ACTA HISTRIAE
32, 2024, 3
UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185ACTA HISTRIAE 32, 2024, 3, pp. 321-458
UDK/UDC 94(05) 
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper
Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria
ACTA HISTRIAE
32, 2024, 3
KOPER 2024
ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767
ACTA HISTRIAE • 32 • 2024 • 3
ISSN 1318-0185                UDK/UDC 94(05)             Letnik 32, leto 2024, številka 3
e-ISSN 2591-1767
Darko Darovec
Gorazd Bajc, Furio Bianco (IT), Flavij Bonin, Paolo Broggio (IT), Stuart Carroll (UK), Àngel Casals 
Martínez (ES), Alessandro Casellato (IT), Dragica Čeč, Lovorka Čoralić (HR), Darko Darovec, Marco 
Fincardi (IT), Darko Friš, Aleksej Kalc, Borut Klabjan, Urška Lampe, Amanda Madden (USA), John 
Martin (USA), Robert Matijašić (HR), Aleš Maver, Darja Mihelič, Edward Muir (USA), Jeppe Büchert 
Netterstrøm (DK), Žiga Oman, Egon Pelikan, Luciano Pezzolo (IT), Jože Pirjevec, Claudio Povolo (IT), 
Marijan Premović (MNE), Colin Rose (CA), Luca Rossetto (IT), Vida Rožac Darovec, Tamara Scheer 
(AT), Polona Tratnik, Boštjan Udovič, Marta Verginella, Nancy M. Wingfield (USA), Salvator Žitko.
Žiga Oman, Urška Lampe, Boštjan Udovič, Jasmina Rejec
Cecilia Furioso Cenci (it.), Žiga Oman (angl.)
Žiga Oman (angl., slo.), Cecilia Furioso Cenci (it.)
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper / Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria© 
/ Inštitut IRRIS za raziskave, razvoj in strategije družbe, kulture in okolja / Institute IRRIS for 
Research, Development and Strategies of Society, Culture and Environment / Istituto IRRIS 
di ricerca, sviluppo e strategie della società, cultura e ambiente©
Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, SI-6000, Koper-Capodistria, Garibaldijeva 18 
/ Via Garibaldi 18, e-mail: actahistriae@gmail.com; https://zdjp.si/en/p/actahistriae/
Založništvo PADRE d.o.o.
300 izvodov/copie/copies
Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost 
Republike Slovenije / Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
Ministrska predsednika Jadranka Kosor in Borut Pahor leta 2010 / I 
primi ministri Jadranka Kosor e Borut Pahor nel 2010 / Prime ministers 
Jadranka Kosor and Borut Pahor in 2010 (foto/photo: Stanko Gruden, 
STA, Wikimedia Commons).
Redakcija te številke je bila zaključena 30. septembra 2024.
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Editor in Chief:
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Revija Acta Histriae je vključena v naslednje podatkovne baze / Gli articoli pubblicati in questa rivista sono inclusi nei seguenti indici di citazione 
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ACTA HISTRIAE • 32 • 2024 • 3
Volume 32, Koper 2024, issue 3UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767
VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS
Andreja Jaklič & Magdolna Sass: Foreign Direct Investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe After Two Decades of EU Enlargement: 
Slovenian and Hungarian Perspectives ...................................................................
Gli investimenti esteri diretti in Europa centro-orientale dopo 
due decenni di ampliamento dell’UE: prospettive slovene e ungheresi
Tuje neposredne investicije v srednji in vzhodni Evropi 20 let 
po veliki širitvi EU: primera Slovenije in Madžarske
Jana Arbeiter: Diplomatic Bridges: Two Decades of 
Slovenia’s Development Cooperation .....................................................................
Ponti diplomatici: due decenni di cooperazione allo sviluppo in Slovenia
Diplomatski mostovi: dve desetletji slovenskega razvojnega sodelovanja
Sabina Lange & Marjan Svetličič: Slovenia’s First and Second 
EU Council Presidency: Lessons Learnt to Enhance 
the Benefits of EU Membership .............................................................................
Prima e seconda presidenza slovena del consiglio dell’UE in Slovenia: lezioni 
apprese per migliorare i vantaggi dell’adesione all’UE 
Prvo in drugo predsedovanje Slovenije svetu evropske unije: nauki za povečanje 
koristi od članstva v Evropski uniji
Adriana Mezeg & Julija Rozman: Trends in the Translation 
of Slovenian Literature in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis 
of Published Works in 16 Languages (1991–2024) .................................................
Tendenze nella traduzione della letteratura slovena nell’Unione Europea: 
un’analisi comparativa delle opere pubblicate in 16 lingue (1991–2024)
Trendi prevajanja slovenske književnosti v Evropski Uniji: 
primerjalna analiza objavljenih del v 16 jezikih (1991–2024)
321
341
367
391
ACTA HISTRIAE • 32 • 2024 • 3
Thomas Bickl: European Bratstvo i jedinstvo? Slovenia’s Bilateral 
Relations with Croatia Through the Lens of EU Membership ................................
Bratstvo i jedinstvo europeo? Le relazioni bilaterali di Slovenia e Croazia 
attraverso la lente dell’appartenenza all’unione europea
Evropsko bratstvo i jedinstvo? Bilateralni odnosi Slovenije s 
Hrvaško skozi prizmo članstva v EU
Dragutin Papović: The Last Decades of the State of Duklja (Dioclia) ..................
Gli ultimi decenni dello stato di Doclea
Zadnja desetletja države Duklje (Dioclia)
OCENE
RECENSIONI
REVIEWS
Paolo Tomasella (a cura di): 
Nelle città della Venezia Giulia. Piani, progetti, fatti urbani 1924–1954 
(Aleksandar Kadijević) .........................................................................................
433
455
413
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Thomas BICKL: EUROPEAN BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO? SLOVENIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CROATIA ..., 413–432
EUROPEAN BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO? SLOVENIA’S BILATERAL 
RELATIONS WITH CROATIA THROUGH THE LENS 
OF EU MEMBERSHIP
Thomas BICKL
Avenue des Rogations 27, 1200 Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: tbickl@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT
This article looks at the impact of EU membership on the bilateral relations between 
Slovenia and Croatia. The analysis centres around policy issues of conflict and coop-
eration and how they were accentuated, contained, processed, or boosted by the EU 
membership of both countries. Further, the EU accession process of Croatia and Slovenia 
is scrutinized as to its implications on bilateral issues and the lessons learnt for EU 
enlargement in the Western Balkans with regard to the resolution of bilateral disputes.
Key words: Slovenia, Croatia, bilateral relations, cooperation, open issues, European Union
BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO EUROPEO? LE RELAZIONI BILATERALI DI 
SLOVENIA E CROAZIA ATTRAVERSO LA LENTE DELL’APPARTENENZA 
ALL’UNIONE EUROPEA
SINTESI
Questo articolo osserva l’impatto dell’adesione all’Unione europea sulle relazioni 
bilaterali tra Slovenia e Croazia. L’analisi si focalizza sulle questioni politiche di con-
flitto e cooperazione e su come queste siano state accentuate, contenute, elaborate o 
potenziate dall’appartenenza di entrambi i Paesi all’UE. Inoltre, il processo di adesione 
all’UE di Croazia e Slovenia viene esaminato per quanto concerne le sue implicazioni 
sulle questioni bilaterali e le lezioni apprese per l’allargamento dell’UE nei Balcani 
occidentali in merito alla risoluzione delle controversie bilaterali.
Parole chiave: Slovenia, Croazia, relazioni bilaterali, cooperazione, questioni aperte, 
Unione Europea
Received: 2024-08-18                                                   DOI 10.19233/ H.202 .17
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Thomas BICKL: EUROPEAN BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO? SLOVENIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CROATIA ..., 413–432
INTRODUCTION
Looking at the balance sheet of EU membership, one may draw on several crite-
ria with regard to the domestic impact: economic, financial, political, societal, and 
perhaps also in terms of domestic perception or awareness. This article, however, 
draws more on an external dimension: the bilateral relations with Slovenia’s southern 
neighbour Croatia and a set of issues that can be related to the European Union in 
this regard.
This article deals with the EU context in a broader sense and, where appropriate, 
also covers the period before Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004. The first 
section looks at the process of independence from Yugoslavia and moments where 
the interests of Slovenia and Croatia had been aligned, at odds, or coordinated. The 
second part covers both countries’ differing paths of accession to the EU. The subse-
quent section deals with bilateral contemporary issues of cooperation and conflict at 
policy level. The fourth part looks at the transformative power of the EU, and the last 
heading deals with the positions on EU enlargement in the Western Balkans followed 
by conclusions.1
Historically, it is worth noting that the bilateral relations between Slovenia and 
Croatia have been embedded in a multi-fold process of transition. For some periods of 
time in the more recent history, the two entities have been part of larger political units: 
during the Habsburg Empire from the fifteenth century (with parts of Slavonia under 
Ottoman rule until the seventeenth century) up until 1918, in the inter-war period 
(initially the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes before becoming Yugoslavia 
in 1929), and after World War II as constituent Republics of Socialist Yugoslavia 
(the late SFRY) until 1991. During the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, both 
Republics became independent states in 1991.2 As from 2004 and 2013 respectively, 
Slovenia and Croatia have been Members of the European Union (EU), a sui generis 
regional organisation with supranational and intergovernmental elements.
INDEPENDENCE FROM YUGOSLAVIA: DIVERGING INTERESTS, 
TACTICS, AND A JOINT ACCOMPLISHMENT NONETHELESS
The way to independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 is sometimes seen as 
inevitable and pre-determined when events are put into perspective ex post. To 
avoid a deterministic view, however, it is useful not to read the unfolding of events 
backwards as this would make us subject to the phenomenon of hindsight bias3 thus 
becoming less able to grasp the atmosphere and the context of the decisions taken at 
1 This article is an extended and revised version of this author’s contribution on the Slovenian-Croatian 
bilateral relations in Kaeding & Udovič (2024).
2 For a comprehensive account of the multiple Yugoslavia, cf. Ramet (2006).
3 Hindsight bias refers to the interpreting of past events as inevitable and logical. Roese and Vohs (2012, 
412–413) distinguish three types of hindsight bias: memory distortion, inevitability, and foreseeability.
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the time (Bieber, 2014, 3). As regards the dissolution of Yugoslavia, irrespective of 
the simultaneous declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 
1991 and a previous solid and long-standing shared concern about the state of the 
economy and regional development in Yugoslavia, the emancipation from the SFRY 
was not a joint exercise of Slovenia and Croatia from the very beginning. It is true 
that allowance must be made for the fact that Ljubljana and Zagreb as economically 
advanced Republics had become disgruntled over time with the performance of the 
system of allocation of federal grants as aid for the underdeveloped regions in the 
country, predominantly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montene-
gro. By way of example, the largest infrastructure project in socialist Yugoslavia, 
the construction of the Bar-Belgrade railway line and the port of Bar, would have 
been financed largely by the federal state coffers with an overall cost of around 
USD 450 million for the 496 kilometres railway line alone (Kežić, 2011). Slovenia 
and Croatia fiercely opposed the project (it nonetheless came about) which, in their 
view, was against the interests of the existing Adriatic ports of Koper/Capodistria 
and Rijeka and also delayed the planned Zagreb-Split highway. It led Slovenia to 
invest in regional roads rather than the highways between Ljubljana and the border 
to Austria and southbound (Ramet, 2006, 279–282).4
The road to independence, however, was not free of controversy between Za-
greb and Ljubljana. After the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s (CPY) Congress 
in January 1990 (which triggered the end of one-party rule), Slovenia was actively 
preparing for secession from Yugoslavia managing to win the de facto consent of 
the leadership of Serbia for secession (Ramet, 2006, 374; Jović, 2008, 265), whilst 
Croatia initially was wary of Slovenian independence and had no such plans itself, 
largely because it supported the new federal reform government of Ante Marković, 
a Croat, saw a Yugoslavia without Slovenia as a considerable weakening of the 
Croatian position vis-à-vis Serbia (Meier, 1995, 221, 241–242; Jović, 2008, 253), 
and had been virtually absent from the SFRY constitutional debate in the 1980s 
(Jović, 2023a).
The intentions behind the joint Slovenian-Croatian confederal proposal of 2 October 
1990 remain unclear to this day.5 Whilst some see it as a tactical move mainly to show 
good will and buy time (Jović, 2008, 252, 274), others contend it was a sincere offer 
of a common market including monetary union and also but not primarily to appease 
the Serbian leadership (Meier, 1995, 280) after the Jugoslav National Army (JNA) had 
confiscated most of the weaponry of Croatia’s Territorial Defence (TO) units6 (Ramet, 
4 For the role of the pan-Yugoslav Highway of Brotherhood and Unity, where 200,000 volunteers 
contributed to its construction, through the lens of collective identity and architecture, cf. 
Korolija & Pallini (2020).
5 The unification of Germany on 3 October may yet help explain the date of the proposal.
6 The TO of Slovenia had been under Slovenian command since mid-July 1990 (cf. e.g. Meier, 
1995, 282) – a fact that proved crucial during the Ten-Day War in Slovenia in July 1991.
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2006, 373–374; Jović, 2008, 259).7 Unity of Slovenia and Croatia over the joint proposal 
proved limited and fragile, and the Slovenes were particularly irritated by Tuđman link-
ing a prospective confederal Yugoslavia to border changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (cf. 
e.g. his interview in DER SPIEGEL, 8 November 19908), whilst the mood in Zagreb 
was that Slovenia had been very selfish in preparing its own independence – which 
would practically also include new border posts, something that might not go down 
well amongst the population in Croatia (Jović, 2008, 274).9
In the end, independence was coordinated between Slovenia and Croatia only at 
very short notice at the highest political level on 15 June 1991, and the two sides 
agreed to proclaim independence ten days later on 25 June 1991 (Ramet, 2006, 
392; Meier, 1995, 311), whilst Kučan is reported to have been concerned at the 
low level of preparations in Zagreb (Meier, 1995, 311). After independence, Kučan 
and Tuđman only met three times until the end of 1999 although regular meeting 
intervals had been agreed on in the first place (Jović, 2023a). It is important to note, 
nonetheless, that relations and collaboration at local level on the ground have been 
very close since.
DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES OF EU ACCESSION 
AND THE MOTHER OF DISPUTES
Slovenia was able to almost fully escape the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia 
save for the Ten-Day War in July 1991. It may be said that Slovenia was able to 
consolidate its statehood in a relatively short period of time. With regard to EU 
accession, Ljubljana’s road to Brussels proved almost free of bilateral issues, 
too, with the exception of the dispute over the maritime and land border with 
Croatia. This territorial dispute, however, was only tackled during Croatia’s own 
accession to the European Union several years later; more on this below.
Nonetheless, in its EU accession process, Slovenia had to face a sensitive bi-
lateral issue with Italy. In 1993, Rome started blocking the opening of Ljubljana’s 
EU accession talks over property seized by the former Yugoslavia after World 
War II which had also affected Italian citizens in Istria (optanti) who had left 
after the former Italian territories were ceded to Yugoslavia in 1954 (Geddes & 
Taylor, 2016, 934–936; Bučar & Udovič, 2023, 393). The matter was settled when 
Slovenia introduced, through an amendment to the constitution, the right for EU 
7 In the end, the proposal was only debated in the federal SFRY State Presidency, rejected by 6:2 
votes, and thus not forwarded to the federal parliament (Ramet, 2006, 374–37; Jović, 2008, 252). 
A survey of scholarly assessments of the rationale behind the confederal proposal can be found in 
Ramet (2008, 38–39).
8 Whilst Tuđman advocated the prospective confederation, he also said that ‘if you look at the map, 
you don’t need to be a historian to see that Bosnia forms a geopolitical unit with Croatia. They be-
long together’.
9 Tuđman himself, however, according to Meier (1995, 311), was surprised that the practicalities of 
Slovenian independence would include new checkpoints at the border to Croatia.
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citizens to purchase property in the country within four years from the beginning 
of the EU accession negotiations, a requirement of the EU single market rulebook 
and the free movement of capital which was mandatory for every EU Member 
State anyway (European Commission, 1997, 16). This right was extended im-
mediately to EU citizens who had resided on Slovenian territory for at least 
three years, so that the Italian optanti were covered at very short notice. The 
Italian government on its part announced in early 1996 that it would surrender 
new property restitution claims for the optanti who had left Istria after 1954 – a 
matter that had been resolved anyway by the Italian-Yugoslav Treaty of Osimo 
in 1975. In June 1996, Slovenia’s Association Treaty with the EU was signed and 
the bilateral issue with Italy thus cleared (Geddes & Taylor, 2016, 936; Bučar & 
Udovič, 2023, 393).
For Croatia, the path to EU accession was considerably rockier in that it 
was heavily affected by a violent state-building process: the bitter fighting and 
bloodshed on its own territory 1991–1995 and also by its involvement in the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995. Croatia only enjoyed full sovereignty over 
its entire territory since 1998 when the country’s state-building process can be 
regarded as completed with the full reintegration of the territories in Eastern 
Slavonia (Koska & Matan, 2017, 131, 134). Additional delay in the EU acces-
sion process of Croatia was caused by the country’s sovereigntist phase under 
Tuđman who had become a staunch opponent to multi-ethnic political entities, be 
it Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the EU, not least on the grounds that in-
dependence from Yugoslavia was a hard-won achievement against a millennium-
long history of being part of multinational entities, which had limited or denied 
national sovereignty (Dolenec, 2013, 131–146; Jović, 2023, 123–124, 139).
Only after the democratic turn in 2000 and the subsequent reform governments 
of Račan and Sanader10 did the country embrace the European path. Full coopera-
tion with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
proved a hard choice between national-identity and legitimacy considerations on 
the one hand, and the commitment to fulfil the political EU conditionality items 
for membership on the other (cf. Freyburg & Richter, 2010, 273–275). Accession 
negotiations with the EU would only start in late 2005 when Croatia was ready to 
extradite General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY.11 At that time, Slovenia had already 
become an EU Member.
10 As of the 2003 Sanader government, representatives of the minorities were part of all Croatian go-
vernments until very recently. The Constitutional Law on Rights of National Minorities had been 
adopted in 2002 by the Račan government inter alia extending the number of seats in the national 
parliament for minorities representatives; cf. Koska & Matan (2017, 134). The established practi-
ce of including them in the government partly came to an end with the latest HDZ/DP government 
taking office in May 2024 when the Serbian minority party was excluded at the request of DP; cf. 
Euronews (2024).
11 Somewhat face-saving (from the perspective of the Croatian government) was the fact that Gotovina was 
arrested in Spain thus avoiding a humiliating extradition from Croatia.
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Three years later, one particular bilateral issue with Slovenia affected the Croatian 
accession negotiations very seriously: the dispute about the common state border. 
Historically, it is a by-product of the dissolution of Yugoslavia where the borders of 
the SFRY Republics became international borders at the moment of independence.12 
In late 2008, Slovenia decided to take advantage of its veto power as a Member State 
in calling for a resolution of the border dispute with Croatia. Zagreb perceived this 
as an act of blackmailing by its northern neighbour, and there is little doubt that the 
dispute became a loaded issue for both the Croatian accession talks and the bilateral 
relations. There had been various bilateral attempts to resolve the border dispute 
between 1993 and 2007,13 including an initialled agreement from 2002 (known as 
Drnovšek-Račan or Račan-Drnovšek referencing the then two prime ministers), the 
ratification of which failed in Croatia after it had been ratified in Slovenia.14 
In the course of 2009, the European Commission took on a mediating role after 
a failed attempt by the French EU Council Presidency at the end of 2008 to defuse 
the situation. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and his team came up with the 
idea of a judicial third-party resolution with a tailor-made mandate: arbitration. 
Subsequently, the Commission drafted an arbitration agreement (cf. e.g. Cataldi, 
2013) and discussed it with the parties. Eventually, with the help of the Swedish 
EU Council Presidency, Slovenia and Croatia signed the arbitration agreement in 
November 200915 and the blockade of the Croatian accession negotiations was 
lifted. The arbitration procedure imploded, however, in 2015 (Croatia had joined 
the EU on 1 July 2013) due to unlawful contacts between the Slovenian government 
and the tribunal member appointed by Slovenia.16 In response to this, the Croatian 
government  unilaterally withdrew (based politically on an unanimous vote in the 
Croatian parliament) from the arbitration procedure.17 The Tribunal on its part 
procedurally remedied the violation of the arbitration agreement (by replacing the 
two party-appointed tribunal members) and handed down a binding award under 
international law in 2017, which Croatia does not recognize, however.
12 Some sections of the land border between Croatia and Slovenia (and elsewhere between successor states 
of Yugoslavia) became disputed due to overlapping cadastral records. It must be noted that the borders 
between the Yugoslav Republics have never been established by any federal or other legal act. The ma-
ritime boundary had to be delimited de novo, as the SFRY territorial sea had been integrated waters that 
were not separated by riparian Republics.
13 At a meeting in Bled in August 2007, the two prime ministers Sanader and Janša agreed to submit 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the negotiations on the mandate for 
the Court stalled in the bilateral expert group in the following year.
14 For a detailed account, cf. Arnaut (2002), Sancin (2010), Dolenec (2013, 150–151), Bickl (2021, 133–146).
15 The political will and constructive attitude of the two prime ministers Jadranka Kosor and Borut 
Pahor and their advisors in the second half of 2009 was a key element in this silent-diplomacy 
operation.
16 The Tribunal consisted of three members jointly nominated by the parties and one party-appointed 
arbitrator each.
17 Legally, Croatia invoked a breach of the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) (cf. 
Partial Award 2016, e.g. §85). The arbitration tribunal, however, having the inherent competence to 
decide on all procedural matters found no reason for the arbitration procedure not to continue.
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Thomas BICKL: EUROPEAN BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO? SLOVENIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CROATIA ..., 413–432
The Slovenian government has subsequently attempted to enforce the arbitra-
tion award, but to no avail. It proved impossible to implement the award by means 
of EU law through an infringement procedure against Croatia before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2018.18 In a second attempt, Slovenia 
had supported the case of Slovenian fishers who, in 2022, had lodged an applica-
tion before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for being fined by the 
Croatian police for fishing in waters that under the arbitration award are under the 
territorial sovereignty of Slovenia.19 With the Croatian government welcoming the 
ECtHR decision and striving for a bilateral agreement on the border independent 
of the 2017 arbitration award (Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 
2024), and the Slovenian government insisting on the implementation of the very 
arbitration award (Slovenian Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, 2024), the 
dispute has remained in a legal-political limbo for the time being.
18 The CJEU declared the case inadmissible in 2020. Some scholars, however, argue that the 
Court has not sufficiently considered the link to the arbitration procedure in the EU Acces-
sion Treaty of Croatia (cf. e.g. McGarry, 2020). The European Commission (EC) had stayed 
neutral after Slovenia had filed the infringement procedure in March 2018 irrespective of the 
previous position of the EC legal service in July 2017 that the bilateral border dispute had 
a direct effect on EU law, and therefore the Union had jurisdiction in respect of this matter 
(European Commission, 2017).
19 The applications were declared inadmissible in May 2024. Croatian fishers had, in the same vein, filed 
applications for being fined by Slovenian authorities, cf. STA (2023).
Fig. 1: Prime ministers Jadranka Kosor and Borut Pahor in 2010. Photo by Stanko 
Gruden, STA (Wikimedia Commons).
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CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: INFRASTRUCTURE, 
FOREIGN-CURRENCY DEPOSITS, ENERGY POLICY
The relevance of the border dispute, however, a frozen conflict politically, 
has perhaps become less pressing. Croatia joined the Schengen Area (with free 
movement across whatever border-crossing with Slovenia) and the Euro in 2023 
and has thus reached the innermost level of European integration. With regard to 
Fig. 2: The Slovenia-Croatia land border at the Brezovec - del/
Murišće hamlet according to the arbitration award (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, Final Award, 29 June 2017, 135).
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the bilateral relations between Ljubljana and Zagreb in the area of infrastructure 
projects, there have been no discussions on major joint infrastructure projects re-
cently. Repair work on several bridges in cross-border areas, for instance, cannot 
go ahead because their cross-border status may be disputed, with no agreement 
on whether decisions concerning the repairs should be made on a case-by-case 
basis or adopted as a package. There is an agreement, however, on a new bridge 
at the Kaštel-Dragonja border crossing, the most frequented one in Istria along-
side Jelšane-Rupa further east, where the two sides have shared the repair and 
construction costs fifty-fifty and completed the works (N1, 2021; author’s field 
notes July 2024). It is worth noting that the border on this part of the Dragonja 
River has not been in dispute.20 With regard to both countries’ northern Adriatic 
ports, Koper and Rijeka, cooperation has been limited and competition has been 
the norm (Barić et al., 2021, 36).
Alongside border disputes, there is another legacy from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia: The issue of foreign-currency deposits and the compensation for 
the illegal use of them by the SFRY to cover its demand for foreign-currency 
reserves. The deposits were mainly held by citizens working abroad. At the 
time, these foreign-currency accounts were predominantly deposited with Lju-
bljanska Banka (LB), the country’s largest commercial bank, and its subsidiar-
ies in other Republics of the SFRY. In terms of bilateral disputes with Slovenia 
from the lens of Croatia, the foreign currency deposits issue was perceived as 
a major root-cause for bilateral tensions with Slovenia in the first two decades 
after independence.
It was not before 2014, however, when the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) handed down a landmark judgement in the most prominent case relating 
to LB and the foreign-currency deposits: In Ališić et al. v. Slovenia, the country 
was ordered to unilaterally cover all claims against LB. The Slovenian government 
subsequently set up a compensation scheme worth 385 million Euro (cf. Hojnik, 
2016). In a previous case (Kovačić et al. v. Slovenia) brought before the ECtHR 
in 2006, the Court found in 2008 that the matter of compensation for so many 
thousands of individuals be solved by agreement between the successor States.
In two separate judgements relating to Ljubljanska Banka in 2015 and 2020, 
the ECHtR declared two cases in which Slovenia sought to recover the debt of 
Croatian companies towards LB inadmissible (cf. Stavridi, 2021). This created 
a situation in which Slovenia was held liable for the repayment of foreign-
currency deposits in LB subsidiaries on the territory of the former Yugoslav 
Republics while not being able to enforce LB’s own debt claims against Croa-
tian and other companies.
20 In the strip of land between the Dragonja-Kaštel border-crossing and the Plovanija-Sečovlje one fur-
ther to the west, there are three settlements (Škrilje/Škrile, Bužin/Bužini, and Škudelin/Škodelin) on 
the left bank of the Dragonja historically claimed by Slovenia. The 2017 arbitration award stipulates 
the Dragonja River as the border.  
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In the area of energy policy, close cooperation in the operation of the Krško 
nuclear power plant has been the default mode since the block went into service 
in 1983.21 The contract with the US provider Westinghouse dates back to 1974.22 
The plant’s electricity production has been shared in equal parts (Croatian 
Ministry of the Economy and Sustainable Development, 2023; Senior Croatian 
Civil Servant 2023). Currently, the Krško plant covers 40% of Slovenia’s and 
17% of Croatia’s energy demand (Bičak, 2023).23 Slovenia has undertaken to 
phase out coal by 2033 and the current economic situation of the Šoštanj lignite 
power station with its record losses in operational electricity production has 
become untenable, so the government will have to step in to avert bankruptcy 
(STA, 2024). Whatever the consequences for the phase-out of coal in Slovenia 
or the reliance on energy imports, Slovenia has started preparations for a second 
reactor (JEK2) at Krško (Slovenian Ministry of the Environment, Climate, and 
Energy, 2023). Croatia’s prime minister announced as early as in April 2022 
that Croatia wishes to continue its participation also through the construction 
and use of the second reactor. This would help meet the country’s CO2 reduc-
tion targets (Radosević, 2022). Currently, the JEK 2 project is being developed 
by GEN Energija. According to the Slovenian government, the intention is to 
continue the cooperation with Croatia and to officially do so at the time of the 
investment decision.
The future Krško reactor project is currently managed by a dedicated State 
Secretary at the prime minister’s office. The vision is that JEK2 is a promising 
approach also for the wider region of Southeast Europe in the context of achieving 
the net-zero goal of full decarbonization of electricity production by combining 
renewable energy sources with nuclear power (Levičar, 2023). Critics of nuclear 
power contend that the costs of producing electricity from nuclear will consider-
ably exceed the costs of a large-scale installation of solar and wind power (Kus, 
2023)24 the percentage of which currently is still very low. Slovenia’s largest share 
of renewables to date is from hydropower covering around one third of the country’s 
electricity production (SURS, 2024).25
21 However, a temporary cut-off of electricity supply to Croatia on the part of Slovenia between July 
2002 and April 2003 was subject to an investor-state arbitration procedure on the financial compensa-
tion. The award was handed down in December 2015, ordering Slovenia to cover the financial damage, 
cf. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2015).
22 The contract was signed by the then parent companies Savske Elektrarne Ljubljana and Elektroprivreda 
Zagreb (International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 November 1974); cf. also next footnote. The contract 
was backed up by a USD 600 million loan from the US government in 1975 (Pirjevec, 2018, 412).
23 The Krško power plant is owned and operated by Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško (NEK), which is jointly 
owned by Croatia’s Hrvatska Elektroprivreda (HEP Group) and Slovenia’s GEN Energija. 
24 The production of one megawatt-hour (MWh) from JEK2 would, according to Kus, amount to €170, 
compared to €55 for electricity generated with large wind farms and solar power plants.
25 In July 2024, the electricity production in Slovenia had the following allocation by source: nuclear 36.1%, 
hydro 32.9%, coal 18.6%, and solar and wind 12.4% (SURS, 2024). It should be noted however, that during 
wintertime the share of solar is considerably lower whilst the share of coal and nuclear tends to be higher.
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ON EQUAL FOOTING: CAN PARITY OF STATUS HELP SOFTEN TENSIONS?
Notwithstanding the different EU trajectories Slovenia and Croatia have ex-
perienced on their way to Brussels (a rather smooth accession here, and a rockier 
road with a heavy item of transitional justice and a forced resolution attempt for 
the bilateral border dispute there; more above under the second heading), both 
countries now enjoy parity of status. At the beginning of 2023, Croatia joined 
both the Schengen Area and the Euro and is now on equal footing with Slovenia 
at the same and innermost layer of EU integration.
Whereas the accession to the Euro can be seen as a reward of Croatia’s sus-
tainability of its public finances and its previous central bank’s ability to defend 
the Kuna’s close alignment with the Euro in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 
II), the accession to Schengen has a strong bearing on the bilateral relations with 
Slovenia. It can be seen as a win-win situation in several respects: First, the 
positive impact, albeit largely anticipated, on the bilateral economy. Accord-
ing to the Slovenian Public Agency for Entrepreneurship, Internationalisation, 
Foreign Investments, and Technology, bilateral trade almost doubled between 
2017 and 2022 (SPIRIT, 2023). Second, the end of the controls on what used 
to be Schengen border-crossings between both countries can also be considered 
to have become a positive and dampening side-effect on the stretching out of 
bilateral tensions due to the border dispute: occasionally during tourist seasons, 
the Slovenian police would replace random checks by (non-mandatory) regular 
checks for road traffic into Croatia thus causing considerable delays for travellers 
to holiday destinations with the southern neighbour. By definition, northbound 
traffic from Croatia into Slovenia now on intra-Schengen crossings is no longer 
a structural bottleneck.26 And third, very much in line with the positive effects on 
travel and tourism, the expiry of the Schengen border between the two countries 
has been positive for cross-border family relations and for many Slovenes who 
own property in Croatia.
Whilst it is true that some anxieties stemming from previous disputes, not 
least related to unequal status, seem to indeed have faded away to some degree, 
one can acknowledge a more general relaxation of relations at the diplomatic 
level. This concerns personal relations more recently, both in the technical and 
the political domain. Allowance must be made for the fact that bilateral conflicts 
matter less once both countries have joined the EU (Senior Croatian Civil Serv-
ant, 2023). Contacts between diplomats from both sides are now described as 
more comfortable due to Croatia and Slovenia being on an equal footing in terms 
of EU integration and an increasingly self-confident Croatia (Senior Slovenian 
Civil Servant A, 2023; Jović, 2023, 138). In some cases, personal relations at the 
26 It must be noted, however, that Schengen controls for vehicles entering Slovenia northbound from Cro-
atia were mandatory on a Schengen border, so all traffic from Croatia into Slovenia had to undergo 
standard checks for each and every vehicle.
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political level have become almost amicable, also across party-political affilia-
tions, as is currently the case with foreign ministers Tanja Fajon and Gordan Grlić 
Radman (Jović, 2023; Senior Slovenian Civil Servant B, 2023).
The more recent geopolitical situation has been of great importance, too. 
What can boost the internal cohesion of an international organisation such as 
the EU are external security threats. No matter whether we look at Russia, the 
Middle East, or China: In the face of a common external threat, internal bilat-
eral conflicts tend to lose relevance in a European context (cf. Schimmelfennig, 
2023, 190).27 The same holds for extreme weather events and disaster relief, for 
instance. In the Slovenian-Croatian context, we have seen excellent neighbourly 
relations during the wildfires in the summer of 2022, also with increased mul-
tinational regional cooperation (European Commission, 2022), and the heavy 
floods after several days of torrential rain in August 2023 saw both sides com-
ing together to help one another (Hina, 2023b).
ALL EYES ON THE WESTERN BALKANS: EVERYONE EMBRACING 
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD?
Croatia and Slovenia have a distinctive expertise with and experience on the 
Western Balkans region – as neighbours and former members of Yugoslavia in 
its different settings (1918–1991). With regard to enlargement, both Ljubljana 
and Zagreb share a pro-enlargement policy line, e.g. as members of the Friends 
of the Western Balkans Group together with Austria, Greece, Italy, Czechia, 
and Slovakia (Brzozowski, 2023). When it comes to pursuing national interests 
in the region, the picture is more nuanced, however. Slovenia has an interest 
in securing market access for its export-oriented companies, sees itself as a 
gateway to the region enjoying very good economic and political relations with 
all Western Balkans countries, and has virtually no unresolved issues with any 
countries in the region (except for the territorial one with Croatia). Nonetheless, 
Slovenia’s achievement as the host of the 2021 Western Balkans Summit in 
Brdo pri Kranju, for example, remained limited as the EU Member States would 
not commit to any timeline for enlargement in the Western Balkans, a fact that 
still holds at the time of writing.  In Croatia, where the economy is also closely 
integrated in the region, issues of national identity traditionally have a strong 
bearing, particularly concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Croat community, 
and concerning Serbia e.g. with regard to missing persons after the 1991–1995 
war.28 In Croatia, EU membership has largely been framed in terms of de-
Balkanisation (and de-Yugoslavisation previously) while recognizing that, as 
an EU member, Croatia actually enjoys more, not less influence on foreign 
27 Research on e.g. domestic polarization in the US in the face of external threats seems to provide for more 
nuanced conclusions, cf. Myrick (2021).
28 For other open bilateral issues in the area cf. e.g. Petrović & Wilson (2021); Bickl (2023).
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policy – which is where Europeanisation goes hand in hand with sovereigntism 
(cf. Jović, 2023, 139).
There is one fundamental point that needs to be taken into account with EU 
enlargement: seen as a process, it offers ample opportunity to every Member 
State to exert maximum influence by leveraging its EU membership when deal-
ing with Candidate Countries – as demonstrated by the Slovenia-Croatia case. 
What boded particularly ill more recently was Bulgaria’s last-minute blockade 
of North Macedonia when issues of history, culture, and identity were favoured 
above the European interest substantially delaying the start of EU accession 
negotiations (cf. Kamberi, 2023). It is therefore not difficult to agree with Bash-
eska (2022, 226) that ‘allowing Member States to redefine enlargement criteria 
in line with their domestic preferences and politics does not only undermine 
the rule of law as a fundamental part of [EU accession], but also discredits the 
entire enlargement process’.
CONCLUSION: SLOVENIA’S EU MEMBERSHIP AND 
THE LESSONS FOR EU ENLARGEMENT 
In a geopolitical context where all eyes are on the EU accession process 
of Ukraine after the opening of accession negotiations in December 2023, the 
Western Balkans Candidate Countries are finding themselves yet again in a state 
of unpredictability and discouragement as for their own accession process. In 
the face of the non-existence of a timeline for merits-based EU accession, the 
laborious and often painful reform process will be hard to maintain.
Nevertheless, what then can we learn from Slovenia and Croatia’s EU 
membership and its influence on their bilateral relations? Joint EU member-
ship is undoubtedly a positive undertaking. Being ‘in it’ together can help 
decrease the salience of bilateral disputes, particularly when both countries 
enjoy the same level of EU integration. Second, the Slovenia-Croatia case 
is a stark reminder that the power imbalance between a Member State and a 
Candidate Country can be (ab)used to resolve a bilateral dispute in favour of 
the Member State through coercion and at the expense of sustainability. This 
can create both alienation and the risk of importing a frozen conflict. Third, 
although it would seem reasonable not to scrap the current merits-based ap-
proach to EU enlargement – also not with regard to Ukraine – it might make 
sense to avoid a scenario where countries joining one by one can make full 
use of their leverage of membership as a powerful tool to impose solutions 
to bilateral issues. It may rather be worth exploring whether it would make 
more sense to think about having some countries join in groups (which has 
happened in the past, albeit in much less bilaterally loaded settings), which 
would make these issues less toxic, giving silent diplomacy the opportunity 
to try to seek a solution ahead of accession within a robust dispute resolution 
framework (Bickl, 2021, 297–301).
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There can be little doubt that the situation that EU newcomers are facing today is 
substantially different from the one in 2004 or 2013. Given the geopolitical focus on 
Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova) and the de facto Western Balkans enlargement 
fatigue (which has not disappeared in some capitals despite the official rhetoric to 
the contrary), the sobering assessment is that the economic and political interests 
of EU Member States in the region are divergent (cf. Bartlett, 2023, 49–51). Some 
even argue that ‘integration without membership’ is becoming a reality (Radić 
Milosavljević & Petrović, 2024). At any rate, the EU enlargement process bears 
particular responsibility for improving rather than straining bilateral relations.
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EVROPSKO BRATSTVO I JEDINSTVO? BILATERALNI ODNOSI SLOVENIJE 
S HRVAŠKO SKOZI PRIZMO ČLANSTVA V EU
Thomas BICKL
Avenue des Rogations 27, 1200 Brussels, Belgija
e-mail:tbickl@hormail.com
POVZETEK
Članek obravnava vpliv članstva v EU na dvostranske odnose med Slovenijo in 
Hrvaško. Analiza se osredotoča tako na pristopni proces k EU kot na sodobna politična 
vprašanja sporov in sodelovanja. Zgodovinsko gledano je vstop Slovenije v EU potekal 
precej nemoteno, medtem ko je bila hrvaška pot v Bruselj obremenjena z vprašanjem 
tranzicijske pravičnosti in, ne nazadnje, z dvostranskim mejnim sporom s Slovenijo. Med 
političnimi konfliktnimi področji izstopata arbitražni postopek o mejnem sporu in devizne 
vloge v nekdanji Ljubljanski banki. Kar zadeva sodelovanje, je izrazit primer energetska 
politika in skupno delovanje jedrske elektrarne Krško. Poleg bilateralnih vprašanj je 
skupno članstvo obeh držav v EU poskrbelo za splošno sprostitev odnosov na politični 
ravni. Izkušnje, pridobljene pri širitvi EU na Zahodnem Balkanu v zvezi z reševanjem 
dvostranskih sporov, vključujejo potrebo po proaktivnem obravnavanju vprašanj in trdni 
mreži za reševanje sporov v zvezi s tem.
Ključne besede: Slovenija, Hrvaška, dvostranski odnosi, odprta vprašanja, sodelovanje,
Evropska unija
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