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Mojca Kovač Šebart in Roman Kuhar
Katja Jeznik
Od prepoznanja do pripoznanja identitete otrok in mladostnikov
Povzetek: Vprašanje oblikovanja posameznikove identitete znotraj šolskega prostora se povezuje z mnogoterostjo vlog, ki jih posameznik sprejema v odnosih, v katere vstopa od rojstva naprej. Ob orisovanju nekaj možnih načinov, kako sploh razumeti posameznikovo identiteto in proces njenega oblikovanja znotraj institucionaliziranega šolskega okolja, bom v članku odgovarjala na vprašanje, kaj za podporo procesu oblikovanja posameznikove identitete pomeni teorija pripoznanja. Iz te teorije lahko izpeljemo konkretna izhodišča za oblikovanje šolskega prostora kot heterogenega okolja. Sobi-vanje v različnosti razumem kot temeljno vrednoto sodobnosti, kar pa je, kot je prikazano v članku, tudi osnovno izhodišče oblikovanja odprte identitete otrok in mladostnikov. V članku so na primeru obravnave otrok s posebnimi potrebami prikazane nekatere anomalije slovenskega šolskega prostora, ki bi jih lahko ustrezno odpravili prav z upoštevanjem načel predstavljene teorije pripoznanja.
Ključne besede: vzgoja, identiteta, prepoznanje, pripoznanje, učenci s posebnimi potrebami
UDK: 376
Znanstveni prispevek
Dr. Katja Jeznik, asistentka, Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za pedagogiko in andragogiko, Aškerčeva 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana; e-naslov: katja.jeznik@ff.uni-lj.si
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Uvod
Pojem identiteta je zelo razpršen, znotraj pedagoške teorije pa ga lahko raziskujemo na različnih ravneh. Z njim se posredno srečamo tako že na ravni vsebine ciljev, ki so zapisani v krovnem zakonu o slovenski šoli (Zakon o organiziranju in financiranju vzgoje in izobraževanja). Oblikovanje identitete je na primer vezano na cilje, kot so spodbujanje integritete posameznika ter razvijanje zavesti o državni pripadnosti in narodni identiteti. Proces vzgoje in izobraževanja se veže na poznavanje slovenske zgodovine in kulture ter na vzgajanje za obče kulturne in civilizacijske vrednote, ki izhajajo iz evropske tradicije. Tako oblikovani cilji vplivajo in sodoločajo neposredno pedagoško delovanje, zato ni nepomembno, kako jih razumemo oziroma kakšne pedagoške prakse iz tega izpeljemo. V članku odgovarjam na vprašanje, ali je razumevanje identitete, kot jo lahko izpeljemo iz osrednjih ciljev slovenskega šolstva, torej predvsem kot odnos do samega sebe, drugega in skupnosti, v kateri je posameznik, zadostno, ustrezno in usklajeno z novejšimi spoznanji o identitetnem razvoju otrok in mladostnikov. Če želimo tudi znotraj šolskega sistema ustrezno podpreti proces oblikovanja identitete otrok in mladostnikov, se moramo zavedati kompleksnosti samega pojma in različnih načinov, kako identiteto razumeti. Pojem identiteta bom najprej opredelila s štirimi znanstvenimi disciplinami (filozofija, sociologija, psihologija in pedagogika).
Opredelitev pojma identiteta
Gnothi seauton oziroma spoznaj samega sebe je napis iz grško-rimskega obdobja v Delfih v Grčiji. Ta napis povzemam kot dokaz tega, da je vprašanje identitete eno temeljnih vprašanj človeka. Središčna vprašanja identitete znotraj filozofije so: ali je identiteta enako kot sebstvo, ali je sebstvo avtentično bistvo posameznika, ki je nesprejemljivo, in če je sebstvo tisto trdno jedro posameznikove identitete, na podlagi česa oziroma koga se naša predstava o sebi, o svojem sebstvu, naša identiteta vseeno spreminja in preoblikuje. Odgovor ni enoznačen. Kristjansson (2010) opredeli razumevanje pojmov med realisti in antirealisti. Slednji sebstvo in
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identiteto razumejo kot konstrukt brez realne osnove, ki se ustvarja s praksami, diskurzi in odnosi, realisti pa verjamejo, da se za temi predstavami vseeno skriva neko realno jedro, ki nas določa oziroma ki določa naše sebstvo in identiteto. Tako kot ogledalo hkrati odseva pohištvo v sobi in je del tega pohištva, tako je lahko koncept sebstva hkrati sebstvo samo (selfhood) in njegov del (part of the selfhood). Za realiste je samopoznavanje (self-knowledge) osnovno poznavanje sebe, kar pomeni, da se lahko z dejavnostmi in komunikacijo z okoljem tudi spreminja in razvija, a vendar to ne pomeni, da se tudi šele vzpostavlja z odnosi, kot to razumejo antirealisti (npr. Gergen 2009).
Taylor (2004) v svoji opredelitvi pojma izpostavi odnosno dimenzijo identitete. Zanj identiteta obstaja le v prostoru spraševanja in določenega zavedanja. Pri tem sta ključni dve dimenziji. Prvič, imeti moramo občutek za to, kdo smo, kar je mogoče le tako, da razumemo, kako smo do tega prišli. Vprašanje Kaj sem? je v bistvu vprašanje Kdo sem postal?. In drugič, to razumevanje ne sme biti vezano le ozko na razumevanje svojega lastnega življenja, ampak mora biti globlje. Ni namreč identitete zunaj skupnosti in odnosov, niti zunaj moralnega prostora, kar nam omogoča spoznati naracija. Oblikovanje identitete tako za Taylorja (prav tam) pomeni tudi graditev moralnih orodij. Gre za vprašanje odgovornosti človeka, ki je lahko razumljena kot prilagoditev posameznika družbenim normam/ vrednotam/pričakovanjem, ki naj bi jih ta ponotranjil s procesom identifikacije, lahko pa odgovornost razumemo tudi kot vzpostavitev odgovornega odnosa do bližnje osebe, skupnosti, naravnega okolja in smisla lastnega bivanja, ki je posledica posameznikovih osebnih izkušenj, ki jih pridobiva z refleksijo odnosov in dejavnosti v družbenem okolju (Kroflič 2007). Gre za razumevanje oblikovanja moralne samopodobe, ki izhaja iz ideje, izpeljane iz Aristotela, in sicer o moralni vzgoji kot učenju/urjenju vrline, ki se lahko razvije le na podlagi posameznikovih neposrednih izkušenj, refleksije odnosov in ravnanj, česar, kot dokazujejo tudi nekatere novejše raziskave (npr. Štirn 2014), so ob ustrezni podpori zmožni že otroci v predšolskem obdobju. Pravila, norme in konvencije so nuja, ker vnaprej določajo mejo med dopustnim in nedopustnim ravnanjem, zagovorniki Aristotela (npr. Rice in Burbules 2010) pa ob tem zagovarjajo misel, da je treba razliko med dopustnim in nedopustnim vedno znova in znova premisliti glede na ključne vrline, kakor tudi glede na kontekst konkretne situacije oziroma odnosa, kar omogoča praktično presojanje (phronesis).
Sociološka opredelitev identitete je zanimiva predvsem kot način razumevanja moderne in postmoderne konstrukcije sebstva ter kot način razumevanja modernega in postmodernega vzgojnega ideala. Na podlagi študija socioloških preučevalcev identitete (npr. Beck 2001; Giddens 1991; Ule 2000, 2008 idr.) lahko ugotovimo, da niti moderna niti postmoderna konstrukcija sebstva ni zadostna osnova, na kateri lahko utemeljimo sodobno vzgojo. Cilj vzgoje je sicer vedno tudi prenašanje/reprodukcija družbenih vrednot in znanja iz generacije v generacijo, a ni le to. Namen vzgoje je tudi preseganje prevladujočega družbenega ustroja. Rezultat moderne je bil, povzemajoč Riesmana (1951), »samovodeni subjekt«, ki ga je na prelomu iz 19. v 20. stoletje zamenjal »od drugih vodeni subjekt«. Obe subjektiviteti pa se skozi zgodovino izkažeta za problematični (Ule 2012). »Samo-
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vodena identiteta« se je izkazala za problematično, ker do nje navadno vodi izrazito paternalistično naravnana vzgojna metodika z rezultatom avtoritarne osebnosti, za problematično pa se je izkazala tudi »od drugih vodena subjektiviteta«, ker ravnanje posameznika vodi predvsem socialno okolje, subjekt pa je razumljen kot od objektivnih okoliščin vodeno bitje, ki ga Lasch (2012) opiše kot patološki narci-sizem. Ustreznega odgovora ne daje niti postmoderna konstrukcija sebstva, ki jo določa predvsem proces individualizacije. Čeprav je osnovna ideja individualizacije osvoboditev posameznika od tradicionalnih družbenih spon (npr. spol in razred), je identiteta, ki iz tega izhaja, razumljena predvsem kot refleksivno urejanje posameznikovih življenjskih zgodb. Beck in Beck-Gernsheim (2002) v svojih študijah izpostavita tako pozitivno kot negativno plat sodobnih procesov individualizacije. To ilustrirata na primeru človekovih pravic in plačanega dela. Oboje je pozitiven prispevek individualizacije. Ampak kot ugotavljata, temeljne pravice posameznika in potreba po posameznikovi ekonomski aktivnosti zaradi svoje nesamoumevnosti postajajo hkrati tudi grožnja temeljnemu socialnemu sožitju. Osrednje institucije moderne družbe so namreč usmerjene k posamezniku, in ne k skupnosti. Po Gid-densu (1991) pa svoboda izbire kot posledica povečane individualizacije postane absolutna zapoved brez gotovosti v tradicionalnih življenjskih potekih, vse to pa vodi v pomanjkanje dveh ključnih sestavin identitete, občutka ontološke varnosti in temeljnega zaupanja.
Proces individualizacije in iz tega izhajajoče razumevanje identitete sta vodila tudi v razgradnjo (tradicionalne) šolske skupnosti in v manjšanje njenega pomena. To postavlja pred pedagogiko zahtevno nalogo iskanja modelov novih (šolskih) skupnosti. Ta naj bi bila čim bolj inkluzivna in temelječa na širokem konsenzu o temeljnih vrednotah, ki si jih delijo njeni pripadniki, ne da bi bili ob tem izključujoči do posameznikovih partikularnih vrednot (Strike 1999). Zagotavljala naj bi tak način vstopanja v osebne odnose, da bi ponovno povezala temeljna sklopa posameznikovih potreb po svobodi in varnosti oziroma sprejetosti (Bauman 2002). Drugačnost in različnost naj bi bili v takšni skupnosti osrednji vrednoti, kar je po mnenju Bieste (2006) tudi osnovni pogoj za vztrajanje pri vrednoti demokracije v sodobni družbi. Sodobnost zahteva takšna okolja in skupnosti, ki temeljijo na zmožnosti različnih skupin in posameznikov, da sobivajo nenasilno ter da vstopajo v odnose tako, da različnost bogati in krepi vsakega posameznika in posledično tudi skupnost.
Psihološki pogled na identiteto pa je z vidika pedagogike zanimiv predvsem zato, ker ponuja nekaj zelo konkretnih odgovorov na to, kako se posameznikova subjektivnost in identiteta sploh oblikujeta in kakšen pomen imajo za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete konflikti in krize. Klasična psihoanalitična teorija izhaja iz predpostavke, da so psihični konflikti ter nasprotja gibalo posameznikovega razvoja. Osnovne faze človekovega razvoja gredo prek prvotne separacije in indi-vidualizacije ter t. i. psihološkega rojstva otroka, od simbioze, ki daje otrokom prvi občutek varnosti, in simbolne identifikacije do ustrezne razrešitve Ojdipovega kompleksa, ki se zaključi v oblikovanju ustrezne subjektivitete in moralne avtonomije posameznika. Klasični psihoanalitični pogled na oblikovanje osebnosti je danes deležen številnih kritik (npr. Benjamin 2008), z vidika identitetnega razvoja pa je
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posebno zanimiva teorija psihosocialnega razvoja. Kot ključno obdobje oblikovanja posameznikove identitete opredeli mladostništvo (Erikson 1994). Marcia in Kroger (2011) govorita o štirih identitetnih položajih mladih (razpršeni, privzeti, odloženi in doseženi identitetni položaj), ki pa niso več stopenjski nizi razvoja identitete, kot je bilo značilno za Eriksonovo teorijo identitete. Avtorja (2011) sta naredila nekaj možnih aplikacij različnih identitetnih položajev na področje izobraževanja. Opozorila sta na negativne plati zgodnjega odločanja otrok o poklicni poti ali drugih pomembnih odločitvah glede izobraževanja. Šola in študij naj bi bila namenjena predvsem odkrivanju različnih idej in vrednot, ne pa le doseganju akademskih dosežkov. Tisto ključno, ki v veliki meri določa oblikovanje identitete, je po njunem mnenju predvsem odsotnost oziroma prisotnost dveh elementov - opredelitve in krize. Slednje je z vidika pedagogike ključno, saj, kot izpostavlja Kroflič (2013a), lahko na konfliktnost in upornost otrok gledamo kot na pomembni dimenziji moralnega razvoja na individualni ravni ter moralnega napredka na družbeni ravni. Razumemo ju lahko kot urjenje v moralni avtonomiji in kot vstop posameznika v politično angažirano delovanje.
V pedagogiki pa pojem identiteta srečamo že ob temeljnem teoretskem vprašanju pedagogike, tj. ob vprašanju opredelitve vzgoje. Na tem mestu izpostavljam razliko med opredeljevanjem vzgoje na ravni cilja oziroma ideala vzgoje (moderni in postmoderni vzgojni ideal) ter na ravni razumevanja vzgoje kot procesa (stopenjske teorije razvoja otroka, ki omogočajo sprejemljivost sintagme »disciplina, ki osvobaja«) in vzgoje kot komunikacije posameznika z drugimi, z vrednotami.
Če opredeljujemo vzgojo na ravni cilja oziroma ideala, je z vidika pojma identiteta treba izpostaviti predvsem razliko med klasičnim/modernim in sodobnim/ postmodernim poimenovanjem tega, kar naj bi bil cilj naših vzgojnih prizadevanj. Moderni vzgojni ideal lahko izpeljemo iz razsvetljenske pedagoške tradicije in pogleda na vzgojo kot kreacijo človeka oziroma človečnosti. Vzgoja tako v klasičnem razsvetljenskem konceptu pomeni ustvarjanje človekove druge narave. Pri Kantu (1988) poteka od discipliniranja prek kultiviranja in civiliziranja do človečnosti oziroma prek absolutne poslušnosti volji vzgojitelja (discipliniranje) v prostovoljno poslušnost vzgojitelju (razumni razlogi za poslušnost) in k poslušnosti lastnemu umu. Takšno razumevanje vzgojnega cilja vzgojo opredeli kot dejavnost/ravnanje, ki izhaja iz vnaprej danega in družbeno veljavnega seznama vrednot in ciljev, ki naj bi jih dosegli z ustreznim vzgojnim posredovanjem oziroma prek nadzora nad ključnimi vzgojnimi dejavniki. V tem smislu je bil vzgojni cilj oblikovan tako, da je lahko, kot zapiše Medveš, »... sledil najvišjim idealom, ni pa mogel biti manjši od največje ideje, ki jo je sproducirala človeška misel.« (Medveš 1991, str. 215) Kroflič (1997) izpostavlja, da je sodobnost posamezniku in znanosti zamajala gotovost in trdno vero v svet, ki ga je prej gradil na avtoriteti lastne ideje (ali idej) o človečnosti in vere v znanstveni napredek. Nekaj let zatem pa zapiše: »Da bo lahko posameznik optimalno razvijal svoje osebnostne potenciale, mu moramo priskrbeti optimalno vzgojno okolje, nikakor pa ga nismo upravičeni pojmovati kot 'še-ne-človeka', že v začetku potrebnega prevzgoje iz 'divje naravnega' v 'kultivirano bitje'.« (Kroflič 2001b, str. 33) Gre za temeljni vzgojni paradoks, kako s podrejanjem spodbuditi posameznikovo avtonomijo. Kantov stavek (1995, str. 10) »Rezonirajte, kolikor
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vas je volja in o čemer hočete, toda bodite poslušni!« res lahko razumemo kot svobodo posameznika (vsaj v zasebni sferi), lahko pa ga razumemo tudi kot vzpostavljanje »navidezne svobode« posameznika, ko ga vodijo predvsem izsiljene izbire (npr. Salecl 2012) in lažen občutek, da je v svojih izbirah svoboden in avtonomen, kar Beauvois (2000) ponazori s konceptoma pomanjkanja družbene bistrovidnosti in kulta internalnosti.
Pogled na cilje vzgoje je posledično spremenil tudi poglede na vzgojni proces. Po eni strani lahko sledimo t. i. stopenjskim teorijam razvoja otroka, s katerimi se potrjuje ideja o disciplini (kot pomembnem delu vzgoje), ki osvobaja, po drugi strani pa lahko identificiramo poglede na proces vzgoje kot komunikacijo posameznika z drugimi, z vrednotami.
Razumevanje vzgoje, ki izhaja iz stopenjskih teorij otrokovega razvoja, lahko vežemo na psihoanalitične razlage otrokovega razvoja, na Piagetovo teorijo spoznavnega razvoja in na Kohlbergov model moralnega razsojanja. Ker je bilo o posamezni teoriji veliko napisanega na drugih mestih, tukaj podajamo le navezavo na to, kakšno razumevanje vzgoje navadno sledi temu. Zagovorniki stopenjskih teorij navadno vidijo cilj vzgoje predvsem v ponotranjenju zakona, pravil oziroma t. i. simbolne matrice, kar je osnova zdravega osebnostnega razvoja (npr. Kovač Šebart 2002; Kovač Šebart in Krek 2009; Kovač Šebart 2013). Medveš (2007) se na podlagi razmisleka, kje so teoretske meje razumevanja vzgoje kot internalizacije/ ponotranjenja vrednot, ustavi pri vprašanju, ali bi lahko vzgojni koncept razvili tako, da bi omogočal integracijo posameznika na ravni razumsko reflektirane morale brez internalizacije vedenjskih in vrednotnih vzorcev. Sprašuje se: »Ali lahko verjamemo v to, da je mogoče z vzgojo in vzgojnim konceptom razviti odnos do sveta vrednot kot reflektirano komunikacijo z vrednoto, in ne kot prisvajanje ali ponotranjenje vsebine ali celo forme vrednot?« (Prav tam, str. 22) Ob tem se mu porajajo tri ključna vprašanja pedagoške teorije: prvič, ali je v postmoderni sploh mogoče definirati univerzalni moralni kodeks; drugič, kako se pri vzgoji v duhu vrednot izogniti indoktrinaciji; in tretjič, kako zagotoviti, da bi se posameznik po privzgojenih oziroma privzetih vrednotah ravnal v vsakdanjem življenju.
Odgovore na ta vprašanja iščejo tudi avtorji, ki jih zaznamuje pogled na vzgojo, kjer »vzgoja ni niti navajanje na reproduciranje obeležij preteklega ali sedanjega bivanja niti navajanje na uporabo nekih oblik vedenja in vrednotenja, ki bi jih kdor koli razglasil za zgodovinsko trajne, nesporne in vselej sprejemljive« (Medveš 1991, str. 117). Vzgoja je predvsem prilagajanje na stalno iskanje novih form sobivanja: »Je prilagajanje na edino stalno stvar v zgodovini človeštva, to je spreminjanje.« (Prav tam) Kroflič (2001a, str. 33) ugotavlja, da je prisotnost prava in človekovih pravic dokončno vodila v zamenjavo klasične moderne paradigme vzgoje kot prenašalke tradicionalnih poenotenih resnic in vrednot. Kulturno-transmisijsko paradigmo vzgoje je zamenjala procesno-razvojno naravnana paradigma vzgoje, katere bistvo je v iskanju načina, »kako razumeti možnost sobivanja (sožitja) v svetu relativnosti in legitimnega obstoja različnih življenjskih in mišljenjskih praks« (Kroflič 1997, str. 313). V ozadju takega pogleda na vzgojo je podoba otroka kot zmožnega bitja, ki, ob ustrezni podpori, zmore od zgodnjega otroštva naprej z bližnjimi osebami komunicirati prosocialno (Kroflič 2013a; Štirn 2014).
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Mojca Kovač Šebart in Roman Kuhar
Kaj pomenijo ta vprašanja z vidika oblikovanja posameznikove identitete kot izrazito odnosnega fenomena? Stopenjske teorije predpostavijo brezpogojno sprejetje družbenih norm kot pogoj svobode/avtonomije, druga veja pa izpostavi pomen nenehne komunikacije, refleksije konfliktnih situacij in predpostavljenih vrednot kot način vzpostavljanja praktične modrosti, pa tudi odprte izkušnje upora. Kot zapiše Kroflič (2013a), moramo posamezniku v vzgojnem procesu od najzgodnejšega obdobja pomagati razvijati potenciale za »politična dejanja«, kajti šele tak pristop posamezniku omogoča izstop iz družbenih konvencij in vstop v svet(nost) kot prostor humanega bivanja, kar je po H. Arendt paradigma človekove svobode (prav tam).
Današnja, pretežno individualistična koncepcija vzgoje (Gergen 2009), ki izhaja iz razsvetljenskega pogleda na posameznika in njegovo družbeno umestitev, je z vidika identitetnega razvoja otroka/mladostnika očitno nezadostna. Gergen meni, da bi učitelji morali obrniti svojo pozornost od posameznega učenca k povezavi učencev v odnose, v katerih se vzpostavljata učenje in izobraževanje ter s tem prostor podpore oblikovanja posameznikove identitete. Čeprav Gergen ne uporabi pojma odnosna pedagogika, njegovo razmišljanje B. J. Aspelin (2010) poveže ravno z izhodišči le-te. Kroflič zapiše: »Vzgoja torej prvenstveno ni posredovanje znanja in izkušenj, kakor tudi ne zgolj zaščita otroka kot nebogljenega bitja, ampak aktiven odnos, ki poteka prek skupnih dejavnosti in se postopoma širi od prvih pomembnih oseb k pomembnim tretjim (odraslim) osebam in vrstnikom.« (Kroflič 2008, str. 3) Ali kot zapiše nekaj let pozneje ob razmišljanju o pomenu zgodb za posameznikovo identiteto: »Pripovedovanje zgodb je igra, postavljena v narativno obliko [...] Otrokove zgodbe so literatura, otrokova igra je njegovo življenje. [...] Otroci se vedno vidijo znotraj zgodbe. [...] In prijatelj postaneš, ko prevzameš vlogo v igri bližnje osebe.« (Paley v Kroflič 2013b, str. 1) Otrok je zares sprejet v skupino, ko ga otroci vključijo v svoje zgodbe in dramatizacije. Z zgodbo, naracijo kot potjo zaznavanja posameznikove identitete (Kearney 2002) v vzgojnem odnosu vplivamo tudi na otrokovo vrednotenje življenjskih situacij, a ne v smislu »moralk«, ko se odrasli navadno sklicuje na deduktivno utemeljevanje (ne)etičnosti določene situacije, ampak induktivno, pri čemer Kroflič (2007) izpostavi drugačen pogled na odgovornost kot posameznikovo zmožnost odgovora, kar lahko spodbujamo z vstopanjem v socialno občutljive odnose, kjer ima posameznik priložnost razvijati občutek spoštovanja do konkretne osebe in njenega obličja. Šele to pa je potem vodilo h krepitvi zavedanja etičnih načel in humanističnih zahtev, ki zadevajo človekove pravice in ekološke vrednote, ter učenja, kako jih uporabiti kot osnovo demokratičnega dogovarjanja in reševanja medsebojnih konfliktov. Vloga odraslega torej ni, da otroku zlasti dosledno razlaga prepoved in čaka, da jo ta sprejme za svojo, ampak predvsem, da ga opozarja na njegov položaj v odnosu s preostalimi akterji zgodbe. Tako lahko otrok iz opazovanja učinkov svojih dejanj na bližnjih osebah v zgodbi ter iz njihovega pripovedovanja, kako se počutijo ob sprejeti vlogi, ujame tudi »moralno dimenzijo dogodka«. Otrok lahko tako sporočila zgodbe prenese v realno življenje, postanejo pa mu lahko tudi vodila za lastno odločanje in ravnanje. To pa odpira številne praktične možnosti za aktivnosti z otroki in mladostniki, torej za aktivnosti, katerih cilj ni predvsem ponotranjenje in sprejetje pravil, ki
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določajo delovanje skupnosti, ampak priložnost za oblikovanje varnega in spodbudnega okolja za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete s srečevanjem različnosti.
Oblikovanje heterogenega okolja je zelo pomemben pogoj za kakovostno spodbujanje identitetnega razvoja. Raznolika šolska skupnost1 je zelo pomembna tudi za oblikovanje identitete otrok/mladostnikov z značilnim razvojem oziroma iz večinske kulture okolja. Srečanje z drugačnostjo bližnjih oseb je namreč nujen pogoj za občutenje lastne identitete ter znajdenje v svetu razlik. Šele z refleksijo drugosti bližnje osebe se lahko produktivno soočimo z drugostjo v jedru lastne osebe (Ricoeur v Kroflič 2015). Človeka očitno določa lastnost, da lastna nelagodja in strahove projicira v drugo osebo ter jo tako okrivi, označi in izloči iz svoje sredine. Kot ugotavlja Kroflič, povzemajoč Ricourjevo razumevanje narativne identitete (prav tam), se to kaže tudi z umetniškimi podobami, ki pričajo o nelagodju, ki ga izzove eksistencialna drugost akterja družbenega dejanja. Človek se tudi v sodobnosti, ko naj bi različnost postala vrednota, oklepa norm »istosti«, da bi s tem zavaroval svojo nespremenljivost in pomensko vrednost lastne fiksne identitete idem, čeprav šele bolj odprta, narativna identiteta ipse omogoči simpatetično naravnanost do sicer družbeno marginaliziranih posameznikov in skupin.
Ali šola danes pomeni prostor soočanja z drugimi kot drugačnimi? Ali pedagoški delavci res spodbujajo dejavnosti, ki krepijo vrline sodelovanja, poslušanja bližnje osebe in pomoči? Ali danes šola res pomeni okolje, kjer lahko otroci izkustveno oblikujejo svojo moralno samopodobo kot pomembno dimenzijo lastne identitete? Vsakokratni dogodki v šolski praksi, ki pogosto segajo v polje medvrstniškega nasilja, kažejo na to, da obstajajo številne težave, ki izhajajo iz siceršnje postmo-dernistične zahteve po tem, da znamo (kakovostno) sobivati v okolju, kjer različnost bogati.
Opredelitev pojma pripoznanje
Teorija, za katero se zdi, da pomeni ustrezno dopolnitev in podporo oblikovanju identitete znotraj šolskega prostora, je pripoznanje. V šolskem prostoru je ideja pripoznanja aktualna predvsem zadnja leta. N. Fraser in Honneth (2003, str. 1) pojem opredelita kot »ključno besedo današnjega časa«, v slovenskem prostoru pa je razprave o vrednosti pripoznanja za pedagoško polje v zadnjem obdobju najti pri Krofliču (npr. 2010a, 2014). Teorijo pripoznanja bom v nadaljevanju opredelila ob odgovarjanju na vprašanje, kaj je dodana vrednost pripoznanja v primerjavi s koncepti, katerih cilj, vsaj glede identitetnega razvoja, je podoben: zagotoviti (heterogeno) šolsko okolje kot spodbudo oblikovanju identitete otrok in mladostnikov.
Pripoznanje kot politično načelo ni le prepoznanje otrokove individualnosti
1 Kamor, skladno z idejami inkluzije in medkulturnosti, vključujemo tudi učence, ki v svojem razvoju ali s svojim hendikepom odstopajo od razvoja večinske populacije, ter učence, katerih kulturna identiteta odstopa od kulturne identitete okolja. Pri tem seveda ne smemo pozabiti še preostalih drugačnosti, npr. spolne identitete, otrok iz socialno šibkejših okolij ipd.
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Mojca Kovač Šebart in Roman Kuhar
Pripoznanje bom najprej opredelila kot politično načelo (Kroflič 2010a). Kot izpostavljajo različni avtorji (npr. Fraser 2007; Kroflič 2014), je takšno razumevanje pripoznanja pomembno dopolnilo Rawlsove teorije pravičnosti (1999). Rawls s svojo teorijo pravičnosti razvija razsvetljensko paradigmo pravičnosti, ki temelji predvsem na ideji etike pravičnosti in utemeljitvi morale na umnih načelih (Kant 1988, 1995). Iz Rawlsove teorije pravičnosti (1999) sicer izhajata dve temeljni ideji, ki sta na ravni zagotavljanja temeljnih človekovih pravic in svoboščin zelo pomembni. Prvo je, da morajo biti vsaki osebi zagotovljene enake pravice na najširši lestvici temeljnih svoboščin, drugo pa je, da morajo biti socialne in ekonomske nepravilnosti urejene tako, da lahko smiselno pričakujemo, da koristijo vsakomur. To dvoje, kot je bilo predstavljeno tudi že na drugih mestih (npr. Kroflič 2003; Lesar 2009; Kodelja 2004), Rawls oblikuje še naprej v tri načela: načelo enakih možnosti, načelo poštenih enakih možnosti in načelo diference, kar na praktični ravni pomeni, da moramo delovati tako, da imajo vsi, ne glede na svoj položaj, enake pogoje za uspeh in da so dopustne le tiste razlike med nami, ki prinašajo koristi ljudem, ki so v družbi v najslabšem položaju. Z vidika identitete to pomeni, da identiteta skupine ali posameznika ne bi smela biti ovira pri doseganju družbenih položajev, dobrin, pravic in svoboščin. Kako je z uresničevanjem načel pravičnosti na ravni prakse, lahko ilustriramo s prakso inkluzije otrok s posebnimi potrebami v večinske šole. Otroku s posebnimi potrebami, ki ga v postopku usmerjanja prepoznamo kot otroka z določenim hendikepom, primanjkljajem, lahko skladno z idejo inkluzije omogočimo šolanje v večinskem sistemu. V skladu z načelom pozitivne diskriminacije/ diference mu s (primerno) oblikovanim individualiziranim programom, do katerega je po zakonu upravičen, omogočimo različne prilagoditve, za katere menimo, da mu bodo v pomoč pri šolskem delu, ter dodatno učno pomoč kot obliko realizacije Rawlsovega načela pozitivne diskriminacije. Praksa kaže, da se pri uresničitvi pravice posameznika do šolanja v večinski šoli zapleta na mnogo ravneh. Pogosto o tem, kaj je dobro za otroka, odločajo strokovnjaki, ki identitetnega položaja otroka s posebnimi potrebami ne poznajo2. Na ravni vključitve otroka s posebnimi potrebami v razred, v realno socialno skupino, učitelji upravičeno sporočajo, da nimajo ustreznih znanj za delo z otrokom z določeno posebno potrebo3. V odnose z njimi vstopajo polni stereotipnih in nerealnih predstav o tem, kaj določena posebna potreba pomeni in kako bo vplivala na učiteljevo delo, pogosto pa so tudi
2	Rovšek (2013) na primerih usmerjanja otrok z motnjami v duševnem razvoju ugotavlja številne pomanjkljivosti že v samem postopku usmerjanja otrok. Kljub temu da obstajajo primerni testi ugotavljanja stopnje socialne prilagodljivosti otroka, stopnjo motnje v duševnem razvoju pri nas ugotavljamo pretežno s testi intelektualnih zmožnosti. Prav tako so v diagnosticiranje slabo vključeni tisti, ki otroka najbolj poznajo, zato smo usmerjeni v medicinski diskurz (odkrivanje anomalij), in ne v pedagoškega (odstranjevanje tistih ovir, ki otroku s hendikepom preprečujejo doseganje zanj optimalnih rezultatov).
3	Na problematičnost pretirane specializacije študijskih programov (specialna pedagogika, socialna pedagogika, obča pedagogika itd.) je leta 2003 na posvetu Integracija, inkluzija v vrtcu, osnovni in srednji šoli opozoril na primer Medveš (2003). Če pri delu z otroki s posebnimi potrebami zagovarjamo specializirano obravnavo, ki poteka celo v različnih institucijah, smo hitro tudi pri izključitvi tistih, ki ne ustrezajo temu, kar predstavlja večinsko populacijo, s tem pa smo spet daleč od idej inkluzije. Specializacija pri izobraževanju učiteljev ne podpira inkluzivne šolske prakse.
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nepripravljeni, nepoučeni in brez idej, kako otroka smiselno vključiti v šolsko sredino4.
Pripoznanje kot politično načelo se od prepoznanja loči predvsem v tem -kot ugotavljata Fraser in Honneth (2003) -, da moramo posameznika ob tem, ko mu neko pravico priznamo (v primeru otroka s posebnimi potrebami gre torej za potrebne prilagoditve programa in/ali za nudenje dodatne strokovne pomoči), hkrati podpreti pri tem, da lahko resnično izkoristi različne možnosti javnega izražanja svojega lastnega položaja, ne da bi tvegal težave v konkretnem družbenem okolju (v primeru otroka s posebnimi potrebami to pomeni, da mu omogočimo, da na primer on sam ali njegovi zakoniti zastopniki soodločajo najmanj o načinu izvedbe dodatne strokovne pomoči (v razredu ali zunaj njega ipd.), ki sicer izhaja iz odločbe o prilagoditvi).
Fraser in Honneth (prav tam) opozarjata, da vseh konkretnih oblik družbene nepravičnosti ne moremo zvesti le na kršitev načela poštenih enakih možnosti ali načela diference. Sama navajata sicer predvsem težave z netipičnimi spolnimi identitetami, ki morajo biti zakrite, če želijo biti posamezniki v družbi izpostavljeni na vidnih mestih političnega odločanja. Da pa je to vprašanje relevantno tudi v prej izpostavljenem odnosu do otrok s posebnimi potrebami, lahko utemeljim še z opozorili A. Šelih (2013, str. 12). Avtorica ugotavlja, da čeprav je Slovenija podpisnica številnih zavezujočih dokumentov o človekovih in otrokovih pravicah, smo na praktični izpeljavi dimenzije prava na ravni konkretnih šolskih rešitev pogosto neuspešni. To konkretizira na primeru uresničitve inkluzije. Na primeru otrok z motnjami v duševnem razvoju opozori na neuresničevanje načel inkluzije v praksi, čeprav je ta predpostavljena z različnimi pravnimi formulacijami. Otroci z lažjo motnjo v duševnem razvoju imajo sicer po zakonodaji že več kot desetletje pravico do šolanja v večinskih šolah, vendar ta pravica v praksi ni uresničljiva. Šolanje otroka z lažjo motnjo v duševnem razvoju v večinski osnovni šoli po znižanem izobrazbenem standardu kljub nekaterim osamljenim poskusom za zdaj v praksi še ni zaživelo, čeprav takšne inkluzivne prakse poznajo v nekaterih drugih evropskih državah (npr. Norveška5). To pomeni, da moramo v kontekstu pedagoške obravnave načel pravičnosti vedno znova pomisliti - kot opozarja tudi Kroflič (2010a) -, kam v širokem spektru različnih oblik družbene nepravičnosti spada določen primer (npr. neuresničevanje inkluzije) in kako pri tem povezati Rawlsova načela pravične distribucije (ki se sicer na ravni prakse najuspešneje uveljavlja pri odpravljanju socialne deprivilegiranosti) s političnim načelom pravičnega pripoznanja.
Tematizacija neustreznih oblik pripoznanja kot del teorije pripoznanja
V nadaljevanju bom opredelila neustrezne oblike pripoznanja, ki sicer izhajajo že iz tematizacije same teorije pripoznanja. To lahko izpostavimo kot prednost
4	O tem poročam kot moderatorka izobraževanja v okviru Centra Janeza Levca v Ljubljani, ki je v letu 2014 izvedel dve izobraževalnici za vzgojiteljice in učiteljice Mestne občine Ljubljana z naslovom Oblikovanje inkluzivne kulture v šoli in vrtcu (Aktualno: Izobraževalnica za ... b. l.).
5	Na tem mestu tega ukrepa ne vrednotim, kajti prakse iz tujine kažejo tudi na številne težave, ki jih taka inkluzija prinaša v neposredno pedagoško prakso (gl. Rovšek 2013).
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Mojca Kovač Šebart in Roman Kuhar
pripoznanja v primerjavi z nekaterimi drugimi teorijami in koncepti, kot npr. in-kluzija, ki svojo »brezpogojno pozitivno vrednost« utemeljuje na lastnih nasprotjih, v segregaciji in asimilaciji, zelo redke pa so razprave o morebitnih pomanjkljivostih same ideje inkluzije (npr. Winkler 2011).
N. Fraser (2007) običajni pristop k pripoznanju imenuje »identitetni model« in izhaja iz heglovske ideje o tem, da je identiteta dialoško zgrajena v procesu vzajemnega prepoznavanja, kjer vsak vidi drugega kot sebi enakega in kot ločenega od sebe. To razmerje je bistveno za subjektivnost in razvoj jaza, identitete. Avtorica izpostavlja, da če je ob tem pripoznanje napačno, lahko posameznik utrpi hude poškodbe svoje identitete, kar je navadno posledica nenehnega stigmatiziranega pogleda, to pa posledično vodi v izgradnjo negativne samopodobe in prepreči razvoj zdrave identitete. Podobno problematično je za posameznika, ko je njegov identitetni položaj nepripoznan. Uresničevanje načel pripoznanja je namreč povezano tudi z umanjkanjem ali nerazumevanjem zahteve po tem, da nekomu sploh priznamo pravico do drugačne obravnave zaradi siceršnje deprivilegiranosti. Če tega ne naredimo, govorimo o dveh, prej omenjenih in prevladujočih oblikah neustreznega pripoznanja - o nepripoznanju in/ali o napačnem pripoznanju. Kot primer takega neustreznega pripoznanja lahko, poleg že omenjenih težav z nepripoznanjem ali napačnim pripoznanjem posameznikove spolne identitete in posebnih potreb, opredelimo tudi odnos večinske kulture okolja do manjšinskih kultur. K. Skubic Ermenc (2003, 2007) je z analizo odnosa šole do kulturne različnosti ugotovila, da je celotna slovenska šola predvsem »slovenska« in kot takšna usmerjena v asimilacijsko politiko, in to tako na ravni šolskih dokumentov (učni načrti) kot tudi na ravni vsakodnevnega govora. Če se otrok ne more prilagoditi zahtevam večinskega šolskega okolja, naj se šola drugje oziroma naj se čim prej nauči jezika okolja.
Takšna personalna drža ali družbene prakse onemogočajo to, kar sicer Kro-flič (2010a) opredeli kot etično dimenzijo pripoznanja. Če posameznik ali skupina ne zmore izstopiti iz svojih vnaprejšnjih sodb in ocen o posameznikovi (moralni) vrednosti, težko govorimo o tem, da drugega obravnava takšnega, kot je (Taylor v prav tam, str. 8), oziroma takšnega, kot lahko v odnosu šele postane (Butler v prav tam, str. 8). Etična raven pripoznanja ne pomeni le strahu pred distanciranim dopuščanjem drugačnega mnenja (pasivna toleranca) oziroma jasnega sočustvovanja z usodo posameznika ali skupine (usmiljenje), ampak tudi samo zavedanje, da je različnost vrednota sodobne šole in temeljni pogoj za ustrezno podporo oblikovanja identitete znotraj šolske skupnosti.
Pomen teorije pripoznanja za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete
Kaj pomeni pripoznanje za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete? Iz prej zapisanega izhaja, da je to, kar določa posameznikovo identiteto, tudi posledica različnih oblik pripoznanja, zaradi česar smo vedno izpostavljeni nevarnosti problematičnih oblik pripoznanja in izkrivljenih predstav o tem, kdo v resnici smo ter kaj pomenijo naša identitetna določila. Pripoznanje je v veliki meri vezano na diskurze v družbenem prostoru, zato Kroflič (2010a) vidi rešitev v spoštljivem odnosu
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do drugega kot drugačnega, ki ga je mogoče zagotoviti le tako, da se ob pripoznanju posameznikovega identitetnega položaja vedno znova vzpostavlja tudi vprašanje prevladujočega diskurza in njegove morebitne nekorektnosti, ki pripoznanega vodi v nepravičen družbeni položaj ali vsaj v občutek ogroženosti/nezaželenosti njegove identitete/osebe v družbenem prostoru.
Svojo identiteto pripoznavam tako v iskanju podobnosti z bližnjimi (kolektivne identitete) kakor tudi v neidentiteti z drugim, pri čemer pa je sobivanje odločilno odvisno od tega, ali se zmorem z drugim ali tujcem srečati z zanimanjem in ali sem pripravljen različnost drugega sprejeti v svoj horizont refleksije. »Z drugimi besedami: ne razumemo vsega in pogosto je nujno, da to nerazumljeno pripoznamo, ker to pomeni trenutek soočenja z identiteto drugega. V tem trenutku namreč prevzamemo odgovornost za drugega, ki se mu s tem odpira možnost zagotovitve lastne identitete.« (Borst 2011, str. 27). To Kroflič (2010) opredeli kot epistemo-loško zahtevo po pripoznanju, ki se kaže s pedagogiko poslušanja in hermenevtiko. Usmerjenost v upoštevanje miselnega horizonta sogovornika omogoča spoznanje globlje resničnosti pojava oziroma odnosa, s katerim se ukvarjamo.
E. Borst (2011) izpostavi, da je za pripoznanje izrednega pomena tudi to, kakšne možnosti so posamezniku v zgodnjem otroštvu dane za to, da svoje čute in identiteto čim bogateje razvije. Če posameznik ima to možnost, mu je s tem dana tudi večja možnost, da bo zaznaval svet v njegovi raznolikosti in si bo hkrati znal zagotoviti svojo raznolikost. »Prve emocionalne izkušnje otroka - če so se zasidrale v tako imenovanem epizodičnem spominu - ne vtisnejo pečata samo njegovemu poznejšemu vedenju in ravnanju, ampak so v ugodnih okoliščinah odgovorne za nastanek empatije in sočustvovanja [prim. Benjamin 1993, str. 50; Schafer 2003, str. 88], fantazije in ustvarjalnosti [prim. Sesnik 2002; str. 74-75; Winnicott 1997, str. 66] [...] Ljudje, ki so odraščali v čustveno varnem okolju, bodo to čustveno varnost verjetno integrirali v svoje vzorce obnašanja in jih bodo v poznejšem življenju lahko priklicali.« (Prav tam, str. 28)
Na to idejo lahko navežemo tudi ugotovitve J. Benjamin (2008) o pomenu klasične psihoanalitične razlage razvoja posameznikove osebnosti, ki izhaja iz izrazite polarizacije vlog med moškim in žensko, med aktivnim in pasivnim, simbolnim in kapricioznim. Gre za delitev vlog in za zahtevo, da se nosilec ženske vzgojne vloge kot utelešenje kapricioznosti podredi simbolni avtoriteti nosilca moške vloge, kar se lahko pozneje izrazi v obliki odpora posameznika do vsakršne drugačnosti (v opisani situaciji jo uteleša nosilec ženske vloge, negativno pripoznane kot kapriciozne), ki se razlikuje od moralnih norm, za katere posameznik sam sicer predpostavlja, da so univerzalne. Avtorica vidi izhod iz opisanega v pozitivnem pripoznanju medsebojnih vlog vseh vključenih ter v pripravljenosti posameznikov na odmik od predhodno ustvarjenih predstav o drugem. Iz tega izhajajoča sodelovalna instanca »skupnega moralnega tretjega«6 krepi sočutje in odprtost za drugega kot drugačnega.
6 Razlika med »instanco moralnega tretjega«, kot jo oblikuje Lacan, in tem, o čemer J. Benjamin (2008) govori kot o »skupni moralni tretji«, je predvsem to, da pri Lacanovem substancialnem pogledu »instanca moralnega tretjega« izhaja iz norme, zakona, simbolnega reda družbe, pri »skupnem moralnem tretjem« pa se to moralno šele vzpostavlja skozi uglaševanje potreb vključenih v dialog in dogovore (prav tam).
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Mojca Kovač Šebart in Roman Kuhar
O pomenu pripoznanja v najzgodnejšem obdobju piše tudi Honneth (2005, str. 115), ki izpostavlja pomen čustvene identifikacije otroka s pomembno drugo osebo. Šele za tem lahko otrok to osebo spozna in sprejme kot pomembno v odnosu do sveta. Iz tega izpelje tezo o ontološki prioriteti pripoznanja pred spoznanjem: »Z emocionalno navezanostjo na 'konkretnega drugega' se otroku razkrije svet smiselnih kvalitet, v katerega se bo moral praktično vključiti.« (Prav tam, str. 118) Kroflič (2014) spoznanje o ontološkem primatu pripoznanja kot pogoju za spoznavanje/učenje poveže z Rancierjevo predpostavko o enakosti inteligenc kot najprimernejši obliki pripoznanja otroka kot učečega se bitja. Klasična pedagogika si je po Rancierju zaradi ohranjanja hegemonskega položaja učitelja izmislila predstavo o učencu, ki si lahko le z učiteljevim posredovanjem vednosti in disciplino zagotovi status samostojnega subjekta, s teorijo pripoznanja pa lahko to podobo ovrednotimo kot krivično. Kot zapiše Kroflič (2014): »Aksiom o enakosti inteligenc v luči teorije pravičnega pripoznanja pomeni sprejetje podobe učenca kot kompetentne osebe, katere subjektifikacija in emancipacija potekata ob pravi participaciji v procesih učenja in odločanja o lastni usodi.« (Prav tam, str. 122)
Iz zapisanega lahko izpeljemo torej še eno od pomembnih ugotovitev teorije pripoznanja z vidika utemeljitve njene pedagoške vrednosti za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete. Od ustreznega pripoznanja otroka in mladostnika od ranega otroštva naprej je odvisno, kakšne možnosti in priložnosti za razvijanje identitete znotraj šolskega prostora mu bomo sploh omogočili. Diskurzi nezmožnosti otroka s posebnimi potrebami vnaprej opredeljujejo z vidika učnih težav, in ne najprej kot osebo, zmožno učenja. Če pa pri učencu prepoznamo ovire, ki jih zanj predstavlja pouk, ukrojen po meri otrok z značilnim razvojem, lahko te ovire v skladu z načeli diference in pozitivne diskriminacije tudi odpravljamo.
Sklep
Iz članka izpeljujem tezo o teoriji pripoznanja kot nujni konceptualni podpori oblikovanju identitete otrok in mladostnikov znotraj šolskega prostora, ki jo je na ravni sistemskih rešitev smiselno kombinirati s teorijo pravičnosti in inkluzijo.
V prvem delu besedila sem pojem identiteta opredelila z različnimi disciplinami, pri čemer sem posamezno opredelitev ovrednotila predvsem z vidika pedagogike. Na podlagi tega sem kot ključno dimenzijo sodobne identitete izpostavila njeno odprto (ipse) zasnovo, kajti šele odprtost identitete posameznika je izhodišče za vstopanje v odnose z drugimi, pri čemer se posameznik s soočenjem z različnostjo sooča tudi z lastnim sebstvom. Oblikovanje identitete posameznika ostaja nenehen proces spreminjanja. Ob dvomu o šolskem prostoru kot okolju, ki ustrezno podpira opisan proces oblikovanja posameznikove identitete, sem v drugem delu besedila kot novejšo idejo ovrednotila teorijo pripoznanja. To sem prevzela kot ustrezno kvalitativno dopolnitev drugim pedagoškim konceptom (teoriji pravičnosti in inkluziji), katerih osnovni cilj je sicer podoben - vzpostavitev (pravične, vključujoče) heterogene šolske skupnosti kot okolja za oblikovanje posameznikove identitete.
Od prepoznanja do pripoznanja identitete otrok in mladostnikov
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Na podlagi tega lahko v sklepu oblikujem še nekaj sugestij za razvijanje pedagoških praks kot podpore oblikovanju posameznikove identitete: v vrtčevskem in šolskem okolju je treba spodbujati (zgodnji in varni) vstop otrok in mladostnikov v širok izbor dejavnosti, s katerimi odpiramo vprašanja posameznikove identitete (kdo sem, kakšen je moj odnos do drugega, kakšen je odnos drugega do mene ipd.). Ob tem moramo otroke in mladostnike razumeti kot prosocialno občutljive posameznike, ki jim ob zaščiti njihovih pravic, še posebno pravice do participacije, omogočamo take prakse vstopanja v odnose in ravnanja, s katerimi lahko razvijajo svoj ontološki angažma za učenje in zadovoljijo svojo zahtevo po smiselnem učenju (Kroflič 2010b). Ob tem je pomembno krepiti občutek varnosti in zaupanja posameznika, da lahko kljub temu, da je del neke skupnosti, neguje in izrazi tudi svojo različnost od drugih, svojo individualnost, identiteto. Če izhajamo iz teorije pripoznanja, naj bi posameznikovo individualnost sprejeli z zanimanjem in brez zdrsov v neustrezne oblike pripoznanja. Pri tem, kot je izpostavljeno tudi v besedilu, se za podporo razvoju otrokove prosocialnosti in moralnosti kot dveh pomembnih vidikov identitete - kot ustreznejši pristop kot le navajanje na vnaprej določen sistem pravil - kaže podpora refleksiji vsakokratne situacije in procesom uglaševanja potreb ter predstav o skupnem življenju/delovanju med vključenimi otroki in odraslimi, kar je temeljno načelo induktivnih disciplinskih praks (na primer mediacije in zahteve po poravnavi nastale škode) in širšega induktivnega vzgojnega pristopa.
Na sistemski ravni pa velja opozoriti na trenutno aktualne anomalije slovenskega sistema usmerjanja otrok s posebnimi potrebami in dodeljevanja pravic do dodatne učne pomoči, ki očitno ne poteka na podlagi postopkov spoznavanja konkretnih oviranosti obravnavanih otrok. O tem pričajo tako podatki o visokem odstotku otrok z motnjo v duševnem razvoju, ki so bili prekvalificirani iz druge usmeritve (Rovšek 2013), kakor tudi povečanje deleža otrok z odločbami, ki so sicer usmerjeni v redno osnovno šolo (s 3,3 % v šolskem letu 2005/06 na 6,2 % v šolskem letu 2011/12). Ocena, da so postopki usmerjanja pri nas še vedno oblikovani na podlagi medicinskega diskurza, usmerjenega v specialistično diagnosticiranje primanjkljajev, kaže na eno ključnih oblik napačnega pripoznanja otrok s posebnimi potrebami. Posledica tega niso samo opisane anomalije pri dodeljevanju odločb, ampak verjetno tudi anomalije v odnosu učiteljev do usmerjenih otrok in posledično anomalije v njihovem identitetnem razvoju.
Teorijo pripoznanja lahko torej razumemo kot pomembno osnovo za oblikovanje takega šolskega prostora, pravil sobivanja, izražanja ipd., ko drugemu, navkljub ali pa prav zaradi njegove različnosti, aktivno omogočimo prostor za izražanje in udejanjanje lastne individualnosti.
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28 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 1/2015	Katja Jeznik
Katja Jeznik
From the acknowledgment to the recognition of children's and adolescents' identity
Abstract: The question of the development of an individual's identity within the school space is related to a variety of roles that the individual takes on in the relationships that she/he builds from birth onward. In the article, I outline some possible ways of understanding an individual's identity in the process of its formation in the institutionalized school environment, and I then proceed to answer the question about what the theory of recognition means for the support for the process of developing an individual's identity. The theory of recognition can serve as a concrete starting point for the creation of the school space as a heterogeneous environment. I understand coexistence in diversity as a fundamental value of our time, which is—as I show in the article—also the basic starting point for the development of an open identity of children and adolescents. The article uses the example of the placement of children with special needs to demonstrate certain anomalies in the Slovenian school system that could be adequately eliminated if the described principles of the recognition theory were taken into account.
Key words: education, identity, acknowledgement, recognition, students with special needs UDC: 376 Scientific article
Katja Jeznik, Ph.D., teaching assistant, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Educational Sciences, Aškerčeva 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia; E-mail for correspondence: katja.jeznik@ff.uni-lj.si
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 1/2015, 28-45
From the acknowledgment to the recognition .
29
Introduction
The concept of identity is very vague, and—within pedagogical theory—it can be investigated at a variety of levels. To begin with, the concept is indirectly part of the goals defined in the fundamental act on the Slovenian school system (the Organization and Financing of Education Act). For instance, identity development is related to goals such as encouraging an individual's integrity and developing awareness of belonging to the state and national identity. The educational process is tied to knowing Slovenian history and culture and to educating individuals on general cultural and civilization values originating in European tradition. Goals defined in this way affect and co-define direct pedagogical action. Therefore, it is not unimportant how we understand them and what pedagogical practice we derive from them. This article answers the question about whether understanding identity as derived from the central goals of the Slovenian school system (i.e., as an attitude toward oneself, the other, and the community in which the individual lives) is sufficient, adequate, and in tune with the recent findings on the identity development of children and adolescents. If we are to adequately support the process of identity development in children and adolescents, we must be aware of the complexity of the concept and the different ways of understanding identity. I will first define the concept of identity through four scientific disciplines (philosophy, sociology, psychology, and pedagogy).
Defining the concept of identity
Gnothi seauton or know thyself is an inscription from the Greek-Roman period found in Delphi, Greece. I quote the inscription as evidence of the fact that the issue of identity has always been one of the most fundamental issues of humankind. The central questions pertaining to identity in philosophy are: Is identity the same as selfhood, is selfhood the authentic essence of the individual that is unchangeable, and if selfhood is the solid core of the individual's identity, who or what is the basis for the changes still occurring in our notion of ourselves, of
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our selfhood, our identity? The answer is not unambiguous. Kristjansson (2010) outlines how the concepts are understood by realists and anti-realists. The latter understand selfhood and identity as a construct without a real foundation that is created through practices, discourses, and relationships. Realists, on the other hand, believe that behind all this there is a real core that defines us, that defines our selfhood and our identity: "just as a mirror can both reflect the furniture in the room in which it is placed and be itself part of that furniture, so self-concept can both represent selfhood and be part of selfhood." (Ibid. p. 32) Realists perceive self-knowledge as the basic knowledge of who one really is, which means that it can change and develop through activity and communication with the environment, but it does not mean that it can only be established through relationships—which is anti-realists' claim (e.g., Gergen 2009).
In his definition, Taylor (2004) stresses the relational dimension of identity. For him identity can only exist in the space of inquiry and specific awareness. Two dimensions seem to be crucial. Firstly, we require a sense of who we are, which is only possible when we understand how we have reached that. The question Who am I? is, in effect, the question Who have I become? And, secondly, such understanding cannot be related merely to understanding one's own life; it must go deeper. That is to say, there is no identity outside communities and relations, nor outside a moral space, which is what we can come to know through narration. According to Taylor (ibid.), developing identity also means developing moral tools. It is a question of human responsibility, which can be understood as the individual's adaptation to the social norms/values/expectations that the individual should internalize through the process of identification; or we can see responsibility as establishing a responsible attitude toward fellow human beings, the community, the natural environment, and the meaning of one's existence as the consequence of the individual's personal experiences gained through reflection upon relationships and activities in the social environment (Kroflic 2007). This understanding of the development of the moral self-image is based on Aristotle's idea about moral education as learning/practicing virtues, which can only develop from the individual's own direct experiences, reflection upon relationships and actions. This, as some recent studies prove (e.g., Stirn 2014), is what preschool children are already capable of, provided that they are offered adequate support. Rules, norms, and conventions are necessary, as they define the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable actions in advance. The proponents of Aristotle (e.g., Rice and Burbules 2010) claim that the difference between what is acceptable and what is unacceptable must be reconsidered over and over again according to the crucial virtues as well as according to the context of each individual situation or relationship, which enables practical wisdom (phronesis).
The sociological definition of identity is especially interesting as a way of understanding the modern and postmodern constructions of selfhood, as a way of understanding the modern and postmodern educational ideals. Having examined sociological studies of identity (e.g., Beck 2001; Giddens 1991; Ule 2000, 2008), we can conclude that neither the modern not the postmodern constructions of selfhood provide sufficient basis on which to found present-day education. The
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goal of education is, certainly, the transmission/reproduction of social values and knowledge from generation to generation. But it is more than that. Education also aims at rising beyond the existing social structure. According to Riesman (1951), modernity resulted in the "inner-directed" subject, which was replaced by the "other-directed" subject when the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth. However, through history both subjectivities have proved problematic (Ule 2012). "Inner-directed" identity has become problematic because we can usually only reach it through an explicitly paternalistically oriented educational methodology with the authoritarian personality as a result. On the other hand, "other-directed" identity has also been seen as problematic, since the individual's actions are mainly directed by the social environment, with the subject being understood as directed by objective circumstances. Such a subject is described by Lasch (2012) as pathological narcissism. The postmodern construction of selfhood, primarily defined by the process of individualization, does not provide an adequate answer either. Although the basic idea of individualization is the liberation of the individual from traditional social restraints (e.g., gender and class), the identity that stems from that is predominantly understood as a reflexive organization of the individual's life stories. In their studies, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) emphasize both the positive and negative sides of the contemporary processes of individualization. They illustrate them with the examples of human rights and paid work. Both are positive contributions brought about by individualization. But, as the authors maintain, the individual's fundamental rights and the need for the individual's economic independence are—because they are not self-evident— also becoming a threat to the basic social coexistence. The central institutions of modern society are, namely, oriented toward the individual, not the community. According to Giddens (1991), the freedom of choice, as a consequence of increased individualization, becomes an absolute command without certainty in traditional life courses. This, subsequently, leads to the lack of two key identity components: the sense of ontological security and fundamental trust.
The process of individualization, together with the related perception of identity, has led to the loosening of (traditional) school communities and a decrease in their importance. This faces pedagogy with a demanding task of looking for new models of (school) communities. They should be truly inclusive and based on a broad consensus about the fundamental values shared by their members, without being exclusive of individuals' particular values (Strike 1999). They should ensure such a building of personal relationships that would reintegrate the fundamental sets of the individual's needs for freedom and security and acceptance (Bauman 2002). Difference and diversity should be the central values in such communities, which Biesta (2006) believes are an essential prerequisite for insisting on the value of democracy in contemporary society. Contemporariness requires such environments and communities that are based on the ability of different groups and individuals to coexist in a nonviolent manner, to enter into relationships so that diversity enriches and strengthens each individual and, consequently, each community.
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From the aspect of pedagogy, the psychological take on identity is interesting because it offers some very concrete answers to how the individual's subjectivity and identity are developed in the first place and what the significance of conflicts and crises is for the development of the individual's identity. Classical psychoanalytical theory starts from the assumption that mental conflicts and contradictions are the motors of an individual's development. The basic phases of human development run from primary separation, individualization, and the so-called psychological birth of the child, from symbiosis, which gives the child the initial sense of security and symbolic identification, to the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex, which completes with the development of the individual's appropriate subjectivity and moral autonomy. Today, the classical psychoanalytical view on the development of personality faces considerable criticism (e.g., Benjamin 2008). From the aspect of identity development, another theory, the theory of psychosocial development, is also interesting. It defines adolescence as the crucial period for the development of an individual's identity (Erikson 1994). Marcia and Kroger (2011) describe four identity statuses in youth: identity diffusions, foreclosure, moratoriums, and identity achievement. These are no longer stages in identity development, as typified by Erikson's identity theory. The authors apply the different identity statuses to the field of education. They draw attention to the negative sides of children's having to make early decisions on their vocational paths and other important decisions relating to the education. Schools and studies should be primarily concerned with discovering different ideas and values, rather than limiting themselves to academic achievements. They propose that the presence or absence of two elements is vital for identity formation: crisis and commitment. The crises are crucial when seen from the aspect of pedagogy, as conflicts and children's rebelliousness can be perceived as important dimensions to moral development at the individual level and moral progress at the level of society (Kroflic 2013). They should be understood as exercises in moral autonomy and as an individual's entry into politically committed action.
In pedagogy we encounter the concept of identity already at the basic theoretical question of pedagogy—the question of how to define moral education. Here, we underline the difference between defining moral education at the level of the goal or ideal of identity development (the modern and postmodern moral educational ideals and identity formation) and at the level of understanding moral education as a process (the stage theories of child development that allow for the acceptability of the expression "liberating discipline") and education as an individual's communication with others and with values.
If moral education is defined at the level of goals or ideals of identity formations, it is important to underscore the difference between the classical/modern and contemporary/postmodern designation of what is to be the goal of our educational efforts. The modern educational ideal derived from the enlightenment pedagogical tradition and the view of education as the creation of humans/humankind. Education in the classical enlightenment concept means the creation of a person's other nature. According to Kant (1988), moral education must nurture, discipline, cultivate, civilize, and moralize human beings. In other words, it leads from the
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total obedience to the educator (discipline) to the voluntary obedience to the educator (reasonable reasons for obedience) to the obedience to one's own mind. Such an understanding of educational goals defines education as activities/actions that originate in a predetermined and socially valid list of values and goals that are to be achieved through adequate educational interventions, that is, through control over key educational factors. Thus, the goal was formulated so as to be capable of "following the highest ideals, not being capable of being smaller that the greatest idea produced by human thinking" (Medveš 1991, p. 215). Kroflič (1997) emphasizes that contemporariness has shaken individuals' and science's certitude and firm beliefs in the world that individuals previously built on the authority of their own ideas about humanity and scientific progress. Some years later the author writes: "For individuals to be able to develop their personal potentials optimally we must provide them with optimal educational environments, rather than thinking of them as 'not-yet-human', in need of a re-education of their 'wild nature' into 'cultivated beings'" (Kroflič 2001a, p. 33). It is a fundamental paradox: how to encourage an individual's autonomy through submission. Kant's sentence (1995, p. 10): "Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!" can indeed be understood as the freedom of an individual (at least in the private sphere), but it can also be understood as setting up an individual's "virtual freedom" mainly directed by forced choices (e.g., Salecl 2012) and a false sense that the choices are free and autonomous, which is illustrated by Beauvois (2000) with the concepts of the lack of social clear-sightedness and the cult of internality.
The views of goals have subsequently changed the views of the educational process as well. On the one hand, we can follow the so-called stage theories of child development that confirm the idea about discipline (as an important part of education) which liberates and, on the other hand, we can identify the views of the educational process as an individual's communication with others and with values.
The understanding of education that originates from the stage theories of child development can be related to the psychoanalytical explanations of child development, to Piaget's theory of cognitive development, and to Kohlberg's model of ethical decision making. Since the theories have been elaborated on at some length elsewhere, we will only consider the understandings of education that usually originate in them. The proponents of stage theories generally see the goal of education in the internalization of the law, rules, the so-called symbolic matrix, which is the basis for a healthy personality development (e.g., Kovač Šebart 2002; Kovač Šebart and Krek 2009; Kovač Šebart 2013). Medveš (2007) considers the theoretical limits of understanding education as the internalization of values and asks whether the educational concept could be developed so that it would enable an individual's integration at the level of rationally reflected morality without the internalization of behavior and value patterns. He writes: "Can we believe that it is possible, with education and the educational concept, to develop an attitude toward the world of values as a reflected communication with a value, rather than appropriating or internalizing the content or even the form of values?" (Ibid., p. 22) In this, he raises three crucial questions of pedagogical theory: Firstly, is it possible, in postmodernity, to define a universal moral code; secondly, how can we
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avoid indoctrination when educating in the spirit of values; thirdly, how can we ensure that individuals will act in accordance with the imparted/adopted values in their everyday lives?
The same questions are also raised by the authors whose views of education are characterized by understanding "education as neither getting accustomed to the reproduction of the features of past and present existence nor getting accustomed to the use of certain forms of behavior and valuing that some might call historically permanent, undisputable and forever unchangeable" (Medves 1991, p. 117). Education is mainly becoming accustomed to the permanent search for new forms of coexistence: "It is getting accustomed to the only permanent thing in the history of humankind, that is, change." (Ibid.) Kroflic (2001, p. 33) finds that the presence of law and human rights definitely led to the change of the classical modern paradigm of education as the transmission of unanimous truths and values. The cultural-transmission paradigm of education has been replaced by the process-development oriented paradigm of education, whose essence lies in looking for a way to "understand the possibility for coexistence in the world of relativity and legitimate presence of various living and thinking practices." (Kroflic 1997, p. 313) Underlying this view of education is the image of the child as a capable being who can—with appropriate support—communicate with other people in a prosocial way from early childhood on (Kroflic 2013; Stirn 2014).
What do these questions mean from the aspect of forming an individual's identity as an explicitly relational phenomenon? Stage theories presuppose the unconditional acceptance of social norms as a condition for freedom/autonomy. The other branch stresses the importance of constant communication, reflection upon conflicts, and presupposed values as a way of establishing practical wisdom as well as the experience of rebellion. According to Kroflic (2013), we must use the educational process to help individuals from the earliest period of life to develop potentials for "political acts," since only such an approach will enable individuals to withdraw from social conventions and enter the world(liness) as a space of humane existence. For Hannah Arendt, this is the paradigm of human freedom (ibid.).
The existing, predominantly individualistic conception of education (Gergen 2009), deriving from the enlightenment view of individuals and their social positioning, is obviously unsatisfactory when seen from the aspect of the child's/ adolescent's identity development. Gergen believes that teachers should direct their attention from individual students to connecting students into relationships in which learning and education are established, thus opening a space of support for the formation of an individual's identity. Although Gergen does not use the term relational pedagogy, Aspelin (2010) relates his ideas to the foundations of relational pedagogy. Kroflic writes: "Thus, education is not first and foremost the transmission of knowledge and experiences, just as it is not merely the protection of the child as a helpless being; rather, it is an active relationship happening through shared activities and gradually extending from the first significant persons to significant third (adult) persons and peers." (Kroflic 2008, p. 3) Or, as he notes some years later when considering the significance of stories for the individual's identity: "Storytelling is play put into narrative form [...] The stories
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are literature, the play is life. [...] Children see themselves, always, inside a story. [...] You are a friend if you take part in someone's play. (Paley in Kroflic 2013a, p. 1) The child is truly accepted by a group when other children make her/him part of their stories and dramatizations. In the educational process, the story, narration as a path of perceiving the individual's identity (Kearney 2002) also influences the child's evaluation of life situations, but not in the sense of "moral lessons" with adults frequently referring to the deductive justification of the (un)ethica-lity of a situation. On the contrary, the influence is inductive, and Kroflic (2007) highlights a different view of responsibility as an individual's response-ability, which can be developed when entering into socially sensitive relationships with the individual having the opportunity to develop a sense of respect for a specific person and his/her face. Only this can lead to the strengthening of the awareness of ethical principles and humanistic requirements that relate to human rights, ecological values, and learning how to utilize them as a basis for democratic negotiations and conflict resolution. The role of adults is therefore not consistently explaining a prohibition to children and waiting for them to accept it as their own, but mainly drawing their attention to their position in relation to the other actors in the story. Consequently, having observed the effects of their actions on other people in the story and having heard them talk about how they feel in the accepted role, children can perceive the "moral dimension of the event" as well. In so doing, they can transfer the messages of the story to real life and use them as guidelines for their own decision-making and actions. In addition, this opens numerous practical possibilities for activities with children and adolescents, for activities whose primary goal is not internalizing and accepting the rules that regulate the functioning of a group, but an opportunity for creating a safe and encouraging environment for the formation of the individual's identity by way of encountering diversity.
Creating heterogeneous environments is a very important condition for a quality encouragement of identity development. Diverse school communities1 are very important for the development of the identity of children/adolescents with a typical development or from the majority culture. Encountering the difference of other people is a precondition for the perception of one's identity and for finding a place in the world of differences. Only when reflecting upon the otherness of other people can we productively face otherness in the core of ourselves (Ricoeur in Kroflic 2015). Human beings are obviously determined by the characteristic that makes them project their own uneasiness and fears onto others, thereby putting the blame on them, labeling them, and excluding them. Kroflic, who recapitulates Ricoeur's understanding of narrative identity (ibid.), writes that this is seen in artistic images that testify to the uneasiness which is provoked by the existential otherness of an actor of social events. Even today, when diversity should have become a value, people cling to the norms of "sameness" in order to protect their
1 Including, in accordance with ideas of inclusion and interculturalism, students whose development or handicap differ from the development of the majority population and students whose cultural identity differs from the cultural identity of the environment. Needless to say, we should not forget other differences, such as gender identity, children from socially underprivileged environments, etc.
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own unchangeability and the value of their fixed idem identity, although it is only a more open, narrative ipse identity that enables sympathetic attitude toward socially marginalized individuals and groups.
Does school today represent a space of encountering others as different? Do educators really encourage activities that strengthen the virtues of cooperation, listening to other people, and helping others? Does school today really mean an environment where children can experientially create their moral self-image as an important dimension of their identity? Everyday events in school practice, often related to bullying, demonstrate that there are numerous problems originating in the postmodern demand for knowing how to coexist (in a quality manner) in an environment where diversity enriches.
Defining the concept of recognition
The theory that seems to be an adequate complement and support to identity formation in the school space is recognition. In the school space the idea of recognition has been particularly debated in recent years. Fraser and Honneth (2003, p. 1) define the notion as "a keyword of our time," and in Slovenia discussions of the significance of recognition to the pedagogical area have recently been generated by Kroflič (e.g., 2010, 2014). Below I will define the recognition theory while answering the question of what its added value of recognition is in comparison with the concepts whose goal—at least as far as identity development is concerned—is similar: to ensure a (heterogeneous) school environment as a stimulus to children's and adolescents' identity formation.
Recognition as a political principle is not merely acknowledging a child's individuality
Let me first define recognition as a political principle (Kroflič 2010). Various authors (e.g., Fraser 2007, Kroflič 2014) stress that such understanding of recognition means an important addition to Rawls's theory of justice (1999). With his theory of justice, Rawls develops the enlightenment paradigm of justice, which is primarily based on the ethics of justice and the substantiation of morality on reasonable principles (Kant 1988, 1995). Rawls's theory of justice (1999) is also the origin of two key ideas that are highly relevant for the provision of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The first stipulates that each person should be guaranteed the same rights on the broad scale of fundamental freedoms, while the second argues that social and economic irregularities should be managed so that we can reasonably expect they are to everybody's advantage. This, as already argued by others (e.g., Kodelja 2004; Kroflič 2003; Lesar 2009), was the basis for Rawls to form three further principles: The principle of equal opportunities, the principle of fair equal opportunities and the principle of difference. At the practical level, this implies that we should act so that everybody, regardless of their position, has the same conditions to succeed and that only those differences are
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permissible that benefit those who are socially the most underprivileged. Regarding identity, this means that group or individual identity should present no obstacle to obtaining social positions, goods, rights, and freedoms. The practical level of realizing the principles of justice can be illustrated with the practice of including children with special needs in majority schools. The child with special needs who is acknowledged as a child with a particular handicap or deficit can be enabled schooling in the majority system in accordance with the idea of inclusion. In line with the principle of positive discrimination/difference, the child is offered a (suitably) drawn up individualized plan (which the child is entitled to by the law), various adjustments (which we believe will help the child in school work), and additional learning support as a way of realizing Rawls's principle of positive discrimination. Practice demonstrates the there are numerous problems concerning the realization of individuals' right to be educated in majority schools. It is often experts who are unfamiliar with the identity position of a child with special needs who decide on what is good for the child.2 At the level of integrating children with special needs in classrooms, in real social groups, teachers legitimately report not having adequate qualifications to work with children with a specific special need.3 They enter into the relationships full of prejudice and unrealistic ideas about what a specific special need means and how it will affect the teacher's work. Besides, they are frequently unprepared, uninformed, and without ideas about how to include the child sensibly in school.4
According to Fraser and Honneth (2003), recognition as a political principle differs markedly from acknowledgement in that when an individual is recognized a right (in the case of a child with special needs, this denotes necessary program adjustments and/or additional expert assistance), she/he must also be supported in really being able to use a variety of possibilities for a public expression of her/ his position, without risking difficulties in specific social environments (in the case of a child with special needs this means, for instance, enabling her/him or her/his legal representatives to co-decide on at least the manner of providing additional expert assistance (inside or outside of the classroom, etc.) that is stipulated in the adjustment decision).
2	Rovsek (2013) uses examples of the placement of children with mental development disorders to point to a number of problems in the very procedure of the placement. Although there are adequate tests to assess the level of a child's social adjustment, the level of the mental development disorder is predominantly established with tests of intellectual ability. Furthermore, those who know the child best are insufficiently included in diagnosing; therefore, we are led into the medical discourse (discovering anomalies) rather than into the pedagogical one (removing the obstacles that prevent the child with a handicap from achieving optimum results).
3	In 2003, during the conference Integration, inclusion in preschool, primary and secondary schools, Medves (2003) underscored the problems related to the excessive specialization of study programs (special pedagogy, social pedagogy, general pedagogy, etc.) If, when working with children with special needs, we argue for a specialized treatment, possibly provided in different institutions, we will soon end up excluding those who do not fit into what represents the majority population and thus far from the ideas about inclusion. Specialization in teacher training does not support inclusive school practice.
4	I report on that as the facilitator of the training course Creating an inclusive culture in schools andpreschools organized in 2014 by the Special Education Center Janez Levec in Ljubljana, Slovenia, for teachers and preschool teachers working in the Municipality of Ljubljana (Aktualno: Izobrazevalnica za ... no year).
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Fraser and Honneth (ibid.) also emphasize that all concrete forms of social injustice cannot be ascribed only to the violations of the principles of equal opportunities or difference. They mostly quote problems concerning atypical gender identities that must remain hidden if individuals aspire to be socially exposed in the positions of political decision-making. That this issue is relevant to the above-mentioned attitudes toward children with special needs is substantiated by Selih (2013, p. 12). The author notes that although Slovenia is a signatory to a number of binding documents on human and children's rights, we are frequently unsuccessful at the practical level of providing concrete school solutions. She gives the example of realizing inclusion. Using the example of children with mental development disorders, she calls attention to the practical non-realization of the principles of inclusion, although it is presupposed in various legal acts. Children with a minor mental development disorder have already had the legal right to be educated in majority schools for over a decade, but the right is not exercised in practice. Educating a child with a minor mental development disorder in majority schools in accordance with lower educational standard has, despite certain isolated attempts, not been put into practice, although such inclusive practice is known in some other European countries (e.g., Norway5). According to Kroflic (2010), this means that in the context of the pedagogical treatment of the principles of justice, we must always consider where in the wide variety of different forms of social injustices a specific example belongs (e.g., the non-realization of inclusion) and, in so doing, how Rawls's principles of just distribution (at the level of practice this is most effectively asserted through the elimination of social underprivilege) should be related to the political principle of just recognition.
Examining inadequate forms of recognition as part of the theory of recognition
I am now going to outline inadequate forms of recognition which are part of the debates on the recognition theory. We see this as an advantage of recognition in comparison with some other theories and concepts, such as inclusion, that found their "unconditional positive value" on their own contradictions, segregation and assimilation, while debates on their possible drawbacks are very rare (e.g., Winkler 2011).
Fraser (2007, p. 213) calls the usual approach to recognition the "identity model," which "starts from the Hegelian idea that identity is constructed dia-logically, through a process of mutual recognition." In this process each subject sees the other as its equal and as separate from it. This relation is essential for subjectivity and for the development of self and identity. The author stresses that in the case of misrecognition, an individual may suffer a serious distortion in his/ her identity, which is usually a result of the repeated stigmatizing gaze. This leads to the development of a negative self-image and prevents the development of a healthy identity. It is similarly problematic if the individual's identity position is
5 Here, I am not judging this measure in any way, since practice from abroad does also point to many problems brought by such inclusion to direct pedagogical practice (see Rovsek 2013).
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unrecognized. Realizing the principle of recognition, namely, is related to a lack or misunderstanding of the demand for recognizing one's right to a different treatment due to her/his underprivilege. If we fail in it, we can speak about the two above-mentioned forms of inadequate recognition, unrecognition and/or misreco-gnition. In addition to the already mentioned issues regarding the unrecognition or misrecognition of the individual's gender identity and special needs, we can quote the example of the attitudes of the majority culture of the environment toward minority cultures. Skubic Ermenc (2003, 2007) analyzed the attitude of school toward cultural diversity and found that the entire Slovenian school is primarily "Slovenian" and as such oriented toward assimilation policies, both at the level of education documents (syllabuses) and at the level of everyday speech. If a child cannot adapt to the demands of the majority school environment, he/ she had better be educated elsewhere or learn the language of the environment as soon as possible.
Such a personal attitude or social practice disables what Kroflič (2010) calls the ethical dimension of recognition. If individuals or groups cannot renounce their prejudgments and evaluations about an individual's (moral) value, it is hard to speak about treating others as they are (Taylor in ibid., p. 8) or as they can become in the relationship (Butler in ibid., p. 8). The ethical level of recognition not only signifies a fear of a merely distanced allowing for a different opinion (passive tolerance) or a clear compassion with the individual's or group's fortune (pity), but also awareness of the fact that diversity is a value in the contemporary school and a basic foundation of an adequate support for identity development within a school community.
The importance of the theory of recognition for the development of an individual's identity
What does recognition mean for the development of an individual's identity? What has been said above also implies that an individual's identity definition is a consequence of various forms of recognition. This, however, always exposes us to the danger of problematic forms of recognition and distorted images of who we really are and what our identity characteristics mean. To a large extent, recognition is interrelated with the existing discourses within a social space. Therefore, Kroflič (2010) sees the solution in a respectful attitude toward the other and the different, which can only be guaranteed—when recognizing an individual's identity position—by constantly questioning the dominant discourse and its possible incorrectness that brings the recognized to an unjust position or at least to a sense of jeopardy/unwantedness concerning his/her identity/person in the social space.
One can recognize one's identity by looking for similarities with other people (collective identities) as well as non-identity with others. Coexistence decisively depends on whether one is capable of coming face to face with others with interest and whether one is willing to accept the other's difference into one's own horizon of reflection. "In other words: we do not understand everything and it is often necessary to recognize that which is not understood, and that is the moment of
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coming face to face with the other's identity. It is at this moment, namely, that we accept responsibility for another person, who is thus given a possibility for ensuring his/her own identity." (Borst 2011, p. 27) Kroflič (2010) defines this as the epistemological demand for recognition, which can be seen through pedagogy of listening and hermeneutics. Incorporation of the mental horizon of the person we are talking to enables us to get to know a deeper reality of the phenomenon or relationship we are addressing.
Borst (2011) stresses that it is extremely important to recognize what possibilities are given to an individual in early childhood to develop his/her senses and identity. If the individual has this possibility, she/he is given greater possibility of being able to perceive the world in its diversity and to ensure her/his own diversity. "The child's first emotional experiences—if anchored in the so-called episodic memory—do not leave an impression only on his/her later behavior and actions, but they are—in favorable circumstances—also responsible for the establishment of empathy and compassion (cf. Benjamin 1993, p. 50; Schafer 2003, p. 88), fantasy and creativity (cf. Sesnik 2002; pp. 74-75; Winnicott 1997, p. 66) [...] People who grow up in an emotionally secure environment, will probably be able to integrate this emotional security into their behavior patterns and will be able to recall them in later life." (Ibid., p. 28)
Benjamin's (2008) findings on the significance of the classical psychoanalytical explanation of the development of an individual's personality are relevant here. This explanation originates in a pronounced polarization of the roles between men and women, between active and passive, symbolic and capricious. This signifies the separation of the roles and the demand for the carrier of the female moral educational role as the embodiment of capriciousness to be subordinated to the symbolic authority of the carrier of the male role. Later, this can result in a form of resistance to any diversity (in the described situation it is embodied by the carrier of the female role, negatively recognized as capricious) that differs from the moral norms that the individual assumes to be universal. The author sees a solution in a positive recognition of the roles of all the participants as well as in the willingness of all individuals to step away from their previously formed ideas about others. The subsequent cooperative instance of the "common moral third"6 strengthens compassion and openness for the other and the different.
The importance of recognition in the earliest period is also discussed by Honneth (2005, p. 115). He emphasizes the import of a child's emotional identification with a significant other. Only after that can the child get to know this person and accept her/him as important in relation to the world. This serves as a basis to develop a thesis about the ontological priority of recognition over other forms of relating to the world: "Therefore, it is through this emotional attachment to a "concrete other" that a world of meaningful qualities is disclosed to a child as a world
6 The difference between »the instance of the moral Third« as developed by Lacan and »the common moral Third« as defined by J. Benjamin (2008) is mainly that in Lacan's substantialist view »the instance of the moral Third« derives from the norm, law, symbolic order of society, whereas in »the common moral Third« the moral is established through the harmonization of the needs of those participating in the dialogue and negotiation (ibid.).
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in which it must involve itself practically." (Ibid., p. 118) Kroflic (2014) relates the finding about the ontological primacy of recognition as a condition for learning to Ranciere's supposition on the equality of intelligence as the most suitable form of the recognition of a child as a learning being. According to Ranciere, in an attempt to maintain the hegemonic position of the teacher, classical pedagogy has made up a notion about the student who can ensure him-/herself the status of an independent subject only through the teacher's transmission of knowledge and discipline. With the theory of recognition, however, this notion can be assessed as unjust. In Kroflic's (2014) words: "In the light of just recognition, the axiom of the equality of intelligence means accepting the notion of the student as a competent person whose subjectification and emancipation happen in the appropriate participation in the processes of learning and deciding on one's own future." (Ibid., p. 122)
This brings us to another important conclusion from the aspect of the pedagogical value of the theory of recognition for the development of an individual's identity. It depends on the adequate recognition of children and adolescents from early childhood onward regarding what possibilities and opportunities to develop identity inside the school environment they will be allowed at all. Disability discourses about children with special needs define these children in advance from the aspect of learning difficulties, rather than first and foremost as individuals capable of learning. But if we identify obstacles that are the result of the school instruction tailored to the needs of children with the typical development, we can, consequently, overcome the obstacles following the principles of difference and positive discrimination.
Conclusion
My article develops the thesis on the recognition theory as a necessary conceptual support to the development of the identity of children and adolescents within the school environment that should—at the level of system solutions—be combined with the theory of justice and inclusion.
In the first part of the text, I define the concept of identity through different disciplines, assessing each definition primarily from the aspect of pedagogy. On that basis I emphasize the open (ipse) conception of contemporary identity as its key dimension, since only the openness of an individual's identity can serve as a point of departure for entering into relations with others. At the same time when an individual faces diversity, he/she faces his/her own selfhood. His/her identity development remains a constant process of change. Expressing certain doubts about the existing school environment as an environment that would adequately support the described process of an individual's identity development, I assess the more recent theory of recognition in the second part of my article. I adopt the theory of recognition as a suitable qualitative complement to other pedagogical concepts (the theory of justice, inclusion) whose central goal is similar—the establishment of a (just, inclusive) heterogeneous school community as an environment for the formation of an individual's identity.
42 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 1/2015	Katja Jeznik
Let me, then, conclude by formulating some suggestions for the development of pedagogical practices as support to the formation of the individual's identity: In preschool and school environments it is important to encourage an (early and safe) access of children and adolescents to a wide range of activities that address the questions of an individual's identity (who am I, what is my attitude toward others, what is the others' attitude toward me, etc.). Children and adolescents must be understood as prosocially sensitive individuals who are guaranteed children's rights, especially the right to participation and thus enabled such practice of entering into relationships and actions through which they can develop their ontological commitment to learning and satisfy their demand for sensible learning (Kroflic 2010a). It is important to reinforce the sense of security and trust so that an individual, although she/he is part of a community, can maintain and express her/his difference form others, individuality, and identity. Starting from the theory of recognition, an individual's individuality should be accepted with interest and without slips toward inadequate forms of recognition. In this, as emphasized above, the support for the reflection on each situation and for the processes of the harmonization of needs and ideas about common life/action among participating children and adults seem to be more important than getting children accustomed to a predetermined system of rules when developing their prosociality and morality. This is the fundamental principle of inductive disciplinary practice (e.g., mediation, demand for the reparation of the damage caused) and the broader inductive educational approach.
At the system level, we should point to the current anomalies in the Slovenian system of placing children with special needs and granting them rights to additional learning assistance, which clearly do not follow the procedures of becoming acquainted with the actual children's disabilities. This is substantiated by the data on the high percentage of children with a mental development disorder who were retrained (Rovsek 2013) and the data on the increased share of children with formal decisions who are placed in regular primary schools (from 3.3% in the school year 2005/06 to 6.2% in the school year 2011/12). Placement procedures still seem to be formed on the basis of the medical discourse oriented toward a specialist diagnosing of deficits, which calls attention to one of the central forms of the misrecognition of children with special needs. The consequences are not only the described anomalies in granting decisions, but probably also anomalies in teachers' attitudes toward placed children and, subsequently, anomalies in their identity development.
The theory of recognition can thus be understood as an important basis for the creation of such a school environment, such rules of coexistence, expression, etc., that will actively allow another person a space for expressing and realizing his/her individuality, in spite of—or because of—his/her difference.
From the acknowledgment to the recognition .
43
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