

CHALLENGES FACING MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: FROM SECULARIZATION TO THE IDEA OF 'EURO-ISLAM'

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the article is to present a variety of questions and challenges that Muslims in Europe are exposed to with the processes of secularization, the definition of their „European“ identity as well as the analysis of the concept of 'Euro-Islam', which is advocated by the prominent European Muslim intellectuals Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan, among others. Special attention is paid to the presentation and analysis of Bosnian Islam and its specifics, which are the result of European secularization processes.

Keywords: Islam, Muslims in Europe, Secularization, Euro-Islam, Islamic Tradition and Identity, Bosnian Islam

UNA SFIDA AI MUSULMANI IN EUROPA: DAL SECOLARISMO ALL'IDEA DELL'«EURO-ISLAM»

SINTESI

Lo scopo del saggio è riflettere le questioni e le sfide che per i musulmani in Europa rappresenta la secolarizzazione, la definizione della loro identità europea e l'analisi del concetto di «euro-islam» che vengono difesi da due intellettuali europei di spicco, Bassam Tibi e Tariq Ramadan. Una peculiare attenzione è dedicata alla presentazione e all'analisi del islam in Bosnia, nonché alle sue specificità che sono la conseguenza dei processi europei di secolarizzazione.

Parole chiave: islam, musulmani in Europa, secolarizzazione, euro-islam, tradizione e identità islamica, l'islam della Bosnia (islam bosniaco)

INTRODUCTION

According to Pew Research Centre (Pew Research Centre, 2016) there are more than twenty million Muslims in Europe, representing one of the largest religious minorities, which is by no means monolithic, as many would like to believe as a consequence of their religious illiteracy. The main challenges faced by Muslims in Europe are the consequence of European processes of secularization. Muslims are faced with the question of how to live the Islamic way of life and at the same time fully participate in the wider (European) society. How is it possible for them to shape their identity as Muslims as well as Europeans? How to transmit the Islamic heritage to the new generations of Muslims in Europe? At the same time, Europe is facing challenges of its own, especially regarding the question of how to apply and react to religious plurality and to the desire of Muslims to actively participate in the political arena. Are the secular values of European society compatible with Islamic norms and what does one and the other mean for the peaceful coexistence of all European citizens?

In a research project, conducted in 2011 at the Science and Research Centre in Koper, Mateja Sedmak and her team addressed various topics, such as the issue of interethnic relations, the process of intercultural confrontations, and the free expression of migrants's culture, among others (Sedmak et al., 2013, 216). They have exposed the problem of present day Europe, where *„the dynamic relations are becoming increasingly complex and schizophrenic. On the one hand, we have elaborated supranational directives and national legislations regulating interethnic relations and emphasising the basic rights to preserve and cultivate one's own cultural and religious identity“*, which are promoting cultural and religious diversity, plurality, intercultural dialogue, etc., but are mainly denied on an everyday basis due to ethnocentric, racist and discriminating views (Sedmak et al., 2013, 216–217).

We must be aware that the debate does not only take place between the so-called Islamic and European values, but Europe needs to reformulate its attitude towards religion as such. If we are looking for answers of how the new generations of Muslims in Europe should actively live their European citizenship, we must at the same time understand the environment in which their thought can be shaped and applied. We *cannot* and *must not* ignore European secularization processes. Above all, we must remember *why* secularization has to happen and what it represents in a European context.

SECULARIZATION AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION
IN EUROPE

During the first half of the 20th century the Western idea of secularization (at least partially) drew from the work of Max Weber and his sociology of religion.

Weber regarded secularization as a part of the radical process of modernization, which includes the state as well as society (Weber, 1988, 536–573). Similar to his interpretation was others from the founding fathers of sociology, including Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies and Ernst Troeltsch. For all of them, secularization correlates with the declining influence of religion in a public sphere (social institutions, communal life) as well as in a private sphere (*„secularization of consciousness“*). In a chapter with the title *„Secularization as a Concept“*, Jose Casanova explains that *„the distinction between the concept „secular,“ or its derivation „secularization,“ and the sociological theory of secularization proper is important because the concept itself is so multidimensional [...] and so loaded with the wide range of meanings it has accumulated through its history“* (Casanova, 1994, 12). Some of these distinctions will be presented in the following chapters.

THE IMPERATIVE OF SECULARIZATION

Marko Kerševan, an expert in sociology of religion, also questioned the role of secularization. According to him, secularization covers only the role of religion and the church in society, and not religion or religiosity as such. The institutions of power no longer have a religious (supernatural) identity; more precisely, they do not require such legitimacy anymore (Kerševan, 2011, 70–71). In his opinion,

a particular form of atheism is emerging from a secularized environment: atheism, which does not emerge from the combat and conscious denial of God, but from the sense of redemption of God. When man begins to live and work as if there is no God, 'without the hypothesis of God,' ... man can quickly approach the feeling that everything goes without God [...] 'Desacralisation' of the world, changing the world into an object of human action, means at the same time removing God from the world (Kerševan, 2011, 78).

According to the just said, a question should be asked about what kind of god we have in mind? Is this an inclusive god, who works interconnectedly during religious pluralism and tolerates *„otherness“*? Or is this god who sets a sharp border between his believers and those who are not? Does it promote the coexistence of diversity? Unfortunately the answer is well known. Because of the negative experiences of religious exclusions, particularities and extremisms, the secular imperative has become a European reality. This secular imperative allowed the emergence of new religious forms in the space, which was emptied from the narrative of just one religion and offered (at least theoretically) an equal coexistence of different religions/alternative ideologies and world views.

Different causes of secularization are mentioned in Europe: Galilean and Copernicus discoveries, the rationalization of philosophy, the declaration of human rights, the phenomenon of technology, industrialization, urbanization, the rationalization of thinking in all spheres, and, of course, the laicisation of the state and the political sphere. According to Kerševan, the laicisation of the state and the state authorities is on the one hand linked to the independence of the absolutistic rulers of the church, and, on the other, to the necessary independence of state power from the church, which was caused by the Protestant Reformation. If there are several recognized religions in the state, then power, law and morality (at least in fundamental matters) must be independent of any particular religion. Only then are they acceptable for all citizens. The condition for the integration in the society is no longer the existence of one state religion, but religious tolerance. For Kerševan, tolerance does not only mean respecting opposing attitudes, but recognition that these differences (whether God is or is not) are no longer essential (in some sphere). In this case, religion has become immaterial in the state-legal sphere, and with regard to the state, it has become a private matter (Kerševan, 2011, 81). Reflecting on the just said, Jose Casanova distinguishes three aspects of secularization: the separation of laic administration from religious institutions and norms and their emancipation, the decline of religious notions and norms of conduct, and the restriction of religion to the private sphere (Casanova, 2011, 54–89).

Among the first scholars to discuss the classical or the so-called orthodox model of secularization were Peter Berger and David Martin. They were reluctant towards the idea that the classical secularization thesis can be used to explain the religiousness of the developed parts of the non-Western world and, in particular the situation in the USA, which remains a rather religious country in spite of intensive modernization (for more see Davie, 2001). Secularism has been accepted as a normative model and an integral part of the modern constitutional state. However, the concepts handling the degree of separation of religion and the state in Europe are very heterogeneous, which indicates that secularization is far less thoroughly defined than the process of desacralization (based upon Weber's „disenchantment of the world“), but more so than the separation between the spheres of religion and non-religion, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It was Alfred Stepan (Stepan 2000 and 2001) who raised important questions on the basis of an analysis of the European relationship between religion and the state. He is interested in the minimum and long-term conditions for democracy, and whether European countries, despite different practices of attitudes towards religion, meet these minimum standards.

Let us look closely at some of these examples in Europe, presented by Grace Davie (Davie, 2001). In the Netherlands and Belgium, where the process of

secularization gave rise to the so-called ‘pillar’ model: each religious group – the Catholics, the Protestants and others – constitutes a „pillar“ of society, within which their own institutions are being maintained; the system has penetrated almost all aspects of life – schools, hospitals, media, syndicates ... Great Britain unites four nations, each of which has its own religious history and arrangement: in England, the *Anglican* Church is established, in Scotland the *national* Calvinist Church, in Wales neither of them, while Northern Ireland remains an unsolved problem because of its religious history. On the contrary, the Republic of Ireland is technically a secular state, though the preamble to the constitution is strongly Catholic and the religious practice remains unusually common in comparison to the European norm. Another example is Greece, the only Orthodox Christian member state of the European Union. The Orthodox Church is the official religion of the country and is nearly identical with Greek identity, so the members of other, minority religions are disadvantaged, particularly the members of other Christian groups. These examples demonstrate that substantiated separation of state and religion is not crucial for a functional democracy (for more see Fox, 2006, 537–569; Fox, 2015). Though all states mentioned above possess a secular legal system, none of them is laicistic. France and Portugal are the only constitutionally laicistic states in Europe, where laicism is considered to be a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of religious freedom and conscience, and the only possible way to ensure an equal status of all religious, as well as philosophical and political standpoints.

On the basis of an analysis of European countries, Stepan develops a „twin toleration“ model, which refers to the „minimum limits of freedom of action“ for both the religion/religious organizations and the state. States should not use religion for political purposes and provide equality to all religions, while religious groups must not strive to covet state institutions and policies for specific religious purposes (Stepan, 2000, 37). According to him the „twin toleration“ model is „*the minimal boundary of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis religious institutions*“ (Stepan, 2001, 213).

WHOSE DEFINITION OF SECULARIZATION?

With so many definitions and diverse historical and political backgrounds, we must consider historical factors that have shaped the understanding, interpretations and practical implementation of *certain* secularism in a given *time* and *space*. What *norms* did it introduce and what *problems* did it solve? Hashemi wonders whether

secularism implies anticlericalism, atheism, disestablishment, state neutrality and equidistance towards

all religions, the rejection of religious symbols in the public sphere, separation of public and private spheres, complete separation of religion from politics, or more narrowly the separation of the institutions of the state from the influence of religion? (Hashemi, 2009, 104).

Secularism is mostly measured and evaluated in comparison with the two most distinguished models in the Western tradition: the already mentioned French model, which is relatively hostile to religion, and the American model, which is relatively friendly towards religion. Adding to just said, Cesari defines secularism as the various Western political cultures that contextualize and historicize the two major principles of secularity: the protection of the law for all religions and the equidistance of the state versus religion. These two principles are constantly interpreted within specific political cultures, which ultimately shape social expectations about the role of religion in the public sphere and in society (Cesari, 2014, 3–14). In the case of the West, these expectations are mainly (but not always) the separation of the church from the state and the privatization of religion. It is true that this Western experience is at the heart of most secularization theories relating to the western countries. But although secularism has „Christian roots“, as Charles Taylor noted, „it is wrong to think that this limits the application of its formula to post-Christian societies“ (Taylor, 1998, 31). It is therefore imperative to find alternative models and take into account the religious experience and processes of individual countries. Each country can develop its own model, depending on its interests and needs (priorities and norms), but with awareness not to bow to the „cultural relativism“ regarding the respect for human rights and religious pluralism (among others). When we introduce the question of Islam and Muslims in Europe, we are often confronted with interpretations of Islam as an alternative to secular politics. In this context, we are confronted with a series of ideas or performances that are instrumentalized by political Islam in order to crash a secular state. The central problem remains the question of Islamic law in Europe: it seems that the removal of the possibility of applying *Sharia* to a European context will mean the transformation of Islam into a type of religion that has been handed over to the western secular standards. As we shall see below, such an application is *not* a prerequisite for consolidation of a normative Muslim identity. Conflicts, such as the issue of the introduction of *Sharia*, naturally seem invincible and advocate the „clash of civilization“ thesis. Therefore it is equally important to be aware of the clashes that take place within the European Muslim societies that are brought about by the challenges of living in Europe and by the attempts to adapt to the new social standards and conditions.

ISLAM AND THE SECULAR SOCIETY

Often the expressed idea of the „secularization“ of Islam is thought to mean the reformation of Islam. It seems as if Islam is incompatible with secularization and democracy until it passes through fundamental theological reforms. According to Oliver Roy, such understanding is ignoring the fact that Roman Catholicism never went through a fundamental theological reformation (as this would mean „the triumph of Protestantism“), but it was nevertheless able to adapt to modernism (Roy, 2006, 129). It is true that in Europe we are confronted with various Islamic organizations, movements, societies, and trends that are opposing all kinds of changes and adaptation to „European culture“. They are also embodying the dualistic vision of „eternal strangers“ who live in a parallel society, without the need for social interaction with non-Muslims. At the same time Muslims in Europe do not have a central political or theological authority. Because of this fact the „European Muslim community“ is lacking the interpretation of central doctrines in Islam and their application to a new environment that will help to identify, understand and present their needs to European governments and to a broader European public.

The famous Swiss philosopher and the professor of contemporary Islamic studies Tariq Ramadan is working primarily on the question of Muslims in the West. According to Ramadan, with the experience of a new society Western Muslims have no choice but to return to the beginning and examine the basics of their religious tradition in order to delineate and differentiate between what is in their religion immutable (*thabit*), and what can be changed (*mutaghayyirat*) (Ramadan, 2004, 145). Regarding this matter, also other Muslim intellectuals warn against the rigidities of the Muslim communities in Europe and the problem of the so-called „frozen time“ syndrome, which idealizes the past and the land from which the first generations of European Muslims came. This is the reason that it is even more important to listen to the idea of ‘Euro-Islam’, which was introduced especially by Bassam Tibi, and also by Tariq Ramadan, although the term as such was not explicitly mentioned in his work.

‘EURO-ISLAM’ – IDENTITY ON THE DRAFT?

Debates about Euro-Islam raise many questions, mostly with a sceptic undertone. As already mentioned, the term was introduced by Bassam Tibi, who challenged the evolution of the Islamic perception, and is forcing the integration of Muslims into European society. According to Tibi, Muslim migrants should be requested to redefine their identity in the diaspora by adding a European component (Tibi, 2002, 32). Certainly there are significant differences among Muslims in Europe, especially between Islamists and so-called secular Muslims, since many secular Muslims favor political integration.

In order to avoid complications and „apologize“ for the *terminus techniquis* (Euro-Islam), let us consider the work of Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Nasr (2003) presents characteristics of different areas or belts of so-called Islamic civilization. These belts according to Nasr are: Arabic, Persian, Indian, Turkish, African, Malay, Chinese, European and American. Euro-Islam should be considered along the lines of Nasr's analysis of these autochthonous Muslim cultural and religious zones. Each of these zones is defined by specific socio-cultural, political, historical and geographical features. Our analysis of religion as a cultural system (Geertz, 1993) clearly distinguishes between the „official“ or „normative“ religion with its general interpretations on the one side, and the „popular religion“, which marks the interpretations and practices of a *certain* religion in a particular territory or within a particular group on the other. Such terminology is generally not acceptable for a normative religion, but cultural and anthropological approaches are important for the concrete understanding and practice of religion in a given time and space. The best example of this understanding is presented by Hakan Yavuz in the case of Turkish Islam and Fikret Karčić in the Bosnian case, which will be discussed in more details in the final chapter of the article.

Hakan Yavuz cites Ahmet Oçak, who identifies a Turkish Islam (*Türk Müslümanlığı*), which differs from Persian or Arabic Islam in „its production of cultural norms and modes of thinking“ in relation to religion, faith, personal life, ritual practices and religious feasts – it covers an entire spectrum from „social mores to personal mores“ and interpretations of Islamic principles (Yavuz, 2004, 218). What the nature of those cultural norms and modes of thinking are in the European environment is a topic of our recent discussion. Muslims in Europe profess their religion in different ways, some of those being „orthodox“ or standard, i.e. invariable from one country to another, one culture to another, or one time to another. Others are characteristic of a specific culture.

Discussions about Muslim identity in Europe have been ongoing for some time now. According to Ameli, the difference between „Muslim“ and „Islamic“ identity is very important (Ameli, 2002, 30). Islamic identity focuses on the basics of Islam, with an emphasis on the primary sources of religion, Islamic law, theology, philosophy, Islamic education or the interpretation of the Koran. The field of „Islamic identity“ is therefore the field of theology. Yet the „Muslim identity“ is made up of the cultural, social and political background of Muslims and the transformation of religious thought into different periods of history. The „Muslim identity“ therefore defines the specific characteristics of Muslim societies that distinguish these societies from other nations, the understanding that Muslims have about their religion, motives of action and behavior, the way to participate in various public areas, etc. Sanders from the Institute for Ethnic Relations in Gothenburg distinguishes four

categories of Muslims: ethnic, cultural, religious and political Muslim. The ethnic Muslim belongs to an ethnic group in which the majority are Muslims, a cultural Muslim is a person who is socialized in a Muslim culture, a religious Muslim is a person who implements Islamic commandments, and a political Muslim is a person who claims that Islam is (or is supposed to be) „a political and social phenomenon“ (Sanders, in: Roald, 2001, 18). With these categories Sanders determines the number of Muslims in Europe that are particularly suitable for quantitative research. However, Anne Sofie Roald is sceptical about such categorizations. For her it is essential to search for the so-called self-definition of Muslims. Based on this self-definition, we can explain the Islamic way of classification (Roald, 2001, 18). In her researches she noticed that Muslims who are loyal to the pillars of Islam most often define their identity on the basis of a *hadith*, which states that the prayer stands between man and the unbelief (*kufr*) (Sunan at-Tirmidhī, in: Roald, 2001, 18). According to Nevzet Porić, the secretary of the Islamic Community in Slovenia, this *hadith* explains that a person who does not perform a five-day prayer quickly loses his belief in God (Zalta, 2010, 391). The suitable question for a further discussion would be, if the believer is a Muslims, is a Muslim necessarily also a believer? As Porić stated, believers who regularly carry out their prayers are stable in their faith. Naturally, there are some variations to this interpretation. From his research among Muslims in Great Britain, Saied Reza Ameli (2004) has identified three different views on the definition of „Muslimness“. Some believe that in order to be a Muslim, it is sufficient to testify the existence of God and Mohammed's prophecy, which is a formal requirement for a man or woman to become a Muslim. The more demanding definition advocates Islam as a way of life: Islam should mark the Muslim in all aspects of life. The third view sees Islam as performing purely ritual duties: prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and paying religious taxes. This perspective minimizes the ideological and political dimensions of religion.

Bassam Tibi offers an introductory definition of the term Euro-Islam as the marker for the common European Muslim identity:

Ethnic identities are exclusive identities. If cultivated in the diaspora, they will lead to a kind of neo-absolutism and related social conflicts. The alternative is an all-inclusive civil identity, based on cultural pluralism. Thus, while fundamentalism is a modern variety of neo-absolutism, pluralism would encourage people to represent different views while at the same time being strongly committed to share cross-cultural rules – and, above all, mutual tolerance and respect. Tolerance can never mean that only one party has the right to maintain its views at the expense of the other. The bottom line for a pluricultural (not a multicultural) platform is the unequivocal acceptance of

secular democracy, individual human rights for men and women, secular tolerance, and civil society (Tibi, 2002, 48).

According to Tibi, Euro-Islam is marked by the „cultural modernity“ as a degree of tolerance that goes beyond „Islamic tolerance“, limited only to the „people of the book“ or „Abram’s heirs“. The main characteristics of Euro-Islam should be: cohesiveness, integration, and tolerant perception which, in order to live beyond the conceptual construct, must be internalized by most of the European Muslims. Tibi’s Euro-Islam consists of following elements: democracy (according to Western understanding), individual human rights, recognition of pluralism in civil society, gender equality, reduction of foreign influences from Muslim lands, introduction of Muslim discourse about Islam in Europe, tolerance towards other religions, an identity based on shared values and not on ethnicity and nationality, equal opportunities for Muslims and non-Muslims, secularism, and rejection of *Sharia*. This means no legal diversity in Europe for Islamic minorities, including family law, as it increases the distance between European citizens and reduces the sense of belonging (Tibi, 2014, for more details see also Struss, 2011).

In his approach to Euro-Islam, Tariq Ramadan is somewhat less „liberal“ than Tibi, and his thinking is based on the interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna in the context of Western European societies. According to him, Islamic sources allow Muslims to live in the West, they are under the authority of the agreement and its conditions need to be respected as long as they are not forcing Muslims to act against their conscience. If a clear conflict of references arises, Muslim lawyers must carry out studies to formulate a legal opinion (*fatwa*) (Ramadan, 2004, 6). Ramadan is trying to implement the legitimacy of reforms based on Islamic teachings, yet they should be interpreted in a contemporary context by Muslims who are living in a non-Muslim environment (Ramadan, 2009). Tibi would agree with the just said, since he wrote that cultural reforms must enable Muslims to live under the governance of a non – Muslim ruler (Tibi, 2002, 47). It is therefore highly important to look at the Bosnian Islam as a „European“ example with the experience of the separation between secular and religious institutions based on cultural reforms and adaptation to secular processes.

THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND SPECIFICS OF BOSNIAN ISLAM REGARDING THE SECULARIZATION PROCESSES

Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the product of various processes of secularization and relationships between religious and secular authorities. Islam appeared in the country together with the Ottomans in

1463. In the Ottoman Empire, Muslims did not have a religious administration that was separated from the state structure: all institutions of the Ottoman Empire were simultaneously also Islamic. In this way, the Ottoman state was built on the principle of organic unity of religious and political authority, and since 1517 the Ottoman sultan has also been the caliph, combining political as well as religious authority of all Muslims in the Empire. With the appearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina came into contact with European political, legal and cultural institutions and norms. Under these circumstances, conditions were created for the emergence of the first Muslim „autonomous“ institutions, separated from Istanbul. According to Durmišević, with the detention of the *mufti* institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sanctioning of the Ottoman Act of Sharia Courts of 1859, the Austro-Hungarian authorities consolidated the further interpretation and application of Sharia law, in particular the existence of Sharia courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the formation of the Sharia Judiciary School in 1887 trained able candidates for Sharia judges (*kadija*) (Durmišević, 2008, 211). Although according to the Istanbul Convention the sultan was given the right to appoint high religious officials to Bosniaks, he did not get the rights in the appointment of judges (*kadije*). This made the Austro-Hungarian authorities aware that the sultan’s „sovereignty“ over Bosnia and Herzegovina was understood only as the right to appoint high-ranking religious officials, and not to appoint judges. The local authority appointed and financed all judges in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Durmišević, 2008, 228). Since Sharia courts and the adoption of Sharia law remained the responsibility of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, the Muslim religious structure remained responsible for religious (ritual) elements and partly *waqf* (property, charitable trust) transactions. With the establishment of the „*Waqf* Commission“ (*Zemaljska vakufska komisija*), the Austro-Hungarians wanted to keep the *waqf* property in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina received their own Islamic institutions. The Islamic institutional structure, which was founded in this period, included 4 segments: *ulema*, *waqf*, education and Sharia courts (for more see Karčić and Karić, 1998; Durmišević, 2008).

Since this model has proven the coexistence of Islamic and European institutions, the next question would be, how different political decisions, some already mentioned, shaped specific forms of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, we should keep in mind that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the most liberal Hanafi law school, which allow Muslims to live under the non-Muslim authority, but in the event Muslims become a minority in a state, they must maintain their autonomous legal status, which means they use Sharia law in personal matters (Durmišević, 2008, 218; see also Karčić, 2016). The „problem“ appeared with the

socialist regime after the 2nd World War, which left its mark on Islamic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The regime was based on the principle of separating religious communities from the state, secularizing the law and understood religion as a private matter. Freedom of religion was guaranteed by legislation. But the socialist secular state did not understand the neutrality of religion in a sense that religious institutions – although they are structurally and functionally separate from the state – had the right to give their opinion on public affairs. The regime was rather hostile towards religion as such. Among the first things the socialist secular regime did was to abandon Sharia courts.

Nevertheless, the Islamic tradition in Bosnia succeeded in preserving its distinctive character, which is certainly also a consequence of traditional Islamic reformism in the interpretation of Islam since the mid-19th century, when the revitalization of *ijtihad* (independent interpretations) and the reform of socio-political conditions occurred. Although the intellectual tradition – with both modernist and conservative trends – in the interpretation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not homogeneous, the perception and adaptation does not change the normative constitution of Islamic tradition itself. According to Adnan Silajdžić, this normative tradition constitutes and standardizes religious practice of Muslims. It defines Islam and it is followed by an interpretive (intellectual) tradition. Therefore intellectual tradition is equally important for Muslims and they should supplement it with religious, spiritual and cultural deepening and efforts (Silajdžić, 2008, 14). For Silajdžić such a tradition has a constitutive power, since it constitutes religious practice, and protects universal values of the Islamic tradition, but it has also a didactic role, because it represents an awareness and a historical memory of Islamic tradition as an integral part of the social and historical dynamics of Muslims. Therefore, whenever they want to define their relationship to modernity, Muslims cannot ignore the question of (re) interpretation of tradition, simply because the history of every Islamic-ethno-cultural social group or community (as any other religious tradition) naturally develops in a dialectics of tradition (constitutive or normative and interpretative intellectual traditions) and innovation (modern – constitutive historical development).

As already presented, until the last decade of the 19th century the Islamic thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina developed under the strong influence of the reformist movement, known as *harakat al-islam wa-l-tajid* (for details see Karčić, 1990 and 2016). The reform in this context implies the reconstruction of religious thought and the importance of religion (*tajid*), especially on the basis of the return of *ijtihad* (independent interpretation), as well as the improvement of the conditions of Islamic institutions (*islam*). This school was one of the responses to the internal crisis of Muslim societies and the challenges of Western modernity (Karčić and Karić,

1998 and Karčić, 2016). Such conditions were detected in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian project of modernization – the presence of two identities, the Islamic and European forced Bosniaks and their religious leaders to consider new interpretations for new challenges and dilemmas.

Which of these institutions have been preserved today and where can we look for models to be analyzed and/or applied to the concept of Euro-Islam? One of the key features of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the way in which Islamic authorities are institutionalized. The structure is hierarchal, centralistic and financially independent, which is according to Ahmed Alibašić very beneficial, since having a single Islamic structure means having a stronger organization and a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the state and other actors. Self-financing makes such organizations more resistant to unwanted external influences. Both factors together represent a more autonomous and, consequently, more credible Islamic authority that is capable of preventing radicalization (Alibašić, 2007, 3). The Bosnian Islamic educational system, mainly covered by the Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIN) is also extremely important, because it includes religious and secular, modern and traditional Islamic education. In this way it helps Bosnian Muslims to find new answers for the challenges of modernity.

The experience of Bosnian Muslims shows that Muslims can change without losing their identity and their faith: the dissociation of culture(s) and (local) traditions from religious principles is a decisive feature of this process.

CONCLUSION

Reflection on secularization offers an insight and understanding of European social processes. In the context of Europe it is clear that without the processes of secularization, (religious) pluralism would not be possible. The religious „mono story“, the usurpation of the space by the one and only (monotheistic) religion, was confronted with competition and differentiation. At the same time opportunities for coexistence and co-creation in a religiously diverse space were offered. This presents a challenge as well as an opportunity for Islam in Europe to (re)invent answers for its new European environment. Yet an analysis of Muslims and their organizations in different European countries shows an ambiguous picture, especially regarding ideas about the future and the role of Islam in Europe (for the analysis of Muslim organizations in various European countries, see Struss, 2011 and Cesari, 2015). Muslims and their organizations in Europe are mainly seeking old patterns of identity, rather than creating new ones. The „stolen time syndrome“, captivity to nostalgia, the illusion and the romanticization of the past and the unchanged tradition of the original homeland are still major presentations of conservative organizations, promoting the definition of

identity based on ethnicity, nationality or ideology, and not on European citizenship. Since Muslims in Europe are faced with new challenges, one of the main needs is a quality Islamic educational system/institution. In Europe it is necessary to educate critical non-dogmatic religious figures (imams, muftis and other members of

the ulama) who will help to deconstruct tribal customs and practices, which are too often presented as „Islamic“, and support the implementation of human rights as well as peaceful coexistence that goes beyond religious, ethnic or even gendered lines.

IZZIVI ZA MUSLIMANE V EVROPI: OD SEKULARIZACIJE DO IDEJE O »EVRO-ISLAMU«

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POVZETEK

Za islam so značilni številni kulturni, socialni, politični in gospodarski dejavniki, ki prispevajo k izgradnji tako kolektivne kot individualne identitete muslimanov, tudi v Evropi. Ta raznolikost ni omejena le na njihovo etnično pripadnost ali na njihovo družbeno-politično zavzetost. Dejstvo je, da so med muslimani (tako v Evropi kot širše) vedno obstajala razhajanja, temelječa na različnih interpretacijah islamskih nauk in praks. Precej nov izziv za muslimane v Evropi pa danes predstavlja evropska „sekularna“ družba in načini, kako postati integralni del te družbe. Tako muslimani kot tudi Evropa se morajo soočiti z zastavljeni vprašanji in se odzvati na zastavljene izzive. Med drugim so prisiljeni odgovoriti na vprašanja, na kakšen način postati sestavni del evropskih kultur in tradicij, ter kako uskladiti islamske norme z evropskimi. Namen članka je predstaviti vprašanja in izzive, ki jih za muslimane v Evropi predstavljajo procesi sekularizacije, definiranje njihove „evropske“ identitete, ter analiza koncepta „Evro-Islam“, ki ga med drugim zagovarjata vidnejša evropska muslimanska intelektualca Bassam Tibi in Tariq Ramadan. Posebna pozornost je posvečena predstavitvi in analizi bosanskega islama in njegovih specifik, ki so posledica evropskih sekularizacijskih procesov.

Ključne besede: islam, muslimani v Evropi, sekularizacija, Evro-islam, islamska tradicija in identiteta, bosanski islam

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