ekonomska ter finančna katastrofa. Pričujoči prispevek se opira na delo kulturnega teoretika Slavoja Žižka in francoskega filozofa Jeana-Pierra Dupuyja in izhaja iz problema našega odnosa do katastrof, ki se še niso zgodile. Bistvo katastrofe je postalo nekaj normalnega za naš, rečeno z Žižkom, zahodni upravljani svet, ki ga trenutno upravljajo po scenarijih vojne, terorja, ekološke katastrofe itn., ki nenehno motijo normalno delovanje naše družbe. Glede na to, da avtor vztraja, da katastrofa vključuje pojem »sreče«, ali lahko katastrofo sploh mislimo? Zdi se, da tega ne moremo, saj lahko svoj odgovor damo šele, ko poznamo izid določenega dogodka. Smo torej upravičeni do sprejemanja preventivnih ukrepov proti globalnemu segrevanju? Ali to pomeni, da v primeru, da jih sprejmemo, do katastrofe ne bo prišlo? Lahko z gotovostjo povemo, da bo do katastrofe vseeno prišlo? In, ali bo v primeru, da ne ukrepamo, do nje prišlo? Vemo, da je katastrofa možna, celo verjetna, vendar pa ne verjamemo, da se bo zares zgodila. Ali lahko sprejmemo racionalno odločitev pred apokalipso? Če naj se soočimo z grožnjo katastrofe, moramo, kot verjame Dupuy, izstopiti iz našega historičnega, linearnega pojmovanja časa. Novo pojmovanje časa (tisto, čemur Dupuy pravi »čas projektov«) ni črta med preteklostjo in prihodnostjo, temveč zaprti krog. Prihodnost je naključno proizvedena z našimi preteklimi dejanji, način kako delujemo, pa je določen z načinom, kako anticipiramo prihodnost in kako se odzovemo na to anticipacijo. S tem, ko Dupuy misli razmerje med krizo svetega in našo nezmožnostjo predstaviti si in izogniti se ka-tastrofični prihodnosti, razvije idejo razsvetljenega katastrofizma kot alternative načelu razionalne previdnosti.
Jelica Šumič Riha
Est Deus in nobis or the Will to Enjoy
Key words: Sade, Epictetus, desire, will, prohairesis, reason, jouissance
In "Kant with Sade", Lacan stages two incompatible couples, incompatible precisely to the extent that they bring together reason and jouissance: Kant and Sade on the one hand and Sade with Epictetus on the other. If Sade is coupled with Kant in order 337 to reveal a hidden driving force behind Kant's moral law, Epictetus' joining Sade is revelatory of Sade's deficiency as a desiring subject. Following Lacan's indications concerning the radical change of the status of the subject resulting from the establishment of an unheard of relationship between desire and will at the end of analysis, this essay examines two modalities of the subject's confrontation with the Other's will to enjoy: Sade's and Stoics'. Insisting on a few crucial points of convergence and divergence of these two modalities of the subject's coming to terms with the will to jouissance, the author aims to explore the conditions of possibility of an ethics without the Other, an ethics of the drive, to be precise, that allows for a non-perverse transgression of the pleasure principle.
Jelica Šumič Riha
Est deus in nobis ali volja do užitka
Ključne besede: Sade, Epiktet, želja, volja, prohairesis, um, užitek
V »Kantu s Sadom« Lacan uprizori dva nezdružljiva para, nezdružljiva natanko v tisti meri, v kateri združujeta um in užitek: na eni strani Kanta s Sadom, na drugi strani Sada z Epiktetom. Če je Sade sparjen s Kantom, zato da bi se pokazala skrita gonilna sila Kantovega moralnega zakona, pa nam združitev Epikteta in Sada razodene Sadovo manjkavost kot želječega subjekta. Sledeč Lacanovim opazkam glede radikalne spremembe subjek-tovega statusa na koncu analize, ki je posledica vzpostavitve novega razmerja med željo in voljo, bo pričujoči prispevek preiskoval dve modalnosti subjektovega soočenja z voljo Drugega do užitka: Sadovo in stoiško. Opirajoč se na nekatere ključne točke zbliževanja in razhajanja omenjenih dveh modalnosti subjektovega soočanja z voljo do užitka, bo avtorica raziskala pogoje možnosti etike brez Drugega, natančneje povedano, etike gona, ki omogoča neperverzno prekoračitev načela ugodja.
Rado Riha
The Second Copernican Turn of Kant's Philosophy
Key words: Copernican turn, "transcendental difference", self-critique of reason, a thought's thing, reflecting judgement, universal, singularity
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What is at issue in this article is the thorny question of the relationship between reason and enjoyment such as it can be elaborated from the perspective of Kant's philosophy
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^^ being considered to be the very epitome of "pure reason". According to the central thesis advanced in this essay, the revolution in the way of thinking inaugurated by the famous ^^ Kantian "Copernican turn" in philosophy, which consists in the recognition of thought's affection by a thing that at one and the same time belongs to thought as it makes it think, and evades its grasp, requires for its completion an additional, "second" Copernican 338 turn. With the second Copernican turn, accomplished only in the Critique of Judgement, Kant takes up the "transcendental difference" between appearance and the thing-in-it-self, introduced in the first Critique, and advances the problem of thought's affection beyond the result of the first Critique. The author argues that in order to tackle the onto-logical status of the thing itself, which functions, in objective reality, as an element that is excluded from it, further conditions are required than those provided by the critique of speculative reason. The making visible, in objective reality, of the material traces of this presence of the absence, implies a reflection upon the presence of the ideas of reason in empirical reality, a reflection capable of attributing to empirically given contingent particularities the status of the cases of the ideas of reason. At stake in these cases is the peculiar way that reason's ideas manifest their presence in the world, and, consequently,