uprava mednarodna znanstvena revija za teorijo in prakso Univerza v Ljubljani Fakulteta za upravo letnik IV, številka 2-3, december 2006 ISSN 1581-7555 Revija Uprava je znanstvena revija, ki združuje različne discipline povezane z javno upravo. Obravnava teoretična in praktična vpra{anja ter re{itve s področja javne uprave, upo{tevajoč upravne, pravne, ekonomske, organizacijske in informacijske vidike delovanja in razvoja javne uprave. izdajatelj / publisher Fakulteta za upravo Univerze v Ljubljani naslov uredni{tva / address Fakulteta za Upravo Univerze v Ljubljani Gosarjeva 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana tel.: +386 (0)1 5805-500 faks: +386 (0)1 5805-521 e-po{ta: uprava@fu.uni-lj.si odgovorna urednica / editor Stanka Setnikar-Cankar uredni{ki odbor / editorial board Sre~ko Devjak, Janez Grad, Nevenka Hrovatin, Štefan Ivanko, Tone Jerov{ek, Maja Klun, Rudi Kocjan~i~, Zdravko Pe~ar, Mirko Vintar, Stane Vlaj, Rajko Pirnat, Metka Tekav~i~ mednarodni uredni{ki odbor / international editorial board Stephen Bailey, (Glasgow Caledonian University, Velika Britanija), Biljana Crnjak Karanovi} (Ekonomski fakultet Split, Sveu~ili{te u Splitu, Hrva{ka), Mirjana Drakuli} (Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Srbija), Jurgen Harbich (Bayerische Verwaltungsschule, Universitat Munchen, Nem~ija), Morton R. Davies (University of Liverpool, Velika Britanija), Milton A. Jenkins (Merrick School of Business, University of Baltimore, ZDA), Kveta Kubatova (University of Economics Prague, Če{ka Republika), Ivan Mencer (Ekonomski fakultet Rijeka, Sveu~ili{te u Rijeci, Hrva{ka), Katarina Ott (Institut za javne financije, Zagreb, Hrva{ka), Mirko Pejanovi} (Fakultet politi~kih nauka Sarajevo, Univerzitet u Sarajevu, BiH), Heinrich Reiner-mann (Deutsche Hochschule fur Verwaltungs-wissenschaft, Speyer, Nem~ija), Walter Scherrer (Economics Institute, University of Salzburg, Avstrija), John Taylor (Glasgow Caledonian University, Velika Britanija) recenzenti / referees Marko Bohanec, Miha Brejc, Marjan Brezov{ek, Bojan Bugari~, Andreja Cirman, Janez Čebulj, Mitja Čok, Zarjan Fabjan~i~, Franci Grad, Marko Ho~evar, Mitja Horvat, Nevenka Hrovatin, Albin Igličar, Igor Kaučič, Andrej Kovačič, Maja Klun, Polona Kovač, Marko Kranjec, Marjan Krisper, Alenka Kuhelj, Tanja Markovič Hribernik, Anton Perenič, Vladislav Rajkovič, Ciril Ribičič, Rudi Rozman, Davor Savin, Janez Stare, Janez Šmidovnik, Gregor Virant, Zvone Vodovnik tehnična urednica / tehnical editor Marjeta Pečarič oblikovanje / design Primož Fijavž, studiobotas™ fotografije / photography Iztok Rakar, Zlatko Mali} prelom / text design Marjeta Pečarič lektoriranje / lecture Katarina Puc tisk / print Present, d.o.o. ISSN 1581-7555 Revija izhaja dvakrat letno. Cena posamezne {tevilke je 3.500,00 SIT. Letna naročnina za pravne osebe je 7.000,00 SIT, za posameznike 5.000,00 SIT, za {tudente 3.000,00 SIT, za tujino 40 EUR. Znastveno revijo Uprava je Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS opredelila kot znanstveno periodično publikacijo in jo v letu 2006 tudi sofinancira. vsebina 5 Stanka Setnikar-Cankar Uvodnik 7 Maja Klun Does tax competition make tax reform essential? 25 Walter Scherrer Economic aspects of a "middle layer" of administration and government: some experience from Austria 35 Primož Pevcin Ekonomski vidiki pritožb državljanov na ravnanje birokracije: primer uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev 55 Polona Kova~ The never-ending story of public administration reform in Slovenia (from 1991 to further Development) 75 Janez Stare Model of effective leadership in public administration 97 Tatjana Kozjek Vloga in naloge asistentskega osebja pri organizaciji in izvedbi sestankov 113 Iztok Rakar Človekovo dostojanstvo kot ustavnopravni temelj načela zaslišanja stranke v upravnem postopku 143 Ciril Ribi~i~ Evropski vidiki regionalizacije Slovenije 161 Miro Cerar Ideološki vidiki razmerja med (demokratično) politiko in pravom 181 Branka Vugrin Delovanje registra neposestnih zastavnih pravic in zarubljenih premičnin (RZPP) summaries / povzetki 21 Maja Klun Ali je dav~na reforma nujna zaradi »dav~ne« konkurence? 33 Walter Scherrer Gospodarski vidiki »srednje ravni« administracije in upravljanja: nekaj izku{enj iz Avstrije 52 Primož Pevcin Economic aspects of the issue of citizen complaints against bureaucratic activities 724 Polona Kovač Reforma slovenske javne uprave (od 1991 k nadaljnjemu razvoju) kot nikoli kon~ana zgodba 94 Janez Stare Model uspe{nega vodenja v državni upravi 109 Tatjana Kozjek The role and tasks of assistant personnel in the organization and execution of meetings 138 Iztok Rakar Human dignity as the constitutional basis of the principle of audiatur et altera pars in administrative procedures 151 Ciril Ribi~i~ European aspects of the regionalization of Slovenia 177 Miro Cerar Ideological aspects of the relation between (democratic) politics and the law 195 Branka Vugrin Management of the register of non-possessory liens and seized movable property Uvodnik Spoštovani! Eden od člankov tokratne dvojne številke revije Uprava se nanaša na znano geslo o nikoli dokončani zgodbi administrativne reforme v Sloveniji. Seveda ta zgodba ni zna~ilna samo za nas. Reforma javne uprave je proces, ki poteka v državah razvitega sveta in tudi v tranzicijskih državah. Je posledica izjemno hitrega razvoja družbenega sistema, ki zahteva ustrezno prilagoditev in razvoj upravnih sistemov. Primerjava reform javne uprave po državah pokaže, da se države razlikujejo glede na stopnjo, do katere so se pripravljene spremeniti. V Veliki Britaniji so obstajali mo~ni nagibi k radikalnemu reformiranju celotne državne uprave, medtem ko je Francija reformo uvajala precej previdno. [vedska in Nem~ija sta reformo uvajali s predhodnim testiranjem posameznih sprememb. V Nem~iji je bilo že pred za~etkom reforme jasno, da se le-ta ne bo ukvarjala z institucionalno prenovo; v okviru uprave so tako uvedli samo nekatere podjetni{ke oblike upravljanja. V Franciji so poglavitni cilji vsebovali: spremembo notranjih odnosov v upravi, pove~anje odgovornosti zaposlenih, obvezno vrednotenje dela in programov ter ve~jo usmerjenost k zadovoljevanju uporabnikov javnih storitev. Pregled reform v razvitih državah razkriva, da ni bilo enotnega pristopa. Ugotovimo pa lahko, da kljub velikim sredstvom, vloženim v reforme, redko naletimo na njihovo ovrednotenje, tudi z vidika u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti. V praksi se veliko predvidenih sprememb ni uresni~ilo. Kljub navedenim razlikam si vse države prizadevajo za u~inkovitej{o porabo sredstev. Organizacija javne uprave, ki želi biti u~inkovita, je poli-ti~no avtonomna, visoko strokovna, upo{teva potrebe in interese svojih uporabnikov. Za njeno u~inkovitost je pomembno, da vodje organizacijskih enot razpolagajo s sredstvi za stimulacijo u~inkovitega in uspe{nega dela zaposlenih. Poleg integralnega državnega proračuna je namreč uslužbenski sistem najmo~nej{e sredstvo, ki vpliva na strokovno usposobljen personalni organizem sodobne države. Zaradi zna~ilnosti storitev bi zaposleni morali razumeti posebnost dejavnosti v upravi. Dohodki zaposlenih bi morali biti čim bolj odvisni od doseženih rezultatov. Uslužbenski sistem bi moral biti prilagojen uresničevanju javnega interesa, ki naj ga uveljavlja javna uprava sodobne države. Vse te ugotovitve vsebujeta tudi članka o učinkovitem vodenju v javni upravi in vlogi asistentskega osebja pri organizaciji sestankov. Aktualno temo o evropskih vidikih regionalizacije Slovenije smo dopolnili s člankom o izkušnjah Avstrije na tem področju. Zato upam, da vam bo tudi tokratna številka ponudila obilo zanimivega branja. Odgovorna urednica Red. prof. dr. Stanka.Setnikar-Cankar Does tax competition make tax reform essential? UDK: 336.27: 339.97 Maja Klun Fakulteta za upravo, Univerza v Ljubljani maja.klun@fu.uni-lj.si ABSTRACT Tax competition is generally defined as competition between national economies to increase their competitiveness and attract foreign investment by means of tax policy. Tax policy measures that tax mobile or foreign capital at significantly lower rates are known as harmful tax competition. Some recent corrections to the tax code and proposed tax amendments in Slovenia represent an attempt to relieve the burden on the taxpayer. This paper compares the taxation of high income taxpayers, low income taxpayers, taxpayers with passive income, and the taxation of businesses in Slovenia and neighbouring countries. The comparison indicates that Slovenian taxpayers with a high income have a higher tax burden than in neighbouring countries, while low income taxpayers have one of the highest burdens. The same applies to passive income. The tax burden on businesses ranks in the middle. Key words: taxes, tax reform, globalisation, European Union, OECD. 1. Introduction "Tax competition" is one effect of globalisation. Tax competition is generally defined as competition between national economies to increase their competitiveness and attract foreign investment by means of their tax policy. Tax policy measures that tax mobile or foreign capital at significantly lower rates are known as harmful tax competition. Although different global organisations (including OECD and EU) have continually warned of the negative consequences of harmful tax competition, they have recently also pointed out the positive effects of them. The fact is that over the past decade most countries have lowered their highest tax rates for personal income tax and have moved from a comprehensive income tax approach or offering special deductions for specific types of income (according to tax schedules) in favour of an approach (generally a dual system), in which capital income or gains is not taxed at progressive rates. Similar trends have also occurred in the taxation of corporate profits. A large number of Eastern European countries have abolished the progressive taxation of personal income and introduced a flat-tax rate, although the high social security contributions mean that one cannot truly speak of a flat-tax rate, but rather a special dual model for taxing working income. Over the past three years, Slovenia has undergone almost continual change in its tax legislation as well as intense debate on the introduction of a flat tax rate. Although experts have not reached a common position on the tax reform (or the reform of the reform), there is a commonly held view that labour income is overtaxed, and particularly high, and that the tax burden on labour must be reduced. Slovenia is not isolated from globalisation and tax competition leads not only towards reducing the burden on income from employment, but also business income and income from capital. This paper gives the results of different views on the existence of tax competition and relations with tax reforms. The main section of the paper compares the taxation of high income taxpayers, low income taxpayers, taxpayers with passive income, and the taxation of businesses in Slovenia and neighbouring countries. 2. Different views on tax competition In the past the concept of tax competition was not part of the wider theoretical debate. Economies were relatively closed, and capital was less mobile. Increasing volumes of trade, the faster flow of information, increased mobility of production, and the removal of tax and non-tax-related restrictions on international business and investments, national tax systems has become an important element in decisions on the location of businesses and investments. Textbooks on public finances do not place particularly emphasis on tax competition, with the term appearing most frequently in relation to the Tiebout model, which indicates that people emigrate to countries with the best living conditions in terms of public goods, including tax. Globalisation has led to massive changes in mobility and the issue has therefore become more relevant. The first debates were on harmful tax competition, which is by definition a tax policy measure that significantly lowers the taxation of mobile or foreign capital (OECD, 1998). The transfer of domicile to countries with favourable income tax rules, and the transfer of a company's registered office to a country with low tax rates for profit and capital, is today common practice among wealthy individuals and large companies respectively. The OECD therefore passed a number of recommendations and proposals to counteract harmful tax competition, and also started to publish a list of countries that do not respect the recommendations. In 1998 EU finance ministers changed the corporate tax code. In its 1999 report it identified 66 tax measures as harmful tax competition, with 40 such measures being identified in EU member states. The EU is therefore working to eliminate harmful tax competition, primarily through tax harmonisation, but this process is slow and there is significant resistance from member states. Tax harmonisation is a process that does not just eliminate harmful tax competition, but is also an attempt to restrict any tax competition at all. It would be difficult to set a precise boundary between harmful tax competition and tax competition, as both cases involve more favourable taxation for taxpayers. The essential difference between the two is essentially that harmful tax competition is largely aimed at attracting foreign capital, income and assets through low or zero tax rates and creating special forms of taxations for individual forms of capital, particularly foreign capital. Tax competition, however, can be generally defined as tax policy measures to increase the competitiveness of a domestic economy (see Drezgic, 2005). Wilson and Wildasin (2004) listed the consequences of tax competition, based on definitions from a number of authors: • tax competition leads to the effective distribution of companies into different regions; • tax competition reduces the state's participation in the economy and its influence over general prosperity; • tax competition shifts the tax burden from mobile to immobile capital; • reducing some tax rates mitigates progressiveness and hence the distributory function of public finances. The OECD (1998) largely points to the negative consequences of tax competition, as it leads to potential disturbances in business and investment, and reduces global prosperity. Changing tax systems affects the national tax revenue potential (e.g. capital flow, leading to reduced employment) and changes the tax structure (higher taxation of non-mobile subjects), and reduces the distributory effect of taxes, which has a negative impact on society. OECD is therefore in favour of harmonising tax systems rather than tax competition. McGee (2004) offers a completely different view of tax competition. Tax harmony, he asserts, is an attempt by rich countries to maintain high tax rates and to finance social programmes. Globalisation is therefore a positive trend, offering greater opportunities to invest anywhere in the world. Companies have the opportunity to select the site of their investments where the tax system is most favourable, which enhances their competitiveness. Countries with low tax rates record higher economic growth, not only due to attracting foreign investment, but also because more capital and revenues remain in the private sector, which uses funds more efficiently than the state. 3. Tax competition and tax reform Tax reform in most countries is largely due to tax competition, as most reforms lead to an expansion of the tax bases (mainly to include worldwide income, whereby an attempt is made to tax income generated in countries with more favourable tax codes), and the reduction of tax rates. Tax reforms cover personal income tax as well as corporate income taxation. Most countries work to create a competitive fiscal environment, which promotes investment, assumption of risk and entrepreneurship, while on the other hand wanting to make the tax system simpler and fairer. As mentioned, most countries have expanded the tax base and reduced the level of taxation. In the taxation of personal income there is a clear trend to move from a comprehensive taxation system towards a schedular or more accurately a dual income taxation system. OECD member states have a varied tax structure as the importance of direct taxation differs from country to country. The ratio of income tax to total tax revenue varies from just over 10% (Slovakia) to over 50% (Denmark). Despite the different proportions, between 2000 and 2005 the tax burden on salaries fell on average for all salary categories in OECD countries. According to OECD (2006) data, over this period the taxation of the lowest salaries fell by 0.8 percentage points, while taxation on the highest salaries fell by 0.7 percentage points. The top marginal tax rate over the period ranged from 47% (average top marginal tax rate in OECD countries in 2000) to 43.3% (2005). There was also a significant reduction in the number of tax brackets and the move towards a dual taxation system. The dual income tax system means that capital income is taxed at a flat tax rate, and not with progressive rates like other income. Although in the past one could not speak of a comprehensive income tax system, as most countries had a special tax regime for specific types of income (recognising different costs and deductions for different income types), all income was still taxed using a progressive scale. The lowest top marginal tax rate for personal income tax is in Slovakia, where it is 19% (the flat tax rate), while the highest is in Denmark, where it is 59%. The average top marginal tax rate in the EU is 41.7% - in the EU15 it is 47.19% while in the new 10 states the average is 32.6%. Austria, Belgium and Slovenia all have a top rate of 50%, while the Netherlands (52%), Finland (52.12%) and Sweden (56.5%) all have rates above 50% as well as Demark. Dual taxation systems are found in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK (for more see Blaži} and Ba{agi}, 2005). There is also a trend towards reducing tax rates in the taxation of corporate income tax. Of considerable interest are studies indicating that if a country lowers its tax rate by 1%, then foreign direct investment amount increases by 3.3% to 4.3% (Drezgi}, 2005). OECD studies have shown that over the period 1985-1994 the number of direct investments in Caribbean islands and islands in the South Pacific increased fivefold, and reached USD 200 billion (OECD, 1998). 4. Slovenia and its neighbouring countries In the last two years Slovenia has witnessed the continual reform of its tax system. In 2004 a large-scale reform of personal income tax, corporate income tax and the tax process was carried out. Soon after the changes were introduced it became clear that they included a number of deficiencies. Some corrections were then made, and more changes will follow in 2007. One such correction to the income tax system, which actually came into force before the 2005 changes, was the taxation of capital gains from shares forming a substantial shareholding, as it was clear that unfavourable taxation of capital gains would lead to capital flow away from Slovenia. Most substantial shareholders sold shares to newly established companies abroad, mainly in favourable tax regimes. Ignoring the existence of tax competition therefore had negative consequences for Slovenia's tax system. The correction of the 2004 reforms recognised the existence of tax competition, and was aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the Slovenian economy and simplifying tax procedures. IMD world competitiveness 2005 yearbook listed 20 weakest criteria in Slovenia among which 5 were connected with taxation (employee's social security contribution rate, effective personal income tax rate, collected total tax revenues, investment incentives and real personal taxes), while corporate tax rate on profit was listed as one of 20 strongest criteria. To make it easier to evaluate the changes made to tax legislation over the last year and the changes forecast for this year, the paper will now review personal income tax and corporate income tax in Slovenia's four neighbouring countries (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy), which may be seen as direct competitors to the Slovenian tax system. It remains true, of course, that today's globalisation process does not limit competition to neighbouring countries alone, particularly in relation to mobile capital. 4.1 Personal income tax In all four neighbouring countries personal income is taxed according to the global income principle with a progressive scale. All four countries also have some form of dual system (some forms of income taxed at a set final rate). Slovenia and Austria have the highest marginal tax rate, followed by Croatia, Italy and Hungary. Slovenia has the highest number of tax brackets, while Hungary has the lowest. Austria's bottom marginal tax rate is the lowest, while Italy has the highest bottom rate (see Table 1). Table 1 indicates that taxpayers in Slovenia reach the top tax bracket more quickly than taxpayers in Austria, while taxpayers with the lowest income exceed the first tax bracket relatively quickly. Italy, where the lower threshold is highest, also has the highest bottom marginal tax rate, however this is somewhat mitigated by the allowance system. All countries allow certain expenses to be used to lower the tax base, especially those relating to education and various forms of health insurance and additional pension saving. Austria permits a set percentage of expenses, but also sets a maximum amount for the allowance. Other countries set a maximum amount for individual allowance groups, except for donations in Croatia for which there is a set percentage. Slovenia has a set percentage without a maximum amount for some forms of income. Croatia offers general allowances in the form of a reduced tax base that differ according to the taxpayer category (employee, pensioner, the region of residence), while Italy also has different allowances for different taxpayer groups, though they only apply to people not exceeding a set income limit (e.g. EUR 33 500 for employees in 2006). Their tax allowance system also allows employees not exceeding the general allowance limit of EUR 7500 to remain untaxed. This mitigates the high bottom marginal tax rate. A similar system applies in Slovenia and Croatia, however in Slovenia there is a general allowance for all taxpayer groups, and then specific allowances available for different groups. In both countries this allowance is significantly lower than in Italy; in 2006 it was EUR 2552 in Slovenia and EUR 2656 in Croatia. Slovenia, Croatia and Italy also permit tax allowances for dependent family members, with set amounts reducing the tax base. All forms of tax allowance mentioned above involve reducing the tax base. Table 1: Personal income tax in 2006 for Slovenia and four neighbouring countries Country Top marginal tax rate (%) Lower margin for top income tax bracket (in EUR1) Number of tax brackets Lowest marginal tax rate (%) Upper margin for lowest tax bracket (EUR) Austria 50 51 000 4 0 10 000 Croatia 45 37 178 4 15 5 311 Italy 43 100 000 4 23 26 000 Hungary 36 5 556 2 18 5 556 Slovenia 50 44 012 5 16 5 539 Slovenia* 41 13 600 3 16 6 800 Vir: IBFD, European Tax Surveys, 2006 * in 2007 Austria has a general allowance (as well as specific allowances for different groups), and allowances for dependents, while employees can also have expenses for travel to work recognised. All allowances are set amounts, with some amounts reducing the tax base, while other reduced the tax liability (tax credits). It is a combination of two forms of allowance with the same purpose. Italy and Hungary also offer tax credits that reduce tax for various 1 The following exchange rates apply: one euro is equivalent to 239.64 Slovenian tolars; 7.23 Croatian kunas and 278.99 Hungarian forints. expenses and income up to a maximum amount, however in Hungary income tax payers with income over EUR 23 300 are not entitled to these credits for expenses, and the same applies to individual expenditure, as there are also maximum income limits after which these credits do not apply. The only tax credit in Slovenia that actually reduces the tax liability is for pensioners (IBFD, 2006). As the allowance system differs between these countries, it is difficult to draw a direct comparison for individual taxation. Nevertheless, the paper sets out below the tax liabilities for an individual with a high income and with a low income. To simplify the comparison, it involves a taxpayer whose income derives solely from a salary, who is single without children and who does not claim tax allowances and credits for various expenses. Table 2 gives a calculation of the income tax return in each country for an individual with high income, when the net tax base is EUR 46 000 (income tax calculated according to the tax brackets for each country only), and when the taxable income is EUR 46 000 (general allowance taken into consideration). Table 2: Tax liability of high income individual Country Net tax base EUR 46 000 Taxable income EUR 46 000 (general allowance considered) Austria 14 905 14 503 Croatia* 15 123 13 928 Italy* 13 300 13 300 Hungary 15 560 15 560 Slovenia 16 788 15 576 Slovenia** 16 208 15 060 •excluding local taxes ** in 2007 The table shows that in both cases the tax liability for an individual is highest in Slovenia, despite the fact that in Italy and Hungary taxpayers earning over a set taxable income are not eligible for the general allowance. The difference in taxation between Slovenia and rest in the first example is as much as EUR 3000, and in all cases is over EUR 1000. Higher earners in Slovenia are therefore taxed much more than in neighbouring countries. The tax changes in 2007 does not drasticly change situation. The position of taxpayers with a lower income is different. They face the heaviest tax burden in Hungary - if the general allowance is considered - or in Italy if one considers the net tax base, as Italy has the highest bottom marginal tax rate. A Slovenian taxpayer with a net tax base of EUR 5500 is in third place in this comparison, paying over EUR 300 less than the Italian taxpayer and EUR 100 less than the Hungarian, however the Italian's taxable income is much higher than the Slovene's in that case. Taking the general allowance into account and fixing the taxable income at EUR 5500, the Slovenian taxpayer pays just over EUR 100 less than the Hungarian, somewhat more than the Croatian, while the Austrian and Italian taxpayer actually pay no tax. A taxpayer not reaching a taxable income of EUR 2522 (the general allowance in Slovenia), is not taxed in any country except Hungary, where income tax of EUR 216 would still have to be paid. Table 3: Tax liability of low income individual Country Net tax base EUR 5500 Taxable income EUR 5500 (general allowance considered) Austria 0 0 Croatia* 844 427 Italy* 1.265 0 Hungary 990 603 Slovenia 880 476 Slovenia** 880 432 •excluding local taxes ** in 2007 In all countries, taxpayers pay social contributions defined according to income levels. The rates differ and range from 10% (Italy) to 22.5% (Slovenia). The highest income at which contributions are still paid is fixed in Austria and Croatia, while in Hungary there is a minimum daily amount required for pension contributions. Social security contributions already paid are not part of the tax base for personal income tax in any of the countries. The salary burden is determined by taking into account the average rate of income tax and social security contributions (employees and employers) and is given by Eurostat for EU members for low incomes, and by the OECD for average and low and high incomes. According to OECD data for 2005 (for Austria, Italy and Hungary) the tax wedge on average production salaries is highest in Hungary (49.2%), and lowest in Italy (45.4%), while in Austria it was 47.4% (OECD Tax Database, 2006). If the tax wedge on the average salary in Slovenia and Croatia is assessed in a similar manner, the values would be higher than 50% in Slovenia and less in Croatia. This reveals that Slovenia has the highest tax wedge for average earner. As initially mentioned, all countries observed have some form of dual taxation system. The introduction of the dual system in Slovenia from 2006 brought Slovenia's system into line with its neighbours. Austria has a final income tax rate of 25% for dividends and taxable interest. Capital gains generated from the sale of shares and other securities after being held for one year and real estate held for 10 years is not taxed, while other capital gains and capital gains from the sale of shares that form substantial shareholding are taxed according to a progressive scale. In Croatia dividends will not be taxed from 2006 onwards, taxable interest (primarily interest on loans) are taxed at a final rate of 35%, while capital gains from the sale of real estate are not taxed after being held for three years. The sale of real estate before the three-year time limit is taxed with a final rate of 25%. Capital gains from the sale of movable property and securities are not subject to tax. In Italy dividends held by small shareholders are taxed at a final rate of 12.5%, while dividends from substantial shareholding are taxed according to a progressive scale, however dividends received are eligible for an allowance of 60%. A similar regime applies to capital gains generated from the sale of shares and other securities. Capital gains generated from the sale of real estate become tax exempt when the taxpayer has owned the property for over five years, otherwise a progressive scale applies. Interest is taxed at a final rate of 27%, except for interest on lending which is taxed according to a progressive scale, and interest on government and other bonds, which is taxed at 12.5%. In Hungary a total of 30% of dividends are taxed at a final rate of 25%, while the remaining dividends are taxed at a final rate of 35%. There is a zero-tax rate on interest, except for interest on loans to companies, if they exceed a set amount. Capital gains from the sale of shares and other securities are taxed at a final rate of 25%, capital gains from the sale of real estate are also taxed at 25%, but the rate reduces by 10% after six years' ownership, and reduces by a further 10% each year after that so there is no tax on real estate owned for more than 15 years. Hungary is planning changes for 2007, setting the final income tax rate for interest and capital gains at 20%. In Slovenia, dividends, taxable interest and capital gains are taxed at a flat final rate of 20%. This level is only reduced for capital gains depending on the length of ownership, with no taxation after 20 years. Although the level is generally lower than in other countries, one can conclude that capital gains from the sale of real estate are subject to a less favourable tax regime, as they only become tax exempt after 20 years, with the period being shorter in the other four countries. Dividends are taxed higher in Austria and Hungary, interest higher in Austria and Croatia, and on some forms of interest in Italy. Austria has the most favourable tax regime for capital gains from the sales of shares after a period of year (unless they form a substantial shareholding), followed by Croatia (with exemption after three years' ownership), followed by Slovenia at 20%, which offers exemption after 20 years (IBFD, 2006). The table below gives a country-by-county comparison for an individual with the following income: • A: EUR 200 dividends (not from substantial shareholding); • B: EUR 200 interest on time deposit; • C: EUR 500 capital gains from sale of real estate (owned for 5.1 years) • D: EUR 500 capital gains from sale of real estate (owned for 15.1 years); • E: EUR 200 capital gains from sale of shares (not from substantial shareholding; owned for 1.1 years); • F: EUR 200 capital gains from sale of shares (not from substantial shareholding; owned for 3.1 years). Table 4: Taxation of dividends, interest and capital gains Income Austria Croatia Italy Hungary Slovenia A 50 0 25 64 40 B 50 02 54 0 03 (40) C 01 0 0 125 100 D 0 0 0 0 25 E 0 02 25 50 40 F 0 0 25 50 40 Total 100 0 129 289 245 (285) 1Austria: EUR 500 is taxable on a progressive scale, but the bottom marginal tax rate is 0%. 2Croatia: interest on savings and capital gains from selling securities are tax exempt. 3Slovenia: up to SIT 300 000 tax exempt in 2006 and up to SIT 150 000 in 2007; after 2008 interest will be taxed in full (values in bracket). 4.2 Corporate income tax When Slovenia introduced corporate income tax it emphasised that its 25% rate was one of the lowest in Europe. However, the limit has never been changed, while its fellow new EU member states significantly lowered their rates before EU entry. Cyprus lowered its rate from 25% to 10%, Latvia from 22% to 15%, Lithuania from 24% to 15%, Poland from 34% to 19 %, the Czech Republic from 31% to 28%, Hungary from 17.5% to 16%, and Slovakia from 29% to 19%. In addition to these countries (excluding the Czech Republic), Ireland (12.5%) and Estonia are also among the EU countries with the lowest corporate tax rate. Although other countries do not have lower tax rates, they have nevertheless been lowered in other countries (e.g. in Austria from 34% to 25% in 2005). Of all the countries observed, Italy has the highest corporate tax rate, while Hungary has the lowest. Austria has the same rate as Slovenia, but in addition to the tax rate there is a minimum tax contribution that companies must pay, depending on their legal status. The rates are given in Table 5. Table 5: Tax rates for corporate income tax Country Tax rate Austria 25 Croatia 20 Italy 33 Hungary 16 Slovenia 25 Slovenia* 23 Source: IBFD, European Tax Surveys, 2006 * in 2007 All the observed countries recognise a range of allowances and incentives when defining the tax base. Austria permits accelerated depreciation, allowances for expenditure on research and development, employee training and new share issues. All the incentives have a maximum allowance limit. Croatia offers allowances for entertainment expenses, employment and donations, and a range of incentives for new companies and investments, as in some circumstances companies can pay at a lower tax rate. Lower tax rates apply to set regions and free zones. In Hungary companies can make use of allowances for investments, employment and expenditure on research and development. Most of these have a maximum specified amount. Under certain conditions companies may also be eligible for a lower tax rate. In Italy, in addition to a set percentage for entertainment expenses, there are also allowances for employment and research. Accelerated depreciation is permitted and there is an allowance limit for reserves. Slovenia has similar allowances and incentives to its neighbours, offering allowances for set costs of entertainment expenses, as well as allowances for donations, investments, employment, and research and development. Slovenia according to stated do not differ much from other neighbouring countries. 5. Conclusion Predictions of what form the latest changes to Slovenia's tax code will take suggest that the existence of tax competition is no longer seen as negligible, as most of the changes tend towards simplifying and reducing tax rates, and - for personal income tax - reducing the number of tax brackets. Reducing the top marginal tax rate will reduce the burden on higher earners, which the comparison has shown are taxed highest in Slovenia. The lowering of the bottom marginal tax rate, even if the general allowance were raised to one million tolars (EUR 4173), would leave lower earners significantly worse off, particularly in comparison to Italy and Austria, where many Slovenes living in border areas already work. Increasing the standard VAT rate to over 20% could also have a negative impact, as none of the neighbouring countries has a higher rate at present. Italy, Austria and Hungary all have two reduced VAT rates, while Croatia even has a zero rate for essential goods. It does not make sense when preparing tax legislation to worsen the position of taxpayers that are currently in a comparable position at least with neighbouring countries, while it does make sense to improve the position of those currently in a poorer comparable position, i.e. those earning higher incomes. Doc. dr. Maja Klun je julija 2002 uspešno zagovarjala doktorsko disertacijo in tako pridobila naziv doktorja znanosti s področja ekonomije, leta 2005 pa je bila prvič izvoljena v docentko za področje ekonomike javnega sektorja. Njena poglavitna raziskovanja so s področja davkov, ciljno usmerjenega proračuna in merjenja uspešnosti in učinkovitosti v javnem sektorju. References • Blažic H., Bašagič D. (2005): »Dividend Taxation: The Comparative Analysis with Emphasis on Slovenia and Croatia«, Uprava, III, No 1, pp. 83-100. • Drezgič S. (2005): »Harmful Tax Competition in the EU with Reference to Croatia«, časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu, 23, No 1, pp. 71-100. • IBFD (2006): »European Tax Surveys«, IBFD: Amsterdam. • McGee R.W. (2004): »Is Tax Competition Harmful?« Andreas School of Business Working Paper Series, Barry University: Miami. • OECD (1998): »Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue«, OECD: Paris, www.oecd.org. • OECD (2006): »Reforming Personal Income Tax«, The OECD Policy Brief, March 2006, www.oecd.org/publications/Policybriefs. • OECD Tax Database (2006): »Taxation of Wage Income«, OECD: Paris, www.oecd.org. • Wilson J.D., Wildasin D. E. (2004): "Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon", Journal of Public Economics, No 88, pp. 1065-1091. POVZETEK Ali je davčna reforma nujna zaradi »davčne« konkurence? Proces globalizacije povzro~a med drugim tudi »dav~no konkurenco«. Dav~na konkurenca je splo{no definirana kot tekmovanje nacionalnih gospodarstev za pove~anje njihove konkuren~nosti in privabljanja tujih investicij s pomo~jo dav~ne politike. Ukrepi dav~ne politike, ki bistveno nižje obdav~ujejo mobilni kapital ali tuji kapital, so ozna~eni kot {kodljiva dav~na konkurenca. Čeprav razli~na svetovna združenja in organizacije (tudi OECD in EU) stalno opozarjajo na negativne posledice {kodljive dav~ne konkurence, se v zadnjem ~asu poudarjajo tudi pozitivni u~inki lete. Dejstvo je, da je ve~ina držav v zadnjem desetletju znižala najvi{je dav~ne stopnje pri obdav~enju dohodkov posameznikov in odstopila od celovitega ali prikrito cedularnega pristopa obdav~evanja dohodkov posameznikov, in sicer v smeri cedularnega (ve~inoma dualnega) pristopa, v katerem dohodki iz kapitala niso obdav~eni po progresivnih stopnjah. Podobni trendi se pojavljajo tudi pri obdav~evanju dobi~kov podjetij. Veliko {tevilo vzhodnoevropskih držav je odpravilo progresivno obdav~enje dohodkov posameznikov in uvedlo enotne dav~ne stopnje, ~eprav pri {e vedno visokih prispevkih za socialno varnost ne moremo govoriti o enotni dav~ni stopnji, ampak o posebnem dualnem modelu obdav~evanja delovnih dohodkov. V Sloveniji smo v zadnjih treh letih soo~eni prakti~no z nenehnim spreminjanjem dav~ne zakonodaje ter polemikami o uvedbi enotne dav~ne stopnje. Čeprav med strokovnjaki ni enotnega stali{~a o dav~ni reformi (ali reformi reforme), velja enotno mnenje, da so delovni dohodki dav~no preobremenjeni, posebej visoki in je zato razbremenitev dela nujna. Slovenija ni izolirana enota v procesu globalizacije in dav~na konkurenca vodi do teženj razbremenitve ne samo dohodkov, ki izhajajo iz zaposlitve, ampak tudi razbremenitev dohodkov podjetij in dohodkov, ki izhajajo iz kapitala. V prispevku so prikazani razli~ni pogledi na obstoj dav~ne konkurence ter povezanost z dav~nimi reformami. Osrednji del prispevka prikazuje primerjave obdav~enja zavezanca v Sloveniji in v njenih sosednjih državah (Avstriji, Hrva{ki, Italiji in Madžarski). V vseh sosednjih državah je dohodek fizi~nih oseb obdav~en po na~elu svetovnega dohodka in s progresivno lestvico (stopni~asta progresija). V vseh državah imajo dolo~eno obliko dualnega sistema (nekateri dohodki so obdav~eni s kon~nim davkom). Najvi{jo mejno dav~no stopnjo imata Slovenija in Avstrija, sledijo Hrva{ka, Italija in Madžarska. Slovenija ima najve~ dav~nih razredov, najmanj pa Madžarska. Najnižjo spodnjo mejno dav~no stopnjo ima Avstrija, najvi{jo pa Italija. Dav~ni zavezanci v Sloveniji hitreje dosežejo zgornjo mejo obdav~itve kot zavezanci v Avstriji, po drugi strani pa zavezanci z najnižjimi dohodki relativno hitro presežejo prvi dohodninski razred. V vseh državah priznavajo dolo~ene izdatke, ki znižujejo dav~no osnovo, predvsem za izobraževanje in razli~ne oblike zdravstvenih zavarovanj in dodatnih pokojninskih zavarovanj. V Avstriji so dolo~eni odstotki izdatkov, ki se priznajo, vendar pa je isto~asno dolo~en tudi maksimalni znesek olaj{ave. V drugih državah so dolo~eni maksimalni zneski za posamezno skupino olaj{av, razen za donacije v Hrva{ki, kjer je dolo~en odstotek. V Sloveniji imamo dolo~ene odstotke brez zgornjih omejitev pri nekaterih dohodkih. Ker je sistem olaj{av v državah razli~en, je primerjavo obdav~enja posameznika težko enostavno prikazati. Zaradi poenostavitve primerjave gre za zavezanca, ki ima edini dohodek pla~o, je samski, brez otrok in ne uveljavlja olaj{av za razli~ne izdatke. V ~lanku je prikazan izra~un dohodnine v posamezni državi za posameznika z visokimi dohodki, in sicer v primeru, ko je njegova neto dav~na osnova 46.000 EUR (zgolj izra~un dohodnine glede na lestvico v posamezni državi) in ko je njegov obdav~ljivi dohodek 46.000 EUR (upo{tevana je splo{na olaj{ava). Iz izra~una je razvidno, da je v obeh primerih dav~na obremenitev zavezanca najvi{ja v Sloveniji, kljub temu, da Italija in Madžarska ne priznavata splo{ne olaj{ave za zavezance, ki presežejo dolo~en obdav~ljivi dohodek. Razlika v obdav~itvi v prvem primeru presega 3.000 EUR in ni manj{a od 1.000 EUR, ~e upo{tevamo prvi primer. Visoki zaslužki v Sloveniji so torej bistveno bolj obdav~eni kot v sosednjih državah. Druga~en je položaj zavezancev z nizkimi dohodki. Ti so najbolj obdav~eni v Madžarski, ko upo{tevamo splo{no olaj{avo ter v primeru neto dav~nih osnov v Italiji, ki ima tudi najvi{jo spodnjo mejno dav~no stopnjo. Slovenski zavezanec je z neto dav~no osnovo v vi{ini 5.500 EUR na tretjem mestu in pla~a dobrih 300 EUR manj kot italijanski zavezanec in 100 EUR manj kot madžarski, vendar pa je obdav~ljivi dohodek pri italijanskem zavezancu precej vi{ji kot pri slovenskem v tem primeru. V kolikor upo{tevamo splo{no olaj{avo in dolo~imo 5.500 EUR kot obdav~ljivi dohodek, pa slovenski zavezanec pla~uje le dobrih 100 EUR manj kot madžarski, nekoliko več od hrvaškega, medtem ko avstrijski in italijanski zavezanec ne plačata davka. V vseh državah zavezanci plačujejo socialne prispevke, ki so določeni v stopnjah od dohodka. Stopnje so različne, in sicer se gibljejo med 10 % (v Italiji) in 22,5 % (v Sloveniji). Najvišji dohodek od katerega se še plačujejo prispevki je določen v Avstriji in Hrvaški, v Madžarski pa je določen minimalni dnevni znesek za pokojninsko zavarovanje. Plačani prispevki za socialno varnost niso del davčne osnove za dohodnino v nobeni državi. Kot je že omenjeno v začetku, vse obravnavane države poznajo dualni sistem obdavčitve. Uvedba dualnega sistema v Sloveniji z letom 2006 je približala slovensko obdavčitev sosednjim državam. Čeprav je stopnja večinoma nižja kot v drugih državah, pa lahko zaključimo, da so kapitalski dobički od prodaje nepremičnin manj ugodno obravnavani v Sloveniji, saj so neobdavčeni šele po 20 letih, v vseh drugih obravnavanih državah pa je ta doba krajša. Dividende so bolj obdavčene v Avstriji in Madžarski, obresti pa v Avstriji, Hrvaški in nekatere v Italiji. Kapitalski dobički od prodaje vrednostnih papirjev so po preteku enega leta lastništva najugodneje davčno obravnavani v Avstriji (če ne gre za pretežne lastniške deleže), sledi Hrvaška (z oprostitvijo po treh letih lastništva), z 20 % stopnjo jima sledi Slovenija, ki tudi omogoča oprostitev po 20 letih lastništva. Od vseh obravnavnih držav ima najvišjo davčno stopnjo obdavčenja dobička podjetij Italija, nižjo od Slovenije pa imata Madžarska in Hrvaška. Vse države poznajo podobne olajšave in vspodbude, tako da v primeru obdavčenja podjetij Slovenija ne izstopa. Economic aspects of a "middle layer" of administration and government: some experience from Austria UDK: 338.2 (436) Walter Scherrer Department of Economics and Social Science, University of Salzburg walter.scherrer @sbg.ac.at ABSTRACT There was no "middle layer" of government between the central state and the municipal level in the new member states of the European Union when these countries joined the EU recently. For various motivations - the ability to optimize access to EU funds being one of the motivations - the creation of a middle layer of regional government or administration has been discussed. In opposite to the new EU members Austria has already had a political system with three layers not only of administration but with three layers of government for several decades. Section 1 discusses major features of the territorial organization of Austria's economy and its system of political decision making. Section 2 finds that history, a strong political preference for federalism, and pragmatism are major explanations for the emergence and durability of the system. Section 3 analyses the economic cost of Austria's complex territorial organisation, and section 4 shows the scope for economic policy action at the state level using examples from the state of Salzburg. Key words: Austria, economy, regionalism, organizational structure 1. The territorial organization of Austria's economy The territorial organization of Austria's economy and its system of political decision making is rather complex. It comprises four levels of legislation: Since its accession to the European Union legislation at the EU-level affects and limits the degree of freedom of national politics. Austria itself is a federal state with three layers of government, with elected government institutions, independent decision making powers and budgetary autonomy - the federation, the states, and the municipalities. Austria's 8 million inhabitants live in 9 states, the average size of a state being less than 10.000 square kilometres of land, and the median number of population being less than 700.000. Federalism, Austrian style means an own parliament, an own government, an own set of laws with an own administration etc. for small numbers of inhabitants. The states have substantial legislative powers which include social welfare, health care in the hospital sector, some areas of primary and secondary education, nature conservation, building regulations, and regional infrastructure planning, including transport. Table 1: Key data of Austrian states Area (km2) Population (census 2001) Number of districts Number of municipalities 9 states, average 9.319 892.547 11 262 9 states, median 9.500 673.000 10 171 8 states (without Vienna), minimum 2.601 277.569 4 96 9 states, maximum 19.178 1.550.123 25 573 Austria, total 83.871 8.032.926 99 2.359 Source: Statistik Austria (2006) Austria's territory is organized in more than 2.300 municipalities. Austrian states comprise up to 573 autonomous municipalities; the median still is 171. The constitution guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities in all local matters. Municipal authorities perform policing and inspection tasks and local planning, and they provide infrastructure - such as water services and buildings for primary and secondary schools - and social services. Groups of municipalities can voluntarily form co-operations and are often mandatory members of co-operations of municipalities which address specific issues (e.g. in providing infrastructure, social and school services). These cooperations of municipalities add another layer of administration to the whole system. Finally there is the district level: 99 districts have administrative competencies, but no elected government officials and no legislation power. 2. Administrative regions vs. functional regions The complex territorial organization of Austria's political and administrative system is rooted in history and tradition as well as in a strong political will. Most parts of the provincial structure (states) and of the district structure of administration have been inherited already from the Habsburg monarchy and reflect the administrative entities of the monarchy. Many Austrians have strong emotional ties to the state they live in or they were born in. Federalism is one of the cornerstones of the constitution since Austria became a republic in 1920 and thus it is an expression of political will; the federalist structure has never been seriously disputed since then. From an economic point of view the diversified legislative and administrative structure has some major advantages. Decentralised decision powers are expected to allow policy makers to take local preferences and specific regional needs of the population better into account than in a unitary state. It also allows to take political decisions and to perform related administrative tasks at those levels of government at which the provision of public goods is most cost-effective. From a European Union member's perspective regional entities below the level of the central state are important for attracting European Union regional and structural funds. The nomenclature of unit's territorial statistics (NUTS) distinguishes several layers of statistical description of regions: At the NUTS 1 level Austria is structured in three regions (east, south, and west) which have purely statistical significance (see Statistik Austria 2006, ch.37). The NUTS 2 level reflects the basic administrative structure of the country, and therefore it is structured in 9 regions which are equivalent to the states. The NUTS 3 level Austria is structured in 35 regions which are equivalent to districts or clusters of districts within a state. Regions which are eligible to EU funds in most cases are defined according to the NUTS 2 classification, but EU documents also relate to NUTS 3 and even smaller regional entities. So the statistical regional units are based on the existing administrative structure (availability of data!) and they were defined according to several criteria, one of them being the eligibility for EU support. While until 2005 the state of Burgenland was a target 1-area (which allows for the highest levels of support), now no Austrian state is defined as a target area for EU regional funding any more. By and large the territorial organisation of Austria's economy reflects administrative regions. Administrative regions are the units in which regional economic policies are designed and executed and the members of regional governments and regional parliaments find their constituencies in such regions. Regional economic policy thus will primarily reflect the administrative regions' interests; therefore they are proper starting points for most purposes of regional economic policy analysis. "Functional regions" have much more intense economic interactions inside the region than with any other area outside the region and are likely to be congruent with labour market regions. In fact, the definitions of functional regions in a recent international survey on this topic (OECD 2002) are based on labour market regions in most countries. Although this definition might sometimes to be too narrow for the analysis of some issues as there are other than labour market interactions (e.g. flows of goods and services, flows of knowledge) regularly taking place which cross the borders of individual labour market regions, this concept is a proper starting point for regional economic analyses. A major problem with administrative regions is that they only rarely are congruent with functional regions, which entails the emergence of positive and negative spillovers. This means that actions of one region's government have an impact (positive or negative) on other regions which in turn have no possibility to avoid the negative impact or which have no incentive to pay for the provision of the service from which the positive impact derives. As there is no way to change the structure of administrative regions in Austria there has emerged a complex system of intergovernmental cooperation and financial relations as a pragmatic solution. The longer a "grown system" is in place the more difficult it seems to be to change that system. Therefore it might be particularly worthwhile to consider the concept of functional regions and to make administrative regions congruent with them when the territorial organization of a country is diversified by adding another layer of administration or government. 3. The economic cost of Austria's complex territorial organisation structure Each additional layer of government imposes additional cost on a nation's economy as the complexity of the system will be increased. Therefore the three layers of government within Austria and the complex relations among the many administrative units create substantial cost of the political and administrative system. The waste of resources within this system ("There is much scope to improve the efficiency of revenue allocation across governments"; OECD 2005, p.14) has been a major topic of the latest OECD Economic Survey of the Austrian economy. Several interrelated issues are responsible for this situation: First, the mere size of Austria's states (and even more so of municipalities) often does not allow exploiting economies of scale in the provision of public goods and services. Approximately half of Austria's 2.300 municipalities count less than 1.500 inhabitants, and cost of administration per capita are significantly higher in small municipalities than in larger ones. Second, in the field of legislation there is the "factor 9" (or even 10 if the federal level is included). Legislative bodies derive its existence and its meaning from the production of laws and regulations, and administrations derive their existence from enacting regulations in a specific way. As Austria comprises nine states it has nine different parliaments producing law and regulations at the sub-national level and nine different state governments which enact these laws and regulations. This is not only costly in terms of the direct resource cost of government like paying salaries and maintaining the administrative infrastructure, it also is the source of cost which is imposed on the population and on firms indirectly. Law and regulations at the state level are not always well co-ordinated among states, and therefore it is no wonder that sometimes negative implications for the macro-economy arise. For example, the laws governing subsidies for residential construction vary across states and therefore - in addition to its highly questionable impact on income distribution - they impair mobility of labour between states and thus negatively affect the flexibility of the labour market. Third, the existence of several layers of government implies a great variety of forms of shared decision making processes which in many cases end up in a fragmentation of decision making across different layers of government (OECD 2005). Decision making competences in closely related areas are often assigned across different levels of government, responsibilities might overlap, and most administrative tasks emanating from federal legislation are delegated to the states, and - to a lesser extent - to the municipalities. In some matters the constitution assigns legislative powers on the framework conditions to the federal level, and states can set regulations within this framework. The fragmentation of decision making regularly goes hand in hand with inefficient incentive systems and/or a lack of transparency. The situation is even worsened because part of government activities have been outsourced to "private" firms in which a public authority still is the single owner, and in those cases in which other public entities like social insurance are involved. An example of inefficiencies is the sharing of responsibility in primary and secondary education among layers of government: Municipalities or cooperations of municipalities provide buildings and other infrastructure (if "poor" municipalities are not able to do that the state might help), the states employ the teachers and legislate teachers' working conditions, while the federal government has to pay for the teachers' salaries and sets up the curricula. Therefore the states have no incentive to save cost of teachers, which made the federal government develop a variety of regulations which entail a continuous series of re-negotiations of regulations and allocations. In effect, the degree of freedom for state policy is rather small. Another very costly example for the fragmentation of decision making is the spending responsibilities in health care. The constitution assigns legislative powers on the framework conditions of hospital care to the federal level, and the states legislate within this framework. Executive powers and financial responsibilities again involve all layers of government plus the social insurance, and it is further complicated by the fact that health care services provided by hospitals and those provided outside hospitals by practicing physicians have been managed separately. The states contribute only less than half of government expenditure for hospital services but they play a dominant role in decision making for hospital services. Fourth, the Austrian federal system has experienced a dynamics of its own which is best reflected by developments in the federal financial system. After having run a federal system for several decades Austria has been confronted now with a multitude of general rules, special regulations, and various provisions which have been added to the initial system of allocating public tax income to federal, state, and municipal governments. Earmarking of revenues, extra-budgetary funds, and co-financing arrangements between governments have increasingly become important and have increased the complexity of the system of federal fiscal relations. A consultation mechanism which aims to reduce cost spillovers of legislation originating from the federal or the state level on other levels of government was introduced in 1998 and has brought some relief. The legislating level of government has to reimburse other levels of governments for such cost spillovers; any municipal, state or the federal government can invoke the mechanism. 4. The scope for economic policy action at the state level Finally, the possibilities of state governments to pursue an own distinct economic policy ought to be addressed from an empirical perspective. For this purpose the results of an analysis of five regional economic policy instruments implemented by the state government of Salzburg (Scherrer, 2003) are reported briefly. A key element which determines the scope for regional policy and its success is its appropriate relation to policy at the federal level. Some issues obviously cannot be treated adequately at the regional level as the relevant agents are located outside the region or solving the issues would render implications which are considered delicate at the macroeconomic or federal level. This was one of the major reasons why an effort to enhance work-time flexibility failed in Salzburg. There can be a strong trade-off between customizing economic policy to local needs and cost efficient provision of public goods. An innovation stimulation program is a good example: On the one hand it tried to provide custom-tailored support for firms in the region, on the other hand the state government does not have the expertise to evaluate innovation projects (and it would be extremely costly to develop that expertise). The state delegated the decision on funding to the federal level which improved efficiency but at the same time it raised difficulties to meet local needs. Federal policy interventions sometimes provide new opportunities for regional policy initiatives. Response at the state level to federal legislation has to be timed properly (e.g. the effort to enhance work time flexibility came too late). States also have to weigh the benefit increased scope for regional policy intervention against the economic burden which might be shifted to them by the federal authorities. For example the federal government has legislated the founding of polytechnic universities ("Fachhochschulen") in the 1990s and "allowed" the states to support them and thus to share the financial burden of provide tertiary education which by constitution is within the competencies of the central state. Another major result of the evaluation of policy instruments is that merely giving money - public money - is not sufficient for a successful policy intervention: Complimentary advisory and consultancy services have been most important for the success of two of the economic policy instruments which have been analyzed, the village renewal program and the regional place marketing organization. The evaluations further show that the impact of individual instruments is weak unless they are not part of a comprehensive economic policy strategy. Economic policy options within such a strategy at the state level basically seem to be twofold: First, there is a potential for "defensive" economic policies which largely aim at reducing the negative impact of change on those parts of the public which are hit most severely. These policies include social policy and policies to attain regional equity; in many cases they are of a curative nature. Second, there is a potential for "pro-active" economic policies at the provincial level. These policies aim at improving the framework for economic growth and development in the region and include innovation policy, build-up of infrastructure, land use regulation, education and labor market policy, and location marketing. In summary, a differentiated answer to the fundamental question about the potential scope of regional policy intervention has to be given, but some success stories suggest that such a potential exists. Dr. Walter Scherrer is full professor for economics and public finance; deputy director, Economics Institute, University of Salzburg; director of the postgraduate study programme for General Management, University of Salzburg; visiting professor Fudan University Shanghai (2001); has taken part at international conferences in universities in Austria, China, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Tunisia. Major fields of research: Regional economic policy, economics of long-term structural change, labour economics. Bibliography • OECD (2002): Redefining Territories: The Functional Regions. Paris. • OECD (2005): Economic Surveys: Austria. Paris. April 2005. • Scherrer Walter (2003): Information & Communication Technologies and Regional Policy: What Can We Learn from Evaluations of Policy Instruments? In: Uprava, year I, No. 1, Sept. 2003; pp.76-90. • Statistik Austria (2006): Statistical Yearbook of Austria 2006 (Statistisches Jahrbuch Osterreichs 2006), Vienna. POVZETEK Gospodarski vidiki »srednje ravni« administracije in upravljanja: nekaj izku{enj iz Avstrije Avstrija je država z 8 milijoni prebivalcev, zvezna parlamentarna republika od leta 1920, ki ima v svoji sestavi 9 dežel (Lander) in 99 upravnih okrajev (Politische Bezirke). Zakonodajna in izvršilna moč sta porazdeljeni med federalno državo in dežele, nižja raven od dežel pa so občine (Gemeinde), ki ji je 2359. Občine so teritorialne in hkrati upravne enote s pravico lokalne samouprave, mesto Dunaj ima status dežele, okraja in občine. Avstrijske dežele imajo precejšnje zakonodajne pristojnosti na področju socialnega in zdravstvenega varstva, osnovnega in srednješolskega izobraževanja, varstva okolja, gradbenih predpisov ter načrtovanja regionalne infrastrukture, vključno s prometom. Ustava zagotavlja avtonomnost občin glede vseh lokalnih zadev. Občinske oblasti so pristojne za policijsko dejavnost, inšpekcijske naloge in lokalno načrtovanje ter infrastrukturo, kot so vodovod in stavbe za osnovne in srednje šole, in socialno skrbstvo. Upravni okraji imajo samo administrativne pristojnosti. Decentralizirana pristojnost odločanja naj bi oblikovalcem politike omogočala, da bodo bolje upoštevali lokalne želje in posebne regionalne potrebe, kot je to mogoče v unitarni državi. Sprejemanje političnih odločitev in izvajanje s tem povezanih administrativnih nalog naj bi se izvajalo na tistih ravneh upravljanja, kjer je zagotavljanje javnih dobrin stroškovno najbolj učinkovito. Po nomenklaturi statističnih teritorialnih enot (NUTS), ki so pomembne za pridobitev regionalnih in strukturnih skladov EU, se Avstrija nahaja na ravneh NUTS 1 (3), NUTS 2 (9) in NUTS 3 (35). Regije, upravičene do sredstev EU, so v večini primerov opredeljene v skladu s klasifikacijo NUTS 2. Teritorialna organizacija avstrijskega gospodarstva odraža administrativne regije, enote, v katerih se načrtujejo in izvajajo regionalne gospodarske politike. Te so primerno izhodišče za večino namenov analize regionalne gospodarske politike. V "funkcionalnih regijah" potekajo precej bolj intenzivne gospodarske povezave znotraj regije kot z območji zunaj regije, za te regije pa je verjetno, da so skladne z regijami trga delovne sile. Glavna težava z administrativnimi regijami je v tem, da se redko ujemajo s funkcionalnimi regijami, kar ima za posledico pozitivne in negativne učinke. Veljalo bi razmisliti o konceptu funkcionalnih regij in te uskladiti z administrativnimi regijami. Vsaka dodatna raven upravljanja pomeni dodatne stro{ke v gospodarstvu države, saj se pove~a kompleksnost sistema. Tudi velikost avstrijskih dežel ({e bolj pa ob~in - približno polovica jih ima manj kot 1500 prebivalcev) pogosto ne omogo~a izkori{~anja ekonomije obsega pri zagotavljanju javnih dobrin in storitev, stro{ki administracije na prebivalca pa so v majhnih ob~inah precej vi{ji kot v velikih. Ker ima Avstrija devet dežel, ima devet razli~nih parlamentov, ki pripravljajo zakone in predpise na deželni ravni, ter devet razli~nih deželnih vlad, ki te zakone in predpise uresni~ujejo. To ni drago samo v smislu neposrednih stro{kov virov uprave, kot so izpla~ila pla~ in vzdrževanje administrativne infrastrukture, tem-ve~ je tudi vir stro{kov, ki se posredno prenesejo na prebivalce in podjetja. Razen tega zakoni in predpisi na državni in deželni ravni niso vedno dobro usklajeni, zato ni ~udno, da v~asih pride do negativnih makroekonomskih u~inkov. Obstoj ve~ ravni upravljanja pa pomeni tudi ve~jo razli~nost oblik procesov odlo~anja, kar ima v mnogih primerih za posledico razdrobljenost odlo~anja. Rezultati analize petih regionalnih instrumentov gospodarske politike, ki jih je uporabila deželna uprava Salzburga, kažejo, da je klju~ni element, ki dolo~a obseg pristojnosti regionalne politike in njeno uspe{nost, ustrezen odnos do politike na zvezni ravni. Ukrepi zvezne politike pomenijo v~asih tudi nove priložnosti za spremembe regionalne politike, vendar mora biti odziv deželne ravni na zvezno zakonodajo pravo~asen, dežele pa morajo tudi pretehtati, kak{na bi bila korist ve~jega obsega pristojnosti regionalne politike glede na gospodarsko breme, ki bi ga nanje lahko prenesle zvezne oblasti. Vpliv posameznih instrumentov je {ibak, ~e niso del iz~rpne strategije regionalne gospodarske politike. Analiza instrumentov politike pa je tudi pokazala, da za uspe{no spremembo regionalnih pristojnosti ni zado{~ala zgolj zagotovitev javnih sredstev, ampak so bile odlo~ilne dodatne, strokovne svetovalne storitve. Ekonomski vidiki pritožb državljanov na ravnanje uradništva: primer uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev UDK: 342.7 : 351.74 Primož Pevcin Fakulteta za upravo, Univerza v Ljubljani primoz.pevcin@fu.uni-lj.si IZVLEČEK Reševanje problematike pritožb državljanov na ravnanje uradništva ponavadi temelji na vplivanju na t.i. ponudbene dejavnike pritožb, kot so na primer večji nadzor nad ravnanjem uradništva, dodatno usposabljanje uslužbencev ipd. V praksi ima navedeni pristop pomanjkljivost v demotivacijskih učinkih na aktivnosti uslužbencev, hkrati pa tudi povečuje stroške delovanja uradništva. Tako se je smiselneje in racionalneje reševanja navedene problematike lotiti z vplivanjem na t.i. povpraševalne dejavnike pritožb, s čimer se dejansko skuša vplivati na zmanjšanje možnosti pojavljanja potencialnih primerov ravnanja, ki vodi v pritožbe. Ključne besede: uradništvo, ravnanje, birokratski output, agencijski problem, pritožbe državljanov 1. Uvod S problematiko pritožb državljanov na ravnanje uradništva in posledičnih možnih odškodninskih zahtevkov se srečuje večina razvitih in demokratičnih držav.1 Problematika je postala pereča zato, ker vzpostavitev sodobnega instituta človekovih pravic v povezavi z naraščajočo družbeno-ekonomsko neenakostjo državljanov implicira v skladu s teorijo nasprotij negativen odnos določenih družbenih skupin do državnega aparata. Namreč, sodobna teorija 1 Tudi Slovenija na tem področju ni nobena izjema. Eno izmed področij, kjer je ta problematika še posebej izrazita, je področje delovanja policije. Več o pravnih, ekonomskih in organizacijskih vidikih problematike odškodninske odgovornosti države za ravnanje državnih uslužbencev v Sloveniji glej Seliškar Toš (2005). nasprotij, ki se v osnovi naslanja na velika nesorazmerja v porazdelitvi družbene moči, pravi, naj bi družbene skupine, ki imajo v lasti oziroma nadzirajo pomembne družbene vire, uporabljale državni aparat, katerega sestavni del je tudi policija, v določeni meri tudi z namenom prevlade nad dohodkovno šibkejšimi družbenimi skupinami. Skladno s to teorijo naj bi bila policija kot družbeni nadzorni agent države pristojna ne le za omejevanje in preprečevanje kriminala, temveč tudi za nadzor, vodenje in omejevanje družbeno podrejenih skupin (Fielding, 1991), kar pa po drugi strani implicira tudi negativen odnos teh družbenih skupin do državnega aparata. Osnovni namen prispevka je prikazati institucionalno ekonomske vidike vzrokov pritožb državljanov na ravnanje uradništva, s posebnim poudarkom na analizi ravnanja policistov pri rabi policijskih prisilnih sredstev. Namreč, eden izmed "privilegijev" policije je tudi možnost uporabe prisilnih sredstev, pri čemer se ta tematika v bistvu nanaša na enega izmed vidikov zlorabe policijske moči, to je neustrezne (predvsem prekomerne) rabe prisilnih sredstev, kar zmanjšuje zaupanje javnosti v policijo, negativno vpliva na delovno motivacijo in moralo policistov ter ustvarja konfliktne situacije med državljani in policisti. Standardni način analize pri proučevanju rabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev ter s tem povezanih potencialnih pritožb državljanov temelji na organizacijskih, socioloških in psiholoških vidikih policijskega dela, kar pomeni proučevanje organizacijske klime, psiholoških značilnosti policistov in njihove nagnjenosti k (prekomerni) uporabi prisilnih sredstev ter družbenih vidikov policijskega dela.2 To pomeni, da takšna analiza temelji na proučevanju povezave med starostjo, delovno dobo, nacionalno pripadnostjo policistov ter verjetnostjo in načinom uporabe prisilnih sredstev pri njihovem delu, pa tudi na vidikih nadzora nad njihovim delom.3 Posledično tudi analiza vzrokov za pritožbe na uporabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev temelji na takšnih ugotovitvah. Problem je v tem, da pomeni odkrivanje vzrokov na ponudbeni strani nujno povečevanje stroškov policijske organizacije, hkrati pa pretirano iskanje vzrokov pri samih policistih povzroča tudi določene negativne motivacijske učinke. Obravnavani pristop v prispevku je alternativen, saj temelji na t.i. institucionalno ekonomskem vidiku in predstavlja posledično nagradnjo njegovih osnov.4 Namreč, v klasični ekonomski terminologiji bi lahko navedeni vidik 2 Ve~ o tem glej Pevcin (2005). 3 V veliki ve~ini temelji obstoje~a literatura s podro~ja prou~evanja policijskega dela ravno na obstoje~ih treh pristopih. 4 Standardni institucionalno-ekonomski vidik temelji na prou~evanju ekonomskih vidikov uveljavljanja zakonodaje in se ukvarja pretežno z ekonomsko analizo razli~nih podzvrsti prava, kot so naprimer kriminalno pravo, premoženjsko pravo itd. V obravnavanem tekstu je analiza razširjena še na posledice uveljavljanja zakonodaje, to je na rabo prisilnih sredstev in proučevanja, ki temelji na organizacijskih, socioloških in psiholoških vidikih, pojmovali tudi kot proučevanje ponudbenih dejavnikov pri uporabi prisilnih sredstev.5 Vendar je to samo eden, čeprav precej standarden, vidik proučevanja. Povsem enakovredno bi namreč lahko pri proučevanju uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev proučili tudi drugo plat medalje, to je povpraševalni vidik6, saj lahko tudi prisilna sredstva in njihovo uporabo obravnavamo kot trg, kjer se srečujeta ponudba in povpraševanje. Na strani ponudbe nastopajo policisti, na strani povpraševanja pa kršitelji določenih norm in pravil ravnanja, proti katerim je zato treba uporabiti prisilna sredstva, da se prepreči njihovo nadaljnje nezaželeno ravnanje. Povedano drugače, ti posamezniki so dejansko uporabniki policijskih prisilnih sredstev. 2. Institucionalno ekonomski vidik uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev in problematika pritožb Uresničevanje sprejete zakonodaje (z inšpekcijskimi službami, policijo, davčno administracijo, tožilstvom ipd.), z namenom ugotovitve in kaznovanja kršilcev zakonodaje, ima z družbeno-ekonomskega vidika izjemen pomen.7 V ekonomski literaturi so se prva dela s področja ekonomskih vidikov uresničevanja zakonodaje pojavila že v sredini 18. stoletja, usmerjena pa so bila na proučevanje ekonomike kaznovanja (več o tem glej de Montesquieu, 1748). Presenetljivo pa je navedeni vidik proučevanja izginil iz ekonomske literature za celi dve stoletji, saj se šele v 1960-ih letih ponovno pojavijo ekonomska dela s področja kriminala in sistema kaznovanja kriminalcev (glej Becker, 1968).8 posledično "nezadovoljstvo" oziroma "nestrinjanje" uporabnikov (državljanov) z njihovo uporabo. 5 Ponudbeni vidik je zato, ker se analizira delovanje policijske organizacije in policistov, to je tistih, ki ponujajo prisilna sredstva. 6 Povpraševalni vidik je zato, ker se analizirajo dejavniki na strani uporabnikov prisilnih sredstev, to je tistih, ki se posledično podajajo tudi pritožbe. 7 Na primer, uresničevanje zakonodaje ima pomemben vpliv na stopnjo onesnaževanja okolja, stopnjo upoštevanja davčne zakonodaje, stopnjo kriminala ipd. Skrb za red in varnosti, kar sodi v sklop policijskega dela, je tudi ena izmed temeljnih funkcij države v skladu s Smithovo filozofijo ekonomskega liberalizma (glej Smith, 1776). 8 Navedeno delo kasnejšega nobelovega nagrajenca za ekonomijo je bilo precej vplivno in je odprlo vrata ekonomistom tudi za proučevanje družbenih pojavov, kateri so bili prej v domeni drugih ved. Dejstvo, da se je proučevanje državnega aparata v ekonomski znanosti pojavilo šele takrat, ne preseneča, saj je vse od prve polovice 19. stoletja do pred nekaj desetletij v prevladujoči ekonomski znanosti prevladovalo prepričanje, da za proučevanje delovanja V institucionalnem kontekstu je nadzor dela policistov eden izmed osrednjih problemov policijske organizacije, saj slabo ravnanje policije negativno vpliva na odnos javnosti do nje. Problem uporabe pritožb državljanov zoper policijsko delo kot vira informacij nadzornega mehanizma je v tem, da ima ta metoda svoje prednosti in pomanjkljivosti. Namreč, na navedeno metodo pogosto letijo očitki, da ni objektivna, saj prihaja tako do pojava premajhnega števila pritožb kot tudi do prekomernega števila pritožb.9 Po eni strani se državljani bojijo podati uradno pritožbo na ravnanje policistov, medtem ko po drugi strani nekateri državljani podajajo neutemeljene pritožbe, pogosto s ciljem vplivanja na sprejete odločitve sodišč in zavlačevanje ukrepanja proti njim. Pri pritožbah državljanov pa je treba upoštevati še dva vidika, in sicer vidik njihove dejanske neizogibnosti ter vidik kazalca produktivnosti. V zvezi s prvim vidikom velja omeniti, da so, glede na naravo policijskega dela, pritožbe zoper njeno delo dejansko neizogibne, saj prihajajo policisti v neposredne konflikte z državljani (Wagner in Decker, 1997), zato se pojavlja vprašanje, kako zanesljiv merilec neustreznega ravnanja policije sploh so. V zvezi z drugim vidikom pa velja omeniti, da sicer v glavnem pritožbe državljanov zoper delo policije pomagajo identificirati problematične policiste, vendar jih lahko po drugi strani obravnavamo tudi kot neke vrste kazalnike produktivnosti dela policistov. Namreč, v praksi je treba preveriti tudi povezavo med pritožbami državljanov in dejanskim obnašanjem policistov, saj so lahko v določeni meri tisti "problematični" policisti, na katerih delo je vloženih veliko pritožb, v resnici produktivni policisti. V tem kontekstu je treba zaznati pomen pritožb zoper delo policije vsaj v dveh dimenzijah (Terrill in McCluskey, 2002): • Pritožbe zoper delo policije so slab kazalnik kakovosti dela, saj so nezanesljiv in nepravilen merilec dela policistov. Delež utemeljenih pritožb glede na celotno število pritožb je relativno nizek, kar kaže na to, da je pritožba bolj kot z dejstvom, da je policist naredil napako pri delu, povezana z dejstvom, da posameznika moti že dejstvo vpletenosti v policijski postopek. državnega aparata praktično ni prostora v ekonomiji. Izjemen metodološki napredek ekonomske teorije v zadnjih desetletjih pa je povzročil, da so novejši teoretični pristopi (na primer teorija javne izbire, institucionalna ekonomika ipd.) sposobni rigorozne znanstvene analize državnih institucij na podlagi obstoječe, v veliki meri matematizirane, ekonomske metodologije. O ekonomskih vidikih policijskega dela in uporabe prisilnih sredstev glej tudi Pevcin (2005). 9 Nekatere ocene kažejo, da naj bi samo tretjina državljanov, ki so bili izpostavljeni neustreznemu ravnanju policije, tudi vložila uradno pritožbo zoper delo policije, pri čemer se pogosto kot vzrok zato pojavlja nizko zaupanje v sam proces vlaganja pritožbe. Po drugih ocenah pa naj bi bil večji problem v tem, da je vloženih precej neupravičenih pritožb, na kar kaže že zelo nizek delež upravičenih pritožb (Lersch in Mieczkowski, 2000). V tem kontekstu je pritožbe na policijsko delo treba jemati le kot barometer uspešnosti policijskega dela oziroma kot koristen vir menedžerskih informacij (Cao in Huang, 2000). • V določeni meri naj bi pritožbe državljanov pomagale identificirati problematične policiste, vendar so po drugi strani v določeni meri tudi kazalnik produktivnosti dela policistov. Namreč, verjetno najbolj zanesljiv način, kako se policist izogne pritožbam zoper njegovo delo, je izogibanje kakršnemu koli delu oziroma izogibanje situacijam, ki bi lahko vodile do konfliktov z državljani.10 3. Povpraševalni in ponudbeni vidik pritožb državljanov na uporabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev Namen prispevka je prikazati in analizirati vzroke za pritožbe državljanov na rabo prisilnih sredstev kot temelja odškodninskih zahtevkov iz povpraševalnega vidika, saj bi se na takšen način lahko zmanjšale pritožbe kot tudi sami stroški policijske organizacije, ki so povezani z zmanjševanjem števila pritožb.11 Namreč, pritožbe državljanov so nujno povezane tudi s količino uporabljenih prisilnih sredstev. Tako poizkus zmanjševanja pritožb državljanov z vplivanjem na zmanjšanje rabe prisilnih sredstev oziroma njihovo bolj strokovno rabo pomeni dejansko vplivanje na ponudbene dejavnike (npr. večja strokovna in situacijska usposobljenost policistov, večji pregled (interni ali eksterni) nad rabo prisilnih sredstev ipd.), kar pa samo nujno vpliva tudi na povečanje stroškov delovanja policije, ne pozabiti pa velja tudi na negativne zunanje vplive, ki lahko demoti-vacijsko vplivajo na policiste. V samem bistvu je tako treba za racionalnejšo rabo prisilnih sredstev in s tem povezano zmanjšanje potencialnih pritožb poiskati rešitve na povpraševalni strani, kar pomeni, da se zmanjša sama potreba po rabi prisilnih sredstev, hkrati pa tudi sama motivacija državljanov za podajanje pritožb. Na podlagi podanih predpostavk lahko izpeljemo prvo premiso in njeno utemeljitev. 10 Argument o produktivnosti policistov je bil delno podprt tudi v študiji avtorjev, ki sta ugotovila, da obstaja pozitivna povezanost med intenzivnostjo izvajanja policijskega dela na področju preverjanja in zasliševanja državljanov ter med pritožbami zoper takšno početje. 11 Navedeni pristop je pionirski in alternativa obstoječemu, njegov cilj pa je prikazati dejanske vzroke za pritožbe državljanov na uporabo prisilnih sredstev, s pomočjo katerih bi lahko pritožbe zmanjšali brez posebnih negativnih stroškovnih in motivacijskih učinkov. PREMISA 1: Reševanje problematike vzrokov za pritožbe državljanov na rabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev s ponudbenim pristopom, predvsem z večjim eksternim nadzorom upravičenosti in strokovnosti rabe prisilnih sredstev, zaradi agencijskega problema z institucionalnega vidika ni najbolj priporočljivo. 3.1 Pomanjkljivosti ponudbenega pristopa pri reševanju problematike pritožb državljanov Omenili smo že, da se dvom v pravilnost in zakonitost ravnanja uradništva pojavlja praktično na vseh področjih delovanja javnega sektorja, še posebej pogosto na področju uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev, pri delovanju davčne administracije ipd. Kljub aktualosti tematike pa je bilo v ekonomski znanosti napravljenih zelo malo študij o vprašanju, kakšen naj bo nadzor delovanja uradništva, še posebej o tem, ali naj bo nadzor interne ali eksterne narave. Čeprav je v praksi večina nadzora nad delovanjem policijskih organov interne narave, pa se v zadnjem času glede njenega delovanja pojavljajo tudi številne eksterne institucije, kot so mediji, organizacije za človekove pravice, politične institucije itd. Zavedati se je treba, da v javnem sektorju nastopa agencijski problem zato, ker imamo tri skupine subjektov: družbo (principale), uradništvo (agente) in uporabnike, pri čemer je na splošno naloga agentov dodeljevanje virov uporabnikom. S tem v zvezi je eden izmed večjih problemov javnega sektorja ta, da javnost pogosto ne verjame kredibilnosti internih preiskav nepravilnega ravnanja državnih uslužbencev (takšen primer je dvom v iskrenost preiskav ravnanja policistov zaradi prepričanja, da ne bodo "tožarili" drug drugega - t.i. tanka modra linija). Enega izmed razlogov za dvom v kredibilnost je treba iskati v drugačnih preferencah državnih uslužbencev in prebivalstva, zaradi česar so po eni strani državni uslužbenci lahko bolj učinkoviti, vendar pa šepa njihova sposobnost učinkovitega in kredibilnega nadzora.12 Po drugi strani eksterni nadzor nima tega problema, problem pa nastane zaradi slabše informiranosti, saj se ponavadi nadzor izvaja šele takrat, ko se pritoži uporabnik. Za razliko od internega nadzora, katerega primerjalna prednost je v tem, da se lahko spremljata tako dodeljevanje virov kot tudi reakcija uporabnikov, pa v primeru ekster-nega nadzora, če se uporabnik ne pritoži, ni mogoče spremljati dodeljevanja virov, temveč na izvajanje nadzora ključno vplivajo uporabniki. Namreč, do 12 Dejstvo je, da je policist, ki težje verjame v nedolžnost osumljenca, verjetno bolj u~inkovit v boju proti kriminalu. eksternega nadzora pride šele, ko se pojavijo dokazi o napačnem ravnanju, na katere opozorijo nezadovoljni uporabniki (npr. osumljenec, zoper katerega so bili uporabljena prisilna sredstva na nepravilen način ipd.). V primeru, da uporabniki prevzamejo vlogo ocenjevanja dela, lahko državni uslužbenci enostavno začnejo upoštevati želje uporabnikov tudi v primeru, ko to ni zaželeno, zato da bi se izognili pritožbam.13 Nadzor nad uradništvom s preiskavami ravnanja državnih uslužbencev potem, ko principali prejmejo informacije od medijev, interesnih skupin in zakonodajalcev, naj bi zagotavljal, da agenti (uradništvo) ravnajo v skladu z interesi principala (družbe).14 Številne ekonomske študije pa opozarjajo na pasti navedenega mehanizma. Na primer, Hopenhayn in Lohmann (1996) sta s tem v zvezi na primeru regulatornih agencij opozorila na konstantno asimetrijo informacij v njihovem nadzoru, katere posledica je prekomeren konzervatizem regulatornih agencij v izdajanju raznih dovoljenj.15 Podobno je Prendergastova (2001) pokazala na posledično »nedejavnost« uradništva, ki je posledica negativne stimulacije, ki jo povzročajo pritožbe uporabnikov. Namreč, v že omenjenem agencijskem problemu nastopajo uporabniki in državni uslužbenci na nasprotnih straneh, saj je cilj uporabnika pridobiti neko korist »birokratski output«, medtem ko je naloga uradništva produkcija in razdelitev outputa točno določenim uporabnikom (prejemnikom koristi). V takem primeru vodijo preiskave ravnanja na podlagi pritožb državljanov do tega, da agenti (uaradništvo) v čimvečji meri upoštevajo želje uporabnikov. Namreč, nadzor ravnanja uradništva na podlagi zaznav uporabnikov je izjemno težak, saj so takšne zaznave učinkovitosti in primernosti ravnanja precej nezanesljive. Ključen problem je v dejstvu, da uporabniki kot primarni vir informacij o ravnanju uradništva niso kredibilen vir informacij o uspešnosti delovanja uradništva. Razlog je v dejstvu, da precej »birokratskega outputa« predstavlja neko obliko koristi za uporabnike, zato imajo ti popolnoma drugačne preference in niso pripravljeni opozarjati na znane napake.16 13 Na primer, policisti se lahko začnejo izogibati kritičnim situacijam in zmanjšajo uporabo prisilnih sredstev. 14 Številne ekonomske analize se ukvarjajo s problematiko uvajanja praks zasebnega sektorja v javni sektor. Problem v javnem sektorju je, da je težko stimulirati zaposlene s plačilom po učinku, saj se državni uslužbenci ponavadi srečujejo z različnimi nalogami, katerih učinke je težko meriti (več o tem glej Dixit, 2002). Ponavadi se stimuliranje v javnem sektorju zagotavlja z nudenjem kariernih možnosti na podlagi zaznavanja usposobljenosti kandidata. 15 Navedena avtorja sta pokazala, da se v primeru izdajanja dovoljenj za prodajo določenih zdravil regulatorni organi zaradi bojazni pred možnimi pritožbami uporabnikov, ki bi jih povzročilo neustrezno zdravilo, zaščitijo tako, da relativno pozno in po dolgotrajnih postopkih izdajo dovoljenje za uporabo in prodajo nekega zdravila. 16 Na primer, težko je pričakovati, da bo prestopnik, ki se je izognil aretaciji, zatožil policista, ker ga le-ta ni aretiral. Osnovna dilema pri nadzoru nad uradništvom je v tem, ali naj uradniška dela opravljajo posamezniki, ki so bolj ali manj dovzetni za zahteve uporabnikov kot družba. Prendergastova (2001) pravi, da naj bi uradniška dela opravljali posamezniki, ki so manj dovzetni za zahteve uporabnikov, ker jim to po drugi strani omogoča sprejemati boljše odločitve. Namreč, naloga državnih uslužbencev je pravilna alokacija resursov uporabnikom, na primeru policije je to skrb za preprečevanje kriminala. V tem kontekstu je osnovna dilema, kakšne policiste zaposliti: ali tiste, ki jih bolj skrbi, da bo nedolžna oseba obsojena ali tiste, ki jih bolj skrbi dejstvo, da bi bil krivec lahko izpuščen. Med navedenima primeroma je namreč bistvena razlika, saj v prvem primeru obstajajo številni mehanizmi, ki preprečujejo nezaželene izide: pritožbe osumljencev, sojenje ipd., ki zmanjšujejo verjetnost, da bi bila nedolžna oseba obsojena. Po drugi strani pa je majhna verjetnost, da bo odkrita napaka policista, ki izpusti krivega osumljenca, saj osumljenec nima interesa, da bi razkril napako policista. To pomeni, da je s tega vidika veliko bolj koristen policist, ki ga bolj skrbi možnost, da bi bil krivec izpuščen. S tem v zvezi pa je pogled popolnoma drugačen glede nadzora. Namreč, prednost internega nadzora je boljše poznavanje postopkov in predvsem primerov rutinskega ravnanja, kar nadzornikom omogoča, da nagrajujejo posamezne državne uslužbence tudi v primeru sprejemanja težkih odločitev. Po drugi strani pa je problem internega nadzora v tem, da je pogojen v precejšnji meri s preferencami posameznikov in njihovo voljo po opozarjanju na napake (t.i. uradniška pristranskost). Problem postane še večji, saj so državni uslužbenci v povprečju manj dovzetni za zahteve uporabnikov, kar pomeni tudi nizko odzivnost na legitimne zahteve uporabnikov. Povedano drugače, tisto kar dela državne uslužbence bolj učinkovite jih po drugi strani dela slabše nadzornike. Vendar ima tudi eksterni nadzor svoje prednosti in pomanjkljivosti. Namreč, eksterni nadzor nima problema pristranskosti, vendar pa nastopi problem slabše informiranosti, saj do nadzora pride ponavadi šele ob pojavu »pretiranega« nezadovoljstva uporabnikov.17 Tako niso eksterni nadzorniki usmerjeni na vse primere napak državnih uslužbencev, ampak samo na tiste, kjer je bil oškodovan uporabnik. To lahko povzroči, da so državni uslužbenci motivirani za izogibanje nadzora, tako da upoštevajo zahteve uporabnikov. Problematika nadzora uradništva izvira iz dejstva, da proizvaja predvsem dobrine in storitve, katerih uporabe ni mogoče neposredno zaračunati. Namreč, če bi bilo uporabo dobrine mogoče zaračunati, bi prišlo do pritožb uporabnikov v dveh primerih: (a) če bi uporabnik dobil dobrino, ki je ne potrebuje, in (b) če bi uporabnik ne dobil dobrine, ki jo potrebuje. V primeru večine dobrin, ki jih proizvaja uradništvo, to je javnih dobrin, pa se pritožijo samo uporabniki, ki ne dobijo dobrine. Navedena karakteristika javnih dobrin, to je neposredno neplačevanje za njihovo uporabo, dejansko pripelje do agencijskega problema pri eksternem uradniškem nadzoru. Tako ima interni nadzor sicer prednost v tem, da imajo interni nadzorniki možnost trajno nadzorovati ravnanje uradništva (v vseh njenih aktivnosti), slabost pa je v tem, da v uradništvu praktično ni vzvodov za nagrajevanje v primeru dobrega ravnanja - edini način motiviranja državnih uslužbencev je pogosto povezan le z grožnjami z odpustom, ponavadi v primerih večjih kršitev in nedopustnih oblik ravnanja, obstaja pa malo mehanizmov pozitivne motivacije. Zaradi takšne situacije je problem »poštenosti« (pozitivnega pristopa) agentov še posebno velik, saj jih nadzorniki kljub dobremu delu, preprosto ne morejo nagraditi. Ker je naloge in rezultate dela državnih uslužbencev težko določati, meriti in nadzirati, tudi ni vzvodov plačevanja po uspešnosti, kar je značilno za zasebni sektor. V takem primeru so edino uporabniki tisti, ki lahko opozorijo na napake, zastonjkarstvo pa dela uporabnike precej nezanesljive subjekte za ugotavljanje napak. Policija je tipičen primer uradniškega področja s konstantno asimetrijo v odzivih uporabnikov na njeno ravnanje. Osnovni nalogi policije sta skrb za javno varnost in boj proti kriminalu. Asimetrija v odzivih uporabnikov se kaže v dejstvu, da se na policijsko ravnanje pritožujejo le posamezniki, proti katerih so bila na primer po nepotrebnem (ali pa neustrezno) uporabljena prisilna sredstva, ne pritožujejo pa se posamezniki, ki so se izognili policijski obravnavi, čeprav bi si jo zaslužili.18 To dejstvo povzroča, da so pritožbe uporabnikov dejansko samo enostranske. Rezultat zanašanja na takšne pritožbe pri nadziranju policijskega dela pogosto vodi v situacije, da se policisti enostavno začnejo izogibati situacijam, ki bi lahko vodile do pritožb uporabnikov. Razlog je v preprostem dejstvu: previdnejše in korektnejše delo pri uporabi prisilnih sredstev sicer lahko zmanjša število pritožb zoper policista, vendar to povzroča dodatne stroške policistu (izobraževanje, študija situacij ipd.), nenazadnje pa tudi državi. Precej lažje je doseči zmanjšanje števila pritožb z zmanjšanjem aktivnosti, torej z manj agresivnim pristopom do boja proti kriminalu. 17 Pozornost nadzornikov ponavadi pritegne nepravilno ravnanje policije ob aretaciji in ne ravnanje policije ob izpustitvi sicer krivega osumljenca. 18 Sicer obstajajo pritožbe državljanov na nerešene prestopke ali opuščanje aretacij zločincev, vendar je takšne pritožbe praktično nemogoče naprtiti točno določenemu policistu. 3.2 Ponudbeni pristop in izkušnje v praksi Povečana odzivnost policijske organizacije na večje število pritožb državljanov (na primer v obliki povečanega eksternega nadzora nad delovanjem), ki posledično lahko pripelje do zmanjšane aktivnosti policijskega dela, ima tudi negativne stranske učinke, še posebej, če se "uporabniki" začnejo zavedati tega. Navedene trditve dokazujejo tudi analize Prendergastove (2001) in Shija (2005) za policijski organizaciji v Los Angelesu in Cincinnatiju. Uvedba intenzivnega eksternega nadzora policijskega dela, ki je bil posledica medijske pozornosti ob nemirih19 (leta 1998 v Los Angelesu in leta 2001 v Cincinnatiju), je dejansko pomenila asimetrično pozornost do policijskega dela, kar je ob izostanku sprememb sistema sankcioniranja policistov, ki jim ni uspelo kaznovati prestopnikov, vodilo do zmanjšane aktivnosti dela policistov in njihove agresivnosti v boju proti kriminalu. Namreč, Prendergastova (2001) je pokazala, da je povečan eksterni nadzora nad delovanjem policije po nemirih v Los Angelesu leta 1998 vodil do zmanjšane aktivnosti policije oziroma njene večje pasivnosti, saj se je v letih 1999 in 2000 zmanjšalo število aretacij glede na število storjenih kriminalnih dejanj, kar je bilo še posebej izrazito na tistih področjih delovanja policije, kjer imajo policisti pri svojih aktivnosti največ diskrecijskih pravic20 in kjer je agencijski problem še posebej izrazit21, zmanjšalo pa se je tudi število napadov na policiste, kar dokazuje tezo o izogibanju konfliktnim situacijam. Do podobnih ugotovitev je prišel tudi Shi (2005) s proučevanjem policijske organizacije v Cincinnatiju po nemirih v letu 2001, ko se je število aretacij na področju boja proti mamilom in prestopkov povezanih z zlorabami alkoholnih substanc zaradi povečanega eksternega nadzora nad delovanjem policije zmanjšalo kar za 46 % oziroma 74 %, izrazit pa je bil tudi upadec števila izrečenih kazni na področju prometne varnosti, in sicer kar za dobro polovico.22 Shi je podobno kot Prendergastova tudi ugotovil, da se je 19 Nemiri, nekakšna ekstremna oblika pritožb uporabnikov, so bili posledica burnega odziva dolo~enih socialnih skupin na domnevno nekorektno in pretirano rabo prisilnih sredstev s strani policije. 20 Takšne aktivnosti so na primer boj proti prometu z mamili in alkoholom, prometna varnost ipd., pri katerih je kršitev zakonodaje v najve~ji meri znana šele ob kontaktu z osumljencem. 21 Analize so pokazale, da se je najbolj zmanjšalo število aretacij na podro~ju boja proti proizvodnji in preprodaji mamil, ki velja za eno izmed podro~ij, kjer se osumljenci dejansko pogosto ne zavedajo aktivnosti policije vse do takrat, ko so aretirani. Podatki Prendergastove so pokazali, da se je v Los Angelesu število aretacij na tem podro~ju v obdobju 1998-2000 zmanjšalo kar za 40 %, kar potrjuje domneve o precejšnji odzivnosti policistov na pove~an eksterni nadzor ter o posle-di~nih vedenjskih spremembah. 22 V skupnem se je število aretacij zmanjšalo za dobrih 25 %. Pri tem ne gre zanemariti dejstva, da se je v prou~evanem obdobju stopnja kriminala v Cincinnatiju celo pove~ala (za 16%). Se posebej je bil izrazit porast kriminala na tistih podro~jih, ki so bolj "ob~utljiva" na policijsko delo, kar pomeni, da je njihovo odkritje bolj povezano z samimi aktivnostmi policije. Tako se je na najbolj opazno zmanjšala aktivnost policistov na tistih področjih dela, kjer je sama uspešnost dela odvisna predvsem od "agresivnosti" delovanja.23 Vse to dokazuje, da povečan nadzor nad policijskim delovanjem ne vodi do večje obzirnosti policistov pri njihovem ravnanju, temveč enostavno do zmanjšane aktivnosti, kar je posledično vodilo tudi do porasta kriminalitete.24 Izkušnje v praksi tako očitno kažejo, da povečan eksterni nadzor nad policijskim delom ne pripelje do bolj "mehkega" pristopa pri rabi prisilnih sredstev, temveč do zmanjšane aktivnosti policistov - dejansko pride do disfunkcional-nega odziva policije. Navedena ugotovitev pa ni značilna samo za policijsko organizacijo, temveč lahko pride do disfunkcionalnega odziva pri vseh tistih aktivnostih uradništva, kjer uporabniki lahko pridobijo neko korist (bodisi v pozitivnem ali negativnem smislu) od alokacije resursov uradništva, čeprav si te alokacije ne zaslužijo. Natančneje, z vidika nadzora so problematične tiste aktivnosti, kjer (a) uporabniki pridobijo neko korist od birokratskih resursov in (b) kjer so povratne informacije osnova za ocenjevanje uspešnosti dela državnih uslužbencev.25 Glede na to, da imajo pritožbe uporabnikov lahko zelo pomemben učinek na karierne možnosti državnih uslužbencev, se lahko le-ti odločijo, da bodo v večji meri upoštevali zahteve uporabnikov. Negativni učinek ekster-nega nadzora je zaradi tega ravno v tem, da lahko precej zmanjša motivacijo državnih uslužbencev za opravljanje dela.26 Glede na navedeno se je smiselno lotiti reševanja problematike pritožb državljanov na uporabo policijskih sredstev iz povpraševalnega vidika, kar lahko strnemo v spodnji premisi. PREMISA 2: Pri reševanju problematike pritožb državljanov na rabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev se je iz institucionalnega vidika smiselneje bolj osredotočiti na t.i. povpraševalne dejavnike pritožb. Izpostavimo lahko vsaj tri dejavnike: (a) negativne spodbude z uporabo groženj z nasiljem, (b) pričakovane koristi od pritožbe za uporabnika in odzivnost nadzornikov na pritožbe in (c) stopnjo kriminala. primer število ropov in kraj avtomobilov v navedenem obdobju v Cincinnatiju povečalo kar za 45 % oziroma za 68 %. 23 Na primer, na področju nasilja v družini se aktivnost policijskega dela ni bistveno zmanjšala, deloma tudi zato, ker gre za prekršek, ki je največkrat znan šele, ko žrtev pokliče policijo, ki se mora odzvati. 24 Izračuni Shija so pokazali, da sta elastičnosti nasilniškega in premoženjskega kriminala glede na aktivnosti policije približno -1.3 in -0.5. 25 Takšen primer dejavnosti je tudi izobraževanje. 26 Na primer, policisti enostavno zmanjšajo svoje aktivnosti v boju proti kriminalu. 3.3 Alternativni (povpraševalni) vidik reševanja problematike pritožb državljanov na uporabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev Najučinkovitejši način za zmanjšanje pritožb državljanov na uporabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev je seveda v zmanjšani rabi prisilnih sredstev, pri čemer se lahko raba prisilnih sredstev zmanjša z "obzirnejšim" ravnanjem policije (t.i. ponudbeni vidik) ali pa z zmanjšano potrebo po rabi prisilnih sredstev (t.i. povpraševalni vidik). V praksi se ponavadi reševanja navedene problematike v policijskih organizacijah lotijo s prvim pristopom, to je z vplivanjem na t.i. ponudbene dejavnike, kot so na primer dodaten nadzor nad rabo prisilnih sredstev, usposabljanje policistov ipd. Problematika navedenega pristopa je, da implicitno povečuje stroške delovanja, poleg tega pa predvsem instrument nadzora lahko povzroča nezaželene negativne motivacijske učinke v obliki zmanjšanega delovnega napora pri policistih, ki tudi na takšen poskušajo zmanjšati stroške opravljanja svojega poklica. Namesto tega se zdi bolj smotrno vplivati na t.i. povpraševalne dejavnike. Kar se tiče povpraševalnih dejavnikov rabe prisilnih sredstev, lahko izpostavimo nekaj le-teh27: • Negativne spodbude državljanom v obliki groženj z uporabo prisilnih sredstev kot obliko nasilja, ki učinkovito zmanjšujejo potrebo po rabi prisilnih sredstev. V tej zvezi je ena izmed implikacij uporabe prisilnih sredstev tudi ta, da je uporabo prisilnih sredstev mogoče zmanjšati tudi s povečanjem groženj z uporabo nasilja. Dejstvo je, da je z metodo nasilja težko kaj doseči, saj predstavlja nasilje neki osebi dejansko le t.i. potopljene stroške in zato ne vpliva na njeno nadaljnje vedenje. Tisto, kar vpliva na ravnanje nekega posameznika, je grožnja z nadaljnjim nasiljem, že prejeto nasilje pa služi zgolj kot informacija o možnosti in moči.28 Običajen način, kako spraviti osebo v zapor, je tako grožnja z nasiljem (npr. z uporabo gumijevke, prijema itd.), pri čemer pogosto do dejanske uporabe nasilja niti ne pride. Namreč, za policijski aparat, ki je pripravljen uporabiti nasilje, je značilno, da mu ga 27 Bralca opozarjamo, da gre v veliki meri za pionirski pristop pri analizi navedenega področja, zato vsa vprašanja in problematika nikakor niso v celoti obdelana, saj je potrebna še nadaljnja diskusija. 28 Na primer, razlog, zakaj prestopnik sledi policistu v zapor, ni v tem, da ga je le-ta udaril oziroma uporabil prisilna sredstva, temveč v bojazni, da bo tepen. Poleg tega je osebo težko spraviti v zapor ne da bi grozili z uporabo nasilja. Namreč, če želimo posameznika fizično omejiti in zapreti brez poškodb, bomo za eno osebo najverjetneje potrebovali tri do štiri policiste, hkrati pa je skoraj gotovo, da bodo policisti med tem dejanjem tudi sami utrpeli kakšno poškodbo v primeru močnejšega upiranja aretiranega. To pa s seboj prinaša dodatne stroške, saj bi bilo treba policistom zagotoviti dovolj visoko plačo, ki bo odtehtala verjetnost fizične poškodbe, poleg tega pa bi to vplivalo tudi na potrebno povečanje policijskega aparata, ki bi bil potreben za ročno prenašanje aretiranih, v kar pa bi težko prepričali večino davkoplačevalcev. je le redko treba uporabiti, saj že sama grožnja z uporabo nasilja in demonstracija moči delujeta dovolj prepričljivo, hkrati pa je to iz družbenega vidika povzroča tudi nižje stroške. Tiha grožnja z uporabo nasilja je tako dejansko potrebna, kar pa utemeljuje tudi potrebo po obstoju policijskega aparata, saj se s tako obliko kolektivne akcije v družbi odpravlja problem pripornikove dileme, s čimer se povečuje tudi neto izid družbe (Tullock, 1974). • Pričakovana korist od podane pritožbe za državljana (tudi v obliki nane-sene karierno-materialne škode policistu) ter odzivnost policijske organizacije in nadzornikov na pritožbe državljanov. Pričakovati je, da bo večja odzivnost policije (in drugih institucij) na pritožbe državljanov na rabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev, kar bi v praksi lahko izhajalo tudi iz možnosti lažjega (na primer elektronskega) načina podajanja pritožb, sama po sebi vodila do večjega števila pritožb.29 Poleg tega večja odzivnost na pritožbe lahko vpliva tudi na ravnanje policistov, saj se le-ti zavedajo negativnega kariernega učinka pritožb30, zato postanejo bolj previdni pri svojem delu, spremenijo pa lahko tudi samo ravnanje in njegovo intenzivnost, katerega cilj je zmanjšanje možnosti dobiti pritožbo na svoje ravnanje. Obnašanje policistov se lahko spremeni v več smereh, saj lahko policisti postanejo bolj previdni in konzervativni pri rabi prisilnih sredstev, lahko se začnejo izogibati situacijam, v katerih bi lahko prišlo do potrebe po rabi prisilnih sredstev, nenazadnje pa lahko enostavno zmanjšajo intenzivnost dela. • Stopnja kriminala. Povsem jasno je, da večja stopnja (odkritega) kriminala pozitivno vpliva na potrebo po rabi prisilnih sredstev, kar pomeni, da je treba zmanjšati tudi stopnjo kriminala. Ekonomski vidik navedene problematike se nanaša predvsem na sistem sankcij proti prestopnikom.31 V tem kontekstu je treba proučiti dejavnike, ki vplivajo na odločanje za storitev kriminalnega dejanja, kar z drugimi besedami pomeni, da je treba določiti dejavnike, ki določajo ponudbo kriminalnih dejanj. Tako je Smith (1776) zaključil, da do kriminala pride v vsaki družbi, v kateri obstajajo premoženjsko-dohodkovne razlike med ljudmi.32 Pri tem pa velja tudi dejstvo, da se tudi kriminalci odločajo 29 Razlog je najbrž iskati tudi v dejstvu, da ima tudi podajanje pritožb svojo ceno - večja odzivnost policije implicitno znižuje ceno pritožbe, kar posledično vodi do večjega števila podanih pritožb. 30 Večje število prejetih pritožb ponavadi pomeni tudi večjo možnost za poklicne sankcije proti policistu. 31 Osnovna dilema pri zmanjševanju stopnje kriminala je, ali naj se s tem namenom povečajo kazni za storilce kriminalnih dejanj. Problem pri navedeni relaciji je, da bi uniformno povečanje kazni za vse vrste kriminalnih dejanj vodilo implicitno do relativno večjega števila tistih "večjih" zločinov, razlog pa leži v marginalnosti odločanja kriminalcev. 32 V praksi to dejansko pomeni, da večja premoženjsko-dohodkovna neenakost v družbi implicira tudi večjo stopnjo kriminala, saj ljudi v takem primeru žene želja po pridobitvi premoženja drugih. Tukaj je iskati enega izmed možnih razlogov za porast kriminalitete v t.i. tranzicijskih državah. Primož Pevcin Ekonomski vidiki pritožb državljanov na ravnanje birokracije: primer uporabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev racionalno in pred svojim dejanjem pregledajo anticipirane stroške in koristi svojega početja, pri čemer med stroške sodijo možnost ujetja, obsodbe in zapora, koristi pa predstavlja izplen kriminalnega dejanja. Takšna analiza ponudbe kriminala nam omogoča ugotoviti načine, kako zmanjšati kriminal z zmanjšanjem neto pričakovanih koristi storilcev kriminalnih dejanj, pri čemer je treba izpostavitvi pomen povečanja verjetnosti odkritja in izsleditve storilca kriminalnega dejanja ter pomen sankcij pri zmanjševanju kriminala. Številne študije navedenih dveh področij so podale precej nejasne ugotovitve. V pregledu študij so Miller in drugi (2003) izpostavili, da naj bi imela stopnja odkritja in izsleditve kriminalcev zelo majhen vpliv na stopnjo kriminala, medtem ko naj bi večina analiz učinka policije in sistema sankcij na stopnjo kriminala pokazala, da večja policijska aktivnost celo povečuje stopnjo kriminala. Sicer so te trditve potrjene tudi z empiričnimi analizami, vendar so avtorji pogostokrat pozabili na metodološke pasti. Namreč, v praksi se pogosto pojavlja primer, ko se ljudje, ki živijo na področjih z visoko stopnjo kriminala, dejansko želijo zavarovati pred tem pojavom s tem, da želijo imeti večjo prisotnost policije, pa tudi kriminalce želijo bolj kaznovati.33 Ameriški ekonomist Levitt je v seriji člankov s področja ekonomike kriminala analiziral dejavnike, ki vplivajo na stopnjo kriminala, ter prikazal dejanske koristi in omejevalne učinke policijskega dela na kriminaliteto. Tako je na podlagi proučevanja kriminala v večjih ameriških mestih v obdobju 1970-1992 ugotovil, da večja prisotnost policije na terenu dejansko vpliva negativno na stopnjo kriminala (Levitt, 1998).34 V istem kontekstu je Levitt (1998a) izpostavil tudi vlogo kaznovanja kot (de)motivacijskega elementa pri kriminalnih dejanjih in ugotovil, da strogost sistema kaznovanja v povprečju izrazito negativno vpliva na stopnjo kriminala.35 33 Gledano z ekonometri~nega vidika je v takem primeru treba upoštevati kavzalnost in/ali endogenost prou~evanih spremeljivk. Brez tega lahko nudijo rezultati analiz popolnoma napa~ne interpretacije. 34 Levitt (2002) je izra~unal, da naj bi bila elasti~nost t.i. nasilniškega kriminala glede na policijsko aktivnost -1.0, t.i. premoženjskega kriminala pa -0.3, kar druga~e povedano pomeni, da naj bi 10 % pove~anje števila policistov na terenu zmanjšalo nasilniški kriminal za 10 %, premoženjskega pa za 3 %. Poleg tega je Levitt (2002) tudi izpostavil stroškovne vidike delovanja policije in ugotovil, da pomeni strošek zaposlitve dodatnega policista na terenu le približno 40 % prihrankov, ki jih družba pridobi zaradi posledi~ne manjše kriminalitete. 35 Levitt je pri analizi vzrokov porasta mladoletniškega kriminala v zadnjih desetletjih ugotovil, da na stopnjo kriminala odlo~ilno vpliva ravno sistem kaznovanja, saj je pokazal, da strog režim kaznovanja mladoletnih prestopnikov in nekoliko blažji režim kaznovanja "odraslih" prestopnikov vodi do pove~ane kriminalitete mladoletnikov, ko le-ti dopolnijo 18 let. 4. Sklep V praksi se države lotevajo reševanja problematike pritožb državljanov na ravnanje uradništva kot temelja svoje odškodninske odgovornosti s poskusom vplivanja na t.i. ponudbene dejavnike pritožb, kot so na primer večji nadzor nad ravnanjem uradništva, dodatno usposabljanje državnih uslužbencev ipd., pri čemer ima navedeni pristop številne pomanjkljivosti, glavni dve se kažeta v demotivacijskih učinkih na državne uslužbence in v povečanju stroškov delovanja uradništva. V prispevku so tako prikazane značilnosti alternativnega pristopa k reševanju navedene problematike na področju rabe policijskih prisilnih sredstev, ki pomeni vplivanje na t.i. povpraševalne dejavnike pritožb državljanov. Med navedenimi dejavniki lahko izpostavimo povečanje groženj policije z uporabo nasilja in demonstracijo moči ter zmanjšanje kriminalitete, kar dejansko zmanjšuje potrebo po rabi prisilnih sredstev in s možnost pritožb državljanov. Poleg tega lahko kot enega izmed povpraševalnih dejavnikov izpostavimo tudi zmanjšanje pričakovanih potencialnih koristi za državljane od podajanja pritožb ter manjšo odzivnost nadzornikov na pritožbe, saj navedeni dejavnik s svojim negativnim demonstracijskim učinkom na potencialne pritožnike dejansko vpliva na zmanjšanje števila pritožb. Dr. Primož Pevcin je doktor ekonomskih znanosti. V svojem raziskovalnem delu se ukvarja pretežno s proučevanjem ekonomskih vidikov politike in prava, v pedagoškem delu na Fakulteti za upravo pa sodeluje pri izvedbi predmetov Temelji ekonomije in Ekonomika javnega sektorja. Literatura • Becker, G.S. (1968): Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Joournal of Political Economy, 76, 2, str. 169-217. • Cao, L. in Huang, B. (2000): Determinants of citizen complaints against police abuse of power, Journal of Criminal Justice, 28, 3, str. 203-213. • De Montesquieu, C. (1748/1989): The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. • Dixit, A. (2002): Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review, Journal of Human Resources, 37, str. 696-727. • Fielding, N.G. (1991): The Police and Social Conflict, Althone Press, London. • Hopenhayn, H., Lohmann, S. (1996): Fire-alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12, str. 196-213. • Lersch, K.M. in Mieczkowski, T. (2000): An examination of convergence and divergence of internal and external allegations of misconduct filed against police officers, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 23, 1, str. 5468. • Levitt, S.D. (1998): Why Do Increased Arrest Rates appear to Reduce Crime: Dette-rence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, Economic Inquiry, 36, 3, str. 353-372. • Levitt, S.D. (1998a): Juvenile Crime and Punishment, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 6, str. 1156-1185. • Levitt, S.D. (2002): Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to estimate the effects of Police on Crime: Reply, American Economic Review, 92, 4, str. 1244-1250. • Miller, R.L. et.al. (2003): The Economics of Public Issues, Addison Wesley, Boston. • Pevcin, P. (2005): Institucionalni vidik pritožb državljanov na uporabo policijskih prisilnih sredstev: teorija in praksa v razvitih državah. V: Seliškar Toš, M. (ur.): Odgovornost države, lokalnih skupnosti in drugih nosilcev javnih pooblastil za ravnanje svojih organov in uslužbencev, Zbornik Inštituta za primerjalno pravo, IPP, Ljubljana, str. 87-97. • Prendergast, C. (2001): Selection and Oversight in the Public Sector, with the Los Angeles Police Department as an example, Working Paper No. 8664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. • Seliškar Toš, M., ur. (2005): Odgovornost države, lokalnih skupnosti in drugih nosilcev javnih pooblastil za ravnanje svojih organov in uslužbencev, Inštitut za primerjalno pravo, Ljubljana. • Shi, L. (2005): Does Oversight Reduce Policing? Evidence from the Cincinnati Police Department After the April 2001 Riot, SSRN Working Paper. • Smith, A. (1776/1976): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. • Terrill, W. in McCluskey, J. (2002): Citizen complaints and problem officers, Journal of Criminal Justice, 30, 2, str. 143-155. • Tullock, G. (1974): Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution, Center for Study of Public Choice, Blacksburg. • Wagner, A.E. in Decker, S.H. (1997): Evaluating citizen complaints against the police. V: Dunham, R.G. in Alpert, G.P.: Critical issues in policing, 3. izdaja, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, str. 275-291. SUMMARY Economic aspects of the issue of citizen complaints against bureaucratic activities There has been a tendency of increased number of citizen complaints against bureaucratic activities in the majority of developed and democratic countries. The main reasons for this tendency are predominantly rising socio-economic inequality in modern societies and the emphasised issue of human rights, which contributes to larger awareness of people when seeking for their rights. In this context, the contemporary conflict theory stresses that bureaucracy is nowadays often seen as an instrument of politically and economically privileged classes through which they exercise social control over marginalised groups of population. Consequently, it is to be expected that this would imply strained relations between bureaucracy and those marginalised social groups. This can be also observed in increased number of citizen complaints against bureaucratic activities, in particular those that are impartially seen as unfunded, and are filled primarily to gain some benefit or to avoid responsibility. Besides, strained relations could also affect the confidence in bureaucratic impartiality, thereby causing that citizens see complaints as useless and are averted to fill them. Consequently, these two problems (so-called over- and underreporting) cause that citizen complaints can be a very poor indicator of the quality of bureaucratic work and ouput for their biasness. Moreover, focusing on citizen complaints as a tool of bureaucratic quality monitoring can be very problematic, since they can be used for measuring bureaucratic productivity and work effort. Namely, if bureaucrats perceive that they are monitored primarily through citizen complaints against their activities, they can be compelled to avoid those complaints by simply reducing their work effort or becoming more prudent as the simplest ways to avoid making mistakes and subsequent complaints. The reduced work effort and growing cautiousness have been found in practice in many bureaucratic activities, in particular in regulatory agencies and police organisations. In this context, the issue of citizen complaints against the (excessive) use of police force has been preoccupying many practitioners and scholars in the majority of developed and democratic countries. Namely, this problem has escalated in magnitude in recent years, as the number of citizen complaints against police activities has been growing, yet the success in solving this problem has been very limited. The majority of theoretical as well as practical studies have focused on organisational, sociological or psychological determinants of citizen complaints and excessive use of police force. From the perspective of the paper, those studies focused mainly on the so-called supply-side factors of this issue, meaning that this approach has its own limits as it necessarily puts additional burdens on police organisations in the form of larger operating costs and disincentive effects on working efforts of police officers. Consequently, the alternative, (so-called demand-side) approach in finding solution to the problem of citizen complaints is discussed in the paper. This alternative approach focuses on the demand-side factors of citizen complaints against police use of force, the real advantage of this approach being in (directly or indirectly) reduced costs of police use of force. The possible demand-side factors analysed in the paper are the increased demonstration of police force and reduced crime rate, which, in essence, reduce the necessity for police to use force. Besides, the issues of increased responsiveness of monitoring agencies toward citizen complaints and the reduced implicit price of filling complaints by citizens are discussed, since they increase the number of complaints against police activities. The never-ending story of public administration reform in Slovenia (from 1991 to further development) UDK: 35 (497.12) Polona Kovač Fakulteta za upravo, Univerza v Ljubljani polona.kovac@fu.uni-lj.si ABSTRACT In Slovenia, the public administration reform has been a systematic task since 1996 when the government adopted the strategy of transformation of public administration due to Slovenia becoming a full member of EU. Such a strategy could be developed and implemented regarding the fact that Slovenia has had a functioning system of public administration since 1991 when it became an independent state. In the last few years after year 2000 the reform has been built up as constant development of public administration based on several pillars such as civil service system, reorganisation of administrative structures, e-government etc. The public administration reform in Slovenia is therefore aimed at upgrading the existing system in terms of greater professionalism, transparency, efficiency and user-friendly delivery of public services, all together incorporated in the principles of new public management and good governance. The modernisation of Slovene public administration is a process which has been so far based on a rather legalistic approach (a set of basic laws were passed mainly in 2002) and is to be continued especially focusing on process orientation. In July 2003 within special midterm strategy on further development of public sector and later in 2005 within national Strategy on Development of Slovenia till 2013 the coordinated approach has been stressed as well aiming to present administration as an impetus and not an obstacle in developing competitive advantages of national economy. The recommendations that Slovenia can deliver in conducting public administration reform to ensure optimal results are today the following: orientation towards users, effectiveness and efficiency, openness, adequate rewarding of civil servants, optimisation and informatisation of working processes, involvement in international networks, awareness of public administration doings' impacts in national economy, consistent political support, long-term strategic planning. Key words: public administration, reform, Slovenia, EU. 1. What is "public administration reform" The wording "public administration reform" or "public sector reform" has been commonly used (and abused) worldwide since the end of eighties1. There are also some other expressions in use, such as development, modernisation, regulatory reform, lean government etc. Nevertheless all national administrations had the same problems at least till the mid-nineties, most important of all because of the need to cut down the proportion of public expenditure within GDP2 and the need for user-oriented public administration. There have been other reasons such as globalisation, privatisation, deregulation, IT development, transition, change of values etc. Primarily the objectives of public administration reforms are increased efficiency and effectiveness3. Some argue that we can recognize the new paradigm called New Public Management, since new approaches are based on the principles of private sector as firstly put forward by Hood4. Others stress the meaning of European Administrative Space, developed by SIGMA5 and European Court of Justice with the following guidelines: reliability and predictability, openness and transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. If we take those principles into account, we would be talking about developing entrepreneurial public administration, which emphasises the value of people involved. Those general frameworks are valid for Slovenia as well, since New Public Management has been officially defined as a governmental current guideline in national strategies from 1996 on. 1 The most famous reforming country is New Zealand, followed by Great Britain, United States of America, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, France etc. OECD has identified the majority of radical reforms in the period of 1989-1992. In different countries the politiciants and top public managers emphasized different approaches, depending on constitutional and legal system, history, competitiveness of national economy etc. Public administration reforms in Germany are therefore oriented more towards decentralisation and financial management, in USA and GB towards privatisation, users and HRM, in Sweden towards participation and decentralisation (Lane, 1995, Flynn and Strehl, 1996, Peters and Pierre, 2005). 2 In mid-nineties the proportions were 33% in USA, 43% in Great Britain, 49% in Germany, 67% in Sweden (source: OECD, 1994); in Slovenia from 1992-2005 between 47 and 43%. Ferlie (1996) would say that public expenditure growth is reasonable in the fields of health, education, R&D, but not in the field of justice, social care and general administration, since this is a clear symptom of no satisfaction in modern society. 3 The well known abbreviation 3E and lately 5E stands for: effectiveness, efficiency, economy and furthermore ethics and environment. 4 The basic seven elements of Chris Hood's findings (1995) about reform in Great Britain are: 1 - orientation towards professional management, 2 - standards and performance measurement, 3 - output control, 4 - decentralisation, 5 - competition, 6 - business methods, 7 -economy and efficiency. 5 More: Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space- EAS (1998) and European Principles for Public Administration (1999), Sigma Papers No 27, OECD, Paris. Picture 1: New Public Management PRIVATE SECTOR ENTREPRENEURIAL CONCEPTS, METHODS, PRINCIPLES Public Interest ■4- D Democratisation (Taking into Account the Public Services Users and Employees) n Increased Efficiency and Economy (Efficient Use of Allocated Resources, Management by Results) Legality It is worth stressing that Slovenia, as well as other countries of course, had to acknowledge, sometimes even painfully, that the public and the private sector function with different missions, so it is not possible to just "copy&paste" the private sector methods. The most important drivers to be put in front of efficiency and orientation toward users are therefore legality and public interest, which have to limit entrepreneurial or lately the so-called neo-liberalistic approches. The public administration can be oriented toward users, but there are situations when its quality is not satisfying individual interests. Howewer, one must find it hard to define what public interest is in certain cases. But the principles of legality, political neutrality, objectivity, autonomy are nevertheless still more than valid; they are to be upgraded and not replaced by effectiveness and efficiency. As the grounds for further public administration reforms the philosophy of good governance has been developed in the last few years on the basis of New Public Management within OECD, putting forward not only efficiency, but mainly participative strategic planning by giving the government of the day the crucial role in stimulating cooperation among societal subsystems. Donald J. Johnston, Secretary-General of the OECD, expresses the good governance in the following words: »...the key to providing opportunities for all citizens to enjoy productive and fulfilling lives.is ensuring that the triangular paradigm of economic growth, social cohesion and good governance is kept in balance.« The principles of good (or some call it corporate or new) governance in Slovenia are emerging in theory (and much slower in practice) from 2003 on, being built in the lately passed Strategy of Development of Slovenia till 2013 (mainly prepared to put forward the priorities Slovenia has to challenge in the first decade of full membership in the EU). Slovenia has met some major milestones so far by becoming an indepent state in 1991 and joining the EU in 2004. If public administration had not responded to new needs of the state and its people, Slovenia could not have been facing new challenges now, in 2006, such as introducing the euro in 2007 or holding the presidency of the EU in 2008. Furthermore, public administration is just one pillar creating the public sector system in Slovenia. Namely, in accordance with the Civil Servants Act and the Salary System in the Public Sector Act public sector in Slovenia is regarded as the entirety of government bodies and local self-government units' administrations, public agencies, public funds, public institutes, public economic institutes and other legal persons of public law, when they are classified as national or local communities' budget spending units, all together about 150.000 employees. Public sector therefore covers systems of public education, public health, social welfare, R&D, judiciary system etc. The public administration is narrower as the entirety of government administration bodies, municipalities' administrations (about 200 of them) and legal persons of public law (public agencies and certain public institutes) performing administrative tasks under public authorisations. There are about 46.000 employees (4% of active population) working in public administration, about 33.000 of them within state administration (police and army included) and about 4.000 within municipalities. It is worth mentioning that in Slovenia there is a great difference between the state administration (in central and local levels) and local self-government (municipalities). The state administration is represented by 15 ministries and 16 supportive common governmental services, about 50 autonomous units within ministries (such as Tax Office) and 58 local administrative units. Despite common theoretical dimensions experts identify two major trends of the public sector reforms within the OECD countries: 1- reforms based on privatisation (main goal being free market) and 2- reforms on the basis of de/regulation, but both types aiming to adjust legal framework and the public sector activities to current social environment and joining-up the public and the private sector (Schuppert, 2000, p. 277 and 350). We would presume that the basic objectives of public authorities are the following: 1. To protect public interests and therefore regulate those fields where the market would not function in that respect; 2. To plan and control the implementation of public policies; 3. To create an enabling environment to stimulate entrepreneurship and investment (and economic progress and sustainable social development in the long run). The role of the state is therefore changing - from once being just the institution to remove market dysfunctions to the modern state which acts as a promoter of strategic economic and societal development. The authorities must distinguish whether they are dealing with the power - as an institution and regulative power - or with the services for the people - as an organisation and service provider. When organisation is in question, there is no doubt that efficient public sector is also in the interest of the economy. 2. Periods of development in slovene public administration In Slovenia the public administration reform has been a priority task since 1996 when the government adopted the strategy of transformation of public administration. In the last few years the reform has been built up as a constant development of public administration. Concerning public administration reform there have been several periods since 19916: From 1991 to 1996 The turning points in 1991 that triggered a comprehensive reform of public administration were the first democratic elections in Slovenia, its independence in June and the adoption of the Constitution at the end of the same year. Due to a completely new environment in which the Slovenian public administration found itself, the reform was first directed into the establishment of institutions in administrative areas assumed by the Republic of Slovenia from 6 Some recognize the three major periods, as 1- »revolution« (1990-1994), 2- transition (1995-1997) and 3 - accession to the EU (after 1997). the former Yugoslavia (defence, customs, citizenship, personal documents etc.), and later into the adjustment of public administration system with the constitutional concept of the division of authority and local self-government (in 1995). From 1996 to 1999 Further development of public administration was related to the process of Slovenia's integration into the European Union. In 1996 the government passed the strategy on integration in the EU, including the partial strategy on public administration reform 1997-1999. The basic goals of the strategy were to increase the efficiency of the Slovene public administration and to adjust its functions and structures according to the European standards. The strategy incorporated over 30 projects, joined up into six fields: state administration, local self-government, public utilities, the rights of individuals in administration, civil service system and public finances. The reform was not a success, mostly due to the inconsistent political support and lack of ministerial coordination. From 1999 to 2003 The periods of 1996-1999 and 1999-2003 have a common denominator: the EU. From 1999 on the basic new laws were prepared and passed later. Within this new context, new legislative framework for public administration had to be developed and harmonized with the standards of the European Administrative Space. Regular reports of the European Commission on the progress of Slovenia in its integration into the European Union (2002, 2003) testify that part of the reform was successfully concluded. The reports give positive evaluation of the administrative capacity on both, ministerial and horizontal levels. The legislative part of public administration reform was concluded with the adopting of the six fundamental legal acts: the Civil Servants Act, the Salary System in the Public Sector Act, the State Administration Act, the Inspection Act, the Public Agencies Act and the Act on the Access to Information of Public Character. In 2001, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia began the activities to establish the second level of local self-government and adopted the basis for further development of local self-government, founded in constitutional amendments, in June 2002. In addition to the preparation of a new systemic legislation, numerous measures were implemented in years 2002-2003 on the level of implementing regulations and operative level to improve the quality of public administration operations, its services and information, to attain greater satisfaction of customers and better qualification of employees (e-government, governmental programme on removal of administrative barriers, special training for civil servants in the field of European affairs etc.). From 2003 onward In July 2003 a special midterm governmental strategy on further development of public sector and in 2005 a broader strategy on development of Slovenia were passed. They define specific objectives and priority activities relating to public administration development in the areas of human resources management, task restructuring and administration organisation, administration and e-government processes, quality management, open administration and public finances. The activities are analytic, implementing and developmental, defining priority tasks, holders and time limits. The strategy from 2003 was the first one to integrate different parts of public administration operations in one document, based on "the vision of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to shape public administration that shall function under the principles of legality, legal protection and predictability, political neutrality, openness and transparency, quality, effectiveness and efficiency; in which doing, it will obtain results comparable with the result of public administrations in the countries of the European Union, under the indicators of imposed measures and satisfaction of citizens, traders and other affected persons and public-financial effects". Specific measures in the strategies aim to cover pitfalls of reforms so far, such as too legalistic approach to the reform, too much centralisation or on the other hand too much decentralisation without coordination among ministries, lack of political support on the highest level, too many abstract goals without supporting measures etc. 3. The leading fields and measures in slovene public administration reform The legislative part of public administration reform was concluded by implementation of several laws and its secondary legislation from 1997 to 2003: • the Civil Servants Act (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia (OJRS), No 56/02, applied since June 2003), • the Salary System in the Public Sector Act (OJRS, No 56/02, applied partially since 2004), • the State Administration Act and the Public Agencies Act (OJRS, No 52/02) and the Inspection Act (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 56/02) in force since 2002, • the Act on the Access to Information of Public Character (OJRS, No 24/03). Some of these acts have been newly introduced in every day life and work, so it is too early to evaluate the impacts (3-4 years is not enough to evaluate added value of such umbrella laws, not to mention lack of evaluation criteria set in advance). Nevertheless let us take a look over their objectives and concrete activities. Major emphasis in the Civil Servants Act is given to the renewal of the system of personnel planning and employment, enhancement of the strategic centre for human resources management within administration, decentralisation of human resources management, increasing of internal mobility, planning of employees' career development, optimal use of human resources, separation of political functions from officials' positions, establishment of the top-level public managers, establishment of the Council of Officials representing an independent master of objective selection of the top-level administrative managers, professionalism and stability of administration, a more objective system of selection and remunerations, establishment of the policy of horizontal training and advanced training, and enhancement of social partnership. The Act also introduces the mechanisms for attaining greater flexibility, as well as the rationalisation of operations (project work, reorganisation, temporary and permanent transferral). On the basis of Civil Service Act and State Administration Act the government adopted several decrees in June 2003 to regulate bodies within Ministries, internal organisation, systemisation, positions and the titles within public administration bodies and judicial authorities, internal tendering procedure, as well as restrictions and duties of civil servants related to accepting of gifts. The statistical data have already proven that these measures led to greater efficiency, but regarding the limited influence of politics on civil servants some serious doubts have been introduced, also via Constitutional Court of Slovenia which decided some governmental authorisations on dismissal of top public managers without breaching the law (put in law) to be excessive. The Salary System in the Public Sector Act (judiciary system included) was adopted in order to establish a uniform salary system in the public sector and ensure a uniform basic salary for comparable positions, motivate and remunerate the above-average work results and effectiveness, ensure the transparency, flexibility and control of the salary system from the point of view of public finance. The Act also stimulates the rationalisation of operations, since it permits that a part of the savings created through rationalisation be directed into the remunerations for employees achieving above-average work results. But the Act itself has not been put in force fully due to some years' negotiation with trade unions regarding collective bargaining, so the goals are still to be reached in practice. In the area of training, a special emphasis was given to the implementation of training programmes in the area of European Affairs in accordance with the strategy adopted in 2000. A three-year training programme has been implemented for the elite group of junior officials for the preparation on " con-cours". In 2003 a special training programme for the highest ranking senior employees7 started comprising 8 modules from the areas of administration management, organisation theory, human resources management, strategic planning and decision-making, mastering of changes, relationships and communication, management methods and team work. The training is conducted by Administrative Academy, an internal unit in the Ministry of Public Administration, established in 1997. Academy has so far conducted a lot of programmes, but has not proven itself to be (as planned) a nucleus policy making unit. Instead of preparing annual governmental programmes it focuses only on rather partial execution of certain seminars and exams. Academy will have to take a new role within preparation of Slovenia to organise and lead all activities necessary in the EU during the first half of 2008. The State Administration Act has, in accordance with the practice of the member states of the European Union, transferred authorisations for the management of the state administration organisation from the parliament to the government, thus ensuring a greater flexibility and minimizing the burdening of the parliament, as well as renovating the management system in state administration (a clearer distinction between political functions and highest-ranking positions of officials) and regulating more clearly the status of bodies within ministries. The reorganisation of state administration has not been completed, since it is run on several levels using several legal and other instruments. On macro level there is transition of some state functions into public agencies, institutes and funds. Within state administration the number of governmental services and bodies within ministries need to be rationalised, joined-up, the same goes for local administrative units. Slovene State Administration currently incorporates 15 ministries, about 50 bodies within them such as Police and Inspectorates (10 abolished in January 2004), 16 governmental services (5 abolished in April 2004), 58 (local) administrative units (planning to be centralised in about 14 centres). Decreasing the number of bodies results in fewer direct budget spending units and a greater integration of administration, and thus a less complex coordination, increased political responsibility and a decrease in the number of heads representing the highest-ranking officials' positions. 7 The Decree on Internal Organisation, Job Systematisation, Positions and Titles within Administration and Judicial Bodies (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 58/03). On mezzo level - within ministries - the new governmental decree in 2003 defined the basis for unified internal structure, building on directorates as basic elements. On micro level there is a reform of civil service system (the systematisations of positions within administration bodies will be essential when shaped as actual, therefore including only the actually employed workers; new/replacement positions, promotions, education and training, departures and others, are covered by the personnel plan of the authority as part of its budget). On the whole there is a demand to consider the type of activities (policy-making, implementation, inspection, public utility etc.), number of employees and procedures/customers and autonomy needed when looking for optimal organisational unit or form. There is, for example, no need to accelerate public agencies without prior analysis of the autonomy needed, growing from internal organisational unit to directorate or autonomous body within the ministry, ministry itself or at least governmental service led by minister portfolio (the latest established at the end of 2005 to carry out the implementation of Strategy on Development of Slovenia) or having an independent public agency or an institute. The Inspection Act from 2002 provided the legal framework that permits a more efficient and more coordinated work of inspections (enlarged authorisations, establishment of the Inspection Council Coordination, a more adequate procedure regulation). The Public Agencies Act provides for the systemic regulation of a public agency, a so far unregulated status form of the person of public law. By adopting the act on the access to information of public character the first step was made towards an open administration, classifying Slovenia in the big group of developed countries that are familiar with such legislation (24 of 30 Member States of the OECD). The act allows the citizens to access any information of public character. A procedure is being regulated, under which every individual can acquire any information of public character and which introduces the liability of bodies to actively transfer certain selected information via the World Wide Web. Only confidential information, personal data, professional secrets, etc. are excepted. The access to information of public character is of great importance in the establishment of an overall structure of the open administration: only the citizens that are armed with information will be able to participate in various decision-making procedures and thus effectively realize their right to participate in the adopting of regulations. The Public Finance Act (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 79/99, 110/02) and the Court of Auditors Act (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 11/01) were adopted, imposing economical and rational use of budget and other public-financial resources, planning and reporting of the direct and indirect national and municipal spending units on obtained goals and results and, consequently, economy audit, as well as audit of the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. In accordance with ISO 9000 standards almost 30 administration organisations (mostly administration units, but also the government services, one ministry, bodies within Ministries, municipalities) acquired the certificate of quality, respectively. Since 2002, the predominant model (about 60 organisations) in Slovenia, used in accordance with the European trends, has been the European model Common Assessment Framework (CAF) for organisations in the public sector, adapted to public administration and developed on the basis of the concept, model and experience of the European excellence model EFQM, as well as national award for quality like Award of the Republic of Slovenia for Business Excellence. Amendments to the General Administrative Procedure Act (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 52/02) introduced the exchange of information from official databases as a burden of administration and not applicants. A series of measures have been implemented: reengineering of business process, informatisation of registers and providing access to databases (especially the central register of the population and land cadastre), training of employees. Further amendments are being prepared in order to regulate certain unsolved issues of electronic administrative procedure (e-serving, e-submission, e-file). The Administrative Fees Act (May 2002) was also amended. It facilitates the payment of administrative fees by allowing the payment in cash, credit card or other contemporary payment instruments, irrespective of the amount of the fee (implemented since the end of 2003). The Decree on the dealings of public administration bodies with customers (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No 22/01, 81/03, 20/05) determined minimal standards for dealings with customers. It regulates the obligation to provide information on administration services in different manners, the system of responsiveness to criticism and remarks from customers, the obligatory identification of the satisfaction level of customers, the obligation of the employees to wear identification tags, the discretion field, and others. In February 2003, the portal of administration units was established, representing a sample of a service portal and containing the information on approximately 140 administrative services, structured in a user-friendly manner (the catalogue of life events), however being rather informative and not enabling full communication and back offices optimatisation. The standardized application forms for all types of procedures that are being conducted at administrative units are also available. In 2001 and 2002, the activities of the Government in the area of removal of administrative barriers were directed towards the simplification of procedures for the establishment of companies, influencing the environment and employment of aliens (a summary decision on the fulfilment of conditions for the performance of activity, for the 50% reduction of court fees, shorter time for company registration, simplified procedures referring to the Spatial Planning Act and the Construction Act, a more rapid acquisition of the residence permit for aliens, partly associated procedures for the acquisition of the residence permit and work permit, new act on nostrification of university degrees and certificates, respectively, acquired in foreign educational institutions and others). The establishment of the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) project (autumn 2002) is of great importance in relation to both, traders and individual citizens. 4. Further development of slovene public administration/sector Further development of Slovene Public administration is inevitably placed within the EU. The EU in general does not include national administration into acquis, when it is capable of implementing the sectoral regulations and directives. Nevertheless some trends are to be followed, especially on the fields of HRM and TQM. The common critic of public administration reform in mid European space is a too legalistic approach, which is the case in Slovenia as well8. It is natural that public administration is accurately defined by legislation to ensure legality, objectivity and the rule of law to avoid misuse. So it is a logical consequence to base the majority of measures on changed regulations, especially those aiming to develop the organisation, functions, civil service system, and management of resources. Nevertheless, initially the legalistic approach should be just one which is later upgraded by process orientation. Within OECD (Anglo-Saxon legal system) there is even an opposite view: functional analysis should be the starting point to begin restructuring and passing amendments to existing acts and new laws. Both views should be combined to assure optimal effects. Functional studies carried out in 2003 and later have analytically proven the problem of rather isolated reforms so far. Mainly there are strong trends within state administration, but rather poor strive for efficiency for example within municipalities (some even talk of public administration being run in two tracks). There are even more drastic differences among systems 8 Germans have even invented the special word for this phenomenon - Juristenmonopol. Beside officials the citizens as well favour authority, hierarchy and legality to efficiency. within the whole of public sector, especially regarding privatisation processes such as those in the area of public health. As identified in so far conducted partial functional analyses, Slovene public administration should be strengthened from 2006 on basing on four major development problems : 1. quality of regulations, 2. relation to customers and economy, 3. management of resources and its coordination, 4. size and expenditures of state administration or public sector as a whole. Priority tasks should therefore be connected to ensure optimal results. Some of the key objectives and further tasks to be implemented would be: • implementing the strategic human resources planning, • a greater possibility for remunerations according to work effectiveness, • strengthening the cooperation with civil society and building of partnerships with unions, • intensive introduction of electronic services in public administration, • elaboration of methodology for the regulatory impact analysis (RIA). • expanding and remunerating good practices; developing adequate standards of service quality, • elaboration of standards for the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and individuals, as well as promotion of competition and benchmarking. To fulfil the goals listed it is of great help to be involved as a state on international level, since it provides additional ideas and checks the state of affairs at home comparatively to international scene. Slovenia is active in international screen for a few years bilaterally (Austria, Germany, GB, Netherlands) and in the context of larger integrations. Slovenia is an active contributor in European Public Administration Network since 2001 (also cooperating fully in 4QC in Tampere in September 2006). Regularly we have cooperated with SIGMA representatives and with European Institute for Public Administration from Maastricht. In February 2003 Slovenia was appointed as an observer in OECD Public Management bodies. Of course some foreign experiences are more and others less applicable, but the process of globalisation should be recognized in the field of public administration as well. The society and its formal and informal leaders should be aware of economic importance of public sector and administration (framework given by Lisbon Strategy). According to assessments, in the last years public sector contributed a good quarter of the added value, while the actual government's impact in the private sector is still great. In addition to the almost complete covering of non-market activities and economic infrastructure, the government can also seize, particularly through national banks and public funds, the potential opportunity to control a greater part of public sector operating under the conditions of competition. Since the response time of the organisations under government control is inevitably longer, both for the reasons of differing legal procedures (for instance, public procurements) as well as for the reasons of potential politisation of strategic decisions, the Government has opted for the minimized ownership role of the government within the private sector, as well as for the continuation of privatisation already in the Strategy of Slovenian Economic Development. The quality of institutional environment is a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth. Some international indicators prove that government is supposed to be active contributor in developing national economy competitiveness9. Additionally the size of public sector has to be recognised. The number of employees only in Slovene public administration (now from 33.000 in state administration to about 46.000 all together) has increased three times since 1991 due to the objective reasons (independence, establishment of local self-government, integration in the EU), as well as subjective reasons. The growth of public administration and salaries in public administration (and in the entire public sector) represents an increased pressure on the national budget and one of the reasons for the increase of the public-financial deficit. In addition in Slovenia as well as worldwide almost all measures have been taken to assure more user friendly administration and to rationalise it. On the other hand civil servants were rarely systematically motivated and/or awarded at the same time, even though they are the key success factor. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia realizes that good governance represents one of the pillars of social development and prosperity; the other two being the economic growth and social cohesion. Public administration (should) play(s) a significant role within the framework of good governance, since it provides professional basis for political decision-making and directly enforces the adopted policies. Therefore, the quality of public policies and their 9 To name some: Growth Competitiveness Index - GCI (its third is represented by Public Institutions Index), Governance Research Indicators Country Snapshot by World Bank (taking into account the quality of governance measuring the quality of regulations, rule of law, efficiency of government, control over corruption), IMF analyses on correlation between GDP per capita and previously mentioned indicators. Only by summary of criteria on government (aggregate governance measure of institutions') almost three quarters of differences among GDP per capita can be explained (IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2003). actual social value depend to a large extent on the quality, effectiveness and success of its operating. Slovenia has declared the goals mentioned, but implementation is rather poor especially regarding public-private partnerships in all forms (institutional, contractual and other arrangements, formed between a public agency and a private company that can include a variety of activities that involves the private company in the development, financing, ownership and/or operation of a public facility or service). Public sector and public/state administration still seem to be self-efficient. Reasons for the development of PPP could be grouped as economic (budgetary and entrepreneurial) and social reasons; the first ones further more classified into macroeconomic, dealing with availability of public investments, and secondly microeconomic, dealing with efficiency of public expenditure. Public private partnerships can offer innovative and competitive solutions when value for money is demonstrated, risk is allocated to the partner best able to manage and mitigate it and processes are open, fair and transparent. On the other hand there are some disadvantages. The most important one is connected to competition or in fact with the lack of it. Privatisation and PPP are in the function of growing efficiency and quality as far as there is significant number of potential suppliers of public services. Therefore, some favouring circumstances or even conditions for a successful PPP are regulatory framework ensuring fair procedure, existing programmes of investments, risk management, relatively balanced social, economic, technical and institutional environment etc., which Slovenia still lacks. Let us conclude by emphasizing once again the great importance of government provided consistent political support and pro-active stand. It takes time to modernise public administration, since public administration reform means the change of the mentality. As public administration is functioning within rapidly changing societal environment, public administration reform is, as we all know and hope for, the never-ending story. Dr. Polona Kova~ je vi{ja predavateljica na Fakulteti za upravo Univerze v Ljubljani. Doktorirala je l. 2005 na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. Prednostno se ukvarja z upravnimi postopki (splo{ni upravni postopek, dav~ni postopek, uveljavljanje pravic iz socialnih zavarovanj, in{pekcijski nadzor idr.) in nasploh s pravno ureditvijo javne uprave. Poleg tega je dejavna na področju kakovosti, zlasti rabe modelov odli~nosti v javnem sektorju. S slednjim se ukvarja od l. 2001, od tega do l. 2004 kot nacionalna koordinatorica za uvajanje modela CAF v slovensko upravo, od l. 2005 dalje pa kot razsodnica v postopku Priznanja RS za poslovno odli~nost. Redno objavlja v strokovni literaturi in sodeluje na doma~ih in tujih konferencah. Je izvajalka vrste seminarjev in delavnic na področju kakovosti in pravne ureditve javne uprave, od l. 2005 je tudi predstojnica za izobraževanje javnih uslužbencev na Fakulteti za upravo. Raziskovalno vodi in je udeležena v razli~nih skupinah, tudi v mednarodnem projektu Evropske komisije One Stop Government (6. okvirni raziskovalni program). Literatura in viri • Engel, C.(2003): Quality Management Tools in CEE Candidate Countries - Current Practice, Needs and Expectations, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht. • European Institute of Public Administration, http://www.eipa.nl/default.htm/Projects/CAF. • European Principles for Public Administration, (1999), Sigma Papers No. 27, OECD, Paris. • Flynn, N. and Strehl, F.(ed.)(1996): Public Sector Management in Europe, Prentice Hall,. • Hood, C. (1996): Contemporary Public Management: a New Global Paradigm, Public Policy and Administration, Volume 10, No. 2, 104-117. • Kovač, P. (2003): Evropski upravni prostor - realnost ali mit, Uprava, Nr. 2, Fakulteta za upravo, Ljubljana. • Lane, J. E.(1995): The Public Sector, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi,. • OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (2004) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. • Peters, B. G., Pierre, J. (ed.)(2005): The Handbook of Public Administration, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi. • Pollitt, C., Talbot, C. (ed.)(2004): Unbundled Government, A critical analysis of the global trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation, Routledge, London and New York. • Strategija nadaljnjega razvoja slovenskega javnega sektorja 2003-2005, Vlada Republike Slovenije, (2003), http://www.mnz.si/si/14.php. • Strategija RS za vključitev Slovenije v Evropsko unijo, Poročevalec Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije, 48/97 in 48/I/97, 1996, 61-73 and 168-207. • Schuppert, G. F. (2000): Verwaltungswissenschaft. Nomos, Baden-Baden. • Trpin, G. (2003): Nove možnosti organiziranja javne uprave in učinkovitost upravnih sistemov, Uprava, Nr. 2, Fakulteta za upravo, Ljubljana. POVZETEK Reforma slovenske javne uprave (od 1991 k nadaljnjemu razvoju) kot nikoli končana zgodba Pojem »upravne reforme« se je začel v svetu uveljavljati konec osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Temeljiti prenovi vladnega sektorja je v posameznih državah, tudi v Sloveniji, botrovalo več vzrokov, med katerimi je treba izpostaviti potrebo po zmanjšanju deleža javne porabe v bruto domačem produktu ter uveljavljanju glasu uporabnikov javnih storitev in javnih uslužbencev. Reforma slovenske javne uprave se pojavlja kot prioritetna vladna politika od sredine devetdesetih let dalje, zlasti v povezavi s procesom vključevanja Republike Slovenije v Evropsko unijo. Posamični sodobni pristopi so bili zaznavni že prej, ko se je slovenska uprava pravzaprav šele oblikovala, vendar o (bolj ali manj) sistematičnem načinu nadgrajevanja dela govorimo po letu 1997. V grobem ločimo štiri obdobja modernizacije in razvoja slovenske javne uprave: (1) med leti 1991 in 1996, ko se je Slovenija kot država osamosvojila in radikalno prenovila sistem državen uprave in ločene lokalne samouprave, (2) med leti 1996-1999, ko je Slovenija delovala v skladu s strateškim načrtom za uvedbo reforme slovenske javne uprave 1997-1999 kot delu strategije RS za vključitev v EU, (3) med leti 2000-2003, ko je bila glavnina reforme usmerjena v zakonodajne projekte, in (4) po letu 2003, ko se reforma pojmuje kot stalen program s konkretnimi časovno opredeljenimi projekti, pri čemer modernizacija javne uprave temelji na strateških dokumentih, kot je zlasti Strategija razvoja Slovenije do leta 2013 (za prvih deset let članstva v EU). V razvojnem procesu je medsebojno povezanih več dimenzij spreminjanja uprave - funkcionalna, organizacijska, upravljavska (glede kadrov, financ, IT idr.), procesna dimenzija. Slovenska uprava je bila reformirana predvsem glede organizacijskih struktur in načinov upravljanja virov, medtem ko procesni vidik ni bil v ospredju. To ni presenetljivo, če si pre-dočimo dejstvo, da uprava deluje kot monopolna dejavnost s ciljem varovanja javnega interesa. Da bi preprečili zlorabo oblasti je zato zanjo značilna velika stopnja regulacije. Posledično je tudi reforma uprave - vsaj v delu, ki določa njene naloge in strukturo - nujno predvsem normativnega značaja. Z vidika normativne podobe reforme slovenske uprave so najpomembnejši v maju in juniju 2002 sprejeti t. i. sistemski zakoni, uveljavljeni pa so bili nekateri šele par let kasneje. To so v prvi vrsti Zakon o državni upravi, Zakon o javnih agencijah, Zakon o javnih uslužbencih, Zakon o sistemu plač v javnem sektorju, Zakon o inšpekcijskem nadzoru, Zakon o splošnem upravnem postopku z novelami, Zakon o javnih financah, Zakon o javnih skladih, Zakon o lokalni samoupravi z novelami in povezanimi predpisi in drugi. V bistvu gre pri določbah teh zakonov za redefinicijo pristojnosti in racionalizacijo strukture uprave, tako da sta zaokroženo opredeljena temeljna strukturna dela uprave, kot jih definira OECD: najprej neposredna uprava pod direktnim hierarhičnim nadzorom vlade, in nadalje posredna uprava, ki vključuje organizacije s samostojno pravno subjektiviteto, kot so samostojne javne agencije (regulatorne in druge, kar je od leta 2002 nova sistemsko urejena statusna oblika oseb javnega prava v slovenskem pravnem redu), javni zavodi, javni skladi itd. Glavni poudarki uvedbe uslužbenskega sistema v letu 2003 pa so: prenova sistema kadrovskega načrtovanja in zaposlovanja, decentralizacija upravljanja kadrovskih virov, povečanje interne mobilnosti, optimalna izraba kadrovskih virov, oblikovanje ravni vrhunskih javnih menedžerjev, profesionalizacija in stabilnost uprave, objektivnejši sistem izbire in nagrajevanja, vzpostavitev politike horizontalnega usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja, mehanizmi za doseganje večje fleksibilnosti in za racionalizacijo poslovanja (projektno delo, reorganizacija, premestitev), socialno partnerstvo idr. Med pomembnimi programi, ki so predmet reforme slovenske javne uprave, pa kaže omeniti tudi od leta 2001 dalje vzpostavljeni program odprave administrativnih ovir. Od leta 1996 se v slovenski upravi nadalje vse več organizacij odloča za upravljanje kakovosti v lastnih organih tudi s pomočjo standardov in modelov kakovosti /odličnosti. Med standardi je najpogostejši ISO 9001:2000 (certifikat je bil do leta 2003 pridobljen v približno 30 slovenskih upravnih organih). Evropski Skupni ocenjevalni okvir za organizacije v javnem sektorju - CAF (angl. Common Assessment Framework), ki temelji na modelu odličnosti EFQM, se uporablja v Sloveniji od leta 2002 dalje. Do sedaj ga je uporabilo približno 80 slovenskih upravnih organov. Na centralni ravni je za področje upravljanja kakovosti ključna Uredba o upravnem poslovanju (sprejeta leta 2005), ki pomeni nabor minimalnih standardov med upravo in strankami (npr. posredovanje splošnih informacij, ugotavljanje zadovoljstva strank, obvestila o poteku postopkov, knjiga pripomb in pohval, označbe prostorov in identifikacijske značke, črta diskretnosti). Kritike reforme slovenske uprave se večinoma nanašajo na posamezne sklope pristopov, bodisi v zvezi z določenim zakonom ali področjem (npr. e-uprava). Med najbolj pogostimi očitki je vsekakor (pre)velika naravnanost reforme na regulativo. Nadalje se večkrat navaja, da je reforma kot vseobsežna javna politika premalo sistematična. Temu botruje nenazadnje deljena odgovornost nosilcev posameznih delov reforme. Vsebinski problem pa je mestoma kar konceptualna neusklajenost ciljev in pristopov posameznih politik oz. aktov. Dodatno zlasti davkoplačevalci slovenski javni upravi očitajo njeno preobilnost, stalno naraščanje števila javnih uslužbencev. Končno je treba izpostaviti, da je lahko modernizacija uprave uspešna le ob stalni politični podpori, katere konsistentnost v zadnjih letih ni bila vzorna (npr. glede racionalizacije upravnih struktur). Modernizacija javne uprave je proces, ki je do sedaj pretežno temeljil na legalističnem načelu (pretežni del sistemske zakonodaje je bil na novo sprejet v letu 2002), torej veri, da se reforma izvede le s spremembo zakonodaje. Reforme so izhajale prednostno iz spremembe struktur, namesto procesov in šele posledično organizacije in funkcionalne porazdelitev nalog. Strategija razvoja Slovenije do leta 2013 pa pojmuje modernizacijo javne prave kot stalen program, ki ga sestavlja kopica ukrepov, pri čemer strategija izhaja iz pojmovanja upravnega sistema kot spodbujevalca in ne ovire pri razvoju konkurenčnosti nacionalnega in širše evropskega gospodarstva. Ključni razvojni problemi slovenske javne uprave, na katerih je treba graditi, so tako: kakovost regulacije in koordinacija razvojnih politik, odnos do uporabnikov, zlasti gospodarskih subjektov, način upravljanja kadrovskih, finančnih, informacijskih in drugih virov, krčenje in decentralizacija uprave. V tem smislu naj bi bil nadaljnji razvoj javne uprave osnovan na naslednjih načelih oz. ciljih: usmerjenost k uporabnikom javnih storitev, uspešnost in učinkovitost, odprtost in preglednost, ustrezno nagrajevanje javnih uslužbencev, optimizacija in informatizacija delovnih procesov, vključenost v mednarodne navezave, zavest o vplivu delovanja javne uprave na nacionalno ekonomijo, stalna politična podpora in dolgoročno strateško načrtovanje. Zaradi potrebe po gospodarni rabi virov, je treba le-te uporabiti v skladu z vnaprej opredeljenimi in ponderiranimi cilji uprave kot celote. Izpostaviti je treba pomen javnih uslužbencev, saj je uspešna tista organizacija, ki gradi na sposobnosti in motiviranosti ljudi. Zaradi hitrega napredka je na področju informatizacije priložnosti za modernizacijo največ, najteže - a neizogibno - pa bo streti oreh gospodarne in manj ekstenzivne porabe javnih financ. Sodobna uprava mora biti vitka, torej okleščena nepotrebnih administrativnih opravil, ki obremenjujejo tako stranke kot institucije same. Država oz. občina si mora pridržati določitev javnih dobrin in storitev, torej oblikovanje javnih politik in nadzor nad njihovim izvajanjem, medtem ko se sama eksekutiva postopoma prenaša v širši javni sektor oz. zasebni sektor. Model of effective leadership in public administration UDK: 35.008.2:342 Janez Stare Fakulteta za upravo, Univerza v Ljubljani janez.stare@fu.uni-lj.si ABSTRACT A large number of factors have an impact on leadership effectiveness. One of the most commonly cited is the leadership potential of the leaders themselves. Leaders as individuals are defined in this manner by their inherited qualities and the personality-trait development they have either received or actually achieved themselves. Furthermore leadership (the conduct of leaders) is closely connected to leaders' motivation, values and work ethic, and the power and authority that leaders acquire or build. To determine the extent to which leadership effectiveness is related to personality-trait based leadership potential, the paper presents a proposed model of effective leadership in the public sector, which covers the formation of personal leadership potential and identifying leadership effectiveness. The paper presents a trial application of the model in Slovenia, which offers a realistic representation of leadership potential and leadership effectiveness, which are at a relatively low level due to past neglect of this field in Slovenian central government units. Keywords: leadership, competences, leadership effectiveness, personality-trait based leadership potential 1. Introduction Both the theory and practice of organisational science offer examples of attempts to identify the characteristics of effective leadership through research and analysis of how successful organisations operate. This work has found that the quality (efficiency and effectiveness) of an organisation's functioning depends primarily on leadership1, with leaders and their potential having a major 1 Irrespective of whether an organisation is in the public or private sector. Cf.: Hyde (1992), Fivush Levine (2000), Chaudron (1992), Bennis (1989), Skansi (2000). impact on leadership effectiveness. The results of research and studies by organisational science experts, psychologists, economists, sociologists, engineers and others involved in theoretical and practical work are all agreed on just one point: there is no simple answer to the question of what leadership potential entails and how to measure it. There is a range of approaches and content that are considered to have a significant impact on leadership, and which have proved beneficial when applied by effective organisations. Increasingly rapid change and development demand corresponding changes in central government operations, and also increase the importance of public administration in general. Society can only change if the public administration is actively promoting change. In modern central government units and public administrations2 there is a growing realisation of the importance of leadership for this issue. Furthermore, leaders have been identified as the key factor in terms of impact on the people within an organisation, whose actions then have an impact on the organisation's performance. This places them at the very centre of studies in this field. Scientific approaches are being used -following the best practice of effective organisations - to develop and upgrade this knowledge and create a system that will facilitate the best possible selection and development of leaders, and enable them to operate effectively. The traditional understanding of leadership focuses on the importance of accomplishing tasks that are considered achievable by means of an approach grounded on the principle of autocratic leadership and respect for rules and power. More recent concepts of leadership within central government units take into account a wider range of operation-based contents. Operational excellence and leadership effectiveness are emphasised in this approach. Furthermore, the amount of change that has occurred in central government units and the need for a continual, up-to-date response to environment requirements has only served to enhance the role of leaders. Leadership potential in the wider sense is defined as communicative expression, personality-trait based potential, motivation to lead, and intelligence. In the narrower sense it is defined primarily as personality-trait based potential. There are different definitions of the personality-trait based potential factor (or factors); many of them are inadequate, as they are limited to individual factors within the study of personality and individual behaviour. In the proposed model the expectations relating to the personality-trait based potential indicator are broader and include results from testing character and personality and behavioural 2 Experience (e.g. UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, France) has indicated a number of activities (e.g. developing competence systems, defining development systems) implemented by governments, ministries or other such bodies in these countries that have been promoting leadership. patterns as indicators of possessing various potentials. This is intended to take into account "inherent and developed" leadership potential. Another strength of this model is that it is studied in relation to leadership effectiveness and efficiency. The model tests the personality-trait based leadership potential of leaders, assessing the effectiveness of their leadership and identifying the correlation between personality-trait based leadership potential and leadership effectiveness. The initial section of the paper presents some theoretical views on leadership and the development of leadership competence models, followed by a presentation of the model and the methodology applied. The third section presents the application of the model in Slovenia. 2. Theoretical aspects of public administration leadership and competences Leading other people is a field that historically has been subject to a great deal of study and investigation. The diversity of approaches and findings prevents the presentation of a uniform view of leadership. Furthermore, while some studies have been primarily practical or theoretical, some have attempted to create a universal leadership model by taking in account a range of approaches, while others have attempted to use a range of models and approaches to create and explain various leadership styles. Leaders themselves are naturally the key factor in leadership. Their actions or failure to act have a key impact on their attitude to co-workers, attitudes between co-workers and attitudes to work. The shared characteristic of most definitions of a leader is that a leader is someone that directs and leads something or someone by setting an example and giving advice. In organisation theory, the definition of a leader is usually connected to achieving objectives: a leader is a person who leads co-workers by means of example and advice to achieve a set organisational objective. Of course, there is a large number of factors affecting the public administration's performance, but leadership is definitely of fundamental importance. Leaders have the highest competences and responsibilities as well as the power to launch the processes of change. If a leader stagnates, has no vision, or responds too slowly to change, the consequences may be serious. The more change there is, the greater the leadership role (Brejc, 1999). The (legal) definition of central government administration has a huge impact on leadership within central government units. The traditional, "well-worn paths" that arise from legal provisions and define the administration's function generally restrict creativity and the possibility of promoting flexibility in the administration's work. Research carried out in Germany indicates that public administration employees are generally more oriented towards job security and job continuity than competition, risk and mobility (Cornelius, 1993). Furthermore the internal relationships and tasks are based on regulations, with constitutional provisions requiring their implementation. The traditional view of leadership in central government units is that it is an organisational form for executing political decisions. This means that members of the executive in this organisational form do not set the operational objectives themselves, but are required to respect and achieve objectives set for them. It includes the theory that employees on principle avoid work, and their results are best if they are coerced in some way and closely supervised. The first leadership principles and models were designed on the basis of an autocratic leadership style. Noteworthy theoretical contributions include Weber, McGregor, and Fayol. Fayol's contribution explains the management function3 (1916) and defines it as an activity including planning (analysis, planning, forecasting, decision-making), organisation (material and human resources), commanding (commanding, leading operations), coordinating and supervising (control, analysis and measures with appropriate sanctions). It is an important part of leadership studies because he discussed principles that leaders have to consider depending on the appropriateness of the situation, rather than simply rules to be followed. This diverges significantly from Weber (1947, pp. 328340) who links leadership in public administration to rules and the concept of bureaucracy. McGregor's contribution is significant to leadership studies because he set out another theory, "Theory Y", which offers a positive view of people (Dessler, 1986, pp. 52-53). Nevertheless, public administration differs from the private sector in the approaches to people found in managing and leading people. Farnham and Horton (1996, pp. 32-33) state that the differences exist due to a different orientation towards people. In the public sector (including central government units) there is noticeably more (primarily social) responsibility towards employees than in the private sector. In the private sector employees are seen more as a resource, with managing them seen as a secondary operational function. More recent efforts to achieve operational efficiency in the public sector have related to all the major aspects of operations, from the organisation and implementation (technology) of administrative work to setting the operational objectives, strategies, vision and mission. The limited resources available in 3 Management in the sense of governance. the public sector, the impact it has on social development and the increase in customer demands regarding services, has led to calls for management principles to be introduced to the public sector. This approach or movement emphasises the role of employees, particularly leaders, whose conduct influences the management of operations, development and implementing change. Behavioural competences include personal characteristics that contribute to effective work performance (e.g. interpersonal skills, positions, motivation). Work-based competences include specific skills and aptitudes that ensure work output will meet specific standards. The beginnings of competence theory go back to 1967, when Argyle developed a competence concept that was intended to recognise excellence in the performance of individuals. The concept was aimed at the overall field of human characteristics and abilities. There was a special emphasis on the aptitudes of the individual, their habits, skills and knowledge, motivation, interests and disposition. A significant milestone in the application of competences came with the theories argued by McClelland in his work Testing for Competence rather than Intelligence (1973). He found (Spencer L. M., Spencer S. M, 1993, p.4) that tests of knowledge could not be used to predict an individual's work performance, and that tests were often biased against people from minorities, women, and people from a lower social class. He therefore started to develop a research method to define competency variables that could be used to predict work performance, and that would not be biased towards any specific social group. This was intended to demonstrate that an individual's work performance depends on his or her competences and not just on intelligence. Tomažič (2003) states that today there are almost as many definitions of competence as there are authors studying them. He also states that the great majority of authors want to use the competence concept to cover everything that either directly or indirectly has an impact on outstanding productivity by the individual. 3. Designing the effective leadership model and methodology 3.1 Starting points for model design The design of the model to test effective leadership follows the pattern of models treating leadership as a process. Within this model, the leadership competence model becomes the linking factor between leadership potential and leadership effectiveness, which is used as the basis for testing leadership effectiveness and determining how leader potential influences the effectiveness of their leadership. The leadership competence model must be designed so that is a factor in leadership, but also a criterion for leadership. In that way it can serve both as a basic criterion for measuring leader effectiveness (performance), and also as a tool for shaping leader development. A number of foreign leadership competence models were studied in order to develop the model4. This review indicated that the models used were generally designed for public administration and public sector, but related to various levels of leadership. The competence models usually comprise competences defined by various content-based factors or groups (e.g. intellectual competences with cognitive capacity and creativity) and verification criteria. It should be made clear that models used in practice by central government units around the world, and various foreign organisations, particularly in the public sector, in the field of leadership can offer a sound basis for acquiring an overview of the competences involved in public administration leadership, but no more than that, because a competence model must be designed for a specific environment, taking into account the specific work culture, values and characteristics. On this basis and by analysing individual models (studies of factors and criteria within the model) one can formulate the content groups that are frequently mentioned in the case of leadership in central government units. These are the groups or competences: • Teamwork; content (criteria) that relate to teamwork are linked to the leader's attitude to cooperation between all employees. This involves permitting and promoting diversity, ownership of ideas and results, and judging when teamwork is effective and when it is not; • Interpersonal relations; the leader builds, works on and maintains good interpersonal relations. This includes being aware of difficult situations that could lead or have led to problems and conflicts. Leaders must be interested in subordinates' expectations in order to achieve this; • Communicating; communicative expression and willingness to engage in two-way communication is the most important leadership criterion. It relates to clear verbal and non-verbal communication, respecting the principles of dialogue and keeping employees informed; 4 Including Senior Executive Leadership Capability (Australia), Public Services Commission of Canada (Canada), Bundesverwaltungsamt, Konzept VBS (Germany), ABD - Algemene Bestuursdienst (Netherlands) Verteidigung, Bevolkerungsschutz und Sport (Switzerland), Senior Civil Service Competence Framework (United Kingdom) and United States Office of Personnel Management, MOSAIC (United States). • Vision and creativity; leaders promote, co-create and implement a vision and strategy for future work that will contribute to achieving the organisation's objectives. To this end, leaders promote and enable employees to operate in accordance with the vision and strategy; • Environment; the environment of an administration (interior and exterior) is an important factor in the operations of an organisation unit. The leader must be familiar with and understand the administration's operational system and links with formal and informal groups that affect work and attitudes to work; • Process creation; knowledge and experience allow leaders to understand various aspects of work, and the creation of work processes. To ensure that leaders optimise the organisation of work, they provide conditions and respect the interests of key partners (employees, customers); • Action; action is one of the most important characteristics of a leader. It relates to the implementation and progress of work and providing and coordinating all actions to achieve the set objectives; • Resource management; leaders plan, provide and take charge of optimal utilisation of resources. This emphasises the importance of the leader's role in managing human resources both in recruitment procedures and employee development. Leaders ensure that employees have an appropriate work burden and adopt measures to assess their contribution to work; • Motivation; leaders help employees to seek challenges in work, and motivate them to achieve standards and provide appropriate rewards, promoting independence and responsibility at work; • Cognition and development; based on their knowledge and understanding of the situation, leaders recognise innovations and their impact on work. To make managing new content easier, leaders study and search for information, keep aware of trends and developments in the fields in which they operate; • Employee development; leaders recognise the need for employees to gain new knowledge and qualifications. This is the basis for ensuring the development of employees. This includes clearly explaining matters to those affected, and openly discussing knowledge and skills they must develop to work effectively and enjoy a successful career; • Awareness; leaders in the central government units must have an awareness of working in the public interest on the basis of a mission and common values; • Values; in every situation leaders must act honestly, responsibly and respectfully; • Example; leaders encourage responsible conduct by setting an example themselves. They do not use their position for their own private interests, and work to bring a sense of pride to the organisation; • Personality; leaders exude energy. They are reliable and have established principles within which they generally operate. In stressful situations they retain their composure and maintain the effectiveness of their work. These 15 groups of competences serve as the basis for creating a leadership competence model for central government units. 3.2 The effective leadership model The model is based on studying two content groups, based on two questionnaires. The first questionnaire determines leadership effectiveness, the second determines personality-trait based leadership potential. The results of the two questionnaires are given separately in the middle section and are then combined in the joint analysis of the leadership effectiveness of the groups of leaders. Personality-trait based leadership potential is determined by studying leaders' personalities. This study took place using personal characteristic tests to assess leadership potential. The Frančeškin character test (FTK-test) is used, which is intended to study and develop human potential in the workplace and in general. It represents a network of intersecting basic findings from several major researchers into human behaviour5. It is based on studying character and personal characteristics as the part of the personality with the most stable, long-term validity. It is the very stability of personal characteristics that allow them to serve as a basis for forecasting potential, as well as current and future opportunities (for more detail see Frančeškin, 2003). 5 R. Le Senne, C. G. Jung, R. B. Cattell, H. J. Eysenck, J. Makarovič, J. L. Holland, R. Plutchik, C. Myers and I. Briggs, R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa. The definitions of the effectiveness of leaders and their potential in the model are based on two indexes: the leadership effectiveness index and leadership potential index. The baseline for creating the leadership potential index is the FTK-test. The results are classified into seven groups (six types of test and a "quick fit" personality tester), making a total of 112 values. Creating the indicators for the leadership potential index was carried out using individual indicators from four tests used in the FTK-test, based on existing theoretical and experiential findings. These indicators were used to indicate development, ranging from character to social roles. Five factors (basic groups) for personality-trait based leadership potential were created based on similarities in indicator content. Each factor includes between two and four indicators. The indicators within each group are treated equally. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the personality-trait based leadership potential index. The leadership potential index is calculated using factor analysis. For a given group of related questions (in this case, tests), the first step is to check and calculate the measurement characteristics of tests, and how well they represented the area being studied (potential). In effect this measures the internal consistency of the group of tests. Cronbach's alpha is normally used to measure internal consistency. For a value to be considered as indicating a relatively high level of reliability, it should be higher than 0.80 (a>0,8), however, lower values for this test are usually acceptable in social science research. In this case, the calculated value for Cronbach's alpha is: 0.866. The test indicates a relatively high level of reliability, and it was found that the test provided a good representation of the field being measured (personality-trait based leadership potential). In each case the same method was used (mainly for consistency), i.e. the Kaiser criterion, where only factors with a value of over 1 are retained. Five factors were rejected using this criterion. These five factors explained 87% of variance. The results obtained, or the five factors obtained on the basis of the factor analysis correlate with the theoretically designed proposal of five factors (the basic groups) for personality-trait based leadership potential (based on the presented theory of leadership and experience with FTK-tests). Table 1: Breakdown of personality-trait based leadership potential index Factor Indicator Source (used in FTK) Primacy Le Senne INHERENCY Extravita (extraversion) Eysenck Extraversion Myers-Briggs Surgency Big5 Activity Le Senne DUTIFULNESS Judging Myers-Briggs Conscientiousness Big5 Unemotional Le Senne STABILITY Maturity (non-neuroticism) Eysenck Emotional stability Big5 Intuitiveness Myers-Briggs PERCEPTIVENESS Openness to experience Big5 Sociability Eysenck LINKAGE Thinking Myers-Briggs Agreeableness Big5 A factor matrix was then calculated with the five factors labelled as: inherency (factor 1), dutifulness (factor 2), stability (factor 3), perceptiveness (factor 4) and linkage (factor 5). Varimax rotation was used to improve the factor analysis results, as the value increased for most tests (Table 2). Based on the factor weightings defined for individual factors and personal scores a weighted arithmetic mean was calculated for each leader, with the weightings representing the personal scores for each factor. A leadership potential index was then calculated. The index values were ranked to place the leaders in order of their leadership potential. Table 2: Rotated factor matrix (Varimax rotation) for potential testing Factor 1 2 3 4 5 Test >- o C 2 5 ■C C CO CO CD C 3 Q £ J5 CD +-< t/5 CO CO CD C CD > +J cp