

Bogoslovni vestnik

Theological Quarterly
EPHEMERIDES THEOLOGICAE

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Glasilo Teološke fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani

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
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Guy Lafon

Abraham ali iznajdba vere

O Abrahamovem zgodovinskem obstoju ne vemo ničesar. Toda njegovo duhovno potomstvo je ogromno in tisti, ki so povezani z njegovim imenom, »so tako številni kakor pesek na morskem obrežju«. Judje, kristjani in muslimani se sklicujejo nanj: za monoteiste je »oče vernikov«. Svetopisemske pripovedi, ki govorijo o njem, so med najbolj znanimi: odhod iz Ura na Kaldejskem v deželo, ki jo je obljubil Bog, neverjetno Izakovo rojstvo in njegovo žrtvovanje, prikazanje Boga pri Mamrejevih hrastih, pripoved o Sodomi in Gomori.

Guy Lafon poskuša torej pokazati, kako je Abraham resnično univerzalen lik. »Bralci Svetega pisma si vedno znova prilaščajo zgodbo o Abrahamu in v njeni pripovedi črpajo tisto, kar jim omogoča, da razumejo sami sebe v družbi, sredi sveta.«

Prevod Lafonove knjige Abraham ali iznajdba vere na razumljiv ter sodoben način slovenskemu bralcu razloži, kaj je Lafonova teologija, kako razume vero in kako so medčloveški odnosi povezani z vero.

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*Jože Krašovec***Vsebine in oblike v koncepcijah, prikazih in razlagah nasprotij in protislovij***Contents and Forms in Conceptions, Presentations and Interpretations of Opposites and Contradictions*

Povzetek: Prispevek obravnava kompleksno dojetje nasprotij v redu pojavnega sveta ter različne razlage nasprotij in protislovij v filozofiji, v študijah o Svetem pismu in v teologiji. Načini dojetja ter smeri razlage nasprotij in protislovij na ravni stvarnega sveta kažejo, da večina ljudi nasprotij ne dojema kot protislovja, ampak kot različne dele celovite kozmične stvarnosti. Splošna smer razlage je inkluzivna – in komplementarna. V redu duševnega in duhovnega dojetja življenjskih situacij ter stanja morale je drugače. Bolj ko življenje dojemamo duhovno, bolj se srečujemo s polarizacijo med inkluzivno in ekskluzivno smerjo razlage kontrastne stvarnosti. Presentacije resničnosti v svetu literature dojemamo na dva načina: en način je inkluzivno polarno izražanje celote zakonov resničnosti z rabo nasprotnih besed, pojmov, besednih zvez in diskurzov; drugi način je ekskluzivno dojetje nasprotij kot protislovij moralno sprejemljivega in nesprejemljivega. Naš namen je ugotoviti, kako stopnje izobrazbe, vidiki kozmične in nadkozmične, presežne resničnosti ter nazorske usmeritve vplivajo na stvarno ustrezno oziroma stvarno neustrezno oziroma zmotno dojetje vloge nasprotij v redu materialnega sveta in v redu morale ter vrednot. Analiza literarnih vrst in zvrsti ter sloga svetopisemskih besedil je posebno bogato področje dojetja in izražanja nasprotij in protislovij: nasprotij polarnega razmerja v podporo življenjskemu realizmu, protislovij v obsodbo varljivih in samovoljnih razlag, ki materialni in moralni zasnovi sveta ter življenja v njem ne ustrezajo. Resnica in laž nista polarno inkluzivna, ampak antitetično ekskluzivna pojma, ki po svetopisemskem razodetju le v kontingentnem svetu lahko služita za polarno, torej komplementarno dojetje celote resničnosti. V oznanilu poslednje sodbe pa je med njima tako popolno nasprotje, da se laž ukine sama – s sodbo absolutne Božje svetosti.

Ključne besede: nasprotje, protislovje, pojavnost, duševno in duhovno stanje v človeku, inkluzivna polarnost v materialnem svetu, ekskluzivna antiteza v redu morale

Abstract: The article deals with the complex perception of opposites in the order of the phenomenal world and different interpretations of opposites and con-

traditions in philosophy, in Biblical studies and in theology. The ways of perception and directions of interpretation of opposites and contradictions at the level of the material world show that most people do not perceive opposites as contradictions, but as different parts of the whole cosmic reality. The common direction of interpretation is inclusive and therefore complementary. In mental and spiritual perception of life situations and of the state of morality the situation is different. The more we perceive life spiritually, the more we encounter polarization between inclusive and exclusive directions of interpretation of contrasting reality. Presentations of reality in the world of literature are perceived in two ways: one way is the inclusive polar expression of the entirety of the laws of reality through the use of opposite words, concepts, phrases and discourses; the second way is the exclusive perception of opposites as contradictions between the morally acceptable and unacceptable. The purpose of the article is to determine how levels of education, aspects of cosmic and supercosmic, transcendent reality, and ideological orientations influence the actually adequate or inadequate or mistaken perception of the role of opposites in the order of the material world and in the order of morals and values. The analysis of literary types and genres and the style of biblical texts is a particularly rich field of perception and expression of opposites and contradictions: polar opposites in support of realism in life, contradictions in condemnation of deceptive and arbitrary interpretations that do not correspond to the material and moral design of the world and life in it. Truth and lies are not polarly inclusive, but antithetically exclusive concepts which, according to biblical revelation, can only serve for a polar, i.e. complementary, perception of the whole of reality in a contingent world. In the announcement of the last judgment, there is such a complete contrast between them that the lie is abolished by itself and by the judgment of absolute God's holiness.

Keywords: opposite, contradiction, phenomenal world, mental and spiritual state in humans, inclusive polarity in the material world, exclusive antithesis in the order of morality

1. Uvod

Leta 1807 je Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), utemeljitelj nemškega objektivnega idealizma, objavil svoje prvo večje, pa tudi najslovitejše delo *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, v katerem je razvil tehniko dialektičnega mišljenja, ki jo je dopolnil v poznejših delih, zlasti v delu *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1848).¹ Leonard F. Wheat v svoji študiji *Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics* (2012) ugotavlja, da v več sto knjigah in tisočih člankih ni našel prav nobenega razlagalca Heglove filozofije, ki bi njegovo dialektično triado

¹ Prispevek je nastal kot rezultat dela v okviru raziskovalnega programa „P6-0262: Vrednote v judovsko-krščanskih virih in tradiciji ter možnosti dialoga,“ ki ga sofinancira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

teza-antiteza-sinteza razložil zadovoljivo. Wheat tako razlagalce Heglove filozofije deli v tiste, ki mu dialektično mišljenje odrekajo, in tiste, ki mu ga priznavajo. Po njegovem mnenju sta Hegla razumela samo Karl Marx in Paul Tillich. V predstavitvi ‚narave problema‘ (14–17) Wheat navaja 35 konceptualnih parov teza-antiteza:

1. Univerzalno in posebno
2. Eden in mnogo
3. Združitev in ločitev
4. Bistvo in eksistenca
5. Božanski in človeški
6. Notranji in zunanji
7. V sebi in zase
8. Potencialen in dejanski
9. Nezavesten in zavesten
10. Umetno (narejeno od človeka) in naravno
11. Bog in človek
12. Oče (Bog, nebesa, božanski, umeten) in Sin (Jezus, zemlja, človeški, naraven)
13. Bog v nebesih in učlovečeni Bog
14. Abstrakten in konkreten
15. Teologija (razodetje) in filozofija (razum)
16. Bog (božanski vladar) in monarh (človeški vladar)
17. Neodvisnost in odvisnost
18. Svoboda (osvoboditev od vraževerja) in suženjstvo (zasušnjevanje z vraževerjem)
19. Resnica in laž
20. Naravni (fizični) zakon in psihološki (duševni) zakon
21. Moralni (družbeni) zakon in naravni (osebni) vzgibi
22. Notranji zakon (‚srčni‘, osebni) in zunanji zakon (družbeni)
23. Ropar in žrtev
24. Subjekt in predmet
25. Notranje (samo)odobravanje in zunanje (družbeno) odobravanje
26. Teorija in praksa
27. Veljavnost in neveljavnost
28. Ženska (družina, božanstvo) in moški (država, človeštvo)
29. Božji zakon in človeški zakon
30. Morala (moralni zakon) in človeška narava (naravno vedenje)
31. Vest (notranji zakon) in morala (zunanji ali družbeni zakon)
32. Identiteta (ena) in neidentiteta (mного)
33. Misel (ideja, neoprejemljivo) in snov (nekaj fizičnega, oprijemljivega)
34. En vladar in veliko vladarjev
35. Eno vladano ozemlje in mnogo vladanih ozemelj

Ta seznam nasprotnih pojmov je konceptualne narave. Prikazi nasprotnih pojmov odražajo Heglov konceptualni interes v razlaganju razmerja teza-antitezasinteza. Fragmenti grškega filozofa Heraklita pa kažejo, da so starogrški filozofi, še posebej Heraklit, kozmične razsežnosti dojemali pod vtisom nasprotij, ki so le navidezna, v resnici pa izražajo celotno resničnost sveta.

Poglabljanje v svet nasprotij in kontradikcij kaže, da nasprotja lahko dojemamo na kozmični, metafizični in semantični ravni. Moralni imperativ človeške duhovne narave pa k temu dodaja še moralni vidik v dojetanju nasprotij in kontradikcij. Moralni vidik dojetanja nasprotij in kontradikcij je značilen za hebrejski monoteizem, ki v središče vsega postavlja absolutno Božjo avtoriteto, ki človeku zagotavlja svobodo odločanja za »biti ali ne biti« (Shakespeare 2006, 3.1) – s tem ko ga postavlja pred prepovedani sad drevesa spoznanja dobrega in hudega (1 Mz 2,17). Hebrejski monoteizem pomeni konstitutivni monizem v nasprotju z vsemi vrstami konstitutivnega dualizma, a zato toliko bolj izpostavlja dualizem na ravni morale. V korelaciji med konstitutivnim monizmom in moralnim dualizmom se postavlja vprašanje, ali so kakšna nasprotja tudi kontradiktorna. Na kozmični ravni zaznavamo razne vrste nasprotij, ki pa jih ne moremo dojemati kot kontradikcije, ker kozmos sicer ne bi mogel obstajati. Možne pa so kontradikcije v redu morale, ko gre za vprašanje avtoritete moralnih norm. Postavka o absolutni Božji svetosti vključuje logični sklep, da je vsaka oblika zla podrejena Božji avtoriteti – da kaos in demoni ne morejo zmagati. Božja popolnost kot najvišje dobro in notranja nujnost čiste eksistence osebnega Božjega imena JAZ SEM, KI SEM (2 Mz 3,14) zato omogoča harmoničen razvoj celotnega stvarstva.

Zgodovina človeške kulture in znanosti kaže, da so nekateri nasprotja dojemali predvsem kot kozmične danosti, drugi kot metafizične ideje, medtem ko so tretji glavno pozornost posvečali moralnemu imperativu človeške osebe, ki ji posebno dostojanstvo zagotavlja moralni imperativ vesti. Skozi zgodovino razvoja evropske civilizacije narava teh treh domen narekuje različne pristope v okviru znanosti, umetnosti, religije in osebnega življenja. Simbolna vloga nasprotij pri izražanju odtenkov nasprotij v moralnem redu je porajala zlasti nasprotne pojme, kot so Bog in demon ali malik, materialno in duhovno, nebeško in zemeljsko, vera in nevera, meso in duh, vrlina in pokvarjenost, strah in pogum itd. Simbolna uporaba teh nasprotij tvori sámo substanco evropske umetnosti, religije, hermenevtike, filozofije, psihologije in teologije² ter odpira velike možnosti za bolj pretanjen hermenevtičen pristop k vprašanju vloge nasprotij v naši kulturi.

2. Naravna osnova antiteze in njeni prikazi v znanosti in umetnosti

Izraz ‚narava‘ se nanaša na različne objektivne okoliščine zunaj ljudi samih. Ena takšnih najbolj izvernih danih okoliščin je gotovo fizična narava s svojimi kontrastnimi pojavi, kot so na primer svetloba // tema v svetu svetlobe, črno // belo v svetu barv, moški // ženska v svetu človeške vrste itd. Te kontraste je mogoče zaznati na precej različne načine, odvisno od situacije in zornega kota opazovalca.

Ljudje so občutljivost za antinomije na različnih področjih življenja razvili le počasi, na kar je vplivalo več dejavnikov. V poznejših obdobjih so bili med njimi ver-

² Za opredelitev različnih vidikov percepcije nasprotij prim. Clark 1997; Priest 2006; Lee 2010; Wong 2014.

jetno družbene razmere in življenjska filozofija. Družbene antinomije so bile vse občutnejše, ko je prvotno patriarhalno družinsko strukturo nadomeščala urbana kolektivizacija – v teh razmerah je bilo več možnosti za nepravilno ravnanje s človekom. Družbeni odnosi so začeli postajati problem, ki so ga ljudje poskušali reševati na različne načine – vsak po svoji prirojeni občutljivosti in svoji življenjski filozofiji.

Če je dokaze o takšnih poskusih mogoče ugotavljati le za sorazmerno pozna obdobja, to ne pomeni nujno, da so bila taka nasprotja in protislovja – kot so elementarne antinomije zdravje // bolezen itd. – v prejšnjih časih kaj manj boleča. Pomanjkanje virov onemogoča natančnejšo proučitev tega vprašanja. Nobenega dvoma pa ni, da se je dodelan literarni slog lahko uveljavil šele, ko je bil v skladu z ‚uradnim‘okusom in potrebami družbe. Določen način razmišljanja, ki je doživel velik intelektualni razvoj, je bil za tak proces pomemben predpogoj. Za to je moral čas dozoreti. To pa ne pomeni, da posamezni individualisti, kakršni so svetopisemski preroki, ki so običajno morali plavati proti toku, niso bili možni. Toda tudi zanje so morali biti glede ‚izpolnitve časa‘ podani določeni predpogoji.

Drug pomemben razlog za uporabo antitetičnih oblik je način razmišljanja in pojmovanje življenja. Ker je objektivna narava v osnovi povsod enaka, lahko domnevamo, da jo vsi ljudje dojemajo na podoben način. Toda v resnici to ne drži. Ljudje različnih kultur določene situacije doživljajo precej različno. Iskanje vzroka za tako raznoliko dojetje – vsaj glede vprašanja antiteze – razkriva, da stopnja in kakovost občutljivosti za fizične, moralne in socialne antinomije pri vseh ljudeh nista enaki. Težko pa je ugotoviti, ali ima pri njihovem dojetju pomembnejšo vlogo lastna prirojena psiha ali način razmišljanja in gledanja na svet, ki jim ga je posredovala tradicija.

V starem Izraelu je do intelektualne revolucije prišlo zgodaj.³ Toda zaradi življenjske filozofije in religije so manifestacije antiteze v grški in hebrejski literaturi zelo različne. Osnovna antiteza med Bogom in človekom, ki jo stari Grki komajda prepoznajo, povzroči v izraelski misli dolge verige edinstvenih ontoloških in etičnih antitez. Seveda so svet in družbeni red opazovali tako stari Grki kot Izraelci – vendar je vsak videl nekaj drugega. Ne predmeti kot taki, ampak načini zaznavanja in pristopa k obstoječim problemom so bili diametralno nasprotni. In te razlike so spet privedle do različnih besednih izrazov in različnih literarnih žanrov.

Ta pojav je še posebej presenetljiv v odnosu Nove zaveze do helenizma, saj je jezik isti. Zlasti apostol Pavel daje antitezi zelo pomembno mesto zaradi svojega specifično judovskega načina razmišljanja in njegovih literarnih oblik, ki se odločilno razlikujejo od helenističnih – zaradi česar nastopa kot edinstvena literarna osebnost.⁴

Posebej presenetljiva vrsta posebnosti semitske govorne figure je slogovno-retorično sredstvo, imenovano ‚merizem‘, umetnost izražanja celote z omembo de-

³ Ne smemo pozabiti, koliko ima zgodnja hebrejska poezija skupnega z drugimi kanaanskimi literaturami. Strogo gledano so bili preroki tisti, ki so kontinuiteto kanaanske vere dokončno prekinili.

⁴ Pretanjenost teoloških vsebin je razlog, da imamo v Svetem pismu veliko odtenkov žanrov, ki jih drugod ne srečamo (Avsenik Nabergoj 2019).

lov (običajno dveh skrajnosti), in ‚polarno izražanje‘ – postavitev dveh polariziranih pojmov enega poleg drugega, da bi v zvezi z dano idejo, kakovostjo ali količino posredovali predstavo o celoti. Polarni izraz je najpogostejša oblika merizma. Merizem je zamenjava za abstraktne besede ‚vse‘, ‚vsak‘, ‚vedno‘ itd. Omenjeni deli imajo figurativni ali metaforični pomen. Nekateri starodavni in najsodobnejši prevodi Svetega pisma isto besedo nenehno prevajajo z različnimi ustrezniciami v ljudskem jeziku zaradi tekočega prevoda in domnevne natančnosti pri definiranju pomenskih nians. Številne standardne različice prevodov Svetega pisma pa ohranjajo istovetnost besed in enotnost fraz. Zelo pomembno je namreč izraziti isti ključni pojem z isto določeno besedo in se tako odzvati na slogovno razlikovanje med posameznimi svetoписemskimi knjigami. Ustrezen prevod stereotipov in merizmov lahko na splošno pokaže skladnost z izvirnimi svetoписemskimi besedili (Krašovec 1977).

Merizma ne bi smeli zamenjevati z antitezo, kajti »v nasprotju z merizmom v antitezi nasprotne skrajnosti ne izražajo istih vidikov iste ideje v njeni celoti, ampak nasprotne vidike iste ideje v medsebojni izključitvi« (1983, 232). Primeri merizma se pojavljajo v vseh svetovnih literaturah, in to povsem neodvisno od temeljnega pogleda na svet ali prepričanja, medtem ko literarni fenomen antitetičnega načina izražanja jasno odraža ideološka ali moralna nasprotja z daljnosežnimi posledicami. Primerjalni pregled književnosti starega Bližnjega vzhoda kaže, da primere antropološke antiteze izkazujejo vse književnosti. A Karel van der Toorn ima prav, ko trdi, da je izrazita prisotnost antitetične sheme nasprotja med pravičnim in nepravičnim značilna za čisto drugačen teološki okvir hebrejskega Svetega pisma, kjer fokus ni na družbeni hierarhiji, temveč na moralnem in duhovnem nasprotju: »Celotna situacija potrjuje, da je antiteza značilna lastnost modrostne literature Stare zaveze.« (Toorn 1985, 101) In na drugem mestu: »Že sam pojav antitetičnega modela v Izraelu kaže na razdaljo, ki je ločevala Izrael od Mezopotamije.« (101) Van der Toorn zaključuje:

»V retrospektivi se religiozna antiteza ne kaže kot tuje telo, ki ga je starozavezni veri vsilil zasok zgodovine. Napoveduje se v nasprotju med čistim in nečistim, v dualistični klasifikaciji vesolja, ki je razlikovala Izrael od Mezopotamije, kjer so te kategorije ostale odvisne od okoliščin. Tako kot so stvari čiste ali nečiste le v odnosu do Boga, ki je svet, tako je nekdo pravičen ali nepravičen glede na edinega Boga pravičnosti. Na njegove neomejene zahteve je na koncu mogoče odgovoriti le z zvestobo ali nepokorščino. Pred njegovimi zahtevami so razredne razlike izbrisane in nevtralnno ozemlje med za in proti izgine.« (115)

Temeljna ontološka in moralna struktura antiteze ima pomen za človeštvo kot celoto in poraja številne vrste antitez pod različnimi perspektivami: nasprotje med resnico in lažjo, pravim čaščenjem ter vsemi mogočimi oblikami ideologije in magije, med poštenostjo in jasnostjo v javnem jeziku in dvogovoru, med pričevanjem za resnico in propagando itd.

3. Kozmološka percepcija nasprotij pri grškem filozofu Heraklitu

Pri vrednotenju Heraklitovega razumevanja nasprotij je treba upoštevati, da se njegovi spisi niso ohranili v celoti, ampak le kot fragmenti v obliki citatov v raznih delih starogrških avtorjev, kot so krščanski teolog Hipolit (170–235), novoplatonski grški filozof Porfirij (233–303) itd. Za razumevanje nasprotij pri Heraklitu je velikega pomena knjiga Geoffreya Stephena Kirka, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (1986). Kirkova študija je dragocena zaradi dokaj izčrpnega komentarja približno polovice ohranjenih Heraklitovih fragmentov. Njegove razlage nam omogočajo kritično oceno vidikov, pa tudi utemeljenosti njegove presoje vsebine Heraklitovih fragmentov.

Pogosto citiranje Heraklitovih pogledov na vlogo in pomen nasprotij v strukturi sveta v obdobju rimske vladavine kaže na aktualnost tematike. Eduard Norden v svoji knjigi *Die antike Kunstprosa* (1971) Heraklitove poglede na vlogo nasprotij vrednoti z besedami: »Mogočnemu Efežanu, ki je šel po svoji poti osamljen in v nasprotju z vsem svetom, in njemu, ki je učil, da popolna harmonija izvira iz drugačnega, so se nasprotja našla med seboj, so se antinomije bivanja in videza prvič razkrile. Določena logična posledica je hipostazirana tudi v jeziku.« (Norden 1971, 2:18) O »duhovnih titanah tistega časa« Norden dalje ugotavlja: »Skupna vez, ki jih vse povezuje, je boj proti tradicionalnemu in najde svoj čutni izraz v antitetičnem jeziku. Heraklit, zaničevalec sofistične retorike, je bil pravzaprav njegov oče.« (2:20–21)

Pomembna okoliščina je, da velik del Heraklitovih fragmentov razlaga oblike in pomen nasprotij na kozmični, ne pa na antropološki ravni. V predgovoru Kirk pravi:

»Kozmični drobcí so tisti, katerih predmet je svet kot celota, za razliko od človeka; vključujejo tiste, ki se ukvarjajo z Logosom in nasprotji, in tiste, ki opisujejo obsežne fizične spremembe, v katerih ima ogenj primarno vlogo. Ne vključujejo tistih, ki se ukvarjajo z religijo, z bogom v odnosu do ljudi, z naravo duše, z epistemologijo, etiko ali politiko; prav tako ne vključujejo Heraklitovih napadov na določenega posameznika ali ljudi na splošno, čeprav je razlog za te napade zelo pogosto nepazljivost Logosa ali njegovih ekvivalentov. Ti fragmenti, ki bi jih lahko poimenovali ‚antropocentrični fragmenti‘, bi lahko postali predmet kasnejših študij.« (Heraclitus 1986, xii)

Kirkovo metodološko vodilo je, da komentira samo tiste fragmente, ki opisujejo svet kot celoto, ne pa toliko tiste o ljudeh. Najpomembnejše metodološko vodilo pa je primerjava med vsebino fragmentov (Heraclitus 1986, 30). Prvi jasen primer Heraklitove razlage vloge nasprotij najdemo v fragmentu 50 (1 B). Hipolit v delu *Refutatio* ix, 9, 1 navaja Heraklitovo stališče, »da so vse reči eno« (Heraclitus 1986, 65). Heraklit meni, da so nasprotja v kozmosu le navidezna, v resnici pa izražajo celotno resničnost sveta. Nasprotja se torej ne izključujejo, ampak dopolnjujejo. Na ravni jezika torej binarni pari, kot sta ‚deljiv in nedeljiv‘ ali ‚smrten in nesmrten‘, služijo kot polarni način izražanja nasprotij, pa tudi vsega, kar je med

nasprotji vmes. Iz tega sledi, da binarni pojmi ne izražajo ‚istega‘, ampak vse odtenke celotne resničnosti sveta, o katerem govorimo – in ga dojemamo v njegovih navidezni nasprotjih.

Fragment 61 (52 B) vsebuje Hipolitovo izjavo v njegovem delu *Refutatio* ix, 10, 5, kjer navaja Heraklitovo razlago: »Morje je najčistejša in najbolj onesnažena voda; za ribe je pitno in zdravilno, za ljudi pa nepitno in škodljivo.« (Heraclitus 1986, 74) Popolnoma nasproten par čist // onesnažen torej izraža celoto neke kozmične danosti.

Za razumevanje narave in vloge nasprotij v likovni umetnosti in glasbi je posebno poveden odlomek v delu *De mundo* (5, 396b7), ki ga je tradicija pripisovala Aristotelu. Besedilo v fragmentu 10 (59B) za podkrepitev razlage vloge nasprotij navaja stališče Heraklita: »Stvari, vzete skupaj, so cele in ne cele, nekaj, kar se združuje in ločuje, kar je usklajeno in neusklajeno: iz vseh stvari je mogoče narediti enotnost in iz enotnosti vse stvari.« (Heraclitus 1986, 167–168) Osnovna ideja tega odlomka je, da v naravnem svetu nasprotja omogočajo harmonijo različnih vrst: v redu spola, slikarstva, glasbe in končno v strukturi celotnega sveta. Razlagalci pa imajo težavo v razumevanju, kako je v naravnem redu sploh mogoče, da nasprotja sestavljajo harmonijo.

Temeljno vprašanje je, ali se harmonija ustvarja v poteku dogodkov, ki jih dojemamo v nasprotjih, v časovnem zaporedju ali v sočasnosti strukture sveta. Kako aktualno je to vprašanje, nam pokaže primer rabe nasprotij v 3. poglavju svetopi-semške knjige Pridigar, ki se glasi: »Vse ima svoj trenutek, vsaka reč ima svoj čas pod nebom: Čas za rojevanje in čas za umiranje; čas za sajenje in čas, da se vsajeno izruje. Čas za ubijanje in čas za ozdravljanje; čas za podiranje in čas za zidanje. Čas za jokanje in čas za smejanje; čas za žalovanje in čas za plesanje. Čas za meta-nje kamnov in čas za zbiranje kamnov; čas za objemanje in čas, ko se zdržiš obje-manja. Čas za iskanje in čas za izgubljanje; čas za zbiranje in čas za razmetavanje. Čas za trganje in čas za šivanje; čas za molčanje in čas za govorjenje. Čas za ljube-zen in čas za sovraštvo; čas za vojno in čas za mir.« (Prd 3,1-8) Razporejanje do-godkov in odločitev po časovnem zaporedju nam omogoča predstavo možne har-monije v okviru celote kozmosa oziroma resničnosti. Težko pa si predstavljamo harmonijo, če imamo pred očmi način delovanja resničnosti v sočasnosti. Kirk to dilemo razlaga takole:

»Res je, da pojavni svet ponazarja enotnost, ki jo sestavlja pluralnost, ne samo zato, ker je celota iz delov, temveč zato, ker so vsi njegovi navidezno nepovezani deli bistveno povezani: torej se domneva na podlagi sovpa-danja nasprotij. /.../ Heraklitova enotnost je povezava med nasprotji in povezava se komajda lahko šteje za edino sestavino stvari, ki so povezane.« (Heraclitus 1986, 178)

To torej pomeni, da kozmos kaže na centripetalno in ne centrifugalno zakonitost povezovanja delov v celoto. Raba nasprotij ima retorično funkcijo izražanja celote kozmične resničnosti, ker povezuje tudi vse tiste dele resničnosti, ki obstajajo vmes

med nasprotji. Na področju antične retorike, vključno s svetopisemsko literaturo, sta se za povezovanje nasprotij v celoto uveljavila dva izraza. Dokaj razumljiv izraz je ‚polarno izražanje‘, ki pomeni zaobjemanje celotne resničnosti med nasprotji. Prvi stavek v Svetem pismu: »V začetku je Bog ustvaril nebo in zemljo« (1 Mz 1,1) dejansko ne označuje kozmične resničnosti ‚neba‘ in ‚zemlje‘, temveč služi kot retorično sredstvo za izražanje celote vesolja. S to vrsto retorike so si v antiki pomagali, da so se izognili abstraktnim pojmom, kot so ‚vse‘, ‚vesolje‘ itd. Drugi uveljavljeni strokovni izraz je ‚merizem‘ (gr. ‚delitev‘), ki označuje delitev celotne resničnosti v dele, kar pa v dojemanju resničnosti pomeni dejansko združevanje delov v celoto. Koincidenca nasprotij je mogoča le v primerih prilagoditve vseh delov neke resničnosti celoti.

Porfirij v delu *Homerska vprašanja* (4.4) navaja Heraklitovo izjavo: »Za Boga so vse stvari lepe, dobre in pravične, toda ljudje menijo, da so nekatere stvari nepravične, druge pa pravične.« (Heraclitus 180, 1986)

V delu *Refutatio* ix, 10, 8 Hipolit pod vpivom Heraklita govori o sestavi sveta in pri tem navaja Heraklitove besede: »Bog je dan, noč, zima, poletje, vojna, mir, sitost, lakota in je podvržen spremembam v načinu, kakor se ogenj, ko je pomešan z začimbami, imenuje glede na vonj vsake od njih.« (Heraclitus 1986, 184) V tej izjavi Heraklit besedo bog (*theos*) enači z navedenimi pari nasprotij. Vsi pari nasprotij imajo skupno točko v tem, da jih povezuje časovno zaporedje, ki je odvisno od gibanja sonca. Najbolj logična razlaga razloga za nizanje štirih parov nasprotij je, »da so štirje pari imenovani kot predstavniki vseh nasprotij: to bi pojasnilo dejstvo, da jih ni mogoče uvrstiti v nobeno posamezno kategorijo. Kozmološki dogodki so uravnoveženi z antropološkimi, kot je primerno za posploševanje tega lika o bogu, ki je nekako identificiran s celim svetom ali je del njega.« (Heraclitus 1986, 187) Za Heraklitovo podobo boga so vsa nasprotja enako ‚dobra‘. Heraklitovo enačenje vseh nasprotij v Bogu odraža nazor, »da je bog neločljivo povezan s svetom, da je osnova vseh sprememb in da zagotavlja bistveno enotnost stvari, ki se drugje imenuje Logos« (201). Ker njegova razlaga narave boga označuje univerzalno enost v povezovanju nasprotij, je očitno, da imajo nasprotja retorično funkcijo izražanja celotne resničnosti sveta – torej vsega, kar obstaja med ekstremi in nasprotji. Interakcija med nasprotji je torej naravna.

Če povzamemo Heraklitovo dojetje nasprotij v kozmosu, lahko sklepamo, da je njegovo osnovno sporočilo v tem, naj nasprotij ne dojemamo kot deformacijo kozmičnega reda, temveč kot oporne točke za dojetje celote kozmosa – torej vsega, kar je med ekstremi in nasprotji v odnosu do boga, Logosa ali univerzalne kozmične harmonije. Vesolje lahko dojemamo kot ‚kozmos‘ – tj. urejeno in harmonično univerzalno resničnost, ki ne dopušča, da bi posamična nasprotja izstopala iz celote in prevladala nad drugimi, temveč igrajo konstruktivno vlogo medsebojne interakcije, ki zajema vse, kar med nasprotji obstaja. Za nas to pomeni, da moramo svoje mesto v kozmosu usklajevati z determinacijo usklajevanja nasprotij v naši težnji po univerzalni kozmični harmoniji.

Usklajevanje vtisa o nasprotjih je za človeka boleče, ker v njem ne delujejo samo združevalni, ampak tudi razdiralni instinkti. Tako smo vedno v nevarnosti, da bi

dojemanje nekega ekstrema potencirali, ga presojali ločeno od celote in za vsako tezo iskali antitezo – brez želje po sintezi.

4. ‚Semantična‘ dialektika v mistični teologiji in Kantov moralni imperativ

V novejšem obdobju je postalo pomembno razlikovanje med ‚metafizično‘ in ‚semantično‘ percepcijo nasprotij. V metafizičnem načinu izražanja se pojavlja ideja o resničnosti sami po sebi – za razliko od tega, kar je o njej rečeno. Razlikovanje med ‚metafizično‘ in ‚semantično‘ percepcijo nasprotij se odraža v vseh domenah humanistike: govorimo o dihotomiji med materialnim in duhovnim, med realnim in idealnim. Poznamo klasično razlikovanje med formo (*eidos*) in materijo (*hyle*); sholastično razlikovanje med čutno formo (*morphe, species sensibilis*) in inteligibilno formo (*eidos, species apprehensibilis*); razlikovanje med formo kot lastnostjo objekta in formo kot produktom mišljenja. Pogosto se navaja tudi de Saussurjevo razlikovanje med *significant* (beseda, glasovna podoba) in *signifié* (koncept, pomen, stvar, ki jo significant – označevalec nakazuje) v jeziku in retoriki. Kant je formo opredelil kot *a priori* intuicijo, transcendentalno idejo pojavov. Umetniško delo ima vlogo izražanja metafizične ali transcendentalne ideje, ki je lahko formalna, konceptualna, ekspresionistična, intelektualna, numinozna, duhovna ali estetski vidik umetniškega dela. John Shannon Hendrix v svoji knjigi *The Contradiction between Form and Function in Architecture* (2013) razmerje med ‚formo‘ in ‚funkcijo‘ v arhitekturi prikazuje v kontradiktornem razmerju, če delo ne doseže notranjega komplementarnega razmerja v prezentaciji tako popolne harmonije kot nasprotnih entitet.

V visokem srednjem veku je dal nove pobude za dojemanje in razlaganje nasprotij nemški učenjak – teolog, škof, kardinal, filozof, matematik, astronom in cerkvenopravni strokovnjak – Nikolaj Kuzanski (1401–1464), ki se je uveljavil s številnimi spisi s področja znanosti, filozofije in teologije. V okviru raziskovanja pomena nasprotij je pomembno predvsem njegovo delo *O božjem pogledu* (*De visione Dei*, 1453), ki obsega 25 kratkih poglavij. V tem delu Nikolaj Kuzanski ob neposrednem nagovarjanju Boga razvija svoje dojemanje ‚mistične teologije‘. V predgovoru pravi, da mu v prizadevanju, da bi o božjih rečeh govoril s človeškimi sredstvi, najbolj pomaga podoba Vsevidnega. V 4. poglavju razlaga, »da se Božji pogled imenuje previdnost, milost in večno življenje«. V 5. poglavju ugotavlja, da »videti pomeni okušati, iskati, usmiliti se in delovati«. O pomenu Božje milosti pravi:

»O neskončna blagost, kako nesrečen je vsak grešnik, ki zapušča tebe, kri življenja, in te ne išče v tebi, temveč v tem, kar v sebi ni nič, in nič ne bi bilo ostalo, če tega ne bi ti poklical iz nič! Kako nespameten je tisti, ki te išče, tebe, ki si dobrot, in se, medtem ko te išče, oddaljuje in odvrča oči? Vsakdo, ki išče, išče dobro, in vsakdo, ki išče dobro in stopa stran od tebe, stopa od tega, kar išče. Vsak grešnik blodi stran od tebe in še dlje odhaja.

Ko pa se vrača k tebi, mu ti prideš nemudoma nasproti, in že preden te zagleda, z očetovsko ljubeznijo spustiš nanj oči usmiljenja.« (Nikolaj Kuzanski 1997a, 16)

V 9. poglavju Nikolaj Kuzanski razlaga, da je ovira v prizadevanju, da bi človek zrl v Boga, ‚sovpadanje nasprotij‘:

»Iz tega spoznam, kako nujno je, da vstopim v temo in dopustim sovpadanje nasprotij nad vso zmožnostjo razumske predstave in da iščem resnico tam, kjer se pojavlja nemožnost, ki je nad vsakim, celo najvišjim umskim vzponom. Ko pridem do tega, kar je vsakemu umu nespoznavno in za kar vsak um sodi, da je najdlje oddaljeno od resnice, tam si ti, moj Bog, ki si absolutna nujnost. /.../

In odkril sem kraj, zagrnen v sovpadanje nasprotij, kjer te je najti mogoče odkrito. To sovpadanje je zid raja, v katerem prebivaš; najvišji duh razuma je njegov čuvar, ki ti ne odpre vrat, če ga ne premagaš. Onstran sovpadanja nasprotij te je moč uzreti, tostran nikoli.« (29)

V 10. poglavju Kuzanski razlaga: »Boga je mogoče videti onstran sovpadanja nasprotij in videti je enako kot biti.«

»Tako začnjam na pragu sovpadanja nasprotij, ki ga čuva angel na rajskem vhodu, videti tebe, Gospod. Tukaj si, kjer je govoriti, videti, slišati, okusiti, dotakniti se, sklepati, vedeti in razumeti eno in isto, in kjer videti sovpada z biti viden, slišati z biti slišan, okusiti z biti okušan, dotikati se z biti dotaknjen, govoriti s slišati in ustvariti z govoriti.

Če bi jaz videl, kakor da sem viden, ne bi bil ustvarjen. In če ti, Bog, ne bi videl, kot da si viden, ne bi bil vsemogočni Bog. Vse, kar si ustvaril, te vidi, in ti vidiš vse. Skozi to, da vse vidiš, te vse vidi. Na drug način to, kar si ustvaril, ne bi moglo obstajati, ker obstaja skozi tvoj pogled. Če to, kar si ustvaril, ne bi videlo tvojega pogleda, bi od tebe ne prejelo biti. Bit ustvarjenega je pri tebi videti in biti viden hkrati.« (31)

Sovpadanje nasprotij pa ne zajema samo sočasnih dogodkov, temveč tudi tiste, ki se vrstijo po nekem zaporedju. Absolutna Božja večnost zaobjema tudi vsakršno zaporednost:

»Da pa stvari na tem svetu obstajajo po merilu prej in pozneje, je zato, ker si ti nisi stvari takšnih, kot so, zamislil prej. Če bi si jih bil zamislil prej, bi bile prej. Toda v čigar zamisli se lahko zgodi »prej in poznej«, tako da si najprej zamisli eno in potem drugo, ta ni vsemogočen. Ker si ti, Bog, vsemogočen, si znotraj rajskega zidu. Zid pa je tisto sovpadanje, kjer pozneje sovpade s prej, kjer konec sovpade z začetkom, kjer sta alfa in omega eno in isto.« (32)

Mistično gledanje Boga pri Nikolaju Kuzanskem je doživljanje matematika in astronoma, ki mu v strukturi sveta, morda predvsem v doživljanju nasprotij, uspeva najti dovolj razlogov za občudovanje čudovite popolnosti Božjega stvarstva. Če velja, da je občudovanje (*thaumadzein*) začetek znanosti in filozofije, potem lahko strasten raziskovalec vesoljstva še posebej občuduje notranjo skladnost vesoljstva, ki se kot svet, poln neobvladljivih nasprotij in protislovij, kaže le na videz.

V svojem delu *Kritika čistega uma* je Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) dokazoval, da imajo naše kategorije naravni obseg aplikacij. Če svoje časovne pojme apliciramo na celotno vesolje, ki leži onkraj naše izkušnje, bomo lahko dokazali, da je vesolje hkrati vezano na čas in v časovnem pogledu večno. V tem razmerju nastajajo antinomije, argumenti, ki se končujejo v kontradikciji. V svojem dojemanju Kantovih antinomij je Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) trdil, da so naši koncepti kontradiktorni, in sklepal, da so nedoslednosti resnične, če se porajajo ob popolnoma pravilni aplikaciji konceptov/jezika.

Dve moji monografiji (*Merizem*, 1977; *Antitetična struktura*, 1984) sta me pripeljali do prepričanja o veliki pomembnosti izražanja oblik kontrasta, opozicije, antiteze in kontradikcije za različne namene v vsakdanji komunikaciji in v znanosti na splošno; v življenju, filozofiji in teologiji, v literarnih prikazih nasprotja med dobrim in zlim z rabo različnih podob, simbolov, značajev in posebitev. Tako sem začel z raziskovanjem kozmoloških, moralnih in semantičnih osnov kontrasta, opozicije, antiteze in kontradikcije. Ocena diskusij o naravi in rabi konceptov ‚kontrast‘ ali ‚opozicija‘, ‚kontrapozicija‘, ‚kontradikcija‘ in ‚antiteza‘ v različnih domenah znanosti in umetnosti kaže, da veliko avtorjev termine uporablja na zavajajoč ali celo napačen način.

Razlog za pogosto neustrezno rabo terminologije je predvsem pomanjkljivo razlikovanje med fenomenološkimi, kozmološkimi, ontološkimi in moralnimi vidiki dojemanja in prezentacije resničnosti in resnice. V vsakdanjem sporazumevanju, v filozofskih diskurzih, znanstvenem raziskovanju ter v umetniških prikazih resničnosti in resnice se opiramo na nasprotno koncepte. Ljudje smo pozorni na nasprotja vseh vrst, nasprotja v naravi in nasprotja v svetu jezika. Tako v naravi kot v svetu jezika nasprotja v večini primerov niso rabljena v resničnem antitetičnem smislu, temveč kot komplementarne polarnosti oziroma nasprotja. V različnih oblikah dialoga antitetični način govora služi za izražanje namenov, ciljev, verovanj, zavračanje pričakovanja, dopuščanje možnosti in korelacije izjav. Dokler ostajamo v svetu pojavov in intelektualnega diskurza, lahko nasprotja, kot so univerzalno in partikularno, eden in številni, edinost in ločevanje, bistvo in eksistenca, božansko in človeško, notranje in zunanje, umetno in naravno, abstraktno in konkretno, resnica in laž, teorija in praksa, ženska in moški itd., uporabljamo brez dramatičnega osebne učinka.

Resnične eksistencialne in intelektualne drame se odvijajo na ravni človekove vesti, osebnih moralnih dilem, moralnih in pravnih norm. Antiteze na ravni morale obstajajo v vseh časih – kljub veri v božanski zakon in sankcije. V modernem času se bije boj med sprejemanjem in zavračanjem božanske avtoritete v utemel-

jevanju osnovnega moralnega zakona in vrednot. To osnovno antitezo lahko dobro osvetlimo s primerjalno analizo filozofije Sørenea Kierkegaarda (1813–1855) in Friedricha Nietzscheja (1844–1900). Nietzsche je v nasprotju s Kierkegaardom v krščanstvu videl svojstveno šibkost, ki jo je razumel kot antitezo svoji lastni volji do moči. Krščanstvo je dojemal kot religijo »šibkega in dekadentnega ljudstva«, kot podaljšek morale ‚gospodar – suženj‘, ki temelji na prejšnjih razrednih razlikah. Zavrgel je idejo božjega kot osnove za naše religiozno in moralno verovanje. Uvedel je koncept Nadčloveka kot antiteze Bogu in je vse religije presojal izključno glede na njihove učinke na družbo.

Nasprotujoči si nazori pri nekaterih filozofih ilustrirajo ozadje tega premika. Najbolj koristna se zdi primerjalna presoja razumevanja sveta pri Friedrichu Heglu (1770–1831), Sørenu Kierkegaardu (1813–1855) in Karlu Marxu (1818–1883). Hegel je verjel v dialektično strukturo in historično neizbežnost sveta. Zagovarjal je tezo, da so osnove resničnosti v historičnem boju med idejami in njihovimi antitezami. V nasprotju s Heglom Karl Marx vprašanja, ali je objektivno resnico mogoče pripisati človekovemu mišljenju, ni presojal kot teoretično, temveč kot praktično vprašanje. V nasprotju s Kierkegaardom je videl izvor odtujenosti sodobne družbe v materialnih strukturah in ekonomiji. Po njegovem mnenju so bili delavci odtujeni od svojega ‚človeškega bistva‘. Heglov koncept sveta, ki ga poganja historični boj med idejami in njihovimi antitezami, je nadomestil s svetom, ki ga poganja historični boj med različnimi razredi za nadzor nad sredstvi produkcije. Marx je trdil, da je Heglova dialektična metoda idealistična, medtem ko je njegova materialistična. Med Heglom in Marxom je Kierkegaard, ki je veroval v duhovne osnove resničnosti in vztrajal, da je sedanji človekov položaj odtujenost, ki je duhovne narave.

Primerjava razlik v pogledih se osredotoča na pojmovanje kontradikcije. Hegel je trdil, da je kontradiktorna vsaka stvar, in je konkretna družbena razmerja obravnaval kot manifestacije razmerij med idejami. ‚Ideja‘ je bila za Hegla celota, totalnost, v kateri so se razmerja razvila z ustvarjanjem kontradikcij. Končno so vse kontradikcije dosegle spravo v Ideji. Marx je Heglove abstraktne koncepte kontradikcije zavrgel kot nekaj internega v bistvu resničnosti – in prepoznal izvor kontradikcij v kontradiktorni naravi sistema produkcije, ki je kapitalizem. Kontradiktorni pogledi na svet pri teh dveh in nekaterih drugih vplivnih filozofih ter mislecih moderne dobe so neizogibno generirali kontradiktorne odnose do religije, vrednot, družbenih organizacij, zlasti pa obrat v politiki, ki se imenuje totalitarizem. Priče in različni viri razkrivajo različne načine preganjanja, ki odsevajo notranjo logiko posvetnih totalitarizmov. Ti so rezultat redukcije zahodnih simbolov človekovega dostojanstva, svobode in enakosti za vse državljane v potrošniške slogane. Nietzschejev program ‚razvrednotenja vseh vrednot‘, njegova volja do moči in povzdigovanje nadčloveka so navdihovali zlasti nacizem. Komunizem ima za opozicijo krščanstvu in vsaki religiji posebej kompleksno teoretično ozadje.

Ideološka nasprotja so v 20. stoletju eskalirala do te mere, da so sprevržene ideologije začele ogrožati temeljno vprašanje smiselnosti zgodovinsko preverjenih vrednot in so znanost začele podrežati vsem vrstam gradnje babilonskega stolpa »z

vrhom do neba« (1 Mz 11,4). Namesto globalne empatije do vseh ljudi vseh narodov sveta se stopnjuje tekmovanje med kolonizatorji z najbolj neverjetnim konstruktom jezika propagande – z zlorabo svobode, demokracije in solidarnosti. Tako se uresničuje ugotovitev motivov za gradnjo babilonskega stolpa: »Glej vsi so eno ljudstvo in imajo en jezik. In to je začetek njihovega dela. Zdaj jih ne bo nič zadržalo, da ne bi storili vse, karkoli jim pride na um.« (1 Mz 11,6) Judovski pisatelj Stefan Zweig je leta 1942 v svojem delu *Die Welt von Gestern* (prevod *Včerajšnji svet*, 2008) predstavil povzetek svojega doživljanja najbolj pretresljive antiteze med veličastnimi sadovi moderne znanosti in prepadnim dnom stanja človeškega duha:

»Bil sem nemočna priča najbolj nepredstavljivega padca človeštva v davno pozabljeno barbarstvo z njegovo zavestno in načrtno dogmo nečlovečnosti. Nam je bilo namenjeno, da smo bili zopet priča vojni brez napovedi, koncentracijskim taboriščem, mučenju, ropanju množic, bombnim napadom na nezavarovana mesta, zverinskim dejanjem, ki jih že petdeset generacij ni več poznalo in ki jih bodoče – upajmo – ne bodo več trpele. Toda po nekem paradoksu sem istočasno, ko je naš svet moralno padel tisoč let v preteklost, spremljal, kako se je to isto človeštvo na področju tehnike in duhovnosti povzpelo do neslutnih dejanj, da je na mah prekosilo vse, kar je bilo storjeno prej v milijon letih: zavzetje zračnega prostora z letalom, prenos človeške besede v isti sekundi prek vse zemeljske oble in s tem obvladovanje svetovnega prostora, cepitev atoma, zmaga nad najbolj zahrbtnimi boleznimi, skoraj dnevno uresničevanje tega, kar je bilo še včeraj nemogoče. Nikdar prej se ni človeštvo vedlo bolj satansko kot v naših časih in nikdar doslej ni ustvarilo toliko božanskega.« (Zweig 2008, 8–9)

5. Nasprotja kot kontradikcije v redu morale

Spopad med vrlinami in vrednotami odraža paradoks razpetosti človeške narave med teženjem (*inclinatio*) po najvišjem dobrem in torej po najvišji sreči in obnem nagnjenostjo (*propensio*) k slabemu. Immanuel Kant v svojem delu *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (*Religija znotraj meja golega uma*, 1793) v štirih delih temu paradoksu posveča veliko pozornosti. V prvem delu (1.22) tako piše, da je človek »moralno dober ali moralno zloben« (*entweder sittlich gut oder sittlich böse*). V 1.2.29 človeško slabost označuje s tremi vidiki: prvič z vidikom šibkosti (*Gebrechlichkeit, fragilitas*); drugič nelojalnosti (*Unlauterkeit, impuritas, improbitas*); tretjič pa zlobnosti (*Bösartigkeit, vitiositas, pravitas*), pokvarjenosti (*Verderbtheit, corruptio*) ali sprevrženosti (*Verkehrtheit, perversitas*). V nagnjenosti k zlu (*Böse*) Kant vidi »celo radikalno, prirojeno zlo« (*»selbst ein radicales, angeborenes Böse«*). Roe Fremstedal paradoks človeške razpetosti med dobro in slabo izčrpno obravnava v knjigi *Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good: Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God* (2014) (Engstrom 1992; Caswell 2006).

Razlog za dojemanje resničnih nasprotij ni sestava vesoljstva kot takšnega, tudi ne abstraktni filozofski koncepti, kot sta ‚idealizem‘ ali ‚materializem‘, temveč človekov moralni čut za razlikovanje med dobrim in slabim. Nujen predpogoj za ustrezno dojemanje narave nasprotij in za pravilno rabo terminologije je ustrezno razlikovanje med konstitutivnim in moralnim dualizmom. Moralni čut za antitezo med dobrim in zlim je v vseh religijah ustvaril antitetične prezentacije bogov in demonov, dobrih in slabih duhov, personifikacije dobrega in zla, pravičnosti in nepravičnosti, pravične in nepravične osebe, ideale ljubezni in nesrečo sovraštva itd. Bogata raba različnih oblik nasprotja v Svetem pismu in v poznejših judovsko-krščanskih civilizacijah kaže, da so moralne osnove prisotne v samem jedru judovstva in krščanstva – v nasprotju s ‚fatalističnimi‘ antičnimi in poznejšimi kulturami.

Karel van der Toorn ima dobre razloge za odločitev, da v svoji študiji *Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A Comparative Study (Greh in sankcija v Izraelu in Mezopotamiji: primerjalna študija, 1985)* antitezi posveča posebno poglavje z naslovom „Razredni konflikt in moralna antiteza“. V 6. poglavju tako pravi: »Samo dejstvo, da se je v Izraelu pojavil antitetični model, nakazuje razdaljo, ki je Izrael ločevala od Mezopotamije.« (1985, 114) Razdaljo, ki je Izrael ločevala od Mezopotamije, še bolj vsestransko prikazuje prva izčrpna obravnava božanstev in demonov, ki se v kontrastnih vlogah pojavljajo v Svetem pismu. Gre za odmeven slovar Toorn, Becking in Horst, *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible* (1999).

Temeljno sporočilo Svetega pisma Stare in Nove zaveze je, da Bog stvarnik vsa navidezna nasprotja in kontradikcije povezuje v popolno harmonijo. Na drugi strani pa je na delu sebično človeško srce, ki na moralni ravni ustvarja antinomije, nasprotja, kontradikcije in paradokse. Razširjena nejasnost v rabi terminologije za izražanje različnih vrst kontrasta, polarnosti, opozicije in kontradikcije zahteva opredelitev dveh različnih vrst rabe nasprotnih terminov v Svetem pismu in v literaturi na splošno. Etimološki pomen antiteze, ‚postavljanje v nasprotje‘, je tako splošen, da se lahko nanaša tudi na jezikovno in stilistično figuro polarnega izražanja ali merizma, ki pa je literarni obliki antiteze diametralno nasprotna. V obeh primerih obstaja razmerje nasprotnih terminov ali konceptov, kot je nasprotje besednih parov dan // noč, dobro // slabo, nebesa // zemlja, mlad // star itd. Slogovni figuri se ne razlikujeta po rabi nasprotnih terminov, temveč po izraženih vsebinah. Temeljna razlika med obema slogovnima figurama je, da je polarno izražanje komplementarna raba nasprotnih terminov za izražanje abstraktnih idej, kot so ‚vse‘, ‚vsi‘, ‚vsak‘ itd., medtem ko je antiteza učinkovito sredstvo za izražanje nezdržljivosti pod določenim vidikom, večinoma v moralnem pogledu. Isti besedni par se tako lahko uporablja v diametralno različnem smislu.

Obstaja sloviti primer polarnega izražanja (merizma) v Jezusovem govoru na gori: »Jaz pa vam pravim: Ljubite svoje sovražnike in molite za tiste, ki vas preganjajo, da boste otroci svojega Očeta, ki je v nebesih. On namreč daje svojemu soncu, da vzhaja nad hudobnimi in dobrimi, ter pošilja dež pravičnim in krivičnim.« (Mt 5,44-45) Sporočilo je, da je Božja milost odprta za ‚vsakogar‘. Na drugi strani najdemo jasen primer antiteze v Marijini hvalnici: »Mogočne je vrgel s prestolov

in povišal je nizke. Lačne je napolnil z dobrotami in bogate je odpustil prazne.« (Lk 1,52-53) Osnovna značilnost antiteze je, da se dva nasprotna termina ali koncepta v razmerju do nekega veljavnega zakona ali norme izključujeta. Obstaja nekaj osnovnih kategorij antitetične strukture: iluzija // resničnost, blagoslov // prekletstvo, ošabnost // ponižnost itd. Obstajajo nekatere ustaljene oblike antitetičnega paralelizma, toda bolj zanimiva so obsežnejša literarna besedila, ki so sestavljena antitetično, na primer Psalm 73.

Moralna nasprotja so v nekem smislu vsa v odnosu do splošnega koncepta dobrega in slabega, ki pokriva širok obseg subjektov in sredstev komunikacije. Fiziologija osrednjih značajev kaže, da s simbolnimi vrednotami niso bili prepojeni samo ljudje, temveč tudi živali in rastline. V svetopisemski literaturi so religiozna in moralna nasprotja izražena na različne načine: v načelnem smislu kot nasprotje med pogansko in resnično religijo (Jer 10,1-16), v oblikah tipologije likov Stare zaveze v odnosu do novozavezne popolnosti. Posebno pozornost zasluži govor na gori, v katerem Matej uvaja najbolj osupljivo in značilno odliko Jezusovega učenja (Mt 5,1-7,29). Jezus je svoj vzgojni nauk postavil nasproti nepravilnim razlagam zakona, kot so bile običajne v tistem času. Judovske in krščanske tipologije in antitetične personifikacije so najbolj priljubljeni motivi v literaturi in umetnosti judovstva in krščanstva od antike pa vse do danes. Znotraj Svetega pisma in judovsko-krščanskih kultur so ti primeri namreč eden najpomembnejših načinov prikazovanja vidikov kontrasta, nasprotja in protislovja. Pojav antitetičnega prikazovanja resničnosti odraža izkustvo in racionalno percepcijo nasprotij v kozmološki, moralni in družbeni domeni: Bog // bogovi in demoni, Bog // ljudje, moški // ženska, luč // tema, dobro // zlo, vera // nevera, resnica // neresnica itd.

Študij Svetega pisma kaže, da je najbolj značilna povezovalna sila naslednja temeljna antiteza: vertikalnost in radikalnost Boga, ki se kaže v njegovih obljubah, dejanjih in v ravnanju tistih, ki mu sledijo, nasproti horizontalnosti malikov in človekove nepokorščine ter njenih posledic. Kljub tematski in oblikovni raznolikosti je povsod očitna vertikalno-horizontalna razsežnost. V temelju zgrešen odnos med presežnimi resničnostmi in izraznimi sredstvi, ki so nam na voljo, je poglobitveni razlog za rabo pesniških in pripovednih sredstev izražanja. Literarne oblike antiteze se uporabljajo, da se teološko-moralne motivacije izrazijo z združevalnimi termini, stavki in obsežnejšimi enotami ter z razdruževalnim pomenom glede narave, kakovosti ali dejanj oseb ali reči. Koncept antiteze ima več pomenov. Kar se tiče Svetega pisma, so teološka načela vedno primarnega pomena.

Kompleksno je vprašanje dojemanja kontrasta, opozicije, antiteze in kontradikcije, kot se kaže na področjih kozmologije, filozofije, literature in umetnosti na splošno v razponu od antike do sodobnosti. Znotraj Svetega pisma imamo primere literarnih antitetičnih zgradb, ki temeljijo na nezdružljivosti med dobrim in slabim, kot je na primer nasprotje med Bogom in Satanom v Jobovi knjigi (poglavji 1-2). Znotraj krščanstva najdemo dva odlična pesnika in pisatelja, ki sta ustvarila trajno literarno prezentacijo narave in vloge personificiranega zla v imenu Satana ali Luciferja: Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) v svoji *Božanski komediji* (1309-1321) in John Milton (1608-1674) v svojem delu *Izgubljeni raj* (1667). Primerjalna pre-

soja obeh del kaže, da oba zastopata isti pogled na Boga, a različno prikazujeta odnos med Bogom in Satanom. Za Danteja je Satan (Lucifer) točno nasprotje Boga, pekel pa ni prikazan kot vroč in goreč kraj, temveč kot hladna pustinja. Lucifer je predstavljen kot poosebitev zla samega. Dante uporablja alegorične podobe za negativno oznako padlega nadangela, in se izogiba vsake pozitivne presoje, ker sledi srednjeveški percepciji, da sta dobro in zlo nekaj različnega in neizrazljivega. Miltonov prikaz Satana medtem zrcali protestantsko individualistično razumevanje osebnih bitij. V nasprotju z Dantejevimi alegoričnimi podobami Luciferja Milton obilno uporablja poosebitve in metafore. Njegova podoba Satana kaže vlogo junaka z lastno individualnostjo, svobodno voljo in lastnimi moralnimi značilnostmi. Na Satana gleda kot na reprezentacijo greha samega, pa tudi kot na utelešenje pozitivnih vrednot v negativni karakterizaciji.

Colum Hourihane je leta 2000 uredil najobsežnejši seznam znanih poosebitev vrlin in slabosti v umetnosti. Prakso predstavljanja moralnih kvalitete v človeški obliki lahko najdemo tudi v klasičnem obdobju. Najzgodnejše poosebitve vrlin in slabosti so bile dinamične podobe, ki so prikazovale dejanski boj oziroma boj med nasprotujočimi si moralnimi vrednotami. Hourihane pravi:

»V nasprotju s to dinamično predstavitevjo koncepta, ki v veliki meri črpa iz bojnih prizorov, kot so tisti na poznoantičnih sarkofagih, obstaja drug in bolj subtilen način upodabljanja teh moralnih vrednot. To je statična podoba, v kateri so posamezni koncepti prikazani kot posamezne entitete, pogosto ločeno, včasih pa povezani z večjimi skupinami podobno statičnih personifikacij. V takih upodobitvah je mogoče videti posamezne vrednote kreposti ali slabosti, kompleksne skupine dobrega ali zla ali katero koli možno variacijo te teme. Ta skupina sega v deveto stoletje, vendar se nadaljuje skozi celotno srednjeveško obdobje.« (Hourihane 2000, 4)

Katalog vrlin in slabosti, ki ga je uredil Hourihane, vključuje skupno 227 različnih poosebitev, ki so predstavljene po abecedi v treh delih: upodobitve 109 vrlin, od vzdržnosti do modrosti, s posebnim poudarkom na personifikaciji kardinalnih vrlin – trdnost, pravičnost, preudarnost in zmernost; seznam personifikacij vrlin, ki jih ni mogoče dokončno identificirati; katalog 118 razvad. Na koncu kataloga je seznam umetniških del, katerih tema je dejanski konflikt med vrlinami in slabostmi. Večja pogostnost nekaterih poosebitev v določenih medijih – freskah, steklu, rokopisu, kipih, tekstilu itd. – razkriva naravno čutenje umetnikov in moč tradicije pri vrednotenju vrlin. Med poosebitvami vrlin in slabosti kot posameznih entitet ali v upodobitvah konflikta vrlin in slabosti obstaja kompleksen medsebojni odnos. Način predstavitve likov omogoča prepoznavanje tako podobnosti kot razlik med poganskim in krščanskim verovanjem. Hourihane pravi: »Dejanski konflikt vrlin in slabosti, kot ga je prvi dokumentiral Prudencij, podrobno opisuje sedem bitk med temi moralnimi vrednotami in je eno najpomembnejših del, ki premostijo obdobje med poganskimi verovanji in krščanskimi vrednotami. Dolgo je veljalo, da so takšni bojni prizori izhajali iz vzporednic v rimski umetnosti, vendar je bilo le malo pozornosti posvečeno fiziologiji glavnih likov.« (7)

6. Literarne oblike antitez v hebrejskem Svetem pismu

Kljub velikemu številu antitetičnih literarnih in slogovnih enot v hebrejskem Svetem pismu v njem ni veliko obsežnih antitez. Večina primerov so krajši ali daljši antitetični paralelizmi. Iz tega dejstva bi lahko sklepali, da morajo obstajati različne jasne kategorije antitez, saj krajše formulacije veliko bolj kot daljše težijo k ustvarjanju različnih literarnih klišejev. A dejansko stanje te hipoteze ne potrjuje. V svoji skupni literarni obliki se skoraj vse enote antiteze med seboj razlikujejo. V večini primerov so skupne značilnosti le: razmerje vzporednosti; enojni antitetični pari, kot je na primer par pravičen // hudoben in njegove sopomenke; osnovne slike. Če so vsi ali skoraj vsi drugi elementi različni, se zdi poskus uvrstitve posameznih primerov v različne kategorije precej neposrečen.

Nekatere antiteze pa vendarle imajo toliko skupnega, da zagotavljajo zadostno osnovo za oblikovanje kategorij. Včasih določen avtor ustvarja podobne formule in tako pokaže svojo izvirnost; eden takih je Jeremija. V Jeremijevi knjigi so antiteze sestavljene po enakem principu kontrasta: pusta sedanost // prihajajoči sijaj vrnitve. Poleg tega obstaja osnovna konsistentnost v antitezah, ki nastane zaradi kontrapozicije: čudežni procesi v naravi // protislovno vedenje ljudi (Jer 2,32a//32b; 8,7ab//7c; 18,14//15b); sijaj narave kot simbol posebnega položaja ljudstva pred Jahvejem // nasprotna bodoča (ali sedanja) usoda ljudstva (Jer 11,16a//16bc; 22,6b//6c); razlagalne antiteze, ki temeljijo na prejšnjih opisih človeškega vedenja ali naravnih procesov (Jer 18,1-12; 24,1-10; 27,1-11).

Antiteze v drugih knjigah hebrejskega Svetega pisma je veliko težje kategorizirati na prepričljiv način. Zato se obstoječa osnovna strukturna podobnost nekaterih antitez v celotnem hebrejskem Svetem pismu zdi še bolj omembe vredna. Pri tem obstaja nekaj osnovnih kategorij antitetične strukture: iluzija // resničnost, blagoslov // prekletstvo, ponos // ponižanje. Obstoj enakih ali podobnih, pa tudi različnih oblik antiteze v hebrejskem Svetem pismu in v drugi svetovni literaturi, ki se med seboj ne štejejo za odvisne, ima lahko najrazličnejše razloge, ki so lahko povezani z objektivno naravo, psihologijo človeškega dožemanja, posebnostmi človeške družbe in – ne nazadnje – z zakonitostmi jezika. Ti dejavniki ozadja so običajno tako povezani in prepleteni, da jih je težko obravnavati sistematično. Vendar pa je zaradi potrebe po razpravi o tem vprašanju razmeroma sistematična obravnava neizogibna.

Znotraj vprašanja literarnih lastnosti hebrejskega Svetega pisma je poudarek na vlogi nasprotja ali antiteze. Etimološki pomen antiteze, se pravi ‚kontrapozicij‘, je tako splošen, da se lahko nanaša tudi na merizem, ki je figura sloga, diametralno nasprotna antitezi. V obeh primerih gre za kontrapozicijo nasprotnih konceptov, kot so nasprotujoči si besedni pari dan // noč, dobro // zlo, nebo // zemlja itd. Liki se med seboj ne razlikujejo po terminološkem področju, ampak po mislih, ki jih izražajo. To postane očitno šele v slogovni funkciji in literarni strukturi dveh različnih stilnih figur. Temeljna lastnost antiteze je, da se dva nasprotujoča si elementa v zvezi s skupno idejo izključujeta. Posebnost miselnega kontrasta v smislu izključevanja vpliva na obseg antiteze. Značilna antitetična oblika se pojavlja v maj-

hnih enotah: posamezne besede, besedne skupine ali stavki so postavljeni v nasprotje. Kontrast misli pa ni nujno odvisen od popolnega pojmovnega nasprotja vsake posamezne besede. Antitezo je mogoče razumeti v širšem smislu kot zgolj antitetični vzporednik ali vzporednost znotraj stavka. Antiteza se lahko pojavi v kiticah (*strophe // anti-strophe*), pa tudi v daljših dialogih. Očitno je, da je mogoče posebnosti skupaj z vsebino različnih literarnih oblik zaznati šele po temeljitem primerjalnem pregledu celotnega literarnega področja, ki mu te oblike pripadajo. Pri proučevanju literarnih oblik antiteze je treba posebno pozornost nameniti strukturi in funkciji vsake posamezne enote v svojem kontekstu.

7. Sklep

Kulture starega Bližnjega vzhoda so od najstarejših časov močno vplivale na razvoj evropske kulture vse do danes. Uveljavilo se je mnenje, da je stara Grčija dala filozofijo, stari Rim pravo, stari Izrael religijo. V antiki so osnovne idejne usmeritve določala nasprotja med dojemanjem determinacije kozmičnega reda in vtisom o neobvladljivosti kaotičnih sil; med zavestjo o delovanju neobvladljive usode in zavestjo neodtujljive osebne vesti in svobode; nasprotje med vero v mnoštvo bogov in malikov ter vero v enega Boga – stvarnika in gospodarja zgodovine odrešenja; med cikličnim ponavljanjem vedno istega in inklinacijo progresivne zgodovine k telosu; med čutom odgovornosti za vse ljudi in samovoljnim prisvajanjem oblasti; nasprotje med apoteozo faraonov in moralnim imperativom, ki ga nosi v sebi vsak posameznik; nasprotje med kolektivističnimi paradami in tihožitjem vesoljnega občestva, ki zajema družine in narode. Nekatera nasprotja se izravnavajo, druga se zaostrejejo.

V svetu nasprotij in kontradikcij je najbolj povezovalna vizija enotne zgodovine v preroški in apokaliptični svetopisemski literaturi. Skupno jedro te vizije je, da ima celotna zgodovina, ki jo sestavljajo kozmološke in duhovne danosti, začetek in cilj izpolnitve v izravnavi vseh nasprotij ob koncu časov. Ne moremo tudi spregledati, da so »vsa civilizirana ljudstva povezana na podlagi določenih skupnih značilnosti življenja in navad, ki si jih delijo drugo z drugim, tj. predpostavljamo enotnost zgodovine, ker predpostavljamo enotnost človeške narave.« (Russell 1964) Pri doživljanju nasprotij kljub naši naravnosti na temeljno eksistencialno edinost nas najbolj muči vprašanje, zakaj se mora v svetu dobro spopadati z zlom in trpljenjem. To je tudi osrednja tema svetopisemske Jobove knjige. Na koncu knjige Bog v dveh govorih Jobu razgrne skladnost celotnega reda sveta. V tej viziji se izravnavajo vsa nasprotja in kontradikcije: »Časno in večno sta povezana z vezmi, ki jih ni mogoče pretrgati. /.../ Konec koncev obstaja enotnost, ki je širša od enotnosti zgolj svetovne zgodovine; to je enotnost, v kateri je časovno vzeto v večno s pomočjo tistih moralnih in duhovnih lastnosti, ki sestavljajo Božji namen – namen, ki mora za to, da najde svojo aktualizacijo v zgodovini, iskati svojo utemeljitev onkraj zgodovine.« (Russell 1984)

Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti obstaja in deluje v svetu nasprotij in kontradikcij, ki mu skladnost in harmonijo jamčijo zakoni materije in duše, pro-

stora in časa, časovnosti in večnosti. Ko se povezuje z drugimi akademijami sveta, posebej budno išče možnosti za prispevek k edinosti v nas samih, k utrjevanju narodne in osebne duhovne identitete, k miru in blaginji vseh članov skupne svetovne človeške družine.

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Matic Kocijančič

»Živeti je dobro, umreti je hudo«: Vitalistično jedro Hribarjeve etike svetosti

“Living Is Good, Dying Is Bad”: The Vitalist Core of Hribar’s Ethics of Sacredness

Povzetek: Tine Hribar je v drugi polovici osemdesetih razvil prepoznavno interpretacijo Sofoklejeve *Antigone*, ki jo je leta 1991 predstavil v monografiji *Tragična etika svetosti*. V njej je osnoval izviren koncept svetega, na katerem je zgradil etiški sistem, ki je postal – predvsem zaradi odločnega zagovora t. i. posvečenosti umrlih – eden od gradnikov slovenskega spravnega projekta.

Prispevek obravnava nekatere temeljne probleme, ki izvirajo iz Hribarjeve enigmatične opredelitve svetega kot ‚sveta samega v sebi‘ in skuša pokazati, da se v Hribarjevi izpeljavi posledic te opredelitve izgubi jasna razlika med bitjo in življenjem. Osrednja aporija *Tragične etike svetosti* je tesno prepletena tudi z drugimi problematičnimi dimenzijami tega dela, ki jih prispevek analizira: z neutemeljeno apropriacijo etiških značilnosti tradicij, od katerih se na načelni ravni distancira; z nerefektiranim razločevanjem med bivajočim in dejanjem v odnosu do svetega; in nenazadnje nepojasnenim osciliranjem med vitalizmom in antigonskim idealom samožrtvovanja.

Ključne besede: Tine Hribar, *Tragična etika svetosti*, mit o Antigoni, sveto, vitalizem

Abstract: In the second half of the 1980s, Tine Hribar developed a distinctive interpretation of Sophocles’s *Antigone*, which he presented in 1991 in the monograph *Tragična etika svetosti* (*The tragical ethics of sacredness*). Here he developed an original concept of the sacred, on which he built an ethical system that has become – particularly through its determined defense of the so-called sanctity of the dead – a cornerstone of the Slovene reconciliation project.

This paper deals with some of the fundamental problems that stem from Hribar’s enigmatic definition of the sacred as “the world itself in itself,” showing that, in the conclusions Hribar draws from that definition, the clear distinction between being and life is lost. The central aporia of the *Tragična etika svetosti* is also closely intertwined with other problematic dimensions of the work that are analysed in the paper: the unfounded appropriation of the ethical charac-

teristics of traditions from which he distances himself in principle; the unreflecting distinction between being and action in relation to the sacred; and not least, the unexplained oscillation between vitalism and Antigone's ideal of self-sacrifice.

Keywords: Tine Hribar, *Tragična etika svetosti*, Antigone myth, the sacred, vitalism

1. Na poti k etičnemu sistemu

Tine Hribar je v *Tragični etiki svetosti* – enem svojih temeljnih del – ob filozofskem soočenju s Sofoklejevo *Antigono* zasnoval edinstven koncept *svetega*. Na njegovi podlagi je nato zgradil prepoznaven etiški sistem, ki je postal eden izmed vidnih gradnikov slovenskega spravnega projekta. Hribar svoje razumevanje *svetega* v tem delu strnjeno opredeljuje tako: »Svet sam v sebi, ne šele prek razmerja do nečesa drugega, ki mu izročilo pravi božje, je nekaj svetega. Je tisto sveto.« (Hribar 1991, 102) Jasno je, da tovrstna raba pojma *sveto* izrazito odstopa tako od njegovega tradicionalnega pomena kot tudi od modernih filozofskih in teoloških tematizacij – najznamenitejšo najdemo v *Svetem* Rudolfa Otta (Otto 1993) –, kjer je *sveto* praviloma povezano z občutjem nečesa, kar izstopa iz običajnega sveta: s tistim, v čemer človek prepozna dotik presežnega. Hribarjeva struktura je na videz radikalno drugačna; zdi se, da gre celo za antitezo: svetost je brezpogojna kvaliteta sveta kot takega; vse kar je – in če je, je v svetu –, je sveto. Ničesar ni, kar bi bilo manj ali bolj sveto – razen same biti, ki ,je' *najsvetejše* in po kateri je vse bivajoče (vse svetno) sveto (Hribar 1991, 102–103).

Ključni izziv – ki se ga Hribar vsaj do neke mere zaveda – se pojavlja že na samem začetku te *izpeljave*: če je svet sam in vse v svetu – bivajoče v celoti in v svojih posamičnostih – *sveto* po (,svoji') biti, v kakšnem smislu (in s kakšnim ontološkim pojasnilom) je lahko kar koli, kar se odvije v kontekstu tega sveta, ne-sveto? Ali drugače: je sploh (in na kakšen način je) možno človeško delovanje, ki svetosti sveta, v katerem se manifestira, ne deli? Hribar se s tem izzivom – prek obravnave Lacana, ki *Antigono* primerja z junaki Markiza de Sada – sooča skozi kritiko de Bressacove apologije umora v de Sadovi *Justine*. Hribar poskuša de Sadovo poanto zaobiti s precej standardnimi prijemi: pri de Sadu naj bi šlo »za krščansko podobo narave, samo da je negativ zdaj pretvorjen v pozitiv«. Pri tem je »narava druga plat medalje, naličje Boga« (Hribar 1991, 202). Hribar problematično jedro te anti-etike vidi v dejstvu, da v njenem nazorskem horizontu – paralelno (ali zrcalno) z religioznim pojmovanjem nesmrtnosti – »resnične, dokončne smrti potemtakem sploh ni« (203). Vseeno pa de Sadovega razvrednotenja človeškega življenja v kontekstu Hribarjevega enačenja svetega in sveta ne moremo kar na hitro odpraviti. Če pri tej uravnilovki vztrajamo in na njeni podlagi zanikamo vsakršno možnost transcendence, de Sadov model brez dvoma predstavlja ekstremno, toda vendarle konsekventno izpeljavo Hribarjevega onto-etičnega nastavka:

»Kar zadeva uničenje sebi enakega, bodi prepričana, Sophie, da je popolnoma varljivo, moč uničenja človeku namreč ni dana, v njegovi moči je

komajda to, da spreminja oblike, ne pa da bi izničil; v očeh narave je vsaka oblika enaka, nič se ne izgubi v neskončnem kotlu, kjer se te spremembe dogajajo, vse količine materije, ki jih vanj vržemo, se nenehno obnavljajo v drugačnih podobah, in kakršna koli so pri tem naša dejanja, nobeno je neposredno ne žali, nobeno je ne bi oskrunilo, naša uničevanja obnavljajo njeno moč, vzdržujejo njeno energijo, in prav nobeno je ne slabi. Eh, kaj je mar večni ustvarjalki naravi, če se ta množina mesa, danes oblikovana kot ženska, že jutri obnovi v obliki tisočernih različnih žuželk? Si upaš trditi, da je zgradba posameznika, kakršni smo mi, naravi ljubša od zgradbe črva in da je zato prisiljena za nas pokazati več zanimanja? Če pa je stopnja zanimanja, ali bolje nezanimanja, v obeh primerih enaka, kaj ji potem mar, če s tem, čemur pravimo človeški zločin, spremenimo nekoga v muho ali solato? Ko mi bodo dokazali, da je naša vrsta vzvišena, ko mi bodo pokazali, da je za naravo tako pomembna, da se z uničenjem te vrste nujno zamajajo njeni zakoni, tedaj bom lahko verjel, da je uničenje zločin; če pa mi bo najbolj premišljeni študij narave dokazal, da ima v njenih očeh vse, tudi najnepopolnejše med njenimi deli, kar na tej zemlji životari, enako ceneno, ne bom nikoli rekel, da spreminjanje enega izmed teh bitij v tisoč drugih lahko kadar koli žali njene zakone; mislil si bom: vsi ljudje, vse rastline, vse živali, ki se razvijajo, rastejo, se uničujejo z istimi sredstvi in nikoli ne podležejo resnični smrti, le preprosti spremembi v tistem, kar jih spreminja, vsi, pravim, ki se ženejo in se uničujejo in se nezadržno razmnožujejo, se za trenutek pokažejo v eni obliki, brž zatem pa v drugi, se lahko na ljubo bitju, ki jih hoče ali more gibati, v enem dnevu spremenijo tisoč in tisočkrat, ne da bi bil s tem prizadet en sam zakon narave.« (de Sade 1987, 290–292)

Tradicionalni etični sistemi so hierarhični: opredeljujejo boljše (med)človeško delovanje, boljše življenje v nasprotju s slabšim. Toda če sledimo Hribarjevim tezam o svetosti sveta in če obenem svet skupaj z njim razumemo kot nekaj, kar z razkrivanjem *druge strani sveta* v sebi vselej nosi potencial radikalne, celo totalne transformacije, ni jasno, v kakšnem smislu bi lahko takšna ontologija porajala kakršno koli *merodajno* etiko, razen morda takšno, ki poleg svet(n)e uravnalovke bivajočega vzpostavlja uravnalovko tudi na ravni *dejanj* – na ravni človeškega stremljenja, delovanja, poseganja v svet. Toda takšen sklep bi zamajal srčiko Hribarjevega projekta: kako je lahko namreč v kontekstu takšne onto-etike svetega nepokopano truplo *manj* posvečeno od pokopanega – v kakšnem smislu je lahko dejanje pokopa svetejše od nepokopa?

Vendar Hribarjev ontološki sistem vseeno vzpostavlja razvidno hierarhizacijo; vse bivajoče je v enaki meri sveto, a bit bivajočega je najsvetejša: »Bit je najsvetejša, svetejša od sveta kot prostora biti,« (Hribar 1991, 102) »z vidika bistva svetega, z vidika svet(n)osti sveta se bit kaže kot tisto najsvetejše« (103). Etično in protietično – v kakršni koli terminologiji se bosta v nadaljevanju že ugnezdila – naj bi se torej v tem sistemu vselej odražala na ravni človekovega odnosa do biti. A

kaj to pomeni v praksi? Kako lahko človek ravna v skladu z bitjo in proti njej? In kaj ima to s pokopavanjem mrtvih?

2. Dobro in zlo

Praktični vidiki Hribarjeve etike – tudi v tem se približuje tradicionaln(ejš)im sistemom – so oprti na temeljno razmejitev med *dobrim* in *zlim*. Kako ju Hribar opredeljuje?

»Tragična etika svetosti, ki izhaja iz svete igre sveta, iz svetosti življenja in posvečenosti mrtvih na ozadju strašne svobode ničā, se na metafiziko, četudi je daleč od tega, da bi jo spregledala, ne ozira. Zato se niti ne vzpenja niti ne spušča po pobočju Vrhovnega Dobrega. Vrhovno Dobro in Moralni Zakon sta orientaciji. Toda pred vsakršnim človekovim orientiranjem je ek-sistenca človeka. Je človek kot bitje, ki je tu: v svetu.

Ljudje smo pre-bivalci. V življenju k smrti. Živeti je dobro, umreti je hudo. Ubijanje je zato zlo. To je tako zelo preprosto, da je za marsikoga preveč enostavno. Vendar etika svetosti izvira prav iz te preprostosti. Tudi kot etika razmerja do mrtvih, do posvečenosti mrtvih. Posvečenost mrtvih je spominska posvečenost. Prepoved pogreba, ki naj bi bila v funkciji neka-kšnega višjega (Vrhovno Dobro tu lahko celo umanjka) dobrega, je ubijalska, ker hoče ubiti spomin. Spomin in z njim hrepenenje. V imenu stremlje-nja.« (Hribar 1991, 266)

S to definicijo smo dobili ključne ‚hierarhične‘ opredelitve te etike, ki pa se ne nanašajo neposredno na bit – kot bi bralec lahko pričakoval iz prej orisanega ontološkega postopka –, temveč na *življenje* in *smrt*. A pri tem se že poraja slutnja, da se v Hribarjevi presenetljivi ekspoziciji etike svetosti življenje pomensko približuje biti in smrt njeni negaciji.

Kako lahko razumemo formulacijo »Živeti je dobro, umreti je hudo. Ubijanje je zato zlo«? Prvič, takoj lahko opazimo neko nesimetričnost v definicijah: umreti – izgubiti življenje – samo po sebi ni *zlo*, temveč ‚hudo‘. *Zlo* je človeško delovanje, ki povzroča oziroma pospešuje *hudo*, ki je samo po sebi neizbežno. *Dobro* po drugi strani v Hribarjevi terminologiji nima tovrstnega para – življenje je dobro in delovanje za življenje je prav tako dobro. Pa vendar je že pri paru *dobro* – *hudo* neka jasna opozicija. *Dobro* je tako obenem nasprotje *hudega* in nasprotje *zla*.

Dobro je, tako se zdi, lahko tudi pasivno: dobro je ne-izničevati življenja. Dobro je, če življenju samo pustimo, da *je*. Je v tem smislu tudi *zlo* lahko pasivno? Je ne-ohranjanje, ne-reševanje življenja *zlo*?¹ Ob Hribarjevem ustoličenju *življenja* na

¹ Ob teh presenetljivih Hribarjevih etičkih definicijah, ki totalizirajo vrednoto življenja (ki v *življenju* prepoznajajo neko *vrhovno dobro*), se pravzaprav izrisuje etični horizont, za katerega se zdi, da ustvarja podlago za nekakšno sekularno *pro-life* pozicijo, paralelno sodobnemu katoliškemu (pa tudi pravoslavnemu in protestantskemu) aktivizmu proti splavu – kako praktično razumeti Hribarjev zagovor

prestolu *etike biti* – Hribar jasno pravi, da gre za sinonim *etike svetosti*² – se ponovno odpirajo številna nerazjasnjena ontološka vprašanja. Hribar je tako npr. ostro kritičen do Lévinasa, ki po njegovem mnenju »bit razume preprosto iz bivanja: biti mu pomeni bivati (eksistirati), še več, že kar živeti« (148). Četudi Hribar tega enačaja nikjer ne izraža eksplicitno, pa se zdi, da se v teh odločilnih paragrafih *Tragične etike svetosti*, ki jedro etike biti povzemajo z enostavno opredelitvijo dobrega in hudega/zla kot življenja in smrti/ubijanja, brez odloka izgublja ravno oprijemljiva razlika med življenjem in bitjo.

Stvari pa se še bistveno bolj zapletejo pri enem izmed spekulativnih gradnikov Hribarjeve onto-etike: pri spekulaciji o ontološkem statusu mrtvih, ki seveda ne živijo, pa vendar po Hribarju lahko *so*, tako v izrazito ne-etičnem kot tudi izrazito etičnem smislu – kot ‚strahovi‘ ali kot ‚spomini‘, po krivdi ali zaslugi živih (16).

Hribarjeva etika je torej – prej kot etika biti – svojevrstna etika življenja: etika, ki v središče postavlja vrednoto življenja. Hribarjev vrednostni sistem tu glede sprejemanja sveta v njegovi ‚sveti‘ celovitosti sicer izkazuje določeno zagato: zakaj bi bila v takšnem pogledu smrt – kot neizbežni del sveta, narave, življenja – kar koli *problematičnega*?

To pa ni edina aporija Hribarjeve opredelitve dobrega in hudega/zla. Jasno je, da Hribar – tako kot Heidegger in Lacan, četudi iz precej drugačnih razlogov – odločno zavrača najznačilnejše heglovsko branje *Antigone*, ki izvira iz Heglove udarne rehabilitacije Kreonta v *Predavanjih o filozofiji religije* (Hegel 1986, 133). Za Hribarja ni nobenega dvoma, kdo ima v Sofoklejevi drami *prav* in kdo *ne*; *Antigona* zanj nima nikakršne simetrije vzporednih tragičnih usod, ne gre za trk enakovrednih tragičnih pozicij: »Ne drži niti to, da sta tu trčila dva enakovredna, dva posebna dobra. /.../ Zločinec je Kreon.« (Hribar 1991, 260) Hribar pa tej precej razumljivi in pričakovani zavrnitvi Hegla dodaja še sila nenavadno pojasnilo svojega pogleda na središčni konflikt *Antigone*: »Drug na drugega sta zadela univerzalno dobro, ki ga brani Antigona in Kreontovo ekscesno dobro, se pravi zlo.« (260)

Fraza »ekscesno dobro, se pravi zlo«, ki jo tu uporablja Hribar, na intriganten način prevetri njegovo opredeljevanje dobrega in zla. Ko Hribar o Kreontovem ‚zlu‘ govori kot o ‚ekscesnem dobrem‘, pravzaprav ponuja neko zaobrnjeno formalno strukturo Heideggerjeve etike nasilja v *Uvodu v metafiziko*: če za Heideggerja (in Žižka) nasilje v registrih ekstremne ekscesnosti preseže problematične vidike *manj-*

»posvečenosti še ne rojenih?« (Hribar 1991, 25) – in evtanaziji. Ob tem zato velja opozoriti, da je – v očitnem kontrastu z brezpogojno, zapovedovalno dikcijo teh definicij – Hribar odločen zagovornik tako legalizacije evtanazije kot pravice do splava; njegova argumentacija se ob teh témah postavi po robu absolutizaciji ‚svetosti življenja‘ in ‚posvečenosti še ne rojenih‘ z dodatno *pravrednoto*, ‚dostojanstvom človeka‘, po katerem človeku ne sme biti vsiljeno, kako naj razume svetost svojega življenja ali – v primeru neželene nosečnosti – porajajočega življenja v svojem telesu; pri tem se sicer zdi, da ‚dostojanstvo človeka‘ v tej shemi dobi vlogo nekakšne pomožne premične meje, s pomočjo katere lahko Hribar strogost neizogibnih praktičnih izpeljav svojih etičnih imperativov precej poljubno rahlja. Hribar kljub temu tudi danes ostaja zavezan suvereni retoriki svojega onto-etiškega projekta osemdesetih in devetdesetih: »Zagovor evtanazije je utemeljen ne samo etično, ampak tudi ontološko.« (Hribar 2019)

² »Svetost ne izhaja iz posnemanja tega ali onega Bivajočega, marveč iz biti kot biti. Etika svetosti je etika biti.« (Hribar 1991, 262)

šega nasilja, se ob prejšnjem navedku zdi, da za Hribarja *ekscsesno dobro* ogroža pozitivne vidike *manjšega* – ali vsaj manj *zgoščene*ga – dobrega.

Vseeno pa tudi tu ni konsistenten: Hribar Antigonino dejanje označuje za ‚sveto dejanje‘, pri čemer to dejanje očitno razume kot nekaj izjemnega, kar izstopa iz vsakdanjosti – gre za superiorno etično dejanje. Tukaj torej *sveto* označuje neko (pozitivno) izjemnost. *Dejanja* imajo skratka v navezavi na sveto za Hribarja precej drugačno hierarhično logiko kot *bivajoče* – lahko bi rekli, neko bistveno bolj *običajno* logiko.

Običajno seveda, če odmislimo opredelitev o ‚ekscsesnem dobrem‘, ki je – v širšem kontekstu *Tragične etike svetosti* – kljub vsemu precej *ekscsesna*. Kako je namreč lahko dobro, ki ga Hribar enoznačno opredeljuje kot *živeti* (»to je tako zelo preprosto«), v primeru Kreontovega dejanja v ekscesu? Ali pa gre za namig, da Hribar že samo smrt sredi svetega sveta razume kot njegov temeljni ‚ekscses‘?

Jasnih odgovorov na ta vprašanja ne dobimo. Hribar se ob poskusih vpenjanja svoje razgrnitve dobrega in zla v širše teze svojega onto-etiškega projekta namreč še naprej zateka k tавтоloškim, samoreferenčnim opredelitvam, ki bralcu sugerirajo popolno razvidnost povezav med bitjo, svetim ter razliko med dobrim in zlim, vendar je nikdar zares ne prikažejo:

»Resnica pa je, da tudi tedaj, ko gremo onstran dobrega in zla, ne vemo, kdaj smo onstran, če ne vemo za razliko med dobrim in zlim. Razlika med dobrim in zlom obstaja tudi tedaj, ko ni več Vrhovnega Dobra. Ko je Bog kot Vrhovno Dobro mrtev. Ni pa zaradi tega mrtvo sveto kot sveto. Smrt Boga ne pomeni izničenja biti.« (Hribar 1991, 264)

3. Sveto dejanje – etična hierarhija dejanj?

Svetost se torej Hribarju ob opredeljevanju *sveta/bivajočega* in *dejanj* razkriva drugače: vse *bivajoče* je sveto, vsa *dejanja* pač ne. Hribar soglaša s svojo interpretacijo Heideggerja, po kateri so »sveta dejanja« tista, ki so narejena v *imenu* zakona biti: »Zakon [biti je zakon], ki dejanja, ki so narejena v njegovem imenu, spreminja v sveta dejanja.« (1991, 174) Tudi Antigonino dejanje naj bi bilo »v razmerju do posvečenosti mrtvih sveto dejanje« (261). Tukaj se seveda najprej zastavlja vprašanje ontološkega statusa dejanj, ki smo ga delno že zastavili: če je ves svet in vse, kar je v svetu, *sveto* – in če je vse, kar *je*, že po svoji biti *sveto* – kako je lahko neko dejanje potem ne-sveto?

Kljub vsem protislovjem v tej terminologiji je vsaj do neke mere jasno, kaj želi Hribar sporočiti: človeško dejanje lahko na radikalen način nastopi proti *svetu*, proti *biti*, proti *življenju*. Ni pa jasno, kaj to pomeni za razvrščanje in vrednotenje dejanj, ki jih zakon biti »spreminja v sveta dejanja«: ali med njimi obstaja kakršna koli hierarhija? Obstajajo bolj ali manj sveta dejanja? Obstajajo tudi bolj ali manj ne-sveta dejanja? Ali pa gre za binarno strukturo, v kateri so dejanja lahko vedno le v enaki meri sveta ali v enaki meri ne-sveta? Kako bi lahko bilo skozi takšno prizmo Antigonino (ali antigonsko) dejanje kar koli posebnega?

Hribar je zasnoval svoj poskus odgovora na ta vprašanja v korespondenci z Markom Uršičem (Uršič 1986; 1987), ki jo je leto dni pred *Tragično etiko svetosti* objavil v monografiji *O svetem na Slovenskem*: »Izjemna, sveta dejanja, kakršno je bilo Antigono – Antigona je sledila zakonu biti proti pravni obveznosti in čez mejo moralnih dolžnosti – pričajo o svetosti, ki je je zmožen človek v svoji predanosti, zavezanosti biti. Najsvetejšemu. Vendar Antigona ni svetnica. Obstaja svetost, ne obstajajo pa svetniki.« (Hribar 1990, 157–158) Hribar tu ‚sveto dejanje‘ eksplicitno opredeljuje kot ‚izjemno‘. ‚Svetost‘ človeka, ki opravlja ‚sveto dejanje‘, se vzpostavlja v njegovi eminentni ‚predanosti, zavezanosti biti‘. *Sveto* je torej v horizontu bivajočega nekaj *najobičajnejšega* – vseprisotnega –, v kontekstu človeškega dejanja pa nekaj odločno *neobičajnega*. Je torej *razlikam*, ki jih Hribar po vzoru ontološke diference niza v svojem delu, treba prišteti tudi razliko med bivajočim in dejanjem/udejanjajočim?

V *Tragični etiki svetosti* Hribar razvija ostro kritiko svetništva, ki mu v navedenem pismu sicer odvzema možnost obstoja (»ne obstajajo pa svetniki«); toda tudi gleda tega ni konsistenten, saj na uvodnih straneh knjige o svetnikih eksplicitno in afirmativno govori kot ohranjevalcih svetega: »V sveti igri sveta se nič ne izgubi. Sled pobeglih bogov se ohranja v poeziji, se je na drugačen način skozi stoletja ohranjala skozi življenje svetnikov.« (1991, 24) Glede Antigoninega (ne)svetniškega statusa pa je vendarle jasen:

»Antigona ni niti svečenica niti svetnica. Njena svetost je drugačne narave. Svečenik je varuh sakralnega, institucionaliziranega in sankcioniranega svetega. Svetnik je to, kar je, po svoji hoji za Kristusom. Izhaja iz Ideala jaza in gradi svoj idealni Jaz v senci Ideala. S posnemanjem Kristusa. V tem svetnik ni avtonomen. Antigona pa je avtonomna prav zaradi tega, ker nikogar ne posnema. Tako kakor ni nikogar posnemal Kristus sam. Tudi Kristusovo dejanje je bilo sveto dejanje. Ni pa bilo svetniško dejanje. Saj Kristus ni mogel biti (krščanski) svetnik, posnemovalec samega sebe.« (261–262)

Problem te kritične opredelitve je (ponovno) v tem, da je Hribar ne zastavlja svoji lastni poziciji. Predpogoj ‚svetega dejanja‘ naj bi bila po njegovem prepričanju nekakšna *samoniklost* – vsakršno posnemanje tovrstnega dejanja in njegovega izvrševalca naj bi bilo medtem znak posnemovalčeve neavtonomnosti in s tem lažne, razvodenele, ‚sankcionirane‘ svetosti. Vendar – kako lahko potemtakem Antigona služi ravno kot model za prenos sorodne onto-etične drže in sorodnega dejanja v sodobnost, za *antigonski* pokop nepokopanih? Zakaj za to *posnemanje* ne veljajo enaka merila? V kakšnem smislu se opiranje na model Antigone pri vzpostavljanju ultimativnega in univerzalnega svetega dejanja od tovrstne ‚sankcioniranosti‘ odmika? Ali ni prav Hribar – če sledimo njegovi opredelitvi svetosti in s tem zavrnitvi svetništva – s svojim etiškim projektom eklatanten primer posnemovalca, ki *hodi za Antigono*, svečenika, ki poskuša sistematizirati, modelirati njeno ‚avtonomno‘ dejanje?

Sveto dejanje je torej v nasprotju s svetim bivajočim izjemno, toda – ali je tudi *tragično*? Hribar pri opredelitvi tragičnosti svetega dejanja posega po nietzschejanski terminologiji:

»[Volja do moči] hoče premagati smrt samo in zato z zanikanjem posvečenosti mrtvih, ne le svetosti življenja, izzove etični upor. Tisto, kar etiko svetosti pretvori v tragično etiko, je maščevalnost volje do moči. Gledano od zunaj, z vidika skupnosti. Od znotraj, z vidika žrtve je tragično to, da svoje dejanje lahko ,upraviči' le s svetim kot svetim. Prav zato je to dejanje sveto dejanje; ne božje, kajti tedaj, ko je človek pred svojo absolutno, sveto odločitvijo, zgolj pred samim seboj, božjega ni več blizu. Abrahama je poklical Bog, zaustavil pa ga je angel, njegov lastni demon.« (266–267)

Ob teh eklektičnih definicijah marsikaj ostaja begajoče, a osredotočimo se na bistveno, ki je izrečeno povsem neposredno: eden ključnih vidikov *tragičnosti* etike svetosti se nahaja v njeni *uporni* razsežnosti – sveto dejanje je povezano z »etičnim uporom /.../ volji do moči« –, ki ob Hribarjevih paralelnih tematizacijah izkazuje eksplicitne politične razsežnosti:

»Vsaka absolutna oblast, se pravi oblast s težnjo po neomejeni in brezpogojni moči, hoče vladati ne samo nad življenjem, ampak tudi nad smrtjo. Tisti, ki se takšni oblasti upre, kakor se je Antigona ob Kreontovi prepovedi pokopa njenega brata Polinejka, je obsojen na pogubo. Njegovo dejanje je sveto, toda usoda tragična. Vendar tragična etika svetosti ni tragična zgolj zaradi tragične usode. Tragična je, ker nepisani zakoni kot zakoni biti niso oprti na nič bivajočega. So brez Opore. Zanje zato lahko zastavimo le sami sebe.« (5–6)

4. Sveto in posvečeno

Dotaknimo se še enega izmed najosnovnejših (nerazjasnjenih) terminoloških vprašanj glede Hribarjeve onto-etične zakonodaje. Prva med zakoni branita *svetost* življenja in *posvečenost* mrtvih. Zakaj Hribar uporablja dva različna izraza? Zakaj npr. ne *posvečenost življenja* ali *svetost mrtvih*?

Svetost bi bila v kontekstu Hribarjeve etike v povezavi z vsem, kar zadeva smrt, vsekakor paradoksalna oznaka – če upoštevamo, da Hribar ,umreti' označuje za ,hudo', eno izmed dveh pomenskih nasprotij dobrega, ,živeti'. Hribar na uvodnih straneh *Tragične etike svetosti* sicer bežno spregovori o tem, da so tudi živi lahko posvečeni (25), vendar opazke v nadaljevanju ne razvije. Zakon o posvečenosti mrtvih jasno opredeljuje kot »zapoved o pokopavanju mrtvih«, zakon o svetosti življenja pa kot »prepoved ubijanja« (71). Te etične kategorije torej zarisujejo potencialno pozitivno in negativno vlogo človeka v ,sveti igri sveta'. Je posvečenost mrtvih rezultat človeškega *posvečevanja* in označuje neko samostojno, suvereno zmožnost *živih*? Hribar odločno trdi, da ni tako: »V sveti igri sveta mrtvih ne posvetimo živi, marveč jih posveti smrt. Posvečeni so zato, ker so mrtvi, ne zato, ker smo jih posvetili mi. Živi mrtvih ne moremo posvetiti, lahko jih le oskrunimo. Če se od njih ne poslovimo po človeško.« (7)

Kaj je ta smrt, ki se je zdaj znašla v vlogi *posvečevalke*? Je to še smrt kot končni rezultat dveh nasprotij dobrega – hudega/umiranja in zla/ubijanja? Kakšno je nje-no podjetje posvečevanja mrtvih – samostojno ali partnersko? Glede na to, da Hribar posvečenost mrtvih jasno povezuje s človeškim spominom na mrtve, se zdi, da gre za drugo: »Posvečenost mrtvih je spominska posvečenost. Prepoved pogreba /.../ je ubijalska, ker hoče ubiti spomin.« (266) Posvečenost mrtvih torej ni neposredna zasluga živih – človek ne ‚proizvaja‘ posvečenosti –, je pa lahko (in na neki način tudi mora biti) posredna: posvečenost mrtvih, ki jih je posvetila smrt, živi *ohranjajo* s tem, da mrtvih ne oskrunijo in da se jih spominjajo. Posvečenost mrtvih – skupni projekt *smrti* in *živih*?

5. Ljubezenski zaplet

Med prepoznavnimi vzgibi, ki jih Hribar tematizira ob opredeljevanju proti-etičnega delovanja, *zlih* dejanj, smo že obravnavali najvidnejša: nietzschejansko *vo-ljo do moči* in *desadovski zakon želje* (Hribar 1991, 204). Kaj pa naj bi bil temeljni vzgib, ki človeka ob ‚odsotnosti bogov‘ usmerja k dobremu etičnemu delovanju? Hribarjev odgovor je tukaj spet precej ‚tradicionalen‘: ključna pozitivna etična sila je *ljubezen*. V kontekstu etičnega sistema, ki zasleduje Sofoklejevo junakinjo, odgovor seveda ni presenetljiv:

»οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφλεῖν ἔφου.« [523]

»Ne da sovražim – da ljubim, sem na svetu!« (Prev. Kajetan Gantar; Sofokles 1992, 26)

»Živim zato, da ljubim, ne da črtim.« (Prev. Anton Sovrè; Sofokles 1962, 241)

»Sovraštvo ne, ljubezen je moj del.« (Prev. Fran Albrecht; Sofoklej 1941, 113)

»Ne za sovraštvo, za ljubezen jaz živim.« (Prev. Ivan Hribovšek; Sofokles 2014, 57)

»Ne za sovraštvo, za ljubezen jaz sem tu.« (Prev. Cvetko Golar; Sophokles 1924, 28)

Četudi Hribar ob analizi Smoleta pravi, da je ljubezen »tisti temeljni element, po katerem je krščanstvo šele zares krščanstvo« (Hribar 1991, 276), skuša na drugih mestih svoje pojmovanje ljubezni jasno razmejiti od razumevanj ljubezni v tradicionalnih religioznih kontekstih, ki jim očita menjalno, preračunljivo logiko, psevdoetično delovanje v pričakovanju posmrtna nagrade. V nasprotju z ljubeznijo ‚plačila‘, usmerjeno v transcendenco, se ljubezen Hribarjevega onto-etičnega sistema – *antigonska* ljubezen, ki naj bi se upirala vsakršni preračunljivosti – ime-njuje *ljubezen za nič*:³ »Zakon mrtvih je, kakor pravi Heidegger, temeljni zakon živih.

³ Gre za izraz, ki sta ga – v navezavi na Dostojevskega – v slovenskem prostoru pred Hribarjem najbolj odmevno uporabljala Dušan Pirjevec in Marjan Rožanc. Pirjevec v svoji analizi *Bratov Karamazovih* (Pirjevec 1976), Rožanc pa v več esejih in dnevniških zapiskih (Rožanc 1987; 1988). Prim. tudi razpravo Tarasa Kermaunerja »Ljubezen za nič kot izstop iz kroga menjav: filozofska in estetološka razprava o osrednji izmed Pirjevčevih kategorij« (Kermauner 1983).

Ker je zakon biti. Tragično je, da za spoštovanje tega zakona ni plačila. Narobe. Sami ga plačamo. S svojim življenjem. To je ljubezen za nič. Ljubezen za nič ni nič, če to ni ljubezen pred grozo zgolj ničā.« (263)

Kot sem že namignil, se tudi v tej razsežnosti Hribarjeve etike skriva diskretna posvojitve tradicionalnih religioznih konceptov – nesebične ljubezni, samoodpovedi, samožrtvovanja itd. –, ki si obenem domišlja, da razkriva nekaj drugačnega in celo (miselno) *opozicijskega*.

Vseeno pa Hribarjev poskus imanentizacije krščanske ljubezni še enkrat opomni na problemski sklop, ki nastane ob onto-etiški eliminaciji transcendence: zakaj se temu *za nič* pridružuje ravno ljubezen? Zakaj ne kateri koli drug vzgib človeškega delovanja, npr. *sovraštvo za nič? Izničenje za nič? Samoizničenje za nič? Nič za nič?* Na kateri osnovi je ravno ljubezen tisti ideal, ki zasluži – »pred grozo zgolj ničā«⁴ – povzdignjenje v vzgib svetosti?

Odgovor je lahko le *vitalističen*: Hribarjeva etika je v prvi vrsti naturalistična *etika življenja*, ljubezen v njej zasluži prednostno mesto kot *življenjska sila*, kot sila porajanja in ohranjanja človeškega življenja. Kljub temu pa je za etični sistem, ki se v prvi vrsti ukvarja z vprašanjem odnosa do mrtvih, na mestu vprašanje: kako ta *eros* shaja s *thanatosom*?

Hribar pri svoji opredelitvi razmerja med *ljubeznijo* in *mrtvimi* ponovno podaja intrigantno formulacijo, ki razgalja nove metafizične razpoke v tu-svetni neprodušnosti njegovega etičnega sistema: »Ljubezen sega onstran groba in z njo se mrtvi vračajo k nam, kakor da bi bili še zmerom živi.« (Hribar 1991, 125) Nekaj strani prej je namreč zavrnil »zagrobni« svet kot del teološke domišljije: »Božje kot bistvo bogov (Boga) ne spada v prostor zemlje in neba, živih in mrtvih. Ne izhaja iz svet(n)osti sveta, tega sveta, temveč iz želje po drugem, zagrobnem svetu. Kjer naj bi mrtvi ne bili več mrtvi, marveč znova živi.« (106)

Kaj je torej ta ,onstran groba', v katerega naj bi segala ljubezen? Kam so šli mrtvi, da se lahko vračajo? Od kod se vračajo ,k nam', na našo stran sveta? Z ,druge strani sveta'? Ima torej ljubezen neko ultimativno prednost pred ,mislijo' in ,domišljijo'? Lahko avtentično posega po ,ne-skritosti', druge strani sveta'? In ali ni ta ,stran', če je ,onstran groba', prav tako del ,zagrobnega sveta' – ali vsaj ,želje' po njem?

6. Sklep

V prispevku sem skušal pokazati, da Hribarjeva edinstvena in enigmatična opredelitev svetega v *Tragični etiki svetosti* poraja številne aporije, ki v veliki meri izvirajo iz njenega izhodiščnega paradoksa: Hribar poskuša zaobiti hierarhične vrednostne strukture tradicionalnih etičnih sistemov s tezo o svetosti vsega bivajočega – ne-

⁴ Tudi od nje se Hribar na koncu svoje zadnje trilogije srdito distancira, saj jo zdaj prepoznava kot zadnjo metamorfozo krščanskega hipostaziranja ničā – vendar nam to ne sme prikriti dejstva, da je bila ,groza (zgolj) ničā' osišče njegovega prejšnjega opusa

kakšno *uravnalovko* svetega –, obenem pa te strukture aproprira in sekularizira z dvema tezama, ki ju le stežka uskladimo s prvo: tezo o biti kot *najsvetejšem* in tezo o Antigoninem *svetem dejanju*. V tem paradoksu lahko razberemo simptom globljega notranjega konflikta v Hribarjevem filozofskem projektu, ki se želi po eni strani od platonistične in judovsko-krščanske duhovne dediščine kategorično distancirati, po drugi strani pa predano zasleduje ravno nekatere etiške vrednote, ki so evidentno ukoreninjene v teh tradicijah.

Teza o Antigoninem svetem dejanju je povezana z drugim, sorodnim paradoksom Hribarjevega etiškega sistema: poskusom opredelitve dobrega in zla v svetu, ki je svet in kjer je vse sveto. Ta problem postane še posebej pereč – in razvejan – ob poskusu opredelitev dobrih in zlih dejanj. Hribar namreč ne pojasni, zakaj vzpostavlja bistveno razliko med bivajočim in dejanjem prav ob vprašanju svetega, pri čemer je bivajoče vedno in povsod sveto, dejanje pa je lahko sveto – in obenem tudi ‚izjemno‘ – ali pa ne-sveto. Pri Hribarjevi opredelitvi svetosti/ne-svetosti dejanja ni jasno niti to, ali gre pri njej za binarno razmejitev ali za večstopenjsko strukturo, ki prehaja od ne-svetih (ali celo proti-svetih) prek manj ali bolj svetih do ‚izjemnih‘ svetih dejanj, kakršno je Antigonino. Videli smo tudi, kako se ta dilema zaostri skozi de Sadovski zakon želje in ničejansko voljo do moči, s katerima se Hribar sicer sooča, a na njune izzive ne odgovarja prepričljivo.

V nadaljnjem postopku *Tragične etike svetosti* pride do še enega nenavadnega, ključnega zapleta: Hribar svoje pojmovanje dobrega in zla tesno poveže s protipostavitvijo življenja in smrti, iz česar izpelje nekatere najbolj prepoznavne formulacije tega dela (in širšega pravega projekta), npr. *svetost življenja* in *posvečenost mrtvih*. Če osrednje definicije, s katerimi tej povezavi pritrjuje, primerjamo s prej obravnavanimi opredelitvami biti kot *najsvetejšega*, Antigoninega dejanja kot *svetega dejanja* in *svetosti sveta*, ugotovimo, da se v Hribarjevem onto-etiškem sistemu zabriše jasna razmejitev med bitjo in življenjem (prav to pa je v *Tragični etiki svetosti* sicer eden izmed glavnih Hribarjevih očitkov Lévinasu). Tovrstno ne-reflektirano enačenje biti in življenja, ki oscilira med vitalizmom in antigonskim idealom samožrtvovanja, se izkazuje kot temeljna aporija Hribarjeve etike.

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Michał Wyrostkiewicz and Marek Petro

Lie as the Anthropological Destruction

Laž kot antropološko uničenje

Abstract: The theory of post-truth and the conviction that absolute objective truth does not exist have many supporters in the modern world. A lie seen from this point of view appears to be one of the many ways people contact each other. The conducted research shows that this reasoning is incorrect. It proves that a lie is a reality that destroys those who have been lied to and those who are lying, as well as other people who are found in their environment. A lie drives people away from the truth, replacing it with untruth. In this way, it strikes a person and disturbs the order in one's social environment. Thus, it becomes an anthropological destruction. This creates an "alternative world" that "competes" with God's created world. Also, by rejecting God's call to live according to the truth, man moves away from God and draws closer to Satan. The world "created" by a liar is not appropriate to human nature, it cannot become a space for his development, but is only regression and, consequently, destructive. The matter of lying and its consequences appear to be very topical today when the "power of disinformation" is being revealed more and more clearly.

Keywords: lie, disinformation, communication, morality, anthropology, social life

Povzetek: Teorija postresnice in prepričanje, da absolutna, objektivna resnica ne obstaja, imata v sodobnem svetu veliko zagovornikov. Laž se s tega vidika zdi eden od številnih načinov, kako ljudje drug z drugim stopajo v stik. Izvedena raziskava kaže, da je takšno razmišljanje napačno. Dokazuje, da je laž realnost, ki uničuje tiste, ki so jim lagali, lažnivce, pa tudi druge ljudi, ki se znajdejo v njihovem okolju. Laž ljudi oddaljuje od resnice in jo nadomešča z neresnico. Tako človeka prizade, poruši red v njegovem družbenem okolju in postane antropološko uničenje. S tem nastane ,alternativni svet', ki ,tekmuje' z Božjim ustvarjenim svetom. Prav tako se človek z zavračanjem Božjega poziva, naj živi v skladu z resnico, oddaljuje od Boga in se približuje satanu. Svet, ki ga je ,ustvaril' lažnivec, za človekovo naravo ni primeren, ne more postati prostor za njegov razvoj, temveč je le regresija in posledično uničujoč. Vprašanje laži in njenih posledic se zdi danes, ko se ,moč dezinformacij' razkriva vse jasneje, zelo aktualno.

Ključne besede: laž, dezinformacija, komunikacija, morala, antropologija, družbeno življenje

1. Introduction: Context and Methodological Information

Without a doubt, our times present a peculiar moment in dealing with information.¹ On the one hand, the development of a social and cultural civilization has led to the fact that information is recognized as one of the main values of modern society, and within it every person. That's why we mainly talk about the information society in which information is the basic commodity and currency. On the other hand, many claims and theories draw attention to the subjectivity and relativity of information, as shown in the concept of post-truth, which is used by many people, especially journalists and politicians, to characterize our current understanding of information. In addition, the current world situation related to the invasion of Ukraine and the so-called hybrid war makes many people aware of the importance of understanding what disinformation is. And what effects it causes. All this points to the importance of information in a person's personal and social life (Wyrostkiewicz 2022, 4).

The second-mentioned point of view is very popular today. However, there is no lack of people convinced that a lie is bad for society and every person who functions in an environment affected by a lie. This last statement is the main research hypothesis of this study. Demonstrating its validity will take place in several steps. The first step will be to show the relationship between a lie and the truth and to place our reflection on lies in the classical moral-theological context of human deeds. This will be an introduction to the topic showing new original proposals for looking at a lie as an activity aiming to build an alternative reality in which both a liar and the person lied to are to function. The culmination of the analysis will be a theological reflection on the subject of lying concerning God and Satan.

The subject of this article is lying. It deals with the problem of the consequences in one's social and personal life. The purpose of the text, as the title of the article states, is to give a synthetic presentation of a lie as a factor effectively disrupting the development of man and society, and therefore creating anthropological destruction. In particular, it is about supplementing the current moral-theological concept of a lie with new original theses developed based on biblical premises and the reflections of anthropologists who are not theologians. Therefore, our assumption is to shed new light on the current knowledge about a lie and its consequences, both in the social and personal lives of the liar and the person lied to. In the era of the above-mentioned post-truth and the rejection of classic values, it appears to be an important task for researchers to answer the most important questions posed by people to lead them to integral development (their absolute fulfilment, meaning achieving fullness in life, meaning salvation from the theological point of view) (Nęcek and Nagórny 2005, 474–475).

As the title of the article states, the basic and primary source materials for this study are the works of theologians, philosophers, and sociological representatives

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of the Lublin scientific community (this is evidenced by the source literature). They are mainly associated with the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. In this group is also included Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II. Before his pontificate, he was a professor at this university.

2. Searching for the Essence of the Lie

In its most basic understanding, a lie is giving someone information that does not agree with the objective state of affairs. It is a statement that diverges from the truth, an act of deliberately misleading someone (Wyrostkiewicz 2005, 258–259). The basis of a lie is the perpetrator's freely undertaken decision to express information incompatible with his knowledge and belief in a given matter (Communicating this information does not have to be through words or verbally. It can be a gesture or other means that the recipient will see as a clear representation of the information.) Thus, we are dealing with giving someone information that the informer knows (or at least thinks) to be untrue. The premise of lying is to be aware of the truth. Therefore, a lie is a persuasive type of activity (Chudy 1992, 88–89).

The natural consequence of this condition is leading the deceived person into a lie, meaning that they will make the wrong decisions based on the (false) information obtained. As we can see, misleading someone confuses them, leading to wrong thinking and wrong decisions. In this way, it can be shown that the ultimate goal of a lie is not to present what is untrue, but to make sure that the person lied to will undertake decisions and perform actions that would not have happened if they knew the truth. This thesis is the original understanding of a liar's purpose.

According to the point of view presented above, a liar's great cunning is revealed. Attempting to make changes in the world that are not in accord with the truth, a liar tries to use other people for this purpose from whom he hides the truth. He wants to build an "alternative world" (which will be discussed later) through the actions of other people.

It is worth adding that a lie is not just "simply" presenting what is untrue as true. It is also the transmission of doubtful information (unverified and uncertain) without appropriate commentary. This raises doubts and thus indicates its uncertainty, meaning the potential falsehood of the information presented (Wyrostkiewicz 2007, 49–50).

Because a lie is not passively blocking someone's access to the truth, it is not simply a static obstacle that the person lied to has a chance to recognize and bypass. A lie always requires human activity. Thus, it is assumed that the liar will try to give the person lied to the least chance to suppose they are being lied to. Therefore, a lie is an action that not only stops the person being lied to from accessing the truth but actively directs him or her to an untrue area. This is because a liar gives false information by presenting it as true information, and so getting to the truth is difficult (Chudy 1992, 89).

This does not depend on the cleverness, ability or knowledge of the person lied to (as in the case of manipulation, for example) (Wyrostkiewicz 2014), because the truth is completely hidden, “secured” and “blocked” from the recipient. These “safeguards” are the human person’s natural traits, such as those arising from their deepest needs, and therefore recognized as obvious, the pursuit of truth and goodness, and living according to them. It also includes solidarity, justice and the need and willingness to affirm the human person (Nagórny 1997, 174–201; Pokrywka 2000, 141–73). In other words, an honest man will hardly question what the other person presents to them as being the obvious truth. Inscribed in human mentality is trusting people, faith in their natural goodness and living in solidarity with one’s neighbour; these are factors that favour liars.

3. A Lie is an *Actus Humanus*

Our reflections up to now have shown that lying is not a simple or accidental act. It is a human activity with all its attributes, and therefore it carries both temporal and eschatological consequences (Nowosad and Wyrostkiewicz 2005a, 129–32). Lying is an action that not only directs people into the area of untruth but also puts untruth instead of truth into the consciousness of the deceived and into the world in which they function (Chudy 1992, 89–90). The key in the moral-theological assessment of a lie, perceived as an *actus humanus*, is to draw attention to the intention of the informer (*finis operantis*) and the necessary, inalienable effect (*finis operis*) that false (ambiguous, incomplete) information will produce.

According to moral theology’s theory of human action, *finis operis* and *finis operantis* are the two basic sources of morality (*fontes moralitates*) of a person’s actions. This means that, based on them, a decision determines whether the act is morally good or evil. The latter situation occurs when at least one of these goals (*finis operis* or *finis operantis*) is evil, meaning that it is incompatible with the sense and purpose of man’s and the world’s existence, i.e. when it harms the nature of one or the other (Nowosad and Wyrostkiewicz 2005a, 131).

To deepen our analysis of lies as a human activity (*actus humanus*), it is worth emphasizing the fact that a lying person’s goal (*finis operantis*) is to mislead someone by allegedly providing them with true information and causing the recipient to recognize as true something that is not true. Treating what is untrue as true by the deceived is the basic effect of a lie (*finis operis*); the fact is that truth in his consciousness is replaced by untruth.

The decision (willingness, intention, and disposition) for someone to obtain false information is a key issue for a liar. The real truth of the message being conveyed is secondary. What the person giving the information thinks about it is fundamental. If he or she wants to mislead someone, even when they accidentally transmit true information (for example, due to ignorance), we are still dealing with a lie (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1993, can. 2482–2484; Wyrostkiewicz 2005; Chudy 1992; Rubinkiewicz 2002).

In this context, it is worth stating that in the Catholic tradition adopted by moral theology, a lie is included in the category of acts of the highest level of evil. We are talking about actions referred to as intrinsically evil (*intrinsece malum*), meaning those that will not reduce their evil status regardless of the circumstances. Due to their subject matter, there is also no way for good to come from them. Such activity is always “greatly evil” and causes harm to a man who finds himself in its sphere of influence (John Paul II 1993, 80; 1984, 17).

Comparing earlier reflections on a liar’s goal with the above theory of a human action allows us to state that a lie is clearly an evil deed. This is due to both the intention of the lying person (*finis operantis*) as well as the purpose and effect of the action (*finis operis*). When an act is bad, it means that its necessary consequence is a specific evil that takes on many forms. To some extent, it “stays in the villain” and “works” there. This “work” consists of making changes in the area of his reason and will, which are reflected in his or her transformed thinking, evaluation and limited freedom. In an obvious and necessary way, this results in a weakening of the fundamental option (John Paul II 1993, 65–68) focused on the good and the creation of vices that systematically reduce one’s sensitivity to evil, thus facilitating doing evil, and sometimes even imposing evil (Wyrostkiewicz 2013, 52–56). This means that the evil “working” in a man destroys his good nature and pushes him to perform further evil deeds. Another area of evil arises as a result of a morally wrong act “entering into the world” and “working” there, thus contributing to the emergence of evil structures that become the context of other actions (Mariański 1998, 19–32), which will be discussed later.

Further exploring the issue of the essence and impact of lies, it is worth reaching as deeply as possible in search of the essence of both its mentioned goals (*fines = finis operis + finis operantis*) and their common basis. Not only should we look at a specific single act, but also see it as a link in the whole sequence and discover the goals and effects (*fines*) of a complex action. This concerns seeing the entire spectrum of both the effects and their contexts. Only this will lead to an understanding of the aforementioned lie. This proposition to pay sufficient attention to circumstances (*circumstantiae*) is more than a suggestion which, as already noted, constitutes the last of the two mentioned objectives (*fines*) from among the three sources of the morality of an act (*fontes moralitatis*) (Nowosad and Wyrostkiewicz 2005a, 131).

It is also something more than the implementation of a just postulate developed within the framework of the concept of a moral situation stating that it is necessary to include a variety of unique conditions in the moral assessment that create the subjective (though not relative) space of action for a specific subject being a rational and free being. Here we are dealing with stressing the truth that every act, as mentioned, is part of a larger whole (activity) constituting a collection of related individual works; thus, the effects of one action are the conditions for other actions. Relating all this to the evil act of lying and keeping in mind the truth about the social dimension of such an activity, it is impossible not to notice that it generates evil structures, as we have already pointed out. These, in turn, create a new

environment in relation to the original environment of man's life and functioning, which becomes the source of subsequent activities (John Paul II 1984, 16).

To conclude this part about the essence of a lie and its moral-theological assessment revealed in this context, it is worth emphasizing the thesis noted earlier that a person who is lying does not say (or even transmit at all even non-verbally) that he does not know the truth. He does it because he wants someone to accept as true the news that he, the liar, is convinced to be untrue. A liar is trying to build an "alternative world" whose leaven, foundation and bond is falsehood, which he presents as the truth.

4. Lies Result in an "Alternative World"

Looking at the information presented above from a different perspective, meaning searching for the basic goal and effect (*finis*) integrating both of the above-mentioned goals and effects (*finis operantis* and *finis operis*), one can see that a person who is lying is about to construct an "alternative world". It is a "world" that will not be based on the truth, but on what they want, that others (the deceived) will recognize as such, and that this "world" creates false information in the consciousness of the recipients. These people will function within this "world" with the conviction that it is real (that it is based on truth, on the objective state of affairs). At the same time, the liar knows what the truth really is.

A liar is also aware of what knowledge the person lied to possesses and the "world" created as a result of this knowledge. Paradoxically, the lying person counts on the honesty of the recipients, and this happens even when he is not aware of it. A liar's realization of this fact is a confirmation of his premeditated and even perfidious action. His action is based on the belief that the person lied to (a person who is honestly seeking the good resulting from basing his actions on the truth) will make decisions based on the information presented to him (Nowosad and Wrostkiewicz 2005b).

Obviously, these decisions will be different from those this person would have made if they had known the truth. In that case, some other, different action would be considered the right thing to do. Being convinced that the untruth presented by the liar is true, the recipient will do what he normally would not have done if he knew the whole truth. That's what a liar assumes and counts on. This is his goal (*finis operantis*).

One cannot fail to notice that, thanks to the premeditated actions of the liar and the other person applying false knowledge based on lies, this "alternative world" becomes a reality. It is no longer a "world" existing only in the consciousness of a deceitful person, but it is now a fact made real based on other people's actions performed according to false information. This "alternative world" is "activated" by the deeds of a person who was lied to. Next, it is systematically built up by subsequent actions which were somehow the results of the initial lie, or

those whose starting, or reference point were the actions of those who were lied to. This expresses the previously mentioned generation of evil structures.

It is not difficult to see at this point that the spiral of evil is winding up. Therefore, all subsequent activities, which, according to the intentions of the acting person were to result in good, do not bring about such effects. These do not meet the minimum level assumed by the acting person who was lied to, the one who initiated his actions from the knowledge that was based on lies. The reality in which the deeds are carried out does not correspond to the one it should, meaning that the perpetrator "adapted" his actions to the situation because he possessed the wrong knowledge. These actions apply to the "false world," which, as a result of obtaining false information, were created in the consciousness of the person who was lied to. They are implemented in the real world in a way that turns out to be different from the original one.

Due to the inherent social dimension of every human activity (and therefore including lies), it should be assumed that they affect other people living in the vicinity of the liar (if we call the liar the "first" person and the person lied to the "second," then anyone else who is surrounded by the second person may be called a "third" person). There is no doubt that this act also becomes a condition of their actions. It is not a question of directly misleading a third person. The point is, however, that the third person must confront his thinking and actions with the activity of the person lied to or the "changed" person, who is also being misled. This "transformation" of the second person is evident in the fact that the person who is now overwhelmed behaves in a manner inadequate to the real situation. The third person must face the lie of the first person.

Based on the above thesis and referring to previous analyses, it is not difficult to conclude that a "changed" liar transforms the world according to their new vision, sensitivity and altered valuation. One person's transformation always leads to a transformation in the environment in which other people live, function, and make decisions. Every person comprises part of the environment along with other people. This means that the environment affects people's actions, lives and even their identities. Liars live in an environment of people, meaning they see it from a different perspective to the environment they belong to. Liars want to exist in this "changed" environment that includes people feeling the effects of the mentioned change in their minds and wills. They naturally adapt to it, considering it to be the right solution.

Therefore, they agree to live according to these "transformed" points of view that are not in accord with the truth (referring to the title of this part of the text and our previous analyses, we can talk about alternative points of view). People who do not agree with this and are forced to do so experience restrictions on their freedom. In this way, every single lie becomes the cause of the structure of evil (more or less built up and more or less intensively affecting others). It makes living according to the truth and freedom difficult (i.e. a truly human life characteristic of personal beings), and in extreme cases makes life almost impossible. Lying be-

comes a way to achieve the appearance of fulfilment and gives the delusion of development, seemingly natural and harmless, and maybe even becomes a helpful element of the world's functioning.

The analyses carried out so far clearly show that the term "alternative world" given in the title of this section, which is the result of lies, has a dual meaning. First, it means a "world" that arose in a deceived person's consciousness. This happened against his or her will and without their awareness. It is an "alternative world" to the one in which a person lives. Second, it is all about an "alternative world" that is created in the mind of a liar. In effect, the liar tries to live in both worlds simultaneously. Reconciling these two roles is very difficult and requires great effort.

It also requires further lies that would confirm the "truthfulness" of previous lies (because one cannot find their confirmation in the "real" or "original" world, so one has to generate more lies). A lot of commitment is needed to hide the real world from other people and the fact that a liar is the creator of an "alternative world". Lying to oneself also requires someone who has started living in this "alternative world". It is where the actions of the person lied to take place. By lying to others, the liar builds a realm of untruth around himself. This is not only moral but also mental and temporal (Chudy 1992, 91–93).

5. A Liar's Relationship with God and Satan

For a moral theologian, a lie is not only a bad deed, but above all a sin. It violates the eighth commandment of the Decalogue, which forbids bearing false witness (Ex 20:16). Lying also appears to be an abuse of the gift of speech received from God (or more broadly, the ability to communicate), which is an evident misappropriation. Actions against God also go against the man whom a liar wants to treat instrumentally as part of his plan to acquire the good he does not deserve. In this way, a lie also turns out to be an act of injustice, which bears the marks of sin (Derdziuk 2002).

Exploring the problem of lies in the above analyses presents them as actions contrary to the will of God and the love revealed in Christ's saving work. It allows us to see a lie as misappropriating God the Creator, the Savior and Sanctifier, and even as offending Him, an injustice towards Him. Lying is undoubtedly turning away from God and a disorderly turning towards creatures. This means it's a sin (Greniuk 2006, 238–242).

Drawing attention to the object of a lie as emphasized above, these deeds are classified as *intrinsece malum*, and Catholicism includes them in the category of mortal sins (Derdziuk 2002, 182). Classifying lies as such also results from the fact that a liar works in a conscious, voluntary, and intentional way, thus violating the order established by God in very important spheres of human existence, meaning towards God, one's neighbour, the world and oneself. We can see it as a desire to

break contact with God, who is the guarantor of order in the world. All this makes a lie a mortal sin (Greniuk 2006, 345).

When sinning or rejecting God, man does not remain alone. This is due to man's nature, being a person who does not lock himself up in his natural state. He replaces God's authority and plans with a pseudo-authority, Satan's devious plan. As a consequence, a sinful man acts like Satan and executes his deeds. This strong and even dramatic statement not only results from the anthropological knowledge pointed out earlier, but also from research on sin. According to it, whoever sins becomes a child of Satan (1 Jn 3:6). The above thesis, which applies to every mortal sin, in cases where the sin is a lie, is reinforced by the words of Jesus himself. He stated that everyone who lies is a child of Satan, the "liar and father of lies" (Jn 8:44).

An important original argument, which not only confirms but also strengthens the correctness of the thesis discussed here stating that a liar enters into a relationship with Satan and performs acts characteristic of the devil, is the concept of the liar outlined above as the creator of an "alternative world". Here we can find a community that thinks like Satan, whose destructive activity comes from the desire to be "like God" by rejecting the truth about his identity as a creature. A liar creating an "alternative world" succumbs to the devil's suggestions and tries to be "like God" (Gen 3:5); he deludes himself into thinking he is a creator. He wants to become the creator; he wants others to function according to the rules he proposes. A liar treats other people like tools that he needs so that he can implement his plan. This gives his activity a satanic character.

Referring to the reflection on the "alternative world as the effect of a lie", it can be stated here that the world "created" by a liar is a devilish world. It is marked by evil structures and based on them. Although they are the results of the accumulation of many lies, they always begin with one specific lie. Each subsequent lie strengthens and expands already existing sinful structures. In this process, every lie is significant. The alternative presented by the "world" described here created by a liar consists of being different from the world planned by God the Creator.

This "alternative" was not born out of love, but out of selfishness and injustice. These are its characteristic traits and also its basic principles. They leave no place for solidarity or even empathy. What counts is self-interest and achieving goals. Basing something on what is untruth is an obstacle to reaching the truth and, consequently, also the good that is integrally connected with it (Nowosad and Wprostkiewicz 2005b). Such a world does not correspond to the nature of man created in the image of God (Gen 1:27), who is Love (1 Jn 4:16), Truth (Jn 14:6) and the only Good (Mt 19:17). Thus, this is a world in which it is difficult to live and fulfil oneself; it is difficult to achieve one's goal and find meaning in one's existence. It is a world in which man constantly gets tired (although he is often not aware of it).

6. Conclusions: A Moral Theological Synthesis

The analyzes carried out and presented above most certainly shows the correctness of the hypothesis that a lie is harmful to a person who is within its reach. Research conducted according to the methodology of moral theology (i.e. referring to the Bible and according to man's experience, which in this case means using the achievements of philosophy and social sciences, including theological anthropology) (Mroczkowski 2011, 42–60) leads to the following conclusions: a lie is evil. It destroys man. This applies to both those who have been lied to and those who lie.

Due to the social dimension of this act, a lie adversely affects the entire society that it creates together with other people. This means that the effects of lies are also felt by those who are not directly involved in them. A lie strikes every person it touches on various levels of their existence: the personal and social levels, including in relation to God. Lies hinder man's integral development and fulfilment. It is no exaggeration to say that a lie creates anthropological destruction.

A lie is a planned activity, a purposefully executed human activity. It is characterized not only by actions but also by sophistication and premeditation. It is an action that not only directs man into the area of untruth but also imposes untruth instead of truth into the consciousness of the deceived and into the world in which these people function (Chudy 1992, 88–89). A liar tries to replace the truth with what is false. In this way, a liar becomes a kind of creator of an "alternative world".

By creating this "alternative world", a liar imposes "new rules" on the deceived according to which they both try to live. However, since these rules are incompatible with human nature and the world, they come from "another creator" and do not give man the opportunity to find fulfilment. Man was created in God's image, he comes from God, and in order to achieve our natural goal and find meaning in our existence, we must rely on God's rules. This means that people must know the truth that comes from the Eternal Truth. Man must associate with the truth and live according to it. This is because only the truth can set us free (Jn 8:32), meaning that it opens up the way for man to be fulfilled (Nowosad and Wyrst-kiewicz 2005c).

Trying to live happily in an "alternative world" is to condemn oneself to constantly generate lies. No lie or no evil gives man real peace but forces him to undertake activities that will make him create alternative worlds for himself and others. These are actions contrary to God's actions. Thus, it is also contrary to man.

Man, created in the image of the God of Truth (Gen 1:26-27), is unable to realize himself in life except by imitating God. This imitation, however, does not mean the need to create a "new world". It is a call to live according to the truth and good. Here we are talking about a life where there is no room for egoism; it is one in which man "rejects lies" (*deponentes mendacium*) (Eph 4:25) and moves towards a real community of persons (*communio personarum*) by "speaking the truth in love" (*veritatem facientes in caritate*) (Eph 4:15). Research in moral the-

ology leaves no doubt that this is the only way that leads to man's natural existential fulfilment in society (Nagórny 1997, 149–154; 273–338).

The above analyses lead to the belief that from the point of view of moral theology practiced in the spirit of personalism, one cannot agree with statements and concepts that recognize any positive sides of a lie and consider it to be one of the tools in communication for maintaining and regulating social relations. A lie is an act of *intrinsece malum* that cannot be considered beneficial in any case, regardless of the circumstances and goals of the actor. In other words: there is no situation where a lie can be considered a source of good (Derdziuk 2002, 182).

The above statements, however, do not include a naive belief that people will always say “the whole truth and nothing but the truth”. Its goal is not to develop an imperative that would oblige people to do so. Nor is it an absolute ban on deforming the truth. There are situations where telling what is not true cannot be treated as evil. Here we mean, among others, telling jokes, promising confidentiality, so-called defensive speech, or a white lie. However, one must be able to see the difference between these forms of expression and a lie.

Separate research should be devoted to these issues (which is the author's intention). Let it suffice to state that there are situations in which telling untruths does not mean lying. It concerns such a deformation of the truth that we clearly see it is a lie. This distinguishes it from lies. The later are always bad, something worth emphasizing at the end of the reflections undertaken here. Therefore, one cannot agree to justify a lie under any circumstances or obstacles in communicating the truth.

The thesis that lying is an element of communication is inconsistent with the knowledge presented above. Therefore, it can be seen as ideological. First, this point of view is not rational. Second, it is used to justify the behaviour of people who use lying for their own benefit. Especially for influencing. It can therefore be said that the theory that lying is a normal element of communication and building relationships between people resembles an ideology (Chlewiński 1993; Janeczek 1993). Because interdisciplinary scientific research shows that lying is an anthropological destruction – It destroys man and society. Here we can see the “spiral of destruction”: destroying society is destroying man, and destroying man is destroying society.

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Tomáš Halík's Concept of Atheism

Pojmovanje ateizma pri Tomášu Halíku

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the main theses of the Czech philosopher, sociologist, and theologian Tomáš Halík on atheism. He departs from the dogmatic understanding of atheism as the conviction of the non-existence of God or the lack of conviction of His existence and argues on the side of atheism as a way of purification and maturation of faith. The article consists of two parts. In the first one the context of the emergence, sources and main types of dogmatic atheism are presented. In the second part, the concept of atheism as a way of faith's criticism (criticism of inadequate concepts and ideas about God) and a form of existential experience (experiencing God's silence, absence and "death" and the insufficiency of human mental powers in His cognition) is outlined.

Keywords: religion, faith, atheism, idolatry, existential experience

Povzetek: Namen prispevka je analizirati glavne teze češkega filozofa, sociologa in teologa Tomáša Halíka o ateizmu, ki odstopa od dogmatičnega razumevanja ateizma kot prepričanja o neobstoju Boga ali pomanjkanja prepričanja o njegovem obstoju in se zavzema za ateizem kot način očiščevanja in zorenja vere. Prispevek sestavljata dva dela. V prvem delu so predstavljeni kontekst nastanka, viri in glavne vrste dogmatičnega ateizma. V drugem delu je orisano pojmovanje ateizma kot načina kritike vere (tj. kritike neustreznih pojmov in idej o Bogu) in oblike eksistencialne izkušnje (doživljanje Božje tišine, odsotnosti in 'smrti' ter nezadostnosti človekovih umskih sposobnosti pri njegovem spoznavanju).

Ključne besede: religija, vera, ateizem, idolatrija, eksistencialna izkušnja

1. Introduction

Researchers who deal with religion define three main positions concerning the existence of God: theism (belief in the existence of God or gods), atheism (denying their existence) and agnosticism (no possibility of acquiring knowledge on the existence of Gods). Each of these approaches has multiple versions, which are justified in many ways. It is difficult to specify the number of people sharing each view.

Theists are sometimes estimated to account for a majority of mankind, whereas atheists account for a minority. The latter dominate, particularly in many countries of Western Europe.

Tomáš Halík – a Roman Catholic priest, philosopher, psychologist and theologian, lives in a country in which more than half of the residents declare themselves atheists. Therefore, it is not surprising that his studies in philosophy, psychology, sociology of religion, mysticism, and the relationship between religion and culture also deal with atheism. He presents descriptions of the phenomenon, looks for its causes and points to its positive aspects.

The aim of these considerations is to analyse Halík's concept of atheism, which he understands not so much as a negation of the existence of God but as a way of purification and maturation of faith. These considerations consist of two parts. The first will present the origin and the main types of atheism, identified by the Czech intellectual. The second is his concept of atheism, which has a critical function toward faith, and which is a certain type of existential experience. Halík's selected publications, which are not only the outcome of his scientific reflection on religion but also of his socio-pastoral commitment, will be the point of reference.

2. Origin and Types of Atheism

For a start, one should agree that the concept of atheism provokes many problems. Firstly, it appeared in the context of the monotheistic religions of the Western world, especially the Christian rebellion against the cult of the "divine" emperor in ancient Rome (Clark 2015, 277). Secondly, atheism is related to the specific concept of theistic God as a personal and transcendent being, and the specific religious tradition (Cliteur 2009, 2–4). Thirdly, this term and expressions of atheism are ambiguous (Diller 2016, 7–18). This may mean that one is convinced that there is no God or that one is not convinced that God exists. Therefore, an atheist may be a person who opposes a certain form of theism or one with (or without) a certain conviction. This means that considerations of atheism have to take into account the context in which the term is used.

Therefore, Halík indicates two basic contexts in which atheism appears. Christianity is the first (Halík 2006a, 75–76). According to American scholar Justin L. Barrett, atheism is always a phenomenon secondary to religion. It appears in a specific socio-cultural context, marked by criticism of religious beliefs, and attempts to explain human death (Barrett 2004, 110–111). In this case, that religion is Christianity.

The second context is Enlightenment. The Czech thinker is of the opinion that classic Enlightenment atheism no longer exists. It turned into a vicarious religion (e.g. Nazism, communism) or various forms of agnosticism (Grün and Halík 2017, 88–90; Halík 2010b, 163–164). According to Halík, atheism, which had its roots in the Enlightenment, was ideological, plebeian, and indifferent to questions of God (Halík 2011, 97–103; Halík and Dostatni 2013, 75). Therefore, it does not hesitate

to reject Him (Halík 2005, 99; 2006a, 12). Therefore, Christian religion and the phenomenon of faith, which is of considerable importance, will be the context of the Czech intellectual's reflection on atheism.

Some contemporary philosophers also see Christianity as the context for the origin of atheism. They stress that atheism came into being against Christianity, and it does not exist without it (Ruse 2015, 186). In consequence, one can say that atheism is a product of a specific religion and culture. The religion is Christianity, and the cultural background is provided by the rationalist West-European tradition.

Halík believes that there are two sources of atheism. It is noteworthy that the Czech intellectual is referring to dogmatic atheism in this case. He understands it as a conviction about the non-existence of God or the lack of conviction about His existence. However, he does not want to question the existence of God.

He rejects dogmatic atheism, as it can transform into an intolerant pseudo-religion and repeat the errors of the existing religion (Grün and Halík 2017, 29; 2010a, 74; 2022, 272). Moreover, the metaphysics which lies in its grounds is primitive (Halík 2009, 99). So, what are the two sources of dogmatic atheism?

One is ideological, and the other is theological in nature. In the first case, it emphasises natural materialism and scientism. According to the Czech intellectual, materialism has been discredited because it is information rather than matter that is the primary element of the world. In contrast, science is not an ally of theism or atheism, and the dispute between them cannot be settled by reason (Grün and Halík 2017, 30; 84; Halík 2011, 89–91; 2014, 67). The relationship between atheism and natural materialism of an ideological nature is also mentioned by the British philosopher Julian Baggini (Baggini 2003, 3–10). Modern natural science replaced according to Halík theology as the dominant language of the modern people (Halík 2015, 57). Theology should therefore adopt a scientific language in order to argue in the public square and to be understandable for ordinary people (Kočí and Roubík 2015, 120). However, in the Czech thinker's opinion, science cannot provide support for the purification of faith. If science is not mistaken for ideology, it helps to show theism and atheism as two possibilities of the world interpreted by humans (Halík 2014, 65; Halík and Dostatni 2013, 46–47; 53). Therefore, Halík seeks the reason for atheism in modern theories, in which reality is reduced to material elements and real and justified knowledge is reduced to cognition provided by natural sciences. These theories were the foundation of ideologies, which shape human mentality.

The development of science is also seen as the source of atheism by the world-famous theologian Henri de Lubac. This progress had its consequences in the absolutisation of the cognitive value of science (human power over the world through knowledge), and the elimination of delusions (the source of religion). Therefore, all mystery and transcendence are excluded from the world. However, in de Lubac's opinion, this approach is in contrast with the competencies of natural sciences and with methodological purity. Science and religion deal with different dimensions of reality. They are neutral with respect to each other, and they provide

answers to different types of questions. Science explains the nature of phenomena, whereas religion shows the sense of human history and life. However, they have one feature in common: a critical approach to magical thinking (de Lubac 1969, 20–27; 38–49; 51–53). American theologian Michael J. Buckley, on the other hand, believes that atheism is not the result of the development of science, but rather the result of a lack of religious experience. Science, in his view, supported religion (e.g. Newton's mechanistic system). At the same time, the importance of religious experience was overlooked. God was a deduced being, not an experienced one. Over time, science achieved autonomy, God did not have to fill cognitive gaps, and religion has been questioned (Buckley 2009, 51–60; 81–84; 90–92).

Therefore, it seems that referring to the specific sciences does not have to result in atheism. This is because it is not possible to ask about the existence of God for methodological reasons in sciences. The emergence of atheism is rather linked with the crisis and elimination of metaphysics. The issue of the existence of God appears as part of metaphysical studies, whose objective is to show the ultimate reasons for the existence of reality. Showing such ultimate justifications is not possible on the basis of specific sciences, which seek answers to questions about how reality functions rather than about the ultimate reason for its existence (Szopa 2013, 162–163). Therefore, using Stephen J. Gould's words, science and religion are "non-overlapping *magisteria*" when it comes to the existence of God because they use different study methodologies. The relevant metaphysics plays a much more important role in this case.

According to Halík, the second source of atheism has a theological nature, as it concerns the issue of faith. In his opinion, faith means being open to others and overcoming being focused on oneself. A believer does not see self-fulfilment but rather overcoming oneself as the purpose of life. This is because self-fulfilment often conceals the danger of a narcissistic focus on oneself. Self-fulfilment can be only a side effect of overcoming oneself. On the other hand, faith is mainly a dialogue with "you". In Halík's opinion, in faith, it is always about the other "you". It finds its articulation in the praying dialogue with God, which, however, cannot neglect the dialogue with humans. There is the divine "You" present in meetings with the human "you". Therefore, atheism is caused by the narcissistic inclinations of humans (Halík 2004, 174–175; 2006b, 162; 2010b, 165; 202–203; 2013, 13–15; 2014, 127–128; 143). Atheism is related to the crisis of faith, which no longer involves an opening to God coming in oneself, but a closing of oneself in the circle of one's own affairs. Therefore, following the intuition of the German religious thinker Martin Buber, atheism is caused by a transformation of the dialogic into the monologic lifestyle. Therefore, faith becomes impossible as the dialogue is its essence.

Other researchers who study atheism mention its intellectual-cognitive and social-moral sources. The former include the lack of proper religious knowledge and the difficulties in acquiring it, empirical-practical education and excessive emphasis on human power resulting from scientific accomplishments. The latter include a rebellion against the requirements of faith and abandoning practising it, outrage with the life of Christians and bad examples from history, the materialism of mo-

dern civilisation and orientation towards the earthly life and non-rational reasons (emotions, traumas, lack of time, weakness of one's will) (Szopa 2013, 164).

It has also been pointed out that contemporary atheism is associated with a new context. Its novelty consists in proposing a new morality (without reference to the transcendent reality), warning against fundamentalism (intolerance and aggression), regarding scientific accomplishments as the base for one's actions (especially cognitive sciences) and religious pluralism (culturally conditioned religious experience and concepts) (Skurzak 2020, 18–23).

However, Halík points to two sources of atheism, mentioned above, which partly overlap with those mentioned by other researchers. He also stresses that contemporary atheism is not uniform, but it has many different forms.

"Apatheism", i.e. indifference to religious matters, is one of them. Silence in the face of the Mystery, close to the negative mystic theology, is another (Grün and Halík 2017, 30; Halík 2011, 89–91; 2014, 67; 2022, 153). Apatheism is sometimes called a "grey zone", which includes people basically being indifferent towards religion (Hošek 2015, 3). While negative theology can be regarded as the heir of authentic biblical atheism, which defends the freedom and greatness of the Divine mystery against subjectivisation (Halík 2011, 100).

Moreover, according to Halík, there is reckless atheism (one forgets about God and replaces Him with other gods), self-righteous (God is overshadowed by the inflated human ego), liberating (one gets rid of one's own projections of the Absolute), painful (rejecting one's faith because of suffering), atheism of indifference (one is not interested in the issue of God, as it is not consistent with scientific theorems), of enthusiasm (protest against evil and eagerness to seek good) (Halík 2009, 53; 107–111; 2013, 62–63) and so-called "atheism of the stomach" (one does not ask any questions concerning spiritual reality) (2020, 253).

It is worth noting that there is also another typology of atheism in the literature. We are faced with theoretical (dogmatic) atheism (denial of God's existence after consideration), practical atheism (failure to draw consequences from theism), atheism of inattention (no question about God due to lack of time and interest), cultural atheism (criticism of faith by hedonistic and consumerist culture), scientific atheism (denial of the existence of God on the basis of the application of scientific methods and results) (Fafara 2016, 72–75), and militant atheism (struggle against traditional creeds and institutionalized dogmas) (Roubík 2015, 70).

Thus, Halík mentions a whole range of types of atheism. It is noteworthy that they are not isolated as a result of unrealistic speculations but rather reflections on human existential experiences. In consequence, they can lead to theism or atheism.

Halík is of the opinion that theistic faith and atheism are two points of view and two possible interpretations of reality. This is because God does not exist in the same way as the world and people do. He is primarily concealed and transcendent. It is this concealment of God and the radical dissimilarity of His existence that leaves space for both phenomena (Halík 2009, 58–59; Halík and Dostatni 2013, 142).

Faith and atheism are related to a feature of the world, i.e. an ambivalence which allows for both interpretations (Halík 2007, 79). Therefore, faith and atheism are forms of interpretation of ambivalent reality. They can be perceived and understood in a variety of ways. They give some people access to the cognition of the existence of the Absolute. However, they deny such cognition to others. In the words of the Romanian religious scientist Mircea Eliade, the world can become a sphere of *sacrum* or *profanum*, a place of hierophany or concealing of the Absolute.

In another place, Halík stresses that atheism is the antithesis of naive religion. Its elements include a type of faith which does not experience darkness (2009, 50). Meanwhile, the experience of the concealment of God and uncertainty of His existence and cognition is an inherent part of faith.

In this way, atheism reveals its tragic side. This is because a person can lose confidence and orientation in life, which is guaranteed by faith. In consequence, one starts to experience existential emptiness (Grün and Halík 2017, 20), and one can then start to absolutise relative values uncritically. Paradoxically, one who questions the existence of God, in Halík's opinion, starts to pretend to be Him (Halík 2007, 163). As a consequence of atheism, one can experience the meaninglessness of life and the specific deification of humanity. Therefore, it proves to be self-contradictory, as by denying the existence of God, it absolutises and deifies humanity.

However, Halík claims that nowadays, people tend to incline toward agnosticism rather than atheism. The latter is in crisis, and the future does not belong to it (Grün and Halík 2017, 30; 84; Halík 2011, 89–91; 2014, 67), especially since the Czech thinker points to another modern phenomenon – post-secularism, that is, the return and rebirth of religion.

The advent of the post-secular age was announced in 2001 by the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (2022, 123–124). However, opinions can be found that this occurred at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries or the mid-1970s of the 20th century.

Halík stressed that we now see the so-called “return of religion” in several forms. Firstly, as terrorism. Second, in philosophical thought (e.g. J. L. Marion, G. Vattimo, J. Caputo, R. Kearney). Thirdly, in human interest in spirituality (Grün and Halík 2017, 147–155). Halík thus agrees with an ideologically close to him Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who also stresses the return of religion as spirituality. Its main features are subjectivism, emphasising the needs of one's own self and emotionality. The main focus is on the development of one's own personality and the search for the meaning of life. Religion does not have institutional forms but takes the shape of individualised spiritual life. Hence, what we see is a transformation rather than a vanishing of religion (Taylor 2007, 506–513; 519–520; 2011, 252–256). The postmodern era became the post-secular era. However, this does not mean the return of the sacral era and the earlier religious order, but it is rather related to the emergence of different forms and striving for a new spiritual experience. In this situation, there is a need for a deeper inner life and seeking a form of spirituality. It is noteworthy that not only believers engage in spiritual searches but also people who think of themselves as atheists.

In this case, post-secularism would be a result of a certain tension between the traditional religion (religiousness is wearing out) and atheism (atheistic worldview is unsatisfactory). A question would appear between these two options. This is also a question asked by Halík, who also assigns an important role to be played by atheism. He stresses that the only form worth one's attention is a form of atheism which is critical of faith, whose purpose is the purification of faith, and atheism which is a type of existential experience. Let us look at both types.

3. Atheism vs Purification and the Maturation of One's Faith

Halík mainly stresses the critical function of atheism, which applies to a specific type of theism. He believes that only then can it be interesting and inspiring (Halík 2009, 99; 2022, 272). Moreover, in his opinion, atheism in its critical function is topical and important these days, when the return of religion – mentioned above – takes place. At the same time, this atheism should be closer to the tradition of negative theology (2011, 97–103; Halík and Dostatni 2013, 75). Therefore, atheism could be, in the view of some commentators on Halík's thought, integrated into theology as its relevant methodological tool (Kočí and Roubík 2015, 116). Halík believes that its importance arises from the phenomenon of post-secularism, which is present nowadays. Peter Berger's claim of progressive secularisation is no longer valid, and he replaced it with desecularization. Religion does not dwindle, but rather it undergoes the processes of transformation, privatisation, and pluralisation. Halík is also a proponent of a similar theory – that religion transforms rather than vanishes.

In Halík's opinion, atheism is mainly a critical attempt at purifying faith from its illusory, caricatural and outdated forms. The real enemy of faith is not so much atheism but rather superstitions and idolatry. One succumbs to the latter in two cases. Firstly, when one starts to worship and adore the products of the mind. Secondly, when one takes too seriously something that does not deserve it (e.g. money, politics, power) (Grün and Halík 2017, 101; 271–272; Halík 2005, 61; 2009, 12; 2010b, 161; 2011, 35–36; 2013, 60; 2022, 271–272). The Czech intellectual thus approaches the concept of anatheism, or faith renewed, purified in the fire of criticism and deeper (Halík 2022, 115–116). The author of this concept is the Irish philosopher Richard Kearney, according to whom anatheism is a third way between dogmatic theism and militant atheism (Kearney 2010, 3). Anatheism is linked to the critical recovery of sanctity and the return of divinity after the disappearance of its previous form. It is thus not only an experience of loss, but also an opening up to the newness of the divinity with doubts and uncertainties. Its essence is the loss and recovery of the sanctity in human life (2021, 79–83). The experience, therefore, of purification and renewal of faith, is common to Halík and Kearney. They have a positive attitude to it because it is an opportunity to abandon a superficial and immature faith and emergence of a deeper and more mature faith. Halík refers to the way of purifying faith as atheism and Kearney as anatheism.

Elsewhere, Halík points out that atheism performs an iconoclastic function, as its role is to topple idols (Halík and Dostatni 2013, 75). This is because society tends to produce idols by creating images and concepts of God. On the one hand, the fall of idols breaks human piety (Halík 2020, 253). Therefore, the main contribution of atheism to faith is its anti-idolatrous nature. Atheism functions as an interruption of idols (Kočí and Roubík 2015, 118). However, on the other hand, it provides an opportunity for humanity to open up to the mystery of the world (Halík 2007, 32). Atheism is also an ally of religion and faith, as it dismantles everything that is dead and rotten in it. However, the problem lies in that, as a consequence, it may lead not so much to discover the living and true God but to the emergence of new idols (2006a, 86–87).

Simon Weil, the French philosopher, and social activist, thinks along similar lines to Halík's – that atheism is a manifestation of human striving for purification of the idea of God from obsolete sociological, philosophical, and theological influences (Evdokimov 1996, 152). Moreover, in de Lubac's opinion, atheism gives an opportunity for purification, healing, enlightening and safeguarding faith against mixing the human and the divine element (de Lubac 1969, 19).

In this case, Halík sees atheism as a blessing, an opportunity for the purification of faith and opening a new space for it. This is because believers succumb to a harmful temptation to equate God with human notions and expectations (Halík 2006a, 285; 2009, 119). However, in Halík's opinion, one cannot forget that human notions of God change during a human lifetime. What is more, even an atheist has some idea of Him but assigns Him a different ontological status (Halík 2007, 106; 2013, 17–19; Halík and Dostatni 2013, 52). The Czech thinker believes that atheists are sometimes more faithful than they think. They know God under a different name, they reject a caricature of Him, or they struggle with Him in their lives (Halík 2010b, 72). Therefore, they are not completely indifferent to Him, but they rather try to discover the truth about Him.

In the case of believers, atheism is – in Halík's opinion – a moment in the dynamics of faith. It enables one's transition from the world of infantile religious notions and external signs of piety to the maturity of faith and spiritual development (2004, 327). Therefore, the Czech intellectual does not see atheism as being convinced about the non-existence of God or not being convinced about His existence. It is rather a form of criticism of all idolatry and purification of religion from human concepts, convictions, and notions of God. However, a question arises: can they be fully eliminated and avoided? It rather seems not.

Therefore, one should agree with the philosopher of religion, Ireneusz Ziemiński, that images of God are never free from human notions, and each conceptualisation of God is the process of creating an idol. Therefore, idolatry is a constant and inherent element of each religion – only its forms change. Idols become dangerous when people equate them with the object of religion and worship them. One should bear in mind that they exist solely as certain metaphors. Therefore, in Ziemiński's opinion, one should distinguish the real God from His images.

However, if one is aware of their inadequacy with respect to *sacrum*, they can be a tool for establishing and maintaining relations with Him. An idol cannot retain on itself but refer to the transcendent reality with respect to it. Ziemiński points out that some idols are replaced with others, but they are not removed completely. This is because destroying idols would be tantamount to destroying religion itself because they are means of reaching the transcendent *sacrum* (Ziemiński 2020, 145–157; 188–189). Therefore, one can say that a certain form of idolatry in religion, i.e. the creation of human notions and concepts of God, is unavoidable. Therefore, Halík is right when he claims that religion and faith need constant purification. People should bear in mind at all times that God is always greater than our concepts and notions of Him (*Deus semper maior*). He also exceeds our existential and cognitive categories. Purification would be possible owing to atheism performing the function of not so much the negation of God, but rather of criticism of His various conceptual and notional representations.

To Halík, atheism is a kind of existential and spiritual experience. One can describe it as “the silence of God”, His absence or even “death” (Halík 2006a, 88–89; 92–93; 2009, 47). This vision of atheism of the Czech intellectual brings him close to the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg’s concept of “atheism of hiddenness”, whose view is that God does not exist because if he did, he would not be hiding. For if a perfectly loving God existed, He would then be open to a personal relationship with human being, just as a parent is open and present with a child in order to provide opportunities for growth and help in moments of crisis (Schellenberg 2004, 33–34; 2005, 203; 2015 21; 103). Halík, however, draws different conclusions from the hiddenness of God than Schellenberg. For the former, this phenomenon is an existential and spiritual experience for the purification of faith, while the latter treats it as a rationale in favour of dogmatic atheism.

Therefore, Halík emphasises the existential dimension of atheism, which is a kind of religious experience and a stage in faith development. Because it has to pass through the desert of God’s silence and dark night to reach a greater depth and maturity. In such situations, atheism is a manifestation of doubt, which should be taken seriously to prevent faith from becoming an ideology (Halík 2005, 99; 2006a, 12). In Halík’s opinion, this experience sometimes stems from a confrontation with suffering and related existential questions. It also appears at a moment of a crisis of faith and of limited human cognitive capabilities and volitive powers (2006a, 88–89; 92–93; 2009, 47).

In the opinion of the Czech thinker, the experience of the absence of God is a feature in each type of real living faith. An atheist responds to the experience of the absence of God with the conviction of His death, and a believer – with the patience of faith (Grün and Halík 2017, 79). Halík remarks elsewhere that the claim of “God’s death” is incomprehensible and unacceptable to Christians. It is nonsensical both with respect to classic Greek metaphysics and to positivistic atheism. However, the sense of the term can be understood positively, and the deep spiritual experience behind it can be articulated on the grounds of Christianity (Halík 2006a, 89–90). The phrase “God’s death” is used by the Czech thinker to describe

the death of specific notions of God, which are affected by historical, temporal, cultural and personal factors (Grün and Halík 2017, 269–270). Faith has to pass through the experience of death many times so that its existing form, marked with human notions of God, could die. Their death is an indispensable element of the religious maturation of a believer (Halík 2022, 220). Elimination of specific notions and concepts is familiar even to mystics, who often talk in this context about the experience of the “dark night” of senses and spirit (e.g. John of the Cross). Therefore, Halík moves considerations of atheism from the area of metaphysics to the sphere of existential experience, marked by the experience of Divine silence, absence and dying. On the one hand, this experience is difficult for the individual, but on the other, it can bring some benefits, as it leads to more mature faith.

According to some, Halík’s opinion mentioned above can be called “moderate theism”. In which the limitations of theism and atheism are repealed, the strengths of both options are preserved, and religion is authenticated. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the concept of moderate theism applies to our thinking about God rather than to God Himself. This is because He is a non-empirical being, and there is no certainty about His ontic status (Ciesielski 2018, 90–99).

Therefore, the brave concept of complementarity of modern theism and atheism would be close to Halík. Atheism would be linked to a precious existential experience of “God’s death”, which would be the death of idolatry. In this regard, Halík’s concept would be close to the representatives of the so-called “theology of the death of God”. They drew attention to the necessity to free God from a description in concepts present in our culture (idols), the result of which is a kind of objectification of the divine being and postulated the need for a living reference to God in the world by taking into account new ways of His presence and worship (McGrath 2005, 160; Trotter 1965, 46–47). However, they would not be completely free of any notions and representations of God because worshipped notions and symbols are elements of ritual. The existing notions and symbols of God’s presence would be replaced with new ones, and the existing rituals could be replaced with new forms of worship.

4. Conclusion

The aim of these considerations was to analyse Halík’s concept of atheism, which he understands not so much as a negation of the existence of God but as a way of purification and maturation of faith. They consisted of two parts. The first part presents the origin and the main types of dogmatic atheism. The second part presents a concept of atheism which has a critical function toward faith, and which is a type of existential experience.

Firstly, it must be stressed that Halík abandons the dogmatic understanding of atheism as a conviction about the non-existence of God or the lack of conviction about His existence. Therefore, he does not want to question the existence of God. He understands atheism in two main ways. Firstly, he sees it as a way of cri-

ticising and purifying the faith. Its objects include mainly various notions and ideas of God, which lack an adequate concept of Him. Moreover, they are always affected by historical, temporal, cultural, social, and personal factors. Secondly, atheism is a kind of existential and spiritual experience. It involves experiencing God's silence, absence or even "death" in situations marked with suffering, existential questions, doubts, crises of faith and insufficiency of cognitive capabilities and the volitive powers of a person.

Halík enhances atheism understood in this way. He does not regard it as a threat to religion or an obstacle in the life of a believer but rather as an opportunity for the maturation of faith and for opening up new ways of experiencing the presence of God, who is primarily a Mystery to humans. Such atheism is close to the tradition of negative (apophatic) theology, whose proponents believed that positive cognition of God's nature was beyond human cognitive capabilities. They wanted primarily to maintain respect towards the divine Mystery. Hence, they rejected all images and abstract notions as inadequate to describe the nature of God, and they approached His mystery with negative formulas, paradoxes, and antinomies. However, the assumptions of the negative theology are problematic, as they result in religion and faith with no content. However, it seems that they cannot be empty with respect to contents as religion and faith always contain a cognitive element because it is significant in each dimension of human life, despite the fact that human cognition must always be corrected or questioned.

Therefore, Halík's concept of atheism should be regarded as a form of objection to the immaturity of faith and an antithesis to naive human religiousness, that is, an attitude based on infantile imaginations and anthropomorphic notions. In the post-secular era, marked by the return and metamorphosis of religion, the Czech intellectual appeals for mature faith in the case of the modern believer. If faith is to mature, it must be constantly purified and confronted, to use the words of Karl Jaspers, with various "limit situations". It must also be emphasised that purification is not a one-off activity but a permanent process. This effort seems to be worth making, especially given the insufficiency and deficits of traditional religion and the challenges associated with the secularisation and pluralism of religiousness.

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Forgiveness as the Way to Salvation: A Soteriological Account of Forgiveness in the Religious Writings of Kierkegaard and Its Meaning for Immanent Ethics

Odpuščanje kot pot do odrešenja: soteriološki prikaz odpuščanja v Kierkegaardovih verskih spisih in njegov pomen za imanentno etiko

Abstract: This paper attempts to draw a strict Christian vision of forgiveness from Kierkegaard's religious writings and to present its possible meaning for immanent ethics. The starting point of the considerations presented herein is the presupposition that forgiveness, as an essentially Christian phenomenon, does not refer to immanent interpersonal relations, but has its own deep, transcendent dimension. In this view, forgiveness is founded on the spiritual understanding of love of one's neighbour as an act in which God always mediates in the relation between two people. It is He who really forgives and, in this act, reconciles and equalizes the one who loves and the sinner with each other. Such forgiveness does not concern some particular sinful act, but the sin of life—living without God in the world. In this sense, forgiveness is a creative work of love which transforms the being of man and recreates it in the new reality of love, opening before the individual the way to salvation. At the end of the text, I argue that such forgiveness may have great importance for immanent ethics if only the epistemic and moral distance between temporal and eternal reality is kept.

Keywords: forgiveness, love, soteriology, Christianity, Kierkegaard, transcendent ethics, immanent ethics

Povzetek: Prispevek skuša iz Kierkegaardovih verskih spisov izluščiti strogo krščansko vizijo odpuščanja in predstaviti njen morebitni pomen za imanentno etiko. Izhodišče predstavljenih razmišljanj je predpostavka, da se odpuščanje kot bistveno krščanski pojav ne nanaša na imanentne medosebne odnose, temveč ima svojo globoko, transcendentno razsežnost. V tem smislu odpuščanje temelji na duhovnem razumevanju ljubezni do bližnjega kot dejanja, v katerem v odnosu med dvema človekoma vedno posreduje Bog. On je tisti, ki zares odpušča in s tem dejanjem spravi in izenači ljubečega ter grešnika. Takšno odpuščanje ne zadeva kakega posebnega grešnega dejanja, ampak greh življenja –

življenje v svetu brez Boga. V tem smislu je odpuščanje ustvarjalno delo ljubezni, ki človeško bitje preoblikuje, ga poustvarja v novi resničnosti ljubezni in pred posameznikom odpira pot k odrešenju. Na koncu prispevka trdim, da ima takšno odpuščanje za imanentno etiko lahko velik pomen, če le ohranimo epistemično in moralno razdaljo med časno in večno resničnostjo.

Ključne besede: odpuščanje, ljubezen, soteriologija, krščanstvo, Kierkegaard, transcendentna etika, imanentna etika

1. Introduction

The problem of forgiveness is one of those issues in which Kierkegaard's religious thought cumulates.¹ Essentially all of the Danish philosopher's thought regarding the spiritual development of the person is organized around the sin of the individual and the possibility of the individual's liberating himself from its influence. This article is an attempt to develop a certain radical account of Christian forgiveness, which, based on Kierkegaard's thought, refers both to the spiritual vision of love presented in his *Works of Love*, as well as to a broader spiritual concept of man that emerges from the entirety of his religious writings. Of key importance here is Sylvia Walsh's comment that: "Of all the later literature, *The Sickness unto Death* has probably received the most critical attention, while the devotional writings of the period have been virtually ignored. But it is precisely in these works that one finds the heart of Kierkegaard's understanding of the consciousness of sin and its relation to the forgiveness of sin in living Christianly." (Walsh 2005, 32)

Kierkegaard presents his understanding of the act of forgiveness primarily in the discourses devoted to the subject matter "Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins" (1 Pt 4:8)². His vision finds its implicit but clear exemplification in the other set of his discourses referring to the character of "The Woman Who Was a Sinner" from the Gospel of Luke (Lk 7:36-50).³ In order for the correspondence between these two pictures to be complete, however, it is necessary to cast a critical eye on the way in which Kierkegaard sees the encounter of Jesus with the sinful wom-

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² Kierkegaard published discourses devoted to this topic in various series of his discourses over the span of his creative output. He first considers this topic in two texts from *Three Upbuilding Discourses*, published in 1843 (Kierkegaard 1990, 55–68; 69–78), next taking it up in the second series of *Works of Love* from 1847 titled *Love Hides a Multitude of Sins* (1995, 280–299) and finally in the second of *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* from 1851 (1997b, 179–188).

³ These are discourses written and published in a later phase of Kierkegaard's output, though still before his last polemical stage. The first discourse comes from the 1849 collection *Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (Kierkegaard 1997b, 135–144), the second was published as *An Upbuilding Discourse* in 1850 (Kierkegaard 1997b, 145–160), and the third opened 1851's *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (283–292). In the discourses devoted to the subject "Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins," Kierkegaard himself invokes the character of "The Woman Who Was a Sinner" (Kierkegaard 1990, 75–76; 77; 1995, 282) which was the motivating factor behind seeking such a correspondence as an original interpretative approach in this article.

an in the home of the Pharisee. A crucial supplement for understanding his vision of forgiveness are Kierkegaard's thoughts concerning Christian reconciliation as set out in *The Victory of the Conciliatory Spirit in Love, Which Wins the One Overcome* (Kierkegaard 1995, 331–344), as well as his comments regarding the problem of forgiveness and salvation found in other discourses, pseudonymous writings and in his notes from *Journals*.

The authors of publications devoted to the problem of forgiveness in Kierkegaard's discourses have, so far, focused primarily on the possibility of applying select fragments of his thought to the contemporary discussion of this issue. John Lippitt, in his book *Love's Forgiveness: Kierkegaard, Resentment, Humility and Hope* (2020) as well as in several texts predating this work, has devoted the most attention to this problem (Lippitt 2013a; 2013b; 2017). Lippitt presents a deep, multidimensional picture of how Christian forgiveness as understood by Kierkegaard can enrich our universal-human, moral decisions relating to this act. He uses Kierkegaard's deliberations to argue for a certain way of thinking about forgiveness (unconditional forgiveness understood not as an obligation, but as a praiseworthy and admirable gift), one that is present in the contemporary ethics debate. Despite admitting the importance and need for Lippitt's arguments for unconditional forgiveness in the ethics debate, in this paper I intend to advance a different dimension of forgiveness that emerges from Kierkegaard's thought. My deliberations run, to some extent, contrary to those developed by Lippitt.

The main aim of this paper is to provide, within the context presented above, and based on Kierkegaard's religious discourses, a certain vision of Christian forgiveness as a soteriological event. Forgiveness Kierkegaard speaks of does not refer to the typical life situation in which one, having committed a blameworthy act towards another, asks for forgiveness (conditional forgiveness), or to the situation where one receives forgiveness from a victim without asking for it (unconditional forgiveness), but to the spiritual dimension of the individual's existence, the goal of which, in a Christian sense, is to obtain salvation. On Kierkegaard's account, the actual act of forgiveness arising between two individuals proves to be a moment of divine intervention which completely transforms the life of a person.

Forgiveness so understood differs significantly from the way this problem is formulated in the debates in contemporary ethics (See Słowikowski 2020). It does not refer to an interpersonal ethical relation but to the transcendent Christian problem of creating an individual to live in Divine love and to spread this love in the world. On the Christian account presented by Kierkegaard, only love brings forgiveness. In this sense, the individual who, in following the prototype of Christ, spreads forgiveness through love, opens up before himself and others the prospect of salvation.

This spiritual, soteriological understanding of forgiveness which, in essence, has a transcendent dimension (just like Kierkegaard's entire ethics of Christian love—the so-called second ethics), is impossible to directly translate into the typically human understanding of this phenomenon, for it concerns a different real-

ity. The true Christian, an imitator of Christ—as portrayed by Kierkegaard—is a person fixated not on realizing temporal human ends (such as forgiving someone’s particular wrongdoing or forgiving some socio-political phenomenon or even considering, at the meta-level, whether forgiveness is generally sensible or possible), but on obtaining, through oneself and through others, the final aim of existence—salvation.

This paper is tasked with showing, in this context, that immanent ethics (that is, universal-human ethics, that which is concerned with interpersonal relations) needs transcendent ethics (that is, Christian ethics as conceived by Kierkegaard). The former does not need the latter, however, in order to be able to apply the latter’s solutions directly to the former’s domain, this being impossible without the spiritual transformation of the people, whom transcendent ethics is meant to concern. In other words, in the world there is no Christian forgiveness without true Christians who spread it. Transcendent ethics is nevertheless needed in the temporal world as a certain higher idea, as a certain model for behaviour that gives an order to the universal-human world.

In this sense, though of course one can attempt to combine transcendent ethics with immanent ethics as Lippitt does—one then has to constantly bring attention to the distance separating the two and to stress that this distance is epistemically and morally significant. One should not blur the difference between the two, but accentuate it, just as Kierkegaard does when, for example, speaking of the infinite, qualitative difference between the eternal (transcendent ethics) and the temporal (immanent ethics) (Kierkegaard 1985, 41–47; 1992, 217; 412–413; 492; 580; 1980b, 99; 121; 126–27). Here I do not intend to dispute or undermine specific arguments of Lippitt or of other authors who follow a similar interpretive path (Berry 1992, 196–217; Senyshyn 1998; Howell 2010; Pyper 2011; Ball 2019; Marcar 2019). My aim is to show that Kierkegaard’s main endeavour is to make it clear that Christian forgiveness is qualitatively different from the forgiveness that is discussed in ethical debates, both secular and Christian, that focus on the ethical character of people.

To this end, in the steps that follow I will first briefly recount the spiritual conception of Kierkegaard’s understanding of love, which underpins his account of forgiveness. I will then present his vision of the love-forgiveness dialectic in which there always exists a relation between the three sides. With this as a foundation, I will show what Kierkegaard’s Christian strategy of forgiveness as the hiding of sins consists in, a strategy which goes against common-sense ethical intuitions, its main goal being to arouse love in others. This will allow for a more critical analysis of how, in Kierkegaard’s thought, love is created in another person by means of the act of forgiveness, thereby summoning him to a new spiritual life. This in turn will serve as a basis to show how, on such an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s religious writings, Christian forgiveness becomes an event with a soteriological dimension. Having so constructed a picture of Christian forgiveness, in the conclusion I will try to show what the value of such an affirmative theological ideal consists in. To this end, I will attempt to consider why it is worthwhile to be

ethically aware of this ideal's existence, and how, while retaining its qualitative difference from immanent ethics, it can enhance the ordinary person's ethical character in temporal life (i.e. the ethical character of those who are not Christians as understood by Kierkegaard, but who are deeply moral people in the universal-human sense).

2. The Spiritual Concept of Love

To understand what Christian forgiveness is on Kierkegaard's view, it must be shown in the context of the Christian account of love presented in *Works of Love*. Of the greatest importance here is the distinction between spiritual love and preferential love—and the kind of love that makes it possible to separate one attitude from the other is love for one's neighbor (Kierkegaard 1995, 17–90). In short, spiritual love is love for one's neighbor, while every other kind of love is preferential love (all kinds of preference should be included here: erotic love, friendship, love for one's spouse, for the child, for the homeland, and the like). The former belongs to the order of transcendence and is that in which God's love in man manifests itself; the latter refers to immanent reality and is a natural, purely human event.

The category of neighbour in Kierkegaard's thought is treated maximally seriously as that which, in accordance with the pattern of Jesus Christ, unites and equalizes all people in God (Kierkegaard 1995, 44; 49–50; 53; 58–60; 65–73; 80–90; 99–102; 137–143). Love for one's neighbour appears only where man unites through God with another person. Every moment in which love for one's neighbour is actualized in a person is a moment in which divine love manifests itself in this person; this occurrence is the utmost expression of humanity (62–63; 147; 366; 1997a, 117–118). What is clear in this context is that normal, human displays of love—those relating to preference—are deprived of this transcendent feature, and though existentially they are very important in life, they cannot be a medium for a person's relationship with God and do not lead the individual to spiritual fulfilment.

On the other hand, however, love for one's neighbour in Kierkegaard's view is not something voluntary, something one could choose as a life attitude on the basis of preferring one lifestyle or another. Love for one's neighbour is the duty of every person as one who was created by God, and in it lies the essence of humanity (22; 24; 29–44). This duty, however, is hidden in spirit and will remain invisible to anyone who does not delve deep into his interiority. Love for one's neighbour is thus an object of choice, but this choice is a choice of self-denial, that is to say, of giving up preferential love as a fundamental way of relating to other people (52–56; 364–365; 369; 372–373). This means renouncing the attitude of life which is manifested by the majority of people who are oriented in their existence towards fulfilling temporal goals. And that is why it is an extremely difficult choice, even an impossible one for someone who does not seek spiritual transformation in his life.

This duty to love one's neighbour points to yet another very important element—the fact that one does not recognize in another one's neighbour and that one does not treat him as one's neighbour does mean that he ceases to be one's neighbour (21–24). This is why a lack of relating to another as one's neighbour reveals the sin of man—the lack of a real relation to God in existence (23; 236–237; 257; 271–273; 281–282; 296–299). The lack of love for one's neighbour is thus here an absence of love for God; it is a resignation from spiritual fulfilment in relation to the Creator (1995, 112–114; 1997a, 195). A person who does not have a love for his neighbour within him is guided in his life by egoistic self-love, which is manifested in preferential love (1995, 21; 44; 52–58). And while there are, of course, different attitudes possible here, from those in the human sense, which are completely condemnable (such as using other people for one's own needs) to the noblest (sacrificing oneself for another person), this ethical difference is, in a certain sense, only a quantitative difference in relation to the qualitative difference between preferential love and love for one's neighbour (53; 139–142). For Kierkegaard, the lack of love for one's neighbour is the source of evil in man; it is precisely that which requires forgiveness in the Christian sense.

3. The Dialectic of Love and Forgiveness

In the Christian account, Kierkegaard presents, the relation of love cannot simply be a relation between one person and another, but “/.../ is a relationship between: a person—God—a person, that is, that God is the middle term” (Kierkegaard 1995, 106–107). God, who establishes love as the foundation of a person's life, must be present in every manifestation of this love if it is to relate to its source of creation (8–10; 215–217). This three-dimensional relation of love is not a matter of a person's choice but constitutes the basis of his being established in love. When one person turns to another, he thereby turns to God, who is the only true and appropriate object of love (106–109; 120–121; 113; 130; 264–265). The ultimate addressee of man's acts is always God. Thus, if one performs an act against another, one at the same time in a spiritual sense performs an act against God and oneself, and when one performs an act for another, one at the same time performs an act for oneself and for God. This results from the fact that, on Kierkegaard's account, “neighbor”, like God, is a middle term (54; 119; 142). Thus, there exists a full equality between love for God and love for one's neighbour, such that to not love God is equivalent to not loving one's neighbour, and not loving one's neighbour is to not love God. In this way, when a person, in his egoism, forgets about others and cares only for himself, God, too, forgets about him, and such a person fails to exist spiritually. And when a person, out of love, forgets about himself and sacrifices himself for others, God then remembers about him and maintains his spirit in existence (281). As a result, Kierkegaard says:

“What love does, that it is; what it is, that it does—at one and the same moment. At the same moment it goes out of itself (the outward direction),

it is in itself (the inward direction); and at the same moment it is in itself, it goes out of itself in such a way that this outward going and this returning, this returning and this outward going are simultaneously one and the same." (280)

This dialectical reflexivity of love radiates upon the Christian understanding of forgiveness, which, on Kierkegaard's account, is nothing more than a work of love (Berry 1992, 207; Ferreira 2001, 169; Lippitt 2017, 21; 22; 30). This means that, when one person forgives another, he at the same time receives forgiveness from God, and that, when he refuses to forgive another, he cannot expect to be shown forgiveness. Here Kierkegaard leaves no illusions:

"Christianity's view is: forgiveness is forgiveness; your forgiveness is your forgiveness; your forgiveness of another is your own forgiveness; the forgiveness you give is the forgiveness you receive, not the reverse, that the forgiveness you receive is the forgiveness you give." (Kierkegaard 1995, 380)

It is such, because forgiveness, like love, is never merely a relation between two people, but has, spiritually, a three-dimensional shape. This relation is always mediated by God, who alone can give ultimate forgiveness (339–342).

This Christian scheme of forgiveness founded upon love therefore always has on Kierkegaard's account, three "actors": the one through whom forgiveness flows—the one who loves; the one who is forgiven—the sinner; and the one who forgives—God. The central figure in this process-act of forgiveness is obviously God. However, it is not the case that forgiveness concerns, in an essential way, only the sinner. Kierkegaard stresses that it is equally necessary for the one who loves, through whom forgiveness flows (336; 343). The former needs forgiveness to free himself of sin and to discover his spiritual path in God, while the latter must strive for forgiveness so that he is able to reaffirm his spiritual existence in the Creator. As a result, at the moment forgiveness is given, both agents are equal to each other in God—they are both equally receivers and givers (1990, 149–151; 156–158; 1995, 281–282)—neither is more important than the other as both are equally necessary: the sinner, to be able to become the one who loves; the one who loves, to be able to reaffirm his state. It thus turns out that forgiveness in the Christian sense must be that which flows out from the one who loves towards the sinner whom he encounters (1995, 335–337). Spreading the good news on Earth is therefore equivalent to spreading forgiveness and mercifulness to every individual encountered, independently of any social connection with him. This results from the spiritual definition of love underscored by Kierkegaard and from Christianity's equality of all people in relation to God (141–143). However, in order to spread forgiveness, one must conceal his actions in love, to undertake self-denial knowing that he is not the one who forgives, but instead the one through whom forgiveness flows, an instrument in the hands of God (340–341; 361–366).

An ideal portrayal of this situation is offered by the encounter of the sinful woman with Jesus described in the Gospel of Luke (Lk 7:36-50). In this case, how-

ever, the Kierkegaardian lens does not fully reflect his own understanding of forgiveness as an act of love. He sees the situation described as two-dimensional, that is, as an encounter of Christ the Savior with a sinful woman. For the model to be complete, one needs to see that Jesus here fulfils a double role, in accordance with his dual nature as God-man—he is simultaneously the one who loves, through whom forgiveness flows, as well as God the Savior, who gives this forgiveness. Along such an interpretive angle, forgiveness arises in accordance with the three-dimensional pattern herein described: Jesus the human—God the Savior (Christ)—and the human sinner. Here the central role is played by the Savior, and it is he who utters the words of forgiveness, yet, for this to actually occur, both Jesus and the sinful woman must humble themselves before Him, to make themselves equal in relation to His Majesty. This can be seen in the behaviour of the sinful woman, which is the focus of Kierkegaard's attention—her silence, weeping, and wiping of Jesus's feet as a symbol she acknowledges her infirmity and forgets about herself (Kierkegaard 1997b, 139–142; 155–158). This is also evident in the behaviour of Jesus, who does not speak, but remains focused, allowing the sinful woman to perform her act of washing. Here, this act constitutes a symbolic leveling of each in God. Their absolute concentration on one another (the sinful woman on Jesus, Jesus on the sinful woman), both desiring forgiveness, signifies their renunciation of themselves and their importance in relation to God as well as their utter reliance on Him, as a result of which space is made for His action.

4. The Hiding of Sins and the Awakening of Love in the Process of Forgiveness

Occupying the very center of Kierkegaard's thought is the consideration as to how, in a Christian sense, one can really forgive another person, and what actions one should take towards this aim. To the fore in this context comes a certain phenomenon: the ability to not see sins. Such an ability can develop only in a person of pure interiority (heart). Here the matter concerns a particular attitude towards another person in which the one who loves, in spite of an awareness of the other's sinfulness, comes to him, not with direct reproof or admonition, but instead to try to discover and awaken in him the love established by God at the heart of each person. For Kierkegaard, building up another person in love begins precisely with the fact that: "The one who loves presupposes that love is in the other person's heart and by this very presupposition builds up love in him—from the ground up, provided, of course, that in love he presupposes its presence in the ground." (1995, 216–217)

While the actions of a natural person tend to reveal the other's guilt to force him to confess and to punish him or seek atonement for the sinful act committed, Kierkegaard insists that the truly loving Christian must behave in the opposite way. Here the attitude of the individual, in accordance with the dialectic of love, reveals his interiority:

“A person’s inner being, then, determines what he discovers and what he hides /.../. When envy lives in the heart, the eye has the power to elicit the impure even from the pure; but when love lives in the heart, the eye has the power to love forth the good in the impure, but this eye sees not the impure but the pure, which it loves and loves forth by loving it. Yes, there is a power of this world that in its language translates good into evil, but there is a power from above that translates evil into good—it is the love that hides a multitude of sins. When hate lives in the heart, sin is right there at the door of a human being, and the multitude of its cravings is present to him; but when love lives in the heart, then sin flees far away and he does not even catch a glimpse of it.” (1990, 60–61)

Seeing and showing another’s sins is, on this dialectical account, a sign of one’s own inner impurity. However, it is the power of love, so to speak, to be able to disregard the sinfulness of the other to reach what is in him originally good, which alone can help him cope with his sin. In the discourse “Love Hopes All Things—and Yet Is Never Put to Shame,” Kierkegaard notes that the relation of the one who loves to other people consists in his hope that, at any moment, there exists a possibility of good for the other. He must therefore “hope for him” until the very end, believing in the good of the other to the very end. Not hoping for the other, not searching out the good in him means, in this sense, not loving (1995, 253–256).

The essence of Kierkegaard’s thought here is that the one who loves hides the multitudes of another person’s sins since he knows that condemning particular evil acts of his will not change him in a spiritual sense. It may, in the best-case scenario, bring it about that, in an ethical sense, he will become more mindful in his life. This, however, will not lead him to Christian forgiveness. For this to become possible, it is necessary to approach this other person in such a way that, despite her many sins, one will see what people like her do not see—the love established by God within her. The profundity of the attitude of the one who loves consists in his being able to refer to the sinner such that, instead of his own sinfulness, the sinner discovers the love residing within himself, which allows him to reflexively acknowledge his sin, and which awakens within him the desire for forgiveness (72–74; 77).⁴

The task of the one who loves—he, who is to forgive the sinner—is thus to bring it about that the sinner recognizes himself as a sinner so that he discovers his sin and becomes terrified by it: such is the condition of upbuilding each person (1997a, 96–97). Of concern in this matter is not some particular sinful act or some concrete instance of immoral behaviour, but rather what lies beneath it—the sin of abandoning God, of living without God in the world (1993a, 32–36; 1997b, 136;

⁴ In addition to forgiveness, Kierkegaard provides two other ways to hide sin. They are: silence and mitigating explanation (Kierkegaard 1995, 289–294; Ferreira 2001 174–175; Howell 2010, 33–36). Most commentators grant that Kierkegaard lists three independent ways to hide sins, of which the most excellent is forgiveness.

143; 180–181).⁵ Instead of focusing on a particular sin of another person, the forgiveness of which will not, in a spiritual sense, change anything in the long run, the one who loves focuses on what is important, the source of evil in this person.

However, to experience one's absolute guilt without an internal foundation of consciousness that love resides within oneself and spreads forgiveness and divine mercy would mean an immediate inner death, the destruction of one's spirit. It is for this reason that the first task of the one who loves is to awaken in the sinner the love established within him, to make him aware of God's love for him, to bring it about that he desires this love. It is only in this moment that the inner restoration of a person begins, the process of discovering his own sin and the search for forgiveness. The consciousness of sin must therefore always be accompanied by the consciousness of forgiveness and cannot ever manifest itself without it (1993b, 246; 2010, 181–82; 1992, 524).

The process of discovering one's own sin within the realization of God's love for man is inversely related to seeing the sins of others. For the more one focuses on the sins of other people, the more one does not perceive one's own sins and does not search out forgiveness; and the more one desires forgiveness, the more one stops seeing the sins of others, seeing instead one's own inner imperfection, which completely involves one and orders one to search for forgiveness. Kierkegaard is speaking in this context about one's knowledge of evil, which is common in people living in sin, and about one's opposite knowledge of the good, characteristic of the one who loves. It is from this skill of perceiving the good that one's reluctance to perceive evil stems (1995, 285–287). At the same time, the attitude of the one who loves is not anthropologically naive as was the case with the attitude of Prince Myshkin from Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*. The one who loves is marked by an intentional lack of interest in evil resulting from the knowledge that curiosity about evil is never spiritually pure and always leads to sin.

In consequence, in the Christian account presented by Kierkegaard, it is precisely this not seeing the sins of another which gives him the chance to discover his own sin—while this pointing out of his sins and placing blame only binds him more to them. This logic is inverse to the intuitions and behaviour of the natural person. In a spiritual sense, the matter comes down, not to showing another his sin, but to giving him a tool that allows him to discover it on his own and to give him the strength to do away with it.

A paradigmatic example of such a situation is the entire context of Jesus' encounter with the sinful woman, about which the Holy Scripture says only perfunctorily that: "A woman in that town who lived a sinful life learned that Jesus was eating at the Pharisee's house, so she came there with an alabaster jar of perfume." (Lk 7:37) Kierkegaard does not consider what leads to their encounter but instead focuses on the behaviour of the sinful woman, which offers some important guidance. He underscores that the sinful woman—being a symbol of how

⁵ In this sense, Kierkegaard states, in *The Sickness unto Death*, that: "sin is specifically a qualification of spirit" (Kierkegaard 1980b, 81), and "every sin is before God" (80).

one should desire forgiveness and accept it (Kierkegaard 1997b, 140–143)—comes to the home of the Pharisee having already made a decision (150; 155). This act of deciding is key since no one can find forgiveness who is not determined to obtain it. The act of confession, which must necessarily accompany forgiveness, requires that one strives for purification, at all costs and regardless of one's unfavourable inner situation or inner anxieties, as an absolutely overriding goal (137–139). The question arises as to how one can awaken in oneself such a state of inner determination. Kierkegaard notes that of the utmost importance is one's complete concentration on one's sin and the desire to rid oneself of it. Awareness of this inner infirmity that fills man makes everything apart from the search for the forgiveness of sins meaningless (150–155). This is a state of individualistic self-hatred, hatred for the evil which hitherto defined the life of the person, the feeling that continued existence in this state is pointless (138–139).

Yet one should ask a question for which neither Holy Scripture nor Kierkegaard provides an answer—that is, what exactly happened in the life of the sinful woman, such that she decided against herself and her life hitherto, against everything that seemed at the moment to testify against her, to go to the home of the Pharisee and devote herself to Jesus? It seems that to unravel this puzzle, one ought to reference what Kierkegaard says about “love hiding a multitude of sins” since, in accordance with Kierkegaard's “theory” of forgiveness, for the sinful woman to be able to decide to perform a gesture of confession (being, in this case, the symbolic act of washing Jesus's feet with her tears) she would have had to meet earlier in her life one who loves, who, not wanting to see her sins, discovered the good residing in her and awakened the love established in her heart. This somebody must have been Jesus. It is he who somehow must have earlier influenced the sinful woman, he who must have removed the veil of sin and activated the love residing within her. The most important element here that must appear in the sinner is the desire for forgiveness. This desire, however, cannot arise in and of itself; an impulse from the outside is necessary, some person or event capable of pulling him off the beaten path of sin. In this context, Kierkegaard says precisely that the one who loves is reconciled with the other long before the other even thinks about searching for reconciliation (1995, 335–337). This anticipatory move by the one who loves, his going out to the sinner with love—this here is key. In the New Testament story, Jesus is precisely such a person—a Saint (1997b, 138–139) whose appearance knocks people out of their sinful reality and forces them to disclose the thoughts of the heart (Lk 2:34–35; Kierkegaard 1991, 96; 126; 132; 136). This awakening of the heart concerns every person and each stands then before a decision: either to be offended or to believe (Kierkegaard 1980b, 98; 122; 1991, 33; 40; 81; 96–97; 105; 111; 115–116; 139; 141).

It is worth noting that though Kierkegaard obviously sees in Jesus a Saint, he acknowledges His Holiness as an attribute of His Divinity (1997b, 181–182; 184–188). One should, however, see the Jesus who proclaims the gospel as a man and not God. He becomes God only in those moments in which he performs the miracles of forgiveness and healing when he gives signs. As a matter of fact, these

are his most difficult moments of trial: allowing his Divinity to speak through himself and reaffirming himself in his calling as the Son of God. While at the same time remaining incognito, recognizable only through faith, imperceptible to the purely temporal gaze that searches out empirical evidence (1991, 123–144).

The sinful woman, like Mary (Lk 10:42), chose “the one thing needful” (Kierkegaard 1997b, 149), allowing herself to be directed by the love awakened in her by Jesus. Worthy of note is that this love that was awakened within her was not yet actual, fulfilled love—that is, Christian love as in Kierkegaard’s account, but was a state of a certain indebtedness in this love, a discovery of the possibility of this love’s existence, a desire that she, the sinful woman, have that which was revealed to her in Jesus. This means that the sinful woman, in going to the home of the Pharisee, acts, really, under the influence of Jesus’ love, who leads her, not under the influence of her own love. This situation is analogous to that in which one acts under the influence of a desire for something which remains only a possibility, which at the same time draws one to itself, leading one to make an ultimate choice. This mechanism characterizing the workings of human freedom is brilliantly described by Kierkegaard in the form of the titular “Concept of Anxiety” as “freedom’s possibility” (1980a, 41–42; 49; 61; 91; 123; 155). In other words, Jesus, in awakening in the sinful woman the love established within her, actually reveals to her “love’s possibility,” which activates in her the working of freedom that strives to fulfil this love.

5. Creating Love in Forgiveness

Love cannot be actualized in the individual’s existence without forgiveness, that is, without being absolved of sin. The state of love and the state of sin are mutually exclusive—the former means being a servant of the good, while the latter means remaining under the influence of evil. Thus, one cannot become one who loves when at the same time one is not internally purified, separated from sin.

The very act of forgiveness, which Kierkegaard places special emphasis on, requires faith because only faith has the power to create something in spiritual reality, that is, to bring to life that which is invisible and to take away into non-being that which is visible (Kierkegaard 1995, 294–296). It is precisely the faith in love that makes love truly exist in a spiritual sense and fills the existence of the Christian (5; 16). Such love simply does not exist physically in the world—it is not an object. Its existence is possible only by virtue of the faith of the individual, who, through himself, bears witness to this love before others. Only the loving individual, by believing in God’s love,⁶ can become one through whom love manifests

⁶ The subject of faith in God’s love as the most important element of a person’s spiritual being is the focus of two of Kierkegaard’s discourses: “All Things Must Serve Us for Good—When We Love God” from the third series *Christian Discourses* (Kierkegaard 1997a, 188–201) and “The Joy of It That in Relation to God a Person Always Suffers as Guilty” from the third series of *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (1993b, 264–88).

in the world in accordance with the pattern set by Jesus. Properly speaking, in this love, the one who loves becomes, in Kierkegaardian terms, contemporary with Christ (1991, 62–66). The actions of the one who loves are, in this way, an instrument for God Himself, who reveals Himself in them. God simultaneously both removes what others see—a person’s sin—and establishes that which cannot be directly seen in the world of the senses, that which requires faith—the forgiveness of sins. It is no coincidence that the forgiveness of sins, made possible solely by faith, is for Kierkegaard an expression of Christian paradox (1992, 224–228; 538–539)—for it is, in a spiritual sense, and by virtue of eternity, a bringing to life of that which is unreal to the senses and a depriving of existence that which is real to them. As Kierkegaard explains: “But when love forgives, the miracle of faith happens /.../: that what is seen is, by being forgiven, not seen.” (1995, 295) Of course, the act of forgiving sins and all that this encompasses makes sense only in spiritual reality and does not strip the individual of his moral responsibility towards others in the temporal world. The fact that sin does not weigh on the individual spiritually does not change the fact that others can blame him for his sins just as they could previously. For here the matter concerns a change of the individual’s internal status, not his position in the world.

Kierkegaard notes that from the rational point of view, the forgiveness of sins is something impossible, something that should not occur. In Kierkegaard’s view, forgiveness is so impossible for human reason that people’s first reaction to it should be to take offense, where not reacting in this way constitutes evidence of their spiritlessness or indifference in this regard (Kierkegaard 1980b, 116; 1997a, 107). The possibility of the forgiveness of sins is here what Kierkegaard believes most differentiates man from God (1980b, 121–122).

Under such an account, it becomes clear that through God’s love and in God’s love—as manifested in the one who loves—forgiveness creates love in the sinner, that is, it establishes in him the reality of love, at the same time annihilating his sin, wiping away the reality of sin. A transformation of reality occurs at this moment, which becomes possible thanks to two acts performed by God. On one hand, God, in hoping for the sinner, brings him into a new life in love, while on the other, in forgetting his sin, deprives said sin of its real existence (Kierkegaard 1995, 295–96). To deprive sin of its real existence means, in a spiritual sense, that sin no longer affects the existence of the individual, that it no longer directs his life, that it disappears from his life.

Thus, in the act of forgiveness that occurs between the one who loves and the sinner by means of God’s mediation, the reality of the sinner’s life is reestablished anew. Worth noting is that here Kierkegaard makes use of ontic terms, and thus the matter concerns an authentic change in one’s being, the sinner’s transformation into one who loves. This is possible as, for Kierkegaard, the fundamental, decisive reality of one’s life is not the sensory world but that of the spirit—it is in the latter that what is actual and true for the individual is decided (145–146; 383–384).

This transformation of the spirit is experienced by the sinful woman when she hears Jesus's words of forgiveness "Therefore I say to you, her many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much." These words seem to be spoken in a cause-and-effect mode: first, that "she loved much" and then, that "her many sins are forgiven her". Kierkegaard, in his interpretation of this case, applies this line of reasoning as well, as he acknowledges, somewhat contrary to his own "theory" of forgiveness, that the sinful woman's love somehow actualized before the words of forgiveness were uttered, thus suggesting that her love was prior to them (Kierkegaard 1997b, 143). As a result, Kierkegaard states that the act of forgiveness doubles love in the individual, causing it to acquire additional power (175–176).⁷

Yet, in accordance with the "theory" of forgiveness presented herein, these words of forgiveness cannot simply pronounce the sinful woman's love, they must create it. That which she was previously guided by was not her current love but her desire for it and for purification. The words "because she loved much" cannot, therefore, refer to what proceeded earlier, but must reference what was happening the moment Jesus spoke them. He declares the spiritual fact, that, at that moment, "her many sins are forgiven her," since at that moment "she loved much". If it were otherwise, this would mean that, first of all, God is unnecessary for her, as she could actualize her love herself, which, in turn, contradicts the theory of truth presented by Kierkegaard in *Philosophical Fragments* (1985, 13–22). Love is here, in a spiritual sense, equivalent to the truth, and for it to be learned, the teacher, who is equally necessary in teaching both, must offer the follower the condition for discovering it. This condition is forgiveness, which lies behind what Kierkegaard calls "rebirth" in *Philosophical Fragments* (19). In this way, the sinful woman's transition from a state in which love is possible to the state in which it actually unfolds.

6. Salvation through Forgiveness—Reconciliation in Love

Christian forgiveness as Kierkegaard understands it must lead to reconciliation (1995, 313–314; 335–337; 343–344)—the forgiveness offered by the one who loves must correspond to its being accepted by the sinner. If forgiveness is not accepted, this means that the one who loves did not succeed in awakening love within the sinner. In this case, this is not full forgiveness, but only the possibility of forgiveness directed towards the sinner. It is only when the forgiveness being offered encounters in another the desire to be forgiven that there is a chance for the reconciliation of both individuals in God. It is important to note that it is not the case that the one who loves comes forward unselfishly, in a spiritual sense, with forgiveness. It is obvious that, insofar as the life of the senses is concerned, what he offers is entirely unselfish, however on the spiritual level—as Kierkegaard stresses with all his might—the one who loves needs forgiveness as much as

⁷ John Lippitt in his book (2020, 76–83) provides the detailed description of this problem with the Kierkegaardian interpretation of Jesus' words of forgiveness.

the sinner does (1970, 49), for it is only by spreading love to others in the form of forgiveness that one can reaffirm oneself in this love, thereby strengthening one's spiritual bond with God.

Reconciliation is an act which directly proceeds forgiveness: it is that which occurs immediately after love becomes actualized in the sinner. As only two equals can enter into reconciliation, it is when the actualized love of the sinner answers the initial love of the one who loves that this reconciliation—that which signifies the unity of their love in God—occurs. This reconciliatory act ends the formal process of forgiveness and transforms the sinner into one who loves and whose mission becomes to spread love, in forgiveness, to one's neighbour, that is, to all people.

It must be understood that, on the account that can be constructed from a reading of Kierkegaard's works, the moment one's love is actualized, that is, the moment a person is created in the spiritual reality of love is the very moment the perspective of salvation opens up before him. Of course, for as long as the individual lives, he must spread forgiveness, thereby reaffirming himself in the forgiveness he receives, but every act of forgiveness and reconciliation, starting with the very first such act, is an act of fulfilment in God.

It is not obvious that salvation here is dependent only upon the acts of a person. His actions must be placed into a broader context of atonement in Christ. As David Gouwens notes, in Kierkegaard's account: "Salvation is not *reduced* to experience (because of logical priority and actuality of atonement), but soteriology includes human response and experience." (Gouwens 1996, 149) This means that the subjective salvation of the individual can occur only in the objective and actual sphere of Christ's love, that is, in the love of one's neighbour, which is the response of man's love for God to God's primary love for man.⁸

And in this way, if the moment one's love is actualized happens to be the moment of one's death—as in the case of the robber whom Jesus forgives on the cross (Lk 23:43)—this moment then proves to be the moment of the individual's fulfilment in God as well as his being saved. In this way his salvation is equal to that of the one who loves, who might even have spread love in the world for thirty years. A feeling of injustice relating to this equality arises only in the natural person, who is guided by a temporal sense of justice. From the spiritual point of view, the matter is one of complete logical consistency, as in both cases the unity and equality of God's love for man in man's love for God are fulfilled to the same degree.

It may be said that the moment one reconciles with another in God, one becomes and is a Christian and is thereby at the end of one's existence; moreover, the individual is "there" each time reconciliation occurs through him in forgiveness. This is a state in which, regardless of the individual's actual life situation in temporality, he can at every moment of his life remain in a spiritual sense fulfilled in God, for at every moment the individual is realizing his existential end. This is possible

⁸ A detailed and multidimensional analysis of the problem of atonement in Kierkegaard's thought is provided by Lee C. Barrett (2013).

because, on Kierkegaard's account, the means and the end in Christianity are always one and the same (Kierkegaard 1993b, 141–143). On precisely this basis, the forgiveness one gives to another (that which one does at a given moment—the means) is, at the same time, forgiveness for him, the forgiver (that which one wants to achieve in eternity—the end). Kierkegaard states that a person: “is not eternally responsible for achieving his end in temporality, but he is unconditionally eternally responsible for which means he uses. When he wills to use or uses only the means that truly is the good means, he is, eternally understood, at the end” (141). This is precisely what the Kierkegaardian concept of becoming and being a Christian consists in: when a person becomes one (the means) he thereby at the same time is one (the end), and for precisely this reason he cannot, for as long as he is alive, stop becoming a Christian, as then he would stop being one. The state in which the Christian here finds himself is described by Kierkegaard as being present to himself or being contemporary with himself, which can be interpreted as being in accordance with one's vocation in God (1997b, 39; 44–45; 1997a, 74–75). In this context Kierkegaard very strongly emphasizes the words spoken by Jesus on the cross to the robber: “This very day you are in paradise.” (Lk 23:41)

It is in this state that both Jesus and the sinful woman find themselves when they reconcile with one another by virtue of The Redeemer uttering his words of forgiveness. In this scene, one should see in Jesus Christ both the man (Jesus), who fulfils his vocation as the Son of God, and the Redeemer (Christ), who actualizes the love within the sinful woman and reaffirms Jesus in his mission to spread love to others. Each time Jesus forgives or performs a miracle, he, as a person, yields to his Divine nature, which speaks through him.

Of importance here as well are the edifying words Christ directs towards Simon immediately after the words of forgiveness are uttered: “But one who is forgiven little loves little.” (Lk 7:47) Kierkegaard's interpretation of these words reverses their meaning, for Kierkegaard reads them as: “he is forgiven little—because he loves little.” (Kierkegaard 1997b, 169; 171–173; 175) This results from his logically literal reading of the words of forgiveness and confirms his thesis that the love within the sinful woman for Jesus exists prior to Jesus's words of forgiveness. However, if one is to remain consistent with the thesis that the sinful woman's love was brought forth concurrently with her forgiveness, these words mean something else. They refer to the idea that if there is no one who can forgive, then likewise there is no one who can awaken love in another person. This means, therefore, that there is no possibility for the sinner, without the help of another person, to discover within himself the possibility of love and the desire for forgiveness. This is why Christianity cannot exist without love of one's neighbour—there must always be one who spreads love to another, as otherwise Christianity as a religion of love ceases to truly exist.

Simon also seems to be an important figure in this whole story since he constitutes a counter-attitude towards the sinful woman, all the while being a person who, in the presence of a saint, is offended by him (137–138). In his thoughts, Simon accuses Jesus, thereby putting him in the situation of a spiritual trial. Jesus

perfectly guesses the intentions of Simon and thus gives him the sinful woman as an example. Such a move must be a shock for Simon and at the same time constitutes a chance for his inner awakening. If he understands the words directed to him by Jesus, love will awaken within him; if not, his offense will deepen. For Kierkegaard, Simon is above all a symbol of his reader, for when Jesus Christ turns to Simon, he turns to each person who has not yet begun to fulfil the Christian ideal in his life (141–142). It bears stressing that, on Kierkegaard's account, when Jesus turns to another with his Gospel message, he at the same time turns to one who reads the Gospel (1995, 14; 97). The words directed towards Simon are thus the words directed towards each person meant to awaken in him the love residing within, pushing him towards the search for forgiveness.

Finally, it is worth noting, that the natural place for forgiveness to happen, the place Kierkegaard speaks of, is where the Christian encounters God—in Church. And, ultimately, Kierkegaard himself actually takes the entire situation that occurs between Jesus and the sinful woman to the church altar. Such an approach appears primarily in the last discourse from the cycle of texts addressing the passage Luke 7:47. In this text, Kierkegaard is no longer referring to the personage of the sinful woman, but to the edifying words Jesus Christ directs towards Simon (1997b, 167–177). By presenting the sinful woman as a pattern of the individual's desire for forgiveness, Kierkegaard speaks of the daily confession of sins of Christians contemporary to him, trying to awaken within him an attitude of utmost seriousness towards this act. It is precisely in this confession that a person's love should be activated and reaffirmed and thereafter spread to others. In this place Kierkegaard passes over the role of the priest, thanks to which the Danish philosopher's interpretation becomes two-dimensional, just as in the case of Jesus's encounter with the sinful woman—the entire situation unfolds between a sinner and the Redeemer (This topic is the main issue of the final discourse from the cycle *Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins* from *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* [Kierkegaard 1997b, 179–188]). Yet it seems it is precisely the priest who should be the one who loves, the one who comes out with love to the sinners who confess their sins in church. It is he who should be able to awaken love within people and to reconcile with them in God such that they then be able to spread this love to others and that he be able to reaffirm himself in his calling to be the loving priest. In this so seriously understood communion, the church becomes a place for the occurrence of Christian love—a place where God forgives sins and where people reconcile with God. In this sense, Jesus's encounter with the sinful woman could be fully reproduced before the altar, in accordance with Kierkegaard's intention.

7. Conclusion: Christian Forgiveness—Its Meaning for Immanent Ethics

Kierkegaard, of course, realizes that, when speaking of Christian forgiveness as an act of love for one's neighbour, he presents an extremely high ideal, one that can

be met by very few in each generation (Kierkegaard 1992, 488; 1991, 247; 2012, 190). These individuals move this living, Christian ideal into the future—they bear witness to the transcendent and eternal truth of Christianity in the immanent and temporal world. The question thus arises as to why Kierkegaard introduces this ideal knowing well that not just a great majority, but in fact an overwhelming majority of his readers are unable to fulfil it. Why does he so fiercely defend the distinctiveness of the Christian ideal and the need to maintain its proper transcendent form?

This problem can be solved in two spheres: the epistemic and the moral. In the epistemic sphere, the Christian ideal of love and forgiveness points to the ultimate purpose and meaning of humanity. In presenting it, Kierkegaard illustrates how absolute good manifests itself in human existence and how this good radically transforms and arranges human being in relation to the world and to other people. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard shows just how extreme the sacrifices are if man is to fulfil this ideal. Kierkegaard devoted a great deal of his Christian works to phenomena such as renunciation, self-denial, dying to oneself and to the world. All of these are meant to show that discovering one's spiritual, transcendent relation with God requires breaking with normal (sinful), human existence that is (in the best-case scenario) focused on fulfilling the immanent ideal.

This spiritual level, as has already been stated, is attained by few, yet for Kierkegaard it remains an object of intense focus due to the fact that consciousness of its existence determines the highest level of a person's being, in relation to which the relativity and self-interest specific to all other human attitudes become visible. The transcendent ideal clearly structures other human attitudes and imparts a deep dimension to the phenomena of human existence. In this sense, a consciousness of the existence of forgiveness as an act of love allows one to consider all purely immanent concepts of forgiveness in a different light. It cannot, of course, replace them, but it shows the essential spiritual difference between forgiveness in which only a certain agreement between people is performed and one which speaks of God's spiritual creation of man to live in love.

This difference has important epistemic implications, for it shows that, in a Christian (transcendent) and universal-human (immanent) sense, the matter at hand concerns two completely different acts of forgiveness that refer to two separate realities of life. At the same time, the unity of a human being's spiritual structure causes us to think that here, formally speaking, we are concerned with one and the same phenomenon (one forgiveness) that manifests itself in different ways (different acts of forgiveness) depending on what reality it refers to (immanence or transcendence).

In the light of this statement, we may go so far as to claim that by being conscious of the existence of Christian forgiveness one can better understand what forgiveness in the immanent world is; it might also indirectly incline people to perform morally better acts of forgiveness. No element of transcendent forgiveness, however, could reveal itself in purely human forgiveness, as, for the latter

to occur, the presence of God would be necessary, which only a true Christian—an imitator of Christ—can bring unto the world.

This epistemic distance so fiercely defended by Kierkegaard is here of the utmost importance, for if it is not preserved, the transcendent ideal and immanent ideal bleed into one another. It is in this way that what Kierkegaard calls the aesthetization of Christianity occurs (1992, 557–561; 562; 572–573; 580–581; 605; 608), a linking of absolute Christian values with temporal and relative human interests. As a result, Christianity ceases to be a timeless way of being centered on attaining salvation and instead becomes a certain type of doctrine to serve people in their efforts to realize their temporal social and political aims. God, rather than creating (via forgiveness) human beings meant to love, is turned into a certain idea, one which allows people to legitimize their position in the world (as well as moral position). It is precisely this that what Kierkegaard calls the possibility of offense is meant to protect Christianity from (1980b, 117; 125; 128–129).

In the moral dimension, the result of this epistemic distance is that the transcendent, Christian ethics of love for one's neighbour that Kierkegaard proposes lacks a direct transposition into immanent, universal-human ethics, which strives towards establishing rules by which people coexist harmoniously with one another. No rule of transcendent ethics can be directly applied in the universal-human world since doing so immediately shatters this world, relativizes its principles, and deprives this world of its autonomicity. This underpins the conflict between faith and reason that Kierkegaard studied so deeply with reference to Abraham's situation in *Fear and Trembling*.

It is on this basis that Christian forgiveness, when applied directly to ordinary human forgiveness, poses absurd and incomprehensible demands on people who have yet to undergo a transformation of love. Here, the victim is not only supposed to forgive his transgressor, but to love him as well—as he loves those closest to him—and to do unto him all the good that is possible. The transgressor, in turn, should not only admit his guilt and repent but must spread this ideal of love further among people. Without a spiritual transformation in love, no human being can do this, not the victim (even if he is morally the best of men) and even less the perpetrator of evil.

In spite of this, the consciousness of the existence of such a transcendent ideal, even if one cannot apply it in one's own life, may be pivotal to how one sees and realizes the immanent ideal in one's life. This transcendent ideal here provides an existential grounding, points to the source of all good (God) and evil (sin) in the world and creates certain patterns of behaviour that can reinforce the immanent moral attitude, perhaps thereby bringing the individual closer to Christian forgiveness.

The patterns of behaviour indirectly inspired by the Christian ideal of love and forgiveness include, among others, focusing on the possible good in another person, not on the particular evil of his act; the tri-relational nature of the ethical attitude—the search for a higher, common good in one's relation with another person and the attempt to reconcile with this person in spite of existing divisions;

consciousness of the reflexivity of one's own moral attitude—my relation to another has a considerable impact on my relation to myself (what I do comes back to me—what I give I myself receive); and finally, the search for life fulfilments by means of doing moral good.⁹

These patterns of behaviour may, on the one hand, resemble certain obvious bits of human wisdom. On the other hand, however, consciousness that these patterns have their source in a transcendent ethics that encodes complete selflessness and full equality between one person and another in relation to God may do much to reinforce one's ability to apply said patterns in one's moral attitude. It seems that, even in people with purely secular moral attitudes who do not agree with defining the values of good and evil in relation to God or sin, these attitude-patterns, as understood by Kierkegaard, can inspire respect, and point the way to a strengthening of one's own moral attitude. Obviously, these patterns cannot be applied directly without a transformation of love, but the ability to adapt them formally to the contents of immanent ethics offers the possibility of strengthening one's own moral attitude and gives rise to a capacity for creating an authentic moral good, one which is only to a slight degree burdened by one's own self-interest (as at the level of immanence this is never possible to completely remove).

In this sense, in the act of forgiveness, it is on one hand not possible to transfer Christian forgiveness into the immanent world—for it is not possible for some person to generate love in another person unless the former has himself already been called to it. Yet on the other hand, in ordinary human forgiveness, the victim's being driven by the possibility of awakening moral good in the transgressor not only makes the former better morally but may also create a moral pattern of conduct for other people. However, this being driven by the moral good of others requires consciousness of the existence of a higher common good to which the victim must subjugate himself and in which he must level himself with the transgressor in order to truly forgive him. Such a morally advanced attitude of forgiveness can clearly be inspired by Kierkegaard's transcendent considerations, yet it does not thereby erase the epistemic distance between the transcendent ideal and the immanent ideal and does not distort the proper sense of Christianity's existence in the world.

⁹ The intriguing example transcendent principles being formally transferred into the immanent world is provided by Sharon Krishek in her book *Kierkegaard on Faith and Love* (2016). There she claims, in reference to Kierkegaard's *Works of Love*, that not only is it love for one's neighbour that is based on the model of double movement of faith described by Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling*, but every relation of true love (in this case, romantic love). On Krishek's interpretation each relation of love first requires sacrifice, which kills the egoism in love, to be followed by self-affirmation, by self-fulfilment.

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Nik Trontelj

A Possibility of Religious Experience in the Life of a Contemporary Person According to Theology of Franc Rode

*Možnost verske izkušnje v življenju sodobnega
človeka v teološkem nauku Franca Rodeta*

Abstract: The article presents Franc Rode's teaching on the possibility of religious experience in the life of a contemporary person as he discussed it in his textbook for fundamental theology "Osnovno bogoslovje" (1979). Rode was a lecturer of fundamental theology at the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana between 1967 and 1981, i.e. in a time when Slovenia was a part of a highly secularized SFR Yugoslavia, which was founded on atheist Marxism. In his discussion, Rode presents existential and philosophical reasons for experiencing God as the absolute meaning of life and the final aim of the world. He shows the individual's intuitive need for transcendent in a modern society, based on a technological development that demystified the natural world and on the political vision of a laicized state.

Key words: religiosity, faith, fundamental theology, socialism, secularization, secularism, Christianity, Yugoslavia, Franc Rode

Povzetek: Prispevek predstavlja nauk Franca Rodeta o možnosti verske izkušnje v življenju sodobnega človeka, kot ga podaja v svojem učbeniku za osnovno bogoslovje z naslovom *Osnovno bogoslovje* (1979). Rode je bil predavatelj osnovnega bogoslovja na Teološki fakulteti v Ljubljani v letih 1967–1981, tj. v času, ko je bila Slovenija del močno sekularizirane FLRJ Jugoslavije, osnovane na ateističnem marksizmu. Rode v svoji razpravi predstavlja bivanjske in filozofske razloge za izkušnjo Boga kot absolutnega smisla življenja in končnega cilja sveta. Izpostavlja tudi posameznikovo intuitivno potrebo po presežnem v sodobni družbi, temelječi na tehnološkem razvoju, ki je demistificiral naravni svet, in politični viziji laične države.

Ključne besede: religioznost, vera, osnovno bogoslovje, socializem, sekularizacija, sekularizem, krščanstvo, Jugoslavija, Franc Rode

1. Introduction

The twentieth century was a time of increasing secularization process in Western societies.¹ A radical division between state affairs and religious life occurred in the period following World War II, especially in the countries with newly introduced socialist regimes, such as SFR Yugoslavia. The trend of decreasing traditional religiousness demanded theology to rethink its role in society and face the new reality of contemporary people if it wanted to speak to them. The purpose of this article is to discuss the academic teachings of Franc Rode about the possibilities of religious experiences for secular people of his time as he systematized it in his textbook "Osnovno bogoslovje" (1979) [Fundamental Theology]. He laid a theoretical foundation for the religious experience and the acceptance of Christianity in modern society. Rode was a professor of fundamental theology at the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, which was the time of the Yugoslav socialist rule.

2. Rode as a Lecturer at the Faculty of Theology

Rode (born 1934) was a lecturer at the Department of Fundamental Theology and the Department for Dialogue.² He also served as the head of the Department for Dialogue for some years. Until 1981, when he finished his academic career, Rode had been giving regular lectures in compulsory subjects, such as missiology, the doctrine of atheism and Marxism³, and theology of non-Christian religions (Trontelj and Osredkar 2017, 378). He started to teach fundamental theology (former apologetics) in 1971. This subject was considered to be the main subject in the eponymous department with the highest number of weekly lessons. Rode's aim in a discussion of fundamental theology was to explain the foundations of the Christian faith to both Christians and non-Christians (Rode 1979, 1). His students remember him as an insightful lecturer, full of fresh and striking thoughts (Petko-všek 2014, 157). During his professorship, he issued two editions of his textbook on the subject of fundamental theology. The first was published in 1974 and the second followed in 1979. In this research, we used his second textbook because it is an extended edition that offers a deeper insight into Rode's teaching.

¹ This paper was written as a result of work within the research program "Religion, ethics, education, and challenges of modern society (P6-0269)", which is financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARIS).

² The Department for Dialogue at the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana was founded in 1973 following the reform of the Second Vatican Council. Both individual departments were united into one in 1995. Hence, in the present day, there is a Department of Fundamental Theology and Dialogue.

³ Rode was a great connoisseur of contemporary atheism. He published numerous written discussions on the topic and was giving lectures on atheism throughout the years of his work at the Faculty of Theology. That was most likely the reason for him to be called to the Secretariat for Dialogue with Non-Believers in 1981.

3. Historical Circumstance of Rode's "Contemporary Person"

The historical background of a modern European secularized society goes back to the beginning of the Renaissance in Europe when the developing sciences began to emancipate from theological concepts. Since then, the technological-scientific civilization has started to evolve opposite to the Christian metaphysical vision of the world (Moltmann 1988, 20). The Renaissance introduced a new understanding of man as the measure of all things, the idea that was subsequently radically promoted in the Enlightenment era when reason was liberated from the influence of civil and religious authority. The rationalist perception of the world caused a modern human in the West gradually lose his sense of the transcendent which eventually led to the following dichotomies: modern secular thought is superior to all past forms of understanding reality (including Christian faith) (modern vs. traditional); religious statements are excluded from a reasonable discourse because they do not meet scientific rationality (science vs. religion); religious language refers to human personal experience only (faith vs. reality); all religions are equally valid (indifferentism vs. Christianity) etc.⁴ (Dulles 1977, 191–192)

3.1 Who Is a "Contemporary Person"?

Let us explain who is a "contemporary person" as understood in Rode's textbook. Rode also uses the term "modern human" (Rode 1979, 106). A "contemporary person" is an inheritor of rationalist philosophy who tends to deny the positive, supernaturally revealed religion and demands autonomy of reason and conscience. A modern person accepts the "truth" when it shows its inner plausibility and refuses the acceptance of the truth transferred by the outside authority of the Church or even God (106). However, a "contemporary person" seeks answers to the meaning of life and thus, shows susceptibility to the transcendent but the preaching of the Church has not yet reached his or her heart (131). These foundations of a contemporary person's spiritual attributes are part of a wider historical technological development and consequent cultural and social changes which shaped modern people's perception of reality.

What affected modern human's stance on religiousness most was the process of secularization after World War II. Secularization (not to be confused with secularism) has led to the emancipation of culture and civilization from the Church's influence (65). Religion lost its role in public life and was limited merely to the private sphere. Contemporary people who have lived in such an environment evolved two main personal attitudes toward the transcendent: agnosticism and atheism. They are both not following any religion in the traditional sense. While the first perspective reflects religious indifferentism without denying God's existence, however, the second refuses the concept of Absoluteness and the very idea of God (66).

⁴ "An Appeal for Theological Confirmation" (1975), a document by an ecumenical group of eighteen theologians from the USA, issued in Dulles 1977, 191–192.

Therefore, a “contemporary person” in Rode’s textbook is a modern, secularized human person of the twentieth century, an individual of the Western world in particular. A contemporary person favors natural reason and is reserved to traditional forms of religion, especially Christianity as the predominant religion of the West. Even more, modern opponents of Christianity refuse Christianity (Rode and Grmič 1971, 13). In Rode’s perception of a “contemporary person” we can certainly recognize a reflection of the society that he was surrounded by. Rode had worked at the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana during the time of the Yugoslav socialist regime. It is legitimate to understand the then Yugoslav as the actual realization of the “contemporary person” in Rode’s discussion, especially since studying modern atheism and establishing connections with the secularized, irreligious people in the Yugoslav (or Slovenian) environment were one of the main purposes of the Department for Dialogue (Perko 1990, 127).

3.2 Secularism in Yugoslavia

The decline of religious beliefs and practices is a leading historical trend in the Western world, particularly in many European societies (Casanova 1994, 213; Greeley 2004, ix). Generally, this trend is related to the secularization process (Casanova 1994, 211; Greeley 2004, ix⁵). Apart from philosophical reasons, politics has had a major role in restricting the expression of religious life in the public domain in many European countries. In this article, we want to consider the case of socialist Yugoslavia. Political socialism in Yugoslavia was grounded in the philosophy of Marxism which became the main doctrine of the communist party (Jović 2009, 60; Alexander 2008, 1). In 1952, the latter also changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, similar to Marx’s Communist League of 1848 (Jović 2009, 60). The leading communist party set the only life truth of the new world: establishing the classless society, and then protecting it by the state apparatus. The purpose of Marxist philosophy was to form the “atheist man” in the private and collective sense of the system (Fuček 1994, 633). The communist society formed a world without God and produced godless people (Rode 1995, 260). Marxist socialist regimes promoted practical materialism which did not do a favour to religious teaching and wanted to eliminate religion or, when that was not possible, at least encourage religious indifference among their citizens and make religious belonging the private (silent) matter of a person (Fuček 1994, 633; Casanova 1994, 215).

At this juncture, we need to point out the inner differentiation in the secularization phenomenon. The term secularization has gradually developed its contemporary meaning: the passing of responsibilities from ecclesiastical to political authority (Cox 1965, 19). In Western practice, this means that the Church does not interfere in state politics and that the state keeps away from the Church’s te-

⁵ Greeley argues that the dominant role of religion in society has been destructed by what we could call the “general historical development of Western civilization” and by political reasons. On the one hand, philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution rationalized human perception of the world. On the other hand, what has also contributed to the decrease of the Church’s influence in public life, was the fact that Churches were usually “on the wrong side” in the political revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Casanova 1994, 211).

aching and internal organization (Osredkar 2013, 464). When pushing religious institutions and religious life out of the public sphere is encouraged by the state politics we deal with secularism, an ideology that negates faith and the idea of God (Cox 1965, 21; Pastor 1994, 973). Thus, if secularism alienates God, it often leads to atheism which is “the extreme limit of secularism” (Amato 2009, 8). It is possible to claim that Marxism stimulated secularism (Halík 1993, 9). Yugoslavia was highly secularized under Tito’s rule (Martin 2005, 82). This was obvious in the case of the SR of Slovenia where religiosity was weakening permanently after World War II as a result of both the general Western secularization process and the official political secularism, based on the Marxist ideology (Juhant 1991, 236).

The struggle between atheist Marxism⁶ and religious belief was present in postwar Yugoslavia. The first years after the war were characterized by political pressure on the work of the Church and by arrests of individual priests for political reasons. The government tried to make Church independent from the Vatican and Pope’s leadership to create a national Church of Yugoslavia. Such political actions intended to weaken the Catholic Church which was the only organization in the country outside the direct control of the Party (Pirjevec 1995, 167). The government wanted the Church to stay out of Yugoslav politics and be cut off from public influence, especially among young people. The relations between the state and the Church improved after the Second Vatican Council when the Church officially renewed its attitude to world affairs as we show in the next chapter.

Despite the obstacles which the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia was going through, the attitude of the Yugoslav government towards religions was broadly more tolerant than in some other socialist countries.⁷ For example, when the Yugoslav government at times “only” obstructed the dialogue with Christians, Czechoslovakia eliminated it (Mojzes 1981, 12). Finally, among Yugoslav republics, the Catholic Church received the greatest liberties in Slovenia where the Catholics showed collective vitality and represented a significant factor in public life.

3.3 Pastoral Response of the Church

The Catholic Church acknowledged the rising atheism in the world at the Second Vatican Council. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World

⁶ Marxist philosophy was atheist because it substituted the idea of God with technological progress which can create general welfare and enables personal prosperity by making everyday life more comfortable. Marxism reduces the perception of the *truth* to a practical truth and disregards its higher foundation (Rode 1977, 26–27).

⁷ Yugoslav communist model was different from that of the Soviet Union and its allies after a 1948 dispute between the Parties of the Soviet Union (Stalin) and Yugoslavia (Tito) which led to Yugoslavia’s breakaway from the Soviet bloc. Titoism, the doctrine of Yugoslav Marxism, was ultimately evolved by 1953 when a socialist model of self-management was introduced. The model served as the basis of Yugoslavia’s political and economic decentralization in distinction from the Eastern Bloc countries which practiced central planning and centralized management of their economies. The consequence of decentralization in Yugoslavia was a weaker influence by the Party over many societal matters, including religion. The Party namely had a negative attitude towards the Church leadership mainly for its wartime activities, i.e. anti-Partisan position and occasional collaboration of Church representatives with the occupying forces (Mojzes 1981, 129–130).

“*Gaudium et spes*” proclaimed atheism as one of the most serious facts of our time (1965, no. 19). Modern atheism in Western industrial societies has arisen as an effect of the secularization process (Groth 1994, 55). The significance of the Second Vatican Council, in this regard, was the fact that it promoted pastoral renewal and greater openness to matters of contemporary culture.⁸ “*Gaudium et spes*” emphasized the Church’s intention to announce Christian messages to all people and that is where the Church’s need to continuously investigate signs of the times and understand the surrounding world has originated (1965, no. 2; 4). Rode’s teaching reflects the adoption of new directions of the Church.

As we have already noted, socialist Yugoslavia was an environment with a strong secularization/ism process. Rode claimed that the Church was hardly convincing to the contemporary people because it was often negatively promoted by the media. Church was also blamed in school (Rode 1979, 228). People were mistrustful of the Church as an institution and reserved to the exclusive meaning of the Christian revelation as the Word of God. If the Church wanted to speak to people, it had to stop teaching Christian truths in the form of superior dogmatic formulas but rather interpret the act of revelation as an active force of God’s Word in history, most importantly as a personal relationship between God and man (107; 110). Christian message had to be addressed to the real situation of people living in the secular environment (Rahner 1977, 3; 9). We introduce Rode’s discussion of the modern human’s susceptibility to religious affairs in chapter 3.

3.4 Dialogue with Marxists

The Second Vatican Council encouraged dialogue with modern atheists and atheist governments to gain active liberty of believers in the world (*Gaudium et spes* 1965, no. 21). It is historically noted that Marxists have identified socialism with atheism (Mojzes 1981, 141). Therefore, Marxist socialist regimes had a negative attitude toward religions. In Slovenia, Catholic theologians eventually rejected Marxism, mainly after the Slovenian independence was promulgated (Mojzes 1994, 195). However, Rode was one of the more obvious critics of the Marxist regime even during the time of Yugoslavia. In 1978, he held a public lecture in Ljubljana in which he addressed the lack of democracy and social justice in Yugoslav society. He was critical of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist myths as, for example, the cult of personality. Slovenian League of Communists called him for interrogation by Commission for Religious Affairs which threatened him with a jail sentence⁹ (Petkovšek 2014, 58).

⁸ The Church’s position on increasing secularization before the Second Vatican Council was distinctly reserved and even offensive (e.g. “*Syllabus Errorum*” by Pius IX. and the First Vatican Council and its sentences against rationalism). “*Gaudium et spes*” reflected a mature and balanced interpretation of this phenomenon of the modern world and adopted it as a pastoral challenge for the Church. (Halík 1993, 9–10)

⁹ Rode’s late Seventies critique can be understood in the context of the history of Christian-Marxist dialogue in Yugoslavia. The Christian-Marxist dialogue in Yugoslavia was practiced successfully in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Open discussions were organized in various Yugoslav cities (Belgrade, Opatija). After 1972, endeavours for dialogue were attacked by the Party because they introduced liberalization and alleged rising nationalism. The dialogue was then obstructed because of suspicion by the leading Marxists. See: Mojzes 1981, 140; 143; 147.

Rode is regarded as a noticeable contributor to the development of the Christian-Marxist (atheist) dialogue despite the occasional criticism of the Yugoslav regime. The work for dialogue became his focal occupation during the time of his job at the Secretariat for Dialogue with Non-Believers (further: Secretariat), a department of the Roman Curia, where he was named undersecretary in 1981 and secretary in 1993.¹⁰ The Secretariat was organizing meetings with atheists in places all over Europe and beyond. Most meetings were dedicated to dialogue with Marxists.¹¹ Rode was regularly debating with atheist intellectuals about social questions (Rode 1987, 53). The theoretical principle of the Secretariat's efforts was the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, namely "Gaudium et spes" which suggested a sincere and prudent dialogue.

4. A Possibility of Religious Experience

Over the past centuries, a scientific and social development have diminished Westerner's capability for perceiving the mysterious dimension of life which led to the demystification of the world (Greeley 2004, ix). Considering that religious thinking gives deeper meaning to worldly matters, the absence of religious perspective in the public society causes a simultaneous decline of human common sense for life (Rode 1979, 177). In some of his later writings, Rode tells that a secularized postmodern man is unhappy and anxious, which results in his or her inability to go through life (1993, 8; 2009, 36).¹² On the other hand, a human of the twentieth century has experienced enormous distress which especially manifested in both world wars and totalitarian regimes following World War II. This has brought up eternal questions on life and freedom, which means suffering and death (1979, 262). Theology had to renew its speech about God in a secularized environment to be effective. The starting point for delivering the Christian message needs to be different from that of the past. Theology should not build its arguments on the "self-evident" attributes of God or even on the fact of his existence but rather explain the basis that makes the reasons for faith justifiable (Rahner 1974, 80). In his discussion, Rode systematically deals with natural reasons for human religious inclination.

4.1 Existential Reasons for Religious Experience

Rode first discusses the human's essential qualities which can lead him or her to intuitively sense the transcendence and, thus, bring him or her a religious experience. These qualities are somehow anthropological, and they also apply to the "contemporary person". We are naming them the existential reasons

¹⁰ Rode was a counsellor at the Secretariat for Dialogue with Non-Believers since 1973.

¹¹ The Secretariat held meetings in Vienna, Oslo, Hong Kong, etc., as well as on Marxist grounds like Prague, Budapest, Zagreb, and Ljubljana (Petkovšek 2014, 58).

¹² Postmodernism is a philosophical term that is linked to a philosophical reflection of the final decades of the twentieth century and is characterized by scepticism and, ironically, a suspicion of reason.

for religious experience because they originate from the very essence of the human person.

Rode introduces seven possible standpoints of a human's intuitive experience of the sacral (1979, 178–182; Stres and Rode 1977, 60). The first ground for religious experience is the meaning of *eros* and its significant and mysterious role in the process of transmission of life through generations. *Eros* has formed a fundamental religious perception of the cosmic order as a reflection of basic family roles.¹³ The most powerful possibility for religious experience in this matter is the birth of a child. The child has always been, even to our contemporaries, considered a gift to the family.

The second opportunity for the religious experience of a human person is the awareness of his or her *individuality*. One's inability of comprehending his or her own being (e.g. the feeling of the incomprehensibility of birth and death, freedom, and sense of responsibility) and experiencing inexplicable inwardness (e.g. the question of conscience) can be a solid ground for experiencing transcendence.

Another field of possible religious experience is a feeling of *uncertainty about life* which manifests in deep existential anxiety. Life is threatened by evil which derives from a multitude of reasons: outside reasons, such as accidents and illnesses, or volitional actions of evil coming from free will. The evil leads to chaos that a man feels helpless about. One looks for help outside his control and experiences help from "above".

A human person looks for the answers to the *meaning of life* and the questions of his or her own existence and destiny. He or she inevitably learns about the mystery of life. Human nature does not possess all the answers. One has a premonition of a higher Knowledge which indeed knows the answers to the mysteries. Such premonition is the essence of religious experience.

Another dimension of life's mystery is the *existence of the outside (physical) world*. One can understand the material surroundings either as a necessary coincidence or a gift by the Absolute who wants the existence of the world and leads its destiny.

The final ground for spiritual intuition is the experience of the *finality of life*. While the medieval conception of both the world and human life followed the idea of finality in relation to the exclusive infinity of God, the following centuries have extended the meaning of space and time to the category of infinity due to the constant scientific progress of humanity. In recent decades, however, science (e.g. astrophysics) has shown limitations of human space and time and evolved a concept of nothingness.¹⁴ Human life is endangered by the feeling of emptiness which can lead to a discovery of the divine on the "other side" of the known.

¹³ In religious thought, the character of a father as an inseminator, defender, and master has found its higher meaning in the image of the sky. The earth was given the attributes of a mother who conceives, gives birth, and feeds her children. The character of a child links to the human race (Rode 1979, 178).

¹⁴ The human scientific and technical progression that gave an impression of absolute and infinite human power eventually got to the point of its limitations. Scientific discoveries bumped into the inexplicabil-

4.2 Philosophical Expression of Religious Experience

Human religious experience needs to be expressed in a rational discussion if it does not want to be fideist and limited to subjective sentience. Therefore, Rode sets out particular examples of philosophical reflection on religious experience (Rode 1979, 182–185). A well-argued discussion was required in the reality of secularized environment which considered religious experience as irrational.

The first fundamental question which emerges from the experience of life is the origin of creation: How did it all come to life? What was at the beginning? Why do the world and humans exist? These are the questions about the beginnings (Greek: *archē*). Human is impressed by the creation and looks for the reason for its existence in an outside cause.

The following question goes from origins to the final goal of creation: Where is it all directed? What is the final aim of creation? Religious perception finds answers in the divine which is the beginning and the end of everything.

Another philosophical aspect of religious experience manifests itself in human's inner demands of morality: Why do I feel obliged to be moral? Who is the basis of morality?

A human being needs to fulfil his or her life. He or she is looking for the meaning of his or her life. He or she is looking for happiness, life's progress, etc. The desire for fulfilment cannot be stopped because it would lead to losing the meaning of life. Yet one's life cannot be fulfilled by anything transient and final but since the desire for life's meaning is absolute, it has to be directed to the Absolute itself.

The final question is about the human self. The person can come to the fulfilment of his or her nature and destiny and acknowledgement of his or her duty and responsibility only by the existence of *you*. Each human is a personal being. A fundamental need of human nature is to meet the other one and be with him or her, usually with the person that he or she loves or cares for. However, the desire of being with the other goes even further because the person seeks the higher *you* in his or her relations with others.¹⁵ Human yearns for the absolute *you*. Thus, human explores the Absolute as a personal entity through interpersonal relations. To be able to talk *about* God, one has to talk *to* God (Rode 1998, 2).

We may conclude that only religious experience and its philosophical reflection can lead up to religious belief.¹⁶ A mutual connection between religious experien-

ity of the universe which showed the limitation of human knowledge and possibilities and caused a spiritual restlessness.

¹⁵ This aspect of theology has evolved in the recent decades, and it is called a Relational Theology.

¹⁶ A religious experience without philosophical reflection would remain an unclear subjective feeling and could lead to superstition. On the other hand, a philosophical reflection of faith without a religious experience turns into an idealistic theological discussion. J. B. Metz stresses the importance of a narrative structure of theology that reflects an original experience of the Christian faith shared among Christians and with the world. Only a narrative structure of personal faith can lead to an inviting practical Christianity (1980, 163–164; 205–206).

ce and its thinking evaluation leads to one's certainty about the existence of the Absolute which is the beginning of the world and its final aim. In a religious tradition, this Absolute was named God. The final step to accepting God, as Rode defines it, is caused by the argument of one's inner willingness to accept God in his or her life. Only faith enables the leap from the laws of finality to the absoluteness of life. The final decision is mainly practical, not just theoretical. The decisive question is: Letting God enter my life and define it or defiantly refuse Him (1979, 185)?

4.3 Accepting Christianity

In this part of the discussion, Rode wants to rationally justify faith in God in Jesus Christ through whom God had spoken (198). This step follows one's acceptance of the transcendent. Christian faith fulfils human's yearning for God because it announces Jesus as the Saviour who brings answers to his or her fundamental questions and gives meaning to his or her life (207). The New Testament testifies that God definitely spoke through his Son who revealed the Divine mysteries and was Himself the fullness of God's revelation (*Dei Verbum* 1965, no. 4). Rode argues that if God has a face and name, they are fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ. But how does one recognize Jesus Christ as a Son of God? One's personal stance on Jesus Christ as a Son of God is determined by his or her inner willingness for recognizing his signs, i.e. his words and deeds which can only happen by accepting his person. One's selfishness and self-sufficiency do not allow him or her to recognize Jesus Christ as a deity. It is only possible to meet another person by affection for him or her. The same is true with accepting God (Rode 1969, 48–49). In front of Jesus, a personal decision has to be done: to choose light or darkness, faith or unbelief, and life or death (1979, 209). The divinity of Jesus can be accepted only by faith. Otherwise, His person remains enigmatic (208). An individual's faith in Jesus as a Son of God is finally possible by grace, the help that God gives to humans to comprehend the acts of Christ as acts of God. Some of Jesus's contemporaries have met Jesus directly but for the people of other periods, the meeting with Him is indirect through historical events and the testimony of the Church.

5. Conclusion

In contemporary times, the ability for religious experience has been declining. The contemporary person has a reservation toward the religious concept of God who works in human history (106). The idea of a transcendent God's intervention in the world does not correspond to a modern philosophical understanding of reality (1970, 84). Following the classical three-part structure of fundamental theology, Rode's discussion on *demonstratio religiosa* illuminates the possibility of religious experience as the main factor in justifying the sanity of religious life. Only by searching for the answers to fundamental life questions and the meaning of life, one can open up to having a religious experience and subsequently accept and comprehend God's active presence in the world.

Rode argued that an individual could experience God's presence in a then-modern society, known for its weak religiosity and prevalent rational interpretation of the world. He notes human's internal predisposition for the transcendent as the crucial circumstance for having a religious experience. In his discussion, the professor addresses human inwardness (both intuition and deliberation) as the main factor in recognizing the transcendent despite the anti-religious political and cultural environment of the time. Finally, Rode presents Christianity as a fulfilment of one's yearning for God. The paper researches Rode's theological discussion and concludes that a religious experience is possible in the life of a contemporary person due to his or her inevitable anthropological susceptibility to discovering the meaning of life. Reaching contemporary persons' hearts with the message of Christian hope was finally the pastoral challenge for the Church and theology.

Abbreviation

GS – The documents of Vatican II 1966 [Gaudium et spes].

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Razvoj metode semantičnih polj ob primeru hebrejskega pojma resnice

Development of the Method of Semantic Fields on the Example of the Hebrew Concept of Truth

Povzetek: Namen članka je pokazati prednosti metode analize leksikalnih in semantičnih polj na področju literature ob prikazu večpomenskosti besedišča, ki v Svetem pismu izraža pomenske vidike pojma resnice. Analiza semantičnih polj upošteva osnovne jezikovne, literarne in retorične strukture – od najmanjših enot, kot je vrstica, do daljših odlomkov različnih besedil različnih vrst in zvrsti. Pri tem posebna pozornost velja stalni zvezi med sinonimi in antonimi v tipičnem bibličnem slovničnem paralelizmu (*parallelismus membrorum*) in v drugih temeljnih literarnih oblikah. Izhodišče vsake analize je zato upoštevanje razmerja med sinonimi in antonimi s podobnim pomenom. Literarne strukture pomenskih polj, ki izražajo razsežnosti pojma ‚resnica‘ v hebrejskem Svetem pismu, vključujejo sinonime in antonime korena ‚mn. Koren ‚mn se večinoma uporablja v pomenu ‚trdnost, stanovitnost, zanesljivost, stalnost, trajanje, zvestoba, resnica‘ v odnosu do Boga in človeštva. Iz osnovnega pomena korena ‚mn izhaja pomen vere kot zaupanja v nekoga, ki ga ima oseba za zanesljivega in zaupanja vrednega. Da bi razumeli celoten pomenski obseg koncepta resnice, v analizi izvirnega besedila upoštevamo tudi rabo besedišča v najvplivnejših prevodih Svetega pisma, kot sta Septuaginta in Vulgata, v sedanji vsakdanji rabi ter v razvoju teološkega besedišča na področjih filozofije in teologije. Tradicionalno razumevanje izraza ‚resnica‘ v vsakdanji rabi je osredotočeno na skladnost z določenim dejstvom ali z zunanjimi okoliščinami neke realnosti ter na razvidnost ‚poštenosti‘ v odnosih med ljudmi. Analiza semantičnih polj nam končno pomaga ugotoviti, kateri so specifični vidiki bibličnega pojma resnice v primerjavi z antično in novodobno posvetno literaturo.

Ključne besede: večpomenskost besed, vloga slovničnega paralelizma (*parallelismus membrorum*), sinonimi in antonimi, strukturalno jezikoslovje, semantična polja resnice, bralna izkušnja

Abstract: The aim of the article is to show the advantages of the method of analysis of lexical and semantic fields in the field of literature while showing the polysemy of the vocabulary that expresses the semantic aspects of the concept

of truth in the Bible. Semantic field analysis considers basic linguistic, literary, and rhetorical structures from the smallest units, such as a line, to larger fragments of various types and genres of texts. Special attention is paid to the constant connections between synonyms and antonyms in the typical biblical *parallelismus membrorum* and in other basic literary forms. The starting point of any analysis is the consideration of the relationship between synonyms and antonyms with a similar meaning. Literary structures of semantic fields that express the dimensions of the concept of “truth” in the Hebrew Bible include synonyms and antonyms of the root *'mn*. The root *'mn* is mostly used in the sense of “firmness, steadfastness, trustworthiness, constancy, duration, faithfulness, truth” in relation to God and humanity. From the basic meaning of the root *'mn* comes the meaning of faith as trust in someone whom a person considers reliable, trustworthy. In order to understand the entire semantic scope of the concept of truth, in the analysis of the original text we also take into account the use of vocabulary in the most influential translations of the Bible, such as the Septuagint and the Vulgate, in current everyday use and in the development of theological vocabulary in the field of philosophy and theology. The traditional understanding of the term “truth” in everyday speech is focused on conformity with some fact or with the external circumstances of a certain reality and on the evidence of “fairness” in relations between people. The analysis of semantic fields finally helps us to determine what are the specific aspects of the biblical concept of truth compared to ancient and modern secular literature.

Keywords: multiple meanings of words, the role of *parallelismus membrorum*, synonyms and antonyms, structural linguistics, semantic fields of truth, reading experience

1. Uvod

V filozofiji je pojem ‚resnica‘ eno osrednjih vprašanj, ki ga v različnih okvirih in teorijah razlagajo različno.¹ V gnostičnih različicah koncept ‚resnice‘ označuje božansko bistvo, znanje in moč ter razodeto doktrino. Najpomembnejši cilj filozofije je iskanje merila za razlikovanje med resnico in zmoto. Tradicionalno razumevanje izraza ‚resnica‘ je medtem osredotočeno na skladnost z dejstvi, z zunanjimi okoliščinami neke realnosti ter na integriteto v odnosih med ljudmi. V sodobnem času sta postali priljubljeni koherentna in pragmatistična teorija resnice. Koherentna teorija resnice išče korespondenco z že obstoječo tradicijo resnice. V nasprotju s teorijo koherentnosti pragmatistične teorije gradijo na testu uporabnosti resnice in nosijo pečat njenega relativnega razumevanja.²

¹ Prispevek je nastal kot rezultat dela v okviru raziskovalnega programa „P6-0262: Vrednote v judovsko-krščanskih virih in tradiciji ter možnosti dialoga,“ ki ga sofinancira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

² Prispevek vsestransko nadgrajuje članka iz let 2013 in 2014 z osredotočenjem na metodo semantičnih

Za povzetek filozofskega pristopa h konceptu ,resnice, se lahko sklicujemo na izjavo Paula Horwicha:

»Filozofsko vprašanje se ne glasi »Kaj je res?«, pač pa raje: »Kaj je resnica?« Kaj povemo o propoziciji, ko rečemo, da je resnična? Pomen tega vprašanja izhaja iz raznolikosti in globine načel, po katerih se pojem resnice uporablja. V skušnjavi smo, da bi na primer mislili, da je resnica pravi cilj in naravni rezultat znanstvenega raziskovanja, da so resnična prepričanja koristna, da je pomen stavka podan s pogoji, ki bi ga naredili resničnega, in da veljavno sklepanje resnico ohranja. Če torej želimo razumeti, oceniti in izpopolniti te epistemološke, etične, semantične in logične poglede, se zdi, da je potrebna neka razlaga narave resnice. Vendar pa je bilo takšno pojasnilo zelo težko dosegljivo.« (Horwich 2009, 930)

Znano je, da filozofske teorije resnice izključujejo absolutno razumevanje resnice. Drugače kot filozofski abstraktni koncept resnice, ki se opira na objektivni svet, Sveto pismo govori o resnici in njenem naravnem antonimu (laži) na temelju medosebnih odnosov: v razmerju človeka do Boga in med ljudmi. Vprašanje, kakšna je narava resnice v relativnem in v absolutnem smislu, je v središču vizije starozaveznih prerokov, Jezusa Kristusa, njegovih apostolov in učencev. Zato je osrednji cilj te raziskave razkriti vse vidike dojemanja resnice – s celostno pomensko in literarno analizo najpomembnejših besedil, izražajočih koncept ,resnice' v jezikovnih in literarnih strukturah pomenskih polj z osnovnimi besedami, ki izražajo različne vidike koncepta ,resnice', njihovih sinonimov in protipomenk ter tudi temeljnih literarnih oblik svetopisemske literature.³

2. Prvi poskusi obravnave svetopisemskega pojmovanja resnice

Svetopisemski pisci, predvsem preroki in psalmisti, izraza ,resnica' niso želeli obravnavati v povezavi z dejstvi in zunanji okoliščinami. Hebrejski preroki so dojemali ,resnico' na podlagi osebne izkušnje z Bogom, še posebej v času stiske. W. A. Irwin se pri obravnavanju koncepta resnice v odnosu do Boga in ljudi obrača predvsem na preroško tradicijo. V kakovosti resnice – v smislu zvestobe – vidi osnovo vse morale. Trdi: »Preroška drža izvira predvsem iz čustvenega odziva na izkušnjo.« (Irwin 1929, 380) Izkušnja človeških napak krepi preroke v prepričanju, da Bog

polj, ki so jo v obdobju od leta 1930 razvili literarni teoretiki in filozofi jezika. Razlog za težišče na semantičnih poljih je v razširitvi perspektive mojega primerjalnega raziskovanja koncepta resnice v okviru biblične literature na celoten obseg sinonimov in antonimov, ki se pojavljajo v semantičnih poljih hebrejskega in grškega besedišča. Po tej metodi je mogoče priti do bolj jasnega spoznanja celostne personalistične osnove večpomenskega bibličnega koncepta resnice – drugače kot pri enosmerni racionalni logiki v filozofskem diskurzu. Tako postane razvidno najpomembnejše: kako je resnica, ki v konkretnem svetu nastaja po nujnosti, po kateri ga preoblikuje, lahko hkrati specifična in univerzalna, situacijska in večna (prim. Badiou 2022).

³ O temeljnih oblikah svetopisemske literature gl. Avsenik Nabergoj 2019.

ostaja svojemu ustvarjenemu svetu in svojemu izvoljenemu ljudstvu ves čas zvest. Preroška vizija Boga absolutne zvestobe je privedla do vizije o zahtevi do Izraela, da odgovori na Božjo zvestobo z »željo po resnici v sebi« (Ps 51,6). Irwin prepoznava preobrazbo v religiozni misli od zgodnjega obdobja – ko je bila Božja zvestoba zgolj predpostavljena – do časa izgnanstva, ko je vera v Božjo zvestobo v preroškem pridiganju postala najpomembnejši poudarek. Svojo razlago Irwin pojasnjuje takole:

»Izgnanstvo je za Izraelovo odkrivanje Resnice epohalno. Katastrofa za narod je bila razumljena kot dokaz zanesljivosti prerokov in Boga, ki je po njih govoril. Zlasti drugi Izaija je velik predstavnik Božje zvestobe. To je nakazano v njegovem zaničevanju malikov, ničevih stvari, ki so prevara za njihove častilce; toda Izraelov Bog je ustvaril in ohranja svet. To je jasno razvidno iz njegovega velikega nauka o Jahveju kot Bogu zgodovine, ki v skladu s svojim večnim načrtom kroji usode narodov. Napovedal je dogodke in zdaj je bilo potrjeno, da so se zgodili. Njegova »pravičnost« naj bi se potrdila v bližajoči se obnovi Izraela. Katera izjava o transcendentni Božji zvestobi bi bila lahko jasnejša, kakor so tisti veliki odlomki, v katerih pisec spodbuja svoje ljudstvo k dejanju vere?« (Irwin 1929, 385–386)

Eduard König je svetopisemsko občutenje ustvarjenega sveta primerjal s filozofskimi pristopi. Pojasnjuje, da je »osnovni temelj za resnico vere Stare zaveze položen v preroško izkušnjo Abrahama« (König 1933, 105). Metode biologov primerja s spoznanji vere v Stari zavezi: »Biologi komajda poznajo bistvo življenja in izvor življenja jim je povsem neznan. /.../ Gibanja vesolja ne more povzročiti nič drugega kot element, ki ni podvržen gravitaciji in ima zato v sebi težnjo po gibanju. Ta element vesolja je božanski duh (Iz 31,3), najgloblji izvir življenja sveta (Ps 104,29 sl.), tako rekoč utripajoče srce vesolja.« (König 1933, 111)

Edward Thomas Ramsdell primerja hebrejski in starogrški pristop k razumevanju izraza ‚resnica‘: »Božja zvestoba je resnica, ki jo je treba povedati. Govori jo prerok in poje psalmist. Ni logična univerzalija. Ni filozofska kategorija. Kot resnica je globoko osebna. Dojemamo jo z vero celotnega sebe.« (Ramsdell 1951, 271) Svoje stališče pojasnjuje še naprej:

»Resnica Stare zaveze je torej globoko osebna. Presenetljivo je, da hebrejski um ni začel s pojmom biti na splošno, temveč z izkušnjo Božje zvestobe. Ko pa je bil ta um v aleksandrijskem obdobju judovstva končno pripravljen na filozofski tip vprašanja, je uvidel, da ta zvestoba omogoča razumevanje bitja, s katerim so se ukvarjali grški filozofi. Nasprotno pa so se Grki s svojim posebnim darom za filozofsko raziskovanje že zelo zgodaj začeli ukvarjati s pojmom biti, vendar niso nikoli dosegli razumevanja Božje zvestobe. Resnica za Staro zavezo ni nikdar končna univerzalnost, ki bi v sebi zajemala ves obstoj, pač pa je vedno izkustvena zvestoba Boga kot Svetega: ustvarjalna, zakonodajna, sodna, odrešujoča. Čeprav sama po sebi ni logična univerzalija, osvetljuje ves obstoj. Dojeta je v odzivu vere in je vse, kar človek v okviru te vere vidi. Vključuje življenje verujočega, njegovo

osebno predanost in samoodpoved. Vendar ne gre za slepo zvestobo – vera priča o Božji zvestobi. O tem, kaj je Bog storil za Izrael, je mogoče pripovedovati in to, kar obljublja, je mogoče izkusiti. V luči te zvestobe lahko vsak razume sebe in svoje skupno življenje. Lahko ,hodi' v Božji resnici in najde svojo pot razsvetljeno. Ko psalmist moli: »Pošlji svojo luč in svojo zvestobo« (43,3), ga lahko *emet*, za katerega moli, vodi – tudi kot svetloba.« (272)

Otto A. Piper opisuje razliko med grškim ,kognitivnim, in hebrejskim ,ontološkim' načinom razumevanja resnice o Bogu:

»Medtem ko v grškem pogledu na resnico prevladuje kognitivni element, je to v Stari zvezi ontološki vidik /.../ Ker ,resnica' o Bogu ni postranska značilnost, ampak sama narava Božje volje, ki je ni mogoče spremeniti zaradi spremenjenih okoliščin, iz tega sledi, da Božje zapovedi niso poljubne zahteve, ampak v sebi vsebujejo ,resnico' (Neh 9,13; Oz 4,1). Takšna raba pomeni, da starozavezne norme pravičnosti ne najdemo v abstraktnem sociološkem ali etičnem načelu, ampak v Božjem načinu poseganja v ta svet. Zdi se, da verovanje v kar koli, kar je v nasprotju z Božjo resnico, kot so lažni bogovi, lažni preroki, lažni nauk, ne velja le za obžalovanja vredno nevednost, ampak za nekaj, česar ne bi smelo biti in kar je zato treba grajati.« (Piper 1962, 714)

Janezov evangelij posreduje poseben, globoko osebni, odnosen in dejaven koncept resnice (*alētheia*). Bastian Ogon trdi,

»da Janez razume resnico kot absolutni koncept, nezdržljiv z relativizmom ali pluralizmom. Poleg tega resnica vernikovega uma in srca ne doseže le na intelektualni, temveč tudi na medosebni ravni. Ker Janezov evangelij razglaša trinitarnega Boga za resnico, mora resnica sama po sebi imeti odnosno razsežnost, kajti Bog je oseba, s katero se verniki lahko povežejo. Poleg tega, če intelektualno raven razumemo pravilno, resnica doseže vernika na relacijski osnovi. Ne nazadnje – odnosni vidik resnice vodi vernika v tesnejši odnos z Bogom in mu pomaga, da resnico bolje razume.« (Ogon 2020, 4)

Na področju racionalnih metod filozofije so se mnjenja o pomenu pojma ,resnica' kresala v zvezi z racionalno logiko in metafiziko, pogosto povezano z antagonizmom med politeizmom in monoteizmom. Kako težko je priti do prepričljive definicije po tej poti, jasno pokaže Alberto Vanzo v članku „Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth“ (2010). Uvod začena s stavkom: »Vidik filozofije Immanuela Kanta, o katerem se znanstveniki močno razhajajo, je, kakšno pojmovanje resnice je Kant dejansko imel.« (Vanzo 2010, 147) V zvezi z racionalno logiko zasledimo Kierkegaardovo paradoksalno racionalnost, ki izhaja iz kritike čiste logike v luči širšega in živetelega pomena resnice in se pri tem poslužuje »sokratske prevare za resnico« (Gregorčič 2021, 35–46).

Na področju filozofije jezika je pomenljivo že Platonovo delo *Kratil* (383a–d), v katerem avtor išče razlago za vprašanje, kaj pomeni beseda ‚ime‘ (*onoma*) kot splošni izraz za ‚besedo‘ ali v določenih kontekstih kot lastno ime. Retorična tradicija se osredotoča na proučevanje govornih figur v slogovne in literarne namene. V 19. stoletju zasledimo rojstvo zgodovinsko-filološke semantike. Proučevanje pomena besed je tako za raziskovanje temeljnih lastnosti človeškega jezika postopno postalo ključno. Ker je izraz ‚beseda‘ večpomenski, je osnovno terminologijo leksikalne semantike težko definirati. Semantične teorije pomena besed temeljijo na naravnem jeziku. Študije, nastale na osnovi zgodovinsko-filološke semantike za proučevanje besednega pomena, so sicer imele dolgotrajen vpliv, a strukturalistična semantika daje prednost sinhronemu opisu besednega pomena. Diahroni pristopi so za analizo relacijskih lastnosti jezika logično posteriorni.

V 20. stoletju si je švicarski jezikoslovec, semiotik in filozof Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) utrdil sloves z briljantnim prispevkom k primerjalnemu jezikoslovju. Postavil je temelje za številne pomembne dosežke v jezikoslovju in semiotiki. De Saussure je v svojem *Cours de linguistique générale* (1972; angleški prevod 2011) pokazal, da je pomen besede mogoče opisati samo v smislu nasprotij in razlik med sosednjimi izrazi v jezikovnem sistemu. Uvedel je tudi dva izraza za razlikovanje med govorom posamezne osebe (*parole*) in sistemom govorne dejavnosti (*langue*). Njegove distinkcije lahko štejemo za izhodišča jezikoslovne smeri, znane kot strukturalizem.

Pod vplivom de Saussurjeve teorije je Jost Trier (1931) uvedel teorijo ‚leksikalnega polja‘ z definicijo, da je leksikalno polje niz pomensko povezanih besed, katerih pomeni so medsebojno odvisni in ki skupaj predstavljajo konceptualno strukturo neke domene resničnosti. Besedni pomen je zato treba proučevati tako, da se proučijo odnosi med besedami v istem leksikalnem polju.⁴

Nemški filozof Hans-Georg Gadamer pa je kompleksnost poti do ‚resnice‘ še bolj celostno razložil v svoji knjigi *Resnica in metoda (Wahrheit und Methode)*, 1960; slov. prevod 2001). Gadamer poglobljeno razlaga, da resnice z znanstveno metodo ni mogoče ustrezno razložiti – pravi pomen jezika presega meje metodološke interpretacije. Resnica ni nekaj, kar bi lahko opredelili s posebno tehniko ali postopkom raziskovanja, temveč nekaj, kar lahko presega meje metodološkega razmišljanja. Resnica govornega ali pisnega jezika se zato lahko razkrije, ko odkrijemo pogoje za razumevanje njegovega pomena.

⁴ V novejšem času je bila tovrstna teorija leksikalnega polja sprejeta v semantični študiji japonskega izraza za okus (Backhouse 1994). Poznejša študija Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg in Karin Aijmer *The Semantic Field of Modal Certainty: A Corpus-Based Study of English Adverbs* (2007) se ukvarja s podobnostmi in razlikami med prislovi v celotnem pomenskem polju besed. Cilj te študije je ponuditi model za predstavitev pomenskih odnosov med prislovi pri prevajanju v več jezikov. Najti je mogoče pojasnilo: »Različni pristopi k proučevanju pomenskih razmerij so raziskani z vidika njihove uporabnosti za opis prislovov gotovosti. Začenši s pregledom tradicionalnih pomenskih področij si ogledamo novejše dosežke kognitivnega jezikoslovja, računalniškega jezikoslovja in jezikovnih tipologij. Razvoj odraža razširitev zanimanja v jezikoslovju na proučevanje jezika v dialoški interakciji. Naša analiza se od prejšnjih razlikuje po tem, da kot dopolnilne podatke uporabljamo prevode, s čimer dobimo bogatejšo sliko o pomenih in funkcijah prislovov ter njihovih odnosih, kot jo dajejo enojezične študije.« (Simon-Vandenberg in Aijmer 2007, 10). Mojca Šorli se medtem v knjigi *Semantična prozodija: Leksikalni in besedilno-diskurzivni vidiki* (2020) osredotoča na pragmatični pomen na ravni leksike in skladnje besedila.

Za premislek o metodi analize besedil na ravni besedišča ter sloga hebrejskega besedišča in sloga svetopisemskih besedil od ožjega konteksta pa vse do najširših intertekstualnih razmerij predstavlja izziv Hans Walter Wolff s svojo knjigo *Anthropology of the Old Testament* (1975) v 25 poglavjih, razdeljenih v tri dele glede na naslednje vidike: človekovo bivanje; človekov čas; človekov svet. V prvem delu Wolff išče odgovor na vprašanje »Kdo sem« z uporabo metode semantičnih polj besed, ki označujejo naravo človekovega bitja. Ugotovitev, da Stara zaveza ne temelji na enotni doktrini o človeku, mu narekuje metodo leksikalne analize temeljnih antropoloških besed v kontekstih značilnega bibličnega dialoga z Bogom v popolni odprtosti človeškega bitja za prihodnost: »Svetopisemska antropologija kot znanstvena naloga bo iskala izhodišče tam, kjer je v samih besedilih prepoznavno vprašanje o človeku. Za iskanje konkretnih odgovorov je treba uporabiti celotno širino konteksta.« (Wolff 1975, 3) V razlagi ključnih pojmov, kot so ‚srce‘, ‚duša‘, ‚meso‘ in ‚duh‘, Wolff dosledno izhaja iz izvirnega hebrejskega, celostnega jezikovnega in literarnega konteksta – in se izogiba kontekstu grškega besedišča, ki je pod vplivom helenistične dihotomne in trihotomne antropologije prišlo v grški prevod Stare zaveze, imenovan Septuaginta (7). V drugem delu Wolff na podlagi širšega bibličnega konteksta razlaga, kako se razumevanje časa v temeljnih virih (jahvist, duhovniški vir in devteronomist) nanaša na hebrejsko antropologijo, ki temelji na principu progresivne zgodovine upanja. V tretjem delu Wolff razkriva strukturo sveta z znamenjem človekove bogopodobnosti v odnosih med moškim in žensko, med starši in otroci, med gospodarjem in sužnjem, med učiteljem in učencem, med posameznikom in skupnostjo – glede na vprašanje človekove usode.

Septembra 2012 je v Strasbourgu potekala konferenca, posvečena leksikološkim raziskavam in njihovemu odnosu do eksegeze in prevajanja. Prispevke so uredniki Eberhard Bons, Jan Joosten in Regine Hunziker-Rodewald objavili pri založbi Walter de Gruyter v Berlinu pod naslovom *Biblical Lexicology: Hebrew and Greek* (2015). Knjiga skuša obnoviti in okrepiti izmenjavo med študijem besed in študijem besedil glede na hebrejsko izvorno besedilo in najzgodnejši grški prevod, Septuaginto. Avtorji odgovarjajo na vprašanja, kako se jezikovni pomen izvaja, kako je povezan z besedami in kako se lahko besede prevedejo v drug jezik – v antiki in danes. Obravnavani so etimologija, semantična polja, sintagmatska razmerja, zgodovina besed, neologizmi in druge pod teme. Nekateri prispevki odpirajo tudi širše perspektive interpretacije.

William G. Lycan se medtem v tretji izdaji knjige *Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction* (2019) osredotoča zlasti na jezikovne pojave, kot so teorija opisov, opisna teorija lastnih imen, teorije pomena, govorna dejanja; izrazno in figurativno proučuje različne oblike izraznega jezika, razlago ‚metaforičnega pomena‘. Pred nedavnim sta bila uvedena izraza ‚semantika polja‘ in ‚semantična tipologija‘ z razlago:

»Semantika polja je terensko zbiranje podatkov za pomenske raziskave od govorcev jezika za namene jezikovnega dokumentiranja, opisovanja, teoretsko usmerjenih raziskav – in seveda tudi za namene pomenske tipolo-

gije. Semantična tipologija je medjezikovno proučevanje pomenske kategorizacije, to pa pomeni iskanje univerzalij in razlik, kako različni jeziki predstavljajo resničnost.« (Bohnenmeyer 2021, 19)

3. Semantika in metode primerjalne (kontrastivne) analize semantičnih in leksikalnih polj

Zelo splošna značilnost jezika je večpomenskost. Številne besede pokrivajo široko pomensko področje. V svojem ‚vodniku po semantiki‘ Paul Elbourne opozarja na »izjemno širok razpon predmetov, ki se jih proučevanje pomena bodisi dotika bodisi jih ključno vključuje: človek se lahko začne zanimati za semantično vprašanje in ne ve, ali ga bo njegova rešitev pripeljala do filozofije jezika, metafizike, jezikoslovja ali nevroznosti. Zelo verjetno je, da bo vključevalo več kot eno disciplino – in zelo verjetno, da ne bo dokončno rešeno.« (Elbourne 2013, 157) Od približno leta 1900 so nekateri raziskovalci pomagali definirati metode strukturalne lingvistike z uvedbo izrazov semantika in pomen. Izraz semantika so uporabljali kot poskus razumevanja, kako so lahko besede in stavki smiselni. Smisel ali pomen je povezan s kompleksnim sistemom odnosov med jezikovnimi elementi, predvsem besedami in stavki. Pomenska razmerja so torej temeljno vprašanje sodobne lingvistike. Iskanje pomena pa vodi do odkrivanja vloge konteksta v poljubni jezikovni strukturi. Izjemnega pomena je ideja, da lahko pomen besed izrazimo v smislu njihove povezave z drugimi besedami v stavkih in slogovnih prijemih.

Razmišljanje o ‚pomenu‘ se giblje od jezikoslovja, antropologije, filozofije do psihologije in tako naprej. Pri analizi literarnih besedil začnemo na področju jezikoslovja. Na ravni besedišča se srečamo s pojmom pomenskega polja, ki je del razprave o jeziku kot sistemu. John Lyons pravi, da je »semantično polje množica leksemov in drugih enot, ki so pomensko povezane, polje, katerega člani so leksemi, pa je leksikalno polje« (Lyons 1977, 268). Andrienne Lehrer sledi zgodovini teorije semantičnega polja, začenši z delom Ferdinanda de Saussurja in drugih strukturalistov ter nadaljujoč z nemškimi jezikoslovci iz tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, kot je bil Jost Trier. Študije o konceptu semantičnega polja v angleščini in nemščini so privedle do razjasnitve terminologije v obeh jezikih. Pri uporabi v angleščini je pojem ‚semantično polje‘ širši od pojma ‚leksikalno polje‘ in vsebuje drugega, vendar se včasih uporabljata izmenično. V nemščini medtem izraz *Wortfeld* ustreza ‚leksikalnemu polju‘, *Sinnfeld* ‚konceptualnemu (pojmovnemu) polju‘, *Bedeutungsfeld* pa ‚semantičnemu polju‘. V Sloveniji je za ustrezno terminologijo za celotno področje leksikologije poskrbela Ada Vidovič Muha s svojo knjigo *Slovensko leksikalno pomenoslovje* (2000).⁵ Z izvirno razlago in aplikacijo metode

⁵ Dragocen je tudi prevod knjige *Pretekla prihodnost: Prispevki k semantiki zgodovinskih časov* Reinharta Kosellecka (1999). Avtor namen svoje knjige razlaga takole: »Primarna namera predlaganih semantičnih analiz ni jezikovno-zgodovinska. Prej naj bi odkrivala jezikovno konstitucijo izkustev časa, v katerem so se dejansko pojavile. Zato analize vedno znova segajo tudi širše, da bi razložile socialnozgodovinski kontekst, da bi sledile jezikovnopragmatični ali jezikovnopolitični usmerjenosti avtorjev ali govorcev, pa

semantičnih polj za pojma ‚pravičnost‘ in ‚pravica‘ v monografiji v slovenščini in angleščini (slovenska 2020b, angleška 2022) pa je doma in v tujini prodrli Jože Krašovec.

Semantična razmerja v skupini sorodnih besed so temeljna pri poskusu ugotavljanja pomena posameznih besed in njihove vloge v slovničnih in literarnih strukturah. Sorodne besede namreč sestavljajo osnovne knjižne oblike paralelizma. Najosnovnejša so razmerja med sinonimi in antonimi. Frank Robert Palmer sinonimijo opredeljuje kot ‚enakost pomena‘: »Za slovničarja je očitno, da ima veliko sklopov besed enak pomen; so sinonimi ali pa so sopomenke druga drugi /.../ Lahko pa trdimo, da pravih sopomenk ni, da dve besedi nimata popolnoma enakega pomena. Pravzaprav se zdi malo verjetno, da bi se v jeziku ohranili dve besedi s povsem enakim pomenom.« (Palmer 1982, 88–89)

Pri poskusih odgovora na to dilemo se zdi pomembno upoštevati večpomensko razsežnost vsake abstraktne besede, ki označuje duhovno vsebino. Prav zato je osnovni pomen (t. i. *Grundbedeutung*) mnogih besed težko določiti. Dilema, ali lahko govorimo o čistih sinonimih, je v procesu semantične analize znotraj istega jezika in znotraj iste kulture pomemben dejavnik. Vendar pa postane zelo problematična pri primerjalni analizi znotraj širšega spektra jezikov iste jezikovne skupine, a različnih kultur. Praviloma se besedna polja osrednjega besedišča Svetega pisma primerjajo z besednimi področji drugih jezikov starega Bližnjega vzhoda. V tem primeru govorimo o ‚vporednicah‘, ki v pomenskih vidikih po eni strani kažejo na istovetnost, po drugi strani pa na opazno razliko. Besedišče, motivi in osnovne literarne strukture so lahko celo enaki, njihova funkcija v kontekstu vsake kulture pa je lahko precej drugačna. Predvsem lahko govorimo o ožjem ali širšem pomenskem razponu skupnih jezikovnih in literarnih izraznih sredstev. Poleg teh okoliščin lahko opazimo, da nekateri sklopi sinonimov pripadajo različnim jezikovnim narečjem. Iste besede sicer lahko nastopajo v podobnih položajih, vendar se rabijo v različnih slogih. Nekatere besede se lahko razlikujejo po svojih čustvenih ali vrednotenjskih pomenih. Palmer dilemo pojasnjuje z zelo jasnimi primeri:

»Koristno bi bilo, če bi imeli kakšen način preverjanja sinonimije. Eden od načinov je morda substitucija – zamenjava ene besede z drugo. Predlagano je bilo, da so pravi ali popolni sinonimi medsebojno zamenljivi v vseh okoljih. Vendar je skoraj gotovo, da popolnih sinonimov v tem smislu ni; zdi se, da je to posledica prepričanja, da dve besedi nimata popolnoma enakega pomena. Seveda bomo ugotovili, da so nekatere besede zamenljive samo v določenih okoljih, npr. da se *deep* (‚globok‘) ali *profound* (‚globok‘) lahko uporabljata za *simpatijo*, vendar v povezavi z vodo le *deep* (globok); da je *cesta* lahko *broad* (‚široka‘) ali *wide* (‚široka‘ ali ‚prostrana‘) naglas pa samo *broad* (‚širok‘). Toda to nam ne bo dalo velike mere sinonimije ali pomenske podobnosti; pokazalo bo le na kolokacijske možnosti, ki pa z bližino pomena niso nujno vedno tesno povezane.

tudi zato, da bi od semantike pojmov sklepale na historično-antropološko razsežnost, ki je pojmovnosti in jezikovnemu dejanju govornice vedno imanentna.« (Koselleck 1999, 11).

Druga možnost je, da raziščemo »nasprotja« (antonime). Tako je *superficial* (,površinski') v nasprotju tako z *deep* (,globok') kot tudi s *profound* (,globok', ,globinski'), *shallow* (,plitev') pa je večinoma v nasprotju le z *deep* (,globok'). Morda je dejstvo, da imata dve besedi enake protipomenke, razlog, da ju obravnavamo kot sopomenki. Vendar primeri, ki smo jih pravkar obravnavali, kažejo, da bomo spet prišli do besed, ki so v določenih okoljih zamenljive, saj je ravno v kontekstu, v katerem sta *deep* (,globok') in *profound* (,globok', ,globinski') zamenljiva, možno, da imata antonim *superficial* (,površinski').« (Palmer 1982, 192)

Palmer podaja zelo jasno definicijo tudi za izraz antonimija:

»Izraz antonimija se uporablja za »nasprotje pomena«; besede, ki so si nasprotne, so antonimi. Na antonimijo pogosto gledamo kot na nasprotje sinonimije, vendar se status obeh besed zelo razlikuje. Jeziki namreč pravih sinonimov ne potrebujejo, in kot smo videli, je vprašljivo, ali pravi sinonimi sploh obstajajo. Antonimija pa je redna in zelo naravna lastnost jezika in jo lahko dokaj natančno opredelimo. Vendar je presenetljivo, da je to tema, ki je v knjigah o semantiki pogosto zapostavljena in ji običajno ni dodeljeno mesto niti v slovarjih. Vendar pa obstajajo različne vrste »nasprotij«, ki jih moramo jasno razlikovati.

Za začetek naj velja ugotovitev, da je v angleščini veliko besednih parov, kot so *wide/narrow* (,širok/ozek'), *old/young* (,star/mlad'), *big/small* (,velik/majhen') itd. Vsem tem, ki so pridevniki, je skupno dejstvo, da jih je mogoče obravnavati v smislu stopenj kakovosti, o kateri je govor. Tako je cesta lahko *široka* ali *zelo široka* in ena cesta je lahko *širša* od druge. Imamo, se pravi, stopnjevanje širine, starosti, velikosti itd., vse to pa je označeno s temi pridevniki.« (94)

Številne besede pokrivajo široko pomensko področje. Ista beseda ima lahko več različnih pomenov. To dejstvo označujemo z izrazom polisemija, besede z več pomeni so polisemične oz. večpomenske. V nasprotju s polisemijo homonimija obstaja v primerih, ko se uporablja več besed za izražanje iste oblike (*shape*). Palmer pravi:

»Vendar pa je problem odločiti, kdaj gre za polisemijo in kdaj za homonimijo. Če imamo pisno obliko z dvema pomenoma, ali naj rečemo, da gre za eno besedo z različnima pomenoma (*polisemija*) ali za dve različni besedi z isto obliko (*homonimija*)? Na to vprašanje lahko odgovorimo na več načinov. Prvič, slovarji se običajno odločajo na podlagi etimologije. Če je znano, da imajo enake oblike različni izvor, se obravnavajo kot homonimi in dobijo ločena gesla; če je znano, da imajo en izvor, čeprav imajo različne pomene, se obravnavajo kot polisemija in dobijo v slovarju enotno geslo. Vendar to še zdaleč ni zadovoljivo, saj zgodovina jezika ne odraža vedno natančno njegovega sedanjega stanja.« (102)

Polisemična oz. večpomenska narava besed širše odpira pomen metaforične vloge besed. Palmer tudi za naravo in vlogo metafore ponuja zelo jasno opredelitev:

»Eno od najbolj znanih vrst razmerij med pomeni je metafora, kjer se zdi, da ima beseda ‚dobesedni‘ pomen in enega ali več ‚preneseni‘ pomenov. Najpresenetljivejši niz primerov najdemo pri besedah za dele telesa, roko, nogo, obraz, jezik, oko itd. Intuitivno je dovolj jasno, kateri je dobesedni pomen, in našo intuicijo podpira dejstvo, da se celoten sklop besed nanaša le na telo; le nekatere od njih je mogoče prenesti na ustrezen predmet – ura nima nog, postelja nima rok, stol nima jezika itd.« (103)

Pojav večpomenskosti besed je zelo splošna značilnost jezika. Mnogi samostalniki imajo konkretni in abstraktni pomen. Ta dvoumnost in večpomenskost besed omogočata razlikovanje med osrednjim ali jedrnim pomenom, čeprav je na splošno težko odločiti, ali v besedah osrednji ali jedrni pomen obstaja. Večpomenske besede imajo različne sinonime in vrsto antonimov. Palmer pravi: »Morda bi nas zamikalo reči, da imamo tam, kjer je antonim enak, polisemijo, in da razlika v antonimih pomeni homonimijo.« (107)

V zadnjem času se je pojavilo več publikacij o metodah semantičnih polj, ki se ukvarjajo z nekaterimi metodološkimi vprašanji ali s primeri uporabe (Berlin 1989; Lehrer in Kittay 1992; Barsalou 1992; Lehrer 1993; Lutzeier 1993; Lehrer in Kittay 1994; Bolin 2005; Levinson in Burenhult 2009; Bassac, Mery in Retoré 2010). Povečalo se je tudi zanimanje za popolnejše in ustrežnejše razumevanje leksikalnega pomena. Pri tem različne stroke proučujejo leksikalno strukturo z lastnih stališč. V zborniku konference *Frames, Fields, and Contrasts* (1992) sta urednici Adrienne Lehrer in Eva Feder Kittay združili raziskovalce s področij lingvistike, filozofije, psihologije in računalništva, da bi izmenjali ideje, razpravljali o vrsti vprašanj in pristopov, razmislili o alternativnih raziskovalnih strategijah in metodologijah ter glede leksikalne organizacije oblikovali interdisciplinarne hipoteze. O vidikih dojemanja besed v semantičnih poljih uredniki pravijo:

»Predlagali smo stališče, da načela leksikalne organizacije vplivajo na pomen besed. Da bi ugotovili, kako je to mogoče, številna poglavja v tem zvezku raziskujejo besedilne enote, ki so večje od besede ali stavka. Prevladujoče teorije v semantični teoriji so bile atomistične (s poudarkom na besedi), molekularne (s poudarkom na stavku) ali holistične (s poudarkom na jeziku kot celoti). Nekatera poglavja zagovarjajo »lokalni holizem«, po katerem je treba težišče pomena iskati v jezikovnih strukturah, ki hkrati delujejo kot organizacija posameznih besed, strukturah, kot so okvirji, polja ali nasprotja. To pomeni, da so nekateri elementi pomena znotrajjezikovni in da povsem zunajjezikovni opis ni ustrezen. Druge avtorje v zborniku zanima razmerje med jezikom in mislijo – pomen vidijo kot odvisen morda ne toliko od jezikovnih struktur kot od miselnih struktur. Pisci, ki vztrajajo pri pomembnosti znotrajjezikovnih in mentalnih analiz pome-

na, delijo nezadovoljstvo s tistimi prevladujočimi stališči v semantični teoriji, pri katerih sta v ospredju resnica in referenca.« (Lehrer in Kittay 1992, 10)

Za pojasnitev metode semantičnih polj sta še posebej dragocena prispevka Berlin 1989 in Bolin 2005. V prispevku „Lexical Cohesion and Biblical Interpretation“ (1989) Adele Berlin svojo raziskavo osredotoča na odnos med deli svetopisemskih odlomkov in pravi:

»Kohezija je še posebej pomembna v poeziji, saj zaradi jedrnatosti poezije, paratakse in izpuščanja nekaterih delcev (את in אשר) razmerje med vrsticami ni vedno zapisano na enak način, kot je v prozi. Obstoje razmerja je pogosto nakazan s paralelizmom, ki že sam po sebi zagotavlja veliko kohezije, vendar obstajajo tudi druge oblike kohezije – poleg paralelizma ali namesto njega. Nekateri, kot je ponavljanje besed, so biblicisti opazili že dolgo tega, vendar njihova *funkcija v procesu razlage* ni bila cenjena. Prav to funkcijo kohezije, zlasti leksikalno kohezijo, želim izpostaviti.« (Berlin 1989, 29)

V Svetem pismu lahko leksikalno kohezijo dosežemo z uporabo besed v primerih ponavljanja istega leksikalnega elementa (ali leksema), z uporabo sorodnega elementa (npr. sinonima) in z uporabo nadomestka za element (npr. zaimka) (30). Adele Berlin se v svojem zgledu omejuje na prvo vrsto kohezije: ponavljanje istega elementa v vseh njegovih oblikah. Mary K. Bolin se z metodo semantičnega polja ukvarja v svojem delu *Grace: a Contrastive Analysis of a Biblical Semantic Field* (2005). Njeno delo je kontrastivna analiza semantičnega polja besed *grace* in *mercy*, kot se pojavljata v različici svetopisemskega prevoda *The King James version* (KJV). Gre za angleške besede *grace, mercy, kindness, favor, compassion, pity, lovingkindness, goodness* in *thanks*. Avtorica začenja z angleškimi besedami iz KJV, nato pa išče ustreznice v grškem in hebrejskem izvirniku, nemškem prevodu Martina Luthra in latinski Vulgati. Pri obravnavi besed pomenskega polja milosti vključuje razpravo o semantični analizi, pomenskih poljih, teoriji prevajanja in pregled nekaterih drugih študij pomenskega polja.

Robert Petkovšek nakazuje možnosti za dojetje resnice s postavko svetopisemskega monoteizma. V prispevku „Veselje resnice in svetopisemski monoteizem“ (2018, 235–258) povezano z monoteizmom razlaga takole: »Svetopisemski monoteizem, ki ima za svoj temelj zvestobo in resnico, oblikuje novega, monoteističnega človeka, ki je sad spreobrnjenja. Zvestoba in resnica zahtevata spreobrnjenje, s katerim se monoteistični človek jasno loči od drugih bogov in od vsega, kar človek morda po božje časti.« (Petkovšek 2018, 243) Jože Krašovec medtem v prispevku „Od simbola besede v Svetem pismu do teologije o opravičenju“ (2020) izpostavlja značilno večpomenskost pojma ‚pravičnost‘ v semantičnih poljih v okviru svetopisemskega monoteizma. Pojem se uporablja »v sodnem pomenu božjega povračila in pojma pravičnosti v pomenu odrešenja in milosti, ko zadevata Boga. Ko pa je subjekt človek, je to vprašanje alternative med zakonitostjo kot normo in pravičnostjo v pomenu vere.« (Krašovec 2020a, 49; 2020 in 2022)

Izpeljava terminologije pomenskega polja *grace* (milost) iz prevodnih jezikov je izrazito vprašljiva. Kontrastivna analiza kakega semantičnega polja z izhodiščem v prevodnem jeziku v metodološkem pogledu ni zanesljiv pristop. Veliko več koristnih ugotovitev obeta izhajanje iz ključnega termina v izvirniku, ki ga analiziramo na vseh mestih, na katerih se pojavlja v semantičnem polju skupine besed z istim ali sorodnim pomenom. Izhodišče z upoštevanjem izvornega jezikovnega in literarnega konteksta v izvirniku nam omogoča zanesljivo prvo raven razlage: ugotavljanje morebitnega etimološkega pomena izvirnega korena; presoja osnovnega pomena (*Grundbedeutung*) izbrane besede; naravne povezave s sinonimi in antonimi istega semantičnega polja.

Izhodišče v izvirniku ima veliko prednost tudi za drugo raven razlage. Ta pristop nam ponuja neomejeno možnost kritične presoje vseh prevodov – od najstarejših antičnih do najnovejših. Teorija prevajanja svetih besedil se mora upreti slabi sodobni navadi prevajalcev, ki trdijo, da lahko prosto prevedejo tudi najpomembnejše osnovno besedišče izvirnika svetih besedil, tako da se zatečejo k množici domnevnih ustreznic v prevedenem jeziku. Zagovorniki tovrstnega pristopa ne upoštevajo dokazov struktur semantičnih polj, ki kažejo, da se etimološki in osnovni pomen osnovnega besedišča dosledno kaže v stalni rabi istih besed, besednih parov, sloga, skladnje, slovnice in pravopisa v vseh vrstah in zvrsteh besedil. Izražanje ustaljenih oblik je značilno zlasti za hebrejsko poezijo. Robert C. Culley je takšne primere zbral v knjigi psalmov z naslovom *Oral Formulaic Language in the Biblical Psalms* (1967). Za ponazoritev navajam primer ponavljanja iste hebrejske oblike psalmistove prošnje »Gospod (Bog), usliši mojo molitev« (Ps 54,4; 84,9; 102,2; 143,1). Slovenski prevajalec v tem primeru lahko izbira med opcijo »Gospod (Bog), usliši mojo molitev« in »Gospod (Bog), poslušaj mojo molitev«. Culley formulacijski jezik definira takole: »Formula v ustnem pesništvu je ponavljajoča se skupina besed, katerih dolžina ustreza enemu od členov v pesniški strukturi, na primer vrstici ali manjšim delitvam v vrstici, ki nastanejo zaradi neke formalne delitve, tako kot cezura.« (Culley 1967, 10) Abba Bendavid je v svoji knjigi *Parallels in the Bible (Vzporednice v Svetem pismu, 1972)* zbral primere iz proze v proznem korpusu »zgodovinopisja Svetega pisma od stvarjenja do vrnitve iz izgnanstva« (Bendavid 1972). Številne izdaje povzetkov izvirnega besedila evangelijev in njihovih prevodov izkazujejo podoben evangeljski pojav stalne rabe istih besed in ustaljenih izrazov. Tudi pojav stalnosti v prevodih ne dopušča nenadzorovane leksikalne večpomenskosti.

V zvezi z izvirnikom obstajajo pomembna vprašanja za vse vrste raziskav: Kateri sinonimi ali antonimi se pojavljajo v izvirnem pomenskem polju nekega ustreznega teološkega izraza? Kako so v osnovni pesniški obliki paralelizma strukturirani sinonimni ali antonimni besedni pari? Katere pomenske vidike lahko v rabi besedišča semantičnega polja razberemo iz neposrednega konteksta, katere pa šele iz medbesedilnih razmerij? Koliko nam osnovne literarne oblike in retorične odlike besedila lahko pomagajo pri ugotavljanju pomena besedišča v obravnavanem odlomku? V primerjavah med besediščem semantičnega polja v izvirniku in v prevodih sta pomembna zlasti dva metodološka vidika: doslednost ali nedosle-

dnost pri prevajanju izvirnih besed v prevodnem jeziku ter upoštevanje ali neupoštevanje literarnih in retoričnih struktur izvirnika. Že prevajalci sprejetega grškega prevoda (Septuaginta) ključnih teoloških izrazov izvirnika niso prevajali enotno, ampak so uvedli večje število ustreznice. Poleg tega so metafore iz narave ali stvarnega sveta pogosto spreminjali v abstraktne pojme. Takšen je bil pristop tudi v latinskih prevodih (Vetus Latina, Vulgata). Že zaradi tega lahko trdimo, da so tudi najstarejši prevodi Svetega pisma bolj ali manj svobodne interpretacije izvirnika. Razumljivo je, da je v celotnem poznejšem obdobju vse do danes temu pristopu sledila večina prevajalcev Svetega pisma. V novejšem obdobju pa imamo nekatere izjeme, med katerimi je morda še najbolj znan nemški prevod Martina Bubra in Franza Rosenzweiga. Vprašanje doslednega prevajanja besedišča, literarnih in retoričnih lastnosti izvirnika je bil eden najpomembnejših izzivov tudi za prevajalce Slovenskega standardnega prevoda (SSP) z leta 1996 in najnovejšega prevoda po predlogi francoske *Bible de Jérusalem* (SPJ) iz leta 2023.

4. Semantično polje pojma ‚resnica‘ v hebrejskem Svetem pismu

Iz korena *ʾmn* so izpeljane glagolske oblike *ʾāman* v qalu, *neʾēman* v nifalu in *heʾēmîn* v hifilu; prislov *ʾāmēn*, pridevniška oblika *ʾēmûn* in samostalniški obliki *ʾēmet* in *ʾēmûnāh*. Glagolska oblika v qalu pomeni ‚nositi‘, v nifalu ‚zanesljiv, zvest, zaupanja vreden, trajen (v predikatu)‘, v hifilu ‚zaupati vanj, verjeti vanj‘. Samostalniški obliki ženskega spola *ʾēmet* in *ʾēmûnāh* izražata ‚trdnost, stanovitnost, zanesljivost, stalnost, trajanje, zvestobo, resnico‘; prislov *ʾāmēn* predstavlja pritrdilni izraz »Zagotovo, Tako je!« v slovesni izjavi. V Psalmih se pojavlja kot liturgični zaključek zbirke psalmov (4 Mz 5,22; Ps 41,14; 72,19; 89,53; Neh 8,6). Pridevniška oblika *ʾēmûn* pomeni ‚zvest, zaupanja vreden‘ in je zato podobna glagolski obliki *neʾēman* v nifalu, ki ima prav tako vlogo pridevnika (v povedkovem določilu). V 5 Mz 7,9 se pojavi izraz »zvesti Bog« (Koehler and Baumgartner 1994, 1:62–65).

Glagolska oblika je v qalu uporabljena redkeje, in sicer kot aktivni deležnik v moški obliki (*hāʾōmēn*) (4 Mz 11,12; 2 Kr 10,1.5; Est 2,7; Iz 49,23) in v ženski obliki *ʾōmenet* (2 Sam 4,4; Rut 4,16) v pomenu skrbi za zaupane osebe. Veliko pogosteje se glagol pojavlja v nifalu in hifilu – v nifalu 32-krat v deležniški obliki *neʾēman*, v perfektu 5-krat in v imperfektu 8-krat. Oblika *neʾēmân* v nifalu pomeni ‚biti zanesljiv, trajen, trden‘. Sorazmerno redko se pojavlja v odnosu do materialnih stvari in pomeni ‚trajno‘ stvar, kot na primer bolezen (5 Mz 28,59), ali vodo, ki stalno teče (Iz 22,23.25; Jer 15,18), ali trdno mesto (Iz 22,23.25). Pogosteje se pojavlja v razmerju do ljudi in do Boga; do ljudi, ko jih označuje kot zanesljive predstojnike, priče ali na splošno (1 Sam 22,14; Job, 12,20; Ps 101,6; Prg 11,13; 25,13; 27,6; Iz 8,2; Neh 13,13).

Redko nifalova oblika označuje odnos posameznikov do Boga. V molitvi skrupnosti v Neh 9,8 je Abraham imenovan kot ‚zvesti‘ pred Bogom, v 4 Mz 12,7 se tako govori o Mojzesu, v 1 Sam 3,20 pa o Samuelu. Poudarjeno je označevanje

Boga kot zvestega in zanesljivega. V 5 Mz 7,9 je Bog imenovan kot ‚zvesti Bog‘, v Iz 49,7 Bog govori o sebi, da je ‚zvest‘, v Jer 42,5 ljudstvo zagotavlja zvestobo pred Bogom, ki je »resnična in zvesta priča«. Včasih so Božje zapovedi imenovane kot ‚trajne‘. Omenjena je tudi Božja zvestoba v zvezi z obljubo trdnosti Davidove dinastije (2 Sam 7,16; 25,28; Ps 89,29.38). Nekajkrat se ta oblika pojavlja kot oznaka za zanesljivost Božje besede (2 Sam 7,25; 1 Kr 3,6; 8,26; 1 Krn 17,23; 2 Krn 1,9; 6,17). V vseh primerih je osnovni pomen ‚stalnost, trdnost, zvestoba‘.

Med glagolskimi oblikami se najpogosteje uporablja oblika *he'ēmîn* v hifilu, ki pomeni dejavno vlogo trdnosti in v odnosu do Boga večinoma pomeni ‚verovati v, misliti, imeti zaupanje v‘; vera pa pomeni zaupanje v nekoga, ki ga ima vernik za zanesljivega, verodostojnega. Vernik čuti gotovost v tistem, v katerega veruje, ker v njem odkriva resničnost in resnico. To vsebino takoj začitimo v sloviti izjavi o Abrahamovi veri v 1 Mz 15,6: »Veroval je (*he'ēmîn*; gr. *episteusen*; Vg *credidit*) Gospodu in ta mu je to štel v pravičnost.« Ta oblika se v pripovednih besedilih pojavlja 24-krat, v Psalmih 8-krat, v preroških govorih 7-krat, v modrostni literaturi 11-krat. V odnosu do ljudi imamo izjave v pozitivnem in negativnem pomenu: ljudje nekaterim ljudem lahko verjamejo, drugim pa ne; v Boga verujejo ali dvomijo. Z utrjevanjem monoteizma se utrjuje tudi vera, da je samo Bog resničen, zato je mogoče zaupati samo njemu – in le v njem je mogoče najti trdnost. Ljudje, njihove besede in dejanja niso vedno verodostojni. Skladno s to večinoma negativno izkušnjo je razumljivo, da imamo v hebrejskem Svetem pismu le redko izjavo, da je ljudstvo ali posameznik v Boga veroval (1 Mz 15,6; 2 Mz 4,41; 14,31; Ps 27,13; 106,12; 116,10; 119, 66; Jon 3,5). Izaijeva osebna izkušnja, kaj vse vera v Boga pomeni, pa mu v trenutku stiske kralja in ljudstva v Jeruzalemu, ki ga oblega asirski kralj, narekuje načelno izjavo (Iz 7,9): »Če ne boste verovali, ne boste obstali (*'im lō' ta'āmînû kî lō' tē'āmēnû*; gr. *kai ean mē pisteusēte oude mē synēte*; Vg. *si non credideritis non permanebitis*).«

Samostalniški obliki *'ēmēt* in *'ēmûnāh* sta še posebej pomembni za razumevanje svetopisemskega pojmovanja resničnosti in resnice. Obe obliki se v nekaterih besedilih pojavljata v povezavi s sopomenkami *ḥesed*, ‚lojalnost, zvestoba, dobrota, milina, dokazi za milost‘, *šedeq/šedāqāh*, ‚pravičnost‘, *šālôm*, ‚mir‘, in *mišpāt*, ‚sodba‘. Oblika *'ēmet* se pojavlja 126-krat: 37-krat v Psalmih, 12-krat pri Izaiju, 11-krat pri Jeremiju, 11-krat v Pregovorih, 6-krat pri Danielu, 6-krat pri Zahariju in v manjšem številu še v nekaterih drugih knjigah. Od narave svetopisemskih knjig je odvisna tudi izbira predmeta te samostalniške oblike. V Pregovorih in nekaterih pripovednih besedilih prevladuje človeški subjekt, v Psalmih pa je subjekt Bog. V zvezi s človeškimi osebami in ustanovami se samostalniška oblika včasih pojavlja v povezavi z besedo *dābār*, ‚beseda, stvar, ki je resnična‘. V 5 Mz 13,15 Bog o gnu-sobah, ki so se zgodile v njegovi sredi, Izraelu očita, da je »stvar zanesljivo resnična (*'ēmet nākôn haddābār*)«. V 1 Kr 10,6 kraljica iz Sabe hvali kralja Salomona: »Kako resnična je beseda (*'ēmet hāyāh haddābār*; gr. *alēthinos ho logos*; Vg *verus est sermo*), ki sem jo slišala o tvojih dosežkih in tvoji modrosti v svoji deželi.« Najpogosteje pa se ‚beseda‘ pojavlja v izjavah opozoril, pritožb in zagotovil, da je nekdo ali nekaj resnično ali neresnično. V Prg 23,23 imamo spodbudo: »Pridobivaj

si resnico (*'ēmet qēnēh*) in je ne prodajaj, modrost in vzgojo in razumnost.« V Iz 48,1 prerok graja ljudi, da Boga ne slavijo »v resnici in pravičnosti (*lō' bē'ēmet wēlō' biṣdāqāh*; gr. *ou meta alētheias oude meta dikaiosynēs*; Vg *non in veritate neque in iustitia*)«. V Iz 59,14-15 prerok toži: »Tako je pravica potisnjena nazaj in pravičnost stoji od daleč, kajti resnica se je spotaknila na trgu (*kī kāšēlāh bārēhōb 'ēmet*) in prava pot nima moči, da bi prišla. Resnica je pogrešana (*wattēhī hā'ēmet ne'ēderet*).« V Jer 9,4 prerok izjavlja: »Drug drugega varajo, in nihče ne govori resnice (*wē'ēmet lō' yēdabbērū*).« V Jer 42,5 poveljniki pred Jeremijem izjavljajo: »Gospod naj bo resnična in zvesta priča proti nam (*yēhī yhwh bānū lē'ēd 'ēmet wēne'ēmān*), če ne bomo ravnali po vsaki besedi, s katero te Gospod, tvoj Bog, pošilja k nam.« V Oz 4,1 prerok bridko ugotavlja, da »ni resnice (*'ēn 'ēmet*) ne dobrote in ne spoznanja Boga v deželi«. V Zah 8,16 imamo na primer spodbudo: »Drug z drugim govorite resnico (*dabbērū 'ēmet 'iš 'et-rē'ēhū*), pri vaših mestnih vratih sodite po resnici in pravici (*'ēmet wēmišpāt*) za mir.« V Zah 8,19 pa prerok spodbuja: »Ijubite resnico (*hā'ēmet*) in mir.«

V odnosu do Boga se samostalnik *'ēmet* uporablja za označevanje ene od temeljnih Božjih lastnosti. V Psalmih posamezniki ali skupnost slavijo ,resničnega' oziroma ,zvestega' Boga (Ps 31,6; 86,15; 89,15). Besedo *'ēmet* prevodi večinoma ustrezno podajajo z besedo ,zvestoba, zanesljivost', na nekaterih mestih pa vsebina jasno narekuje prevod ,resnica, resničen'. V Prg 8,7 poosebljena Božja modrost govori: »Moja usta govorijo resnico.« Prerok Jeremija v polemiki o ničevosti malikov pred Izraelovim Bogom pravi: »Gospod pa je resnični Bog, živi Bog in večni Kralj.« (Jer 10,10) V Jer 23,28 se postavlja v nasprotje sanje in resnično govorjenje Božje besede. V templju Jeremija zagotavlja, da ga je Gospod ,v resnici' poslal k njim (Jer 26,15). Kralj Jozafat preroka Miha roti, naj mu pove samo »resnico v Gospodovem imenu« (1 Kr 22,16). Prerok Daniel dobi zagotovilo, da je »videnje resnično« (8,26), da je »beseda bila resnična« (Dan 10,1); oznanjeno mu bo, »kaj je določeno v pismu resnice« (10,21), in končno skrivnostni Božji odposlanec pravi: »In zdaj ti bom naznanil resnico.« (11,2) V Drugi kroniški knjigi Božji duh govori, da je Izrael »bil dolgo brez pravega (resničnega) Boga« (2 Krn 15,3).

Za razumevanje pomenskega obsega koncepta resničnosti in resnice v razlagi v helenistični dobi je pomembno usmeriti pozornost na besedišče, ki ga za hebrejsko samostalniško obliko *'ēmet* izbira grški prevod Stare zaveze Septuaginta: *alētheia* 87-krat, (pridevnik) *alēthinos* 12-krat, nekajkrat *alēthēs*, *alēthos* in *aletheûein*. V 1 Mz 24,49; Joz 24,14, Iz 38,19; 39,8; 9,13 nastopa samostalnik *dikaiosynē* ,pravičnost'; 4-krat pridevnik *dikaios* ,pravičen'; v Jer 35 (28),9; 39 (32),41; 40 (33),6 *pistis* ,zvestoba'; v Iz 38,18 *eleēmosynē* ,usmiljenje'; v Iz 38,19 *dikaiosynē* ,pravičnost' (Quell 1964, 233).

Samostalniška oblika *'ēmûnāh* približno v enakem razmerju označuje resnico oziroma zvestobo v odnosu do človeških oseb in do Boga. Čeprav je osnovni pomen isti, pa raba samostalniških oblik *'ēmet* in *'ēmûnāh* kaže nekatere razlike – kar ima za posledico tudi dejstvo, da grška Septuaginta *'ēmet* večinoma prevaja z besedama *alētheia* ,resnica' in *alēthinos* ,resničen', *'ēmûnāh* pa s *pistis* ,vera, zvestoba' (Jepsen 1974, 310, 317). Pozorni smo na dejstvo, da se samostalnik *'ēmet*

pogosteje pojavlja v povezavi s sinonimnimi pojmi. V Ps 119,29-30 psalmist Boga prosi, naj od njega odstrani »pot laži/lažno pot«, ker je izbral »pot resnice/zvestobe«. Zanimiva je ugotovitev, da se samostalniška oblika *'ēmûnāh* pogosto pojavlja kot nasprotje besede *šeqer*, 'laž' (Iz 59,4; Jer 5,1.2; 9,2; Ps 89,34; 119,29-30.86; Prg 12,17.22; 14,5). V odnosu do Boga se samostalniška oblika *'ēmûnāh* uporablja samo v pesniških delih hebrejskega Svetega pisma, na primer v Ps 40,11; 92,3; 88,12; 89,2.6, in izraža sólo bistvo Boga, ki se kaže v njegovi zanesljivosti, zvestobi in resničnosti. V 5 Mz 32,4 pesnik Boga imenuje *'el 'ēmûnāh*, »Bog resnice = resničen/zvesti Bog«.

5. Sklep

Semantični pristop pri ugotavljanju pomenskih vidikov pojma 'resnica' omogoča vpogled v celotno hierarhijo vrednot, ki jih prikazujejo različne literarne vrste bibličnih besedil z izraznimi sredstvi besedišča, literarnih oblik in umetnosti retorike. Osrednja literarna oblika paralelizma omogoča vpogled v pomenske vidike sinonimov in antonimov, ki se pogosto pojavljajo v parih ali v povezavi z večjim številom sinonimnih ali antonimnih izrazov. Vpogled v najvplivnejša starodavna prevoda Svetega pisma, Septuaginto in Vulgato, nam pomaga ugotoviti, kakšni so novi odtenki pomenov, ki so jih pod vplivom prevodov poznejši razlagalci Svetega pisma, teologi in literarni poustvarjalci vnesli v jezike, ki so s svojo izredno razširjenostjo skozi stoletja oblikovali univerzalno versko in kulturno skupnost.

Metoda analize besedišča v okviru semantičnih polj nam je pomagala, da smo lahko v vsakem odlomku natančneje ugotovili, kakšen je osnovni pomen (*Grundbedeutung*) izbrane ključne besede za leksikalno in semantično analizo. Poleg tega nam je pomagala ugotoviti morebitni etimološki pomen, kako kontekst kaže večpomenskost besede, kakšne so stalne besedne zveze po v parih ali širših sklopih izbranih besed. Na ta način smo lahko tudi ugotovili, da je osnovno merilo jezikovnega in literarnega konteksta besedila glede možnosti, da bi iz njega izpeljali variabilnost pomenskih vidikov besed s ključnim pomenom, omejeno.


Ko v leksikalno in semantično analizo besedil vključujemo še izbrane ustreznice v prevodih posebnega kulturnega vpliva, dobimo vpogled v premike v določanju pomena besed v izvorniku in ustreznih v standardnih prevodih, ki so po posameznih jezikovnih skupinah vplivali tudi na razvoj teologije in filozofije. Velik vpliv standardnih prevodov Svetega pisma skozi zgodovino eksegetom narekuje, da primerjajo dokazne besede, ki izražajo vidike 'resnice' v izvorniku, s prevodi kot dodatnimi podatki – in tako dobijo bogatejšo sliko pomenov, kot pa jo lahko dajo zgolj enojezične študije. S tako celotno sinhrono in diahrono metodo lahko omogočimo tudi, da se popravi raba ključnega svetopisemskega besedišča v sistematični teologiji in filozofiji, ki se razvijata vzporedno – in včasih tudi mimo posebnosti besed v semantičnih poljih. Ko delamo leksikalno in semantično analizo besed, kot so ljubezen, zvestoba in resnica, se hote ali nehote poleg kognitivnih razkrijejo tudi čustveni vidiki tovrstnega besedišča.

Rezultate semantične analize lahko povzamemo z nekaj ugotovitvami: 1) semantično polje koncepta resnice večinoma pokriva samo vsebinsko jedro Božjih in človeških lastnosti, ki zaznamujejo medosebne odnose v komplementarnem povezovanju pomensko podobnih besed: trdnost, stanovitnost, zanesljivost, stalnost, trajanje, zvestoba, resnica; 2) ko preroki govorijo o človekovi verodostojnosti ali neverodostojnosti, izražajo razočaranje, ker se stanje duha ne ujema s pričakovanji; posledica človeške neverodostojnosti so različne kazni, ki prerokom dajejo povod za klic h pokori, za obljubo odpuščanja in za spravna dejanja; 3) celovita duhovna narava resnice, ki se udejanja v medosebnih odnosih, predstavlja za razlagalce in literarne poustvarjalce svetopisemskega dojemanja resnice velik izziv. Po splošnem prepričanju lastnosti resnice ni mogoče ustrezno izraziti le s pojmi, besednimi zvezami ali definicijami. Predstavitve v pripovedi, obliki govorov in molitev, slogu modrostnih izrekov in dialogov imajo veliko večjo prepričevalno moč. Besedila največkrat prikazujejo zaupanja vredna ali nevredna dejanja likov v odnosu do Boga in ljudi v konkretnih življenjskih situacijah.

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Janez Juhant

Lambert Ehrlich, prerok slovenskega naroda

Knjiga je celovit prikaz osebnosti Lamberta Ehrliche (1878–1942) ter njegovega vsestransko bogatega delovanja v Cerкви in družbi na Koroškem in v Sloveniji. Deloval je kot duhovnik, profesor, veroslovec, misijonar, socialni in narodno-politični delavec. Odlikujejo ga izjemna sposobnost, treznost, preudarnost in človeška bližina pri presoji problemov ter zmožnost vključevanja različnih ljudi pri iskanju najprimernejših rešitev za narod in Cerkev.

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Krešimir Šimić

Eco's *Lingua Edenica* and "Other Languages": A Biblical-Theological Critique of Umberto Eco's Semiotics

Ecova Lingua Edenica in ,drugi jeziki':

biblično-teološka kritika semiotike Umberta Eca

Abstract: The paper introduces a close reading of Eco's article "Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica" (1971), in which he fictionalized the biblical story from Gen 2 to show that the aesthetic use of language generates internal contradictions (self-contradictions), as well as that any such contradiction at the level of expression/form also entails a contradiction at the level of content. Furthermore, the basic postulates of Eco's semiotic theory revolving around the sign-function are discussed, followed by outlining certain theological-semiotics of language based on the text from the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles (descent of the Spirit). It is based on an original sign – which is not, as with Eco, a sign associated with another sign (interpretant) within a sign system (code) nor a "dynamic object," but it is the Mystical Body. The paper concludes by arguing that it is this very Body, and not the poetic invention, that generates "other languages" (ἑτέρας γλώσσας) and consequently a communion, which is not multiethnic nor multilingual, but a Catholic community.

Keywords: Umberto Eco, semiotic, sign, "other languages", Mystical Body

Povzetek: Prispevek predstavlja natančno branje Ecovega članka „Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica“ (1971) – v njem poustvarja svetopi-semsko zgodbo iz 2. poglavja Geneze, da bi pokazal, da estetska raba jezika ustvarja notranja protislovja (samoprotislovja) in da vsako tako protislovje na ravni izraza/forme vključuje tudi protislovje na ravni vsebine. Ob tem so obravnavani osnovni postulati Ecove semiotične teorije, ki se vrtijo okoli funkcije znaka, čemur sledi oris nekaterih teološko-semiotičnih vidikov jezika na podlagi besedila iz drugega poglavja Apostolskih del (sestop Duha). Ta temelji na izvornem znaku, ki ni (kot pri Eco) znak, povezan z drugim znakom (razlagalcem) znotraj znakovnega sistema (koda), niti „dinamični predmet“, temveč Mistično Telo. Prispevek se zaključuje z argumentom, da prav to Telo, in ne pesniška iznajdba, ustvarja „druge jezike“ (ἑτέρας γλώσσας) in posledično občestvo, ki ni ne multietnično ne večjezično, pač pa katoliška skupnost.

Ključne besede: Umberto Eco, semiotika, znak, „drugi jeziki“, mistično telo

1. Introduction

Although the notion of the divine origin of language has left a profound mark on Western culture (among others), the topic of *lingua adamica* might come as a surprise, especially if one avoids the historiographical approach, as is the case with this paper. Namely, the “new philology” – having developed at the threshold of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with comparative grammar and the categorisation of languages into families as its main pillars – rejected the thesis on the divine origin of language. Finally, the twentieth century “revelation of language” (M. Foucault) seemed to fully banish the (religious) attitude that God granted language to man in heaven as well as *that*, Adamic language expressed the true nature and essence of things (*etymon*), i.e. that it did not consist of conventional signs. Yet, it becomes obvious that this Adamic language is not alien to the contemporary academic *milieu* or pop culture if one delves into an extensive work of one of the brightest beacons of those two areas, the “master of words” – as he was oftentimes called – Umberto Eco.

Eco dealt with the topic of Adamic language in a two-fold way: on the one hand, he was interested in the history of searching for the perfect language, wherein he could not omit Adam (Eco 1995, 8; 352–353), while on the other hand, he used the notion of *lingua adamica* (i.e. *edenica*) to showcase his own semiotic theory. Hence, both the latter and the former (historiographic research and semiotic theory) – as is inherent to a true postmodernist – served Eco as a sizable foundation for his largely detective novels (what else?). It is almost superfluous to mention his debut novel *The Name of the Rose* (1980), as well as the ones that followed: *Foucault's Pendulum* (1988), *The Island of the Day Before* (1994), *Baudolino* (2000), *The Mysterious Flame of Queen Loana* (2004), *The Prague Cemetery* (2010), and *Numero Zero* (2015). Since all these novels, originally published in Italian, were soon translated to English (as well as to many other languages, of which, at least the widespread ones such as French and German, Eco the polyglot, the translator, and the champion of *confusio linguarum* knew himself) and reference – either directly or in the background – the idea of Adamic language, *lingua adamica* that has become a certain *topos* for contemporary pop-culture. Due to necessary limitation and considering the aim of this paper (the attempt to explore Eco's semiotic theory and outline a certain theology of language), the paper will bypass Eco's novels and focus on his fictionalization of the biblical story “Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica” (1971).

By applying Peirce's concept of unlimited semiosis, Eco engaged with the biblical story in the manner of Giacomo Leopardi's philosophical reflections to show that the aesthetic use of language generates internal contradictions (self-contradictions), as well as that any such contradiction at the level of expression entails contradiction at the level of content (Bondanella 1997, 82). Consequently, the mentioned work, revealing both Eco's semiotic beginnings and final phase (Caesar 1999, 75), will now be approached by means of “close reading”. This mode of reading is not only a methodological choice, but also a kind of *hint* to thinking

about language by starting from reading the particular biblical text (the event of "other languages"; Acts 2) – but more about that after "reading" Eco.

2. Linguistic Experimentation – "Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language"

"Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica" was originally published in the journal *Strumenty Critici* (1971), where it was titled "Sulla possibilità di generare messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica". Later it was included in the collections of articles *Le forme del contenuto* (1971) and *The Role of the Reader* (1984), where it was translated according to its original title ("On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language"), and as a supplement to the third edition of *The Open Work* (1976 in Italian, 1989 in English), which the critics deemed Eco's presemiotic phase. Since the latter work was re-published by Eco several months after the Italian edition of *A Theory of Semantics* (1976), he supposed he might be asked whether he could once more write *The Open Work* in the light of his semiotic research and finally show how the "entire thing works". The answer would be, emphasises Eco, as follows: "To be blunt /.../ I already have. In the essay 'Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica' /.../ It's only sixteen pages, but I don't think there is anything to add." (Caesar 1999, 75) Let us look at them!¹

Although surrounded by a lush environment, Adam and Eve devised a limited series of semantic units (minimum labelling units) that favoured primarily their emotional relationship (values and attitudes) toward flora and fauna, rather than naming and precise classification. The semantic units were structured around six relational units:

- yes vs. no
- edible vs. inedible (edible as in "can be eaten," "aimed for eating," "wanting to eat" etc.)
- good vs. evil (refers to both moral and corporal experiences)
- beautiful vs. ugly (refers to all that is pleasurable, fun, desirable etc.)
- red vs. blue (refers to an entire scale of chromatic experiences, earth is perceived as red, sky is blue, meat is red, stone is blue etc.)
- serpent vs. apple (this opposition, unlike the previous ones, does not refer to the quality of object and reaction to objects, but on the very objects; it was codified after God expressed his attitude on the apple, hence, exceptionally).

¹ This paper uses Italian ("Generazione di messaggi estetici in una lingua edenica", in Eco 1976) and English ("On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language", in Eco 1984a) trying not to betray Eco himself, aware that translation is an approximation (*la stessa cosa* – "almost the same"), i.e. a palimpsest (G. Genette) but such from one can still, in hints, read the old inscription below. Moreover, the paper tries as much as it can to read the "old" not only in allusions, but as if it were protruding strongly from underneath the "new" inscription.

One cultural unit (codified knowledge) inevitably leads to another (it turns into its interpretant), creating a series of connotations (1):

Red = edible = good = beautiful

Blue = inedible = evil = ugly

Conversely, Adam and Eve can denote and understand cultural units only by means of meaningful forms (*forme significanti*). Therefore, they are given or are slowly developing (Eco is not interested in which exactly) an extremely simple language sufficient to express the indicated concepts. The repertoire of this language derives from two voices: A and B, which can be combined into sequences according to the rule X, nY, X . Therefore, each sequence must begin with the first element, followed by n repetitions of the second element, and end with only one repetition of the first element. With such a rule, it is possible to generate an infinite number of syntactically correct sequences. However, Adam and Eve know only a limited repertoire of sequences corresponding to the mentioned cultural units. Their code (the system of expectations valid in the world of signs) is, therefore, the following (2):

ABA = edible

BAB = inedible

ABBA = good

BAAB = bad

ABBBA = serpent

BAAAAB = apple

ABBBBA = beautiful

BAAAAAB = ugly

ABBBBBBA = red

BAAAAAAB = blue

Apart from that, the code includes two general operators (which can mean: allowed/forbidden; exists/does not exist etc.):

AA = yes

BB = no

There are no other syntactic rules, except for the possible combining of sequences in such a way as to bring their cultural units into a reciprocal relation of predication (e.g. BAAAAB, ABBBBBA = "apple is red" or "red apple").

Although they are only anticipating the rule of generating sequences (the encounter issues with the AA and BB sequences), Adam and Eve use the Edenic language very well. Yet, they do not know that other correct sequences can be generated as well. The reason is that, firstly, they have no need for them because they have nothing else to name and, secondly, they live in a harmonious world. The connotative series (1) are therefore structured as follows (3):

ABA = ABBA = ABBBBBA = ABBBBBBA = BAAAAB = AA

(edible = good = beautiful = red = apple = yes)

BAB = BAAB = BAAAAB = BAAAAAB = ABBBA = BB

(inedible = bad = ugly = blue = serpent = no)

Words are things (that is, familiar experiences), and things are words. That is why certain associative connotations are natural for Adam and Eve, for instance, ABA = "red". This, in turn, is a basic use of metaphor, based on the possibility of separation from the metonymic chain type (3). Only, the invention that has been shown is still minimal because all the series include familiar elements. The semiotic world of Adam and Eve is tiny, both in the form of the content and the form of the expression.

All the judgments that Adam and Eve make about the world are semiotic – they belong to an established cycle of semiosis. However, as soon as Adam and Eve became accustomed to Eden and learned to "move" in it with the help of language, God came and gave the first factual judgment (*giudizio fattuale*):² BAAAB. BAB-BAAAB. BAAB (apple inedible, apple evil). The meaning of God's factual judgment is as follows: "You think that an apple belongs to the category of good, edible things because it is red. But – I tell you, 'An apple must not be considered edible because it is evil!'" God has no need to explain why an apple is evil because he is a measure of value. For Adam and Eve, in the case of God, AA is not just a sequence used to control the combination of other sequences, but it is a name (the One who is). If they had a higher theological consciousness, Eco notes, Adam and Eve would have known that the serpent was BB. Yet, they blissfully ignored such subtlety. Either way, the serpent is blue and inedible. After God's intervention, the snake became an important detail among the Edenic resources. God's judgment is therefore not only factual but also semiotic because it leads to a new type of connotative pairing of semantic units. Thus, because of God's command, Adam and Eve can introduce changes into the connotative series set forth in (3), leading to the following series (5):

red = edible = good = beautiful = yes

serpent and apple = inedible = bad = ugly = no

This leads to the connotation: serpent = apple. The semantic world that had previously been balanced generated the first contradictions, thus becoming unbalanced. Namely, there are still perceptual habits due to which the apple is denoted as red, but it connotatively corresponds to that which is evil and inedible. The sentence (6) BAAAB. ABBBBBA (apple is red) opposes the sentence (7) BAAAB. BAAAAB (the apple is blue). Adam and Eve are, therefore, faced with a peculiarity: denotation bases its opposition through the connotation it necessarily produces. This contradiction cannot be expressed in the usual denotative words. In other words, Adam and Eve cannot point to the apple and say, "This is red" because they also know it is blue. They do not dare to formulate the sentence "apple

² Instead of the analytical vs. syntactic judgment opposition, Eco introduces the semiotic vs. factual judgment. In the process of interpretation, the first attributes to the given content the sems already given to them by the code, and the second attributes to the content that the sems have not been given to them before. When the factual judgment is stated and accepted, it becomes conventional and semiotic since the newly established connection between cultural units enters the structure of the code.

is red and blue,” so they resort to a kind of metaphor to express the new situation with the apple. Instead of the sentence BAAAB. ABBBBBA. BAAAAAB (apple is blue, it is red), they use a complex substantive expression to avoid the danger of logical contradiction and to allow them to understand the term intuitively and ambiguously (8): ABBBBBABAAAAAB (red-blue). The new word expresses a contradictory fact without asking to be formed according to the usual logical rules. Yet, it also brings about a new experience in Adam and Eve. They are fascinated by the new sound and the unusual sequence. The sequence (8) is ambiguous not only regarding the form of content but also regarding the form of expression. Thus, she becomes the origin of self-reflexivity. Adam and Eve – highlights Eco – meet words for the first time, not things.

Adam soon discovers that the sequence (8) contains the sequence BAB (inedible) at its center. The apple, *qua red-blue*, structurally incorporates a formal indication of its own inedibility, which seemed to be only one of its connotations in terms of content form. The apple becomes “inedible” even in terms of expression. Adam and Eve finally discovered the aesthetic use of language, yet without fully accepting it. The desire for the apple must be stronger to generate an aesthetic impulse. There is an interaction between the desire for the apple and the desire for language, resulting in a creative-aesthetic motivation. The next phase of Adam’s experiment brings to the fore the substance of expression (*sostanza dell’espressione*). Adam writes (9) ABBBBBA (red) with blue berry juice, and then (10) BAAAAAB (blue) with red berry juice. The sequences (9) and (10) are two metaphors. Their metaphoric nature is increased by the presence of physical elements, that is, the special emphasis inherent in the matter of the expression itself. This resulted in the transformation of the substance of expression from a mere variant into a pertinent element: the substance of expression became the form of expression. Until then, red things were imprecise referents to which the signifier ABBBBBA was applied, and now the red thing (redness of berry juice) itself became the sign-vehicle (*significante*) of an element that contains the word ABBBBBA as one of its meanings. In fact, the process of unlimited semiosis was introduced, in which each signified can become a signifier of another signified, and even of its own former signifier. Even the object (referent) can undergo the process of semiosis and become a sign. The amazed Adam and Eve – imagines Eco – watch in ecstasy for hours what was written. Adam embarks on a new adventure and writes: (11) ABBBBBBA. The sequence with six B letters does not exist in his dictionary. Since it closely resembles ABBBBBA (“red”), one could say that Adam wrote “red”, only with a graphical highlight. Highlighting the form of expression has a counterpart at the level of the form of content. In an attempt to place the new word somewhere, Adam for the first time directs his attention to the varying redness that surrounds him. The innovation in the form of expression leads him to make the content form pertinent. Thus, one B is no longer a variant of the form of the expression, but a new part of it. Adam still tries to write something even more complex (12):

BAB

BAAB

BAAAAB

BAAAAAB

BAAAAAAB

("inedible evil, apple ugly and blue")

Consequently, a progressive increase in the length of the word occurs (establishing a rhythm) and all sequences end with the same letter (establishing rhyme). The evilness of the apple is expressed through a kind of formal need that imposes (also in terms of content) that the apple is ugly and blue. Adam is so convinced of the indissolubility of form and content that he begins to think – writes Eco – *nomina sint numina*. This opinion overwhelmed him so much that he decided to amplify the rhythm and rhyme by including repetition elements into his statement (12) (13):

BAB BAB

BAAB BAB

BAAB BAB

BAB BAAAAAB

ABBA

ABBBBA

ABBBBBA

ABBBA

(good, beautiful, red – serpent is)

For her new expression, Eve uses the same formal identity between expression and content that Adam used for his poem (12). Obviously, she re-instigates the issue of self-contradiction that Adam's poem seemed to obscure: how can the serpent be the formal equivalent of things that the language system (the code) excludes as its predicates? Eva vaguely imagined a new way of creating hidden homologies between expressions and content from which new contradictions would then arise. She could, for example, make a sequence in which each letter would be composed of a semantic opposite. But – in order to produce such "concrete poetry" (*poesia concreta*), she needed a graphic sophistication which she did not possess. For this reason, Adam takes the matter into his own hands and imagines an even more ambiguous sequence (15): BAA – B (whereby the meaning of the empty space is unclear: it might be an empty or a true place). Consequently, Eva imagines her own *recitar cantando*, the Edenic *Sprachgesang* (16); ABBBA (whereby the voice rises and stays on the last B, so one does not know if it is the "serpent" or a doubling of the last B, which would then mean "beautiful"). All this (the real possibility that the language is responsible for ambiguity and deception) greatly confused Adam, due to which he shifted his anxiety from language to meanings that called into question God's commandments. While singing the indicated dilemma, he was overwhelmed by rhythm, the language in his mouth shattered into pieces and he let it roam freely in the spirit of the futuristic slogan

parole in libertà (17):

ABA BAB
 BAB BAB
 ABA BAB BAB BB B A
 BBBBBBAAAAAABBBBBB
 BAAAAA
 AA

However, just when he invented the wrong words, he began to understand more clearly why other words were correct. The generative law that governs his code (X, nY, X) became clear to him. But not only that; in the same moment when Adam understands the strict generative law of the code to which he has been subjected, he also realizes that he could set up a new code instead. As he destroys the code, he discovers that he is its master. Only a moment ago he thought that poetry was the medium spoken by the gods, but now he discovers the *arbitrariness of the sign*. He composes new sequences, invents vocal colours, manages form, flatters himself that he has created a poetic language that will eventually reach all meanings, he intends to compile a book to give an orphic explanation of the land, while the work gradually replaces the author.

And while in the last part of the last sentence, it is not difficult to see an allusion to Roland Barthes's famous essay *La mort de l'auteur* (1967), the essay in its entirety – supposedly without Eco's intention (which is in a way "in the spirit" of the aforementioned Barthes's essay) – evokes Kant, whom Eco often referred to.³ Regardless of the fact that he is a famous author, it is a lesser-known text (*Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte*, 1786). In Gen 3, Kant saw Adam's awakening of the mind as the "first attempt at a free choice", the "liberation" from dependence on nature and grace, the horizon of new possibilities. The man's eyes "opened", Kant points out and "[h]e stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss; for instead of the single objects of his desire to which instinct had up to now directed him, there opened up an infinity of them /.../ and from this estate of freedom /.../ it was nevertheless wholly impossible for him to turn back again to that of servitude" (Kant 2011, 166). But let us return to Eco's Adam. After leaving Eden, Adam calms down. During the linguistic experimentation, he found that the linguistic order is not absolute, that the Order (*Ordine*) does not exist; it is only one of the infinitely possible states of repose (Eco 1984a, 102–103).

3. Eco's Semiotics

A certain pleasure in reading Eco's essay, rightly remarks Michael Caesar, is found not only in the "technical demonstration" but also in the "discrete parody"

³ In fact, it seems that Eco's semiotic project is somewhat close to Kant's philosophical project. Namely, Eco is disinterested in the question of God because, as well as Kant, he believed that it cannot be answered, thus he pushed it within the limits of semiotics or the semiotically conceived "common sense".

(present in his novels as well) of poets, literary theorists, and philosophers (Baroque, Romanticism, "concrete poetry," futurism, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Joyce, Heidegger, Barthes, Kristeva, Jakobson, Derrida, Hjelmslev) who are present in one way or another in Adam's and Eve's role as "breakneck experimenters" with forms of language and culture (Ceasar 1999, 75). More importantly – at least for this occasion – is that the biblical story of Adam and Eve served to Eco as a "practical demonstration" of the basic features of aesthetic use of language in a humorous way (how else?) based on a simple model – since complex aesthetic messages are too complicated to be precisely analysed – as well as own semiotic theories (Eco 1984a, 91). The characteristics of the aesthetic message were, therefore, the focus of Eco's interest not only because he believed that a semiotic approach to aesthetic texts could clarify much that the traditional aesthetics (especially Croce's) leave unexplained, but also because the basic characteristic of an aesthetic message (homology of expression and content) illuminates the basic tenets of his own semiotic theory.

At the very beginning of his essay, Eco engages with Roman Jakobson's claim that the aesthetic use of language is determined by ambiguity (*ambiguità*) and self-focusing character (*autoriflessività*), which he explains further. Through ambiguity, the message becomes inventive in relation to the possibilities recognized within the code. But for an aesthetic message to emerge, ambiguity is not enough just at the level of content form – where, within the formal symmetry of metonymic relations, a metaphorical substitution operates that encourages a new conception of the semantic system and the world of meaning it harmonizes. A change is needed in terms of the form of the expression as well, and that change must be significant enough to require the addressee of the message to return to the message itself as a physical entity. Thus, the addressee will detect a kind of interaction between the changes that have taken place in the form of content and in the form of expression. In this way, the aesthetic message becomes self-focused. In it, therefore, there is a kind of inseparability of content and expression (90–91). Eco is somewhat more systematic in *A Theory of Semiotics*.

Any discussion of the invention (and the question of the invention is inevitable since it is actually a question of freedom, the question of the extent to which language rules over human beings), Eco notes, inevitably leads to ambiguity, self-focusing, and idiolectal use of code (an individual code) and thus forces one to discuss the aesthetic text (Eco 1976b, 258). There are five reasons, Eco continues, as to why the aesthetic text is important to the semiotician. *First*, the aesthetic text involves a kind of manipulation of expression. *Second*, expression manipulation leads to a revision of the message content. *Third*, the indicated double operation, which creates an idiosyncratic and very original instance of the sign-function, is to an extent reflected precisely in those codes on which the aesthetic sign-function is based, thus freeing the process of changing the code. *Fourth*, the entire operation, although focused on codes, often creates a new kind of awareness of the world. *Fifth* and final, since aesthetic activity aims to be understood by the addressee (therefore the addressee engages in complex interpretive work),

the addresser must focus on possible reactions by the addressee, which means that the aesthetic text represents a network of different communicational acts that elicit very original responses (261). The aesthetic text thus represents a summary of all aspects of the sign-function.⁴ But let us return once again to Eco's story of Adam and Eve.

That story, as we have seen, is a simple model (an extremely simple language code) that shows the rules belonging to the code, the mechanisms of innovation, and possible changes to the code itself. Or, to be more precise and systematic, the model shows the core points of Eco's semiotics, revolving around the sign-function. *First*, language rules derive from the code itself, but they also (when there is a change in both expression form and content form) can lead to code changes (the model, therefore, shows the capacity of the language to generate self-contradictions). *Second*, the aesthetic use of language is the most appropriate means of creating self-contradiction. *Third*, any self-contradiction created by the aesthetic use of language at the level of its form of expression likewise includes self-contradictions at the level of the form of content, which leads to reconceptualization, i.e. a new vision of the world. *Fourth*, some solid, unchanging structure,⁵ the universal-logical realm as such does not exist (at least as far as semiotic research is concerned), but areas, axes, subsystems are organized by culture.⁶ For Eco, the role of

⁴ In rethinking Hjelmslev's notion of sign-function (solidarity between two functives: expression and content) and based on Peirce's conception of unlimited semiosis, Eco finds the following: "When code distributes elements from a conveying system to conveyed system elements system), the first becomes the expression of the second, and the second becomes the content of the first. The sign-function occurs when the expression is related to the content, and both correlated elements represent the function of such correlation." (Eco 1976b, 48) Thus, the sign-function is realized when expression and content enter into mutual correlation. The same functive can also enter into a different correlation, thus becoming a different functive that allows the creation of a new sign-function. Obviously, the classical notion of a sign dissolves into a very complex network of changing relationships. In fact, a sign, Eco argues, is not a "fixed material entity" or a "fixed semiotic entity" – meaning that "there are no signs, only sign-fund ions" (49). This then means that semiosis is self-explanatory. However, Eco notes, there are at least two cases in which semiosis is confronted with something outside of it. The first case are indications. Although he disputes Peirce's view that indications must be related to the object, they signify in order to be understood as signs, he notes that it is irrefutable to say *this* and point a finger at a given object that indications are in some way related to a unit of the extralinguistic or extrasemiotic world (115–121). The second case is the fact that each semiotic act is determined by a "dynamic object," which is "a reality that in some way manages to determine the sign of its *Representamen*." Namely, we produce *Representamen* because something outside the circle of semiosis forces us to do so. But a "dynamic object" is not an entity of the physical world, but a thought, an emotion, a movement, a feeling, a belief. This gives way to Eco's claim that a text can be interpreted independently of the intention of its creator, but it cannot be denied that the author wrote the text in accordance with his actual intention and that this intention was motivated by a "dynamic object" (or he himself was a "dynamic object") (Eco 1990, 38–39).

⁵ For Eco, structure is an "operational instrument" (*strumento operativo*) and not, as for structuralists, an "ontological reality" (*realità ontologica*) (Eco 1968, 284). By emphasising the operational role of the structure, Eco, on the one hand, sought to avoid tendencies that negate any foundation (F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, J. Lacan) and that he considered dangerous because they deny "common sense." On the other hand, he sought to avoid a kind of "ontology of absence," which he considered dangerous because it leads to intellectual paralysis, as he saw it in poststructuralists such as J. Derrida and M. Foucault.

⁶ Moving away from the definition of code as a set of rules toward its definition as a system of possible inferences, Eco developed the concept of an encyclopedia of rhizome-shaped culture (characterized as follows: each point is connected to each other, can be interrupted at any point and build on each other, it is antigenealogical, there is no boundary between outside and inside, it is in constant modification,

structure is clear: "Since it is absent in any case, the structure will no longer be considered the objective goal [*termina*] of the final research, but a hypothetical instrument by which phenomena can be explored before being put into broader correlations." (Eco 1968, 361) This is the foundation of semiotics which, in the words of Teresa de Lauretis, "works on systems of intersubjective cultural conventions based on social relations and history" and in which "codes are hypostasized as models of proposition that are partial, provisional, associated with changing historical circumstances and therefore 'repairable'" (De Lauretis 1981, 33).

Eco, therefore, sees the story of Adam and Eve *sub specie semiotica*. Did God introduce the ban to bring about the beginning of history? Or is God non-existent, thus the prohibition was invented by Adam and Eve to make changes to the code and start speaking in *new languages*? Or has the contradiction always been within the code, so the myth of prohibition was invented by human great-grandparents to explain such a scandalous fact? These are questions that semiotics does not ask – Eco is resolute. It is limited to the creativity of language, not its poetic use, to the interaction of world forms and semantic forms (Eco 1976a, 305–306). These are the "natural boundaries" that semiotic research cannot go beyond (1976b, 6). It is clear: Eco's thought is a "weak thought" (*pensiero debole*).

To indicate how the Adamic language is perceived in this paper, the discussion shall now set Gen 2 aside and focus on another biblical text, which – as will be showcased later – the erudite Eco knew yet did not pay much attention to. Understandably, that text (if one were to accept Eco's theory of the cooperation between the text and the reader) speaks of transcending the "boundaries", of exiting the semiotically established maze-world.

4. "Other languages"

Eco mentions the text from the second chapter of the *Acts of the Apostles* at the very end *The Search for the Perfect Language*. There, he wonders what the nature of the gift of tongues given to the apostles was. If one keeps in mind the *First Epistle to the Corinthians* (12–13), Eco notes, one might think it is *glossolalia* (the ability to express oneself in an ecstatic language that everyone could understand as if it were their own). Yet, the *Acts* are about speaking in *other languages* – which means, according to Eco, that the apostles received a gift, if not for *xenoglossia* (polyglotism), then at least for a kind of mystical service of simultaneous translation. In the first case (glossolalia), the apostles were given the opportunity to speak the holy pre-Babel language, while in the second case (xenoglossia), they were given the privilege of not seeing Babel as a sign of defeat, but as the key to "a new alliance and /.../ a new concord" (Eco 1995, 351). Eco's vision corresponds to Frye's vision of a new society. Namely, the new society should be based on

it branches out in every direction, no one can describe it globally, everyone is located inside and sees only the nearest forks (Cf. Eco 1990, 143–144; Eco 1984b, 46–84; Eco 2014, 2–94).

imagination whose basic elements are words, which once formed the original language: the language of “human nature” (Frye 1963, 68).⁷ I am convinced that in “Babel” (Gen 11) and in the event of “descent of the Spirit” (Acts 2), one can discern something else: the fundamental outlines of the two communities. In the words of the author dear to Eco (St. Augustine): *Civitas terrena* and *Dei civitas*. For the first, the said author strongly argued that, if the woman with a blindfold and a scale in one hand and a sword in the other were to move away from it, it would be nothing but *magnum latrocinium* – organized brigandage (Augustin 1995, 195).

It is known that Gen 11 (the story of *confusio linguarum* – the confusion of tongues in Babel) is not always interpreted in the theological horizon in terms of the loss of the Adamic language. Hence, this paper shall refer to Miroslav Volf’s insightful interpretation. Having argued that the interpretation which sees in Acts 2 the “annulment” of the sentence from Gen 11 – although rightly linking these two texts – is not correct for either text (hereby we bypass the issue of what it means to interpret a text correctly – which Eco, I think, gave an insightful and authoritative answer to), Volf considers the story of the Tower of Babel. According to Gen 11, the people settled on a plain in Shinar and, driven by the desire to “make a name for [them]selves”, built a tower that “reaches to the heaven”. One place, one language, and one tower are the pillars of a centralized political, economic, and religious system. The biblical writer, with a measured dose of irony, writes that Yahweh “came down to see the city and the tower the people were building”. When he saw that they were “one people speaking the same language” (imperialist architects pursued a project of unification by suppressing differences that did not fit into the grand scheme), he “confused” their language and scattered the imperialist builders. Yahweh, therefore, condemned a centralized political, economic, and religious system that had universal aspirations, that sought to unite by dispelling differences, which sought to “make a name for [them]selves” by erasing a multitude of small names. Yahweh stopped the totalitarian plan of centralization, homogenization, and control. But that is not the last answer of Yahweh, claims Volf. He not only “deconstructed” false unity, but he “constructed” a new one. The Babylonian attempt to reach “heaven”, which draws everything into a centralized, totalizing community, failed. A new community is created by the “descending” of the Spirit (Volf 1996, 175).

The “descent” of the Spirit – Volf turns to the interpretation of Acts 2 – creates an alternative to the imperialist unity of the Tower of Babel. The tongues of fire separate and come to rest on each of them, and the people gathered “every nation under heaven” hear them speak “their own language”. The claim that *everyone* speaks, Volf points out, contains a critical edge: namely, even those who did not have a *voice* before now speak. As the logic of the tower sucks energy from the margin to solidify and elevate the centre, the Spirit pours power into the margin and puts the creative words of prophecy into the mouths of all (old men, chil-

⁷ Seeing Babylon as the key to a new covenant and concord is actually a call to “return to Babylon,” which corresponds to a call to “return to Egypt” by J. Assmann (Assmann 1998).

dren, servants, maids) and enables them to become the instruments of God's rule. At Pentecost, everyone was given a *voice* and was allowed to speak their own language. In "other languages", because they are equally accessible to *all*, the classification of society is destroyed (176).

Granted, there are other interpretations of glossolalia and xenoglossia (which are not based only on the interpretation of Acts 2 or 1 Cor 12–13 but are based on "charismatic experiences"). For instance, James Smith considers "tongues-speech" as a liminal case in the philosophy of language (Smith 2010, 123–150).⁸ Since, in the Anglo-American analytical tradition especially, "ordinary language" was at the centre, the phenomenon of glossolalia was bypassed, notes Smith. The reason seems obvious: glossolalia resists philosophical analysis or conceptual description. For Smith, it is precisely the "resisting" character of glossolalia that is philosophically most challenging. That the central characteristic of glossolalia is resistance is shown in two senses. *First*, it is a type of speech, that is, a speech act that resists the categories imposed by the philosophy of language. *Second*, glossolalia is a type of discourse that arises from resistance to given cultural norms and institutions (glossolalia is the language of a community that resists the existing powers). In his analysis, therefore, Smith places glossolalia not only within the framework of the philosophy of language (phenomenology – Husserl and Derrida; philosophical hermeneutics – Heidegger and Gadamer; theory of speech acts – Austin and Searle)⁹ but also ethics and social philosophy (critical theory, the "new left") (123).¹⁰ In any case, before starting a new "reading" of Acts 2 (and of other biblical texts), here is just a brief overview of the content and methodological direction.

The account of Pentecost — initially the Feast of Harvest (Ex 23:14–19) and then the memorial of the renewal of the Covenant, celebrated fifty days after the Passover — reveals that the "descent" of the Spirit enabled communication not because one language is renewed (the language with the help of which — yet not according to Eco — Adam named the true essence of things), or because a comprehensive metalanguage was created, or because a strict generative law of code was discovered, but because a new community — *the Mystical Body* — was created. Adhering to the old exegetical principle of the dual (but inseparable) meaning of biblical texts, the literal meaning (*sensus litteralis*) and the spiritual meaning (*sensus spiritalis*), wherein interpreting the latter allows interpretive freedom, which to some

⁸ Smith "puts into brackets" the theological question of whether glossolalia is the initial material record of "baptism in the name of the Spirit" — as Pentecostals claim — or simply a charismatic gift to the community, and whether glossolalia is an expression of existing languages unknown to the speaker (xenoglossia) or simply a kind of ecstatic speech (124).

⁹ Husserl's phenomenological analysis, Smith notes, raises the question: What is glossolalia? What does "speaking in tongues" mean? Hermeneutics: How to understand glossolalia? What is "spoken" in "tongues"? The theory of speech acts opens the question: What was done in glossolalia? What are the effects of glossolalia? (Smith 2010, 126).

¹⁰ J. Smith notes that glossolalia can also be considered through other perspectives, for instance, based on an analysis of the orality and literacy of Walter Ong etc. An outline for such an analysis was made by Smith in his article "The Closing of the Book: Pentecostals, Evangelical, and Sacred Writings" (Smith 1997). On semiotic theory in the context of glossolalia see: Huges 2003 and Macchia 1993.

extent means that we will stick to Eco's semiotics of literature (advocating a cooperative relationship between reader and text), I will take a look at the event of "other languages" (ἑτέραις γλώσσαις) *sub specie semiotica et corporis*.

4.1 "Other languages" *sub specie semiotica et corporis*

At the beginning of Acts 2, one reads: "Καὶ ἐν τῷ συμπληροῦσθαι" ("When the day of Pentecost was fully come"), which emphasises "fullness" (πλήρωμα). There are two complementary passages in the New Testament (Lk 9:51 and Gal 4:4) – the first is about passion and the second about incarnation – in which the "fullness of time" is emphasised (πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου). It is not, of course, a matter of the chronologically understood time, but of a soteriological economy – "the history of salvation" (Pelikan 2005, 48–49). In Acts 2, the "fullness of time" is connected with the Spirit.¹¹ The following is a description of the "descent" of the Spirit through theophanic topoi (wind, fire), followed by the description of confusion that arose among the multitude "because each one [disciple] heard their own language being spoken". There is no doubt that the depiction of a multitude, made up of different peoples (a list of Mediterranean peoples corresponding in scope to the kingdom of Alexander the Great's successor and very similar to maps and descriptions of ancient historians and geographers), evokes the following text from Isaiah:

"And I /.../ am about to come and gather the people of all nations and languages, and they will come and see my glory. I will set a sign among them [תּוֹטָא – translated as σημεῖα in *Septuaginta*, and as *signum* in *The Vulgate*], and I will send some of those who survive to the nations—to Tarshish, to the Libyans and Lydians (famous as archers), to Tubal and Greece, and to the distant islands that have not heard of my fame or seen my glory. They will proclaim my glory among the nations. And they will bring all your people, from all the nations, to my holy mountain in Jerusalem as an offering to the LORD – on horses, in chariots and wagons, and on mules and camels, says the LORD. They will bring them, as the Israelites bring their grain offerings, to the temple of the LORD in ceremonially clean vessels." (66:18-20)

Thus, in Acts 2, one can say that the event of "languages" is presented as *a sign* (as with Jesus's "performances" in the Gospel of John, shown as σημεῖον or *signs*, not as δύναμις or miracles). Only, it is not a sign created by the disciples to explain the "object" of faith, but a sign that is *given*. The sign, of course, immediately stimulated an interpretive process, but not *ad infinitum*.

The scene of the event "in the house" (where the disciples to be "descended" on by the Spirit were) is strangely connected to the scene of the crowd in the open. The people who made up the crowd were amazed because they "hear[d] them declaring the wonders of God in our own tongues," so they asked each other, "What does this mean?" Then, in that

¹¹ V. Lossky notes that the "descent" of the Spirit is the final goal of divine economy (Lossky 1957, 159).

"outside" scene, "some" stand out from the crowd and when asked what this "language" event could be, mockingly reply: "They have had too much wine." After this ironic sting, the two scenes merge: the one in the house and the one outside. Those "inside" become interpreters to those "outside". In fact, both crowds have their own interpreters: the interpreters to those outside are "others", the interpreter to those "inside" is Peter. He, together with eleven disciples, begins a speech that connects the event of "language" with a text from Joel (3:1-5). The crowd that hears Peter's interpretation of the events of "language" is deeply shocked. This distress does not cause a state of dull silence, but raises the (pragmatic) question: "Brothers, what shall we do?" Peter tells them to "repent and be baptized" so that they too might receive the gift, for "[t]he promise is both for your children and for all those who are far off – for all whom the Lord our God will call" (Acts 2:37–39).

Thus, the gifted sign is Yahweh's factual and semiotic judgment that instigated the semiotic phenomenon, the process of interpretation — but not in terms of unlimited semiosis. The process of interpretation soon led to a kind of *agôn* – to two interpretations. It is, therefore, an *eschatological sign* – a sign that in itself does not carry the potential infinity of possible interpretations, but a sign that is true *judgment*. To where leads an ironically based interpretation, a semiotic process that ultimately remains open (but is actually closed-off!), a semiotic that has only the explanatory and practical but not predictive power, can be seen if one compares the community residing in the *Holy City* "coming down out of heaven" (Rev 21:2) and the community that builds the Tower of Babel.¹² There is no temple in the Holy, "the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are its temple" (Rev 21:22). The temple has been replaced by the Body! The Holy City is replaced by the Body! The Holy City – the Body – is permanently open: "On no day will its gates ever be shut, for there will be no night there", but "[n]othing impure will ever enter it, nor will anyone who does what is shameful or deceitful" (Rev 21:25–27). At the center of the Holy City – the Body – is the "tree of life" (Rev 22: 2). No serpent, no apple, no command, no taboo. It is entered by faith. In it, "other languages" are spoken. It is a perichoretic community.

Even if one does not understand it (like Volf, for example) as the aspiration to make a name, that is, as a hegemonic endeavour and a creation of totalitarian universalism, but (like Eco) as the key to "a new alliance and /.../ a new concord" (Eco 1995, 351), the event of the construction of the Tower of Babel shows that communication outside the *Body* – whether based on one language or on different languages – is impossible. It is clear that where hegemonic processes rule, where individuals are uniform, and where one language is desirable, mutual communication becomes a self-contradiction. The idea of a community in which the

¹² General semiotics, Eco points out, does not explain phenomena, it offers a framework within which phenomena gain coherence, hence it has explanatory and practical power, it can change the world, but not predict (Eco 1984b, 11).

triumph of total polyglotism is not celebrated, but in which people can recognise the atmosphere of another speech, in which people can meet each other by speaking each their own tongue and understanding that of others, based on a “comparative instrument” which in turn is based on unlimited semiosis – I guess it is clear: it is an illusion. *Lingua edenica* – a language that encompasses all languages, a language that existed *ab initio* and in which all others were contained (352) – is a mere hypothetical language, a language of a kind of formal logic that provides tools to the define infinitely possible forms of the world and to helps us navigate the maze-word – but only in certain moments. To get out of the maze, one needs the *original sign*.

5. Instead of a conclusion – “Other languages” as the language of the Other

In reflecting on the “essence of language” (in the “vicinity” of singing and thinking), Heidegger referred precisely to the description of the “descent” of the Spirit (Acts 2:3-4). He pointed out that speaking in the biblical text was not meant as a “mere facility of the tongue” (*bloße Zungenfertigkeit*), but as speaking filled with the Holy Spirit (Heidegger 1971, 97). He then included a passage from the beginning of Aristotle’s *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* (*On Interpretation*) in which utterance (λόγος) is presented as articulated speech. It is a classic place: letters are signs of voices, voices are signs of mental experiences, mental experiences are signs of things. Everything is connected through the relationship of signs. We, Heidegger notes, act too harshly when we talk about signs without further definition, about something that signifies something else and shows it in a certain way (namely, Aristotle himself, with the word σημεῖα [*semeia*] uses both σύμβολα [*symbola*] and ὁμοιώματα [*homoiomata*]) – with which Eco, and I hope from what I have written so far it is now clear, agrees. Then comes what seems pertinent to me. Heidegger argues that metaphysical thinking has obscured – that of the “bodily language” (*Leibhafte der Sprache*), ringing, vibrating of language (98). And while Heidegger develops from the “corporeality of language” the idea of language as the utterance of speech (which was developed into a theological concept by Ernest Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling), and Eco develops the understanding of the aesthetic message,¹³ Acts 2 – actually the Bible and Christian tradition – they make one think, more precisely know the “corporeality of language” (after all, the corporeality itself) in a completely different way, both beyond metaphysics and beyond Heidegger and Eco (and Nietzsche and Nancy).

The “descending” Spirit is not some cultural universe that everyone expresses by speaking the language of their ancestors (Eco 1995, 351), nor some *anima*

¹³ The basic characteristic of which is, once more, shaping a signifying sequence, whereby changes in content are homologous to changes in substance of expression, the very tissue of the matter of which signifying forms are composed – ambiguous about the rules of code as a system that codifies and therefore leads to the creation of new semantic worlds.

mundi, nor a formal constitutive principle of the universe, a stage in the dialectical development of "idea" (Hegel), or even just that for which we cannot say that it is, but that it has (*Es gibt Sein*), which is not in the way of being, but in the way of revealing, of bringing to non-concealment, into language (Heidegger). Because the Spirit is not all that is mentioned, he "descends".¹⁴ He is the "Spirit of truth" (πνευμα της αληθείας, Jn 16:13): the adequacy of the body (of Jesus) and God (the Father) – *adaequatio Iesū et Dei*. He is, we may say, the Spirit-Body, the body of Jesus of Nazareth extended to infinity. The "descent" of the Spirit is, therefore, the event of becoming the "one Body" of Jesus of Nazareth and his disciples – *mystici corporis Christi*.¹⁵ It is precisely "one Body," the Mystical Body, which is the original sign, a sign that is not grounded within semiotic discourse. The original sign is not understood, therefore, as a sign by relating it to another sign (*inter-preter*) within a sign system (code), it is not a "dynamic object", but, to use the semiotic nomenclature for a moment, a kind of the ultimate Code. But – the Mystical Body is not an arch-code that determines, but a code of freedom, a code that generates "other languages" (ἑτέρας γλώσσας) – and thus a *communion* that is not a multi-ethnic or multilingual, but a Catholic community.

"Other languages" are not, therefore, languages that arise *ad placitum*, languages generated by the poetic invention. "Other languages" are not some *energeia*, a spiritual process (W. von Humboldt), nor they are the transmission of the corporeal in words (F. Nietzsche), nor do languages that arise from some outpouring of the creative spirit, nor they are languages of from imagination free of any constraints, nor they spring from the unconscious, nor they are a pulsive state of humming (R. Barthes), mumbling, swaying (M. Foucault), nor languages of the "semiotic order" (J. Kristeva). "Other languages" are not a language of set-up, nor a language by which one can discern some solid internal form. "Other languages" are erotic language, a language that arises from the mystical union of two bodies, the language of the birth of a new body. It is the language spoken by Adam in Eden, the prophetic poetry that expresses a deep somatic homology – the oneness of two:

"This is now bone of my bones
and flesh of my flesh;
she shall be called 'woman,'
for she was taken out of man." (Gen 2:23)

"Other languages" are actually an *organon* of invocation to the very "essence" of a thing – which is not a mere thing (an extralinguistic object, a mere entity of

¹⁴ The Church has rejected Giordano Bruno's teachings that the Spirit is a formal constitutive principle of the universe and Abelard's "Quod Spiritus Sanctus sit anima mundi" (Dupré 1992, 59; 62).

¹⁵ N. Nissiotis describes the "descent" of the Spirit as an event in which the chosen people of God, the Body of Christ, become the *koinonia* of the Spirit. The body of the Son of Man thus, Nissiotis points out, revealed an inspiring grace and became the omnipresent Spirit (Nissiotis 1963, 488). S. Chan takes over the ecclesiological thought of *Christus totus* and notes that it was at Pentecost that the people of God united with Christ, the Head, in such a way that the Body of Christ was created: the Church (Chan 2011, 58–59).

the physical world) or something prelinguistically determined (mind, spirit), but a Mystical Body, a *communion of bodies* and *Word-Body (logos-sarx)*: the one Body (1 Jn 1:1-4). Here, it is worth referring to the thought of Joseph Ratzinger: “When Adam names the animals, what this means is not that he indicates their essential natures, but that he fits them into his human world, puts them within reach of his call” (Ratzinger 2007, 133).

Unlike Adam, the heretic Salvatore from *The Name of the Rose*, spoke a kind of mother tongue, taking the words intermittently from one and the other language:

“Penitenziagite! Watch out for the draco who cometh in futurum to gnaw your anima!

Death is super nos! Pray the Santo Pater come to liberar nos a malo and all our sin! Ha ha, you like this negromanzia de Domini Nostri Jesu Christi! Et anco jois m’es dols e plazer m’es dolors. /.../ Cave el diabolo! Semper lying in wait for me in some angulum to snap at my heels. But Salvatore is not stupidus! Bonum monasterium, and aquí refectorium and pray to dominum nostrum. And the resto is not worth merda. Amen. No?” (Eco 1980, 31)

Such a language – a kind of mother tongue, a language that is not a single language but a complex of all languages actually corresponds to the Kabbalistic pan-semiotic idea of creating a world that is far from *creatio ex nihilo* by Yahweh’s word (Gen 1). Even when he does not speak it, but only holds that it is a hypothetical language, man is, I believe, *insipiens*.

That the Mystical Body is an original sign is not hereby determined by way of a hypothetical conjecture (abduction), but by *faith* in the one (more accurately, perhaps, by faith *within* the one, because it is not something that exists on its own, which is given externally) who is the Word-Body. Thus, the faith meant here is not a mere “dynamic object;” it is trust in the One who *knows* the answers to questions that semiotics does not ask and hence actually (alas!) pushes them into a subculture that generates various fundamentalisms. For the Word-Body, the evangelist Luke says that it is – σημειὸν ἀντιλεγόμενον (a sign that will be spoken against) (2:34), which *The Vulgate* translates as *signum cui contradicetur*, therefore, *la stessa cosa*: “a sign disputed” or “a sign to be contradicted”, because it generates “other languages”, languages that cannot be semiotically typologized, languages that elude even the interpretations of languages based on the postulate of matching metaphysics, logic, and grammar (elaborated by scholasticism in the treatise *de modis significandi*), the romantic idea of *Sprache als Weltansicht* (which in some linguistic corresponds with Eco’s *lingua edenica*) and all post-Nietzschean philosophies of language based on the belief that language is not a reflection, but an illusion. “Other languages” are the languages of the Other – the *call* of the Other!

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From Fear to Theosis: Patristic Reflections on Artificial Intelligence

Od strahu do teoze: patristična razmišljanja o umetni inteligenci

Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI) has already become a ubiquitous and autonomous force transforming our society and how humans interact with the world around them and each other. The staggering development and widespread of AI technology in the last decade raise debates on its evolution potential and social anxiety concerns about its detrimental effects. Techno-optimists expect AI to evolve into a sentient and conscious entity, reaching and surpassing human-level and thus challenging our understanding of the world and the fundamental principles of our society. This paper provides theological reflections on AI evolution and its effects on society and Christian spiritual life. It discusses the risks of AI hindering man's spiritual ascent towards God by autonomously shaping man and society in its image, as expressed by advocates of technological determinism. Finally, it proposes an authentic and liberating Christian viewpoint on AI and today's disruptive technologies by employing a patristic perspective.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, technological determinism, theological anthropology, patristics, eschatology

Povzetek: Umetna inteligenca (UI) je že postala vseprisotna in avtonomna sila, ki spreminja našo družbo in način, kako ljudje komunicirajo s svetom okoli sebe in drug z drugim. Osupljiv razvoj in razširjenost tehnologije umetne inteligence v zadnjem desetletju sprožata razprave o njenem razvojnem potencialu, pa tudi zaskrbljenost družbe zaradi njenih škodljivih učinkov. Tehnooptimisti pričakujejo, da se bo UI razvila v čutečo in zavestno entiteto, ki bo dosegla in preseгла raven človeka in tako izzvala naše razumevanje sveta ter temeljnih načel naše družbe. Prispevek prinaša teološki razmislek o razvoju UI ter njenih učinkih na družbo in krščansko duhovno življenje. Obravnava tveganja UI kot ovire za človekov duhovni vzpon k Bogu, saj človeka in družbo avtonomno oblikuje po svoji podobi – kar trdijo zagovorniki tehnološkega determinizma. O tem predlaga pristen in osvobajajoč krščanski pogled na umetno inteligenco in današnje prelomne tehnologije z uporabo patristične perspektive.

Ključne besede: umetna inteligenca, tehnološki determinizem, teološka antropologija, patristika, eshatologija.

1. Introduction

Artificial Intelligence is increasingly becoming a pervasive, transformative force across a vast array of domains - such as health, banking, manufacturing, human resources, industrial systems, and transportation, to name just a few. AI-powered systems bring the promises of improved efficiency, increased productivity, reduction of costs (Aly 2020, 2–5), and, in general, higher and faster computing capabilities for any given computing task (Zhang and Lu 2021, 2–4). However, AI is not just automizing processes but also influencing decision-making by making this process faster and more data-driven. We interact with AI daily, often seamlessly: we encounter it in our smartphones, cars, homes, and work environments. Therefore, there is a high chance that many of our actions end up as input data for an AI-based system. Moreover, AI's pervasive and somewhat obfuscated nature may expose people to unknown risks. As such, an increasing number of research efforts attempt to identify and raise awareness regarding the ethical and societal challenges brought forward by AI (Khan et al. 2022, 383–384).

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is the next evolutionary step for AI and involves acquiring the capability of understanding and learning any new task like a human can. The seeds of AGI have been around since the middle of the 20th century, being planted with the establishment of cognitive science, a research field that has proposed various theories for modelling the human mind as a computational framework: from the classic computational theory of mind (CCTM) to Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM), and, more recently, to van Gelder's dynamical approach to cognition (Rescorla 2020). Researchers expect that once a reality, AGI will be on an exponential learning curve, consistently growing in its intelligence and abilities, up to the point where it will be able to self-evolve. There is an almost unanimous agreement between researchers from different fields (computer science, philosophy, theology) that AGI will be the most ethically consequential technology ever created. Already, AI-related anxiety has emerged to become a universal phenomenon that impacts people's lives and has the potential to generate significant social issues (Li 2020, 1). Two of the most discussed AI anxiety dimensions in related literature (3) relate closely to AGI: artificial consciousness anxiety and existential risk anxiety.

The former refers to a scenario where AI will become sentient - like an artificial brain with human-like consciousness - and exist independently from human control (Haladjian and Montemayorb 2016, 219–222). Such a development may challenge human status while at the same time fostering debates on whether or not we should recognize AI as a new species, a form of sentient - yet artificial - life (Buttazzo 2008, 146). Moreover, some voices expect AGI to merge with biological organisms leading to cyborgization, raising additional questions regarding the nature of human identity (Aliman 2017, 188–191) and potentially leading to confusion in differentiating between artificial and natural, between humans and AI agents (Galanos 2017, 587–588). Furthermore, this potential autonomous evolution of AI can lead to somber scenarios where a super-AI would either turn against

humanity and destroy it (Bostrom 2002, 15–16) or permanently and drastically curtail its potential (Li 2020, 3). Such a foreseen outcome generates the latter AI anxiety dimension - the existential risk anxiety.

Given the radical social transformation caused by AI and how it influences how people relate to one another, theology can bring a consistent contribution to the ongoing interdisciplinary debate on the role and dangers of AI in today's society. It can answer fundamental questions regarding the relationship between *Imago Dei*, human creativity, and the limits of AI evolution (Dorobantu 2019, 14). The link between theology and AI is also visible in the tendency of AI researchers and advocates to resort to theological terminology to underline the importance of their accomplishments and to imply that from a religious evolution perspective, AI is the ultimate step, playing a crucial role in the salvation of humanity (Oeming 2022, 354–355). Doing this creates a somewhat “mystical” aura around artificial intelligence, contributing even more to AI-related anxiety among religious groups. In many religious communities, there is a general distrust toward artificial intelligence, with clergy and laymen fearing its implementation might lead to negative transformations in their personal lives and society (Vinichenko et al. 2021, 21). Fears of a negative impact of AI on religious activity were also reported (2020, 66).

This article will first provide an analysis of the social and spiritual implications of AI and its evolution potential through the lens of Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan, both advocates of technological determinism. Next, it will analyze the main concerns regarding AI's potential to detrimentally shape us and our interactions by turning to Christian anthropology, specifically the writings of St. Maximus the Confessor, a 7th-century Byzantine monk, and theologian. Finally, the paper discusses the limits of AI evolution and how Christians should relate to AI (and technology in general) in light of the writings of Maximus and the 20th-century Orthodox neo-patristic theologian Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae.

2. AI and Technological Determinism

Three philosophical perspectives on the relationship between technology and society can be identified (Poel 2020, 500): a) technology as an autonomous force that determines society; b) technology as a human construct that human values can shape; and c) a co-evolutionary perspective on technology and society where neither of them determines the other. The fear of AI taking over the world pertains to the first philosophical perspective, established in the 20th century by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Ellul, Marshal McLuhan, and Langdon Winner (van de Poel 2020, 500–502). This view is shared not only by techno-pessimists like Ellul, or more recently, Stephen Hawking and Nick Bostrom, but also by techno-optimists and AGI supporters, such as Frank Tipler and Ray Kurzweil (506).

Ellul introduced the concept of autonomous technology, i.e. technology is a closed system, “a reality in itself /.../ with its special laws and its own determina-

tions” (Ellul 1967, 134) that ultimately conquers every aspect of human society. One can say this to be the case for AI also, given its widespread across all areas of human life. For Ellul, technology and its effects on society cannot be seen as good or evil - all technology is a disruptive, self-augmenting force that engineers the world on its terms. He feared the impact of systems or complexes of techniques on human society and warned the result could only be “an operational totalitarianism” (391). Ellul concludes the world technology creates is “the universal concentration camp” (100), a somber picture very similar to what today’s AI’s harshest critics warn: that humanity will end up enslaved in a world ruled by it.

Ellul also condemned the sacralization of technology and raised awareness for Christians not to worship it, a trend that, according to him, will lead to technology becoming society’s new religion. Ellul is often credited as a fatalist, primarily due to his early works focusing on the tyranny of the latest technologies and the fallenness of contemporary culture (Christians 2006, 157–159). However, once Ellul defined the totalitarian character of technology and raised awareness about it, he moved on in his later works to discuss the only authentic solution in his view: restoration through a transformed life in Christ. This restoration and transformation of life require a man to gain a genuine consciousness of the problem, so he can consciously reject the artificiality. If misrelating to technology brings tyranny, Ellul argues that the solution is an authentic Christian life, a life by definition one of freedom that arises from each person’s relationship with Christ (157).

Sharing with Ellul the same deterministic perspective on the technology’s outcome on society, Marshall McLuhan introduces a more in-depth vocabulary. He defines any technology as an “extension of man” that ultimately and inevitably causes unforeseen cultural implications (McLuhan 1994, 7–16). McLuhan acknowledges that people create new technologies (new “media”, as he calls them in his writings) to fulfil a particular intent or need. Only after that technology became mainstream and widely used (often decades later) did its cultural implications (what McLuhan called its “message”) become visible. However, this message, often unobserved and almost always unanticipated, can change us and our society without us being aware. One of the most iconic examples McLuhan uses to illustrate his theory is the invention of the printing press, an essential driving force for progress and cultural expansion since it allowed the distribution of printed material (the original design of this technology). McLuhan, however, argues that this also changed how people think by amplifying linear and logical thinking to the detriment of more intuitive, non-linear, and even mystical thinking (1962, 110–111).

The mainstream perspective on AI is that it represents a new, enhanced form of intelligence that can improve our society. Applying McLuhan’s model to AI, however, we are faced with the question: is AI a different type of intelligence, or is it extending human intelligence (Braga and Logan 2017, 2)? McLuhan states that “all media are extensions” of some human faculty – mental or physical (McLuhan 1994, 21). These extensions are connected closely to our senses, to the human faculties they extend, and tend to shift our sensory balance outwards, from the

human sensor or faculty towards the extension. According to McLuhan, “when these [sensory] ratios change, men change” (McLuhan and Fiore 2005, 41). This change is caused by another concept McLuhan introduced: “amputation”- The ultimate unintended consequence of an extension is the numbing - going as far as an amputation - of the faculty it extended (McLuhan 1994, 42). If AI extends human intelligence, it will also contribute to its decline to some extent, causing us to lose some of our cognitive autonomy to AI and ultimately altering our perspective on the nature of the human spirit (Braga and Logan 2017, 6).

3. Becoming like What You Worship

McLuhan’s example of Narcissus, who fell in love with his image reflected in the water (McLuhan 1994, 41), is an analogy for people seeing a reflection of themselves in the technology they are using and ending up serving or worshipping that technology as if they were worshipping themselves. McLuhan states: “by continuously embracing technologies, we relate ourselves to them as servomechanisms. This is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects, these extensions of ourselves, as gods or minor religions.” (46)

Based on McLuhan’s theory, Braga and Logan advocate AI as the pool Narcissus looked into and fell in love with his image. AGI and AI supporters seem mesmerized by the beauty of logic and rationality to such an extent that they end up dismissing (or amputating) the remaining dimensions of the human intellect, such as the emotional, moral, or spiritual ones (Braga and Logan 2017, 6–7). The authors argue that AI is limited and oversimplifies the concept of intelligence. It can be viewed as a unicameral brain with a left-brain bias, missing the dynamics of emotional chemistry present in the human brain (7).

McLuhan’s view on technology can be summarized as “We become what we behold. We shape our tools, and then our tools shape us.” (Culkin 1967, 70) This applies very well to AI: we have devised AI algorithms, systems, and agents that not only interact with us (they “watch” us how we move, how we act, and “learn” from this, i.e. the data used for training AI systems is “produced” by humans) but they also “design” us by recommending (and indirectly deciding) what videos we see, what products we buy, what content we read, and so on. AI is thus converging us to our bubbles and feeding us constantly with content of their choice, shaping us in this process without us noticing it.

Worshipping a technology that, in turn, shapes its worshipers is not something new. At the core of this process stands an ancient and eternal principle: you become like what you worship. We can find one of the oldest such admonitions in Psalm 115:8, where the Psalmist warns those who trust in idols, “Those who make them become like them; so do all who trust in them” (Ps 115:8). The implication here is that people worshipping other things in place of God will become like their idols. We can see the same principle in a question that God asks Israel in the book

of Jeremiah regarding Israel's pursuit of idols: "What wrong did your fathers find in me that they went far from me, and went after worthlessness, and became worthless?" (Jer 2:5) Going after worthless and empty idols led them to become worthless and empty themselves.

Christian spirituality takes one step further the principle of "becoming like what you worship". The patristic tradition of the Church expresses this through the voices of Church Fathers such as Saints Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Augustine, in the well-known phrase: "God became man that we might become God." (Cooper 2005, 35) Saint Maximus the Confessor, widely regarded as the greatest Byzantine theologian, builds upon this tradition and expresses his fully developed understanding of the direct and mutual reciprocity between divine incarnation and human deification in *Ambigua* 10: "For they [the Fathers] say that God and man are paradigms of each other so that as much as man, enabled by love, has divinized himself for God, to that same extent God is humanized for man by His love for mankind; and as much as man has manifested God who is invisible by nature through the virtues, to that same extent man is rapt by God in mind to the unknowable." (Maximus the Confessor 2014, 165) God takes bodily form in man to the extent that man deifies himself through the cultivation of virtue. Hence, worshipping God and being engaged in an authentic Christian life (by the cultivation of virtue) puts humans on the path of "theosis", of becoming like God (you become like what you worship).

Worshipping AI (Ellul) and becoming its "servomechanisms" (McLuhan) can ultimately lead to humans getting their lives "shaped" by AI in a way that is detrimental to them. While AI advocates hope that it will contribute to humans morphing into an improved, transhuman stage, the thinking of Ellul and McLuhan, corroborated with Christian spirituality, warns us that it might lead to the opposite - morphing not into trans-human but sub-human.

4. The Discarnate Man and the Incarnate Church

Today's online, digital technologies - especially AI - achieve a massive extension of the human senses and nervous system, creating an online presence that takes precedence over the physical, "incarnate" presence, rendering the body obsolete and thus leading to the "discarnate man" (McLuhan 1977, 80). Given his Catholic faith, McLuhan identified this new paradigm as a critical challenge to Christianity: "discarnate man is not compatible with an incarnate Church." (1987, 543) Christian spirituality revolves around the divine-human relationship, in which the status of the human body plays a central role, as confirmed by the Church's bi-millenary tradition (Delicata 2011, 232). The good news of the Gospel is a truth that communicates itself in authentic personal encounters. One can experience this truth personally, in the complete unity of oneself's - body and soul. Disembodiment and virtualization lead to a simulated reality that, as Pope Benedict XVI warned in 2010, can hinder our experience of God, which requires enhancing our senses

and expanding our experience of reality. Ultimately, they will immerse us in a self-contained virtual environment where we become “indifferent to the Truth” (234).

To better understand the importance of “incarnation” for the Church and Christian life, we turn again to the theology of Saint Maximus the Confessor. Maximus considers the Incarnation of Christ “the heart of the world existence - not only in terms of redemption but also in terms of the creation of the world” (Zinkovskiy and Zinkovskiy 2011, 44). For Maximus, the concept of hypostasis in Christ represents an integrative principle in the God-man relationship. Based on this, he defines the same concept of hypostasis in man as the highest integrative principle that unifies the body and the soul (59). Consequently, human hypostasis is, according to Maximus, the basis (σύστασις) of the objective reality of his nature, which gives this nature independence, unity, individuality and uniqueness (Stead 1989, 32).

St. Maximus also asserts inseparable kinship of the body and soul, both during this life and in the Kingdom of God: “the reason of a unifying power /.../ does not allow the weakening of the /.../ union due to [their] natural differences, nor the appearance of a particularity stronger than the kinship given to them mystically in unity, that could encompass each of these in itself, distinguish them and tear them apart one from the other.” (Maximus the Confessor 2000, 27) The power of unity will prevail even more following the eschaton, when “the body will become like the soul /.../ in terms of honor and glory, showing in all one divine power /.../ [that] will keep the bond of union unbroken through it for endless ages.” (27) Maximus considers the Christian life’s ultimate goal as the restoration of the harmonious hierarchy of soul and body, their consonance, their passionless and peaceful state, and joint divinization (Zinkovskiy and Zinkovskiy 2011, 53). Hence, the Confessor sees perfection (human likeness with God by grace, achieved through theosis) as the hypostasis-nature unity of the objective reality of a human (i.e. the harmonic unity of body and soul).

5. Relating to AI and Technology on the Path to Theosis

A theological analysis of the implications of Artificial Intelligence has to consider the broader discussion on the meaning of technology in the context of theological anthropology. We again turn to Maximus the Confessor, who in *Ambigua* 45 discusses three different understandings of technology as an anthropological reality following the Fall of Man. He makes these arguments as an analysis of Gregory the Theologian’s understanding of Adam’s prelapsarian condition, as expressed in his famous verse in the oration On Pascha: “He (i.e. Adam) was naked in his simplicity and in a life devoid of artifice, and without any kind of covering or barrier. For such was fitting for the primal man.” (Maximus the Confessor 2014, 193)

The first understanding relies on a close relationship between technology and pathos, linking man’s prelapsarian apatheia (dispassion) with the lack of needing artifacts: the first man lived “a life devoid of artifice.” In his second argument,

Maximus makes the case that before the fall, man was not just in harmony with the environment but also had a single need: “the unconditioned motion of the whole power of his love for what was above him, by which I mean God” (197), and thus having no intellectual curiosities and being “wholly undistracted by any of the things that were beneath him, or around him, or oriented to him” (197). Finally, in his third contemplation, the Confessor argues that the original man was perfectly and naturally virtuous and had “no need to rely on ideas discursively drawn from sensible objects in order to understand divine realities” (199).

In his notes on the *Ambigua*, the Orthodox Neo-patristic theologian Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae shows that according to Maximus, three layers are standing between man and God, which are pulling man towards those things beneath him, hindering his ascent upwards towards God: the irrational fantasies of passions, the principles of technical skills, and the natural principles derived from the law of nature (2006, 450). Adam, before the Fall, did not have to face these three layers, having a direct, unmediated experience of God. We now must proceed through and beyond these layers to achieve our goal of reestablishing the prelapsarian, Adamic state and relation with God. To achieve this, Fr. Stăniloae argues that we must first recognize the irrational fantasies of passions for what they are (inconsistent mirages) and consequently destructure (dismiss) them. At the same time, the principles of technical skills, according to Stăniloae, “are made by man, who in turn to make them uses the natural principles” (451). However, these “natural principles” must become known to man “not only for the help they provide in making technological principles” but also because through them, man satisfies “his natural thirst for knowledge” which includes the knowledge of God (451). Stăniloae concludes that “technology must not develop beyond the real needs of man and should not be used to harm him. Man must remain its master, and he should not be impeded by it in his ascend towards God.” (451)

Fr. Stăniloae also notes that Maximus, in his second contemplation, does not imply that before the Fall, Adam was deprived of the natural principles and the principles of technical skills, nor was he despising them. Instead, Adam possessed these principles “as a simple and unitary understanding” (452). According to Stăniloae, Adam had a global understanding of all the natural and technical principles, an understanding which the postlapsarian man must also acquire but following a different path than Adam: going through the specific knowledge of natural and technological principles and practicing virtues (452).

According to Maximus, the postlapsarian world is implicitly technical, and humans are bound to create and use technology and make tools that not only have a practical use but also “mediate and transform their experience and knowledge of the rest of creation” (Delicata 2018, 42). Based on Maximus and the interpretation of Fr. Stăniloae, the “natural principles and the principles of technical skills” are necessary until the eschaton. Humans must get to know, learn to master, and rightfully use them in their ascend towards God to fulfill their destiny - returning to the same level of closeness to God as before the Fall. However, as Stăniloae warns, a correct understanding and use of technology are mandatory, so it will

meet its purpose and not become an obstacle in man's spiritual ascent. Hence, technology should mediate our relationship with the divine without separating us further from God (by discarnation and amputation of our senses, intellect, and emotions).

St. Maximus also offers interesting reflections on the possibility of a new form of "artificial" life emerging some time in the future, i.e. by AI evolving into a conscious, sentient entity. In *Ambigua* 42, commenting on St. Gregory the Theologian's oration "On Baptism", the Confessor states that ".../ there has never existed, nor is there now, nor will there ever be, any nature among created beings, subsisting according to its own principle, that is anything other than what it is at present; and it is not now nor will ever be in the future something it was not in the past. /.../ the production and substantiation of created beings admits of absolutely no increase or decrease in terms of what they essentially are" (Maximus the Confessor 2014, 179–181).

St. Maximus is obvious in stating that other than the existing "natures" of the created beings, which have existed in the world since Creation, there will not be different "natures" that will subsist according to their own principle: the principles of technical skills cannot, consequently, transcend their nature and "evolve" into something different that they always were. In light of what Maximus states, AI would not transcend into a conscious, sentient AGI capable of evolving and self-replicate by itself ("subsisting according to its own principle"), as advocated by the AGI prophets. Fr. Stăniloae's comment on this fragment of *Ambigua* also emphasizes this: "Man can create new forms in the world through technique and art, but they never last forever, nor do they multiply by themselves. /.../ That's why human technology /.../ has limited expansion possibilities." (2006, 440)

6. Concluding Remarks

Technological determinism, through its prophets such as Ellul and McLuhan, argues that technologies act as autonomous and self-augmenting forces transforming society and humans and disembodimenting us: extending our senses and faculties while "amputating" or "numbing" them. As a result, the new "homo technologicus," whose creation AI contributes significantly to, is becoming "discarnate", a reality that challenges the Christian vocation of continuous spiritual ascent towards God. Indeed, as this paper shows by turning to the writings of St. Maximus the Confessor, Christian anthropology and spirituality have always emphasized the inseparable kinship of the body and soul as a central principle in the divine-human relation.

However, while concerns over the detrimental impact of an AI-shaped society on religious and spiritual life may be justified, Christian spiritual life should not become aground by AI-related fear and anxiety. The Christian life is an authentic transformation and restoration of man: as Pope Benedict XVI stated in his encyclical on hope "Spe Salvi", "the Christian message [is] not only 'informative' but

‘performative’”. As St. Maximus and Fr. Stăniloae both argue, in the postlapsarian world, man must master technology and use it not merely for practical reasons but also for mediating and transforming their experience and knowledge of the rest of creation and God. Correctly understanding the principles of technical skills is, according to Maximus and Stăniloae, a necessary step in man’s ascent towards God; as such, fear and anxiety over AI will only make us stumble in this journey as worshipping it and becoming its servomechanisms would do the same.

Christian patristic tradition offers us a positive and liberating perspective to correctly relate to AI and technology in general and to use them for mediating our relationship with the divine without separating us from God: to commit ourselves to the path of deification by grace and the practice of virtues. As Maximus writes in *Ambigua* 45, to correctly “perceive in all things the ray of true knowledge”, one must first remove “all the dark fluid of passions and every material attachment from their intellectual eyes” (Maximus the Confessor 2014, 193). Only purified from all passions can our intellectual eyes correctly relate to the principles of technical skills and contemplate “the meanings of all things encountered” (2006, 447). This way, we will see and use things for what they are, without fear and anxiety towards them, and AI and technology would transcend from tools that deterministically shape humans and society into means by which humans participate as co-creators in the world, fulfilling God’s commandment.

Abbreviations

- AGI** – Artificial General Intelligence.
CCTM – Classic computational theory of mind.
RTM – Representational theory of mind.

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Monografije FDI - 22



✧ Rojstvo sakralnosti ✧ hrepenenje po Bogu ✧
✧ občutje svetega ✧ vrojenost ideje o Bogu ✧
✧ razlogi za vero in nevero ✧

Psihoanaliza in sakralno izkustvo

Christian Gostečnik OFM



Christian Gostečnik

Psihoanaliza in sakralno izkustvo

Psihoanalitična relacijska paradigma predpostavlja, da imata tako religiozni kot nereligiozni človek svoje psihične razloge za vero oziroma nevero. Zato je pomembno ugotoviti v kakšnega Boga verujoči veruje oziroma v kakšnega Boga neverujoči ne veruje. Tudi religiozna oseba namreč ne veruje v Boga v katerega nereligiozna oseba ne veruje ali ne more verjeti.

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Remigijus Oželis

Pelican: a Christian symbol

Depicting the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ

*Pelikan: krščanski simbol,
ki upodablja žrtvovanje Jezusa Kristusa*

Abstract: Alongside with the legendary phoenix, which rises from death through the fire, and with the lamb, which expresses selfless love, the Pelican is one of the oldest symbols of Jesus Christ. This article reviews the rise of the legends about the sacrifice of the pelican, discusses the pelican as a symbol of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ and presents Jesus Christ as a true Pelican, feeding His faithful with His blood. Seeing the pelican through the eyes of the faith helps to discover the deepest Christ's message: to give oneself to one's brothers because it will make visible what evangelist John said about Jesus' love: "Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends." (Jn 15:13) The symbol of the pelican in Christianity evokes contemplation of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, understanding the depth of God's love and gratitude for this sacrificial love. Representation of Jesus' sacrifice through the symbol of the pelican visually reminds us that the Lord, when He feeds people with His Body, receives them into Himself to become His Body.

Keywords: Pelican, symbol, Jesus Christ, sacrifice, selfless love, Christianity

Povzetek: Pelikan je poleg legendarnega feniksa, ki iz ognja vstane od smrti, in jagnjeta, ki izraža nesebično ljubezen, eden najstarejših simbolov Jezusa Kristusa. Prispevek obravnava nastanek legend o žrtvovanju pelikana, pelikana proučuje kot simbol žrtvovanja Jezusa Kristusa in predstavlja Jezusa Kristusa kot pravega pelikana, ki vernike hrani s svojo krvjo. Pogled na pelikana skozi oči vere pomaga odkriti Kristusovo najgloblje sporočilo: podariti se bratom, da postane vidno, kar je o Jezusovi ljubezni povedal evangelist Janez: »Nihče nima večje ljubezni od te, da življenje za svoje prijatelje.« (Jn 15,13) Simbol pelikana v krščanstvu spodbuja razmišljanje o žrtvi Jezusa Kristusa, krepi razumevanje globine Božje ljubezni in hvaležnost za to požrtvovalno ljubezen. Prikaz Jezusove žrtve s simbolom pelikana nas spominja, da ko Gospod ljudi hrani s svojim telesom, jih sprejema vase, da postanejo njegovo telo.

Ključne besede: pelikan, simbol, Jezus Kristus, žrtvovanje, nesebična ljubezen, krščanstvo.

1. Introduction

Whether a person lives in an archaic community or in a postmodern society, he or she is surrounded by a number of formed symbols. Symbols are agreed signs, objects or ideas with a deep *otherworldly* meaning (Federavičienė and Valantinaitė 2003, 205). The nature or image of a symbol represents or depicts more than it itself is. It is the key to understanding the spiritual world because the meaning of the symbol does not lie within it, but beyond it (Biedermann 2002, 5–8). It is understood as a process that brings and presents reality *from beyond*. Symbols reveal the deep truth and therefore they are inseparable from the rituals of all religions. Some of them are easy to understand because the interpretation of the symbol itself continues through the centuries and its meaning is recognized through human, mundane and existential experience. However, there are symbols that obviously no longer speak to the postmodern person, so they have to be revealed and interpreted in a new way. Not knowing or recognizing symbols disables understanding of numerous phenomena of everyday life. Without knowing the environment of the origin of a particular symbol, it becomes difficult to interpret the visual symbolic image and understand its meaning (Kazlauskas 2012, 15; Bianci 2011, 6). Interest in symbols can help discern what is behind things, to interlink the visual and verbal manifestations of our amazing multifaceted and multi-layered world. On the other hand, a lot of people admire and become interested in various ancient symbols. This may be due to the desire to return to the roots now that value orientation is increasingly being lost (Oželis 2009, 160).

The pelican symbol, as the sign of Jesus Christ, came to Christianity from legends in its first centuries. It is repeated in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and is also mentioned by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) as the sign of the selfless Jesus Christ's love for people. The pelican, as a symbol of sacrifice, is also found in the early Christian art. It can be found in the decoration of churches as buildings, in religious art and in the decoration of liturgical vestments. Although the pelican is not a common symbol in churches, it is one of the oldest traditional Christian symbols.

This article will discuss the story of the pelican's sacrifice, as an image of Jesus Christ's sacrifice, revealing God's infinite love for Man. The purpose of the article is to reveal the symbolism of the pelican legend and its applicability to Jesus Christ. The object of the study is the symbol of the pelican in the context of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The tasks are: 1) to present the legend of the sacrifice of the pelican; 2) to discuss the pelican as a symbol of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ; 3) to discuss Jesus Christ as a true pelican, feeding His believers with His own blood. The methods are the narrative method, analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of scientific literature.

A person for whom the context of the symbol is unknown would not perceive the pelican's connection with Christ. At first glance, a simple description of the symbol in the context of scientific works faces a number of difficulties caused by the object itself – a symbol capable of revealing transcendence, bringing together

and participating in two spaces of limited and transcendental reality. According to this concept of the symbol, the language of the symbol is not the language of words, since it transforms infinity into limitation (Paškus 2002, 90). Thus, the symbol is understood as a process that unifies what is *within reach* with what is *beyond*. The interpretation of the concept of a symbol can lead to scientific despair, as it is impossible to explain scientifically because although being empirically perceived or experienced, it expresses an empirically intangible reality. But a symbol can become a sensual and obvious manifestation of holiness (Derrida and Vattimo 2000, 117) and a sense of meaning. In the case of the symbol chosen here for discussion, this holiness is Jesus Christ.

2. Legends about the Sacrifice of the Pelican

Pelican (Lat. *pelecanus*, Gr. *pelekan*) is a pelecaniform bird. Its feathers are white or brownish. The head is small, the neck is long, the beak is long, flat, and strong, the two sides under the beak are connected by sharply stretching naked skin. It lives in the deltas of rivers of the tropical and temperate zones and on the coasts of seas. It feeds almost exclusively on fish. The Greeks, seeing its very large beak, called the bird *pelekós* from the word *pelecus* which means *hatchet*, or *onocrotalus* because it was *krotós*, i.e. *strange* as its cry during mating reminded of the bleating of a donkey (*Visuotinė Lietuvių Enciklopedija* 2010, 734). After mating they make nests and lay eggs in secluded and isolated reeds, islands, less often in trees. They bring food for their hatchlings in these secluded places inside “pockets” at the throat. Due to the fact that a pelican bends its beak to its chest and feeds the little ones with the fish brought inside the throat pouch, it was assumed that pelicans tear their chest and feed the young with their own blood. So, legends were born while observing how adult birds feed their young.

In approximately the second century, an unknown Greek author, who lived in Alexandria in Egypt, wrote *Physiologus* - a work on various animals, including the pelican (*Physiologus: A Medieval Book of Nature Lore* 2009). There was no biological paradigm in the work that would allow for debates such as whether each cell needs a nucleus or whether animals reproduce sexually, etc. The goal of *Physiologus* was not, as stated in the introduction, merely to physically describe animals, but to present through nature’s creatures the earthly activities of Jesus Christ (*Physiologus: A Medieval Book of Nature Lore* 2009, 2). But *Physiologus* became an educational textbook that remained popular among Christians for a millennium.

In the 7th century, the book was translated into Latin and several other popular languages of the time, which resulted in widespread distribution among Christians. For a long time, the work influenced all European symbolism; from it came the genre of *bestiarium* - books about animals (*The Medieval Bestiary: Animals in the Middle Ages* 2017). Another interesting thing happened – the original work was didactic and used animals as symbols to explain why things happen the way they happen, and in the Middle Ages, with a strong belief that everything was

created meaningfully and purposefully, symbolic meanings became the essence of animals (Latauskienė 2015, 15). Observation of the natural characteristics of the bird is used for moral instruction, for example, in *the Aberdeen Bestiary* it is written that the life of a hermit is similar to that of a pelican, in that he does not live to eat, but eats to live (Aberdeen Bestiary 1200).

Medieval *bestiaries* contain moral stories about how pelicans love their children. One of them says that growing up young pelican's peck at their parents with their beaks to ask for food. Although the pelican loves his chicks very much, it pecks back and thus kills them. Three days later, the pelican pierces its side or chest with its beak and lets its blood flow onto the dead children. The pelican's blood revives its chicks (*The Medieval Bestiary: Animals in the Middle Ages* 2017). Medieval *bestiary* presents an allegorical interpretation of the story about the pelican. The pelican is Jesus Christ, who is torn apart by the sins of men. Pecking by the pelican chicks at their parents parallels with Isaiah's biblical prophecy about Jesus Christ: "I reared children and brought them up, but they have rebelled against me." (Is 1:2) But Jesus Christ, like the pelican, with His blood flowing from the pierced side, revives the faithful to a new life of grace (Schnitzler 2002). Thus, together with the phoenix, which rises from death by fire, and the unicorn, which can be touched and caught only by a virgin, the pelican becomes one of the first symbols of Jesus Christ (Saunders 2021; Latauskienė 2015, 15). Young pelicans' unreasonable pecks at their parents symbolize the sins of man by which we rebel against God, and thus we are condemned to death, because "sin leads to death" (Rom 6:16). But God's mercy does not allow us to perish. When He dies, He opens His chest so that He can revive us with His blood for eternal life. This is how the pelican's piercing of the chest represents the death of Jesus Christ on the cross and the flow of blood from His pierced side (*The Medieval Bestiary: Animals in the Middle Ages* 2017).

The symbol of the pelican, like the lamb, expresses the sacrificial love of Jesus Christ. Speaking of this bird, one must remember the word *pelican* found in the Latin translation of the Bible: "Similis factus sum pelicano solitudinis factus sum sicut nycticorax in domicilio" ("I am like a pelican of the wilderness: I am like an owl of the desert") (Ps 102:7). And although the pelican is a bird of waters, the psalm uses this symbol to allude to a man crying in the desert. St. Augustine tried to explain this verse of the Psalm. Knowing that the pelican lives in Egypt, on the banks of the Nile, he identifies this image with that of a Christian: Christians who lived among pagans also felt as if in an isolated desert. St. Augustine does not talk about killing chicks, though, he only mentions that parents pelicans tear their chests to feed their hungry children (Schnitzler 2002). This symbol evokes reflection, understanding of the depth of Christ's love and thus calls us to thank Him for this love.

The pelican symbol was also adopted by the church fathers such as Albert the Great (1193–1280) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Van Parys 2012, 135). Thomas Aquinas, in „Adoro te, devote“, one of the five hymns he composed in 1264 in honour of the Eucharist, calls on God's mercy with words: "Pie Pelicane, Jesu Domine, Me

immundum munda tuo sanguine: Cujus una stilla salvum facere Totum mundum quit ab omni scelere” (“Lord Jesus, Good Pelican, clean me, the unclean, with Your Blood, one drop of which can heal the entire world of all its sins”) (Adoro Te Devote 2017).

By changing theological interpretations of the pelican legend in the Middle Ages, the soteriological message also becomes Eucharistic. The Eucharistic significance of the myth is expressed in a different version of the story of the pelican. There was a famine in the land over all men and against all the living creatures. There lived a pelican in that land, who did not grieve for itself, but for the life of its children. After searching in vain for food for a week, the tired, hungry bird landed in the nest, where five chicks were eagerly waiting. The hungry voices of the chicks tore the mother’s heart. The exhausted bird flew back into the sky and again searched for food but returned empty. The little ones met their mother noisily, pecked and pounded at her chest. The poor pelican, eager to feed the children, did not feel pain. It tore its chest with its beak, and the warm blood began to flow directly into the beaks of the hungry chicks. Their lives were saved. When the famine was finally over, the pelican’s children were already strong and ready for a new life. The good pelican died in sacrifice for its children (Schnitzler 2002). In the first myths, the pelican had the power to revive from death, but here the pelican has the power to protect from death.

In the 20th century, the latter legend of the pelican is applied to donation, where the pelican is introduced as the first donor on Earth. A white, bleeding-chested bird with hungry chicks leaning on it has become an international symbol of donation (*Donorystė – gyvybės viltis* 2011, 132; Pelikan – symbol ofiarności i poświęcenia 2021). Legends about the pelican, feeding hungry children with its blood, became a symbol of mercy, selfless love, devotion, and kindness.

3. Pelican in Christian Visualization

Since ancient times, natural science books have described the pelican to be a special bird, because, in times of famine, it pierces its chest and feeds its little ones with its heart blood; thus, in symbolism, the pelican began to represent Jesus Christ, who sacrificed himself for the sake of humanity. Christian tradition, in reference to the psalm (Psalm 102:6) and the myth of the pelican, adapted it as a symbol of Jesus Christ’s sacrifice for the salvation of mankind. Already in the 3rd century, we find the symbol of the pelican on votive candles in Carthage, where it symbolizes our Savior Jesus Christ. Pelican images began to be used for decorating churches. From early Christian art in Carthage to late medieval art in Italy (Giotto di Bondone, Masolino Da Panicale), from Renaissance and Baroque to Postmodern art, the pelican serves as a symbol of the cross and the cup of the Mass, and also as an ornament on altars (Huggins 2010, 119–132; A guide to the works of the major Italian Renaissance Painters 2021; Zenit 2005). The pelican symbol is depicted above the tabernacle or on its door and becomes an important part of the

iconography¹. Above the tabernacle, on the nest encircled by a crown of thorns, there sits a pelican feeding the chicks with its blood from the torn chest. Jesus announced this sacrifice as a gift and offered it in advance at the Last Supper: “This is my body given for you.” (Lk 22:19) When the tabernacle was installed above the altar table, even its shape resembled a pelican, for example, Durham Cathedral in England (built in the 11th–12th century) had a pelican-shaped silver tabernacle suspended above the main altar (Van Parys 2012, 135). This bird can often be seen in works of art, depicted sitting on the cross or building a nest on its top.

References to the pelican and its Christian meaning of sacrifice are found in Renaissance literature: Florentine poet Dante Alighieri (1321) in the Paradiso (Heaven) part of *The Divine Comedy* speaks of Christ as “our Pelican”, who feeds us in paradise with his flesh and blood in the supreme act of love (D’Sylva 2021). Laert, the son of Polonius, says to King Claudius in English playwright William Shakespeare’s (1616) *Hamlet*: “To his good friends thus wide I’ll open my arms and, like the kind life-rendering pelican, repast them with my blood.” (Shakespeare 2021, 67).

The symbol of the pelican’s sacrifice has found its rightful place in religious art and its examples can be seen in Christian art of different eras. The pelican symbol is depicted in the decorations of churches, on liturgical vestments, crosses, and church altars. The pelican, which feeds its chicks with its own blood, symbolizes Christ’s sacrifice for the salvation of mankind and the sacrament of the Eucharist; therefore, at the top of the cross, it can be considered the highlight of the most important religious idea. Placed at the highest point of the vertical crosspiece, it symbolizes the blood sacrifice by the Son of God in the name of His believers. The symbol of the pelican in Christianity evokes contemplation of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, perception of the depth of God’s love and gratitude for this sacrificial love (Schnitzler 2002). Representation of Jesus’ sacrifice by the symbol of the pelican visually reminds us that the Lord, when He feeds us with His body, receives us into Himself so that we can truly become His Body (Benedict XVI 2011, 188–189).

The symbol of the pelican is found in both old and new Christian churches in the whole world. For instance, there is a 17th-century monstrance in the Archcathedral Basilica of St. Stanislaus and St. Ladislaus in Vilnius (Lithuania), which

¹ The tabernacle is one of the most sacred elements inside a church. Early Christians consecrated ordinary bread and ate it at home. The need for its storage arose as a way to give consecrated bread to the sick later. The Eucharist was used outside the Liturgy even at the very beginning of the Church. This is alluded to in St. Justin’s *Apology* in the 2nd century. In describing the celebration of the Eucharist, he mentions that the Body of Christ was carried to those who were unable to come to the congregation. In times of persecution of Christians, the Blessed Sacrament was already carried to the sick and prisoners in prisons. It was then the custom to keep the Eucharist in the sanctuary outside of Mass, so that Christians could receive it if necessary. Until the 13th century, the usual practice of the Church was to keep the Blessed Sacrament for the sick in a suitable place in the sacristy or in a small storage on the wall of the presbytery. It was only in the 12th–13th centuries, when the altars were pushed against the wall and the priest offered Mass with his back to the people, that a tabernacle was placed on the altar. The first official rule for storing the Eucharist was promulgated in 1215 at the Fourth Council of the Lateran, which stipulated that the Most Blessed Sacrament should be kept locked up. In the 15th–16th century, the tabernacle was always installed in the centre of the high altar, the altar cross was placed on top of it and a pelican was depicted. (Krugelis 2012, 30–32; Kazlauskas 2015, 3; Šinkūnaitė 2008, 186).

has a tiny pelican with two hatchlings above the ostia. The chicks perch in a nest that resembles Christ's crown of thorns and raise their heads towards their leaning mother. The figure of this bird can also be seen in other shrines in Lithuania: above the altar of the Basilica of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Šiluva; above the top of the tabernacle of St. James the Apostle Church in Švėkšna; in the stained-glass window at the tabernacle of St. Casimir Church in Klaipėda; on the cross bar in the fresco of the northern wall of the Church of St. Francis of Assisi in Vilnius.

Fr. Marko Ivan Rupnik, a famous contemporary Slovenian artist and theologian, uses Christian symbolism in his creations of mosaics. On the altars of churches and chapels, we can find mosaics created by M. I. Rupnik which depict Jesus Christ and His sacrifice in the symbol of the pelican, for instance, in Saint Angela Merici Chapel of The Ursuline Sisters in Ljubljana, Slovenia; in the Sanctuary of Divine Mercy in Częstochowa, Poland; in the Sacred Heart University Chapel of the Holy Spirit in Fairfield, USA; in the Church of Our Lady of the South Cross in Brisbane, USA; in the Church of Santa Maria del Rosario ai Martiri Portuensi in Rome, Italy; in the Church of Saints Elizabeth and Zaccaria in Catania, Italy; in the Chapel of San Carlo Fraternity in Rome, Italy (Centro Aletti 2022).

The Basilica de la Sagrada Familia in Barcelona is the most impressive structure designed by Antoni Gaudí. The Tree of Life on the Nativity facade of the Basilica depicts a pelican and two angels carrying bread and wine – the symbol of the Eucharist.

4. Jesus Christ – the True Pelican, Feeding People with His blood

The symbol of the pelican reminds a person of the sins, which rebel against God and thus draw condemnation. But God's mercy does not allow man to perish. Dying on the cross, the incarnate Lord opens his chest so that He can revive people with His own blood. Jesus Christ gives Himself to the people who are His persecutors and feeds them with His sacrifice. He Himself becomes both food and drink for the man, despite the fact that people have offended Him so much. His death gives life (Schnitzler 2002). Thus, the symbol of the pelican conveys God's mercy to His creatures – sinful and weak people. Incarnate Lord Jesus Christ loves people so much that He sacrifices Himself and does not allow them to perish. By the sacrifice of His death on the cross, He gives himself for us to live. Thus, pelican symbolism encourages people to reflect on and comprehend the mystery of the love of Jesus Christ. Only a person who understands it can adequately accept and appreciate this love. This love to love and sacrifice teaches man himself.

In terms of sacrifice, two levels can be distinguished: the willingness to sacrifice and the performance of the sacrifice itself. Sacrifice is only achieved when a person sacrifices oneself and desires this sacrifice because of a noble purpose.

This goal is altruistic and of free will. Such a sacrifice was offered by many martyrs, who were later declared saints. However, if a person goes to death by divine will, but without inner desire or sacrifice, then such a death is not a sacrifice. For example, the shooting of prisoners of war or similar cases where people die without having a choice and without a decisive determination to make a sacrifice would not be considered a sacrifice. The most noble sacrifice is considered the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The very coming of the Lord into this world meant that the Savior and the Redeemer is close to man. By his life and death, by the establishment of the Eucharist, Jesus testifies that he came to sacrifice and atone for the sins of mankind. One single sacrifice was enough for all sinners to live eternal life. This sacrifice is unique, and it does not need to be renewed. It says on forever in its self-sacrificial love (Schnitzler 2002). The live sacrifice of Jesus Christ is constantly experienced by Christians while attending Holy Mass. When bread and wine are offered, a transformation takes place – the sacrifice of the blood and body of Christ for the salvation of mankind. The sacrifice of God cannot be equated with even the greatest, the most noble human sacrifice as it is inclusive of all humanity, it is capable of saving all people from sin, it is not subject to time, and therefore it is eternal. The Pelican is one of the many symbolic images of this sacrifice, representing the redeeming sacrifice of Jesus Christ and the sacrament of the Eucharist (Daley 2009, 81; Sprindžiūnienė 2013, 2–7).

People are saved through the blood of Jesus Christ, as the Bible says: “we are justified by his blood” (Rom 5:9), we are redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ (1 Jn 1:7; Rev 5:9; 12:11). To understand the importance of the blood of Christ, we must understand the principle of the Scripture that “the life of every creature is its blood” (Lev 17:14). The body cannot stay alive without blood, so blood symbolizes life. This explains the appropriateness of Christ’s words: “unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you.” (Jn 6:53)

Sin leads to death (Rom 6:23), i.e. to the shedding of life-giving blood, and therefore the Israelites had to shed blood every time they sinned, which reminded them that sin ended in death. “And almost all things are by the law [of Moses] purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission [of sins].” (Heb 9:22) Therefore, the garments made by Adam and Eve from the leaves of the fig tree were inadequate; instead, God killed an animal and made garments from its fur to cover their sin (see Gen 3:7-21). Likewise, the animals sacrificed by Abel were accepted more favourably than Cain’s sacrifice of the fruits of the Earth, for Abel understood that without bloodshed one could not approach God properly and receive forgiveness (Gen 4:3-5).

These events speak of the extraordinary importance of Christ’s blood. This is especially evident in the events of Easter (Paschos or Passover), when, in order to be saved from death, the people of God had to anoint the door frames with lamb’s blood (Ex 12:11). This blood testified to the blood of Jesus Christ, by which we are saved. Before the coming of Jesus Christ, the Jews had to offer animal sacrifices for their sins according to the law of Moses. But this bloodshed of animals had only the instructive meaning that sin is punishable by death (Rom 6:23).

It is impossible that man can kill an animal to replace his own death or use it as his own true substitute. The sacrificial animal did not realize what was good and what was bad; so, it could not fully replace man: “It is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins.” (Heb 10:4)

Animals that were killed as offerings for sins were to be without blemish or defect (Ex 12:5; Lev 1:3-10, etc.). They were like a prophecy about Christ, “a lamb without blemish or defect” (1 Pt 1:19). Thus, the blood of those animals symbolized the blood of Jesus Christ. They were accepted as offerings for sins because they testified to the future perfect sacrifice of Christ. Because of this, God was able to forgive the sins of His people who lived before the coming of Jesus Christ. His death “set them free from the sins committed under the first covenant [i.e. under the law of Moses]” (Heb 9:15). All the sacrifices made according to the law testified to Christ, the perfect sin offering, who “appeared once for all at the culmination of the ages to do away with sin by the sacrifice of himself” (Heb 9:26; cf. Heb 13:11-12; Rom 8:3; 2 Cor 5:21). Jesus gives His life voluntarily. When He died, He clearly understood what He was dying for. Christ perceived His death as a gift of His life to the associates at the table of the Last Supper (Ramonas 2007, 47–48). Life is taken from Him on the cross, but he is giving it freely now. He turns his forced death into a free act of giving Himself for others and to others. Jesus sacrificed Himself for our salvation. He offered this sacrifice as a gift at the Last Supper. Like the pelican, Jesus gave his body and blood. Spurts of blood spilt from His side pierced by a spear. His blood is a complete self-giving, enduring all distress of humanity, overcoming all the breaches of fidelity with unconditional loyalty (Benedict XVI 2011, 109–112). Taking into his human heart the Father’s love for men, Jesus “loved them to the end” (Jn 13:1), for “greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (15:13). In this way, in suffering and death, His humanity became a free and perfect instrument of His divine love for human salvation. He freely consented to suffer and die out of love for His Father and for the people whom the Father wants to save: “No one takes it [life] from me, but I lay it down of my own accord.” (10:18) Thus, the Son of God went to death completely free (Katalikų Bažnyčios Katekizmas 2012, 609). The greatest plenitude of love was achieved at the moment of death. He really went to the end, to the limit and beyond. He fulfilled all His love – He gave away Himself. Blood and water flowed from the pierced heart of Jesus. In the pierced heart we see the source of blessing, the stream of blood and water that renders eternal life (Benedict XVI 2011, 178–180).

Jesus Christ, like a sacrificing Pelican, once and for all gave Himself to people. And even more: He desires to satiate people daily with Himself – above all with His unique revealed word and Manna – Communion, filled with the fullness of divine life, in which his loyal disciples very often receive with ever-growing faith and ever-expanding gratitude the One who desires that the faithful not only never forget His words, but, above all, are guided by them: “I am the bread of life. Whoever comes to me will never go hungry, and whoever believes in me will never be thirsty.” (Jn 6:35) Jesus is the bread given to people. St. Augustine states: “To eat

this is to become stronger, but when you are strengthened, He who has strengthened you will not weaken. To drink is to live. Eat Life, drink Life. You will then have life." (Salij 1996, 151) Jesus says in the Gospel of John: "I am the bread of life. Your ancestors ate the manna in the wilderness, yet they died. But here is the bread that comes down from heaven, which anyone may eat and not die. I am the living bread that came down from heaven. Whoever eats this bread will live forever. This bread is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." (Jn 6:8-51) Jesus, like the loving Pelican of the legend, feeds His children with His flesh. Jesus gives everything to His children – He dies to give life. By His sacrifice, Jesus showed that God is love. Love is giving oneself to another. Jesus is the true Pelican, who gave his body and blood as food for us to live (Daley 2009, 81; Saunders 2021). So, the image of the pelican reminds us of the need to remain in the love of Jesus and how He loved people and sacrificed Himself for them, "just as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God" (Eph 5:2), so every person is called to selfless love.


5. Conclusion

The purpose of symbols is to bring us out beyond the limits of what is tangible materially, *to awaken* inner senses and to teach new vision, to see the otherworldly. The meaning of the symbol lies not in itself, but beyond it. Symbols reveal the deep truth and therefore they are inseparable from the rituals and images of all religions. The symbol of the pelican, which expresses the selfless love of Jesus Christ for people, came to Christianity from legends in its first centuries. According to the legends, the pelican loves its children so much that it tears its chest to feed them with its blood. Thus, the pelican symbol is found in Christian art of different eras to represent the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The pelican symbol is found in the decoration of churches, crosses, and liturgical vestments.

The pelican, tearing its chest and feeding its chicks with its blood, is one of the oldest and deepest symbols of Jesus Christ. Jesus is the true pelican, feeding believers with His flesh and blood. Jesus manifested His love for people until the end by dying on the cross. The depiction of the pelican has long revealed to the faithful the sacrificial love of Jesus Christ. The incarnate Lord, by the supreme act of His life sacrifice, gives Himself to men and becomes the Bread of Life. Representation of Jesus' sacrifice by the symbol of the pelican visually reminds us that the Lord, when he feeds people with His body, receives them into Himself so that they truly become His body. Seeing the pelican through the eyes of the faith helps us discover the deepest Christ's message: to give oneself to one's brothers because it will make visible what evangelist John said about Jesus' love: "Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends." (Jn 15:13)

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Luka Trebežnik

**Med nihilizmom in mesijanizmom:
Derridajeva filozofija religije**

Derridaju nikakor ne gre za zavračanje obstoja resnice, temveč gre le za sporočilo, da ta nastopa preko razlike. Dekonstrukcija trdi, da ne obstaja zunaj teksta, kar pomeni, da ne obstaja večna resnica. Temu je tako, ker je sleherna resnica inkarnirana v jezik in pripoved. Ta Derridajeva stališča pa so v veliki meri nasprotna tradiciji, ki veruje, da se za tekstem nahaja trden in nesporen smisel. Izmed vsega slovstva je to najočitneje izraženo pri religijah, ki sprejemajo nadnaravni izvor svojih tekstov. Od to sledi, da sta dekonstrukcija in teologija izvorno nerazdružljivi.

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Bogdan Kolar

Škof Anton Vovk – prvi častni doktor

Teološke fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani

*Msgr. Anton Vovk - The First Doctor Honoris Causa
Conferred by the School of Theology in Ljubljana*

Povzetek: Teološka fakulteta je bila pri ustanovitvi Univerze v Ljubljani leta 1919 ena od pet ustanovnih članic. Zakonodaja o delovanju univerze (in tudi drugih na ozemlju Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev/Jugoslavije) se je oblikovala le postopoma. Isto je veljalo za ureditev podeljevanja doktorskih nazivov. Fakulteta je doktorat prvič podelila leta 1923. Po letu 1952, ko Teološka fakulteta v Ljubljani ni bila več del javnega šolskega sistema, so zanjo veljala le cerkvena pravila – akademski nazivi so se podeljevali v imenu Svetega sedeža. Tako je bilo urejeno tudi podeljevanje doktorskih nazivov. Leta pa 1960 je bil podeljen prvi častni doktorat; prejel ga je veliki kancler škof Anton Vovk, in sicer zaradi svojega zavzemanja za ohranitev fakultete ter zaradi vsestranskega podpiranja njenega pedagoškega in raziskovalnega dela v desetletju po njeni izključitvi iz javnega šolstva. Do tedaj je bilo doseženih 51 doktoratov teologije.

Ključne besede: Nadškof Anton Vovk (1900–1963), Teološka fakulteta Ljubljana, častni doktorat

Abstract: The School of Theology was one of the five founding members of the University of Ljubljana. The legislature on universities (as in other parts of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians/Yugoslavia) was created only gradually. The same held for conferring of the doctorate title. The first one was conferred in 1923. Only Church legislation was valid after 1952 when the School of Theology was excluded from the public school system. The academic titles, doctorates included, were conferred on behalf of the Holy See. The School of Theology conferred the first doctorate *honoris causa* in 1960. It was conferred to its grand chancellor Bishop Anton Vovk. He was awarded the title because of his many-sided support for the preservation of the School and its educational and scientific work in the decade after School's elimination from the public school system. 51 divinity doctorates (DD) were conferred until then.

Keywords: Archbishop Anton Vovk (1900–1963), School of Theology Ljubljana, doctorate *honoris causa*

1. Uvod

Za akademski naziv častnega doktorja so se v preteklosti uporabljala različna merila.¹ V prvi vrsti je šlo za podelitev priznanja osebi, ki je imela poseben pomen za razvoj in delovanje določene znanstvene ali umetniške panoge, izobraževalne ali raziskovalne ustanove, ki ima tudi sicer pravico do podeljevanja doktorske časti. Takšno priznanje se je podeljevalo zaradi znanstvene odličnosti, odmevnih dosežkov, posebnih zaslug pri delovanju takšne ustanove ali za uveljavljanje določenih vrednot. Merila za podeljevanje častnega doktorata določajo pravila posamezne ustanove, vključena v statute ali pravilnike. V določenih okoljih se častni doktorati podeljujejo zaradi politične oportuniteti ali za pridobivanje ugleda ustanove (to je veljalo tudi za Univerzo v Ljubljani). Gre za avtonomno pravico posamezne univerze ali druge znanstveno-raziskovalne ustanove. Pri podeljevanju naziva častnega doktorja na cerkvenih ustanovah je potrebno soglasje pristojne ustanove Svetega sedeža (kongregacije ali dikasterija). Gre seveda za drugačno vrsto doktoratov kot pri doktoratih, ki se podeljujejo za izdelavo znanstvenega doktorskega dela – po opravljenih izpiti ali drugih dolžnostih. Zato sezname disertacij častnih doktoratov navadno ne vključujejo; to velja tudi za objavo seznamov doktorskih del na Teološki fakulteti v Ljubljani (Smolik 1969). Do tedaj je bilo na fakulteti podeljenih 51 doktoratov teologije. Častni doktorati se posameznikom navadno podeljujejo po dolgoletnem delu in pomenijo neke vrste potrditev njihovega predhodnega vzemanja za določeno znanstveno ali umetniško disciplino/ustanovo. Škof Anton Vovk je bil prvi častni doktor ljubljanske Teološke fakultete. Noben častni doktorat, ki je bil podeljen na Teološki fakulteti v Ljubljani, ni naveden v seznamu častnih doktoratov, ki jih je doslej podelila Univerza v Ljubljani.² Prispevek želi obeležiti 100-letnico podelitve prvega doktorskega naziva na Teološki fakulteti in 60-letnico smrti prvega častnega doktorja.

2. Anton Vovk in Teološka fakulteta

Anton Vovk (1900–1963) je postal študent na Teološki fakulteti v Ljubljani v prvem letu delovanja fakultete, to je v študijskem letu 1919/20, ko je uradno začela delovati Univerza v Ljubljani – Teološka fakulteta je bila med ustanoviteljicami (Petkovšek 2019, 478). Stanoval je v bogoslovnem semenišču ljubljanske škofije in obiskoval predavanja v Alojzijevišču, kjer je fakulteta dobila prostore za predavalnice, medtem ko se je dekanat nahajal v poslopju univerze. Poleg bogoslovcev ljubljanske škofije so bili v istem letniku na fakulteto vpisani še člani frančiškanskega reda. Med slednjimi sta se v zgodovino redovne skupnosti in Cerkve na Slovenskem močno zapisala p. dr. Stanko Aljančič (1892–1959) in p. dr. Roman Tominec

¹ Prispevek je nastal kot rezultat dela v okviru raziskovalnega programa „P6-0262: Vrednote v judovsko-krščanskih virih in tradiciji ter možnosti dialoga,“ ki ga sofinancira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

² Leta 2011 je bila pripravljena razstava o častnih doktorjih Univerze v Ljubljani in objavljen katalog razstave *Častni doktorji Univerze v Ljubljani: Doctores honoris causa Universitatis Labacensis* (2011).

(1900–1991). Več bogoslovcev ljubljanske škofije je imelo kasnejše odgovorne službe v škofiji: Andrej Ilc (1896–1981), Franc Ks. Lavrenčič (1899–1973), Franc Markež (1900–1948), Franc Mervec (1897–1977), Pavel Simončič (1897–1971), Alojzij Strupi (1901–1945), Janez Tiringner (1901–1923), Žagar Sanaval Janko (1896–1978) in drugi. Leto za Vovkom sta se na Teološko fakulteto vpisala tudi Maksimilijan Miklavčič (1900–1971) in Matija Tomc (1899–1986), a sta duhovniško posvečenje prejela po tretjem letniku v letu 1923 – torej skupaj z Vovkom (ATF, fasc. 49). Službo ravnatelja semenišča je leta 1919 prevzel dr. Ignacij Nadrah (1868–1951), stolni kanonik, pozneje generalni vikar ljubljanskega škofa dr. Gregorija Rožmana in tudi svetovalec škofa Antona Vovka v povojnih letih (Ceglar 1993, 37–38).

Vovk je študij zaključil po štirih letih leta 1923 in po prejemu duhovniškega posvečenja isto leto nastopil svojo prvo službo v Metliki. V drugem semestru prvega študijskega leta se je predavateljem pridružil dr. Josip Ujčić (1880–1964), ugledni profesor moralne teologije na dunajski teološki fakulteti, dvorni kaplan in ravnatelj kolegija Frintaneum. V tej službi je skrbel za ekonomijo zavoda in knjižnico, spremljal je doktorske študente s področja bibličnih ved in po letu 1913 predaval moralno teologijo. Leta 1919 je dobil povabilo, da bi se vključil v učiteljski zbor novoustanovljene ljubljanske univerze, in sicer najprej kot honorarni predavatelj; leta 1921 je postal izredni in šest let kasneje redni profesor (Škerl 1990; Ceglar 1993, 44–45).

Med Ujčićem in Vovkom se je že takrat razvila tesna povezanost, ki se je posebej pokazala po drugi svetovni vojni, ko je Vovk postal upravitelj ljubljanske škofije, Ujčić pa je kot že izkušen nadškof upravljal beograjsko nadškofijo in bil tudi vršilec dolžnosti predsednika Jugoslovanske škofovske konference. Prav zaradi tega se je vodstvo Teološke fakultete leta 1960 odločilo, da bo kot promotorja postopka razglasitve Vovka za častnega doktorja predlagalo nadškofa Ujčića. Svojega nekdanjega študenta se Ujčić ni spominjal le po tem, da je bil za glavo višji od drugih, temveč je izstopal po dobrih lastnostih, svoji prizadevnosti in študijski resnosti (Ceglar 1993, 45). Učitelj cerkvene zgodovine na Teološki fakulteti dr. Maks Miklavčič je v svojem govoru ob spominski slovesnosti³ in nato v spominskem članku, ki ga je leta 1965 objavil po smrti Vovka, Ujčića in dr. Mihaela Toroša (1884–1963), zatrdil, da je profesor Ujčić izstopal po svojem humanizmu, odprtosti za različnost in optimističnem pogledu na stvari (Miklavčič 1965, 134). Kljub zvestobi svojim vrednotam in cerkvenemu učenju je bil tako svobodoumen, da je znal spoštovati vest in znanje vsakega sobesednika.

»Ko je (sc. dr. Ujčić) odhajal iz Ljubljane, je tu zapustil občudovanja vredno število hvaležnih učencev in gotovo še večje število zvestih prijateljev med vodilnimi slovenskimi izobraženci najrazličnejših nazorov. Nedvomno je veljal prof. Ujčić za najbolj priljubljenega tolmača verskih in teoloških vprašanj v krogih, ki so se sicer pred glasniki krščanskega nazora radi zapirali, njemu edinemu pa so vrata radi na stežaj odpirali. Prof. Ujčiću se

³ Spominska svečanost („Memoria trium Antistitum anno praeterito pie defunctorum in Facultate Theologica Labaci reverenter celebratur“) je bila izvedena na Teološki fakulteti 15. junija 1964. Osrednji govor je imel dr. Maksimilijan Miklavčič.

je to posrečilo, ker je bil poln osvežujočega življenjskega optimizma, nasrkanega iz božjega razodetja, ker je bil nekam preprost in bister v umovanju, morda še bolj prisrčen do vsakega, ki je bil Cerkvi odtujen kakor do verskih somišljenikov, do katerih je bil zahteven v isti meri kakor do sam sebe pri iskanju resnice in čiste krščanske morale. Vse to priča, da je svoje poslanstvo v srcu Slovenije opravil kar najbolje, saj je bil za mnoge res kakor ‚luč, ki sveti v temi‘.« (Miklavčič 1965, 134; Ceglar 1993, 44–45)

Za delovanje fakultete se je Vovk zanimal v vseh službah. Posebej sta se njegova vloga in odnos do fakultete razširila po letu 1952, ko je ta postala samostojna cerkvena ustanova neposredno pod oblastjo Svetega sedeža – vsakokratni voditelj ljubljanske škofije, na ozemlju katere se je fakulteta nahajala, pa je bil njen veliki kancler. Škof Vovk je pravočasno poskrbel, da so bili pripravljene vsi dokumenti, ki so fakulteti zagotavljali samostojno delovanje in kontinuiteto, potem ko je dobila obvestilo, da s poletjem 1952 ne bo več javna izobraževalna ustanova (Petkovšek 2019, 482–483). Ob sodelovanju z dekanom dr. Stankom Cajnkarjem (1900–1977) in prof. dr. Vilimom Kellbachom (1908–1982), dekanom zagrebške teološke fakultete, ki je doživela isto usodo kot druge teološke šole na ozemlju Jugoslavije, je bil postavljen pravni okvir za delovanje fakultete in njen prehod v samostojno cerkveno ustanovo. V ta namen je bil pripravljen pravilnik o poslovanju fakultete, s katerim so bile seznanjene tudi državne oblasti (Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve). V trenutku, ko so osrednje cerkvene oblasti razmišljale o njeni ukinitvi in prenosu teološkega študija na raven škofijskega semenišča, je Vovk kot dober poznavalec razmer na Slovenskem in pomena lastne teološke fakultete ohranil samostojnost v odločanju – in na ukinitev ni pristal. Zanimal se je za materialna vprašanja fakultete, na voljo ji je dal dodatne prostore v Alojzijevišču in pomagal pri sprotne vzdrževanju; skrbel je za pridobivanje novih knjig in spremljal vsakodnevni utrip fakultete – tudi tako, da je imenoval svojega predstavnika v izpitne komisije ali, če mu je dopuščalo zdravje, komisijam za zagovor doktorskih del predsedoval sam. Skrbel je za pripravo rednih poročil o delovanju fakultete in za pravočasno izvajanje habilitacijskih postopkov. V odnosu do državnih oblasti je zagovarjal interese fakultete, čeprav je pogostokrat ostal nemočen – argument moči je prevladal nad močjo argumentov (Kolar 2010, 154–155).

3. Prvotni namen

Ob priložnosti praznovanja Vovkovega 55. življenjskega jubileja leta 1955 so štirje nekdanji profesorji v Škofovih zavodih v Šentvidu, dr. Frančišek Jere, France Glinšek, dr. Anton Čepon in dr. Maks Miklavčič⁴ dekanatu Teološke fakultete poslali

⁴ Dr. Frančišek Jere (1881–1958) je opravljal naloge rektorja uršulinske cerkve v Ljubljani. Franc Glinšek (1903–1967) je bil ljubljanski stolni kanonik in župnik vikar v stolnici. Dr. Anton Čepon (1895–1995) je bil ljubljanski stolni kanonik. Dr. Maks Miklavčič (1900–1971) je bil učitelj cerkvene zgodovine na Teološki fakulteti in pomemben voditelj stanovskega Ciril-metodijskega društva slovenskih duhovnikov. Veljal je za zaupnika škofa Vovka.

utemeljeno pobudo, da naj se msgr. Vovku podeli častni doktorat za zavzemanje za ohranitev fakultete in za vsestransko podporo njenemu delovanju (ATF, fasc. 43d). Kot so poudarili predlagatelji, ki so se pri tem sklicevali na podporo svojih nekdanjih dijakov in kolegov, je bil Anton Vovk prvi absolvent Škofovih zavodov, ki je v Cerkvi prevzel naloge škofa. Svoj predlog so utemeljili z desetimi razlogi. V nadaljevanju navajamo temeljne poudarke iz utemeljitve. V istem letu je minilo deset let, odkar je Anton Vovk prevzel naloge voditelja ljubljanske škofije; pri tem je pokazal dobro poznavanje razmer in storil ustrezne korake za zagotavljanje, kolikor je bilo mogoče, urejenega cerkvenega življenja. Čeprav škof in administrator škofije, je še naprej opravljal naloge rektorja semenišča – kar mu je pomagalo, da je lahko skrbel za nove kandidate za bogoslovni študij –, za poslovanje semenišča in dobro strokovno pripravo. Prizadeval si je, da je fakulteti zagotovil redno delo in razvoj, da je ohranila status fakultete in ni bila spremenjena v bogoslovno učilišče. »Zato se je odločno zavzemal, da slovenska teološka fakulteta živi kot samostojen raziskovalen in znanstveno vzgojen zavod, ki ima poleg splošnih nalog teoloških fakultet še posebno nalogo, preučevati slovensko versko življenje v preteklosti ter duhovnosti med Slovenci kazati pota in posredovati notranjo zvezo med slovenskimi katoličani in vesoljno Cerkvijo.«⁵

Škof Vovk se je zavedal vloge, ki jo je Teološka fakulteta imela za Cerkev na Slovenskem in za Slovence v zamejstvu. Zato je z vsemi sredstvi podpiral njeno vodstvo in po svojih močeh skrbel za njeno nemoteno delo. Predlagatelji so posebej poudarili tri področja njegove podpore delovanju fakultete: skrbel je za kadrovske pogoje njenega delovanja in nove učne moči; podpiral je pripravo in izdajo učnih pripomočkov (skript) ter njene druge objave; podpiral je znanstveno delovanje fakultete s skrbjo za tri osrednje knjižnice – fakultetno, semeniško in škofijsko pastoralno –, ki so v bile tistem času osnova vsakega resnega in poglobljenega znanstveno-raziskovalnega dela. Kljub težavam (glavna ovira je bila prepoved uvoza literature iz tujine in preganjanje stikov s tujino) so v letih po vojni knjižnice svoje gradivo bogatile in nudile vse možnosti za študij.

Podpiral je zamisel in ustvarjal materialne pogoje za to, da so v ljubljanskem bogoslovnem semenišču skupaj bivali študentje teologije iz ljubljanske in lavantinske škofije ter delov goriške nadškofije, ki so po končani vojni pripadli Sloveniji. V določenem obdobju so se jim pridružili še člani nekaterih redovnih skupnosti. Tako se je med študenti ustvarjalo povezanost in zavest pripadnosti isti narodni skupnosti in Cerkvi.

Neposredne pastoralne naloge, ki jih je prevzel po posvečenju – takšno je bilo prepričanje predlagateljev in, smemo reči, dobrih poznavalcev Vovkovega življenja – so pritegnile vso njegovo pozornost in mu prinašale zadovoljstvo, niso pa ga motivirale, da bi se bolj posvetil znanstvenemu delu, nadaljeval študij in pripravil doktorsko delo. Pobudniki za odlikovanje so ugotavljali, da je ves čas ohranjal zanimanje za teološke predmete. Sodeloval je pri pripravi zgodovine župnije Tržič,

⁵ Predlagatelji so dopis na dekanat Teološke fakultete naslovili 25. junija 1955. V razpravi povzemamo glavne poudarke dopisa, ne da bi na vsakem mestu navajali, kje smo jih našli.

zasnoval nekatere dele monografije in pomagal pri zbiranju gradiva.⁶ Kot pravijo predlagatelji, je ustanovil in urejeval župnijsko glasilo *Tržiški glasnik*, ki je redno objavljalo izvirne prispevke s področja zgodovine in pastoralne teologije.⁷

Kot praktični pastoralni delavec se je zavedal pomena načrtnega homiletičnega delovanja, ki bi moralo obsegati celotno vsebino krščanskega oznanila, poudarja jo predlagatelji. Kar je glede priprave homiletičnega načrta sicer že predvidela ljubljanska škofijska sinoda in Zakonik ljubljanske škofije, zaradi vojnih razmer ni bilo uresničeno, čeprav v času tik pred vojno in med njo strokovnjakov s tega področja ni primanjkovalo. Vovk je v letih po vojni uspel pridobiti sodelavce in zasnovo prej zamišljenega načrta, ki je postal okvir delovanja ne le v ljubljanski in lavantinski škofiji, temveč tudi v nekaterih hrvaških škofijah, v veliki meri izdelal sam. Načrt je omogočil sistematično obravnavo temeljnih verskih resnic in njihovo celovito predstavitev v določenem časovnem okviru (Kvaternik 2003, 85–86; 191–193).

Po njegovi zaslugi je bil v letu 1954 pripravljen obsežen in celovit popis cerkva ljubljanske škofije v luči zgodovinskih in cerkveno-umetnostnih meril. Vsi rektorji cerkva so imeli nalogo, da so pripravili referate o stanju cerkva, ki so jim bile zaupane. Ker je šlo za pripravo gradiva v letih neposredno po koncu vojne, je bilo mogoče zbrati natančne popise o dogajanju v cerkvah med vojno in po njej in tako ohraniti podatke, ki bi se bili gotovo izgubili, če ne bi bili takrat načrtno zbrani. To je še v večji meri veljalo za tiste dele slovenskega ozemlja (Kočevsko in drugod), kjer so bile cerkve in kapele načrtno uničene. Izvod tako pripravljenih popisov je moral biti oddan v škofijski arhiv, kjer je s tem nastal obsežen in zelo dragocen popis stanja na področju sakralne arhitekture in umetnosti v prelomnem zgodovinskem času in nenadomestljiv vir informacij za nadaljnje proučevanje.⁸ Uporaba gradiva pri zgodovinarjih in umetnostnih zgodovinarjih je pokazala, da je bila odločitev škofa Vovka zgodovinskega pomena.

V času, ko je Cerkev ostala brez materialnih sredstev, ni opustil prizadevanja za ohranjanje kulturne umetniške dediščine in bogatitev umetniških del. V luči ohranjanja kulturne dediščine je poskrbel za prenavljanje pomembnih sakralnih objektov, skulptur, slik, orgel, zvonov in liturgičnih paramentov ter posodja. Za oskrbo revnejših cerkva s potrebnimi predmeti je pred drugo svetovno vojno skrbela Bratovščina sv. Rešnjega Telesa. Ker je bila ta po vojni ukinjena, so revne cerkve lahko izboljšale svojo opremo le s pomočjo darov, za katere je poskrbel voditelj škofije Vovk. V ljubljanski stolnici sv. Nikolaja je bil po njegovem zavzemanju narejen nov

⁶ Monografiji z naslovom *Zgodovinski drobci župnije Tržič* je dal dokončno podobo Viktor Kragl (1883–1951). Knjiga je izšla leta 1936 v založbi tržiške župnije. Kragl je bil tržiški rojak, a je v letih po prvi svetovni vojni služboval v več krajih lavantinske škofije. Ko je kot župnik nastopil A. Vovk, je imel Kragl z njim pogostne stike in od njega prejemal pobude za nadaljnje raziskovanje preteklosti kraja in župnije Tržič.

⁷ V resnici se je župnijsko glasilo imenovalo *Cerkveni glasnik za Tržiško župnijo*, njegov začetnik v letu 1924 pa je bil tedanji tržiški župnik Matija Škerbec (1886–1963) (Kvaternik 2003, 66).

⁸ V Nadškofijskem arhivu Ljubljana se je tako oblikovala zbirka popisov cerkva („Popis cerkva 1954“), ki jih je pripravila velika večina župnikov. Izvod popisa so ohranili župnijski uradi.

škofovski tron in krstilnica; načrte za oboje je pripravil akademik Jože Plečnik. Prenovljena je bila tudi notranjost škofijskega dvorca, ki je tako ohranil značilnosti najlepšega ohranjenega renesančnega dvorca v Ljubljani (Ceglar 1995, 120).

Po prepričanju pobudnikov za odlikovanje, ki so dobro poznali razmere v ljubljanski škofiji in delovanje cerkvenih ustanov, je bila pomemben del Vovkovega delovanja skrb za ohranjanje neoporečnega teološkega nauka in razvijanje spretnosti za njegovo posredovanje množicam. Že kot član stolnega kapitlja v Ljubljani je imel nalogo teološkega izvedenca – njegovo službo so uradno imenovali ‚canonicus theologus‘ in v njenem okviru je skrbel za razvoj teoloških ved ter spodbujanje pravovernosti. Nove naloge, ki jih je prevzel po koncu vojne, so mu dale možnost, da je s svojimi nastopi, ki so bili vedno temeljito pripravljene, svoja dognanja in izkušnje posredoval množicam ljudi, s katerimi se je srečeval. Istočasno je bil merilo nastopanja mnogim pastoralnim delavcem, ki niso bili najbolj trdni niti v posredovanju nauka niti ne v ustrezni govorici, ki bi bila odraz zahtevne jezikovne oblike. Podobna načela je uporabljal pri izvajanju katehetskega pouka (1993, 244–245).

Nekdanji učitelji v Škofovih zavodih so zagotavljali, da je škof Vovk veliko pozornosti namenjal razvoju cerkvene glasbe, skrbi za urejeno liturgično petje cerkvenih zborov ali ljudsko petje. Liturgično gibanje, ki se je v Cerkvi začelo širiti po drugi svetovni vojni, je zahtevalo nove pristope in bolj resno ovrednotenje sodelovanja laikov, kar je bilo v prvi vrsti mogoče pri opravljanju liturgičnih srečanj. Hkrati je bilo zadosti možnosti za gojenje starih slovenskih liturgičnih oblik in izvirnosti. Škof Vovk je pri tem pokazal veliko razgledanost in zanimanje.

Kolikor je mogoče ugotoviti iz ohranjene dokumentacije, delovni organi fakultete o predlogu niso posebej razpravljali (ATF, fasc. 4). Sta pa pobuda in utemeljitev nato služili kot osnova pri pripravi postopka v letu 1960.

4. Ob življenjskem jubileju

Drugič je bila pobuda za podelitev doktorata *honoris causa* škofu Vovku podana v letu 1960, ko je škof praznoval svojo 60-letnico in le nekaj mesecev potem, ko je 2. decembra 1959 postal ljubljanski rezidencialni škof in je 20. decembra 1959 to službo uradno nastopil (Ceglar 1995, 180–181). Potem ko je 16. novembra 1959 v Clevelandu (Ohio) umrl škof dr. Gregorij Rožman (1883–1959), ki je naslov ljubljanskega škofa ohranil vse do konca, je Sveti sedež vprašanje njegovega naslednika uredil zelo hitro (Merlak 2002, 129). Za mnoge poznavalce poslovanja osrednjih rimskih cerkvenih ustanov je bila takšna ekspeditivnost presenetljiva – tistim, ki so delovanje škofa Vovka in povezanost z naslednikom apostola Petra poznali, pa je bilo takšno ravnanje povsem na mestu. Vernikom ljubljanske škofije je stolni kapitelj tako med drugim sporočil: »Imenovanja smo toliko bolj veseli, ker že iz dosedanjega štirinajstletnega dejanskega vodstva škofije znamo ceniti in spoštovati njegove izredne voditeljske darove. V teh letih je že večkrat prehodil vse dele

naše škofije, imeli ste priložnost slišati njegovo besedo, sprejemati zakramente in blagoslov iz njegove roke in občudovati njegovo priljubljenost, požrtvovalnost in neutrudljivo gorečnost.« (131)

Redni fakultetni svet je o pobudi za podelitev doktorata *honoris causa* razpravljaj na več sejah spomladi 1960, to je v mesecih pred Vovkovim rojstnim dnevom 19. maja (ATF, fasc. 4). Kot temeljno izhodišče je služil življenjski jubilej velikega kanclerja Vovka in njegova povezanost s fakulteto. Vodstvo fakultete se je prireditev ob Vovkovem življenjskem jubileju tudi sicer udeleževalo. Po sklepu rednega fakultetnega sveta je dekan Cajnkar za to predhodno pridobil soglasje (*nihil obstat*) od Kongregacije za semenišča in univerze (dopis št. 1269/60/7 z dne 8. julija 1960). V dopisu, ki ga je v Rim uradno poslal ljubljanski škofijski ordinariat, je bil še predlog, da bi promocijsko dejanje opravil beograjski nadškof in nekdanji učitelj na Teološki fakulteti dr. Josip Ujčić, Ta je zaupano nalogo z veseljem sprejel. »To bom zelo rad storil, ker prevzvišenega škofa zelo spoštujem in ker je bil moj slušatelj; predstavljam si, da je fakulteta predlagala mene za ta slovesni čin, kar me kot bivšega profesorja zelo veseli,« je v odgovoru zapisal nadškof Ujčić (ATF, fasc. 94).

Osrednja slovesnost, ki jo je kronist ustanove označil kot »najlepši praznik po vojski« (Zbornik 1960, 1), je bila 20. oktobra 1960 v največjem prostoru, s katerim je takrat razpolagala fakulteta, to je kapeli Alojzijevejšča.⁹ Med uglednimi gosti sta poleg slovenskih ordinarijev, pa voditelja škofije Križevci na Hrvaškem Gabrijela Bukatka (1913–1981), tudi zastopnika zagrebškega nadškofa, ljubljanskega stolnega kapitlja, zastopnikov redov, učiteljev fakultete in študentov izstopala predsednik Verske komisije pri Izvršnem svetu Republike Slovenije Boris Kocijančič (1909–1968) in tajnik te komisije Franek Sladič. To je bilo prvo srečanje vladnih funkcionarjev s škofom Vovkom v cerkvenih prostorih (Merlak 2002, 136). Dekan fakultete dr. Stanko Cajnkar, ki je prvič nosil slovesno dekansko verigo – fakulteti jo je ob njeni 40-letnici podaril prav škof Vovk –, je predstavil utemeljitev za podelitev častnega naziva (1960, 3–8).

Dekan Cajnkar je najprej poudaril izvornost dogodka in podelitve doktorskega naziva, ko je ta dogodek primerjal z drugimi doktorskimi zagovori in promocijami. Kandidat se ni prijavil sam, ne bo izpitov in učitelji ne bodo imeli priložnosti, da bi ga izprašali in pokazali svoje znanje: »Edini izpit je življenjsko delo, ki ga je častni doktor opravil in ki priča zanj.« (Cajnkar 1960, 3) Gre za promocijo, ki je spontan izraz ustanove, ki naziv podeljuje. Po dekanovih besedah je bil osnovni razlog za podelitev doktorskega naziva v delu, ki ga je za fakulteto in Cerkev na Slovenskem opravil slabo leto pred tem ustoličeni ljubljanski škof Anton Vovk. Z dotedanjim ravnanjem na vseh delovnih mestih je pokazal, da dobro pozna delovanje fakultete, njen pomen in vlogo v zgodovini Cerkve na Slovenskem, še posebej pa njeno mesto v novih okoliščinah, v katerih sta se znašli slovenska družba in Cerkev. Ko so se po koncu vojne ljubljanskim študentom teologije pridružili še mariborski in primorski, je imela fakulteta s tem zagotovljeno možnost nadaljnega delovanja.

⁹ Daljše poročilo o dogajanju na fakulteti je pod naslovom „Ljubljanski škof, prevzvišeni gospod Anton Vovk, theologiae sacrae doctor honoris causa“ objavil verski mesečnik *Družina* (1960).

Upravitelj ljubljanske škofije je vodstvu fakultete dal svobodo in mu popolnoma zaupal. Po Cajnkarjevih besedah je bila taka svoboda »izredno znamenje zaupanja in največje priznanje, ki ga more cerkveni predstojnik izkazati svojim podrejenim« ter dejanje »znamenje izredne dušnopastirske modrosti in razgledanosti« (5).

Vrsta preizkušanj, s katerimi se je škof Vovk moral srečati, je bila, po mnenju dekana Cajnkarja, kot rigorozni, ki jih morajo sicer premagati kandidati za doktorski naziv. Glede na to, da je moral skoraj desetletje in pol čakati, da je postal pravi rezidencialni škof, je dekan Cajnkar dejal:

»Naš veliki kancler je moral – pač v skladu z novo ureditvijo vsega našega cerkvenega življenja – prestati tudi zadnje dejanje, ki ga taka škofovska življenjska promocija zahteva. Pred najvišjo izpitno komisijo, ki jo občestvo katoliške Cerkve pozna, je moral v večnem mestu Rimu braniti svojo slovensko kanclersko in škofovsko tezo, ki jo je začel pisati že kot novoimenovani vodja ljubljanskega semenišča leta 1944 in ki jo je končal letos, v svojem šestdesetem letu, kmalu potem ko je postal pravi ljubljanski škof. Tako je zadostil vsem zahtevam, ki so zvezi s promocijo za častnega doktorja.« (7)

Drugega priznanja za opravljeno delo mu fakulteta – po besedah dekana Cajnkarja – ni mogla dati. Dodal je:

»S tem mu ne daje nič takega, česar bi si ne bil s svojim življenjskim delom zaslužil. Kdor kot veliki kancler predseduje najtežjim doktorskim izpitom svojih duhovnikov in ocenjuje znanje bodočih znanstvenih delavcev na področju teologije, je v očeh Cerkve tudi razsodnik v teološki znanosti in ne samo poslušalec tuje modrosti. Če pa veliki kancler s svojo nadpastirsko uvidevnostjo fakulteto tudi usmerja, brani, zagovarja in podpira, je več kakor le član profesorskega in doktorskega kolegija. Z imenovanjem za častnega doktorja mu fakultetno vodstvo to vidno in nevidno navzočnost v zboru učiteljev božje modrosti na viden način priznava in potrjuje.« (7)

Osrednje dejanje je bila promocija in utemeljitev tega dejanja, ki ga je opravil 80-letni nadškof dr. Josip Ujčič. »Z žarečim pogledom in mladostnim glasom je spregovoril v vesoljnem cerkvenem jeziku, v preprosti in jasni latinščini, da je vsa dvorana začutila slovesnost dejanja in povezanost z vesoljnim občestvom Cerkve.« (Ujčič 1960, 1)¹⁰ Nadškof Ujčič je v svojem govoru poudaril veselje, da je bil Anton Vovk med njegovimi najdražjimi slušatelji. Od drugih ni izstopal le po svoji velikosti, temveč »se je pred drugimi odlikoval v kreposti, vztrajnosti, gorečnosti in bogoslovnem študiju« (1960, 10). Naštel je vse službe, ki jih je škof Vovk opravljal na svoji življenjski poti, in na vsaki od njih dokazoval, da je primeren za voditelja ljubljanske škofije. Ko je 1. decembra 1946 v ljubljanski stolnici sv. Nikolaja prejel škofovsko posvečenje, je bil prav nadškof Ujčič tisti, ki je posvečevalcu, nadškofu

¹⁰ Izvirni latinski govor, ki ga je imel promotor nadškof Ujčič, je objavljen v *Zborniku fakultete* (1960) ter v drugem zvezku Cegljarjevega življenjepisa (1995, 248–252). Na str. 244–248 Cegljar objavlja slovenski prevod. Deloma je Ujčičev nagovor povzel tudi Merlak 2002, 136–137.

Josephu Patricku Hurleyu, odpravniku poslov apostolskega nuncija v Beogradu, Antona Vovka predstavil kot za službo škofa primernege. V naslednjih letih je pokazal veliko pastoralno modrost in zavzetost in se kljub številnim dolžnostim vedno resno poglabljaj v teološka vprašanja. Posebno spretnost je po oceni nadškofa Ujčiča pokazal pri urejanju vprašanj, povezanih s fakulteto. »Škof Anton ni samo veliki kancler fakultete, ampak tudi njen velik prijatelj in izvrsten zaščitnik. /.../ Hoče, da se teološki pouk ravna po navodilih Svetega sedeža. Nujno pač tudi teologija omahuje, če se ne opira na Petrov sedež, katerega niti peklena vrata ne morejo premagati.« (12) Nadškof Ujčič je v govoru obudil spomine na čas, ko je v istih prostorih imel predavanja in se srečeval z bodočimi duhovniki. »Leta, v katerih sem bil profesor, hranim v zelo lepem spominu. Še več kot lep pa bo spomin na ta dan, ko morem predragemu bratu izročiti izredno diplomo.« (12)

Ob navdušenju vseh navzočih je škof Vovk prejel umetniško izdelano doktorsko diplomo (izdelal jo je arh. Ivan Pengov)¹¹ in se za podeljeno priznanje zahvalil v kratkem nagovoru. Priznal je, da je leta 1946 naloge voditelja ljubljanske škofije sprejel z veliko tesnobo, med drugim zato, ker se ni čutil zadosti znanstveno utrjenega. Besede hvaležnosti je izrekel svojim petim učiteljem, ki so bili v trenutku promocije še vedno med živimi (nadškof Josip Ujčič ter profesorji dr. Franc Grivec, dr. Janez Fabijan, dr. Andrej Snoj in dr. Josip Demšar) in bi njihova beseda veljala za najbolj zanesljivo oceno o njegovi strokovni usposobljenosti. Priznal je, da nadaljevanje delovanja fakultete po koncu druge svetovne vojne ni bilo samo po sebi umevno: »Nekateri so naši teološki fakulteti več let po vojski skušali osporavati celo njen obstoj. Take žalostne zamisli so bile razpršene z rednim poslovanjem fakultete in z odloki same svete stolice.« (Ujčič 1960, 15) Svoje delo za ohranitev fakultete je primerjal z delom, ki ga je ob ustanovitvi in vključitvi fakultete v ljubljansko univerzo opravil škof dr. Anton Bonaventura Jeglič. Ta se je namreč v pregledu svojega življenja s posebnim zadovoljstvom oziral prav na ustanovitev fakultete in prve povsem slovenske gimnazije v Šentvidu.

Hkrati je ob navzočnosti predstavnikov države imel za primerno zatrditi, da se je ugodno razpletel tudi položaj fakultete po letu 1952, ko je prenehala biti del slovenskega javnega šolstva in je bila vprašljiva njena prihodnost nasploh: »Vendar moram javno priznati, da nam je to skrb v veliki meri odvzela naša slovenska ljudska oblast, ki nam je nudila in nam še nudi vsako leto po lastni naklonjenosti primerno subvencijo. Hvaležni smo zanjo in, ko sem bil letos pri svetem očetu in na številnih svetih kongregacijah v Rimu, je poročilo o subvenciji povsod odjeknilo jako ugodno.« (Ujčič 1960, 15–16)

Veliki kancler Vovk je zato lahko izrazil zadovoljstvo nad delovanjem fakultete. Takrat je imela preko 110 vpisanih študentov, okoli deset jih je bilo na služenju vojaškega roka. Učiteljsko ekipo so okrepili učitelji nekdanje visoke teološke šole iz Maribora, šest učiteljev, ki bi že imeli pravico do odhoda v pokoj, pa je predavanja nadaljevalo. Izraz urejenega delovanja fakultete so bila doktorska dela, ki so nastala-

¹¹ Umetniško izdelana diploma se nahaja v zapuščini nadškofa Antona Vovka v Nadškofijskem arhivu v Ljubljani (NŠAL 333, zapuščina nadškofa A. Vovka, fasc. 1/18).

jala pod mentorstvom učiteljev fakultete. Od 27. junija 1923, ko je bil prvi zagovor, do julija 1960 je doktorsko delo uspešno zagovarjalo 51 študentov, od teh 13 v letih po drugi svetovni vojni. S promocijo škofa Vovka pa je fakulteta dobila še prvega častnega doktorja. Ko se je ob zaključku zahvale vprašal, v čem bi bile njegove zasluge, da mu je fakulteta podelila to čast, si je odgovoril: »To zaslugo pa imam, da sem našo fakulteto, naše slovensko semenišče in naš duhovniški naraščaj imel vedno rad. V tej svetlobi za obstoj in napredek naše fakultete in duhovskega semenišča res rad izpolnujem svoje dolžnosti, ki jih kot škof in veliki kancler imam.« (Ujčić 1960, 16) Ob isti priložnosti je fakulteti izročil podporo sto tisoč dinarjev.¹² Svoj prispevek je kot darilo odlikovancu dodala še Verska komisija.

5. Sklep

Anton Vovk je bil študent ljubljanske Teološke fakultete v prvem letu njenega delovanja in je končal študij v prvi skupini diplomantov. Osebna zavzetost pri pastoralnem delu, zadovoljstvo pri tem in številne pastoralne zadolžitve v ljubljanski škofiji ga niso spodbujale, da bi študij nadaljeval sistematično – tudi v smislu specialističnega študija in priprave doktorskega dela. Kljub temu je s svojim delom na vrsti področij pokazal, da mu je bil razvoj teoloških disciplin dragocen. Ko je prevzel naloge voditelja ljubljanske škofije in s tem posebno skrb za Teološko fakulteto, ji je nudil vsestransko podporo in skrbel za nemoteno delo. Ni pristal, da bi fakulteta prenehala delovati. Ob skrbi za njene materialne potrebe je veliko pozornost namenjal tudi pridobivanju teološke literature. V znak hvaležnosti mu je zato fakulteta ob njegovi 60-letnici podelila naslov doktorja *honoris causa*. Prvič je bila pobuda za tak naslov oblikovana že v letu 1955. Škof Anton Vovk je bil na doktorat, ki mu ga je podelila fakulteta, ponosen. Dogodek je ugodno odmeval tako znotraj Cerkve v Sloveniji kot tudi med slovenskimi rojaki po svetu.

Kratici

ATF – Arhiv Teološke fakultete Ljubljana.

NŠAL – Nadškofijski arhiv Ljubljana.

¹² Tako govor nadškofa J. Ujčića kot zahvalni govor nadškofa A. Vovka po podelitvi sta bila objavljena tudi v *Okrožnici ljubljanske škofije* št. 11/1960. Dokumentarno gradivo, povezano s slovesnostjo podelitve doktorata in spremljajočimi dogodki, je del zapuščine nadškofa A. Vovka (NŠAL 333, zapuščina nadškofa A. Vovka, fasc. 5/17).

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Neža Strajnar

**Zaprte po nedolžnem:
redovnice v slovenskih komunističnih zaporih**
*Unjustly Imprisoned:
Nuns in Slovenian Communist Prison*

Povzetek: V prispevku je predstavljena usoda redovnic, ki jih je po drugi svetovni vojni na Slovenskem komunistična oblast krivično obtožila ter obsodila na zaporne kazni. Predstavljeni so podatki o tem, koliko redovnic je bilo po vojni zaprtih ter kako dolgo in zakaj so prestajale kazen. Opisano je še, kako so oblasti ravnale z ženskimi redovnimi skupnostmi, kako jih je obravnaval povojni sodni sistem in kakšne so bile razmere v ženskih kazenskih ustanovah. Na podlagi analize t. i. zaporniških dosjejev, ki jih hrani Arhiv Republike Slovenije (Fond AS 1267, Republiški upravni organi in zavodi za izvrševanje kazenskih sankcij), avtorica ugotavlja, da je skupna značilnost redovnic pokončna drža, trdnost v veri, zvestoba lastnim prepričanjem – in kljubovanje represivnim ukrepom komunističnega sistema.

Ključne besede: redovnice, komunizem, montirani sodni procesi, ženske kazenske ustanove, 20. stoletje

Abstract: This article presents the fate of nuns who were unjustly accused and sentenced to imprisonment by the communist authorities in Slovenia after World War II. It includes information on how many nuns were imprisoned after the war, how long they served their sentences, and why. The treatment of religious women by the authorities, their treatment by the post-war judicial system, and the situation in women's penal institutions are also described. Based on an analysis of the so-called prison files of the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (Fond AS 1267, Republic Administrative Bodies and Institutions for the Execution of Sentences), the author concludes that their common characteristic is an upright attitude, firmness in faith, fidelity to one's convictions and resistance to the repressive measures of the communist system.

Keywords: religious sisters, communism, staged trials, women's prisons, 20th century

1. Uvod

Komunistična družbena ureditev je celovito določala položaj človeka v političnem, kulturnem in družbenem življenju.¹ Že od nastanka je nasprotovala kakršni koli družbeni vlogi vseh religij, še posebej pa je bila uperjena proti Katoliški Cerkvi, ki je zaradi javnega opozarjanja na zmote te ureditve postala njen glavni ideološki nasprotnik (Griesser Pečar 2019, 662). Položaj Cerkve se je od države do države razlikoval, a povsod so jo komunistične partije želele nadzorovati in zmanjšati njen pomen z uvajanjem marksistično-ateistične ideologije – že ob prevzemu oblasti so poskušale vidnejše predstavnike Cerkve odstraniti ali utišati. V Sovjetski zvezi je bila v prvih dveh desetletjih po oktobrski revoluciji leta 1917 večina katoliških duhovnikov, redovnikov in redovnic izgnanih in zaprtih, nekaj tudi ubitih, v Vzhodni Evropi pa je katoliška Cerkev najhujši teror doživela v štiridesetih in petdesetih letih 20. stoletja (Luxmoore 2019). V tem obdobju se je tudi v Sloveniji prav posebno »zaostril odnos do Katoliške cerkve, ki je bila pod udarom, ker je ostala edina organizacija zunaj Komunistične partije, ki je oblast ni mogla prevzeti, ker je cerkvena hierarhija segala preko mej Jugoslavije in ker je imela velik vpliv pri pretežno vernem prebivalstvu« (Griesser Pečar 2019, 664).

V prvem desetletju po vzpostavitvi komunistične oblasti je bilo v Sloveniji več kot 13.550 političnih obsojencev (na podlagi Baze podatkov o političnih obsojencih v Sloveniji v obdobju 1945–1955, ki jih je zbral Študijski center za narodno spravo na podlagi vpisnikov kazenskih spisov sodišč), med njimi je bila več kot petina žensk (Puhar 2014, 190–192; Baza podatkov o političnih obsojencih). V slovenskih zaporih se je znašlo tudi triinosemdeset redovnic (Kolar 2018, 255); obenem je v desetletju po drugi svetovni vojni zaznaven tudi izrazit upad števila redovnic na ozemlju ljubljanske škofije. Komunistični sistem je do ženskih redovnih skupnosti v Sloveniji takoj po koncu vojne nastopal zelo nasilno. Goriški časopis *Slovenski Primorec* je leta 1948 poročal: »V Sloveniji vlada brezbožni komunizem, ki uporablja vsa mogoča sredstva, da ovira versko življenje. Prav posebno težko prenaša redovnike in redovnice.« (Slovenski Primorec, 11. avgust 1948) Redovne skupnosti so komunisti obravnavali kot tajne organizacije, ki ogrožajo oblast, zato so postale ključne tarče zatiranja. Najhujši teror so redovnice doživljale v prvem desetletju po drugi svetovni vojni. Pozneje so zaradi njihove prilagoditve novi stvarnosti, pa tudi zaradi vzdržljivosti, pokončnosti in tihega odpora v družbi – ter predvsem zaradi pritiskov iz mednarodnih krogov – komunisti hujše oblike represije nad njimi opustili. Vendar pa je bila komunistična partija v Sloveniji vseskozi (tj. do konca osemdesetih let 20. stoletja) tako do redovništva kot do katoliške vere na splošno nestrpna. Njen načrt je bil vlogo Cerkve omejiti na najmanjšo možno mero. Kot je znano v izjavi enega vodilnih slovenskih komunistov Ivana Mačka – Matije iz leta 1950, pa so se zavedali, da tega načrta ne bo mogoče hitro uresničiti: »Ideološka borba proti verskim predsodkom bo dolga in ostra ter je pri nas najbolj težka, ker

¹ Prispevek je nastal kot rezultat dela v okviru raziskovalnega programa P6-0380: „Kršitve človekovih pravic in temeljnih svobod na slovenskem ozemlju v 20. stoletju,“ ki ga sofinancira Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

so Slovenci najbolj veren narod ter bo to šlo skozi generacije.« (AS 1589/III, t. e. 2, a. e. 102) Cerkvi so prepovedali vsako delovanje na ravni civilne družbe, na socialnem, vzgojnem, izobraževalnem in kulturnem področju; tudi redovnice so tako svojo vlogo in mesto v družbi izgubile. Oblast je tolerirala vero samo kot »zasebno zadevo posameznika, ki pa ni smela imeti v javnosti nobenega mesta in nobene vloge« (Stres 2004, 15). Zanimivo je, da je oblast v nekaterih drugih – pretežno pravoslavnih in muslimanskih – jugoslovanskih republikah z redovnimi skupnostmi ravnala mileje kot v Sloveniji. Tako so npr. v Srbiji in Makedoniji slovenske redovnice z veseljem sprejeli, jim omogočili, da ohranijo redovno obleko (redovno skupnost) in se zaposlijo v javnih zdravstvenih ustanovah (Kolar 2001, 126).

Po padcu komunističnih režimov na začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja so redovne skupnosti po naročilu slovenskega metropolita dr. Alojzija Šuštarja pripravile poročila o nasilju, ki ga je nad njimi izvajala komunistična oblast. Tovrstna poročila hrani Nadškofijski arhiv v Ljubljani (ŠAL/Razno, 27), predstavljajo pa najpopolnejšo zbirko informacij o tej temi. Med njimi je tudi kar nekaj pričevanj zaprtih redovnic. Veliko relevantnega gradiva v različnih fondih hrani tudi Arhiv Republike Slovenije, za raziskovanje pa izredno vrednost predstavljajo t. i. zaporniški dosjeji (AS 1267, Republiški upravni organi in zavodi za izvrševanje kazenskih sankcij). Pokrajinski arhivi hranijo kazenske spise okrožnih sodišč, iz katerih lahko razberemo vzroke za obsodbo redovnic in kazni, na katere so bile obsojene.

Preganjanje duhovnikov ter redovnikov in redovnic sta prva raziskovala zgodovinarja Tamara Griesser Pečar in Bogdan Kolar. Knjiga *Cerkev na zatožni klopi* (Griesser Pečar 2005) ostaja na tem področju temeljno delo. V njej je posebno poglavje v celoti posvečeno preganjanju ženskih redov. Oba raziskovalca opozarjata, da so po maju 1945 redovnice postopoma povsem izginile iz javnosti, da je bilo proti njim izpeljanih več montiranih sodnih procesov in da jim je bilo zaradi zaplemb premoženja onemogočeno delo. Kako hudo nasprotovanje povojne oblasti so doživljale v javnosti, kaže izjava, da »že samo njihova redovna obleka je v prvih letih po vojni izzvala hude represalije« (599). Najbolj so bile na udaru sestre usmiljenke, uršulinke in karmeličanke, saj so imele največ družbenega vpliva in premoženja. V časopisu *Slovenski Primorac* so 18. avgusta 1948 dobro povzeli takratno dogajanje v Sloveniji:

»Velike težave so delali uršulinkam v Ljubljani in jih stiskali tako dolgo, dokler jih niso popolnoma vrgli iz samostana. Na Golniku so šolske sestre iz Slovenske Bistrice stregle bolnikom celo med vojno, ker so Nemci po bolnicah sestre še pustili, a sedaj so tudi te morale prepustiti svoja mesta tako zvanim ›tovarišicam‹. Isto se je zgodilo drugim redovnicam, da so jih stisnili v kak kotiček v samostanu, ali pa popolnoma izgnali.«

Redovnica s. Alojzija Domajko pa se je spominjala: »Nastrojenost proti vsemu, kar je cerkvenega, se je začutila na vsakem koraku.« (Jenič 2015, 71)

2. Preganjanje redovnic

Redovnice v Sloveniji so najprej preganjali nacisti. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bilo tako na delu ozemlja Slovenije, kjer so oblast prevzeli Nemci, premoženje večine ženskih redovnih skupnosti zaplenjeno, redovnice pa so bile z izjemo bolnišničnega osebja izgnane (Kolar 2018, 216). Na italijanskem okupacijskem ozemlju so redovnice pod nadzorom okupacijskih oblasti ohranile svoje mesto in nadaljevale poslanstvo in delo – posvečale so se karitativni, zdravstveni, vzgojno-izobraževalni dejavnosti ter kontemplaciji. Po kapitulaciji Italije, ko so nacisti prevzeli nadzor še nad preostalim delom Slovenije, so delovanje nadaljevale.

Pripadnice ženskih redovnih skupnosti so imele že med okupacijo do revolucionarne ideologije v veliki večini odklonilen odnos (tako zaradi navodil cerkvenih oblasti kot tudi zaradi lastnega konservativnega pogleda na svet, osebnega prepričanja – in tudi zaradi posledic medvojnega komunističnega nasilja), vendar pa se v politične zadeve zaradi svoje vloge in poslanstva niso vpletale niti med vojno niti po njej. To potrjuje tudi statistično poročilo Uprave državne varnosti (Udbe) iz leta 1947, iz katerega izhaja, da je bila velika večina redovnic popolnoma nepolitična: od 1282 redovnic jih je bilo 1057 neopredeljenih, 129 članic OF in samo 96 sovražno mislečih (Iz arhivov slovenske tajne policije, 147).

Kljub temu, da ženskim redovnim skupnostim povojne oblasti niso mogle očitati sodelovanja z okupatorji in da so med vojno doživljale tudi nasilje nacistov, jim po vojni s preganjanjem, zapornimi kaznimi, mučenji in odvzemom premoženja ni bilo prizaneseno. Ker je bil eden od temeljnih ciljev novih oblasti prevzgoja družbe v izrazito ateistično, so redovnicam delovanje najprej onemogočili na vzgojno-izobraževalnem področju. Odvzeti so jim bili internati, šole in zavodi (Kolar 2001, 120–130); prekinjeno in prepovedano jim je bilo delo z otroki in mladino. Sestre so morale postopoma zapustiti vse zdravstvene, vzgojne, šolske in večino socialnih zavodov. Kolektivni odpust sester usmiljenk iz vseh slovenskih bolnišnic se je zgodil 8. marca 1948 (Pacek 2018, 112). Z nacionalizacijo vsega družbenega premoženja je bilo redovnicam izpolnjevanje njihovega poslanstva onemogočeno. Redovne skupnosti so imele ogromne težave pri preskrbi s hrano; nemalokrat so se soočale z vprašanjem, kako zaslužiti za preživetje.

Izrazit pritisk nedemokratične oblasti na versko delovanje je imel daljnosežne posledice. Nekatere ženske redovne skupnosti so zaradi povojnih ukrepov – zaplenba premoženja, prepoved delovanja, zaprtje članic in izgon iz države – prenehale delovati, na primer sestre sv. Petra Klaverja, katehistinje evharističnega križarstva, vizitatinke (Kolar 2001, 129). Veliko redovnic pa se je zaradi „neznanskih sitnosti“ iz Slovenije izselilo in so delovale v redovnih skupnostih v Avstriji, Italiji ali tudi v drugih jugoslovanskih republikah. Kot je obrazložila s. Antonija Mataj: »Živeti v taki psihološki napetosti v domovini ni bilo prijetno in enostavno, zato je v sestrah tlela želja, da bi šle v tujino.« (Jenič 2015, 66) Tako je bilo ob koncu leta 1944 njihovo skupno število 1302 (Letopis Ljubljanske škofije 1944, 6), konec leta 1959 pa le še 749 (1959, 6). Podrobnejši podatki po redovnih skupnostih so zbrani v Tabeli 1.

Redovna skupnost	Št. redovnic v letu 1943*	Št. redovnic v letu 1958**	Št. obsojenih in zaprtih redovnic po l. 1945***
Karmeličanke	19	6	ni podatkov
Uršulinke	140	73	ni podatkov
Šolske sestre (Maribor)	139	133	ni podatkov
Šolske sestre (Gradec, frančiškank brezmadežnega spočetja)	111	32	3
Šolske sestre de Notre Dame	75	78	12
Usmiljene sestre sv. križa	55	35	7
Frančiškank Marijine misijonarke	10	/	Vse so se izselile v tujino.
Sestre Marijinega obiskovanja (vizitatinke)	5	/	Vse so se izselile v tujino.
Sestre križniškega reda	25	20	ni podatkov
Hčere Marije Pomočnice	14	9	1
Družba sv. Petra Klaverja	6	1	ni podatkov
Hčere krščanske ljubezni sv. Vincencija Pavelskega (usmiljenke)	558	289	40
Marijine sestre čudodelne svetinje (Bolniške sestre sv. Vincencija Pavelskega)	122	70	14
Usmiljene sestre sv. Vincencija Pavelskega (Zagreb)	5	10	2

Tabela 1: Primerjava števila redovnic proti koncu druge sv. vojne in v letu 1958 ter število zaprtih redovnic po redovnih skupnostih. (Vir: *Letopis ljubljanske škofije 1944, 152–157; **Letopis ljubljanske škofije 1959, 115; ***Kolar 2001, 128 in Poročila redovnih skupnosti (ŠAL/Razno, 27))

3. Po krivem obsojene in zaprte redovnice

Številne redovnice so se znašle tudi na zatožni klopi. Sodišča takrat »niso bila neodvisna in nevtralna. V nasprotju s pravnimi državami je bilo v Sloveniji oz. Jugoslaviji sodstvo v rokah vladajoče partije in je uresničevalo samo njene cilje.« (Griesser Pečar 2010, 85) Komunistična partija je v različnih mestih po Sloveniji proti redovnicam izvedla montirane sodne procese. Z njimi so želeli doseči izločitev domnevnih nasprotnic novega sistema, ustrahovanje ljudi in zaplembo premoženja (kazen za kaznivo dejanje, ki ne predvideva nobene odškodnine). Med večjimi so bili: proces proti sedmim usmiljenkam (hčeram krščanske ljubezni sv. Vincencija Pavelskega), ki so delovale v Zavodu Lichtenturn, pred Okrožnim sodiščem v Ljubljani v letu 1947; proces proti šestim usmiljenkam iz Maribora in Črne, ki so delovale v mariborski bolnišnici, pred Okrožnim sodiščem v Mariboru konec leta 1947; proces proti štirim šolskim sestram (frančiškankam brezmadežnega spočetja), ki so delovale v Slovenski Bistrici, pred Okrožnim sodiščem v Celju v letu 1949 (1995, 599–618). Posamezne redovnice so bile obsojene tudi na drugih montiranih sodnih procesih – tako sta bili npr. na procesu proti članom Katoliške akcije leta 1947 pred Okrožnim sodiščem v Novem mestu obsojeni šolski sestri s. Darina (Marija) Ogulin in s. Stanislava (Antonija) Babnik iz samostana v Šmihelu (Kurnjek idr. 1999, 132–133).

Tamara Griesser Pečar je zbrala podatke za 107 redovnic v sodnih postopkih (Kolar 2001, 128). V Bazi podatkov o političnih obsojencih v Sloveniji v obdobju 1945–1955 so podatki za 34 obsojenih redovnic: Antonija Babnik, s. Stanislava (r. 1882); Valerija Bojc (r. 1904), s. Akvina; Jožefa Borse, s. Matilda (r. 1893); Antonija Doma, s. Ivana (r. 1901); Ivana Debevec, (r. 1894); Angela Vlastimira Denžič (r. 1906); Brigita Dvoršak, s. Satornina (r. 1910); Franciška Feuš, s. Helena (r. 1907); Marija Gibičar, s. Katarina (r. 1903); Ana Jereb (r. 1902); Marija Kozoderc, s. Davorina (r. 1900); Marija Lotrič, s. Irmina (r. 1911); Angela Markuš, s. Blažja (r. 1911); Neža Mikec (r. 1877); Alojzija Murkovič, s. Jožefa (r. 1894); Marija Ogulin, s. Darina (r. 1910); Neža Pavel, s. Avgušтина (r. 1892); Marija Piškur, s. Priska (r. 1905); Marija Plevnik, s. Antonila (r. 1920); Terezija Pogorelc, s. Ljudmila (r. 1912), Marija Pristovšek, s. Evangelista (r. 1888); Ivana Prijatelj (r. 1902); Rozalija Pučnik, s. Boromeja (r. 1890); Marija Rozman, s. Vasilija (r. 1898); Ana Venencija Simonič (r. 1895); Ana Sušnik, s. Antonija (r. 1910); Marija Strman, s. Patricija (r. 1913); Amalija Štefulja, s. Natalija (r. 1886); Neža Trdan, s. Bronislava (r. 1897); Antonija Toplak, s. Romana (r. 1887); Alma Tratnik, s. Blažena (r. 1896); Marija Trkov, s. Velena (r. 1903); Cecilija Vrbnjak, s. Alojzija (r. 1907); Angela Žižek, s. Faustina (r. 1909). Poleg teh redovnic, ki so bile obsojene na sodiščih, je bilo precej redovnic priprtih med preiskovalnim postopkom in potem izpuščenih ali pa so bile po Zakonu o prekrških zoper javni red in mir kazensko napotene na družbenokoristno delo, kar bo predstavljeno v naslednjem poglavju.

Večina zaprtih redovnic je bila obsojena po Zakonu o kaznivih dejanjih zoper narod in državo (ZKND), ki je bil sprejet 25. avgusta 1945 (Uradni list DFJ, št. 66/1945, 645–47) ter potrjen in dopolnjen 19. julija 1946 (Uradni list FLRJ, št. 59/1946, 685–87). Pred montiranimi procesi niso bile nikoli kaznovane. V sodnih postopkih jim je bila pravica do pravičnega sojenja v veliki meri kršena. S. Tiburcija Lenassi, Marijina sestra iz Maribora, se spominja: »V Mariboru so nas vsako noč zasliševali po 8 do 9 ur, da smo bile že čisto uničene. Meni je zasliševalec večkrat nastvil revolver na glavo ali vrat. Hotel me je prisiliti, da bi priznala, da sem iz ljubljanske škofije nosila pošto v Maribor in širila alarmantne vesti med ljudmi. /.../ Bila sem že tako izčrpana in utrujena, da tudi jesti nisem mogla. Zelo sem se slabo počutila in hujšala sem.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27) S. Salvatora Varga iz reda šolskih sester (tj. frančiškank brezmadežnega spočetja) je v spominih zapisala, kako je bilo julija 1945 priprtih najmanj dvanajst sester iz bolnišnice na Golniku: »Ponoči so bila večkratna zasliševanja. ›Zakaj ste tukaj?‹ ›Ne vemo.‹ ›Z Nemci ste delale, za škofa Rožmana ste molile.‹ ›Nemci so prišli na Golnik, bolnike smo že prej imeli. Za škofa Rožmana je predpisani spomin pri maši. To nikomur ni škodovalo.‹ /.../ ›Delale ste z Nemci. S. Nada je vse priznala, ona bo šla domov, ti pa v bunker!‹ mi je med zasliševanjem rekel. Odgovorila sem: »Ne bojim se, ker nimam nič na vesti.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Na ustnih razpravah med sodnim postopkom jih je velika večina izjavljala, da se ne čutijo krive. Kljub pomanjkanju dokazov so bile obsojene na visoke zaporne kazni – v povprečju na več kot dve leti odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom (Baza podatkov o političnih obsojencih v Sloveniji v obdobju 1945–1955). Obtožene so

bile zaradi podpore ‚protiljudskim elementom‘, ki so prehajali državno mejo, širjenja protidržavne literature, vzdrževanja ilegalnih vezi s pobeglimi, zaradi nevklučevanja v ljudsko skupnost, zaradi delovanja proti narodnoosvobodilnemu boju itd. V obrazložitvah sodb so sodišča velikokrat poudarjala, da je bil cilj redovnic tudi »zrušiti ali spraviti v nevarnost obstoječo državno ureditev FLRJ«, pri čemer pa konkretni dokazi niso bili podani. Sodeč po dnevniških zapisih zaprtih redovnic so bile obsojene zaradi malenkosti, ki jih je oblast nato »napihnila do onemoglosti«, na primer »zaradi tega, ker so bolnikom dajale brati dobro čtivo, na primer Glasnik Srca Jezusovega« (ŠAL/Razno, 27).

Redovnice, ki so bile obsojene pred majem 1948, so bile po obsodbi poslane na prestajanje kazni v Begunje na Gorenjskem, kjer je bil ženski zapor. Konec junija 1948 je prišlo do selitve iz Begunj v Kazensko-poboljševalni dom Rajhenburg (KPD Rajhenburg). V prvem desetletju po vojni je bila večina zapornic političnih – druge storilke kaznivih dejanj so bile v manjšini. Zaradi velikega števila zapornic so bile zaporniške celice prenapolnjene. Iz spominov zapornic izvemo, da so trpele zaradi hudega mraza, pa tudi higienske razmere in prehrana so bile slabe. S. Helena Feuš, pripadnica reda Marijinih sester čudodelne svetinje, se tako spominja: »Prva moja ječa je bila v Celju – Stari pisker. V celici sva bili dve. /.../ Vsak dan je bil samo fižol kuhan na vodi in še tega je bilo bore malo. /.../ Olajšave ni bilo nobene, samo mraz in lakota. /.../ Zelo so naju mučile uši. /.../ Brez dela, mraz, glad, negotovost, bolezen ... živci so mi čisto popustili. /.../ V ponedeljek, 5. 12. 1949, na moj rojstni dan, sem bila z drugimi prepeljana na sodišče na Miklošičevo ulico.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27) 10. decembra 1949 je bila obsojena na sedem mesecev odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom. V Ljubljani je bila zaprta do 2. februarja 1950, nato pa so jo premestili v Begunje na Gorenjsko. V spominih je zapisala: »V tem gradu je bila miličniška šola, zapornice pa smo jim prale. Bilo nas je šest. V desetih dneh smo oprale 1110 rjuh. Delale smo od 8 h do 18 h z dvournim opoldanskim presledkom.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Zapornice so morale delati tako zaradi splošne vključitve obsojencev v izpolnjevanje petletnega plana kot tudi zaradi prevzgoje (Piškurić 2019, 182–183). Pri delu so morale izpolnjevati visoke dnevne norme. Delo je potekalo v več izmenah, pogosto z nadurami. Izvzete so bile le bolne ali zaradi starosti za delo nesposobne zapornice. Iz zaporniških dosjejev pa je razvidno, da to za redovnice ni držalo, saj so bile kljub boleznim in starostni onemoglosti v razne delovne procese v zaporu vključene prav vse – z njimi so torej ravnali strožje kot z drugimi zapornicami. V Rajhenburgu je veliko redovnic delalo v Državnem šiviljsko-pletilskem podjetju Pletilka ali pri ekonomiji, ki je pridelovala krompir, povrtnine, žita, krmne rastline, vzrejala svinje in perutnino ter skrbela za pridobivanje mleka in jajc. Številne zapornice iz Rajhenburga, tudi nekaj redovnic (npr. Marija Kozoderc, s. Davorina), je bilo septembra 1949 poslanih na delo pri gradnji Ceste bratstva in enotnosti – pri tem so delile usodo z drugimi zapornicami in zaporniki iz vse Jugoslavije. V zapor so se vrnile šele junija 1950. Delale so na Hrvaškem – v različnih delovnih taboriščih ob cestnih gradbiščih, pri čemer so morale opravljati težka fizična dela. »Delale so nasip za cesto, raztovarjale vagone s prispelim gradbenim materialom, utrjevale močvirni teren, razbijale skale ali polagale tračnice.« (193)

Za večino zaprtih redovnic je iz zaporniških dosjejev razvidno, da so bile pri delu zelo disciplinirane in marljive. Presenetljivo je, da so skoraj vse redovnice kazni odslužile do izteka (niso bile pomiloščene), kljub temu da so bile nekatere od njih starejše in bolne. Iz pisnih izjav upravnikov zaporov je razvidno, da posebnega uspeha pri prevzgoji zaprtih redovnic ni bilo. Sredstva za prevzgojo so bila fizično, učno-vzgojno in kulturno-prosvetno delo (Mikola 2016, 104–106). Kako pogumna je bila drža večine zaprtih redovnic, dokazujejo zaporniški dosjeji, iz katerih je vidno, da je večina svojo vero kljub neverjetnim pritiskom ohranila. Za ponazoritev naj navedemo nekaj primerov.

Upravnik KPD Rajhenburg je za sestro usmiljenko Amalijo Štefulja (roj. 1886, s. Natalija), ki jo je Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani 20. aprila 1948 obsodilo na štirinajst mesecev odvzema prostosti, podal naslednje poročilo: »Drugače je disciplinirane obnašanja. Politično je nasprotna današnji oblasti, konzervativnega gledanja in versko blazna, kakor vse nune. Krivde ne priznava in pravi, da sedi radi tega, ker je izkazala usmiljenje drugi osebi. Kazen jo do sedaj ni še v nobenem oziru popravila. Z naše strani se je ne predlaga za pogojni odpust.« (AS 1267, t. e. 243/48)

Antonija Babnik (roj. 1882, s. Marija Stanislava) je bila pred Okrožnim sodiščem Novo mesto leta 1947 obsojena na sedem mesecev odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom. Upravnik KPZ Begunje je v odgovoru na prošnjo za pogojni odpust zapisal: »Imenovana je bolj boleha, zaposlena je pri pletiljah in je kolikor more delati marljiva. Krivde pa se nikakor noče zavedati, povsod najde gotovo izgovor, kateri misli, da bi ji koristil. Je pretkana, uglajenega vedenja, pozna se ji samostanska šola ›Umijem roke‹. V zavodu je sicer neškodljiva.« Upravnik je za pogojni odpust ni priporočil in odsedeti je morala celotno kazni (AS 1267, t. e. 734/47).

Katehistinja in redovnica Zvonimira Kompare je bila 9. februarja 1949 obsojena pred Okrožnim sodiščem v Mariboru na dve leti in pol odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom. Kazen je prestajala v KPD Rajhenburg in »na autoputu«. O njej so v zaporu Rajhenburg zapisali:

»Imenovana je bila v službi pri mariborskem škofu pri upravi verskih listov. Za časa okupacije se ji ne more nič posebnega očitati kot to, da je navdušena klerikalka. Po osvoboditvi se je opazilo, da ni naša simpatizerka. Omenjena je pri delu še dokaj pridna. Je tudi disciplinirana. V političnem pogledu je nasprotna, ter skuša svoje nazore prenašati tudi na druge obsojenke. Govori, da se pri nas vero preganja. Večkrat skuša organizirati obsojenke za skupno molitev. Po našem mnenju omenjena nima nikakih pogojev za pogojni izpust.« (AS 1267, t. e. 41/49)

O Ani Jereb (roj. 1902), sestri usmiljenki, ki je bila leta 1946 zaradi dejanj zoper ljudsko oblast obsojena na osemnajst mesecev odvzema prostosti, je upravnik KPZ Begunje zapisal:

»Kazen na imenovano ne vpliva v vzgojnem smislu, ker se svojega dela noče zavedati in je prej na njega ponosna. To ji narekuje njen verski fana-

tizem, vsak najmanjši prosti čas izrabi za molitev, moli na mrtvo. Ako bi bila pomiloščena, ne bi pripisovala pomilostitve širokogrudnosti ljudskih oblasti, ampak povsem neki drugi volji in pravičnosti. Zato je najbolje, da se sodba okrožnega sodišča izvrši do zadnjega dneva, ker tudi pomilostitev bi nanjo ne vplivala, da bi svojo politično miselnost spremenila. Drugače pa je nje ponašanje dobro, tudi za delo je pridna, seveda, ker se zaveda, da mora in, da se izogiblje disciplinskim nepravilikom.«

V drugem dokumentu pa je bilo zapisano: »Omenjena je zaposlena pri hišnih delih, kjer se je pokazala pridna in marljiva, kazen ne vpliva vzgojno na njo in se je ne zaveda, ker bi nam lahko od zunaj škodovala, jo ne predlagamo za pogojni odpust.« (AS 1267, t. e. 632/47)

O Neži Pavel, s. Avguštni (roj. 1892), učiteljici, ki jo je Okrožno sodišče v Celju februarja 1949 zaradi »vzdrževanja ilegalne zveze z inozemstvom« obsodilo na devet let odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom in na izgubo državljskih pravic za dobo pet let, so maja 1950 v Rajhenburgu zapisali: »Omenjena je vsled bolezni zaposlena pri lažjih delih v domu. Ne čuti se kriva kaznivega dejanja, ter se izgovarja na svojo politično nerazgledanost. V političnem oziru se še ni sprijaznila z ljudsko oblastjo ter bi v slučaju pogojnega izpusta na svobodi več škodovala kakor koristila.« (AS 1267, t. e. 77/49) Na podlagi več prošenj za pomilostitev so jo nato 2. januarja 1951 izpustili.

Marija Kozoderc, s. Davorina (r. 1900), je bila prednica samostana šolskih sester v Slovenski Bistrici. Okrožno sodišče v Celju jo je 16. februarja 1949 zaradi ilegalnega delovanja in ,sprovajanja' redovnic preko državne meje obsodilo na pet let odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom in izgubo državljskih pravic za dobo dveh let. Najprej je bila v zaporu v Celju, nato je kazen prestajala v Rajhenburgu. O njej so v Rajhenburgu zapisali: »Imenovana je zaposlena v šivilnici DOP-a. Za delo je srednje dobra, je pa disciplinirana. Kot bivša redovnica je zelo versko fanatična. Političnih izjav ne daje, ker je zelo previdna, je pa nasprotnica naše oblasti.« (AS 1267, t. e. 76/49)

Angelo Markuš, s. Blažjo (r. 1911), je Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani 9. julija 1948 obsodilo na tri leta in tri mesece odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom in izgubo državljskih pravic za dobo treh let – Klaverjevi družbi v Ljubljani pa se je v zvezi s to sodbo izrekla zaplemba celotnega premoženja. V priporu je bila od 15. aprila 1948, izpuščena je bila po prestani kazni 15. julija 1951. Kazen je prestajala v KPD Rajhenburg. O njej je rajonski ljudski odbor avgusta 1950 zapisal: »Imenovana je bila nuna ter je klerikalno usmerjena in je bila po osvoboditvi izrazit sovražnik Ljudske oblasti in kot taka za skupnost ni ničesar doprinesla, pač pa je rovarila proti ljudski oblasti. K njej so po osvoboditvi zahajali bivši domobranci, kateri so bili pozneje aretirani. Po mnenju terena imenovana ne zasluži pomilostitve.« (AS 1267, t. e. 474/48)

Življenje v zaporu je bilo težko zaradi pogostih zasliševanj, nezaupanje med zapornicami je bilo veliko, na svoje izjave so morale pogosto paziti. Še dodatno jih je obremenjevalo surovo ravnanje nadrejenih. Tudi nad redovnicami so se neredko

izživljali, jih zaradi vere zasmehovali. Angela Vode je v svojih spominih lepo opisala utrinek iz zapora:

»Bilo je na božični večer. Večina si je želela praznovati kakor nekoč doma: z jasicami in drevescem. Ena med nami je hodila delat na vrt oziroma pripravljat drva. Skratka: prinesla je oskubljeno smrečico, na katero smo navezovalе sladkorčke ter izrezale iz papirja sveto družino in pastirce pa zvezdico in jaslice. V konzervni škatli smo raztopile malo masti, napojile z njo volneno nit in prižgale – in praznovalе. Bil je presunljivo prazničen občutek. Božične pesmi smo pele tako tiho, da se je slišalo kot piš pomladnega vetra. Naenkrat se odpro vrata in v celico plane paznica – naravnost v kot z drevescem, ga divje zmečka in pohodi pa jaslice prav tako. Mirno smo stale in jo gledale. »Kdo je prinesel to? Katera si je izmislila?« /.../ »Ali je prepovedano?« – Ona: »Vsako praznoverje je pri nas prepovedano in kaznivo.« (Vode 2005, 195)

Izjemoma se je odnos paznikov do zapornic ob prazniku vendarle nekoliko omehčal. S. Cecilija Pavšič, pripadnica reda šolskih sester (frančiškank brezmadežnega spočetja), je božični večer leta 1948 preživela v zaporu v Slovenski Bistrici:

»Ko se je bližal božični praznik, sva sklenile s sozapornico Milko, da ga bova prav lepo in sveto obhajale. Določila sva si molitve in premišljevale božično skrivnost. Začele sva peti Sveto noč. Med petjem je zaropotalo po vratih, prišel je uslužbenec in me odpeljal na zaslišanje. Ko sem prišla v pisarno in se je začelo zaslišanje, sem začela jokati, kar nisem nikdar prej. Ko me je vprašal, zakaj jokam, sem mu odgovorila, da mi je hudo, ker moram biti na ta veliki sveti dan zaslišana. Rekel mi je, da ne bo tako hudo in da on ve, da so sestre dobre. Iz svoje torbe je vzel zavitek v katerem sta bila dva kosa potice ter mi ga je izročil z besedami: »Kajne, da ni bilo tako hudo?« Nato me je odpustil. Potičko sva si z gospo Milko razdelile, zraven pa premišljevale, ali ni morda zastrupljena. Končno sva pa jo le pojedle. In še presenečenje sva doživele za božič: celica je bila kurjena, kar se ni zgodilo ne prej, ne pozneje.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Iz pričevanj izvemo, da je marsikatera redovnica v zaporu zelo pogrešala življenje v cerkvenem občestvu in prejem obhajila. S. Helena Feuš: »V Begunjah na Gorenjskem je bilo zame najhujše to, da je bila na drugi strani ceste cerkev pa nismo smele tja. Ob nedeljah smo sedele pri oknu, molile rožni venec in jokale. Tako blizu Boga, a nismo mogle do Njega, da bi si utešile dušno lakoto, ki je bila neprijetno večja od telesne.« S. Tiburcija Lenassi: »Najbolj smo pogrešale sveto mašo in sveto obhajilo, drugače pa smo se že kar umirile in bile včasih prav dobre volje.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Kongregacija šolskih sester de Notre Dame je junija 1990 v poročilu z naslovom „Preiskave, zaslišanja, obtožbe, sodni procesi nekaterih članic notredamskih šolskih sester po drugi sv. vojni dalje“ zapisala: »Vsa ta nadlegovanja so imela za cilj,

da bi se sestre same od sebe razšle, zapustile samostan in se vrnile v svet. Toda tega niso dosegli, še bolj smo se strnile skupaj in prenašale vse.«

4. Zaprte redovnice po Zakonu o prekrških zoper javni red in mir v letih 1949 in 1950

V maju 1949 je bil sprejet republiški Zakon o prekrških zoper javni red in mir, na podlagi katerega so v Sloveniji začela nastajati taborišča za družbenokoristno delo.

»Družbenokoristno delo je bil prisilni upravni kazenski ukrep, ki so ga na podlagi zakona izrekli upravni organi za notranje zadeve za dobo od šestih mesecev do dveh let. Ukrep družbenokoristnega dela so izrekale tričlanske komisije, ki so delovale pri izvršilnih odborih okrajnih, mestnih in rajonskih ljudskih odborov. Pomembno vlogo pri odločanju o tem, koga poslati na družbenokoristno delo, je imela partija.« (Šturm 2014, 227)

Na družbenokoristno delo so bile poslane tudi številne redovnice. Zaradi pomanjkljivega arhivskega gradiva točnega števila ni mogoče podati. Glede na poročilo, ki so ga o povojnih letih napisale usmiljenke, je bilo leta 1949 v ženskem taborišču Ferdreng na Kočevskem kar 40 redovnic, med katerimi so bile zlasti usmiljenke, frančiškanke, Marijine sestre in uršulinke. V knjigi *Ženska taborišča* (Jambrek 2014) najdemo podatek: »Od zapornic je bilo v tistem času v Ferdrengu 69 nun, vsa ljubljanska katoliška inteligenca, pa tudi iz drugih krajev Slovenije.« (Jambrek 2014, 21)

Zanimiv je primer sester usmiljenk (hčera krščanske ljubezni sv. Vincencija Pavevskega) s. Terezije Pogorelc (roj. 1912), s. Marije Trkov (roj. 1903) in s. Marije Rozman (roj. 1898), ki jih je Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani leta 1947 obsodilo skupaj s petimi sestrami iz Lichtenthurna. Pritožba na Vrhovno sodišče je uspela in sestre so izpustili. Ker so nekaterim izmed njih očitali politično sodelovanje s sovražnikom, je bila redu izrečena zablembo celotnega premoženja zavoda Lichtenturn. Po zablembi zavoda so se sestre morale znajti same in veliko jih je odšlo k domačim. V juliju 1949 so bile vse tri sestre ponovno zaprte. Sestra Ljudmila je bila z odločbo poverjenišva za notranje zadeve Ljubljana-mesto št. 910/1 z dne 31. 8. 1949 upravno kaznovana s tremi meseci poboljševalnega dela in v tej zvezi z odločbo komisije za kaznovanje prekrškov Ljubljana-mesto št. 291 z dne 31. 8. 1949 poslana na družbenokoristno delo za dobo štiriindvajset mesecev. Na prisilnem delu je bila v Ferdrengu na Kočevskem, 22. avgusta 1950 pa je bila pogojno odpuščena. Enaki usodi sta doživeli tudi Marija Trkov in Marija Rozman (AS 1267, t. e. 65/1581).

Med zaprtimi v Ferdrengu je bila tudi s. Monika Frančiška Arčon (roj. 1911), za katero se je ohranila odločba z dne 19. 8. 1949, ko je bila poslana na družbenokoristno delo. Ker se je tovrstnih odločb ohranilo zelo malo, je toliko dragocenejša. Iz nje je razvidno, česa so jo obdolžili in kakšno banalnost so ji očitali: »Obdolžena

Arčon Frančiška /.../ je kriva, da ni nikjer zaposlena, čeprav je sposobna za vsako delo in tako živi v brezdelju in na račun drugih delovnih ljudi. Izmišlja in razširja lažnive vesti, ki rušijo mir in zadovoljstvo državljanov.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27) Očitek, da ni nikjer zaposlena, je bil sprevržen, saj ji je državna oblast najprej prepovedala opravljati javno službo, nato še privatno: »Danes sta zopet prišla dva moška, /.../ rekla sta, da ne smemo več hoditi v privatno strežbo k bolnikom.« Nato so ji ponovno zavrnilo prošnjo za državno službo, saj se ni želela odreči redovništvu (ŠAL/Razno, 27).

Pričevalki iz Ferdrenga Joža Meze in Jela Mastnak se spominjata, kako so se paznice nad redovnicami prav posebej izživljale – npr. ko je bilo treba v cerkvi ,sesekati‘ kipe svetnikov, so bile za to zadolžene redovnice (Jambrek 2014, 57). Do skrajnosti so skušali poteptati njihovo versko prepričanje in jih z nehumanim početjem prisiliti, da so opravljale dejanja, ki so žalila njihovo versko in človeško dostojanstvo. Življenjski pogoji v taborišču pa so bili strahotni – pričevanja in spomini redovnic, zbrani v Nadškofijskem arhivu Ljubljana, to potrjujejo. S. Monika Frančiška Arčon pričuje:

»Po zajtrku smo se zbrale v brigade in odšle s krampom ali lopato na delo /.../ Tudi na pokopališče so se spravili. Vse so porušili in splanirali, tako, da je tam nastala njiva. Tudi jaz sem morala od tam nositi lesene križe, da smo jih skurili. Ko sem tako nesla, ali bolje vlekla precej velik križ, se je eden od zidarjev, ki so tam delali, norčeval: ›ki je za nas nesel težki križ.‹ Križe smo morale razžagati in pokuriti, kar se je meni zdelo kar prav. Bolje da zgorijo, kot da se skrunijo po tleh.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Usmiljenka s. Gabriela Grivec pa: »Razkopale smo pokopališče. Nagrobne kamne smo znosile v šolo, zemljo pa preštihale z lopatami, da se ni nič poznalo, da je bilo na tem mestu pokopališče. Cerkev na vrhu hriba (verjetno je bila podružnica) smo razkrivale in opeko nosile v dolino. Ko sem hodila na delo sem vedno molila molitve, ki sem jih znala na pamet: Litanije Imena Jezusovega, jutranjo molitev in še druge molitve.« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

Usmiljenka s. Gabriela Grivec je opisala razmere v taborišču Ferdreng:

»Bile smo v svoji civilni obleki. Vsaka si je lahko vzela le eno naročje sena, na katerem smo potem spale tri mesece. Nismo imele nič odeje. V kamri, kjer smo spale, je bil betonski pod. /.../ Med počitkom so nas zbujali za fiskulturo. Za jutranje umivanje smo tri-štiri skupaj dobile le en liter vode, kadar je zmanjkalo vode, pa še tega ne. Razdeljene smo bile v sedem brigad. V vsaki brigadi je bilo 100 žensk. Bila sem v prvi. Bile smo zelo različnih poklicev: ciganke, arhitektinje, advokatinje, pisarniške delavke, sestre iz različnih redov – Marijine sestre, šolske sestre, uršulinke, usmiljenke. Iz prve brigade smo pospravljale seno in iz pašnikov čistile grmovje in kamenje. (Še prej smo debelo kamenje nosile iz hriba v dolino, potem pa smo ga morale nositi nazaj na hrib. Potem so tam postavili barake.)« (ŠAL/Razno, 27)

V prispevku smo izpostavili redovnice, ki so bile obsojene pred sodišči in zaprte ali pa so jih na družbenokoristno delo poslali organi za notranje zadeve. Poleg teh pa je bilo kar nekaj redovnic med preiskovalnim postopkom zaprtih in nato izpuščenih. Te izkušnje so bile izrazito neprijetne, npr. s. Alojzija Domajnko (HPM) je bila 23. decembra 1948 aretirana. V priporu je bila cel mesec. Na zaslišanjih so jo spraševali o preteklosti in »jo obtoževali nelegalnega dopisovanja. Z njo so ravnali, kot da bi bila glavna članica protikomunističnega gibanja.« (Jenič 2015, 66) Ne da bi vedela, česa so jo pravzaprav obtoževali, so ji grozili, da bo zaprta šest let. Z ustrahovanjem je oblast dosegla, da so ženske redovne skupnosti postale po vojni manj aktivne, saj so se morale prilagoditi novi stvarnosti.

5. Sklep

Redovnice so bile po vojni v mnogih sodnih postopkih obsojene na zaporne kazni s prisilnim delom, poleg tega jih je bilo v letih 1948 in 1949 več kot štirideset brez obsodbe poslanih na družbenokoristno delo v taborišče Ferdreng. Kljub neverjetnim pritiskom komunističnih oblasti redovnice v veliki večini niso klonile. Njihova skupna značilnost je bila pokončna drža, trdnost v veri in lastnem prepričanju ter kljubovanje represivnim ukrepom komunističnega sistema. Za zvestobo svojemu verskemu prepričanju so bile pripravljene veliko prestati in pretrpeti – poniževalno ravnanje paznikov, nezadostno in pomanjkljivo prehrano, umazanijo, mrčes, mraz, izredno slabe higienske razmere, nezadostno zdravstveno oskrbo itd.

Le nekaj primerov je bilo, da so redovnice z izkušnjo zapora zaradi neznosnega pritiska Udbe iz redovne skupnosti izstopile. V Arhivu Republike Slovenije nismo našli podatkov o tem, da bi bila katera izmed 34 obravnavanih in na zaporne kazni obsojenih redovnic pripravljena sodelovati z Udbo. Zaprte redovnice svojih izkušenj sicer z javnostjo niso delile vse do zloma komunističnega sistema, saj so morale pred odpustom podpisati, da ne bodo »nikjer govorile o tem, kje so bile, kaj so delale in kako se jim je godilo« (ŠAL/Razno, 27).

Glede ravnanja komunističnih sil proti ženskim redovnim skupnostim bi se lahko strinjali s takratno oceno s. Alojzije Domanjko: »Komunizem se je odločil, da nas izbriše.« In: »Nikoli ne smemo izgubiti upanja.« (Jenič 2015, 66) Upanje so redovnice ohranile. Njihova vera je bila dovolj trdna. Redovnice z izkušnjo krivičnega odvzema prostosti so moč za nadaljnje delo lahko črpale iz Jezusovih besed: »Blagor tistim, ki so zaradi pravičnosti preganjani, kajti njihovo je nebeško kraljestvo. Blagor vam, kadar vas bodo zaradi mene zasramovali, preganjali in vse húdo o vas lažnivo govorili.« (Mt 5,10-11) Komunistični pritisk je v šestdesetih letih 20. stoletja končno nekoliko popustil. Ženske redovne skupnosti so bile do leta 1990 še vedno nadzirane, delo so opravljale zasebno in ob zelo skromnih finančnih virih. Kljub nenaklonjenim okoliščinam so pripadnice redovnih skupnosti poklicu v veliki večini ostale zveste in so za delovanje v okviru svojega poslanstva izkoristile vsako priložnost (npr. hčere Marije Pomočnice so organizirale duhovne vaje za dekleta, vodile župnijsko katehezo itd.). Svobodneje so redovniške skupnosti lah-

ko zaživele šele po osamosvojitvi in demokratizaciji Slovenije. Katoliška Cerkev v Sloveniji in tudi širša javnost, ki si prizadeva za spoštovanje človekovih pravic in svoboščin, ima v državi redovnic med komunističnim preganjanjem svetel zglod.

Kratice

SI AS – Arhiv Republike Slovenije.

ŠAL – Nadškofijski arhiv Ljubljana.

SCNR – Študijski center za narodno spravo.

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Branko Klun, Luka Trebežnik (ur.)

Vračanje religije v postmodernem kontekstu

Zbornik želi pokazati, da religija ni izginila iz filozofije, kot so napovedovali nekateri razsvetljenski misleci, temveč se vanjo vrača in jo na novo vznemirja. Sicer je to vračanje raznoliko in pogosto nekonvencionalno, vendar pa to ne zmanjšuje njegovega pomena in s tem potrebe po dialogu med postmoderno filozofijo in teologijo.

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Boštjan Udovič

»Kakó dolgo bo smel tako zaničevavno govoriti o našem mojstru?«: Gregor Rihar in cecilijansko gibanje v prizmi nastajanja slovenskega državištva
“How long will he be allowed to bandy such contemptuous words about our Master?”: Gregor Rihar, the Caecilian Movement, and the Beginnings of Slovenian Statehood

Povzeteke: Prispevek obravnava pomen Gregorja Riharja in njegovega dela ter njegovo opredelitev v okviru razvoja slovenskega državištva. Glavne ugotovitve so: (1) Gregor Rihar in njegovo delo sta bila z vidika proučevanja nastajajočega slovenskega državištva in prebujajočega se slovenskega naroda v 19. stoletju do sedaj raziskovalno zanemarjena; (2) stranski produkt cecilijanskega gibanja na Slovenskem je bila krepitev nacionalnega zavedanja in ustvarjanje slovenskega državištva tudi skozi jezik in glasbo; (3) obravnava riharijanstva in protiriharijanstva v slovenskih časopisih 19. stoletja kaže, da sta se v obrambi Gregorja Riharja in njegovega dela združila tako liberalni kot konservativni tabor (ta predvsem zunaj mest in v manjših mestih), vsak s svojim stališčem, vendar s skupnim ciljem – ohraniti in krepiti slovenski jezik ter ga oblikovati v samostojno enoto.

Ključne besede: Gregor Rihar, državištvo, slovenski narodni vzpon, cecilijanstvo

Abstract: The article examines the significance of Gregor Rihar and his work, as well as the role it played in the formation of Slovenian statehood. The main conclusions of the article are: (1) Up until now, Gregor Rihar and his opus have been overlooked when researching the beginnings of Slovenian statehood and the Slovenian national awakening in the 19th century; (2) the spread of the Caecilian Movement throughout Slovenian lands inadvertently produced greater national awareness and the seeds of Slovenian statehood in language and music; (3) reading about Rihar’s supporters and detractors in Slovenian 19th-century newspapers shows that both the liberal and conservative camps came to the defence of Gregor Rihar and his work (particularly in more rural areas and in smaller towns). While each side had its own specific views on the matter,

they both shared a common goal – preserving the Slovenian language, building on it, and creating a coherent whole.

Keywords: Gregor Rihar, statehood, Slovenian national awakening, the Caecilian Movement

1. Uvod

Državništvo je izmuzljiv koncept, ki vsakomur, ki ga uporablja, pomeni nekaj drugega.¹ Pogosto se meša s politiko, in to na vseh treh ravneh (angl. *politics, polity, policy*), včasih s prestižem države, z njenim ugledom, drugič z njenim upravljanjem (angl. *governance*). In prav temu je, če upoštevamo Oxfordov slovar angleškega jezika (2015), državništvo najbližje. Ta vir državništvo razlaga kot »upravljanje državnih zadev«. Državništvo je tako proces, ki poteka, kadar politični akterji s svojim vedênjem vplivajo na oblikovanje, izvajanje in delovanje državne in širše – narodne in nacionalne – politike. Če je ta opredelitev statična in državništvo razume kot nekaj danega, Anderson (1977, vii) tega v svoji definiciji dinamizira s poudarkom, da je državništvo resda vodenje političnih zadev, pomembno pa je, da poznamo ne samo rezultat (državništvo), ampak tudi proces, tj. veščine in tehnike, ki do državništva pripeljejo (Baldwin 1985). *Prima facie* je državništvo koncept, ki se veže na zunanjo politiko države in na njene zunanje odnose, le redko pa se teoretiki ukvarjajo s pomenom vzpostavljanja, oblikovanja in razvijanja državništva za razvoj nacionalne povezanosti in notranje kohezivnosti države (Udovič 2017; Arbeiter in Udovič 2017; Nagode 2015). V času, ko politika postaja predvsem notranja politika, zunanja politika pa je le njen odsev (Haass 2013), je razprava o pomenu državništva navznoter oziroma notranjega državništva – od njegove vzpostavitve, strukturiranja, razvijanja, pa vse do doseganja določene sebi lastne razvojne stopnje – več kot relevantna. Le tako bomo namreč razumeli trende, ki jim sledi sodobna mednarodna skupnost.²

Namen prispevka je analizirati prve zametke nastajanja državništva na Slovenskem.³ Gre za čas druge polovice 19. stoletja, ko je na Slovenskem pomlad narodov

¹ Prispevek je nastal v okviru programske skupine P5-0177 „Slovenija in njeni akterji v mednarodnih odnosih in evropskih integracijah“ ter raziskovalnega projekta J6-3135 „Glasba mladih po 1945 in Glasbena mladina Slovenije“, ki ju financira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARIS). Članek nadgrajuje in dopolnjuje spoznanja in ugotovitve doktorske disertacije „Glasba kot orodje državništva v Sloveniji“ (avtor: Boštjan Udovič). Na tem mestu bi se rad zahvalil doc. dr. Alešu Nagodetu za pripombe in predloge za izboljšanje prispevka.

² O različnih vidikih državništva nasploh prim. Vaupot (2019), specifično državništva na Slovenskem pa Munda-Hirnök in Medvešek (2017), Žigon (2020), Maver (2021) in Novak (2021).

³ Razmišljanje o državništvu je na Slovenskem omejeno predvsem na vzpostavljanje državnosti, tj. samostojnosti in suverenosti Slovenije. A to je ozka opredelitev državništva, ki zahteva najprej državo – šele ta naj bi omogočila nastanek državništva (tako razumevanje bi lahko označili kot determinirajoče – angl. *determinants*). Širši pogled na državništvo tega razume tudi v kontekstu predhodnika ustvarjanja države (na Slovenskem včasih govorimo o tisočletnem hrepenenju po lastni državi, kar bi lahko označili kot širše oblikovanje državništva) ali pa le nastavkov za proces ustvarjanja države. Takšno državništvo ni determinirajoče, ampak ustvarjajoče (angl. *antecedents*).

pustila globoke sledi, to pa je vodilo k oblikovanju slovenskega naroda in nacije (več o tem prim. Kosi in Stergar 2016; Štih et al. 2021). Prav v zvezi s tem velja omeniti tabore in čitalnice, ki so bile ključni narodnoformativni element za nastajanje slovenskega naroda. Toda za ustvarjanje slovenskega naroda ni bila pomembna samo brana beseda in druženje ob njej, temveč tudi glasba. Ta se je pojavljala zlasti na prireditvah, imenovanih ‚bésede‘, na katerih so se izvajala dela slovenskih skladateljev, mdr. Jurija Flajšmana, Miroslava Vilharja, Davorina Jenka, pa tudi Gregorja Riharja. V nasprotju s prvimi tremi, ki so bili posvetni, je bil Gregor Rihar cerkveni skladatelj. Ne glede na to je njegov pomen segel daleč onstran kora ljubljanske stolnice, v kateri je deloval, in se je v določenem trenutku idejno močno povezal prav z nastajajočim slovenskim narodom. Rihar tako ni bil več skladatelj, ki bi pisal pesmi zgolj za bogoslužno rabo, ampak je bil v nekem časovnem pasu – ne po svoji zaslugi, temveč zaradi spleta okoliščin – narodni buditelj, ki mu je bila pripisana avreola ‚našosti‘, tj. povezanosti s slovenskim narodom in novo, porajajočo se slovensko nacijo. Zato so bile kritike, ki so jih nekateri v določeni meri upravičeno naslavljali nanj, pri nekaterih razumljene kot napad ne le na Riharja, ampak tudi širše na slovenski narod, kar je bilo prav v tistih časih izjemno občutljivo. Če bi posplošili, bi lahko dejali, da je bil Rihar neke vrste sredstvo nastajajočega slovenskega državnštva, vendar ne v času svojega življenja, temveč predvsem po smrti. Bil je nekakšno ‚narodovo blago‘, nedotakljiv, saj je v očeh mnogih predstavljal to, kar da je – kot bomo prikazali pozneje v analizi – v slovenskem narodu pristno. Po načelu binarnih opozicij se je okoli Riharja spletla tudi neke vrste binarna logika državnštva: če si za slovenstvo, potem si za Riharja; če nisi za Riharja, potem si za *tujstvo*.

Zakaj je vse naštetu pomembno? Predvsem zato, ker se je dosedanja analiza nastajanja slovenskega naroda in nacije ukvarjala zlasti s tem, kako se je ta notranje oblikoval, premalo pa je poudarjala pomembne komponente njegove državnosti oziroma njene zametke (Bajt 2011; Jurić Pahor 2015; Sedmak in Zadel 2013); pogosto jih je potiskala predvsem v čas pred oziroma med prvo svetovno vojno, ko so bile sprejete politične odločitve (Bister 1992), da se slovenska nacija odcepi od Avstrije in se najprej združi v novo državo Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov, čez en mesec pa pridruži Kraljevini Srbiji v novi državi. Pri tem je pomembno poudariti še, da se v slovenski historiografiji zametki in začetki slovenskega naroda pripisujejo t. i. liberalnemu taboru oziroma intelektualcem, pesnikom in pisateljem, ki da so s svojimi deli prispevali k snovanju temeljev slovenskega naroda in nacije. Na Riharjevem primeru bomo videli, da razvoj slovenskega naroda ni bil premočrten. Res je, da so imeli liberalci pri njegovem oblikovanju, pa tudi pri začetkih njegovega državnštva, pomembno vlogo, a so bili v določenih primerih konservativci tisti, ki so se res želeli držati ljudskih praks, praks okolja, iz katerega so prihajali, in jim tudi velja priznati pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju slovenskega *nacionalnega* in državnštva. Tako lahko na obravnavanem Riharjevem primeru ilustriramo dejstvo, da je ustvarjanje naroda in nacije v 19. stoletju potekalo vzporedno po več tirih, ki bi jih bilo mogoče povezati v dva sklopa: v ‚mesto‘ in ‚podeželje‘.⁴

⁴ Dejansko gre tudi v primeru Riharja delno za boj med ‚mestom‘ in ‚podeželjem‘, kar potrjujejo časopisni zapisi, objavljeni v rubrikah ‚iz‘ [nato pa je navedena pokrajina – Kranjska, Primorska oz. Štajerska].

‚Mesto‘ so predstavljali liberalci in učenjaki, ki so postavljali narodno in državniško infrastrukturo od zgoraj navzdol (angl. *top-down*), medtem ko so ‚podeželje‘ predstavljali učitelji in duhovniki, ki so prihajali *od ljudi* ter vsebino oblikovali od spodaj navzgor (angl. *bottom-up*). V primeru (proti)riharijanstva je postalo to še posebej očitno po ustanovitvi Cecilijinega društva v Ljubljani leta 1878.

Prispevek je razdeljen na dva dela. Uvodu sledi kratek oris tega, kdo je bil Gregor Rihar in kakšno mesto je zavzemal v slovenski (cerkveni) glasbi in v takratnem času nasploh. Drugi del se ukvarja z razumevanjem Riharja ter s spopadom proriharijanskega in protiriharijanskega gibanja. Na koncu sledita še razprava in zaključek.

2. O Gregorju Riharju

Gregor Rihar velja v cerkveni glasbi za očeta moderne slovenske cerkvene glasbe. Rodil se je v Polhovem Gradcu leta 1796. Leta 1827 je prevzel službo stolnega organista, položaj *regens chori* v ljubljanski stolnici, in začel temeljite reforme cerkvenega petja.⁵ S kora stolnice je ‚pregnal godce‘,⁶ a – zanimivo – pri tem ni naletel na odobravanje, temveč na gluha ušesa, in to tako pri godcih kot tudi pri ljudstvu in duhovščini (Škulj 2003, 36). Zgodovina se je ponovila petdeset let pozneje, ko so pripadniki cecilijanskega gibanja s kora ljubljanske stolnice izrivali Riharjeva dela. A če se vrnemo k izhodišču: Rihar se je ob nastopu svoje funkcije spopadel z nizko ravno kakovosti glasbe pri bogoslužju. V *Drobtinica*h (1888, 98–99) najdemo tako zapis o stanju cerkvene glasbe pred Riharjem, ki pravi:

»Kaj žalostno je bilo stanje cerkvene glasbe na Slovenskem pred Riharjem, če se sploh o cerkveni glasbi pred njim more govoriti. Bilo je petje po naših cerkvah skoraj popolnoma posvetno in ni nikakor zadostovalo svojemu vzvišenemu namenu. Umetelne vrednosti te skladbe niso imele nikakoršne, ker so bili orgljavci navadno slabo izobraženi v glasbi; cerkvenega duha so imele morebiti še manj. Bile so navadno posnemanje posvetnih melodij, včasih prav nedostojnih, posebno še zato, ker je spačen lašk⁷ ukus segal tudi med Slovence. /.../ Pa tudi ob navadnih nedeljah in praznikih so v cerkvi radi godli. A kakšna je bila ta godba? Koračnice, polke, mazurke vrstile so se druga za drugo. ‚Piskači‘, tako namreč so imenovali te godce, so si na vso moč prizadevali, da bi spravili s svojimi ‚vižami‘ ljudstvo v dobro voljo. [G]lasile so se v cerkvi med najsvetejšim opravilom iste viže, kakor v gostilnici pri plesu razuzdane mladine. Kolika nečast!«

⁵ Vprašanje je, ali je Rihar izobrazil in sposobnost, da bi zasnoval kakšno reformo glasbe v stolnici, tudi dejansko imel. ‚Možgani‘ za reformo so bili verjetneje Potočnikovi, a o tem zaradi osebnih stikov med akterji nimamo virov (Nagode 2023).

⁶ Tega Škuljevega zapisa ne smemo vzeti dobesedno, saj stolnični arhiv temu ne pritrjuje.

⁷ Italijanski. Laški okus je sopomenka za teatralično, operno glasbo, ki je bila po cerkvenih predpisih za cerkev neprimerna (npr. okrožnica Benedikta XIV. „Annus qui“ 1749) (Nagode 2023).

Da so se Riharjeve reforme prijele, gre pripisati predvsem temu, da je na prvi pogled stare prakse (poskočnice, valčke, marše itd.) resda opuščal in jih nadomeščal z novimi. A te nove se od starih niso zelo razlikovale. Njegove pesmi so bile še vedno poskočne (niso bile valčki ali koračnice, vendar so imele vgrajen prav takšen ritem, da so bile pevne), sočasno pa so se – tudi zaradi svojih glasbenih značilnosti (temelj njegovega skladanja je bila t. i. kranjska terca,⁸ kot intervale je pogosto uporabljal sekste)⁹ – med ljudmi prijela: bile so hitro priučljive in napisane v melodijah, ki so bile ljudem blizu. Njegovo aktivno skladanje je korak za korakom izpodrivalo stare valčke in marše s kranjskih, štajerskih in primorskih korov.

Da je bil Rihar v cerkveni glasbi pozitivna osebnost, ne potrjuje le visok delež njegovih pesmi, ki so se ohranile, temveč tudi zapis škofa Antona Wolfa (povzet po R–č) (*Zgodnja Danica* 12. 1. 1857, 184) o njem, v katerem je zapisal:

»Hvalevredne prizadevanja in storitve zakristana tukajšnje stolne cerkve in stolniškiga organista Gregorja Rihar-ja v zadevah cerkveniga petja sploh, posebno pa glede *slovenskiga* cerkveniga petja – so častiti duhovšini že tako znane, in bodi si tukaj v Ljubljani, ali pa ob kanoniškim obiskovanji po deželi smo z radostjo zaznali, de se je od časa, kar so se od fajmoštra Blaža Potočnik-a zložene, in od stolniškiga zakristana in organista Gregorja Rihar-ja postavljene pesmi vpeljale, *slovensko* cerkveno petje veliko sčistilo in zboljšalo [ležeči tisk je avtorjev].«

V zapisu lahko najdemo dve pomembni zadevi in eno težavo: gre za izjemno pohvalo Riharju in Potočniku za delo, ki sta ga opravljala; škof Wolf v svojem zapisu jasno poudarja pomen slovenskosti v petju, kar pomeni, da že načrtuje smer podpore razvoju slovenskega naroda in nacije.¹⁰ A to predstavlja tudi ključni problem: petje v cerkvi (pri slovesnih mašah, večernicah in blagoslovih z Najsvetejšim) naj bi bilo latinsko, in ne slovensko. Škofov zapis tako kaže na delno razcepljenost teorije in prakse, zato je tudi razumevanje odpora, ki je sledil ob poskusih ponovne vpeljave latinščine na kore cerkva, *padlo* tako trdo.¹¹

⁸ Gre za splošno poimenovanje glasbene figure, ki v sebi nima ‚nič zares kranjskega‘, izhaja pa iz habsburško-italijanskega glasbenega prostora in temelji na *belcantu*; ‚začinjena‘ je z obliko slovenske ljudske pesmi v 19. stoletju (Nagode 2023).

⁹ Kimovec (1908, 18) o Riharjevih pesmih, ki so upoštevale osnovne glasbene stopnje (tonika, dominantna, subdominantna z dodatkom terce in sekste), piše dokaj pokroviteljsko, ko pravi: »Tako je [Rihar-jeva] harmonizacija pogosto prav preveč preprosta, monotono se venomer ponavlja ena in ista harmonija, to pa tako, da zlasti bas, pa tudi tenor velikrat nimata drugega postopa kot kvarto oz. kvinto iz tonike v dominantno, sopran in alt se pa vozita pod pazduho v tercah ali pa za roke v sekstah. Seveda so terce in sekste lepe, toda če se ponavljajo v toliko in toliko pesmih od začetka do konca, postane navsezadnje le predolgočasno, premrtvo, posebno če sta gornja glasova visoko v višavi, spodnja pa daleč spodaj brnita.«

¹⁰ To lahko razumemo v okviru njegovega življenjskega creda, saj vemo, da se je zavzemal za večjo emancipacijo slovenskega naroda na vseh področjih (npr. prevod Svetega pisma, sredstva za nemško-slovenski in slovensko-nemški slovar itd.).

¹¹ Nagode (2023) opozarja, da je bilo slovensko petje mogoče pri večini dejansko obhajanih obredov – tihi maši, različnih pobožnostih ipd. Latinsko je moralo biti le pri slovesni (péti) maši, slovesnih petih večernicah (te so se obhajale le izjemoma, v stolnicah in pomembnejših samostanskih cerkvah) in blagoslovu z Najsvetejšim. Petje pesmi v ljudskem jeziku pri večini obredov je bilo v ‚nemških‘ deželah

Seveda je bil škof eden izmed o Riharju enako mislečih. To kažejo zapisi ob Riharjevi smrti in pogrebu, objavljeni v *Zgodnji Danici* (1. 5. 1863, 171–178), ko A. D. v rubriki *Iz Ljubljane* o Riharjevem pogrebu piše:

»Spremlili smo v nedeljo popoldne ob 6 k sv. Krištofu moža, čigar ime slovi dalječ čez meje *slovenskega naroda*.«

in dodaja

»Če je kdo zaslužil, da ga *narod* časti in v pobožnem spominu ohrani, je to gotovo zaslužil gosp. Rihar. /.../ Postavil si je rajni neumerjoč spominek sam *med Slovenci*, vendar upam da *slovenskim* duhovnikom in *prijatlom naroda* iz serca govorim. /.../ Ako nasvetujem, da bi z združenimi močmi glasbine dela rajnkega *ohranili narodu*, ker mu bo težko kdo kdaj, da ne rečem boljše – tako zapel, in da bi mu postavili spominek, ki bi svetu razodeval, *kako Slovenci zasluge svojih pobožnih rojakov vedo ceniti* [ležeči tisk je avtorjev].«

A. D. poudarja, da Rihar ni bil samo cerkveni skladatelj, ampak je s svojim delom prečkal meje kora, škofije. Postal je narodno blago, zato je treba njegova dela ohraniti in jih razširjati. Zapis jasno kaže, da je bilo Riharjevo delo razumljeno kot *conditio sine qua non* narodnega prebujenja Slovencev. Zato je dogajanje okoli njega – kar označujemo kot riharijansko gibanje – mogoče opisati kot nacionalno gibanje. Gre za eno mnogih aktivnosti, ki so se na Kranjskem oblikovale med formacijo nacionalne biti slovenskega naroda (Granda 2007).¹²

3. Od hvale do posameznih glasov zavračanja Gregorja Riharja

Če je bil Rihar do svoje smrti načeloma nedotakljiv, se je po njegovi smrti to spremenilo. Kritiki so si o kakovosti njegovih del vse bolj upali postavljati (utemeljena) vprašanja. Seveda – zaradi povezanosti med Riharjem in nacionalnim gibanjem na Kranjskem – to vprašanje ni bilo le ‚glasbeno‘ in ‚o kakovosti del‘, ampak je bilo umeščeno v celoto napadov na narodno prebujanje Slovencev.

Prvi, ki naj bi dela Gregorja Riharja domnevno zavračal, je bil Anton Nedvėd, učitelj in skladatelj češkega rodu, ki je deloval v Ljubljani. Od leta 1859 je učil na

razširjena navada, ki pa ni imela uradne odobritve papeža, ampak se je stoletja (od Ferdinanda I.) odvijala pod tihim pokroviteljstvom habsburške dinastije. Temu gre pripisati tudi škofijsko toleranco do slovenskega petja pod Wolfom, Vidmarjem in Pogačarjem (ki je bil sicer vnet cecilijanec) celo pri najpomembnejših cerkvenih obredih.

¹² Pri definiciji in razumevanju *nacionalnega*, tj. tistega, kar je bilo usmerjeno v nacionalno samouresničitev Slovencev, moramo biti nekoliko previdni. Ni namreč vse, kar se je znašlo pod klobukom *nacionalnega*, tudi zares bilo *nacionalno*. Obstaja več primerov, ko je bilo nekaj, kar je bilo razglašeno kot *nacionalno*, usmerjeno predvsem v spoštovanje obstoječih pravil ali pa udejanjanje nekaterih ukrepov za vsakodnevno rabo (brez iskanja višjega cilja oz. zasledovanja cilja samouresničitve porajajočega se slovenskega naroda).

državni glasbeni šoli pri glavni normalki in obenem poučeval petje na ljubljanski gimnaziji, pa tudi v Alojzevišču in semenišču (Kozina 2013). Nedvėdova očitka Riharju sta bila neprimerna glasbena oblika in izvajanje njegovih skladb ter uporaba slovenskega jezika v Riharjevih cerkvenih in posvetnih skladbah. Svoje negotovnosti nad Riharjem (*Celovški Slovenec* 8. 4. 1965, 99) naj bi pred svojimi slušatelji izrazil z očitkom »Diesem Elende in Krain muss ein Ende gemacht werden!«,¹³ bogoslovcem pa naj bi dejal: »Möglich, dass Richar Verdienste um der Kirche gesang hatte.«¹⁴ Ne vemo, če je to Nedvėd res izjavil ali ne; vse, kar vemo, je, da je bil Riharju nenaklonjen. V boj zoper Nedvėda so se pognali različni avtorji: najprej v (celovškem) *Slovencu*, nato pa tudi v *Novicah*. *Celovški Slovenec* je 8. aprila 1865 objavil jezno, nepodpisano pismo, v katerem avtor obračunava z Nedvėdom, ki ga posmehljivo imenuje »nek učitelj petja v Ljubljani«. Nedvėda v tem odzivu sploh ne omenja ne z imenom in ne s priimkom. Da gre za Nedvėda, izvemo iz opisov tega, kje vse slušbuje in koga poučuje. To je vidno v zapisih: »Že pri življenju rajncega Riharja je ta učitelj navdajal s sovraštvom in merzo do Riharjevih pesem pripravnik«; »Uči namreč peti pripravnike za učiteljski stan; dalje uči gimnazijalce /.../; dalje uči še posebej Alojzijance /.../;¹⁵ dalje tudi bogoslovce.« A hvalospev in zaščita Riharja v tem pismu nimata le cerkvene ali glasbene note, temveč tudi narodni in državniški značaj. To je mogoče videti iz poudarkov o Riharjevih pesmih, ki jih avtor povezuje z narodom, nacijo in jezikom, kot npr., »da so te pesmi *slovenske pesmi*«, da jih je »*narod slovenski sprejel kot svoje narodno blago*«, da te pesmi »čuješ po lepih logih in krasnih dolih *naše domovine* in iz ust *slovenskih pevk*« [poševni tisk je avtorjev]. Če se v tem delu navezuje na Riharja posredno, pa se v nadaljevanju pisma o njem izreka neposredno, ko o Nedvėdu pravi: »Kako dolgo hoče še vrivati ta učitelj svoj *nemški duh slovenskim* mladenčem?« in dodaja: »Kako dolgo bo smel odpravljati lepih, *narodnih*, pa tudi cerkvenih napevov Riharjevih? Kako dolgo bo smel tako zaničevavno govoriti o *našem* mojstru?« Rihar tako ni več le skladatelj, je *naš* mojster [poševni tisk je avtorjev]. Njegove pesmi tako niso bile več ‚le‘ cerkvene pesmi, ampak so »lepe, *narodne* /.../ pesmi« [ležeči tisk je avtorjev], čeprav – če smo natančni – je bera Riharjevih narodnih pesmi izjemno skromna. Ključ do razumevanja prebujajočega se slovenstva je v tem, da avtor pisma loči nemški in slovenski duh; oksimoron pa, da to dela ‚v glasbi‘ (kjer duha ni in ga ne more biti), ko postavlja ločnico med nami in drugimi.

Če se nam morda zdi, da je bil avtor tega zapisa¹⁶ oster, pa je njegovemu članku sledil še en nepodpisan članek 12. aprila 1865 v *Novicah*, ki ni več okolišil. Nedvėda je neposredno imenoval in njegovo ravnanje označil kot »kolosalno predrznost«.

¹³ To revščino na Kranjskem je treba odpraviti.

¹⁴ Cinično: »Morda pa je Rihar res kaj doprinesel k cerkvenemu petju.«

¹⁵ Alojzijanci so bili gojenci Alojzevišča, vzgojnega zavoda (dijaškega semenišča). Danes v tej stavbi domuje Teološka fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani.

¹⁶ Nekateri namigujejo, da naj bi šlo za učitelja Josipa Levičnika. Orglati se je učil pri skladatelju in organistu, *regens chori* ljubljanske stolnice, Gregorju Riharju (1796–1863). Pod njegovim vplivom je začel skladati pretežno cerkvena in vokalna dela. Med drugim je objavil tudi dvoglasno mladinsko pesmarico „Mladi slovenski pevec“ in z njo prekosil denimo tudi podobne poskuse slovitega pesnika ter pisca nabožnih in vzgojnih del Antona Martina Slomška (1800–1862) (Križnar 2017, 163).

Svoj zapis je avtor sklenil z besedami:

»Rihar je in ostane, zlasti v cerkvenem petji ‚profeta‘, ki ga *narod slovenski* [ležeči tisk je avtorjev] v srcu svojem nosi in nevoljno zavrača zabavljive besede: ›möglich, dass Rihar Verdienste um der Kirchengesang hatte!‹« (Novice 12. 4. 1865, 123–124)

Vse zapisano jasno kaže na to, da je bila umestitev Riharja na ljubljanski kor več kot le glasbeno ali cerkveno dejanje. Ko je s kora *šenklavške* stolnice sam preganjal slabo glasbo in pisal lastne pesmi, ni imel v mislih narodnostnega, nacionalnega ali celo državniškega značaja, ampak le religioznega. A zgodilo se je, da je bil Rihar že za časa življenja, po smrti pa še bolj, razumljen kot nekdo, ki je v (cerkveni) glasbi tlakoval pot slovenstvu. S tem se strinjajo tudi vsi pisci, ki v tistih časih pišejo v časopise – tudi njegovi kritiki. Težava torej ni v Riharjevem delu, ampak v njegovem *posredstvenju*, ko ni bilo več ‚le‘ glasbeno delo, ampak narodno, emancipatorno sredstvo. Rihar je bil razumljen kot proslovenski, ker mu je uspelo združiti slovenska besedila pesmi (ki jih je zanj pisal Blaž Potočnik), ker je uporabljal ljudskemu okusu všečno melodiko¹⁷ in bil ob pravem času – času prebujanja slovenskega naroda in nastajanja temeljnih narodnih tvarin – na pravem mestu (o tem več v npr. Rupel 2013; Žigon in Kramberger 2014; Darovec 2021; Vidmar Horvat 2021; Rahten 2021). In narod te pesmi v sebi nosi še danes. V nasprotju z narodi, ki so nastajali na podlagi političnih (Hrvati, Francozi, Angleži, Američani) ali verskih elementov (Rusi, delno tudi Poljaki), sta slovenski in nemški narod nastajala prav prek kulturnih vzorcev, ki so narodnost in nacionalnost (ter posledično državništvo) definirali kot sestvo po načelu lastne samoopredelitve v odnosu do drugega. Slovensko sestvo je izhajalo predvsem iz jezika, glasba je bila sekundarnega pomena – a vendarle jo je prav ljudstvu bližnja melodika potiskala v vzporejanje s slovensko besedo.

Razprava o Riharjevem delu se je po teh dveh zapisih umirila, verjetno tudi zato, ker se odpor do Riharja javno ni nadaljeval, kar pa ne pomeni, da ga ni bilo. Blaženje prve faze antiriharjanstva je uradno zakoličil Josip Levičnik (podpisan kot Rodoljub Podratitovski) leta 1868 v *Zgodnji Danici*, ko je vse župnike na Kranjskem pozval, naj Riharjeve pesmi nakupijo in jih razširjajo med slovenskim narodom. Sam je poudaril, da je to kolektivna odgovornost župnikov, saj bodo, če bodo to prepuščali organistom ali pevovodjem, ti Riharjeve skladbe ob svojem odhodu odnesli. Zapis se bere, kot bi bile Riharjeve skladbe neke vrste edinstveno in dragoceno blago, ki ga more in mora imeti vsak, ki je slovensko zavéden. Četudi Levičnik tega ne pove neposredno, je to jasno tudi iz zaključka njegovega zapisa, v katerem poudarja:

»Ob kratkem: vsi ugovori odpadejo; toraj naj se pa častite cerkvene predstojništva po Slovenskem tudi ne mudijo z nakupovanjem prelepih napevov, da čez kaj let ne bodo učeni – organisti prisiljeni tožiti: tako neredne sprednike in predstojnike smo imeli, da nam še izverstnih Riharjevih skladanj niso preskerbeli in zapustili!« (*Zgodnja Danica* 20. 11. 1968, 376–377)

¹⁷ Gre za melodiko, ki je domača v okusu, neproblematična, splošno razumljiva in se z njo ljudje lahko poistovetijo.

Torej naj bo v poduk vsem tistim, ki bi se morda upirali – da jim bo sodila zgodovina. Rihar je nedotakljiv, pomemben za narod in za njegovo samobitnost, zato je zagotovitev teh pesmi nujna, sicer se lahko zgodi, da bodo zanamci kritično presojali delo tistih, ki so to zgodovinsko priložnost zamudili.

Nasploh lahko ugotovimo, da je bil v času vzpostavljanja slovenske nacije sredi 19. stoletja zatrt vsak poskus dvoma o Riharju in njegovem delu. Takšen poskus bi bil razumljen kot spogledovanje z nemškutarstvom in odpad od slovenstva. A čas je šel svojo pot in razvoj je terjal nove poteze. Ena takšnih, ki je na Slovensko prišla od zunaj in so jo spodbujali njeni ‚domači navdušenci‘, je bila ustanovitev cecilijanskega društva, ki mu je načeloval Franz Witt, leta 1868 v Bambergu v Nemčiji.¹⁸ Prenovo v cerkveni glasbi, ki jo je sprožila ustanovitev nemškega cecilijanskega društva, je bilo na Kranjskem čutiti leto pozneje, ko je stolni prošt Janez Zlatousti Pogačar predstavil nekaj idej o izboljšanju cerkvene glasbe v ljubljanski stolnici (Nagode 1998, 92). Njegova priporočila resda niso (še) letela na Riharjevo glasbo, a so med takratnimi cerkvenimi glasbeniki vseeno odmevala.

4. Začetek institucionalnega zavračanja dela Gregorja Riharja in (politične) reakcije na to

Nastanek Cecilijinega društva na Kranjskem leta 1877 je bil pogojen z nastankom Cecilijinega društva v prisotnosti Antona Foersterja, Hugolina Sattnerja, Angelika Hribarja, Miroslava Tomca in drugih leto poprej v Gradcu. Ti so na poti nazaj že razmišljali, kako bi kakšno podobno združenje organizirali tudi na Kranjskem. Rečeno – storjeno. Ustanovni zbor slovenskega Cecilijinega društva je bil 14. junija 1877. Prvi predsednik društva je postal Anton Jarc, tajnik Janez Gnjezda, glasbeni vodja pa Anton Foerster (Šorli 2011, 24–25; več o cecilijanskem gibanju prim. tudi Nagode 1997; 1998; 2000; 2019; 2022). Društvo se je lotilo intenzivne prenove cerkvenega petja, s čimer so ga želeli vrniti v okvir cerkvenih predpisov glede obhajanja liturgije, predvsem h gregorijanskemu koralu. Kot prava mera jim je služila Palestrinova „Missa Papa Marcelli“,¹⁹ ki naj bi bila zgled, kako bi se glasba morala pisati, igrati in peti tudi na Kranjskem, Štajerskem in Primorskem. S podpiranjem takšnih ukrepov v cerkveni glasbi so cecilijanci *napovedali vojno* podpornikom riharijskega opusa.²⁰ Ti ukrepi bi sicer verjetno ostali neopaženi, če ne bi prešli

¹⁸ Franz Witt (1834–1888) je bil duhovnik, cerkveni glasbenik in skladatelj, začetnik nemškega cecilijanskega gibanja.

¹⁹ Ne gre dejansko za ponovno uvedbo, ampak predvsem za spoštovanje sklepov Tridentinskega koncila, ki so predvideli naslednje: »Škofje naj iz cerkve odstranijo vsako glasbo, v katero se je ali v orglah ali v petju primesilo kaj čutnega in nečistega (*Episcopi ab ecclesiis vero musicas eas, ubi siver organo sive cantu lascivum aut impurum aliquid miscetur*).«

²⁰ Nagode (2023) se s to trditvijo ne strinja oz. pravi, da je pretrda. Svoje stališče utemeljuje z visokim deležem Riharjevih skladb v pesmaricah *Cecilija I* in *II*. Te skladbe so izvorno Riharjeve, so pa harmonsko izpopolnjene. Formalno se na tem mestu z Nagodetom lahko strinjamo, da so skladbe Riharjev značaj in melodiko v veliki meri (ne pa popolnoma) ohranile – težava je bilo razumevanje. Poskusi »predrugačenja« Riharja (en primer pokažemo grafično v nadaljevanju) so v izhodišču priredbe Riharjevih skladb, kar pa je bilo v takratnem razgretem političnem ozračju verjetno premalo poudarjeno. Seveda

cerkvenih korov in če ne bi bil njihov nosilec Anton Foerster, priznan glasbenik, ki je na Kranjsko prišel s Češkega. Že to, da je cecilijanske ukrepe uvajal tujec, je bilo za slovensko (cerkveno) pokrajino nezamisljivo – še huje pa je bilo, da Foerster ukrepov ni uvajal premišljeno, previdno in počasi, ampak je vse Riharjevo želel pomesti z enim zamahom, kar delno kaže tudi na njegovo oholost pri določanju tega, kaj da je v cerkveni glasbi kakovostno.²¹

Da se je Foerster odločil z Riharjevo dediščino nepopustljivo pomesti, nakazuje že njegovo pismo Franzu Wittu 2. maja 1878, tri četrt leta po nastanku Cecilijanskega društva v Ljubljani. V njem se je Wittu najprej zahvalil za njegov čas, nato pa opisal stanje cerkvene glasbe na Slovenskem in kot krivca za takšno glasbo izpostavil Gregorja Riharja:²²

»Da vam ne kradem dragocenega časa, ne bom obširno poročal, kako je na deželi s cerkveno glasbo; pripomnim naj le, da mnogi organisti po orglah le tolčejo, akorde igrajo staccato drugega za drugim, spremljava pa zveni prav posvetno, in kot bi igrali klavir, opremijo pa jo z vsemi možnimi okraski, pri tem pa niso sposobni niti, da bi legato, po notah zaigrali najenostavnejši štiriglasni stavek. Večina pevk na deželi poje kot ptice, saj ne poznajo not. Le eno mesto pri posameznem glasu ali skromen zadržek [pevovodje – op. avtorja] je potreben in že dajo na stran še tako dobro skladbo: »Pretežko, ni za nas, to ni nič!« In še: izčistiti bi morali okus, za katerega se imamo zahvaliti pokojnemu duhovniku Gregorju Riharju (mojemu predhodniku), glasbenemu maliku ljudstva in starejše duhovščine. Kot dokaz za to naj od stotine takšnih [njegovih – op. avtorja] pogrošnih pesmi priložim le nekatere. Ta glasbeni propad na eni in različnost jezikov na drugi strani predstavljata oviro za to, da bi se neposredno priključili [nemškemu – op. avtorja] Cecilijinemu društvu, zato smo v Ljubljani ustanovili škofijsko Cecilijino društvo.«

Witt je na primeru Riharjeve pesmi „Najslajše srce Jezusovo“ (glej sliko 1), ki mu jo je poslal Foerster, zapisal: »In tako izkorišča plese, operne melodije, vojaške marše, ki jih v izobilju niza drugega za drugim. /.../ Tukaj imamo še kopicu Riharjevih del. Vsa so pod vsako kritiko!«²³

10. julija 1878 je Foerster poslal Wittu še eno pismo, v katerem je našteval težave, ki se v odnosu do Riharja porajajo na Slovenskem. V svojem pismu piše:²⁴

»Čeprav nisem pričakoval, da boste, Prečastiti, natisnili vse, kar sem vam napisal, bom prenesel vse težave, ki bi se utegnile s strani napadenih zgr-

je tu še izhodiščno vprašanje o tem, kakšno glasbeno izobrazbo je Rihar imel in ali bi lahko napisal boljše skladbe, če bi imel boljše – kot sta jo npr. imela Foerster in Nedvied.

²¹ Prav pri Foersterju prihaja na plano argument avtoritete (on kot avtoriteta), ne pa avtoriteta argumenta. Če bi namreč privzel slednjo, bi svoje reforme izpeljal lažje, sočasno pa bi bilo tudi manj odpora.

²² Besedilo pisma v nemščini je objavljeno v diplomskem delu Lee Vidic (2007, 40). Prevod je avtorjev – v kombinaciji s prevodom Aleša Nagodeta (2007, 86).

²³ Prevod je avtorjev; original je dostopen v Vidic (2007, 22).

²⁴ Besedilo pisma (in njegovih delov) je dostopno v diplomskem delu Lee Vidic (2007, 42). Prevod je avtorjev.

4

Andante con amore. Nar slajsi serce.

Serce ni nar ljubka-rosti. Vse bi vol in da voliti! in na
 voliti! Serce ni mi groznim! sercu. Od te bi pa-vo-je-je! (19)
 Jemce tvoje slastne serce. Naj bo te, ja-je, in-oti. Vse ljubim in je-
 je te. Vse an-je-je serce.

To serce si poklonim.
 Ti serce Jemcevo;
 Ti serce, in mi Kraljko.
 Ti serce Jaguzjstvo.

To serce si pozovim
 Oh naj spoznam in te.
 Vse tebi vsek in si-tem.
 In si-tem sanja se.

©). In po vsej stvari sercu, parafra.

Slika 1: Ena od Riharjevih pesmi, poslana Franzu X. Wittu. Vir: Rihar (1850, 4).

niti name. Vsako besedo lahko desetkrat dokažem in potrdim. In vendar si bom vzel svobodo, da Vas, Prečastiti, izrecno prosim, da bi napisali kratko mnenje o slavni Riharjevih – če smemo temu tako reči – kompozicijah (!). Kajti glede tega, katera smer je prava (neki riharijanski navdušenec je že pripravljen staviti), je v zraku visoka napetost; brez vaše cenjene sodbe, ki odtehta vse, poslano ne bo imelo pravega učinka in vse se bo zgrnilo name, ker sem tu dregnil v osje gnezdo. V zvezi s tem zaupam v Vašo dobroto.»

Nobeno izmed Foersterjevih pisem, ki sta bili objavljena v Cecilijanski reviji *Musica Sacra*, na Kranjskem ni imelo odmeva. So pa Wittove reakcije dale slovenskim cecilijancem prav, in to jih je pri izrivanju Riharja še opolnomočilo. Javni prelom med cecilijanci in proriharijanci se je zgodil za Božič leta 1879, skoraj leto in tri četrt od prvega Foersterjevega pisma Wittu, ko se je Foerster odločil, da pri polnočni ljudski

maši glasbo v ljubljanski stolnici dokončno utiri v prave okvire, to pa je pomenilo vračanje k latinščini. V Ljubljani je završalo in začela se je *medijska* vojna o tem, kdo podpira slovenski jezik in glasbo in kdo je proti temu. Prvi se je na odločitev Antona Foersterja odzval Jakob Alešovec v *Brenclju* (1897). V rubriki „Rešpehtarjova kuharica“ je pritlehno napadel Foersterja, češ naj bi nemškemu jeziku dajal prednost pred slovenskim; dodal je tudi nekaj osebnih opazk – da je skop, da je slab učitelj, da mu ni za slovensko stvar ipd. S svojo vrnitvijo k latinščini naj bi Foerster spodbujal žalostno glasbo, medtem ko naj bi pri frančiškanih na Tromostovju še vedno peli pristne slovenske pesmi (seveda Riharjeve). Osebno diskvalifikacijo je nadaljeval tudi v prvih dveh številkah *Brenclja* v letu 1880, v 6. številki 1880 pa najdemo celo dodatne parodije na Foersterja.

Pritiski, ki so se vršili na Foersterja, so bili, kaže, prehudi, zato se je v njegovo obrambo odzval nekdo pod psevdonimom „Duhoven, v imenu več družih“ (gre za Jakoba Aljaža).²⁵ Ta je v *Slovenskem narodu* (23. 1. 1880) Alešovcu vrnil milo za drago. V tem Aljaževem zapisu zasledimo ponovno umeščanje Riharja v kontekst slovenskosti, nacionalnosti in državnštva. Aljaž v svojem zagovoru Foersterja pravi, da cecilijanci niso »nasprotniki narodnega petja«, da ga gojijo in ga bodo gojili ter peli v narodnem jeziku [v cerkvi – op. avtorja], »če nam dovoljenja dobitek«; Foersterja opravičuje z odgovorom, da se »drži cerkvenih določeb«. Resda o Riharju ne zavzema negativnega stališča, pravi pa, da je »bil samouk« (zaznati je slabšalno konotacijo) in da je »živel v spridenem času«, zato so njegove pesmi v večini »za cerkev nerabne«. Da bi še dalje opravičeval Foersterjevo delo, tudi on, podobno kot v pismih Wittu Foerster, uporablja argument avtoritete, ko izpostavlja Witta, ki zagovarja latinsko petje v cerkvi. Aljaž v svojem zapisu ne pozabi osebno obračunati z Alešovcem, ko pravi, da ta »napada poštenjake, kakor je g. Förster in vsa njegova družina«, da se je navzel »nove baze žurnalistike, katerej Nemci pravijo ‚revolveirpresse‘« ter sklene: »Ali je sramota hišnemu očetu, če je skrben, varčen in živi brez dolgov? Se ve da, ker sami po sebi merite, si za večjo čast štejete posedati po gostilnicah, zabavljati itd.«

Aljaževa razprava kakopak ni ostala brez odmeva. Alešovec se je, misleč, da jo je napisal Foerster (zaradi podpisa „Duhoven“), odzval izjemno pikro. V svojem zapisu v *Slovincu* (27. 1. 1880) je utemeljil, da pri vpeljavi latinščine ne gre za vprašanje cerkvene glasbe, temveč dejansko za razumevanje vezi med Riharjem in slovenskim narodom. Alešovec Riharja označi za »našega nepozabljivega Riharja«; poudarja, da je bil »naš rojak, duha našega«, da je oživil cerkveno petje »po vseh slovenskih deželah«, da ga je »narod sprejel z veseljem«, saj je uglaslbleval v »domačem – ne pa v tujem, husitskem, za nas mrtvem duhu«. Nadaljuje, da se »njegove pesmi pojo povsod, kjer se slovenski govori«. V svojem žolčnem zapisu napada Foersterjeva pisma Wittu, češ da je z njimi obrekoval Riharja in slovenski narod. Nato se zopet osredotoča na odnos med latinskim in slovenskim petjem v cerkvi (sam ga imenuje kot odnos med *husitskim* in *našim*), pri čemer se sprašuje, ali je vse *naše* zanič in je le *husitsko* dobro, ter jedko nadaljuje, da »imamo *mi* [Slovinci, op. avtorja] *svoje* skladatelje, svojo glasbo, posvetno in cerkveno« – in zaključuje:

²⁵ Iz podpisa bi lahko sklepali, da za tem zapisom ni stal Aljaž. A njegovi poznejši zapisi to zanikajo.

»Res je, na Vaši strani je Witt. Ali kdo je Witt? Nемеc, *slovarskega duha v sebi nima sapice*. Če bi mi pripoznavali take avtoritete, bi bili davno že na gnoj vrgli *svoj jezik in vse slovenske knjige*, ker so še večji nemški veljaki izrekli, da naš *slovenski jezik ni za svet*. Če bi toraj ubogali take svetovalce, bi ne imeli kmalu nič svojega – *ne jezika, ne glasbe, ne petja in nehali bi biti svoj narod* [ležeči tisk je avtorjev].«

Vojna med cecilijanci in riharijanci je bila v polnem zamahu, Rihar pa je preseigel dileme glede cerkvenega petja, saj je postal narodno blago. O tem priča tudi nadaljevanje pisanja, ki je v *Slovenca* prihajalo iz vseh slovenskih pokrajin. Na te napade na cecilijanstvo, ki se mu je očitalo predvsem potujčevanje slovenskega jezika in poskus zanemarjanja ter poniževanja slovenskega naroda, se je ponovno odzval Jakob Aljaž v dveh dopisih („Drugo poslano“ [Slovenski narod 14. 2. 1880] in „Tretje poslano“ [Slovenski narod 21. 2. 1880]), tokrat bolj milo, bolj načelno, predvsem pojasnjevalno. V svojih zapisih je želel utemeljevati pomen cecilijanskega gibanja za kakovost cerkvene glasbe; poudarjal je, da cerkvena glasba nima narodnosti in je ne smemo razumeti kot takšne ter da sta narodnost in jezik pogosto le izgovor tistim, ki izboljšanju cerkvene glasbe nasprotujejo. Kljub gorečnosti na obeh straneh se je polemika rahlo polegla že v prvi polovici leta 1880, do konca leta pa je bila v veliki meri že pozabljena.

Dilemo o ‚nacionalnosti‘ v cerkveni glasbi in o Riharjevem položaju je ponovno odprl Fran Hlavka,²⁶ ki je leta 1882 v *Slovenskih muzikalijah* komentiral „26 Tantum ergo“ Angelika Hribarja. Hribarjeve skladbe hvali, da so kakovostno spisane in da izboljšujejo glasbeni okus Slovencev, sočasno pa ne izpusti priložnosti, da bi slovenske cecilijance označil kot tiste, ki »se do zadnjega trudijo, da bi se v cerkev uvedla sama latinščina, a da bi se iz cerkve pahnili narodni jezik, hoteči v cerkvi imeti ono staro cerkveno petje, kakeršno so odobrili in določili razni papeži in cerkveni shodi« (*Ljubljanski zvon* 1. 1. 1882, 59–60). Na to mnenje se je v *Cerkvenem glasbeniku* (1882, 2:12) odzval Hugolin Sattner, ki je cecilijansko gibanje podprl z besedami: »Vsaj jaz sem toliko naroden, da bi nikdar ne zložil niti na koru predložil spev v latinskem jeziku, ko bi vedel, da je slovenski jezik v naši škofiji pripoznan liturgičnim.« Od tod dalje odzivov, vsaj omembe vrednejših, ni bilo več. Cecilijansko gibanje se je krepilo, a kljub temu pregled notnih prilog *Cerkvenega glasbenika* kaže, da je bilo kar nekaj skladb, ki se uporabljajo še danes, zloženih v slovenščini.

Če se je zdelo, da je boj za Riharja ali proti njemu dokončno zaključen, pa je tlečo žerjavico spet razpihal pater Stanislav Škrabec v svoji razpravi v reviji *Cvetje z vertov svetega Frančiška* (1884, 12:357), v kateri je poudaril, da bi bilo smiselno razmišljati o zaprosilu papežu, da naj bi bil slovenski jezik liturgični jezik. S tem bi bilo mogoče ne samo maševati v slovenščini, ampak bi umetna dilema o petju v liturgičnem jeziku – če bi slovenski jezik to postal – odpadla. Ta predlog, ki se nam danes morda zdi nekaj logičnega, je bil za tisti čas prav revolucionaren in je naro-

²⁶ Fran Hlavka je leta 1880 ob razpravi v Glasbeni Matici, ali naj izdajo „Božične pesmi“ Frana Gerbiča, dejal, da je to primerno, saj v njih »prevlada narodni duh in to gotovo ni napačno« [ležeči tisk je avtorjev] (Cvetko 1960, 237–238).

(a)

Solo



1. Pri - sve - til je ve - se - li dan, z-ra-dost - jo ga praz-nuj - mol V_ne
2. Se vzdig - ne-jo na Ju - tro-vem po - bož - ni kra - lji tri - jc, jih
3. Kot kra - ljem zvc - zda je nek-daj na po - ti njih sve - ti - la, ta -

(b)

Razglašnje Gospodovo.

Sopran ali Tenor.
Slovensko.

Rihar - Premrl.



1. Pri - sve - til je ve - se - li dan, z-ra-do - stjo ga praznuj -
2. Se vzdig - ne - jo na ju - tro - vem po - bo - zni kra - lji tri -
3. Kot kra - ljem zve - zda je ne - kdaj na po - ti njih sve - ti -

16 Orgle. pp

Slika 2: Riharjeva in Premrlova spremljava na *Prisvetil je veseli dan*. Vir: (a) Škulj (2004, 5) in (b) Sicherl in Premrl (1922, 20).

dnost in nacionalnost (slovenski jezik) dejansko postavljala nad religioznost in cerkvene norme. Seveda njegov zapis tudi ni ostal brez odzivov,²⁷ a kljub temu je bilo že jasno, da se je boj med *narodnjaki* in *cecilijanci* izpel. V časopisju je po letu 1884 na temo poveličevanja Riharja in njegovega dela²⁸ ali pa njegove kritike mogoče zaslediti še nekaj člankov (*Cerkveni glasbenik* 1888, št. 8/9:70), a spor med obema taboroma je počasi plahnel oziroma stopal v ozadje. Javno se je cecilijansko gibanje zavzemalo za prenovo cerkvene glasbe, a kot kaže objava Kimovčeve zbirke „Rihar renatus“ (1908), so cecilijanci ugotovili, da je gradivo Riharjevih pesmi za nacionalno prebujenje na Slovenskem preveč pomembno, zato so – namesto križarskega pohoda proti njegovim pesmim – raje izbrali pot, po kateri so jih predruščili, da so bolj ustrezale cecilijanskemu okviru (slika 2).²⁹

²⁷ Odzivi so se pojavili predvsem v *Cerkvenem glasbeniku* v letu 1885.

²⁸ Glej npr. dopis „Z Gorenjskega“ (avtor L.) v *Novice* (1888, 25. 7., 243).

²⁹ Take primere najdemo tako v Kimovčevi zbirka „Rihar renatus“ kot tudi v Riharjevi in Premrlovi zbirki „Slava Brezmadežni“ (1911).

Z vidika Riharjeve rehabilitacije je zanimiv Premrllov zapis v *Cerkvenem glasbeniku* (1909, 46), v katerem sam poudarja, da ni smiselno býti bojev za Riharja ali proti njemu, saj »moramo /.../ vendarle pripoznati, da je bil Rihar – kajpada predvsem glasben talent, kakršnih smo imeli Slovenci le še prav malo«, ter da je Rihar za povzdigovanje glasbe na Slovenskem storil veliko. Premrl, verjetno še s trpkim priokusom, a zavedajoč se, da so cecilijanci boj proti Riharju izgubili, dodaja, da so bile Riharjeve skladbe na Slovenskem svojčas najboljše, »danes [pa so] v pretežni večini daleč za našimi sedanjimi: Foersterjevimi, Sattnerjevimi, Kimovčevimi in mnogimi drugimi«.

5. Razprava in zaključek

Slovensko narodno prebujenje je bilo pojav, ki je do sredine 19. stoletja zajel vsa področja družbenega življenja. Doslej je bilo proučevanje odnosa do Gregorja Riharja, ki je veljal za cerkvenega glasbenika, pogosto zapostavljeno; manj mu je bilo posvečene pozornosti z narodnega vidika. S tem prispevkom želimo to vrzel zapolniti in pokazati, da se je narodno prebujenje odvijalo ne samo na političnih, ampak tudi (in predvsem) na kulturnih temeljih.

Analiza časopisnih člankov večinoma posvetnih časopisov, ki smo jih prikazali, potrjuje dejstvo, da so bili Rihar in njegove pesmi pomemben del narodnega vzpona v 19. stoletju in kot takšne tudi pomemben vir za krepitev narodne in nacionalne zavesti ter državnštva. Zato so bile kritike, četudi morda upravičene, razumljene zlasti kot napad na nacionalno bistvo in zoper porajajoči se slovenski narod. Verjetno bi bila javna polemika in opredeljevanje do Riharja ter njegovih del manj intenzivna, morda celo manjša, če ne bi bil na čelu antiriharijanskega gibanja Neslovenec, Čeh Anton Foerster, ki je bil za porajajoči se slovenski narod po mnenju nekaterih njegovih sodobnikov popolnoma neobčutljiv. Njegovo poslanstvo, ki ga je opravil kakovostno in zavzeto, je bilo izboljševanje cerkvene glasbe, to pa skladno z načeli cecilijanskega gibanja, a je pri tem spregledal dejstvo, da se je v nasprotju s Čehi, ki so se razvijali kot politični narod, slovenski narod razvijal kot kulturni narod – in da je bila kultura osrednje gibalno njegovega ustvarjanja ter političnega razvoja državnštva.


Z vidika zgodovinske analize obravnava riharijanstva in protiriharijanstva v slovenskih časopisih pokaže, da sta se v obrambi Gregorja Riharja in njegovega dela združila tako liberalni kot konservativni tabor (zlasti zunaj mest oziroma v manjših mestih), vsak s svojim stališčem, vendar skupnim ciljem – ohraniti slovenski jezik, ga krepiti in oblikovati v samostojno enoto. S tem sta obe struji, ne zavedajoč se, kaj v resnici počneta, ustvarili predpogoje za učinkovito izgrajevanje slovenskega državnštva – določili sta namreč cilje (ohranitev slovenskega jezika in kulture) in celo razvijali sredstva (npr. ideja o pisanju papežu, naj dovoli bogoslužje v slovenskem jeziku; Rihar kot sredstvo narodne blaginje ipd.), ki bi lahko državnštvo ustvarjala in ga krepila.

Končno lahko ugotovimo, da cecilijansko gibanje na Slovenskem tako ni bilo le gibanje samo po sebi, omejeno na cerkveno področje, ampak je imelo kot stranski produkt tudi velik narodnobuditeljski in državniški značaj. Čeprav si cecilijanci tega niso želeli (saj je bil njihov namen izboljšati cerkveno glasbo), je upor proti njihovem delu vodil do krepitev nacionalnega zavedanja in ustvarjanja državnštva – tudi skozi jezik in glasbo. Zato moramo, ko govorimo o državnštvu na Slovenskem, začeti misliti tudi njegove začetke in akterje, med katerimi so se – ne po lastni izbiri ali hotenjeh – znašli tudi Gregor Rihar s svojimi podporniki ter Cecilijansko društvo v Ljubljani.

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Mari Jože Osredkar

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Marko Motnik

Music in the Dominican Convent of Marenberg: in Search of Sources

Odkrivanje glasbenih virov

iz marenberškega samostana dominikank

Abstract: The Dominican monastery in Marenberg (Radlje ob Dravi), founded in 1251, was dissolved in 1782 by Emperor Joseph II. The general history of the monastic community is well researched, but there is no study of the role played by music. Information on music from the early days of the monastery is sparse, becoming more tangible only from the 17th century onwards. The convent chronicle of the early 18th century contains numerous details about nuns who devoted themselves to music. Some of them were trained singers, others played various instruments, and some even composed. The four antiphonaries of Marenberg survived the eventful history of the monastery. These manuscripts are presented to the public for the first time in the present article.

Keywords: Marenberg, Dominicans, dissolution of monasteries, liturgical music, antiphonars

Povzetek: V letu 1251 ustanovljeni samostan dominikank v Radljah ob Dravi (Marenberg) je cesar Jožef II. ukinil v letu 1782. Splošna zgodovina samostanske skupnosti je dobro raziskana, medtem ko vlogi glasbe doslej še ni bila posvečena nobena študija. Podatki o glasbi iz zgodnjega obdobja samostana so redki in bolj oprijemljivi šele od 17. stoletja dalje. Samostanska kronika iz zgodnjega 18. stoletja vsebuje številne podatke o redovnicah, ki so se posvečale glasbi. Nekatere izmed njih so bile izurjene pevke, druge so igrale različne inštrumente in nekatere so celo skladale. Razgibano zgodovino samostana vključno z ukinitvijo so preživeli štirje antifonariji, ki so v pričujočem članku prvič predstavljeni javnosti.

Ključne besede: Marenberg, dominikanke, ukinitvev samostanov, liturgična glasba, antifonar

1. Introduction

From the middle of the 13th century until their dissolution during the reforms of Emperor Joseph II in the 1780s, three monasteries of the female Dominican Order

existed on the territory that is today Slovenia.¹ In 1238, nuns from Viennese noble families settled in Velesovo (Michelstätten) in Carniola and two communities were founded in the now Slovenian part of Styria: Studenice (Studenitz) in 1245 and Marenberg (Radlje ob Dravi) a few years later, in 1251.

All three convents were founded by noble benefactors, and admission was reserved primarily for ladies from the higher echelons of society. While Velesovo enjoyed a high reputation in Carniola, Marenberg played a similar role in Styria and Carinthia. Studenice could not compete with the other two nunneries in terms of prestige (Mlinarič 2005). By all accounts, many ladies had attained a relatively high level of education before entering the convents and also had a profound knowledge of music. In the case of Marenberg, musical skills even proved to be a condition for admission.

Although the general history of Marenberg is fairly well known and researched, the scholarly literature has only briefly touched upon the significance of music within this monastery. Jože Mlinarič, in his 1997 historical overview of Marenberg Monastery, mentions music frequently, but as this is not the focus of his reflections, it is well worth taking a deeper look into the sources. This article aims to provide a comprehensive summary of the music history of the convent, while recognising that further detailed analyses of the Convent chronicles and in-depth studies on the Marenberg antiphoners are necessary. Additionally, it seeks to contribute to the study of women's orders in the territory of Slovenia.

2. The Dominican Convent of Marenberg

Marenberg is situated on a plain in the narrow Drava valley on the left bank of the river. Although it is located on an important crossroads between Styria and Carinthia, it is far removed from the larger towns, as is typical of Dominican convents. Since the Drava River was considered the northernmost border of the Patriarchate of Aquileia, the convent was no longer precisely within its sphere of influence, but in the territory of the Archdiocese of Salzburg. In fact, the bishop of Lavant had spiritual authority over the monastery.

The foundation of the Marenberg Convent in 1251 can be interpreted as an act by means of which the two founders, Gisela and her son Sigfried von Marenberg, expected to ensure their own salvation. At the same time, the foundation of the monastic communities of the new Dominican Order was justified by a revival of the general spiritual life in the region. In practical terms, however, the convent also functioned as a provisioning institution, taking in numerous noble daughters who either could not marry or could not inherit and who had little other choice in order to lead an honourable life.

¹ This article was written within the research project "Old traditions in new vestments: Musical and textual reworkings in the performing practices of liturgical music" (J6-1809), funded by the Slovenian Research Agency ARIS.



Figure 1: Engraving of Marenberg by Georg Matthäus Vischer, *Topographia ducatus Stiriae*, [Graz 1681], vir: (*Digitalna knjižnica Slovenije, dLib*).

Entering a convent was certainly not cheap for the girl's relatives. The community paid for living expenses, and although a dowry was not established by canon law, the women usually brought landed property or financial resources with them. After Pope Alexander IV approved the establishment of the convent in 1255, the nuns of Marenberg were allowed to own land and gradually increased their wealth through land purchases and especially through donations. Even the oldest known record of music practice in Marenberg is related to a gift. When a certain burgess of Maribor, Katarina Valpotič, donated two vineyards near Maribor to the convent around 1474, she set the condition that the nuns should celebrate a jubilee every year on the feast of St. Michael (29 September), namely a vigil and a sung mass in memory of the benefactor (Mlinarič 1997, 96).

After the general religious, moral, and spiritual crisis of the 16th century, the convent experienced a new upsurge under Prioress Susanna von Schrattenbach (1584–1621). A devastating fire in 1653 prompted the Dominican Sisters to rebuild the monastery almost in its entirety, whereupon a representative early Baroque complex with a beautifully landscaped garden was created (Curk 1991, 9–13). The renovated building complex can be seen in the well-known copperplate engraving by Georg Matthäus Vischer from 1681.

Dominican nunneries were usually wealthy, and Marenberg was no exception. In fact, at the time of its dissolution in 1782 it was among the richest in the Austrian lands (Wolf 1871, 79–80).² It was a religious community for the elite, and the convent seems to have been particularly attractive to the local aristocracy. For ad-

² The analysis of the financial situation of the Austrian monasteries published by Adam Wolf in 1871 is neither current nor reliable. However, in the absence of more recent accounts, the data can be used as a guideline.

mission, spirituality played an important role, but no less decisive was the reputation and status of the family, including its financial background (Kos 1996, 21–44).

3. References to the Musical Practice in Marenberg

The available sources pertaining to music in Marenberg are noticeably scant. Regrettably, there are no extant musical sources from the earliest centuries of its history, and only a paucity of records regarding musical practices. It is not until the middle of the 17th century that the number of records and their informational value become more tangible. Occasional references to music can be found in the correspondence of that time, as well as in visitation reports and especially in the extensive chronicle of Marenberg called *Marenbergischer Lustgarthen*. As a result of a fire that destroyed several parts of the monastery building, the library and the archives in 1780, the musical sources themselves have hardly been preserved; what survived was largely lost in the course of the dissolution after 1782. Accordingly, only a small remnant of the original documentation is still available for research. Without clear provenance notes such as ex-libris or other unambiguous indications, the identification of the books and manuscripts proves difficult. In any case, such explicit notes are not always present in the sources from Marenberg.

Music usually plays a subordinate role in the Marenberg archival records and is mentioned only in passing. In the consistory protocols and visitation reports it is noted that music was played on special occasions, such as when the bishop or his deputies visited the convent, at the election or installation of a new prioress, at the solemn ritual of receiving the habit, and at taking of vows. These sources usually note that the nuns performed solemn music, usually the “Te Deum”, with timpani and trumpets (NŠAM Protokoli 1718–1722, 15 October 1719; 1724–1727, 15 September 1725).

For the acquisition of knowledge pertaining to convent music and daily life in general, the extensive Marenberg Chronicle proves to be a rare and significant stroke of luck. The manuscript, preserved in the Episcopal Archives in Maribor,³ was written between 1686 and 1712 by an anonymous Dominican Marenberg nun and is a particularly valuable and informative primary source with extensive references to musical practice. The first part contains a chronicle of events from the founding of the convent onwards. This is followed by detailed descriptions of the lives and work of the prioresses from the 16th century, as well as biographies of sisters. The life accounts of the nuns who lived at the time of the chronicler and whom she knew personally are naturally the most detailed.

³ How and when the Episcopal Archives came into possession of this manuscript cannot be determined. The source is not mentioned in the Marenberg inventory lists of 1782. It was also not in the collection of books brought with the transfer of the Lavant bishop’s seat from St. Andrä to Maribor after 1859. According to a personal communication, the director of the Episcopal Archives in Maribor, Lilijana Urlep, suspects that the manuscript could have arrived in Maribor through a private donation.




Figure 2: The Marenberg Convent Chronicle, title page (NŠAM, Marenbergischer Lustgarten).

The lengthy title of the *Marenbergischer Lustgarthen* provides a detailed description of the book as a garden of pleasure and joy that offers sensory recreation, featuring a variety of deliciously fragrant flowers symbolising virtues embodied by notable figures such as the Father of the Order, St. Dominic, the seraphic Mother St. Catherine of Siena, and other Dominican nuns who have lived or still reside in the convent.

The manuscript's main purpose was to encourage the sisters and give them consolation and moral support. For this reason, historical events are presented throughout as examples of divine providence and grace, and the biographies of the sisters as *bona exempla* to be emulated and followed. The author either omits less pleasant events altogether or glosses over them, which in turn greatly subtracts reliability from the source, from our perspective. However, the record was never intended as a historical document.

Although the book is referred to as a chronicle, the chronological part is actually subordinate. It is, rather, a so-called sister-book, whose models are to be sought in the late medieval representations of the *vitae* in the Dominican convents of southern Germany and Switzerland. The sister-books had a long tradition and served on the one hand for the self-assurance of the monastic communities and on the other hand as *memoria* (Ehrenschedntner 2004, 61–67). Although mystical experiences are rarer in Marenberg writing than in older sources, its narrative form also served the purpose of presenting concepts of religious thought and exemplary action as well as essential aspects of monastic life.

The anonymous author pays close attention to music throughout the document. Music is seen as an honourable and desirable discipline which the sisters might cultivate and refine throughout their lives. Moreover, they practised it for the glory of God and, of course, for their own pleasure. Their mastery in music was considered one of the requirements for admission into the monastic community of Marenberg, or at least a considerable asset.⁴ Using Benedicta Constantia von Raumschüssel as an example, the chronicler reports that the girl was sent home to learn music before being admitted (NŠAM, *Marenbergischer Lustgarthen*, 613). In some cases, girls from lower social classes were admitted as lay sisters if they showed ability in useful work and knowledge of music. A particularly vivid example of this is provided by the description of Maria Magdalena Khöffer, of whom the author reports as follows:

Maria Magdalena came from a poor family from Völkermarkt in Carinthia and was favoured by God's grace. God had gifted her with a beautiful high voice and the right spirit for music. After she learned to sing and play the keyboard, the prioress took her into the care at the request of the girl's mother. In the convent she sang with the other sisters for nine years, always hoping to become a lay sister. But Prioress Susanna Andrian ignored the matter, since the girl was not of noble birth. Only after constant pleading by the sisters, who appreciated Magdalena's

⁴ Similar things are reported about the conditions of admission to the Dominican convent in Graz (Neschenweng 2017, 33).

musical talent, did the prioress grant her wish in 1671. As a lay sister, but not a noblewoman, Magdalena had to dine at the second table, where the nuns were served only re-heated leftovers. Since her stomach could not bear this, she was allowed the last place at the first table. In time, Magdalena perfected her musical skills and became one of the best and most skilled musicians in the community. She played keyboard and string instruments and sang the first soprano for forty years. The writer reports that this was probably due to the fact that she never ate fresh fruit or tough meat or other hard foods. God had also endowed Magdalena with intellect and dexterity, so that she was able to perform all kinds of work to benefit the community (NŠAM, Marenbergischer Lustgarthen, 578).

According to the chronicle's reports, the quantity and quality of music seems to have increased considerably during the tenure of the prioresses Maria Susana Andrian (1668–1689) and Catharina Susanna Grotta (1689–1726). Even in the years prior to the tenure of these two prioresses, at the time of Prioress Maria Johanna Linzer (1640–1668), music was highly valued, although the convent was more focused on extensive building work. At the beginning of the 18th century, at least fifteen sisters played musical instruments and many more sang. Some of them were proficient in several instruments, so that a total of five could play the organ, six the violin, two the viola, three the bass, three the timpani, one the viola da gamba, and five the *tromba marina* (NŠAM, Marenbergischer Lustgarthen, 471–472). To all appearances, the convent maintained an orchestra in the late 17th and 18th centuries.

The last instrument mentioned, the *tromba marina*, is now largely forgotten. Sometimes called nuns' trumpet, nuns' fiddle, or Mary's trumpet, it is neither a trumpet nor a brass instrument, but a stringed instrument that was often used in nunneries. Since it was deemed inappropriate for women to play wind instruments, they played something that, while sounding similar to a trumpet, was actually a one-stringed instrument. This also explains how the nuns performed the "Te Deum" with timpani and trumpets, a fact frequently mentioned in the sources.

The enumeration of musically trained instrumentalists obviously refers to the performance of polyphonic figural music with instrumental accompaniment, although, with one exception, not a word is said about the repertoire and not a single work is mentioned in the inventories. The chronicler tells of a composer who was active among the nuns in Marenberg. Her name was Maria Josepha Waller (1652–1680) and she came from a wealthy merchant family in Klagenfurt. Orphaned as a child, the twelve-year old girl's education was entrusted to the nuns. She became an excellent chorister who, at the request of the sisters, occasionally set words to music for the liturgical feasts, four of which the chronicler specifically mentions. Maria Josepha died young at the age of 28 (NŠAM, Marenbergischer Lustgarthen, 236–237) and, regrettably, all of her compositions have been lost.

Despite the destruction caused by the fire on 30 June 1780, the convent still had a collection of musical instruments at the time of its dissolution. The inventory of

1782 lists a pair of hunting horns, four violins, a viola, timpani, a piano in the nuns' choir, and another keyboard instrument in a nun's cell (Mlinarič 1997, 206; 208).

4. Musical Sources from Marenberg

After the dissolution of the monasteries in the 1780s, the inventories of the settlements were meticulously recorded and, in the case of the Styrian monasteries, sent to the provincial capital in Graz. At least three inventories from Marenberg exist, although these are not congruous with each other, at least as far as the book and manuscript holdings are concerned. The inventory of 26 March 1782 summarily lists 59 religious books in the convent room as well as six large antiphoners and gradu-als and an undetermined number of prayer and contemplation books in the nuns' choir. Due to the fire, there was nothing left in the library (Mlinarič 1997, 207–208).

After the collection of books had been brought from Marenberg to Graz, on 30 January 1783 the scribe of the Viennese Court Library, Patritius Dengg, prepared an alphabetical index according to author names or titles. These books were most likely stored in the sacristy, in the nuns' choir, in individual cells and rooms, or elsewhere in the convent. One can only speculate how extensive the collection must have been before the fire of 1780 but, surprisingly, Dengg's catalogue is still thirteen pages long, containing approximately 185 book titles, mainly of printed religious literature (StLA, R.u.K. Sach. 204, A.III, 1782, K662. *Catalogus Der Von dem aufgelösten Frauen Stift Mährenberg an die hierortig K. K. Bibliothec übergebenen Bücher. Nro. 1*). As far as music in the convent is concerned, the handwritten chant books seem to be most important:

Title	Format	Volumes
1. chant book on parchment	large folio	2
2. ditto	small folio	3
3. ditto	ordinary folio	1
4. ditto	folio	5
5. ditto	quarto	4
6. ditto	octavo	6

Table 1: *Marenberger chant books mentioned in the directory of books of 1782.*

A copy of Dengg's catalogue was sent to the Vienna Court Library, which had the right to select books and manuscripts from the holdings of the dissolved monasteries (Stummvoll 1968, 272–283). The Marenberg collection does not seem to have been of much interest to the Court Library, as it consisted mainly of religious devotional literature for prayer and contemplation. The majority of the books remained in Graz, but neither the University Library nor any other Graz institution seems to have acquired a single printed book from Marenberg. For Vienna, however, the librarian Gottfried van Swieten, requested the following units:⁵

⁵ The catalogue is accompanied by a paper sheet entitled: "Verzeichniß Derjenigen Bücher welche aus dem Frauen Stift Mährenburg für die K. K. Hof Bibliothec in Wien anverlanget werden."

Psalterium latinum, a manuscript in octavo format

Psalterium germanicum in octavo format, printed in Munich

Manuscriptum in membrana [i.e. parchment] in octavo format

Chant books on parchment, 11 volumes, folio format (see table 1, nos. 1–4)

Regrettably, the description of the titles is minimal. The successor institution to the Court Library, now the Austrian National Library, owns a large number of Latin psalteries, and it is almost impossible to determine exactly which one might be the *Psalterium latinum*. It is even more difficult to identify the manuscript on parchment (*Manuscriptum in membrana*), which is very poorly described in the catalogue. However, the mention of the printed *Psalterium germanicum* proves that the books were indeed sent to Vienna. The latter is undoubtedly the printed book entitled *Der gantze Psalter des Königlichen Propheten Davids*, published in Munich in 1629. The title page of the copy in the Austrian National Library contains a handwritten bookplate and reads: “Ex lib. bib. monast. Marenbergensis.” Furthermore, a handwritten dedication is enclosed, which reveals that Sister Maria Strobl from the Dominican convent of St. Leonhard in Graz gave the book to Sister Sibilla Jacobpauitsch in 1643 (ÖNB, 2.Z.15 alt prunk). Sister Sibilla was indeed a member of the Marenberg convent at that time. Although this is not relevant for the study of music history, it does show that the books mentioned in the inventory did indeed reach Vienna and could, at least theoretically, still be contained in the Austrian National Library today.

What attracts particular attention with regard to the musical practice in Marenberg is undoubtedly the presence of eleven large chant books on parchment. It is unlikely that such manuscripts might be lost, even in a large library, but it is difficult to identify them as the recording of provenance was simply deemed unimportant in the 18th century. The question arises whether the chant books were ever kept in Vienna or were perhaps later sold, exchanged with another library, or otherwise lost. It is also conceivable that their provenance was incorrectly recorded.

In addition to the eleven large chant books selected for Vienna, the catalogue also mentions four handwritten chant books in quarto format and six in octavo format and, if the information is correct, on parchment. However, no trace remains of these smaller volumes, either. The Graz University Library owns four antiphoners whose Marenberg provenance is obvious, but these are also in folio format, albeit written on paper (Kern 1942, 2–3; 12). Interestingly, they are not clearly identifiable in Degg’s catalogue. Another valuable manuscript from the 15th century is also a source of confusion. This German Psalter, which, according to several owners’ notes was certainly located in Marenberg from the 16th century, is today identified as Ms. 1593 and contained in the Graz University Library (1956, 369). It cannot, however, be clearly assigned to any entry in Degg’s inventory of 1782.

Of the eleven manuscripts that might have come to Vienna, research to date suggests a Marenberg provenance for the chant manuscript Cod. 1779 of the Austrian National Library. This is an antiphoner for the winter season and has several

layers of origin. The oldest parts were probably written around 1360, whereas the most recent stem from the 17th century. It is undoubtedly a manuscript from a Dominican convent (Klugseder 2014, 68–70). Several features show strong similarities with the much later manuscripts from Marenberg: the book is bound in light brown leather (like Ms. 4–6), probably dating from the 17th century, and the scroll stamps are remarkably similar to the Graz manuscripts. The first ten and the last twelve leaves are made of 17th century paper and were also written on at that time. A watermark (a sickle contained in a coat of arms) is visible, as well as in Ms. 4, but the watermark motif varies slightly. The inserted paper plates with cross-references are also comparable, although the typeface differs from that of the Graz manuscripts. Taken together, the Marenberg provenance of Cod. 1779 can thus far neither be rejected nor confirmed.

5. Four Marenberg Antiphoners from the Graz University Library

Three manuscripts in possession of the Graz University Library (Ms. 4, 5 and 6) are designed in the same style and probably written by the same hand(s). The external design of Ms. 31 is far less precise, contains other features, and was written by a different Dominican sister, probably at a different time. None of the four books has a title page, index, or commentary. Only in Ms. 5 is there a dedication to the prioress Catharina Susanna von Grotta at the supposed end of the book bearing the date 1704, but this is followed by about 30 written leaves. The scribe, who humbly thanked God for allowing her to complete this work, without the hope of any worldly reward and entirely devoted to the glory of God, simply signed her name as “Ordensschwester N”.

The Marenberg Chronicle describes two meticulously compiled antiphoners that were created by an unnamed nun between 1700 and 1704. The Chronicle also notes that the paper used in the manuscripts was purchased in Venice and that the cost of binding the books was 20 florins (NŠAM, *Marenbergischer Lustgarten*, 547). While the Chronicle reports the existence of two manuscripts, it's possible that there were actually more.

Illuminations are not present in any of the manuscripts, but the initials are decorated with pretty ornaments, always in red ink (in Ms. 31 also in blue). The intensity and complexity of the ornamentation varies and is especially elaborate in the chants for feasts that were of particular importance to the convent.

Source	Contents	No. of folios	Size in cm
A-Gu Ms. 4	<i>Antiphonarium ad Triduum sacrum</i> <i>Missae ad Triduum sacrum</i> <i>Benedictio cinerum, incomplete</i>	60	59 x 61
A-Gu Ms. 5	<i>Partes Antiphonarii de Sanctis</i> , 39 Feasts of Saints from April to the end of the liturgical year <i>Commune Sanctorum</i> Appendix, 12 Feasts of Saints, in random order	160	57 x 40
A-Gu Ms. 6	<i>Partes Antiphonarii de Tempore</i> , complete <i>Partes Antiphonarii de Sanctis</i> , 19 Feasts of Saints from the beginning of the liturgical year to the end of March <i>Commune Sanctorum</i> Feast of S. Agnes	143	58 x 41
A-Gu Ms. 31	5 <i>Officia</i> , in random order; 3 <i>de tempore</i> , 2 <i>de sanctis</i> ; 1st incomplete <i>Partes Antiphonarii de Tempore</i> , complete <i>Partes Antiphonarii de Sanctis</i> , 47 Feasts of Saints <i>Commune Sanctorum</i> Appendix, 9 Feasts of Saints, in random order	183	56 x 29

Table 2: *Contents of the Marenberger Antiphoners.*

Examining the contents of the four antiphoners more closely, one cannot fail to notice unfinished sections, repetitions, a jumbled order, and other signs of faulty binding of the leaves of the three books. Ms. 4 is the shortest and contains only the chants for the Holy Week masses and offices, whereas the office for Ash Wednesday is incomplete and placed at the end, certainly not in keeping with the chronology of the liturgical year. Numerous leaves remained blank.

Ms. 5 and Ms. 6 clearly belong together. Ms. 6 contains the chants for the entire *Temporale*, part of the *Sanctorale* and the *Commune Sanctorum*. Ms. 5 contains the chants for various feasts of the saints, though not complete, and for the *Commune Sanctorum*. The *Sanctorale* in Ms. 5 consists of chants for the feasts of saints between April and December, while Ms. 6 contains the feasts from the beginning of the liturgical year to the end of March. Ms. 5 is thus clearly a continuation of Ms. 6, although the *Commune Sanctorum* is included in both.

The antiphoner Ms. 31 is an independent manuscript containing the entire *Temporale*, *Sanctorale*, and *Commune Sanctorum*. It is hardly a cursory work, but compared to the other three antiphoners, it was compiled less scrupulously in terms of the regularity of the writing and especially the design of the ornaments. At the very end, chants for the feast of the Blessed Seven Founders of the Servite Order were inserted. Although the question arises as to why this feast should be celebrated by Dominican nuns, it is of greater significance that the founders of the Servite Order were not beatified until 1725, which indicates the manuscript's possible date of origin.

The Marenberg Chronicle describes the daily routine in the convent (NŠAM, *Marenbergischer Lustgarten*, 472–473). At 4:15 or 4:30 the first bell rang for Matins, followed half an hour later by the second bell. After Matins there was an *Officium defunctorum* and time for silent prayer. Morning mass was celebrated at

7:30, followed by an *officium* at 8:00 and a convent mass, after which the silence ended. With the exception of the break for communal meal at 11:00, the nuns did their manual labour during the day. Between 1:00 and 2:00 silence was ordered, after which the nuns continued working or spent some time in the garden. A bell summoned the nuns for Vespers, which were always sung, as early as 3:00 in the afternoon. Immediately after Vespers there was Compline and silent prayer in the nuns' choir. The nuns continued to work until evening, but spent the rest of the time thereafter in contemplation. After the evening meal at 5:45, which was usually accompanied by readings, there was night prayer and confession. The nuns prayed a special form of the rosary for the deceased as well as the Litany of Mary on Saturdays, and on Fridays they always sang a *Mater dolorosa*. At 9:00 the silence bell rang and candles had to be extinguished. Depending on the liturgical year and the day of the week, there were small variations in the daily schedule, but otherwise its regularity remained unchanged.

The emphasis on Vespers, which was always sung, is also reflected in the antiphoners. Other hourly prayers are much less consistently represented, and the repertoire of services is far from complete in the Marenberg manuscripts. Their number, as well as the completeness of the chants, varies according to the value of the feast. The Vespers are regularly contained in the manuscripts, but alongside them, surprisingly, are almost always the chants for Terce. Lauds are reserved for higher feasts. For Christmas, Easter, Ascension and Pentecost, a liturgy for the Matins is included, consisting of one and, in the case of Christmas, three Nocturns.

In most cases, the chants are incomplete. As a rule, the antiphons for the canticle (*Magnificat*, *Benedictus*, or *Nunc dimittis*) have been entered, but not the antiphons sung to the psalms. Typically, only an incipit of the antiphons is given. Only brief incipits of the canticles and the psalms are given, if these are indicated at all. The responsories, if included, usually lack the first part (a respond), and only a psalm verse appears in writing. All hymns and references to the readings are omitted, as are the chants for the days of the week (*feria*), whether or not they are prescribed in the liturgical calendar.

Some of these missing elements are dispensable, since they are intended to be repeated in the same form and can easily be sung from memory. However, the antiphons in particular, as part of the proper, vary from day to day, and it is less clear why only incipits are present. The contents of the manuscripts therefore give the impression of a rather peculiar mixture of a directory⁶ and an antiphoner.

In summary, the reconstruction of the liturgy in the Dominican convent of Marenberg at the beginning of the 18th century proves to be a difficult undertaking. Although there are some survey studies of Dominican liturgy (Bonniwell 1945;

⁶ Over the centuries many different types of Directory existed. In general, it is a guide for praying the Divine Office and the Holy Mass. What is meant here, however, is not only a calendar of feasts, but a listing of the incipits of each chant with a short text and the beginning of the music. As an example of a handwritten Office Directory from a convent of Dominican nuns, the manuscript of the Germanic National Museum in Nuremberg, Hs. 41458, can be mentioned, although it is considerably older than the Marenberg manuscripts.

Sölch 1950), the male and female monastic communities cannot be equated. Apart from local traditions, liturgical rules were constantly changing. However, based on the description of the daily schedule in the chronicle, it can be said that apparently not all eight canonical hours were celebrated in Marenberg. Surprisingly, next to Vespers, the Terce was most frequently included in the antiphoners, where it is clearly recognisable with the help of the characteristic incipit *Legem pone* (Ps. 119). This probably refers to the Divine Office at 8:00 in the Chronicle account, since the Terce was traditionally celebrated before the Conventual Mass.

The chronicler reports that a new breviary was printed around 1690 and that it contained numerous changes regarding the feasts. She is probably referring to the liturgical revisions made after the election of Antonin Cloche as head of the General Chapter. It is noteworthy that the Marenberg sisters, with the permission of the bishop, did not accept these changes and continued to pray the breviary according to their “old” order, whereupon Sister Dominica Theresia von Dietrichstein was commissioned to correct the Directory of the new breviary (NŠAM, *Marenbergischer Lustgarten*, 575). According to the 1783 catalogue, a handwritten *Directorium chori* existed in Marenberg. The same catalogue also indicates that the monastery had a breviary published in Rome in 1668, as well as the new Paris edition of 1688 (whose publication was arranged by Cloche); later, a Roman edition of 1723 was acquired. The changes in question could refer to the revisions of the *Calendarium* and thus to the feasts of the saints.

The selection of saints is certainly a curious aspect of the Marenberg antiphoners. It reflects the embedding of the manuscripts in the Dominican Order but at the same time a certain local tradition. It is not surprising that numerous feasts of Dominican saints were celebrated. Some of them are included twice in the antiphoners, others three times, but most remarkable are the feasts of Dominican saints and the blessed who were canonised only in the course of the 17th century. It is striking that the antiphoners contain only feasts of saints canonised by Pope Clement X in 1671 (Raymond, Rosa of Lima, Louis Bertrand, Gundislavus, Pius V); but they do not contain a single feast of Dominicans canonised in other years of the same century (Ambrose Sansedoni, Albertus Magnus, Margaret of Savoy, John of Bevania, Margaret of Castello, Joan of Portugal and others). At the same time, feasts were celebrated in Marenberg long before they were officially confirmed by the Holy See, such as the feast of Agnes of Montepulciano (canonised in 1727) or the feast of Catharina de’ Ricci (beatified in 1732, canonised in 1746).

The number of canonisations of Dominicans in the 17th and early 18th centuries was remarkably high (Bonniwell 1945, 342–354), and perhaps the instructions of the Bishop of Lavant, Joseph Oswald von Attems, for the Marenberg nuns are to be understood in this context. In October 1726 he issued a decree that the sisters should sing diligently and not add any new feasts: “Das starkhe gesang in Chor sole durch neüe Fest nit uermehret undt dadurch die Closterfrouen geschwähēt werden.” (NŠAM, Protokoli 1724–1727, 5 October 1726)

XVI

IN FESTO S. CATHARINÆ
SENENSIS VIRGINIS ORDI.
PRÆDICAT. AD VES. SVP. PS. A.

Immorta li. LAUDATE

Curavit agro

tos vitā mortuis restitu

it & al terius generis signa

multa fe cit.

Figure 3: The Beginning of the Divine Office for the Feast of St. Catherine of Siena (UBG, Ms. 5, fol. 9r).

6. Conclusion

The Marenberg antiphoners undoubtedly attest to the obvious and persistent presence of chant singing in the monastic liturgy of the hours well into the 18th century. Future studies must address the question of the chants themselves, for even a cursory comparison suggests that they have certain distinctive features, such as the Office for St. Catherine of Siena, where the melodies are different from those otherwise known. Since the chants are often only sketched and hinted at, and the manuscripts in particular show little sign of use, the question arises as to their use in daily practise. With these four manuscripts alone, it is certainly not possible to sing complete services. Nevertheless, given their enormous size and weight (the largest manuscript, Ms. 5, measures 59 x 41 cm), it is only conceivable that the manuscripts were placed on a pulpit in the nuns' choir for an extended period of the year and served partly as a directory and partly as an antiphoner for singing. However, there is no doubt that smaller and more convenient chant manuscripts or printed books were used. This does not preclude evaluating the manuscripts as products of a spiritual retreat. It is imaginable that a nun immersed herself for years in the completion of these manuscripts, considered copying a spiritual exercise, practised calligraphy, and created beautiful antiphoners that would represent the monastery and, above all, praise, honour, and glorify God.

Abbreviations

NŠAM – Nadškofijski arhiv Maribor, zbirka inkunabel in raritet.

ÖNB – Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien,
Sammlung von Handschriften und alten Drucken.

StLA – Steiermärkischer Landesarchiv, Graz.

UBG – Universitätsbibliothek Graz, Sondersammlungen (A-Gu).

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NŠAM, Protokoli škofijske pisarne, 1718–1722, 1724–1727.

ÖNB, 2.Z.15 alt prunk, *Der gantze Psalter des Königlichen Propheten Davids sampt schönen Gebetlein für die Seelen im Fegfeuer trostlich zusprechen* [...], München: Peter König, 1629.

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History of Protestantism in Ukraine

Zgodovina protestantizma v Ukrajini

Abstract: This article examines the history and current state of Protestantism in Ukraine. The research explores the causes and consequences of the growth and decline of Protestantism in the country, as well as the development and situation of Protestant communities in modern Ukraine. The study utilizes general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, including descriptive and comparative methods. The article finds that Protestantism in Ukraine has experienced periods of growth and decline in popularity among believers. It initially spread to Ukraine after Martin Luther's Reformation in the 16th century and received considerable attention from the elite in the 17th century. However, the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine declined in the 18th century. The second half of the 19th century saw a new period of growth in the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine, which mainly spread among the poor strata of the population. The interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s presented new opportunities for the development of Protestantism in Ukraine, but repression by Soviet authorities forcibly stopped this process. The article also notes that the beginning of Ukraine's independence in the 1990s and 2000s was a time of increasing popularity of Protestantism among various social groups of Ukrainians. Overall, the study provides theoretical significance in the systematization of the development of Protestantism in Ukraine during different historical periods. Additionally, the practical value of the article lies in its potential to contribute to further research on the role of religious searches in helping Ukrainian society during crisis historical times.

Keywords: Calvinism, Christianity, Lutheranism, Reformation, Protestantism, Stundism

Povzetek: Prispevek obravnava zgodovino in sedanje stanje protestantizma v Ukrajini. Proučuje vzroke in posledice rasti in zatona protestantizma v državi ter razvoj in položaj protestantskih skupnosti v sodobni Ukrajini. V raziskavi so uporabljene splošne znanstvene metode analize in sinteze, vključno z deskriptivno in primerjalno metodo. Ugotovljamo, da je protestantizem v Ukrajini doživel obdobja rasti in upada priljubljenosti med verniki. V Ukrajino se je sprva razširil po reformaciji Martina Lutera v 16. stoletju in bil v 17. stoletju deležen velike pozornosti elite, vendar je priljubljenost protestantizma v Ukrajini v 18. stoletju upadla. V drugi polovici 19. stoletja je nastopilo novo obdobje rasti priljubljenosti prote-

stantizma v Ukrajini, ki se je razširil predvsem med revnejšimi sloji prebivalstva. Medvojno obdobje v dvajsetih in tridesetih letih 20. stoletja je za razvoj protestantizma v Ukrajini ponujalo nove priložnosti, vendar je represija sovjetskih oblasti ta proces nasilno ustavila. Prispevek tudi ugotavlja, da je bil začetek ukrajinske neodvisnosti v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja in na prelomu tisočletja čas vse večje priljubljenosti protestantizma med različnimi družbenimi skupinami Ukrajincev. Študija ima na splošno teoretični pomen pri sistematizaciji razvoja protestantizma v Ukrajini v različnih zgodovinskih obdobjih. Njena praktična vrednost pa je v tem, da lahko prispeva k nadaljnjim raziskavam o vlogi verskih iskanj kot pomoč ukrajinski družbi v kriznih zgodovinskih obdobjih.

Ključne besede: kalvinizem, krščanstvo, luteranstvo, reformacija, protestantizem, stundizem.

1. Introduction

Protestantism is one of the most widespread Christian denominations in the world, about 30–40% of Christians in the world are Protestants (Johnson et al. 2015, 28–29). Most believers in Ukraine are Orthodox Christians, but Protestantism is also quite popular among Ukrainians. The number of Protestants in Ukraine increased after 1991, and currently, about 2–3% of the Ukrainian population are Protestants: Around one million Ukrainians profess Protestantism (Lubashchenko 2020, 100–102). The number of Protestants in Ukraine increased rapidly during the period of independence, but Protestantism here has a long history, which goes back to the beginning of the Reformation. Protestantism in Ukraine has evolved from the faith of the elite to the persecuted religion of the masses and an alternative religious doctrine. Protestantism here continues to develop and respond to modern challenges.

Various researchers have studied the history of Protestantism in Ukraine. Among the thorough works devoted to this problem is the collective work *Protestantism in Ukraine* edited by Peter Yarotskiy (2002, 233), and published in 2002. It is a detailed account of the history of Protestantism in Ukraine from the 16th century to modern times. The authors of this work outline the history of various forms of Protestantism, from Lutheranism to later forms of Protestantism such as the Evangelical Baptist movement (Yarotskiy 2002, 233). One of the most active researchers of Ukrainian Protestantism is Victoria Lyubashchenko, who is the author of the course of lectures “History of Protestantism in Ukraine”. In her lectures, the researcher presents the history of Protestantism in Ukraine in the context of European history and the history of religion in neighbouring countries (Lubashchenko 1996, 303). Such researchers as Olena Panych (2016, 55–60), Viktoriya Zaporozhets (2016, 472–473), Maksym Balaklytskyi (2017), and Roman Sitarchuk (2021, 3–6) studied the religious situation in modern Ukraine, the growing popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, and the complex religious situation in the Soviet period (Karpov 2017, 141–143).

Certain aspects of the history of Protestantism in Ukraine are insufficiently studied and require further in-depth research. This is, in particular, the history of the development of Protestantism in Ukraine in the 19th century, as well as its connection with the so-called “spiritual Christianity” at that time. The reasons for the growing popularity of Protestantism at the end of the 20th century require a more detailed study. Also, the current situation in the Protestant communities in Ukraine, their development, and the possibilities of the potential rise of Protestantism have not been sufficiently studied. Further in-depth study of various aspects of the history of Protestantism in Ukraine will help to better understand how religious searches enabled Ukrainian society to find a way out of difficult circumstances in historical crisis periods.

The growing popularity of Protestantism in post-Soviet countries, in particular in Ukraine, increases interest in the mentioned problems in the scientific community and determines the relevance of the study. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the study of insufficiently studied aspects of the problem, such as the causes and consequences of the growth and decline of the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine, and the development and situation of Protestant communities in modern Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to study the history of Protestantism in Ukraine from the beginning of the Reformation to the present. In accordance with the goal, the following tasks are set: 1) to investigate the peculiarities of the development of Protestantism in Ukraine in different periods; 2) to find out the reasons for the growing popularity of Protestantism at a certain time in different strata of Ukrainian society.

2. Materials and Methods

In the research process, general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete and vice versa are used, in particular, the descriptive method and the comparative method; as well as special methods of historical research, namely the historical-critical method, the historical-comparative method.

The descriptive method, which is one of the most common methods of scientific research, is useful because it allows us to create a general picture of past events. With the help of the descriptive method, it is possible to collect the source base of the research, conduct its primary analysis and provide an overview of the religious material. The descriptive method makes it possible to provide a general description of the studies devoted to it, highlighting the positions taken by scientists on the researched issue. The descriptive method helps to reflect the process of development of Protestantism in Ukraine in different historical periods and to reveal the peculiarities and conditions of the rise of Protestantism at one time or another. The use of this method is to create a holistic vision and understanding of complex processes in the religious communities of Ukraine.

The comparative method, as an empirical method and one of the general scientific methods, makes it possible to compare different forms of Protestantism in Ukraine and to determine which forms of Protestantism were more common in Ukraine in certain historical periods, as well as what were the reasons for the popularity of certain forms of Protestantism among Ukrainians. In addition, thanks to the comparative method, it is possible to find commonalities and differences in various forms of Protestantism common in modern Ukraine, their activity, and ways of spreading their own creed. The comparative method makes it possible to find out which forms of Protestantism achieved greater success in Ukraine, and which phenomena and features contributed to this.

The historical-comparative method, as one of the special methods of historical research, by comparing the common and special phenomena of a specific historical era, makes it possible to clarify the paths of different Protestant directions in Ukraine. Also, this method helps to compare the conditions of the general development of Protestantism in Europe and the development of Protestantism in Ukraine. Thanks to the historical-comparative method, we can trace the differences in the development of Protestantism in Ukraine in separate historical eras, compare the features of each of the eras with each other, and to draw conclusions about which times were more favourable for Protestantism in Ukraine, and what determined this.

The historical-critical method is one of the oldest special methods of historical research, which allows us to study sources not literally, but through the prism of criticism, highlighting the factual basis. The method of critical analysis consists of the fact that with its help it is possible to highlight reliable information and then based on the obtained data reconstruct reality. Therefore, it is necessary to approach the sources critically and, being aware of their origin, evaluate the vision of the problem in the presentation of one or another source. The historical-critical method helps to analyse the sources and find out the reasons for the persecution of certain Protestant churches by the state authorities in different historical periods.

3. Results

Despite the fact that the majority of Ukrainians are Orthodox, Protestantism has a long history in Ukraine. From the 16th century, Protestantism and its religious ideas spread among different social strata of Ukrainians. Currently, 2–3% of the population of Ukraine identify themselves as Protestants (Lubashchenko 2020, 101–103). The number of Protestants and Protestant communities in Ukraine increased dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s, but this growth has slowed down in recent years (Zaporozhets 2016, 473–475).

Although Ukraine is a predominantly Orthodox country, Protestantism has a long history here. The first Protestant communities in Ukrainian lands appeared as early as the 16th century. At that time, the Protestants in Ukraine were German colonists who lived in the cities of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of

Lithuania. Martin Luther's religious ideas became popular among Germans throughout Europe, and many Germans living in different countries became Lutherans. Lutheranism in the 16th century including Ukraine, was primarily understood as the "German faith" (Yarotskiy, 2002, 20–26; Chung 2010, 254–255). But in the beginning of the 17th century, the situation gradually changed, and Protestantism gained popularity among ethnic Ukrainians. At that time, Protestantism became a popular religious idea, primarily among the aristocrats of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the majority of representatives of other social strata of the Ukrainian people remained Orthodox. The policy of religious tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of that time and the contacts of its elite with the Protestants of Western Europe contributed to the spread of Protestantism among the aristocrats in Ukraine. Calvinism was then more widespread here than Lutheranism, as its ideas were more universal and not associated exclusively with Germans and Germany (Chung 2010, 254–255). Some influential aristocratic families, like the Radziwill family, were Calvinists. The famous writer and philosopher Stanislav Orikhovskiy was a Lutheran but later returned to Catholicism (Lubashchenko 1996, 50–70).

In addition to Lutheranism and Calvinism, more radical forms of Protestantism, such as Unitarianism and Socinianism, were also widespread among the Ukrainian aristocracy during this period. Unitarians, or as they were also called antitrinitarians, denied the doctrine of the Trinity. Socinianism, in turn, was a separate direction from Unitarianism. The Socinians denied Original Sin, they recognized the New Testament as more important for Christians than the Old Testament. One of the most famous Socinian-Ukrainians of that time was the politician Yurii Nemyrych, who was a high-ranking official of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nemyrych founded a Protestant school in the Volyn village of Kysylyn, which was part of the family possessions of the Nemyrychs. In the last years of his life, Nemyrych joined the Ukrainian Cossacks and converted to Orthodoxy (Yarotskiy 2002, 52–95).

In the 2nd half of the 17th century and the 18th century, the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine went into rapid decline. This period was the time of the Cossack Wars, the formation of the Ukrainian Cossack State, and the division of Ukrainian lands between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The result of these processes was the end of the policy of religious tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In Western Ukraine, the Protestant aristocracy returned to Catholicism, and in Eastern Ukraine, non-Orthodox churches were under pressure from the state authorities (Lubashchenko 1995, 99–105).

The 19th century was a time of a new rise in the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine. Mennonites became the first new Protestants in Ukrainian lands. They were German or Dutch colonists whose ancestors arrived in Southern and Eastern Ukraine in the 2nd century. In the 18th century and the early 19th century, the devout way of life of the Mennonites – honesty and hard work – contributed to the spread of Mennonite ideas among their Ukrainian neighbours. In contrast to the 16th–17th centuries, in the 19th century mainly the peasants of Southern and Eastern Ukraine

became Protestants. Also at this time, new forms of Protestantism, such as Baptist and Pentecostalism, became popular among the Ukrainian people. Such religious groups were in opposition to the official state Orthodox Church. Reasons for the spread of Protestantism in Ukraine in the 19th century were the corruption of the official Orthodox Church, as well as the spread of various currents of so-called spiritual Christianity in the south and east of Ukraine. These religious groups were recognized as sects at the state level and were under pressure from the authorities (Lubashchenko 1996, 130–145; Karpov 2017, 142–144).

A common name for Protestants in the Russian Empire in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century there was the word “*shtunda*”. As a result of this, the Protestant movement in Ukraine during this period is defined as “Ukrainian Stundism”. The word *Shtunda* comes from the German language, where the expression “Bibel Studen” means Bible classes or Bible study lessons (Panych 2016, 58–60). This name came from the tradition of regular Bible study lessons, which were borrowed by Ukrainian Protestants from the Mennonites. Leaders of Ukrainian student groups in the 19th century there were peasants Mykhailo Ratushnyi, who came from the village of Osnova in the modern Odesa region, and Ivan Ryaboshapka, who came from the village of Lyubomyrka in the modern Kirovohrad region (Yarotskiy 2002, 305–307; Cherenkov 2017). In 1860, Ratushny was converted to Protestantism by his neighbour Fedir Onyshchenko, who had previously worked for the German colonists, near Mykolaiv. Due to the fact that Town Hall was the village headman and had the gift of a preacher, the Protestant community of the village of Osnova became quite numerous, and in the 1860s, it included 35 families. Ratushny’s preaching later spread beyond the borders of his native village. In 1873, Ratushny, together with Ryaboshapka, compiled the “Rules of the Creed of the Transformed Russian Brotherhood”, which was also called the “Creed of Mykhailo Ratushny” (Yarotskiy 2002, 305–306; Cherenkov 2017).

Ukrainian Stundists were honest and hardworking; they abstained from drinking alcohol, refused to participate in wars, and also avoided domestic abuse. Such moral principles of Stundists were one of the reasons for the growing popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine in the 19th century. The way of life of the Protestants became attractive to a large part of Ukrainians. Another reason for the rise of Protestantism was the publication in the 1860s and 1870s of the *Synodal Translation of the Bible* – the official translation of the Holy Scriptures into Russian. This translation made the biblical text more accessible to people and made it possible to read and interpret it independently.

Ukrainian Protestants were repeatedly persecuted as sectarians; leaders of Protestant communities were often arrested. In 1879, Shtunda was officially recognized as a sect, and in 1894, the government of the Russian Empire banned the gathering of Shtundists. Only after the revolution of 1905 were discriminatory laws against Protestants abolished (Coleman 2005, 150–155; Wanner 2006, 8–12).

The interwar period was a short time when Protestant churches in Ukraine were able to operate openly. This state of affairs was determined by the revolutionary

era and the declarative freedom of religion proclaimed by the revolutionary governments. In 1919, the Church was officially separated from the state by the Bolshevik decree "On the separation of the church from the state and the school from the church". Since then, the activities of Protestant preachers have intensified, and new Protestant communities have emerged (Sitarchuk 2021, 20–26).

Among the active Protestant missionaries of the Interwar period were such figures as Teodor Yarchuk, a Lutheran missionary from Western Ukraine, and Ivan Voronaev, a Pentecostal preacher from Southern Ukraine. Yarchuk was the founder of the Ukrainian Lutheran Church. He studied in Germany, where he converted to Protestantism. When Yarchuk returned to Western Ukraine, in 1926 he founded a new religious community in Stanislavov (modern Ivano-Frankivsk). The peculiarity of Yarchuk's activity was that he took into account the religious traditions of the Ukrainian people. As a result, the Ukrainian Lutheran Church founded by him was more conservative than other Protestant Churches in Ukraine (Gorpynchuk 2002, 1–7).

Ivan Voronaev lived in the USA, where in 1913 he became a Baptist pastor in San Francisco. In 1919, he converted from Baptist to Pentecostalism. In 1921, Voronaev arrived in Odessa, where in 1927 he founded a Pentecostal community – the All-Union of Evangelical Christians. Thanks to the active activity of Voronaev, Pentecostalism, which until then was not very popular in Ukraine, began to spread rapidly among Ukrainians (Franchuk 2011).

The institutionalization of the Baptist community also took place precisely in the interwar period. The organization of Ukrainian Baptists – the National Baptist Union was created in 1921 in Yelysavetgrad (modern Kropyvnytskyi), Dmytro Praverov became the head of the Union. The National Baptist Union published the magazine *Baptist of Ukraine* (Sitarchuk 2021, 20–26).

In the 1930s–1940s, as a result of the deployment of repressive policies in the Soviet Union, aggressive atheistic propaganda, and the fight against religion, the intensive development of Protestantism in Ukraine was forcibly stopped. Both prominent missionaries Yarchuk and Voronaev became victims of repression. Yarchuk was executed by Soviet punitive authorities in 1940 when Western Ukraine became part of the USSR, and Voronaev was shot in 1937.

In the 2nd half 20th century, religious life in Soviet Ukraine was limited and controlled by the authorities. The Soviet authorities allowed the activities of certain Protestant religious organizations that were under the control of the government. In particular, the Union of Evangelical Baptist Christians was openly active in the Soviet Union. This organization legally published the magazine *Herald of Truth* (Panych 2016, 57–59; Balaklytskiy 2017). At the same time, the authorities spread negative judgments about Protestants and promoted the treatment of Protestant churches as sects.

New opportunities for the development of Protestantism appeared in independent Ukraine, the 1990s became a time of religious revival. Protestant preachers from different countries came to Ukraine to spread their religious ideas and found new communities. Koreans who were forced to immigrate to Ukraine during the

Soviet government have established Protestant churches, maintaining their faith. According to 2012 statistics, there were about 20.000 Korayskis (Ukrainians of Korean descent) who lived in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporozhe, Kirovograd, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnepropetrovsk, Kryvyi Rih, Chernivtsi, Dzhankoi, Simferopol, and Yevpatoriya. Before the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, it is known that about 30.000 Korayskis were active in Ukraine (Hwang 1991). Koreans have sustained their rich religiousness wherever they live. In particular, it is because religion has given them the role of a community that provides them with courage and hope to start a new life in foreign countries such as Central Asia and Ukraine. For this reason, there have been several Korean Protestant churches in Ukraine including Kyiv Korean Church, founded in 1993 by Korayskis, South Koreans, and local Ukrainians.

In addition to the more traditional branches of Protestantism, such as Lutheranism, Baptistism, or Pentecostalism, new movements of charismatic Christians appeared. In the 2010s, the rapid growth of Protestant religious communities in Ukraine slowed down. Currently, there are various forms of Protestantism in Ukraine: Baptistism, Pentecostalism, Adventism, Lutheranism, Anglicanism, the Charismatic Church of the Living God, etc. (2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine 2021; Casper 2021).

Currently, the growth of the popularity of Protestantism among Ukrainians has declined, and Protestantism in Ukraine has certain problems to spread. These problems, first of all, are related to the consequences of long-term anti-Protestant propaganda, which was carried out for many years by the authorities of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Secondly, in the first years of Ukraine's independence, Ukrainians were characterized by intensive religious searches, but now this process has slowed down. Nowadays, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Protestant preachers to find new believers. Thirdly, foreign Protestant missionaries do not always understand the cultural and religious traditions of Ukrainian society. Consequently, Protestantism in Ukraine needs new ways to develop and spread in modern conditions.

4. Discussion

Many researchers have studied the history of Protestantism in Ukraine. In recent years, the number of studies devoted to this issue has increased. The rejection of Soviet atheistic propaganda, the religious revival in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as the increase in the number of Protestant communities, contributed to the increase in interest in this problem among scientists. Scientists who study the history of Protestantism in Ukraine are divided into two groups: secular historians and authors who study the problem from the point of view of belonging to a religion. Historians of the first group consider the history of the development of Protestantism without reference to a certain religious community. Historians of the second group consider the history of Protestantism apologetically, according to their own affiliation to one or another religious group. They can focus on a more

specific issue or person that is important to their community (Khondzinskii 2018, 129–131; Kvik 2021, 50–51; Smirnova 2012, 146–148; Shileykis 2019, 33–34).

One of the most active researchers in the history of Protestantism in Ukraine is Viktoriya Lyubashchenko. In 1995, she wrote a large-scale course of lectures “History of Protestantism in Ukraine”. In this work, the researcher traced the complex path of Protestantism in Ukraine from the 16th century to the present day, and also investigated the reasons for the rise and fall of the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine in different historical periods. The author also considered the history of each form of Protestantism, drawing conclusions about its popularity or unpopularity at certain times. According to Lyubashchenko (1996, 100–104), those Protestant churches that took into account the religious traditions of Ukrainians and fit well into the local soil became popular and influential. According to the researcher, although Protestants have always been a religious minority in Ukraine, Protestantism has left a significant mark on the social and religious life of Ukrainians. “In general, in modern historiography, the opinion about the historical regularity and originality of the reformation processes in Ukraine is becoming more and more established. The reformation was not limited to Central and Western Europe but became an unconditional fact of the spiritual life of Eastern Europe,” says the author (Lyubashchenko 1996, 100–104).

Lyubashchenko is also the author of various scientific articles devoted to Ukrainian Protestantism. The article “Protestantism in Ukraine: achievements and losses” is a short report on the situation of Protestantism in Ukrainian society. The author provides statistical data on various Protestant churches operating in Ukraine and reflects on the problems of the development of Protestantism in modern Ukraine (2010, 266–280). In the article “Evangelical Protestantism in Ukraine: the search for a new paradigm of the church,” Lyubashchenko examines the current situation in the Evangelical Church in Ukraine, the rise in popularity of this creed in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as a certain decline in its popularity in the 2010s. In addition, the researcher examines the participation of Protestants in the social and political life of modern Ukraine (2020, 103–106).

Another major work devoted to the history of Protestantism in Ukraine is the collective work *Protestantism in Ukraine*, written under the general editorship of Peter Yarotskiy (2002, 337–339) and published in 2002. This work paints a general picture of the development of Protestantism in Ukraine from the 16th century to the present day. The articles of this collective work are devoted to each form of Protestantism and the history of its development in Ukraine in a certain period. According to the authors, the teachings of the Reformation and Protestantism influenced Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the ideas of some prominent Ukrainian philosophers. “The seeds sown by Protestants yielded results and contributed to the internal reformation of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. The internal Reformation influenced the work of such religious and philosophical writers of the 18th century as Feofan Prokopovych and Hryhoryy Skovoroda”, the authors emphasize (Yarotskiy 2002, 337–339).

Such Ukrainian researchers as Olena Panych (2016, 64), Viktoriya Zaporozhets (2016, 475–476), Petro Karpov, (2017, 142–144), Maksym Balaklytskyi (2017), and Roman Sitarchuk (2021, 5–8) are authors of scientific articles devoted to various aspects of the history and development of Protestantism in Ukraine. In particular, Olena Panych (2016, 64) wrote an article devoted to the process of institutionalization of evangelical Protestant churches in Ukraine. In the article, the author describes the history of the birth of evangelical Protestantism in Ukraine in the 19th century and the subsequent institutionalization of evangelical churches in the 20th and 21st centuries. Speaking about the current state of Protestant churches in Ukraine, the researcher claims that modern Ukrainian Protestantism has two main directions: conservative and liberal. Conservative Protestants maintain traditions in dress and rules, while liberal Protestants make changes in the nature of worship. According to Panych (2016, 64), recently liberal trends of Protestantism are becoming more and more popular among Ukrainian youth.

In her article, Victoria Zaporozhets (2016, 475–476) makes a brief overview of each significant Protestant church in Ukraine and conveys the history of the development of these Protestant churches. The article is divided into several parts, each of which is dedicated to a certain direction of Protestantism and its position in Ukraine. The author concludes: “In fact, Protestantism has only now received opportunities for development /.../ Protestantism has accumulated considerable experience in adapting to various economic systems, open or closed, or ideological opposition. Today, it helps Protestantism to move into new social and spiritual conditions.”

Petr Karpov’s article is devoted to the stages of the development of Protestantism in Ukraine. The author pays particular attention to the situation of Protestantism in Bukovina, in particular in Chernivtsi. The researcher claims that there were three waves of the spread of Protestantism in Ukraine: 1) the 16th century – the beginning of the 17th century, when Protestantism spread among the elite of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 2) the end of the 18th century – 19th century, when Protestantism became more and more popular among broad sections of the population 3) 1990-the 2000s when new opportunities for the spread of Protestantism appeared in independent Ukraine (Karpov 2017, 142–143). The author concludes: “Protestants had a significant impact on the development of culture in Ukraine, but the anti-reformation campaign and brutal censorship did not contribute to the elevation and mass dissemination of Protestant cultural achievements. At the same time, Protestant ideas in one way or another contributed to the elevation and development of national Ukrainian culture.” (145)

Maksym Balaklytskyi (2017) in his articles promotes the idea that the Reformation won in many respects: “Thanks to book publishing, Protestant cells began to fight for the saturation of the information sphere with printed copies of the Bible; the perception (listening and further reading) of the biblical text was individualized, becoming, in the end, a personal practice,” says the scientist. The author also reviews the development of Protestant magazines and newspapers, talking about the influence of the printed word on the spread of Protestantism among the Ukrainian people. The researcher claims that Protestants attached great importance

to the spread of literacy in their own environment. The author also emphasizes the importance of modern technologies for spreading religious teachings among people (Balaklytskiy 2017; Balaklytskiy and Shevchuk 2021, 183–190).

Roman Sitarchuk (2021, 5–8) devoted an article to the situation of Ukrainian Protestantism in the interwar period. His article reveals changes in Soviet policy toward Protestant churches in Soviet Ukraine, from support in the 1920s to persecution in the 1930s. Articles by Dmytro Vovk (2020), Iryna Vasylieva, and Vita Tytarenko (2020, 75–76) are devoted to contemporary problems of Protestantism in Ukraine. Vovk (2020) analyses the situation in Ukrainian religious communities, which were the result of the challenges of recent years. Iryna Vasylieva, and Vita Tytarenko (2020, 77–78) reveal the dynamics of the development of Protestant Churches in Ukraine and explain the reasons for this.

Other Ukrainian historians and researchers of Protestantism stand in the position of supporting their religious beliefs and consider the problem through the apologia of Protestantism. Some of these authors are Protestant theologians. One of the Protestant theologians, who is also the author of studies on the history of Protestantism in Ukraine, is Vyacheslav Gorpynchuk (2002, 1–5), who has the status of a bishop of the Lutheran Church of Ukraine. He is the author of an article on the history and development of the Ukrainian Lutheran Church. In it, special attention is paid to the personality of the missionary Teodor Yarchuk. According to Gorpynchuk (2002, 1–5), Yarchuk significantly spread Lutheranism among Ukrainians because he did not deny the conservative religious traditions of the Ukrainian people. The author also emphasizes that the Lutheran Church was more democratic and less corrupt than other Christian Churches in Western Ukraine during the interwar period.

Pentecostal author Volodymyr Franchuk (2011) wrote an article dedicated to the preacher and missionary Ivan Voronayev. In it, the author describes the tragic life of Voronayev and introduces readers to his contribution to the spread of Pentecostalism in Ukraine in the 20th century. The author emphasizes that Voronayev gave his life for the faith of Christ (Franchuk 2011).

Most Western researchers do not pay deep attention to the history and development of Protestantism in Ukraine. They mostly consider the problem in the context of the development of Protestantism in neighbouring countries. In particular, Hans Christian Diedrich and Gerd Stricker wrote an article about the history and development of Protestantism in Russia, Belarus, and Lithuania. They provide an overview of the history of Protestantism in this geographic region in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire (Didrich and Schtrikker 2013). Other Western historians who consider the history of Protestantism in Ukraine in a global and regional context are Heather Coleman (2005, 121–122) and Edward Smither (2019, 120–124). Smither is the author of a study on Christian missions. In his book, he touches on the topic of the spread of Protestantism in different countries of the world. Coleman (2005, 121–122) examines the development of Protestantism in the Russian Empire and the early Soviet Union. In her work, she also reveals the position of Protestantism in Ukraine in the imperial context.

F. Prodanyuk and H. Mierienkov (2021, 27–30) are among the Western researchers who deal more specifically with the history of Protestantism in Ukraine. The authors examine the history of the Baptist Church in Ukraine and give a certain vision of the situation in the Baptist Church in Ukraine from the 19th to the 21st centuries. Other Western scholars who touched on this problem are George Williams (1978, 41–45) and Katharina Wanner (2006, 1–21). Williams (1978, 41–45) is a specialist in the history of Protestantism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Wanner (2006, 1–21) studies the history of Baptist and Evangelical churches.

So, there are many academic works devoted to the history of Protestantism in Ukraine. Most scholars consider Protestants an integral part of Ukrainian society. In certain historical periods, Protestants played an important role in the religious life of Ukrainians. The ideas of Protestantism influenced culture, education, and philosophy. At times, Protestantism created competition with other Christian churches, and Ukrainian Protestants were persecuted by the Russian and Soviet governments.

Speaking about the study of the history of Protestantism in Ukraine, it is worth saying that the vast majority of scholars talk about the influence of the Protestant worldview on the religious life of non-Protestant religious communities, as well as on the development of religious and philosophical thought in Ukraine. It is quite possible to agree with such a statement, but it is worth noting that despite the outbreaks of the popularity of Protestantism in certain historical periods, Ukraine remained a predominantly Orthodox country. This phenomenon is connected both with the deep ancient traditions of the Ukrainian people, a certain conservatism in the attitudes of a large part of the Ukrainian population, and the fact that Protestants almost always kept their “biblical faith” which has emphasized more preaching than religious rituals. In addition, it is important to underscore that despite the changes in the public attitudes of the Ukrainian people in different historical periods, the vast majority of Ukrainians are not ready to accept too liberal religious currents and teachings, and this phenomenon is not always understood by Protestant missionaries. Thus, the problem of the history of Protestantism in Ukraine is complex and has various aspects that require deeper, versatile, and neutral research.

5. Conclusions

In the course of the research, results are achieved, according to which it is possible to determine the following periods in history, which are marked by a sharp increase in the popularity of Protestantism in Ukraine, with the definition of specific characteristics of each of these periods.

1) The 16th–17th centuries were the first period of the rise of Protestantism in Ukraine. The democratic and progressive ideas of the Reformation were attractive to some members of the aristocracy. Religious tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during this period and contacts with Germany were favourable circumstances for the spread of Protestantism. The second half of the 17th and 18th centuries was the time of the end of religious tolerance and the decline of Protestantism in Ukrainian lands.

2) Second half of the 19th century – the second period of the rise of Protestantism in Ukraine. The reasons for this phenomenon were contact with German Protestants and the activities of various Protestant missionaries. At the time, the Protestant movement was opposed to the official Orthodox or Catholic Church, which was supported by the Russian and Austrian empires.

3) The third period of the rise of Protestantism in Ukraine was the interwar period. This happened because of new opportunities that appeared after the revolution. But Soviet repression against believers in the 1930s and 1940s stopped the process of spreading Protestantism.

4) The first years of Ukraine's independence were the fourth period of the rise of Protestantism. At that time, Protestant preachers could deliver their message without hindrance. The number of Protestant communities grew rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s. As we have seen, for example, direct and indirect exchanges between Korean Protestant Christians and Korayskis in Ukraine were also very noticeable during this period, and several Protestant churches were established in Kyiv and other small and large Ukurarina districts. Korean Protestants struggled with Japanese imperialists during the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945). After the Korean War (1950–1953) they were praised by people around the world for their role as comforters and helpers for many refugees, orphans, and war widows. During the Russo-Ukraine War, South Korean Protestant churches and Korean-American Protestant churches in the United States have come up with relief measures to help victims of the war and are providing practical help. In the Gwangju rea of South Korea, a Goryeo-in [Korayski] village was used to provide a place for refugees from Ukraine to rest and live. Therefore, once this war is over, the revival of Korayski Protestant churches throughout Ukraine can be expected.

Therefore, the history of Protestantism in Ukraine needs further deep and neutral research that will reveal various aspects of this multifaceted problem. This article can be useful for the next research, which, in particular, will help to reveal how religious searches helped Ukrainian society in a crisis in historical times, which determines its practical significance.

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Intercultural Competencies and Lifelong Learning of Teachers in the Republic of Croatia *Medkulturne kompetence in vseživljensko učenje učiteljev na Hrvaškem*

Abstract: The starting point of this article is the complex European socio-cultural context, in which different cultures, customs, religions and worldviews meet but also clash. All of that extends into the educational environment, which is now facing intense challenges of multiculturalism. Schools are expected to enable students to live in a multicultural society, and that process includes the acquisition of intercultural competencies. In order for schools to successfully achieve this educational goal, they need to have quality teachers. In addition to basic education, teachers participate in continuing education – i.e. lifelong learning. The article analyses and evaluates the correlation between intercultural competencies and lifelong learning of teachers in the Republic of Croatia.

The first chapter discusses the intercultural competences of teachers as a European strategic educational goal within international qualifications. The second part explores, relying on the European guidelines and recommendations of the National Council for Education, the lifelong learning of teachers in the Republic of Croatia, which includes learning for the development of intercultural competencies. The third part is dedicated to the critical evaluation of intercultural competencies of religious education teachers with regard to initial education programmes and professional development programmes in the Republic of Croatia.

Keywords: interculturalism, teacher competencies, qualifications framework, lifelong learning, formation of religious education teachers

Povzetek: Izhodišče prispevka je kompleksen evropski družbeno-kulturni kontekst, v katerem se različne kulture, običaji, religije in svetovni nazori srečujejo in tudi spopadajo. Vse to posega tudi v izobraževalno okolje, ki se danes sooča z intenzivnimi izzivi večkulturnosti. Od šol se pričakuje, da bodo učencem omogočile življenje v večkulturni družbi, ta proces pa vključuje tudi pridobivanje medkulturnih kompetenc. Da bi šole ta učni cilj uspešno dosegle, potrebujejo kakovostne učitelje. Učitelji se poleg osnovnega izobraževanja zato udeležujejo tudi

stalnega doizobraževanja, tj. vseživljenjskega učenja. Prispevek analizira in ocenjuje povezavo med medkulturnimi kompetencami in vseživljenjskim učenjem učiteljev v republiki Hrvaški. Prvo poglavje obravnava medkulturne kompetence učiteljev kot evropski strateški izobraževalni cilj v okviru mednarodnih kvalifikacij. Drugo poglavje na podlagi evropskih smernic in priporočil Državnega sveta za izobraževanje raziskuje vseživljenjsko učenje hrvaških učiteljev, vključno z učenjem za razvoj medkulturnih kompetenc. Tretji del je posvečen kritičnemu vrednotenju medkulturnih kompetenc učiteljev verske vzgoje glede na programe začetnega izobraževanja in programe profesionalnega razvoja na Hrvaškem.

Ključne besede: medkulturnost, kompetence učiteljev, okvir kvalifikacij, vseživljenjsko učenje, formacija učiteljev verske vzgoje.

1. Introduction

In today's globalized world, the crisis manifests itself in various ways: through fear, marginalization, and the exclusion of the other and the different.¹ The phenomena of global terrorism and migration, which have produced fear on a global scale, particularly contribute to this. In Europe, as well as outside of it, we are witnessing the confrontation and conflicts of many diverse cultures, religions, and worldviews. There are no more homogeneous societies in Europe; they are heterogeneous and reflect different forms of tension, which arise from the fear of the other and the different. As Slavoj Žižek asserted, fear has become "the core principle of mobilisation in the contemporary society" (2008, 39). He believes that "political correctness represents a true example of a liberal form of politics of fear" (39). Analysing the society of late capitalism, Žižek concludes that the central human right in such a society is "the right not to be disturbed, therefore, the right to remain at a safe distance from others" (40). The Congregation for Catholic Education points out that "it is ironic how modern man has achieved important goals in knowing the forces of nature, science and technology and, at the same time, is lacking in ideas for adequate coexistence within society so as to give everyone an acceptable and dignified existence" (2018, no. 6). In line with that, Pope Benedict XVI updates the anthropological issue that requires an educational dimension, emphasizing that "a new trajectory of thinking is needed in order to arrive at a better understanding of the implications of our being one family; interaction among the peoples of the world calls us to embark upon this new trajectory, so that integration can signify solidarity rather than marginalization" (2010, no. 53).

In this type of social context, we can recognize the importance of discussions on interculturality. In this regard, the article focuses, among other things, on the following issues: To what extent is interculturalism present in lifelong learning programmes in the Republic of Croatia? Do initial learning programmes develop intercultural competences of religious education teachers in Croatia? What is spe-

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cific about the educational system in Croatia? How does this affect lifelong learning and the practice of intercultural competences?

Cultural differences, as an important feature of European societies' identities, are at the same time a source of wealth and beauty, but also a generator of lasting tensions and conflicts. In order for the resource of wealth in diversity to become the source of coexistence in diversity, intercultural education is rather necessary. That is why the Congregation for Catholic Education appeals to the urgency of humanizing education, which means "putting the person at the centre of education, in a framework of relationships that make up a living community, which is interdependent and bound to a common destiny" (2018, no. 8). To be more precise, personal development without community and without love educates for egocentrism and egoism. Edgar Morin points out that unity is a treasure of human diversity, while the treasure of human unity is human diversity (2016, 69). Even in the first pages of the Bible, we come across the "creative diversity of the other. Diversity rests in creation, in God and his unconditional freedom." (Šarčević 2021, 45) For Ivan Šarčević, "the fundamental starting point for reconciliation is acceptance, respect and understanding of differences" (46). The Bible teaches us that all people, regardless of culture and religion, stand before their own freedom in which they can accept the other as wealth, as a gift of diversity or as a threat, danger, and impoverishment (46).

2. Intercultural Competences of Teachers

2.1 Intercultural Competences – Conceptual Meaning

In the extensive literature dealing with the issue of multiculturalism and interculturalism, we encounter different definitions of intercultural competences (Council of Europe 2012; Council of Europe 2014; Perotti 1994; Piršl and Diković 2012; Piršl et al. 2016). Fantini, for example, sees intercultural competences as "the ability to establish and maintain positive relationships, effective communication and cooperation among members of different cultures" (Buterin and Jagić 2013, 3). In understanding intercultural competence, the key concept is communication with other and different cultures, which includes getting to know, respect and understand them. Communication competence is an essential feature of intercultural competence. The literature mentions, as Marijana Bašić points out, different versions of the intercultural component of communication competence, among which the most common are intercultural communication competence and intercultural communication competence (2014, 56), which are related to multiculturalism and interculturalism.

According to Erika Nardon-Schmid, "intercultural competence is an essential qualification for anyone who works with subjects belonging to different cultural systems and it therefore represents an important 'international qualification'" (Fiorucci 2015, 61). According to Moosmüller, intercultural competence can be

acquired only if one possesses intercultural knowledge, which represents a kind of intercultural base as a starting point for successful interaction in specific situations (Nardon-Schmid 2000, 31). Erika Nardon-Schmid, referring to Bernard-Dietrich Müller, sees intercultural competence as the ability to establish intense communion (*communio*) (32).

When it comes to the matters of social cohesion in European society, it is particularly important to educate people, especially teachers and educators, who will be able to communicate with different cultures, traditions, customs, values, rituals, and different forms of life. The acquisition of intercultural competence requires continuous professional development and becomes an important part of a person's self-development. Massimiliano Fiorucci, discussing the migrant situation in Italy, warns that an important factor of intercultural education is actually intercultural dialogue in which the interlocutors are equal in everything. If this is not the case, then there are, as he points out, processes of subordinate integration or subordinate inclusion of emigrants (2015, 67). Therefore, he advocates the importance of co-education, in which the culture of emigrants would also be included. That implies a dialogic education that occurs through shared relationships based on equality, reciprocity, and responsibility (67–68). During the pandemic times, we could often hear that we needed to get used to the new normal. That is especially interesting when we take into consideration Fiorucci's ideas, as he points out that it is not possible to talk about integration if it is not aware of its fundamental goal: to give life to the new normal, and that is intercultural normality (68).

2.2 Intercultural Competencies of Teachers – European Strategic Educational Goal

Although we live in a globalizing culture, cultural differences remain strong, especially in terms of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours. National and local cultures continue to retain and nurture their peculiarities in everyday life. Even the most developed societies have their own values, customs, behaviours, attitudes, eating habits, communication skills, celebrations, religious rites, cults, myths, fairy tales, short stories... The great migrations of the 1970s and 1980s, and especially migration in the last decade, have placed the issue of cultural diversity at the centre of attention. "In Europe, the immigration of foreigners disrupted the monocultural model." (Perotti 1994, 23) If we take into consideration the immigration at the end of the 20th century and add the current large migrations and emigration of non-European populations to it, it can be stated that Europe no longer consists of homogeneous societies, but multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multicultural societies. As Antonio Perotti points out, no culture is an intruder among European societies anymore. Thus, the attitude regarding the value and contribution of every culture in the construction of human civilization is a fundamental starting point for interculturalism (33).

Consequently, contemporary European schools are facing a number of challenges, especially those caused by migration and the growing number of immigrant

students in European schools. Therefore, the promotion of a culture of coexistence represents one of the more important challenges, as its development asks for intercultural education teacher training (Fiorucci 2015, 57). To the three traditional pillars of education, learning to know, learning to be, learning to do, Jacques Delors adds the fourth: learning to live together, learning to live with others (1998, 102–105). One of the fundamental tasks of education is to promote and educate students to “be aware of similarities between people and their interdependence” (104). As Bedeković and Zrilić point out, “educational institutions are becoming the meeting point of different ethnicities, languages, cultures, religions, and worldviews. The challenges of the future of the individual and society are reflected, among other things, in the structure and quality of educational systems” (2014, 112). There is no quality intercultural education without quality teachers who will be all the more competent after they acquire intercultural competencies. Intercultural education requires the identity of a teacher who will “perceive diversity as a value, who will have intercultural attitudes, intercultural knowledge and behaviours” (113). Teachers are expected to possess “intercultural intelligence that precedes the creation of competences” (Hercigonja 2017, 109).

An important starting point for teachers is the reconsideration of their own educational paradigm based on ethnocentrism. In European schools, integration is an actual daily process, in which employees and students from different cultural traditions participate. Intercultural education represents an important project in European schools. It “must inspire people’s minds, stir their emotions and lend wings to their actions. Such a vision must be convincing in its theoretical foundation, appeal to practitioners, motivate them and support them in their daily work” (Council of Europe 2012, 7).

The implementation of intercultural education requires the quality basic and lifelong education of teachers and educators. Their professional development is faced with many problems because it depends on various factors: culture, social and societal context, type of school, teacher profile...

Massimiliano Fiorucci singles out four competencies that teachers should acquire:

- to learn and adopt the perspective of critical ethnocentrism;
- to adopt the perspective of cognitive, affective, and existential decentralization;
- to be aware of one’s own role as an intercultural mediator, to learn how to mediate;
- to adopt intercultural competences. (2015, 59–61)

2.3 Intercultural Competencies of Teachers in regard to International Qualifications

Due to the constant variability and reforms of education systems in Europe, teachers encounter a number of difficulties on a daily basis: immigrant students, coexistence with different cultures, entering the world of new technologies, distrust in education policies, etc. On the other hand, “teacher education is a strategic node in the process of evaluating educational systems” (Raffaghalli 2008, 4). Fundamental and lifelong teacher education is an integral part of the school system.

Quality teachers guarantee quality education. This is especially true today when schools and education are exposed to constant changes and adjustments. This requires teachers to constantly develop themselves, seeking and acquiring new knowledge, skills, and competencies (6). Teachers' competencies are no longer focused only on the methodological and didactic area and the transfer of content; teachers are expected to greatly contribute to the education and shaping of the personalities of students, families, and society as a whole. These expectations and lasting changes require lifelong teacher education. There is a certain uniformity in Europe when it comes to fundamental teacher education (Bologna Process), yet the same cannot be said for their ongoing formation. Several recommendations of the Council of Europe (Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning a Reality 2001; European Union 2002; Adult learning it is never too late to learn 2006; It is always a good time to learn 2007; European Platform against Poverty and social exclusion 2010; Youth on the Move 2010; Council Recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning 2018; Key Competences for Lifelong Learning 2019) insist on lifelong learning. In that regard, the need for internationalization of teacher education was emphasized (Raffaghalli 2008, 13) – the creation of a common European educational area. Although the education of teachers in the European Union is the responsibility of each Member State, the complexity of European society increasingly highlights the need for a higher level of teacher education. In this regard, special attention is paid to teacher mobility in Europe. Sweden, for example, is one of the countries with the highest percentage of teacher mobility (7.3%), and in the last decade, the need for it has been accelerated due to the migration processes (Filipović 2017, 127–133).

In the descriptions of tendencies in the modern world, professional literature mentions several key terms that indicate a new “global socio-economic scenario” (Nardon-Schmid 2000, 29). Globalization, internationalization, mobility, dialogue, encounters, and relations occupy a special place among them (Council of Europe 2012, 13). An important imperative for mutual understanding is the need to adopt international qualifications aimed at educating for dialogue between peoples and cultures. Intercultural competence is central to the adoption of international qualifications. It is a key qualification for all those who have a direct relationship with people belonging to other cultures (Nardon-Schmid 2000, 31). Professional development of teachers for intercultural education should include two important dimensions: the dimension of awareness and the dimension of relations (Perotti 1994, 102). According to Carla Roverselli, the acquisition of intercultural competencies in itself is rather dynamic – it includes the maturity of the subjects – which ranges from a predominantly ethnocentric phase to a phase with ethnorelative characteristics (2016, 209). Milton Bennett proposes a definition of intercultural competence that goes along these lines, referred to by Roverselli, which focuses on the development of intercultural sensitivity, while Dearle Deardoff also includes the ability to openness, respect, curiosity, and tolerance in the model of intercultural competence (210).

2.4 Teachers in Service of Education for European Citizenship

Documents issued by the Council of Europe and other European bodies correlate intercultural competence, intercultural education, and education for European citizenship. In this sense, cultural diversity in Europe is seen not only as an imperative of mutual understanding and coexistence but as a resource of mutual enrichment among different nations. Cultural diversity in all its splendour is lived every day in European kindergartens, schools, and colleges. These are privileged places of education for European citizenship. Every type of education, including intercultural education, is based on two levers: values-needs and rights-duties of those involved in the educational process. "Education for European and democratic citizenship attaches great importance to the value dimension of education and the interrelationships lived in schools and universities: mutual respect, participation, cooperation, responsible and competent commitment, cooperation and solidarity." (Piršl and Diković 2012, 113)

Schools are places of relationships in which students discover similarities and differences. That is why the focus of intercultural education is not on content and knowledge but on people, relationships, and interactions (Perotti 1994, 75–76). Intercultural education implies teaching – teacher service – as a call for ethical commitment. And that is not contrary to the notion of teaching as a purely professional engagement. It is necessary to promote the formation of teachers (fundamental and permanent) who will be sensitive to cultures as well as open to the diversity and interpretation of cultural baggage that students bring with them to school (Roverselli 2016, 202). In the formation of teachers, it should therefore be emphasized that interculturality presupposes the recognition of different cultures' values, their promotion of human dignity, development of a personal identity that integrates the relationship between interculturality and morality, and recognition and respect of different identities. In this sense, José Luis Moral holds that authentic cultural differences are primarily differences in the way we perceive life, death, and vision of the world or different cosmovisions that integrate different moral norms and values (2012, 99).

3. Lifelong Learning

3.1 Lifelong Learning – Conceptual Meaning

Lifelong learning is defined as "all the lifelong learning activities undertaken by a person that result in the improvement of knowledge, skills, competences and/or qualifications, for personal, social and/or professional reasons" (European Lifelong Guidance Policy Network 2021, 25). It refers to

"all activities aimed at the development of knowledge, skills, attitudes and values during one's lifetime (either through their acquisition or improvement), in the context of personal, social or professional development. Such

a comprehensive concept covers learning at all stages of life and in all forms. It includes programmes of formal education (early childhood and pre-school education; primary education; secondary education; higher education; and adult education and training), non-formal education, as well as incidental and spontaneous acquisition of knowledge, skills, attitudes and values through non-formal and informal learning. Lifelong learning represents the basis for personal development and for developing the capability of individuals to continuously adapt to changing circumstances in their personal lives, in the workplace and in the community.” (Hrvatski sabor 2014)

Lifelong learning must include learning from the pre-school to the post-retirement age, including the full range of formal, non-formal and informal learning. Furthermore, lifelong learning must be understood as all learning activities undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills, and competences within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective (European Union 2002).

Council Resolution of 27 June 2002 on lifelong learning emphasizes the importance of providing access to lifelong learning opportunities to all, regardless of age, including specific actions aimed at disadvantaged people, those not participating in education and training, and migrants, as a means for facilitating their social integration. In order to raise awareness of how important it is to include inclusion in lifelong learning, European institutions have published several recommendations and resolutions mentioned in the first chapter.

3.2 Framework of the National Qualification Standard for Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools in the Republic of Croatia

The umbrella document for the development of the teaching profession in the Republic of Croatia is the National Qualification Framework for Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools, which was adopted in 2016 by the National Education Council in the form of a Recommendation. The framework provides descriptions of eight sets of learning outcomes (academic discipline, subject/ educational areas; learning and teaching; evaluation; learning environment; school-family collaboration; educational system and school organization; professional communication and interaction; professionalism and professional development) and their corresponding learning outcomes.

In the following section, we will try to answer the question of how we are developing the awareness and relations dimensions that Perotti mentions in Croatia, in the context of three of the eight sets of learning outcomes. Are teachers enabled to acquire new knowledge, skills, and competencies when it comes to certain sets of learning outcomes? Does the professional development in Croatia fulfil the need for internationalization of education and teacher mobility?

3.3 An Academic Discipline, Subject/ Educational Areas

The first set of learning outcomes refers to the academic discipline, i.e. educational subject or area. One of the listed outcomes is: "A teacher can connect other curriculum contents and cross-curricular topics with the subject he/she teaches." (Nacionalno vijeće za odgoj i obrazovanje 2016, 5) Educational expectations for students related to multiculturalism or interculturality in the Republic of Croatia are found within the curricula of interdisciplinary topics of Civic Education, Use of Information and Communication Technology, Entrepreneurship, Learning to Learn and Personal and Social Development (Ministarstvo znanosti i obrazovanja 2019a). Outcomes related to interculturality, or multiculturalism are listed in the curricula of several subjects: Islamic Religious Education, Catholic Religious Education, Orthodox Religious Education, Ethics, Sociology, Geography, Nature and Society, Music Culture and Music Art, Art Culture and Fine Arts. It is particularly interesting to see how the curricula of linguistic subjects taught in the Republic of Croatia approach the issue of interculturality and/or multiculturalism. In the curricula of Croatian, English, and French, the term intercultural competence is used, and one of the domains is intercultural communication competence, which indicates the great importance attached to learning about multiculturalism. There is no explicit mention of interculturality or multiculturalism in the subjects Greek and Latin. Some of these terms are referred to in the curricula of Italian, German, Serbian, Serbian language and culture, Czech language, Czech language and culture, Spanish language, Slovak language and culture and Hungarian language and literature (2019b). We can conclude that given the presence of interculturality in the curricula of subjects and interdisciplinary topics, teachers in Croatia intertwine the content of interculturality with a specific academic discipline.

3.4 Learning and Teaching

The second set of outcomes from the National Qualification Framework for Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools relates to learning and teaching, with one of the outcomes being: "Teachers can introduce contemporary and socially relevant topics into their teaching, such as sustainable development, lifelong learning, social responsibility and respect for diversity." (Nacionalno vijeće za odgoj i obrazovanje 2016, 7) Diversity in the context of interculturality refers to cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity (Bedeković and Zrilić 2014, 113). In general, it can be said that one possesses intercultural competences if one demonstrates the following skills and attitudes: respect, self-awareness/identity, ability to take the perspective of another, ability to listen, ability to adapt and build relationships, and cultural humility (UNESCO 2013, 24).

According to some Croatian authors, teachers are interculturally competent when they are aware of the culture of others and when they do not passively accept social reality as it is, but actively participate in it with new proposals and ideas (Hercigonja 2017, 110). Respect for diversity, which is expressed through the intercultural competence of teachers, needs to be developed and that is di-

rectly related to lifelong learning of teachers. UNESCO states that the learning and application of intercultural competences is a lifelong endeavour that develops over time (2013, 26).

In the Republic of Croatia, the Education and Teacher Training Agency organizes and conducts professional development of teachers. Among the training programmes, there are those aimed at developing intercultural competencies.

The development of intercultural competencies of teachers working in schools in the Republic of Croatia is defined by the objectives of education, and includes teachers of various subjects, principals, educators in preschool institutions and professional associates in schools. In 2010, a training programme was organized for all teachers working in bilingual schools that offer integrated language and content learning (CLIL), which means that students have lessons of curricular subjects in a foreign or other language. The description of the programme stated that one of the advantages of such learning is that this way intercultural knowledge and understanding are built, and intercultural communication skills are developed (Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje 2010). The training programme for German language teachers in the Republic of Croatia, organized in 2016, was intended to help teachers answer questions regarding the optimal choice of cultural and other elements that can mediate intercultural competencies in German language teaching in Croatia, and regarding the way the processing of cultural elements contributes to students' competence development (2016).

The goals of the training programme intended for teachers are defined in a way that describes what the participants of the training will be able to do after completing the training. In that sense, it is emphasized that participants will be able to: "apply approaches that create a classroom atmosphere in which students develop their intercultural competence and transversal attitudes, skills and knowledge" (2015), then

"acquire basic intercultural competences, be able to establish satisfactory interactions and communications with people of other cultures, adopt intercultural attitudes, knowledge and skills – better understand and respect different cultures, adopt effective behaviour in other cultures – intercultural sensitivity, develop and expand personal knowledge and communication competence through collaborations with culturally different students." (2014a)

The competencies of teachers who conduct civic education in schools include, among other things, intercultural competencies that are strengthened during development programmes and defined in such a way that teachers will be able to "help students develop human values (solidarity, compassion), fundamental social and identity values (what is personal, native, homeland, European and global identity), as well as what are the identity differences and how to treat them, what are interculturality and intercultural dialogue and how they are applied" (2014b).

3.5 Collaboration with Family and Community in the School

The last place in the National Qualification Framework for Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools in which learning outcomes can be linked to the field of interculturality is the fifth set of outcomes related to the collaboration with family and community in the school. We single out two of the mentioned outcomes: “Teachers can apply a variety of procedures to encourage family members or caregivers to get involved in the school life” [and] “teachers can show awareness of opportunities for participation in domestic and international projects and mobility programmes” (Nacionalno vijeće za odgoj i obrazovanje 2016, 10–11). When it comes to the first outcome, the intercultural dimension is present, while the need for intercultural competencies of teachers is noticeable precisely due to the involvement of the family and caregivers of students in school life.

The extended family, neighbours from the same housing estate, work colleagues, members of a particular religious group or people whose parents came from the same geographical location, all have their own ways of living in the world, their own expectations, traditions, and ambitions. In order to include them in the life of the school as a specific community that has its own rules and way of functioning, participants need to have highly developed intercultural competencies (UNESCO 2013, 12). In the Republic of Croatia, this dimension is clearly expressed in the inclusion of Roma and migrant students in the educational system (Hrvatić 2014). The Education and Teacher Training Agency, in cooperation with the “Korak po korak” Association, organized a development programme for educators, teachers and professional associates of the Kuršanec Elementary School, which is attended by Roma students. The objectives of the programme were as follows: to understand how stereotypes and prejudices are created and how to deconstruct them, to understand what oppression is and how to recognize it (with emphasis on the educational system), to find out what intercultural sensitivity is and to raise awareness of their own intercultural sensitivity, to get to the risk factors associated with intercultural learning, to find out what starting points are and how they are passed from generation to generation, to learn about the theories of group identity creation, to build a plan for creating an alliance for social justice. Several training programmes were organized at the Petrijanec Elementary School for all religious education teachers who work with Roma students in order to help them recognize the importance of special care for children of the Roma population in the school system of the Republic of Croatia (Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje 2014c). Such training programmes for religious teachers aim to acquaint them with scientific and professional elements of intercultural education that contribute to a better understanding and acceptance of the Roma national minority from the perspective of religious education.

It should be noted that thanks to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which defines national minorities and their rights, the situation in Croatia differs from those in other European countries. The official status of national minorities provides certain rights, including the right to education in one’s own language and

script. That is why in Croatian schools, classes are held in the official Croatian language, but also in Czech, Serbian and Italian. Three models have been developed. In Model A, all classes are conducted in the language and script of the national minority, while the number of compulsory weekly Croatian language lessons is equal to the number of weekly lessons of the minority's language. In Model B, classes are conducted bilingually, and in Model C, classes are conducted in Croatian with an additional two to five weekly classes dedicated to learning (nurturing) the language and culture of the national minority (Vlada Republike Hrvatske 2022). Given this legislative framework, it can be concluded that intercultural competencies are rather necessary, and given the practice, they need to be present in the work of teachers, especially those who work within the previously described school models.

The second outcome listed in the Framework "Teachers can apply a variety of procedures to encourage family members or caregivers to get involved in the school life" is crucial in the context of our topic, because it relates to the lifelong learning of teachers in a specific way, through inclusion in one of the mobility programmes. In addition to their individual involvement in mobility programmes, teachers can encourage and guide students in projects where they meet people from different countries and learn together with them as part of the ERASMUS+ programmes, through eTwinning, School Education Gateway and Euroguidance. Learning by doing is achieved this way: it places students in an environment in which they practice their intercultural competence independently, from the content itself.

Some authors note that exposure and interaction with people of different cultures does not imply that they automatically acquire intercultural competencies and does not guarantee their acquisition (Amir 1969, 319–342) but working together on a project is certainly more than just exposure. The very fact that participants learn together with their peers from different countries proves that mobility programmes strengthen some of the elements listed on the Intercultural Competences Tree, such as multilingualism, knowledge, translation, or intercultural communicative competence (UNESCO 2013, 23).

Opportunities for lifelong learning of teachers in the Republic of Croatia, in the context of intercultural competencies, are based on the European strategic documents and the National Qualification Framework for Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools. In addition to the formal training programmes organized by the competent agencies and the Ministry of Science and Education, it is possible to participate in the informal ones organized by various associations in the Republic of Croatia or those at the European level. It is necessary to develop intercultural competencies of teachers because the official state school curricula in the Republic of Croatia require the development of students' intercultural competencies, but also due to many other influences.

One of the challenges is certainly represented by the large number of refugees who have arrived in Europe since 2015, whereby the integration of refugees into the new social context is emerging as a key issue in all European countries. In ad-

dition to the importance of integration in terms of employment and social inclusion, the importance of the integration of refugee children into the educational system should also be emphasized, whereby education is seen as a basis for further learning, social inclusion, mutual understanding between refugees and the societies that accept them, the way according to employment, social inclusion and active participation in social, political and cultural life (Europska komisija 2016, 13). As much as the above represents a challenge for refugee children, one should ask how well the teachers in the educational system in Croatia are trained to teach refugee children, having in front of them certain difficulties that they may encounter, for example: working with vulnerable and traumatized children due to fleeing from the home country, having sufficient information about children's previous education, their specificities, possible special needs, the sufficiency of professional training for teachers in terms of adapting the teaching process to refugee students.

The most recent example is the inclusion of refugee students in the educational system due to the war in Ukraine. According to the official notice from the Ministry of Science and Education, migrant children from Ukraine should be provided with an opportunity to participate in preparatory classes of the Croatian language without prior testing, included in educational work in all school subjects according to their abilities, as well as evaluated and issued a diploma at the end of the school year (Ministarstvo znanosti i obrazovanja, 2022). In order for teachers to respond to this challenge as soon as possible, Guidelines, instructions, recommendations and proposals for activities designed to integrate vulnerable groups of refugee students have been prepared for teachers, educators and professional associates in primary and secondary schools (Ministarstvo znanosti i obrazovanja and Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje, 2022). The guidelines aim to raise teachers' awareness regarding the acceptance of vulnerable groups, children and young people, refugees from war-torn areas, as well as to build socio-emotional skills in classrooms to enable the creation of a peaceful classroom environment where children and young people learn to respect diversity.

4. Intercultural Competencies of Religious Education Teachers

The encounter of different cultures in today's modern world has become an everyday reality. Intercultural interaction is an inevitable *modus vivendi* for contemporary people, and the success of this interaction requires not only information, but also awareness, respect for the other and the different, and a willingness to coexist. Therefore, there are great expectations from educational institutions, which are increasingly becoming a meeting place of different cultures and languages, that contemporary-structured school curricula articulate the contents, programmes, methods and procedures of teachers that will not only relate to the acquisition of knowledge but, looking at the world from a different perspective,

break down different social stereotypes, prejudices and stigmatization among people (Bedeković 2011, 140).

Since when it comes to schools, the religious education teachers are equal to other teachers and contribute to the educational goals of the school, they are required to, in addition to theological-religious, didactic-methodological, pedagogical and communication competencies, possess intercultural competencies that will help them promote necessary confrontation of Christianity, other religions and cultures, respecting consciences and differences, to encourage free answers and pluralism of opinion (Razum 2008, 96–97). In this regard, the new curriculum of Catholic religious education for primary schools and gymnasiums emphasizes that religious education, among other things, allows students to:

“to get to know, acquire, preserve and develop one’s own religious, cultural and national identity, as well as to know and respect the identities of other individuals and groups, while promoting dialogue and cooperation in a modern pluralistic society and a globalized world. It [religious education] also promotes other knowledge and competencies of students across various fields that contribute to the realization of the core values of the school curriculum, especially personal, social and civic responsibility and competencies.” (Ministarstvo znanosti i obrazovanja 2019a)

Given the core outcomes, certain authors see precisely Catholic religious education as the subject that has the potential to be a “workshop on interculturality” (Fioroni 2006, 12), seeking to achieve this as a true place of dialogue that helps build a more tolerant, peaceful, and just life.

One of the central issues is certainly the following: To what extent are religious education teachers trained to mediate the intercultural dimension of religious education in the Republic of Croatia? To what extent do initial and vocational education programmes take into account the intercultural dimension of religious education teachers?

4.1 Initial Education Programmes for Religious Education Teachers

When discussing the subject Catholic Religious Education in the schools of the Republic of Croatia, it should be noted that the focus of teaching this subject is not only the transfer of Catholic content but also the achievement of certain goals/outcomes related to students and their knowledge/skills/values. In this sense, today religious education teachers are expected to possess a whole range of competencies, such as: the competence to achieve correlation - to be a bridge; critical interpretation: encouraging the development of students’ critical judgment; interdisciplinary dialogue and religious competence (Barić and Razum 2019, 114–119).

Based on the insight into the initial formation programme for religious education teachers at the Catholic Faculty of Theology of the University of Zagreb, we can state that there are several courses that contribute to the development of these competencies, i.e. comprehension of contemporary issues, understanding the

other and the different, which is, in turn, reflected on religious education (Katolički bogoslovni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 2021). In this sense, it is necessary to point out certain courses that enable future religious education teachers to acquire the necessary competencies: Empirical Research in Religious Pedagogy, Professional Identity of Religious Education Teachers, Pedagogy of Recognizing and Respecting Diversity in Religious Education, Challenges of Secularity and Secularism, Interreligious dialogue, etc. These courses, as well as student engagement in certain forms of student activities, help students develop knowledge, skills and attitudes that should help them develop empathy, solidarity, and cultural sensitivity. They also strive to achieve the conditions in which the basic principles of interculturalism are not only declarative, but integrated into all areas of schoolwork, including the relationship between students and teachers (Polić 2015, 449).

4.2 Professional Development Programmes for Religious Education Teachers

In addition to the initial formation, professional development is also extremely important for religious education teachers. Namely, as social, and educational changes are more and more pronounced, the demand for quality teacher training is increasing, and professional development programmes represent “a permanent professional support so that all teachers would be more successful in adapting to new educational requirements” (Mandarić and Barudžija 2019, 148). Also, professional development conducted through various institutions provides appropriate support to religious education teachers and seeks to help them accept the value of lifelong learning and the obligation to contribute to the development of the school as a learning community as part of their professional identity (148).

Professional development programmes for the teachers of Catholic religious education in Croatia, in the form of Catechetical Schools and other forms of Professional Meetings, are organized at the national level by the National Catechetical Office of the Croatian Bishops' Conference in cooperation with the Education and Teacher Training Agency. The aim of these programmes, in addition to monitoring the new challenges that the school subject Catholic Religious Education, and consequently the religious education teacher face, is to intensify the dialogue with representatives of different denominations who are occasionally active participants in catechetical schools and other forms of professional meetings. Professional development for religious education teachers of other Christian Churches is organized by the competent body of each Church in cooperation with the Education and Teacher Training Agency. When on the topic of professional development of religious education teachers at the national level, it is worth mentioning the thematic titles of Catechetical Schools and Professional Meetings that were organized in the last ten years, so that we could see how much professional education of religious education teachers takes into account the correlation of religious education and modern changes in society as well as the needed influence of mentioned changes on the formation of religious education teachers (Arhiva stručnih skupova 2021).

Year	Name of the Catechetical School and/or Religious Teachers' Conference
2012	The Topicality of Dialogue among Christian Churches
2012	Dialogue – the Path Leading to the Other
2012	The Mystery of Jesus Christ and the Diversity of the Christian Churches – Religious Education and Ecumenical Dialogue
2012	Religion and the Contemporary World
2013	Intercultural Education through the Prism of Religious Education – Problem and Perspective
2014	Community pedagogy and education for peace
2014	Intercultural Education through the Prism of Religious Education – Religious Education Student and Teacher
2015	Religious Education Classes within the Guidelines of the New Curricular Reform
2016	Religious Education Today
2016	Competences of Religious Education Teachers
2017	Challenges of Education in Faith in Modern Society
2018	Our Everyday Education – Family and Society Facing Challenges
2019	Catholic Religious Education in the Curricular Reform Process
2019	Learning Faith within Encounters with Reality
2019	Being for the Other
2019	Communication Skills of Educators in Conflict Situations
2020	Contact with Vulnerability in Religious Vocation
2020	Noticing Individuals – Vulnerable Groups of Students
2021	Brotherhood and Social Friendship in the Teaching of Religious Education in the Light of the Encyclical „Fratelli tutti”
2021	Dimensions of Christian Anthropology in Dialogue with the Present and through the Perspective of Education
2021	Religious Education Teacher as a Motivator, Moderator and Animator – Quality Communication to Achieve Learning Outcomes in the Teaching Process
2021	Religious Education Teacher Faced with the Challenges of the Modern World – „Are you close to the Kingdom of God?”

Table 1: *The thematic titles of Catechetical Schools and Professional Meetings from 2012 to 2021.*

By pointing out and analysing what has been done so far at the level of adaptation of Catholic religious education to the educational requirements of contemporary schools, we could point out that much has been done in Croatia recently in regard to developing the intercultural and interreligious consciousness of religious teachers. However, there is still a number of opportunities for involving many in intercultural work at different levels. Due to the growing changes and challenges we face every day, in the future, all forms of professional development for religious education teachers will need to be based not only on the openness to diversity, but also on its' recognition and acceptance. Subject, pedagogical, psychological, and didactic-methodological competences will, therefore, no longer be sufficient to obtain a teacher's diploma and to work in a modern cultural plural society – the development of intercultural competence will be one of the fundamental tasks of professional development and lifelong education of teachers (Bedečković 2011, 143–145).

5. Conclusion

The cultural differences that characterize European societies represent a source of European wealth and beauty, but also a possible generator of tension and conflict. Conflict resolution skills are developed throughout life and practised in a variety of life situations. It is therefore not unusual that in the context of recognizing the richness and beauties of the other and the different, as well as in the context of conflict resolution abilities, significant attention is paid to interculturality, which encompasses the development of intercultural competencies. Communication involving knowledge, respect and understanding is a prerequisite for their development. Every culture builds human civilization with its values and contributions, as Pope Francis stated in his encyclical "Fratelli tutti", expressing the desire to recognize the dignity of every human being and to revive our aspiration to achieve universal fraternity throughout the challenges of the time that has been given to us (2021, no. 9).

Past practice has shown that teachers in the Republic of Croatia strengthen their intercultural competencies through various professional development programmes. The development of intercultural competencies of teachers is possible within the academic discipline of individual subjects or subject areas, through learning and teaching of students, and through cooperation with different teachers in the school, students' families, and the community in which the school is located. The curricula of many subjects and interdisciplinary topics, on the basis of which they are taught, list intercultural competence, among other things. Institutions that conduct professional development programmes for teachers have organized workshops on interculturalism for teachers of various subjects on several occasions.

When it comes to rights and obligations, religious education teachers in the Republic of Croatia are equal to all other teachers and they contribute to the educational goals of the school, while the curriculum states that religious education promotes students' knowledge and competencies in various fields that contribute to the core values of the school curriculum and personal, social and civic responsibility and competencies. Due to all the above, religious education has the opportunity to be a kind of a workshop on interculturality. Religious education teachers are trained for this throughout the existing initial education programmes, as well as the professional development programmes. From the above data on development programmes for religious education teachers that strengthen their intercultural competencies, it can be concluded that in the Republic of Croatia, there is a level of awareness of the importance of this topic, as well as that certain steps are being taken so that religious education teachers could respond to the demands of their time and the changes occurring in society and the educational system. In regard to interculturality, contemporary plural society, as well as the modern Church, will not be able to dismiss the need for even more intense life-long learning in general, especially when it comes to teachers of religious education and their need for an even greater range of topics that should strengthen

their intercultural competencies.

Based on the analysis of teachers' development programmes that are part of their lifelong learning, we can conclude that intercultural competencies of teachers in Croatia are developed through various lifelong learning programmes but given the global changes and war-induced crisis situations, lifelong learning programmes will need to include the development of intercultural competencies of teachers even more.

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Paul E. Linzey in B. Keith Travis. *Military Ministry: Chaplains in the Twenty-First Century*. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2022. 294 str. ISBN 978-1-6667-9359-8.

Leta 2022 je ameriška založniška hiša Wipf & Stock izdala delo *Military Ministry: Chaplains in the Twenty-First Century* [Duhovniška služba v vojski: vojaški duhovniki v 21. stoletju], delo dveh (upokojenih) ameriških vojaških duhovnikov. Oba sta služila v ameriški kopenski vojski, pri čemer sta primarno oskrbovala protestantske (Linzey) oz. južno-baptistične (Travis) pripadnike.

Knjiga je razdeljena na pet delov, vsak pa nadalje na poglavja. Prvi del je namenjen osnovnemu pregledu duhovne oskrbe v oboroženih silah,¹ pri čemer prvo poglavje predstavlja zgodovinski pregled vojaškega duhovništva. Pregled je kratek in se začne z antičnim Rimom, omenjeno je tudi staro- in srednjeveško delovanje vojaških duhovnikov, nato pa se zgodovinski pregled osredotoči na delovanje ameriških vojaških duhovnikov od francosko-britanskih vojn do konca druge svetovne vojne. Naslednje poglavje analizira ustavno podlago za delovanje vojaških duhovnikov, predvsem z vidika ločitve verskih skupnosti in države, verske svobode in delovanja verskih skupnosti. Pri tem avtorja na kratko omenjata najpomembnejše sodne postopke o duhovni oskrbi v ameriških oboroženih silah. Tretje poglavje se še dodatno pogloblja v zakonodajno

podlago delovanja ameriških vojaških duhovnikov, ki je dobilo pravno podlago že leta 1775 (slabo leto pred podpisom deklaracije neodvisnosti); kratki pregled zaključuje zadnja večja zakonodajna sprememba iz leta 1956. Nato avtorja predstavljata biblično podlago za delovanje (vojaških) duhovnikov – z navedbo najpomembnejših delov Biblije.

Drugi del knjige se nanaša na proces, v katerem (civilni) duhovnik postane vojaški duhovnik. Oba avtorja novo poglavje začenjata z osebnima zgodba, kako sta doživela »klic« za vojaškega duhovnika, in kako sta na njuno odločitev reagirali njuni družini. Kandidat za ameriškega vojaškega duhovnika mora izpolnjevati sedem pogojev: formalna izobrazba s področja teologije, ameriško državljanstvo (oz. dovoljenje za stalno prebivanje v ZDA), predhodne pastoralne izkušnje (najmanj dve leti), ustrezno zdravstveno stanje, psihofizična kondicija ter posvečenje oz. napotitev v okviru priznane verske organizacije. Osmo poglavje se posveča pregledu osnovnega usposabljanja vojaških duhovnikov: duhovniki kopenske vojske, vojnega letalstva in vojne mornarice se usposabljujejo v lastnih šolah. Večtedensko usposabljanje zajema tako fizično kot akademsko usposabljanje – od poznavanja osnovnih vojaških veščin (korakanje, poznavanje vojaške organizacije in strukture, činovnega sistema itd.) do pridobivanja pastoralnih veščin, specifičnih za vojaško okolje.

Naslednji (tretji) del knjige predstavlja samo delovanje vojaških duhovnikov. Na začetku je predstavljen odnos

¹ V Slovenski vojski se za to podporno dejavnost v oboroženih silah uporablja izraz religiozna duhovna oskrba.

med osebo oz. organizacijo, ki je vojaškega duhovnika predlagala in jo ta predstavlja. Skozi ta odnos vojaški duhovnik ostaja povezan z svojo matično organizacijo; predstavljeni so tudi primeri pomena matičnih organizacij za kariero vojaških duhovnikov. V desetem poglavju avtorja načenjata »največji problem med vojaškimi duhovniki danes« (72), in sicer pomanjkanje skrbi zase. Poudarjata, da pomanjkanje pravega časa zase lahko vpliva ne le na samega duhovnika (tako duhovno, moralno kot tudi telesno), ampak tudi na njegov odnos oz. delo z drugimi (lastno družino, sodelavci itd.). Naslednje poglavje se posveča pomenu nošenja vojaške uniforme kot simbola časti in službe za domovino, kar je pomembno tudi za vojaškega duhovnika. Dvanajsto poglavje govori o vlogi vojaškega duhovnika v vojaški enoti, pri čemer navaja napotke za dobrega vojaškega duhovnika: predanost lastni veri in toleranca do drugih, osredotočenost na vojaško službo (služenje poveljnikom, pripadnikom in njihovim družinam), zgladnost, dobra komunikacija, učinkovito svetovanje tako pripadnikom kot poveljnikom, vidnost in stalna prisotnost med ljudmi. Trinajsto poglavje govori o pomenu verske podporne ekipe (v sklopu delovanja v vojaški enoti), pri čemer »vojaški duhovnik predstavlja etiko in moralo, ustavo in samega« v odnosu do poveljnika, ki ima višji čin od vojaškega duhovnika – a ima slednji še vedno dolžnost, da poveljniku svetuje, tudi če ga ta ne upošteva, ignorira itd. Naslednje poglavje se posveča vsem nalogam vojaških duhovnikov; pri tem avtorja izpostavljata, da vojaški duhovnik istočasno odgovarja več predstojnikom: poveljniku enote, v kateri je lociran, načelniku vojaških

duhovnikov in nenazadnje svoje matični organizaciji (npr. škofu). Posledično »dober vojaški duhovnik nima avtoritete, ampak le veliko vpliva. To je dovolj, da dokonča naloge, dosega izjemne rezultate in da ima zgledno kariero.« (str. 109–110) V 15. poglavju avtorja opozarjata na pomembno dolžnost vojaških duhovnikov glede oskrbe družin pripadnikov vojske. To je pomembno zlasti za ameriške oborožene sile, ki pripadnike na 2–3 leta premeščajo po vsem svetu, kjer živijo v vojaških bazah, pri čemer vojaški duhovniki predstavljajo pomembno vez tako s civilnim življenjem kot tudi z versko skupnostjo, ki ji pripadajo. Sledi poglavje o pomenu verskega pluralizma in verske svobode, pa tudi vplivu teh družbenih konceptov na delovanje vojaških duhovnikov. Vojaški duhovniki se tako vsak dan srečujejo z drugače verujočimi ali neverujočimi, pri čemer morajo upoštevati in spoštovati njihov nazor: »Del službe vojaškega duhovnika je zagotoviti, da je vsaka oseba v oboroženih silah deležna iste verske svobode, ne glede na to, kaj veruje.« (str. 123) V sklopu vojaške kariere morajo vojaški duhovniki skrbeti tako za osebnostni kot profesionalni razvoj, kar avtorja predstavljata v 17. poglavju. V ameriških oboroženih silah imajo vojaški duhovniki na voljo vseživljenjsko usposabljanje (predavanja, seminarje, usposabljanja), poslužujejo pa se tudi civilnih programov. V naslednjem poglavju se avtorja posvečata posebnemu položaju vojaških duhovnikov v rezervi oz. v sestavi nacionalne garde in temu, kako se njihova služba razlikuje od vojaških duhovnikov v aktivni sestavi. 19. poglavje govori o pomenu osebne urejenosti vojaških duhovnikov v smislu skrbi za ustrezno dokumentacijo in bi-

rokratske postopke, saj istočasno pripadajo dvema organizacijama (vojaški in verski) z lastnimi postopki in birokracijo. Naslednje poglavje je namenjeno kratkemu pregledu odklonskosti vojaških duhovnikov – nekateri končajo tudi v vojaškem zaporu. Zadnje poglavje tretjega dela pa poudarja, da je pomembno, da imajo vojaški duhovniki tudi lastne interese, prostočasne aktivnosti, kjer se lahko sprostijo in s tem poskrbijo zase – posledično pa za druge vojaške pripadnike, ki jih oskrbujejo.

Četrty del obravnavane knjige se poglablja v smotrnost delovanja vojaških duhovnikov, predvsem z vidika njihovih duhovnih uspehov. 23. poglavje tako govori o inkarnacijski prisotnosti vojaškega duhovnika znotraj vojaške organizacije oz. enote, pri čemer so vojaški duhovniki »predstavniki Gospoda, kar je izjemna čast in odgovornost.« (str. 169) Zato je pomembno, da je osebno življenje vojaškega duhovnika urejeno, strukturirano, saj lahko svoje dolžnosti le tako izvaja uspešno, predano in učinkovito. Naslednje poglavje se nanaša na duhovno disciplino vojaških duhovnikov, ki se krepi in utrjuje s študijem verske literature, (prostovoljnimi) posti, meditacijo, delovanjem v tišini in samoti itd. Pri tem avtorja poudarjata, kako so določene dejavnosti za vojaške duhovnike glede na naravo njihovega dela manj primerne. A poglavitna naloga vojaških duhovnikov je še vedno pastoralna dejavnost med verujočimi, čemur je posvečeno 25. poglavje. Vojaška pastora temelji na prisotnost vojaških duhovnikov sredi drugih pripadnikov, pri čemer morajo vojaški duhovniki k navezovanju stikov pristopati predvsem prijateljsko in pri tem biti zgled drugim – tudi z duhovno disciplino (skozi katero

utrjujejo svoj odnos z Gospodom). Kako vojaški duhovniki dejansko »delujejo«, je odvisno od osebnosti duhovnika, zmožnosti in priložnosti za tako delovanje: od tedenskega bogoslužja, programa verskega izobraževanja, pisanja glasila, svetovanja na štiri oči, molitve na terenu itd.

Peti del govori o prihodnosti vojaškega duhovništva. 26. poglavje tako poudarja, da mora krščansko duhovništvo upoštevati razvoj (sodobne) družbe (preko antropologije) in svoje delovanje sodobni družbi tudi prilagoditi. Kljub temu se bodo vojaški duhovniki pri svojem delovanju soočali s težavami: od (ideoloških/verskih) sporov z drugimi duhovniki ali pripadniki, upoštevanja zakonodaje, ki je v nasprotju z versko doktrino (npr. vprašanje LGBTQ), odkrtega spreobračanja (drugih/ne-)verujočih, prilagoditve verskih obredov (oz. le splošnih nagovorov) za širšo javnost do dvojne pripadnosti, delovanja vojaških duhovnikov v podporo vojaških aktivnostih in vojn itd. V naslednjem poglavju avtorja podrobneje analizirata vprašanje raznolikosti in spoštovanja drugih znotraj vojaške organizacije (LGBTQ, razizem itd.), pa tudi zagotavljanja duhovne oskrbe za take osebe. 29. poglavje zajema različna priporočila za krščanske duhovnike, vpete v religiozno duhovno oskrbo v oboroženih silah: a) razumevanje biblične teologije in njena uporaba v duhovni oskrbi; b) spoštovanje ustave; c) vojaški duhovnik je duhovni voditelj vojaške enote, zaradi česar mora biti zgled drugim; d) naj ne pozabi na svoje bližnje in družino; e) zavedanje, da je član ekipe oz. hkrati član več ekip/organizacij; f) razumevanje dvojne vloge vojaških duhovnikov (hkrati duhovnik in pripadnik štaba); g) »vse delajte v ime-

nu Gospoda Jezusa in se po njem zahvaljujte Bogu Očetu.« (Kol 3,17) Zadnje poglavje knjige je posvečeno usodi vojaškega duhovništva, pri čemer morajo »krščanski duhovniki, ki so bili poklicani k službi kot vojaški duhovniki, razumeti, kako v takem okolju preživeti in uspevati; razumeti pravila, pravilnike in navodila; sprejeti predloge, predstavljene v prejšnjem poglavju.« (str. 231)

Predstavljena knjiga, delo dveh upokojenih vojaških duhovnikov in univerzitetnih predavateljev, je napisana v poljudnem (in ne znanstvenem) slogu, pri čemer je večina poglavij obogatenih še z osebnimi izkušnjami obeh avtorjev ter drugih vojaških duhovnikov. Posledično je knjiga razumljiva tudi za splošno javnost, a vseeno predstavlja pomembno delo za razumevanje delovanja vojaških duhovnikov. A prvenstveno je knjiga namenjena kandidatom za vojaške duhov-

nike in vojaškim duhovnikom, ki v ameriških oboroženih silah že delujejo.

Za slovenske vojaške duhovnike, proučevalce religiozne duhovne oskrbe, pa tudi za širšo javnost je knjiga zanimiva predvsem v smislu zgleada – kot možnost oblikovanja podobne publikacije, prilagojene slovenskim razmeram. Dejstvo je, da je religiozna duhovna oskrba v Slovenski vojski prisotna le nekaj desetletij, a v tem času je v vrstah Slovenske vojske delovalo že več duhovnikov katoliške in luteranske veroizpovedi, ki bi lahko skupaj ustvarili podobno publikacijo. Taka publikacija bi bila tudi dobrodošla za boljše razumevanje delovanja vojaških duhovnikov, ki so razpeti med versko in vojaško organizacijo ter glede načina svojega delovanja nenehno pod pritiskom širše družbe.

Klemen Kocjančič

Božja liturgija Janeza Zlatoustega in božja liturgija Bazilija Velikega. Bizantinsko-slovanski obred, rutenska recenzija, slovenski prevod. Ljubljana: KUD Logos; Križevci: Ordinariat Križevske eparhije, 2023. 215 str. ISBN 978-961-7155-16-7.

Leta 2023 je slovenski kulturni prostor obogatil nov in celovit prevod temeljnega liturgičnega besedila pravoslavnih in grkokatoliških Cerkev s preprostimi in povednim začetnim naslovom – *Božja liturgija*. Gre za slovensko poljudno izdajo grško-slovanskega oziroma bizantinsko-slovanskega obreda v dveh klasičnih oblikah, polno imenovanih »božja liturgija svetega Janeza Zlato-

ustega« in »božja liturgija svetega Bazilija Velikega«. Ob tem je smiselno izpostaviti, da se je grško liturgično izročilo v srednjem veku razširilo v slovanske dežele in danes predstavlja večinski del vzhodnokrščanske obredne dediščine. Čeprav ima omenjena liturgija nesporno antične korenine, je glavnino svoje sedanje podobe dobila v 10. stoletju; sledile so dodatne prvine iz 14. stoletja, ki so poudarile njeno meniško-mistično obarvanost. Prvemu navedenemu obredu je pripisovana povezava s pridigarsko avtoriteto konstantinopelskega škofa Janeza Zlatoustega ali Krizostoma (347–407), drugega pa opredeljuje ugled meniškega reformatorja Bazilija Velikega (329–379). Božja liturgija v svojih dveh

klasičnih oblikah velja za enega osrednjih besedil celotnega krščanstva. Novi prevod v slovenščino je obenem prvi, ki ga je odobrila pristojna cerkvena avtoriteta – tako papeški Dikasterij za vzhodne Cerkve v Rimu kot tudi Milan Stipić, vladika (škof) grkokatoliške eparhije s središčem v Križevcih na Hrvaškem, ki med drugim pokriva celotno ozemlje Slovenije. Prevod pomeni v slovenskem verskem in kulturnem prostoru preboj. Nastal je pod vodstvom in uredništvom frančiškana Jana Dominika Bogataja s Teološke fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani – ob sodelovanju skupine strokovnjakov s področja teologije, zgodovinarjev in jezikoslovcev. Poljudna izdaja, za katero stojita uveljavljena založba KUD Logos in križevska eparhija, prispeva k duhovni, študijski in praktični rabi liturgične dediščine. S tem deluje kot ekumenski most med rimokatoliškim, grkokatoliškim in pravoslavnim okoljem. Grško-slovanski obred bo odslej mogoče namensko in zanesljivo izvajati tudi v slovenščini.

Liturgija Janeza Zlatoustega je bila pred tem v slovenščino prevedena dvakrat. Prvič leta 1933 z najosnovnejšim naborom besedila, izdanim ob gostovanju grkokatoliškega Ciril-Methodovega zbora iz Zagreba v Ljubljani. Strokovno neoporečnost je prevodu zagotovil Franc Grivec (1878–1963), profesor ekleziologije in vzhodne teologije na takratni ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti, ki je bil verjetno tudi (glavni) prevajalec, cerkveno potrditev izdaje (*imprimatur*) pa je prispeval generalni vikar ljubljanske škofije Ignacij Nadrah (1868–1951). Drugi prevod je sledil leta 1965, ko so trije nekdanji študentje Papeškega vzhodnega inštituta v Rimu in gojenci tamkajšnjega Ruskega kolegija – Jože Markuža (1939–2019), Anton Koren (1910–1985) in Stan-

ko Janežič (1920–2010) – v Trstu izdali knjižico z naslovom *Božja liturgija sv. Janeza Zlatoustega in sv. Vasilija Velikega*. Strokovni pregled (*nihil obstat*) je opravil Jakob Ukmar (1878–1971), cerkveni pravnik in znameniti narodnoobrambni delavec za Slovence v Italiji, *imprimatur* pa je prispeval takratni tržaški generalni vikar Fortunato Fornasaro. Po devetdesetih letih od prvega prevoda v slovenščino tako sledi tretji prevod, ki poleg liturgije Janeza Zlatoustega vključuje liturgijo Bazilija Velikega. Zanimivo je, da tokratna izdaja prvič dosledno sledi ‚rutenški recenziji‘, to je standardni grkokatoliški različici besedila v cerkveni slovanščini, urejeni na prehodu iz 16. v 17. stoletje na ozemlju današnje Ukrajine in Belorusije. Prvič so v slovenščino prevedeni tudi simbolno bogati spevi (troparji in kondaki) za dvanajst velikih praznikov po grškem liturgičnem koledarju. Zadnji del knjige sestavlja dvojezični (cerkvenoslovansko-slovenski) dodatek z glavnimi in stalnimi deli obeh klasičnih oblik liturgije; njegov namen je omogočiti lažje spremljanje obrednega toka za tiste, ki ga niso vajeni. Poleg Jana Dominika Bogataja so pri izdaji strokovno sodelovali ljubljanski grkokatoliški paroh in ikonopisec Mihajlo Jozafat Hardi, teolog in duhovnik z dovoljenjem opravljanja vzhodnega obreda Janez Potisek ter teolog Aljoša Kodba; prevod je recenziral rusist, zgodovinar in teolog Simon Malmenvall, sodelavec Teološke fakultete in Slovenskega šolskega muzeja. Obravnavani poljudni prevod liturgije, prepoznaven po začetnem naslovu *Božja liturgija*, spremljata dva vsebinsko neposredno povezana zvezka: besedilno skoraj identična izdaja z naslovom *Služebnik*, namenjena zlasti duhovnikom in sodelavcem pri obhajanju liturgije; glasbena izdaja, ki vsebuje

notacijo za štiriglasni (moški) zbor in za solista, prilagojeno slovenskemu besedilu liturgije Janeza Zlatoustega. To je kot urednica sooblikovala Cecilija Oblonšek, strokovnjakinja za cerkveno glasbo in sodelavka Teološke fakultete.

Z mislijo na dostopnost širši javnosti novi slovenski prevod vzhodne liturgije uvaja dovolj obsežna in poljudno zasnovana spremna beseda o zgradbi, zgodovini ter teološkem okviru danih obredov. Tu je izpostavljena misel, da liturgija in z njo slovenski prevod ne pomeni toliko ‚scenarija‘ ali priročnika za duhovnika s sodelavci, kako naj posamezna obredna dejanja izvajajo, temveč vsebuje predvsem zgoščeno in v molitvi preizkušeno teologijo stoletij – iz česar sledi, da je liturgija učiteljica vere in molitve. Njena skrbno izoblikovana zunanost tako deluje kot prenašalka bogatega vsebinskega sporočila, ki se ne izčrpa v ponavljanju besed in dejanj, temveč kliče k vedno globljemu premišljevanju in doživljanju. Ena od jezikovno vidnejših značilnosti obravnavanega prevoda so nekateri splošnejši in starejši slovanski izrazi, ki v sodobni slovenščini sprva zvenijo tuje ali nenavadno, denimo ‚hram‘ (cerkev, svetišče), ‚svečenik‘ (duhovnik), ‚Vsedržitelj‘ (Pantokrator, Vladar vseh in vsega). Po eni strani lahko te in podobne prevodne rešitve pomenijo nedokončano delo, ki ne upošteva ustaljene slovenske govornice, po drugi strani pa je v njih mogoče prepoznati zavestno odločitev in določeno obliko ustvarjalnosti, ki v sodobni slovenščini utrjuje vzhodno-krščansko izrazoslovje in ji tako odpira nova jezikovna obzorja, ki ustrezajo tako predstavljeni snovi kot tudi slogovnemu kontekstu. Obravnavani prevod ni in ne želi biti znanstvenokritična izdaja, v kateri bi bili odlomki vzporedno postavljenega cer-

kvenoslovansko-slovenskega besedila natančno komentirani. Ta naloga ostaja na voljo za morebitne prihodnje načrte. Posebej vredno je omeniti, da osnova, iz katere prevod izhaja, ni grško besedilo obeh klasičnih oblik vzhodne liturgije, temveč njegova slovanska različica, ki zaradi svoje razširjenosti in daljnosežnega vpliva na sodobne slovanske jezike predstavlja razmeroma samostojno izročilo. Zunanja in konceptualna posebnost novega slovenskega prevoda liturgije Janeza Zlatoustega in Bazilija Velikega je njegova razplatenost. Od tod izhaja, da – tudi zaradi razmeroma visoke naklade (tisoč izvodov) – osrednji sklop opravljenega dela predstavlja mehko vezana izdaja za ljudstvo v rdeči barvi z naslovom *Božja liturgija*. Ta zvezek dopolnjuje izdaja za duhovnike (*Služebnik*), natisnjena s trdimi platnicami v isti rdeči barvi in razmnožena v tristo izvodih; spremlja ga zvezek za pevce, ki ga od drugih dveh ločuje modra barva, večji format in znatno nižja naklada osemdesetih izvodov.

Nedvomno je glavna zasluga obravnavanega prevoda seznanitev slovenske javnosti z eno od temeljnih stvaritev krščanstva in evropske kulture. V tem pogledu si je smiselno priklicati v zavest, da Slovenija predstavlja stičišče med slovanskim, germanskim in romanskim svetom, kjer bi morali biti takšni prevodi še toliko bolj dobrodošli. Poleg tega ima v slovenskem prostoru – sicer neizbrisno in večinsko zaznamovanim z latinskimi obredom in jezikom – tudi vzhodna liturgična dediščina starodavno ‚domovinsko pravico‘. Na njegovem jugovzhodu (kasneje pa še drugod) sta namreč pravoslavna in grkokatoliška smer krščanstva prisotni že od 16. stoletja.

Tomaževa proslava: nagovor msgr. Stanislava Zoreta *Ljubljana, 6. marec 2023*

Praznovanje sv. Tomaža, ki je zavetnik naše Teološke fakultete, nas je zbralo v stolnici sv. Nikolaja. Pri sveti maši bomo pred Boga položili vse profesorje in študente, vse delavce in vse prijatelje naše Teološke fakultete. Želimo se zahvaliti za uspehe, ki ste jih po Božji dobroti dosegli. Želimo prositi za Božjo pomoč in navdih Svetega Duha, da bi vaše delo vodilo k rasti posameznika in Cerkve v njenem poslanstvu oznanjevanja in prinašanja Božjega kraljestva. Želimo prositi, da bi v tem času, v katerem nas presenečajo sposobnosti človeka, ki prodira v neizmerno majhno in po drugi strani meri neizmerno veliko, zajemali odgovore iz Razodetja. Razodetje nas odpira za prvi začetek vse resničnosti in nas usmerja k zadnjemu cilju in smislu vsega človeškega prizadevanja: k Božji slavi.

Božja slava se je v zgodovini odrešenja vedno razodevala v konkretnih okoliščinah človeškega življenja. Ni ostajala nad vsem tistim, kar je Božje ljudstvo živelo in doživljalo. Ni ostajala ideja, morda celo nekakšna utvara nad vsem dogajanjem v času in prostoru, ampak je stopala v zgodovino in pomagala ljudstvu, da se je postopoma oblikovalo v Božje ljudstvo – da je dobivalo svojo pravo podobo in se zavedalo svoje istovetnosti.

Drugače povedano: Bog je svojo slavo razodeval s tem, da je izvoljeno ljudstvo poslušal, da mu je pošiljal očake in preroke, ki so mu kazali pot v svobodo, in da je ljudstvu dajal postavo, ki je oblikovala njegove notranje odnose in začrtovala njegove odnose z okolico, z okoliškimi narodi. Šele kot takšno je ljudstvo lahko sprejelo v posest obljubljeni dežel, deželo, v kateri teče mleko in med – se pravi deželo preskrbljenosti.

Ko se danes spominjamo zavetnika naše Teološke fakultete, ne moremo mimo njegovega odnosa do znanosti in do Cerkve. Njegov oče si je za svojega sina Tomaža želel odlično prihodnost. Kot manjši fevdalec je takšno prihodnost videl v službi opata bližnje sloveče benediktinske opatije Montecassino, zato se je odločil, da mu bo omogočil kar najboljšo izobrazbo in ga dal v šolo k menihom. Menihi so ga poslali v Neapelj, da bi si tam pridobil znanje. Učitelji pa so spoznali, da je deček izredno bister, zato so ga poslali na slovito univerzo Sorbono v Parizu, kjer je ob svojem učitelju sv. Albertu iz Kölna začel postajati učitelj teološke znanosti, po čemer ga poznamo danes. Oblikoval je tomizem, ki je doživljal spremembe in pri-

lagoditve, še vedno pa ostaja živ kot filozofski in teološki sistem, ki se odziva na izzive sveta in nanje daje teološke odgovore. Svoj filozofski in teološki nauk je strnil v dveh zajetnih delih *Summa theologica* in *Summa contra gentiles*. Zato je prav, da je sv. Tomaž Akvinski postal zavetnik teoloških šol ter tistih, ki na teoloških šolah poučujejo in na njih študirajo.

Sv. Tomaž je živel v trinajstem stoletju. V času torej, na katerega so poznejša obdobja nalepila etiketo mračnega srednjega veka. Vek nastajanja univerz, ki so danes najbolj sloveče v svetu – Sorbona, na kateri je študiral sv. Tomaž, je dobila ime po duhovniku Robertu de Sorbonu, ki je ob njej ustanovil študentski kolegij. Vek, v katerem se je katoliška filozofija spustila v pogovor s filozofi, ki so ustvarjali daleč pred krščanstvom, in je znala njihova dognanja obogatiti s spoznanji naravoslovnih znanosti. Vek gradnje drznih gotskih katedral, ki še vedno nagovarjajo in navdihujejo tudi ta naš postmoderni, postkrščanski, posthumani ali kakršno koli oznako že dajemo našemu času. Ves svet je zadrževal dih, ko so aprila 2019 pariško katedralo Notre Dáme ovijali plameni uničujočega požara. Naš vek bi rad svetil s požari cerkva, z uničevanjem umetnin, z vpitjem o pravici do splava in o »humanosti«
evtanazije – mračni srednji vek in s tem tudi Tomažev čas pa je svetil z univerzami, s katedralami in summami.

Po zgledu sv. Tomaža je tudi današnja teologija poklicana k dialogu s svetom idej in znanosti, ki jo obdaja. Razlika je samo v tem, da je ta teologija bogatejša za vsa stoletja vpraševanj, soočanj z okoljem in miselnimi tokovi ter iskanja odgovorov nanje. Ne smemo si dovoliti, da bi se naša teološka znanost zaprla sama vase in postala sama sebi namen. Najbrž bi to bilo zanjo veliko bolj udobno. Vstopanje v življenje, v razviharjenost družbe in miselnih tokov je izziv, ki je podoben doživljanju apostola Petra, ko je stopil iz čolna in se začel po valovih bližati Jezusu. Vendar zaprtost vase pomeni smrt – predvsem zaradi tega, ker predstavlja nezvestobo Jezusovi temeljni zapovedi, ki jo je dal učencem: »Pojdite po vsem svetu in oznanite evangelij vsemu stvarstvu.« (Mr 16,15)

To je torej tisto poslanstvo slehernega kristjana, ki ga moramo živeti vsak na svojem mestu in vsak v svojem času. To je poslanstvo, h kateremu nas na svojski način spodbuja tudi čas sinode, ki nas opozarja na naše krstno dostojanstvo in na dolžnost oznanjevanja, h kateremu smo vsi poklicani. To je iskanje, kako v našem času in v naši družbi izpolniti Jezusovo naročilo: »Pojdite in oznanjujte.«

Pri tem pa se moramo zavedati, da ostajamo poslani, kar pomeni, da ostajamo v službi nekoga in da poslanstvo ni naše, ampak ga nam je nekdo zaupal in nas zanj pooblastil. Zato je sv. Pavel govoril o slabosti in strahu in velikem trepetu, da bi njegovo oznanilo ne bilo v prepričevalnih besedah modrosti, ampak v izkazovanju Duha in moči. Teologi moramo imeti vedno pred očmi to, kar je papež Benedikt XVI. povedal 7. maja 2005 pri sv. Janezu v Lateranu, kjer je dejal, da oblast učenja v Cerkvi prinaša s seboj zavzetost za služenje v pokorščini vere. Nihče ne sme razglašati svojih idej, ampak mora sebe in Cerkev stalno zavezovati k pokorščini Božji besedi – ob vseh poskusih prilagajanja in razvodenitve, da bi postali bolj sprejemljivi ali bolj všečni okolici, v kateri smo poklicani oznanjati. Ne moreš biti

sol, če se prilagodiš okolju – če postaneš mineštra, namesto da bi bil sol, ki se v mineštro daje. Ne moreš biti luč, če svojo svetlobo zastreš, da ja morda ne bi koga motila, mu povzročala ščemenja v očeh ali odkrila razmetanosti in umazanije po kotih, v katere zaradi pomanjkanja svetlobe ali zaradi teme nihče več ne pogleda. Luč sveti v temi, pravi sv. Janez. Poslanstvo soli je, da je slana; poslanstvo luči je, da sveti.

Zato tudi vas, spoštovani profesorji in študentje teologije vabim in spodbujam, da s poglobljanjem v svete znanosti postajate sol in luč našega časa. Vendar je nadvse pomembno, da se sol upre skušnjavi, da bi ostajala v solnici in da se luč odpove varnosti, ki ji jo morda ima, če je postavljena pod mernik. Takšna zaprtost pred življenjem in njegovimi izzivi bi bila pravzaprav podobna situaciji, ki jo opisuje kardinal Gerhard Müller v knjigi-intervjuju z naslovom *V dobri veri*, kjer pravi: »V tem času vidim Cerkev na nekakšnem grebenu in mi prihaja na misel, ko so se med obleganjem Carigrada teologi osredotočali na razprave o barvi Marijinih oči.« Morate ven, morate v svet. Slišati morate vprašanja, ki jih postavlja svet, dileme, v katerih živi današnji človek. In na ta vprašanja in dileme odgovarjati ne z orodji sveta, ampak z Božjo besedo. Kdo bo človeku našega časa povedal, kaj vprašanja, ki jih postavlja sebi in drugim, dejansko pomenijo? Kdo mu bo pokazal, kakšno prihodnost obetajo odločitve, ki jih sprejema danes? Samo tisti, ki posluša človeka ter nanj in na njegove dileme gleda v luči Razodetja.

Spoštovani profesorji in profesorice, dragi študentje in študentke. Danes se vam zahvaljujem za poslanstvo, ki ga opravljate v naši Cerkvi in v naši družbi. Obenem pa vas prosim in spodbujam, da v povezanosti z Jezusom Kristusom, v poglobljanju v njegovo besedo dobivate potrebno slanost in svetlobo, s katerima boste mogli odgovoriti na vprašanja in iskanja, s katerimi ljudje iščejo smisel in pot naprej.

Naj vas spremlja vaš zavetnik sv. Tomaž Akvinski in naj vam pot kaže naša nebeška Mati Marija. Amen.

Didacta 2023

Stuttgart, 7.–3. 2023

Vsakoletni največji evropski sejem za vzgojo in izobraževanje je bil letos od 7. do 11. marca v Stuttgartu. V okviru projekta „Teologija, digitalna kultura in izzivi na človeka osrediščene umetne inteligence“ sva ga obiskala doc. dr. Iva Nežič Glavica in prof. dr. Janez Vodičar. Sejem ponuja pregled novosti vse od vzgoje v vrtcu pa do izobraževanja za tretje življenjsko obdobje, od didaktičnih programov do tehničnih pripomočkov. Samo podatek, da je bilo razstavljalcev 730 in prireditev 1500, kaže na obilico možnosti, ki jih ima obiskovalec. Sama sva bila prav zaradi okvira raziskovalnega programa še zlasti pozorna na odgovor izobraževanja na digitalno ponudbo in predvsem, kako se na to odziva religijski pouk. Na sejmu je bil tudi razstavni prostor, kjer sta se pod naslovom „Vzgoja in izobraževanje v službi življenju“ skupaj predstavili katoliška in evangeličanska Cerkev. Ob predavanjih in pogovorih, ki so se na tem prizorišču odvijali, je bilo največ poudarka na t. i. socialnih veščinah – in kako jih povezati z verskimi tematikami. Razsežnost sodelovanja v skupini, solidarnosti z ubogimi in srečevanja z drugačnimi verskimi tradicijami, npr. s sirsko pravoslavno skupnostjo, je le nekaj tem, ki so bile v ospredju. Digitalne vsebine, ki so bile na tem cerkvenem prostoru predstavljene, so bile usmerjene k pozitivnim možnostim premagovanja negativnih pojavov – kot npr. antisemitizma –, ki jih verski pouk lahko ponudi tudi v času digitalne prepletenosti življenja mladih. Prav tako je bilo vprašanje, kako lahko virtualna resničnost pomaga k boljšemu sodelovanju in skupnemu življenju različnih verskih tradicij. Pri tem je zanimivo, da novih možnosti za samo didaktično zasnovo verskega pouka niso predstavili. Imajo platformo za gradivo, ki je na voljo učiteljem, ni pa kakšnih posebnih programov, ki bi se odvijali zgolj na ravni digitalne platforme.

Predavanje, ki sta ga imela prof. dr. Julia Knopf in prof. dr. Oliver Thomas z univerze v Saarlandesu, tudi ustanovitelja podjetja „Didactic Innovations“ (<https://didactic-innovations.de/>), je pokazalo na težavo, ki se je v vzgoji in izobraževanju še posebej pokazala v času epidemije – da sama uvedba nove tehnologije ni dovolj. Razvoj tehnologije, ki omogoča nove načine učenja in poučevanja, je treba podpreti z novimi didaktičnimi pristopi – in prav to poskušajo v podjetju, ki sta ga ustanovila. Razvijajo šolske programe, ki bodo z novimi digitalnimi platformami didaktično usklajeni, saj le uporaba tehnike po njunem mnenju ne prinaša veliko koristi – vzgojno-izobraževalno rast posameznika in skupnosti lahko celo prekine.

Drugi poudarki sejma so bili usmerjeni v politično ozaveščanje in spodbujanje za aktivno državljanstvo. V pogovorih so sodelovale vse ravni – od deželne ministrice za kulturo, mlade in šport do deželnega predsednika in odgovornih za vzgojo in izobraževanje na zvezni ravni. Iskali so predvsem pot, kako postaviti celotno didaktično strukturo, ki bi mladim pomagala v svetu, ki je vedno bolj zapleten in sili v številne ekstremizme. Pri tem so zelo aktivni tako na ministrstvih za kult in mlade v obeh zveznih deželah (Bavarski in domači) kot tudi v različnih civilnih ini-

ciativah. Veliko preventivnih programov sta na svojem razstavišču predstavili tudi policija in vojska.

Na samih razstaviščih je bilo ponudbe z digitalnega področja veliko. Zanimivo je, da je bil poudarek na tehničnih izboljšavah in izkoristku virtualne resničnosti in ne toliko iskanju novih didaktičnih modelov, ki bi ob soočanju z novimi komunikacijsko-tehničnimi rešitvami pomagali. Kot nasprotje digitalnim ponudbam je obiskovalec lahko hitro opazil, da je močno v porastu ponudba alternativnih programov, ki na neki način od virtualnega bežijo – mogoče je bilo najti kar nekaj programov in tehničnih rešitev za večjo vključitev prizadevanja za razvoj telesa in motoričnih spretnosti. Prav tako je bila močno navzoča ponudba gozdne in sploh najrazličnejše pedagogike v naravi. Pri tem so si pomagali tudi z virtualnimi rešitvami, ko se učenec znajde sredi virtualnega sveta, polnega biotske raznolikosti. Aktivne delavnice za vzgojitelje so ponujale glasbene in cirkuške učne vsebine, ki naj bi otroke in mlade znova naredile občutljive do sebe in bližnjih. Zato je razumljivo, da je bilo na knjižnih policah vidno novo področje pedagogike: resonančna pedagogika, ki nastaja po modelu H. Rose, in smer, ki jo razvija O. A. Burow. Prav tako je kar nekaj strokovnih knjig, ki iščejo načine, kako pozitivno povezati digitalno in klasično izkustveno učenje.

V ponujenih didaktičnih materialih je bilo opaziti možnosti digitalnih vsebin, ki pospešujejo gibanje: od kvizov do iger, ki se jih projicira na večjo površino – vse lahko uporabimo za interaktivno učenje. Učenec z gibanjem po talni projekciji npr. izbira pravo rešitev ali tekmuje s svojim sošolcem. Taki programi združujejo digitalno podprto interaktivno učenje z razvojem gibalnih veščin. Spet temu nasproti, še posebej na področju verske ponudbe, je opaziti vračanje k starim oblikam pripovedovanja. Kar nekaj založb je tako ponujalo materiale in navodila za kamišibaj. Ta stara oblika kombinacije slike, gledališča in pripovedi kaže potrebo po telesni bližini in živem stiku. Zato lahko zaključimo, da so zadnji poskusi v didaktiki usmerjeni v iskanje živega stika pri vzgoji in izobraževanju ter pametno vključevanje novih tehnologij, ki tega ne bodo zameglile.

Janez Vodičar

Navodila sodelavcem

Rokopis znanstvenega ali strokovnega članka, ki ga avtor/ica pošlje na naslov *Bogoslovnega vestnika*, je besedilo, ki še ni bilo objavljeno drugod niti ni drugod v recenzijem postopku. Rokopis je treba poslati v pisni in v elektronski obliki. Elektronska oblika naj obsega le osnovne programske definicije (urejevalnik besedila Word s standardno obliko pisave brez dodatnih slogovnih določil). Pisna oblika rokopisa naj ima velikost črk 12 pt (Times), razmik med vrsticami 1,5, opombe 10 pt.

Zaradi **anonimnega recenzijskega postopka** mora imeti vsak rokopis prijavo oziroma spremni list, na katerem avtor/ica navede svoje ime in priimek, naslov članka, svoje ključne biografske podatke (akademski naziv, področje dela, poslovni naslov in/oziroma naslov, na katerem prejema pošto, elektronski naslov itd.) in izjavo, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno in da še ni v recenzijem postopku. Obrazec prijave je na spletni strani revije (<http://www.teof.uni-lj.si/bv.html>). Na drugi strani, ki je prva stran besedila, pa naj navede samo naslov članka brez imena avtorja.

Rokopis znanstvenega članka ima **povzetek in ključne besede**, in sicer na posebni strani (listu). Povzetek naj obsega do 160 besed oziroma do 800 znakov. Povzetek obsega natančno opredelitev teme članka, metodologijo in zaključke.

Obseg rokopisa izvirnega znanstvenega članka naj praviloma ne presega dolžine ene avtorske pole (30.000 znakov); pregledni članki in predhodne objave naj ne obsegajo več kot 20.000 znakov, poročila ne več kot 10.000 znakov, ocene knjig ne več kot 8.000 znakov. Za obsežnejša besedila naj se avtor dogovori z urednikom. Besedila daljša od 8.000 znakov morajo vsebovati podnaslove. Tabele in slike morajo biti izpisane na posebnem listu papirja, v besedilu članka mora biti označeno mesto, kam sodijo.

Naslov članka mora biti jasen, poveden in ne daljši od 100 znakov.

Na koncu članka pripravimo **seznam referenc oz. literature**. Knjižna dela navajamo v obliki: Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov. Kraj: Založba. Npr.: Janžekovič, Janez. 1976. *Krščanstvo in marksizem: od polemike do razgovora*. Celje: Mohorjeva družba. Članke iz revij navajamo v obliki: Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov članka. Ime publikacije letnik:prva-zadnja stran. Npr.: Krašovec, Jože. 1991. Filozofsko-teološki razlogi za odpuščanje. *Bogoslovni vestnik* 51:270-285. Pri referencah z interneta navedemo spletni naslov z datumom pridobitve dokumenta. Če je bil dokument objavljen v periodični publikaciji, to označimo za naslovom dokumenta. Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov. Ime publikacije, dan. mesec. URL (pridobljeno datum. mesec leto). Npr.: Rebula, Alojz. 2006. Rekatolicizacija ali recivilizacija? *Družina*, 7. aprila. <Http://www.druzina.si/ICD/spletnastran.nsf/> (pridobljeno 16. oktobra 2006).

V besedilu navajamo citate po sistemu avtor-letnica. Priimek avtorja, letnico izida citiranega dela in stran zapišemo za citatom v obliki (priimek letnica, stran).

Npr. (Janžekovič 1976, 12). Na isti način navajamo tudi citate iz periodičnih publikacij in s spletnih strani. Če sta avtorja dva, navedek zapišemo v obliki (Priimek in Priimek letnica, stran). Npr. (Rode in Stres 1977, 33). Pri več kot treh avtorjih uporabimo obliko (Priimek idr. letnica, stran) ali (Priimek et al. letnica, stran). Npr. (Lenzenweger et al. 1999, 51). Če avtor dela ni naveden, namesto priimka uporabimo naslov, lahko tudi skrajšanega, npr. (*Devetdnevnica k časti milostne Matere Božje 1916*, 5). Če priimek navedemo že v citatu, ga v navedku izpustimo in navedemo samo letnico in stran.

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