GUISEPPE CAFORIO The Political Influence of the Military in Italy, 1945-93. Lessons Learned- Generally speaking. Italy's military has a tradition of non-interference, at least directly, in politics. In terms of military ethics, this was long supported by the doctrine of the non-political nature of the armed forces themselves.' This does not of course mean that the military abstained form exercising any political influence, but this influence was exercised indirectly, by applying pressures in ways which were not usually made apparent. The means of applying these pressures would, of course, vary over time, depending on the political and social organization of the country and the position of the armed forces within it. Looked at from this point of view, the history of civil-military relations since the end of World War II can be divided into two periods. The period from 1945 to 1989. The first period runs from 1945 to 1989. During this period the military undergoes a certain sidelining and a sharp loss in its capacity to influence national politics. A great number of causes have contributed to this phenomenon, and they will be referred to here only summarily. The most obvious - though not perhaps the most important - has been the fact of losing the war. and losing it badly. There is an immediate comparison with Germany, which also lost the war but kept the Allied forces engaged for a very considerable length of time, so demonstrating a very different level of fighting efficiency. Although the responsibilities for military unpreparedness are actually largely to be attributed to the Fascist regime, the armed forces physically failed to achieve all their objectives. A less obvious but perhaps more potent cause has been the removal of the king, which has deprived the military of their direct. privileged - even if only nominal - relationship with the pinnacle of power. This makes it much more difficult, indeed less natural, for the military to act as moderator, guarantor and element of stability in times of crisis. * Priipevek l mednarodnc konfcrence Cmlao-vqilia rumct)j v dcmofcnici)i. Liubliana-Bled. od 10.-I I marca 1994. ' The doctnnc of the non-political nature of the miUurv t> a concept that emerges immediately after the unity of (talk and is enshrined in the country's first constitution (the Statute of King Charles Albert of Piedmont) It derives from the purely electoral nature of the parties of the time and from the choice made bv the military hierarchies to stay out of any political dispute and to take on the rote of guarantor of power, as "party of the king". Some scholars (viz. Virgilio Ilan "Pottre mihtare r fxrttrr pditico in llatm". sec bibliography) believe that this concept led to the transformation of the army of the Rnorgimento "into a new type of professional army and not a national army, for this and only this is what apolitical status means" The position vis-a-vis politics seems to have endured as a constant factor for a great pan of the history of Italy's military. It was also a constant imposed by the political powers themselves if it m true, as Virgibo llari (op. cif.) declares, that "immediately after the war (the second world war) the generals accused of attempting to 'lawntbe' the army were tried... whereas those responsible (or the much deeper 'fascistisaiion' of the economy and of the bureaucracy were not so treated . The feeling must be that together with its 'fascislnatKin' the desire was to strike also at the politicisalion of the army " And again, apropos of the dcmocratisalton of the armed forces foreseen in the republican constitution: "for the other forces - the right, the Catholics, the liberal democrats and the bourgeois left - dcmocratisalion' was to he none other than the restoration of the old apolitical status, that is to say a stance of neutrality vrva-vn the parties." 620 An equally important side-lining factor has been the country's new political framework, with overall influence in the hands of two mass parties, neither of which, for their different reasons, has any interest in supporting or strengthening the military. The Christian Democrat Party, which, due to the impracticability, of alternating administrations was to be the permanent party of government during the period, is of Roman Catholic inspiration and therefore essentially pacifist. It has no tradition of government in the pre-Fascist period and is in some ways in its novitiate. It appears to be much more inclined to home policy than foreign policy (the "low profile" policy, as it has been defined for this period). The Christian Democrat top management feels no need for the military establishment except insofar as it helps guarantee internal security. (It has in fact favoured the development of the Carabinieri. a military force with responsibility for internal policing). Foreign defence is allotted to the American nuclear and conventional umbrella und Italy's defence structures are kept at the minimum level required of countries in the NATO pact. On the other hand, the mass opposition party - the Italian Communist Party - sees the armed forces as anti-communist in terms of internal politics and anti-Soviet in foreign policy terms. It was unlikely that this party would provide much room for any military leadership.2 In organizational terms the new scenario comes about immediately after the war. when the powers of the Chief of General Staff (also renamed Chief of Defence Staff) are cut and the three ministries of War. Navy and^Air. are brought together as the Ministry of Defence.' In effect the military profession undergoes an impoverishment in the country at large. Officer cadets are progressively drawn from lower and less privileged social levels and. although the entrance examinations always seem to provide sufficient numbers, this seems to be largely because of contant areas of unemployment in southern Italy, as is demonstrated by numerous studies of the phenomenon.' For a statistical sample of the examination trend and the social background of the officers, see tables 1 and 2. How was the political influence of the military exercised in Italy during this period? It seems to me that there are two principal lines of policy which are followed by the military hierarchy (lines which also involve part of the political class). These can be named after the major military figures who backed or implementing them. These are two Army Chiefs of Staff who were in charge during two very different historical moments: General Giorgio Liuzzi and General Giovanni de Lorenzo. Liuzzi's line is largely to seek to go beyond the rigid apolitical stance of the ■ As Piero Vium observes. Poliiki r miliuri . . quoted in bibliography . p. 29: "Given their traditions and their (tut hosnlnv lo all things military, the emergence during the post-war political struggle of the two ideologies, catholic and communist, should have left little room (or doubt " 3 P. Ostellimi and L. Caltgaris write apropos in "7 nuovi million". Milan. Mondadon. 19831. p. 131'. "The armed forces, which alter the fall of Fascism were the only playen lefl on the scene to take responsibility for what happened during the war. allowed themselves to be treated as guilty and sidelined themselves to concentrate on their traditional functions of organisation, operations and training Inevitably, in the immediate post war years the anti-Fascist coalition governments identified an objective which, while politically dear, was militarily confused: the reduction of the powers of the Chiefs of Staff and the simultaneous boosting of the military influence of the Council of Ministers, culminating in the institution ol a single Ministry of Defence. " Though this may have been generally the ease, it should he borne in mind that some military leaders opposed the trend. The strongest opposition came consistently from Gen. Raffacle Cadoroa. the then Army Chief of Staff, who eventually resigned in protest on 1 February 1947. See Marina Nuciari: "Lo profraionr militarr in Initio: ito profnslonolizzaziont r burocrotizzozionr'in Sooologia t Riccrca Soeialc. 11/1981: Giampaolo Prandslraller: "La pmfmionr militarr in Italia". Milan. Angcli. 1985: Giuseppe CaforKi "La pmfmionr militarr ntirindapm UKioloitKa in Italia", in Rivista Maritlima. No 2/1988. 621 Teorifa in praksa. let. 31.1«. 7-8. Liubliana 1994 TABLE No.l Entry into the military academies Italy - applicants for placc 60 1981 1 1982 I 1983 1 1984 1 1985 I 1986 I 1987 1 1988 I 1989 1 ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE military leadership, regarded as no longer in line with changed political and social conditions. "Taking up the second question:" writes Liuzzi in a quite famous book he published after his retirement.' "that is. whether career officers should utterly abstain from political activity, it seems to me that we cannot contemplate the very drastic guidelines normally laid down for the governance of military discipline..." As an individual progresses up the hierarchy, his detachment from political activity ". • ■ should lessen for officers:... those of the military in the upper command echelons and ranks should not only seek to maintain contact with their opposite numbers in the world of politics but should also seek to influence them in such a way and to such a degree as are in the interests of the military and of the nation as a whole". Liuzzi no longer thinks in terms of indirect influence exercised by various means of pressure but rather of direct and open involvement which takes part in the debates of interest. The military is no longer to be the "la grande muette" of a nineteenth century tradition which applied not only to Italy: it is now to become one of the actors on the political scene. For having spoken out on matters of military policy. General Liuzzi and his immediate superior. General Manrinelli (Defence Chief of Staff), were removed from their posts by the then Minister for Defence, Giulio Andreotti. in 1959. Liuzzi's idea was taken up much later, in 1981. by Socialist Minister for Defence Lelio Lagorio. who looked at the origin of the apolitical stance and tradition of silence of the military, "much-appreciated by ninetenth century parliamentarians", and considered these were no longer suitable in changed times, and indeed harmful to a democratic regime. "The silence imposed on the armed forces was not a prescription of discretion... of reserve... but rather a sanction which separated and isolated the military and caused its thinking to be unknown to the political powers themselves."* Just as Liuzzi's line of policy seemed to have been put out of court by the removal of his supporters at the top of the military, another line for political conduct started to be brought forward. Through unconstitutional use of the military secret services, this gained the support of certain politicians in positions of power. The key person is General Giovanni de Lorenzo, wellknown to the point of becoming notorious in Italy. At the time he was in charge of the military intelligence services, subsequently becoming Commander of the Carabinieri and then Army Chief of Staff. This process took place while Hon. Giulio Andreotti was Minister of Defence (1959-1966). To get an idea of the features of this line of political conduct. I think it if useful to quote a passage from the conclusions of the Beolchini Commission' on the activities of Italy's secret services and of the Carabinieri under Giovanni de Lorenzo's command. "The Commission states that SIFAR (as the military secret service was entitled at the time) had built up a genuine power group to implement its own policy, with the assent of persons within the Defence Ministry and the General Staffs, and with the direct involvement of the Carabinieri." 5 Giotgio Liuzzi: holm dtfna' . Roma. Votpc. 146). pp. "lulu dilcu'.'" appeared in 196}. Several yean earlier (1939) ihe eminent military thinker. Paolo Sup»», had already »pressed the same idea, attacking the democratic legitimacy of the "apolitical" principle and suggesting it be replaced by the other concept of a "non-party" stance (See "II Ponir" review. November 19)9). It » worth noting than in the following year (I960) it was published the famous book Tht hvfauonal Soldier, where Morns Janowitz theorized the comrrgrnce of the military and civil society. * Speech to the Defence Commiiaion of the Chamber of Deputies. 15 December 19X1 ' After the activities of Gen. de Lorenzo had been publicly denounced in Parliament, the government appointed s commission of enquiry in January 1966. It took its name from that of its chairman, three-star General A [do Beolchim. As a result of the Beolchini Commission report Gen. de Lorenzo was dismissed as Chief of Staff of the Army and Gen Giovanni Attavcna. who was linked to iJie de Lorenzo policy, resigned as head of the military secret service. 623 Teorita in praksa. let. 31. it. 7-«. L|ubl,ana 1994 There have been differing versions and interpretations of this line of action and its consequences, which have certainly damaged the public image of the military itself." and it is not yet easy to pronounce a definitive judgement. For the moment I would just quote the interpretation of an Italian military historian. Virgilio Ilari.* with the caveat that it is a thesis still to be proved. Ilari holds that the actions of de Lorenzo - the opening of files on politicians, military figures and managers; removal from power of officers who supported the end of an apolitical military; arbitrary planning to deal with popular protest - were not aiming at a "golpe". but featured "constant loyalty to the Head of State and the Minister of Defence (Hon. Giulio Andreotti). who are mainly responsible for making unconstitutional use of the security services and giving the wrong impression to the democratic forces of the left, in a manner which has led to the farreaching decay of our political culture and customs". In Uari's reading, therefore, this would have been an attempt to reestablish the privileged relationship between the military top brass and the Head of State, the highest political authority once represented by the king now being invested in the President of the Republic. Unfortunately the instruments used were not legitimate: unfortunately history cannot turn back. In any event, the "far-reaching decay of our political culture" has brought with it two extremely damaging results for the military and for a proper role of the military establishment within society. The first was the extreme distrust felt by politicians of the left (who were not alone in this) as regards the loyalty of the armed forces to the Constitution. The second was the tendency of minority groups within the officer corps to contemplate military intervention on the country's political scene, a mental attitude which, as we have seen, is totally foreign to the Italian military tradition: this attitude caused a great stir in public opinion, despite the very small number of officers involved. It should be apparent from this historical sketch that, over these 54 years, the military in Italy has lost some factors of influence. Besides the losses due to a lost war. to the fall of the monarchy and the change of political regime, there have also been a weakened influence on the industrial sector, lesser interest and indeed misinformation in the Italian public's attitude regarding defence problems.1" and an overshadowed image within society on account of errors and departures from accepted standards by a part of the leadership of the institution Itself. The period from 1989 to 1993 Over the four-year period 1989-93 it seems that Time ran faster. The international arena witnessed a rapid succession of unexpected happenings (or not at least expected so soon), of such importance as to reshuffle all the cards and. consequently. to change many of the rules of the game. Looking specifically at Italy, * As Ambropo Vrviani observes, in "Strrizi ¡efreti ttahani. ISIi-IHVy. Rome. ADN Krone