

DOES THE MEDITERRANEAN EXIST IN STATES' DIPLOMATIC RITUALS?: A COMPARISON OF MEDITERRANEAN STATES' PRÉSÉANCE

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Diplomacy is central to international relations and represents one of the main elements and instruments of state power. All actors in the international community are committed to common rules of behaviour in mutual relations and cannot function without hierarchy. In diplomacy, such hierarchy is best seen in the order of precedence, which is used to clearly represent the distribution of symbolic power among interstate and intrastate political actors. The aim of the article is to test the presumption that a regional impact (i.e. the Mediterranean) is reflected also in Mediterranean states' diplomatic practice of the national order of precedence. However, a detailed analysis of 16 Mediterranean countries does not confirm this presumption, showing that rather than the region having an impact on the order of precedence, it is defined more by the characteristics of the national political system, which should be taken into consideration when analysing the wider aspect within regional interstate relations.

Key words: Order of precedence, Diplomacy, Symbolic power, the Mediterranean



INTRODUCTION

In the framework of international relations theory, diplomacy is often insufficiently analysed (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 1), even though it is the centrepiece of international relations and one of the main elements of power that actors in international relations possess (Murty, 1989; Feltham, 1998; Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte, 2001; Jönsson and Langhorne, 2004; Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Sharp, 2009; Berridge, 2010, 1; Udovič, 2013). According to Morgenthau (1995: 207–55) and Aron (2010: 91), diplomacy—together with geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, the state of military preparedness, population, national character and national identity—represents one of the eight elements of a country's power. Diplomacy therefore ensures and manages relations between the actors of international relations through intermediation of different diplomatic representatives, who participate, cooperate and communicate with each other (Jazbec, 1998; Berridge, 2005; Berridge and James, 2003; Sharp, 2009).

Moreover, some scholars see diplomacy as a “timeless, existential phenomenon” (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 3), whereas others understand it as an institution that represents a set of rules and routines that define the appropriate modalities of actors' actions in the international community (March and Olsen, 1989: 160). However, the international community—which according to Benko (2000) can be understood as community of states that are aware of certain common interests and common values and are thereby committed to the common rules of behaviour in mutual relations and to common building of institutions—cannot exist without hierarchy. Therefore, no civilisation can exist without the appropriate ceremonial, which means that order and discipline are necessary for the existence of a certain community (Wood and Serres, 1970: 17–18). Moreover, in order to guarantee equality between sovereign states, the institutionalisation of diplomatic protocol, which represents a set of norms and rules, based on customs and rules of law, was and still is of high importance (Woods and Serres, 1970; Benedetti, 2008). The importance of protocol is reflected not only in interstate diplomatic relations, usually seen in the treatment and ranking of the



diplomatic corps, but also in the intrastate political/diplomatic behaviour, where the order of precedence (fr. *préséance*) is a clear statement of the distribution of symbolical power among intrastate political actors. However, while analysing a state's *préséance* can show some patterns in the role and place of a political figure in the national political system, cross-country comparisons can offer a more thorough analysis of common features and divergences among countries. This can be especially relevant when observing countries from a particular region—defined historically, geographically politically or economically—or countries of the same cultural tradition (Mikolić, 1995).

The aim of this article is to look for common practices or divergences in the practice of states' order of precedence in the Mediterranean region. Although we agree that this region is very heterogeneous in the political, economic and normative sense (Xenakis, 1999; Šabič and Bojinović, 2007; Bojinović Fenko, 2009: 217ff; Bojinović Fenko, 2015; Osrečki, 2016; Šabič, Bojinović Fenko and Roter, 2016; Koleša and Jaklič, 2017). We are inclined to agree that because of different historical events and geographical vicinity, the Mediterranean countries have more things in common than would seem *prima facie*, even though it is hard to define the Mediterranean in international relations theory as “an institutionalised region in the form of regional governmental organisation” (Bojinović Fenko, 2015). Firstly, one should not forget that the Mediterranean represents a cradle of humanity (Bojinović, 2007: 12; Calleya, 1997 in Bojinović Fenko, 2015: 75). Secondly, the Mediterranean was (and also acted as) the centre of the world (Amin, 1989 in Bojinović Fenko, 2009: 218; Udovič, 2013: 15–71). Thirdly, along with a similar approach in political and economic issues, the Mediterranean area was also a historically important religious, scientific and architectural region (Finlayson, 2016: 46). Taking all this into consideration, we presume that all these activities and actions have left traces in the diplomatic intercourse and diplomatic practice of Mediterranean countries. It is expected that since a common Mediterranean space existed in the past, there are also some similar patterns in these countries' inter- and intrastate diplomacy. This article seeks to identify similarities and



differences in the diplomatic treatment (i.e. symbolical value) of key political decision-makers in Mediterranean countries.

The article is built of two interrelated parts. The first part, which follows the introduction, presents the theoretical framework for analysing the role of symbolism and symbolic power of diplomacy and *in* diplomacy. This theoretical part is then upgraded by an review of diplomatic practice in the Mediterranean, as a prelude to the empirical part in which we analyse the structure and the role of *préséance* in sixteen Mediterranean states. The article concludes by resuming the main findings, answering the research questions and outlining the possibilities for further research.

THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF DIPLOMACY

Power is one of the key concepts for analysing the behaviour of states in international relations, and can be understood in different ways. According to Bojinović Fenko and Požgan (2017: 161), power can be understood “as a static analytic element of what a state possesses materially and ideationally (capability), and /.../ as a relational analytic element of the state’s actions towards the object addressed (influenced)”. Overall, the concept of power is of key importance because it forms a part of the metatheoretical context, where conceptual and theoretical analysis of power is combined (Guzzini, 2005: 500–08), whereby the conceptual framework enables the understanding of different forms of power (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 39). We can distinguish between the power that a state possesses and the power it projects in relation to other actors (Bojinović Fenko, 2014: 7). Firstly, we can therefore analyse power of a state based on its power resources, such as geography, natural resources, military power, internal socio-economic environment, etc. Secondly, an analysis of power can also be based on a state’s capacity to use its resources to influence other actors in order to achieve its own goals (Bourdieu, 1992; Morgenthau, 1995; Barnett and Duval, 2005; Hill, 2003; Nye, 2011; Bojinović Fenko, 2014; Bojinović Fenko and Požgan, 2017).

According to this differentiation, different conceptualisations of power have been developed in international relations theory. For example, the classical theory of realism limits the



understanding of power to *hard power*, whose resources are based on physical coercion, extortion, intimidation, military force and sanctions (Hill, 2003: 135 in Bojinović Fenko, 2014: 8). These sources, according to Morgenthau (1995: 105–07), are derived from eight elements that states do or do not possess: geography, natural resources, economic development and industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale and diplomacy. Paraphrasing Morgenthau (1995), one can conclude that states use these eight elements to enforce and exert their power towards other states in the international community. However, states are no longer the only actors in international relations, security is not the only goal for an actor to achieve, as defined by realism, and coercive means are not the only resource for a state to gain or obtain its own power. A plurality of actors in international relations have made a shift from military security for ensuring state survival towards economic security, where communication, organisation, institutionalisation and other instruments became more important than military force (Nye, 1990: 156–58). States nowadays mostly rely on the use of a soft power, which is an indirect way of exercising power, in which a state does not force others to act according to their will. On the contrary, other actors act in a certain way because they want to follow the state exercising soft power, because of the appreciation of its values or because they want to achieve its level of openness and prosperity (Nye, 2002: 8 in Bojinović Fenko, 2014: 8–9).

Soft power is therefore defined by states' immaterial capabilities, such as culture, political values and foreign policy, and it encompasses the immaterial capabilities and relational analytical elements of one state's actions and influence towards other actors (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan, 2017: 162). Relations between actors in the international community are therefore based also on the possession of different immaterial instruments, which are used in a relationship between those who possess power and those who subordinate to this power. Soft power can be built by focusing on culture, organisational skills and communication, from which the understanding of the ontology of soft power is derived. It is a form of power with which actors benefit without using economic or military means; on the



contrary, actors create a positive attraction that makes it easier to accumulate other forms of power (Nye, 2011).

As Brglez (2014) notes, diplomacy as an interdisciplinary activity can be understood as a form of soft power that different actors use in the international arena to achieve their goals. Therefore, we need to analyse diplomacy not only through the classical conceptualisation of power, but also through symbolic power and symbolisms, which are among the most important characteristics of diplomacy, and give meaning to the behaviour of actors in the international community and importantly influence international relations (Faizullaev, 2012: 91). Actions of individual actors in the international community are always assessed at the symbolic level (Sharp, 2009), where diplomats respect their symbolic status, which is understood as the source of power and influence and is used in relations with other diplomats. Symbols and symbolic actions have been omnipotent in diplomacy since its beginnings. “Symbolism is a tool for meaningful objectification of the state, and it provides an instrument for making the state sensible and for experiencing states, interstate relations and international politics” (Faizullaev, 2012: 92).

In order to understand the symbolic power used in diplomacy by different actors, it is important to approach the concept of power appropriately. We can conceptualise power as an external characteristic of an actor (Morgenthau, 1948), or as a characteristic that arises from the relationship between actors (Bourdieu, 1992). However, as complex as the society is, using only one conceptualisation of power would be insufficient for understanding the intricacy of diplomatic relations, traditions, ceremonies and practices. Therefore, defining power as a characteristic that arises from the relationship between actors, which is also influenced by the external characteristics of an actor, helps us understand why symbolic power is important in diplomacy. Although his texts are very commonly misunderstood and misread, Morgenthau (1995, 104–11) himself notes that power is not only material. Power above all represents human control of the mind and actions of other people and can be understood as symbolic (*ibid*). Morgenthau developed the concept of prestige, with which actors want to create an impression about the power they possess



or want others to believe they possess in order to gain symbolic superiority in relation to other actors. To achieve this symbolic power position, the power of prestige is driven by diplomatic ceremonial and non-military force (Morgenthau, 1995: 124–26).

Morgenthau (1995: 85) identifies diplomatic protocol very clearly as a form of prestige, used in power relations between different actors in the international arena. Prestige is therefore an essential element in interstate relations, just as the desire for prestige is an essential element of relations between individuals (Morgenthau, 1995: 166–76). As noted by Richelieu (Berridge, 2001: 75), prestige is one of four sources of a sovereign's power, along with soldiers, money and possession of the hearts of his subjects. The more prestige the sovereign has, the more power he (or it) possesses. And with more power comes even more prestige and reputation up, to a point where, with proficiently exploited prestige, there is no more need for physical, armed power and only the use of symbolic power is enough. Symbolic power can therefore be defined through certain relationships between those who possess power and those who are able to subordinate themselves to this power. "Symbolic power, a subordinate power, is a transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form of the other forms of power" (Bourdieu, 1992: 170). Therefore, the implementation of symbolic power is strongly related to the ability of a state to exercise its own diplomatic functions, because diplomacy as such is based on symbolism and symbolic actions.

Symbolic power presumes that those subjected to it believe in the legitimacy of the power and those who exercise it; even the ones who will benefit the least from its implementation recognise this power as legitimate (Bourdieu, 1992: 190ff). An actor who is subjected to this power trusts the actor who exercises it and the power itself. Therefore, the dynamics of diplomacy arise from the positions and attitudes of different actors in the analysed field (*diplomacy*) that create a system of permanent positions and views¹, because of which individuals act, think and understand things in a certain way and in accordance with the

1 Bourdieu (1992) defines systems of permanent positions and views as *habitus*.



field (*diplomacy*) (Bourdieu 1992; Guzzini, 2000; Adler-Nissen, 2014). But symbolic power cannot exist on its own, it has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital, which is represented in diplomacy by prestige, which serves as a converter from the real to the symbolic sphere and vice versa (Bourdieu, 1992; Morgenthau, 1995; Arbeiter, 2016). Prestige is therefore the goal that actors want to gain in order to be able to use symbolic power in their relations. Montesquieu understands honour in a similar sense, as it can be understood as the reflection of one's social position in the eyes of others, which is derived from one's power, and represents recognition and has replaced virtue and stable hierarchy of order (Rosanvallon, 2008: 49).

When actors acquire enough prestige—which may be in form of grand embassies, expensive diplomatic receptions, or the order of precedence, where they are placed before other actors—the use of material power is no longer necessary and they can rely solely on their own symbolic power (Morgenthau, 1995: 176). In diplomacy, prestige is most profoundly expressed in diplomatic protocol and ceremonial, and is therefore the basis for acquiring symbolic power. Only clear rules regarding the order of precedence in a certain country can increase its own symbolic power and consequently the superiority over other actors (Arbeiter, 2016). Therefore, the order of precedence serves as a means of communication and especially as a means of expressing the symbolic power of an actor. Every actor in international relations has to act according to certain rules, which have to be clearly defined. Rules in diplomacy are, in addition to diplomatic law, primarily found in diplomatic protocol,² which encompasses various rituals and ceremonials that are an important and inseparable part of diplomacy. Diplomatic protocol was developed interdependently with diplomacy, where the individual's desire for recognition has been a driving force in international relations throughout his-

2 Berridge and James (2003: 217) define diplomatic protocol as “rules of diplomatic procedure, notably those designed to accord to the representatives of sovereign states and others, as well as different classes of officers within them, the treatment in all official dealings to which their recognized status entitles them”.



tory, and the aspect of recognition, or being treated equally and with respect has forced political entities to create international orders that progressively satisfy the individual's desire for social recognition and prestige (Wendt, 1999).

Through historical development and practices, the head of state has become the individual that is placed at the forefront of the order of precedence in diplomatic protocol and has the greatest symbolic power within a country.³ Throughout history, in the times of monarchies, diplomacy was almost exclusively in the domain of the ruling monarch (Murty, 1989: 20), whereas with the rise of other political forms of government, this role was transferred to the elected head of state, in accordance with the constitutional and political system of the particular state (*ibid*). Prestige and symbolic power are in diplomacy expressed through the order of precedence, which can be defined as the right of a diplomatic agent to be placed before another diplomatic agent in protocol and other ceremonial events (Berridge and James, 2003; Benedetti, 2008; Udovič, 2013). Before the nineteenth century, “states sought the ranking for their diplomats which matched their own conception of their importance” (Berridge and James, 2003: 210). Before the Peace of Westphalia, theoretical and ceremonial equality between countries, as it is recognised today by international law, did not exist and competition for supremacy between various countries was in the forefront (Colegrove, 1919; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995). This disagreement between two sides regarding the organisation of the international community even delayed the signing of the peace treaty, with one side defending a hierarchically organised international community and the other supporting equality of countries (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995; Jönsson and Hall, 2005). Moreover, the inability to resolve issues concerning the order of precedence led to a division of the Westphalian congress into two separate congresses at Münster and Osnabrück (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 80).

3 Symbolic power should not be confused with executive, legislative or any other form of power.



From the Westphalian congress to the nineteenth century, no unified and general rules were agreed upon regarding the order of precedence. At the Vienna Congress,⁴ the international community finally agreed on rules regarding the order of precedence (Jazbec, 2002: 131), which were codified in the Vienna Regulation of 1815. The document is considered one of the major milestones in diplomacy. In Article 1, it clearly defines the ranks of diplomatic representatives as follows (Udovič, 2013: 140): 1) full ambassadors, legates or nuntii; 2) envoys or ministers who were accredited to heads of state; 3) *chargés d'affaires*. The Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) added one more rank to this list between the ministers of the second class and *chargés d'affaires*, the rank of ministers resident (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995; Langhorne, 2004; Black, 2010; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2013; Udovič, 2013). Also very important symbolically is Article 5 of the Vienna Regulation, which states that each country should create a uniform method of accepting diplomatic representatives of a particular rank in order to avoid covertly favouring particular diplomatic representatives (Udovič, 2013: 141). Both the Vienna Regulation and the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle mark important steps in the development of diplomatic law and later led to the implementation of customary law in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961.

Even though the Vienna Regulation of 1815 finally determined the open question since the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations, none of the documents codified the rules regarding national orders of precedence. As noted by Simoniti (1994: 21), ceremonial rules are part of national legislation and at the same time have a powerful international and political dimension. Therefore, national orders of precedence should not be discriminatory towards any country and should be applied consistently with respect to all countries. We can conceptually divide order of precedence into four types (Feltham, 1998; Mikolić, 1995; Jazbec, 2009), the order of precedence within the diplomatic corps, the individual order of precedence

4 According to Jazbec (2007), the Vienna Congress represents a highlight of classical diplomacy.



within a particular diplomatic mission, the order of precedence between all diplomats in a particular position in the diplomatic corps, and the order of precedence within the receiving country, also called the national order of precedence. In this article, we will focus on the latter, which is defined by the national protocol service and may differ from country to country, depending on its historical heritage and traditions. Above all, the order of precedence sends a symbolical message about the precedence and importance of different individuals, institutions and countries. It is not necessarily a reflection of an individual's importance, however it always represents symbolical historical importance, which has been gained over time.

THE MEDITERRANEAN LEGACY OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy dates back to ancient history (from 3000–2500 BC to 322–231 BC) when it was primarily based on diplomatic protocol and ceremonial (Udovič, 2013: 31). The diplomacy of Ancient Egypt (Cohen, 1999) provided us with the first example of credentials, personal integrity, diplomatic language, the continuity of diplomatic delegates (Black, 2010) and strict rules of protocol for the reception of foreign delegates. It was known at the time that disobeying ceremonial rules could lead to interstate conflict (Straka, 1998: 10). According to historians, Egyptian diplomacy left us the most important document of all times, the Egyptian–Hittite peace treaty, also known as the Eternal Treaty, between Ramesses II and Hattusilis III. It consisted of an introduction, the main text and a conclusion, followed by a prayer to the gods and a curse on whoever would break this treaty (Potemkin, 1974: 8). Generally, the diplomacy of ancient history was full of protocol and ceremonial rules; it importantly influenced the development of permanent representations, privileges and immunities, which shows that diplomacy in the era of Italian city-states was not the first to develop new concepts in diplomacy (Udovič, 2013).

Furthermore, as a continuation of diplomatic practices of the antiquity, Greek diplomacy (8th and 7th century BC – 3rd century BC) deepened the development of diplomacy, with the



main focus on resident agents, *proxenos*, who represented the economic interests of another city-state and controlled foreign envoys who came to their town (Udovič, 2013: 40). On the outskirts of their city-state, they would establish a *proxenia*, where they hosted foreign representatives and represented the interests of a foreign state—their function was similar to that of today's consuls (Potemkin, 1947: 23–45). While it was similar to the diplomacy of the antiquity and Ancient Greece in several aspects, Roman diplomacy (10th and 6th century BC – AD 476) gave us the origins of the diplomatic corps. Furthermore, privileges and immunities were regulated with *ius fetiales*, which was later formally codified with *ius legationis* (Bohte and Sancin, 2006: 45).

In the area of the Mediterranean, also Byzantium had an important influence on today's diplomacy. Byzantine diplomacy belongs to the diplomacy of Middle Ages and was primarily a ceremonial diplomacy, with a special ceremonial regarding credentials (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995; Campbell, 2004). Foreign envoys were received at the borders of the Byzantine Empire and were taken to Constantinople along the longest route. When they arrived in the capital, they were accommodated in a castle they could not leave, because they were not supposed to interact with the domestic population (Potemkin, 1947: 90–92). Foreign representatives had to carry the credentials for their visit, which clearly stated their name and the purpose of their visit (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 20). The credentials were afterwards presented at the first festive meeting (Potemkin, 1947; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995).

From the ceremonial point of view, the diplomacy of the Dubrovnik Republic is also very important, because they already knew credentials and recredentials, with the former being full of ceremonial phrases and including the name of the foreign representative to be, whereas the latter were a sort of a thankyou letter of the head of the receiving state (Mitić, 1978). That era also saw the development of Papal diplomacy, which established institutes that were later adopted by diplomacies of sovereign states (Udovič, 2013). Canon law established three ranks of representatives: *legatus a latere*, *legatus missus* and *legatus natus*, in



this order of precedence (Udovič, 2013: 74). Papal representatives symbolically represented the Pope in a receiving country, e.g. *legatus natus* was even appointed by the Pope (*ibid*).

The first permanent diplomatic representations developed in the Italian city-states of the 14th and 15th century, which raised important questions regarding the personal privileges and immunities of diplomatic representatives. The practice quickly spread to France, Spain, Austria and England (Mitić, 1978; Anderson, 1993; Jönsson and Langhorne, 2004). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, permanent diplomatic representations were not an invention of Italian city-states, but were developed from a classical need of espionage, with one main goal being to gather reliable information. The first diplomatic corps was established in that period and exists as an institution to this day (Mattingly, 1954/2010). The diplomacy of Italian city-states was multi-centred and multipolar and established a new system of permanent resident representations abroad (Udovič, 2013: 90).

As noted in this historical overview, we can see that the origins of diplomatic protocol and order of precedence can be traced in the heart of the Mediterranean region. Moreover, through historical development and historical practices, we can see that heads of state were placed at the forefront in the order of precedence and had the greatest symbolic power within a country. Furthermore, when monarchy was the most common form of rule, diplomacy was almost exclusively in the domain of the ruling monarch (Murty, 1989: 20). Only with the collapse of monarchies and the rise of other forms of government was this role transferred to the elected head of state, in accordance with the constitutional and political system of a particular state (*ibid.*).

METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF THE ORDERS OF PRECEDENCE OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

METHODOLOGY

Our analysis covered sixteen countries along the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Malta,



Monaco, Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.⁵ In all these states, we analysed the order of precedence, with a special emphasis on its structure. This means that we tried to establish the precedence of different ranks of political decision-makers within the national diplomatic/political system. Since the structure of the orders of precedence is quite complicated, we limited the investigation to the top five state officials. The reasons behind such a limitation are twofold. Firstly, the pre-research phase on some other cases showed that similarities could be found in the top five to ten ranks, while the situation becomes so complicated further down the ladder that it is impossible to develop plausible solutions and solid results. Secondly, the pre-research also showed that in the top five to ten ranks the order of precedence includes the representatives of four branches of the state system: the head of state, the legislative, the executive, the judiciary and other actors of importance for the state.

Based on this, we formulated four research questions that we intended to answer with the analysis:

- R1: Does the political system influence the rank of the head of state?
- R2: What are the relations between the executive and legislative power? Does the political system influence the distribution of ranks among the different branches?
- R3: Which other relevant actors along the representatives of the three branches are included in the top 5 positions in the national order of precedence?
- R4: Does the order of precedence in Mediterranean countries follow common patterns that can be attributed to the “Mediterranean denominator”?

These four research questions constituted the framework of the analysis of the positioning and symbolic power of different political decision-makers in the 16 Mediterranean countries.

The analysed data were obtained by different means—from different publicly available documents, by contacting diplomatic representations of some of the countries and asking them

5 For other countries on the Mediterranean Sea, data was unavailable.



to answer our questions, and by requesting different materials from the foreign ministries of the analysed countries. The research was conducted in the late spring and early summer of 2017, and since no dramatic changes have occurred in the listed Mediterranean countries in the meantime, the data are externally and internally valid.⁶

ANALYSIS

A precondition for the analysis of the order of precedence is the structure of the national political system. That is why we decided to divide the 16 analysed states into two large categories—republican and monarchic—with six subcategories—from the classical presidential republic to parliamentary constitutional monarchy. These categories are important because they allow for variations in the order of precedence between the political systems (Table 1).

Table 1: *Political systems of Mediterranean countries*

	Political system	Country
REPUBLICAN SYSTEM	Presidential republic	Egypt
	Semi-presidential republic	France
	Parliamentary republic	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Montenegro, Slovenia, Turkey
	Presidential democracy	Cyprus
MONARCHIC SYSTEM	Constitutional monarchy	Monaco
	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Spain

Source: Own presentation based on Elgie (2011) and the CIA World Fact Book (2017).⁷

6 All documents are available on request.

7 Elgie's (2011) list of presidential, parliamentary and other countries does not include information for all the analysed countries. Moreover, no official database exists with political systems for all the countries, so a combination of different sources was needed.



As can be seen from Table 1, almost 70% of the analysed states (11 out of 16) are parliamentary republics, meaning that the parliament should have an important role, and therefore also symbolically the legislative representatives should be ranked before officials of the executive branch. Taking, for example, the Slovenian constitution and the Slovenian political system, it would be expected that the head of state would rank first, while representatives of the legislative branch would come second.

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Table 2: *The ranking of heads of state (HoS), high political officials of the legislative branch (L) and the executive branch (E), and others (O)*

	1	2	3
ALBANIA	HoS	L	E
BOSNIA AND HER-ZEGOVINA	HoS	L	E
CROATIA	HoS	L	E
CYPRUS	HoS	O	L
GREECE	HoS	E	L
ISRAEL	HoS	E	L
ITALY	HoS	L1 (Senato)	L2 (Camera)
LEBANON	HoS	L	E
MALTA	HoS	E	L
MONTENEGRO	HoS	L	E
SLOVENIA	HoS	L	E
TURKEY	HoS	L	E

Source: Own elaboration based on the obtained data.

Table 2 confirms our assumption that in the parliamentary republics the first rank in the national order of precedence is reserved for heads of state (HoS), while in most of these countries the second rank is reserved for representatives of the legislative branch (8 out of 12). The third rank is mostly reserved for the executive branch (7 out of 12). Two interesting cases here are Italy, where the second and third rank are reserved for the legislative branch, and Cyprus, where the second rank is reserved for the archbishop.



However, the situation is quite different when we look at (semi-)presidential or monarchical states. As presented in Table 3, the only similarity with parliamentary republics is that the HoS still take the first rank. While in parliamentary republics major power lies in the parliament and the HoS is mostly just a symbolic figure, it is obvious that in (semi-)presidential and monarchical systems the main power is in the hands of the HoS, so the HoS will also have the highest symbolical power. What is interesting in Table 3 is the diverse practice among different countries for ranks 2 and 3. In Spain, the second rank is reserved for the royal family and in Egypt for the vice-president of the republic. France reserves the second rank for the prime minister, while Monaco places the archbishop in rank 2. The third rank in France and Monaco is reserved for representatives of the legislative branch, whereas in Spain this rank is reserved for the prime minister. Egypt is a unique case, where recipients of the Orders of the Nile (the highest award in Egypt) are placed in the third rank.

Table 3: *The ranking of heads of state (HoS), high political officials of the legislative branch (L) and the executive branch (E), and others (O) in (semi-)presidential and monarchical states*

	1	2	3
EGYPT	HoS	HoS2	O
FRANCE	HoS	E	L
MONACO	HoS	O	L
SPAIN	HoS	HoS2	E

Source: Own elaboration based on the obtained data.

When analysing the 4th and the 5th rank, things become even more interesting, and we can observe a plethora of different functions and actors.



Table 4: *The ranking of representatives of the judiciary (J), former heads of state (HoS), high political officials of the legislative branch (L) and the executive branch (E) in ranks 4 and 5*

	4	5
ALBANIA	J	Deputy L
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	<i>No agreement</i>	<i>No agreement</i>
CROATIA	Deputy L	J
CYPRUS	Political parties	Former HoS
EGYPT	Former HoS	L
FRANCE	L	Former HoS
GREECE	Archbishop of Athens	Leader of the opposition
ISRAEL	Leader of the opposition	J
ITALY	E	J
LEBANON	Deputy L	Deputy E
MALTA	Archbishop	J
MONACO	President of the Crown Council	J
MONTENEGRO	Former HoS	Former president L
SLOVENIA	L2	J
SPAIN	L	L2
TURKEY	Chief of the Turkish General Staff	Leader of the opposition

Source: Own elaboration based on the obtained data.

Table 4 does not give a prevailing figure for the fourth rank. However, the picture is clearer for the fifth rank, where one third of the countries have representatives of the judiciary and one sixth former HoS, whereas in two cases rank 5 is reserved for the leader of the opposition. An interesting case can be observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ranks 4 and 5 are not defined and vary from case to case.

Looking horizontally, Table 5 shows that the legislative branch is present in the top five ranks of the order of precedence in all states, while the executive branch is makes it to the list in almost all of them. It is a bit surprising that former heads of state and archbishops have an important role in the symbolic

power of a country, and the latter not only in the Catholic countries, but also in countries that are predominantly Orthodox.

Table 5: *The ranking of representatives of the judiciary (J), (former) heads of state (HoS), high political officials of the legislative branch (L) and the executive branch (E), and others (O)*

	1	2	3	4	5
ALBANIA	HoS	L	E	J	L
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	HoS	L	E	No agreement	No agreement
CROATIA	HoS	L	E	L	J
CYPRUS	HoS	O	L	L	EX-HoS
EGYPT	HoS	Vice-HoS	O	EX-HoS	L
FRANCE	HoS	E	L	L	EX-HoS
GREECE	HoS	E	L	O	L
ISRAEL	HoS	E	L	L	J
ITALY	HoS	L	L	E	J
LEBANON	HoS	L	E	L	E
MALTA	HoS	E	L	O	J
MONACO	HoS	O	L	E	J
MONTENEGRO	HoS	L	E	EX-HoS	EX-L
SLOVENIA	HoS	L	E	L	J
SPAIN	HoS	HoS2	E	L	L
TURKEY	HoS	L	E	Chief of the Turkish General Staff	L

Source: Own elaboration based on the obtained data.

CONCLUSION

The aim of the article was to establish whether some similarities in the order of precedence in Mediterranean countries could be attributed to their Mediterranean dimension (common geographical space, common historical roots, etc.). The analysis of the order of precedence showed some patterns and common features in the horizontal comparison of the countries, but these commonalities can be attributed more to the nature of the



national political systems than the Mediterranean roots of the analysed countries. In the methodological part of the analysis, we set up four research questions that were used in the analysis of the similarities and divergences in the order of precedence in the 16 Mediterranean countries. The first research question focused on the connection between the political system (parliamentary republic, constitutional monarchy, etc.) and the rank of the head of state (regardless of his/her title). In all analysed countries, the first rank in the order of precedence is reserved for the head of state. In the next two ranks, there are notable differences between parliamentary republics and semi-presidential or monarchical systems. In some parliamentary republics, derivatives of the heads of state (former heads of state, vice head of state, etc.) were positioned below the 5th rank, but the situation is different in Egypt (semi-presidential system) and Spain (monarchy). In Egypt, the vice-president has the second rank, while in Spain this rank is reserved for the royal family.

The second research question tested the issue of leverage between the executive and legislative branch in the analysed countries, and whether the political system influences the distribution of ranks among the different branches. In the case of parliamentary republics, the second rank would be expected to be predominantly reserved for the representatives of the legislative branch. This presumption was confirmed, since this is the case in 50% of the countries, while in 25% of them, this rank is reserved for the executive branch. In two countries, Cyprus and Monaco, the second rank is reserved for a “non-political figure”, i.e. the archbishop, which is quite unusual and surprising. The reasons for this might be strongly related to the role of the Church in these two countries. It should also be noted that the first president of Cyprus, Makarios III, was an archbishop, and we can say that the reservation of the second rank for the archbishop derives from the Cypriot historical events. The in-depth analysis moreover showed that the positioning of political decision-makers in the third rank becomes more complex, since half of the analysed countries gives the third rank to members of the executive (usually the prime minister), while in 44% of the countries have a representative legislative branch take this



rank. Again, we find an exception in Egypt, where the third rank is reserved for recipients of the Order of the Nile, who are therefore symbolically more important and powerful than former heads of state and representatives of the legislative branch.

With respect to the third research question, which addressed particularities in the top 5 ranks in the analysed countries, we can say that there are some specific disparities or divergences between countries. Firstly, we should mention the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ranks 4 and 5 are not defined. The reason for this could be, according to our investigation, the complexity of the country's political system and some regional particularities that appear in the order of precedence in different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next unique case that should be mentioned is the symbolic role of the leaders of the political parties or of the opposition in Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Turkey, where these positions have a place among the top five ranks, while the other twelve analysed countries do not value these functions as highly. What strikes the eye is the case of Malta, which placed the archbishop in the fourth rank. Thirdly, the judiciary branch is well represented in the top five ranks, taking the 4th rank once (Albania) and rank five six times (Croatia, Israel, Italy, Malta, Monaco and Slovenia). Finally, another interesting aspect is the role of former decision-makers in Cyprus, Egypt, France and Montenegro. Former heads of state are placed in the 4th rank in Egypt and Montenegro, and in the 5th rank in Cyprus and France. In the case of Montenegro, even the former speaker of parliament takes rank 5. In Slovenia and Croatia, both former Yugoslav republics, do not put their former decision-makers above the 7th rank.

The main question that remains to be answered is the puzzle of the potential Mediterranean denominator in the order of precedence. We tried to identify common roots through qualitative methods, which were tested using quantitative methodology (correlations and regression), but both cases offer no solid ground for conclusive results. Thus, we cannot answer the fourth research question regarding the influence of the Mediterranean area on the diplomatic practice in terms of national order of precedence. We can only conclude that there are certain similarities



among the countries, but in our opinion they can be attributed more to the countries' constitution and national political systems rather than their Mediterranean legacy. Such a conclusion seems plausible and at the same time confirms the basic presupposition of diplomatic studies that change in diplomatic practice cannot be determined by only one factor, but is defined and influenced by a series of variables and factors.

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The analysis showed that on the regional level symbolic power is not of uniform importance for the countries, considering the fact that we cannot identify any common rules regarding the order of precedence that would be strongly associated with the influence of the Mediterranean heritage on the diplomatic practice. Symbolic power is of high importance within the countries and in their international relations with other actors. However, this is not a result of regional historical heritage and influence, but only of national traditions, customs and laws. This should be taken into account when analysing diplomatic protocol and order of precedence in the wider perspective on regional interstate relations.

Therefore, the obtained results are not exhaustive, but serve as a start of research of the influence on the order of precedence, where geographical, historical and cultural roots would need to be taken into consideration in more detail. Since we focused only on the Mediterranean countries, we expect that three changes should be made in future research. Firstly, the number of analysed countries should be increased. This would allow also using quantitative methodology (with more robust methods) in researching the role of rankings in the order of precedence. Secondly, we suggest that a higher number of ranks be included in the analysis in order to generate better results (not only the top five, but the top ten). This would offer a better insight into the network of ranks and positions in the national order of precedence. Finally, there is still some room for improvement in the methodological approach to analysing the orders of precedence, which could include the historical development method—not only analysing the structure, but also focusing on the historical antecedents of the current national order of precedence. Nevertheless, this would be quite a demanding and complex



task, especially because some states are not willing to present their order of precedence, while others do not even have one. With this in mind, the method of historical analysis in combination with the analysis of the diplomatic structure would still offer the optimal tools to study this complex issue of diplomatic practice.

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