41
ANNALES · Ser. hist. sociol. · 28 · 2018 · 1
original scientifi c article                  DOI 10.19233/ASHS.2018.04
received: 2017-09-24    
CHALLENGES FACING MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: FROM SECULARIZATION 
TO THE IDEA OF ‘EURO-ISLAM’
Anja ZALTA
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Sociology, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: anja.zalta@ff.uni-lj.si
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the article is to present a variety of questions and challenges that Muslims in Europe are exposed 
to with the processes of secularization, the defi nition of their „European“  identity as well as the analysis of the 
concept of ‘Euro-Islam’, which is advocated by the prominent European Muslim intellectuals Bassam Tibi and Tariq 
Ramadan, among others. Special attention is paid to the presentation and analysis of Bosnian Islam and its specifi cs, 
which are the result of European secularization processes.
Keywords: Islam, Muslims in Europe, Secularization, Euro-Islam, Islamic Tradition and Identity, Bosnian Islam
 
UNA SFIDA AI MUSULMANI IN EUROPA: DAL SECOLARISMO ALL’IDEA 
DELL’«EURO-ISLAM»
  
SINTESI
Lo scopo del saggio è rifl ettere le questioni e le sfi de che per i musulmani in Europa rappresenta la secolarizza-
zione, la defi nizione della loro identità europea e l’analisi del concetto di «euro-islam» che vengono difesi da due 
intellettuali europei di spicco, Bassam Tibi e Tariq Ramadan. Una peculiare attenzione è dedicata alla presentazione 
e all’analisi del islam in Bosnia, nonché alle sue specifi cità che sono la conseguenza dei processi europei di secola-
rizzazione. 
Parole chiave: islam, musulmani in Europa, secolarizzazione, euro-islam, tradizione e identità islamica, l’islam 
della Bosnia (islam bosniaco)
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INTRODUCTION
According to Pew Research Centre (Pew Research 
Centre, 2016) there are more than twenty million Mus-
lims in Europe, representing one of the largest religious 
minorities, which is by no means monolithic, as many 
would like to believe as a consequence of their religious 
illiteracy. The main challenges faced by Muslims in 
Europe are the consequence of European processes of 
secularization. Muslims are faced with the question of 
how to live the Islamic way of life and at the same time 
fully participate in the wider (European) society. How is 
it possible for them to shape their identity as Muslims 
as well as Europeans? How to transmit the Islamic her-
itage to the new generations of Muslims in Europe? At 
the same time, Europe is facing challenges of its own, 
especially regarding the question of how to apply and 
react to religious plurality and to the desire of Muslims 
to actively participate in the political arena. Are the sec-
ular values  of European society compatible with Islamic 
norms and what does one and the other mean for the 
peaceful coexistence of all European citizens?
In a research project, conducted in 2011 at the 
Science and Research Centre in Koper, Mateja Sedmak 
and her team addressed various topics, such as the issue 
of interethnic relations, the process of intercultural con-
frontations, and the free expression of migrants’s culture, 
among others (Sedmak et al., 2013, 216). They have 
exposed the problem of present day Europe, where „the 
dynamic relations are becoming increasingly complex 
and schizophrenic. On the one hand, we have elabo-
rated supranational directives and national legislations 
regulating interethnic relations and emphasising the 
basic rights to preserve and cultivate one’s own cultural 
and religios identity“, which are promoting cultural 
and religious diversity, plurality, intercultural dialogue, 
etc., but are mainly denied on an everyday basis due to 
ethnocentric, racist and discriminating views (Sedmak et 
al., 2013, 216–217). 
We must be aware that the debate does not only take 
place between the so-called Islamic and European val-
ues, but Europe needs to reformulate its attitude towards 
religion as such. If we are looking for answers of how the 
new generations of Muslims in Europe should actively 
live their European citizenship, we must at the same 
time understand the environment in which their thought 
can be shaped and applied. We cannot and must not 
ignore European secularization processes. Above all, we 
must remember why secularization has to happen and 
what it represents in a European context.
SECULARIZATION AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
IN EUROPE
During the fi rst half of the 20th century the Western 
idea of secularization (at least partially) drew from 
the work of Max Weber and his sociology of religion. 
Weber regarded secularization as a part of the radical 
process of modernization, which includes the state as 
well as society (Weber, 1988, 536–573). Similar to his 
interpretation was others from the founding fathers of 
sociology, including Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, 
Ferdinand Tönnies and Ernst Troeltsch. For all of them, 
secularization correlates with the declining infl uence 
of religion in a public sphere (social institutions, 
communal life) as well as in a private sphere („secu-
larization of consciousness“). In a chapter with the title 
„Secularization as a Concept“, Jose Casanova explains 
that „the distinction between the concept „secular,“ 
or its derivation „secularization,“ and the sociological 
theory of secularization proper is important because the 
concept itself is so multidimensional […] and so loaded 
with the wide range of meanings it has accumulated 
through its history“ (Casanova, 1994, 12). Some of these 
distinctions will be presented in the following chapters. 
THE IMPERATIVE OF SECULARIZATION 
Marko Kerševan, an expert in sociology of religion, 
also questioned the role of secularization. According 
to him, secularization covers only the role of religion 
and the church in society, and not religion or religios-
ity as such. The institutions of power no longer have a 
religious (supernatural) identity; more precisely, they do 
not require such legitimacy anymore (Kerševan, 2011, 
70–71). In his opinion, 
a particular form of atheism is emerging from a 
secularized environment: atheism, which does not 
emerge from the combat and conscious denial of 
God, but from the sense of redemption of God. When 
man begins to live and work as if there is no God, 
‘without the hypothesis of God,’ … man can quickly 
approach the feeling that everything goes without 
God [...] ‘Desacralisation’ of the world, changing the 
world into an object of human action, means at the 
same time removing God from the world (Kerševan, 
2011, 78). 
According to the just said, a question should be 
asked about what kind of god we have in mind? Is this 
an inclusive god, who works interconnectedly during 
religious pluralism and tolerates „otherness“? Or is this 
god who sets a sharp border between his believers and 
those who are not? Does it promote the coexistence of 
diversity? Unfortunately the answer is well known. Be-
cause of the negative experiences of religious exclusions, 
particularities and extremisms, the secular imperative 
has become a European reality. This secular imperative 
allowed the emergence of new religious forms in the 
space, which was emptied from the narrative of just 
one religion and offered (at least theoretically) an equal 
coexistence of different religions/alternative ideologies 
and world views. 
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Different causes of secularization are mentioned 
in Europe: Galilean and Copernicus discoveries, the 
rationalization of philosophy, the declaration of human 
rights, the phenomenon of technology, industrializa-
tion, urbanization, the rationalization of thinking in 
all spheres, and, of course, the laicisation of the state 
and the political sphere. According to Kerševan, the 
laicisation of the state and the state authorities is on the 
one hand linked to the independence of the absolutistic 
rulers of the church, and, on the other, to the necessary 
independence of state power from the church, which 
was caused by the Protestant Reformation. If there are 
several recognized religions in the state, then power, 
law and morality (at least in fundamental matters) must 
be independent of any particular religion. Only then are 
they acceptable for all citizens. The condition for the 
integration in the society is no longer the existence of 
one state religion, but religious tolerance. For Kerševan, 
tolerance does not only mean respecting opposing 
attitudes, but recognition that these differences (wheth-
er God is or is not) are no longer essential (in some 
sphere). In this case, religion has become immaterial 
in the state-legal sphere, and with regard to the state, 
it has become a private matter (Kerševan, 2011, 81). 
Refl ecting on the just said, Jose Casanova distinguishes 
three aspects of secularization: the separation of laic 
administration from religious institutions and norms and 
their emancipation, the decline of religious notions and 
norms of conduct, and the restriction of religion to the 
private sphere (Casanova, 2011, 54–89).  
Among the fi rst scholars to discuss the classical or the 
so-called orthodox model of secularization were Peter 
Berger and David Martin. They were reluctant towards the 
idea that the classical secularization thesis can be used 
to explain the religiousness of the developed parts of the 
non-Western world and, in particular the situation in the 
USA, which remains a rather religious country in spite 
of intensive modernization (for more see Davie, 2001). 
Secularism has been accepted as a normative model and 
an integral part of the modern constitutional state. How-
ever, the concepts handling the degree of separation of 
religion and the state in Europe are very heterogeneous, 
which indicates that secularization is far less thoroughly 
defi ned than the process of desacralization (based upon 
Weber’s „disenchantment of the world“), but more so 
than the separation between the spheres of religion and 
non-religion, which are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. It was Alfred Stepan (Stepan 2000 and 2001) who 
raised important questions on the basis of an analysis of 
the European relationship between religion and the state. 
He is interested in the minimum and long-term condi-
tions for democracy, and whether European countries, 
despite different practices of attitudes towards religion, 
meet these minimum standards.
Let us look closely at some of these examples in 
Europe, presented by Grace Davie (Davie, 2001). In 
the Netherlands and Belgium, where the process of 
secularization gave rise to the so-called ‘pillar’ model: 
each religious group – the Catholics, the Protestants and 
others – constitutes a „pillar“ of society, within which 
their own institutions are being maintained; the system 
has penetrated almost all aspects of life – schools, 
hospitals, media, syndicates … Great Britain unites four 
nations, each of which has its own religious history and 
arrangement: in England, the Anglican Church is es-
tablished, in Scotland the national Calvinist Church, in 
Wales neither of them, while Northern Ireland remains 
an unsolved problem because of its religious history. 
On the contrary, the Republic of Ireland is technically 
a secular state, though the preamble to the constitution 
is strongly Catholic and the religious practice remains 
unusually common in comparison to the European 
norm. Another example is Greece, the only Orthodox 
Christian member state of the European Union. The Or-
thodox Church is the offi cial religion of the country and 
is nearly identical with Greek identity, so the members of 
other, minority religions are disadvantaged, particularly 
the members of other Christian groups. These examples 
demonstrate that substantiated separation of state and 
religion is not crucial for a functional democracy (for 
more see Fox, 2006, 537–569; Fox, 2015). Though all 
states mentioned above possess a secular legal system, 
none of them is laicistic. France and Portugal are the 
only constitutionally laicistic states in Europe, where 
laicism is considered to be a necessary prerequisite for 
the maintenance of religious freedom and conscience, 
and the only possible way to ensure an equal status 
of all religious, as well as philosophical and political 
standpoints. 
On the basis of an analysis of European countries, 
Stepan develops a „twin toleration“ model, which refers 
to the „minimum limits of freedom of action“ for both 
the religion/religious organizations and the state. States 
should not use religion for political purposes and provide 
equality to all religions, while religious groups must not 
strive to covet state institutions and policies for specifi c 
religious purposes (Stepan, 2000, 37). According to him 
the „twin toleration“ model is „the minimal boundary 
of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for 
political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and 
for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis religious 
institutions“ (Stepan, 2001, 213). 
WHOSE DEFINITION OF SECULARIZATION?
With so many defi nitions and diverse historical and 
political backgrounds, we must consider historical fac-
tors that have shaped the understanding, interpretations 
and practical implementation of certain secularism in a 
given time and space. What norms did it introduce and 
what problems did it solve? Hashemi wonders whether 
secularism implies anticlericalism, atheism, disestab-
lishment, state neutrality and equidistance towards 
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Anja ZALTA: CHALLENGES FACING MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: FROM SECULARIZATION TO THE IDEA ..., 41–50
all religions, the rejection of religious symbols in 
the public sphere, separation of public and private 
spheres, complete separation of religion from pol-
itics, or more narrowly the separation of the insti-
tutions of the state from the infl uence of religion? 
(Hashemi, 2009, 104). 
Secularism is mostly measured and evaluated in 
comparison with the two most distinguished models in 
the Western tradition: the already mentioned French 
model, which is relatively hostile to religion, and the 
American model, which is relatively friendly towards 
religion. Adding to just said, Cesari defi nes secularism 
as the various Western political cultures that contex-
tualize and historicize the two major principles of 
secularity: the protection of the law for all religions 
and the equidistance of the state versus religion. These 
two principles are constantly interpreted within spe-
cifi c political cultures, which ultimately shape social 
expectations about the role of religion in the public 
sphere and in society (Cesari, 2014, 3–14).  In the case 
of the West, these expectations are mainly (but not 
always) the separation of the church from the state and 
the privatization of religion. It is true that this Western 
experience is at the heart of most secularization the-
ories relating to the western countries. But although 
secularism has „Christian roots“, as Charles Taylor 
noted, „it is wrong to think that this limits the applica-
tion of its formula to post-Christian societies“ (Taylor, 
1998, 31). It is therefore imperative to fi nd alternative 
models and take into account the religious experience 
and processes of individual countries. Each country 
can develop its own model, depending on its interests 
and needs (priorities and norms), but with awareness 
not to bow to the „cultural relativism“ regarding the 
respect for human rights and religious pluralism 
(among others). When we introduce the question of 
Islam and Muslims in Europe, we are often confronted 
with interpretations of Islam as an alternative to secular 
politics. In this context, we are confronted with a series 
of ideas or performances that are instrumentalized by 
political Islam in order to crash a secular state. The 
central problem remains the question of Islamic law in 
Europe: it seems that the removal of the possibility of 
applying Sharia to a European context will mean the 
transformation of Islam into a type of religion that has 
been handed over to the western secular standards. 
As we shall see below, such an application is not a 
prerequisite for consolidation of a normative Muslim 
identity. Confl icts, such as the issue of the introduction 
of Sharia, naturally seem invincible and advocate the 
„clash of civilization“ thesis. Therefore it is equally 
important to be aware of the clashes that take place 
within the European Muslim societies that are brought 
about by the challenges of living in Europe and by 
the attempts to adapt to the new social standards and 
conditions. 
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR SOCIETY
Often the expressed idea of the „secularization“ of Is-
lam is thought to mean the reformation of Islam. It seems 
as if Islam is incompatible with secularization and de-
mocracy until it passes through fundamental theological 
reforms. According to Oliver Roy, such understanding 
is ignoring the fact that Roman Catholicism never went 
through a fundamental theological reformation (as this 
would mean „the triumph of Protestantism“), but it was 
nevertheless able to adapt to modernism (Roy, 2006, 
129). It is true that in Europe we are confronted with 
various Islamic organizations, movements, societies, and 
trends that are opposing all kinds of changes and adap-
tation to „European culture“. They are also embodying 
the dualistic vision of „eternal strangers“ who live in a 
parallel society, without the need for social interaction 
with non-Muslims. At the same time Muslims in Europe 
do not have a central political or theological authority. 
Because of this fact the „European Muslim community“ 
is lacking the interpretation of central doctrines in Islam 
and their application to a new environment that will help 
to identify, understand and present their needs to Europe-
an governments and to a broader European public.
The famous Swiss philosopher and the professor of 
contemporary Islamic studies Tariq Ramadan is work-
ing primarily on the question of Muslims in the West. 
According to Ramadan, with the experience of a new 
society Western Muslims have no choice but to return to 
the beginning and examine the basics of their religious 
tradition in order to delineate and differentiate between 
what is in their religion immutable (thabit), and what 
can be changed (mutaghayyirat) (Ramadan, 2004, 145). 
Regarding this matter, also other Muslim intellectuals 
warn against the rigidities of the Muslim communities 
in Europe and the problem of the so-called „frozen 
time“ syndrome, which idealizes the past and the land 
from which the fi rst generations of European Muslims 
came. This is the reason that it is even more important to 
listen to the idea of ‘Euro-Islam’, which was introduced 
especially by Bassam Tibi, and also by Tariq Ramadan, 
although the term as such was not explicitly mentioned 
in his work.
‘EURO-ISLAM’ – IDENTITY ON THE DRAFT?
Debates about Euro-Islam raise many questions, 
mostly with a sceptic undertone. As already mentioned, 
the term was introduced by Bassam Tibi, who chal-
lenged the evolution of the Islamic perception, and is 
forcing the integration of Muslims into European society. 
According to Tibi, Muslim migrants should be requested 
to redefi ne their identity in the diaspora by adding a Eu-
ropean component (Tibi, 2002, 32). Certainly there are 
signifi cant differences among Muslims in Europe, espe-
cially between Islamists and so-called secular Muslims, 
since many secular Muslims favor political integration. 
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In order to avoid complications and „apologize“ for 
the terminus techniqus (Euro-Islam), let us consider the 
work of Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Nasr (2003) presents char-
acteristics of different areas or belts of so-called Islamic 
civilization. These belts according to Nasr are: Arabic, 
Persian, Indian, Turkish, African, Malay, Chinese, Euro-
pean and American. Euro-Islam should be considered 
along the lines of Nasr’s analysis of these autochthonous 
Muslim cultural and religious zones. Each of these zones 
is defi ned by specifi c socio-cultural, political, historical 
and geographical features. Our analysis of religion as 
a cultural system (Geertz, 1993) clearly distinguishes 
between the „offi cial“ or „normative“ religion with its 
general interpretations on the one side, and the „popular 
religion“, which marks the interpretations and practices 
of a certain religion in a particular territory or within 
a particular group on the other. Such terminology is 
generally not acceptable for a normative religion, but 
cultural and anthropological approaches are important 
for the concrete understanding and practice of religion 
in a given time and space. The best example of this 
understanding is presented by Hakan Yavuz in the case 
of Turkish Islam and Fikret Karčić in the Bosnian case, 
which will be discussed in more details in the fi nal 
chapter of the article. 
Hakan Yavuz cites Ahmet Oçak, who identifi es a 
Turkish Islam (Türk Müslümanlıĝı), which differs from 
Persian or Arabic Islam in „its production of cultural 
norms and modes of thinking“ in relation to religion, 
faith, personal life, ritual practices and religious feasts – it 
covers an entire spectrum from „social mores to personal 
mores“ and interpretations of Islamic principles (Yavuz, 
2004, 218). What the nature of those cultural norms and 
modes of thinking are in the European environment is a 
topic of our recent discussion. Muslims in Europe profess 
their religion in different ways, some of those being 
„orthodox“ or standard, i.e. invariable from one country 
to another, one culture to another, or one time to another. 
Others are characteristic of a specifi c culture.
Discussions about Muslim identity in Europe have 
been ongoing for some time now. According to Ameli, 
the difference between „Muslim“ and „Islamic“ identity 
is very important (Ameli, 2002, 30). Islamic identity 
focuses on the basics of Islam, with an emphasis on 
the primary sources of religion, Islamic law, theology, 
philosophy, Islamic education or the interpretation of 
the Koran. The fi eld of „Islamic identity“ is therefore the 
fi eld of theology. Yet the „Muslim identity“ is made up of 
the cultural, social and political background of Muslims 
and the transformation of religious thought into differ-
ent periods of history. The „Muslim identity“ therefore 
defi nes the specifi c characteristics of Muslim societies 
that distinguish these societies from other nations, the 
understanding that Muslims have about their religion, 
motives of action and behavior, the way to participate in 
various public areas, etc. Ïke Sanders from the Institute 
for Ethnic Relations in Gothenburg distinguishes four 
categories of Muslims: ethnic, cultural, religious and 
political Muslim. The ethnic Muslim belongs to an eth-
nic group in which the majority are Muslims, a cultural 
Muslim is a person who is socialized in a Muslim culture, 
a religious Muslim is a person who implements Islamic 
commandments, and a political Muslim is a person who 
claims that Islam is (or is supposed to be) „a political 
and social phenomenon“ (Sanders, in: Roald, 2001, 18). 
With these categories Sanders determines the number 
of Muslims in Europe that are particularly suitable for 
quantitative research. However, Anne Sofi e Roald is 
sceptical about such categorizations. For her it is essen-
tial to search for the so-called self-defi nition of Muslims. 
Based on this self-defi nition, we can explain the Islamic 
way of classifi cation (Roald, 2001, 18). In her researches 
she noticed that Muslims who are loyal to the pillars of 
Islam most often defi ne their identity on the basis of a 
hadith, which states that the prayer stands between man 
and the unbelief (kufr) (Sunan at-Tirmidhī, in: Roald, 
2001, 18). According to Nevzet Porić, the secretary of 
the Islamic Community in Slovenia, this hadith explains 
that a person who does not perform a fi ve-day prayer 
quickly loses his belief in God (Zalta, 2010, 391). The 
suitable question for a further discussion would be, if 
the believer is a Muslims, is a Muslim necessarily also 
a believer? As Porić stated, believers who regularly 
carry out their prayers are stable in their faith. Naturally, 
there are some variations to this interpretation. From his 
research among Muslims in Great Britain, Saied Reza 
Ameli (2004) has identifi ed three different views on the 
defi nition of „Muslimness“. Some believe that in order 
to be a Muslim, it is suffi cient to testify the existence 
of God and Mohammed’s prophecy, which is a formal 
requirement for a man or woman to become a Muslim. 
The more demanding defi nition advocates Islam as a 
way of life: Islam should mark the Muslim in all aspects 
of life. The third view sees Islam as performing purely 
ritual duties: prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and paying re-
ligious taxes. This perspective minimizes the ideological 
and political dimensions of religion. 
Bassam Tibi offers an introductory defi nition of the 
term Euro-Islam as the marker for the common European 
Muslim identity:
Ethnic identities are exclusive identities. If cultivated 
in the diaspora, they will lead to a kind of neo-absolut-
ism and related social confl icts. The alternative is an 
all-inclusive civil identity, based on cultural pluralism. 
Thus, while fundamentalism is a modern variety of 
neo-absolutism, pluralism would encourage people 
to represent different views while at the same time 
being strongly committed to share cross-cultural 
rules – and, above all, mutual tolerance and respect. 
Tolerance can never mean that only one party has 
the right to maintain its views at the expense of the 
other. The bottom line for a pluricultural (not a mul-
ticultural) platform is the unequivocal acceptance of 
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secular democracy, individual human rights for men 
and women, secular tolerance, and civil society (Tibi, 
2002, 48).  
According to Tibi, Euro-Islam is marked by the 
„cultural modernity“ as a degree of tolerance that goes 
beyond „Islamic tolerance“, limited only to the „people 
of the book“ or „Abram’s heirs“. The main characteris-
tics of Euro-Islam should be: cohesiveness, integration, 
and tolerant perception which, in order to live beyond 
the conceptual construct, must be internalized by most 
of the European Muslims. Tibi’s Euro-Islam consists of 
following elements: democracy (according to Western 
understanding), individual human rights, recognition of 
pluralism in civil society, gender equality, reduction of 
foreign infl uences from Muslim lands, introduction of 
Muslim discourse about Islam in Europe, tolerance to-
wards other religions, an identity based on shared values 
and not on ethnicity and nationality, equal opportunities 
for Muslims and non-Muslims, secularism, and rejection 
of Sharia. This means no legal diversity in Europe for 
Islamic minorities, including family law, as it increases 
the distance between European citizens and reduces the 
sense of belonging (Tibi, 2014, for more details see also 
Struss, 2011).
In his approach to Euro-Islam, Tariq Ramadan is 
somewhat less „liberal“ than Tibi, and his thinking is 
based on the interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna 
in the context of Western European societies. According 
to him, Islamic sources allow Muslims to live in the 
West, they are under the authority of the agreement and 
its conditions need to be respected as long as they are 
not forcing Muslims to act against their conscience. If a 
clear confl ict of references arises, Muslim lawyers must 
carry out studies to formulate a legal opinion (fatwa) 
(Ramadan, 2004, 6). Ramadan is trying to implement 
the legitimacy of reforms based on Islamic teachings, yet 
they should be interpreted in a contemporary context by 
Muslims who are living in a non-Muslim environment 
(Ramadan, 2009). Tibi would agree with the just said, 
since he wrote that cultural reforms must enable Mus-
lims to live under the governance of a non – Muslim 
ruler (Tibi, 2002, 47).  It is therefore highly important 
to look at the Bosnian Islam as a „European“ example 
with the experience of the separation between secular 
and religious institutions based on cultural reforms and 
adaptation to secular processes. 
THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA AND SPECIFICS OF BOSNIAN 
ISLAM REGARDING THE SECULARIZATION 
PROCESSES
Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the product of 
various processes of secularization and relationships 
between religious and secular authorities. Islam ap-
peared in the country together with the Ottomans in 
1463. In the Ottoman Empire, Muslims did not have 
a religious administration that was separated from the 
state structure: all institutions of the Ottoman Empire 
were simultaneously also Islamic. In this way, the Ot-
toman state was built on the principle of organic unity 
of religious and political authority, and since 1517 the 
Ottoman sultan has also been the caliph, combining 
political as well as religious authority of all Muslims 
in the Empire. With the appearance of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina came 
into contact with European political, legal and cultural 
institutions and norms. Under these circumstances, 
conditions were created for the emergence of the fi rst 
Muslim „autonomous“ institutions, separated from 
Istanbul. According to Durmišević, with the detention 
of the mufti institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the sanctioning of the Ottoman Act of Sharia Courts of 
1859, the Austro-Hungarian authorities consolidated 
the further interpretation and application of Sharia law, 
in particular the existence of Sharia courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, while the formation of the Sharia Judiciary 
School in 1887 trained able candidates for Sharia judges 
(kadija) (Durmišević, 2008, 211). Although according to 
the Istanbul Convention the sultan was given the right 
to appoint high religious offi cials to Bosniaks, he did 
not get the rights in the appointment of judges (kadije). 
This made the Austro-Hungarian authorities aware that 
the sultan’s „sovereignty“ over Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was understood only as the right to appoint high-ranking 
religious offi cials, and not to appoint judges. The local 
authority appointed and fi nanced all judges in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Durmišević, 2008, 228). Since Sharia 
courts and the adoption of Sharia law remained the 
responsibility of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, the 
Muslim religious structure remained responsible for 
religious (ritual) elements and partly waqf (property, 
charitable trust) transactions. With the establishment of 
the „Waqf Commision“ (Zemaljska vakufska komisija), 
the Austro-Hungarians wanted to keep the waqf prop-
erty in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, Muslims 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina received their own Islamic 
institutions. The Islamic institutional structure, which 
was founded in this period, included 4 segments: ulema, 
waqf, education and Sharia courts (for more see Karčić 
and Karić, 1998; Durmišević, 2008).  
Since this model has proven the coexistence of Islam-
ic and European institutions, the next question would 
be, how different political decisions, some already 
mentioned, shaped specifi c forms of Islam in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Firstly, we should keep in mind that 
Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the most 
liberal Hanafi  law school, which allow Muslims to live 
under the non-Muslim authority, but in the event Mus-
lims become a minority in a state, they must maintain 
their autonomous legal status, which means they use 
Sharia law in personal matters (Durmičević, 2008, 218; 
see also Karčić, 2016). The „problem“ appeared with the 
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socialist regime after the 2nd World War, which left its 
mark on Islamic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The regime was based on the principle of separating re-
ligious communities from the state, secularizing the law 
and understood religion as a private matter. Freedom of 
religion was guaranteed by legislation. But the socialist 
secular state did not understand the neutrality of religion 
in a sense that religious institutions – although they are 
structurally and functionally separate from the state 
– had the right to give their opinion on public affairs. 
The regime was rather hostile towards religion as such. 
Among the fi rst things the socialist secular regime did 
was to abandon Sharia courts. 
Nevertheless, the Islamic tradition in Bosnia suc-
ceeded in preserving its distinctive character, which 
is certainly also a consequence of traditional Islamic 
reformism in the interpretation of Islam since the mid-
19th century, when the revitalization of ijtihad (indepen-
dent interpretations) and the reform of socio-political 
conditions occurred. Although the intellectual tradition 
– with both modernist and conservative trends – in the 
interpretation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not 
homogeneous, the perception and adaptation does not 
change the normative constitution of Islamic tradition 
itself. According to Adnan Silajdžić, this normative 
tradition constitutes and standardizes religious practice 
of Muslims. It defi nes Islam and it is followed by an 
interpretive (intellectual) tradition. Therefore intel-
lectual tradition is equally important for Muslims and 
they should supplement it with religious, spiritual and 
cultural deepening and efforts (Silajdžić, 2008, 14). For 
Silajdžić such a tradition has a constitutive power, since 
it constitutes religious practice, and protects universal 
values  of the Islamic tradition, but it has also a didactic 
role, because it represents an awareness and a historical 
memory of Islamic tradition as an integral part of the 
social and historical dynamics of Muslims. Therefore, 
whenever they want to defi ne their relationship to 
modernity, Muslims cannot ignore the question of (re)
interpretation of tradition, simply because the history of 
every Islamic-ethno-cultural social group or community 
(as any other religious tradition) naturally develops in 
a dialectics of tradition (constitutive or normative and 
interpretative intellectual traditions) and innovation 
(modern – constitutive historical development). 
As already presented, until the last decade of the 19th 
century the Islamic thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
developed under the strong infl uence of the reformist 
movement, known as harakat al-islah wa-l-tajid (for 
details see Karčić, 1990 and 2016). The reform in this 
context implies the reconstruction of religious thought 
and the importance of religion (tajid), especially on the 
basis of the return of ijtihad (independent interpreta-
tion), as well as the improvement of the conditions of 
Islamic institutions (islah). This school was one of the 
responses to the internal crisis of Muslim societies and 
the challenges of Western modernity (Karčić and Karić, 
1998 and Karčić, 2016). Such conditions were detected 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian 
project of modernization – the presence of two identi-
ties, the Islamic and European forced Bosniaks and their 
religious leaders to consider new interpretations for new 
challenges and dilemmas. 
Which of these institutions have been preserved 
today and where can we look for models to be analyzed 
and/or applied to the concept of Euro-Islam? One of the 
key features of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the 
way in which Islamic authorities are institutionalized. 
The structure is hierarchal, centralistic and fi nancially 
independent, which is according to Ahmed Alibašić 
very benefi cial, since having a single Islamic structure 
means having a stronger organization and a better 
negotiating position vis-à-vis the state and other actors. 
Self-fi nancing makes such organizations more resistant 
to unwanted external infl uences. Both factors together 
represent a more autonomous and, consequently, more 
credible Islamic authority that is capable of preventing 
radicalization (Alibašić, 2007, 3). The Bosnian Islamic 
educational system, mainly covered by the Faculty of Is-
lamic Studies (FIN) is also extremely important, because 
it includes religious and secular, modern and traditional 
Islamic education. In this way it helps Bosnian Muslims 
to fi nd new answers for the challenges of modernity. 
The experience of Bosnian Muslims shows that Mus-
lims can change without losing their identity and their 
faith: the dissociation of culture(s) and (local) traditions 
from religious principles is a decisive feature of this 
process.
CONCLUSION
Refl ection on secularization offers an insight and 
understanding of European social processes. In the 
context of Europe it is clear that without the processes 
of secularization, (religious) pluralism would not be 
possible. The religious „mono story“, the usurpation of 
the space by the one and only (monotheistic) religion, 
was confronted with competition and differentiation. 
At the same time opportunities for coexistence and 
co-creation in a religiously diverse space were offered. 
This presents a challenge as well as an opportunity for 
Islam in Europe to (re)invent answers for its new Euro-
pean environment. Yet an analysis of Muslims and their 
organizations in different European countries shows an 
ambiguous picture, especially regarding ideas about the 
future and the role of Islam in Europe (for the analysis of 
Muslim organizations in various European countries, see 
Struss, 2011 and Cesari, 2015).  Muslims and their or-
ganizations in Europe are mainly seeking old patterns of 
identity, rather than creating new ones. The „stolen time 
syndrome“, captivity to nostalgia, the illusion and the 
romanticization of the past and the unchanged tradition 
of the original homeland are still major presentations of 
conservative organizations, promoting the defi nition of 
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Anja ZALTA: CHALLENGES FACING MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: FROM SECULARIZATION TO THE IDEA ..., 41–50
identity based on ethnicity, nationality or ideology, and 
not on European citizenship. Since Muslims in Europe 
are faced with new challenges, one of the main needs 
is a quality Islamic educational system/institution. In 
Europe it is necessary to educate critical non-dogmatic 
religious fi gures (imams, muftis and other members of 
the ulama) who will help to deconstruct tribal customs 
and practices, which are too often presented as „Islam-
ic“,  and support the implementation of human rights as 
well as peaceful coexistence that goes beyond religious, 
ethnic or even gendered lines. 
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IZZIVI ZA MUSLIMANE V EVROPI: OD SEKULARIZACIJE DO IDEJE O »EVRO-ISLAMU«
Anja ZALTA
Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za sociologijo, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-mail: anja.zalta@ff.uni-lj.si
POVZETEK
Za islam so značilni številni kulturni, socialni, politični in gospodarski dejavniki, ki prispevajo k izgradnji tako 
kolektivne kot individualne identitete muslimanov, tudi v Evropi. Ta raznolikost ni omejena le na njihovo etnično 
pripadnost ali na njihovo družbeno-politično zavzetost. Dejstvo je, da so med muslimani (tako v Evropi kot širše) 
vedno obstajala razhajanja, temelječa na različnih interpretacijah islamskih naukov in praks. Precej nov izziv za mu-
slimane v Evropi pa danes predstavlja evropska „sekularna“ družba in načini, kako postati integralni del te družbe. 
Tako muslimani kot tudi Evropa se morajo soočiti z zastavljeni vprašanji in se odzvati na zastavljene izzive. Med 
drugim so prisiljeni odgovoriti na vprašanja, na kakšen način postati sestavni del evropskih kultur in tradicij, ter kako 
uskladiti islamske norme z evropskimi. Namen članka je predstaviti vprašanja in izzive, ki jih za muslimane v Evropi 
predstavljajo procesi sekularizacije, defi niranje njihove „evropske“ identitete, ter analiza koncepta „Evro-Islam“, ki 
ga med drugim zagovarjata vidnejša evropska muslimanska intelektualca Bassam Tibi in Tariq Ramadan. Posebna 
pozornost je posvečena predstavitvi in analizi bosanskega islama in njegovih specifi k, ki so posledica evropskih 
sekularizacijskih procesov. 
Ključne besede: islam, muslimani v Evropi, sekularizacija, Evro-islam, islamska tradicija in identiteta, bosanski 
islam
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