

Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges


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GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

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NOVA VLOGA OBOROŽENIH SIL KOT ODZIV NA ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE

*»Nemogoče je mogoče premagati le s pomočjo še nikoli
izkušenega.«*

Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary, I, 1920.

THE NEW ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS

»The impossible can only be overborn by the unprecedented.«

Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary, I, 1920.

VSEBINA

CONTENTS

Liliana Brožič	7 UVODNIK NOVA VLOGA OBOROŽENIH SIL KOT ODZIV NA ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE
Liliana Brožič	11 EDITORIAL THE NEW ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS
Rok Svetlič	15 MONISTIČNA TEORIJA ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC IN OHROMLJENOST VARNOSTNIH SISTEMOV – PRIMER ILEGALNIH MIGRACIJ MONISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PARALYSIS OF SECURITY SYSTEMS – THE CASE OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION
Thomas Matyók Srečko Zajc	27 SKUPNA INTERAKCIJA CIVILNEGA IN VOJAŠKEGA PODROČJA KOT ORODJE PRI ODZIVANJU NA HIBRIDNE GROŽNJE JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION AS A TOOL IN RESPONDING TO HYBRID THREATS
Viktor Potočnik	45 SPREMEMBA V KARAKTERJU BOJEVANJA IN TRANSFORMACIJA PEHOTNEGA ODDELKA, VODA IN ČETE THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INFANTRY SQUAD, PLATOON AND COMPANY
Liliana Brožič	67 ILEGALNE MIGRACIJE IN VLOGA SLOVENSКИH OBOROŽENIH SIL ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

Denis Čaleta Sara Perković	87 PRIPRAVLJENOST EVROPSKIH DRŽAV NA VRNITEV TUJIH BORCEV ISLAMSKÉ DRŽAVE READINESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
John M. Nomikos	107- ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE V GRČIJI: DESKRIPTIVNA ANALIZA ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THREATS IN GREECE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Tamás Berek László Földi József Padányi	115 PRAVNA PRIZADEVANJA MADŽARSKE ZA VEČJO ODPORNOST NA PODNEBNE SPREMEMBE HUNGARY'S LEGAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CLIMATE RESILIENCE
Janos Besenyo	127 RECENZIJ KAKO NAJ POTEKAJO VOJNE? VOJAŠKA STRATEGIJA V PRIMERJAVI S POLITIČNIMI ODLOČITVAMI
Janos Besenyo	133 REVIEW HOW SHOULD WARS BE FOUGHT? MILITARY STRATEGY VS POLITICAL DECISIONS
	137 AVTORJI AUTHORS
	146 NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE
	150 INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

UVODNIK

NOVA VLOGA OBOROŽENIH SIL KOT ODZIV NA ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE

Asimetrične grožnje smo izbrali za osrednjo temo tokratne številke s poudarkom na novi vlogi oboroženih sil kot enega od več mogočih odzivov države nanje. Asimetrične grožnje niso nekaj novega. V literaturi se asimetrične grožnje omenjajo kot ena najstarejših oblik groženj, čeprav v večini primerov izraz asimetrične ni omenjen. Pojem asimetrija kot izraz za nekaj, kar ni simetrično ali enakovredno, se je pojavil pozneje kot grožnje, ki jih danes poznamo kot asimetrične, in velja za sodobnejšega. V resnici gre pri asimetriji za obliko grožnje, ki je nihče ne pričakuje. Ta se nanaša na organizacijski, kadrovski, količinski in še kateri drugi vidik. Pomembno je, da se asimetrična grožnja pojavi na način, ki nas preseneti. Odzivi nanjo zamujajo, ker take grožnje nismo pričakovali in nanjo (še) nismo ustrezno pripravljene. Prav zato so asimetrične grožnje velik izziv. Z njimi se lahko spoprijemamo različno, eden izmed načinov je gotovo tudi vojaški. Asimetrično vojskovanje se tako kaže v zelo velikem učinku ob uporabi minimalnega vložka, ob uveljavljanju različnih interesov, najpogosteje posameznika ali skupine proti večji skupini oziroma državi, z uporabo inovativnih pristopov, z veliko učinkovitostjo glede na odpor tistega, ki je tarča asimetričnega napada. Pri omenjanju vloge oboroženih sil kot tudi pri njihovem odzivu na asimetrične grožnje se tako vprašanje kot odgovor, ali gre za njihovo novo vlogo, ponujata kar sama. Gre za vrsto groženj, ki imajo bogato zgodovino, a prav zaradi njihove inovativnosti in učinka presenečanja ter škode, ki jo povzročijo, zahtevajo veliko čuječnosti pri vseh, ki jim je zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti temeljno poslanstvo. V Sloveniji smo se v zadnjih nekaj letih spoprijemali z različnimi grožnjami, ki jih lahko uvrstimo med asimetrične, kot so na primer poplave, žled, množične, skupinske in posamične ilegalne migracije ter covid-19. Nanje se je država odzvala z aktivacijo različnih deležnikov, med drugim tudi vojske. Slovenska vojska se je s številnimi izkušnjami iz preteklosti, ki jih je pridobila doma in v tujini, uspešno vključila v aktivnosti države, da bi normalizirali, pomagali, sanirali in reševali nastali položaj ter zagotavljali red in varnost. Kljub vsemu se vsi deležniki v državi, ki sodelujejo pri vsakokratnem spoprijemanju

z novimi asimetričnimi grožnjami, vključno s Slovensko vojsko, vedno znova srečujejo z novimi izzivi. Ti se kažejo v različnih pojavnih oblikah kot potrebe po novem znanju, drugačnih oblikah sodelovanja, zagotavljanju specifične logistične podpore, spremembi zakonodaje, posodobitvi samozaščitne opreme za zaposlene in učinkovitosti komunikacijskih ter drugih naprav. Da bi se lahko v prihodnje na asimetrične grožnje bolj pripravili in bili odzivnejši, moramo narediti še veliko za spoprijemanje s prej naštetimi izzivi. To lahko storimo na več načinov. Eden izmed njih je tudi pisanje prispevkov o vlogi oboroženih sil pri asimetričnih grožnjah. Avtorji prispevkov v tej številki z nami delijo različne izkušnje, poglede in zamisli o tem, kako naprej, da bi bili v prihodnje bolje pripravljeni in učinkoviti.

Rok Svetlič se je posvetil vprašanju o pomenu človekovih pravic posameznika, ki kot ilegalni migrant te uveljavlja v državi prihoda, v odnosu do pravic te države in človekovih pravic njenih državljanov ter vseh tistih, ki v imenu države te pravice uveljavljajo pri svojem delu, medtem ko se spoprijemajo z nezakonitimi migracijami. V prispevku z naslovom *Monistična teorija človekovih pravic in ohromljenost varnostnih sistemov – primer ilegalnih migracij* avtor raziskuje vlogo varnostnih sil pri zagotavljanju človekovih pravic državljanov.

Skupna interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja kot orodje pri odzivanju na hibridne grožnje je naslov prispevka avtorjev **Thomasa Matyóka** in **Srečka Zajca**, ki menita, da je za odziv na asimetrične, hibridne in druge oblike groženj nujno poiskati nove načine razmišljanja in organiziranja tistih, ki varnost zagotavljajo. Eno njunih glavnih sporočil je, da je za novejšje pojavne oblike groženj treba strniti vrste med civilnimi in vojaškimi institucijami.

S spreminjanjem varnostnih groženj se je spremenila tudi narava vojne in vojskovanja, meni **Viktor Potočnik**, ki v prispevku *Sprememba v karakterju bojevanja in transformacija pehotnega oddelka, voda in čete* piše o tem, zakaj je do sprememb prišlo, kakšne spremembe so to in kako bi se morale pokazati pri organizaciji, kulturi, doktrini, na usposabljanju in drugih področjih delovanja vojske. Avtor ugotavlja, da novi trendi razvoja na področju vojskovanja prihajajo predvsem iz ameriškega okolja. V prihodnje bo več o tem moralo doreči zavezništvo.

Evropska migrantska kriza leta 2015 je Evropsko unijo soočila z novo preizkušnjo, v katero so bile vključene tudi oborožene sile. Različne države članice so svoje vojske vključile različno. Pet let pozneje pripadnice in pripadniki Slovenske vojske še vedno podpirajo Policijo pri varovanju slovenske meje in reševanju vprašanja vedno večjega števila ilegalnih imigrantov. Več o tem v prispevku *Ilegalne migracije in vloga slovenskih oboroženih sil* **Liliane Brožič**.

Pripravljenost evropskih držav na vrnitev tujih borcev Islamske države je naslov članka **Denisa Čalete** in **Sare Perkovič**, v katerem ju zanima, koliko državljani Belgije in Francije, ki so se kot prostovoljci bojevali na strani Islamske države, v

resnici pomenijo nevarnost za Evropsko unijo in svojo državo, kako se to ugotavlja in kakšni so varnostni ukrepi tako v Evropski uniji kot v obeh državah.

Na vprašanje, kako sistemsko ravnajo ob asimetričnih grožnjah v obliki kibernetских napadov in nezakonitih migracij v Grčiji, je odgovoril **John M. Nomikos**. V prispevku *Asimetrične grožnje v Grčiji: deskriptivna analiza* predstavlja njihovo strategijo kibernetiske varnosti in pomen večjega sodelovanja na obveščevalnem področju, da bi preprečili, omejili in zavarovali vse, kar je posebnega pomena za varnost države in družbe, pa tudi ilegalne migrante, ki so žrtve organiziranega kriminala.

Podnebne spremembe tako kot v drugih državah tudi na Madžarskem povzročajo velike preglavice. Kako nanje vplivati, njihov vpliv čim bolj zmanjšati in se z njimi spoprijeti na obrambnem in vojaškem področju, je bil cilj raziskovanja avtorjev **Tamása Bereka, Lászla Földija in Józsefa Padányija** v prispevku *Pravna prizadevanja Madžarske za večjo odpornost na podnebne spremembe*.

Kadar govorimo ali beremo o državi, obrambi in vojski, vedno najprej pomislimo na dobro organizacijo, dinamično delo, red, disciplino in varnost. Varnost za vse. Naj tako ostane.

EDITORIAL

THE NEW ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS

The central theme of this issue is asymmetric threats with emphasis on the new role of the armed forces as one of several possible national responses. Asymmetric threats are not a new phenomenon. According to the literature, they are one of the oldest forms of threats, although in most cases the term asymmetric is not specifically mentioned. Asymmetry as a term referring to something that is not symmetrical or equivalent emerged later than the threats we today identify as asymmetric, and is consequently considered more modern. In reality, asymmetry is a form of threat that no one expects. It can relate to the organizational, personnel-related, and quantity-related, or some other aspect. It is important to note that an asymmetric threat emerges in a way that comes as a surprise. Our responses are therefore delayed, since such a threat was unexpected and we are not (yet) properly prepared to counter it. For this reason asymmetric threats are a big challenge. We can deal with them in different ways; one of them is certainly military. In asymmetric warfare, a very important effect is demonstrated with the use of minimal input, assertion of various interests – most often of an individual or group against a larger group or country – innovative approaches, and with high efficiency compared to the resistance of the target. When considering the role of the armed forces and their response to asymmetric threats, both the question and the answer to whether this should be the new role of the military are quite obvious. Asymmetric threats are a series of threats with a rich history, but it is their very innovation, effect of surprise, and inflicted damage that require a great deal of vigilance on the part of all whose fundamental mission is to ensure national security. In the past few years, Slovenia has faced various threats that could be classified as asymmetric, such as floods; ice storm; mass, group and individual illegal migration, and COVID-19. The state responded to them by activating various stakeholders, including the military. With its numerous past experiences acquired at home and abroad, the Slovenian Armed Forces has successfully joined state activities to normalize, assist in, restore and resolve the existing situation, and to provide order and security. Nevertheless, all stakeholders in the country who are involved in the

efforts tackling the emerging asymmetric threats, including the Slovenian Armed Forces, are constantly faced with new challenges. These are manifested in various forms such as the need for new knowledge, other forms of cooperation, provision of specific logistical support, changes in legislation, modernization of the self-protective equipment for the employees and the efficiency of communication and other devices. In order to be better prepared and more responsive to asymmetric threats in the future, we still need to do more to face the above-mentioned challenges. There are several ways to do this. One of them is to write articles on the role of the armed forces in asymmetric threats. The authors of articles in this issue share a variety of experiences, views and ideas on how to proceed in order to be better prepared and more effective in the future.

Rok Svetlič addressed the issue of the importance of human rights of an individual who asserts these rights as an illegal migrant in the country of arrival in relation to the rights of this country and the human rights of its citizens as well as all those who exercise these rights on behalf of the state when dealing with illegal migration. In his article *Monistic theory of human rights and paralysis of security systems – the case of illegal migration*, the author explores the role of security forces in ensuring the human rights of citizens.

Joint civil-military interaction as a tool in responding to hybrid threats is the title of a paper by **Thomas Matyók** and **Srečko Zajc**, who believe that in order to respond to asymmetric, hybrid and other forms of threats, it is necessary to find new mindsets and new ways to organize those providing security. One of their main messages is that new forms of threats require a joint effort of civilian and military institutions.

According to **Viktor Potočnik**, changes in security threats brought about changes in the nature of war and warfare. In his article *The changed character of war and the transformation of infantry squad, platoon and company*, he writes about the reasons for these changes, the nature of changes and the way in which they should occur in the organization, culture, doctrine, training, and other areas of military operation. The author notes that new development trends in the field of warfare mainly originate from the United States. In the future, however, the Alliance will have to make more decisions in this respect.

In the 2015 European migrant crisis, the European Union was faced with a new challenge also involving the armed forces. Different Member States chose different ways to involve their respective armed forces. Five years later, members of the Slovenian Armed Forces still support the Police in the protection of the Slovenian border and in dealing with a growing number of illegal migrants. More about this in the article *Illegal migration and the role of the Slovenian Armed Forces* by **Liliana Brožič**.

Readiness of European countries for the return of foreign fighters of the Islamic State is the title of an article by **Denis Čaleta** and **Sara Perković**. The authors are interested in establishing to what extent the citizens of Belgium and France, who have fought as volunteers on the side of the Islamic State, represent a threat to the European Union and their respective countries; how this is established, and what are the security measures in this respect both in the European Union and the above countries.

In the article *Asymmetric warfare threats in Greece: a descriptive analysis* **John M. Nomikos** provides an answer to the question how to systematically deal with asymmetric threats in the form of cyber-attacks and illegal migration in Greece. He presents Greece's cyber security strategy and the importance of greater intelligence cooperation to prevent, limit and protect all that is of particular importance to the security of the state and the society, as well as illegal migrants who are victims of organized crime.

Just as in other countries, climate changes are a major challenge in Hungary as well. In their article *Hungary's legal efforts to strengthen climate resilience* **Tamás Berek**, **László Földi** and **József Padányi** explore how to influence these changes, minimize their impact and address them from a defence and military perspective.

When we talk or read about the state, defence, and the military, we always first think of good organization, dynamic work, order, discipline, and security. Security for all. Let it stay that way.

MONISTIČNA TEORIJA ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC IN OHROMLJENOST VARNOSTNIH SISTEMOV – PRIMER ILEGALNIH MIGRACIJ

MONISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PARALYSIS OF SECURITY SYSTEMS – THE CASE OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Povzetek V prispevku analiziramo posebna tveganja, povezana s temeljnim delovanjem države, ki niso posledica neučinkovitosti oblasti, temveč njene ohromljenosti s pravnega vidika. Z razlago pravnih aktov v družbeno resničnost vstopi ideološki program, ki ni združljiv s temeljnimi postulati liberalne demokracije. Posledično so varnostni organi ohromljeni pri opravljanju svojih nalog, saj so obravnavani kot potencialni kršitelji človekovih pravic. Rešitve za to ni mogoče iskati na zakonodajni ravni, temveč na ravni kompleksne teorije, ki temelji na spoznanju, da je demokracija nezdružljiva s pasivnostjo in ohromljenostjo represivnih organov, pa tudi z njihovimi ekscesi.

Ključne besede *Filozofija prava, človekove pravice, varnostni organi, ilegalne migracije.*

Abstract This article analyzes the specific risks that concern the basic functioning of the state which are not the result of the inefficiency of the authorities but of their legal paralysis. Through the interpretation of legal acts, an ideological agenda which is incompatible with the fundamental postulates of liberal democracy enters social reality. Consequently, security authorities are paralyzed in performing their tasks, as they are treated as potential violators of human rights. The solution cannot be sought at a legislative level, but at the level of a complex theory, based on the realization that democracy is incompatible with the passivity and paralysis of repressive authorities, as well as with their excesses.

Key words *Philosophy of law, human rights, security authorities, illegal migration.*

Introduction

An indispensable aspect of modern liberal democracy is that it places the protection of the individual's rights at the very top of its values. It could be said that the *purpose* of the existence of liberal democracy is to prevent encroachments on human dignity, suffering and risks at all levels. However, at the same time, powers and institutions whose purpose is – at first glance – exactly the opposite, remain a necessary component of every state. These organs have the mandate to interfere with an individual's freedom, or even with their physical integrity, including their life; here we are talking about the penal system and its penitentiaries and, of course, the police and the army. Within a liberal democracy, the legal regulation of these institutions and entities is more difficult than ever. The eventual interference of repressive entities in human dignity is not just a violation of one of the many legal rules, it is a negation of the fundamental value agenda of a democratic state. As a result, a complex system of control over these entities and institutions has become a *sine qua non* of every democratic state.

However, democratic concern for the *possibility* of a conflict between human rights and the powers of the state risks slipping into a false comprehension that this conflict is *inevitable*. This is not merely an aberration of the layman's understanding of the state, often underpinned by imprudent reservation and distrust. Unfortunately, a big part of the theory (Marxist and anarchist provenance) also insists on an irreconcilable conflict between the individual and the state. Consequently, a modern pacifist attitude increasingly includes the naïve belief that the armed forces have become an obsolete institution, or even that their dissolution would automatically provide a world without violence. In this way deficient theories gradually lead to risks at the level of national security, as they paralyze the response of the state's institutions.

A recent example of such paralysis in Slovenia concerns the ideological blockade of the assistance of the armed forces in the control of illegal migration. It is about Article 37a of the Defence Act, which enables the military to assist the police in the task of guarding the border. Populist opposition against it was particularly dominant at the level of civil society; however, it was also widespread over a significant part of the political spectrum. Although the law defines the mandate of the military forces precisely (in terms of its tasks, timespan and territory of the activity etc.), an atmosphere has been created, as if Article 37a would implicate the militarization of society, including tanks and the army in our cities. Both the existence and influence of such ideas in Slovenia are all the more unusual because in countries with a long democratic tradition, military assistance to the police is a normal part of the security system (in Austria, for instance, the *sicherheitspolizeilicher Assistenzeinsatz* has been in use for decades).¹

As preventing illegal migration is becoming an important part of the confrontation with asymmetric threats, the dominance of such an atmosphere in society cannot be

¹ More detailed in: Peter Fender: *Militärisches Einsatzrecht – Inland*, Verlag AV + Astoria Druckzentrum, Wien 2013, pp 52-55 and pp119-121.

accepted with indifference. We will show that it has its origin in a long-term process which has established a distorted account of the relationship between the individual and the state, between their (human) rights and its (repressive) powers. It is about a theoretical error in the understanding of the value-foundation of democracy – i.e. of human rights – which leads to the *legal paralysis* of the armed forces, making them unable to perform their tasks.

1 LEGAL PARALYSIS

There is a widespread comprehension that the law strictly regulates processes in society, through statutes and other acts. The law is supposed to give almost mechanical assurance that social reality reflects the normativity that is written in it. Unfortunately, the law is much more helpless than we usually imagine. We will see that dominant social beliefs largely determine its content; precisely those beliefs that are actually supposed to be regulated by law. A good example is the so-called “democratization” of Iraq and Libya, where the enactment of the democratic institutions proved to be completely powerless. The situation is similar with regard to the regulation of migration, which often remains ineffective despite the existence of appropriate powers and a legal framework. Let us take a closer look at the mechanism of the legal paralysis of these powers.

Although the main ingredient of the law is legal *rules*, it also contains a set of *principles*. The legal rule has a solid structure which, in the event of the occurrence of a specific factual situation, demands certain legal consequences: “if x, then y.” For example: “*A citizen who is assigned to a military or work duty is obliged to be trained to perform this duty in accordance with the regulations*” (Defence Act, Article 13). Legal principles, however, do not contain such a structure, and they cannot be respected in the *same* way as the rule. They have the character of “oughtness”, of a normative tension, as they represent just the “*value goals of statutory system and of the legal system in general*” (Pavčnik, 2015, p 53). In this sense the principles *direct* to some decision, and do not, as in the case of rules, demand clear and determined legal consequences. To give an example of the legal principle: “*Slovenia is a state governed by the rule of law and a social state*” (Constitution, Article 2).

Principles play an important role in the interpretation of rules, determining their meaning and thus their regulatory scope. This enables the meaning of the law to stay open, allowing it to remain alive and to follow changes in society. At the same time, this openness represents a trap, as legal principles are *abstract* and can be interpreted in different ways – even in a way that is *contrary* to the purpose of a particular legal institute. In this way, specific legal institutes can become completely paralyzed.

The most illustrative example in Slovenia is to be found in the field of criminal law, where the majority of sentences are passed below the legal minimum; the percentage of conditional sentences, however, has already reached an excessive 80%. A situation was brought about where in the vast majority of criminal cases

the sanction – as envisaged in the description of the delict – has not been imposed. This is a consequence of the *interpretation* of Article 58 of the Criminal Code, which regulates a conditional sentence in the third paragraph: “*The court imposes a conditional sentence if, in view of the offender’s personality, his previous life, his conduct after the offence, the degree of guilt and the other circumstances in which he committed the offence, it finds that he can be expected not to repeat the offence.*” If we interpret this article through the principles of Article 45a² of the Criminal Code, in which a radical abolitionist agenda has been imposed, the courts will apply a conditional sentence in an excessive number of cases. Despite the formal validity of the Criminal Code, *de facto* radical abolitionism will be implemented.

A similar anomaly could occur in the case of any other institute. If, for instance, in civil law, a theoretical disorientation arose based on the notion that an individual cannot form their true will at all – as they are, for example, constantly misled by the commercial messages of capitalist society – then the courts would probably begin to find errors of will excessively often. Consequently, the legal transactions could be gradually invalidated in such a proportion as in the case of conditional sentences within penal law. Despite the formally preserved validity of the Obligations Code, this would eliminate its actual effectiveness and replace it with the agenda of the anarchist notion of the liberation of the individual from the bourgeois-state and its institutions.

The problem is that the law cannot be written in a way that would make it immune to the abuses described, since it inevitably contains meaningfully open terms. Dworkin describes this cognition by distinguishing between *concepts* and *conceptions*. Concepts are notions written into law, and conceptions are moral theories that provide the meaning to these concepts, interpreting its background principles.³ It is inevitable that a specific notion (concept) could be interpreted through different theories (conceptions), and that in this way the concept gets a different emphasis of its meaning. But this also opens up the possibility of interpreting a notion through a theory that is incompatible with the *basic idea* of a specific legal institute, thus achieving its paralysis – as demonstrated above in the case of penal law.

Protecting the law from such dissolution can only be a task of consistent legal theory and cannot be incorporated into the law itself. Every legal concept refers to principles that imply a moral dimension, and therefore cannot be defined more precisely. Dworkin stated: “*Indeed the very practice of calling these clauses ‘vague’ (...) can now be seen to involve a mistake. The clauses are vague only if we take them to be botched or an incomplete or schematic attempt to lay down a particular*

² “By punishing according to the provisions of this Code, the state (...) while respecting the human dignity and personality of the offender allows to the offender, with an appropriate sanction, a dignified integration into the common social environment.”

³ Bittner points out that “the reference to reading concepts as concepts [that is, when only semantically open concepts, not as already completed conceptions – Author’s note] is fundamental to Dworkin’s theory of interpretation and law” (Bittner, 1988, p 31).

conception. If we take them as appeals to moral concepts they could not be made more precise by being more detailed” (Dworkin, 1999, p 136). For example, the concept of “fair compensation” could be defined, for instance, by reference to human dignity; but then we should also define the meaning of dignity and so on, which would lead to *progressus ad infinitum*.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to enshrine in law how to interpret the law itself; this would require a jump over one’s own shadow. If a belief that is incompatible with the fundamental idea of a legal institute becomes dominant in society, this institute is at risk of gradually becoming ineffective. This is the structure of the problem discussed here. The response to an asymmetric threat linked to illegal migration, is determined by the dominant view on migration as such in a specific society. This view, however, was formed by a naïve and incorrect interpretation of human rights. The fundamental error of this interpretation is the fact that it is not capable of thinking of an *ambivalent relationship* between human rights and state institutions.

2 BETWEEN CONTROL AND PARALYSIS OF SECURITY POWERS

“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes” (“Who will supervise the supervisors themselves?”) is the phrase that most succinctly describes the eternal problem of any kind of control. That social processes need to be controlled due to security risks is the cognition of the broadest consensus. However, in the case that the control-mechanism *itself* escapes control, not only is control lacking, but the door is wide open to serious violations of legally protected goods. This is confirmed by the experience of totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, which massively misused repressive powers for repugnant political aims. On the basis of this very realization, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, where we read: *“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind (...), the General Assembly proclaims this universal declaration of human rights.”* (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paragraph 2 of preamble*)

Human rights catalogues provide a clear and synoptic value-platform for the control of repressive powers. However, a clear insight into the value foundations of a society often creates the misleading impression that control of the power is an easy task. One-sided interpretation of human rights, which views them in an *a priori* opposition to the repressive powers is, referring to this matter, the most widespread mistake. As this interpretation comprehends the repressive powers as the main violators of human rights, the key task of their protection would be, consequently, to limit the mandate of those powers *as much as possible*. Although on the horizon of the historical experience of totalitarian regimes such a view is understandable, it is nevertheless theoretically quite naïve. We must not overlook the circumstance that the only subject which is both permitted to and capable of effectively protecting human rights in practice is the state (with its powers). Individuals and civil society organizations have no means to do this, and above all, they have no mandate to use coercion.

This realization requires a far more complex account of both the control of repressive authorities and the mistakes they can make in performing their tasks. We must be aware that there is not one, but two mistakes that can lead to the most serious human rights violations: the first is *exceeding* the mandate of the repressive authorities, and the second is *not implementing* this mandate. This implicates a *binary* and not just a monistic conceptualization of the relationship between repressive authorities and human rights. When it comes to a discussion on this relationship, the lay public – and unfortunately also some of the scholars – recognize only the first mistake, even though the two errors are flipsides of the same coin. Democratic culture is incompatible both with the excesses of repressive authorities, and with their passivity and inefficiency.

The main theoretical challenge is the circumstance that these two errors are not unrelated. On the contrary, one refers to the other: the excessive proactivity of repressive authorities easily slips into inadmissible encroachments on the human rights of individuals; and excessive concern for the limitation of their mandate easily slips into ineffectiveness of their protection. One excess can instantly pass into the other. For this reason, the main task of the binary approach is to define the conceptual *balance* between these two sides. Failure to accept this theoretical constellation makes it impossible to control the repressive powers and hinders their efficiency in advance.

For this reason, concern for the protection of human rights must begin with the formation of a sound interpretation of the principles enshrined in the highest legal acts. As indicated above, the provisions – if they are read in isolation – tend to point to one or the other excess. For instance, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* stipulates that “*No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*” (Article 5), which suggests the strong limitation of repressive powers. But the *Declaration* also stipulates that “*Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person*” (Article 3), which, on the other hand, demands the efficiency of those same repressive powers. Similarly, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia includes a number of interpretive tensions.

Only proper understanding of the tensions between these provisions, and demonstration of their immanent dialectic and their mutual co-dependence can enable both the effectiveness of security systems and their proper control. Unfortunately, in Slovenia we have a serious problem at this level, as the monistic doctrine of the relationship between human rights and state (security) powers is firmly entrenched. We do not recognize in them institutions that are *sine qua non* for the protection of human rights; instead we see them primarily as violators of human rights. As in the case of criminal law described above, security powers are not formally abolished, but in reality their existence is delegitimized, and their effectiveness is paralyzed.

In this way, ideological teachings that are completely incompatible with liberal democracy become realized within it. First and foremost, it is about versions of secular eschatologies that place human emancipation in the “beyond”, in a world

without law and state. The traditions of anarchism and Marxism are most illustrative here. Kropotkin, for example, describes police officers as “*the impurest race upon the face of the earth*” (Kropotkin, 1976, p 43). Similarly, for Marx “*security is the highest social concept of civil society*” (Marx, 1975, p 163), as it summarizes and fixes all defects of bourgeois society. So “*the concept of security does not raise civil society above its egoism. On the contrary, security is the insurance of egoism.*” (Ibid.)

3 EXAMPLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION OF U-I-59/17-27

In 2015, Europe faced an escalation of the migration and refugee crisis, which took place particularly through the Balkan route. Almost half a million people passed through the territory of the Republic of Slovenia within a few weeks, which posed an enormous logistical burden and a severe security challenge. Despite the commendable work of all the institutions engaged with it, we can say that the crisis ended without incident also with some luck. If the numbers had been just a little higher, the system would have broken down and hundreds of thousands of unidentified people would have been straying around the country.

On that occasion, parliament adopted an amendment to the Foreigners Act, where in Articles 10a and 10b a special border regime was foreseen for the case that “*the circumstance could or has already arisen when public order or internal security would be or already is endangered due to the changed migration situation*” (Foreigners Act, Article 10a). This regime provides the possibility of rejecting requests for asylum when “*there are no systemic deficiencies in the neighbouring Member State of the European Union (...) which could lead to danger of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment*” (Foreigners Act, Article 10b). The legislator also provided for exceptions, such as the health condition of foreigners or their relatives, for minors, and so on.

The Office of the Ombudsman submitted a request to the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of these amendments for several reasons. The main concern was focused on violation of Article 18 of the Constitution (prohibition of torture). The Court ruled that although refoulement is possible only to a country where there are no systemic shortcomings in the asylum procedure, the amendment violates the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment. The Constitutional Court relied on the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which interprets the prohibition of torture in the case of refoulement in a way that an *objective* assessment of asylum procedures is not sufficient. According to the interpretation of this right, it is also necessary to take into account the *subjective* circumstances related to each person individually.

The set of arguments of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was drawn from case law of European and domestic courts, is of even more interest for the purposes of this article than the repeal of the provisions of the amendment itself. In these arguments we

can spot precisely the anomalies thematized in the previous section, concerning the relationship of human rights to the state (and its powers). Despite the Government's argumentation (the Government initiated the adoption of these amendments) that the state "*should not allow uncontrolled and unrestricted immigration, as this would deny the foundations of the state and the entire state system*", (U-I-59/17-27, 9) and that "*international law cannot impose obligations that are impracticable*" (U-I-59/17-27, 54), in its reply, the Ombudsman's Office insisted on the *absolute* right of foreigners to non-refoulement. It referred to the judgments of the highest court of the EU and maintained that according to "*the ECHR, the right from Article 3 of the ECHR is an absolute right that cannot be limited even in cases where the existence of the nation would be endangered. Balancing the weight of the encroachment on that right against the interests of the community as a whole should not be permissible.*" (U-I-59/17-27, 18)

According to this interpretation, respect for human rights implicates the commitment to sacrifice the very existence of the state and, thus, the (human) rights of its citizens. Just a consideration about securing the vital functions of a specific state which it provides for its citizens, i.e. an attempt to "balance the weight" of the rights of a foreigner as an individual against the rights provided by state's organs to the citizens "should not be permissible." The Constitutional Court does not take a direct stand on this account of the relationship between human rights and the state, but it indirectly confirms it when it states: "*The ECHR has already taken the position that the increased arrival of migrants or applicants for international protection does not release the state from fulfilling its obligations arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Difficulty in ensuring formulated standards in the field of positive obligations as a result of the increased arrival of migrants, in itself, cannot justify reducing them*"(U-I-59/17-27, 50).

This stance resembles moral fanaticism, which Hegel (2001) sums up in the following principle: *fiat iustitiae, et pereat mundus* (Let justice be done, even if the world perishes). It stems from an archaically understood Christian ethos, which sees the "world" in irreconcilable opposition to "justice." The core of Christian eschatology is, however, the comprehension that the precondition for the realization of (ideal) justice is the destruction of the (defective) world. Thus, the world has no intrinsic value in any relation whatsoever. This ethical attitude requires from an individual a constant willingness to sacrifice everything they have and treasure in the name of a "higher" value. The extreme limit of this demand is martyrdom, the readiness to perish for something more valuable than our worldly existence.

When this notion of the relationship between justice and the world settles into the interpretation of the right to asylum, in the event of an enormous number of asylum seekers it requires from the state – even if it is clear in advance that the state's capacities are drastically too low – its exhaustion including its dissolution. This is one of the interpretations of the "absoluteness" of the right from Article 18 of the Constitution that is becoming, evidently, progressively relevant. At the same time,

this is a synoptic illustration of the consequences of the monistic approach, which cannot recognize the ambivalence of the relationship between human rights and the state.

In this way, the anarchist motto, “Open the borders!” (i.e. “Dissolve the state!”), became part of legal discourse and is getting (to some extent) realized. One might think that the dissolution of the state could still be avoided if a state of emergency according to Article 92 of the Constitution would be declared. It is questionable whether this is correct, as Article 16 of the Constitution does not allow the “prohibition of torture” to be abolished in this case either. If that were so, however, it would bring a significant realization that, according to the current interpretation of human rights, the state can ensure its existence solely in the context of a state of emergency.

A kind of irony is that right now we are entangled in a theoretical disorientation that philosophy already recognized and understood two centuries ago. In §209 of the *Philosophy of Right*, published exactly two hundred years ago, Hegel writes about the recognition of human equality: “*It is the essence of education and of thought, which is the consciousness of the individual in universal form, that the I should be apprehended as a universal person, in whom all are identical. Man must be accounted a universal being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German or Italian, but because he is a man. This thinking or reflective consciousness is of infinite importance. It is defective only when it plumes itself upon being cosmopolitan, in opposition to the concrete life of the citizen*” (Hegel, 2001, §209). The last sentence is crucial: the universalism of (human) rights as an indisputable civilizational acquisition is only harmful in the case that it degenerates into a rigid extreme that opposes the state. It is clear to Hegel that (human) rights can only be secured within the state, not *beside* or even *against* it.

This would be both 1) *ineffective* – as the disintegration of the basic institutions of the state would benefit neither citizens, nor foreigners who already have been granted asylum, nor foreigners who are striving for it – as well as 2) *immoral*. Due to the religious remnants in our culture, self-sacrifice or at least self-negation is often misinterpreted as a laudable virtue: “*Love your enemies, and be good to everyone who hates you. Ask God to bless anyone who curses you, and pray for everyone who is cruel to you. If someone slaps you on one cheek, do not stop that person from slapping you on the other cheek. If someone wants to take your coat, do not try to keep back your shirt. Give to everyone who asks and do not ask people to return what they have taken from you*” (Lk 6, pp 27-31).

But enlightenment originates from a totally different anthropology than the Christian world. It builds on an autonomous subject that finds a moral law within themselves. They now have intrinsic value and, consequently, not only a duty towards others, but also towards themselves. This is explicitly stated in this version of Kant’s categorical imperative: “*Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the*

same time as an end” (Kant, 1993, p 30). We have duties also towards ourselves,⁴ to “humanity in our person”. The demand for a willingness to destroy oneself – on an individual or collective level – is on the secular existential horizon immoral.

4 HUMAN RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES OF THE STATE

In no other area can state powers intervene more deeply in the private sphere of the individual and affect their fundamental rights more than in the exercise of a repressive mandate. The activity of repressive authorities is a field where terrible violations of dignity can occur. This is evidenced by the Western tradition of abuses of law and the state, first described by Sophocles’ Antigone, and also confirmed by all the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. The realization has matured that the state needs to be strictly controlled when using coercion. The key instrument of this control today is precisely the concept of human rights, which have played an indispensable role in preventing inhumane treatment of the individual.

However, we have seen that this is only one side of the relationship between state authorities and human rights. If human rights are to be implemented into a social reality, they must be effectively and consistently enforced by state authorities. Therefore, the protection of the individual on the one hand and the activity of the state’s powers on the other, do not stand *a priori* in opposition. Theory, for example Hobbes in his Leviathan, teaches us that the absence of law and the state does not implicate the realm of freedom, as the void begins to be replaced by the contingent initiative of individuals. In this manner, the right is sooner or later replaced by brute power, and authority (*postetas*) by force (*violentia*). Hobbes describes the concept of the natural state as a “war of all against all” in these words: “*In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.*” (Hobbes, 1985, p 186)

Unfortunately, history confirms the theory perfectly. Genealogically, human rights have indeed evolved as the protection of the individual from the bearer of power. This is also evidenced by the order of the first three articles of the *Universal Declaration*, where “*life, liberty and security of person*” are mentioned only in the third article. But insofar as human rights are to represent a coherent value foundation of the legal system and society as such, they must provide protection of the individual in all possible situations – including protection against other individuals. This interpretation

⁴ *Not only is indifference to one’s own existence inadmissible, even moral servitude, kneeling (Kriecherei, animo servili) that often accompanies the self-image of the West in relation to the Third World is, according to Kant, reprehensible.*

of human rights was developed through the concept of their “horizontal effect”. Probably the most famous example is “Lüth-Urteil”, where the German Federal Constitutional Court used the phrase “the effect of radiation” (Ausstrahlungswirkung der Grundrechte) of fundamental rights into the private sphere.

This is the basis of the doctrine of the positive duties of the state, which obliges the state to protect human rights also in horizontal relations, in relations between private entities. Constitutionally protected legal goods may be jeopardized not only by the state, they may also be endangered (or, from the perspective of mass illegal migration, even more so) by individuals and their unregulated activities. It is irrelevant to the victim who exactly is violating their safety and human dignity. The recent geostrategic situation which also includes the possibility that Turkey will release millions of refugees and migrants to the EU poses an enormous threat to the national security of all states on the Balkan route. It would be irresponsible to ignore this danger simply because it does not fit the established monist doctrine, envisioning the state as the exclusive source of threats to human rights.

Conclusion If we want to “take (human) rights seriously” (Dworkin), then we must protect them in every situation, no matter who is the violator is. Therefore, human rights not only have a negative status (which prohibits the state from interfering with these constitutionally protected goods), but equally importantly a positive status, which imposes on the state the obligation to protect citizens’ rights. The passivity of the state’s powers in this field is no less unconstitutional than abuse and going beyond its mandate.

Anomalies causing the paralysis of state organs have existed in our society for a long time, as we demonstrated in the case of penal law. But rapid changes in the field of asymmetric threats, associated with the possibility of mass illegal migration, are drastically exacerbating this constellation. The recent blockade of the armed forces’ assistance concerning the protection of the border, which was based on prejudice and populism, has dismantled a dangerous disorientation with regard to national security. As we have demonstrated, the only way to face these challenges is through expert discussion. Unfortunately, external intervention, for example in the form of a change in legislation, is in this case not possible. The first necessary step, therefore, is to understand and analyze the current situation. We hope that this article has provided a small contribution in this direction.

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SKUPNA INTERAKCIJA CIVILNEGA IN VOJAŠKEGA PODROČJA KOT ORODJE PRI ODZIVANJU NA HIBRIDNE GROŽNJE

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION AS A TOOL IN RESPONDING TO HYBRID THREATS

Povzetek Aktualna osredotočenost na hibridne grožnje in asimetrično bojevanje se lahko zdi nekaj več kot le vrnitev v preteklost. Kako daleč v preteklost pa je treba iti, da prepoznamo resnico? Številne doktrine in teorije iz industrijske dobe danes več ne veljajo. Treba se je bolj usmeriti k algoritmu kot vodilu za ukrepanje, in ne ostati pri statični paradigmi. Združena interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja je ena izmed možnosti, ki omogoča odprto varnostno kodo za združevanje strokovnjakov in strokovnega znanja na zahtevo ter ob pravem času. Treba je torej združiti prizadevanja in izboljšati mednarodne mehanizme kriznega upravljanja, da bi zagotovili hitrejši, natančnejši in učinkovitejši odziv. Geografija ne zagotavlja več varnosti. V krizi ni pomembno, iz katere smeri prihaja grožnja. Vsi smo v istem čolnu ali na vesoljski ladji Zemlja.

Ključne besede *Asimetrično bojevanje, vojaške doktrine, hibridne grožnje, interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja, odpornost, solidarnost, končno stanje, način razmišljanja.*

Abstract The current focus on hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare can seem little more than a return to the past. How far into the past should we go to recognize this truth? Many doctrines and theories from the Industrial Age are not valid today. We need to move closer to the algorithm as a guide to action rather than remaining stuck using a static paradigm. Joint Civil-Military Interaction is one option offering an open security code, combining experts and expertise on demand and on time. We must unite our efforts, and improve international mechanisms of crisis management to respond faster, more accurately, and more efficiently. Geography no longer provides security. In a crisis, it does not matter from which direction the threat comes. We are all in the same boat or on Spaceship Earth.

Key word *Asymmetric warfare, military doctrines, hybrid threats, civil-military interaction, resilience, solidarity, end state, way of thinking.*

Introduction

What is the main intention of this paper? To initiate a new, or at the very least, a different way of thinking about responding to crises. Experts from different academic and practice fields, as well as the professions, are immediately necessary in responding to crises, complex emergencies, hybrid threats, and asymmetric warfare. New answers to emerging threats, kinetic and non-kinetic, are required. Peace Operations doctrines are no longer adequate to meet the demands of today's crises. The number of asylum seekers, migrants, and internally displaced people rises endlessly. The number of failed states continues to multiply. Covid-19 has found governments and institutions without effective answers. Trust, as the foundation of democracy, is collapsing like a sandcastle at the water's edge.

It should not be difficult to realize that many doctrines and theories from the Industrial Age are not valid today, and that we must validate our new environment with a different understanding of the changes. We need to move closer to the algorithm as a guide to action, rather than the static paradigm, as it has a data-informed ability to adapt to new and shifting circumstances. The adaptable nature of algorithms is contrary to paradigm thinking, where paradigms must be dismantled and replaced with new ones to remain relevant.

During the pre-industrial era, hammers and simple tools were enough to cut the wood or stone needed to build, but today, even for daily repair work at home, people can buy hundreds and hundreds of metres of building materials and tools specially adjusted for a small fraction of the whole project. Do you remember the movie studio Universal Pictures? Today there are thousands of 'Universal Pictures'. Have we achieved better results? Are movies qualitatively 'better', or do we simply have more of them?

Michelangelo's David is lasting, standing above our heads, and we can admire his appearance as a masterpiece; work carved out of white Carrara marble a long time ago. Can we predict the same destiny for many of today's art products, for example the hundreds of bicycles by Wai-Wei once exhibited in Venice? Are today's art objects durable? Does the term 'life-time warranty' have any legitimacy? Is anything built to last longer than a short time?

Theories and paradigms have short shelf lives, so we must explore their utility within the context in which they were developed, and consider the issues which they were designed to address. We cannot blindly apply outdated theories and models to current crises. Critique is necessary. If we are hoping for the best results possible, we need the proper tools with which to accomplish our work. Specialized tools are required. There is no one-size-fits-all answer to crises. The only universal requirement is the courage and freedom to step out of the box and think differently, to not be constrained by the limits of the intellectual box. To paraphrase Albert Einstein, with logic you can go from point A to point B, with imagination, anywhere.

1 HISTORY IS ASYMMETRIC, THE PRESENT IS COMPLEX, AND HYBRID IS NORMAL

The Westphalia peace collapsing, the Clausewitzian principles in question, and military doctrines outdated the moment they are published; this is the world we are living in and that our children will inherit. A fluid, contradictory, and chaotic global space where state boundaries are becoming irrelevant and state sovereignty is giving way to the sovereignty of the individual. New theories and paradigms are required to confront contemporary issues. Asymmetric warfare presents itself as a dominant paradigm in Post-Industrial wars and conflicts, and strengthens the need of critique in a world where, actually, “war no longer exists” (Smith, 2007, p 13).

It is not that the military is weak in dealing with present and future threats; rather, the threats are too complex for command directed responses, and the military alone cannot provide appropriate, holistic responses. It is a smart defence that is built on shared tasks; coordinated interaction between militaries, civil stakeholders, government agencies, and academia (the principles of Joint Civil-Military Interaction will be explained further in the paper). To be resilient, nations, states, and the whole of society must be smart in adapting to the ‘reality on the ground’, since reality does not easily adjust itself to our theories.

Today, hybrid threats present the greatest challenge to national and human security. When speaking of hybrid threats, it is not uncommon for military and non-military experts to observe that the first documented case of asymmetric warfare was the legendary wooden horse used to gain entrance into the fortified City of Troy. Odysseus was possibly the first asymmetric warrior. Throughout history we find individuals or groups inventing context specific asymmetric attack or defence mechanisms. Who does not know of the Assassins and the fortress of Alamut? With eyes open wide we admire the huge results they achieved with simple tools and, frankly speaking, with meticulous and long lasting training, patiently preparing action all the way to the desired end-state, which was usually the assassination of a strong man, much stronger than that of the whole Alamut company.

1.1 Asymmetric tactics have always been here

Asymmetric tactics and techniques were nothing unfamiliar during the long march of Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar to battle with tribes along the way to the British Isles. In his famous manual for warriors, Sun-Tzu speaks of *smart attack* and *smart defence* when one’s opponents are far stronger. When human societies were divided into smaller administrative units (take this only as an expression, not as an exact term, since it is not important for the main subject of our article), there was not always a balance between two opponents, and the size of the units depended on many circumstances (human resources, funds, equipment, logistics and so on). In that spirit, the advantage was on the side of the most inventive, the side that did not follow the ‘rules of battle’, the side that ignored the minimum of *fair play* and which was able to use surprise as a tactic and technique.

With the development of New Era kingdoms and later states, together with the advent of industrialization, new weapons, as well as three-dimensional warfare – land, sea, and air – defined the new battlefield and an army-to-army strategy, and tactics developed which ended with the termination of the Cold War. Sybille Scheipers, in her book *On Small War – Carl Von Clausewitz and People's War*, noted:

A number of scholars declared Clausewitz's theory of war outmoded and ill-suited to the twenty-first century. John Keagan, Martin van Creveld, and Mary Caldor criticized Clausewitz's alleged rationalism. Martin van Creveld argued that, already with onset of the Cold War, wars become 'non-Clausewitzian' and 'non-trinitarian', in so far as most wars fought after 1945 were 'low-intensity conflicts' fought by non-state actors. At the end of the Cold War, we entered the era of predominant asymmetric warfare challenging old ways of thinking with a demand for a *new way of thinking*. (Scheipers, 2018, p 8)

The Balkan war in the 1990s was a sample of what happens when an official national army such as the Yugoslav People's Army was disintegrated into much smaller units under the command of different nationalistic leaders, chiefs of mafia, local warlords and other new-wave politicians who grab what remains of a *dead state*. Europe was shocked and unable to intervene; NATO, led by the United States military intervention, opened the gate for what was at that moment the only possible peaceful end to a Balkan slaughterhouse. Even today a peaceful transformation has not been concluded. With some exceptions such as Vietnam and Timor-Leste, most of the nations where the international community has intervened have been abandoned as failed states, a result of work never finished by the international community. Something has gone wrong, or mostly wrong, with the international community's responses to asymmetric conflicts, and we may assume that will be the same with the increase in hybrid threats. The reasons for continuing conflicts in states are not the same, but some of them are similar, for example, Syria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq; even the Cyprus dispute is unresolved, as well as the case of Israel and Palestine.

As we have observed, asymmetric warfare and hybrid threats are nothing especially new; what is new can be seen in the dilemma of the military ensuring it is trained, equipped, and organized properly to be the first and most effective responder to hybrid threats and asymmetric conflicts. At the end of the journey lies the strategic question Who is the winner?, since we know that the winner takes it all, and we know from post-Cold War conflicts and intrastate wars that the military can perfectly win the battle but not always the war. The military is often unable to *win the peace*. Not all wars end as gloriously as the Second World War.

1.2 From closed system thinking to open systems thinking

Let us focus for a while on two different contemporary engagements within NATO operations: KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan (bearing in mind that ISAF was not the only mission in Afghanistan, but it was the most complex one). These

operations have many similarities, as well as deep differences. Both operations deserve more profound study, allowing us to learn some valuable lessons.

ISAF and KFOR after-action reviews could provide important guidance in the development of Joint Civil-Military Interaction (JCMI) as a precondition for building positive results, under one important condition: never stop the mission from pursuing its desired end-state outlined on paper, while simultaneously allowing the needs on the ground to inform and guide civil-military interaction. Missions are like controlling poles in a nuclear power plant, and that is the main difference between ISAF and KFOR: KFOR is still present in Kosovo, but the ISAF mission was transformed into the Resolute Support Mission and is almost gone.

Case examples demonstrate the focus of military actions in population-centric conflicts employing “population-centric warfare” (Gregg, 2018, p 238) as operations conducted within the human domain network characterized by civil society, political, economic, and security sector relationships (Cleveland, et al, 2018). Clearly, to find the correct answers it is necessary to ask the proper questions. A wrong hypothesis will only arrive at a wrong conclusion.

“Thinking outside the box” has become a well-worn phrase meant to help individuals and organizations imagine new and innovative ways to build peace in a world subject to increasing asymmetric threats. One thing blocking new ways forward, however, is that we often unthinkingly search for answers within a closed system. This can result in doing little more than rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic, when what is required is a better ship.

If we choose to be guided by closed system thinking we must accept that there is no reason to ask the military what their answer is to current and future national security and defence questions; nor should we only ask civilians. We should ask them both at the same time, in the same place, around the same table. We will need to learn to accept there are only a finite range of responses, and nothing more. Our addition to the discussion of addressing hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare is that we need to engage open systems thinking, where the number of potential responses to threats are limited only by our imaginations. There is not a shortage of *critical* thinking, there is one of *creative* thinking.

Our thinking needs to be fluid and unconstrained by convention. By-the-book responses should be viewed only as a starting point, and we must be prepared to throw out the book when it no longer meets our needs. Here we point out that we see hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare as separate actions which have the potential of flowing into each other, though not necessarily. Each can stand on its own. Hybrid threats can develop into asymmetric ones and manifest as geographically limited war. Asymmetric war can devolve into a hybrid threat. It is a permanent, dynamic process. This dynamic process is the reason why new, fast-adapting, resilient, and context-specific responses are needed at both national and international levels.

It is time to ask whether military operators are properly trained to address hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare, and what the role of civil society, governments and their institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), and Governmental Organizations (GOs) might be. Are they trained and able to work together collaboratively and cooperatively? Can they *interact* in a constantly chaotic, fragile, and dynamic operational environment?

1.3 Our desire for certainty and searching for options

What is needed is a profound, as well as nuanced, understanding of asymmetric warfare. Is it merely the opposite of symmetric warfare, or is it different in kind? If asymmetric warfare is the reverse of symmetric, existing asymmetric responses should be enough – but that has not proved the case. The numbers of special operating forces employing asymmetric means now comes close to the number of conventional forces. Are we prepared to address asymmetry with asymmetric approaches to defence and security, thereby building an asymmetric fortress? How are resilient and anti-fragile systems forms of asymmetric offence and defence? Is it more useful to focus on the current state as continuous, a condition of permanent crisis and global chaos, or look to the creation of future sustainable states able to battle against hybrid threats in asymmetric environments?

Like many phenomena today which we do not fully understand, asymmetric warfare cannot escape our desire for certainty in searching for options, even conducting experiments, so that we can write down the most comprehensive, simple, and understandable definition of asymmetric warfare. If we cannot even agree on a definition, how we can agree on solutions? And the most frightening part: are hybrid threats the first stage of asymmetric warfare or only an announcement of it? Can hybrid threats later develop or transform into something different? Is it more useful to replace the end-state with an understanding of the current state as continuous, a condition of permanent crisis and global chaos?

At the beginning of our journey we take as our definition one of many that can easily be found just *one click away*:

“Asymmetrical warfare, (defined) as unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other” (Ellen Sexton, 2014).

The historical proof of this definition is found, for example, in World War Two Balkan history, where much smaller and lighter armed resistance groups attacked and disrupted the heavier military structures of the Germans, Italians, Hungarians, and some minor neighbour states. A combination of guerrilla, terrorist, and conventional means of attack were used. At the local level resistance groups’ strategy, tactics, and techniques were successful, as they prevented the redirection of manpower and equipment to the Eastern Front by their ongoing engagement and occupation of

key resources. Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are examples of organizations opposing much stronger regular armies in Spain and Great Britain. Al Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) employ terrorism in Afghanistan, London, Brussels, Paris, Iraq and Syria, to name only some of the locations in which they are engaged.

2 THE THIRD MILLENNIUM MILITARY MINDSET NO LONGER FITS

The era of classic, rigid industrial warfare is over. War and peace are no longer divided *à la* Clausewitz, two sides of the same coin; war on one side, flip the coin and ‘voilà’, peace. The borders of war and peace are blurred if not erased, and we cannot think only in terms of ‘battles’. The Third Millennium military mindset no longer fits our needs. If there is no war, classically defined, and the battlefield is a permanent condition incorporating cooperation, competition, and conflict, there is nothing to ‘win’. In this condition we all lose. War is between the people, with the people, and against the people (Smith, 2007), as we can observe when some leaders call upon the military to fulfil missions not legally designed for them, and they impose ill-supported provisional laws to which many high-ranking military personnel object. Operating against their own citizens is nothing less than a dictatorship – a playground well known from states not recognized as democracies in the past. When peace depends on the temper of an individual in the highest position, we are entering into the final circle of Dante’s Hell. We must agree with Admiral (ret.) James Stavridis: we are facing crucial questions about proper leadership and honest leaders (Stavridis, 2020).

Military thinking has atrophied. Some thinkers and politicians suggest all that is needed is to push a button and the military mindset will be reset. However, if we fail to change our way of thinking and move outside the intellectual constraints imposed by an overwhelming bureaucracy, whatever we reset will simply get us more of the same in a different order. It is better to think in a new way; we must recycle our way of thinking even if the risk is that we do not know exactly what will come out. What is needed is at least the courage of Alice when she stepped into the Looking Glass.

Hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare are the new normal. General Rupert Smith (2007) is unequivocal in his observation that “war no longer exists” (Smith, 2007, p 13); no longer is war consigned to clearly demarcated battlefields where uniformed militaries engage in combat governed by the rules of war. Smith further notes that conflict now occurs among the people where the “dynamic of confrontation and conflict, rather than war and peace, (are) at the heart of war amongst the people” (p 183). The hybrid battlefield is everywhere. Asymmetric responses are required.

2.1 Changing models of war – changing role of the military

Traditionally war has been the province of the state, as it held a monopoly on violence (Clark, 2015: p 4). But states have lost their monopoly, and one result is that military leaders must develop new collaborative responses in addressing asymmetric threats.

First, however, military leaders need to understand the changes. Military leaders too often remain anchored to a Clausewitzian understanding of war. A Westphalian model is regularly employed as if it is a state of nature to analyze and explain asymmetric warfare, a model that is proving to have limited utility, as “fewer and fewer wars involve conventional clashes of opposing armies” (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p 13). Outdated analysis tools are used to try and understand ill-defined, amorphous, virus-like hybrid and asymmetric threats. Military effectiveness has primarily been determined on how conventional forces fared in interstate conflicts (Cleveland, et al, 2018).

Smith’s new battlefield can be seen in the refugee crisis confronting the European Union (EU). Beginning in 2015, massive numbers of refugees began to flow into the EU. The crisis has had the effect of disrupting the EU and NATO alliance, and contributing to the escalation of internal disagreements to the point where some question the utility of the NATO alliance and the poor response of the EU. What bad actors could not achieve through kinetic action they accomplished, expressed metaphorically, through the weaponization of refugee populations as biological weapons (it is interesting that the term ‘biological weapon’ is familiar to extreme right political parties harshly opposed to the EU migrant policy).

Refugees walking towards the EU in their thousands presented the governments, police, military, and civilians with a new challenge, one that cannot be dealt with by kinetic means. The only available option is political. Refugees as a threat to domestic peace and freedom of movement have left the military on the side-lines, primarily providing policing activities. Political and military leaders are slow to recognize refugees as a potential hybrid threat.

The flow of refugees through Turkey is an example. Failed negotiations between the EU and Turkey resulted in the Ankara Government opening the gates of existing refugee camps literally overnight. This action can be understood as a hybrid threat, where the EU was pushed into a corner and obliged to pay billions of euros to address the burgeoning refugee crisis without any good results. Some countries, e.g. Italy, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia, sent their militaries to their national borders to address the influx of refugees. This action initiated a legal dispute over the legitimate role of the military on national borders when the perceived threat is from unarmed, barefoot refugees and migrants intermingling and moving into sovereign states. Governments and the solidarity of the EU were stressed as the administrative treatment of refugees and migrants was confused, even though international law treats each differently. The state structures were not prepared for the complexity of the crisis.

An over-reliance on power as determinative can cause military leaders to struggle to understand the profound changes impacting responses to hybrid threats which have the potential to carry over into future forms of asymmetric warfare (where we have entered an era of war without conclusion (Naim, 2013, p 108)). Military

organizations are conservative, and their risk averse nature can lead them to resist the necessary changes (Cleveland, et al, 2018).

2.2 Farewell to the geography

Civilian and military actors are obliged to develop a competency in recognizing and understanding the hybrid threats that now characterize an unbounded operational environment. The battlefield is no longer hemmed in by geography. Technology has extended the physical fight into the cyber realm. Human and technological networks dominate. Networks, not military formations, are the new organizing structure (Ferguson, 2017; McChrystal, et al, 2015). It is necessary to embrace a new paradigm; hybrid threats have the potential to lead us into network war.

Hybrid threats are by their nature asymmetric; they behave like living organisms that replicate themselves throughout the unbounded battlefield demonstrating a *fractal nature*. Hybrid threat activities develop their own logic and move towards an internal congruence. The threat manifests itself at each level of the structure – tactical, operational, strategic, and political – differently, yet the same. To understand a hybrid threat, it can be useful to think of broccoli. The tiniest floret and the whole vegetable replicate the same pattern at each level of analysis. A “self-similarity” develops (Gadlin, et al, 2013, p 476). To combat hybrid threats, it is necessary to disrupt this self-replicating pattern.

2.3 Resilience – nothing new, but always different

Unconventional warfare is no longer a shadow activity. Both state and non-state actors conduct military and non-military operations using hybrid means when power relationships are unequal and the consequences of force-on-force engagements are too great. The cost-benefit analysis has tipped towards the unconventional.

It is not obvious, nor is it necessary, that hybrid threats will evolve into asymmetric warfare. As all adversaries are different, the determining factors are their goals and competing agendas, as well as human, technical, and economic resources. Do not forget that the threat of nuclear war is real, hanging above world peace like the Sword of Damocles, and if a leader of one power decides to strike with nuclear weapons, even if his state will be attacked by conventional weapons in retaliation, it is time to switch on the loudest possible alarm to begin new negotiations between all the states that possess nuclear weapons.

Resilience speaks to a system’s ability to recover from a shock; to quickly get back on its feet, so to speak. The military has a renewed interest in resilience as a key coping strategy (Jermalavičius & Parmak, 2018, p 26). Discussions around resilience should be extended to include the need for *fluidity*. Late in the 20th century “nimbleness and flexibility became increasingly valuable” (Naím, 2013, p 117). “Flexible” suggests systems capable of bending under stress and not breaking, but flexibility is only good enough; it is not the answer to network war. Networks must develop the capacity to

flow with hybrid threats, using their energy to build network-wide responses. Fluid, non-kinetic conflict management approaches which “embrace the chaos in a unity-of-aim, self-organizing, systems approach to peacebuilding” are required (Matyók & Stauder, 2020 p 339).

To successfully transform hybrid threats, it is essential to build *anti-fragile* political and military networks. This approach moves beyond flexible resilience. Resilience relies on building systems that can absorb a shock and recover. In contrast, Taleb (2014) outlines a need for the development of anti-fragile systems – systems that embrace shocks and use the energy to make the system stronger. Military networks must become anti-fragile in meeting hybrid threats, and become dynamic, complex adaptive systems: “a scale-free network...a web without a spider” (Ferguson, 2018, p 37).

Resilient, anti-fragile systems are the answer to hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare. The question is whether military networks are capable of becoming anti-fragile without networking with non-military specialists. Most military headquarters have no need to transform an Industrial Age military way of thinking to one that is adept at dealing with a flattened and dynamic digital world. Calls for change do not endanger the rigid, sturdy military system. Change can be viewed as an opportunity or a threat, and many military leaders have learned to be risk averse.

3 JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION IS NOT AGAINST THE MILITARY, BUT FOR THE MILITARY

Conflict analysis and transformation, as part of joint civil-military interaction (JCMI) employing a unity-of-aim approach (Matyók & Stauder, 2020) to achieve a *harmony of effort*, should become the primary non-kinetic response to hybrid threats. Currently, education and training in joint civil-military interaction is inadequate, leaving military actors ill-prepared to confront hybrid threats that have no kinetic response.

This is not to suggest that a *classic* military capability is no longer needed, only that our understanding of the military and the requirements placed on military actors have changed. The military is now one tool among many in conducting whole-of-society responses to hybrid threats and asymmetric conflicts, and for kinetic responses, the military remains the best option. The military can establish a safe-and-secure environment within which humanitarian actors and other experts can function; but the military is incapable of leading the entire process.

As war has transitioned and now occurs *amongst the people*, new forms of military response are required. Conflict resolution methodologies must become part of a *warrior's tool kit*. Negotiation, mediation, and facilitation are tools for combating hybrid, people-centric, network war. Unfortunately, “NATO personnel are lacking awareness of CMI”, and they are unable to effectively engage non-military actors

positively (van der West & Warstat, 2018, pp 46-47). A myopic focus on kinetic operations continues, irrespective of the observation of how the military engages regularly with local civilian actors in non-kinetic engagements (Davidson, 2009; Gezari, 2013). Increasingly, military actors find themselves engaged in the political sphere 80% of the time and employing the remaining 20% of their time in kinetic operations (Gezari, 2013).

3.1 Battlespace as a social body

The complex nature of hybrid threats makes them a challenge to understand vis-à-vis conventional war. Hybrid threats are asymmetric by their nature. Possibly it is useful to borrow from the medical community in working to understand hybrid, asymmetric warfare. When approaching a patient, more than one specialist gives their opinion and makes a diagnosis and a prognosis, and then a treatment plan is developed to 1) Save life, 2) Treat the main cause, 3) Treat side effects, and 4) Help the immune system to become more resilient. According to the decisions made, monitoring is constantly in place through technical equipment and well-trained human resources.

Possibly it is useful to imagine the battlespace as a social body where diplomacy, information, security forces, and economics interact. Peace-builders approach the social body as a different specialized physician approaches a patient; they conduct a diagnosis, make a prognosis, and apply a therapy or intervention. Rather than meeting threats with direct military force alone, JCMI actors address a social virus using therapeutic means, treating the patient holistically.

The current novel coronavirus, Covid-19, is a threat to global health, and at the same time it is a teacher instructing us that without a global scientific approach, research, and unity of effort no one wins. The coronavirus has no respect for national borders; it is progressing in a fast-moving world, adapting to its specific environment. Systems, states, societies, and individuals must adapt too, and they must reinvent and develop a value regrettably forgotten in the past few decades: solidarity. Solidarity is needed in minimizing the living space of a virus; the virus must have a host; unfortunately, selfishness is expanding to meet the pandemic's size. In this instance large portions of populations are refusing to take Covid-19 seriously, not understanding that solidarity and following the rules is *sine qua non* for better success. The global community must be called to action to meet the threat; a threat that can be exploited by bad actors. Please note that whenever we refer to the Covid-19 pandemic we are not placing health crises on the list of hybrid threats; we are trying to explain the nature of the phenomena using this fresh and painful example.

It is important to recognize that Covid-19 is not a traditional hybrid threat, nor is it a form of asymmetric warfare; however, bad actors can exploit crises such as pandemics to achieve destructive ends. Health crises can be leveraged to gain advantage. For example, when governments and institutions are unable to effectively respond to health emergencies and protect citizens, bad actors can use this failure to engender mistrust of the government among the people.

3.2 Replacing the 'war on terror'

The post 9/11 and ISIS 'war on terror' paradigm must be replaced with 'solidarity for everyone', although we might find some similarities between terrorist attacks and spreading viruses. Hybrid threats that operate like, or as, viruses require whole-of-society responses. Cultural, religious and ethnic differences are minor when facing global, existential threats which endanger life and show no respect for the social differences dividing individuals. The smallest denominator is 'basic life', or 'human rights' if you prefer. Human security and national security are two sides of the same coin.

Asymmetric warfare (Al-Qaida, ISIS, Taliban), or less violent, or even pretending to be, daily routine hybrid threats, infect the social body and when left untreated can affect the DNA of a society. Social structures become addicted to violence and conflicts become intractable.

Hybrid threats as social viruses live off their hosts gaining strength as host-bodies seek to develop an immunity. The virus adapts to changes in the social body. It is a dynamic activity. The idea guiding civil-military intervention should be bringing the social body to a state of wellness. The treatment plan should be holistic. It cannot be military-centric. When a physician treats a patient, they treat the whole patient; physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Responses to asymmetric, hybrid threats can be no less focused. Societies have physical, emotional (cultural), and spiritual dimensions. A pathology in any one dimension will impact all the others.

3.3 C3 – Collaboration, Cooperation, Complementarity

Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) will be the most progressive, adaptable, and useful tool available to civil authorities and the military in tackling hybrid threats and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response to crises. Employing a CMI way of thinking, civil and military stakeholders harmonize their efforts in complex operational environments to ensure the meeting of human needs and the continuation of national security objectives, as national and human security merge. A CMI way of thinking is a goal where the civilian and the military worlds act out of their expertise and complement each other. Competition is anathema to CMI. Collaboration, cooperation, and complementarity (C3) are the process *and* the goal in building resilience. JCMI recognizes the need for *joint* complementarity.

Time is the most critical resource when responding to crises and executing humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. The CMI mindset is built upon a common language or grammar. Agreeing to and using settled-upon terms and definitions facilitates C3 and *speeds joint problem-solving* and *joint decision-making*. Agreed-upon conflict resolution processes expand the amount of time available to civil and military actors. Operational delays resulting from a misunderstanding of the terms in use with no conflict resolution structure in place can lead to unnecessary confusion between individuals and agencies.

To better manage the time available in complex operations we require new ways of thinking and acting. Bureaucratic, stovepipe responses to fast-moving chaotic, complex, and complicated situations is no longer acceptable. The Joint Civil-Military Interaction (JCMI) Network provides a structure within which the CMI way of thinking is made manifest.

3.4 Joint Civil-Military Interaction Network

The JCMI Network brings civil and military actors as well as scholars together to investigate issues impacting civil-military interaction in peace operations and humanitarian actions. JCMI is based on communication, planning, and coordination between international, national, and local non-military representatives and military leaders before, during, and post-crisis to facilitate the mutual effectiveness and efficiency of all. The purpose of JCMI is to construct a new way forward in addressing hybrid threats and humanitarian crises. Its goals are to:

- Establish and strengthen partnerships between JCMI stakeholders,
- Build international cooperation,
- Inform and educate policymakers with regard to JCMI,
- Promote public policy initiatives that advance JCMI within peace operations and humanitarian response communities.

The JCMI Network offers a way forward. JCMI is a humanoid-algorithm, flexible enough to adapt as rapidly as possible in meeting new kinetic and non-kinetic threats – conventional, hybrid, and asymmetric – providing real-time advice to military and non-military actors with regard to conflict analysis and transformation.

As a network, JCMI has the capacity to provide tailored responses based on need. Off-the-shelf responses that are not context driven can have limited utility and are not part of the response set; rather, subject matter experts ‘swarm’ to address specific needs in context. Strategy and tactics are developed case-by-case.

It may appear as though we are suggesting that addressing hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare is like coping with the spread of disease, and that is, in a way, correct. When confronting the spread of disease, it is important to move fast, and to bring experts together who can collaborate and freely exchange information in building the capacity to respond. Governments must understand that all political decisions must be based on the most comprehensive scientific data at that moment, and their role is to calm citizen populations and explain to them how the situation is changing, that response measures must adapt to the changing situation, and that scientific conclusions are always made in a dynamic environment. Strategic communication with populations is sensitive and must be frank and as optimistic as possible, calling for individual participation, goal oriented in such a way that if there are victims it will not be for lack of a meaningful response, but because we do not know enough about the threat; nonetheless, we are working to improve.

In a civil-military interaction context, ‘fight’ is not exclusively used as a military term. It describes concerted action in the same way that we speak of ‘fighting climate change’, ‘fighting the coronavirus’, and ‘fighting for peace’. We are obliged to use precise terms precisely. When we are confronting a pandemic then we are not fighting traditionally, but we are working to stop the spread, minimize the number of victims and the damage to the economy, and find a safe vaccine for the future.

4 VERTICAL FLATNESS

The world is flat, and military organizations are vertical, hierarchical. This can lead to slow bureaucratic thinking and inadequate responses when quick action is required. The military can default to what it knows best, kinetic responses. We must invent responses that are appropriate to the demand.

A JCMI architecture already exists in rudimentary form. What has delayed development of a mature JCMI structure? Possibly one of the main reasons is that since 2005 the development course of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as a peace-building tool has been a stormy one. Many schooled in classic military thought have remained permanent sceptics of CIMIC (Zajc, personal observation during different CIMIC conferences since 2011).

Current CIMIC doctrine can be viewed as a-little-of-this-and-a-little-of-that; something for everyone, and consequently not much of anything. Vertical military command structures seem to ‘hide’ CIMIC, not integrate it. Possibly a reason for hiding CIMIC is political; however, it points towards now being the time to examine CIMIC concepts, considering JCMI as an organizing concept.

There are doubts. In the last five years the idea of blending INFOPS, PSYOPS, and CIMIC and placing them under one structure has been presented. Notwithstanding some brave and forward-thinking exceptions, most high-ranking decision-makers have communicated a discomfort when considering the full integration of civilian supporters into operations from the first day of planning to the conclusion of operations. A hesitancy remains in adapting to a new reality. In our experience some of those decision-makers accepted CIMIC not as a tool which contributes to successful peace operations, but as nothing more than an ornament on their shield used to keep peace in the room. A total defence of an old way of thinking. Military leaders can delude themselves into believing that because their approaches to conflict have worked in the past, they will work in the future. The saying that armies are always fighting the last war holds true.

We acknowledge our goal of changing the military way of thinking, considering JCMI will not be easy to achieve. Recognizing the challenges ahead, we start today, introducing the CMI way of thinking; step-by-step, unit-by-unit, nation-by-nation. In the end we are confident that both civil and military leaders will accept JCMI as a better way of doing more with less when faced with hybrid threats in complex

asymmetric environments. Our initial objective is to establish a permanent structure that will produce and reproduce JCMI at all levels within NATO, EU, and the UN using a common 'language' and way of thinking. Wherever possible JCMI will employ existing resources, i.e. Centres of Excellence, military education systems, academia, the internet, AI, military and non-military subject matter experts, media, and so on to advance the development of a *common mindset*. Some may ask whether we need to focus on the development of such a large JCMI network. Our response is to consider what is required to confront a pandemic or complex crisis? Who should not be part of a coordinated civil-military response?

Conclusion The golden decades after World War Two left the West unprepared to respond to oil, financial and health crises. Most of us were worshipping the advent of permanent unending development, enhanced technology, human rights, liberalization, global and free markets, and labour mobility. Of course, crises are mostly unpredictable in their size and force. In the relative ease of the post-war years we became comfortable in our Western way of life. We entered an era of big data, artificial intelligence, and robotics, algorithms of all kind controlling individuals and collecting data about their private lives. Did we realize that along with the collection of all that data we continued to live in an unpredictable and chaotic world? We find ourselves in a world of constantly recurring patterns of unpredictability. Ongoing crises is the new normal, or maybe better, the new *abnormal*? To address this pattern of unpredictability and ongoing chaos the new terms in use are 'resilience', 'comprehensive', 'civil-military', and finally 'interaction'. We do not have the luxury of retrenching as an outcome of intervention fatigue.

We propose to move beyond the limits of *end-state* and *desired end-state* to speak of *next-state*. End-state planning and execution has often left behind failed states that produced millions of refugees and left the space open to be misused and exploited by authoritarian state actors. There is need for a shift in our thinking. Civil-military actors need to view crises as on-going activities without conclusion, manifesting at any given time as cooperation, competition, or conflict.

During the Industrial Age businesses replicated the vertical military structure as a way of streamlining processes to produce more with less investment. In our post-industrial, digital age the military must now copy the new horizontal business environment. An environment that can assemble rapidly adapting teams without a permanent structure, adjusted for specialized tasks, and inclusive in bringing subject matter experts together and where new inventions are immediately incorporated (AI, Web etc.); *teams-of-teams*.

In this article we proposed an examination of the dynamics of hybrid threats, asymmetric warfare and resilience in an *open-security* environment, and the requirement for a trained and constantly learning core of military and non-military experts who speak the same language and hold the same mindset, respecting their permanent tasks in an always changing and flattened environment.

The coronavirus is painful, but it provides an important lesson for JCMI: national borders protect no-one; they divide and make the work necessary to build solidarity much harder. Tragic stories remind us that wrong political decisions always lead to victims. To avoid future pandemic catastrophes, the EU and the USA must operate together within a responsible Joint Civil-Military Interaction Network where subject matter experts lead collective responses irrespective of operational domains, civil society, or military biases. And what about the rest of the world? They are welcome in an *open-code* society.

A globally networked world requires global responses. JCMI is a global activity that prepares civil society and military actors to work side-by-side in providing collective responses to hybrid, asymmetric threats. In the end hybrid threats affect us all. Health crises, supply chain disruptions, and disrupted economies are a few examples of how a networked world requires transnational, comprehensive responses to catastrophes where the time available to respond is limited.

In a global world, interconnected and interdependent, states are more vulnerable than ever before, despite better trained and equipped militaries and other security instruments and measures. Some people doubt whether it remains a reasonable strategy to continue NATO, the UN, the EU, and other networks which were established on the ruins of World War Two and the Cold War. The question is simple: do we have something that will replace them, even if we agree they are far from being efficient enough and properly tailored to respond to a new, global reality? Behind the institutional walls of all of them are states, their interests, willingness, and selfishness, thousands of lobbyists paid by corporations, political parties, and individuals. That is reality, like it or not, and it will go on.

As always, we have two options: leave the situation as it is and hope and pray it will change by itself, comforting us in our inactive lives, or try to do our best to change our institutions, mostly the UN, the EU, and NATO, simultaneously changing national states. Even if it does not look like it, we try to encourage international organizations to begin to reform their essential parts, educating people to adjust their daily lives and work to a new reality. We are facing a challenging problem: we are building a better boat while still sailing it, and that is why our work is so complicated. But, if we can send people into space, constructing spaceships to deliver people to Mars, then we are able to control complicated, structured, and constantly changing systems in unknown environments. Money is not a question; experts are not a question; only the will to change our way of thinking, and a bit of courage, to step into a recycled land. What we propose in this article are not final answers or even a recipe for adjustment; it is an invitation for change at the national and international level. But most of all we need leaders with vision and courage to change ways of thinking and of doing at a time when leading corporations must realize that unlimited growth is their death and that the 'law' of free markets is lawless. How about a new term: responsible markets?

The first lesson from the novel coronavirus, Covid-19, is that we must unite our efforts, we must improve international mechanisms of crisis management to respond next time faster, *more* accurately, and *more* efficiently.

Geography no longer provides security. In a crisis, it does not matter from which direction the threat comes. Chaos theory is clear: the butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon will influence weather patterns throughout the earth. We must move forward collectively in addressing asymmetric threats. In the end all our work will be useless if we do not try to answer what *A New Role for Military Forces Responding to the New Digital Reality should be*. On the one hand, there is not much change in the military's role, but on the other, the substantial change in how that role is executed is significant. As Dutch General (ret.) Ton van Loon said: 'I am always trying to convince my old-fashioned generals that tanks are not coming through the internet...'

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SPREMEMBA V KARAKTERJU BOJEVANJA IN TRANSFORMACIJA PEHOTNEGA ODDELKA, VODA IN ČETE

THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INFANTRY SQUAD, PLATOON AND COMPANY

Povzetek V članku je predstavljen model transformacije pehotnega oddelka, voda in čete. Članek se začne z ugotovitvijo, da se je karakter vojne v 21. stoletju spremenil, in ugotavlja tudi, v katerih elementih. Pri tem izhaja iz predpostavke, da so trenutni pehotni oddelek, vod in četa v večini vojsk Nata utemeljeni na karakterju bojevanja iz obdobja obeh svetovnih vojn. Ker se je spremenil karakter bojevanja, bi bilo logično, da so se spremenili tudi pehotni oddelek, vod in četa v smislu doktrine, organizacije, kulture, usposabljanja, tehnologije itn. Toda, kot ugotavljam v članku na podlagi študije primera kopenske vojske ZDA, večinoma ni tako. Zato je v članku na podlagi transformacijske teorije predstavljen model razmišljanja o nujnih spremembah.

Ključne besede *Pehotni oddelek, pehotni vod, pehotna četa, karakter vojne, transformacijska teorija.*

Abstract This article offers a model for transforming the infantry squad, platoon and company. It begins by establishing the elements of the changed character of war in the 21st century, the assumption being that the basis for the current infantry squad, platoon and company, in NATO armies, lies in the character of war as it was during the two World Wars. Since the character of war has changed, it should be logical that this is also the case with infantry squad, platoon and company in terms of their doctrine, organization, culture, training, technology, and so on. However, as the article shows, using a US case study, this is not quite the case, so the article uses transformation theory to offer a model of thinking about the necessary changes.

Key words *Infantry squad, infantry platoon, infantry company, character of war, transformation theory.*

Introduction Armies are constantly changing. They must adapt to the new realities of changing missions, enemies, operating environments and societies. However, these changes are not always concurrent at all levels. For example, the French Revolution brought huge changes to warfare at the strategic and operational levels, while the changes at the tactical level were not significant. On the other hand the strategic concepts during the First and Second World Wars were not very different; however, at the tactical and operating levels the changes were substantial, even revolutionary (Gudmundson, 1995, Lind & Thiele, 2015). A commanding officer at the tactical level in 1918 would have felt right at home during the Second World War (WW2) and even in the 1991 Gulf War, perhaps even today. At the same time, this same commander, falling asleep in 1914 and waking up in 1918, would have had a hard time comprehending what was happening on the battlefield around him (Knox & Murray, 2001).

All changes are stressful. Armies do not like change. However, they must change to survive the changing character of warfare and battlefield conditions. How they change is a crucial question (Adamsky, 2010, Terriff, 2006). The results of a war usually depend on strategic and operational level decisions; however, individual engagements within operations are won and lost by tactical units. The entire weight of the tactical fight usually lies with the lowest level tactical units – squads, platoons and companies. The three levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) are therefore closely connected. The best strategic plans are of no use if the tactical level is not capable of producing the required results. Vice versa, an army can win every single tactical fight and still lose the war, if the tactical fight did not link into the operational plan and strategic goals (Leonhard, 1991, Vego, 2009).

1 RESEARCH METHODS

This article will look into the link between the changed character of war and the tactical level of armies.

It will first establish how the character of war has changed since the period of the two World Wars (1914-1945), by reviewing the available literature and comparing the elements constituting the character of war during the period of the World Wars with those of today. The end of the World Wars was chosen because it represents the last major engagement for most NATO armies and the pinnacle of the tactical level changes that began in First World War. It is therefore the basis of the modern tactical level organization, structure, doctrine and culture in NATO.

Next, the US Army case study will show what, if any, significant changes at the level of infantry squad, platoon and company have occurred since 1945, through a review of US Army infantry doctrine since 1944 and research into the changes in US Army infantry squads, platoons and companies carried out by other authors. This will also provide indicators, which can measure change at the tactical level (transformation indicators). The US Army was chosen for two reasons: firstly, because the written sources are most readily available, and secondly, and even more importantly, because

the US is a trendsetter within NATO, as has been shown by Prezelj et al. (Prezelj, Kopač, Žiberna, Kolak, & Grizold, 2016).

Finally, the article will look at how theory treats changes in armed forces. The purpose of this is to identify transformation areas through which appropriate changes at the tactical level can be achieved so that it links with the operational and strategic levels. Only when all three levels are in sync with the character of warfare can we expect armies to be successful.

Based on all of this the article will propose a transformation model for the tactical level (infantry) in NATO Armies.

Now let us look at what results were provided by the research.

2 THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF WAR (TRANSFORMATION ENVIRONMENT)

The fact remains that war is a realm of coincidence, violence and politics (Knox & Murray, 2001, p 56). War has always been and will remain a contest of will, driven by fear, honour and interest (NATO, 2018, p 10). It is organised violence with the intent of imposing one will over another. It is brutal, bloody and unfair. Some things in war change (weapon systems, tactics, technology, etc.) but the nature of war remains unchanged (McFate, 2019, Kindle p 27).

The nature of war therefore remains the same. However, the *character* of war changes over time. The character of war depends on the social, political and economic circumstances. The actors, threats and tools of conducting war are always changing, and with them the character of war.

Even Carl von Clausewitz points out that while the nature of war is a constant composed of a duel¹, trinity², and fog³, its character is a variable dependent on the political and social context. The character of war is a practical and unique expression of each individual war (Angstrom & Widen, 2015, pp 14-19).

2.1 Conventional war

War and peace in western civilization are in accordance with Clausewitz's interpreted binary, as opposites – if there is peace, there is no war and vice versa (Angstrom & Widen, 2015, p 14-19). Conventional understanding of war strictly separates the realm of politics from the realm of military expertise. War is the domain of military elites and begins where peace fails. Of course, the separation has never

¹ *Between two or more opposing sides.*

² *State leadership, army leadership, and citizens.*

³ *The point of the "fog" is that neither side in war can control the situation or fully anticipate enemy actions.*

been this clear, and there have always been interventions from one side to the other, depending on their power in society. Nevertheless, in principle war was conducted by the military with the intent of destroying enemy forces, or his will to fight, on the field of battle. This was then followed by unconditional surrender and the political solution of international affairs.

2.2 Global trends

We can name several global trends which will have major implications on the character of war. Singer lists population growth, connectedness through digital communications⁴, and urbanization (Singer, 2009, pp 242-246). Kilcullen adds littoralization to that (Kilcullen, 2013, p 206). Warfare will take place against an opponent who will most likely be non-state (criminal or military) and who will use asymmetric methods. This does not mean that conventional conflicts are excluded, but the effects of megatrends will tend towards non-regular conflicts (Kilcullen, 2013, p 206).

Ozanne has defined the operating environment of the future as uncertain and unpredictable, with a high level of asymmetric threats, with extended areas of operation, operations among the civilian population in urban environments, the profiling of stakeholders in the war, easy access to new technologies, a high impact of the psychological factor, and large constraints on states which cherish human life and are limited by financial resources, legal frameworks and environmental constraints (Ozanne, 2014, p 24).

Another very important trend on the modern battlefield is the growing firepower and the accuracy of the weapons systems. Based on Snider's model (1987), this demands increasing dispersion of ever smaller units across the battlefield, so that they represent a less profitable target (Johnson, 2000, p 9). The trend of dispersion can only go as far as the human factor allows; this requires soldiers in combat to be close to each other, to preserve the necessary courage (Hughes, 1995, p 39).

It is necessary to also add climate change, which will have a strong impact on the functioning of the tactical level in the future. All these global trends dictate the design of the tactical level, which will need to be capable of working in a complex, networked and interest-knit urban environment where armed actors will use all possible methods to impose their normative system on the population.

2.3 Future warfare

Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu stress the primacy of politics over army, the importance of rationality and the constant of change in war. However, Sun Tzu puts more

⁴ *Connectedness changes the nature of social interactions. In this way it also affects the shape and results of domestic and international conflicts.*

emphasis on cunning, surprise and intelligence, and less on violence (Angstrom & Widen, 2015, pp 20-21).

Among the first to point out the changing character of war in the 1970s was John Boyd⁵. However, serious discussions on the changing character of war appeared after the end of the Cold War⁶ (Bordas, 2014, p 9). The present article focuses on fourth generation warfare (4GW) and hybrid warfare, as they represent the culmination of all the previous theories and thinking about the changing character of war.

The main idea behind 4GW is that, due to lack of resources, non-state actors pursue victory through asymmetric means such as insurgency, information operations and/or terrorism (Hammes, 2004). However, this does not mean that non-state actors are incapable of conventional war fighting or the simultaneous use of different means (Lindsay, 2009). At the centre of 4GW lies a social, political and moral revolution based on the crisis of state legitimacy (Lind & Thiele, 2015). The objective of 4GW is the destruction of the moral ties that enable society to exist (Vandergriff, 2006, p 45). Similarly, hybrid warfare represents a new form of warfare by combining conventional and unconventional warfare. State or non-state actors can use it by mixing irregular warfare, terrorism, civil war, insurgency and conventional war (Huber, 2002, Hoffman, 2007, Kilcullen, 2013, Bjerregaard, 2012). It can also be claimed that hybrid warfare is nothing new, but a complex mix of already known forms of warfare (McCulloh, 2012, Schadlow, 2015).

The point of hybrid warfare is not that the asymmetric approaches dominate the conventional forms of warfare, but that the actors adapt and use approaches to war (even several different ones at the same time) that will bring the most benefits and minimize risk and effort.

2.4 Changing actors, threats and tools

The Peace of Westphalia, 1648, sets the stage for world affairs where sovereign states are a prime actor in international affairs. After that, war is a matter of states and state armies. Today, in the West, this seems pretty natural; however, it was not always so. Prior to the Peace of Westphalia wars were conducted by very different actors – states, privateers, criminals, corporations and ideologies. With the spread of globalization the Westphalia concept of war is crushed into the pre-Westphalia notion of war of all, against all (Kilcullen, 2013, p 105, McFate, 2019, Kindle p 184). War is no longer the domain of state armies as specialized organizations controlled by the state. Van Creveld calls this “non-trinitarian warfare”⁷ (Van Creveld, 1991).

⁵ *The author of the OODA decision cycle and US Air Force officer*

⁶ *Military Operations Other Than War, Complex Warfighting, Nation Building, Insurgency, Asymmetric Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare (4GW), and finally Hybrid Warfare.*

⁷ *Referring to Clausewitz and his trinity of state-army-people, where roles are complementary but strictly separated.*

Today wars are conducted by religious movements, whose goals transcend state borders. Apart from these, we must also look at terrorist organizations as a new actor in the arena of war⁸ (McFate, 2019, Kilcullen, 2013, pp 179-227). Material and political goals are also closely related in war (van Creveld, 1991); people fight for many reasons, including to get rich. At the same time the so-called “narco-wars” are not strictly money-related.⁹ Even according to Milton Friedman, we must ask ourselves whether a political interest is really somehow nobler than an economic one (McFate, 2019). Criminal organizations are definitely one of the actors in wars and will continue to be so. Corporations also have their interests, and nothing prevents them from intervening with their own forces where situations permit it. In fact many of them already operate a sizable military-style force in places like Africa. They certainly have the resources to do so. It is only a step from here to active military intervention in local, regional and even global politics.¹⁰ Not only corporations, but even rich individuals (the top 1%) and Non-Governmental Organizations are becoming actors in armed conflicts. With the reappearance of private military companies, anyone can hire military expertise for their own purposes (McFate, 2019). Private military companies on their own are also an important factor in wars (Papler, 2014). Finally, we must not forget nation states. Even though they lack the motivation to get involved in classical conventional wars, one cannot dismiss the possibility, because actions in war are unpredictable (Friedman, 2020). Experts agree nation-states have lost the monopoly on the use of force in the pursuit of their goals. Non-state actors, such as religious movements, criminal groups, corporations and others with the motive and resources can use force to destabilize nation-states (Žabkar, 2004, pp 352-357, Sokolosky, 2016).

In conventional war the almost exclusive threat to a state army was another state army (Marshall, reprint 2019). However, today the threats are more numerous and closely linked to actors in wars. The paradigm of a duel between a bear and a tiger has been replaced by a paradigm of a sack full of scorpions, snakes and termites (Žabkar, 2004, p 333).

Slovenian and international literature is fairly clear on what threats lie ahead: climate change, economic risks, failed states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, illegal migrations, cyber threats, natural disasters, limited natural resources, environmental degradation, health epidemics, poverty, and so on (DZRS, 2010, Vlada RS, 2018, MORS, 2020, NATO, 2018, Lind & Thiele, 2015, McFate, 2019). However, most of this literature does not prioritise these threats. They have been, however, prioritized by military transformation experts and the results are interesting. They list cyber threats, economic crisis and terrorism as the ones with the most effect on transformation (Prezelj et al., 2015, p 29). It is however hard to

⁸ *They are not necessarily linked to a religious movement, but they are linked to a specific ideology (religious or other).*

⁹ *The narco-wars in Latin America have far-reaching social and political consequences.*

¹⁰ *This is also not entirely a new phenomenon. The British East India Company operating in India was basically a corporation with its own army.*

imagine that military organizations will be the primary means of dealing with these threats.

State armies are no longer the only tool in war (Massicot, 2019). Wars are conducted in the non-physical environment by using all the instruments of national power (NSO, 2018, Thomas, 2019). The most effective weapons are no longer bullets, but non-kinetic tools such as information, refugees, ideology and time (McFate, 2019). Even in the kinetic realm we have tools other than state armies, such as private military companies.


It is clear that all these numerous actors, threats and tools are making the character of war immensely more complex. This requires a significant level of flexibility, adaptability and cooperation from all the elements of the national security system. It is impossible for any single element to adequately respond to all the threats and actors.

2.5 New levels of war

Figure 1:
Interconnected
levels of war.
Source: Lind &
Thile, 2014.

LEVELS OF WAR	MORAL	MENTAL	PHYSICAL
STRATEGIC	X	X	X
OPERATIONAL	X	X	X
TACTICAL	X	X	X

Figure 2:
Influences of
other levels of
war.
Source: Made by
the author.



Conventional military theory lists three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. With this in mind, it must be pointed out that military strategy is inevitably closely linked to national policy and its goals (Metz & Kievit, 1995, p 37). The three levels of war are closely linked; however, it is a lot harder to overcome strategic failures than tactical and operational ones (McFate, 2019, Kindle p 232). Due to the interconnectedness of the DIME¹¹ factors, wars are not just conducted on the strategic, operational and tactical levels, but are at the same time conducted on the moral, mental and physical levels.¹² It is at the physical level that the killing and destruction occurs; it is, however, considered the weakest level of war. Physical destruction that appears as moral failure is considered useless. The moral level is the strongest, as it determines what is acceptable in war. The mental level is represented by theories of war, concepts and doctrine (Lind & Thiele, 2015, NSO, 2018).

The important thing to realize is that the moral, mental and physical levels can be found on all three conventional levels of war. Lind and Thiele have therefore developed a simple two-dimensional table that accurately portrays the linkage of all the levels of war (see above, Lind & Thiele, 2015). For the purposes of this article, it is important to remember that all the other levels also manifest themselves at the tactical level.

3 INFANTRY SQUAD, PLATOON AND COMPANY CASE STUDY

Until the First World War, the squad was a mere administrative unit. However, the conditions of the war radically changed this. The squad had, in a way, become a combined arms unit, capable of combining different weapon systems with the effect of decisive action on the enemy. Squads, however, did not operate in a vacuum, but as an integral part of higher echelon units (platoon and company), which provided a framework for the squads to manoeuvre by providing heavy machine gun, mortar and infantry artillery support. This process reached its pinnacle in WW2 (English & Gudmundsson, 1994, Kindle p 280-303)

We will now look at the development of the US Army infantry squad, platoon and company since WW2, in order to identify what has changed since.

3.1 US Army Company, Platoon and Squad case study since WW2

In the US Army, the infantry is a principal fighting force. Its purpose is to close with the enemy and defeat them by using either the threat of force or the actual destruction of the enemy force (Hughes, 1995, p 2).

Table 1 shows how the mission of the infantry company, platoon and squad has changed, or rather has not changed at all, since WW2. At the same time US

¹¹ *Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic*

¹² *The moral, mental and physical levels of war have already been discussed by J.F.C. Fuller (Fuller, 1926, p 92-174).*

Table 1:
The mission and
doctrine (Source:
Author)

	MISSION		DOCTRINE & ENVIRONMENT
	COY	PLT/SQ	
cca. 1949 (DoA, 1949)	No general mission assigneg. Mission based on type of operation. Attact = to close with the enemy and destroy or capture him. Defense = to repel the enemy assault by fire or close combat.		COY, PLT & SQ are ment to preform offensive and defensive operations in high intensity conventional battlefield.
cca. 1959 (DoA, 1959)	To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to capture or destroy him.	To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to capture or destroy him.	Combat under nuclear conditions (Pentomic division structure). The need for substantial firepower at the decisive point, in order to prevent the enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons.
cca. 1962 (DoA, 1962, 965)	To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.	To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.	COY, PLT & SQ are ment to preform offensive, defensive and delying operations.
cca. 1982 (DoA, 1980, 1982)	No general mission assigneg. Mission based on type of operation. Offensive purpose = to destroy the enemy and his will to fight...They use fire and maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy. Defensive purpose = to deny an area to the enemy, protect flanks, or disorganize and destroy the enemy		Two types of enemies and coresponding mission types. - a guerila force of South-East Asia and a motorised infantry of Central Europe. - the mission types are offensive, defensive and patrolling.
cca. 1992 (DoA, 1990, 1992)	To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.		Air-Land Battle doctrine recognises offensive, defensive and delaying operations. Seperate annexes are dedicated to low intensity conflict and urban operations.


<p>cca. 2006 (DoA, 2006, 2007)</p>	<p>To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.</p>		<p>The doctrine of Full Spectrum Ops. Offensive and defensive operations + (in annex) stabilisation ops, civil support ops, counterinsurgency ops and urban ops. The importance of joint operations, media perspective, non-lethal aspect.</p>
<p>cca. 2018 (DoA, 2016, 2017, 2018)</p>	<p>To close with the enemy using fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas, including populations and resources.</p>	<p>To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy, capture, or repel an assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.</p>	<p>Doctrine of Unified Land operations. It assumes the continuous and simultan use of offensive, defensive, stabilisation and support operations.</p>

Army doctrine has undergone significant changes. The scope of the missions and environments the infantry company, platoon and squad are supposed to operate in have changed and increased in scope. It is, however, also obvious from the doctrine that offensive and defensive operations were at all times, and still are, considered the main and primary missions for the infantry company, platoon and squad. This also explains why organizationally the changes in the company, platoon and squad were so insignificant throughout the entire period. Looking at the pictures (Figure 3, Figure 4 & Figure 5) it can be seen that the size of the squad in terms of manpower has decreased, but the organizational structure has remained unchanged. The same goes for the platoon and company. It must be said, however, that the company headquarter element has decreased considerably since WW2, mainly due to the fact that company cooks were moved to the battalion logistic element. The remainder of the decrease can be attributed to the use of new and more capable technology, especially communications technology. Of course, there have also been major changes in the weapon systems used in the company throughout the period. Interestingly the rifleman has always been at the centre of US Army doctrine, and the entire US Army was and is organized around the question of how to best support the rifleman in the execution of his tasks¹³ (Foster, 2000). This and the inability of the US industry to produce an adequate light machine gun has resulted in the fact that the US Army was the last in NATO to introduce the light machine gun into the squad.¹⁴

¹³ *At the centre of the US Army's philosophy is the conviction of the well-trained rifleman's superiority on the battlefield. This dates back to the War of Independence, and at a certain point even inhibited the introduction of machine guns in the infantry (English & Gudmundsson, 1994).*

¹⁴ *The M60 was introduced in 1957 (Miskimon, 2014) and the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) was used all through WW2 and the Korean War, when everyone else already had a light machine gun. But even then, the M60 was not introduced into the squad because of its weight. The squads received their light machine guns well after the end of the Vietnam War in the 1980s.*

The US Army entered WW1 with the platoon as the basic manoeuvre unit, composed of specialized squads purely as administrative units (Rainey, 1999, pp 8-9, Hughes, 1995, p 5). This was, in part, due to the fact that they were unable to field an appropriate light machinegun, and were using BARs¹⁵ (Melody, 1990, p 4). Squads as tactical units composed of 12 men in three groups appeared in the US Army on the eve of WW2. However, during the war they very seldom operated as doctrinally prescribed, due to the high casualty rate and general squad leader inexperience (Rainey, 1999, p 10, Hughes, 1995, p 6).




In 1946, they organized a conference with the aim of investigating all aspects of infantry operations in WW2. They defined the squad as the “smallest combat element consisting only of as many soldiers (e.g. 8) as one leader could control” (Hughes, 1995, p 6). The debate was centred on the four main topics; command and control (how many men can be controlled by one leader in combat); combat losses (20% average); firepower; and tactics (based on WW2 experience, a squad was unable to fire and move at the same time) (Hughes, 1995, p 6, Melody, 1990, pp 4-9).

The Korean War validated most of the 1946 conclusions. However, during the war, squads were forced to conduct independent manoeuvres (fire and move at the same time). This was supported by Marshall’s research (Marshall, reprint 2019) and the drill concept developed by Major-General J.C. Fry. Based on this, prior to Vietnam

¹⁵ BAR = *Browning Automatic Rifle*

the U.S. Army organized its squads into two teams of 11 men total – with 3 NCOs¹⁶ and two BARs.

Figure 6:
U. S. Army
squad
development,
made by author



These changes were followed by a series of independent exercises and studies. The first was ASIRS¹⁷ in 1956, followed by OCRSP¹⁸ in 1961 and finally IRUS¹⁹ between 1966 and 1972. One of the main friction points examined through these studies was the question of whether or not the squad was able to manoeuvre on its own. The final consensus was that the optimum is represented by a squad of 11 men in two fire teams (capability to manoeuvre), equipped with automatic rifles and grenade launchers²⁰ (Hughes, 1995, Melody, 1990, Rainey, 1999). The organizational development of the US Army squad after WW2 is shown in Figure 6: US Army squad development.

The current squad organization and structure was decided on based on the Army of Excellence Program at the end of the Cold War, and is more a consequence of manning ceilings set by politics. Within the programme, the Army was expanding from 14 to 16 divisions and needed manpower savings wherever it could get them. The squad paid the price. Despite that, the current nine-man squad retained the

¹⁶ Non-Commissioned Officers

¹⁷ A Study of the Infantry Rifle Squad TOE

¹⁸ Optimum Composition of the Rifle Squad and Platoon

¹⁹ The Infantry Rifle Unit Study

²⁰ At that time the US Army was still unable to field an appropriate light machine gun. The M60 was too heavy for the squad and was retained at platoon level.

structure of two balanced fire teams, with each team led by an NCO and controlled/coordinated by a squad leader (Melody, 1990, p 45).

This squad served the US Army in the Gulf War and still serves it today in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Since the Gulf War, new technology has been introduced and the uniform has changed a couple of times, but nothing substantial has altered, despite major changes in the Army's doctrine and operating environment. After IRUS (1969), no new comprehensive studies of the low level tactical units in the US Army can be found. The Army Green Book (AUSA, 2019) lists six modernization priorities, but there is only one linked to the infantry; it states "improving soldier lethality by providing better weapons, armor, communication, exoskeleton and improved training". This implies that the US Army fosters no plans to change the squad's organization, structure or doctrine.

3.3 Transformation indicators at the infantry squad, platoon and company level

The US Army studies of infantry units highlighted some key indicators and their values which need to be considered when discussing the doctrine and organization of infantry squads, platoons and companies.

1. Command and control (C2): defined by the leader's capability to communicate and impose his will on their subordinates so that they respond in a tactically appropriate and coordinated way. A single leader can optimally control up to five subordinate elements; in special circumstances even more, but no more than eight (Hughes, 1995, p 36, Rainey, 1999, p 41).
2. Resiliency, defined as the capability of continuing the mission despite losses (Hughes, 1995, p 37, Rainey, 1999, p 41). The assumption is that a unit must be capable of performing with up to 25% loss²¹.
3. Protection, defined as the capability of using tactics, techniques and procedures designed to prevent the enemy detecting and destroying the unit (Hughes, 1995, p 37). The key here is that the unit is capable of battlefield dispersion without losing its cohesiveness.
4. Firepower, defined as the capability of suppressing and/or destroying the enemy measured in volume, accuracy, range and responsiveness (Hughes, 1995, p 35). In close combat, the number of assault rifles is more important than support weapons (machine guns, grenade launchers, and flamethrowers). The upper limit of support weapons is set at 30% of the total number in a unit.
5. Flexibility, defined as the capability of adapting to different tactical situations (Rainey, 1999, p 41). The point here is that a unit should be internally subdivided in a way that gives its leader/commander more than just one or two tactical solutions.

²¹ 25% is the upper limit. This includes not just KIA and WIA, but also non-combat losses due to disease etc.

4 CHANGING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 Revolution in military affairs and military revolution

A theoretical examination of the changes in military organizations first appeared in the West as a theory of revolution in military affairs (RMA). It developed out of earlier Soviet debate on the military-technical revolution (Metz & Kievit, 1995, p V). It became apparent very early on that there are very different levels of change that appear in military organizations, so theory distinguished between RMA and military revolutions (MR) (Knox & Murray, 2001, Metz & Kievit, 1995, Collins & Futter, 2015, Biddle, 1998).

Military revolution (MR) changes war at its core, changing society and state as well as military organizations. Its course, consequences and implications are largely unpredictable. They represent a change in the purpose²² of war and are a consequence of deeper and wider processes (ideological, political, social, economic and demographic) than the mere appearance of a new technology or a group of technologies. Individuals and groups cannot control military revolutions, they can only try to survive them (Knox & Murray, 2001, pp 7-74). On the other hand, RMA represents a new conceptual approach to warfare developed by the military organization in order to destroy its enemies. RMA combines tactical, organizational, doctrinal and technological innovation. To be successful it needs 1) time to develop, 2) an appropriate perspective, 3) critical thinking and debate, 4) appropriate leadership (Knox & Murray, 2001, p 12-14).

However, the RMA theory treated changes in military organizations sequentially (Žabkar, 2003, p 214). At the end of the millennium, it became apparent that the RMA paradigm no longer sufficed, so a new paradigm developed – transformation theory.

4.2 Transformation theory

Transformation theory defines changes in military organizations very similarly to RMA. However, authors stress that, relative to RMA, the change in transformation theory is gradual and continuous, rather than sequential and final²³ (Kugler, 2006, Sloan, 2008, Davis, 2010). Even then, transformation in a military organization is an unusual and, from the point of view of its members, unwanted occurrence (Dombrowski & Ross, 2008, pp 13-16). Transformation is not always successful and can even be counterproductive if the introduced concepts are embraced too emotionally and uncritically. This is likely to happen especially where the military establishment is prone to uncritical and unappropriated favouring of attractive

²² Some authors claim MR represents a change in the very nature of war. We have, however, established that the nature of war does not change but remains the same.

²³ The term “revolution” implies a quick, radical and uncontrolled change, to which military organizations are not inclined. The term “transformation” is based on the idea of continuous change with an undefined end-point. Transformation is also differentiated from modernization; while modernization means that things are done better; transformation means that we do better things (Sloan, 2008, pp 7-8).

concepts and, as a consequence, the military organisation is “too transformed” (Davis, 2010, pp 11, 19; Prezelj et al., 2016, p 25)

Transformation is seen as a complex process of transforming inputs into outputs, in order to improve military performance and capabilities (Prezelj et al., 2015, p 24). NATO Allied Command Transformation defines transformation as “a continuous and proactive process of developing and integrating innovative concepts, doctrine and capabilities in order to improve effectiveness and interoperability within the alliance” (Ibid., p 40). This means that NATO is not pursuing revolutionary change, but through a transformation process is focusing on increasing interoperability, which of course improves NATO effectiveness.

Closely linked to the idea of RMA and/or transformation in military organizations is innovation. Rosen for example, speaks of “major innovation” instead of RMA, which involves a change in the concept of operation, that is, the ideas governing the ways of using forces to win a campaign. On the other hand, “tactical innovation” is a change in the way individual weapons are applied to the target and environment in battle (Rosen, 1992, pp 7-8). Changes in military doctrine that leave the essential workings of the organization unaltered do not count as innovation/transformation.

In order for military organizations to innovate successfully, innovation must be part of the organizational culture, and not a matter of individual motivation (Mitrova, 2019, p 12). There are other preconditions for military organizations to innovate, such as an effective group of innovation advocates in the organization, the possibility of pursuing different approaches, the ability to learn from mistakes, support from outside (civil) institutions and/or leaders, and outside intervention (Hone & Mandeles, 1987, Posen, 1990). Even then, there is no guarantee that innovation in military organizations will be successful. Military organizations are bureaucratic organizations and as such they are designed not to change (Rosen, 1992, p 2).

To conclude, transformation is seen as a profound change in the way a military organization conducts its business. It incorporates changes in doctrine, new technology and new organizational solutions.

4.3 Transformation areas at the tactical level

Based on the literature review, we can now determine relevant transformation areas, i.e. areas where transformation occurs in order to improve the workings of military organizations, or for the military organizations to obtain the upper hand in relation to their adversaries.

These areas are doctrine, culture, technology, organization, training and education. They are all closely linked. Change in one area influences all the others, although as we have seen in the US case study, this does not always result in visible change. Organizational culture in particular is often the main reason why military organizations continue to use obsolete concepts inappropriate for the realities of

current or future war, and why they resist change (Terriff, 2006, p 478). It is also one of the main factors in determining how military organizations will approach change²⁴ (Adamsky, 2010, p 323). On the other hand, culture in military organizations is also closely linked to how they operate on the moral and mental levels of war. The US Army, for example, recognizes the moral complexity of the current and future operating environment and demands a strong moral character and ethos at all levels (TRADOC, 2010, pp 11-15). On the other hand, the Russian Army has far lower moral standards for its leaders, as long as they perform in combat (Grau & Bratles, 2016).


Particularly within NATO and its allies, technology seems to be the main answer to all the challenges of current and future warfare (Bellamy, 2016, Angstrom & Widen, 2015, Voelz, 2014, Knox & Murray, 2001). Technology seems to be the main cause of doctrine change, as geography once was (Posen, 1990). On the other hand, technology is mainly driven by two factors: the first is military intelligence, which identifies new technologies potential adversaries have; the second is the military-industrial complex (Rosen, 1992, Metz & Kievit, 1995). This however, leads military organizations to ask the completely wrong question: “What will new technology enable us to do?” instead of “What do we expect the army to be able to do?” (Metz & Kievit, 1995, p 26). In any case most authors agree that technology has in no way simplified warfare. Rather, the opposite is true – technology has made warfare exponentially more complex, and there is no reason to think this will change with the emergence of new technologies (Knox & Murray, 2001, pp 176, 178).

5 RESULTS – A PROPOSED TRANSFORMATIONAL MODEL AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL


Based on the above findings, a model of thinking about the necessary changes at the tactical level of war has been developed – Figure 7. The idea is that through the study of changes in the conflict environment, key elements defining the character of war – now and more importantly in the future – can be identified. These elements in turn influence military organizations and how they think about the tactical level of war – its purpose, organization, training, and so on. The transformation areas important for the tactical level are not considerably different from other levels of military organizations; however, the emphasis is different in different areas. In order to measure the direction and quantity of necessary and appropriate change in different transformation areas one should use the transformation indicators which were distilled (in our case) from the US case study.

²⁴ Adamsky differentiated organizational cultures in militaries based on how society is structured (collectivistic vs. individualistic), way of communicating (big context vs. small context), and attitude to time (“polyconic” vs. “monochromic”).

Figure 7:
General
model of
transformation
at tactical level
(Source: Author)



The study of the literature is only the first step, and the model in Figure 8 is proposed based on it. The changed character of war is manifested through increased urbanization, population growth, climate change, hybrid warfare, increased connectedness, proliferation of actors in war, increasing lethality of weapons systems, additional and more interconnected levels of war, the appearance of artificial intelligence, robots on the battlefield, and other new technology. All this influences the technology used at the tactical level, its doctrine, organization, culture and training. How it influences different areas should be determined with the help of the transformation indicators. For example, what kind of change is required in doctrine, organization, culture, training and technology due to urbanization, and how does that manifest itself in terms of the number of C2 elements or other indicators at the tactical level?



Discussion and conclusion


Based on our research, we assume that most NATO military organizations follow trends set by the US Army, which focuses mainly on technological solutions to tactical level problems rather than the doctrinal, organizational or other levels, as the case study pointed out. On the other hand, the literature suggests that all the changes in the character of war require major changes in doctrine, organization, culture and training at the tactical level. This should manifest itself through a more decentralized C2 structure, which could be achieved through the use of swarming/ rules based tactics (as proposed by Lynch & Fish (2018)) and more independent action by subordinates. The use of technology should focus more on resilience (armour, battlefield medicine, performance enhancing drugs, etc) and less on firepower, since at the tactical level, the latter is already at a very high level. Protection should be increased through more battlefield dispersion, which is of course closely linked to C2 decentralization. Above all, tactical flexibility should be increased, by providing tactical leaders and commanders with METT-TC based organizations, and not predetermined organizational solutions.

The transformation model for tactical level infantry units and its assumptions should now be checked by further empirical research. Focused interviews with NATO tactical level (infantry) experts should validate and supplement the assumptions and

elements of the model. Based on the validated transformation model one could then, in more detail and in quantifiable terms, determine the links and their directions between the elements of the transformed character of war and the transformation areas. This is how doctrine, organization, culture, training and technology should reshape the infantry squad, platoon and company for the future character of war.

Change is a team effort.

Figure 9:
Legend and
symbols (Source:
Author)



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ILEGALNE MIGRACIJE IN VLOGA SLOVENSKIH OBOROŽENIH SIL

ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

Povzetek Slovenska vojska pomaga Policiji pri varovanju zunanje schengenske meje od evropske migrantske krize leta 2015. Čeprav krize ni več, število ilegalnih migracij leta 2020 ne pojenja. Slovenska vojska še intenzivneje podpira Policijo pri preprečevanju ilegalnih prehodov meje tudi na notranji evropski meji z Italijo. Vojska pomaga pri preprečevanju ilegalnih migracij tudi v drugih državah članicah EU. V prispevku poskušamo ugotoviti, katero vlogo imajo oborožene sile pri preprečevanju ilegalnih migracij, ali je njihova uporaba na mejah pri preprečevanju ilegalnih migracij pravi odgovor na nacionalni in evropski ravni ter kako to vpliva na opravljanje njenih temeljnih nalog.

Ključne besede *EU, ilegalne migracije, oborožene sile, Slovenska vojska, Policija.*

Abstract The Slovenian Armed Forces have been assisting the police in protecting the Schengen external border since the European migrant crisis of 2015. Despite the fact that the crisis is over, the number of illegal migrations in 2020 is not decreasing, and the Slovenian Armed Forces is supporting the police even more intensively at the internal European border with Italy. The military also helps to prevent illegal migration flow in other EU Member States. In this paper, we try to analyze the role of the armed forces in the prevention of illegal migration, and determine whether their use at the borders in the prevention of illegal migration is the right answer both at the national and the European levels, and what effects it has on the SAF's ability to do its primary job.

Key words *EU, illegal migration, military, Slovenian Armed Forces, Police.*

Introduction

During the European migrant crisis in 2015, Slovenia included the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) in the crisis operation of the country, due to the large number of migrants. The military is often an integral part of crisis management and has in the past often engaged in military support to civilian authorities, e.g. during the floods in 2010, 2012 and 2014. The year 2014 was particularly marked by an ice storm, which paralyzed much of the country and caused great material and financial damage; in this case, too, the military provided assistance to the civilian authorities. Since the assistance of the military is regulated by legal basis, let us see what the basis for the work of the SAF are.

The first point of Article 37 of the Defence Act sets out the tasks of the military as being to carry out military education and training in armed combat and other forms of defence; to ensure its readiness; to provide defence in the event of an attack on the state; to participate in protection and rescue activities in the event of natural and other disasters, in line with their organization and equipment; and to carry out obligations assumed by the state in international organizations and through international treaties.

The third point states that the Government will decide on the participation of the SAF in protection and rescue activities. During a state of emergency, such a decision is made by the Minister of Defence at the proposal of the Civil Protection Commander of the Republic of Slovenia, or the Chief of General Staff on the authorization of the Minister. According to the fourth point, the SAF may, together with the police, participate in the wider protection of the national border within the national territory, in accordance with the plans and upon the prior decision of the Government. However, SAF members do not have police powers in the performance of these tasks.

In February 2016 Article 37 of the Defence Act was amended by what is known as extraordinary powers of the armed forces, with the emphasis on making the police more effective during the migrant crisis, although in practice, those powers were never used during that three month period (Garb, 2016, p 10).

The first point of Article 37 states that should the security situation so demand, the National Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority vote of the deputies present and at the proposal of the Government, adopt a decision that the members of the SAF will, in cooperation with the police and on an exceptional basis, and in accordance with the plans and upon the prior decision of the Government as referred to in paragraph four of the preceding Article, also exercise the following powers in the wider protection of the national border: to warn, to direct, to temporarily restrict the movement of people, and to participate in crowd management.

The second point states that the powers referred to in the preceding paragraph will be exercised under the conditions prescribed for police officers. The third stipulates that the police will immediately be informed of any powers that have been exercised under paragraph one of the Article. According to the fourth point, the legal act referred to in paragraph one of the Article, the National Assembly will define the

time frame within which the members of the SAF will exercise the powers referred to in paragraph one of the Article, which must be limited to the time required for their execution, and should not exceed three months. This period may be extended under the same conditions.

In May 2016, the SAF prepared an analysis of its operations in support of the police in relation to the migrant issues during the period October 2015–May 2016. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2016 states that the SAF supported the Civil Protection Service in dealing with migrants in the first quarter of 2016. From this we can assume that when the SAF stopped supporting the Civil Protection, the migrant crisis as a humanitarian operation ended.

In 2020, SAF members are still patrolling the Schengen border and the border with Italy in support of the police. In this regard, we want to find the answers to two questions.

The first question asks why members of the armed forces, in this case the SAF, are patrolling a border between two EU member states in 2020, if freedom of movement applies between Member States, except at external Schengen borders. During the European migrant crisis of 2015, the SAF supported the police in monitoring migrants through Slovenian territory to other targeted countries, setting up technical barriers and co-operating in the protection of the southern Schengen border, where it patrolled the border together with the police. Why, then, five years later when the migrant crisis is over, are members of the SAF still patrolling the external European border and the internal border with Italy?

The second question, which should perhaps be the first, is whether the use of the military at a time of massive illegal migration to the Schengen area is an appropriate way to address this problem.

In searching for answers to these questions, we used a comparative analysis of primary and secondary written sources, and a comparative analysis between different EU Member States which have been dealing with illegal migration for some time, with an emphasis on secondary written sources. In the case of Slovenia and the SAF, we have selected a study of three examples of SAF cooperation in connection to illegal migration. We are aware that there are relatively few scientific and professional works on this topical issue in Slovenia. This is understandable, as it is a problem that is relatively new, developing quickly, and influenced by many different factors. Regardless, we believe that it is essential to share some very specific experiences with other countries and armies for a very simple reason. Illegal migration takes place in all EU Member States, as well as in third countries. It is therefore up to the EU as a community of 27 countries to deal with the growing number of illegal migrations within its proper context of law enforcement in the future. They could well use their armed forces to deal with this problem, or find a different political solution at the EU level. In the methodological design of this paper, we have mostly

used the deductive approach. Its basic purpose is to find answers to the questions asked, as well as to stimulate discussion on this and similar topics in scientific and professional environments and with the public.

1 ILLEGAL MIGRATION

The main reason why SAF members are patrolling the southern EU border and the border with Italy in cooperation with the police is the illegal migration problem. It could be argued that the European migration crisis in the EU is over, but the fact is that the numbers of illegal migrants are rising, and there is constant change in the migrants' original countries.

Within the theories of EU integration, Cierco and Tavares de Silva wrote that we are dealing with the neo-functionalism that sees integration as transcending political, social, or economic borders, decreasing the significance of internal Union borders. Within the ideal of an EU without frontiers, freedom of movement is an essential feature of the integration process, promoting a sense of community and a European identity. However, we also have the inter-governmental perspective, in which the notion of security is placed over liberty of movement. As Cierco and Tavares de Silva stress, states have the right to control their own borders, and the movement of foreigners between them is an essential expression of national sovereignty. Therefore, the perception of how they enable or prevent migration differs between the EU member states due to the varying political cultures and migration traditions, leading in some cases, to the construction of walls between them (Cierco and Tavares de Silva, 2016, p 2).

According to Lutterbeck, there has been growing concern in Europe over irregular migration across the Mediterranean since the beginning of the 1990s. Illegal immigration has increasingly come to be viewed as a security risk in many, if not all European countries. In particular by virtue of its association with human smuggling and trafficking, as well as other forms of cross-border organized crime, it is seen not only as a threat to national welfare systems and cultural or national identities, but also to domestic peace and stability (Lutterbeck, 2006, p 59).

Cierco and Tavares de Silva state that the end of Cold War created a structure dominated by insecurity, and the chief goal of independent states is to preserve their national sovereignty regardless of any moral criteria. They claim that states are unlikely to co-operate, and that each one seeks to create viable and defensive borders to ensure its "internal security". Conversely, the EU has an idealist perception of borders as a supranational organization, which entails respect for the freedom and equality of people, and requires a regime of borders open to everyone due to the basic human right of free movement. Therefore, a Europe without frontiers, which means de-bordering within Europe, has lain at the heart of the European project since its beginning (Cierco and Tavares de Silva, 2016, p 4).

The “idealist perception of the EU border as a supranational organization” was put to great test in the case of the European migrant crisis in 2015. Crowds of migrants crossed the borders of different countries without abiding by the prescribed procedures at national borders, as well as at the Schengen border. For example, in the autumn of 2015, 334,838 illegal migrants crossed the Slovenian border. Of these, 166,136 were from Syria, 109,211 from Afghanistan and 59,491 from Iraq. They also included people from many other countries whose total numbers were not so significant (Slovenian Police Report for 2015, p 68). Many migrants entered Slovenia as their first EU country without identity documents, which is not possible for EU citizens.

The very first response in Slovenia was a humanitarian one, but later, when the masses of migrants became bigger and more difficult to handle, the second response was about security. At that time Svetlič wrote that, in a humanitarian crisis, the protection of migrants and refugees is the most important responsibility of the state, but when the state itself is in danger because the numbers of the migrant flow are too great, then the state needs to primarily protect its own citizens and enforce its laws (Svetlič, 2017, p 126).

The question of security issues related to the migrant flow appeared in the Slovenian media quite late, only in December 2015. Before that, migration was most often framed from an informational, political, human rights, and social viewpoint; however, by the end of the year the security issues of the crisis had come to prevail (Brožič, 2017).

Five years later, the structure of the illegal migrants by their origin differs in comparison with that of 2015. In 2019, the majority of illegal migrants entering Slovenia came from the following countries: 3,012 from Pakistan, 1,263 from Afghanistan, 952 from Morocco, 633 from Iraq, and 540 from Iran and 540 from Syria (Policija, 2019, online). The facts from the police reports are about those illegal migrants who were stopped at the borders or were already in the country, but not of those who were merely transiting the country to other destinations.

Božić et al. wrote about the experience of human smuggling as a form of crime in Croatia between 2009 and 2015. They noted that human smuggling is generally not perceived in society as a serious form of crime, but more often as helping others in need. In practice, criminal groups promise illegal migrants a smooth crossing of a state border for a reasonable amount of money. After receiving the money, they either provide the promised transport across the border or every trace of them disappears. In some cases, migrants are indeed transported across the border, but sometimes it happens that they are simply dropped off just before the border. Božić et al. noted that the reasons for migrants leaving the country are different (e.g. economic, political, etc.). War criminals are fleeing from justice, and members of criminal groups or associates are fleeing from other members of the group; some people flee in response to natural and other disasters, whilst others are forced to leave due to war or other

forms of armed conflict. All of the above are potential victims of criminal groups which engage in human smuggling or trafficking. Croatian statistics show that only 30% of those who intended to reach the “Promised Land” actually arrived there. All the others remained on one of the many stages of their illegal journey. Between 2009 and 2015, Croatia returned 20,000 illegal migrants (Božić et al., 2015, p 284). The price paid to smugglers by an individual illegal migrant in this period ranged between 500 and 5,000 euros, depending on the means of transport, the number of border crossings on the desired route, and the size of the risk for the organizers (Ibid., p 291). This is a very high amount compared to the standard in the countries from which illegal migrants come.

Thus, five years after the humanitarian migrant crisis, illegal migration is primarily the subject of research as one or more forms of crime that are prosecuted *ex officio*. Armies in several EU Member States, including the SAF, continue to work together with the police in 2020 to protect Europe’s internal and external borders.

2 POLICIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MILITARIZATION OF THE POLICE

Sotlar and Tominc claim that traditional (primarily military) threats have declined, while at the same time, societal sources of threats have increased. Since the possibility of global war has become unlikely, local ethnic conflicts have escalated to local wars, and secondary consequences such as refugees, trafficking in illegal immigrants, extremism, terrorism, and other challenges to security have emerged. It has been observed that global climate change has increased the number and severity of natural disasters, and has brought a myriad of consequences affecting human health. As central components in the power structure of any state, the police and armed forces are heavily involved in the new realities of security, generating both latent and the obvious blurring boundaries (Sotlar and Tominc, 2016, p 329).

Cierco and Tavares de Silva stated that the rise of western nation-states at the beginning of the 19th century led to a strict functional differentiation between the agencies responsible for their external and national security – the military and the police respectively. While the mission of mass armed forces was limited to preparing and conducting wars for defending their borders, police forces were charged with law and order within the borders of these nation states. Cierco and Tavares de Silva concluded that at the end of 20th century that clear division of labour began to blur (2016, p 16).

Enloe wrote that the police and the armed forces have at least one common feature – they are institutions which consolidate and maintain the state’s authority (Enloe, 1990 in Sotlar and Tominc, 2016, p 330).

One of the main reasons for the phenomenon of the policization of the armed forces and the militarization of the police is the fact that there has been a major change in

the structure, number and organization of European armies. They have changed from the mass conscript-filled armies of the post-Cold War period to a drastic reduction in their end-strength, abandoning conscription and establishing a professionally manned army. Therefore, for the present, Resteigne and Manigart state that modern armed forces have extremely diverse missions. Western post-modern armed forces have ceased to be organizations specializing in the management of collective, organized violence (war), as they have taken up constabulary forces specializing in crisis management, both within and outside national borders (Resteigne and Manigart, 2019, p 16), although they are much smaller in size.

So, many authors (Cierco and Tavares de Silva, 2019; Resteigne and Manigart, 2019; Sotlar and Tominc, 2016, Easton et al., 2010; Garb, 2018, etc.) have recently debated the policization of the armed forces and the militarization of the police, as can be seen in the following case studies.

In 2006, Lutterbeck stressed that since the beginning of the 1990s there had been a burgeoning literature on Mediterranean security and the various security challenges that had come to affect the region in that time, but the law enforcement or policing aspect of the Mediterranean security agenda had thus far been neglected. In comparison to the Mediterranean, he claimed that there was a considerable body of analyses of literature which then existed on irregular migration and cross-border crime in a similar north-south context, the US-Mexico border. Lutterbeck understood the drug trafficking and undocumented immigration recognized by the USA as a “national security threat”, which had increasingly resorted both to using military-style technology, and military personnel in securing the border, as “militarization” (Lutterbeck, 2019, p 60). On the other hand, Resteigne and Manigart wrote about the policization of the Belgian military forces during patrolling to support the police on the streets of their country (2019, p 26). According to Sotlar and Tominc, the traditional function of both repressive institutions is the implementation of criminal/internal security and defence policy and has never been changed; what has actually changed is that the new functions have emerged at the forefront of both institutions (2016, p 330). They suggested answers to the questions of how, why, and when the police and armed forces are used. Easton wrote that the capacity of police forces increases and so does the use of military tactics, organizational concepts, and equipment for operating successfully in a violent environment (Easton et al, 2010).

The policization of the Belgian armed forces began in January 2015 in the response to an imminent terrorist threat. Military units were deployed in support of the police to monitor sensitive areas, guard buildings, and patrol streets. For the Belgian army this was a new mission, although it had been used for similar kinds of work and postures abroad as part of their crisis operations (Resteigne and Manigart, 2019, p 27).

In Italy, the policing of migration and cross-border crime began almost thirty years ago with the eminent phenomenon of what were called by Lutterbeck “would-be

immigrants". He speaks of the militarization of migration and crime control across the Mediterranean region. In the process of border militarization along the Mediterranean EU frontiers, both Italy and Spain have been increasing deployments and the expansion of semi-military security forces with a military status to deal with undocumented immigration by sea. These are internal security or police forces that have a number of military characteristics in terms of organization, equipment, and formal affiliation. The Guardia di Finanza, which is organized along military lines, is formally considered as a paramilitary force and reports to the Minister of Finance. Since 1990, the Guardia di Finanza has emerged as the predominant agency in Italy in the prevention of illegal immigration by sea. For example, Lutterbeck stressed that by 2000 its budget had tripled, while its staff had grown by 28%. Even then, it was equipped with a great deal of military-style hardware, including actual warships, with the intensification of the fight against clandestine immigration by sea. Lutterbeck argued that in Spain the increasing concern with irregular migration and narcotics smuggling from the south prompted the trend towards militarizing the country's southern borders. The lead agency in dealing with illegal migrants is the Guardia Civil, a paramilitary police force that reports to the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence. Lutterbeck claims that the Guardia Civil had the most technologically sophisticated coast control system at that time, composed of various military style technologies, such as fixed and mobile radars, infrared sensors, boats, helicopters, and aeroplanes (2006, pp 64-66).

A discourse about the policization of the armed forces and/or the militarization of the police is very interesting in the case of Austria. As Potočnik emphasised, the Austrian Federation Act¹ stipulates that, among other functions, the Austrian army ensures general internal order in the country, and the Defence Act² determines the maintenance of internal public order and security. Both the Austrian army and the police have traditionally co-operated extensively with each other. The most interesting thing is that the state has already regulated their "modern cooperation" within the legislation. As Potočnik noted, the Austrian army evolved from the gendarmerie (Potočnik, 2016, p 134, 140), which means that there is no classic demarcation of competences between the police and the army such as we were discussing at the beginning at this section. We can state that this is the reason for the absence of discourse on this topic in Austria, and the great efficiency of both the police and the army, as both appear wherever there is a need for their engagement. Potočnik compared cooperation between the police and the armed forces in Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Slovenia in 2016. His main findings were that, with regard to the police, all the countries function well, and that the armed forces have sufficient legal bases in their fundamental documents to be able to co-operate with the police in a quality manner without violating any laws (Potočnik, 2016).

¹ Article 79, *Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG)*, BGBl, No. 1.

² Article 2, *Wehrgesetz*, BGBl, (Nr, 146, 2001).

We note that the militarization of the police and the policization of the military is a phenomenon that is not exactly new. In some EU Member States, such cooperation between the police and the military is indeed a constant practice, and in some cases it has been going on for so long that it is no longer the subject of professional and scientific controversy. The question, however, remains why such cooperation is made into a problem in Slovenia.

3 SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES CASE STUDY

The SAF have participated in many multinational operations and missions (MOMs) during the past 23 years.

Its members were first deployed to mission ALBA in Albania in 1997. By the end of 2018, there had been approximately 13,500 deployments in 25 MOMs³. According to Osterman, the participation of the SAF in MOMs represents a direct contribution of the Republic of Slovenia to ensuring peace, stability, and security in the regional and global security environment. In this respect, the SAF makes a visible and recognizable contribution and is, as such, a recognizable partner among the Allies, both in terms of its competence and its equipment and weapons. (Osterman, 2019, p 127).

The SAF has abundant experience in participating in the international environment, from which some⁴ conclude that it is in fact most experienced in the field of ensuring public order, as opposed to war-fighting. Potočnik, however, does not agree with this, and notes that the SAF has used force only twice in its almost 30-year history, on both occasions in Afghanistan. Hence he claims that, according to the actual experience of the SAF at events where public order violations would be so intense as to impose injuries to demonstrators or violators of public order, the SAF, with the exception of the military police, does not have sufficient experience in “police tasks” (Potočnik, 2016, p. 228). According to Garb, the SAF units and individual members have been deployed on MOMs to perform various tasks ranging from medical treatment to monitoring, patrolling and information gathering, force protection, riot control, and training and mentoring of local armed forces. She states that some humanitarian work was also done by the SAF on these missions. The SAF’s support work in the event of natural disasters is highly appreciated by local populations; however, the military are not always included and have not been trained and equipped for the

³ Osterman claims that since 2004, the SAF has taken part in the EU’s operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the military observation mission UNTSO in the Middle East and UNSMIS in Syria; in NATO’s Joint Enterprise operation in Kosovo as KFOR; in North Macedonia and Serbia; in NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; in the UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL in Lebanon; in the EUFOR operation in Chad in 2008 and 2009; in the maritime military operation EU NAVFOR Somalia in 2009; in the military operation EUTM Mali; in the humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum in Lampedusa in 2013 and 2014; in the Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq; in the EU Operation EU NAVFOR MED/Sophia in the Mediterranean Sea; and in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia (2019, p 128).

⁴ At the time of writing his dissertation, Potočnik conducted interviews with leaders in the national security system, with many participants from the police ranks concluding as stated (Potočnik, 2016, p 228).

whole range of the tasks that must be done in such cases (Garb, 2016, p 7). In the following sections we will examine the actual experience of the SAF with illegal migration and the ways in which its members have helped the police in this matter.

3.1 The Mediterranean

The SAF has been numerically involved in many MOMs, three of which were related to illegal migration.

Mare Nostrum

SAF members were included in the illegal migration crisis in the Mediterranean on the basis of a technical arrangement between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ministry of Defence of the Italian Republic, concerning the participation of the SAF patrol boat *Triglav 11* in the operation of the Italian defence and security forces “Mare Nostrum”, signed in Rome in December 2013⁵. The operation took place between 15 December 2013 and 31 January 2014. According to Article 6 of the arrangement, the SAF was obligated to provide first aid, as well as the necessary safety, security, and sanitary measures on the patrol boat during the operation.

EU Operation EU NAVFOR MED/Sophia

The decision of the EU member states to start Operation Sophia, an EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, was made in 2015, following the end of Operation Mare Nostrum. The mandate of Operation Sophia was decided by all the Member States, including its Libya focus, and was part of a wider tendency to use CSDP missions for migration prevention rather than for genuine security objectives, claims Woolard. The operation’s core mandate was to contribute to the EU’s work to disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the southern central Mediterranean. The operation also included support tasks, which were to train the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and monitor the long-term efficiency of its training, and this contributed to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. The operation also conducted surveillance activities, and gathered information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. The operation contributed to the EU’s efforts for the return of stability and security in Libya, and to maritime security in the central Mediterranean region. The mission rescued tens of thousands of people. Many European policymakers were wedded to the idea that search and rescue creates a pull factor and must end, despite the overwhelming evidence of the horrific push factors in Libya that led anyone to get on a boat, especially when combined with smugglers’ lies and pressure (Woolard, 2019).

⁵ For more see <https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/2014-02-0010/wredba-o-ratifikaciji-tehnicnega-dogovora-med-ministrstvom-za-obrambo-republike-slovenije-in-ministrstvom-za-obrambo-italijanske-republike-o-sodelovanju-vecnamenske-ladje-slovenske-vojske-vnl-triglav-11-na-operaciji-italijanskih-obrambnih-in-varnostnih-sil--mare-nostrum->, 18.7.2020.

The operation made it possible to identify, capture and destroy vessels used or allegedly used by smugglers or migrant traffickers. During the operation, 87 suspected smugglers and traffickers were arrested and handed over to the Italian authorities. More than 255 vessels were neutralized. In addition, the operation saved more than 22,000 lives and helped other organizations save more than 36,000 people⁶.

In addition to the crew of the multi-purpose ship *Triglav II*, which included 37 members, the Slovenian contingent consisted of two members of the military police, two members of the medical service, and three members of the national support element, who provided logistical support for the contingent. The latter were stationed at a naval base in Augusta in eastern Sicily, from where the *Triglav II* operated. The SAF also had a liaison officer aboard a ship of the Italian Navy. In the military humanitarian operation organized by the Italian naval forces to address the refugee problem, and in response to the tragic events in the area of the island of Lampedusa, the Slovenian contingent carried out surveillance in international waters with the aim of strengthening maritime security and providing assistance to those in need (SAF website).

On multi-day voyages within its area of responsibility, the SAF prevented the possibility of illegal migration and the smuggling of weapons or petroleum products by being present and navigating in places where smugglers usually operated, which was the mission's main focus at the time (Ibid.)

EU Operation EU NAVFOR MED/IRINI

The participants of the Berlin Conference on Libya on 19 January 2020 committed in particular to fully respecting and implementing the arms embargo established by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1970 (2011), 2292 (2016) and 2473 (2019). Against this background, the Council reached a political agreement to launch a new operation in the Mediterranean, aimed at implementing the UN arms embargo against Libya by using aerial, satellite, and maritime assets on 17 February 2020. In parallel with the launch of Operation IRINI, the existing EUNAVFOR MED operation in the Mediterranean, SOPHIA, permanently ceased its activities⁷.

In accordance with the decision of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, the SAF is also participating in the new Operation IRINI to the same extent as in the previous EU operation NAVFOR MED Sophia. The scope of cooperation includes up to 12 members and occasionally, and when the conditions are met, the multi-purpose ship *Triglav II* with an associated crew of up to 43 members. Since the end of Operation EU NAVFOR MED Sophia, whose technical mandate expired on 31

⁶ European Council. Council of the European Union. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia authorised to start two additional supporting tasks <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/sl/press/press-releases/2016/08/30/eunavfor-med-sophia-op-add-supporting-tasks/>, 23.7.2020.

⁷ Operation EU NAVFOR IRINI. <https://www.operationirini.eu/about-us/>, 23.7.2020.

March 2020, the SAF has been participating in Operation IRINI with two members at its Rome headquarters⁸.

3.2 European migrant crisis

The problems with illegal migrants, which before 2015 plagued mainly Italy and Spain, have increased significantly because of the situation in Syria. Illegal migrants found a new “Balkan route”, through which they travelled in large numbers to Austria, Germany and Sweden via Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia.

Garb notes that the SAF began to support the Civil Protection forces (particularly in terms of logistics) in Slovenia on 16 September 2015, when the migrants crossed the Slovenian and Schengen border, and the police on 19 October (Garb, p 8).

According to the Annual Report of the Slovenian Ministry of Defence 2015, the SAF supported the migrant crisis in three phases: the first, which began on 19 October, supporting the police in dealing with the migrant flow; the second from 21 November when they began the construction, operation, and maintenance of physical obstacles on the border (which remains in progress); and the third, which began on 15 February 2016 and is also still in progress, patrolling the borders with the police (MOD RS, 2016).

In June 2016, the SAF published an analysis of SAF operations in support of the police in relation to migrant issues for the period from October 2015 to May 2016. The analysis states that all tasks were performed in accordance with the adopted operational and tactical plan, rules on the use of force, and other implementation and coordination documents. All tasks were performed at the request and under the control of the police. At the operational level, the execution of tasks was co-ordinated between the General Staff of the SAF and the General Police Directorate, and at the tactical level between the units and the competent police directorates, or members of the police who led the execution of tasks on the ground. The requests of the police were forwarded from the operational headquarters of the General Police Directorate, and after its dissolution, from the Operations and Communication Centre of the General Police Directorate. Reports and briefings, however, were delivered in the opposite direction. According to the SAF analysis, the cooperation with the police went well.

Due to the scope of their engagement in tasks related to migrant issues, the main units responsible for capability-building faced serious difficulties in carrying out their planned tasks. The activities related to the building of a multi-purpose engineering company were also stalled, as the majority of members of engineering units were engaged in erecting the protective technical obstacles. The attempt to relieve the

⁸ *Slovenska vojska sodeluje v operaciji IRINI*. <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/odnosi-z-javnostmi/sporocila-za-javnost/novica/nov/slovenska-vojska-sodeluje-v-operaciji-irini/>, 23.7.2020.

burden from the units engaged in the main effort by transferring personnel from other SAF units proved to be ineffective, since such transfers created more difficulties than solutions. Partial relief was achieved by the mobilization of contractual reserve forces members, who were mostly assigned the tasks of securing the facilities, thus at least partially relieving the units on the ground (Analysis, 2016, p 8).

This was the first⁹ occurrence of such cooperation between the SAF and the police, and successful cooperation required constant adjustments and coordination. The coordination of operations proved to be appropriate, and units at the tactical level liaised with their respective interlocutors. Both sides were open to coordination and adjustments, which contributed to the high quality of the completed tasks. The general assessment of the participants was that cooperation with the police was carried out smoothly and at a high level (Ibid.)

Key features from the analysis were that the cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior was a novelty for both systems; the Ministry of the Interior has a different approach to command and control/management than the SAF; police directorates enjoy greater autonomy; and the General Police Directorate operates with individuals, while the SAF operates with units (Ibid.).

As positive experiences, effective cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior at all levels occurred, despite the different roles and organization structures.

As for negative experiences, the analysis recognized that occasional arrangements had been made at the lowest tactical levels, but not coordinated and reported through the chain of command up to the appropriate level; the General Police Directorate had difficulties in providing the requirements concerning the erection of the temporary technical obstacles in time (Ibid).

3.3 Illegal migration in the post European migrant crisis period

The volume of illegal migration to Slovenia has increased in recent years, due to the situation in the countries of origin and to the fact that illegal migrants are increasingly preferring to use the route across the eastern Mediterranean towards the western Balkan region. The Slovenian Police have strengthened control at border crossing points with Croatia by redeploying staff, as well as by setting up and maintaining technical equipment used for border control in the parts of the country where the terrain is flatter. New border security vehicles were provided for the police. They were assisted in this by the SAF and auxiliary police officers, according to the Police Annual Report 2019. In 2019, police officers dealt with 16,143 illegal crossings of the external Schengen border, compared to 9,262 the year before. In the past two

⁹ *In the past, the police and the SAF have often cooperated in the event of natural disasters such as e.g. floods and the case of the ice storm in 2014, which covered a large part of Slovenia and caused a lot of damage. Nevertheless, the experience of cooperation in the case of the migrant crisis and illegal migration was quite different. For more see Slovenia v ledenih okovih 2014 (Slovenia in ice shackles 2014).*

years, the number of illegal border crossings by Pakistanis stands out the most. Most illegal migrants continue their journey across the Western Balkans from Turkey. The work of police officers on this issue also focused on the interior of the country, dealing with 734 people in 2019 and 494 in the previous year. Here Afghan citizens have been stopped more frequently in the past three years (Police Annual Report 2019, p 30).

Based on international agreements, the police returned 11,150 people to foreign security authorities in 2019, compared to 4,810 in the previous year. The security authorities of other countries returned 643 foreigners to Slovenia in 2019, compared to 579 in the previous year. Most of them were returned from Italy, and in most cases they were illegal migrants who officially intended to apply for asylum in Slovenia and later continued illegally on their way to their destination state (Ibid., p 31).

In 2019, of the people in Slovenian centres for foreigners, 73.9% were men, 20.2% were unaccompanied minors, 3.8% were women and 2.2% were children (Ibid., p 130).

According to the official website of the SAF¹⁰, it has been continuously supporting the police in preventing illegal border crossings since 2015. Since September 2019, they have been providing two infantry companies daily to support the police in the prevention of illegal migration, thus responding again to the increased demands of the police. In addition, since August 2019, the SAF has been supporting the police in the protection of the national border with a Bell 206 helicopter and its crew to observe the border area. In their work, the deployed SAF members use mostly the assets of the SAF, from observation equipment to armoured vehicles. Based on a decision of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, the SAF has been providing support to the Ministry of the Interior in resolving the situation concerning illegal migration without pause since 19 October 2015. Since February 2016, they have also been providing support to the police in the protection of the national border. Since they began to support border protection activities and up to March 2020, SAF members had been deployed 108,441¹¹ times and had participated in more than 64,111 patrols (SAF, 2020).

The Police have been setting up and maintaining temporary technical barriers. Since October 2018, the SAF have been supporting the police by observing a wider area of the state border with personnel and UAVs. In total, SAF members supporting the police have been deployed 150,054 times and have travelled nearly 5,300,000 kilometres. In line with the directions of the police, they have erected and maintained

¹⁰ *The SAF continue to support the Police in protecting the national border:* <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/public-affairs/news/news-single/nov/the-slovenian-armed-forces-continue-to-support-the-police-in-protecting-the-national-border/>, 22.7.2020.

¹¹ *The data is from the SAF website in March, 2020.:* <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/odnosi-z-javnostmi/sporocila-za-javnost/novica/nov/slovenska-vojska-nadaljuje-z-neprekinjeno-podporo-policiji-pri-varovanju-drzavne-meje/>, 22.7.2020.

about 160 kilometres of temporary technical barriers. From 24 February to 23 May 2016, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia granted additional powers to the SAF arising from Article 37a of the Defence Act in support of the settlement of the migrant situation. In accordance with these powers they were allowed, during this time, to alert, refer, temporarily restrict movement, and participate in crowd control¹². In addition, the SAF used helicopters to patrol the border and supplied police helicopters with fuel (Ibid.).

In line with a Government decision, the SAF also provided support in the resolution of the migration situation to the Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief and to the Civil Protection Service between 16 September 2015 and 7 December 2017. During that period, members of the SAF provided transportation and supplies, protected and set up reception and accommodation centres, applied rodent control or disinfection measures in Civil Protection facilities, prepared and distributed both hot meals and beverages, and set up mobile showers (Ibid.).

To return to the topic of the second section, in which we presented the theoretical aspects of the policization of the military as described by Resteigne and Manigart, and the militarization of the police as understood by Lutterbeck, then we can conclude that the military's assistance to the police by applying Article 37a of the Defence Act is the policization of the military, and the implementation of military assistance to the police through the use of military personnel and equipment is the militarization of the police.

4 DISCUSSION

In the section on illegal migration after the European migrant crisis, we found that illegal crossings increased the most in 2019 compared to the previous year. This relates to our first question, about what the SAF is doing on the Slovenian-Italian border. According to police data, the Italian security authorities returned 643 illegal migrants to Slovenia, so we can conclude that there must have been some who were not intercepted by the Slovenian or Italian security authorities and who continued their illegal journey to other countries. We also found that the SAF and the police patrol the border in accordance with the applicable regulations, and after prior coordination and cooperation with the police (more details on the normative aspect in Sotlar and Tominc, 2016, Garb, 2016, and in Potočnik, 2016). According to the Police Annual Report, the number of illegal migrants coming to Slovenia has been growing in the past three years. By far the largest number of illegal migrants are men; their proportion in the centres for foreigners is 80%. Illegal border crossing is considered an offence, and is linked to organized crime.

¹² When in October 2015 the SAF was activated to support the police, subsequent evaluations found that its support was insufficient without police powers. Intense debate followed and the Defence Act was changed in Article 37 by Appendix 37a. See more in Garb, 2018, p 10, paragraph The legislation: repairing the unbroken?

As for the second question, whether the use of the armed forces is the right response to illegal migration, we found that the tasks of the police and those of the army changed significantly in the post-Cold War period. The key change, otherwise dictated by the changed security circumstances, is the transition from mass armies to a professional army. One of the consequences is a drastic reduction in the size of armed forces, which perform significantly more diverse and demanding tasks in the changed conditions. The security threats that are emerging in new forms are forcing us to find solutions that no one in the past had foreseen, and even if they had, we would most likely disagree with the idea of dealing with illegal migration in the future both at the borders and within the country, and this in a modern democratic society. The “traditional” tasks of the armed forces do not include the possibility of the army engaging with (illegal) migrants, as we have seen in the examples of some authors in previous chapters. It is true, however, that some countries (Italy, Austria, Spain) have recently gained important experience from police and military cooperation in various fields (more in Potočnik, 2016), for which they have prepared accordingly, normatively, organizationally and in terms of personnel. For those countries which have been discussed in this article, we can say that the issue of illegal migration is now one of the permanent tasks of their national security system.

Dealing with illegal migration is no longer a humanitarian problem, but above all a security problem, which is why the proper organization of a state and its national security system is crucial for maintaining order and legality in the country.

The increased activities of the army and police, as well as other state bodies, in connection with illegal migration also represent a large financial cost for the country, although none of them publishes this information publicly.

In June 2020, according to SAF data, 6,321 (7,055 in 2015) active members and 696 (860 in 2015) contract reserves were employed in the SAF. In July 2020, the Police employed 8,189 people (8,171 in 2015). All in all, there are not as many members of the SAF and the police together as there were illegal migrants who were stopped at the illegal border crossing in 2019.

The data show that the SAF has decreased by 10% in the past four years.

This is worrying. We can conclude that the two key pillars of the national security system in connection with illegal migration are being depleted in terms of staff and finances. The manning problem of state border protection can be replaced by technical barriers, and some forms of control such as drones, satellites, helicopters and other modern equipment; however, this requires greater financial resources, time and additional training. All of these will probably not be enough in the case of political and security changes in the Western Balkans and the Middle East, where in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere large numbers of migrants are waiting for the first opportunity to continue their journey.

Theoretically, three scenarios are possible in the future. The first is that the number of illegal migrations will decrease by itself or for a yet unknown reason, which in reality is not very likely to occur.

Alternatively, the trend in the number of illegal migrations will remain at about the same level as in 2019, suggesting that both the police and the military will approach burnout. Police manpower is relatively stable, but still small in terms of the number of illegal migrants and the fact that the police have many other tasks.

On the other hand, the option to significantly improve the SAF's manning structure in the coming years is relatively small. Given the possibility that it could be strengthened, a lot of active staff would have to be engaged in the training of new employees, which in turn means an additional burden for the existing staff.

Both the SAF and the police could be relieved of the burden of dealing with illegal migrants by a public-private partnership established by the state, which would additionally engage private security services. The EU and some Member States already include this, but note that there is also a conflict of interest and the possibility of abuse (Davitti, 2019).

For the SAF, the reactivation of Article 37a would probably significantly contribute to the effectiveness of both the police and the SAF in the current situation with illegal migrants in 2020, but not in the long run. Regardless of the tasks the SAF performs in assisting the police, the current military situation is worrying if we take into consideration its primary tasks and mission command at home and abroad.

A third possibility is for the number of illegal migrants to increase beyond the numbers in 2019, which could mean the inability of the country to maintain public order, legality and security for all.

A solution at the political level within the EU seems to be the most appropriate. Due to the large number of illegal migrants, solving this problem at the national level is doomed to failure in the long run, despite the fact that the majority of illegal migrants do not stay in Slovenia. Slovenia has always been and will remain a country where immigrants come to live in a legal way. For example, up to the end of June 2019 there had already been 159,363 applications for permanent or temporary residence granted to legal immigrants from 135 countries in Slovenia (Ministry of Internal Affairs). The legal arrival of foreigners is a path that the EU must encourage in order to improve its demographic picture and future. Possibilities for the revitalization, rebuilding and rehabilitation of the countries from which migrants come should also be explored. Social systems in EU countries can remain high only up to a certain number of beneficiaries, otherwise they may collapse due to overload. It is thus essential for the EU and its members to maintain the right balance in accepting false migrants and to adopt a more appropriate policy in the field of illegal migration.

Under such conditions, police and military forces will be able to perform “traditional” police and military tasks again in the future.

Conclusion

The policization of the armed forces and the militarization of the police seem to be the result of the incompetence of global and European politics in the Middle East and North Africa. Universal access to the internet and the desire of the masses for a better life have also greatly contributed to this. As the cradle of the development of science, human rights, and ethical and moral principles, Europe has succeeded in realizing the great idea of an Union where quality of life is at a relatively high level compared to other parts of the world. Mass migration in 2015 and the increase in the number of illegal migrants in the subsequent years have put European ideas ahead of the facts that the EU is still not dealing with in 2020.

The Slovenian national security system is overloaded. Faced with Covid-19 in 2020, illegal migration has become a side issue that fails to get on the policy-making agenda. The absence of professional and scientific discussions, which died out years ago in the field of security, contributes a lot to this. Public discourse on this issue is therefore essential in order to find new solutions for the future security challenges.

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PRIPRAVLJENOST EVROPSKIH DRŽAV NA VRNITEV TUJIH BORCEV ISLAMSKE DRŽAVE

READINESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

Povzetek V analizi smo želeli prikazati, ali so tuji borci resnično nevarni za evropsko varnost, saj vemo, da je morebitna grožnja vedno mogoča. Do zdaj je bilo zelo težko oceniti grožnjo vrnitve tujih borcev. V raziskavo smo vključili dve državi, v katerih so napade izvedli tuji borci, ki so se vrnili v državo. Vključeni državi sta bili Belgija in Francija. V raziskavi smo primerjali politiko posameznih držav s skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU. Ugotavljali smo, kako se ti državi spoprijemata z vrnitvijo tujih borcev in kateri ukrepi so bili glede tega sprejeti. Poleg tega smo poskušali oceniti, ali sta bolj osredotočeni na pregon tujih borcev, ki se vračajo, ali je poudarek na programih deradikalizacije in reintegracije.

Ključne besede *Tuji borci, terorizem, Islamska država, EU, zakonodaja.*

Abstract This analysis will consider whether foreign fighters pose a real danger to European security, knowing that the potential threat is always possible. Up to now, assessing the threat of returning foreign fighters has been very difficult. In this article we have attempted to analyze the attacks that have been carried out by returning foreign fighters in Belgium and France. Our research compared the politics of individual countries with the common foreign and security policy of the EU. We have investigated how these countries are dealing with the return of foreign fighters and what measures have been taken in this regard. In addition, we have tried to evaluate whether they are more focused on the prosecution of returning foreign fighters or whether their focus is connected with deradicalization and reintegration programmes.

Key words *Foreign fighters, terrorism, Islamic state, EU, legislation.*

Introduction

In this section, the main focus will be on those foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who were part of the war conflicts in Syria and Iraq and who were part of the organization called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS). But who are these foreign fighters? David Malet describes foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during the civil conflict. I build on this formulation and describe a foreign fighter as an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid” (Hegghammer, 2013, p 57). Returning foreign fighters have been well recognized as a potential problem: “As regards the problem of departures, the biggest concern of intelligence and security services and the police were the process of return of EU citizens to their home countries. There are legitimate fears that the return of radicalized individuals with the knowledge of how to use weapons and with traumas from crisis areas could create a serious security risk related to terrorist threats” (Čaleta, 2016, p 18).

The research of this paper will be based on several specific European countries, even though the issue of FTFs has been detected more widely, across all European countries. The many FTFs who have returned from the Islamic State have led to increasing questions about them posing a threat to Europe. The problem of returning FTFs is in the idea that they did not leave their radicalized ideas in the conflict zone, but are returning with a will or a plan to develop terrorist activities. They are returning brave, after seeing many violent situations, and with a broad military knowledge. Other than terrorist activities, a further danger of returning FTFs is that they could radicalize others and make them want to join terrorist organizations in the future. This analysis will look into whether FTFs pose a real danger to European security, knowing that the potential threat is always possible.

Whether the threat is real or not is the question asked not only by scholars but also by governments of European countries and their citizens. But the threat posed by returning foreign fighters (RFFs) is not thought to be underestimated. Terrorist attacks carried out by RFFs in different European countries are the proof of that. We have attempted to research those attacks which have been carried out by or connected with RFFs, including in Belgium and France. Both countries are important members of the European Union, so in order to make a complete analysis it is also important to analyze the politics of the EU in terms of the questions of terrorism, counterterrorism and the return of foreign fighters. In addition, we have compared the politics of these two countries with the common foreign and security policy of the EU, in order to analyze the challenges that European policymakers have in dealing with the phenomenon of RFFs. We have investigated how these countries are dealing with the return of foreign fighters and what measures have been taken in this regard. In addition, we have tried to evaluate whether they are more focused on the prosecution of RFFs or whether their focus is on de-radicalization and reintegration programmes.

Our evaluation could serve as a good analytical example of the situation in Europe. Some of the “restrictive” approaches used by the countries we researched include “new law approaches which criminalized recruitment, travel, the provision of funds, the organization or facilitation of travel, the delivery and receipt of broadly defined training (including self-training via the internet) or various forms of facilitation, support, incitement, “justification” or “apology” for such offences. Increasingly restrictive administrative measures that have been used in the foreign fighters’ context include stripping individuals of their citizenship, deporting them, imposing travel bans and blocking their entry into or transit through territories, or the removal of travel documents” (OSCE, 2014, p 19). Other possible approaches used by countries are presented below. The analysis included in this research could help to additionally regulate all the relevant aspects of this problem and make EU governments ready for possible future events, and could help propose better ways of dealing with the challenges that RFFs will bring in the future in the national and European security environments. In the context of our research, the main research question was: *“Are the governments of European states ready for the return of foreign fighters, and what are their legal and other possibilities to help secure the safety of their citizens?”*

This research question helped us to investigate this complex subject and find some additional answers. The phenomenon of RFFs is possibly the most important question concerning the security politics of the EU of the past few years. To illustrate how serious the situation of RFFs is, we can use some existing studies which show us that “there are now at least 5,600 citizens or residents from 33 countries who have returned home. Added to the unknown numbers from other countries, this represents a huge challenge for security and law enforcement entities” (Barrett, 2017, p 5). Additionally, “some 5000 men, women and children have travelled from Europe to Syria and Iraq since 2012. An estimated 1500 of these foreign fighters have returned so far” (Renard et al., 2018, p 5).

From a methodological point of view, in our research process we used the historical method, the deductive method, the case study method, and statistics. The historical method took into account not only the basic facts, but also a chronology of events, as well as their development, causes, and consequences. The deductive method was used to provide focus analyses in the part of this research which looked at legislation; we used both analysis and synthesis. We also used the case study method, which helped us to investigate each individual country of interest in this paper to see what they are doing when dealing with RFFs. With the case study analysis, we were able to see whether countries were using a more restrictive approach or an approach for the re-integration of foreign fighters into society. In this part of the analysis, we used a comparative method, so we could best present the similarities and differences between countries. Statistics were used to analyse how many foreign fighters have returned to their countries and how many of them have been prosecuted, and also how many are involved in programmes of de-radicalization and re-integration, if

they even exist in their countries of origin. Using these methods together helped us to explain and answer our research question.

1 FOREIGN FIGHTERS AS A SECURITY THREAT

While both governments and citizens of countries are scared by the return of foreign fighters, research shows that foreign fighters do not significantly deviate from their surrounding society, and that in general they are not prone to committing terrorist attacks when they return. “My data indicates that only one in nine foreign fighters return because of an attack in the West” (Hegghammer, 2013, p 7). In addition to this, “it is important to realize that not all foreign fighters represent the same level of danger” (Bos, et al, 2018, p 12). At least initially, those who have travelled to Syria are less likely to see themselves as domestic terrorists than those IS sympathizers who have stayed at home. They generally appear to have a stronger desire to join something new, rather than to destroy something old. Analyses connected with returnees have so far shown that this problem is more manageable than initially anticipated (Barret, 2017, p 14). There will probably always be a percentage of RFFs who get involved in unlawful activities, including terrorist acts, but there are unlikely to be mass numbers of foreign fighters launching major attacks. For this reason it is important to implement a system to separate these individuals from the hundreds of thousands of returnees from Syria or other conflict areas (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018, p 17). This is something that the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) confirms in its annual report of 2018, where they say that jihadi attacks are primarily committed by “local” terrorists that have been radicalized in their own states without travelling to join terrorist organizations, and that they often do not have a direct link with Islamic State or any other jihadi organization. Of course, “recent attacks in Europe have been committed by lone individuals who have not been to a conflict zone – but who may have been inspired by terrorist propaganda and/or the extremist narrative, as well as by other successful attacks worldwide” (TE-SAT, 2018, p 27).

The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN, 2017) explains how, in general, foreign fighters are not likely to commit terrorist attacks when returning to their countries. However, they also mention that when we talk about returning fighters, we are talking about two generations of fighters. The first generation represents those who joined the conflict for humanitarian reasons, to fight the Assad regime. These people are less violent. When talking about the differences between returning foreign fighters, this is the category who do not have any intention of carrying out unlawful activities. The second generation of returners is more ideologically decisive, and it is possible for them to return with violent motives to harm EU citizens. Hegghammer reports that “tentative data indicate that militants usually do not leave intending to return for a domestic attack, but a small minority acquire that motivation along the way and become more effective operatives on their return” (Hegghammer, 2013, p 1). Referring to these analyses, we could suppose that foreign fighters do not represent a danger.

Another reason for this is that this category of individuals often do not pose a threat to the West because they have little or no desire to ever attack their home countries, no matter how much anti-Western sentiment they are exposed to in the conflict zone. They were motivated to join a conflict that took place abroad, and they do not associate that conflict with struggles in their homeland. There are also some very interesting factors connected to militant preachers, who at some level of transferring religious messages argue that fighting foreign “invaders” in places like Iraq is justified, but carrying out terrorist attacks at home is not. We should also understand an aspect related to the social status that comes with fighting abroad, which is far higher than that of those who commit terrorist attacks at home. It is one thing to be seen as a heroic soldier fighting an invading army, and quite another to be seen as a terrorist who bombs his own country. Finally, foreign fighters may not want to carry out attacks back in their home countries for the simple reason that such attacks could endanger their friends and families (Byman and Shapiro, 2014, p 21). However, even if most experts agree that foreign fighters do not represent a direct danger by themselves, and that in most cases they do not return to carry out terrorist attacks in their own countries, the national security environment should still be prepared to deal with them. There are many implacable challenges, such as a negative public viewpoint to their inclusion in the social environment, which could encourage a different conflict situation.

This could have at least two main implications: the first is that the RFFs could very quickly become violent in such a tense situation, while the second is that they start to build a close network of communication only with others of the same mind. The fact is that brutal combat hardens the fighters, making them steady under pressure and giving them a deep sense of loyalty to their comrades-in-arms. They also gain direct, practical skills (Byman and Shapiro, 2014, p 8). We must bear in mind that these people have passed hard training, have been on the battlefield, have seen and experienced many traumatic things, and have learned how to use weapons. We can also find completely different approaches and perception of RFFs, such as: “EU Member States reported that returnees to Europe may have a certain amount of combat and operational experience; have gained an enhanced capability of committing acts of terrorism; and be particularly dehumanized and prone to violence upon their return. They also serve as role models and might be involved in recruiting and radicalizing others” (TES-AT, 2018, p 27). Most returnees will be unlikely to experience anything in their lives at home that matches the intensity of their experience as a member of IS. If they begin to again feel as rootless and lacking in purpose as they did before they left, then they are unlikely to settle back easily into a ‘normal’ life.

We should also understand the constant IS activity with regard to increasing its external campaigns, both through action and propaganda. Returnees may be particularly vulnerable to contact from people who were part of the network that recruited them, or appeals for help from ex-comrades-in-arms. It seems probable that the influence and involvement of returnees will grow as their numbers increase (Barret, 2017, p 15). Even if they are subject to close psychological and

police assessment, circumstances may lead them to again seek violent solutions to their problems, especially if they return to the same conditions that they left. Others may suffer from a delayed psychological reaction to their life with IS. Terrorism is as much emotional as ideological, and even those who returned disillusioned or revolted by what they saw, or simply mentally or physically exhausted, may over time look back on the caliphate more positively and blame outsiders for its failures (Barrett, 2017, p 19). So, even if most of the foreign fighters do not represent any danger, we must pay close attention to them as they return.

1.1 Terrorist attacks carried out by returning foreign fighters

At the present time, most of the research into foreign fighters talks about them not being a danger to the wider society. However, opponents of allowing foreign fighters to return to European countries say that it only takes one person to bring death to a large number of people if they decide to carry out a terrorist crime after they return. Aside from this, it is also said that foreign fighters are dangerous because they could radicalize other people. Even just one person who returned to Europe with the desire of carrying out a terrorist attack is still enough to make us change our opinion on whether RFFs are dangerous. Unfortunately, even though most of the returnees have not been inclined to carry out a terrorist attack, the Islamic State has been an inspiration to many people thinking about terrorist attacks. Statistics state “that since declaring its caliphate in June 2014, the IS has conducted or inspired more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria, where its carnage has taken a much deadlier toll. These attacks have killed at least 2,043 people and injured thousands more” (Lister et al., 2018, e-source). Most of these attacks have been carried out by people who were inspired by IS, not those who were under their direct command, and nor are there any data stating that they participated in war conflict in IS territory. However, there are still some examples where terrorist attacks were committed by people who had participated in the conflict as members of IS and as foreign fighters:

- “Three people were killed and another seriously injured in a shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. The suspect was identified as Mehdi Nemmouche, a 29-year-old Frenchman from Roubaix in the Pas-de-Calais region of northern France. Nemmouche, who had spent a year in Syria, is a radicalized Islamist, according to the chief prosecutor of Paris” (Lister et al., 2018, e-source);
- On 13 November 2015, eight attackers attacked Paris. They killed and/or wounded more than 400 people. Six of the attackers had returned from Islamic State where they had participated as foreign fighters;
- A returnee from Islamic State carried out an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train in August 2015;
- In 2016 “two explosions at Brussels airport and another at a subway station in the Maalbeek district of the Belgian capital left at least 32 people dead and scores injured. In a statement posted online by several prominent supporters and by the ISIS-affiliated Amaq news agency, ISIS claimed that its fighters had carried out the attacks” (Lister et al., 2018, e-source).

1.2 Programmes of de-radicalization of foreign fighters

Some countries have adopted strong measures towards RFFs, while others use softer measures, or soft measures in addition to other methods of dealing with RFFs. These soft measures are mostly deradicalization programmes, or reintegration of foreign fighters into society. Programmes of deradicalization are based on the principle of helping RFFs not to return to their criminal activities. When returning to their countries foreign fighters are faced with lots of challenges; besides the possible legal punishment and criminal prosecution, these challenges include facing up to their families, friends, fellow citizens, and the wider community. However, even though they have a wide range of challenges, there are still potential ways to make the returning process easier. One of these ways is deradicalization, which is a necessary first step for foreign fighters to make a return to society. “De-radicalization is focused on radicalized individuals. It is based on the assumption that not everyone who becomes radicalized remains committed to their cause, and that every extremist movement has disillusioned followers who have doubts, or simply want out (Neumann, 2017, p 20). However, it is also true to say that deradicalization does not have a clear and unique definition, and that there is no consensus about what constitutes successful deradicalization.

Reintegration can be defined as ‘a safe transition to the community, by which the individual proceeds to live a law-abiding life following his or her release and acquires attitudes and behaviours that generally lead to a productive functioning in society’ (Heide and Geenen, 2017, p 8). Successful deradicalization must be carried out by teams of experts, and it must contain one of the following measures: “Positive measures can be taken to form an effective deradicalization strategy. Well-articulated and inspiring counter-messaging, which effectively undermines extremist narratives, can prove powerful when prompting extremists to reflect on their position. Using image and audio-based material on social media sites is particularly effective when communicating positive messages. Moreover, grass-roots initiatives which open up a dialogue between experts and society allow people to feel engaged and respected, while also producing valuable insight and rich discussion. Developing personal resilience can enable society to deal with the difficulties and adversaries it encounters, leaving people less susceptible to extremism. Supporting people through times of transition, via outreach programmes in schools, universities and local communities, can contribute towards healthy behaviours and develop more supportive and cohesive communities” (Manning and La Bau, 2015, p 13).

Apart from these measures, one of the most successful means of deradicalization is that of foreign fighters talking to people who have already undergone deradicalization before them. Communication with people who know exactly what the problems are has been shown to be one of the best ways. “Each testimony highlighted the importance of these personal stories when delivering counter-narratives” (Manning and La Bau, 2015, p 27). When we study terrorism, extremism and violent extremism, we often focus heavily on tactics and strategy. We can better understand the situation

if we look at the cognitive and emotional behaviour which underlines a particular set of beliefs (Manning and La Bau, 2015, p 12). In the end, deradicalized RFFs can be the most helpful in creating programmes for other foreign fighters. “Returning foreign fighters can contribute to intelligence capacities and help in designing better deradicalization programmes” (Leduc, 2016, p 18). When considering the Islamic State, one of the most successful means of deradicalization is to demonstrate how the IS studies and their theoretical teachings are not in harmony with what they are doing. Equally, challenging their ideology can be of use. Depending on the individual success of each person can be tough for the programme in general; although a certain programme may succeed with one individual, it does not mean that it will be successful in other people’s stories. The success of deradicalization programmes depends on many factors.

2 THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND EU COUNTRIES

2.1 EU policy concerning foreign fighters

The European Union came together on joint values such as human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity; democracy and the rule of law are two more. Any action that is not in harmony with these values is in direct dispute with EU law. Terrorist activity is one of the acts that violates the values on which the EU is based; this is why one of the most prominent threats to the EU is terrorism. In the EU it is very important to have a common position of every Member State towards certain questions, one of which is foreign and security policy. The importance of this question is related to the fact that terrorism knows no boundaries, and this is especially highlighted here in the EU, where one of the most important values is the free movement of goods and people.

Ten years ago we might have said that “every member of the EU is solving the problem of terrorism in its own way, more or less successfully” (Prodan, 2009, p 11): so, the “Italian government introduced extensive additional legal powers to help to fight terrorism in the mid-seventies” (Wilkinson, 2002, p 113), while the German authorities were doing something else, and the French had their own system against terrorism. However, Prodan (Ibid., p 15) stated that there is no complete and effective common security and defence policies. The EU considers that Member States are responsible for all the challenges around the fight against radicalism and recruitment, but the EU can help with a certain framework to coordinate national policies, share information, and be successful in fighting against terrorism. This is how the EU thinks that fighting together can be most successful, and is why it began to react with a common foreign policy so that it can protect European citizens. In 2001 the “EU adopted an Action Plan to Fight against Terrorism. Improvement in cooperation in the segment of arrests and extradition of terrorists has been accomplished by the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, by which the EU adopted the European arrest warrant” (Ibid., p 13). This Act was supposed to represent the main document of the EU on fighting terrorism.

A few years later, in 2004, the EU adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, and soon afterwards an Action Plan for Fighting Terrorism. As Prodan mentions (2009, p 13), the goals of this plan were “to disable terrorists from having access to financial and other economic resources; to increase the efficiency of the working bodies of the EU and Member States when searching for terrorists, their prosecution in court, and when preventing terrorist attacks; to deepen international consensus and strengthen international participation in fighting against terrorism; to secure the safety of international traffic and the effective surveillance system of the outer borders, to increase the effectiveness of preventing terrorist attacks.” In 2005 the Council adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which has four pillars (Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond).

As mentioned above, terrorism does not know borders, and this is certainly true in the case of the EU, because of the desire of the Union to have open borders. Apart from the aforementioned surveillance of external borders, an important aid in their maintenance has been the Schengen Information System (SIS). Since 2016 this system has carried “terrorism-related activity” information. Besides this, the SIS has begun to use “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security” technology, which utilizes photos of people’s faces. Following the last large migration wave, many people began to talk about open borders being “death” to European security, and because of this, some of the Schengen countries have instigated border controls. To preserve border safety, the EU has developed Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Frontex is necessary for securing the borders of the EU, and was of great assistance during the migration crisis. The numbers of people crossing the borders and coming to Europe are changing every year. “Every attempt to quantify the number of migrants can give only a momentary and shaky figure that can be outdated after several days. According to the European Frontex agency, there are six main migrant routes: the Western African, Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Balkan, and Eastern land routes” (Kešetović and Ninković, 2016, p 101). Frontex’s main function is to oversee the borders, and with Regulation No. 2016/1624, it will be able to use all the measures for the prevention and detection of terrorism that are required.

The EU believes that it is vital that all information received is shared, not only with Europol, but with every relevant authority figure in all the Member States. The EU has approved this type of action by Article 47 in the aforementioned European Border Coast Guard (EBCG) regulation. As they must be involved in European protection from terrorism, Europol has founded the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). The European Council has control over the Centre, and its purpose is to become the main hub for the fight against terrorism. Apart from support in investigations and aid if a terrorist attack does occur, the ECTC has access to Europol bases that can be checked, if necessary, for the purpose of investigations. Exchange of information can also occur through the information base of Europol, the Europol Information System (EIS), and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which is used so that states can share information related to any event in

any criminal activity, both on suspects and convicted criminals; in other words, any information that can keep the EU a safer place. This type of data comes to Europol through the Member States, and is later published in the EIS. Considering that this information is very confidential, the program SIENA (Secure Information Exchange Network Application) is used so as not to compromise it in any way.

In discussing the exchange of information, FADO must also be mentioned; the False and Authentic Documents Online is a website managed by the Geospatial Service Centre (GSC), which has in its database more than 3000 examples of false identities, travel documents, visas, stamps and so on. Another useful component of the EU's anti-terrorist work is the Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which helps Europol to detect the financing of terrorism. In 2015 the Council and the European Parliament adopted new rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, and in 2016 the European Commission released a proposal to amend those rules to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism.

Finally, it does not matter that the EU offers some frameworks to deal with returning foreign fighters; the Member States are still the ones who must take full responsibility, and must prosecute or find successful ways to deal with foreign fighters.

Next, we will present some individual state approaches to the issue of RFFs.

2.2 Case study of Belgium

Belgium has found itself in a situation that has resulted in some of the most brutal terrorist attacks within just a couple of years. This has made the Belgian government look to dealing with terrorism through different laws and other possibilities. In 2015 it expanded its definition of terrorism; at the same time Belgian law has reduced the time necessary for a verdict, concordant with the 2014 UNSC Resolution and the 2015 EU Directive on terrorism. Besides this, travelling to join a terrorist organization, receiving and giving service to terrorist training, or financing a terrorist organization are from now on considered to be terrorist offences.

Since 2016, Belgian law has allowed house searches and arrests after 9pm in the event of a terrorist offence or a planned attack. The Belgian Criminal Code has been expanded so it can now punish the recruitment of people to carry out terrorist acts (Article 140), and to travel to and from Belgium to carry out terrorist attacks.¹ The modifications to this Article deleted the requirement that an action must pose a real risk to society to be considered an incitement to terrorism. With the removal of this

¹ "The Constitutional Court of Belgium issued Judgement 31/2018 on the action for the annulment of the Law of 3 August 2016 containing various provisions in the fight against terrorism (III), introduced by the NGO Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (Human Rights League) with the Council of Ministers as the defendant. Since the applicant raised objections exclusively against Articles 2 and 6 of the Law of 3 August 2016, the Court considered the appeal admissible only against these Articles, and not to the entire Law. Concerning Article 2 of the Law of 3 August 2016, the applicant's complaint was based on the modification of the previous text of Article 140 of the Criminal Code."

requirement, the Article left a wide margin of interpretation, making it impossible to assess the true impact of the action, as it did not need to pose a real risk. This modification also added the possibility of an action of incitement “directly or indirectly” to commit a terrorist act, an expression considered too general by the applicant, who felt that this generated great uncertainty about what might or might not be considered an incitement to terrorism. The modification could also lead to the criminalization of less serious offences, without the minimum sentence being reduced.

For these reasons, the *Ligue des Droits de l’Homme* claimed that these modifications were a violation of the principle of legality and the principle of proportionality, in that people could be accused of committing a crime without anything to prove it, based on a potential risk determined without objective grounds. These modifications would deeply affect freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement, leaving citizens uncertain about what could be said or done, since an action would not need to pose a real risk to public safety nor directly incite people to commit a terrorist offence in order to be considered as such.

As for Article 6 of the Law of 3 August 2016, the “modification authorizes preventive detention in cases of absolute necessity for public security in the case of terrorist offences for which the maximum applicable penalty exceeds five years’ imprisonment, whereas for other offences for which the maximum penalty does not exceed 15 years’ imprisonment, preventive detention is only possible if there are serious reasons to fear that the accused person, if left at liberty, would commit new crimes or offences, evade justice, attempt to disappear evidence or collude with third parties. The applicant alleges that the classification as a terrorist offence is not an objective criterion to justify the difference made in relation to other offences” (Roson, 2018, e-source).

When Belgium had its first wave of foreign fighters leaving to join Syria and Iraq, in early 2012, the local authorities were, at first, relatively satisfied with that trend. “As early as 2012, Belgium was the first country in Europe to notice an alarming trend of outward travel to Iraq and Syria and to alert their European counterparts. At first, local authorities were relatively pleased to see young troublemakers and petty criminals leaving, since their departure led to a significant decrease in local crime rates. Some services also took this opportunity to improve their information gathering on extremist hubs and networks, instead of seeking to stem the flow” (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018, p 25).

Belgian statistics on foreign fighters are quite devastating. “Belgium reportedly has the highest ratio of foreign fighters per capita in Europe. The federal counterterrorism fusion centre, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), currently lists 498 people as foreign fighters, in addition to 113 “potential candidates” for jihad. Of these, 413 actually reached Syria and Iraq, while the remaining individuals were arrested on route, either in Belgium or Turkey, or never left. The vast majority of

these foreign fighters, 80%, are young men with a typical age range between 20 and 30. Three-quarters of them joined the Islamic State (ISIS)” (Renard, Coolsaet, 2018, p 21).

Belgium has one of the largest percentages of RFFs, according to the number of citizens in Europe, with one returnee to 100,000 citizens. As mentioned further by Renard and Coolsaet (2018, p 19), 125 Belgian foreign fighters had returned by November 2017, while 146 individuals are still thought to be active in combat zones in Syria and Iraq. The official figure is 288, but at least half of those are presumed to have been killed, according to intelligence sources. Among the returnees, nine are known to have died during the terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016), and one died in a car accident. There are thus 115 returnees alive in Belgium. When talking specifically about RFFs, the process of returns should look like this: “Once a returnee is identified in Belgium, whichever way he or she came back, they are now systematically arrested and presented to an investigating judge. With the support of the police and the intelligence services, this judge will make a risk assessment about that individual and decide whether pre-trial detention is necessary.” In January 2018, there were 100 foreign fighters in jail, including approximately 10 abroad. Although some returnees are still awaiting trial, we could still assume that two thirds of the returnees are not in jail (Renard, Coolsaet, 2018, p 29-30).

Work is being carried out not only on making prosecution easier, but in developing an informational program in which all the relevant information will be shared between departments on a regular basis. For some specific examples, in 2015 the Belgian courts convicted five foreign fighters and one person who had assisted them when travelling from Belgium. These men travelled to Somalia and Syria where they had a plan to join jihadi groups, including Al-Shabab and Jabhat al Nusra. The one who assisted in the group travel was Hamza B; he was sentenced as a leader in the activities of this group, and for supporting them financially and materially. The case of Harris C-K. is interesting in that, because of a lack of evidence, it could not be proven that he actually did join the terrorist group Al-Shabab. He was convicted to four years in prison and a 6,000 EUR fine. On the other hand, it was demonstrated that Abdelfattah A. had left for Syria by his bought plane tickets for Turkey and a text message that he had sent from Syria. His punishment was 4 years in prison and a 6,000 EUR fine. The third person, Younnes H., was convicted in the same way, through a bought ticket and travel to Turkey showing that he had travelled to Syria, and with the additional proof of photos of him in military uniform. He was sentenced to five years in prison and a fine of 12,000 EUR. In the case of Kamal A., other than proof of travel to Turkey, the main evidence was given by his ex-wife, who testified how he was radicalized in 2010 and showed the desire for his family to go with him. He was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison and an 18,000 EUR fine. The last case in this group is Sami L., who was sentenced in his absence to ten years in prison and a fine of 60,000 EUR. It is believed that he died in a suicide attack in Iraq. The proof that this man was actually in Syria was, among other things, the use of a Syrian mobile number to talk to his mother on Skype, and a USB stick with Salafi

Jihadi videos on it (Tribunal de Premiere Instance Francophone de Bruxelles, case FD.35.98.212/11, 2015).

While discussing programmes other than prison, “it should be noted that reintegration is traditionally a weak spot in the Belgian penitentiary system, as the relatively high rate of recidivism seems to indicate” (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018, p 35). This does not stop the government of Belgium trying to use these programmes. “Every returnee will leave jail one day – most will in fact be released by 2020, since returnees are typically sentenced to 5 years in jail” (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018, p 33). It is therefore very important to begin the use of different programmes and different ways of helping these people. The local authorities should be well aware that foreign fighters are coming into their territory. They should proceed with some activities to help them find an apartment, job or any other situation that will deter the returnee from re-offending. However, of course, knowing that foreign fighters are in your area can make you more aware of them and their activities.

We should consider deradicalization as the only effective way forward with regard to solving the problems with RFFs. One of the positive examples is the Royal Atheneum in Antwerp, which is a secular state school with a large number of Muslim students. For years, it experienced rising tensions over issues such as wearing headscarves. At the beginning of the decade, extremist groups were beginning to recruit in the school’s neighbourhood. In addition to a security response, the school launched a four-year programme which focused on creating a “common base of shared human values and rights”, and involved “making practical agreements [between the students as well as between students and teachers] and setting clear limits in relation to what was acceptable. The programme included rigorous inter-cultural dialogue, projects on identity and citizenship, and systematic training for teachers in all subjects, as well as arts projects in which students were able to express delicate issues without having to articulate them verbally” (Neumann, 2017, p 58). One more example of preventing radicalization from spreading is a project called COPRA, which has been financed by the EU. This project’s goal is to raise the role of police officials on the front line in the early discovery of violent radicalization. The project was launched in Belgium in 2010. In the first phase, a pocket guide was made for police officers on the front line. This included guidelines on engagement in the community, information about violent groups and their symbols, possible indications, and combinations with other factors to conclude that this situation could cause concern.²

2.3 Case study of France

France is another country that has recently been heavily affected by terrorist acts. The international and the domestic public still remember the attacks in Paris and Nice where many people died. Because of this, France is very sensitive to the potential threat of RFFs, although talking about terrorism in general, “French policies have

² Source: *OSCE Countering terrorism and violent extremism and radicalization which lead to terrorism*, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/d/111438.pdf>.

suffered considerable switching between hard and soft lines. When Mitterrand's government came to power in 1981, it followed softer and more reconcilable policies towards terrorists than all of its predecessors. It gave many terrorists an amnesty, but after this many returned to active terrorism. In 1982 Government had to return to using harder measures. In May 1986, Chirac's government added further hard measures after one of a series of terrorist attacks. The maximum penalty included years in prison, and the law was changed to allow a reduction in sentencing for those terrorists who would reveal the names of others" (Wilkinson, 2002, p 115).

Going even further back into the past, France has been leaning on a state warning system called Plan Vigipirate since 1978.³ The system was designed as an answer to a wave of attacks by left-wing terrorist groups, and has had several updates since its creation. The plan connects all the national actors (the state, local government, public and private operators, and citizens). Since the last revision, made in 2006, it has been thought that France is under constant threat. Vigipirate has two main goals: to protect the citizens, infrastructure and institutions, and to increase awareness in the event of an attack. The plan covers the protection and security of borders; the security of all citizens, not only in France but anywhere where France has a presence, in the sense of citizens of France living in other countries, tourists and travellers from France, and state employees (diplomats and staff); French airports and aircraft in the territory of other states; and ships sailing under the French flag. Vigipirate includes a system of readiness that is within the competence of the Prime Minister, who, after consultation with the President, decides whether it is necessary to increase or decrease the level of preparedness.

Changes to the level of preparedness are broadcast to the wider public through media outlets and other systems of communication between state organs and the private sector. The system has three main pillars:

1. Vigilance is linked to knowledge of the terrorist threat and to its recognition, in order to adjust the behaviour of each individual and the protection measures;
2. Prevention is based on raising awareness of the terrorist threat in state agents, operators, and citizens, on their knowledge of the organization of the national plan, and on good preparation of means of protection and response;
3. Protection is based on a wide range of measures that must be constantly adaptable to the situation in order to reduce vulnerabilities without inducing disproportionate constraints on the economic and social life of the nation.⁴

How serious a process this is considered in France is shown by the fact that "in France, 2,680 additional jobs related to counter-terrorism will be created over the next three years and €425 million earmarked for this purpose" (Europarl, 2015, p 6). Part of this system is an operation called Sentinele, begun after the attacks in 2015,

³ <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/locale/piece-jointe/2017/08/vigipirate-anglais-v2017.pdf>

⁴ <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/locale/piece-jointe/2017/08/vigipirate-anglais-v2017.pdf>

whose goal is protecting French territory from possible terrorist attacks. France brought in a new antiterrorism law in 2017, which guarantees expanded possibilities for searches, even allowing the restriction of free movement and monitoring of the movements of extremists; can close religious institutions due to the spread of extremist ideas; expands security measures at public events; and expands searches of identities at the French borders. France is also part of the Financial Action Task Force initiative, which deals with preventing money laundering for the purpose of financing terrorism.

In terms of statistics, we can say that the problem of foreign fighters is worsening. “Some 350 ‘Islamic terrorists’ currently sit in French prisons; another 5,800 are under police surveillance, and an additional 17,000 have been classified as a potential threat. Manuel Valls, France’s former prime minister, has declared the country’s fight against radicalization the ‘biggest challenge of our generation’” (Crowell, 2017, p 65, e-source). Further, the figures show that around 1700 individuals left France to go and fight in Syria. French law enforcement officials estimate that about 690 French foreign fighters are still in Syria and that about 43% – 295 – of these are women, said the Paris prosecutor, François Molins, in an interview in November on FranceInfo (Rubin, 2018, e-source). France is not a country that will welcome RFFs and others who have left for Syria and Iraq back with open arms. “President Emmanuel Macron said that decisions on allowing women and children to return from Iraq and Syria would be made on a case-by-case basis. The government spokesman, Benjamin Griveaux, made a similarly inconclusive statement in an interview with BFM TV. France favours having its citizens criminally processed where they are caught, he said, but only “if there are judiciary institutions today that are able to grant a fair trial” (Rubin, 2018, e-source).

Further French laws have been added with which they have tried to deal with the situation in Syria, including Legislation No. 2016-731 from 2016, which criminalized the sale of cultural goods that come from areas under the control of terrorist groups, and Law No. 2012-1432, which is about punishing people that have been in training camps. The French government is very firm on the subject of RFFs and their punishment. This is shown by a report from 28 September 2017: “The mother of a French foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) was found guilty of terrorism financing and sentenced to a two-year jail term by a criminal court in Paris. She is accused of having sent money to her son Abbes Bounaga and having paid for plane tickets as he travelled to Algeria and to Malaysia from November 2015 to May 2016. Bounaga eventually reached Syria and joined the so-called Islamic State (IS) in June 2016 and is believed to have died there in August 2016. In addition to the mother, the brother and a friend of the French jihadist were prosecuted for terrorism financing, for a total amount of about 6,000 Euros (2,800 Euros from the mother, 500 Euros from the brother, and 2,900 Euros from the friend)” (Boutin, 2017, p 1). As Boutin (2017, p 2) states, this situation is even harder for parents; if you were a parent who knew that your child had travelled to Syria, and they contacted you in need of financial help to buy food and cover medical expenses, what would you do?

France is one of the countries that takes a hard approach to RFFs. Processes of deradicalization and re-integration are not supported, and more restrictive approaches are used. The French Prime Minister, Edouard Philippe, said that nobody has a magic formula for deradicalization, and this has been shown by the different ways in which the French government has tried to deal with foreign fighters. At the moment, as Philippe said, France is trying to stop the extremism that is flourishing in prisons (Boring, N., 2018, e-source).

They do provide some special measures, which include activities connected with taking care of the psychological health of the children of fighters, strict controls on private Islamic schools, education of teachers to help them detect signs of radicalism, and more investment in teachers so they can help students see the difference between reality and made up stories on the internet.

In 2014 France added 24 further measures to the national plan against violent radicalism. This plan includes making trips to Syria more difficult, prevention and social reintegration strategies for extremism, and prevention of jihadi promotion. The law allows the confiscation of the passports of potential foreign fighters, and also forbids foreigners to enter France if they have been connected with terrorist activities.

The national plan against Islamic radicalization was passed in 2018, and consists of many measures whose purpose is to recognize radicalism and prevent it. The main measures include:

- Improving the detection and segregation of radicalized people in French prisons;
- Providing improved psychological counselling for and monitoring of young French minors returning from Syria and Iraq;
- Removing government agents (especially members of law enforcement and the military) who have been radicalized;
- Improving the monitoring of religiously affiliated schools;
- Working with mental health professionals to find better ways to detect and deal with radicalized individuals;
- Working with social network providers to ensure the removal of illicit content within an hour of posting;
- Developing educational tools to fight against conspiracy theories on the internet;
- Creating a scientific committee to better understand the phenomenon of radicalization and find ways to more efficiently counter it (Boring, N., 2018, e-source).

Before this step, France had developed a project entitled the “Centre for Prevention, Integration and Citizenship”, which was modelled on a programme called *Epede* whose goal was the integration of young people into French society. Unfortunately it turned out that the programme was a total fiasco, as the students were given lessons in French history and religion, among other things. “Several errors were made,

Amelie Boukhobza, a clinical psychologist for Entr’Autres, an association that manages the state’s deradicalization cases, [said]. ‘The issue of volunteering was very problematic.’ But to Boukhobza, the “full-frontal” approach of “flag raising in the morning, courses in secularism, etc.,” was too aggressively nationalistic. ‘They’ve built a program in total opposition to the particular mental universe of the individuals. I don’t think it’s the right solution’” (Crowell, 2017, p 25, e- source). One more programme that French Government began is RIVE (Research and Intervention in Extremist Violence), a new programme whose goal is to help with deradicalization, but where an individual programme is made for each person. The expectations for better results are higher. In 2016 France also established a “Centre for Reintegration” staffed with psychologists, educators, and medical practitioners, with classes in laïcité [secularism], the arts, conspiracy theories and their background, and pre-professional training (Esman, 2016, e-source).

**Discussion
and
conclusion**

Foreign fighters, historically speaking, are not a new aspect of military action. However, in this conflict, because of the sheer numbers of them, they have brought a great deal of insecurity and open questions to the states from which they came. When they first began to join the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, their states did not see this situation as alarming, even though it was analyzed and discussed a great deal, especially in the mainstream media, who saw this “foreign fighters” situation as very interesting from the beginning of the strengthening Islamic State. However, the situation of not caring changed when the first foreign fighters began to return, now with war experience, military knowledge, and having taken part in violent action. All of this made governments react to this situation and begin to see it as a cause for concern.

The solution, as we have shown, is not a specific fix that brings instant results, but consists of trial and error. The situation with RFFs is for the first time happening on such a broad scale that governments should search for new solutions and approaches.

The countries included in the research part of this paper do not seem to have any form of clear and consistent policy towards foreign fighters. They are countries with a large number of citizens who left their homes to join the Islamic State, and so are particularly interesting for research.

In the main problems that have been presented in this research, we should seek fundamental questions as to why there were so many foreign fighters in the first place, why countries allowed the recruitment of citizens, and why did they not care about the routes of radicalization. In accordance with this, there are a large number of theoretical experts in the areas of terrorism, counter terrorism, radicalization and deradicalization, extremism and violent extremism who have been successful in explaining what led to people becoming foreign fighters, and what mistakes were made by systems so that citizens actually wanted to fight for a foreign cause. Although experts have enough knowledge to try to assume what can help in these

matters, their knowledge, for the most part, is theoretical. This means that they can only assume that some approaches could be successful.

There are some countries that had programmes for foreign terrorists in the 2000s, such as Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. These are countries that can present a good framework of appropriate ways of behaving towards foreign fighters. Even though the conditions might not be the same, from them we can see what could be successful and what not to use.

For this paper we researched countries in the European Union – France and Belgium – in order to see what means they were using to deal with RFFs. The countries of Europe are doing their best to successfully deal with RFFs. But it is a fact, which has been shown in this paper, that countries have not developed common systematic approaches. Some are using soft approaches, while others are using harder methods; some mix the two. But not one of these countries is confident about these approaches and their success in dealing with the problem.

Research has shown that it would be irresponsible to let people who have come back from the Islamic State manage alone, without any support. This would not lead to the successful reintegration of foreign fighters, but only to a situation that creates problems for the future. For the process of deradicalization to be successful it needs to begin during the period of imprisonment, and to continue long enough for the community to be safe after they have left prison. The deradicalization and reintegration of foreign fighters is vital not only for the fighters and their families, but also for the other citizens and national security itself.

The Islamic State and the whole idea of jihad has given foreign fighters a meaning to their lives, playing on their emotions and talking about things that each individual could understand. IS found and offered reasons why life is important and gave value to the young people's lives. At the same time, while IS was finding meaning for them, their governments and the system that was supposed to help them was not; they only offered statements like "This is not good", "You are doing something bad", without offering alternative solutions or any help. This turned out to be a key reason why so many foreign fighters left Europe and other countries for IS. However, it could also be a key moment for any successful deradicalization and re-integration. Governments must realize that the only way you can help foreign fighters is to give them an alternative to the life that organized terrorism offers – but they must offer that life before people are even approached by the terrorist organization.

It is essential that information is shared between countries about foreign fighters, potentially dangerous returnees, ways of reintegrating RFFs, successful programmes, problems, and opportunities, and especially to have cooperation at all levels of authority, from the government, intelligence and security services, ministries and judges, to social workers and local authorities. They must all work together for success in dealing with foreign fighters, especially local secular and religious

authorities, because they are the ones with the best information about the potential threats, and can be the first to notice individuals who are changing and becoming more radicalized.

Support must also be given to the families of foreign fighters. They are crucial in helping someone who is being radicalized and in removing them from those surroundings.

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ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE V GRČIJI: DESKRIPTIVNA ANALIZA

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THREATS IN GREECE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Povzetek Eden največjih izzivov današnjega časa je naraščanje asimetričnih groženj. Nato in EU sta tarči politično motiviranih nedržavnih in razvitejših državnih akterjev ter združenj, ki se ukvarjajo s kibernetiskim kriminalom. Sovražna kibernetiska kazniva dejanja spodkopavajo vse družbene ravni v državah Nata in EU ter ogrožajo politično, gospodarsko, civilno in vojaško varnost. S podobnimi grožnjami se spoprijema tudi Grčija. V članku so preučeni grška strategija kibernetiske varnosti ter vzroki in posledice organiziranih terorističnih združb za nezakonite migracije v Grčiji. Prav tako je izpostavljen pomen izmenjave obveščevalnih podatkov med grško varnostno in obveščevalno skupnostjo.

Ključne besede *Grčija, asimetrično bojevanje, kibernetiska varnost, trgovina z ljudmi, migracije.*

Abstract One of the biggest challenges of our time is the rise of asymmetric warfare threats. NATO and the EU are targeted by cybercrime syndicates, politically motivated non-state actors, and sophisticated state actors. Hostile cybercrime undermines all levels of society in NATO and the EU states, threatening political, economic, civil, and military security. Greece faces similar threats. This article focuses on the Greek cybersecurity strategy and analyses the causes and consequences of the terrorism-organized, illegal immigration nexus in Greece, and how essential it is to highlight the importance of collective intelligence sharing among the Greek security and intelligence community.

Key words *Greece, asymmetric warfare, cyber-security, human trafficking, migration.*

Introduction

As the security and intelligence community inexorably works its way into the 21st century, it faces an unprecedented time of challenges (Nomikos, 2014). The chaotic world environment of the post-Cold War (the Arab Spring, Syria, the Libya crises, the Iran nuclear issue, illegal immigration, human trafficking, Islamic radicalization, money laundering and transnational organized crime) covers a wide range of different issues to be understood, and a variety of new threats (e.g. biological viruses) to be anticipated. The rapidly developing information age presents advanced and complex information technology and methodologies to be mastered and integrated to make cyber-security and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) more efficient in combating terrorist incidents on critical infrastructure in Greek society (Nomikos, 2018).

In 2020 the coronavirus Covid-19 entered our vocabulary with a passion and the devastating power of a galactic big bang (Symeonides, 2020). As we speak, the impact of the pandemic is upending government policies, international and domestic economic relations, defence and world health policies, public confidence in those who rule, and the established states themselves. Inevitably, the “post-pandemic” world will be changed to its core.

Greece is located in the Balkan and Mediterranean region and is an active member of the EU and NATO. Today, one of the biggest challenges for Greece is to modernize its intelligence community and its cyber-security public institutional framework to efficiently confront cyber-attacks.

It is in this context that the present policymaking article highlights the asymmetric warfare threats that Greece now faces. The article emphasizes the problems and prospects of Greek HUMINT, cyber-defence, and the strategic significance of intelligence sharing cooperation between the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP), the law enforcement anti-terrorism squad (EKAM), military intelligence, and the coastguard counter-terrorism units. The article concludes that collective action is the most important tool for the security and intelligence community, depending on shared intelligence and joint assessment to prevent prospective major terrorist acts in Greek society.

1 GREEK CYBER SECURITY: PREVENTION AND RESILIENCE

In 1999, the Greek Minister of Defence decided to establish an Office for War Information which was placed in the Greek National Defence Staff. Since then, civilian experts and military officers have been educated, trained, and managed to create a specialized force (Stavrakakis, 2011). Over the past months of 2020, the Greek government has faced serious problems, as many websites have been attacked and as a result some of them went offline. The websites affected by the cyber-attacks included, among others, the Greek Parliament, the Ministry of Athens Stock Market and several Greek businesses (Liaropoulos, 2020). Media reports have attributed the attacks to Turkish hackers. Today Greece is called upon to provide *security and*

become resilient. In Greece, the vast public sector cyber-security umbrella that has the responsibility for the *prevention* of cyber-attacks includes the following agencies:

- The National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP). Characterized as the Authority of International Security (INFOSEC), it ensures the security of national communications and information technology systems. The Greek Intelligence Service is also responsible for the certification of classified material of national communications. It was designed as the National Authority for the Protection of Cyber-Attacks, and prevents cyber-attacks on communication networks, storage facilities and information systems.
- The National Computer Emergency Response Team: in accordance with decisions by the Government Council for Foreign Policy and National Defence, the National Computer Emergency Response Team coordinates the activities of Intelligence Services related to the collection and disposal of information. It cooperates with the Department of Military Intelligence (E-5 branch) on issues of drafting regulations, certification systems, and the prevention and management of cyber-attacks.
- The General Secretariat of Communications of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport, and Networks collaborates with the directorate of banking supervision. It operates as the authority of telecommunications and shapes the national security strategy, managing the implementation of the security of public networks, energy security and cyber-communications.
- The General Secretariat for Information Systems of the Ministry of Finance: the Office of Information Systems Security and Data Protection and Infrastructure is responsible for drafting the standards for plans, development and operation of the information systems' security and quality control.

In the past ten years, Greece has faced dramatic austerity measures. In 2017 the Greek government decided to establish the National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA), which is being created to bridge the organizational and coordinative gap between the stakeholders (the Ministries of Defence and of Digital Policy and the Media, and the National Intelligence Service) involved in cyberspace security in Greece, in both the public and private sectors. The National Cyber Security Authority evaluates, revises, and updates the National Cyber-Security Strategy in order to make Greece a safe and resilient state (UNIDIR 2020).

2 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GREEK NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

In April 2020, Greece experienced a major resurgence of illegal alien arrivals, replicating the worst moments of the 2015 mass invasion of illegal immigrants, primarily via the Greek islands in the northern Aegean Sea. Human traffickers, operating along Turkey's Aegean shores, often with the collaboration of the Turkish authorities, have perfected their system of pushing the immigrants across the narrows: the inflatable boats are shoved into the water in broad daylight, their passengers are well-equipped with life jackets, and smugglers of different nationalities, carrying

the latest technology mobile phones, steer directly to the Greek island of Lesbos, where Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) receivers are waiting in order to immediately disembark the arrivals and move them to the interior of Lesbos (Symeonides, 2019).

Because of the overburden of illegal immigrants, the critical situation was dramatically highlighted by riots in late September 2019 at the Moria hotspot, which was holding nearly 24,000 people when its original capacity was put at 3,000. The current onslaught from Turkey does not only bring in tens of thousands of uninvited and undocumented aliens, it also promises infiltration by Islamist terrorists seeping out of Syria, with Turkey's tacit approval (Symeonides, 2019).

In the specific case of Islamic terrorism, Greece has been in a lull for a long time, judging that "Greek-Arab friendship" is enough to preclude large-scale Islamist terrorist incidents on Greek soil. This impression is outdated for many reasons: the times have changed radically, especially since the Arab Spring and the rapid rise of ISIS/Daesh; the steady flow of Muslims into Greece has come with an increasing resentment of the newcomers towards the host country; Turkey's subversive tactics and constant hostile probing of the Greek domain make this resentment a potent "unconventional" weapon against Greece; and the possibility of a "lone wolf" action is always present and must not be overlooked (Symeonides, 2019). There is little evidence of the Greek government trying to change to specifically face this highly likely threat. The open border alone invites those who may be planning to hit "infidel" Greece in a demonstration of Islamic might. Greece's convergence with the USA and Israel provides additional political and ideological incentives to potential terrorists in the post Covid-19 era.

Greece needs to grow serious about the critical issues of national security. With Islamist radicals entering Greece in, most likely, increased numbers, the official response to the threat is to send out intelligence (HUMINT) and police officers (EKAM) with lists of names and photos to monitor the crowds freely trudging into Greece. Even the most casual observers cannot but be amused at the "lists and photos" approach to this key security threat, which requires advanced monitoring and detection methods.

The Greek government must take the following recommendations on board immediately in order to tackle non-traditional threats and protect the safety of the Greek and European citizens in the European Union member states (Bruske, 2016):

- Declare a state of national emergency and close the land and sea borders to illegal immigrants;
- Move legislation through parliament post-haste to severely tighten asylum laws and enable the re-vetting of asylum-seekers suspected of fraud with the question of deportation;
- Accelerate deportations and the evacuation of squats;

- Immediately allow stop-and-question police operations in urban centres;
- Tighten the rules pertaining to NGOs and immediately prohibit foreign NGOs from operating inside Greece in support of illegal aliens;
- Intensify and expand intelligence cooperation (HUMINT) with other EU/NATO countries in pursuit of jihadis hiding within the throngs of illegal aliens;
- Increase funding for human resources and training for Greek law enforcement personnel.

In the post Covid-19 era, the above list of recommendations represents the minimum the Greek government should be doing in trying to stem the flows of illegal immigrants to Greece.

3 GREEK INTELLIGENCE SHARING COOPERATION IN COMBATING NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and cyber security threats are both an internal and an external problem. The Greek intelligence service (NIS-EYP), the police anti-terrorism squad, and the department of defence are responsible for domestic security. However, there is not a “security and intelligence culture” in Greece, and this makes it difficult for security and intelligence services to overcome governmental obstacles (lack of evaluation of human resources and nepotism) in order to establish a productive and effective HUMINT and cyber-security intelligence sharing (Nomikos, 2008).

It was not until the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terrorist attacks, which deeply shocked the European Union member states and served as a terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism, much like its American counterpart, that the European approach to understanding Islamic terrorism changed from ascribing the attacks to the failure of intelligence or even imagination to a failure of education (Nomikos, 2007). It is worth pointing out that the Western Balkans has also been considered the home of Islamic extremists. Professor József Kis-Benedek, a Hungarian security expert, states that “followers of conservative and extremist Islam endanger the secular system by labelling normal, moderate religious people as apostates. Many radical people are organized in small groups, in a heterogeneous environment, under the subordination of a radical imam” (Benedek, 2018).

Despite the swirling changes that the Greek law enforcement and intelligence community has undergone in the past few years, enough is known of the world that intelligence will confront beyond 2020 (e.g. biological threats) to begin the reshaping (Nomikos, 2014). The world will require intelligence to be dispersed, sharing its information and analyses with a variety of would-be-coalition partners, including foreigners and people outside governments such as specialized think-tanks which focus their agenda on intelligence studies.

Furthermore, the key element for a successful and efficient Greek HUMINT and cyber security strategy against non-traditional threats (biological warfare, CBRNE,

transnational organized crime networks) is the coordination and quick response of public institutions and the private sector (Nomikos, 2018). A systematic collaboration could manage to *establish a scientifically superior multi-disciplinary HUMINT and cyber security expert team* which could cope with large scale cyber-attacks and terrorist incidents on Greek critical infrastructure. Easy access to the internet, the use of a billion computers and the vast digital networks prevent strict control of the state authorities of the internet.

Concluding remarks

The non-traditional asymmetric threats of the 21st century require intelligence-sharing cooperation, which is the most important weapon in the battle against terrorist acts in order to protect the safety of Greek society and Greece's critical infrastructure in the public and private sectors. Today every state's enemy is not a conventional one, but a faceless and remote entity such as the pandemic (Covid-19).

Cybersecurity and defence have long been part of the EU and NATO, and they have begun to see each other as complementary partners in building their cyber resilience. Similarly, Greece shares intelligence with the EU and NATO member states as part of the agreement on a technical arrangement on Cyber Defence in February 2016 between NATO's computer incident response capability and the EU's Computer Emergency Response Team (Lete, 2017).

Furthermore, the EU member states must explore ways to collaborate more on human intelligence by introducing a "*common European Intelligence Culture*" as well as cyber security standards by endorsing European cyber security policies in order to enhance critical infrastructure within the European Union.

Regardless of the ten-year financial crisis and the pandemic (Covid-19), Greece, a EU and NATO member, has managed to form a National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA) under the auspices of the Ministries of Defence and of Digital Policy and Media, and the National Intelligence Service, and to reconsider further reform of its security and intelligence community.

Finally, *collective action* on intelligence sharing between Greek Law Enforcement and the civilian and military intelligence communities is a necessary weapon in the battle to *contain illegal immigration by sealing the European Union's borders and support the safety of the citizens in the European Union member states!*

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PРАВНА PRIZADEVANJA MADŽARSKE ZA VEČJO ODPORNOST NA PODNEBNE SPREMEMBE

HUNGARY'S LEGAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CLIMATE RESILIENCE

Povzetek Tudi Madžarski je, podobno kot drugim državam, vse pomembnejše, da ima ustrezno podlago za prilagajanje na ekstremne vremenske pojave, ki jih povzročajo podnebne spremembe. Kot strateški odziv na te izzive je bilo v zadnjem času razvitih več pravnih in tehničnih predpisov. V tem procesu sodeluje tudi obrambni resor, zato so v prispevku na primeru madžarskih obrambnih sil izpostavljeni primarna okolijska tveganja, povezana z vojsko, in nekatere možnosti za »bolj zeleno« delovanje oboroženih sil. Majhna država, kot je Madžarska, teh neželenih globalnih procesov ne more ustaviti, si pa prizadeva omiliti posledice in se čim bolj prilagoditi spremembam. Tako lahko tudi poveča svojo odpornost na podnebne spremembe.

Ključne besede *Podnebne spremembe, prilagajanje, odpornost, bojevanje, varnost.*

Abstract It has become important for Hungary, like other countries, to have a proper background in order to adapt to extreme weather phenomena caused by climate change. Several legal and technical regulations have been developed recently as strategic answers to these challenges. The defence sector also takes part in this process, so this paper highlights the primary environmental risks concerning the military, and presents some possibilities for the armed forces to be “greener”, based on the example of the Hungarian Defence Forces. A small country such as Hungary, of course, cannot stop these unwanted global processes; the goal is to ease the consequences and adapt to the changes as much as possible in order to increase climate resilience.

Key words *Climate change, adaptation, resilience, warfare, security.*

Introduction

Based upon global climate model forecasts, the average temperature will increase in the future both globally and in Hungary in such a way that the increment will exceed the extent of natural variability in each season of the year. Despite the increment of averages, there will still be colder years and seasons, but higher temperatures will be more typical. Model results predict that the highest temperature increases will be in the summer and autumn. Up to 2050 the increment will be 1.4-2.6°C in summer and 1.6-2.0°C in autumn compared to the reference periods, and up to the end of the 21st century the increase may approach +4°C in autumn, and even exceed in summer (NÉS-2, 2017, p 2). With regard to precipitation in Hungary, a 3-14% increase is predicted, based on the climate models.

The two main models adapted by the Hungarian Meteorological Service (the ALADIN-Climate and REMO regional climate models) predict totally different values for spring and winter: an increase or even a decrease could occur in either season, not exceeding 10% in the forthcoming decades (Bartholy, et al. 2008, p 255).

Involving more European climate models, it can be said that an increase in precipitation is predicted in wintertime with a certainty of 60% for 2021-2050 and more than 80% for 2071-2100 (which means that 60% and 80% of the models predict an increase in the territory of Hungary). For spring periods, however, even involving more models, the tendency is not so obvious; in the middle of the century, an increase is a bit more likely, but by the end of the 21st century an increase or even a decrease could equally occur (Halász and Földi, 2019a, p 81).

With regard to precipitation the picture is quite complex; model forecasts predict very different scenarios, for example, in the case of annual precipitation values, where even the direction of the change is not unambiguous (Kirovne 2020, p 83). A definite decrease is only predicted for the summer, where all the models show almost the same values (less than 5% for 2021-2050, and 18-43% for 2071-2100) (Szépszó, 2014, p 123).

In Hungary climate change has caused more extreme weather events (heatwaves, high winds, thunderstorms and rainfall, drought, flash floods, etc.), and their social and economic consequences are more serious than the changes in average temperatures and annual precipitation values. A significant increase is also predicted with regard to extreme heatwaves (when a heat alert is officially issued in Hungary), with a small deviation between the two models. In the past reference period the number of summer days with extreme heat was 3.4 on average annually, and the forecast increase is 3.6-10 days for the forthcoming decades and 14-20 days towards the end of the century. Models show that the warmer south-south-east territories will be more affected than the colder, northern part of Hungary (Halász and Földi 2019a, p 82).

1 REACHING THE SECOND NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY IN HUNGARY

In 2003 the Ministry of the Environment, together with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, commenced the project “Global climate change: domestic effects and answers” (VAHAVA) to reveal most of the positive and negative consequences of climate change and to try to provide answers to the emerging domestic problems. It was a 3-year programme to analyse the domestic effects of global warming in the present, in order to suggest countermeasures for the future. The main points were the protection of the atmosphere, and adaptation to the effects of climate change.

The programme's declared aims were preparation, prevention, mitigation and rehabilitation to the effects of climate change. The most important tasks were the gathering and spreading of information, communication of international knowledge, assisting related domestic activities, and organizing meetings and conferences. The main goal of the VAHAVA project was to develop a scientific base for the National Climate Change Strategy (VAHAVA 2005, p 48).

The completion of the National Climate Change Strategy (NÉS) was specified by the national regulations based on the United Nations Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. In order to meet national commitments the 1st National Climate Change Strategy was planned for the 2008-2025 period. Its aims were to be completed by the National Climate Change Programme which is developed and renewed every 2 years.

The 1st National Climate Change Strategy designated 3 main directions in the mid-term climate policy of Hungary:

1. Making regulations appropriate for European and international requirements in order to decrease or at least to prevent a future increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Limiting greenhouse gas emissions by a decrease in total energy demand through the transformation of production and consumption structure, focusing on less energy demanding approaches and areas (MITIGATION).
2. Elaborating the main elements of adaptability to the unavoidable ecological and social consequences of climate change (ADAPTATION).
3. Giving information to citizens in order to boost the environmental awareness of society.

In evaluating the NÉS programme, it was seen that the directions of the desired activities were not totally clear within the NÉS. The means of strengthening the adaptation capabilities was not declared. In the area of mitigation, the strategy properly showed the status and tendencies of domestic greenhouse gas emissions and the strategic goals, and the necessary measures were elaborated in accordance with them; but when it came to the adaptation, the objective was not made in detail, only in some individual areas:

- The protection of ecosystems and nature conservation,
- Human health,
- Water management,
- Agriculture and silviculture,
- Settlement and county development, the human environment.

This weakened the NÉS, as the two main areas had different emphasizes (NÉS 2008).

After the evaluation of the NÉS, the Second National Climate Change Strategy, NÉS-2, was introduced in 2015. It had two comprehensive objectives:

1. Subsistence and sustainable development in the changing world;
2. Recognition of our capabilities, possibilities and limits (NÉS-2 2017, p 4).

2 STRUCTURE OF NÉS-2, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON ADAPTATION

The Second National Climate Change Strategy confirmed that the NÉS was developed with competent professional grounding, but it did not take account of the regional differences in the global effects of climate change, or that the regional differences in social-economic systems can result in different adaptation potentials in particular territories. According to this recognition, during the development of the NÉS-2 the following terms were determined:

- Regional differences should be taken into consideration during the status evaluation, the determination of objectives and the dispatch of measures;
- During the evaluation of the Domestic Decarbonization Pathway and the National Adaptation Strategy, the coherence and equality of the mitigation and the adaptation parts should be guaranteed;
- The development of the population’s approach to climate change should be strengthened. This could provide the third pillar of efficient intervention, beside the prevention of climate change’s negative effects and the strengthening of adaptation capabilities;
- A decision support system should be developed with the improvement of the National Adaptation Geographic Information System (NATÉR) to support local and central governmental planning;
- The objectives and measures declared within NÉS-2 should be integrated into the development policy programme documents, and proper indicators should be selected in order to evaluate the usefulness of subventions.

The new programme declared mitigation-adaptation double objectives to correct the weakness of its predecessor. It contains a “Decarbonization Vision” with the slogan “*Transition to sustainability*”: In order to create and maintain economic competitiveness and advancement together with social well-being with special attention to climate change, Hungary is committed to the transition to a low-carbon economy. The main reason is not about conforming to international obligations, but the national strategic goal of intention towards sustainability:

- Decrease in dependence on fossil fuel energy sources;
- Increase in the ratio of material and energy-saving technologies;
- Increase in the use of renewable energy sources.

Hungary's greenhouse gas emissions have changed in several stages since 1990. At the beginning of the 1990s, the cessation of the former socialist heavy industry (responsible for the majority of the emissions), the transformation of the structure of the economy, and the decreasing output of agriculture together resulted in a drastic decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. In the next period, the change from coal to natural gas in industry and an efficiency increase conserved this favourable process until today, while still allowing the economy to grow. The world financial crisis which began in 2008 also had a huge negative effect on the Hungarian economy (almost 9%), resulting in a further decrease in emissions.

The second half of the objectives pair is the "Adaptation Vision", which has the slogan "*Prepare for the unavoidable, prevent the avoidable!*" With regard to the effects of climate change, Hungary is one of the most vulnerable countries in Europe. To avert the negative natural, social and economic consequences of climate change the tasks of adaptation and preparedness, especially in the areas of water management, security of agricultural yield, protection of our natural values and human health, even in the short term, are built in to our political planning and economic decisions. The tasks of domestic decarbonization and climate adaptation are completed by a climate approach-shaping programme.

The aims of NÉS-2 refer back to the objectives, mirroring the scheme concerning mitigation-adaptation:

1. "*Subsistence and sustainable development in the changing world*" Climate change endangers our national (natural, human and economic) resources, so the related aims here are: to provide good conditions for living in Hungary with the conservation of our natural resources (soil, drinking water, biodiversity) and cultural values, and the protection of human health. To provide sustainable development based on the careful and efficient use of our resources, the changing lifestyles of our citizens, and the resolution of territorial differences.
2. "*Recognition of our capabilities, possibilities and limits*" The recognition of the phenomena, natural effects, territorial features and social-economic consequences of climate change needs comprehensive analysis based on scientific methods. To decrease uncertainty in planning and to support decision-making processes, complex monitoring systems and informatics based analysis-evaluation mechanisms are required, which are also suitable for measuring the effectiveness of countermeasures. To reveal the possibilities of emission reduction and cost-efficient adaptation, dedicated research, development and innovation activities are required (NÉS-2 2017, p 6).

3 CORRELATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ARMED FORCES

In general, military activities create hazards for ecosystems and the environment. It is obvious that military operations during wartime can cause great environmental damage, but armed forces exist and operate even in peacetime, and in a modern society it is unthinkable for soldiers' everyday activities to carry ecological hazards. "Warfare ecology", as a quite new principle, tries to cover every part of military activity in its investigation in order to reveal areas where armed forces can become more environmentally friendly, or just simply "greener" (Padányi and Földi, 2014, p 48). If we follow this principle, we can distinguish three periods of military activity in the timeline of a conflict:

- Military preparation;
- War (the armed conflict itself);
- The post-war rehabilitation period.

Each part contains several key elements (such as infrastructure, governmental, logistical, etc.) which can affect both the efficiency of warfare and the ecological consequences. As a new aspect, the problems for the military caused by global climate change can also be included in all of this.

Thus, the correlation of climate change and the military becomes a very complex problem. On the one hand, the military was (and still is) one of the largest polluters, so is at least partly responsible for the problem. On the other hand, carrying out military operations in a changing environment is always a great challenge. So, we can say that military activities contribute to climate change, while climate change causes more and more problems for the military. It is clear that the consequences of climate change affect military operations at the strategic and tactical, planning and operational levels, touching personnel, equipment, infrastructure, training and exercises (Padányi and Földi, 2014, p 49).

Even in the event of extreme meteorological conditions, military forces must keep their operational capabilities working with modern, sensitive technical equipment and weaponry. Such meteorological extremes are becoming more common because of climate change. Humidity, water itself, strong winds or sudden temperature changes can cause corrosion, short circuits or structural tensions and deformations (Halász, 2013, p 57).

There are decision supporting systems for commanders to help in collecting necessary information about the possible effects of weather conditions, but sudden and extreme weather phenomena can cause extra challenges for military meteorologists.

4 RELATED IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMMES IN THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES

The main task of the Hungarian Defence Force (HDF) is the protection of the national sovereignty of Hungary. To complete this task, soldiers need extended professional training and exercises. This training and the exercises inevitably impact the environment, while the HDF must follow the governmental environment politics and must obey the rules and follow the related legal regulations. In Hungary, it is the decision of the Government to reduce the ecological footprint of the military, so it must be part of the country's climate protection strategy.

One of the main areas of necessary change is the modernization of the military infrastructure, where the main targets are the rationalization of energy consumption and the reduction of harmful emissions. These can be achieved by improvements in heating and lighting systems; the complete energetic reconstruction of buildings' heat insulation and ventilation systems; the wide range application of renewable energies (especially photovoltaic systems); and the economical use of drinking water (Padányi and Földi, 2014, p 50).

There are approximately 14,000 buildings to manage, in nearly 1,700 military installations with 15 million cubic metres of internal volume in Hungary. The Hungarian Ministry of Defence has started the "Green Barrack" programme to modernize the energy consumption of the military infrastructure in order to reduce military emissions and ease its impact on climate change, while improving the use of renewable energy sources and developing other environment protection aspects. The main elements of this ongoing programme are research into and application of renewable energies, improvement in heating systems, energetic reconstruction of buildings with new ventilation and heat insulation systems, improvement of lighting with more economic solutions (e.g. LED lamps), economic use of drinking water with utilization of rainwater, and other different environment protection projects (Kovács, 2013, p 71).

Within the framework of the Governmental Reform Operative Programme, the data digitalization of military procurements and improvements in data supply processes have begun, with the aim of turning all the procurement data of the HDF from paper storage to digital form and integrating it into the Military Procurement Information System, enabling a wide range of military procurement processes to be conducted electronically.

Running under the Environmental and Energy Efficiency Operative Programme, there are several projects for the energetic improvement of military installations to renovate designated buildings of the HDF on their bases. These building investments involve changing doors, windows and other openings to modern types, post-insulation of outer walls and slab structures, and installations of individual solar energy based power generators in order to minimize the costs of energy consumption.

The decision for the installations under the monetary supervision of the Ministry of Defence, in order to decrease the necessary amount of procured energy, is to build more electric power generators based on renewable sources, and in this way decrease CO₂ emissions. This project is on a nationwide scale, with minor power generators to be installed on 13 different military sites with a total performance of 409 kW (Galambos, 2018, p 40).

Because of the negative effects of global climate change, improvements are necessary in several other areas concerning the performance of the armed forces, as these effects have both long-term and immediate consequences to security. For example, the number and severity of natural disasters is growing all over the world, causing new challenges for forces and organizations taking part in disaster management, including the military. Within the extremes, the main primary phenomena are:

- Extreme high (or cold) temperatures;
- Extreme precipitation (prolonged rainfall or snow, storms, thunder, blizzards, supercells);
- High winds or windstorms, or tornados.

Primary phenomena can cause secondary consequences. In Hungary, the most common types are:

- Floods and inland inundation;
- Intense fires (including forest and wildfires) and increased explosion hazards;
- Damage to critical infrastructure, disturbances in public utilities and other supply networks, and deficiency situations (Halász and Földi, 2019b, p 392).

It is therefore also important to improve and modernize military installations providing disaster relief capabilities for the armed forces, because in the event of a serious natural or industrial disaster the HDF is one of the intervention forces both in relief and rehabilitation. Furthermore, in some complex disaster situations the military has unique and indispensable capabilities such as airlift, amphibious transport, or CBRN protection and decontamination. Modernization efforts are already going on within the framework of the Széchenyi 2020 programme, with coherent support from the European Union and the financial partnership of the government, affecting 25 of our military units. Seven new units have been formed and 18 are getting various capability improvements. A project to improve the HDF's disaster management and relief capabilities is focusing on the expansion and modernization of devices and materials necessary for flood protection. The investment contains procurements of modern information and communication systems, heavy amphibious transport vehicles, heavy land transport and carrier trucks, mounted field kitchens, high performance water and wastewater pumps, flexible fuel containers (up to 300 m³), mobile hazmat containers, CBRN IPEs, scuba diving sets, safety belts and coats and protective sheets. This investment will improve the efficiency of HDF forces in disaster relief activities, and the safety of our citizens (Defence Economy Office 2020).

Besides the capability improvement of the HDF, volunteer reservist area protection battalions are forming in order to have well-trained, capable forces to be implemented in every county in case of need. The soldiers of area protection forces undergo theoretical and practical training so that they can fortify the self-defence capabilities of local communities in both military defence and disaster relief (Földi and Padányi, 2018, p 59).

Discussion The aims of the strategy listed above show the commitment of the Hungarian Government to creating a more secure environment, putting the emphasis on a wider use of renewable energy sources with a low carbon profile of the economy and a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. Nature conservation and saving our environmental resources have also become of paramount importance. The country's most recent National Security Strategy (which came into effect on 21 April, 2020) also recognizes the challenge created by the global climate change as a major hazard in Hungary (Governmental Decree 1163/2020, p 2103).

Efforts towards better adaptation of the population, included in human health programmes, can increase people's climate resilience. A broad range of medical screening programmes to survey different climate sensitivities in our citizens, and nutritional and physical exercise consultancies and guidance as preventive measures can help to reduce climate change related illnesses. The final objective is to achieve a better standard of life and an even higher average life expectancy, even in the more difficult environmental conditions of the future.

Each field must play its own part in the efforts of society, even the defence sector. Following the vision of decarbonization of NÉS-2 in the areas of sustainability, especially decreasing our dependence on fossil fuels, the spread of material and energy saving technologies, and using renewables, several modernization programmes have been started recently, focusing on the peacetime activities of the armed forces. Besides other projects, the Green Barracks programme has also begun. Building alternative energy sources into the energy supply of military installations (such as biomass, biogas, solar and wind energies) is part of the programme, in order to use renewables to produce hot water, electricity and heat in military buildings. The use of green energy even extends to areas of operations and field camps (Kovács, 2013, p 74).

Warfare is a human activity which causes intense and long-lasting impacts on the biosphere. The local (or larger scale) degradation can be irreversible, so the consequences to the environment and society should be of great concern. Taking the number and extent of today's military conflicts into consideration, we can certainly say that the ecological footprint of warfare is way too large. Warfare ecology, as a new scientific approach, can help to better understand the problem, to analyse it, and to find environmentally friendly solutions (Krajnc, 2015, p 254).

Our scientific research, surveys and analyses can help to reveal more precisely the consequences of military activities both in wartime and in peace, and to provide more effective countermeasures to ease them.

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RECENZIJAZ

**KAKO NAJ POTEKAJO VOJNE?
VOJAŠKA STRATEGIJA V PRIMERJAVI
S POLITIČNIMI ODLOČITVAMI**

Vsakega bralca, ki kupi najnovejšo knjigo *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present* (Zakaj Amerika izgublja vojne – omejena vojna in ameriška strategija od korejske vojne do danes) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) profesorja Donalda Stokerja¹, v kateri avtor analizira vojne in spopade Združenih držav Amerike od korejske vojne naprej, čaka zanimivo branje. Zaradi provokativnega naslova knjige jo bralec začne brati z rahlim nezaupanjem, saj je ta v nasprotju s podobo ZDA kot vodilne svetovne sile, ki lahko skoraj vse države sveta prepriča v sodelovanje z njo bodisi v političnem, gospodarskem ali vojaškem smislu. Zelo pretresljivo je zato spoznanje, kako različno voditelji ameriških in zahodnih držav razmišljajo o vojni. V številnih primerih ne vedo natančno, kaj vojna sploh pomeni in kakšne so lahko posledice njenega izbruha in spopadov. V več spopadih se je izkazalo, da so v tej vodilni svetovni velesili politični odločevalci v neki situaciji razmišljali povsem drugače, kar je pogosto pripeljalo do nasprotujočih si odločitev. Glavni razlog za to ni politična pripadnost, temveč dejstvo, da politiki in vojaki, ki sodelujejo v spopadih, nimajo enake predstave

¹ Donald Stoker je bil profesor strategije in politike v programu ameriške vojaške šole US Naval War College na Naval Postgraduate School v Montereyu v Kaliforniji od leta 1999 do 2017. Je avtor ali urednik 11 knjig, njegova knjiga *Carl von Clausewitz: His Life and Work* (Carl von Clausewitz: življenje in delo) (Oxford University Press, 2014) je na seznamu obveznega strokovnega čtiva britanske kopenske vojske. Njegova knjiga *The Grand Design: Strategy and the US Civil War, 1861-1865* (Oxford University Press, 2010) je prejela prestižno nagrado Fletcher Pratt, vključena je bila v glavni izbor knjig knjižnega kluba History Book Club, je na seznamu obveznega čtiva načelnika štaba ameriške kopenske vojske in se pogosto uporablja kot študijsko besedilo na tečajih strateških študij in zgodovine v ZDA in drugod. Leta 2016 je bil Stoker strokovni sodelavec v programu *Changing Character of War Programme* na Pembroke Collegeu univerze v Oxfordu. V študijskem letu 2017–2018 je bil zaslužni profesor političnih znanosti programa Fullbright na diplomatski akademiji na Dunaju v Avstriji. Trenutno je višji strokovni sodelavec pri organizaciji Atlas v Washingtonu in piše knjigo *American Grand Strategy, 1775–2020* (Ameriška velika strategija, 1775–2020) za založbo Basic Books. Njegova najnovejša knjiga je *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy From the Korean War to the Present* (Zakaj Amerika izgublja vojne – omejena vojna in ameriška strategija od korejske vojne do danes) (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Živi v Montereyu v Kaliforniji.

glede ciljev in rezultatov, ki bi jih bilo treba doseči, ali strategij, ki bi jih bilo treba uporabiti. V številnih primerih je to pripeljalo do nepotrebnih izgub in vojn, ki so trajale veliko dlje, kot bi bilo potrebno. Tak primer sta Irak in Afganistan.

Oblikovalci politik se pogosto ne zavedajo stare modrosti Carla von Clausewitza, ki ga Stoker pogosto citira in izhaja iz njegove knjige *O vojni*, da je vojna nadaljevanje politike z drugimi sredstvi. Ta izjava predpostavlja, da politiki začnejo spopad z jasnimi cilji in natančno predstavo o tem, katere rezultate želijo doseči. Poleg tega se zavedajo, da lahko na uspeh vojne, pa naj bo še tako kratka ali omejena, vplivajo dejavniki, kot so geografsko okolje, gospodarsko ozadje, logistične zmogljivosti, socialna podpora, zgodovinsko in kulturno ozadje ter drugo. Vendar se lahko nekateri od teh dejavnikov med spopadom spremenijo, zato je treba cilje in strategije občasno pregledati in jih, če je treba, preoblikovati glede na trenutno realno stanje.

Jordan Ellenberg je o teh starih resnicah podobno razmišljal v svoji knjigi *How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking* (Kako ne biti v zmoti: moč matematičnega razmišljanja), v kateri je zapisal, da države v vojnah ne zmagajo le zato, ker so pogumnejše ali svobodnejše od nasprotne strani ali ker jih ima Bog nekoliko raje. Zmagovalci so navadno fantje, ki jim sestrelijo za približno 5 odstotkov manj letal, ki porabijo 5 odstotkov manj goriva ali za svojo pehoto dobijo 5 odstotkov več hrane za 95 odstotkov stroškov. To niso stvari, ki bi bile del vojnih filmov, so pa stvari, ki so del vojne. In matematika je prisotna na vsakem koraku.² Kljub temu večina političnih odločevalcev, ki svoje države vodijo v neskončne vojne, na te stvari nenehno pozablja. Posledice teh vojn trpijo vojaki, ki se borijo v bitkah, in civilno prebivalstvo na prizadetih območjih. Stoker torej na te odločevalce upravičeno prenaša krivdo za neustrezno uporabo strateškega razmišljanja. To je še posebno pomembno glede na dejstvo, da se obdobje »omejene vojne«, ki je zaznamovalo zadnji dve desetletji, končuje, in kaj lahko se zgodi, da se bo ZDA soočila z vse bolj enakovrednimi nasprotniki, kot sta Kitajska in Rusija. Pričakovati je, da bo šlo za konvencionalen spopad, na kar pa ameriška politična in vojaška vodstvena struktura, vajena protiuporniškega delovanja in hitrih uspehov, verjetno ne bo ustrezno pripravljena. S tega stališča bi lahko ta knjiga delovala celo kot opozorilo voditeljem, naj se začnejo pripravljati na poznejše obdobje, čeprav avtor ne predlaga načinov, kako to, kar je zapisal, uporabiti v praksi.

Ena glavnih odlik knjige je, da pojasnjuje pogosto uporabljene politične in vojaške koncepte, kot so enostranskost, večstranskost, vrste političnih ciljev, strategija, taktika, cilji, operacije, vnaprejšnja in preventivna vojna, vojna v sivem območju, omejena vojna, mala vojna, ugnezdjena vojna, zmaga in mir. Druga resna dodana vrednost knjige je, da skoraj fanatično poudarja potrebo po aktivnejšem,

² Jordan Ellenberg: *How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking*, Penguin, 2014, str. 7
(»Countries don't win wars just being braver than the other side, or freer; or slightly preferred by God. The winners are usually the guys who get 5% fewer of their planes shot down, or use 5% less fuel, or get 5% more nutrition into their infantry at 95% of the cost. That's not the stuff war movies are made of, but it's the stuff wars are made of. And there's math every step of the way.«)

učinkovitejšem dialogu in sodelovanju med politično in vojaško stranjo, zaradi česar se lahko težave pri razlagi med različnimi skupinami in akterji znatno zmanjšajo in sodelovanje izboljša. Predvsem se mi je zdelo zanimivo, da je avtor predstavil več političnih in vojaških dogodkov, ne samo iz ameriškega, temveč tudi mednarodnega okolja, več postopkov odločanja, ki do njih privedejo, ter njihovo ozadje, ki ga veliko zgodovinarjev in vojaških zgodovinarjev ne pozna v celoti. Avtor poleg opisa zgodovinskih dogodkov omenja tudi številne vojaške in politične stratege, kot so Sun Cu, Carl von Clausewitz, Bernard Brodie (bolj znan v ZDA) in drugi, ter njihova razmišljanja, ki na neki način še danes vplivajo na vojskovanje, čeprav se z nekaterimi ne strinja. Kljub vsemu sem poleg številnih pozitivnih strani knjige pogrešal dejstvo, da avtor, čeprav predstavi skoraj vsak ameriški konflikt v zadnjih nekaj desetletjih, govori le o tem, da se ZDA »zapletajo v neskončne vojne«, in ne o tem, kako je vojna večkrat tudi dosegla svoj cilj, na primer v Grenadi, Panami ali na Balkanu. Morda bi veljalo natančneje pogledati, čemu te uspehe pripisati, in iz tega kaj ugotoviti. Kljub vsemu pa to ne vpliva na vrednost knjige.

Še posebej mi je bilo všeč, da je Stoker ostal zvest svojim preteklim izkušnjam predavatelja na univerzi in je knjigo oblikoval tako, da lahko koristi tudi tistim, ki to področje manj poznajo. K temu pripomorejo jasne razlage in obsežne razprave o različnih konceptih. Bralci iz različnih okolij tako dobijo enotno predstavo o tem, kako poteka politično odločanje, kaj je vojna, kako se v njej boriti in, kar je najpomembnejše, kako jo končati, kaj različni akterji o njej mislijo, predstavi pa tudi razlike v načinih razmišljanja politikov in vojakov, ki v vojni sodelujejo. Po drugi strani bi lahko bila knjiga zelo koristna tudi za politične in strateške odločevalce. Ti pogosto z minimalnim znanjem in pomanjkanjem ustreznih osnovnih informacij sprejemajo odločitve, ki lahko imajo zelo resne posledice. Kot veteran z 31-letnimi izkušnjami v poklicni vojski, ki je kariero začel s činom vodnika v bojni enoti in končal kot polkovnik na generalštabu, se popolnoma strinjam z avtorjevo knjigo, ki bi jo morali prebrati ne samo ameriški, temveč tudi politični in vojaški voditelji vseh drugih držav kot nekakšno gradivo osnovnega strateškega šolanja in se tako naučiti, kako sprejemati premišljene odločitve o vojaških vprašanjih, kako uspešno in razumljivo posredovati med političnimi odločitvami in vojaškimi skupnostmi, ki jih izvajajo, in kakšne so lahko posledice odločitev, ki jih sprejemajo.

REVIEW

HOW SHOULD WARS BE FOUGHT? MILITARY STRATEGY VS POLITICAL DECISIONS

An extremely interesting read can be had by any reader who buys Professor Donald Stoker's¹ most recent book *Why America Loses Wars – Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), which analyzes the wars and conflicts fought by the United States of America since the Korean War. After the provocative title of the book, the reader begins to read with some suspicion, as it does not fit into the image of the United States as the world's leading power, one which can persuade almost all the countries of the world to deal with it either in political or economic or military cooperation. This is why it is shocking to face how differently the leaders of American and Western countries think about war; in many cases they do not even know exactly what it means, and what the consequences of its outbreak and the fighting can be. In several conflicts it can be seen that in the world's leading power, the political decision-makers thought in a completely different way in a given situation, often leading to conflicting decisions. This is not primarily due to political affiliation, but to the fact that the various actors involved in conflicts – politicians and soldiers – do not have a common vision of the goals and the results to be achieved or the strategies to be used. In many cases, it has

¹ Donald Stoker was Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College's Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, from 1999 until 2017. The author or editor of 11 books, his *Carl von Clausewitz: His Life and Work* (Oxford University Press, 2014) is on the British Army professional reading list. *The Grand Design: Strategy and the US Civil War, 1861-1865* (Oxford University Press, 2010) won the prestigious Fletcher Pratt award, was a Main Selection of the History Book Club, is on the US Army Chief of Staff's reading list, and is widely used as a text in strategic studies and history courses both in the US and abroad. In 2016, Stoker was a Fellow of the Changing Character of War Programme at the University of Oxford's Pembroke College. During the 2017-2018 academic year he was the Fulbright Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Austria. He is currently a Senior Fellow with the Atlas Organization in Washington, DC, and is writing *American Grand Strategy, 1775-2020 for Basic Books*. His most recent book is *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy From the Korean War to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2019). He lives in Monterey, California.

led to unnecessary losses and wars that have gone on far longer than they needed to – see Iraq and Afghanistan.

Policymakers are often unaware of the old wisdom of Carl von Clausewitz – often quoted by Stoker – formulated in his book *On War*, “*War as Politics by other Means*”. This assumes that politicians start a conflict with clear objectives, knowing exactly what results they want to achieve. In addition, they are aware that the success of a war, however short-term or limited, may be influenced by factors such as the geographical environment, economic background, logistical capabilities, social support, historical and cultural background, and so on. However, some of these factors may change during the conflict, so the objectives and strategies need to be reviewed from time to time and, if necessary, redesigned according to the realities of the time.

Jordan Ellenberg took a similar view of these old truths in his book, *How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking*; he said “Countries don’t win wars just being braver than the other side, or freer, or slightly preferred by God. The winners are usually the guys who get 5% fewer of their planes shot down, or use 5% less fuel, or get 5% more nutrition into their infantry at 95% of the cost. That’s not the stuff war movies are made of, but it’s the stuff wars are made of. And there’s math every step of the way”². Even so, these things are constantly forgotten by most political decision-makers who lead their countries into endless wars, the consequences of which are suffered by the soldiers fighting the battles and the civilian population in the areas affected. Therefore, Stoker can rightly hold these decision-makers accountable for their lack of the proper application of strategic thinking. This is particularly important in view of the fact that the period of “limited war” which has characterized the last two decades is coming to an end, and the US may face increasingly equal opponents like China or Russia. The conflict against them is expected to be conventional, for which the American political and military leadership, accustomed to anti-insurgency operations and rapid success, is unlikely to be properly prepared. From this point of view, the book could even act as an alarm bell, so that leaders can begin preparations for the later period, although the author did not suggest how what he had articulated could be put into practice.

One of the major strengths of the book is that it clarifies commonly used political and military concepts such as unilateralism, multilateralism, types of political objective, strategy, tactics, objectives, operations, pre-emptive and preventive war, gray zone war, limited war, little war, nested war, victory and peace. The other serious strength of the book is that it almost fanatically emphasizes the need for more active, effective dialogue and cooperation between the political and military sides, as a result of which interpretation problems between different groups and actors can be significantly reduced and cooperation can be improved. It was particularly interesting to me that the author presented several political and military events – not only from American but also from international environments – and the decision-making processes leading

² Jordan Ellenberg: *How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking*, Penguin, 2014, p 7

to them and their background, which many historians and military historians are not fully aware of. In addition to describing historical events, the author lists a large number of military and political strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, or Bernard Brodie (better known in the United States), and others, and he also outlines their thoughts – even if he disagrees with some of them – which in some way still have an impact on warfare to this day. However, in addition to the many positives, I missed the fact that although the author presented almost every American conflict in recent decades, he only talked about the US “getting into endless wars”, and not how on several occasions the war – as in Grenada, Panama, or the Balkans – also achieved its goal. Here, perhaps, it would have been worthwhile to take a closer look at what these successes were due to and to draw conclusions from them. However, this does not detract from the value of the book.

I especially liked that Stoker stayed true to his university teaching past and built his book in a way that even those who are less familiar with the subject could profit from. This is aided by clear explanations and extensive discussions of the various concepts. This helps readers from different backgrounds get a unified picture of how political decision-making takes place, what a war is, how to fight it and, most importantly, how to finish it, what the different actors think about it, and the differences in the way of thinking of politicians and soldiers involved in war. On the other hand, it could also be extremely useful to political and strategic decision-makers, who often make decisions that have a very serious impact with minimal knowledge and a lack of adequate background information. As a veteran of 31 years as a professional soldier, one who began his career as a sergeant in the troops and finished as a colonel on the General Staff, I fully agree with the author's book, which should be read not only by American but all other countries' political and military leaders, as a kind of basic strategic course material to know how to make informed decisions on military issues, how to communicate successfully and intelligibly between political decision-making and the military communities implementing them, and what the consequences of the decisions they make may be.

Avtorji

Authors



Rok Svetlič

Dr. Rok Svetlič je zaposlen kot znanstveni svetnik v Znanstveno-raziskovalnem središču Koper, kjer je vodja Pravnega inštituta in član znanstvenega sveta. Je tudi predavatelj na ISH Alma Mater Europaea, Evropski pravni fakulteti in Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije. Njegove glavne raziskovalne teme so filozofija prava, ontologija in etika. Do leta 2020 je objavil 36 znanstvenih člankov, 16 poglavij v monografijah, 5 monografij in univerzitetni učbenik.

Rok Svetlič, PhD, works as a research counsellor at Science and Research Centre Koper, where he is head of the Institute of Law and a member of the Scientific Council. He is also a lecturer at ISH Alma Mater Europaea, the European Law Faculty and the Faculty of Government and European Studies. His main research topics include philosophy of law, ontology, and ethics. By 2020 he had published 36 scientific articles, 16 chapters in monographs, 5 monographs and one university textbook).



Thomas Matyok

Dr. Thomas Matyok je izvršni direktor Mreže za skupno interakcijo civilnega in vojaškega področja ter višji predavatelj za analizo in reševanje konfliktov na državni univerzi Middle Georgia v ZDA. Izvaja vplivne, za politiko pomembne študije, povezane s strateškim okoljem, glavnimi strateškimi izzivi tega okolja in s tem povezanim ravnovesjem med cilji nacionalne in človekove varnosti. Raziskuje tudi načine združevanja projektnih analiz in analiz reševanja konfliktov za dosego večdimenzionalnega razumevanja konflikta. Je član Interacta Global Network.

Thomas Matyók, PhD, is Executive Director of the Joint Civil-Military Interaction Network and Senior Lecturer in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Middle Georgia State University, USA. He conducts high-impact, policy-relevant studies regarding the strategic environment, its principle strategic challenges, and the relative balance of national and human security ends, ways, and means to contend with them. He also investigates ways of merging design and conflict analysis and resolution methodologies to achieve a multi-dimensional understanding of conflict. He is a member of Interacta Global Network.



Srečko Zajc

Srečko Zajc je bil novinar, glavni urednik, direktor in generalni sekretar nacionalnega združenja Rdečega križa. Leta 2008 se je zaposlil na Ministrstvu za obrambo in razvil slovenski civilni prispevek k Isafu. Do septembra 2019 je bil generalni direktor Direktorata za obrambne zadeve. Strokovno ga zanimajo obrambno načrtovanje, zaščita kritične infrastrukture, odpornost, civilna podpora vojski, civilno-vojaško sodelovanje ter interakcija civilnega in vojaškega področja. Junija 2019 mu je Natov center odličnosti za civilno-vojaško sodelovanje podelil nagrado za odličnost na področju civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja. Je član Interacta Global Network.

Srečko Zajc, was a journalist, chief editor, manager, and secretary general of the national Red Cross society. He joined the MoD in 2008 and developed Slovenian civilian contribution to ISAF. Until September 2019 he was Director General of the Defence Affairs Directorate. His professional interest includes defence planning, critical infrastructure protection, resilience, civilian support to the military, civil-military cooperation and interaction. In June 2019 the NATO CCOE awarded him with the CIMIC Award of Excellence. He is a member of Interacta Global Network.



Viktor Potočnik

Podpolkovnik Viktor Potočnik, magister vojaških ved (Master Military Arts & Science, ZDA), je v Slovenski vojski zaposlen od leta 2001. Bil je poveljnik motoriziranega voda, minometne čete in motorizirane čete v mirovni operaciji ter načelnik sektorja S-3 pehotne brigade. Leta 2011 je končal višje štabno šolanje v Fort Leavenworthu v ZDA. Od leta 2013 do 2020 je opravljal različne dolžnosti v Generalštabu Slovenske vojske. Udeležil se je štirih mirovnih operacij in misij ter opravil več izobraževanj in usposabljanj v tujini. Od septembra 2020 dela na Poveljstvu sil Slovenske vojske.

Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Potočnik, MMAS, was commissioned in 2001. He started his career as Motorised Platoon Leader and later Mortar Company Commander, Motorised Company Commander on deployment, and Brigade Chief S-3. In 2011 he completed Command & General Staff Course, Fort Leavenworth, USA and obtained the title Master of Military Arts and Science. Between 2013 and 2020 he was working at the SAF General Staff. He has been deployed four times, and has attended several career and functional training courses abroad. Since September 2020 he has been performing duties at the SAF Force Command).



Liliana Brožič

Izred. prof. dr. Liliana Brožič je na Ministrstvu za obrambo Republike Slovenije zaposlena od leta 1996. Od leta 2009 je odgovorna urednica Sodobnih vojaških izzivov, prej Bilten Slovenske vojske, ki jih izdaja Generalštab Slovenske vojske. Kot raziskovalka je dodatno zaposlena na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije Nove univerze, pri projektu Integralna prihodnost Evropske unije, ki ga financira Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije. Habilitirana je za področje varnostnih študij. Na fakulteti je članica habilitacijske komisije in predsednica komisije za kakovost.

Assoc. Prof. Liliana Brožič, PhD, joined the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia in 1996. Since 2009 she has been Managing Editor of *Contemporary Military Challenges* (formerly *Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin*), published by the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. She is additionally employed as a researcher at the Faculty of Government and European Studies, New University, in the project *Integral Future of the European Union*, funded by the Slovenian Research Agency. She is habilitated in the field of security studies. At the faculty, she is a member of the habilitation commission and chair of the quality commission.



Denis Čaleta

VVU XIV r. in izred. prof. dr. Denis Čaleta je zaposlen v Slovenski vojski od leta 1991. Predava na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije, pa tudi v drugih strokovnih in akademskih okoljih. Njegova področja raziskovanja so procesi zoperstavljanja terorizmu v nacionalnem in mednarodnem okolju, vloga oboroženih sil v asimetričnem varnostnem okolju, procesi varovanja kritične infrastrukture in varovanja tajnosti. Je predsednik sveta Inštituta za korporativne varnostne študije – ICS Ljubljana in predsednik Slovenskega združenja korporativne varnosti.

Senior Military Specialist, Class XIV and Assoc. Prof. Denis Čaleta, PhD, joined Slovenian armed forces in 1991. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Government and European studies, and professionally and academically engaged in the work of other institutions. His research work focuses on national and international counter-terrorism processes, role of armed forces in an asymmetric security environment, processes of critical infrastructure protection, and information security. He is President of the Council of the Institute for Corporate Security Studies – ICS Ljubljana and the President of the Slovenian Association of Corporate Security.



Sara Perković

Sara Perković je zaposlena v podjetju Nanobit, d. o. o., po štirih letih dela v tajskem generalnem konzulatu v Zagrebu. Diplomirala je iz komunikologije in končala podiplomski študij mednarodnih odnosov in diplomacije na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije v Kranju.

Sara Perković is currently employed at Nanobit d.o.o. after having worked at the Consulate General of Thailand in Zagreb for four years. She holds a bachelor's degree in communication studies and has completed postgraduate studies in International relations and diplomacy in the Faculty of Government and European Studies in Kranj, Slovenia.



John M. Nomikos

Prof. dr. John M. Nomikos je direktor grškega raziskovalnega inštituta za evropske in ameriške študije (RIEAS) ter ustanovni urednik zbornika Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies. V sodelovanju s prof. Josephom Fitsanakisom je nazadnje uredil knjigo »Intelligence Beyond the Anglosphere: Mediterranean and Balkan Regions« (Atene, RIEAS 2017). Kot raziskovalec se ukvarja z reformami na obveščevalnem področju, z bojem proti terorizmu, s protiobveščevalno dejavnostjo, trgovino z ljudmi, hibridnimi grožnjami, nadnacionalnim organiziranim kriminalom ter radikalizacijo v balkanski in sredozemski regiji.

Prof. John M. Nomikos, PhD, is Director of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), and Founding Editor, Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies. His latest book, co-edited with Prof. Joseph Fitsanakis, is "Intelligence Beyond the Anglosphere: Mediterranean and Balkan Regions" (Athens, RIEAS 2017). His research focuses on intelligence reforms, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, Human Trafficking, Hybrid threats, Transnational Organized Crime, Radicalization in the Balkan and Mediterranean regions.



Tamás Berek

Podpolkovnik izr. prof. dr. Tamás Berek je leta 2002 diplomiral kot vodja kemijske varnosti na Fakulteti za vodstvene vede Nacionalne obrambne univerze v Budimpešti. Leta 2008 je končal podiplomski študij in postal varnostni inženir. Leta 2007 je doktoriral, leta 2015 pa je bil habilitiran na Nacionalni univerzi za javno upravo v Budimpešti za področje vojaške znanosti. Na področju raziskovanja se ukvarja s teorijo JRKB-obrambe in vprašanji varnosti voda.

Lieutenant Colonel Assoc. Prof. Tamás Berek, PhD, graduated from the Faculty of Leadership Sciences in National Defence University 2002 (as a chemical safety manager). In 2008 he completed post-graduate studies (safety engineer). He earned his PhD in 2007, and in 2015 was habilitated in the field of Military Science at the NUPS. His research areas include theory of CBRN defence, and water safety issues.



László Földi

Polkovnik prof. dr. László Földi je leta 1990 diplomiral na univerzi v Budimpešti kot raziskovalni kemik. Podiplomski študij je končal leta 1994. Leta 2003 je doktoriral in bil leta 2015 habilitiran na Nacionalni univerzi za javno upravo v Budimpešti za področje vojaške tehnologije. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z okoljsko varnostjo in podnebnimi spremembami, kemičnim orožjem in vprašanji neširjenja orožja.

Colonel prof. László Földi, PhD graduated from the Budapest University in 1990 (as a researcher chemist). In 1994 he completed his post-graduate studies. He earned his PhD in 2003 and in 2015 habilitated in the field of Military Technology at the NUPS. His research areas include environmental security and climate change, chemical weapons and their non-proliferation issues.



József Padányi

Generalmajor prof. dr. József Padányi je diplomiral na Nacionalni obrambni univerzi Zrínyi Miklósv v Budimpešti. Kot raziskovalec se ukvarja z vojaškimi nalogami ob zaščiti in reševanju ter s povezovanjem podnebnih sprememb in varnosti. Podeljen mu je bil naziv doktor Madžarske akademije znanosti.

Major General prof. József Padányi, PhD, graduated from the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, Budapest. His research areas include military tasks of disaster relief operations and correspondence of climate change and security. He holds a title of 'Doctor of Hungarian Academy of Sciences'.

Navodila za avtorje

Instructions to authors

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- Splošno** **Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja ter recenzije znanstvenih in strokovnih monografij (prikaz knjige).
- Vojaškošolski zbornik** je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.
- Vsebina** Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.
- Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za ponovno objavo.
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- Dolžina prispevka** Praviloma naj bo obseg prispevka 16 strani ali 30.000 znakov s presledki (ena avtorska pola). Najmanjši dovoljeni obseg je 8 strani ali 15.000 znakov s presledki, največji pa 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.
- Recenzija znanstvene in strokovne monografije (prikaz knjige) naj obsega največ 3000 znakov s presledki.
- Recenzije** Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, nato pa, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.
- Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.
- Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.
- Lektoriranje** Lektoriranje besedil je zagotovljeno v okviru publikacije. Lektorirana besedila se vrnejo avtorjem v avtorizacijo.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2
Naslov prispevka	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
Povzetek	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
Povzetek v angleščini	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Izjemoma se prevajanje povzetka in ključnih besed zagotovi v okviru publikacije.
Ključne besede	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
Oblikovanje besedila	Avtorji besedilo oblikujejo s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik, pisava Arial. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
Predstavitev avtorjev	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov s presledki (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka, po navedeni literaturi.
Strukturiranje besedila	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). <i>Primer:</i> 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)
Oblikovanje seznama literature	V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja . Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu. <i>Primeri:</i> <i>a) knjiga:</i> Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. Naslov dela. Kraj: Založba. Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ur. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Primer:

Ulrich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite priimek avtorja, letnico izdaje in stran. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 12) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite tudi stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...

Če je avtor omenjen v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo le letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).


Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Diagrami se štejejo kot slike.

Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



- Opombe pod črto** Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.
- Kratice** Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.
- Format zapisa prispevka** Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word.
- Kontaktne podatke avtorja** Prispevkom naj bo dodan avtorjev elektronski naslov.
- Kako poslati prispevek** Avtor pošlje prispevek na elektronski naslov odgovorne urednice.
- Potrjevanje prejetja prispevka** Odgovorna urednica avtorju potrdi prejetje prispevka.
- Korekture** Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.
- Naslov uredniškega odbora** Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija
Elektronski naslov
Odgovorna urednica:
liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

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Name 1 Surname 1,
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Example:
 1 Introduction
 2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)
- Bibliography** Bibliography should include an alphabetical list of authors referred to in the article. Each reference has to comply with the **Harvard referencing style**.
Examples:
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 Surname, name (initial), year. Title. Place. Publishing House.
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 b) *journal*
 E.g. Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ed. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, pp 44–68. For individual articles in a journal, the pages where the article is located are also to be indicated at the end of each source, e.g.
 c) *article in a journal*
 Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, pp 143–167.

Referencing from the internet

Internet sources are referenced the same as with printed ones, but are followed by the information about where on the Internet and when the document was obtained. The information when a document was obtained is important because of the frequent changes to the www environment.

Example:

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Citation

When citing sources in the text, indicate the author’s surname, the year of publication and page. *Example:* (Smith, 1997, p 12) ...

When quoting a part of the text, put the text in the quotation marks, and indicate in the parentheses the author and year followed by the page of the quoted text.

Example: ...(Smith, 1997, p 15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables to be included in the article should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The location in the text where the image is to be inserted should be clearly indicated. The total length of the article may not exceed the given limit.

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.....

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



Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes


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Vsebina

Liliana Brožič	UVODNIK NOVA VLOGA OBOROŽENIH SIL KOT ODZIV NA ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE
Liliana Brožič	EDITORIAL THE NEW ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS
Rok Svetlič	MONISTIČNA TEORIJA ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC IN OHROMLJENOST VARNOSTNIH SISTEMOV – PRIMER ILEGALNIH MIGRACIJ MONISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PARALYSIS OF SECURITY SYSTEMS – THE CASE OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION
Thomas Matyók Srečko Zajc	SKUPNA INTERAKCIJA CIVILNEGA IN VOJAŠKEGA PODROČJA KOT ORODJE PRI ODZIVANJU NA HIBRIDNE GROŽNJE JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION AS A TOOL IN RESPONDING TO HYBRID THREATS
Viktor Potočnik	SPREMEMBA V KARAKTERJU BOJEVANJA IN TRANSFORMACIJA PEHOTNEGA ODDELKA, VODA IN ČETE THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INFANTRY SQUAD, PLATOON AND COMPANY
Liliana Brožič	ILEGALNE MIGRACIJE IN VLOGA SLOVENSkih OBOROŽENIH SIL ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES
Denis Čaleta Sara Perkovič	PRIPRAVLJENOST EVROPSKIH DRŽAV NA VRNITEV TUJIH BORCEV ISLAMSKÉ DRŽAVE READINESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
John M. Nomikos	ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE V GRČIJI: DESKRIPTIVNA ANALIZA ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THREATS IN GREECE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Tamás Berek László Földi József Padányi	PRAVNA PRIZADEVANJA MADŽARSKE ZA VEČJO ODPORNOST NA PODNEBNE SPREMEMBE HUNGARY'S LEGAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CLIMATE RESILIENCE
Janos Besenio	RECENZIJA KAKO NAJ POTEKAJO VOJNE? VOJAŠKA STRATEGIJA V PRIMERJAVI S POLITIČNIMI ODLOČITVAMI
Janos Besenio	REVIEW HOW SHOULD WARS BE FOUGHT? MILITARY STRATEGY VS POLITICAL DECISIONS