik človeške vrste prepozna kot nosilec človekovih pravic, četudi na empirični ravni večina učencev nima zavestne izkušnje delovanja institucionalizirane pravne prakse teh pravic, ki v končni fazi predstavlja izključno realno dejstvo njihovega obstoja: človekove pravice dejansko ne predstavljajo ničesar onkraj konkretne pravne prakse, a navedena argumentacija vzpostavi prepoznanje v njih

in zamišljeno konstituiranje skupnosti njenih nosilcev, ki je od te prakse povsem neodvisna. To prepoznanje še dodatno spodbudijo spremljajoči posnetki dobro situiranih belskih in slabše situiranih temnopoltih otrok, ki se vsi zadovoljno igrajo, smejejo ali rišejo, ter posnetek, v katerem se slika razdeli kot v puzzlu na devet prizorov, ki prikazujejo ljudi, od premožnih belcev (ki so denimo reprezentirani ob igranju golfa in igranju na klavir) do revnih temnopoltih (ki so denimo reprezentirani pri igranju s staro avtomobilsko pnevmatiko na prašni, neasfaltirani cesti), pri različnih opravilih. Ko opis pravice do življenja preide v razlago, da se razlike med ljudmi zgodijo po rojstvu, ko »začne na nas vplivati okolje, ko na nas vplivajo starši ali sistem«, pa sentimentalne posnetke nadomestijo v kontekstu šolskega polja bolj negativno čustveno nabiti posnetki aluzij na nasilje, kot so posnetek vojaške parade ob omembi besede »okolje«, ob besedi »sistem« posnetek kitajskega trga z veliko sliko Maa Cetunga v središču (ki v šolskem kontekstu praviloma sproži konotacijo na demonizirani »totalitarizem«)⁶ in ob omembi nespoštovanja življenja posnetek boksarske tekme. Ob besedi »življenje« in sklepni utemeljitvi, zakaj gre za človekovo pravico, spremljajoči posnetki spet postanejo sentimentalni: vidimo lahko dobro preskrbljeno (slednje gre sklepati po brezmadežnih oblačilih, uhanih in laseh, spletenih v lične kite) belsko deklico ob risanju in nato revna (kar gre sklepati iz prašnega okolja s ponjavami ali pločevino (?) v ozadju – morda gre za šotorsko naselje), a zadovoljna temnopolta dečka ob igri. Kontrast še poudari domnevno enakovrednost, ne glede na družbene razlike, zahodni sentimentalni pogled na otroštvo kot nedolžno in naddružbeno pa prikazano vsebino vzpostavi predvsem skozi čustveni naboj.⁷ Tako je človekova pravica do življenja predstavljena kot po definiciji preddružbena, utemeljena v samem dejstvu življenja in vzbujajoča pozitivne čustvene konotacije zahodnega meščanskega pogleda na domnevno preddružbeno in naturalizirano otroštvo.⁸

Dalje video predstavi pravico do dobrin:

⁶ Bežen pregled ciljev učnega načrta jasno implicira razlikovanje med totalitarizmi, kamor prišteva tako socialistične kot fašistične in nacistične sisteme na eni strani ter liberalno demokracijo na drugi, pri čemer je izrazito poudarjena vrednotna konotacija obeh pojmov vzpostavljena kot samoumevna.

⁷ O meščanskem imaginariju otroštva kot nedolžnem, naddideološkem in naddružbenem obdobju ter sentimentalnem pogledu na nuklearno družino kot sfero harmonične intime glej Burcar, 2007, in Ariés, 1991.

⁸ Enako logiko utemeljevanja je mogoče prepoznati pri utemeljitvi človekove pravice do doma: »Nihče, ki ima hišo, ne more trditi, da je njegova pravica do hiše večja od pravice drugega in da ima pravico dopuščati, da drugi spijo na ulici ali da nimajo lastnega bivališča. Zato je dom, ki mu rečemo »moj dom«, temeljna človekova pravica. Dom je del osnovne narave človeka, del dejanske človekove narave, saj potrebujemo hrano, vodo in dom.« Zopet gre za krožnost argumenta: ker nihče nima pravice dopuščati, da je kdo brez doma, je dom temeljna človekova pravica – a te pravice nima ravno zato, ker obstaja pravica do doma. Prav tako je pravica utemeljena v sami naravi človeka in torej naturalizirana.

Druga temeljna človekova pravica temelji na dejstvu, da je vsako človeško bitje zgrajeno iz snovi, ki nam jih Zemlja daje tako rekoč brezplačno. Prah, voda, glina. Vse kemične snovi in sestavne dele, ki tvorijo fizično telo. Dobrine Zemlje so prosto dostopne. Zato vse dobrine na Zemlji kot temeljna človekova pravica pripadajo vsem. Z dobrinami moramo le učinkovito upravljati, da vsem na Zemlji zagotovimo dejansko prejetje podpore, ki omogoča življenje vredno obstoja. Dostojanstveno, veselo življenje v miru in harmoniji. (Video: Temeljne človekove pravice)

Tudi druga temeljna človekova pravica je naturalizirana, saj je utemeljena v sami človekovi telesni sestavi. Pri tem manjka utemeljitev, ki bi naredila preskok iz kemičnih in fizioloških značilnosti telesa do specifične družbenosti pravnega sistema. Zagotavljanje pravice do dobrin je prav tako prikazano kot izhajajoče iz domnevno povsem »naravnega« dejstva, da Zemlja te dobrine proizvaja sama od sebe in so zato prosto dostopne. Trditve je seveda napačna, saj v istem pravnem sistemu, ki vzpostavlja človekove pravice, zemlja skupaj z dobrinami, izhajajočimi iz nje, pogosto predstavlja zasebno lastnino. A ne glede na to argumentacija sledi podobi, da so človekove pravice vpisane v polje naravnega, ne družbenega. Družbenost je omenjena le v predzadnji povedi, ki za pogoj spoštovanja te človekove pravice postavi »le« učinkovito upravljanje, ta »le« pa jasno implicira, da gre za banalno samoumevnost, ki ne potrebuje dodatne razlage ali razprave. Zadnja poved znova vzpostavi sentimentalno brezčasnost »veselega« življenja »v miru in harmoniji«, ki jo spremlja posnetek srečne temnopolte družine iz višjega razreda (na kar sklepam iz po videzu moderne in prestižne opreme prostora). Norma tega naravnega in samoumevnega življenja (če se le spoštuje človekove pravice) je torej dobro situirana nuklearna družina z majhnim otrokom – da je temnopolta, naj samo dokazuje, da gre za univerzalno normo.

Pomenljiva je uporaba besede »brezplačno«, ki se pojavi tako pri utemeljitvi druge temeljne človekove pravice kot tudi pri pravicah do hrane in do vode. V vseh primerih je beseda uporabljena v smislu, da Zemlja dobrine, hrano in vodo zagotavlja brezplačno, sama od sebe. V pridobitev navedenih dobrin je potrebno vložiti *le* še nekaj dela. V kapitalističnem sistemu, v katerem se je diskurz človekovih pravic sploh vzpostavil in katerega ključna značilnost je tržno gospodarstvo, izraz »brezplačno« pomeni nekaj zunajsystemskega, nekaj, kar ni vezano na kapitalistične tržne odnose, ki v družbi prevladujejo. Ker je v videu poudarjeno, da dobrine ponuja zemlja sama od sebe, izraz »brezplačno« tako še dodatno poudarja izvendružbenost in naravnost navedenih pravic. Podoba, ki jo takšna argumentacija vzpostavlja, sledi mitičnim podobam raja na zemlji, kjer srečni posamezniki polno

in svobodno živijo svoj čas in jim vse potrebno pade v naročje kot mana z neba. Predstava, ki jo je prevzel tudi meščanski sentimentalni pogled na otroštvo in sfero intimnega družinskega življenja, torej ne čudi, da je ta idiličnost vselej pospremljena s posnetki srečnih otrok ali nuklearnih družin.

V takšni srečni družbi vsak posameznik razvija svoje potenciale in s tem prispeva k »ekosistemu«:

So ljudje, ki radi raziskujejo in iščejo rešitve, s katerimi bodo vsem izboljšali življenje. So tudi ljudje, ki se radi izražajo skozi fizična opravila. Tako ima vsak možnost, da odkrije svoj pravi potencial in krepi svoje spretnosti. S tem odkrije lastne veščine, s katerimi lahko prispeva. (Ibid.)

Razlike med ljudmi, ki opravljajo intelektualne in manualne poklice, so tako pripisane le njihovim različnim »praviim potencialom«. Manualni delavci so predstavljeni kot tisti, ki se »radi izražajo skozi fizična opravila«. Razredna delitev družbe ne obstaja, eksistenčna prisila po mezdnem delu tudi ne – nasprotno, gre za svobodno »izražanje« in odkrivanje svojega potenciala skozi različna opravila.

Opisana podoba je še bolj poudarjena ob kontrastu s svojim domnevnim nasprotjem. Pri utemeljitvah pravice do hrane, do izobrazbe in do dela so odnosi, ki bi vladali, če teh pravic ne bi spoštovali, opisani z besedno zvezo »odnos gospodar-suženj«. Tako so človeški odnosi reducirani bodisi na srečne posameznike, živeče v harmoniji, ki jim narava priskrbi vse, kar potrebujejo, če le spoštujejo človekove pravice, bodisi na suženjske odnose, ki očitno ne predstavljajo dejanskih institucionalnih razmerij realnih sužnjelastniških odnosov, temveč so v svoji samoumevnosti namenjeni demonizaciji odnosov, ki bi nastali ob nespoštovanju človekovih pravic. Izraz torej učinkuje izključno v smislu čustvenega naboja, ki ga v liberalnih družbah sproži izraz »suženj«, ne pa v svojem denotativnem pomenu konkretnega institucionaliziranega odnosa.

V tako naturalizirani podobi človekovih pravic se občinstvo – učenci že zgolj kot pripadniki človeške vrste prepoznajo kot njihovi nosilci. S tem so konstituirani v skupnost »srečnih ljudi, ki živijo v harmoniji«, ki se v posnetku kaže kot samoumevna apriorna danost, izhajajoča iz same biološke narave človeka. Videoposnetek tako predstavlja prvi moment ideološke interpelacije učencev, ki sledijo argumentaciji, zakaj izpostavljene pravice predstavljajo temeljne človekove pravice. Skozi *logos* argumentacij (kljub njihovi logični napačnosti oz. prav zaradi nje) in *pathos* spremljajočih jih podob in čustvenega naboja ubeseditve se človekove pravice kažejo kot samoumevne danosti, utemeljene same v sebi oz. v biološkem dejstvu človeške vrste. Skupaj video sproži patotični učinek prepoznanja pripadnosti skupnosti.

Do sedaj je bil video analiziran z vidika retorične stopnje *inventio* (torej iskanja vsebine in argumentov) in deloma *elocutio* (načina ubesedovanja s patotičnimi učinki) kot nosilec argumentacijskega procesa, kljub temu da je točka nestrinjanja, ki je začetni in konstitutivni vidik argumentacijskega procesa, v njem povsem izpuščena in jo je mogoče le analitično rekonstruirati. Če upoštevamo tudi retorično stopnjo *dispositio*, torej ureditev delov besedila, pa se opustitev eksplikacije točke nestrinjanja pokaže še v drugačni luči. Po retoričnih napotkih namreč del besedila, v katerem so predstavljeni argumenti in morebitna ovržba protiargumentov, nikakor in nikoli ne more stati na začetku besedila – ta del, t. i. *exordium*, je namenjen predstavitvi problematike, ne že utemeljevanju določenega stališča. Tudi če ne predpostavljamo, da je učitelj retorično izobražen, besedilo učinkuje nenavadno, če ga začne z argumentiranjem, ne da bi bila prej predstavljena problematika. Če že ne iz tradicionalnih konvencij pisanja besedil (ki v grobem izvirajo iz klasične retorike), pa učitelj gotovo pozna didaktične napotke za pisanje učnih priprav, ki se v grobem glasijo: uvodni del in uvodna motivacija naj vsebujeta napoved, predstavitev ali umestitev v nadaljevanju obravnavane teme. Kako si torej lahko razlagamo dejstvo, da učitelj brez kakršnega uvodnega nagovora (vsaj v učni pripravi ta ni zapisan) učencem predvaja video, ki utemeljuje posamezne temeljne človekove pravice? Le tako, da na vsebino videa dejansko ne moremo gledati, kot da je namenjeno argumentiranju določenega stališča, temveč predstavitvi teme.⁹ Tako se še zaostri podoba, ki jo prikazuje besedilo, da človekove pravice niso tema, o kateri bi bilo možno razmišljati na različne načine in jih utemeljevati, temveč je edini predstavljeni pogled prikazan kot edini možen in kot tak nesporen.

Glavni del učne priprave

Drugi, glavni del učne priprave temelji na skupinskem delu. Z vidika *dispositio* lahko govorimo o delu besedila *narratio*, torej pripovedovanju z namenom prepričevanja. V tem delu se bo analiza še posebej osredotočala na ubesedovanje – *elocutio* in njegove patotične učinke.

Učitelj razdeli učence v dve skupini po spolu, vsaka pa nato prejme različen učni list z besedilom zgodbe in dvema vprašanjema. Na koncu sledita predstavitvi rešitev vsake skupine pred razredom in skupen premislek o njih (glej *Učna priprava*, 2). Skupina deklet dobi učni list (*ibid.*: 4, 5), na katerem je zapisana zgodba o zgodnjenovoveški kmetici, obtoženi in nato obsojeni čarovništva. Gre za dobreseden navedek dela članka iz spletne revije Govori.se,

⁹ Pri tem je povsem vseeno, kaj je učitelj dejansko razmišljal, ko je pisal učno pripravo, tega pač ne moremo vedeti – ključno je, da besedilo zaradi uveljavljenih družbenih konvencij učinkuje na določen način.

hčerinske izdaje revije Metropolitan, pri čemer na delovnem listu vir ni naveden, tako da dvomljiva strokovnost vira učencem ni predočena. Slog besedila, ustrezen reviji za trače, astrologijo in modne trende, v kontekstu šolskega polja doseže povsem drugačne učinke. Bralstvo spletne revije od njenih prispevkov načeloma pričakuje predvsem prostočasno zabavo ali informacije, za katere praviloma ve, da nimajo ne izobraževalnega namena ne zanj ustrezne strokovne podlage. Nasprotno pa se v kontekstu učne ure gradivo, za katerega ustreznost s svojo strokovnostjo in izobrazbo jamči učitelj, kaže kot nevtralen in neproblematičen vir usvajanja znanja.

Besedilo učnega lista bralca neposredno naslavlja v drugi osebi:

Za nekaj trenutkov si predstavljam, da si evropska kmetica iz 17. stoletja. Pridno obdeluj majhno zaplato zemlje, na kateri gojiš korenčnice in nekaj vrst zelišč s tradicionalnimi zdravilnimi učinki. Si bogaboječa žena, redno obiskuješ cerkev oziroma tako pogosto, kolikor te stare kosti še lahko odnesejo k maši. Trdno verjameš v hudiča, čeprav se ne oziraš na pripovedke o čarovnicah, ki se ponoči nekje globoko v gozdu predajajo Satanu, se mazilijo s hudičevo mastjo in z zlimi uroki preklinjajo živino. (Ibid.: 4)

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Sledi podroben opis »tvojega« doživljanja aretacije, mučenja in priznanja, z uporabo domnevno »domačinskega« pogleda na dogajanje. Pri tem »domačinskem« pogledu ne gre za sledenje Geertzovemu pozivu zgodovinarjem, naj zasedejo t. i. domačinsko stališče, saj naj bi bilo le tako mogoče razumeti mentaliteto in simbolne pomene posameznega obdobja (Geertz, 2015: 37–60). V opisanem kontekstu se skozenj vzpostavlja nasproten učinek: ne gre za to, da bi skozi izbor besednih zvez, kot je »dušni pastir« namesto župnik, ter zatrjevanje domnevno domačinskih prepričanj, denimo »Si bogaboječa žena, redno obiskuješ cerkev oziroma tako pogosto, kolikor te stare kosti še lahko odnesejo k maši« [poudarki Z. B.] in »v agoniji zavrtiš oči – prepričljivo znamenje, da iščeš Satanovo pomoč,« subjekta besedila dejansko postavila v miselni okvir zgodovinskega konteksta. Nasprotno, takšna jezikovna raba z načrtnim izpostavljanjem za današnji pogled »absurdnih« in pretiranih stališč ter zaznamovanih izrazov, ki dandanes zvenijo tuje, »kmečko« in zastarelo, do teh vzpostavi distanco in humorni učinek. Uporaba izrazov, ki tako izrazito odstopajo od danes uveljavljenih »navadnih« izrazov, denimo sinekdohe »stare kosti te nesejo«, metafore »dušni pastir« ipd., ima ravno nasproten učinek od navadnih oz. nevtralnih izrazov. Kot zapišeta Perelman in Olbrechts-Tyteca, »[o]dnos med navadnim jezikom in sprejetimi idejami ni naključen: navaden jezik je sam na sebi manifestacija strinjanja, skupnosti misli« (1969: 152–153; navedeno po: Fahnestock, 2011: 93; prev. Z. B.). Po njenem mnenju takšna raba jezika pri

občinstvu ustvari občutek skupnosti oz. povezanosti (*communion*) (*ibid.*: 165, 177). Poudarjeno izogibanje navadnim izrazom torej, nasprotno, sproži distanciranje do neke ideje, ki se ne kaže več kot splošno sprejeta in samoumevna. Hkratno naslavljanje bralca v drugi osebi učinek distanciranja skozi uporabo bralcu nenavadnih izrazov izrazito ironizira – težko bi si namreč razlagali poziv »Predstavljaš si« kot pristen in dobeseden.

Uporaba takšnega sloga sicer v sami učni pripravi ni utemeljena, didaktično utemeljitev pa bi lahko ponudila maksima sodobnega pedagoškega diskurza o t. i. izkustvenem učenju, ki ji sledi tudi Inovativni projekt: »Učenje v odprtem učnem okolju daje veliko možnosti za izkustveno učenje, ki omogoča pridobivanje trajnejših in vseživljenjskih znanj« (*Strokovni prispevek*: 6) ter cilj razvijanja empatije pri učencih (*ibid.*: 3). Domnevno bi bila uporaba takšnega besedila pri učni uri namenjena vživljanju v dogajanje takratnega časa, ki naj bi ponudilo domnevno učinkovitejše usvajanje znanja skozi nekakšno osebno izkušnjo pregona čarovnic ter razvijanje empatije do njegovih žrtev. A glede na zgoraj predstavljeni ironični učinek takšnega »vživljanja« si je težko zamisliti, da bi učenci takšno besedilo brali resno ali da bi jim dejansko dalo boljši vpogled in vživljanje v zgodovinsko dogajanje. Prav tako bi težko govorili o morebitnem razvijanju empatije: podrobni opisi mučenja in trpljenja, poudarjeni s stopnjevanjem in prav tako zapisani v drugi osebi, ki daleč presegajo zgolj podajanje zgodovinskih informacij o mučilnih praksah sodnih procesov, prej dajejo vtis perverznega naslajanja nad dogajanjem:

Eden izmed sodnikov te sleče do golega in te v iskanju prikritih hudičevih znamenj na tvoji koži temeljito pretipa. Tvoj palec zaprejo v čudno, kleščam podobno napravo in ga močno stisnejo. Ponovno te vprašajo, ali si pripravljena priznati. Prvi dan zaslišanja preživiš v neznosni bolečini, a ne kloneš, čeprav se skoraj nezavestna zgrudiš z natezalnice. Ko se vzvod sproži in potegne narazen tvoje ude, v agoniji zavrtiš oči – prepričljivo znamenje, da iščeš Satanovo pomoč. Ah, priznanje je tako sladko. Naslednje jutro te posadijo na voz s štirimi čarovnicami, odpelejo na grmado in sežgejo. (Učna priprava: 4)

Pathosa besedila torej nikakor ni mogoče označiti kot dejansko vzbujajočega empatijo ali vživljanje v trpljenje, kaj šele kot poskus razumevanja zgodnjenovoveške mentalitete. Kljub eksplicitnemu pozivu k vživljanju (»Za nekaj trenutkov si predstavljaš«) je namen besedila kratkočasje skozi naslajanje po eni strani in ironično rabo »domačinskega« besedišča, ki naj bralcem zveni smešno, po drugi. Poudarjeno izpostavljanje »absurdnosti« takratne mentalitete (npr. »To je absurdno, poveš.«) ter očitno ironično opisovanje (denimo »V agoniji zavrtiš oči – prepričljivo znamenje, da iščeš Satanovo

pomoč.«) bralca nikakor ne moreta približati njenemu razumevanju, temveč sprožita le vzvišeno norčevanje iz domnevno neumnih zgodnjenovoveških »vraž«. (V nadaljevanju besedila na spletni strani je denimo eksplicitno uporabljen izraz »vraževni norčki«, a takšna nastrojenost je jasno implicirana skozi celotno besedilo.) S tem se miselnost časa, v katerem je besedilo pisano in brano (današnjost), vzpostavi kot obdobje, v katerem smo, v nasprotju s prejšnjimi, dosegli racionalno in zdravorazumsko normalnost.

Na drugem učnem listu (*Učna priprava*: 6, 7), namenjenem skupini fantov, so navedeni prvoosebni odlomki pripovedi dveh judovskih deklet, Mirjam in Erike, ki sta opisali svojo izkušnjo z nacističnimi taborišči, navedeni po delu *Judovstvo, antisemitizem in holokaust v slovenski zgodovini* (Luthar *et al.*). Tudi v tem primeru vir odlomka učencem ni predložen. Odlomek pripovedi Miriam Steiner Aviezer je vzet iz njenega romana *Vojak z zlatimi gumbi*, v katerem svojo izkušnjo opiše skozi sanje protagonistke romana Bibe, pri čemer pa je učitelj, ki je pripravil učni list, ime Biba spremenil v avtoričino ime Mirjam (domnevno zaradi še bolj poudarjene pristnosti osebne izkušnje?). Prvi odlomek, ki ga pripoveduje Mirjam, predstavlja njeno ločitev od matere:

Mama je vrisnila, kot da šele zdaj dojemam vse: da ne spi, ne sanja. [...] Skočila je pokonci ravno takrat, ko je kamion ustavil pred dolgim vlakom. Na peronu je bilo vse polno žensk. [...] Postavili so jo na tla in še preden se je tega dobro zavedla, že se je izvila vojaku iz rok in se pognala iz mesta. [...] 'dajte mi otroka ...' je slišala nekje pred seboj. 'Mama, mama mama!' je kričala, kot bi hotela prepiti pisk lokomotive, brnenje avtomobilov, kričanje podivjanih žensk, ki so jih tlačili v vagone in povelja, ki so grmela preko zvočnikov. Prerivala se je med škornji, kovčki, kamioni, vagoni, tekla je, proti glasu, ki je še zmeraj klical: 'Mirjam!' In tedaj je med dvema vojakoma zagledala mamo. Držali so jo za lase in jo skupaj z ostalimi ženskami tlačili skozi odprta vrata vagona. (Učna priprava: 6; poudarki Z. B.)

Izbrani odlomek opisuje Mirjamino ločitev od mame, ki so jo nacistični vojaki »tlačili skozi odprta vrata vagona«. Čustveni učinek doseže s sekvencami paralelizmov: »da ne spi, ne sanja«, in »Mama, mama mama!« je kričala, kot bi hotela prepiti pisk lokomotive, brnenje avtomobilov, kričanje podivjanih žensk, ki so jih tlačili v vagone, in povelja, ki so grmela preko zvočnikov. Prerivala se je med škornji, kovčki, kamioni, vagoni, tekla je, proti glasu, ki je še zmeraj klical: 'Mirjam!« [poudarki Z. B.]. Asindeton v zadnji povedi, v kateri so izpuščeni vezniki, ki bi jih v nevtralnem jeziku pričakovali, ustvari učinek okrepitve ter daje vtis, da je več stvari izraženih hkrati (Fahnestock, 2011: 247), in vtis hitrega ritma dogajanja. Trušč in vpitje v prizoru sta bralcu

predočena s pogostim ponavljanjem izrazov: »je vrisnila«, »je kričala«, »hotela prevpiti pisk [...], brnenje [...], kričanje [...], povelja, ki so grmela iz zvočnikov«, »proti glasu, ki je še zmeraj klical«. Poleg hitrih vtisov dogajanja in poudarjenega trušča in gneče besedilo dalje daje občutek nerealnosti in nezmožnost, da bi dojeli grozo dogajanja: »kot da šele zdaj dojemam vse: da ne spi, ne sanja«, »še preden se je tega dobro zavedla«.

Še izrazitejši je paralelizem v drugem odlomku, ki ga pripoveduje Erika:

Ostala sem sama, čisto sama in jokala, jokala ... Nikogar več nisem imela od svojih, da bi se mu lahko vsaj malo potožila. Prav nikogar ni bilo. Niti ena teta ni preživela, vse so šle v smrt, v krematorij, tako kot sestra Judita. Upala sem, da bo preživela vsaj sestra po mamini strani, teta Olga. Prosila sem boga, naj mi pusti vsaj njo. Pa me ni uslišal, vzal mi je tudi teto Olga. Tudi ona je za vedno ostala v pepelu Auschwitz-Birkenau... [...]

Vedela sem, da grem v smrt. Za sestro in očetom še jaz. Ni me bilo strah, bili smo čisto apatični, nebogljeni, enostavno smo šli, kot so nas vodili esesovci. (Ibid., poudarki Z. B.)

Epizeuksis »jokala, jokala«, ponavljanje izraza »nikogar« in sinonimnih izrazov za »umreti« ter stopnjevanje pripovedi v prvem odstavku od »Upala sem, da bo preživela vsaj [...]« prek »Prosila sem boga, naj mi pusti vsaj [...]« do »Pa me ni uslišal, vzal mi je tudi [...]« in »Tudi ona je za vedno ostala v pepelu« sprožijo poudarjeni učinek obupanosti in bralcu pred očmi naslikajo razvoj od upa do brezupa. Z izrazom Perelmana in Olbrechts-Tytece besedilo tako doseže enega od treh elementov pathosa oz. učinkov na občinstvo, *presence*: predmet obravnave občinstvu predочи v mislih oz. »naslika pred očmi«. (1969: 174)

Medtem ko prvo besedilo vsaj na videz tudi informira, denimo z opisom verovanjskih vzorcev skozi navedbo obsodb (čaranje slabega vremena, skisanje kravjega mleka sosedu, vzbujanje spolne sle), opisom mučilnih naprav ipd., je vsebina drugega besedila izrazito osredotočena na opisovanje trpljenja. Medtem ko prvo besedilo torej vzpostavi predvsem ironizacijo zgodnjenovoveške mentalitete in njeno distanco do današnje, je za drugega mogoče skleniti, da omogoči vzbujanje empatije in izkustveno učenje (kar sta dve od maksim Inovativnega projekta) ter s tem čustveni odpor do »kršenja človekovih pravic«, kar predstavlja cilj retorične argumentacije učne priprave.

Takšna učinka se še okrepi skozi po dve vprašanji, ki sledita opisanima besediloma. Na prvem učnem listu: »Katere osnovne človekove pravice bi ti bile kršene, če bi doživljala opisane dogodke?« in »Navedi kakšen primer množičnega kršenja človekovih pravic iz obdobja 20. stoletja.« (*Učna*

priprava: 5). Na drugem: »Naštej človekove pravice, ki so bile kršene Mirjam in Eriki.« in »Tudi danes ljudje v nekaterih delih sveta doživljajo množične kršitve človekovih pravic. Navedi kakšen primer.« (*Ibid.*: 7). Seveda v času pregonov čarovnic koncepta človekovih pravic niso niti poznali niti takrat ni bila uveljavljena njim podobna pravna praksa, torej je prvo vprašanje povsem anahronistično. Kljub temu se s takšnim anahronizmom človekove pravice vzpostavijo kot univerzalna in ahistorična danost, neodvisna od posamezne družbene pravne prakse in torej naturalizirana. A pomenljivejši sta drugi dve vprašanji na vsakem od učnih listov, ki sprašujeta po drugih primerih kršenja človekovih pravic. Pri tem se prvo nanaša na časovno oddaljenost (kršenje človekovih pravic v 20. stoletju – ki za osnovnošolske učence leta 2015 izkustveno predstavlja daljno zgodovinsko preteklost) in drugo na geografsko oddaljenost (poudarek na »v nekaterih delih sveta«).

Ti dve vprašanji več kot o dejanskih družbenozgodovinskih situacijah, po katerih sprašujeta, povesta o dožemanju trenutka njenega branja: čas in prostor učne ure se predstavi kot nadzgodovinski okvir, v katerem kršenje človekovih pravic ne obstaja oz. v katerem smo dosegli fazo »veselega življenja v miru in harmoniji«, ki se jasno razlikuje od geografsko in časovno oddaljenih družb. Na ta način se učenci spet prepoznajo kot pripadniki te, z vidika človekovih pravic naravne, samoumevne in harmonične družbe. A v nasprotju s prvim momentom interpelacije, kjer je bila ta domnevno naravna danost človekovih pravic predstavljena kot vsesplošna, je v drugem momentu ta vsesplošnost poudarjeno razbita in zamejena: »naša« družba ohrani »naravnost« in samoumevnost spoštovanja človekovih pravic, medtem ko je njihovo kršenje potisnjeno na geografsko in časovno oddaljene ter empirično neizkušene družbe. Skupina deklet je v to »naše« interpelirana skozi ironizacijo, skupina fantov pa skozi empatijo do teh oddaljenih družb, kjer se kršitve »še« dogajajo. V tem pogledu ideološke interpelacije z vzpostavitvijo distance med »nas« in »one« tudi opisana empatija lahko predstavlja le še pokroviteljsko sočustvovanje.

Zaključni del učne priprave

V zaključnem delu (*Učna priprava*: 3) učitelj učencem predvaja fotografije begunskih otrok iz Sirije (glej *ibid.*: 8–11). Učenci morajo znova zapisati, katere človekove pravice so otrokom kršene, in razmisliti, kje se danes dogajajo kršitve človekovih pravic. To, da gre pri fotografijah ravno za otroke, v zahodnem svetu s sentimentalnim in naturaliziranim pogledom na otroštvo še zaostri čustveni učinek, ki naj ga sproži prikazano trpljenje. A zopet se kljub temu vzbujanju empatije skozi učno nalogo vzpostavlja distanca. Na vseh slikah, na katerih je mogoče kaj razbrati o geografski lokaciji beguncev, je prikazano peščeno oz. puščavsko okolje, kar jasno nakazuje, da gre za

dogajanje na Bližnjem vzhodu oz. v krajih, oddaljenih od Evrope (oziroma od podob narave v videoposnetku na začetku ure, kjer je med opisi dobrin, ki jih »brezplačno« priskrbi narava in so zato predmet človekovih pravic, prikazani zeleni travniki, čista modra reka in drevesa). Odgovor na vprašanje, kje se danes dogajajo kršitve človekovih pravic, je tako impliciran v samih podobah.

Na tem delu je pomenljiv *kairos* – časovno dogajanje učne ure, njen zgodovinski kontekst – namreč konec novembra leta 2015. Gre za čas, ko se je v javnem diskurzu intenzivno govorilo o t.i. »migrantski krizi«, 10. novembra tistega leta pa je Slovenija, sledeč Hrvaški in Madžarski, začela s postavljanjem rezilne žice na meji, ki jo je vlada evfemistično poimenovala »tehnična ovira«. Sirska vojna je tedaj dokončno prerasla v geopolitično posredniško vojno s pomembnimi posledicami za celoten Bližnji vzhod, v državah Zahoda pa je v kontekstu govora o migrantih v javnosti porasel varnostni diskurz. S konca novembra prav tako datira odločitev Evropske unije, da Turčiji podeli tri milijarde evrov pomoči pri zaustavitvi napredovanja migrantov proti Evropi ter ji spregleda vse bolj avtoritarno notranjo politiko in slabe razmere za migrante, ki naj bi jih oskrbela. Opustitev kakršne koli reference na opisano družbenozgodovinsko situacijo v učni pripravi je pomenljiva. Implicira namreč, da se kršenje človekovih pravic otrok vojnih beguncev iz Sirije dogaja nekje daleč stran na Bližnjem vzhodu, Slovenija pa s tem nima nič. S tem je argumentacijska usmeritev priprave, ki kršitve človekovih pravic postavi v daljno odmaknjenost, vsaj implicitno podobna težnji tedanjega premiera Mira Cerarja, ki je potrebo po rezilni žici na meji utemeljil z željo, da do humanitarne katastrofe ne bi prišlo na slovenski strani meje.¹⁰ Z vidika intertekstualnosti besedil zamolčanje oz. umanjkanje kakršnega koli ekspliciranja odnosa do drugih vsebinsko relevantnih izjav, v času izvajanja učne priprave v javnem diskurzu dovolj pogostih, da je mogoče z veliko gotovostjo sklepati, da je bila večina učencev vsaj v določeni meri z njimi seznanjena, učinkuje samo na sebi: z vidika interpelacije učencev je v tem prepoznavanju kršenja človekovih pravic beguncev iz Sirije tako znova ponovljena logika glavnega dela učne ure, torej vzpostavitev distance med brezčasnim in naravnim prostorom/časom dogajanja učne ure na eni strani in oddaljenimi kraji/časi, zaznamovanimi s kršenjem človekovih pravic, na drugi. V učni pripravi vzpostavljeni odnos do teh, ki so jim pravice kršene, je vselej pokroviteljski – bodisi ironično vzvišen nad »necivilizirano« mentaliteto bodisi pokroviteljsko sočuten in viktimizirajoč.

Takšna interpretacija seveda temelji zgolj na gradivu učne priprave. Povsem mogoče si je zamisliti, da učitelj/ica pri njeni izvedbi na tem mestu v razredu odpre vprašanje aktualne situacije v Sloveniji. A ker to v učni

¹⁰ Miro Cerar o postavljanju ograje na meji: »V razmerah, ko prihaja zima na našem ozemlju, lahko pride do humanitarne katastrofe, če ne bomo sprejeli potrebnih ukrepov« (citata naveden po Žurnal24).

pripravi ni predvideno, nasprotno, predvidena aktivnost je le učenčev »razmislek« o vprašanju, kje se kršitve človekovih pravic pojavljajo (ob projiciranju slik s peščenim ozadjem, ki že same napeljujejo na odgovor), ne pa tudi razprava o odgovorih nanj, se zdi prva interpretacija utemeljena.

Učna priprava predvideva še tretji moment interpelacije, v katerem učenci ponotranjeno prepoznanje v nosilcih človekovih pravic in stališče, ki naj jim postane sprejemljivo, sami izjavljajo. Ta vidik se pojavi že v zaključku glavnega dela učne ure, ko mora vsak učenec zapisati po eno misel, s katero obsodi zločine proti človeštvu in kršitve človekovih pravic. Še izrazitejši pa postane ta moment v zaključku ure. Po ogledovanju in komentiranju fotografij sirskih beguncev spet sledi naloga, naj učenci s svojimi besedami obsodijo zločine proti človeštvu in kršitve človekovih pravic (*ibid.*: 3). Skoraj dobresedna ponovitev naloge, naj učenci obsodijo zločine proti človeštvu in kršitve človekovih pravic, glavni argumentacijski cilj učne ure (»učenec zna obsoditi zločine proti človeštvu, genocide, holokavst in druge oblike množičnega kršenja človekovih pravic«) po eni strani dodatno poudari, po drugi strani pa gre za od zunaj zadano zahtevo (s strani učitelja), za katero učenci že vnaprej, od napovedi učnih ciljev dalje, vedo, da je cilj učitelja, da jo ponotranjijo. Pa vendar bi težko rekli, da gre pri tem (le) za vsiljevanje tujega stališča od zunaj: kot je bilo prikazano, učitelj skozi celotno učno uro učence vodi skozi argumentacijo utemeljevanja domnevne nujnosti in samoumevnosti spoštovanja človekovih pravic ter jim živo prikljuje pred oči *pathos* trpljenja, ki ga povzroči njihovo kršenje. Učenci so se z lastno ubeseditvijo zahtevanega stališča prisiljeni še enkrat samostojno podati skozi proces utemeljitve človekovih pravic oz. si ga predočiti, s tem pa se učitelj dokončno prepriča, da so učenci dejansko sledili njegovemu argumentacijskemu procesu in jim je bil ta sprejemljiv. V fazi učne ure, ko morajo učenci z lastnimi besedami kršitve človekovih pravic obsoditi, so torej že interpelirani v navidezno skupnost njihovih nosilcev. A pri tem ne gre zgolj za potrdilo učitelju, da je cilj argumentacije dosežen, temveč obenem za še en nadaljnji element interpelacije učencev, ki povsem sledi Althusserjevemu opisu ideološke interpelacije: moment interpelacije predstavlja samo prepoznanje, da je izjava namenjena tebi (trenutek, ko se ozreš proti klicu »Hej, vi tam!«), ideologija, v kateri se vselej-že prepoznaš, pa predstavlja dojemanje same materialne prakse (po slovitom Pascalovem izreku »Poklekните, premikajte ustnice v molitvi in verovali boste.«) (Althusser, 2000: 93). Pri zahtevi po lastni ubeseditvi gre torej prav za zahtevo po »premikanju ustnic v molitvi«. Ideologija po tej logiki namreč učinkuje ne glede na to, kaj si učenci o njej dejansko mislijo.

Moment interpelacije skozi materialno prakso se ponovi v sledečem zadnjem stadiju učne ure, ki predstavlja projektno delo: učenci naj pripravijo didaktično gradivo za osmošolce o čarovništvu v zgodovini – izdelajo

časovni trak, zemljevid z označenimi kraji čarovniških procesov ter pripravijo in izvedejo kviz. Tako so devetošolci postavljeni v navidezno vlogo učiteljev, ki naj ponotranjeno snov predstavijo osmošolcem. Gre za isto logiko materialne prakse, v katero so prisiljeni učenci, le da so v tem primeru potisnjeni še v (navidezno) vlogo avtoritete. Da je ta avtoriteta navidezna, jasno kaže formulacija iz učne priprave, ki govori o dejavnosti učitelja med projektним delom: »učence usmerjam«, »dam navodila«. Takšno prakso je mogoče prepoznati v še eni od maksim Inovacijskega projekta, ki si prizadeva k t. i. odprti šoli. Ena od značilnosti slednje je, z besedami Komljanec, konzulentke v projektu z ministrstva: »Biti na obeh straneh 'učnega pulta'« (2010: 5), pri čemer strokovna utemeljitev takšne prakse ni podana. Vendarle je mogoče sklepati, da podelitev navidezne avtoritete sledi Althusserjevemu opisu materialne ideologije, pri čemer je v tem primeru logika še zaostrena: medtem ko so v prejšnji nalogi učenci morali ubesediti določeno stališče, pri čemer je bilo jasno, da to od njih zahteva zunanja avtoriteta, so sedaj oni tisti, ki na videz predstavljajo avtoriteto. Zunanja zahteva (ki, kot rečeno, že v prvem primeru ni bila zares povsem zunanja, saj so učenci do tistega momenta že sprejeli opisano stališče) se sedaj bistveno bolj zakrije, saj se zdi, da imajo učenci avtonomijo pri predstavitvi snovi.

Takšen učinek lahko primerjamo z Beauvoisovim opisom učinka navidezne podelitve svobode: avtor opisuje številne eksperimente, v katerih so ljudje, ki jim je bila tekom eksperimenta na videz podeljena svoboda odločanja o tem, ali bodo storili nekaj, kar gre proti njihovim dotedanjim pogledom, v to skoraj vselej privolili. V nasprotju z eksperimentalno skupino, ki ji navidezna svoboda ni bila podeljena in jo je v neko dejanje silila zunanja avtoriteta, jih je večina po tem dejanju dejansko spremenila prvotni pogled. Beauvois opisani fenomen poimenuje liberalna sužnost in ga razlaga s psihološko potrebo po razrešitvi kognitivne disonance, ki nastane ob na videz prostovoljnem pristanku na sporno dejanje. Zaradi navidezne svobode se osebe ne morejo sklicevati na zunanjo prisilo, temveč razlago za dejanje poiščejo v sebi, ob tem pa svoj prvotni pogled spremenijo oz. prilagodijo na način, da kognitivna disonanca med njim in opravljenim dejanjem ne obstaja več (Beauvois, 2000). V obravnavanem primeru projektne dela učencev sicer ne gre za stališče, ki je sporno za učence, saj je učna priprava do tega trenutka domnevno že dosegla razumevanje pogleda, ki ga postavlja za cilj prepričevanja. Prav tako v sami učni pripravi nikjer ni navedeno, da bi učenci osmošolcem morali predstaviti tudi vrednotno stališče do pregonov čarovnic, temveč opis didaktičnih pripomočkov, ki jih pripravljajo učenci, predpostavlja le njihovo informativno vrednost skozi dejstveno vsebino. Pa vendar bi še posebej v kontekstu poudarjeno vrednotne usmeritve celotne učne ure lahko sklepali, da tudi pri realizirani izvedbi poučevanja osmošolcev s strani devetošolcev, ideološki vidik gotovo ne bi umanjkal.

Čeprav o tem zgolj na podlagi učne priprave ni mogoče povedati ničesar konkretnjšega, je smiselno opozoriti na učinek, ki ga podelitev navidezne avtoritete samodejno proizvede: učenci, ki jim je podeljena, so prisiljeni v delovanje, ki ga praviloma začnejo utemeljevati iz samih sebe, na podlagi svojih pogledov in stališč. Če se morda s tem delovanjem ne strinjajo, po opravljeni nalogi obstaja veliko večja verjetnost, da se bodo.

Podoba učitelja v besedilu – prepričevanje z ethosom

Do sedaj je pričujoča analiza učne priprave obravnavala dva od treh načinov prepričevanja, kot jih definira retorika: *logos* (v pripravi le v manjši meri) in *pathos* (v pripravi izrazito poudarjen). Vendarle v besedilu ne umanjka tretji vidik prepričevanja, *ethos*, čeprav je zgolj impliciten in ga je treba rekonstruirati. *Ethos* po Aristotelu predstavlja prepričevanje s sklicevanjem na značilnosti govorca, kot se vzpostavi skozi besedilo. *Ethos* tvorijo trije vidiki: *phrónesis* (govorec se vzpostavi kot tisti, ki ve, ki se spozna na obravnavano tematiko, ki je zdravorazumski), *aréte* (blagohotnost, vtis odkritosti, ki ne zavaja) in *eunoía* (govornik se vzpostavi kot občinstvu simpatičen in z njim vzpostavi zaupljivost). Izhajajoč iz te delitve se najprej vrnimo k že omenjenemu zamolčanju morebitne problematizacije ali nestrinjanja, torej zamolčanju omembe *stásis*: lahko bi rekli, da gre za kršitev načela *aréte*, saj izjavitelj (učitelj) z občinstvom (učenci) ni odkrit v razčlenjevanju obravnavane teme, svojo pozicijo predstavi za edino možno in neproblematično, kljub temu da skozi celotno besedilo stremi k doseganju cilja, da bi jo učenci razumeli in jo ponotranjili kot sprejemljivo. A to je mogoče skleniti le skozi retorično analizo, ki pokaže, da v besedilu vendarle gre za željo po vzpostavljanju sprejemanja v njem opredeljenega stališča s strani občinstva. Z vidika učenca, če ta le ni že seznanjen s stališči, ki v pripravi predstavljena stališča problematizirajo, kršitev načela ni zaznana, s tem pa ne doseže podobe učitelja, ki bi negativno učinkovala na sprejemljivost teze. Nasprotno se z napovedjo učnih ciljev v uvodnem delu ure učitelj vzpostavi kot tak, ki proces (vsaj navidez) vodi transparentno. Kljub temu da je ta videz lažen, pri občinstvu lahko doseže retoričen učinek zaupanja. Vzpostavljanje *aréte* z napovedjo učnih ciljev, kar je postala ena od norm sodobnega pedagoškega diskurza, tako doseže vzpostavitev oblastnega razmerja do učencev in prispeva k učinkovitejšemu doseganju cilja prepričevalnega procesa – učenčevemu razumevanju in sprejemanju izjavljenih stališč. Kritičnost učencev, ki naj jo takšna praksa spodbuja, je tako očitno zgolj navidezna in v funkciji sprejemanja enega pogleda kot samoumevnega. Po drugi strani že samo dejstvo, da učno pripravo vodi učitelj, za katerega institucionalni okvir zahteva določeno izobrazbo in se zanj predpostavlja, da »ve«, prepričuje učence tudi z vidikom *phronésis*, saj se zdi, da nimajo razloga, da bi v povedano dvomili.

Sklep

Skleniti je mogoče, da izjavitelj skozi *logos* (krožno sklepanje, utemeljeno samo v sebi) oz. pomanjkanje le-tega, *pathos* (pokroviteljsko ironizacijo ali viktimizacijo) in *ethos* (*arête* z zamolčanjem dvoma in institucionalizirano predpostavljane avtoritete – *phronésis*) proces prepričevanja vodi od prepoznanja učencev s pripadnostjo zamišljeni skupnosti nosilcev človekovih pravic kot samoumevnih in utemeljenih na naravni danosti in vzpostavlja joče brezčasen »raj na zemlji«, prek distanciranja te skupnosti od tistih, ki so jim pravice kršene, ki pa so potisnjeni v geografsko in časovno oddaljenost od »normalnega stanja« »harmonije«, do končnega razumevanja in sprejemanja utemeljevalnega procesa skozi njegovo lastno, na videz samostojno ubeseditev. Interpelacija učencev v »zaželeno« občinstvo, ki »zna obsoditi kršenje človekovih pravic«, tako doseže postavljeni cilj oziroma tezo prepričevanja. Enakega procesa interpelacije je deležen učitelj, ki se tako kot učenci vzpostavi kot nosilec človekovih pravic. A možnosti razumevanja, reflektiranja in argumentiranja trditve, ki predstavlja glavno tezo prepričevanja v obravnavani učni pripravi, slednja ni zagotovila, nasprotno, na vsakem koraku si je prizadevala za njihovo nemožnost. In če je res, da je vsak pedagoški proces obenem nasilen proces vzpostavljanja oblastnega razmerja, skozi katero se konstituira »zaželeni« učenec, je treba izpostaviti, da doseganje enega cilja »za vsako ceno« lahko (in v tem primeru tudi res) pomeni spregledanje številnih drugih sprejetih ciljev, kot so razvijanje učenčevih zmožnosti argumentiranja, kritičnega mišljenja, samostojnega razmišljanja ipd. Nasprotno, kot je bilo prikazano v pričujoči analizi, ti zadnji cilji prej lahko služijo kot še dodatni momenti vzpostavljanja oblastnega razmerja in orodja podreditve učencev določenemu stališču.

Pričujoča analiza učne priprave, ki sledi retoričnemu pristopu, se osredini na točko interpelacije, ki občinstvo skozi prepoznanje interpelira v »zaželeno«. Uporaba koncepta interpelacije, menim, omogoča globlji vpogled v učinkovanje besedila na svoje občinstvo, namreč razumevanje, na kakšen način besedilo šele konstituira občinstvo. S takšnim pristopom je mogoče analizirati performativno in konstituirajočo moč besedila, ki učence šele vzpostavi kot vselej-že subjekte človekovih pravic. Šele z razumevanjem tako občinstva kot izjavitelja (v obravnavanem primeru učencev in učitelja) kot vzpostavljaljajočih se skozi proces prepričevanja, ki ga vzpostavlja besedilo učne priprave, je mogoče ostati na retoričnem pojmovanju relacijske prepletenosti *logosa*, *pathosa* in *ethosa* ter razumeti njihovo preoblikovanje skozi učinkovanje enega na drugega med celotnim procesom prepričevanja.

Pri tem velja znova poudariti, da pričujoča raziskava, ki se omejuje na en sam primer učne priprave, le težko ponuja širši vpogled v procese

interpelacije skozi jezikovno rabo v pedagoškem procesu na splošno, zato je kakršnokoli posploševanje njenih sklepov nemogoče. Prav tako nemožnost spremljanja jezikovne rabe skozi dejansko izvedbo učne ure, za katero je bila priprava narejena, močno omejuje samo analizo, ki ne more upoštevati morebitnih drugačnih jezikovnih rab in vsebinskih poudarkov učitelja/učiteljice. Kljub temu omogoča prepoznavanje nekaterih problematičnih procesov interpelacije, ki so splošnejši in jih je mogoče identificirati tudi v širšem javnem diskurzu, denimo naturalizacija človekovih pravic, vzpostavljanje vrednostne distance do tistih, ki jih nimajo, viktimizacija itd. Problematičnost takšnih procesov ni v tem, da učitelji oz. učiteljice poskušajo dosegati v učnem načrtu predpisane vzgojne cilje – ideološkost in vzgojnost sta namreč po definiciji nujni in inherentni lastnosti vsakega vzgojno-izobraževalnega sistema, katerega temeljna funkcija je reproduciranje dane družbe in zatorej subverziranja slednje ni mogoče pričakovati znotraj njenih institucij. Problematičnost tu izpostavljam z vidika procesov jezikovnih rab, ki dosegajo nepredvidene, neeksplicirane in pogosto kontradiktorne učinke. Z razumevanjem le-teh se nato lahko nakaže razpoka, inherentna sami ideološki tvorbi človekovih pravic, ki s sklicevanjem na univerzalnost reproducira kapitalistične razredne odnose in načine izključevanja (glej Balibar, 2007). Tako torej ni zadostno vprašanje, *čigavo* je »uradno znanje« v kurikulumih (prim. Apple in Christian-Smith, 1991), temveč si je treba zastaviti tudi vprašanje, *na kakšen način je ubesedeno*.

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DELEŽNIKI SLOVENSKE GLASBENE INDUSTRIJE V KRIZNIH RAZMERAH**

Povzetek. Izbruh pandemije COVID-19 je povzročil hitre in dramatične spremembe v globalnem družbenem in kulturnem življenju. Tudi deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije niso ostali imuni. S pomočjo ankete, izvedene v tretjem četrtletju leta 2022, smo preučili zaznane negativne učinke krize v tej veji gospodarstva. Po čiščenju podatkovna baza vključuje 126 anketirancev. Neodvisne spremenljivke nastalega regresijskega modela so: zaznana podpora države, stopnja proaktivnosti, lokus kontrole, zadovoljstvo s poklicem in stopnja uporabe opojnih substanc. Rezultati so omogočili potrditev večine postavljenih hipotez in odprli nekatera vprašanja za potencialne raziskave te pogosto zanemarjene veje kreativne industrije.

Ključni pojmi: COVID-19, glasbena industrija, podpora države, proaktivnost, lokus kontrole, zadovoljstvo, Slovenija

Uvod

Marca 2020 je svet začel izvajati obsežne preventivne ukrepe proti širjenju nove koronavirusne bolezni z omejitvami potovanj, karantenami in omejitvami družabnih srečanj. Posledica teh omejitev je bilo takojšnje zaprtje številnih dejavnosti, vključno s koncertnimi in drugimi glasbenimi prizorišči. To je imelo takojšnje posledice za tiste izvajalce, ki se pretežno preživljajo z glasbo. Pandemija COVID-19 je povzročila nepopravljivo in dolgoročno škodo številnim industrijam, vključno z glasbeno industrijo. Mnogi so se znašli v položaju, ko so poleg negativnih čustvenih posledic doživeli znatne finančne izgube (Messick, 2021) in negotovost. Negotovost, ki je subjektivno razumljena kot ogrožajoča in stresna, človeku onemogoča ohranjanje nadzora in vodi do neprilagojenih psiholoških reakcij in anksioznosti (Özmete in Pak, 2020). Podobno kakor drugi so se tudi deležniki glasbene industrije v takšnih okoliščinah znašli v času pandemije covid-19.

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** Izvirni znanstveni članek.

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Moteče je bilo predvsem sprejemanje ukrepov: od popolnega zapiranja do odpiranja javnega življenja, kar je onemogočalo dolgoročno načrtovanje. Vsak se je reševanja finančnih in osebnih težav loteval po svoje. V enem od prejšnjih prispevkov smo raziskovali, kakšne pomoči so bili deležni. Tudi statistika osebnih stečajev glasbenikov govori sama zase. Tisti glasbeniki, ki so želeli preživeti, pa so morali spremeniti svojo dejavnost. Tako so bili na boljšem tisti, ki se z glasbo ne ukvarjajo profesionalno, ampak so zaposleni in jim ukvarjanje z glasbo pomeni dodatni vir zaslužka (Raspor idr., 2022).

S člankom želimo raziskati, kako so deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije doživljali zaprtje javnega življenja in prepoved koncertnega glasbenega udejstvovanja v času pandemije COVID-19.

Teoretično ozadje z izpeljavo hipotez

Pandemijo COVID-19 lahko štejemo za krizo, ki je prizadela največjo populacijo na svetu doslej. Predhodne pandemije (npr. španska gripa) so prizadele manjše skupine ljudi, saj je leta 1918 živelo le 1,8 milijarde ljudi, leta 2020 pa že 7,8 milijarde ljudi. Zato je zaprtje javnega življenja povzročilo gospodarsko in socialno krizo. Kriza je opredeljena kot obdobje psihološkega neravnovesja, ki se pojavi kot posledica grožnje ali dogodka, ki nakažuje velik problem, ki ga ni mogoče rešiti z znanimi strategijami obvladovanja (Özmete & Pak, 2020). In prav takemu neravnovesju smo bili priča med letoma 2020 in 2023.

Študija temelji na predpostavki, da pri profesionalnih glasbenikih spoprijemanje z negotovostjo in gospodarskimi težavami – pod vplivom različnih dejavnikov, povezanih s pandemijo – lahko pozitivno ali negativno vpliva na motivacijo glasbenikov (López-Íñiguez idr., 2022), na njihovo osebno in glasbeno udejstvovanje.

Organizacije in vladne agencije bi morale zagotavljati glasbenikom podporo, kadar so koncerti zaradi zaprtja odpovedani. Oblike podpore ne bi smele zadostovati samo za zagotavljanje osnovnih potreb (npr. hrane in namestitve), temveč tudi za ohranjanje glasbenikove (samo)motivacije – s ciljem zagotavljanja (1) odpornosti in spoprijemanja ter (2) zadovoljstva in osnovnih psiholoških potreb (López-Íñiguez idr., 2022). Predvsem pa bi morala biti podpora usmerjena v ohranjanje dejavnosti.

Kako je pandemija COVID-19 vplivala na glasbeno industrijo

V literaturi zasledimo uporabo različnih, med seboj močno povezanih izrazov ali sopomenk: kreativna ekonomija, kreativne industrije, kulturne industrije, kreativne in kulturne industrije (KKI), v zadnjem času pa se v EU vedno bolj uveljavlja poimenovanje kulturni in kreativni sektor (KKS).

Poleg vseh že omenjenih izrazov v Sloveniji v zvezi z njimi zasledimo še dodatne različice, ki sicer izvirajo zgolj iz različnih prevodov oz. naklonjenosti avtorjev do uporabe tujk (kreativni/ustvarjalni) (Murovec idr., 2020). Z razvojem dejavnosti pa se je prijela raba kulturne in kreativne industrije, pri čemer se angleška beseda »creative« enkrat prevaja kot kreativno, drugič pa kot ustvarjalno. Breznikova navaja, da lahko brez zadržka uporabljamo oboje (Breznik idr., 2011).

Na splošno bi lahko opredelili, da termin »glasbena industrija« vključuje vse, kar je povezano z glasbo. Glasbena industrija je glavni posrednik med glasbo (avtorjem) in potrošnikom (Kretschmer idr., 2001). Širše so deležniki te panoge predstavljeni na Sliki 1.

Z razglasitvijo pandemije COVID-19 je bila v večini držav razglašena prepoved javnih zbiranj. To je privedlo do takojšnje prekinitve delovanja koncertnih prizorišč in glasbenih festivalov, odpovedi nastopov in koncertnih turnej, zaprtja glasbenih trgovin ter številnih drugih ekonomskih dejavnosti, ki jih obsega glasbena industrija. V negotovosti so se znašli posamezniki številnih poklicev, ki sestavljajo glasbeno panogo, od skladateljev, glasbenikov, besedilopiscev, glasbenih učiteljev, dirigentov, glasbenih menedžerjev in agentov do založnikov, distributerjev, organizatorjev festivalov in koncertov, zvočnih in lučnih tehnikov, redarskih služb in številnega drugega storitvenega osebja, ki je povezano s to razvejeno in pomembno svetovno gospodarsko panogo (Matoz, 2020).

Slika 1: DELEŽNIKI GLASBENE INDUSTRIJE

IZDELAVA AVDIA IN VIDEA		POSREDNIŠTVO AVDIO IN VIDEO NOSILCEV	POSREDNIŠTVO ŽIVE GLASBE	
MENADŽER GLASBENEGA IZVAJALCA				
USTVARJALCI: (Skladatelji, ekspozisce)	IZVAJALCI: • Glasbeniki • Pevci	ZALOŽNIK/SAMOZALOŽNIK - GLASBENA ZALOŽBA • ZASTOPANJE PRAVIC • PROIZVODNJA • TRŽENJE • Marketinški menager, • Stiki z javnostmi • DISTRIBUCIJA • Komericalist	DISTRIBUCIJA GLASBENEGA DOGODKA • BOOKING AGENCIJE • ORGANIZACIJA KONCERTOV IN TURNEJ • PRODAJA VSTOPNIC	
	AUDIO PRODUKCIJA: • Producent • Tonski mojster/tehnik • Končni oblikovalec zvoka "mastering"	PRODAJA FIZIČNIH NOSILCEV GLASBE IN PRETOČNIH VSEBIN (Plošče, kasete, CD, DVD, MP3) • VELEPRODAJA • MALOPRODAJA	PRIZORIŠČA GLASBENIH DOGODKOV • KONCERTNA DVORANA • DISKOTEKA • KLUB • "OPEN AIR" FESTIVAL • STADIONI	
	VIDEO PRODUKCIJA: • Producent • Režiser • Direktor fotografije • SNELMALNA EKIPA: • Glavni organizator • Kamerman • Scenograf • Diajter • Masker • Kostumograf • Montažer	BREZPLAČNE PRETOČNE VSEBINE PREDVAJANJE • RADIO • TV • SPLET • SOCIALNA OMREŽJA • REKLAME • FILMI • APLIKACIJE	IZVEDBA DOGODKA • Glasbeni izvajalci • Menedžment dogodka - organizator • Tonski mojster/tehnik • Odrski delavci • Varnostniki • Gostinci • drugi	
		ZAŠČITA PRAVIC AVTORJEV IN IZVAJALCEV - AGENCIJE Avtorske in sorodne, Izvajalske, Predvajalske		POTROŠNIKI: (kupec, poslušalec)
		PROMOCIJA TV, Radio, Tisk, Reklamni panoji, Splet, Socialna omrežja,		
	REZULTAT • Zvočni proizvod (fonogram) • Video proizvod (video)	REZULTAT • Prodana glasba ali video	REZULTAT • Glasbeni dogodek	

Vir: avtorjevo delo.

Vendar pa vsi deležniki glasbene industrije niso bili enako prikrajšani. Dejstvo je, da so lahko nekateri nemoteno poslovali. Skladatelji, besedilopisci, založniki, izdajatelji fonogramov in pretočnih spletnih vsebin (glasba) so v času pandemije zaslužili celo več kot prej. Glasbeni agenti so omejeno poslovali, saj ni bilo organizacije dogodkov. Drugi so se lahko odločili za alternativne oblike poslovanja, predvsem z izvedbo in prodajo po spletu (prodaja, poslušalci, glasbeniki). Nekateri pa so bili praktično brez prihodkov (koncerti, diskoteke, tonski in lučni tehniki) celi dve leti. Zaradi tega so se številni selili v druge dejavnosti.

Kriza

Kriza lahko nastopi v obliki nevarnega dogodka ali niza zaporednih stresnih dogodkov, ki hitro povzročijo kumulativni učinek. Slatter¹ (1984: 14) meni, da simptome krize največkrat prepoznavamo s finančnimi kazalci, poleg teh uporabljamo tudi nefinančne pokazatelje. V akutni fazi lahko ljudje, ki doživijo krizo, pokažejo reakcije, kot so zanikanje, zmedenost, jeza, strah, tesnoba, umik ali žalovanje (Mirabito, 2017; Yeager in Roberts, 2015). Negotovost zaradi pandemije COVID-19 je bila lahko grozeča, stresna in alarmantna. Strah pred neznanim pri posamezniku lahko povzroči odsotnost informacij na kateri koli ravni zavesti ali na točki obdelave. Negotovost povzroča strah zaradi zaznave trenutne bližnje grožnje in tesnobo zaradi zaznave, da se negotovost nadaljuje in lahko povzroči negativne dogodke. Negotovost preprečuje posameznikovo ohranjanje nadzora in vodi do neprilagojenih psiholoških reakcij (Bomyea idr., 2015). Tako lahko negotovost in težnja po izogibanju negotovim situacijam igrata osrednjo vlogo pri razvoju in vzdrževanju duševnih bolezni, zlasti anksioznih motenj. To dokazujejo številne študije (Carleton, 2012; Gu idr., 2020; Shihata idr., 2017).

Zaznani negativni vpliv COVID-19

Pandemija COVID-19 je na različne načine negativno vplivala na posameznike. Eno glavnih področij, ki vzbujajo skrb, je vpliv na duševno zdravje. Študije so pokazale, da je izbruh COVID-19 povzročil povečano psihološko stisko, depresijo, anksioznost in stres med posamezniki (Hamouche, 2020). Dojemanje varnosti, grožnja in tveganje okužbe, debelost, karantena in zaprtje, stigma, socialna izključenost, finančna izguba in negotovost zaposlitve so zgolj nekateri med negativnimi učinki pandemije (Hamouche, 2020). Poleg tega sta bili socialna izolacija in osamljenost opredeljeni kot

¹ *Gre sicer za nekoliko starejši vir, a je glede na njegov doprinos k diskurzu kriznega menedžmenta še danes zelo aktualen.*

pomembna zdravstvena izida, ki vplivata zlasti na starejše odrasle (Wu, 2020). Pandemija je prekinila družbene povezave in omejila možnosti za socialno interakcijo, kar je škodljivo učinkovalo na dobro počutje (Wu, 2020). Na splošno negativni vpliv COVID-19 na duševno zdravje posameznikov in njihovo socialno blaginjo izpostavlja potrebo po intervencijah in podpori za ublažitev teh učinkov.

Stopnja zaznane podpore države

Čeprav se na prvi pogled zdi, da je država izdala več prepovedi, ki so omejevali javno življenje, pa je bilo tudi precej pomoči, namenjene različnim skupinam. Tako so bili ukrepi, namenjeni omejevanju socialnih stikov (zbiranja ljudi, ustavljen potniški promet): na mejah; na področju zdravstva; v vzgojno-izobraževalnih ustanovah; v delovnih okoljih; v upravnih enotah in pravosodju; v zavodih za prestajanje kazni; domovih za ostarele. Posledično so organizacije organizirale delo od doma, prav tako je potekalo od doma tudi šolanje.

Vlada je sprejela več protikoronskih zakonov, s katerimi je urejala status zaposlenih in samozaposlenih. Tako so bile različne skupine deležne različnih pomoči ali nadomestil za odsotnost z dela zaradi okužbe. Samozaposleni in zaposleni so bili lahko upravičeni do pomoči glede na njihov status. V prednosti so vsekakor bili tisti, ki so bili ob nastopu COVID-19 stoodstotno zaposleni za nedoločeni čas. Na drugi strani pa so bili na najslabšem tisti, ki so delno zaposleni, delno pa samozaposleni. Samozaposleni so koristili del subvencij, a ker dejansko niso imeli prihodkov, so živeli od prihrankov. Nekateri pa so kasneje zaprli svoje s.p.-je ali celo šli v osebni stečaj (Raspor idr., 2022).

Družbena in državna podpora igrata osrednjo vlogo pri trajnostnem razvoju glasbene industrije. Ta podpora ima lahko različne oblike: od finančne podpore in sistemskih ukrepov do zagotavljanja potrebne infrastrukture. Cilj državne podpore je – poleg stimulacije ekonomske aktivnosti – pospešiti rast glasbene industrije in promovirati kulturno različnost. Eden od ključnih načinov, kako vlade podpirajo glasbeno industrijo, je finančna pomoč. Le-ta lahko vključuje nepovratna sredstva, subvencije in programe financiranja, ki zagotavljajo finančna sredstva glasbenikom, glasbenim organizacijam in glasbenim dogodkom. Na Novi Zelandiji je vlada na primer uvedla močne podporne ukrepe za glasbeno industrijo. Ustanovitev agencije za financiranje oddajanja glasbenih prizorišč »New Zealand On Air«, ki jo financira vlada, je povzročila povečano zanimanje za lokalne ustvarjalce. Podobno so bile v Kolumbiji izvedene javne politike za izboljšanje virov in zmogljivosti glasbenega sektorja, da bi tako povečali razvoj glasbenih grozdov (Gómez-Reyes idr., 2021).

Državna podpora se širi tudi na področji promocije in trženja lokalne glasbe. V nekaterih primerih vlade radijskim mrežam, ki se osredinijo na promocijo lokalne glasbe, zagotovijo brezplačen oddajni spekter in znatna sredstva (Mollgaard, 2018). Takšna podpora pomaga izpostaviti glasbenike, in tako ustvariti priložnosti, da dosežejo širše občinstvo. Denar pa kroži znotraj lokalne ekonomije.

Poleg finančne pomoči imajo vlade na voljo tudi oblikovanje politik in predpisov, ki koristijo ali škodijo glasbeni industriji. Ministrstvo za medije, kulturo in šport (DCMS) v Združenem kraljestvu je na primer objavilo poročilo, ki analizira glasbeni sektor in predlaga strategije za inovacije in rast (Cluley, 2009). Ob tem je pomembno upoštevati, da se lahko učinkovitost teh politik razlikuje. V nekaterih primerih lahko politike spregledajo dejanske potrebe glasbene produkcije in ne uspejo učinkovito podpreti malih producentov (Cluley, 2009). Zato je ključnega pomena, da vlade pri oblikovanju politik upoštevajo različne potrebe in izzive celotnega spektra deležnikov glasbene industrije.

Poleg tega lahko vlade podpirajo glasbeno industrijo z vlaganjem v infrastrukturo in ustvarjanjem ugodnih razmer za dejavnosti, povezane z glasbo. To lahko vključuje razvoj glasbenih prizorišč, prostorov za vaje in snemalnih studiev. Z zagotavljanjem potrebne infrastrukture vlade olajšajo rast glasbene industrije in ustvarijo ugodno okolje za uspeh glasbenikov. Vendar je pomembno zagotoviti, da so te naložbe pravično porazdeljene po različnih regijah, da bi spodbudili vključenost in dostopnost vseh.

Državna podpora glasbeni industriji pa ni omejena zgolj na finančno pomoč in razvoj infrastrukture. Vključuje tudi vzpostavljanje partnerstev in sodelovanja med vladnimi agencijami, glasbeno industrijo in drugimi zainteresiranimi stranmi. Ta partnerstva pomagajo spodbujati sodelovanje, izmenjavo znanj in združevanje virov (Mollgaard, 2018).

Kljub pomenu državne podpore je treba opozoriti, da obstajajo izzivi in omejitve. Eden od pomembnih izzivov je pomanjkanje političnih zmogljivosti in sredstev za učinkovito podporo glasbeni industriji. V nekaterih primerih ekonomski pomen glasbene industrije za družbo morda ni dovolj pomemben, da bi lahko utemeljili podporo politike, zato je treba upoštevati še druge dejavnike, kot sta kulturni pomen in družbeni vpliv (Spence, 2019: 45–60). Poleg tega lahko na učinkovitost vladne podpore vplivajo politični in gospodarski dejavniki ter specifične značilnosti glasbene industrije v posamezni državi. Če povzamemo, vladna podpora glasbeni industriji in glasbenikom igra ključno vlogo pri trajnostnem razvoju. Na podlagi navedenega smo izpeljali prvo hipotezo: **H1: Več je zaznane podpore države, manj je zaznanih negativnih učinkov pandemije COVID-19.**

Proaktivno vedenje posameznika v krizi

Proaktivno vedenje posameznika v kritičnih situacijah je ključen vidik osebnega in poklicnega razvoja. Proaktivnost omogoča posameznikom, da prevzamejo pobudo, predvidevajo izzive in prispevajo k lastnemu napredovanju (Zhang idr., 2016: 241–256). Vključuje vedenje, kot so prevzemanje odgovornosti, individualna inovativnost in preprečevanje težav (Cheah idr., 2021: 95–102). Raziskave so pokazale, da na posameznikovo stopnjo proaktivnosti vplivajo različni dejavniki, vključno z intenzivnostjo osebne nostalgije. Ugotovljeno je bilo, da višje stopnje osebne nostalgije pomembno vplivajo na kognitivne reakcije, stališča in namere (Marchegiani in Phau, 2010: 241–256). Zato lahko posamezniki izkoristijo svojo nostalgijo za izboljšanje svojega proaktivnega vedenja v kritičnih situacijah. Vendar je pomembno omeniti, da je bila osebna nostalgija v referenčni študiji preučena le v eni kategoriji aktivnosti, zaradi česar avtorji pozivajo k nadaljnjim raziskavam tega področja (Marchegiani in Phau, 2010: 241–256). Na podlagi navedenega smo izpeljali svojo drugo hipotezo: **H2: Bolj je posameznik proaktiven, manj je zaznanih negativnih učinkov pandemije COVID-19.**

Nadzor kontrole vedenja posameznika

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Mesto (lokus) nadzora se nanaša na prepričanje, da so dogodki in rezultati bodisi pod posameznikovim nadzorom (notranji lokus) bodisi jih določajo zunanji dejavniki (zunanji lokus) (Ajzen, 2011). Posamezniki z notranjim lokusom nadzora so običajno bolj (samo)učinkoviti in bolj prilagodljivi, medtem ko lahko tisti z zunanjim lokusom nadzora kažejo pasivnost in naučeno nemoč (Ajzen, 2002). Na koncept mesta nadzora vpliva osebna in družbena identiteta posameznika, pri čemer je osebna identiteta povezana z notranjim lokusom nadzora, družbena identiteta pa z zunanjim (Galvin idr., 2018). Kar zadeva na primer akademski uspeh, so raziskave pokazale, da je notranji lokus nadzora povezan z višjo akademsko uspešnostjo (Leung, 2001). Na podlagi navedenega smo izpeljali svojo tretjo hipotezo: **H3: Višja je stopnja notranjega lokusa kontrole, manj je zaznanih negativnih učinkov pandemije COVID-19.**

Zadovoljstvo s poklicem

Na zadovoljstvo glasbenikov pri delu lahko vplivajo različni dejavniki. Študija je pokazala, da so profesionalni glasbeniki, ki so dosegli svojo sanjsko službo in nastopajo v profesionalnem orkestru, izrazili relativno nizko stopnjo zadovoljstva pri delu (Dobrow, 2013). Takšno, nekoliko nepričakovano ugotovitev bi lahko pripisali mehanizmom, kot so izgorelost,

dolgočasnost ali spreminjanje vrednot in prioritet skozi čas. Druga študija je poudarila pomen ravnotežja med poklicnim in zasebnim življenjem, posebnih glasbenih veščin, možnosti odločanja o sebi, dolgoročnih kariernih ciljev in razvoja glasbene identitete za povečanje zadovoljstva v karieri (López-Íñiguez in Bennett, 2021). Interakcijski model zadovoljstva z delom nakazuje, da ima skladnost med značilnostmi poklica ter sposobnostmi in potrebami nosilca zaposlitve vpliv na zadovoljstvo posameznika (Lepojevic idr., 2018). Na splošno lahko razumevanje in raziskava teh dejavnikov pripomoreta k izboljšanju ravni zadovoljstva in dobrega počutja glasbenikov pri delu, zato se četrta hipoteza glasi: **H4: Bolj je posameznik zadovoljen s svojim poklicem, manj je zaznanih negativnih učinkov pandemije COVID-19.**

Povečana poraba opojnih substanc

Pandemija COVID-19 je močno vplivala na uporabo opojnih substanc (alkohola, zdravil in mamil) in duševno zdravje. Študije so pokazale, da sta se med pandemijo znatno povečali uporaba in zloraba substanc (Taylor idr., 2021). Omenjena študija poroča o uporabi substanc kot načinu obvladovanja tesnobe, povezane s COVID-19. Občutek osamljenosti, ki ga je pandemija okrepila, je bil povezan z višjo stopnjo izraženosti simptomov slabšega duševnega zdravja in uživanjem substanc (Horigian idr., 2021). Gospodarska kriza in izguba dela med pandemijo sta bila prav tako opredeljeni kot dejavnika tveganja za zlorabo substanc (Lawson idr., 2020). Mladostniki so med pandemijo poročali o spremembah v uživanju substanc, konfliktih s starši in slabšem nadzoru nad svojim vsakdanjikom (Kapetanovic idr., 2021). Te ugotovitve poudarjajo potrebo po preventivnih in intervencijskih strategijah za obravnavo povečane uporabe substanc in izzivov duševnega zdravja med krizo zaradi COVID-19 in jih poskušamo preveriti v peti hipotezi: **H5: Višja je posameznikova poraba opojnih substanc, več je zaznanih negativnih učinkov pandemije COVID-19.**

Metodologija

Za testiranje postavljenih hipotez smo uporabili linearni regresijski model. V modelu je poleg odvisne spremenljivke še pet neodvisnih spremenljivk: zaznana podpora države, stopnja proaktivnosti anketiranca, stopnja internega lokusa kontrole, zadovoljstvo s svojim poklicem in stopnja povečanja uporabe opojnih substanc. Naštetim in v teoretičnem delu utemeljenim neodvisnim spremenljivkam smo dodali še dve dihomični spremenljivki. To sta spol in prejeta pomoč države. Zanima nas namreč, ali bomo zaznali razliko med spoloma pri obravnavanem vprašanju. Poleg tega smo v model umestili tudi podatek, ali je anketiranec od države prejel pomoč. Z

izjemo zadnjih dveh spremenljivk so vse spremenljivke zajete s predhodno znanstveno potrjenimi Likertovimi lestvicami. Na vseh lestvicah smo preverili verjetnost pojava multikolinearnosti z izračunom VIF (variance inflation factor), ki v nobenem primeru ne presega vrednosti 2, kar je daleč pod teoretično določeno zgornjo mejo 10 (Flury idr., 1988).

Vzorec

Našo populacijo predstavljajo deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije v tretjem četrtletju leta 2022. Vzorec po čiščenju podatkovne baze vsebuje 126 deležnikov glasbene industrije. Naključnost vzorca temelji na spletnem anketiranju, ki je v zadnjih desetletjih sprejeto kot dovolj zanesljivo orodje pri vprašanju zagotovitve naključnosti vzorca. Dodatno smo za naključnost poskrbeli tako, da smo informacijo o raziskavi s prošnjo za sodelovanje hkrati posredovali širokemu naboru komunikacijskih kanalov, ki so redno v stiku z deležniki glasbene industrije. Prav tako so v raziskavi vključeni prav vsi deležniki, torej glasbeniki in tudi tehnično osebje (tonski tehniki), producenti, organizatorji in managerji. Bolj natančno strukturo vzorca prikazuje Tabela 1. V vzorcu prevladujejo ženske z 59,6%. Iz tabele razberemo, da je med krizo 36,2% vprašanih razmišljalo o opustitvi kariere v glasbeni industriji. 67,3% vseh sodelujočih v anketi je poleg udeleževanja v glasbeni industriji tudi redno zaposlenih, 21,7% pa jih ima status samostojnega kulturnega delavca. Med vsemi anketiranci jih je 30,3% prejelo neko obliko državne pomoči.

Tabela 1: STRUKTURA VZORCA

Struktura vzorca	Razmišljal o menjavi kariere	Redno zaposlen	Samozaposlen v kulturi	Prejel državno pomoč	Struktura vzorca	Spol
DA	36,2	67,3	21,7	30,3	Moški	40,4
NE	63,8	32,7	78,3	69,7	Ženske	59,6

Vir: avtorjeva raziskava.

Spremenljivke

Odvisna spremenljivka modela je zaznani negativni učinek pandemije COVID-19. Vrednost smo zajeli s petimi vprašanji, na katera so anketiranci odgovorili tako, da so obkrožili izbrane vrednosti na petstopenjski Likertovi lestvici. Anketirance smo prosili, naj ocenijo negativni učinek krize na njihovo finančno situacijo, občutek gotovosti, samozaupanje, psihološko ravnesje in družinske odnose.

Naše neodvisne spremenljivke so: podpora države, proaktivnost posameznika, stopnja internega lokusa kontrole, zadovoljstvo s poklicem v okviru glasbene industrije in zaznana stopnja povečanja uporabe opojnih substanc med krizo. Za zajem osebnostnih lastnosti anketiranih posameznikov smo uporabil znanstveno preizkušene petstopenjske Likertove lestvice. Stopnjo zaznane podpore države pri posameznikovem udejstvovanju smo zajeli z Likertovo lestvico, sestavljeno iz šestih vprašanj (Eisenberger idr., 2001). Stopnjo proaktivnosti posameznika smo zajeli z desetimi vprašanji, ki smo jih preverili v predhodnih raziskavah (Bateman & Crant, 1993). S stopnjo internega lokusa kontrole smo zajeli posameznikovo dojetje nadzora na svojimi odločitvami. Višja stopnja lokusa kontrole pomeni višjo stopnjo zaznanega nadzora na svojimi odločitvami in življenjem kot takšnim (Levenson, 1973). Zadovoljstvo s svojim poklicem smo merili z lestvico, sestavljeno iz petih vprašanj (Agho idr., 1992). Gre za skrajšano lestvico, ki v prvotni izvedbi vsebuje 18 vprašanj (Wall idr., 1981). Glede uporabe opojnih substanc so anketiranci odgovorili na vprašanja o zaznani lastni povečani porabi alkohola, tablet ali drugih opojnih sredstev v obdobju krize.

Poleg navedenih sta med spremenljivke uvrščeni dve dihomični spremenljivki, in sicer spol (moški/ženski) ter odgovor na vprašanje, ali so anketiranci v času krize od države prejeli finančno pomoč v kakršni koli obliki (da/ne).

Rezultati in diskusija

V Tabeli 2 podajamo rezultate korelacijske analize spremenljivk. Ugotovili smo, da med neodvisnimi spremenljivkami ni velikih korelacij, kar potrjuje pričakovanja, da ni pričakovati težav zaradi morebitne multikolinearnosti.

V nadaljevanju Tabela 3 prikazuje rezultate osrednjega dela analize, regresijskega modela. Neodvisna spremenljivka modela je s strani anketirance zaznana stopnja negativnih učinkov krize zaradi COVID-19 na posameznika.

Rezultati so pokazali, da višja stopnja zaznane podpore države posamezniku in njegovemu delu pomeni nižjo stopnjo zaznave negativnih učinkov krize. Regresijski koeficient je v tem delu statistično značilen ($p = 0,028$). Hipotezo H1 na tej podlagi potrdimo. Naše ugotovitve so v tem delu skladne s pričakovanji in dosedanjimi raziskavami, ki krizo povezujejo z negotovostjo in težnjo posameznika, da se ji zaradi tega izogiba (Anderson, 2017). Višja stopnja podpore države namreč zmanjša zaznano stopnjo ogroženosti pri posamezniku (Hamouche, 2020). Sklepamo lahko, da je zelo pomembno, da država prepozna pomembnost in vlogo posameznih deležnikov glasbene industrije. Predvsem je pomembno, da se vsak deležnik v glasbeni industriji zaveda takšne podpore države in sprejetosti v družbi, in

Tabela 2: KORELACIJSKI KOEFICIEN TI

	Zaznani negativni vpliv COVID-19	Podpora države	Pro-aktivnost	Interni lokus kontrole	Zadovoljstvo s poklicem	Povečana uporaba substanc	Spol (M=1)	Dobili državno pomoč
Korelacijski koeficient	Zaznani negativni vpliv COVID-19	-0,315	0,227	-0,254	-0,219	0,403	-0,088	0,232
	Podpora države	1,000	-0,137	0,186	0,132	-0,245	-0,054	0,036
	Proaktivnost	0,227	-0,137	1,000	0,351	0,205	-0,004	-0,154
	kontrole	-0,254	0,186	0,351	1,000	0,346	-0,431	-0,158
	Zadovoljstvo s poklicem	-0,219	0,132	0,205	0,346	1,000	-0,166	0,049
	Povečana uporaba substanc	0,403	-0,245	-0,004	-0,431	-0,166	1,000	0,069
	Spol (M = 1)	-0,088	-0,054	-0,258	-0,003	-0,135	0,052	0,005
	Dobili državno pomoč	0,232	0,036	-0,154	-0,158	0,049	0,069	1,000
	Zaznani negativni vpliv COVID-19	0,000	0,000	0,005	0,002	0,007	0,000	0,165
	Podpora države	0,005	0,062	0,062	0,019	0,070	0,003	0,273
Stopnja značilnosti	Proaktivnost	0,002	0,019	0,000	0,011	0,483	0,002	0,042
	kontrole	0,007	0,019	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,485	0,039
	Zadovoljstvo s poklicem	0,000	0,070	0,011	0,000	0,032	0,066	0,293
	Povečana uporaba substanc	0,000	0,003	0,483	0,000	0,032	0,282	0,220
	Spol (M=1)	0,165	0,273	0,002	0,485	0,066	0,282	0,476
	Dobili državno pomoč	0,005	0,344	0,042	0,039	0,293	0,220	

Vir: avtorjeva raziskava.

sicer pred nastopom morebitnih kritičnih razmer. V tem primeru bo morebitne kritične razmere zaznaval manj intenzivno. Takšna ugotovitev lahko koristi predvsem državni administraciji. Njeno vlogo smo obširno opisali v pregledu teorije in na tistem mestu že poudarili pomen podpore države deležnikom glasbene industrije. Ni tako pomembno, v kakšni obliki je podpora (finančna, infrastrukturna, odpiranje trženjskih poti). Pomembno je predvsem, da se jo deležniki glasbene industrije zavedajo, torej, da je jasno in nedvoumno izražena. Na takšen način si država lahko poleg vseh uvida doma naštetih ciljev (stabilen ekonomski sektor, trajnostni razvoj kulture, sprejemanje različnosti) ob nastopu kriz obeta tudi bolj stabilne razmere.

Tabela 3: REZULTATI LINEARNE REGRESIJE

	B	SN	Beta	t	st. znač.	VIF
Konstanta	8,753	3,424		2,556	0,012	
Podpora države	-0,140	0,063	-0,174	-2,231	0,028	1,137
Proaktivnost	0,161	0,045	0,306	3,569	0,001	1,371
Lokus kontrole	-0,059	0,054	-0,103	-1,094	0,276	1,643
Zadovoljstvo s poklicem	-0,258	0,103	-0,199	-2,499	0,014	1,189
Povečana uporaba substanc	0,783	0,243	0,270	3,218	0,002	1,310
Spol (M = 1)	-0,522	0,664	-0,061	-0,786	0,433	1,121
Dobil državno pomoč	2,409	0,695	0,260	3,465	0,001	1,056

Vir: avtorjeva raziskava.

V nadaljevanju ugotavljamo, da so bolj proaktivni posamezniki tudi bolj občutljivi na krizne razmere, saj jih močneje zaznavajo. Tudi v tem delu so naši rezultati visoko statistično značilni ($p = 0,001$). **To sicer pomeni, da zavračamo hipotezo H2, vendar ugotovitve niso zaradi tega nič manj pomembne.** Ravno nasprotno. Gre za nepričakovan rezultat. Pričakovali smo namreč, da bodo bolj aktivni posamezniki manj intenzivno zaznavali negativne učinke krize, saj naj bi se zanašali na svoje sposobnosti, da se spopadejo s kriznimi razmerami (Cheah idr., 2021). Dosedanje raziskave so pokazale, da bi proaktivni posamezniki morali lažje sprejemati kritične razmere in se nanje bolj učinkovito odzvati (Marchegiani & Phau, 2010). Naša raziskava pa je pokazala v slovenski glasbeni industriji drugačno sliko. Na tem mestu imamo premalo podatkov, da bi si lahko privoščili ugibanja o razlogih za takšne ugotovitve. Gre namreč za širok spekter možnih razlogov. Vsekakor ima naša ciljna populacija občutek, da jim njihov proaktivni pristop ni bil v pomoč. Kdo in kako jih torej ovira pri njihovem udejstvovanju, ostaja v tem trenutku prikrto, daje pa po našem mnenju iniciativo za prihodnje raziskave. S praktičnih vidikov bi bilo pomembno ugotoviti, zakaj se deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije počutijo nemočni. Zakaj menijo, da jim njihov proaktivni pristop ni (bil) v pomoč?

Pri analizi vpliva lokusa kontrole vedenja podatki našega vzorca ne nasprotujejo hipotezi H0 ($p=0,276$). **Hipotezo H3 tako zavrnamo.** Upoštevajoč dejstvo, da posamezniki z izrazitejšo stopnjo internega lokusa kontrole menijo, da sami lahko vplivajo na to, kar se jim dogaja (Ajzen, 2011), smo pričakovali drugačen rezultat, saj so dosedanje raziskave pogosto pokazale, da je višja stopnja zaznanega internega lokusa kontrole pomenila tudi višjo stopnjo uspešnosti in iznajdljivosti (Leung, 2001). V tem delu na podlagi naše analize ne moremo izpeljati zaključkov.

V nadaljevanju smo potrdili našo hipotezo H4. Višja stopnja zadovoljstva v svojem poklicu vodi v nižjo stopnjo zaznanih negativnih učinkov krize. Rezultat je statistično značilen ($p = 0,014$). Gre za ugotovitev, ki je pomembna z dveh vidikov. Dosedanje študije so pokazale, da spremenjene razmere v okolju lahko vodijo v nižanje stopnje zadovoljstva z delom (Dobrow, 2013). Tudi mi smo ugotovili, da je ob nastopu krize skoraj tretjina anketirancev razmišljala o menjavi svoje kariere. Natančneje o izstopu iz glasbene industrije. Po drugi strani pa naši rezultati kažejo, da se bolj zadovoljni (pri svojem delu) posamezniki lažje soočajo s krizo v okolju. Z vidika družbe kot celote sta obe ugotovitvi pomembni v praksi. V nekriznih razmerah mora država glasbeni industriji posvečati dovolj pozornosti in sredstev, da bi tako zagotovila trajnostno rast dejavnosti ter zadovoljne posamezne deležnike v okviru te dejavnosti. To je dober prvi pogoj za učinkovito soočanje posameznikov s potencialnimi krizami. S tem država dosega enega svojih glavnih makroekonomskih ciljev, tj. stabilnost. Med krizo pa mora biti država sposobna in vnaprej pripravljena priskočiti na pomoč s finančnimi sredstvi in z infrastrukturo, ki naj glasbeni industriji omogoča delovanje tudi v kriznem obdobju. Vsaj v omejenem obsegu. Cilj takšnih ukrepov ni zgolj golo preživetje posameznih ustvarjalcev, temveč zagotavljanje trajnostnega razvoja glasbene industrije. To pa ima neposreden širši vpliv tudi na ekonomijo.

Tudi pri vplivu povečane uporabe opojnih substanc smo zaznali visoko statistično značilen vpliv ($p = 0,002$) na višjo stopnjo zaznanih negativnih učinkov krize. **Hipotezo H5 s tem potrdimo.** Dosedanje raziskave so se sicer v večji meri posvečale vplivu krize na uporabo opojnih substanc in ob tem ugotovile značilen vpliv kriznih razmer na povečano uporabo substanc zaradi lažjega obvladovanja tesnobe, povezane s pandemičnimi razmerami v družbi (Taylor idr., 2021). Usmerili smo se v raziskavo povratne zanke, predpostavljene v hipotezi H5. Torej, ali sedaj že povečana uporaba opojnih substanc poveča učinek krize? Ugotovili smo, da ta povratna povezava obstaja, kar razmere za posameznika dodatno poslabša. Rezultati so skladni z nekaterimi predhodnimi raziskavami, opravljenimi na drugih področjih (Kapetanovic idr., 2021; Lawson idr., 2020). Takšne ugotovitve opozarjajo na izjemno veliko potrebo po preventivnih ukrepih. Ti bi se verjetno morali osrediniti predvsem na ozaveščanje družbe in posameznikov v njej.

V ta namen je vsekakor lahko uporabna tudi pričujoča študija, ki potrjuje potrebo po takšnem udejstvovanju predvsem v predkriznem času. Ob tem velja še enkrat poudariti, da so posamezniki že v osnovi različno dovzetni za negativne vplive krize, saj je to lahko odvisno od drugih dejavnikov. Naša raziskava in ugotovitve se osredotočajo na ozko vprašanje. Analiziramo čas, ki sledi trenutku, ko posameznik že zazna negativne učinke krize skladno s svojimi osebnostnimi predispozicijami in ob tem poseže po opojnih substancah, ki naj bi omilile negativne občutke (Taylor idr., 2021). Na podlagi rezultatov lahko dvomimo o tem, da uporaba substanc omili negativne občutke, saj je standardiziran koeficient regresijskega modela v tej dimenziji med najvišjimi (0,270), kar lahko kaže na možnost, da se z uporabo substanc negativno občutenje krize le stopnjuje. Vsekakor pa menimo, da so v tem delu potrebne dodatne, bolj poglobljene raziskave.

V model smo vključili tudi spol kot dihotomično spremenljivko, vendar nismo zaznali statistično značilnih razlik pri zaznavanju negativnih učinkov krize. Zaznali pa smo visoko statistično značilno razliko ($p = 0,001$) pri zaznavi negativnih učinkov krize med posamezniki, ki so prejeli državno pomoč, in tistimi, ki je niso bili deležni. Izkaže se, da posamezniki, ki so prejeli pomoč, bolj intenzivno zaznavajo negativne učinke krize kot njihovi kolegi. Mogoče je takšna ugotovitev pričakovana, saj bi lahko – sicer spekulativno – skleпали, da so takšni posamezniki prej pripravljeni zaprositi za pomoč, saj zaznavajo več negativnih učinkov krize. Ob tem velja opozoriti, da je regresijski koeficient relativno visok (2,409). Visok je tudi standardizirani regresijski koeficient (0,290), ki tako ta dejavnik uvršča v skupino pomembnejših. Kot najvplivnejši dejavnik v modelu sicer izstopa proaktivnost s standardiziranim regresijskim koeficientom 0,306.

Sklep

V članku smo raziskali, kako so deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije doživljali zaprtje javnega življenja in prepoved koncertnega glasbenega udejstvovanja v obdobju pandemije COVID-19. Naše ugotovitve temeljijo na testiranju postavljenih hipotez s pomočjo linearnega regresijskega modela. Odvisna spremenljivka modela je zaznani negativni učinek pandemije COVID-19. Neodvisne spremenljivke pa so: zaznana podpora države, stopnja proaktivnosti anketiranca, stopnja internega lokusa kontrole, zadovoljstvo s svojim poklicem in stopnja povečanja uporabe opojnih substanc. Naštetim in v teoretičnem delu utemeljenim neodvisnim spremenljivkam smo dodali še dve dihotomični spremenljivki, to sta spol in prejeta pomoč države.

Rezultati so pokazali, da višja stopnja zaznane podpore države posamezniku in njegovemu delu pomeni nižjo stopnjo zaznave negativnih učinkov

krize (H1). To upravičuje pomoč, ki jo je vlada s protikoronskimi zakoni namenila deležnikom glasbene industrije, saj je zmanjšala vpliv izpada dohodka in omogočila, da so preživeli. Večina deležnikov deluje v okviru prekarne oblike dela. To je velik problem. Premagovanje prekarnosti dela in življenja kot univerzalnega problema bi moralo temeljiti na hkratnem lokalnem, kratkoročnem, parcialnem odporu in poskusih omejevanja negativnih vplivov in širjenja prekarnosti na eni ter konceptualizaciji in spodbujanju celovitih in univerzalnih rešitev za prekarnost na drugi strani (Kanjuo-Mrčela, 2022). Nadalje ugotavljamo, da so bolj proaktivni posamezniki tudi bolj občutljivi na krizne razmere, saj jih močneje zaznavajo (H2). Večina predstavnikov glasbene industrije namreč deluje v t.i. svobodnih oblikah dela (s. p.) ali imajo status svobodnega umetnika, kar jih sili, da ustvarjajo (so proaktivni) in iščejo prostor za glasbeno udejstvovanje. S tega vidika so zelo prilagodljivi glede na način, kraj in plačilo dela (Uršič, 2021), vendar pa ta prilagodljivost ni absolutna, če je ogrožena eksistenca. Prav tako višja stopnja zadovoljstva v svojem poklicu vodi v nižjo stopnjo zaznanih negativnih učinkov krize (H4). Glasbeniki, ki niso mogli nastopati, so poskušali izkoristiti pandemijski čas za pisanje in snemanje. Pandemija COVID-19 je pospešila preoblikovanja in pomagala malim in srednjim podjetjem z »oblikovanjem« novega vedenja« potrošnikov, kar je pomagalo poenostaviti procese, proračune in poslovne kanale (Gaffar idr., 2022). Seveda vsi deležniki niso bili v enakopravnem položaju. Lokusa kontrole vedenja na podlagi vzorca nismo uspeli statistično značilno povezati z zaznanimi negativnimi učinki krize (H3). Ugotavljamo tudi, da povečana uporaba opojnih substanc dodatno povečuje občutljivost posameznika na zaznavo negativnih učinkov krize (H5). Odvisnost je vedno od odvisnost od ljudi, ne od stvari (Lukšič, 1999), in z zaprtjem javnega življenja v pandemijskem obdobju so se posamezniki družili s sebi enakimi in povečevali svojo nezmožnost reševanja problemov.

Med spoloma nismo zaznali razlik. Zaznali smo pa visoko statistično značilno razliko pri zaznavi negativnih učinkov krize med posamezniki, ki so prejeli državno pomoč, in tistimi, ki je niso bili deležni. Upravičenost do pomoči ni bila samoumevna. Izpolnjeni so morali biti določeni pogoji za dodelitev pomoči. Tu so bili tisti, ki niso imeli rednega delovnega razmerja ali plačanih vseh obveznosti do države (davkov, prispevkov), znova v neenakopravnem položaju v primerjavi z redno zaposlenimi. Pomoč bi morala biti neodvisna. Take primere poznamo v ZDA, kjer so državljani prejeli »stimulativne čeke« (Fan in Nie, 2020), s katerimi so lahko blažili vplive pandemije na njihove izdatke in manjše prihodke. Pogojevanje pomoči z višino osebnega dohodka je lahko diskriminacijsko.

Ob tem menimo, da bi prihodnje raziskave s kvalitativnim pristopom lahko nadgradile naše rezultate z bolj poglobljenimi spoznanji, saj gre za

raziskovanje subjektivnih občutenj, ki so po svoji naravi izjemno kompleksna. Kvantitativni pristop v takšnih primerih lahko poda usmeritve, kar je bil tudi glavni cilj pričujočega članka.

Na splošno deležniki glasbene industrije niso mogli nadzirati dogodkov med krizo, saj je bilo prisotnih preveč zunanjih vplivov (omejitev gibanja, testiranje, prepoved nastopanja, ipd.). Na podlagi ugotovitev sklepamo, da bi upoštevanje rezultatov pričujoče in podobnih bodočih raziskav pomembno pripomoglo k trajnostnemu razvoju kreativne industrije.

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THE EFFECT OF GREENWASHING PERCEPTION, GREEN WORD OF MOUTH, AND GREEN MARKETING ON H&M PURCHASE INTENTIONS IN JAKARTA

Abstract. Greenwashing has long been an issue in Western and developed countries. Yet, this matter regrettably remains quite underexplored among academics in developing and emerging markets, especially in Indonesia. The presented quantitative research focuses on the impact of greenwashing perception, green word of mouth (“green WOM”) and green marketing on intentions to purchase items at H&M in Jakarta. Hypotheses were answered with the SEM-PLS model using SmartPLS3 software. Based on a questionnaire administered to 200 respondents, results show that the perception of greenwashing has a direct negative impact on consumers’ purchase intentions and an indirect negative impact through green WOM, which can be influenced by the factor of lack of concern and awareness in Jakarta. These findings stand in contrast to several studies in Europe that were used as a reference while conducting this research. At the same time, green WOM strengthens the positive impact between green marketing and purchase intentions. Practical implications for companies include taking substantial steps towards sustainability and the need to adopt a fact-based approach without embellishment.

Keywords: *greenwashing perception, green word of mouth, green marketing, purchase intention*

Introduction

Consumers perceive greenwashing as being present when a company’s communications regarding the environment are unaccompanied by action, with these perceptions ultimately being able to deter them from purchasing

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products made by the company (Nyilasy et al., 2014). Greenwashing has long been an issue in Western and developed countries. Yet, this matter regrettably remains quite underexplored among academics in developing and emerging markets, especially Indonesia. The “Go Green” movement in Indonesia has been widespread in recent years. Many consumers in Indonesia are unaware of the practices concerning products and related advertisements that companies engage in. This is due to the lack of both education and public concern for the environment in Indonesia. According to Fitrianingrum (2020), Indonesia is considered to be less educated about greenwashing practices.

Among the myriad of global fashion brands, H&M is known as a fast fashion manufacturer that produces environmentally friendly products, namely H&M Conscious. As a multinational company from Sweden, H&M has over 5,000 stores spread across 34 countries around the world. H&M Conscious is a clothing line that utilises recycled and organic goods such as recycled polyester and Econyl, a material made 100% from small plastic and fishing nets (H&M, 2019).

Nevertheless, in the conduct of its business practices H&M is perceived to have engaged in greenwashing activities. A 2021 report by the Changing Markets Foundation in England says that H&M Conscious uses synthetic raw materials that can damage the environment (Welbers, 2022). Research by Lorincz (2021) in 2019 described how the Norwegian Consumer Authority had accused H&M of having misled its customers. In addition, according to Commodore (2022), H&M New York is claimed to lack transparency in the recycling process it carries out and other details to allow the company to call its products sustainable fashion, which may be assumed to be greenwashing activities.

Consumer perceptions of greenwashing at H&M in the European countries mentioned above led to the selection of H&M in Jakarta as the object of the study in response to the absence of research on greenwashing perceptions in the fashion sector in Indonesia. Jakarta as the capital city was chosen as the location for the research because Jakarta is a megapolitan city in which the public strongly desires to follow fashion trends to appear fashionable, and, with 16 of them, Jakarta itself has the most H&M outlets in Indonesia. This is further supported by research conducted by Valendia (2022) which states that the term greenwashing is not very well known among Indonesians. The presented research was thus performed to determine how aware Indonesian people, especially in Jakarta, are of greenwashing perceptions and associated variables.

When companies greenwash, the impact is to make consumers become sceptical (Rahman et al., 2015) and confused while deciding which environmentally friendly products to buy (Chang and Chen, 2013). This confusion

means consumers with a greenwashing perception of a product or service become reluctant to refer to that product or service. When consumers believe that a product has engaged in greenwashing, consumers may become convinced to give positive word of mouth (“green WOM”). Referring to Chaniotakis and Lymperopoulos (2009), green WOM is verbal communication between customers and other people or stakeholders such as channels, product or service producers, experts, friends and relatives. Green WOM directly affects the intention to purchase environmentally friendly products since consumers consistently consult the information available to reduce errors while making purchasing decisions (Chen et al., 2014).

Purchase intention is an important aspect for a company by showing consumers’ intention to buy, in turn allowing the company to develop further and earn profits. Raza et al. (2014) describe how purchase intention is a process whereby consumers analyse their knowledge of products, compare products with similar products, and decide on the product to purchase.

Purchase intention is related to consumer plans to buy certain products and how many product units are needed in a given period. If consumers dream of a product and intend to buy one, they will endeavour to place an order for that purpose. To increase intentions to purchase a product, companies can positively implement green marketing activities. The company forms an environmentally friendly image as part of a good communication and marketing strategy. Consumers tend to be more interested in buying environmentally friendly products if both companies prioritise environmental sustainability and they believe that environmentally friendly products can benefit themselves, others and the environment (Setiawan and Yosephani, 2022). Growing public awareness of the important need to preserve the environment has made various companies communicate themselves as environmentally friendly companies. Consumers are often willing to pay more for products that are claimed to be environmentally friendly, even relatively high prices, due to their desire for products that have a smaller negative impact on the environment (Utami, 2014). This indicates that consumers are today paying greater attention to their purchases and prioritising their environmental impact.

In light of the foregoing explanations and issues, the presented study addresses the issue with the title *The Effect of Perceptions of Greenwashing, Green Word of Mouth, and Green Marketing on H&M Purchase Intentions in Jakarta*.

Perception of greenwashing

Perception is important in the positioning concept because humans interpret a product or brand as they perceive it. According to Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, greenwashing is the selective disclosure of information that aims to promote environmentally friendly programmes to divert attention away from corporate activities which are not environmentally friendly (Rahman et al., 2015). Greenwashing is the selective disclosure of positive information without fully disclosing negative information with a view to creating an overly positive corporate image. Companies that cannot prove their green claims often mislead consumers when purchasing (Ramus and Montiel, 2005). Accordingly, one may infer that greenwashing can engender negative perceptions among consumers such as doubt and confusion with regard to a company's green claims.

Green word of mouth

Chen et al. (2014) proposed Green Word of Mouth (green WOM) to describe the extent to which customers tell their friends, relatives and colleagues about the positive environmental messages and environmentally friendly. Green WOM is split into two segments: positive and negative. Positive green WOM will develop when consumers tell others about their pleasant experiences. Products with positive green WOM enable customers to become more confident while making purchases. Negative green WOM will develop when consumers express discontent and tell others stories about their unfavourable experience. According to (Chen et al., 2014), if a company deceives its consumers through greenwashing practices, consumers will disseminate adverse information about the company, and might deter prospective buyers from purchasing the company's products.

Green marketing

Pride and Ferel state that green marketing is the efforts a company makes to design, promote, calculate prices, and distribute products that are friendly to the environment (Jain and Kaur, 2004). Green marketing refers to marketing activities developed to stimulate and maintain environmentally friendly consumer behaviour. In marketing activities, one also encounters a Green Marketing Mix, a concept in which activities related to product, price, place and promotion take environmental sustainability or environmental health into account. Companies produce eco-friendly products in an endeavour to fulfil customer needs and as a form of concern for environmental sustainability. This simultaneously provides added value to the

company by increasing its competitiveness. Companies that make products with the environment in mind have a stronger reputation because the company is seen as being concerned about environmental sustainability (Haryadi, 2009).

Purchase intention

Purchase intention can further be defined as a customer's desire to buy the same product since they know its functions (Madahi and Sukati, 2012). According to Kotler, Bowen and Makens (2014), as cited by (Purbohastuti and Hidayah, 2020), interest in buying a product/service arises after an alternative evaluation process is in place. In this process, an individual will make a series of choices regarding the product to be purchased based on brand or interest. The intention to purchase derives from a learning process and a thought process that forms a perception. The interest that arises in making a purchase creates a motivation that is continuously recorded in the individual's mind and becomes a very strong activity which ultimately actualises what is in the mind. Thus, interest in buying will arise during the decision-making process.

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Relationship between perception of greenwashing and purchase intentions

The existence of perceptions of greenwashing can damage consumer confidence in companies, in turn lowering purchase intentions. If a company engages in greenwashing practices, consumers may no longer want to build a long-term relationship with the company and may eventually reduce their intention to purchase its products. If consumers feel that a company's communication about the environment is not accompanied by genuine actions, their perception may inhibit and reduce their intention to buy the company's products. The sceptical attitude that develops in consumers' minds can make them not wish to have a long-term relationship with the company. Research conducted by Lu et al. (2022) shows that the impact of perceptions of greenwashing significantly influences purchase intentions.

The first hypothesis considered in the study draws from the literature and aforementioned arguments:

Hypothesis 1. Perceptions of greenwashing influence purchase intentions.

Relationship between green marketing and purchase intentions

Green marketing initiatives undertaken by companies can foster consumer purchasing behaviour, thereby encouraging stronger interest in product purchases. By influencing consumer decisions, green marketing has an impact on interest in buying. As an outcome of successful green marketing activities, consumers will exhibit a proclivity to spread positive green WOM and cause an increase in product purchases and, in turn, satisfy the business goal of making profit. The findings of this study are corroborated by research by (Akhfiani et al., 2022) which shows that green marketing has a significant positive influence on purchase intentions. The following hypothesis draws from the literature and above-mentioned arguments:

Hypothesis 2. Green marketing influences purchase intentions.

Relationship between perception of greenwashing and green WOM

Consumers who perceive a company offering a product or service has been involved in greenwashing become reluctant to refer to the product or service through green WOM and reduce their associated purchase intentions. Green WOM directly influences the intention to purchase a product because consumers always refer to the information that is available to reduce errors while making purchasing decisions. If a company engages in greenwashing practices to mislead consumers, the latter may no longer want to build a long-term relationship with the company and ultimately may reduce their intention to buy green products. This is also supported by research carried out by Zhang et al. (2018) showing that the perception of greenwashing has an influence and on green WOM. The following hypothesis stems from the literature and abovementioned arguments:

Hypothesis 3. Perceptions of greenwashing influence green word of mouth.

Relationship between green marketing and green WOM

Green marketing is among the latest marketing strategies. The Green Marketing strategy is said to exert a significant influence on the business by allowing the creation of trust in the brand due to the trust generated by the product. Community behaviour that is sensitive to environmental sustainability is an important basis for carrying out green marketing. If a company is implementing green marketing practices effectively, the response and intensity of consumers in spreading positive news about this will be substantial, and vice versa. Further support for this may be found in research by (Chen et al., 2014), which states that green marketing has an influence on

green WOM. The following hypothesis draws from the literature and aforementioned arguments:

Hypothesis 4. Green marketing influences green word of mouth.

Relationship between green WOM and purchase intentions

Green WOM has a direct impact on product purchase intentions as explained by consumers' consistent reliance on the information available to reduce errors being made in their purchasing decisions. Consumer purchase intentions are directly influenced by green WOM because the information consumers acquire by way of peer recommendations can prove pivotal in intentions to purchase a product. Positive green WOM can be particularly credible and thus customers are more likely to develop green purchase intentions when they associate a person who conveys positive information about a product. Research by (Guerriero and Pacheco, 2021) also describes how green WOM has a positive and significant influence on purchase intention. The next hypothesis arises from the literature and the above-mentioned arguments:

Hypothesis 5. Green word of mouth influences purchase intentions.

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Relationship between perception of greenwashing and purchase intentions through green WOM

Perceptions of greenwashing held by consumers can influence their attitudes while making purchasing decisions. If a company indulges in greenwashing practices and ultimately attracts negative WOM, its reputation may suffer and consumers would be unlikely to want to build a long-term relationship with the company, also including preventing others from buying the company's products. In the end, intentions to purchase a given product are reduced due to the mediating effect of green WOM, which can significantly encourage consumer purchase intentions and reduce the negative impact of greenwashing perceptions. Research conducted by (Ghassani et al., 2022) corroborated this by showing that the perception of greenwashing has an influence on purchase intentions through green WOM. The following hypothesis draws from the literature and the arguments mentioned above:

Hypothesis 6. Green word of mouth mediates the influence of greenwashing perceptions on purchase intentions

Relationship between green marketing and purchase intention through green WOM

Green marketing is among the factors able to influence consumer decisions, including purchase intentions. Consumers committed to certain environmentally friendly products seek to achieve a number of purchasing objectives. Green WOM is seen as more reliable information and hence influences consumer purchase intentions. The existence of WOM as an element of green marketing strategies relies on consumers viewing WOM as reliable, which ultimately leads them to become inclined to purchase a product. Román-Augusto et al. (2022) also found that green marketing has an influence on purchase intentions through green WOM. The next hypothesis arises from the literature and the arguments presented above:

Hypothesis 7. Green word of mouth mediates the effect of green marketing on purchase intentions.

Methods

This research conducted is quantitative in nature. An explanatory research design was used and aimed to analyse the relationship between one variable and another, or how one variable affects other variables (Husein, 2005). The data utilised in this study largely come from primary sources, specifically respondents' answers to the questionnaire completed online through Google Forms.

When analysing and evaluating visitors to H&M fashion product outlets in the city of Jakarta, the sampling technique used was purposive sampling, a sample selection technique entailing certain considerations and criteria:

1. Age 18-40 years old, namely, the age of maturity when an individual is considered legally mature and can be held personally responsible
2. Minimum high school education or equivalent
3. Will make purchases and has used H&M fashion products twice in the last 6 months

Considering that the research was conducted on an unknown number of buyers at all H&M fashion brand outlets in Jakarta, the sample used in the study was 200 respondents, which was considered sufficient for the purposes of the research. An appropriate sample size is between 100-200 respondents in order to be able to conduct Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (Hair, 2010).

The presented research evaluates the research model in two steps: the outer (measurement) model and the inner (structural) model. To test the

hypotheses, a bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 samples was used. The hypothesis testing procedure considered two effects: direct and indirect.

The measurement scale in the study is the rating scale, which is obtained in the form of numbers and then interpreted qualitatively. Since it can be used for a wide range of research subjects, the rating scale can assess 200 samples spread across the city of Jakarta. For instance, on a scale from 1-10, "I get recommendations for H&M products from other people because of their good environmental image".

Results and Discussion

Reliability and validity analysis was performed on the data contained in the 200 valid questionnaires collected. Cronbach's alpha coefficient and composite reliability coefficient were used to analyse the reliability of the questionnaire. Table 1 shows Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the model by dimension, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of *the variables* Greenwashing Perception, Green WOM, Green Marketing, and Purchase Intention *respectively being* 0.934, 0.941, 0.915 and 0.957, indicating that the questionnaire's reliability is acceptable. Convergent validity was assessed using the factor loading method. Factor loadings exceeding 0.6 indicate reasonable convergent validity.

Multiple covariances were tested using a full variance inflation factor (VIF). If the VIF value is 5 or higher, one may infer that a problem of collinearity exists among the latent variables. The multicollinearity test results are presented in Table 1. The highest VIF for the potential variables is 4.298, showing that multicollinearity is not a concern in this study.

As displayed in Table 1, the factor loadings for all latent variables are above 0.6, indicating good convergent validity of the factors. Average variance extraction (AVE) was used to assess the discriminant validity of the measure. Specifically, the square root of AVE must exceed the correlation between the variable and other variables. As shown in Table 1, the square root of the AVE of all variables is higher than the correlation between all constructs in Table 1, and thus the discriminant validity of this measure is acceptable.

Further, the AVEs of Greenwashing Perception, Green WOM, Green Marketing, and Purchase Intention are 0.628, 0.860, 0.746 and 0.796, respectively. All AVEs exceed the minimum level of 0.5, indicating that the convergent validity of this measure is also acceptable. Moreover, all the questions in the scale were derived from other well-established classical literature, which has undergone rigorous testing to ensure content validity.

Table 1: PROPERTIES OF THE CONSTRUCTS AND ITEM LOADINGS

	GMK	GWM	GWS	PCI
R-squared		0.441		0.605
Adj R-squared		0.436		0.599
Composite reliability (rho_a)	0.944	0.944	0.930	0.958
Composite reliability (rho_c)	0.944	0.958	0.936	0.965
Cronbach's alpha coefficient	0.934	0.941	0.915	0.957
Average variance extracted (AVE)	0.628	0.850	0.746	0.796
Full collinearity. VIFs	3.366	3.987	3.429	4.298
Q-squared		0.327		0.420

Source: Analysis result, 2023.

Hypotheses Testing

Direct Effect Test


The results of the PLS-SEM analysis are summarised in Figure 1 and simplified in Table 2. It is shown that the perception of greenwashing has a non-significant negative effect on purchase intention ($\beta = -0.379$). The higher the perception of greenwashing, the lower the willingness to buy green products, providing support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of the path from Green Marketing to Purchase Intention is significantly positive ($\beta = 0.299$) and Hypothesis 2 is thus supported. Greenwashing Perception holds a significant negative effect on Green WOM ($\beta = -0.283$), which is in accordance with Hypothesis 3. Among all the latent variables in the full model, the strongest standardised regression weight was found between Green Marketing and Green WOM ($\beta = 0.420$). This demonstrates that Green Marketing has the strongest positive effect on Green WOM, giving support for Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of Green WOM on Purchase Intention as suggested by Hypothesis 5 is also supported ($\beta = 0.245$).

Table 2: DIRECT EFFECT TEST

	Original Sample (O)	Sample Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (STDEV)	T Statistics (O/STDEV)	P Values
Greenwashing Perception -> Purchase Intention	-0.379	-0.292	0.233	1.628	0.055
Green Marketing -> Purchase Intention	0.299	0.359	0.127	2.350	0.010
Greenwashing Perception -> Green WOM	-0.283	-0.280	0.090	3.147	0.000
Green Marketing -> Green WOM	0.420	0.448	0.087	4.849	0.000
Green WOM -> Purchase Intention	0.245	0.278	0.143	1.718	0.044

Source: Analysis result (2023).

Figure 1: PATH ANALYSIS DIAGRAM



Source: Designed by authors.

Indirect Effect Test

The indirect effect test depends upon the statistical significance of the direct path coefficients in the research model. Green WOM is included in the research model as a mediating variable. The table below presents the indirect effect in this study:

Table 3: INDIRECT EFFECT TEST

	Original Sample (O)	Sample Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (STDEV)	T Statistics (O/STDEV)	P Values
Green Marketing → Green Word of Mouth → Purchase Intention	0.115	0.121	0.062	1.649	0.035
Greenwash Perception → Green Word of Mouth → Purchase Intention	-0.111	-0.082	0.056	1.237	0.020

Source: Analysis result (2023).

The data in Table 3 reveal that the results of the estimation of the path coefficient of the indirect influence of the Green Marketing (GMK) variables on Purchase Intention (PCI) was 0.115 with a significance value of P = 0.035. Meanwhile, the estimated value of the Greenwashing Perception coefficient (GWS) on Purchase Intention (PCI) was -0.111 and significant at P=0.020. The results of the estimation of changes in the value of the direct

influence path coefficient in the model are further analysed below using the Variance Accounted For (VAF) method.

Table 4: VAF TEST

	VAF	
1	VAF = Green Marketing (0.115/0.402)	0.286
2	VAF = Greenwashing Perception (-0.011/-0.499)	0.022

Source: Analysis result (2023).

According to Hair et al. (2013), a VAF value above 80% indicates the role of the mediating variable as full mediation. If the VAF is between 20%–80%, it can be categorised as partial mediation. However, if the VAF is less than 20%, one may infer that there is a minimal, if any, mediating effect. The results of the VAF calculations made to examine the effect of the Green WOM variable between Greenwashing Perception on Purchase Intention were 0.022 or 2.2%, which indicates that Hypothesis 6 may be accepted. Further, the VAF value on the Green Marketing variable on Purchase Intention is 0.286 (or 28.6%), which means Hypothesis 7 may be accepted.

The study findings demonstrate that the Green WOM variable acts as a mediator able to enhance the relationship between Green Marketing and Purchase Intention. However, the Green WOM variable does not play a role by way of partial mediation between the Greenwashing Perception and Purchase Intention variables since its VAF value was below 20%.

Conclusion

Noting the unique circumstances of the fast fashion industry, the presented research has examined the effect of perceptions of greenwashing, green word of mouth, and green marketing on H&M purchase intentions in Jakarta. After collecting 200 valid questionnaires, the study employed statistical analysis to test hypotheses and draws the following conclusions: consumers' perception of greenwashing in the fast fashion industry has a direct negative impact on their purchase intention and an indirect negative impact through green WOM, albeit green WOM does not play a partial mediating role. This is also in line with greenwashing perception that has a direct negative impact on green WOM. This perception can be influenced by the lack of concern and awareness in Jakarta, a finding that is in contrast with several earlier studies conducted in Europe that were used as a reference while conducting this research.

At the same time, the moderating variable of Green WOM strengthens the positive impact between Green Marketing and Purchase Intention. Green

WOM is also positively correlated with Purchase Intention regarding H&M in Jakarta. In summary, Green Marketing has a positive effect on Purchase Intention and Green WOM. The presented study holds certain practical implications. First, the more consumers perceive a company's behaviour as greenwashing, the more their desire to buy related products is weakened. This means it is necessary for companies to undertake substantial sustainability measures and embrace a verifiable approach without embellishment or concealment.

Business actors can prepare green marketing actions that are more substantive, real and transparent to consumers. Further, companies must demonstrate the capacity to capitalise on opportunities to support consumer behaviour that is aware of environmental sustainability so as to increase consumers' purchase intentions.

The results of the study show the Green WOM variable does not play a mediating role between the Greenwashing Perception variable and Purchase Intention. By upgrading the role of Green WOM as a mediator, business actors can work to lower consumer scepticism with a view to consumers providing positive feedback about a given product.

Like other studies, this research has some limitations. First, the sample used in this study was only in the retail industry. Future research could examine other sectors that apply environmentally friendly principles, such as the food and beverage industry, beauty, and so on. Second, the study only measured Greenwashing, Green Word of Mouth, and Green Marketing perception variables on Purchase Intention. Research in the future could add other related variables like Green Concern, Green Perceived Quality, Green Trust, and more. Third, the sampling for this study only encompassed Jakarta. Future research could concentrate on other areas and compare them with the results of this study.

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Maxim POPOV*

AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM, ORDOLIBERAL RATIONALITY AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT

Abstract. The author assesses the relevance and analytical significance of authoritarian liberalism and interprets it as one of the modern conceptual models of ordoliberalism and European integration. The basic concepts of authoritarian liberalism and ordoliberalism emphasise the political and ideological connection between the authoritarianism of the strong state and the economic liberalism of market rationality. As a flexible market-oriented form of authoritarian liberalism, ordoliberalism means a rational strategy for maintaining and promoting the European integration project towards which the market economy and the technocratic elite are moving to contain crises. Due to the presence of the values of political liberalism, pluralism and the rule of law, authoritarianism in this structure is not repressive or monocentric, but subject to democratic criticism in relation to the supranational regulation of European integration.

Keywords: authoritarian liberalism, ordoliberalism, market capitalism, democracy, eurocrisis, European integration

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Introduction

The European Union's credibility and legitimacy have been influenced by several existential challenges related to the liberal democratic future of the European project. After Brexit, the EU remains stable; outside the UK, while political ideas of abandoning European integration are marginal, Euroscepticism is on the rise. Contemporary challenges are primarily associated with the very functioning of the European Union, entailing right-wing populist pressure from regional parties and movements. In European regions, where there is increased support for right-wing populist parties, the mobilisation of Eurosceptics occurs on the basis of ethno-national identity. As Lovec, Kočan and Mahmutović note, "the EU crises initially led

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to a decline in support for the EU, based on the drop in the EU's output legitimacy and that this later triggered input-side Euroscepticism, mutually reinforced by populism and illiberalism. While on the left anti-neoliberalism became more vocal, on the right, a reactionary-nationalist type of populism emerged with some faux-modern elements also being mainstreamed" (Lovec, Kočan and Mahmutović, 2022: 523). This crisis of confidence concerns not only the European Union as a whole, but also the supranational political system and the order of governance on the continent. The systemic conditions for this were created in the era of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent transformation of Europe. The Maastricht Treaty created the constitutional structure of the Economic and Monetary Union, which laid the foundation for the Schengen Area and expanded European integration. These processes paved the way for a weakening of the search for a 'real alternative' to market capitalism and neoliberalism on the part of nationalists, Eurosceptics and leftists and the development of authoritarian liberalism. According to Habermas, since 1992 it has no longer been possible to escape from the universe of capitalism; the only option left is to civilise and tame the capitalist system from within (Habermas, 2012).

Contemporary political analysts characterise the constitutional crisis in Europe as an outcome of the economic policy of authoritarian liberalism (Bonefeld, 2017; Somek, 2015; Wilkinson, 2015), which was first analysed by Heller as a fundamental characteristic of the late Weimar regime (Heller, 2015). Polanyi and Marcuse conceptualised authoritarian liberalism as the most common characteristic of the entire period of the interwar collapse of liberal democracy (Marcuse, 1988; Polanyi, 2001). Müller introduces the concept of constrained democracy as a representation of authoritarian liberalism (Müller, 2011). Wilkinson points out the connection between political authoritarianism and economic liberalism, which lies in the dynamics of constitutional changes in Europe (Wilkinson, 2018). Authoritarian liberalism is actualised during periods of economic crisis and a structural element of post-war constitutional regulation in Europe based on the fear of democracy and popular sovereignty, largely because of the threat they can pose to the ordoliberal order (Bonefeld, 2017). Authoritarian liberalism does not operate through the economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*, but with the help of a strong state apparatus that overregulates national parliaments, deregulates the free market and privatises social goods, using forms of coercion within both states and the framework of integration institutions. Neoliberal constitutionalism has always viewed social rights with caution and suspicion due to the clearly articulated material demands they entail (*ibid.*). According to Streeck, the neoliberal authoritarian regime of the consolidation state involves a deep transformation of democracy away from the traditional institutions of popular political participation designed to stand

up for social equity against the laws of the market: where there are fewer public goods due to privatisation, there is less to decide politically, and the economic democracy of capitalism begins to replace political democracy (Streeck, 2014). With markets becoming the principal mechanisms of collective decision-making, there is even less fiscal democracy left than in the rigidified debt state of old: on the macro level, public finances are increasingly constrained by constitutionally enshrined debt limits and balanced-budget rules. In the European case, there are also international agreements on fiscal austerity from which countries can break away only at great political and economic cost (Streeck, 2011).

This article aims to achieve two goals. First, to show the connection between ordoliberalism and authoritarian liberalism on one hand and the European integration project on the other. Second, to provide a conceptual analysis of authoritarian liberalism within the framework of competing political and philosophical models: critical and neoliberal theory. The conceptualisation of authoritarian liberalism as a category of contemporary political philosophy is becoming a theoretical priority. Based on an all-embracing conceptual analysis, the article corroborates that in critical and transformational periods the actualisation of authoritarian liberalism corresponds to the fundamental tension in a democratic state between market capitalism and representative democracy. By identifying contemporary liberalism as political liberalism, political theory usually excludes the conflict dynamics between capitalism and democracy, thereby creating difficulties for the perception of the concepts of authoritarian liberalism and ordoliberalism.

Ordoliberalism and Authoritarian Liberalism – the Other Face of the Liberal Canon

In critical periods when capitalism and democracy come into a fundamental conflict of values, the state is perceived as conflict manifestation and in some cases as an actor in conflict resolution. The reason that one can speak of the state within the framework of this conflict is that the ideological and repressive state apparatus reinforces the contradictions between democracy and capitalism through the military, police, and judicial authorities (Althusser, 2014). Just as modern capitalism and inequality can threaten a democratic state, the democratic struggle for political and social equality can act as a potential threat to the capitalist state. Democratic movements are challenging the structural configuration of politics and economics with a new demand for political democratic control of the economy. In order to preserve the status quo, the ‘ideological and repressive state apparatus’ proposes a market-oriented and renewed form of authoritarian liberalism – European ordoliberalism.

European ordoliberalism as an enhanced market-oriented form of authoritarian liberalism transforms the norms of democratic constitutionalism and representative democracy in order to maintain economic commitments to currency and price stability, tight fiscal discipline and competitiveness. Bonefeld defines ordoliberalism as “a veritable statement about the character of capitalist society and its state”, adding that

in the contemporary debate about the ordoliberalisation of Europe, the ordoliberal argument about capitalist labor economy as a practice of government is put aside and instead it is identified with a certain ‘German’ preference for austerity and seemingly also technocratic governance, undermining the European democracies and leading to calls for the resurgence of the national democratic state that governs for the many. In this argument illusion dominates reality. (Bonefeld, 2019)

Following the 2008 crisis, authoritarian liberalism paradoxically began to be accompanied by antisystem challenges to the future of the European project in the process of searching for integration alternatives, activating right-wing populism, neo-nationalism and illiberal authoritarianism. The situation described is most evident in Central and Eastern Europe, yet also reflected in the growth of Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe. The economic and political model of authoritarian liberalism has a contradictory character: in a crisis, neoliberal integration processes can increase social instability, creating conditions for the escalation of reactive neo-traditionalism and its development into deep-rooted cultural conflicts (Moravcsik, 2004; Slobodian, 2018; Wallerstein, 1995). According to Slobodian, “while neoliberal elites might be organized globally, they remain reliant on the setup of a national vision, through which any national ruling class can appear as the sole representative of their national people. If we want to know why neoliberalism is now dissolving into this specific nightmare – one of nationalist authoritarianism – this is where we need to look” (Brandes, 2019).

Bonefeld states that Hayek’s idea of the potentially illiberal nature of a democratic government is the key to understanding German ordoliberalism as a form of authoritarian liberalism that arose in the context of the socio-economic crisis of the Weimar Republic (Bonefeld, 2017; Hayek, 1960). Ordoliberals relied on the political theology of Schmitt with his concept of the state as the dominant force in relations between the market and the state, calling these relations the union of a free economy and a strong authoritarian state. The premise of authoritarian liberalism was the idea that the establishment of a social order is the basis of a free economy, and a strong liberal state becomes a concentration of this order (Bonefeld, 2019; Röpke, 1960; Schmitt, 2008).

Ordoliberalism is the theory behind the German social market economy. Its theoretical stance was developed in the context of the economic crisis and political turmoil of the Weimar Republic in the late 1920s. It is premised on the strong state as the locus of liberal governance, and holds that economic freedom derives from political authority. In the context of the crisis of neoliberal political economy and austerity, and debates on the resurgence of the state vis-à-vis the economy, Bonefeld introduces the ordoliberal argument that the free economy presupposes the exercise of strong state authority and that economic liberty is a practice of liberal governance. This practice is fundamentally one of social policy to secure the sociological and ethical preconditions of free markets. The study of ordoliberalism brings to the fore a tradition of a state-centric neoliberalism, one that says that economic freedom is ordered freedom, argues that the strong state is the political form of free markets, and conceives of competition and enterprise as a political task (Bonefeld, 2012).

During periods of political transformations, tensions between democracy and the capitalist state increase, leading to a potential constitutional crisis. The most important moment in the history of European integration is the interwar period. In late Weimar Germany, the democratic capitalist state reached its climax due to the growth of a politically emancipated proletariat, which began to threaten the differentiation of the political and the economic created and protected by the Constitution (Wilkinson, 2019). The reaction of the ruling elite to this threat was the convergence of authoritarianism and economic liberalism, as first pointed out in 1933 by the social democrat and constitutional theorist Heller (Heller, 2015).

The main principle of authoritarian liberalism in Heller's phenomenology is the principle of rigid authoritarian power instead of the principle of democratic majority; authoritarian support for economic liberalism does not necessarily amount to totalitarian quasi-religious salvation (*ibid.*). The term authoritarian liberalism was used by Heller to radically criticise German conservatives' attempts to enter into an alliance with big business between 1930 and 1933 in order to maintain economic liberalism at the cost of intervention in politics in favour of capitalist interests. The subject of Heller's criticism was not only the centrist policy of Chancellor Brüning, but also the constitutional theory of Schmitt with the formula "the strong state and the free economy". Schmitt recommended for Germany a strong state with a free market, resisting the threat of social democracy and emancipative experiments of economic democracy (Cristi, 1998). Heller's central argument is that social inequality is incompatible with constitutional democracy since it requires a high degree of social homogeneity, or at least its prospects for maintaining political legitimacy (Heller, 2015).

According to Polanyi, the more violently Western countries resisted

social democracy through authoritarianism in the name of economic liberalism, the stronger and tougher the backlash was: authoritarian liberalism crowded out democracy, weakening its ability to respond to the fascist threat (Polanyi, 2001). However, modern liberal-constitutional theory still underestimates the challenges to democracy from economic liberalism and sees it as a threat to capitalism. After the Second World War, political theory substantiates the key idea of the constitutional defence of liberalism, neglecting research into power structures that can formally or informally undermine democracy in a capitalist state (Hailbronner, 2015). Post-war neoliberal theorists who design legal and political institutions are developing domestic, international and supranational institutional mechanisms to control majoritarianism and 'democratic irrationality'.

In post-war political practice, "Les Trente Glorieuses" (Fourastié) of welfare states mitigated the contradictions between capitalism and democracy. Post-war democracies were created not only to counter state terror or aggressive nationalism, but to counter totalitarianism as well: Western Europe has built a highly manageable form of democracy marked by the stamp of deep distrust of popular sovereignty and even traditional parliamentary sovereignty (Müller, 2011). Liberal theory sought to resolve the majority dilemma by limiting democracy both institutionally (constitutional control) and ideologically (Rawls' concept of reasonableness; Rawls, 1993). The post-war liberal development of Europe has been characterised by a new vision of not only technocratic management functions, but also the essence of economic management. Wilkinson's criticism describes this trend as the de-democratisation of power and sovereignty; this neoliberal approach sets out a new vision of the individual as a market participant rather than a political citizen (Wilkinson, 2018).

The Freiburg Ordoliberal, for whom uncontrolled irrational capitalism was a threat to a social market economy based on order and competition, proposed the new concept of the economic role of the state. While analysing the ideological significance of neoliberalism, Friedrich noted the fundamental theoretical turn of German ordoliberalism with its idea of transforming popular sovereignty into individual market freedom as a tool to legitimise the constitutional order (Friedrich, 1955). For the Ordoliberals, economic constitutionalism, based on equality, individual rights and competition, was intended to ensure the complete elimination of class and ethno-national conflicts from the political sphere. From this point on, the self-identification of the subjects of constitutional relations in Europe (in particular, the European Court of Justice and the European Commission) will be conditioned by the ideology of economic rationality and the logic of market competition (Müller, 2011).

Heller's concept of authoritarian liberalism became part of the criticism

of Schmitt's political theology and German ordoliberalism. A common feature of these doctrines is the recognition of the state as a source of security and social order in capitalist society. In relation to the economy, the state is absolutely the dominant force: Schmitt and the German Ordoliberals viewed the state as a "security regime" and characterised it as the main instrument for "preventing civil war" (Bonefeld, 2017; Schmitt, 2008). For them, the Weimar Republic was an ineffective political structure that allowed the ruled to influence the strategy of the rulers. According to Schmitt and the German Ordoliberals, for the sake of a free economy, the state should have been built as a fortress in order not to become a victim of massive democratic demands for social protection. Schmitt argued his position by referring to Hobbes' concept of Leviathan as a symbol of dominant power, as well as to the traditions of conservative criticism of the egalitarianism of the French Revolution: Schmitt rejected the idea of social equality and defined lawmaking in democracy as the "rule of the crowd" (Schmitt, 2008).

Ordoliberals argued, based on the political intuitions of Smith, that the power of the state is fundamental to the creation of civil society. The state, as legislator, must uphold the law of private property and prevent "bloodshed and disorder" (Smith, 1976). In ordoliberal theory, the state is the political practice of the market police, where competition is not a category of cohesion and integration (Rüstow, 1942). The market police is obliged to maintain a competition of private interests, which can be reconciled based on common needs for security and freedom through contract and guarantee of property rights. Acting as the market police, the state civilises the behaviour of "greedy self-seekers" based on politically imperative rules of the game (Rüstow, 1942). The law is a means of social security and a category of personal freedom: individuals are free if they obey the law, but the law does not apply to riots. The rule of law is underpinned by social order as a key political category. For theorists of authoritarian ordoliberalism, the rule of law entails the absolute power of the state as a concentrated force of order: if a situation of choice between law and order arises, the law must be sacrificed for the sake of order (Bonefeld, 2017). Marcuse states that authoritarian liberalism is associated with the existentialisation and totalisation of the political sphere, when the depoliticisation of social relations entails the politicisation of the state as the dominant force (Marcuse, 1988).

Early German ordoliberalism expressed the political needs of a free economy in the form of Schmitt's political theology: it is vital to eliminate all democratic intentions of state policy, especially in the monetary sphere, which should not be run like a switchboard by a weak government directly dependent on the parliamentary majority or, even worse, from a non-parliamentary group posing as a representative of public opinion (Röpke, 1960: 232). In this context, the Ordoliberals argued that the desire for a free

economy presupposes a reduction in social democracy and total freedom to make executive decisions. The weakness of democracy in its effective response to economic crises and social unrest leads to the need that, according to Röpke, it must be supported by such restrictions and guarantees that will not allow democracy to be absorbed by democracy itself (Röpke, 1969: 97).

The reduction of democracy to a liberal economic regime has become the main goal of authoritarian liberalism in the post-war period. These attempts have included empowering European constitutional courts to rule on the legitimacy of parliamentary law, subjecting parliamentary law to the primacy of judicial oversight, declaring the majority system invalid, and using debt-ceiling regulation as a constitutional constraint on parliamentary power in the current European crisis. Since the early 1980s, there have been institutional attempts to remove and reduce the democratic oversight of political decision-making for extra-democratic technocratic institutions such as central banks, which have been given wider independent powers (Bonefeld, 2017). Slobodian argues that authoritarian ideas have shaped modern globalist neoliberalism, despite the fact that the path to it was “a twisting one of diplomacy, political economy and power politics”, and therefore identifies it as “the last episode of the twentieth-century neoliberal search for an institutional fix in a world they saw as always threatened by spasms of democracy and the destructive belief that global rules could be remade to bend toward social justice” (Slobodian, 2018: 258).

The concept of interstate federalism underlying ordoliberalism and the European integration project was embodied in the European economic constitution, according to which federal states operate within a supranational framework of economic rights and restrictions that dominate national democratic decision-making and legitimise the de-democratisation of lawmaking (Wilkinson, 2015; Bonefeld, 2017). Today, in the eurozone, the ordoliberal idea of an effectively governed community that should limit the democratic excesses of a mass society (Bonefeld) manifests itself in a federal form, including a supranational economic constitution agreed on by all member states. This megastructure reduces the national democratic regulation of monetary policy, restricts fiscal policy, and assures free competition and territorialisation of the labour market, establishing the regime of imposed liberty (Bonefeld, 2017).

According to Somek, the ambivalence of authoritarian liberalism as an instrument of eurocrisis management is an example of how actions taken in unfavourable conditions contribute to cognitive adaptation: confrontation with what needs to be done in an unprecedented crisis easily cancels what previously were considered as normative restrictions for delegation, and such cognitive adaptations occur not the least because delegation is based

on trust (Somek, 2015). Crisis management of the Economic and Monetary Union shows the administrative character of the cosmopolitan constitution of the member states (Somek, 2014). This type of constitution obliges states to present their results in a peer review process: the administrative dimension of authoritarian liberalism is associated with the growing importance of transnational decision-making processes, such as technocratic mechanisms and control and enforcement tools. In the present eurocrisis, the principle of the proportional exercise of powers is replaced by the principle of the proportionality of powers to unpredictable tasks (Somek, 2015: 78).

The post-war political mainstream did not offer an alternative to capitalism as a potential threat to the democratic order, which today is reflected in the criticism not only of the economic liberalism of Hayek, but also of the political liberalism of Habermas and Rawls for insufficient coordination with the problem of the ability of economic power to influence politics (Mouffe, 1999; Wolin, 1996). Independent technocratic institutions such as constitutional courts, commissions and central banks are becoming the norm and gradually taking root in neoliberal consciousness. European integration is becoming an integral part of the ordoliberal constitutional processes of building a “militant democracy” or “constrained democracy” (Müller, 2011). The principle of the militant defence of neoliberalism in the name of democratic consolidation is chiefly due to concern for economic liberalism, and not the goals of defending political liberalism and strengthening representative democracy. Modern liberal theory focuses on analysis of the challenges and dangers of “unfettered democracy” rather than the explicit threats of “unfettered capitalism” to social and economic equality, as Heller and Polanyi warned (Wilkinson, 2019).

Authoritarian liberalism and the eurocrisis: Ordoliberal structures of the European integration project

The democratic paradigm of modern political science is based on the concept of competitive electoral democracy. Indices calculated by Freedom House are widely used to define the state as an electoral democracy (competitive multi-party political system; universal suffrage; regular alternative elections; wide public access to the main political parties through the media and through open political agitation). An electoral democracy is procedural and limited in nature and defined as a method: such an interpretation does not intrude on the economy and the political system. As P. Schmitter and T. Karl note, democratisation does not necessarily lead to economic growth, social stability, managerial efficiency, political harmony, a free market, or the end of ideology (Schmitter, Karl, 1993). Contemporary critical analysts consider the mechanism of electoral democracy outside of the separation

from political institutions and the framework of the capitalist economy of liberal democracy. In this context, many critics view liberal democracy as a political tool and the most suitable shell for capitalism, and by no means as a means of human liberation.

In a democratic state, the political sphere belongs to liberalism, and the social sphere belongs to democracy: the political sphere is the space for limiting the powers of the state and protecting civil rights, the social sphere is the democratic space for the redistribution of welfare. Today, the new left is advocating cultural liberalism that promotes individual rights and equality of opportunity, while the new right is advocating authoritarian liberalism that defends a free market liberated from a bureaucratic state. These conflicting forms of contemporary liberalism mutually reinforce each other and add to the convergence of market individualism, bureaucratic collectivism and sociocultural atomisation which, in turn, is leading to depoliticisation of the economic sphere, making it completely dependent on market capitalism. The process of European depoliticisation as the main factor of authoritarian liberalism reached its apogee in the centrism of Blair's New Labour that proposed an alternative to economic neoliberalism, but in many cases deepened it. European integration has strengthened centrism through consensus lawmaking procedures and institutional support for market liberalism. Neoliberal austerity measures (privatisation, liberalisation, labour market reforms, regressive taxation) became the fundamental conditions for European integration, proposed by the member states of the Eurogroup, as well as the Troika of institutions (IMF, European Central Bank, European Commission). This requires the extreme intervention of the market state in a democratic process and the transformation of social contracts. While analysing institutional changes in the management of the Economic and Monetary Union, it is important to note that this trend is a symptom of long-term latent authoritarian processes in European constitutionalism (Wilkinson, 2018; Kaupa, 2017).

Bruno analyses the ordoliberal ideas on European integration and argues that there exist two ordoliberal paradigms of integration: one epitomised by Röpke's liberalism from below, which follows a bottom-up logic and posits that the commitment of the nation states to a liberal *Ordnungspolitik* is the pre-requisite for the international order (Bruno, 2023). In this paradigm, as Bonefeld put it, governments act as federated executives of an international order whose functioning depends on their commitment to govern through liberal economic practices (Bonefeld, 2017). The other, exemplified by V. Vanberg's competitive federalism, is top-down: a federal *Ordnungspolitik* can help the establishment of a liberal order on the national level (Vanberg, 2015). What matters here is not consensus, but competition. Not all member states need to be committed to a liberal economic policy from the outset; a

federal Ordnungspolitik that exposes them to the disciplining pressure of international competition among governments will force them to reform their economies in a liberal sense (*ibid.*).

In the context of the European crisis, it is necessary to talk about the politically authoritarian style of management of the Economic and Monetary Union, even if this managerial authoritarianism does not bear traces of direct repression (Somek, 2015). According to Wilkinson, authoritarian liberalism encompasses two key symptoms of the constitutional crisis of contemporary Europe – de-democratisation and de-legalisation. In the EU, there is a latent authoritarian aspect of governance represented by the binary process of de-democratisation and delegation, associated with ignoring parliamentary powers and democratic debates, and violation of guarantees of the rule of law and the protection of social rights (Wilkinson, 2018). To understand this binary process in contemporary political philosophy, the terms “executive managerialism” and “emergency Europe” are used (Joerges, 2013; White, 2015).

Efforts to combat the systemic eurocrisis and its implications for public debt financing have profoundly changed the legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. The essence of these reforms is manifested in the active and deep involvement of the European Commission in the economic and budgetary planning of the member states through the European Semester, which gives the Commission broad access to the entire field of domestic policy planning. The member states of the eurozone should not only submit to the Commission and the Eurogroup a draft budget planning for the coming year, but in certain conditions, following the results of the work of fact-finding missions, they may be sanctioned in connection with the failure to implement the recommendations based on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (Somek, 2015).

Constitutional reforms and the creation of new European integration institutions are accompanied by two fundamental problems that have been present during the entire post-war European project. The first issue is the legal authority and competence of the Union and the member states to take appropriate action. The second relates to the prospects for European crisis management within the existing “democracy deficit” (Craig, 2012; Menendez, 2014; Somek, 2015). In this respect, the contradictions between national and supranational legal competences inevitably lead to an increase in the deficit of democracy. The democratic deficit is that not one of the areas in which the European Parliament specialises – trade liberalisation, monetary policy, the removal of non-tariff barriers, technical regulation in the field of environmental protection and others – appears on the list of issues of interest to voters (Moravcsik, 2004). The transformation of democracy in the direction of market technocracy and market rationality is also a

manifestation of these trends. In 1995, Habermas noted an increase in the deficit of democracy in Europe: economic dynamics within the existing institutional structure were leading to the erosion of nation states through European law (Habermas, 1995). The concern of Marxists and critical theorists about the economically liberal bias of the European integration and its impact on social democracy can be traced back to before the Single European Act was adopted. Although authoritarian-liberal governance has intensified through the eurocrisis, the logic and dynamics of authoritarian liberalism and the underlying de-democratisation have been defined since the beginning of European post-war reconstruction, when the judiciary and technocratic authorities assumed the role of leaders of the European integration project (Cohen, 2007; Wilkinson, 2018).

Systematic interference in national law is observed within the framework of the European semester in order to develop a mechanism for reporting macroeconomic imbalances in member states. The checks conducted by the European Commission and the European Council cover all areas of public policy and areas over which the Union has no jurisdiction. According to Somek, due to the Union's influence on budget planning, the member states are left with a "core of sovereignty": national parliaments are not the main participants in decision-making against the background of the growing influence of the European Parliament and supranational executive bodies (Somek, 2015). W. Streeck states that where national democratic institutions are neutralised by international "governance", as under the European Monetary Union, their de-politicised empty spaces are likely to be filled with new content, which may be public entertainment of the "post-democracy" kind (Crouch, 2004) or some politically regressive sort of nationalism. Under the auspices of the emerging consolidation state, politicisation is migrating to the right side of the political spectrum where anti-establishment parties are becoming ever better at organising discontented citizens dependent upon public services and insisting on political protection from international markets (Streeck, 2014). The measures taken in response to the eurocrisis can be described as violating various constitutional norms stipulated in European treaties and constitutions: authoritarian liberalism leads to deconstitutionalisation, which is the flip side of excessive neoliberal constitutionalisation: post-war constitutional regulation in Europe reflects this authoritarian attitude, which is the systemic fear of popular sovereignty and democratic constitutional power. Various measures associated with attempts by democratic politics to strike back at the principles of authoritarian liberalism at the national and subnational levels are rejected and condemned by neoliberal constitutionalists as populist (Wilkinson, 2018).

Authoritarian liberalism is accompanied by a significant weakening of parliamentary power and parliamentary debate both within the member

states and within the EU itself, as well as the violation or refusal to protect social rights. The economic measures imposed by the Eurogroup and the Troika (IMF, ECB, European Commission) are neoliberal austerity measures requiring government intervention, breaking social contracts and disrupting existing social relations in favour of structural reforms. According to Tusk, the alternative to austerity is a dangerous illusion: Tusk links national resistance to austerity with “anti-German” forces and speaks approvingly of ordoliberalism as a “new rationality” and the main criterion of economic stability (Donald Tusk Interview, 2015). The authoritarian tendencies of European integration are manifested in the practices of “crypto-federalism” and “integration by stealth”. Crypto-federalism is federalism without a federal constitution, when the subjects of political integration do not act openly in the direction of the federal constitution, but non-publicly launches the integration process, while political integration takes place under the guise of economic integration. The integration by stealth strategy renders democracy irrelevant and provides key solutions to European elites: it is a *fait accompli* – a realised fact strategy that renders confrontation and public debate useless (Majone, 2009).

European neoliberalism is not formally a constitutional restriction and the internal electorate may agree with the idea of the absence of alternatives to neoliberal reforms, but today this idea is imposed as dominant. Authoritarian liberalism is becoming both a transforming and a ‘conservative’ idea and principle of the constitutional order in Europe: the post-war Euro-regime has mutated from a nominally rule-based structure accompanied by market discipline to a discretionary regime reinforced by bureaucratic power; the goal of the mutation is to preserve Europe’s neoliberal constitution and its underlying market principle (Bonefeld, 2017; Wilkinson, 2015). For post-war political philosophy, the convergence of authoritarianism and liberalism seems conceptually untenable given that the considered conceptual dichotomy is about political, not economic liberalism. During the ideological battles of the Cold War, liberalism was closely associated with democracy (in Western capitalism) and opposed to authoritarianism (in Soviet communism). In the theories of Rawls and Habermas, liberal democracy is combined with egalitarian and progressive tendencies (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1995). However, they offer neither an alternative to capitalism as a subject of political economy, nor an analysis of capitalism as a threat to the democratic order (Wolin, 1996).

The COVID-19 pandemic affected all European societies. This new crisis arrived after a period of gradual recovery from the 2008 financial crisis that had jeopardised the achievement of the Europe Strategy 2020 (ES2020) targets. The need to recover for the European countries, which had austerity programmes during the financial crisis, is crucial to ensure the continuation

of economic and social development. Currently, there is strong European investment in response to the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic, with all countries defining measures adjusted to protect the most vulnerable groups. As Casquilho-Martins and Belchior-Rocha note, the implications of these responses require political commitment for them to contribute to sustainable recovery and development: “the influence that the economic and financial crisis of 2008 had on the EU is remarkable and did nothing to ensure that in 2020 societies will be prepared for a new global crisis” (Casquilho-Martins and Belchior-Rocha, 2022: 36). According to Hočevar, during the COVID-19 crisis, “the main goal of the EU did not change, i.e., the reproduction of the capitalist economy” (Hočevar, 2022: 961). The COVID-19 crisis “might prove to be a unique response within the broader deregulation and flexibilisation of labour markets. When taking a historical-materialist perspective and comparing the reasons for the temporarily different cross-national policy responses, the making of general claims about radical and long-term Keynesian policies would demand a stronger and more organised working class, which is not the case in the three countries considered, nor the EU as a whole. As explained, the future of labour market regulation depends on the balance of class power relations and the EU’s orientation regarding that” (ibid.: 962).

To summarise, we can say that authoritarian liberalism is being reduced to the conceptualisation of the free economy as a political practice of latent economic authoritarianism: European ordoliberalism proceeds from the idea of the insufficiency of political liberalism and controls the democratic organisation of power. Today, the ordoliberal rules of economic neoliberalism established by the Economic and Monetary Union are in conflict with the democratic and social movements against austerity. Democracy and the rule of law, including the protection of social rights, are also nominally protected in EU treaties and the Charter of the European Union. Thus, the eurocrisis could transform into a legitimation crisis and a conflict of political values of ordoliberalism, market capitalism, European integration and democratic self-government. The essence of authoritarian liberalism lies in the fact that distribution and production issues are removed from the public sphere of politics and determined by market rationality and technocratic bodies: when politics is reduced to economic logic and market rationality, and the possibility of reformism is reduced to a constitution and constituent power, the autonomy of the political is reduced or to a pure formality or to the prospect of right-wing populism. In contemporary Europe, right-wing Eurosceptics are gaining popularity, and in this tense situation the authoritarian-liberal restriction of democracy can lead not only to a strengthening of market capitalism, but also to the revival of reactionary forms of ethnic nationalism and illiberalism.

Conclusion

The modern state continues to develop as a democratic state; its constitutional authority essentially depends on a fundamental connection with the people. The people here represent the rhetorical and symbolic power of sovereignty, which reflects the relative autonomy of the political sphere, not only from classical theocracy in the context of modern secularisation, but also from economic power. It is not simply a modernist worldview, but a continuous and fragile process of democratisation and cultural modernisation as well, driven by the social struggle against the confluence of political and economic power and class society; this narrative includes class, labour, feminist, anti-colonial, ethno-national movements and other forms of struggle for equality and recognition.

The autonomy of the economic sphere, acting according to the logic of the depoliticisation of inequality, the commodification of social relations and the erosion of solidarity, affects the legitimacy of the political dimension of democracy and the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Neoliberal theory shies away from analysing these dynamics, taking market capitalism for granted: it does not resolve capitalist contradictions between public goods and private interests, nor the structural inequalities inherent in the capitalist state. In Europe, authoritarian liberalism means the strategy of maintaining and promoting economic neoliberalism, to which the market economy and technocratic elite are shifting to contain social crises. Authoritarian liberalism embodies the structure of capitalism's dominance over democracy with the priority of economic liberalism and a technical role of political authoritarianism. Due to the presence and dominance of the values of liberalism, authoritarianism in this structure is neither repressive nor monocentric, it is subject to sharp democratic criticism in relation to the supranational overregulation of European integration processes.

European ordoliberalism as an enhanced form of authoritarian liberalism manifests itself in the constitutional consolidation of the primacy of economic freedoms in relation to legislatures and trade unions, as well as in institutions (European Commission, European Council, ECB, Eurogroup, European Parliament) that transfer control over economic and monetary management from parliaments to supranational expert bodies and executive power. Authoritarian liberalism is pragmatic and ambivalent: on one hand, if the emphasis is on economic liberalism, then authoritarian ways of managing and implementing policies are subject to the interests of property; on the other hand, economic liberalism can be an effective means of facilitating political authoritarianism, making it more acceptable to achieve interests. For authoritarian liberalism, the state is the dominant category of political economy. Authoritarian liberalism recognises that the free economy, as

a fundamental political category, is based on social order and constitutes an all-encompassing, totalising practice of government: for ordoliberalism, all economic crises reveal themselves as “crises of interventionism”.

The institutional model of authoritarian liberalism is made up of the principles of constrained democracy: constitutionally proclaimed and protected human rights and procedures for making political decisions either remain unchanged for a long time or are more difficult to change than the provisions that are regulated by ordinary law. The approval of the model of constitutionally limited democracy in post-war Western Europe was impossible without two conditions: first, the development of the welfare state, which guaranteed everyone a certain share of the social wealth; second, the integration processes that unfolded in the 1950s and imposed restrictions on the national sovereignty of European democracies through the creation of supranational institutions. The essence of authoritarian liberalism lies in the fact that distribution and production issues are removed from the public sphere of politics and determined by market rationality and technocratic bodies: when politics is reduced to economic logic and ordoliberal goal-setting, and the possibility of reformism is reduced to the constitution and constituent power, the autonomy of the political is reduced or to a pure formality or to the prospect of right-wing populism and disintegration. In contemporary Europe, right-wing Eurosceptics are gaining popularity, and in this tense situation the authoritarian restriction of democracy can lead not simply to the strengthening of market capitalism, but also to the revival of reactionary forms of ethnic nationalism and illiberalism.

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EMOTIONAL LABOUR AND EMOTIONAL BURNOUT: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SERVICE SECTOR EMPLOYEES

Abstract. Emotional labour (hereinafter EL) is a form of work that involves managing emotions and emotional expressions during social interaction to achieve professional goals and to fulfil the emotional requirements of a job. EL can bring negative psychological consequences for employees such as burnout and exhaustion. Such negative outcomes are determined mostly by the EL strategy that employees implement. This article seeks to expand understanding of the dispositional and situational determinants of EL, and the role played by dispositional variables in determining the outcomes of EL. Drawing on survey data from 29 employees working in the service sector, we find that among EL strategies surface acting has been consistently shown to have the most detrimental effects on employee well-being. On the other hand, deep acting can be viewed as a healthier way to perform EL, and the expression of genuine emotions can even reduce the negative outcomes of EL. Understanding the antecedents of EL strategies would therefore enable more effective interventions to be developed aimed at reducing burnout by influencing the way in which employees perform EL.

Keywords: emotional labour, burnout, antecedents of emotional labour

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Introduction

“Today, one only has to walk into any supermarket, phone a call centre or check into a hotel to recognise that for many frontline service workers managing their emotions as well as those of the customer is an integral part of what they do for a living” (Payne, 2009). This quote indicates that typically the modern service economy – the biggest employer in the labour market

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- is increasingly employing workers based on their social and emotional competence, also known as their 'people' or 'soft' skills. The management of emotions during social interaction in the labour process is connected with the concept of emotional labour (EL), a term coined by Hochschild (1983/2012). What is probably less obvious in the lay perception is that, first, EL is based on the emotional 'rules of the game' established by organisations and, second, that EL is neither inherently pleasurable, enjoyable nor fun, but can cause negative psychological consequences. The core of EL is made up of requirements to restrain and transform one's 'true', 'genuine' and 'private' emotions (or what the individual feels as their 'true self') to fit the organisation's expectations and requirements. Demands to suppress an individual's negative emotions or show positivity which they do not feel (i.e., emotional dissonance - the mismatch between genuine emotions and those required) requires energy and the use of internal resources. Over time, the constant effort to contain emotions (rather than express anger, offence, fear etc.) induces depleted emotional resources that can lead to burnout. While on the surface EL seems simple and effortless or enjoyment-filled, in the background complex roles and requirements are involved that result in high levels of stress, burnout and other affective outcomes. In her theory of EL, Hochschild (1983/2012) was primarily concerned with the consequences experienced by individuals performing EL and mainly focused on negative consequences. While conflict between the emotions felt and those prescribed is strongly related to burnout, EL is not necessarily something bad. According to Hochschild, both harmful and positive consequences of this kind of labour depend on when and how it is performed. Subsequent research has shown that negative outcomes associated with performing EL are determined mostly by the EL strategy employees implement (Pugliesi, 1999; Brotheidge and Lee, 2003; Judge et al., 2009). The concept of EL is thus useful in understanding the complexity of the emotional part of service work, its stressful and psychologically damaging nature, and the mechanisms that lead to the ill-effects of having to display conflicting emotions in the workplace. Yet, at the same time, it enables us to avoid the pitfalls of the mythologisation of EL as indicated above.

Hochschild described EL as a form of work "which requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others (...). This kind of labour calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honour as deep and integral to our individuality" (1983/2012: 7). The definition outlines two features of EL: it is performed for the benefit of others and requires the coordination of one's own emotions to create a specific mental state in others, such as joy, pleasure, security etc. Hochschild also defines EL as "the management of feeling to create a publicly observable

facial and bodily display” that is “sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value” (1983/2012: 7). The management of emotions includes pretence (the pretence of emotions and the hiding of true emotions – surface acting) and the ‘transmutation’ of one’s inner self (fusing the real and acted emotional self – deep acting). Workers who provide ‘services with a smile’ hide their real emotions and keep ‘smiling and being friendly’, or transmute them to client-friendly and profitable emotions as guided by commercial imperatives. EL therefore defines the conflict between projected, commodified emotions and unprofitable emotions that underlie workplace performances and need to be concealed or repressed. As Hochschild stated: “(...) for the flight attendant, the smiles are *a part of her work*, a part that requires her to coordinate self and feeling (...) to disguise fatigue and irritation” (1983/2012: 8, italics in the original). If a passenger reacts negatively, the flight attendant is expected to neutralise the situation – by increased kindness and use of the “company language”, which dictates standardised expressions of empathy. Competition in the labour market is forcing organisations to keep pressing for a ‘genuinely friendly’ service through the intensification of work, which on the individual level means that “for workers, the job of ‘enjoying the job’ becomes harder and harder” (1983/2012: 125).

According to Hochschild, the profession of flight attendant is the model that can be generalised relative to other service professions in which workers need to match their private emotions with the emotional rules of the company. Organisations force rules to homogenise service interactions, improve service quality, increase customer satisfaction and in this way facilitate their success and competitive advantages in the market. Emotions with the company’s interventions stop being the grounds of personal experience and become part of the capitalist labour process and the object of strategic use, management and control. This is leading to the ‘transmutation of an emotional system’ in which private emotions are sold as commodities. This kind of use of EL and the control over emotions reflects the imperatives of capital and profit-making.

EL – traditionally privatised and feminised – is becoming the model of the working behaviour of female and male service workers and a characteristic of the labour force in post-Fordist service industries generally. EL is clearly a class issue. It is characterised by exploitative and poor working conditions (such as low wages) and related to unequal power and control being actively exercised by management, while workers, especially in low-status service jobs, lack autonomy concerning how and when EL is performed, resulting in higher levels of stress and burnout. Further, a gender issue arises with EL because most employees in the service sector work are women, particularly at the bottom end. The unequal gender distribution of EL reflects the gendered emotion–reason binary and structural positionality of women in

society as natural caregivers, an aspect Hochschild (1983/2012) also underscored in her analysis. As noted by Müller (2019), women who do EL are not only exploited as workers, but also in a gender-specific way given their social position as women and the relatedness of EL to female gender (e.g., tasks including caring and loving are considered part of a woman's nature). In the context of hierarchical gender relations, where a woman's position is less valued than a man's, EL as women's work is undervalued, defined as unskilled and poorly paid. EL is considered women's work regarding which men are reserved due to its connotations with femininity (kindness, deference, empathy, complaisance, subordination) (see, e.g., Nixon, 2009).

Hochschild claims that the EL theory is useful while researching service workers in the private sector. Still, the EL concept is also popular among researchers who study a wide range of professional groups, including sales and waiting staff, school teachers, nurses, call-centre workers, workers in holiday and leisure centres, public service jobs and many others (see Bolton 2005; Glinsner et al., 2019; Veldstra, 2020, to mention just a few recent examples). The work of different service workers varies in both content and the complexity of their roles and interactions, which means this is a heterogeneous group of workers with differences between them reflecting the complexity of work or skills and qualifications required by different professional roles in the labour market (Payne, 2009). As precarious contractual forms of work expand, precarious work and the accompanying EL are not limited to the lowest-paid employees, but can also occur in better-paid jobs in the private and public sector, including management and highly-skilled professions.

In the context of precarious working conditions employees are required to not only produce positive emotions for their economic productivity, but to suppress the negative emotions caused by the neoliberal forms of work or insecurity of neoliberal capitalism. Veldstra (2020) identifies "the increasing demand for emotional labour from workers expected to manage a complicated set of feelings that include not only projected, commodified affects, but also the ambivalent or negative feelings that derive from their working environment, location in a class structure, temporal burden, cost-of-living, and social situation" (2020: 11). For example, Butler and Stoyanova Russell (2018) find that the EL of employees in the creative sector is not simply a source for cooperation with consumers (creating the feeling of well-being in users and clients), but also with (several) employers and during salary negotiations. To please employers and preserve the relationships with them on an equal level – even when the payment rate and timeliness of payment fall below acceptable standards – they are forced to project an image of positivity and suppress their feelings of anxiety and frustration (and not appear too needy or too forward) that come from financial insecurity.

EL therefore includes the replacement of an 'unkind' personality with a 'friendly' one and at the same time certain kinds of enthusiasm, engagement and passion in playing the commodified form of personality despite or precisely because, as Veldstra (2020) notes, such work is often precarious, unprotected and insecure. A positive attitude to work – the creation and maintenance of seeming satisfaction and optimism – is thus ideologically enforced on late capitalism's precarious workers – contributing to the normalisation of insecure working conditions without improving the quality of life for precarious workers or ensuring their future. This means that employees working in companies which follow explicit or implicit affective labour policies are forced to internalise the burden of their own precarity, and manage it through affective resilience as if it were an ordinary crisis (Veldstra, 2017). Workers therefore carry a large personal cost due to precarity, while they continue to express optimism. Such an emotional attitude portrayed by workers to their own working environment at its core inauthentic and psychologically burdens the individual due to the continuous practice of hiding of their negative feelings. The EL expected from precarious workers is defined by "cruel optimism", an expression used by Lauren Berlant (2011, as cited in Veldstra, 2020: 4) to define a contemporary structure of feelings where the goals one is required or desires to pursue simultaneously impede on the ability for one to flourish.

Although many studies have examined the consequences of EL, empirical evidence is mixed; research has found that EL produces both benefits and detrimental effects for individual workers (see, e.g., Lazányi, 2010). The purpose of the article is to deepen understanding of the influence of personal and situational factors while responding to the need for EL and the role of personal factors in determining the outcomes of EL. Understanding the influence of dispositional variables in the occurrence of consequences associated with performing EL would assist while developing interventions aimed at reducing them. Most burnout interventions were historically oriented to the individual (Maslach and Goldberg, 1998). Yet, more recent interventions acknowledge that such interventions should consider both situational and dispositional aspects in order to be effective because burnout may also occur as a result of person-job misfit (Maslach and Goldberg, 1998; Maslach et al., 2001).

The article is structured as follows. First, we present different EL strategies. Next, the situational and dispositional antecedents included in the study are described along with an explanation of why they are considered to be important in EL. Our findings are then presented in light of burnout prevention and discussed in consideration of certain previous research in the area. The final section presents the conclusion.

Emotional labour strategies

EL research indicates that in itself the expression of emotions is not necessarily stressful; the negative consequences are chiefly due to emotional dissonance (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012). Still, regardless of the importance of emotional dissonance in EL, especially in determining the outcomes of performing EL, it is important to keep in mind that EL does not always involve emotional dissonance (Brotheridge and Lee, 2003). Throughout this article, EL is viewed as expressing organisationally prescribed emotions, regardless of the level of emotional dissonance. In cases characterised by dissonance, expressing the required emotions is definitely more difficult than when there is congruence between genuine emotions and the prescribed ones. However, even when the required and genuine emotions are congruent, EL is still present because these emotions have to be expressed in the appropriate way. Display rules also prescribe how emotions should be expressed, not only which ones have to be expressed (Morris and Feldman, 1996).

Accordingly, better understanding of the EL process can be achieved if all possible EL strategies, i.e., all possible responses to emotional demands, are included. When a discrepancy arises between prescribed and genuine emotions, surface and deep acting enable employees to conform to the display rules and express appropriate responses. Still, an individual faced with this discrepancy can choose to express their genuinely experienced feelings regardless of the mismatch between the prescribed and their genuine emotions, which results in negative consonance or emotional deviance (Mikolajczak et al., 2007; Zapf, 2002; Cukur, 2009; Scarduzio, 2011). Emotional deviance is present when expressed emotions match genuinely felt emotions but are inconsistent with the display rules – the employee intentionally disregards the display rules and expresses emotions that are genuinely felt (Mikolajczak et al., 2007). Lastly, if organisationally prescribed emotions match genuine emotions employees might fulfil the display rules without any additional effort. In these cases, employees are performing EL through the expression of naturally felt emotions (Diefendorff et al., 2005) or emotional consonance (Näring et al., 2006).

Different EL strategies have been shown to have various dispositional and situational determinants (Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011). Some individuals might be predisposed to surface act in response to EL demands, while others might prefer to fulfil them through deep acting. Distinct EL strategies have been associated with differential outcomes as well.

The results of meta-analyses confirm that emotional dissonance and surface acting bring the most detrimental outcomes for employee well-being and that deep acting has generally weak effects that are negligible compared to the effects of surface acting (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012; Wang et al.,

2011; Osolnik, 2011). The effects of expressing genuine negative emotions (emotional deviance) are comparably unfavourable (Osolnik, 2011). On the other hand, emotional consonance is generally unrelated to (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012) or even reduces reported levels of burnout (Osolnik, 2011). This means the negative consequences of performing EL might be largely due to felt dissonance and surface acting. Thus, EL is not necessarily a source of job stress or employee dissatisfaction (Šadl, 2002: 66).

Hochschild (1983/2012) proposed that most of the negative consequences associated with performing EL might be explained by feelings of inauthenticity – when employees feel fake – resulting from the mismatch between their genuine emotions and those they express. This could help explain the differences in the effects of surface and deep acting. While deep acting, employees consciously attempt to modify their inner feelings in order to conform to the display rules. Therefore, the discrepancy between the felt and expressed emotions shrinks accordingly. On the other hand, surface acting only entails modifying outward expressions, without any changes in inner feelings. When surface acting, employees only pretend, fake and suppress their emotions, which might only deepen the discrepancy. The discrepancy between the felt and expressed emotions should hence be smaller for deep acting compared to surface acting since deep acting involves attempts at modifying inner feelings to bring them into line with the displays required. The resulting difference in emotional dissonance is an explanation proposed for the differences in the effects of surface and deep acting (Mann, 1999; Grandey, 2003; Judge et al., 2009).

Different EL strategies have distinct impacts on employee well-being. Accordingly, understanding what leads an individual to respond to emotional demands in a particular way might prove to be beneficial. Here, both situational and dispositional factors should be considered.

Previous research has shown that individual difference variables have the ability to influence the way in which employees perform EL (Diefendorff et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011).

The role of dispositional and situational determinants in emotional labour

Surface acting has been consistently linked with detrimental outcomes for employee well-being. This means that understanding why an individual responds to emotional demands by surface acting should be a priority. Both positive affect (hereinafter PA) and negative affect (hereinafter NA) are expected to play an important part in determining the extent of surface acting. Understanding what enables employees to perform EL through emotional consonance seems equally important. This approach to EL has in fact

been associated with diminished levels of negative outcomes generally associated with performing EL. If dispositional factors play a crucial part in determining the response to EL demands (display rules), then influencing the way in which employees perform EL through selection and training would enable organisations to reduce the levels of burnout experienced by employees. Selecting employees based on their tendencies to experience certain emotions would also result in greater person-job fit (Morris and Feldman, 1996). A lack of person-job fit is one of the factors contributing to the experience of burnout. Conversely, greater person-job fit could potentially lead to higher engagement – the opposite of burnout (Maslach and Goldberg, 1998).

Emotional experience can be separated into two general dimensions: PA and NA. NA represents a general category encompassing dissatisfaction and aversive mood states. The dimension is composed of several more specific negative emotional states such as: fear, anger, sadness, guilt, contempt, disgust and nervousness. Analyses of emotional experience indicate that individuals predisposed to (experiencing) a particular negative emotion such as sadness also experience other negative affects – fear, anger and guilt to a greater extent (Watson and Clark, 1992). Therefore, negative affect encompasses a tendency to experience negative emotions. Similarly, PA reflects a tendency to experience positive emotions more often – the extent to which an individual experiences positive emotions like enthusiasm, interest, excitement and alertness (Watson and Clark, 1997). Both PA and NA affects entail a tendency to experience certain emotions, hence it seems reasonable to expect that both types of affect have an impact on the level of discrepancy between organisationally prescribed emotions and emotions that are felt – the extent to which an individual will have to manage their emotions or emotional displays in order to meet the EL demands.

Diefendorff et al. (2005) categorised dispositional determinants into factors that determine the need to act and factors that influence the individual's willingness to act – willingness to regulate emotions. The PA and NA affects should determine the need for acting the most among dispositional factors. Moreover, previous research findings indicate that among individual difference variables NA and PA are responsible for the strongest effect on burnout (Alarcon et al., 2009; Swider and Zimmerman, 2010).

For deep acting, a certain level of PA should first be required – which enables deep acting (to allow an individual to deep act). Then factors of willingness should play a decisive role. Job satisfaction is treated as a factor of willingness in this study. Employees who are more satisfied with their work should more readily engage in deep acting (in the case of a discrepancy between their genuine and the organisationally prescribed emotions). On the other hand, less satisfied employees should be more inclined to surface act in response to emotional demands (Wang et al., 2011).

Individuals who experience negative emotions more often (high NA) should also find their genuine emotions to more frequently be at odds with the display rules. Consequently, high NA individuals are expected to resort to deep or surface acting to meet the display rules more often (Brotheridge and Lee, 2003; Judge et al., 2009). Yet, previous research summarised in meta-analytic findings indicates that these individuals are more likely to surface act in response to EL demands (Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011). Similarly, individuals who do not experience positive emotions frequently might find their true emotions to be at odds with the display rules more often and therefore encounter a stronger need for acting (both surface and deep acting; Brotheridge and Lee, 2003).

While deep acting, employees attempt to alter their emotions by redefining the situation (e.g., viewing an agitated client as a hurt family member with a traumatic past) or recalling the appropriate emotions and expressing them (see Hochschild, 1983/2012; Wang et al., 2011). Individuals who tend to experience positive emotions less often thus should have greater difficulty recalling the prescribed positive emotions. Consequently, individuals low on PA should engage in surface acting to a greater extent (compared to deep acting). On the other hand, recalling pleasant, positive emotions should be easier for individuals who tend to experience them more often. This should enable high PA individuals to perform EL through deep acting to a bigger extent (Wang et al., 2011).

Therefore, individuals low on PA and high on NA should be predisposed to surface act the most given that they will be faced with the discrepancy between the genuine and organisationally prescribed emotions the most; lower levels of PA would also make it more difficult for them to perform EL through deep acting.

Hypothesis 1a: Surface acting will be positively related to NA and negatively related to PA.

Conversely, individuals high on PA and low NA should encounter the discrepancy between the genuine and prescribed emotions less frequently. This would enable them to meet the display rules through emotional consonance to a greater extent.

Hypothesis 1b: Emotional consonance will be positively related to PA and negatively related to NA.

Among situational determinants, display rules are the most widely studied antecedent of EL (Wang et al., 2011), followed by interaction characteristics (duration, frequency, and level of routines of interactions, as well as the intensity and variety of emotions displayed). In the present study, only display rules (both NA and PA) were included along with the frequency and

duration of interactions. Job satisfaction was also considered as an antecedent of EL, even though job satisfaction has been considered as both an antecedent and outcome of EL in previous EL research.

Based on past research, employees were expected to respond to positive display rules primarily by deep acting and emotional consonance; and surface acting to a smaller extent. Several authors agree that individuals respond to positive emotional requirements by deep acting because people have a tendency to experience positive emotions (Wang et al., 2011).

In contrast, employees tend to surface act in response to negative display rules – requirements regarding the suppression of unfavourable negative emotions (Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011). Surface acting should require less effort in dealing with negative emotions compared to deep acting (Wang et al., 2011).

Hypothesis 2a: Positive display rules will be positively and weakly related to deep acting and emotional consonance, and surface acting.

Hypothesis 2b: Negative display rules will be positively and strongly related to surface acting, and deep acting and negatively related to emotional consonance.

Outcomes of emotional labour: Burnout

Past research shows that the response to EL demands plays a vital role in determining the consequences of EL (Martinez-Iñigo et al., 2007). Surface acting is the most stressful and harmful response to EL demands. In contrast, deep acting represents a less detrimental form of EL (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011). The most promising finding arising from past research is that emotional consonance is unrelated to (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012) or even reduces levels of burnout and stress (Osolnik, 2011).

Burnout is the most widely researched outcome of EL. Burnout represents a pressing challenge for organisations since employees who were once enthusiastic and motivated professionals become exhausted, cynical and inefficient. Even though some of these employees quit their jobs as a result of burnout, many remain in their positions even though they only meet the minimum requirements and not their true potential. This demise in the quality of their work is felt by everyone affected by their work (Maslach and Goldberg, 1998).

Maslach (1982, as cited in Halbesleben and Buckley, 2004) defined burnout as a form of prolonged response to chronic emotional and interpersonal stressors present within one's job. Burnout comprises three

dimensions: emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, and lack of personal accomplishment. Emotional exhaustion and depersonalisation develop as a result of work overload and personal conflict; while a diminished sense of personal accomplishment develops in response to a lack of resources that would enable one's job tasks to be carried out (e.g., lack of time, lack of tools, of lack of information; Maslach, 2003). *Emotional exhaustion* refers to feelings of emotional over-extendedness and a lack of emotional resources. Employees experience it as a lack of the resources and energy that would enable them to improve their work performance. The main sources of emotional exhaustion are work overload and interpersonal conflict in the workplace. Employees feel depleted, without any possibilities for replenishment. Individuals lack the energy they need to face another workday (Halbesleben and Buckley, 2004; Maslach and Goldberg, 1998). Emotional exhaustion leads to emotional and cognitive distancing from one's work, presumably as a form of coping with job demands. For this reason, emotional exhaustion is usually closely tied to depersonalisation (Maslach, 2003; Maslach et al., 2001). The current study includes only one dimension of burnout - emotional exhaustion. Based on previous research, surface acting is expected to have the strongest effect on emotional exhaustion. Conversely, emotional consonance is expected to be related with lower levels of burnout. The relationship between deep acting and emotional exhaustion should be weak. When considering the relationship between deep acting and emotional exhaustion, it seems important to consider that an employee probably applies all EL strategies during the workday. For instance, an employee might express genuine feelings (emotional consonance) in part of their workday, while the rest of the time they perform EL by deep acting, and when dealing with a difficult client express appropriate responses through surface acting. When examining the consequences of EL, this fact should not be overlooked, whereas when determining the outcomes of a particular EL strategy, e.g., deep acting, the effects of other strategies should be taken into account. Therefore, the level of surface acting should be considered while examining the effects of deep acting on emotional exhaustion.

Hypothesis 3a: Emotional exhaustion will be positively related to surface acting.

Hypothesis 3b: Emotional exhaustion will be negatively related to emotional consonance.

While the theoretical underpinning is deeper in the theoretical part of the article, our empirical work in this study is limited to correlational analysis.

Method

Participants and Procedure

The sample comprised 29 employees working in the service sector in Slovenia. While ‘services with a smile’ were relatively poorly developed during the time of socialism, changes in the economic structure moving towards a market economy and Slovenia’s insertion into the global economy (beginning in the late 1980s) have required positive EL in service sector jobs similar to that required in the service sector in the West. Thus, successful frontline employees must constantly adapt to new organisational contexts and demands. As new forms of affective forms of labour have emerged, this takes considerable effort and can be exhausting.

Some of the occupations covered in the sample include: tourism and restaurant employees, sales and bank employees, hairdressers and other service occupations. A relatively small company operating in the tourism sector agreed to distribute questionnaires within the company and mail the responses to the researchers. Part of the sample included acquaintances of the authors who provided their responses in an online survey. The participants had to provide their responses by the start of April 2012 in order to be included in the study. The mean age in the sample was 38 years ($M = 38.46$, $SD = 11.30$) and two-thirds of the sample was female ($N = 19$).

Materials

The questionnaire included measures of positive and negative display rules, EL, the frequency and duration of interactions, emotional exhaustion, positive and negative affectivity. The scales were translated from English into Slovenian by the authors.

Positive and negative display rules, emotional labour, as well as the frequency and duration of interactions were measured/assessed by scales developed by Diefendorff et al. (2005). Even though the positive display scale includes four items, one was omitted due to reliability considerations. One item was also omitted from the negative display rules scale based on similar considerations. Both the frequency and duration of interactions scales include two items; however, duration was assessed with only one item. The scale for surface acting comprised seven items, while the emotional consonance scale was assessed with three items. Even though the original scale contains four items, deep acting was assessed with three items after one was omitted based on reliability considerations. All of the items had responses on a scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. The sample size was quite small, which may have caused the troubles

concerning reliability. Decisions to omit items were based solely on reliability considerations since the sample size did not allow for factor analysis.

Positive and negative affect were assessed with PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). The scale includes 10 items for positive and 10 items for negative affect. The respondents provided their answers on a scale ranging from 1 “very slightly or not at all” to 7 “extremely”.

Emotional exhaustion was assessed with the burnout measure developed by Malach-Pines (2005). The scale is made up of 10 items with responses ranging from 1 “never” to 7 “always”.

Job satisfaction was assessed with three items. Respondents provided their answers on a scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”.

The frequency and duration of interactions were included primarily as control variables because the sample included employees from a range of occupations. Both duration and frequency can differ significantly among different occupations and could have an important impact on a study’s findings. As the frequency or duration of interactions increases, it becomes more likely that employees will experience a discrepancy between their genuine and the organisationally prescribed emotions – which may affect the need for acting (Morris and Feldman, 1996; Zapf, 2002).

Analysis

Before proceeding with further data analysis, reliability statistics were computed. Items were omitted in order to ensure higher levels of reliability.

First, (descriptive statistics) means and standard deviations were computed for all study variables. Next, correlations between all variables included in the study were computed. This provided a test of hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b.

Results

Table 1 includes the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables included in the study. Cronbach’s coefficients α are shown on the diagonal.

The effects of dispositional determinants

Table 1 shows that surface acting was negatively related to PA ($r = -.39$, $p < .05$) and positively related to NA ($r = .40$, $p < .05$). Emotional consonance follows the opposite pattern of correlations, being positively related to PA ($r = .51$, $p < .05$) and negatively related to NA ($r = -.52$, $p < .05$). Hypotheses 1a and 1b are therefore supported.

Table 1: SUMMARY OF MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, RELIABILITIES, AND CORRELATIONS OF STUDY VARIABLES

	M	SD	1.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1. duration	3.57	.99	-									
2. surface acting	3.17	.68	-.03									
3. deep acting	3.20	.92	.25	(.82)								
4. emotional consonance	3.64	.76	.15	-.19	(.73)							
5. positive display rules	4.08	.70	.39*	.19	.27	(.68)						
6. negative display rules	3.46	.89	-.13	.36	-.13	-.03	(.61)					
7. frequency	3.30	.92	.20	.11	-.32	.14	-.24	(.79)				
8. job satisfaction	3.89	.73	.42*	.14	.04	.15	-.33	.31	(.74)			
9. positive affect	3.55	.53	.12	-.49*	.51*	.27	-.47*	-.14	.33	(.71)		
10. negative affect	1.94	.54	-.21	.08	-.52*	-.21	.09	.18	-.06	-.24	(.84)	

Table 1 includes means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables included in the study. Chronbach's coefficients α are shown on the diagonal.

Note: N ranges from 27 to 29. Correlations, statistically significant at the $p < .05$ are marked with an *.

Source: Own calculation.

The effects of situational determinants

Table 1 indicates that Hypothesis 2a was partially supported: individuals respond to positive display rules through emotional consonance ($r = .27$, ns), deep acting ($r = .19$, ns) and, contrary to expectations, also through surface acting ($r = .20$, ns). Hypothesis 2b was confirmed: employees primarily follow negative display rules by surface acting ($r = .49$, $p < .05$); however, they also deep act in response to negative display rules ($r = .36$, $p < .05$).

Emotional exhaustion as an outcome of emotional labour

Emotional exhaustion was positively related with surface acting ($r = .55$, $p < .05$) and negatively related to emotional consonance ($r = -.12$, ns). Hypothesis 3a was confirmed. The results support the expected direction of the correlation between emotional consonance and emotional exhaustion. Still, the association between emotional exhaustion and emotional consonance was relatively weak and not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3b was not fully supported.

Conversely, the level of emotional exhaustion decreases as interactions become longer for individuals who engage in surface acting less often. It is possible that individuals with lower levels of surface acting fulfil their EL requirements through deep acting or emotional consonance - which have been shown to produce less detrimental outcomes. Yet, when faced with

short superficial transactions, it is possible that they surface act to a greater extent since more genuine displays are more difficult in such cases/situations. Hochschild (1983/2012) observed that since the time for customer interaction is being drastically shortened, “it can become impossible to deliver emotional labor” (Hochschild, 1983/2012: 121). In these situations, any more involved relationship becomes unattainable and hence deep acting is replaced by the less persuasive surface acting (see Hochschild, 1983/2012). Even employees who would want to offer a deeper, more involved relationship are unable to do so in the given situation.

On the other hand, it is possible that such shorter interactions are more emotionally exhausting for different reasons (e.g., work overload or a lack of time) even for individuals who report lower levels of surface acting.

This study has several limitations; the first limitation to be mentioned is the sample size. This fact should be borne in mind while interpreting the study's findings. Therefore, future studies based on larger sample sizes should seek to support the reported findings before any more definite conclusions can be drawn. Next, another important consideration refers to causal inferences. All of the data obtained were cross-sectional. Due to the lack of a longitudinal design, the direction of the cause-and-effect relationship cannot be established. For example, it is equally likely that more satisfied employees will be more motivated to deep act since it is likely that employees who deep act experience more positive interactions with their co-workers, supervisors or clients – and are thus more satisfied with their work. Another important consideration is common method bias: all the data were collected from a single source (employees) using one methodology. Further, our analysis is still limited to correlational bivariate analysis. Further analysis should embrace multivariate analysis taking the interactions among the variables into account.

Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of the article was to deepen understanding of the personality and situational factors in EL, and of the consequences of performing EL, especially the role of personality factors in determining them. Different forms of EL hold diverse outcomes; surface acting has been linked to the most devastating effects, while emotional consonance could even reduce levels of emotional exhaustion (Näring et al., 2007; Martinez- Iñigo et al., 2007). Dispositional factors (PA and NA) also had a significant effect on all EL strategies. Consequently, organisations could indirectly impact the level of employees' emotional exhaustion by adapting selection procedures, developing training and coping programmes, or adapting the work process. Past research consistently shows that the degree of emotional dissonance

plays a vital role in determining the negative outcomes of EL. Further, previous research provides support for the importance of dispositional factors in determining the response to EL demands. Many authors agree that increasing the person-job fit, especially by selecting employees predisposed to experiencing emotions that coincide with the organisationally prescribed emotions, should result in a diminished experience of emotional dissonance and, in turn, lower levels of burnout. The present study's findings confirm the importance of dispositional factors in EL. PA and NA had a significant effect on all EL strategies. Of note, PA and NA together accounted for almost half the variability in emotional consonance.

Dispositional determinants also significantly impacted surface acting, particularly on the correlation level. However, PA and NA together did not account for the majority of the variability in surface acting as had been expected. Moreover, contrary to expectations, surface acting had a significant effect on emotional exhaustion even after taking the effects of PA and NA into account. Prior research nevertheless points to the important role of PA, and especially NA, in surface acting (Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011).

PA also played an important role in deep acting: for individuals with a certain level of PA deep acting is strongly related to job satisfaction. Therefore, potential interventions aimed at increasing job satisfaction would bring more favourable outcomes for these employees. Thus, organisations can indirectly influence the way in which employees perform EL by including tendencies for experiencing (selected) emotions in selection procedures. Influencing the way in which employees perform EL can in turn affect the experience of burnout. Emotional consonance could reduce the levels of emotional exhaustion, while surface acting causes the most detrimental outcomes. Selecting employees based on affect tendencies could also lead to a greater person-job fit since most service occupations call for expressing of positive emotions while suppressing negative ones.

Past research has consistently linked surface acting to the most detrimental outcomes (Mesmer-Mangus et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011; Osolnik, 2011). Burnout reduction interventions should accordingly be aimed primarily at reducing levels of surface acting.

Apart from being the most emotionally exhausting EL strategy, surface acting became increasingly emotionally exhausting as the interaction progresses. For employees who tend to surface act less, the levels of emotional exhaustion actually decrease as the interaction progresses.

The frequency and duration of interactions could be conceptualised as an indicator of workload. Despite the study's relatively small sample size, the duration of interactions and surface acting were found to interact in their effects on emotional exhaustion. Hence, if the duration of interactions is viewed as an indicator of the workload, then as the misfit on this dimension

increases surface acting becomes increasingly emotionally exhausting. However, this effect was not found for the other possible indicator of workload – the interaction effect of frequency of interactions and surface acting on emotional exhaustion was not empirically supported.

A similar interaction effect of surface acting and one of the dimensions of person-job fit – the control dimension – was reported by Grandey et al. (2005); the positive association between surface acting and emotional exhaustion was stronger for employees with lower levels of autonomy. The relationship between surface acting and emotional exhaustion was not as strong when employees enjoyed greater control or autonomy. Therefore, as the misfit in the control dimension (i.e., the lack of control/autonomy) increases, surface acting becomes increasingly emotionally exhausting. Comparable findings were reported by Scott and Barnes (2011): the association between surface acting and work withdrawal was stronger for women than for men. Gender differences in evaluations of work and work performance have generally favoured men both financially and socially. Therefore, gender differences might entail a difference in the dimension of rewards.

Burnout occurs most often in emotionally highly demanding professions (Černigoj Sadar, 2002; Pujari and Pal, 2018). Here, it is important to apply an intersectional lens while researching workers' burnout as some groups may become burdened with the most EL: "often it's people experiencing oppression or marginalization through multiple factors who are assumed to owe the most EL to those in dominant groups" (Jorgensen, 2019). It is critical to understand the seriousness of the health problems resulting from EL among frontline service workers and to provide interventions to prevent or relieve burnout at work. Service workers' burnout is a complex problem, which means the solutions are also complex and require interventions on multiple levels – individual, workgroup, organisational and structural. By nurturing "the culture of well-being" (Čehovin Zajc and Kohont, 2017), organisations can help reduce the negative health effects of stressful working environments. Similarly, leadership can also play a significant role in dealing with EL by encouraging employees to share emotional responses. Leadership efforts aimed at removing emotional barriers in communication can improve the emotional climate of the organisation and have a positive impact on workers' satisfaction (Kanjuo-Mrčela and Vrčko, 2007). In addition to the individual and organisational interventions mentioned above (training and coping programmes, workplace transformation etc.), we believe that strong informal workgroup cultures or "communities of coping" (hereinafter CC) (Korczyński, 2003) can play an important role in supporting the health and well-being of employees. Research has found that CC can serve as a buffer against burnout (Surana and Singh, 2009). Communal coping, defined as "the pooling of resources and efforts of several individuals [...] to confront

adversity” (Lyons et al., 1998: 580), expands “resources and capacity for coping with stressors” (ibid.: 587). “Banding together to address stress provides some distinct benefits not gain acting alone” (ibid.). The stressor is perceived and acted upon as ‘our problem’ (ibid.) and stress becomes a community-level concern. Moreover, CC provide safe spaces removed from organisational surveillance and monitoring. Based on the organisation’s goals and norms, management can dictate the display rules and determine appropriate ways of coping with stress and burnout in order to better control workers’ responses. In CC, which workers might create in order to escape from the display rules imposed by management, workers can freely discuss work-related difficulties (low pay, excessive emotional and job demands, conflicts with customers or supervisors, stress) and understand the positive and negative effects of organisation-level interventions on their well-being and capacity to effectively respond to their customers’/organisations’ demands.

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*Sanja STANIĆ****EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE 21ST CENTURY – SOCIALLY NEGLECTED CHILDHOODS**

Abstract. *Childhood is socially constructed, depending on social, economic and cultural circumstances. Poverty, social differences, conflicts, and social injustice have a negative impact on children's lives. The aim of the article is to present childhoods under conditions of exploitation. Despite general progress, and the emancipation of children's rights, data confirm an increase in the number of children who are engaged in war conflicts, perform difficult and inappropriate work, or in slavery. In conclusion, the exploitation of children is considered in the context of social conditions and processes, neoliberal capitalism, globalisation, and documents that guarantee children's rights.*

Keywords: *childhood, exploitation, children's rights, social inequalities, globalisation*

514**Introduction**

The idea of childhood has changed throughout history. Considering childhood in Western European countries, the French historian P. Aries concluded that the “idea of childhood” did not exist in medieval society and the concept of childhood had been created by modern society (Tomanović, 2004; Corsaro, 2005; Brockliss, 2016). Since the Enlightenment, the perception of childhood has changed. Gradually, childhood is becoming the focus of the family and society. The world of children was separated from the world of adults, children were given their own space, they did not mix with adults, playing the same games and using the same vocabulary. The West's child-centred concept of childhood, which began to dominate thinking around the world during the second half of the nineteenth century, was itself continually being developed, refined and contested (Brockliss, 2016: 3–5).

Contemporary social changes, primarily in family structure, culture and other social institutions, have strongly impacted the concept of childhood. Authors agree that the emergence of the modern idea of childhood is a product of modernity and bourgeois ethos. As Jenks states, “children have

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become our main preoccupation, we have become their protectors and nurturers, and they have become the main object of our love, our human capital, and our future” (2004: 97). Placing the child in the centre and attributing great importance to childhood, the modern era sees the child as an investment in the future, an object of love and human capital (Tomanović, 2004: 10–11). Zelizer follows this transformation through the change in the social value of the child. The economically useful child of the 19th century was replaced by the economically useless yet emotionally priceless child of the 20th century. The sentimentalisation of childhood extended to all social classes. The meaning of a child in the 20th century is almost sacral, as it “inhabits a special world governed by feelings, not work and profit” (2004: 77–78).

Today, the Western concept and idea of childhood has become almost global. As the great European powers, and to a lesser extent the USA, became globally commercially and militarily dominant after the 1850s, the rest of the world began to look at Western culture as an ideal to be imitated and absorbed. This was also true for the concept of childhood and raising children (Brockliss, 2016:1).¹ However, despite the globalisation of the Western concept of childhood and emancipation of the emotional meaning of the child, it cannot be said that childhood is universalised. Parallel to the childhoods that take place with safety and well-being, many children are not encompassed by social changes and processes that improve their position and ensure well-being. Besides progress as a dimension of the 21st century, we are witness to armed and civil war conflicts, social injustice, the deepening of social differences, and the growing gap between rich and poor, representing the context within which childhoods can be found that are quite different from those in West.

The main aim of the article is to present childhoods that take place in extremely negative social, political, economic and security conditions, childhoods that are mostly socially neglected. The focus is on describing, understanding and explaining the problem of children exploitation. The research questions are descriptive and normative (Dillon according to Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013) with the aim of addressing the continuity and causes of child exploitation along with what is to be done to mitigate the problem. To this end, relevant academic literature outlining the problem in both the past and today was reviewed. The selection was made using the Google Scholar database. To identify recent trends, secondary data were used.

¹ *Childhood has not been defined and experienced in all societies and times in the same ways. The Western concept of childhood could be understood as a historical and ideal type, existing more as a theoretical concept than the overall accepted practice. As Brockliss states: “The West’s child-centered concept of childhood which began to command the world’s attention in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century was itself continually being developed, refined and contested” (2016: 2).*

Children in armed conflicts

War is a serious conflict that includes material destruction, human casualties, and various forms of violence, some of which are especially harmful for children. In wars, children can be passive victims or actively participate in armed conflicts. Moreover, children are often recruited for the purpose of being active participants in armed or war conflicts (Haer, 2019). In addition, they can be used as spies, scouts, messengers, home servants, or sex slaves. In any case, they are exposed to extreme exploitation and abuse (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2012: 2). Although child soldiers are most often considered to be boys, estimates show that as many as 40% of child soldiers are girls (Conradi, 2013: 1212).

According to a UNICEF (2022) report, between 2005 and 2020 over 93,000 children took part in war conflicts. Since 2005, more than 266,000 cases of serious violence against children have been recorded in armed conflicts in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, while in excess of 104,000 children have been killed or injured in armed conflicts worldwide. There has been a strong annual increase in the number of children killed in wars since 2013. The report warns that the actual numbers are significantly higher than the official statistics.

Children become members of armed groups in different ways. They can be kidnapped or recruited into the army by force. They may join the army because of poverty or family debt. Joining armed groups can help them feel safe, ensure their survival, or improve their social status. It is not uncommon for them to join armed groups because they want to be with their peers.

In 2021, armed conflicts escalated. The most affected children were in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Yemen, Israel, the occupied Palestinian territory, Afghanistan and Syria. Exposed to severe forms of violence were 23,982 children, of whom 19,165 had been recruited, kidnapped or exposed to sexual violence, whereas 1,600 were victims of multiple forms of violence (UN General Assembly, 2022: 2).²

Due to the war in Ukraine, which began in 2022, the number of children engaged in armed conflicts is set to dramatically increase. This war confirms the severity of childhood in wartime. The consequences are already known by displaced, wounded or dead children. As the war is still ongoing, the data are changing. In August 2022, UNICEF reported that by that time close to 1,000 children had been wounded or killed during the war, while

² *The biographical book A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (2007) by Ishmael Beah, a boy who experienced the horrors of being recruited during the civil war in Sierra Leone, is an illustrative example. During the civil war in this country, from 1991 to 2002, children under the age of 18 made up 40%–50% of the rebel forces and about 20% of the government military forces. In total, it is estimated that 10,000 children were exploited for war purposes and forced to be soldiers (The Borgen Project).*

an average of five children had been killed every day (UN Report of the Secretary-General, 2022).

The media reports stories of children in the conflict in Ukraine. Some of them have been forced to participate in the armed conflict to protect and defend their families and communities.³ However, it should not be ignored that two sides are involved in this war, which means one may expect that children are also involved in the actions of the Russian army.⁴

Growing up surrounded by war, violence, sexual abuse, and the risk of being recruited can have a harmful effect on children. Ethnic or political tensions, repression or terrorism also affect children. Many children live in countries where ethnic conflicts or political violence are ongoing. This reality has become their way of life. Growing up in conditions of chaos and deprivation can endanger the psychosocial development of children (Ajduković, 1995), cause mental disorders, behavioural and sleep disorders, somatic problems, and endanger cognitive functions and moral reasoning (Ladd and Cairns, 1996). Despite many studies about children in war conflicts, we still do not have a comprehensive picture of the impact of war on children across time and space (Bahgat et al., 2018).

Throughout history, children have been exploited as soldiers or exposed in other ways to the horrors of war. Yet, the difference is that in the 20th century children acquired rights that guaranteed their lives and growing up with safety and protection. Despite legal protection and global efforts to ensure that children grow up in safety, the number of children in war zones is rising. In that way, their childhood is severely disrupted, as a period of life that should prepare them for healthy adulthood.

Working children

In history as well as today, children help with house chores, such as cleaning their rooms, looking after younger siblings, helping in the kitchen, or gardening. Children's activities, responsibilities, and easier household chores have positive effects on their development. They grow with self-esteem, prosocial and cooperative behaviour, they socialise into family roles, obligations and responsibilities (Goodnow, 1988; Klein et al., 2009).

³ *An 11-year-old boy voluntarily joined the Ukrainian army. He participated in combat and was hospitalised after being wounded. His commander was aware of the boy's age (Shevchenko, 2014). Groups of boys 'armed' with toy weapons protected their destroyed village after it had been liberated by Ukrainian forces. They control positions or checkpoints (Ramsay, 2022).*

⁴ *According to Garener (2022), Russia is indoctrinating youth by shutting down social networks and exposing them to propaganda influences through video games or by popular influencers. According to Boffey (2022), Ukraine accused Russia of using children's bodies as 'human shields' on tanks while they regroup their forces.*

There is a difference between child work and child labour. Easier tasks performed by children, well-structured and distributed, that do not limit activities, such as play and learning, are not child labour. On the other hand, child labour is work that harms their physical and mental health and limits their development (Fyfe according to James, Jenks and Prout, 2010: 108).

According to the International Labour Organization (2023), child labour deprives young individuals of their childhood, potential and dignity. It refers to work that is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children and/or interferes with their schooling by stripping them of the opportunity to attend school, obliging them to leave school prematurely, or requiring them to attempt to combine school attendance with excessively long and heavy work. Although exploitative child labour also exists in developed countries, it is most often associated with poor and developing countries, where children are forced to work to add to their family's income.

There is a particular burden on girls who bear the 'triple burden' of school, housework, and work outside the home, which increases the risk of them falling behind and becoming more vulnerable to poverty and exclusion (UNICEF, 2021). A child's age and the type of work they perform are considered important determinants. Work that is usually done by adults, in which children are exploited working in agriculture or industry, has attracted criticism (Momen, 2020: 7).

A useful division of child work is provided by Putnick and Bornstein (2016), dividing it into three categories: children's work in the household, for example, cleaning, cooking, babysitting, doing laundry, shopping etc., as a hidden and unpaid form of child labour. The second category is children's work in the family, namely, any type of work related to the activity or business the family is engaged in. The third one, child work outside the home, which can be paid or unpaid, is most common in agriculture, industry, and services.

It is difficult to obtain precise data on child labour. The reason is the sensitivity of the problem, closed families, or poor availability. Still, there is no doubt that, for the first time in the last 20 years, child labour has increased. UNICEF estimates that globally at the start of 2020 child labour had risen to 160 million children, or 63 million working girls and 97 million working boys in the world. That is an increase of 8.4 million child workers in the last 4 years.

The number of children working in hazardous jobs has grown by 6.5 million since 2016. According to a UNICEF/ILO report (2021), the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are expected to further worsen the child labour situation. Due to the pandemic, an additional 9 million children have been at risk of being forced to work. These children will have to put in longer working hours, in more difficult working conditions, and

many will be drawn into child labour because of family reasons like job loss, parents' unemployment, or other family vulnerabilities.

Throughout history, children have regularly participated in family chores and worked outside the home. However, there was a strong rise in child labour at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries in both traditional activities and newly opened factories and workshops. During the industrial revolution, child labour became more 'visible' because children began to work in large numbers in the industrial sector, often in the textile industry and coal mines. Working full time, and even longer than that, the children contributed their earnings to the family's income. It is estimated that at the start of the 19th century over 50% of children under the age of 14 were working in British factories (Tuttle, 2001), while in 1870, more than 750,000 children under the age of 15 were working in the USA (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). They started working at a younger age because, in the early phases of industrialisation, there were many employment opportunities for children (Humphries, 2013). The employment of children at an ever-younger age is also caused by changes in the family structure. While older children became independent earlier and left their parents' home, younger children took over their role in contributing to the household budget (Horrell and Humphries, 1995).

Corsaro describes child work in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the USA. Working children contributed to their families and economy as well (2005: 74-81). Their work was appropriate to their gender and age. Through their work, children gained a sense of autonomy and were proud to help their families, while having fun at the same time. At that time of strong changes in America, through work children played an active role in their own socialisation, developed their potential, and prepared themselves to enter the world of adults (Corsaro, 2005: 79).⁵

Working children are described in Croatian literature too. Research has confirmed that through the 20th century the economic usefulness of the child was significant. Between the two world wars, in rural areas the family was the basic production unit. From the age of 14 to 16, children performed all kinds of work on family farms. Jobs were assigned by gender. Children were taught by their mother or father (Leček, 1997). In coastal towns, due to poverty, alongside their work in family businesses, children aged from 7 to 17 years were forced to work additional jobs. While boys were more useful in their own houses, girls earned an income by serving in households (Vene, 2008).

⁵ Corsaro mentions the example of *Newsies*, boys who in the early 20th century contributed to household budgets by selling newspapers on the streets of American cities. They founded their union to prevent an increase in newspaper prices (2005: 78-80).

Changes in child labour occurred in the early 19th century. One of the earliest restrictions was the Factory Act passed in 1833 by the British Parliament to improve the conditions for children working in factories. Children were forbidden to work before the age of 13 and could not work more than 9 hours per day (Beck, 2021). In addition to legal restrictions, a significant change in child labour was the introduction of compulsory education. Zelizer considers that to these changes led to children becoming “a luxury for the poor, and a pleasure for the wealthy” (2004: 77).

Although limited by legislation and reduced by cultural and social changes, child labour remains a phenomenon in the 21st century. In less developed countries, parents are forced to send their children to work as an outcome of poverty or family debt. Employers often promise them a good job, accommodation, regular food, and an education for their children, yet research shows that the actual conditions are quite different, close to slavery as the worst form of child labour (Theuws and Overeem, 2014). Children often work in the textile industry and mining, mostly doing simple tasks that do not require knowledge and skills. Their work, especially in the fast fashion industry, enables affordable clothing and footwear. This explains why “a blind eye is turned” to children’s work. Children are engaged in hazardous jobs, exposed to dangerous devices or substances. In most countries, there are no control or prevention mechanisms.⁶ Among underdeveloped countries, child labour is often associated with trafficking, forced labour, and slavery.

Commercial sexual exploitation of children

Sexual exploitation of children is one of the worst forms of child labour. The Declaration and Agenda for Action (1996) defines it as

a fundamental violation of children’s rights. It comprises sexual abuse by the adult and remuneration in cash or kind to the child or a third person or persons. The child is treated as a sexual object and as a commercial object. The commercial sexual exploitation of children constitutes a form of coercion and violence against children, amounts to forced labor, and is a contemporary form of slavery.

Children’s sexual exploitation includes prostitution, pornography, trafficking for sexual services, online sexual exploitation, for the purposes of

⁶ For example, child labour in cobalt mines in the Congo. According to UN estimates, in the province of Katanga more than 40,000 children work in hazardous conditions in cobalt mines, without safety equipment, for a few dollars a day (European Parliament).

travel and tourism, as well as some forms of early and forced marriage. The International Labour Organization assesses that the sexual exploitation of children and minors is economic exploitation similar to slavery or forced labour. The destructive effects of sexual exploiting children are considered a serious violation of the integrity, dignity and fundamental rights of girls and boys as human beings (Riggio and Hecht, 2016).

Child prostitution is on the rise in less developed countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.⁷ Social turbulence such as armed conflicts, poverty and insecurity, running away or being thrown out of the home are also situations when children are forced to provide sexual services in exchange for food, money or protection. Children can be sold or bought for forced marriage or prostitution in underdeveloped as well as developed countries. They can be kidnapped and sold across borders to be used in prostitution in other countries. Due to the sensitivity of the problem and limited research, exact data are not available, although it was estimated that at the start of the 21st century there were 1.8 million child sex workers (Bardin, 2005: 266).

Child sex tourism has become a growing business in recent decades. Tourist destinations are chosen based on the offer of adult and child sexual services. The global social stratification gap has particularly contributed to the rise of the child sex tourism industry (UN News, 2019). In some countries, this form of tourism has reached alarming proportions, requiring urgent government intervention.⁸

It is commonly understood that children may be pushed into the sex industry because of poverty or a hard life. However, they are not the only reasons that children lead to actively engage in their own exploitation. There is a trend that children who are not facing financial difficulties enter sexual relations with adults in positions of power or authority exchanging sex for concession, gifts, or expensive items. At the same time, such activities of children are not perceived as prostitution (ECPAT, 2020: 3). In highly consumerist societies, prostitution 'for pocket money' can also be motivated by peer pressure, building identity and status through the possession of expensive things that their parents cannot afford.⁹

⁷ *In India, children make up more than 40% of sex workers. They offer sexual services in brothels, massage salons, tourist tours or streets. Many of them forced into sex work come from poor families in rural areas with the promise of employment (Srivastava, 2019).*

⁸ *Thailand has history of child prostitution (Lau, 2008). It is estimated that in 2009 there were 30,000 to 40,000 under-age children in prostitution (Milde, 2013). Children perceive the providing of sexual services as a desirable 'job' since the earnings from prostitution are significantly higher than with other jobs (Sachs, 1994).*

⁹ *In Japan, a society that has rapidly transformed from a traditional to a consumer society, this phenomenon is known as Enjo Kosai (McLellan, 2013). In 1996, the Japanese police stated that there was an epidemic of prostitution among schoolgirls (Reitman, 1996). This type of prostitution of minors for expensive gifts or pocket money is evident in other countries, including Croatia (Index.hr).*

Children in slavery

Slavery is an extreme form of inequality in which individuals own another person as property. The slave owner disposes of the slave's life and can exploit, sell or deprive them of their life without sanctions (Giddens, 2007: 270). According to the UN document International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, modern slavery is used as an 'umbrella' term to cover forced labour, debt slavery, forced marriage, and human trafficking. It refers to situations of exploitation that a person cannot refuse because they are exposed to threats, violence, deception, or the abuse of power.

In 2021, there were 49.6 million people in slavery, of whom 27.6 million were in forced labour and 22 million in forced marriage. The sale of women and children for the purpose of prostitution is the largest slave trade in history and a rapidly growing criminal industry (Panko and Babu, 2012: 68). It is estimated that there are about 10 million children in modern slavery today.

The most common forms of slavery refer to the exploitation of children through hard and unpaid work in agriculture, factories, construction and mines. It also includes child prostitution, pornography and other forms of sexual exploitation, as well as forced marriage. Child slaves work 7 days a week, including holidays, and are not paid for their work (The World Counts, 2023).¹⁰ The reasons for the rise of modern slavery are the over-exploitation of the natural resources of underdeveloped countries, global migration trends, the growth of information and communication technologies, low transport costs, low risk, the low price of modern slaves, and the fact that it is an extremely profitable business (Pupovac and Lovrić, 2020: 67).

Although children were slaves in history as well, the social circumstances determined how they were valued and the attitude to child slavery. There is accordingly a difference between the contemporary understanding of child slavery and that in times gone past. For example, in ancient Rome there was no difference between children in the family and slave children because both performed hard work. The idea of working children was not a moral problem for the Romans. Since work was integrated into a familiar environment, there was no drastic transition from a "carefree childhood" to work for slaves as well as for free children. Certainly, childhood was not valued like it is today and there is an obvious difference between the Roman approach and ours (Laes, 2008: 273–274).

¹⁰ For example, using boys as riders in camel races in the United Arab Emirates. At least 30 boys a month are kidnapped from their families to become camel riders, or the families themselves rent or sell them to pay their debts (Beaumont, 2001).

Childhood in slavery in the southern states of the USA is described in American literature. The life of children in slavery is reconstructed based on historical data. Although it was not easy for any slave child, there were easier and harder jobs. For example, it was easier to work as a servant in the house than on a cotton plantation (Corsaro, 2005: 70–74). Despite the frequent belief that child slaves were being excessively exploited, they started working in the fields at the age of 13. The reason is more economic and less humane in nature because if children worked hard they could not be expected to grow up to be productive adult slaves. Slave children had freedom of movement in the environment and could play with white children. Nevertheless, the differences were manifested in the play given that white children regularly held the main roles (Alston according to Corsaro, 2005: 72).

One form of modern-day child slavery is Restavek.¹¹ It persists in Haiti and affects 1 in 15 children. Extremely poor families, usually in rural areas, sell their children to wealthier families in the hope that they will receive an education in exchange for doing unskilled chores. Girls represent 60% of Restavek children. In their new families they perform chores and are not paid (Rezolucija Europskog parlamenta, 2018).

Conclusion

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This article set out to present childhoods dominated by exploitation. As shown, children have been exposed to exploitation in the past through until today. Notwithstanding human life and society in the 20th century having seen advances in various aspects, which improved the conditions of children's life and ensured a safer childhood, some forms of violent exploitation of children are still on the increase. Children in any kind of exploitation have lost their childhoods.

The introduction of compulsory education reduced child labour, compulsory health care ensured their health and life, while increased material standards improved their well-being and quality of life. In the 20th century, children obtained rights for the first time. The last century has been marked by the strengthened role of the state in providing support to parents for raising their children (Lansdown, 2004: 185). Noting the high level of care shown in child protection and the efforts to establish a safer and better childhood, the 20th century is often called the century of the child. However, a large number of children remain outside general development and the reach of measures that have been introduced on the national or international levels. Recent data even indicate that child labour and other forms of child exploitation are worsening. It is obvious that there is a gap

¹¹ The term comes from the French language *rester avec*, "to stay with".

between the efforts of the social actors and institutions and the different reality of many childhoods.

An explanation may be found in the notion of the social construction of childhood, which implies that childhood is a part of the social structure such as social class, family, or age groups. Therefore, children live their lives in the childhood determined by the dimensions of a given society (Corsaro, 2005). Positive or negative political, economic and cultural trends affect children's social environment, experiences and lives. This makes it appropriate to talk not about one shared childhood, but about many childhoods, the differences between cultures and within them, their class, ethnic, gender and other determinations (Jenks, 1996: 29–31). As Jenks states, there are no identical groups, communities, societies or social circumstances, and also no universal childhood. On the contrary, there is a plurality of childhoods, which can be constructed in different and changing ways. Childhoods should therefore be understood contextually. Childhood does not exist in a definitive and recognisable form but can be constructed in different and changing ways (Jenks, 2009: 93–98).

This article presented different types of child exploitation. As shown, children are exploited as participants in armed conflicts, as working children and slaves. Different forms of child exploitation were revealed as a historical phenomenon, a permanent problem that persists over time. In general, it can be said that what mainly links the various forms of child exploitation are strong social disturbances; more precisely, social inequalities, poverty, and social and political conflicts.

The childhoods described in this article should be perceived in the social and economic context of the modern world. Neoliberal capitalism, which has become an almost worldwide system, has intensified social inequalities and poverty on all levels. The chief characteristic of this model of capitalism is the maximisation of profit, while social goals and politics are neglected. Profit as the supreme value is penetrating the non-economic sphere, moving into areas like education, health, culture, sports and other social and public activities (Mesarić, 2006: 612). Capitalism, whose strength rests on the realisation of interests and production concentrated in countries with cheap labour and is based on the unconditional consumption of resources and goods, ignores human values and human needs, even the most vulnerable ones. Further, the exploitation of children is spread by globalisation processes that have expanded inequality as a serious problem facing world society (Giddens, 2000: 6). The impacts of globalisation, which were supposed to make life more certain and predictable, often brought the opposite effect (Giddens, 2005: 17) and contributed to a worsening of the economic divisions within and between nations, the rise of fundamentalism, and nationalist and ethnic tensions (Thompson, 2012).

In this article, the exploitation of children is generally described as a phenomenon existing in developing or countries experiencing turbulent social or political periods. At the same time, we are aware that socially neglected childhoods exist in developed countries, including those with an established democratic culture. Social inequalities have been increasing in recent decades causing a social gap and the related impoverishment of the population, which has a strong impact on children and their lives.¹² Children who live in poverty are exposed to deprivation and various risks, including the possibility of abuse in general. It is also worth mentioning that ever since the European migrant crisis of 2015 we have witnessed the inhumane treatment of migrant children. This topic acts as strong motivation for further research.

Modern child exploitation should be perceived in the context of legal protection, respectively, documents that should guarantee a safe childhood and quality of life. The first Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child was accepted in 1924 as a fundamental document, then The Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1959. Thirty years later, the 1989 expressed the ideals and goals of the world community in relation to individual children's rights (Hrvatska enciklopedija, 2021). The Convention established universal standards that should be guaranteed to every child. It was important in the international movement for children's rights because, along with the rights of care and safety, it introduced the rights of participation, and became obligatory for the countries that had ratified it. The right to monitor countries which had ratified it was implied (Lansdown, 2004). The Convention was signed by 196 countries and became the fastest and most widely accepted agreement in the field of human rights in history. Among international documents, the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children from 1990 defined challenges, opportunities, obligations, tasks and future steps, and is a supporting and transitional means for fulfilling the obligations imposed by the Convention (Čubelić, 1994).

Despite almost universal ratification of the Convention together with other efforts of national or international agencies, awareness campaigns and the work of NGOs, too many children are involved in different kinds of exploitation. There is a gap between legal acts aimed to improve the position and well-being of children and the reality of many childhoods in the

¹² For example, the poverty risk rate in the Republic of Croatia in 2022 was 18%, while among children aged 0 to 17 it was 16%. The influencing variable is not only social, but also spatial differences; the risk of poverty among children in Pannonian Croatia was 25.9%, while for the City of Zagreb it was 9.5% (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2023). The consequence of poverty is the child work that exists in Croatia. Due to poverty, children work as beggars. They are aged between 7 and 13 years old. For this 'job', a physical handicap is desirable. They can spend HRK 20 of the money they earn, while the rest is to pay off their parents' debt (Globus, 2014).

21st century. The data presented in this article confirm that many children are still outside the reach of acts that should guarantee their safety and protection, whether they are participating in war events, live in poverty, or are in forced labour. It seems that international documents are still programmatic, tasks and visions that need to be worked on. Nevertheless, their value is significant because were signed on the level of the world community and are binding on a moral and cultural level. However, their realisation takes place with different intensities in certain parts of the world (Čubelić, 1994: 457).

To the children who experience any form of exploitation, all four groups of the Convention's rights are denied. In the first place, survival rights like the right to life, an adequate standard of living, nutrition, suitable accommodation, and healthcare. Such children are also deprived of their rights to development such as education, the right to play, free time, cultural activities, information and expression. The children involved do not gain protective rights against abuse, neglect, exploitation, the prohibition of child labour, and the protection of refugee children or in armed conflicts. Finally, children are deprived of the right to participate in their environment, which is a group of rights that prepares a child to become an active, adult citizen.

The severity of the problems that exploited children face is depressing. The illegality and sensitivity of the phenomenon mean that precise numbers of child exploitation are not available; still the growing trend is evident. In spite of positive legal acts protecting children and ensuring them rights to live free from exploitation and abuse, as stated earlier, a large number of children globally experience some form of exploitation every year. This leaves space for action aimed at reducing social inequalities and ensuring all kinds of children's safety in an unstable world. To all who are children's advocates, regardless of whether they are individuals, organisations or state institutions, future efforts should be aimed at reducing child poverty, promoting peace, and monitoring the realisation of children's rights.

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ATTITUDES OF ECONOMICS STUDENTS TO SEARCHING FOR JOBS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA: THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Abstract. The article examines how the landscape of social networks has significantly transformed the job search process. The objective of the study was to evaluate attitudes to searching for a job on social media with a focus on students attending the Faculty of Economics, University of Prishtina. The findings indicate that self-perceived level of social media activity is associated with time spent on social networks, and that unemployed individuals are more likely than those with jobs to use social media. The results show the most popular methods used for job searching were social media networks and online job portals. A noteworthy finding is that even individuals who do not use social networks recognise the importance of maintaining a professional profile on social media when it comes to searching for work. The study's findings hold implications for both job seekers and employers by highlighting the importance of using social media while searching for a job, necessitating strategic investments in online platforms, customised support programmes harnessing these platforms, enhanced digital literacy, and continuous research to adapt policies in response to evolving social media trends among job seekers.

Keywords: *social media, job searching, recruitment, digitalisation*

Introduction

In the current era of increasing digitalisation, the emerge of social media has impacted many aspects of life, including the process of searching for a job. Considering the presence of social media in our daily lives, social media

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platforms have become a popular tool young jobseekers use to explore employment opportunities. Job seekers these days search for job opportunities mainly through online job portals or social media networks and most commonly contact companies electronically using a digital application form or by email (Petschar and Zavrel, 2016). Since the job search process has shifted online, it is important to investigate how this trend has impacted the attitude of people, especially university students who will soon be entering the labour market for the first time. Social media allows a company to search for potential candidates who are not necessarily in the process of looking for a job. This is a positive change given that previously it has been very difficult for companies to reach individuals not actively looking for a job (Davison et al., 2016). Further, job seekers need to manage their own social media profile and keep it professional by paying attention to what they share online, noting that around 70% of recruiters visit applicants' social media profiles and their decision is influenced by what they see on social media (Savković et al., 2016). Nowadays, half of all young adults around the world aged between 18 and 34 years can be reached by marketers through Facebook (Datareportal, 2022). Based on data analysis, the paper aims to provide missing information regarding how higher education students view the job search process through social media and to provide evidence for hiring managers on tailoring their recruitment strategies, career counsellors on better navigating the job market via social media, and young job seekers to inform them that the utilisation of social media increases their chances of becoming employed.

Higher education and the job search process

The academic pursuit of knowledge and the job search process are crucial for shaping students' professional journey. The competencies, skills and knowledge obtained at university are expected to prepare students for the labour market. Higher education institutions have long been considered as gateways to better employment opportunities. Graduates typically have lower unemployment rates and higher earning potential than individuals who have completed lower education levels (Baum et al., 2013). Still, once young individuals complete their education, they often face significant challenges in securing stable, long-term employment. These difficulties are compounded by the presence of a record-high number of well-qualified individuals currently unemployed in the job market (Živoder, 2011). A critical dimension between employment and education is skills development. In response to the expanding technology-driven labour market, bigger emphasises have been given to the development of digital skills. As MN et al. (2020) note, this focus on digital proficiency is reinforced by recent

research suggesting that educational institutions hold considerable responsibility for preparing students for the digital age, whereas employers specifically expect education to cover technology-based knowledge and skills in job searching (Hirudayaraj and Baker, 2018). Durak and Sefero lu (2020) stressed that digital literacy has become a cornerstone of employment. The time of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to digital competencies being developed among students as a necessary step in adapting to remote learning (Pavlin, 2021). Within educational institutions, teacher support for enhancing students' employability is considered vital (Zhao et al., 2021). The incorporation of more digitally oriented content in teaching methods means that students can develop more valuable digital skills. Such skills would not only improve their employability but also enable them to effectively use digital tools in the job search process.

Social media and its impact on job search

Generations raised without any memory of the time before the Internet rarely think about how much these technologies have changed daily life. They take information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet for granted as integral parts of their existence (Prodnik, 2014). For over one decade, online social networks have changed how we communicate and connect (de Mesa et al., 2020). Moreover, social media has become a tool that has affected the job search process and recruitment as well. Since social media may be helpful when searching for a job process, it is important to consider differentiated social media use while looking at how online job search behaviour may vary across the population (Burke and Kraut, 2013). While many use social media as a way to stay connected with their peers, organisations have been using social media for various functions like recruiting and screening job applicants (Segal, 2014). These changes in the way of living mean it is no longer enough for people to rely only on the traditional job search methods. With the emergence of social network sites, professional networking has also expanded to the online environment. In line with these comparisons with traditional employment channels (newspapers, friends, agencies), online job portals are able to provide a wider choice as well as increasingly more advanced tools to evaluate the suitability of a job for employment seekers (Kurekova et al., 2015). In the career building and job search context, when compared to usual online job portals, these platforms (e.g., LinkedIn) offer additional tools that allow users to establish contact with others "they may want to know or need to know" (Van Dijck, 2013).

Social media networks like LinkedIn, Facebook and Instagram can be defined as web-based services which permit individuals to create a

semi-public or public profile within a limited system and choose a list of users with whom to share their connection (Nicoli and Papadopoulou, 2017). LinkedIn has some basic features that allow employees and employers to create profiles. Users can track and search for companies or organisations they are interested in with those features. LinkedIn is used ever more by recruiters and HR employees in order to find potential candidates. With a single click, they can simply find users who are relevant to them with keywords (Fertig, 2013).

Professional social network sites like LinkedIn allow for a range of information about organisations to be acquired (Brouer et al., 2015) and hence enable job seekers to communicate with professional contacts and discover career opportunities (Hoye et al., 2009). Job seekers need to pay attention to their social media profile. A survey revealed that while Facebook is generally used for social networking, LinkedIn is used for job networking and, of all the social media networks, recruiters used LinkedIn the most. About 87% use LinkedIn to recruit skilled candidates. In comparison, about 55% use Facebook, and roughly 47% use Twitter (Jobvite, 2019). Accordingly, people must present themselves online in the best possible way. Employers and job seekers should be aware of the power held by social media in the recruitment process as they can benefit from reaching potential candidates and potential employers. In today's competitive labour market, social media use is essential for achieving success.

The changing job search landscape

The job search landscape has been transformed with a slight shift from traditional methods such as job fairs, referrals, and word of mouth to modern approaches. Job search is a complex and demanding effort (Wanberg et al., 2020). In this era influenced by technology, the conventional hiring and recruitment strategies of the past are no longer adequate to attract the most qualified candidates. Instead, what is needed is a modern and slightly adjusted approach to use technology to empower hiring teams to make more effective and efficient decisions in the recruitment process (Maharjan, 2019). Research by Smith and Jones (2020) highlights the ways social media platforms like LinkedIn, Facebook and Instagram have become integral for connecting job seekers with employers and expanding networking opportunities. The presence of applications and business wheels has fundamentally changed the way people search for work (Dwityas et al., 2020). The growth in Internet users affects the rise of social media users on smartphones and the shift to using job search apps (Mulyana et al., 2020). In contrast to conventional employment channels like newspapers, personal connections and recruitment agencies, online job platforms offer a broader spectrum of

job options and continually improve their tools for assessing the suitability of jobs for prospective candidates (Kurekova et al., 2015).

Regional and global Internet penetration trends and their job search impact

In a regional context, as outlined on the Datareportal (2023), Kosovo leads the Western Balkans countries in Internet penetration compared to Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, each with a penetration rate of 84%, as well as Montenegro with 83% and Albania with 77%. This large percentage of people with access to the Internet can impact the job search process as they find it easier to have online access to job opportunities and connect with potential employers. Analysis by Kepios, which produces reports on digital trends and online behaviours, indicates that the number of Internet users in Kosovo was unchanged between 2021 and 2022. Kosovo's Internet penetration rate at the beginning of 2022 stood at 97.0% of the total population (Datareportal, 2023).

Globally, by January 2023 over 5.16 billion people were already using the Internet, and, among them, 4.76 billion people were using some form of social media according to research presented in the Digital 2023 Global review report (Datareportal, 2023), which also established that almost 64.4% of the Earth's population is online. With 1.95 billion users, Facebook is the most popular social media used. Further, 50% of mobile Internet use is solely for communication applications like Facebook, Messenger or WhatsApp. These figures reveal not only the great role social media plays in daily life but also in the pursuit of job opportunities, making them an essential part of the modern job search process.

Purpose of the study

Unemployment is a significant concern in Kosovo. In 2021, the unemployment rate reached 20.7% (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2022). It was observed that women were more affected by unemployment (unemployment rate of 25.0%) compared to men with a rate of 19.0%. The most concerning statistic shows the highest unemployment rate (38.0%) is found among individuals aged 15–24 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2022). Social media provide young people with access to a diverse range of job posts as these platforms are a good place where job seekers can build their personal brand and showcase their skills and experience to a potential employer.

The research questions that guided this study were:

- RQ1: What are the preferred job search methods among the university students?
- RQ2: Are there differences in attitudes to social media as a job search tool based on age, gender, level of study, or current status of respondents?
- RQ3: Are there differences in social media activity levels and time spent on social networks per day based on demographic factors such as age, gender, level of study, or employment status?
- RQ4: Is there a relationship between the perceived effectiveness of social media for searching for jobs and the perceived importance of maintaining a professional social media profile?

Research design

A quantitative research design was used for the study. The researchers chose a quantitative study to analyse data of survey respondents' social media use and job search experiences relative to their socio-demographic data. Quantitative methods involve the processes of collecting, analysing, interpreting and writing the results of a study. Specific methods exist in both survey and experimental research that relate to identifying a sample and population, specifying the strategy of inquiry, collecting and analysing data, presenting the results, making an interpretation, and writing the research in a manner consistent with a survey or experimental study (Creswell, 2003). To understand the linear relationship between two variables, this correlation study used non-experimental research methods as determined by the statistical analysis.

Sample and data collection

This study employed an e-mail-based methodology to collect data from the target population. Of the 350 surveys distributed by e-mail, we received 200 completed surveys. The response rate for the survey is 57.14%. The sample for the study was 200 students at the Faculty of Economics, University of Prishtina. Participants were reached in collaboration with the faculty. The researchers had no prior relationship with the survey participants. Before conducting the survey, students were provided with an explanation of the study's objectives and informed by e-mail that the survey was anonymous.

The instrument used in the study contained 15 questions. To gather information in this questionnaire, two types of answers were offered. The first part of the questionnaire examined the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (such as data about age, gender, level of studies and

employment status). The second part consisted on questions focused on social media usage and the job search methods used by the respondent students. For most (10) questionnaire items, respondents could only select one possible answer. With two questions, respondents could select more than one answer. The survey questions were formulated to be concise and clear. The questionnaire was created using Google Forms, making it easily accessible to students. The research questions were originally written in Albanian and translated into English for research purposes. Before administering the questionnaires, a pilot test with 20 students was conducted to examine the questionnaire's clarity, validity and reliability. The respondents in the pilot are considered to be the first participants in the main survey. Cronbach's Alpha for the questionnaire was 0.81, indicating a high level of internal consistency.

Table 1 shows the socio-demographic data of the respondents, where 61.5% of the respondents were female and 38.5% were male. As to the age distribution, the data show the majority of respondents were in their early twenties, while 40% of all respondents were aged 25 years or older.

Table 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Variable	Socio-demographic characteristics	Respondents	
		N	%
Level of study	Bachelor's	98	49
	Master's	102	51
Gender	Female	123	61.5
	Male	77	38.5
Age group	Under 20	19	9.5
	21–22	61	30.5
	23–24	40	20
	25 and above	80	40
Employment status	Full-time employed	79	39.5
	Part-time employed	11	5.5
	Self-employed	15	7.5
	Unemployed, actively seeking a job	48	24
	I am unemployed and not actively looking for a job	47	23.5

Source: Own data.

Data analysis

To achieve the study's objectives, the collected data were managed and analysed using SPSS software. To understand whether the data have a normal or an abnormal distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Shapiro-Wilk) was conducted. The results of the test for normality show that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests reached the level of statistical significance ($p \leq .05$), indicating that the condition of a normal data

distribution was not fulfilled. Therefore, several statistical analyses and a non-parametric test were used to analyse the data.

Results

As shown in Table 2, the most popular job search method used by the respondents is a social network, with 78.8% of respondents relying on this method. The next most common method is Online job portals, with 72.1% of respondents using this method. The table also indicates that the official company webpage, University of Prishtina information channels, and the Employment Agency are used less frequently.

Table 2: METHODS USED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO SEARCH FOR A JOB

	Methods used by respondents to search for a job		
	N	M	SD
Social network	164	.7800	.41529
Online job portals	150	.7000	.45941
Employment agency	32	.1550	.36281
Official company webpage	79	.3869	.48828
University of Prishtina information channels	48	.2350	.42506
Valid N	199		

Source: Own data.

When asked which social media platforms the respondents were using, the data show that 185 students were engaging with Instagram. The engagement rate is high (88.9%), indicating that a significant portion of the respondents were active on Instagram. In addition, 169 respondents were engaging with Facebook. The engagement rate is 81.3%, which shows the strong presence of students on Facebook. It remains a popular choice among the respondent students for social networking. Finally, 69 respondents were engaging with LinkedIn. LinkedIn has an engagement rate of 33.2% among the respondents. LinkedIn allows users to provide information about themselves and their contacts, enabling potential employers to search for job seekers' information. (Sameen and Cornelius, 2013). This platform is a very valuable resource for connecting job seekers with employers. This makes it important to further explore why the level of LinkedIn use is relatively low among students and to offer suggestions regarding how they can optimise their use of this powerful platform.

The questionnaire examined whether any differences exist between time spent per day on social media based on socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, current employment status and level of study (see Table 3). Mann Whitney-U and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to detect significant

differences between groups and the time spent per day on social media. As indicated by the high p-values (0.81), the finding suggests that gender is not significantly associated with time spent per day on social media. No finding suggested that gender plays a significant role in how much time individuals spend per day on social media. The low p-values ($p < .001$) in the data analysis showed that age is significantly related with time spent per day on social media. This finding reveals that younger individuals are more likely to spend time on social media than older individuals. No statistically significant difference was established between bachelor's and master's students in terms of time spent on social media channels. Nevertheless, employment status was not significantly linked to time spent on social media (0.22).

Table 3: DIFFERENCES IN TIME SPENT PER DAY ON SOCIAL NETWORKS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Dependent variable	Demographic variables	N	Mean rank	$\chi^2(2)$	p	df	p
Time spent on social media	Gender						
	Female	123	99.79	32.876	.796	4	0.81
	Male	77	101.64				
	Age						
	Under 20	19	137.98	16.650	.643	3	0.04
	21–22	61	105.98				
	23–24	40	106.06				
	25 and above	80	84.75				
	Level of study						
	Bachelor's	98	108.17	12.346	.320	4	0.50
	Master's	102	93.13				
	Employment status						
	Full-time employed.	79	89.84	5.684	.121	4	0.22
	Part-time employed.	11	97.18				
	Self-employed	15	104.90				
	Unemployed, actively seeking a job	48	110.98				
I am unemployed and not actively looking for a job	47	107.10					

Source: Own data.

Table 4 presents the results regarding the differences between the level of social media activity in relation to socio-demographic factors like gender, age, level of study and employment status. Mann Whitney-U and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to establish significant differences between groups and level of social media activity. The results showed no evidence that gender plays a significant role in how likely respondents are to use social media to look for a job. Data analysis revealed that age is significantly related to the use of social media in looking for a job. These findings suggest that younger individuals are more likely to use social media channels to seek a job than older individuals. Bachelor's students were shown to use social

media channels more than master's students since the level of studies is significantly linked with the use of social media to find a job, as indicated by the low p-value ($p < .001$). The low p-value (0.00) also indicates that employment status is significantly linked with use of social media to find a job. The mean ranks of respondents who are employed full-time, part-time and self-employed are relatively high, suggesting that they tend to use social media more frequently for job search. Yet, a relatively low mean rank was shown for unemployed respondents and those actively seeking a job, revealing that they tend to use social media less frequently to search for a job. An interesting result is that the highest mean rank among all groups is for respondents who are unemployed and not actively seeking a job.

Table 4: DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY LEVEL BASED ON DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Dependent variable	Demographic variables	N	Mean rank	$\chi^2(2)$	p	df	p
Use of social media to find a job	Gender						
	Female	123	101.44	12.876	.652	4	0.75
	Male	77	98.99				
	Age						
	Under 20	19	111.97	13.203	.342	3	0.01
	21–22	61	119.19				
	23–24	40	91.70				
	25 and above	80	87.92				
	Level of study						
	Bachelor's	98	122.13	52.091	.412	4	.000
	Master's	102	79.72				
	Employment status						
	Full-time employed	79	91.72	57.702	.211	4	.000
Part-time employed	11	98.14					
Self-employed	15	97.17					
Unemployed, actively seeking a job	48	67.96					
I am unemployed and not actively looking for a job	47	150.12					

Source: Own data.

The relationship between the observed level of effectiveness of social media for job search and the observed importance of maintaining a professional social media profile is presented in Table 5. A noteworthy result is that individuals who do not use social media channels still think that having a professional profile in social media is an important factor in the job search process. This indicates that social media channels play a crucial role in searching for a job and hence maintaining a professional social media profile is a vital aspect as well, even for respondents who for different reasons do not use social media. Many reasons can explain why individuals who do not use social media channels still consider that maintaining a professional

social media profile is important. As an illustration, respondents can be aware of the social media use trends in the labour market and recognise the importance of upholding a professional social media presence.

In addition, respondents may have heard or read about the experiences of others who had successfully found a job via social media, further reinforcing the importance of maintaining a professional social media profile. Overall, this highlights the growing significance of social media in the job search process, and the importance of ensuring a professional social media presence, even for those who may not use social media regularly for personal reasons.

Table 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA FOR JOB SEARCH AND PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL MEDIA PROFILE

Statistics						
	Use of social media to search for a job	N	Mean rank	$\chi^2(2)$	df	p
Importance of maintaining a professional profile on social media while searching for a job	Yes, very often during the month	88	87.03	21.314	3	.000
	Yes, but no more than 3 times a month	44	93.93			
	Yes, but only once a month	36	113.72			
	No, never	32	131.70			

Source: Own data.

Discussion

By investigating the prevalent social media channels commonly utilised generally and during the job search process, this study makes a valuable contribution to understanding attitudes to job search through social media among the respondents.

Socio-demographic factors like gender, age, level of study and employment status are important elements in explaining the differences in social media activity levels and time spent per day on social networks. The study results show that women and men use social media at similar rates. Similarly, Perrin (2015) found that men were less likely than women to use social media channels, albeit since 2014 these differences have been modest. Further, studies by Masciantonio and Bourguignon (2023) and Shensa et al. (2016) did not find any gender-related differences with respect to the use of social media. Moreover, the results show that age is significantly associated with both time spent per day on social media and the use of social media to find a job. A factor that could contribute to this association is that younger individuals may possess more digital skills and are comfortable

using social media platforms, leading to increased time spent on social media. According to the findings of Rozsa et al. (2022), individuals actively seeking employment tend to participate in online social networking activities during the initial phases of their job search journey. In these phases, they invest time in evaluating their options and deciding on potential job applications. Consequently, they exhibit a lower preference for or commitment to specific job opportunities.

It is worth noting that the association between age, social media usage and job search can vary depending on cultural, socioeconomic and individual factors. Similarly, studies by Masciantonio and Bourguignon (2023) and Shensa et al. (2016) discovered that social norms play a supportive role in conjunction with the motivations underlying the use of social networking sites.

Regarding the methods used to search for job, we established that social networks are commonly relied on to this end, with our findings being in line with prior studies. Van Dijck (2013) determined that Facebook and LinkedIn are favourite spaces for 'performing' oneself. Masciantonio and Bourguignon (2023) suggest that platforms like LinkedIn, Facebook and Instagram are linked to the practice of self-documenting within the social networking realm. Nonetheless, in the presented study LinkedIn was used by only 33% of the respondents, suggesting that LinkedIn is not as widely adopted among our sample compared to other social media platforms such as Facebook. This research finding is in line with data reported in the Balkan Barometer 2023 survey conducted by the Regional Cooperation Council showing the percentage (N/%) of respondents in Western Balkans countries who use various social media platforms.

This study provided interesting insights into the use of social media for job search among different respondent groups. The data suggest that a positive association exists between self-rated level of social media activity and amount of time spent per day on social networks. This aligns with the idea that higher levels of self-perceived engagement or interest in social media are associated with greater time spent on these platforms. According to Valkenburg et al. (2022), qualitative studies have repeatedly established that media users differ greatly in their responses to social media. Therefore, this study suggests that self-perception can be subjective and may vary from person to person.

The presented study indicates that individuals who do not use social media still consider that it is important to maintain a professional social media profile while searching for a job. This suggests that social media have become a vital aspect of the job search process, and that maintaining a professional online presence is seen as crucial for finding job opportunities, even among non-users. Moreover, previous findings on this topic reveal

that maintaining a professional social media profile while managing and paying attention to what they share online is very important for job seekers as 70% of recruiters are influenced by what they see when visiting an applicant's social media profile (Savković et al., 2016). According to the findings of Robards and Graf (2022), social media posts and profiles are increasingly pivotal in employment processes, with employers relying on 'cybervetting' to assess job candidates, whereas social media disclosures can significantly impact career progression and even lead to termination.

It is important to acknowledge certain limitations when interpreting the findings of this study. First, the study was limited by the sample size, which may restrict the generalisability of the presented findings to a broader population of young people. Our research focused solely on the attitudes of higher education students and did not consider the perspectives of employers or other stakeholders involved in the job search process. This means that further research must be done in the near future.

Conclusion

The findings reveal a noteworthy connection between individuals' self-perceived level of social media engagement and the amount of time they invest in social networks. In addition, it should be emphasised that unemployed individuals tend to have a greater propensity to use social media than those who are currently employed. These findings carry significant implications for policy development in the region and internationally in several key respects. First, policymakers should recognise the proportionally greater use of social media by unemployed individuals. This observation suggests that investing in online platforms as a way of connecting job seekers with potential opportunities and resources could be a strategic move to enhance employability. Second, understanding that social media use is particularly evident among the unemployed points to the importance of creating support programmes to maximise these platforms. Initiatives that facilitate job searches, skill development, and networking within social media spaces could prove highly effective. Third, policy development should include provisions for enhancing students' digital literacy, in turn boosting their competitiveness in the job market. The fourth aspect involves a consideration of the ongoing research and the monitoring of social media trends among job seekers and how they evolve over time. As a consequence, policymakers can maintain their flexibility and adapt strategies in response to the ever-evolving digital landscape.

In summary, the presented findings underline the potential to take advantage of social media as a valuable tool for developing policy in the unemployment context. Understanding and recognising the value of online

platforms for job seekers can lead to more appropriate strategies to support job seekers on their journey to employment and overall economic empowerment.

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*Mirjana DOKMANOVIĆ, Neven CVETIĆANIN**

REGULATION OF THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY –LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE**

Abstract. *The aim of this article to identify and highlight limitations and challenges of the legal regulation of the use of facial recognition technology for surveillance purposes. The UN and the EU are seeking to develop robust human rights safeguards to regulate such practices, whereas civil society calls for a complete ban on its use for mass surveillance. The type of this technology makes it difficult to impose legal and democratic control over its lawful use and to prevent abuse. We conclude that the regulation of this area, no matter how restrictive, amounts to tacit approval of the mass use of this type of technology that opens the door to various ways of abusing human rights and freedoms, and whose justification from the perspective of the public interest is questionable.*

Keywords: *video surveillance; facial recognition technology; right to privacy; protection of personal data; Clearview AI*

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Introduction

The explosion of AI technologies, without sufficient guardrails, has already led to chilling setbacks for human rights. (Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights)¹

Video surveillance cameras on streets, roads, banks and shops, even in workplaces, have become commonplace. Ever more of these cameras (e.g.,

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¹ *United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Türk addresses World Standards Cooperation meeting on human rights and digital technology, 24. 2. 2023.*

closed-circuit television (CCTV)) rely on advanced technologies containing software to recognise faces and emotions. This facial recognition technology (FRT) is defined as “a specific type of biometric technology that refer to a multitude of technologies used for different purposes, ranging from the simple detection of the presence of a face in an image, to more complex verification, identification, and categorisation or classification of individuals” (Madiega and Mildebrath, 2021: 1).

The use of FRT is increasing globally. It was estimated that by January 2022 approximately 110 countries were either using or had approved the use of FRT for surveillance purposes (Bischoff, 2022). Common uses of CCTV with FRT for general surveillance include: as part of border control; in policing, to detect criminals and accelerate investigations, and find missing children and persons; in airports, to improve security and speed up boarding; in institutions like companies, banks and government buildings, to monitor visitation. One may expect an increase in the areas where this technology will be used, for example, in mobile banking systems eliminating the need for passwords, to unlock a car, in ‘smart buildings’ or to monitor employee productivity (Forbes, 2022). Companies have started using facial recognition to target advertising toward a specific audience group (Altaf, 2022). The recent COVID-19 pandemic saw novel uses of FRT such as for monitoring whether potential carriers of the coronavirus were obeying the rules of quarantine, to check whether an individual was wearing a mask and whether people were respecting the social distance rules (Becuywe et al., 2022: 27–31).

Accordingly, notable proportions of people’s lives all around the world are today being tracked and monitored by police, government agencies, advertisers, security agencies, banks and companies (Rainie et al., 2022). At the same time, the regulation of this area in many countries is still poor or does not exist at all. Clear boundaries on the use of this type of ‘smart’ surveillance of people have yet to be established, even though the risks of the uncontrolled use of surveillance of privacy and protection of personal data are high and indisputable. The aim of this article to identify and highlight limitations and challenges of the legal regulation of FRT use for surveillance purposes. The first section of the article presents an overview of the main concerns related to the use of this technology from a human rights perspective. The second part elaborates the position of countries and civil society in Europe with respect to attempts to regulate the use of FRT. The third section discusses the limitations of legal regulation on the use of FRT surveillance to safeguard individuals’ human rights and freedoms. In the conclusion, we argue that the regulation of this area, no matter how restrictive, amounts to tacit approval of the mass use of a type of technology that is opening the door to various types of abuses and restrictions on human rights and

freedoms, and whose justification from the perspective of the public interest is questionable.

Overview of the problem

The use of FRT is accompanied by many concerns regarding, among others, privacy, accuracy and control of the usage and storage of the data gathered. Over a decade ago, Karlovšek et al. (2008) warned about the need to set up boundaries for the use of a video surveillance to monitor employees. Worries have been particularly raised by the development of web-based intelligence platforms powered by FRT that are used not only by law enforcement and other state actors, but private companies such as Clearview AI as well. The practice of the mentioned company raises so many issues that some national authorities have banned Clearview AI from the further collection of data, as described in the second section of this article. Namely, this US-based private company's platform has gathered the largest known database of 30+ billion facial images sourced from public-only web sources, including news media, mugshot websites, public social media, and other open sources (Clearview AI). Clearview AI uses a process called data scraping to scour the Internet for what it states are "public" photos to stockpile its database. This includes gathering images from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Venmo and other social media applications without the tacit approval of their users. The company has declared that it "serves federal, state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies", supporting them "to identify victims and perpetrators in order to safeguard their communities and secure industry and commerce" (Clearview AI). Clearview AI states that it uses the photos gathered only to assist law enforcement. Yet, many argue the software represents "an invasion of privacy because there was no consent for Clearview AI to use their photos. Because of its algorithm, which recognizes faces even in the background of images, people can be identified even if they are unaware their photo was being taken" (University of Miami News, 2020). The possibilities for the abuse of photos gathered from social media without the knowledge and consent of the persons in those photos are immense, and the consequences may be chilling.

In many countries, citizens have pointed to the substantial and potential misuse of this technology and threats to privacy and the enjoyment of human rights. A survey by Kostka, Steinacker and Meckel (2023) indicates that trust in respective governments and their administrations plays a key role in the development of these acceptance levels. Acceptance of the public use of FRT correlates with cross-country differences in political contexts "with 51% of Chinese respondents showing the highest level of acceptance", while "only 37% of their American and 38% of their German counterparts

strongly or somewhat accept FRT for public use” (Kostka, Steinacker and Meckel, 2023: 12). This study also shows that citizens are especially critical of FRT uses in public when they perceive FRT uses as a threat to their individual privacy. A survey taken in the United States reveals that “only 36% of Americans trust technology companies will use facial recognition responsibly, and 95% of citizens feel they should have the right to opt-out of facial recognition; just 32% of consumers feel comfortable having their faces scanned by businesses, and 81% of them are concerned about biometric data misuse” (Wolf, 2023). In 2020, civil society across Europe launched the “Reclaim Your Face” campaign, demanding that “local and national authorities listen to their communities about the serious risks of using facial recognition and other biometric technologies in public spaces” (EDRI, 12 November 2020), while a global campaign to ban the use of FRT was started in January 2021 by Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2021a).

Citizens’ concerns about the threat to the right to privacy and other human rights are particularly in response to the lack of liability of and control over authorities, companies and other users of FRT. Addressing this issue, in June 2021 Andrea Jelinek, Chair of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), and Wojciech Wiewiórowski, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), issued a joint statement:

Deploying remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces means the end of anonymity in those places. Applications such as live facial recognition interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms to such an extent that they may call into question the essence of these rights and freedoms. This calls for an immediate application of the precautionary approach. A general ban on the use of facial recognition in publicly accessible areas is the necessary starting point if we want to preserve our freedoms and create a human-centric legal framework for AI. The proposed regulation should also prohibit any type of use of AI for social scoring, as it is against the EU fundamental values and can lead to discrimination. (EDPB, 21 June 2021)

The EDPB and the EDPS have jointly called for a ban on the use of facial recognition in public spaces. The call for a global ban has also been echoed by numerous civil society organisations around the world (Privacy International, 2021; European Centre for Non-for-Profit Law, 2021; Amnesty International, 2021).

In addition, this issue was the subject of various policy briefings whose goal was to warn European Union institutions about the consequences of using FRT for fundamental human rights. In 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service produced a study containing analysis of all

aspects of the regulation of FRT in the EU, considering that hitherto there have been “limited legally binding rules applicable to FRT” (Madiega and Mildebrath, 2021).

Position of the EU member states

In the EU member states a debate is still underway among legislators about the benefits and risks of using facial recognition systems. In October 2021, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters.² The EP expressed its great concern over the use of private facial recognition databases by law enforcement actors and intelligence services, such as Clearview AI, which has without a lawful basis collected a database of over 30 billion pictures from social networks and other parts of the Internet, including from EU citizens. The EP resolution calls on member states to oblige law enforcement actors to disclose whether they are using the Clearview AI technology or equivalent technologies from other providers; recalls the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) opinion that the use of a service such as Clearview AI by law enforcement authorities in the European Union would “likely not be consistent with the EU data protection regime”; and calls for a ban on the use of private facial recognition databases in law enforcement. Moreover, this resolution

calls for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement purposes that have the function of identification, unless strictly used for the purpose of identification of victims of crime, until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant, results derived are non-biased and non-discriminatory, the legal framework provides strict safeguards against misuse and strict democratic control and oversight, and there is empirical evidence of the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies.
(para. 27)

The resolution seeks a ban on facial recognition and automated analysis and/or recognition of other human features, such as gait, fingerprints, DNA, voice, and other biometric and behavioural signals, in publicly accessible spaces; private facial recognition databases in law enforcement; predictive policing, i.e., algorithmic-driven behavioural predictions to identify people likely to commit a crime on the basis of historical data and past behaviour,

² European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (2020/2016(INI)).

group membership, location or any other such characteristic; on any processing of biometric data, including facial images, for law enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in publicly accessible spaces; on AI-enabled mass-scale scoring of individuals.

In its Guidelines on Facial Recognition (2021), the Council of Europe has also called for a moratorium on the use of live FRT in uncontrolled environments, places freely accessible to individuals where they can also pass through, including public and quasi-public spaces like shopping malls, hospitals or schools. In June 2021, the EDPB and European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued a joint statement calling for a ban on the use of AI for the automated recognition of human features in publicly accessible spaces, and some other uses of AI that can lead to unfair discrimination. Further, the EDPB and the EDPS consider that the use of AI to infer the emotions of a natural person is highly undesirable and should be prohibited, except in very specified cases such as some health purposes, and that the use of AI for any type of social scoring should be prohibited.

In line with these demands, in November 2022 the Council of the EU approved the proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act, which is expected to be adopted close to the end of 2023. The text of the proposed Act clarifies that the use of “real-time” remote biometric identification system in public spaces is strictly necessary for law enforcement purposes and where law enforcement authorities should be allowed to use the system as an exception. However, several members of the European Parliament are demanding a complete ban on these practices (Reclaim Your Face, 15 September 2022). They consider that the proposed AI Act is weak because it does not prohibit ‘post’ uses of remote biometric identification, the ban would only be applied to law enforcement actors, and since it contains wide and dangerous exceptions that could undermine the purpose of the ban.

In the majority of EU countries, facial recognition in offence proceedings is not directly or clearly regulated but is generally a topic of legislation related to a criminal procedure code, data protection, personal data proceeding, national security service, police etc. (TELEFI Project, 2020: 40–190). The legal basis for having such a database for facial images is missing in many countries (TELEFI Project, 2020: 40–190).

In March 2023, France became the first European country to legalise the use of FRT surveillance. By adopting the Law on Olympic Games that envisages the use of FRT surveillance during the 2024 Paris Olympics, the French parliament formalised the introduction of the algorithmic processing of private data in public spaces (La Quadrature du Net, 2023). This step has triggered protests of civil society, branding the legislation “dystopian”, unconstitutional, and one of the greatest-ever violations of the right to privacy (Barker, 2023; European Centre for Non-for-Profit Law, 1 March 2023;

European Centre for Non-for-Profit Law, 25 April 2023). Many believe that the French government used the Law on Olympics as a pretext to authorise algorithmic video surveillance (AVS), thereby creating a worrisome precedent and normalising biometric mass surveillance (Duroy, 2023).

Belgium and Luxembourg are known as the only two countries, not just in Europe, but in the world, to have banned facial recognition. Even though there is no law in Belgium regulating the use of FRT by the government, civil society organisations have observed that the police and the government still (want) to use it, hindering the right to privacy, the right to anonymity, the freedom of movement, association, assembly and demonstration, and the right not to be discriminated against (Democratie Brussels, 2023). FRT has been used several times by the Belgian police, provoking a coalition of organisations to launch the petition “Protect my space” in public spaces (The Brussels Times, 15 March 2023). In November 2022, Italy prohibited the use of FRT until a specific law has been adopted; except where such technologies are used in judicial investigations or the fight against crime (Reuters, 14 November 2022). Many European countries are currently considering enacting legislation that would ban the use of FRT (CaseGuard, 2022).

In response to the concerns of European Parliament members regarding certain developments in facial recognition technologies, the EDPB recalled that under Law Enforcement Directive (EU) 2016/680 law enforcement authorities may process biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person only pursuant to the strict conditions of Articles 8 and 10 of the Directive (EDPB, 10 June 2020). The EDPB issued the opinion that the use of a service like Clearview AI by law enforcement authorities in the European Union would, as it stands, likely not be consistent with the EU data protection regime (EDPB, 10 June 2020).

In line with this EDPB opinion, in 2022 the Italian authorities imposed a fine of EUR 20 million on Clearview AI company for having unlawfully collected and processed biometric and other personal information of persons in the territory of Italy without an appropriate legal basis (EDPB, 10 March 2022). The US-based company was also banned from any further collection and processing and was ordered to erase the data. Based on the same grounds, Clearview AI was fined EUR 20 million in France (EDPB, 20 October 2022) and Greece (EDPB, 20 July 2022).

The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection also determined that the Swedish Police Authority had processed personal data in breach of the Swedish Criminal Data Act while using Clearview AI to identify individuals (EDPB, 12 February 2021). It was found that when using Clearview AI the Police unlawfully processed biometric data for facial recognition and failed to conduct a data protection impact assessment. The Police was ordered to inform the data subjects whose data had been disclosed to Clearview AI,

when the confidentiality rules so allow, and to ensure that any personal data transferred to Clearview AI was deleted. Similarly, the Finish Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman has issued a statutory reprimand to the National Police Board for the illegal processing of special categories of personal data when using facial recognition software (EDPB, 7 October 2021). The Finish National Police Board was ordered to notify the data subjects of the personal data breach and to demand that Clearview AI erase the data transmitted by the police from its storage platforms.

In the Netherlands, the Data Protection Authority has issued a formal warning to a supermarket for its use of facial recognition technology, even though facial recognition technology has been banned for uses outside the home since December 2019 (EDPB, 26 January 2021). Facial recognition used to monitor the attendance of students at a school was a basis for the Swedish Data Protection Authority to impose a fine on the local municipality responsible for the school (EDPB, 22 August 2019). The Data Protection Authority concluded that the school had processed sensitive biometric data unlawfully and failed to prepare an adequate impact assessment. In 2016, the European Commission for Justice warned the Maltese government that the planned deployment of a Safe City CCTV network with FRT would need to undergo a data protection impact assessment and comply with EU law (Biometric Update, 8 April 2019).

Many European human rights organisations have also pointed to the numerous severe harms that biometric mass surveillance entails, demanding a ban on the use of this technology in public spaces (EDRI). A coalition of parliamentarians and human rights organisations in the United Kingdom has called on the Frasers Group to end its use of facial recognition surveillance in its stores (Big Brother Watch, 24 April 2023). British human rights organisations have also expressed the concern that “live FRT would turn citizens into walking ID cards” (Big Brother Watch, 6 April 2023). Similarly, people across Switzerland (Reclaim Your Face, 30 November 2021) and Italy (Reclaim Your Face, 14 July 2022) have taken a stand in support of human rights and are opposed to any expansion of FRT mass surveillance.

This brief overview of the position of the EU member states and their data protection authorities regarding the use of facial recognition software in surveillance systems indicates that they are seeking to develop robust human rights safeguards to regulate such practices, whereas civil society demands a ban on FRT mass surveillance.

Discussion

The UN and the EU data protection authorities agree that the use of FRT surveillance brings clear risks for the enjoyment of some basic human

rights and freedoms, including the rights to privacy, protection of personal data and freedom of peaceful assembly. Thus, they stress the importance of establishing a strong national legislative framework in this area. In 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that “biometric recognition systems should only be used in public spaces to prevent or investigate serious crimes or serious public safety threats and if all requirements under international human rights law are implemented”.³

While states are tending to develop relevant regulation, there are growing demands from civil society and human rights organisations worldwide to ban FRT use. Scholars also hold different positions on this aspect. Only a few authors argue that the use of FRT should be prohibited. For example, Barrett (2020) insists that the use of this technology for children should be banned, but also for everyone else. The majority of authors, such as Nakar and Greenbaum (2017), Sarabdeen (2022) and Dushi (2020), are in favour of adopting adequate regulation. Sarabdeen (2022: 6) underlines that the current telecommunication and criminal law has “failed to address the technology induced crimes and breaches”, and hence “it is necessary to criminalise the unauthorised use, storage and communication of images through FRT”. He concludes that the passing of appropriate laws is inevitable given that the existing laws are inadequate for regulating the use of FRT by government and commercial organisations (Sarabdeen, 2022).

In its report published in 2020, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) highlights that it is essential to consider procedural rights when FRT is used by public administrations, including the rights to good administration, to an effective remedy, and to a fair trial (FRA, 2020: 33). The FRA considers that FRT may be used in public spaces if the deployment of such technology is assessed to be necessary and proportionate (FRA, 2020: 34). A study by Nakar and Greenbaum (2017) is a classic study that researches almost every aspect of FRT and the growing lack of privacy, researching in the same time legal framework for the use of FRT, especially in the USA and Europe, and universal concerns with FRT in their ethical and legal aspects. Nakar and Greenbaum observe that there is no definite consensus even in the industry and among stakeholders over different recommendations and instructions for how to use FRT, and that it is essential that the government step up and provide the regulation (Nakar and Greenbaum, 2017: 123).

Many other authors warn of the risks that FRT use imposes on individuals and their basic rights and freedoms (Lai and Rau, 2021; Lynch, 2020; Barrett, 2020; Hamman and Smith, 2019; Hirose, 2016; Introna and Nissenbaum,

³ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. *Interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner on the report identifying recent trends and challenges with regard to the human right to privacy*. 16 September 2022. Accesible at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2022/09/interactive-dialogue-high-commissioner-report-identifying-recent-trends-and>, 5. 5. 2023.

2010; Dushi, 2020; Brey, 2004). In her article that includes a “Non-Orwellian draft legal proposal”, Raposo (2020) advocates

the creation of a specific law on the use of facial recognition technology for identification in law enforcement, based on existing regulations, to specifically address the pressing issues arising in this domain, with the ultimate aim to allow its use under certain conditions and to protect the rights of the people involved, but also to provide law enforcement authorities with the necessary tools to combat serious crimes.

In their comparative analysis of video surveillance regulation in data protection laws in the former states of Yugoslavia, Krivokapić et al. (2020) conclude that it will be difficult to implement novel regulations on video surveillance based on the new technology due to its considerable potential to violate fundamental human rights. Crawford (2019) argues that there is a need for a moratorium on this technology until appropriate safeguards are put in place. Madiega and Mildebrath (2021: 1) warns that “even if courts attempted to close gaps in protection through an extensive interpretation of the pre-existing legal framework, legal uncertainties and complexities would remain”.

The overview of the standpoints of authors with respect to this problem indicates that, despite their different views, they agree on the great potential of FRT surveillance to violate basic human rights and freedoms. They also agree that it is difficult to monitor the implementation of regulation, prevent abuses and sanction violators.

We contend that no regulation, no matter how strict, can prevent the misuse and abuse of this sophisticated AI technology. In support of this claim, we argue as follows:

- There is no efficient mechanism thus far to ensure democratic control of the controllers and the FRT operators in charge of the processing, storing and use of collected photos and other data, especially regarding live surveillance in public spaces. While a legal framework may foresee organisational, technical and personnel protection measures aimed at preventing the violation of human rights and freedoms, there is no efficient way to monitor whether they are being implemented properly, lawfully and ethically.
- The performance of AI algorithms has been developing at a fast pace, while the use of this technology has also been widening rapidly. Face recognition accuracy was increased with mask-aware face recognition system, developed during COVID-19 pandemic, that can identify persons with or without facial mask presence. Face Emotion Recognition software, the process of mapping facial expressions to identify emotions, is

also in growing use, as are other technologies related to speech recognition, sound identification etc. The quick development of this technology means that gaps in legislation may be expected, along with an increase in risks of the violation of human rights and freedoms.

- Putting the face of an individual into a search engine creates the possibility that their face could be linked to their name and other personal data by cross-checking the face with their social media profile. This and similar types of cross-checking of data using AI algorithms cannot be prevented, thus there is a high risk of the collected data being abused.
- As a rule, scanning the faces of individuals is done without their consent. Even if they had been warned that they were being watched, mass general surveillance causes 'chilling effects' and the substantial erosion of privacy and other rights and freedoms.
- There is no reasonable justification to use FRT surveillance in stores, parks and other public spaces, except when everyone is considered to be a potential criminal. This is unacceptable and in fact contrary to international human rights law.
- Even if law enforcement officials and controllers of surveillance fully obey the legal and ethical norms, the danger of cyberattacks and hacking is high. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to protect software and database from a cyberattack outside of the system. This fact adds to the high risk of recorded and stored data being misused.
- Finally, it should be considered that the development of facial recognition software and video surveillance cameras has become a profitable business. The facial recognition market is soaring and dominated by key players like 3M, Microsoft Corporation, IBM Corporation, Panasonic Corporation, Cognitec System GmbH, FaceFirst Inc., and Fijutsu Limited (Expert Market Research, 2022). Many of these corporations are more powerful than states, contributing to concerns with the rational use of this technology: is it about the security of citizens and preventing crimes, creating room for corporations to make big profits, or about establishing authoritarian control over citizens? In any case, the benefits for 'ordinary' citizens may be questioned.

Conclusion

The rapid development and use of FRT surveillance systems raises unprecedented issues from the perspective of the protection of personal data and other human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, no evidence could be found that laws may provide safeguards against the misuse of FRT surveillance in public spaces and ensure democratic control over it. The UN and EU are seeking to develop robust human rights safeguards to regulate

these practices, while civil society is demanding a complete ban on this practice.

The overview of the state of play in this area permits the conclusion that the right to privacy, protection of personal data, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly face greater risks than ever before. It is particularly disturbing and 'chilling' that sophisticated modern data-driven technologies create possibilities for state and private actors "to operate at a scale never before possible, obtaining and storing massive amounts of private data, and targeting communities, neighbourhoods and groups".⁴ These new technologies have shifted the balance of power between those doing the monitoring and those being monitored. Besides, the mass use of this type of technology facilitates various types of violations and restrictions of human rights and freedoms that are difficult, if not impossible, to prevent by legal means. Those being monitored may be unaware of it, meaning that they may not be aware that their privacy, private data or other human rights are being violated or abused. It is also difficult to impose a democratic control mechanism on multinational corporations and private entities to ensure their proper and lawful use of FRT. If state actors rely on this type of 'smart' surveillance, it is also difficult to prevent abuse and to pinpoint 'a legitimate aim' and 'the public interest' of using FRT in each case.

We therefore argue that regulation can only limit the risks of FRT use, but not prevent them. Further, developing regulation in this area, no matter how restrictive, amounts to tacit approval of the mass use of a type of technology that opens the door to various types of abuses and restrictions on human rights and freedoms, and whose justification from the perspective of the public interest may be questioned.

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⁴ *United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner on the report identifying recent trends and challenges with regard to the human right to privacy. 16 September 2022. Accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2022/09/interactive-dialogue-high-commissioner-report-identifying-recent-trends-and*, 5. 5. 2023.

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Sabrina P. Ramet
**East Central Europe and
Communism. Politics, Culture,
and Society, 1943–1991**
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Nova knjiga Sabine Ramet se loteva dolge zgodovine komunizma v Srednji in Vzhodni Evropi in je, kot že sam naslov pove, zastavljena precej ambiciozno. Cilj knjige je namreč izpeljati zgodovinski prerez in podati funkcionalistično analizo »komunističnih režimov«. Geografsko zajema Albanijo in Jugoslavijo kot specifična zgodovinska komunizma ter območje bivšega Vzhoda, tj. Vzhodne Nemčije, Poljske, Češkoslovaške, Romunije, Bolgarije in Madžarske, in sicer v obdobju med letoma 1943 in 1991. Tak cilj je za eno knjigo kakopak nedosegljiv, kar pa ne pomeni, da Sabrina Ramet ne prispeva nekaj dragocenih pogledov v študije posamičnih prelomnih dogodkov: upor/revolucija na Madžarskem leta 1956, Češkoslovaška leta 1968, ter Poljska v 80. letih. Ramet korektno ponazori trenja znotraj komunističnih partij ter oriše konflikte z ostalimi družbenimi agenci znotraj komunističnih družb ter vlogo Sovjetske zveze pri nastanku in krizah komunizmov v teh državah. Nadalje se knjiga bolj sistematično loteva treh podpodročij, ki v prevladujoči liberalni tranzicijski literaturi niso tako popularna oziroma niso bila dosti obdelana: žensko vprašanje, vprašanje religije (vloge uradne cerkve) in alternativne/disidentske kulture. Tako ambicioznega

cilja in tako raznolikih področij raziskovanja – četudi delamo zgolj kratek pregled politično-kulturne zgodovine – na 320 straneh ne moremo temeljito pokriti in obdelati. Po prebrani knjigi prevlada občutek, da smo zgolj zaplivali na površino dogodkov, spoznali zlasti kapitane ladij ter ključne (dis) funkcije komunistične plovbe. Namesto bolj analitičnega in preciznejšega raziskovanja, ki bi moralo biti tako geografsko kot časovno bolj zamejeno in ki bi pokazalo na kopico protislovnih in kompleksnih procesov, dobimo zgolj vajo v funkcionalističnem mišljenju (dolgo teoretsko presežena-ga Mertona) in kritiki komunizmov. V najboljšem primeru bi knjigo lahko označili za liberalno prežet učbenik o nujnem propadu komunizma in nekaterih vidikih, ki so se pokazali za disfunkcionalne. Če primerjamo to knjigo z avtoričinimi zgodnejšimi knjigami o nacionalizmu in federalizmu ter zgodovini (socialistične) Jugoslavije, je knjiga tako po obdelanih podatkih in metodologiji kvalitativno pomeni nekaj korakov nazaj.

Naj se zadržim pri nekaterih dragocenih prispevkih Sabine Ramet na omenjenih podpodročjih; zlasti področji religije in kulture kažeta na dejansko družbeno moč agensov, ki so pomembno pripomogli k sesutju komunizma in bili vseskozi pokazatelj njegove »disfunkcionalnosti«. Prvič, Ramet pokaže, da uradna kritika verske ideologije, represije nad cerkvenimi voditelji in potiskanje cerkve, ki sicer izgubi ekonomski vpliv, na obrobje, ne rezultirajo v zmanjšani ideološki vlogi cerkve. Nasprotno, v

več kontekstih je ravno zaradi te »disidentske« pozicije pod okriljem cerkve prišlo do nacionalnega in civilnodružbenega preporoda, ki pa je bil izrazito antikomunističen. Drugič, knjiga pokaže na ne preveč uspešno izpeljane politike enakosti žensk in moških (bolj je šlo za bratstvo kot sestrstvo). Ramet tu sicer ne analizira globljih procesov, ideoloških obrazcev v širšem časovnem prerezu. Predvsem se zanaša na pozitivistično merjenje podatkov, koliko so bile ženske zastopane v določenih političnih segmentih in na vodstvenih položajih (kot da je bilo pred komunizmom ali dandanes veliko bolje?). In tretjič, knjiga ponudi pregled neuspehov uradne kulturne politike, ki se tu reducira na diktirano in socrealistično usmerjeno umetnost, ki pa je skozi zgodovino doživela kopicu alternativ in podtalnih umetniških praks, ki so – morda odločilno – naznanjale družbene spremembe.

V naštetih aspektih se knjiga sicer razlikuje od standardne ideološke antitotalitaristične tranzicijske literature, ki vse, kar se je zgodilo v socializmih, reducira na belo-črno branje, na zgodovino totalitarnega nasilja. Ramet dokazuje, da je znotraj socializmov v vseh časih prihajalo do političnih, kulturnih, verskih in drugih uporov, alternativnih tendenc, kar ovrže tezo o represiji. A ta kopica alternativnih praks za Ramet ne priča o svobodi, raznolikosti in manevrskem prostoru za oblast, pač pa o sami disfunkcionalnosti sistema. V prihodnjih odstavkih bom ponudil nekaj pomembnih kritik epistemoloških izhodišč in ideološkosti tega pristopa, ki dokazuje/

vidi, tisto, kar hoče videti, še preden se analiza sploh začne.

Začnimo pri samem epistemološkem izhodišču: Sabrina Ramet za analizo političnih dogodkov znotraj komunističnih partij in vzpostavitve komunizma ter spodletelih politik uporablja (funkcionalistično) analizo ameriškega sociologa Mertona, ki je izhajal s področja kriminologije. Izhodišče knjige je pojasnjeno deloma v uvodu, deloma pa na začetku v drugem poglavju (str. 11–12), in postavlja precej samoumevno razumevanje družbe: prvič, Ramet pravi, da so sfere politik in njenih učinkov »medsebojno povezane«; drugič, da (uradne) politike nimajo zgolj namenskih učinkov, pač pa tudi nepredvidljive učinke, nekatere imenujemo stranski, druge pa latentni učinki; tretjič, da politika vpliva na kulturo in kultura vpliva na politiko; četrtič, da iz te dinamike in morebitnih konfliktov nastajajo družbene spremembe. Pri tem intelektualnem izhodišču si ne moremo obetati nekih epohalnih teoretskih rezultatov, knjiga pa nenehoma poudarja to tezo: komunisti so – ne glede na morebitne dobre namene – pogosto spregledali nepredvidljive posledice oziroma jih niso hoteli videti. Ti učinki pa so jih potem »udarili po nosu«, in to zlasti iz družbenih sfer, kjer tega niso najbolj pričakovali (uradna cerkev in religije, polje kulture in disidentov); ženska vprašanja so najbolj pomanjkljivo obdelano področje, tam stoji kot neka pozitivistična preverba zastopanosti.

Eno najbolj problematičnih epistemoloških predpostavk (dis)funkcionalistične analize lahko najdemo

v njeni binarni in teleološki zastavitvi. Še preden začnemo samo analizo, previdimo idealni standard in njegov odstop (deviacijo), s tem pa že določamo svoj rezultat raziskovanja. Demokracija ali komunizem; spoštovanje cerkve ali njena represija; kulturna politika svobode umetnosti ali socrealistična doktrina. Naj ponovim Rametino tezo: komunistični režimi so -navkljub nekaterim utopičnim in svetlim idealom ter politikam, ki so ciljale na odpravo neenakosti na razredni in spolni ravni - že od samega začetka kazali ne le na odstopanje od lastnih idealov/zastavljene politike od realnosti, pač pa so bili že od začetka obsojeni na propad. Skratka, komunizem in njegova dinamika sta že sama po sebi disfunkcionalna. Tovrstno naziranje v analizi in razumevanju preteklosti sledi dvema premisama: prvič, linearnemu zgodovinskemu premikanju od a do b, tu konkretno, od komunizma k liberalni demokraciji, ter drugič, teleološki nujnosti propada komunizma, ki se skriva za svetim idealom (neo) liberalne demokracije in kapitalizma. Z drugimi besedami, Rametina vnažajska interpretacija, ki 30 let po padcu komunizma, »dokazuje« nujnost njegovega propada ni niti izvirna niti (preveč) znanstvena. Še več, upal bi si trditi, da niha med dvema bolj ali manj zavednima vzgiboma: po eni strani legitimira samo tranzicijo socializma v neoliberalni kapitalizem, ki je med drugim prinesla veliko bolj patriarhalne, konservativne verske ideološke prakse, vojno usmerjene in nacionalistične družbene formacije (prim. Buden, *Cona Prehoda*, 2014). Po drugi

strani pa analiza sproti potrjuje svojo lastno ideološko prepričanje: komunizem je že sam po sebi »disfunkcionalen«, ker ga vodijo ideološko enoumje, politični monopol, slabo ekonomsko vodenje, nerazumevanje posledic lastnih politik, sivi strici iz Kremlja itd. Ta epistemološki pristop ustvari idealno samoizpopolnjujočo se preokbo o nujnosti propada, obenem pa vse voditelje komunističnih držav postavlja ali v popolnoma podrejeni odnos do Kremlja (Vzhodna Evropa) ali pa jih reducira v kult bolj ali manj krutega voditelja (Tito, Hoxha, Ceausescu); kljubovanje in delna avtonomija pomenita visoko ceno za družbo. Analiza postane sicer bolj zanimiva v trenutkih, ko pokaže, da so nepredvidljive posledice lastnih politik zahtevale intelektualni in politični napor vladajočih, da svojo družbo in oblastna razmerja pomagajo reproducirati, se adaptirati itd. Na žalost pa v knjigi ne bomo naleteli na globlje razumevanje družbene dinamike, geopolitičnih sprememb, vzrokov za ekonomske krize, kdaj in kako je potekala integracija socializmov v globalni kapitalizem, se pravi vseh ključnih vprašanj, ki so v veliki meri določale uradno politiko režimov. Namesto mišljenja prepletov družbenih sfer in analize vzrokov implozije socialistične ekonomije knjiga vsa politično-ekonomska vprašanja zreducira na komunistično neučinkovitost in pomanjkanje dobrin, na vedno večji zunanji dolg ter spodletelo kolektivizacijo agrikulture. To so neki obči ideološki toposi, ki pa bi morali biti bolje analizirani. Ampak že se poraja vprašanje, ali niso ravno

propadle kolektivizacije na podeželju pokazale, da je tudi v socializmu vztrajala in soobstajala »privatna« ekonomija ter različno organiziranje ekonomije. Še več, če ta monografija dobro pokaže na tranzicijskost reform in spodletele ukrepe ter na raznolikost med različnimi »komunizmi«, zakaj bi potem sploh vztrajali pri imenu *komunizem*? O ideji komunizma so nedavno potekale številne izvirne teoretske debate, v katerih so sodelovali politični filozofi/inje Isabelle Garro, Slavoj Žižek, Katja Diefenbach, Costas Douzinas, Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Toni Negri in še mnogi drugi. Če že govorimo o dejanski zgodovini, bomo morali fenomene in formacije motriti kot specifikke različnih socialističnih formacij. Socializem po sami definiciji in zgodovini je bil »tranzicijska forma«, forma, ki je bila polna protislovij, ki nikoli ni dosegla komunizma, vsaj ne v Marxovem smislu brezrazredne družbe, v kateri se bo človek lahko šele začel razvijati. V bolj kritičnem zgodovinopisju in sodobnih političnih analizah te sisteme imenujejo realno obstoječi socializmi, mešana ekonomija, socialistični sistem, samoupravni socializem (dober pregled Darko Suvin, *Samo jednom se ljubi, Radiografija SFR Jugoslavije*, RLS, 2014; Kirn Gal, *Partizanski prelomi*, 2014) – zakaj torej rokovati z ideološko prežetim in negativnim terminom »komunizem«, zlasti če tega knjiga na nobenem mestu ustrezno ne definira? Nadalje, ali nista zunanji dolg in zadolženost prebivalstva veliko večji težavi – ne le kvantitativno, ampak tudi kvalitativno,

saj je v globalnem kapitalizmu celotna družba prežeta z zadolženostjo? Ali ni večanje razlik med bogatimi in revnimi, razredna razslojenost – če jo primerjamo z obdobjem socializma – veliko hujša dandanes – ne glede na večjo dostopnost dobrin? In kako je mogoče, da se vloge bank, mednarodnih finančnih institucij, finančnega kapitala ne omenja niti s kakim odstavkom?

Knjiga bo prišla prav »prepričanim« v nujni propad komunizma in tistim, ki ne vidijo možnosti alternative sedanjemu kapitalističnemu sistemu. Ponudila bo nekaj dragocenih podatkov in opisov glavnih političnih dogodkov in trendov v socialističnih sistemih. Ne bo pa ponudila odgovora ne na vprašanje in vrednotenje tega, kar je bilo na teh območjih pred komunizmom, pa tudi ne tega, kaj je prišlo po komunizmu. Zdi se, ko da knjiga sledi tihi tezi, da je bil zgolj komunizem devianten in disfunkcionalen, medtem ko so (bili) drugi sistemi v bolj daljni preteklosti ali naši sedanjosti funkcionalni. Prav tako knjiga ne odgovori na vprašanje, kaj točno naj bi bili »ideali« funkcionalnih družb, a mirno lahko predpostavimo, da ta analiza zrcali stari model (neo)liberalne modernizacije, formalnega pluralizma interesov (korporativnih lobijev močnejšega), evrocentrizma in celo apologije strogo hierarhičnih in konservativnih cerkvenih entitet.

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Primož ŠTERBENC: AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO UNDERSTAND
THE TALIBAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS WOMEN
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 3, pp. 355–373

August 2021 saw the second takeover of the Islamist movement of the Taliban in Afghanistan, following 20 years of Western military presence. The Taliban movement first ruled the country between 1996 and 2001. In 2021, the international community was wondering whether the »students« would implement the same brutal policies towards women as they had imposed during their initial rule. Despite certain signs indicating that this time the Taliban's policies might be different, ultimately women have become victims of the same oppression. The Taliban's negative attitude to women is the result of several intertwined and complementary factors: ethnic, religious-ideological, social-political and inter-cultural. One cannot grasp the Taliban's policies without taking these factors into account. However, it seems that Western actors have not understood this complex background and consequently imposed counter-productive sanctions on the Taliban regime. They have also proven unable to conduct a self-critical assessment of the consequences of the West's protracted and problematic military presence in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Taliban, women, Pashtunwali, Deoband, West, culture

Pavel VUK: COLIN GRAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONTEMPORARY
STRATEGIC THOUGHT AND STRATEGY THEORY
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 3, pp. 374–391

This article critically examines the work of Colin Gray and his original contribution to science, strategy theory and contemporary strategic thought. Gray's understanding of strategy is considered a universal theory of strategy, one that allows us to disclose the key ingredients of strategy regardless of time, place, belligerent sides, technology or domain. Although he was considered to be a follower of Clausewitz, he argued that the strategy theory is a living subject that needs to be continuously engaged with and developed. He focused his thinking on finding answers to the question of how strategy theory can be applied to the formulation of strategies to address current situations. The article brings to the Slovenian space an analytical perspective on the understanding of contemporary strategy theory and the value for its scientific study as well as the consideration of practical principles.

Keywords: strategy, strategy theory, strategic thought, Colin Gray, strategic history

Janez BEŠTER: MANAGERIAL FORECASTS AND ACTUAL EFFECTS OF
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON SLOVENIAN COMPANIES

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 3, pp. 392–412

Predicting the financial performance of companies is a challenging task even in normal business circumstances, with the uncertainties brought about by COVID-19 pandemic having further added to this challenge. In this article, we examine the responses of managers from 154 Slovenian companies to a survey taken in the spring of 2020 at the end of the first pandemic wave, and compare them to their actual financial performance for the years 2019, 2020 and 2021. Our findings show no significant links between the pre-pandemic financial performance and management survey predictions. Still, managers accurately predicted the pandemic's impact on the financial performance of their companies in 2020 and 2021.

Keywords: companies, management, predictions, effects, pandemic, finance, indicators, COVID-19

Lucija Zala BEZLAJ: INTERPELLATION OF PUPILS INTO HUMAN RIGHTS
HOLDERS: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF A LESSON PLAN

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 3, pp. 413–440

The article examines a discursive analysis of a lesson plan case study to identify how pupils are interpellated into an imagined community of bearers of human rights. The process of interpellation can be traced through language use as the site and tool of pedagogical practice. The rhetorical method, derived from Aristotle's rhetorical apparatus, was applied to analyse the latter. In the study, several moments of interpellation through the discourse were discussed – the establishment of a sentimental image of the 'universal community', creating a distinction from societies that are temporally and spatially distant and presumed to violate human rights, and the 'independent' pronouncement of condemnation for rights violations. Analysing the processes of interpellation through language use in the pedagogical process demonstrates its unforeseen, inexplicit and often contradictory effects. Through them, a fissure inherent in the ideological construction of human rights itself is indicated; by invoking their universality, specific modes of exclusion are established and reproduced.

Keywords: Interpellation, human rights, lesson plan, discursive analysis, rhetoric

Predrag LJUBOTINA, Andrej RASPOR: SHAREHOLDERS OF THE SLOVENIAN MUSIC INDUSTRY IN CRISIS CONDITIONS
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 3, pp. 441–459

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has caused rapid and dramatic changes in global social and cultural life. Stakeholders of the Slovenian music industry were also not immune to this. With the help of a survey conducted in the third quarter of 2022, we examined the perceived adverse effects of the crisis in this branch of the creative economy. After cleaning, the database included 126 respondents. The independent variables of the resulting regression model are perceived state support, level of proactivity, locus of control, job satisfaction and level of substance use. The results made it possible to confirm most of the hypotheses and raised some questions for future research into this oft-neglected branch of the creative industry.

Keywords: COVID-19, music industry, state support, proactiveness, locus of control, satisfaction, prohibited substances, Slovenia

Rasya NATASYA, M. M. NGATNO, Bulan PRABAWANI: UČINEK ZAZNAVANJA ZELENEGA ZAVAJANJA, ZELENEGA TRŽENJA OD UST DO UST IN ZELENEGA TRŽENJA NA NAMERE KUPCEV PRI H&M V DŽAKARTI
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 460–474

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Zeleno zavajanje je v zahodnih in razvitih državah problem že dolgo. Med akademiki na razvijajočih se in novih trgih, zlasti v Indoneziji, pa to vprašanje žal ostaja veliko premalo raziskano. Predstavljena kvantitativna raziskava se osredotoča na učinek zaznavanja zelenega zavajanja, zelenega trženja od ust do ust (“green WOM”) in zelenega trženja na namere kupcev za nakup izdelkov v H&M v Džakarti. Na hipoteze smo odgovorili z modelom SEM-PLS, pri katerem smo uporabili programsko orodje SmartPLS3. Na temelju vprašalnika, ki smo ga uporabili pri 200 respondentih, rezultati kažejo, da ima zaznavanje zelenega zavajanja neposredni negativni učinek, učinek zelenega trženja od ust do ust pa posredni negativni učinek na nakupne namere kupcev, na kar lahko vpliva pomanjkanje obravnave tega problema in ozaveščenosti v Džakarti. Te ugotovitve nasprotujejo več raziskavam v Evropi, ki smo jih uporabili kot referenčne med izvajanjem pričujoče raziskave. Hkrati zeleno trženje od ust do ust (WOM) krepi pozitivni učinek zelenega trženja na nakupne namere. Praktične implikacije za podjetja vključujejo potrebo po precej bolj trajnostnem ravnanju in uporabi pristopa, ki temelji na dejstvih brez olepševanj.

Ključni pojmi: zaznavanje zelenega zavajanja, zeleno trženje od ust do ust, zeleno trženje, nakupne namere

Maxim POPOV: AVTORITARNI LIBERALIZEM, ORDOLIBERALNA RACIONALNOST IN EVROPSKI INTEGRACIJSKI PROJEKT
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 475–492

Avtor ocenjuje relevantnost in analitični pomen avtoritarnega liberalizma in ga interpretira kot enega izmed modernih konceptualnih modelov ordoliberalizma in evropske integracije. Temeljni koncepti avtoritarnega liberalizma in ordoliberalizma poudarjajo politično in ideološko povezovalno med avtoritarnostjo močne države in ekonomskim liberalizmom tržne racionalnosti. Ordoliberalizem kot fleksibilna tržno usmerjena oblika avtoritarnega liberalizma pomeni racionalno strategijo ohranjanja in spodbujanja projekta evropskega združevanja, v smeri katerega gresta tržna ekonomija in tehnokratska elita v prizadevanju za zaustavitev kriz. Zaradi prisotnosti vrednot političnega liberalizma, pluralizma in vladavine prava, avtoritarnost v tej strukturi ni represivna ali monocentrična, temveč je predmet demokratične kritike v razmerju do nadsacionalne regulacije evropske integracije.

Ključni pojmi: avtoritarni liberalizem, ordoliberalizem, tržni kapitalizem, demokracija, evrokriža, evropska integracija

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Zdenka ŠADL, Maja OSOLNIK: EMOCIONALNO DELO IN EMOCIONALNA IZGORELOST: EMPIRIČNA ANALIZA ZAPOSLENIH V STORITVENEM SEKTORJU
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 493–513

Emocionalno delo je oblika dela, ki vključuje upravljanje emocij in emocionalnih izrazov v družbeni interakciji za doseganje poklicnih ciljev in izpolnjevanje emocionalnih zahtev dela. Izvajanje emocionalnega dela ima lahko negativne psihološke posledice za zaposlene, kot sta izgorelost in izčrpanost. Takšne negativne rezultate večinoma določa strategija emocionalnega dela, ki jo zaposleni uporabljajo. Članek želi poglobiti razumevanje vpliva osebnostnih in situacijskih dejavnikov pri odzivu na zahteve emocionalnega dela ter vlogo osebnostnih dejavnikov pri določanju izidov emocionalnega dela. Na podlagi anketnih podatkov, pridobljenih na vzorcu 29 zaposlenih v storitvenem sektorju, ugotavljamo, da ima med strategijami emocionalnega dela površinsko igranje najbolj škodljiv učinek na dobro počutje zaposlenih. Po drugi strani pa lahko na globinsko igranje gledamo kot na bolj zdrav način izvajanja emocionalnega dela, izražanje pristinih čustev pa lahko celo zmanjša negativne rezultate emocionalnega dela. Razumevanje dejavnikov emocionalnih delovnih strategij bi torej omogočilo razvoj učinkovitejših intervencij, namenjenih zmanjšanju izgorelosti, z vplivanjem na način izvajanja emocionalnega dela.

Ključni pojmi: emocionalno delo, izgorelost, dejavniki emocionalnega dela

Sanja STANIČ: IZKORIŠČANJE OTROK V 21. STOLETJU -
DRUŽBENO ZANEMARJENO OTROŠTVO

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 514-531

Otroštvo je družbeno konstruirano, odvisno od socialnih, ekonomskih in kulturnih okoliščin. Revščina, socialne razlike, konflikti in družbena krivica negativno vplivajo na življenja otrok. Cilj članka je prikazati otroštvo v razmerah izkoriščanja. Kljub splošnemu napredku in emancipaciji otrokovih pravic podatki potrjujejo naraščanje števila otrok, ki so vpleteni v vojne spopade, opravljajo težka in neprimerna dela ali so v suženjstvu. V zaključku je izkoriščanje otrok obravnavano v kontekstu družbenih razmer in procesov, neoliberalnega kapitalizma in globalizacije ter dokumentov, ki zagotavljajo otrokove pravice.

Ključni pojmi: otroštvo, izkoriščanje, otrokove pravice, družbene neenakosti, globalizacija

Zana SHERIFI, Elmedina NIKOCEVIQ-KURTI: STALIŠČA ŠTUDENTOV
EKONOMIJE DO ISKANJA ZAPOSLOTITVE PREKO DRUŽBENIH MEDIJEV:
PRIMER KOSOVA

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 532-547

V članku proučujeva, kako krajina družbenih omrežij že pomembno spreminja proces iskanja zaposlitve. Cilj raziskave je bil oceniti stališča do iskanja zaposlitve preko družbenih medijev s posebnim poudarkom na študentih in študentkah, ki obiskujejo Ekonomsko fakulteto Univerze v Prištini. Ugotovitve kažejo, da je samozaznana raven aktivnosti na družbenih medijih povezana s časom, preživetim na družbenih omrežjih, in da družbene medije bolj verjetno uporabljajo nezaposleni kot zaposleni posamezniki in posameznice. Rezultati kažejo, da so bili najbolj priljubljeni načini iskanja zaposlitve družbena omrežja in zaposlitveni spletni portali. Omembe vredna ugotovitev je, da celo posamezniki in posameznice, ki ne uporabljajo družbenih omrežij, priznavajo pomen vzdrževanja poklicnega profila na družbenih medijih med iskanjem zaposlitve. Iz ugotovitev raziskave izhajajo implikacije tako za iskalce in iskalko zaposlitve kot za delodajalce, saj izpostavljajo pomen uporabe družbenih medijev za iskanje zaposlitve, iz česar izhaja nujnost strateških investicij v spletne platforme, uporabnikom prilagojene podporne programe, ki delujejo preko teh platform, povečane digitalne pismenosti in nenehnega raziskovanja za namen prilagodive politik in odzivov razvijajočim se trendom družbenih medijev med iskalci in iskalkami zaposlitve.

Ključni pojmi: družbeni mediji, iskanje zaposlitve, najemanje, digitalizacija

Mirjana DOKMANOVIĆ, Neven CVETIČANIN: REGULACIJA UPORABE
TEHNOLOGIJE PREPOZNAVE OBRAZA - OMEJITVE IN IZZIVI S
PERSPEKTIVE ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 3, str. 548–564

Namen članka je prepoznati in izpostaviti omejitve in izzive, povezane s pravno regulacijo uporabe tehnologije prepoznave obraza (FRT) za namene nadzora. Organizacija Združenih narodov in Evropska unija se zavzema za razvoj zanesljivih ukrepov za zaščito človekovih pravic za regulacijo teh praks, medtem ko civilna družba zahteva njihovo prepoved. Zaradi vrste te tehnologije je težko uvesti pravni in demokratični nadzor njene zakonite uporabe in preprečiti zlorabe. Skleneva, da regulacija tega področja, ne glede na njeno restriktivnost, pomeni tiho odobritev množične uporabe te vrste tehnologije, ki odpira vrata različnim načinom zlorabe človekovih pravic in svoboščin, zaradi česar je s perspektive javnega interesa njena upravičenost vprašljiva.

Ključni pojmi: video nadzor, tehnologija prepoznave obraza, pravica do zasebnosti, varstvo osebnih podatkov, Clearview AI

Teorija in praksa sprejema v presojo za objavo izvirna znanstvena besedila, ki še niso bila objavljena drugje ali niso v recenzentskem postopku pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji oziroma monografiji. Objava članka ali knjižne recenzije v Teoriji in praksi je brezplačna.

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ČLANKI

Znanstveni članki v slovenskem ali angleškem jeziku naj ne presegajo 6.500 besed. V kolikor želi avtorica oziroma avtor objaviti daljše besedilo, naj se o tem predhodno posvetuje z glavnim urednikom. Članek naj bo opremljen s povzetkom v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku v obsegu do 100 besed. Povzetek naj vsebuje natančno opredelitev teme besedila, metodo argumentacije in zaključke. Avtorica/avtor naj navede tudi do sedem ključnih pojmov, tako v slovenskem kakor tudi v angleškem jeziku. Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s krepkimi velikimi tiskanimi črkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko največ dvonivojski. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno.

Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vključeni v besedilo) z jasnimi naslovi, pri čemer naj avtorica/avtor uporabi velike tiskane črke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilčeni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno označeno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica/avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora zavzema v besedilu. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica/avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran). Pod tabelami in grafi je potrebno navesti vir. Navedba vira naj se zaključí s piko. Uporabljajte orodje za oblikovanje tabel v programu Word.

Tabela 1: UČINEK ODBOROV

Regulativni učinek	Mešani učinek	Distribucijski učinek
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno označene z zaporednimi številkami od začetka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvrščene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici/avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vključujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice/avtorja, ki so relevantne za obravnavano problematiko v besedilu, ter o finančnih in drugih pomočeh pri pripravi besedila.

Dobesedni navedki, ki so dolgi tri ali več vrstic, naj bodo postavljeni v poseben odstavek, robovi odstavka naj bodo obojestransko zamaknjeni, besedilo naj bo v poševnem tisku in brez narekovajev.

Če so gibanja za pravice vložila svoja telesa v aktivizem in mobiliziranje novih oblik diskurza, da bi tako omajala njihovo marginalizacijo in zatiranje, so filozofske in teoretske kritike kartezijanstva na novo pretehtale subjekt in ga opredelile kot hkrati razsrediščenega (ki v sebi ni v celoti koherenten) In utelešenega (ne čisti "kogito"). (Jones, 2002: 239)

RECENZIJE KNJIG

TIP sprejema v objavo recenzije domačih in tujih znanstvenih del, ki niso starejša od dveh let. Recenzija naj ne bo daljša od 1.500 besed. V recenziji naj se avtorica/avtor dosledno izogiba navajanju literature in virov. Recenzija naj ne vsebuje naslova ali podnaslovov. Na začetku recenzije naj navede podatke o sebi in recenzirani knjigi v spodaj navedeni obliki:

Ime PRIIMEK

Institucionalna pripadnost

Ime in priimek avtorja knjige

Naslov knjige: podnaslov

Založnik, Kraj letnica objave, število strani, cena (ISBN številka)

Janez NOVAK

Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL

Eviatar Zerubavel

Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 \$ (ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

NAVAJANJE

Osnovna oblika reference v besedilu je (Novak, 1994). Za navajanje strani naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja naslednjo obliko navajanja: (Novak, 1994: 27–29). Če sta avtorja reference dva, naj avtorica oziroma avtor navede oba: (Novak in Kosec, 2007). Če je avtorjev reference več, naj se v tekstu uporablja naslednja oblika navajanja: (Novak et al., 1994: 27), v seznamu LITERATURE pa naj se navedejo vsi avtorji. Če avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ne uporablja prve izdaje knjige, naj pri navajanju zabeleži tudi letnico prve izdaje: (Novak, 1953/1994: 7). Več referenc hkrati naj avtorica oziroma avtor loči s podpičjem: (Novak, 1994: 7; Kosec, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). Pri navajanju večjega števila referenc enega avtorja, objavljenih v istem letu, naj avtorica oziroma avtor reference med seboj loči s črkami a, b, c itd.: (Novak, 1994a: 27–29; Novak, 1994b: 1), in sicer v zaporedju, v kakršnem se prvič pojavijo v besedilu.

Seznam referenc sodi na konec besedila in naj ima podnaslov LITERATURA. V seznam referenc naj avtorica oziroma avtor vključi vso uporabljeno literaturo. Morebitne vire naj navede za seznamom referenc, in sicer s podnaslovom VIRI. Seznam referenc mora biti urejen po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev referenc ter v primeru istega avtorja po časovnem zaporedju izdaj.

Knjige

Priimek, ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zborniki

Priimek, Ime (ur.) (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji

Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V: Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: Založba. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance? V: Martin Hewson (ur.) in Timothy J. Sinclair (ur.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

Članki

Priimek, Ime (letnica izida članka): Naslov članka. Ime revije letnik (števila): strani. Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632–42.

Svetovni splet (WWW)

Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno prek <http://www.imagnet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2001.

Viri

Avtorica/avtor je sam odgovoren za spoštovanje materialnih in moralnih avtorskih pravic, povezanih z uporabo podatkov, datotek, reprodukcij in del (v nadaljevanju vir) drugih fizičnih in pravnih oseb v njegovem članku. Avtorstvo vira, ki ga avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja v članku in ki ni plod njegovega raziskovalnega dela, mora biti jasno razvidno v obliki ustreznega navajanja vira v seznamu VIROV in v navajanju vira v besedilu članka.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj smiselno navede čim več podatkov o viru, kot so na primer avtor vira, mesto oziroma institucija, v kateri se vir nahaja, naslov, ime ali opis vira, evidenčna številka vira, naslov spletne strani, kraj in leto nastanka vira in podobno. Pri tem je smiselnost navajanja opredeljena kot zmožnost sledenja viru oziroma zmožnost intersubjektivne preverljivosti uporabljenega vira. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj navede tudi datum, ko je bil vir pridobljen, če gre za elektronski vir.

Priimek, Ime (letnica nastanka vira): Naslov/nosilec vira. Mesto hranjenja vira. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

Koprivec, Daša (2005–2008): Avdio kasete. Kustodiat za slovenske izsejlence in zamejce SEM. Dostopno prek <http://www.imagnet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2010.

ali

Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov.

Če gre za vir iz zasebnega arhiva avtorja članka, kakega drugega raziskovalca ali posameznika, naj bo to jasno navedeno. Navajanje identitete lastnika vira iz zasebnega arhiva je zaželeno, vendar ne nujno, kadar gre za zaščito njegovih materialnih pravic ali varovanje njegove osebne identitete.

Priimek, Ime morebitnega avtorja (morebitna letnica nastanka vira): Ime ali opis vira/arhivska številka. Mesto hranjenja vira. Zasebni arhiv.

Zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soči. Zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca.

ali

Zbirka pisem Janeza Novaka. 1953–1989. Privatni arhiv.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira

uporabi enako določilo o navajanju v besedilu članka, kot je to v primeru navajanja članka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu članka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi začetne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja.

(Poročilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000)
ali

(Zbirka navijaških šalov)

Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP.

RECENZENTSKI POSTOPEK

Uredništvo TIP uporablja za vse vrste člankov in za knjižne eseje obojestransko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Članke in knjižne eseje recenzirata vsaj dva recenzenta. Postopek recenziranja, od oddaje besedila do seznanitve avtorice/avtorja z recenzentskimi mnenji, traja dva meseca. Uredništvo TIP lahko brez zunanjega recenziranja zavrne objavo besedila, če ugotovi, da avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ni pripravil v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi navodili, ali pa če oceni, da besedilo ne sodi na znanstveno področje, ki ga revija pokriva.

Uredništvo ima pravico, da prispevkov, ki ne ustrezajo merilom knjižne slovenščine (ali angleščine, če je članek oddan v angleščini; upošteva se British English) ne sprejme v recenzentski postopek. Stroški obveznega lektoriranja angleških besedil se avtorjem zaračunavajo po predhodnem dogovoru.

Avtorica/avtor ima od trenutka, ko je seznanjen z recenzentskimi mnenji, tri tedne časa, da v besedilo vnese popravke in popravljeno besedilo vrne v uredništvo TIP. V primeru, ko recenzenti zahtevajo temeljitejšje popravke, se popravljeno besedilo ponovno vrne recenzentu v presojo. Avtorica/avtor naj popravljenemu besedilu priloži poseben obrazec "avtorjevo poročilo", ki ga dobi skupaj z recenzijama besedila, v katerem naj obrazloži, katere dele besedila je popravil in kako. Če avtorica/avtor oziroma avtor meni, da so pripombe recenzenta neutemeljene, pomanjkljive ali kakorkoli nerazumljive, naj neupoštevanje recenzentskih pripomb pojasni in utemelji v posebnem poročilu glavnemu uredniku.

Avtorica/avtor in soavtorji ob objavi dobijo po en brezplačen izvod številke revije, v kateri je bil objavljen njihov prispevek. Vsak dodaten izvod stane 10 evrov (plus poštnina). Na zahtevo lahko avtorici/avtorju pošljemo brezplačen izvod njegove objave v formatu pdf.

Avtorica/avtor prenese materiale avtorske pravice za objavljeni prispevek na izdajatelja revije.

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Revija Teorija in praksa upošteva Pravila o ravnanju Odbora za etiko objavljanja Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE Code of Conduct guidelines in zahteve za recenzirane revije, ki jih je oblikovala založba Elsevier Publishing House (skladno z mednarodnimi pravili založniške etike za znanstvene publikacije).

Revija Teorija in praksa je te politike in postopke sprejela z namenom podpreti urednike, recenzente in avtorje pri izpolnjevanju njihovih etičnih dolžnosti skladno s temi smernicami. Od avtorjev, recenzentov in urednikov se pričakuje, da upoštevajo smernice dobre prakse glede etičnega ravnanja, kot jih določajo te politike in postopki.

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Tables, graphs and figures should be designed as attachments (and not included in the text), with informative titles, in uppercase letters and italics; they should be numbered consecutively (Figure 1: TITLE OF FIGURE, Graph 2: TITLE OF GRAPH, Table 3: TITLE OF TABLE). Each table and figure should be on a separate sheet. Their approximate positions in the text should be marked in the text. The author should determine how much space each table, graph or figure will occupy in the text. The space required for tables, graphs and pictures should be included in the total text length, as either 250 words (1/2 page) or 500 words (1 page). The sources of tables and graphs should be written below the table and graph and should end with full-stop. Use the table feature in Word to create tables.

Table 1: COMMITTEE EFFECT

Relugative effect	Mixet effect	Distributional effect
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Source: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Footnotes should be clearly marked in the text with consecutive numbers from beginning to end; written in appropriate places in the text; and arranged in the same order under the text. Footnotes must be limited in both number and length. Notes about the author/s, as well as any acknowledgements, should include information on the organisation to which the author/s belongs when relevant to the subject addressed in the text, and should also include information regarding any financial or other assistance given for preparing the text.

Quotations of three or more lines in length should be placed in a separate centre-aligned paragraph, with the text appearing in italics and without inverted commas.

The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them. (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12)

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First Name LAST NAME

Institutional affiliation

Author's First and Last Name

Title: Subtitle

Publisher, City Year of publication, number of pages, price (ISBN number)

John SMITH

Oxford University

Eviatar Zerubavel

Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past

University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003, 184 pages, USD 25.00 (ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

REFERENCES

The basic form of an in-text reference is (Smith, 1994). To indicate the page, use the following form: (Smith, 1994: 27–28). If two authors are referred to, they should both be stated: (Smith and Doe, 2007). When there are three or more authors, the following form should be used: (Smith et al., 1994: 27), while all authors should be mentioned in the reference list. If the author does not use the first edition of the book, the year the first edition was published should also be given: (Smith, 1953/1994: 7). Several simultaneous references should be separated by a semicolon: (Smith, 1994: 7; Doe, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). When citing several references by the same author published in the same year, references should be separated by letters a, b, c etc.: (Smith, 1994a; 27–29; Smith 1994b: 1) in the order they first appear in the text.

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Books

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher.

Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Edited Books

Last Name, First Name (ed.) (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher.

Featherstone, Mike and Mike Hepworth, Bryan S. Turner (eds.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

Chapters or Essays in Monographs

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Chapter/essay in the Edited Book. In First Name Last Name of the editor (ed.), Title of the Edited Book, pages of the chapter/essay. City: Publisher.

Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance? In Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

Articles

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Article: Subtitle. Name of Journal Volume (Number): pages.

Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. *American Political Science Review* 57 (3): 632–642.

Internet (WWW)

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title. Accessible at Internet address, date of access.

Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Accessible at <http://www.imagnet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2001.

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Featherstone, Mike (2005–2008): Audio cassettes. National Museum of New Zealand. Available at <http://www.imagnet.nz/deluxe/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2010.

or

Activity Report of the National Assembly of Republic of Slovenia, 1996–2000. Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000.

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Last name, First Name of any author (potential year of creation of the source): Source name or description. The place where the source is kept. Private archives.

Collection of supporters' scarves. Hitchiker Museum, Richmond upon Thames. Private archives of James Longfield.

or

Collection of letters by Janez Novak. 1953–1989. Private archives.

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(Activity Report of the National Assembly, 2000)

or

(Collection of supporters' scarves)

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