Reference and the true value 
of clauses NPr be NPp 
The creation of non-linguistic entity 
as a consequence of a linguistic one 
Olga Kunst-Gnamus 
1. Purpose, problem, and hypotheses 
My attention has been drawn by the question of how to explain the illocutionary force of ordinary speech which makes it possible, 
primarily in ideological discourse, to completely govern the beliefs and actions 
of individuals, sometimes against the evident facts or in contradiction to them. 
This issue of modern linguistics was asked very persuasively by Chomsky: 
»Plato's problem is to explain why we know so much although existing 
evidence is so scarce. However, it is Orwell's problem to explain why we know 
and understand so little although the evidence at our disposal is so rich. Orwell 
was, like many other intellectuals of the 20th century, very impressed by the 
ability of totalitarian regimes to implant beliefs that are firmly valid and 
widely accepted although completely unfounded and often even in 
disagreement with the facts about the world which surrounds us« (Chomsky, 
1989: 6). 
I agree with Chomsky who states that the reasons must be sought in 
institutionalized and other factors which in the decisive spheres of our lives 
block insight and understanding. My hypothesis, however, is that the sources 
of the convincing force of ordinary speech must likewise be sought in its inner 
structure, in its possibility to present entities as equal although they in fact 
belong to different worlds, thus creating possibilities for their exchange. I will 
try to demonstrate this hypothesis through the semantic, pragmatic, and 
grammatical structure of the clause NPr be NPp where index r stands for 
reference and p for predication. The clause has an underlying proposition P: r 
equals p. The use of these clause structures will be illustrated by examples 
taken from both fundamental functional discourses, namely the ideological and 
the scientific. They are characteristic of both discourses and frequently used in 
both of them. We are going to investigate their semantic-cognitive and 
illocutionary function. We will point out that the true value of a clause does 
not depend on its semantic-logical structure but rather on the functional 
discourse in which the clause is used as well as on the communicative 
principles that particular discourses abide by. This means that classification of 
the communicative space in functional discourses (discourse of art, science, 
ordinary speech) and the communicative principles governing them must 
necessarily be taken into account as a significant pragmatic factor that 
influences the interpretation of these clauses. Linguistic studies that do not 
166 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
take this into account inevitably lead to overgeneralizations. This is 
undoubtedly true of many conclusions of speech act theory. 
An NPr be NPp clause is simultaneously a means of expression which makes 
possible the understanding of procedures of equating the so-called »real world« 
with the world of intentional mental states of the speaker (mind world), 
equating and transposing entitties that belong to different worlds. I will call 
this phenomenom »communicative blindness«. Clauses with the same surface 
structure whose deep structures expresses a relation between value and role 
(value be role) will be excluded from this study. Example: M. K. is the 
president of the Republic of Slovenia. As Fauconnier (1985) states, these 
clauses express a relation between value and role, between entities that belong 
to the same mental space. 
NPr be NPp clauses will be considered in the pragmatic context of their 
utterance. The paradigmatic space builder of the pragmatic space is the explicit 
performative verb to say: S says that P. This fact makes the issue of the true 
value of a clause even more complicated, as from the point of the true value, 
identifying relation between P and S says that P is problematic. 
2. NPr be NPp in the context of speech act theory 
We will investigate the structure of the propositional act and the relationship 
between propositional and illocutionary acts. We will try to answer the 
question which illocutionary act is performed by uttering the NPr be NPp 
clause with the underlying proposition P: r equals p. To be able to answer the 
question whether this is an illocutionary act with constative illocutionary force 
(assertion) or an illocutionary act with performative illocutionary force, the 
true value of the assertion has to be determined. According to Searle, 
assertions bind the speaker towards the true value of the expressed proposition: 
»The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the 
speaker... to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of the members of the 
assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes 
true or false« (Searle, 1979: 12). It must be added that the true value is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition in determining the type of illocutionary 
act, as in indirect speech seeming assertions are not selected with the intention 
to describe an actual state of affairs or fact, but rather with the intention of 
performing some other illocutionary act by means of description, e.g., a 
request, promise, or threat. The intention of the utterance is not a true 
proposition; the latter is chosen as a means of performing the illocutionary act 
with performative illocutionary force. This means that besides the true value, 
intention has to be taken into account in determining assertions: assertions are 
illocutionary acts whose intention is a truthful description of the actual state of 
affairs or facts. In order to make the intention recognizable, reasons to believe 
P to be true or false must be ensured. Let us try to investigate whether 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 167 
utterances with the NPr be NPp clause structure are determinable as to their 
true value. A clause has the apparent structure of an assertion, it appears to be 
a description of a state of affairs; we are going to demonstrate - which has 
already been done by Fauconnier (1985) - that this clause is a typical space 
builder, i.e. an utterance that does not represent reality but rather creates new 
mental spaces composed of ungrounded beliefs. True value conditions of this 
clause and reasons to believe it really being true or false can be ensured only in 
scientific discourse. 
According to Searle, the expression of a proposition is a propositional act 
composed of reference and predication: »The utterance of a referring 
expression characteristically serves to pick out or identify a particular object 
from other objects« (Searle, 1969: 28). In the clause Sam is drunk, the proper 
name Sam is the referring expression and is drunk is the predication. Searle 
defines »referring expression« as follows: »An expression which serves to 
identify any thing, process, event, action, or any other kind of 'individual' or 
'particular' I shall call a referring expression. Referring expressions point to 
particular things...« (Searle, 1969: 26-27). 
Having been asked what the reference of the expression is drunk in the clause 
Sam is drunk is, Frege answered »the concept of drunkness.« »He appears to 
think that the use of a predicate expression commits one to the existence of a 
property.« Searle, however, does not agree with Frege: »From the fact that a 
statement I utter commits me to the existence of a property it does not follow 
that in that statement I referred to a property« (Searle, 1969: 98-99). Asked 
about the function that a grammatical predicate can have, Searle answered 
with two statements taken from Frege: »a grammatical predicate refers to a 
concept and a grammatical predicate ascribes a property« from which follows 
»a reference to a concept simply is the ascription of a property« (1969: 100). 
Searle rightfully called attention to the inconsistency of this usage and solves 
the contradiction by insisting on the difference between reference and 
predication »and the correct description is to say that the predicate expression 
is used to ascribe a property« (1969: 100), adding: »Remember that 'ascribe' 
here is meant to carry no assertive force.« Searle does not believe that the 
referring expression and the predicate expression refer to identical entities: »... 
I believe that the notion that some entity stands to a predicate as an object 
stands to a singular referring expression should be abandoned« (1969: 103). 
(...) »It is easy to see in what sense the term identified by the subject 
expression, 'the rose', is non-linguistic, it is material object, its existence is a 
contingent fact. (...) But is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic 
or non-linguistic entity? And can the existence of a non-linguistic entity 
follow from the existence of linguistic entity? (...). Universals are not entities 
in the world, but in our mode of representing the world; they are, therefore, 
identified not by appealing to facts in the world, but in the utterance of 
expressions having the relevant meanings« (1969: 114-116). 
168 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
Searle maintains that »Strawson avoids saying that predicates refer by adopting 
the (apparently) neutral term 'identify'« (1969: 113) and stresses that the 
expression »identify« has two completely different meanings: »... the means of 
identifying universals are quite different from the means of identifying 
particulars, and that this is a consequence of the fact that universals are parts 
of our mode of describing the world, not parts of the world« (1969: 117). 
The ideas developed above seem important for the pragmatic interpretation of 
NPr be NPp clauses in ordinary everyday speech as well as for Fauconnier's 
theory of mental spaces. Complications as to the true value of this type of 
clause and their apparent constative function are the reason for a scientific 
discourse to develop which fulfills Frege's hypothesis that the reference of a 
predicate expression is a concept and at the same time creates conditions for 
determining the true values of these clauses. Therefore it is vital in the 
interpretation of NPr be NPp clauses to take into account principles, strategies, 
and intentions of functional discourses which determine interpretation of the 
illocutionary acts performed by uttering these clauses. In ordinary speech the 
true value of these clauses cannot be determined, and they cannot be 
considered assertions, but rather utterances with performative illocutionary 
force or, as Fauconnier says, as space builders. They obtain the constative 
illocutionary force of assertions by scientific discourse. Not taking into account 
this context leads to overgeneralizations in linguistic science. The usage of 
these clauses in ordinary speech, however, has a blinding effect, i.e. the 
phenomenon in which performative illocutionary force and its perlocutionary 
influence are exchanged for the constative illocutionary force, beliefs for these 
clauses to be descriptions of actual state of affairs and facts. In other words: 
intentional mental states which are expressed through our choice of predicate 
expression are understood as a part of the actual state of affairs and which we 
equate with facts, expressed with subject expression. 
It is time to undertake the analysis. Examples will be chosen in which 
referential properties are not ascribed by adjectives but with nouns, i.e. in the 
metonymic mode: the whole denominated by a noun in the function of a 
predicative ascribes the reference, expressed by NP in the role of subject, 
typical properties contained in the predicate meaning. These properties are 
evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable, desirable or undesirable, permissive 
or unpermissive within the given context. A change of context may change the 
evaluation. 
3. NPr be NPp clauses in ideological discourse 
A detailed definition of ideological discourse would reach beyond the scope of 
this paper. Simply, we can say that this is a discourse which is primarily 
directed toward having a perlocutionary effect and forming beliefs, 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 169 
irrespective of the true value of the assertions and occurs in ordinary speech. 
In order to answer the question what illocutionary act is performed by uttering 
NPr be NPp clauses, the true values of these clauses must be determined and 
the intention of their utterance in pragmatic contexts which are 
paradigmatically expressed by the performative to say. This verb allows the 
following questions to be asked: who has uttered the clause, to whom, when, 
from what reason, with what intention. A pragmatic analysis therefore 
presupposes that a clause is placed in a context of utterance and based on the 
relation between literal meaning and the actual state of affairs or facts to make 
conclusions about the true value; whereas by taking into account the context, 
intended meaning can be concluded from literal meaning and the question may 
be answered as to what the intention of the uttered clause was, in other words, 
what illocutionary act was performed by the speaker through the utterance act. 
In 1990, an article appeared in the main Slovene daily entitled B.S. - The Last 
Bolshevik. B.S. is a proper name that enables us to identify a very concrete 
person who functioned as a university vice chancellor. The copula to be is left 
out of the title; in full the predicate expression would run is the last bolshevik. 
The person who can be identified with the referring expression B.S. in the role 
of subject (NPr) is ascribed properties of meaning expressed by bolshevik. The 
copula to be expresses equality in the value of the referring subject expression 
and the predicate expression. Can the clause be considered an assertion, i.e. the 
true description of the actual state of affairs or of the reference? To answer 
this question, the following must be verified: (1) does the reference have truly 
ascribed properties? and (2) does the copula to be have the value of a logical 
equivalent? The analysis of (1) will be performed by investigating the relations 
between the signifying expressions and corresponding two entities. The analysis 
of (2) will be performed through an investigation of the grammatical relations 
in the surface structure. There is no problem identifying entities denoted by 
the referring expression NPr B.S.. But how to verify whether the person 
possesses the properties ascribed by the predicate expression? What does this 
word mean? The definition of the word bolshevik as taken from the 
Dictionary of Standard Slovene: 1. at the beginning of the 20th century, an 
adherent of the left wing of the Russian social-democratic workers' party or a 
member of the Russian social-democratic workers' party (of the Bolsheviks): 
Lenin's followers began to be called Bolsheviks, his opponents Mensheviks / 
expr. for communist in general. 2. expr. for the opponents of communism, 
atheist, rebel: let them alone, they are only bolsheviks. 
Besides the denotative meaning, this word also has an expressive connotative 
meaning depending on the attitude towards its denotation, i.e. it depends on 
whether the speaker is an adherent or opponent of communism. Referent B.S. 
cannot be ascribed the properties of the denotative meaning but can be 
ascribed the value connotation. The referent is negatively evaluated through 
170 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
the utterance. Properties ascribed to the referent by the predicate expression 
have been completely revalued by the changed ideological context: the 
formerly positive connotation adopted a negative connotation during the 
period of anti-communism. Bolshevism is an undesirable and unacceptable 
property. From the point of view of true value, we are found in a 
contradictory situation: the same referent has conflicting properties in 
different ideological contexts: in context A these properties are evaluated as 
positive, in context B as negative. Obviously we are not dealing with an 
illocutionary act of assertion but with an evaluating judgement with a 
performative illocutionary potential which influences our attitude toward the 
reference. This can be further confirmed by the fact that different speakers 
ascribe the referent different, conflicting properties although in the same 
context. While speaker A says that B.S. is the last of the bolsheviks, speaker B 
says that it means the same as if said that B.S. is the last of the Mohicans. The 
connotation is no longer a negative one. Speaker C may define the referent to 
be a democrat, another a Stalinist. It is obvious that the choice of the predicate 
expression does not depend on the referent, but on the intentional mental state 
of the speaker, his positive or negative attitude towards the reality that he is 
describing. If we wanted to ascribe true value to NPr be NPp clauses, we 
would have to remove differences in beliefs, desires, and intentions from the 
ideological context and proclaim only individual convictions or convictions of 
single homogeneous communities of interest as acceptable; these in turn could 
then proclaim their »assertions« expressed by NPr be NPp clauses as true. That 
this hypothesis is true can be demonstrated by the actual experience of 
totalitarian regimes. Sometimes uttering of this type of clause was sufficient 
reason for the persecution of individuals who were negatively evaluated by 
them. 
On the other hand, the dependence of these utterances on the intentional 
mental states of the speakers and their vague true value is summed up in the 
folk wisdom that there are many truths. This saying also confirms man's right 
to take a different attitude toward reality. 
NPr be NPp clauses set up a seemingly equal relation between two expressions, 
NPr and NPp, which express differing entities belonging to different worlds. 
NPr represents a reference in the »real world« of actual state of affairs or 
facts, whereas NPp represents the speaker's intentional mental state, his beliefs 
and attitudes towards reality. Although the discourse values expressed by NPr 
and NPp appear identical, the NPp expression actually represents the speaker 
in the clause. The NPp expression is bi-relational: (1) it appears as a reference 
property via the equality relation with NPr, and (2) is optional and the option 
depends on the speaker and is the expression of his convictions, desires, and 
intentions. 
Thus a speaker does not express his intentional propositional attitude towards 
reality and toward the listener explicitly, by denominating intentional mental 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 171 
states but rather indirectly by his choice of the predicate expression NPp that 
contains either positive or negative connotations. With the seemingly equal 
relation between NPr and NPp, personal attitudes and evaluations are 
presented as part of the actual state of affairs. Clauses with the underlying 
proposition P: r equals p and with the expressive realization NPr be NPp are in 
ordinary speech the basic means of so-called communicative blindness, as it 
permits a seeming equalization of the real world with the world of the 
intentional mental state (mind world). They appear as descriptions of actual 
states of affairs and facts, as assertions, when in fe^.t^ey exprftssjtl^ ppeaker'p 
beliefs, desires, and intentions, and by way of cofmofative mca.njqg, exercisg 
influence on the listener's evaluation of reality ^ n ^ i s actions resulting from 
it. Their performative illocutionary force stems from the connotative meaning 
of the predicate expression NPp. 
It is therefore not surprising that this is the form in which slogans are written 
on the front of the Ministry of Truth: War is peace. Freedom is slavery. 
Ignorance is power. (Orwell, 1983: 7,15). They transform reality and its usual 
understanding into its opposite. Searle's question of whether the existence of a 
non-linguistic entity follows from the existence of a linguistic entity can be 
answered positively. 
4. NPr be NPp clauses in the theory of mental space 
In accordance with the hypothesis of the performative illocutionary force of 
clauses under analysis and in accordance with the indefinability of their true 
value, we can agree with Fauconnier's claim that »Relative simple 
grammatical structures give instructions for space construction in context. (...) 
Language, then, is not merely interpreted with respect to worlds, models, 
contexts, situations, and so forth. (...) It builds up mental spaces, relations 
between them, and relations between elements within them« (1985: 2). (...) 
»The space elements are not referred to by expressions of language: they are 
set up, identified, etc., and may then be used for purposes of reference (or 
possible purported reference). Mental space construction is an important part 
of natural semantics and pragmatics« (1985: 158). 
Fauconnier already classed Npr be NPp clauses among space builders, i.e. 
linguistic expressions that establish new mental space: a »construct distinct 
from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines 
provided by the linguistic expressions« (1985: 16). He also established that be 
links elements that are counterparts in different spaces: »In other words, even 
though a simple clause usually expresses relations within a space, those of the 
form NP be NP may establish a counterpart relation between elements of 
different spaces. As opposed to many other verbs, be may express transpational 
links: this is a consequence of its general metonymic function and of the 
metonymic nature of pragmatic connectors in general, and of interspational 
172 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
ones in particular« (1985:145). Thus, the copula be is not a logical conjunction 
but a pragmatic connector that »can stand for metonymic relations in general 
and in particular for the relation between a role and its value« (1985: 137). 
Its function in NPr be NPp clauses is worth special attention as it links two 
entities that belong to different worlds and corresponding mental spaces into a 
seemingly equal relation. NPr represents the actual state of affairs or facts of 
the »real« world, while NPp the entities that belong to the world of intentional 
mental states (mind world). The speaker does not express his beliefs, 
intentions, and desires through propositional attitudes but through the 
predicate expression NPp containing the performative illocutionary potential 
contained in the connotation. Thus the intentional worlds appear as real 
worlds. The function of the connector to be that connects entities belonging to 
different mental spaces into a seeming equal relation is similar to the function 
of pronouns »because the connectors that link elements in different spaces are 
open, ... a pronoun with an antecedent in one space freely identify its 
counterpart in another, connected space: 
(1) Vivien saw herself in Gone with the Wind.« 
The pronoun herself identifies the true person with her role in the film. This 
would come as no surprise if one viewed all the counterparts being in some 
sense 'the same' elements« (1985: 35). This blinding illusion which makes 
possible the equalization of entities that belong to different worlds or mental 
spaces was convincingly dashed by Cary Grant who said, »Everyone would like 
to to be Cary Grant, even me!« This type of mechanism built into the structure 
and interpretation of NPr be NPp clauses and other means of expression that 
set up equal relations between entities in different spaces makes possible the 
creation of a non-linguistic entity as a consequence of a linguistic one. This 
enables the full swing of symbolic imagination, but also a schizophrenia of 
mind, the substitution of a linguistic creation of an entity for a non-linguistic 
one. 
5. Grammatical structure of NPr be NPp clauses 
What is the grammatical and logical structure of NPr be NPp clauses like? Is 
the relation between NPr (trigger) and NPp (target) symmetrical and 
reversible or asymmetrical and irreversible? Jackendoff maintains that »the 
trigger will always be real referents, while the targets may be concrete or 
mental representation of them. However, this asymmetrical view is not 
reflected by the linguistic data: the triggers may be in the pictures, beliefs, etc., 
and the target in the so-called real 'world'« (Fauconnier, 1985: 14). Let us see 
what opinion is valid for NPr be NPp clauses. 
NPr is the trigger and has the function of a subject in the surface structure, 
while NPp is the target and has the function of the predicative in the surface 
structure. The predicate consists of the copula to be and NPp. In the Slovene 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 173 
language, subject and predicate are unambiguously definable. Slovene does not 
have the definite article to identify the referring expression and to separate it 
from the predicate phrase, but recognition of these syntactic functions is made 
possible by the rule of agreement: NPr in the function of a subject agrees in 
gender and number with the form of the copula. This, in fact, does not show in 
the present and the future tenses of the auxiliary to be, but it can be noted if 
the verb is put in the past tense: Peter je bil; Marica je bila; dekleta so bila; 
dečki so bili (Peter was; Marica was; the girls were; the boys were). On the 
other hand, NPp functioning as a predicative is a syntactic free form, a simple 
adjunct to the verb. As both NP are in the nominative and if also of the same 
gender and number, difficulties arise in defining them. Some examples: 
(l i) Avtobusna postaja je največji problem Ljubljane. 
(The bus station is the biggest problem in Ljubljana.) 
(lii) Največji problem Ljubljane je avtobusna postaja. 
(The biggest problem in Ljubljana is the bus station.) 
(2i) Ta hiša je opera. 
(This building is the opera.) 
(2ii) Opera je ta hiša. 
(The opera is this building.) 
Which nominal phrase in these clauses has the function of subject (trigger) 
and which the function of predicate (target)? An empirical experiment was 
carried out. The test population were students of Slovene language and 
students of the fourth class of a natural sciences secondary school, i.e. 
linguistically highly educated individuals with a developed linguistic sense. 
Everybody (n = 45) chose the nominal phrase avtobusna postaja as the subject 
in the clause (li). In clause (lii) 43 out of 50 test individuals attributed the 
function of subject to the nominal phrase največji problem Ljubljane. This 
means that test individuals in accordance with the rule of the functional 
perspective chose the first nominal phrase in the clause to be the subject. The 
experiment, however, also confirmed the working of semantic intuition which 
tends to ascribe the function of subject (trigger) to a nominal phrase with a 
»concrete« semantic feature and the function of predicative (target) to the 
nominal phrase with an »abstract« semantic feature. This tendency is even 
more obvious in clause (2ii). All tested individuals ascribed the function of 
subject to ta hiša in clause (2i), whereas in clause (2ii) the same function was 
ascribed to the nominal phrase opera by only 32 out of 45 individuals. It must 
be mentioned that in this clause there is a relation between value and role. It 
can be concluded that semantic intuition speaks in favour of the asymmetric 
relation between the two nominal phrases, namely the relation between trigger 
and target. There is a clearly expressed tendency that the role of trigger is 
ascribed to a nominal phrase with a »concrete« semantic feature. 
174 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
Because in the present tense, agreement between subject and predicate, i.e. the 
copula form, is not expressed in the surface structure, difficulties in defining 
the subject and the predicate in the clause arise, along with grammatical 
mistakes. Due to the complicated relations between meaning and expression, 
grammatical rules are not absolutely defined and speakers must depend on 
semantic intuition. This may be illustrated by the following example: 
(3)* Moja največja ljubezen je bila organizacijske vede. 
(My greatest love was management sciences.) 
(4i)* Predmet razprave je bil družbena razmerja. 
(The topic of the discussion was social relations.) 
The speaker chose the nominal phrase as the trigger, i.e. the subject in the 
clause moja največja ljubezen (my greatest love) and predmet razprave (the 
topic of the discussion). This can clearly be seen in the surface structure from 
the agreement between the nominal phrase and the copula. The form of the 
copula je agrees in gender and number with the subject. However, all the test 
individuals expressed the opinion that both clauses are grammatically 
incorrect, and that they should run: 
(3i) Moja največja ljubezen so bile organizacijske vede. 
(My greatest love were management sciences.) 
(3ii) Organizacijske vede so bile moja največja ljubezen. 
(Management sciences were my greatest love.) 
and 
(4i) Predmet razprave so bila družbena razmerja. 
(The topic of the discussion were social relations.) 
(4ii) Družbena razmerja so bila predmet razprave. 
(Social relations were the topic of the discussion.) 
As already mentioned, this phenomenon is not unambiguously described in the 
grammar of Standard Slovene, so the question should be posed where the 
source of this semantic and expressive intuition is. The role of trigger or 
subject of the clause must be taken on by an NPr that at the same time 
represents entities outside the speaker, whereas the role of the target or 
predicate the NPp which is the expression of the speaker's attitude towards the 
external entity. In clause (3) the management sciences are those that the 
speaker loved, in clause (4) it is social relations that were chosen as the topic 
of discussion. Although a semantic rule referring to the precise structure of 
clauses NPr be NPp is not described and normed in the Slovene language, one 
can obviously rely on intuition. It could be said that from the grammatical 
viewpoint, the relation between NPr and NPp is asymmetrical, as the relation 
between NPr and copula is formally defined, while the relation between 
copula and NPp is free in accordance with the optional understanding. This 
can be further confirmed by the following examples: 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 175 
(5) Matematika je bila moj največji problem. 
(Maths was my greatest problem.) 
and not 
(5i)* Moj največji problem je M matematika. 
(My greatest problem was maths.) 
(6) Peter je bil moja velika ljubezen. 
(Peter was my greatest love.) 
and not 
(6i)* Moja največja ljubezen je bila Peter. 
(My greatest love was Peter.) 
The following clauses are also correct: 
(5ii) Moj največji problem je bila matematika. 
(My greatest problem was maths.) 
(6ii) Moja največja ljubezen je bil Peter. 
(My greatest love was Peter.) 
The difference between the NPr in the role of subject and the NPp in the role 
of predicative can be expressed on the level of expression only in the past 
tense, but not in the present or in the future; it also remains concealed if NPr 
and NPp are of the same gender and number. Therefore, we should not be 
surprised that this clause has escaped exact grammatical description, which 
strengthens the feeling of the equivalent relation between NPr and NPp to the 
extent that we can say that the grammatical structure of these clauses is 
favourable for the blinding effect, i.e. the exchange of the external world with 
the world of the speaker's beliefs, desires, and intentions, especially in the 
present and future tenses. 
On the basis of the analysis performed, it can be stated with certainty that the 
relation between NPr and NPp in an NPr be NPp clause is neither symmetrical 
nor reversible, although it appears to be such in cases when NPr and NPp are 
of the same gender and number as well as in the present and the future tenses. 
Semantic intuition comes into play in these cases and ascribes the role of 
trigger, i.e. subject, to the NPr which represents entities outside the speaker 
and the role of the target, i.e. the predicative, to the NPp expressing the 
speaker's attitude and relation towards external entities. The analysis shows 
that in the Slovene language, the definite and indefinite articles which help 
identify the NPr, i.e. the trigger, and the NPp, i.e. the target, are replaced by 
the rule of agreement of subject and predicate. NPp has two features: (a) it 
takes a space in the clause structure as an adjunct, and (b) is an optional value 
in the paradigmatic system. Language rules on one hand permit the 
differentiation between NPr and NPp, especially in the past tense, while on the 
other hand, they permit the necessary exchange and equalizing which permits 
communicative blindness. 
176 Olga Kunst-GnamuS 
6. NPr be NPp in scientific discourse 
NPr be NPp clauses are not only frequent in ideological discourse, but also in 
scientific discourse. These are clauses that categorize remarks belonging to the 
actual state of affairs into conceptual categories belonging to the system of 
scientific concepts. E.g.: 
(1) Beseda Peter je samostalnik. 
(The word »Peter« is a noun.) 
If in ordinary speech the true value of such clauses is non-definable and the 
relation between NPr and NPp is only seemingly equivalent, it is not valid for 
scientific discourse. The true value of clause (1) can be determined within the 
frame of grammatical theory and its conceptual system by means of syllogistic 
inference: 
Definition: nouns are words that denote beings, things, or concepts, and whose 
gender, case, and number can be determined. 
Recognition of the defined properties under consideration: the word »Peter« 
denotes a being, it is masculine, nominative, singular. 
Conclusion: the word »Peter« is a noun. 
Let us consider how scientific discourse can ensure conditions for defining the 
true value of clauses as opposed to everyday human speech. It ensures those 
conditions that are not ensured in everyday human speech: (1) the choice in 
denomination is replaced by the use of non-selective denominations, i.e. terms; 
(2) the meanings of terms are precisely defined without connotative value 
surplus; (3) this makes possible by means of syllogistic inference to verify if a 
clause of perception has the properties contained in the concept and thus 
determine the true value of a clause. Ensuring these conditions is therefore a 
constituent component of the communicative laws of scientific discourse. In 
this way it is scientific discourse that ensures the truth of Frege's hypothesis 
that the reference of a predicate expression NPp is a concept. It could be said 
that both Frege and Searle were correct to a certain extent; Searle's 
conclusions are valid for the ordinary speech that was the dominant topic of 
his research; Frege's conclusions are valid for the logical metalanguage of 
science. Their conclusions are wrong in as much as they do not take into 
account the functional segmentation of communicative space in functional 
discourses. Not taking this very obvious fact into account presents the danger 
of overgeneralizations. 
The fact that NPr be NPp clauses are impossible as assertions in ordinary 
speech can be best confirmed by examples with logical tautologies: 
(2) Življenje je življenje. 
(Life is life.) 
Logical equivalence of NPr and NPp in such clauses is achieved, but the price 
for it is their sameness. The copula certainly has the value of logical 
Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp 177 
equivalence, but the clause demonstrates the impossibility of understanding 
and the necessity of agreeing with reality as it is. These are clauses that meet 
the need for true definability, but at the price of coinciding of two entities, the 
intentional and the real. Language structure makes it possible for us to escape 
from the state of unperceptiveness and passivity. In everyday human speech, 
NPr be NPp clauses enable the performative illocutionary force which 
performs beliefs, attitudes, and acting, i.e. transformation of a linguistic entity 
into a non-linguistic one. Clauses with the same structure in scientific 
discourse, on the other hand, allow us to perceive a non-linguistic entity with 
linguistic means. Thus the linguistic structure of Npr be NPp clauses meets 
both fundamental human intentions, the intention to change the world 
according to one's desire and the intention to perceive the world. 
References: 
Chomsky, N., Znanje jezika (Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and 
Use), Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 1989. 
Fauconnier, G., Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural 
Language, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985. 
Kunst-Gnamui, O., An Attempt at Conceptualizing the Difference between 
Pragmatic and Rational Argumentation, Second ISSA International 
Conference on Argumentation, University of Amsterdam, June 
19-22 1990. 
Orwell, G., 1984, Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 1983. 
Searle, J. R., Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969. 
Searle, J. R., Vanderveken, D., Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985. 
Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika I, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana 
1987.