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1. Introduction 
From the middle of 2004 until the middle of 2009, the author led, as a senior program/project manager, a series of large international architectural design 
projects.  Three of the projects, one in the U.S.A., one in 
Italy, and a third in the UAE were each, in their own right, 
“once in a career” type projects.  Even though they were 
located in quite different cultures; and were performed 
in different contractual circumstances for dramatically 
different kinds of clients; they each offered universal 
learning opportunities. The author learned:
■ It is absolutely crucial that large projects be planned 
very well in an interactive way involving as many of the 
team and stakeholders as is possible.    
■ The complexity of large projects increases 
exponentially.  
■ Expect and plan for massive changes.  
■ Cultural differences are important and should be 
recognized, but they do not impact a large project as 
much as one might think. 
■ A project manager’s soft skills are as important as his 
or her technical and managerial skills.
2. Project Descriptions and 
Background
2.1 U.S.A.-Project Vdara
Project Vdara is a large design and construction project 
located in a major entertainment venue, Las Vegas, 
A comparison of project management experiences in the U.S.A, Italy                     
 and the U.A.E.
Michael S. Tomasik 
Axioma plus d. o. o., Potrčeva ulica 6, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-pošta: mstomasik@axioma-plus.com
Abstract
Global prosperity and vigorous economic activity have fostered many ambitious construction projects throughout the world 
in recent years.  The author, an architect, program manager and business consultant, led project teams on several significant 
projects from 2004 to 2009. All of the projects were exceptionally ambitious and forward thinking with an aggregate value of 
approximately $5.5 billion. Although each of the project organizations had many similarities, there was significant variation 
in the performance of the projects due to the owner’s approaches, and the cultural differences of the owners and team members. 
This paper, through the personal observations of the author, explores the levels of project management maturity in three of 
the projects in which he was involved by highlighting some of their strengths and weaknesess.  Practical recommendations 
are presented that transcend cultural differences along with a listing of lessons learned during project initiation, planning, 
execution and control.
Keywords: Project management, cultural differences, architectural design, construction management
Nevada, U.S.A. It is part of the CityCentre project which 
has been described, by the owners, MGMMirage, as 
the largest privately financed project in the history of
the U. S. The CityCentre project, costing $11 billion,
contains approximately 6,000 luxury hotel rooms, 900 
condominiums, a 14,000m2 casino, 46,000 m2 of retail and 
entertainment space, a 6,900 space parking garage, a $100 
million central power plant, and a 640 meter elevated tram. 
Project Vdara, a portion of this larger project, consists of 
a 1,500 room luxury condo-hotel, 57 stories in height, 
along with a convention facility, spa and restaurants. Also 
included in Project Vdara are a municipal fire station and
an elevated tram station.
The architectural design contracts for the CityCentre
project were awarded in several portions entitled, blocks. 
The first block to be tendered was Block A. The author’s
employer, Leo A Daly Inc.(LAD), requested him to lead 
a team to prepare a detailed fee proposal. It was a full 
time effort involving 15 professionals plus support staff
over a period of 6 weeks. Although the proposal was not 
successful, it was well enough received by the owner of 
the project for them to place LAD’s name on the list for 
the second portion of the project, Block B (Vdara).  The
author was once again asked to lead a proposal effort.  This
time it was successful. Upon award of the project, in early 
2005, the author was appointed to the position of project 
director for LAD.
LAD contracted with MGMMirage to serve as the 
Architect-of-Record for Vdara. In the USA, the term 
Architect-of-Record, is the title assumed by the architect 
who is legally responsible for the design of a project.  The
Architect-of-Record, working for the client, normally 
designs the project, aesthetically and technically, produces 
the tender documents, and issues a package of documents 
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         Projektna mreža Slovenije              September 2010 12
for construction by a general contractor. During 
construction the Architect-of-Record reviews the general 
contractor’s work to answer questions and to guard the 
owner against defects in the construction.
The project design team, led by LAD, was large and
complicated, due in part to the nature of the project, but 
also due to the owner’s desire to have only the “best of 
the best” working on the project.  LAD worked closely 
with the owner to find and hire the best companies
in the world to perform specialized design tasks.  As 
a result, at the project’s manpower peak, LAD’s team 
had approximately 50 designers along with 25-30 sub-
consultant design companies. The sub-consultants assisted
with architectural design, and performed all structural, 
mechanical, electrical, fire protection, security, IT, interior
design, furnishings, artwork, and other specialty design 
services such as restaurants and spas. Although total staff
counts on the Vdara project were not tracked, the author 
estimates that the project design team managed by LAD 
during the peak work effort amounted to 300-400 design
professionals.
In addition to the complexity associated with its size, 
the Vdara project was further complicated by an aggressive 
schedule requiring commencement of construction well 
in advance of the completion of the design, a very tight 
site requiring substantial coordination with other design 
teams, and an owner that changed design requirements in 
response to market conditions.  In spite of the difficulties,
the project was completed on time in late 2009, achieving 
its final approved scope.  The budget was revised numerous
times with the project conforming to the final approved
budget.  The design team’s contract was profitable.
2.2 Italy – Project Varesine
Project Varesine is a large, mixed-use project and part of 
the Porto Nuovo project in Milano, Italy.   Porto Nuovo 
consists of over 346,000m2 of office, residential, cultural
and retail space with over 3,800 parking spaces.  Varesine 
contains 42,000m2 of office space in one high rise and
two mid rise buildings, along with 33,000m2 of luxury 
apartments in 3 high rise residential structures and 4 low 
rise villas. In addition Varesine contains 7,000m2 of retail 
and 3,000m2 of cultural space, all on top of an urban park 
and 4-level basement housing 2,000 parking spaces and 
support space. The total size of Varesine is approximately
85,000m2 of useable building space.
The architectural design contracts for Varesine were
awarded to Jacobs Italia, a subsidiary of Jacobs Engineering, 
a U.S. firm, by Hines Italia, the Italian subsidiary of Hines,
a large US based development company. Jacobs Italia was 
hired to serve as the Executive Architect. Although this 
title is different from the role, Architect-of-Record for
the Leo A Daly/MGMMirage Vdara project mentioned 
above, the responsibilities were much the same.  That
is, Jacobs Italia’s responsibility was to perform technical 
architectural design services as the official project architect
and to lead the entire design team during the design 
process.  In this instance, Hines Italia elected to hire all 
of the major consultants such as structural, mechanical, 
electrical, security, building codes, etc. while assigning 
the management of these consultants to Jacobs Italia, the 
Executive Architect.
Approximately two thirds of the way through the 
design process, the project owner expressed extreme 
dissatisfaction with the project team. The owner
contacted the parent company of Jacobs Italia and asked 
that a new, experienced project director be added to the 
team.  It was at this point that the author was asked to 
relocate to Milano and assume leadership of the Jacobs 
Italia team.  Upon joining the team, the author found a 
team confused about their roles and responsibilities, 
communication breakdowns with the project owner, and 
a project significantly behind schedule.  After 12 months
of hard work, the project design was completed, the 
project tendered and construction commenced. While 
the original schedule could not be maintained, a revised 
schedule was negotiated that the owner accepted, the 
quality of the design work was acceptable and the project 
was on budget, with the design contract yielding a modest 
profit.
2.3 U.A.E – The Great Mall of Dubai
The Great Mall of Dubai is a large, mixed used project
in Dubai, UAE consisting of 276,000m2 of retail space, 
149,000m2 of entertainment and restaurants, 132,000m2 
of office space in a single tower, 2 hotels, and 395,000 m2
of housing in 12 towers along with 4,600 covered parking 
spaces. Thisproject, forNakheelRetailasubsidiaryofDubai
World, was designed by the U.S. architectural engineering 
firm, the author’s employer, Carter Burgess, who contracted
with Nakheel Retail to provide Schematic Design Services 
for this project.  At the very beginning of the project, 
Carter Burgess was purchased by Jacobs Engineering 
converting the project to a Jacobs Engineering project. The
designs were produced by teams in three U.S. locations; 
Boston, Baltimore and Los Angeles with consultants in 
other cities, along with an associated architectural firm in
Dubai.  The project, a relatively straightforward planning
exercise, was made more difficult by a client that changed
staff frequently and revised it’s proforma during the
design process.  The project team was able to cope with
these dynamics because their initial planning was strong. 
Unfortunately, complications associated with the Jacobs 
buyout of Carter Burgess caused the owner to assign the 
balance of the project after Schematic Design to another
design team. The project has since been put on hold.
3. Obervations
3.1 General
In general, there is a large gap between theory and 
practice throughout the world in the architectural 
design, engineering and construction industry.  Although 
schedule, quality and cost control are well thought out, the 
project management disciplines of interactive planning, 
stakeholder analysis, risk analysis and communication 
planning are underdeveloped.
Project management in the UAE is somewhat more 
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subsequent work.  However, one aspect had room for 
improvement.  Although the stakeholder structure was 
much more modest than the Las Vegas project, it was 
more vertically segregated than either the Las Vegas or 
the Milano projects.  The upper levels of the stakeholder 
structure, leading all the way to Sheikh Maktoum, the 
ruler of Dubai, were totally inaccessible to the project 
team.  As a result, the team had to rely only on information 
provided by surrogate stakeholders, a condition which 
caused considerable anxiety during the project execution. 
While there is nothing more the team could have done 
to gain access to the upper level stakeholders, the team 
should have done a better job of separating, in writing, 
the reported needs of the high level stakeholders with the 
sources of that information clearly identified.
Project Initiation – Lessons Learned
■ Do not underestimate the exponential complexity of 
stakeholder structures on large projects.
■ Assume that buried misunderstandings exist in multi-
cultural project charters.  Find and clear them up 
early.
■ Do not settle for surrogate stakeholder representation 
without extensive, carefully worded documentation
3.3 Project Planning
Project Planning – Vdara
Vdara, in Las Vegas was well planned early in the project 
utilizing rolling planning with downstream phases 
planned initially at the summary level.  The plan consisted 
of extensive lists of design activities and deliverables 
(mostly drawings) couple with pre-scheduled project 
reviews and an open issues list.  Detailed schedules and 
resource and cost plans were prepared indicating staff and 
financial requirements on a monthly basis throughout the 
entire multi-year project.  Again, the complexity of the 
project team and the owner’s organizational structure was 
not fully appreciated early in the project.  As a result the 
project plans were not as deeply coordinated with all sub-
consultants as they should have been.  Even though this 
was the first time many companies and individuals were 
working together, there was a tendency to assume that 
everyone understood how everyone else was working.   This 
caused the team to be confused at times and to experience 
unnecessary extra effort before interim milestones, when 
the misunderstandings were discovered.
Project Planning – Varesine
The Varesine project was planned initially with extensive 
documentation.  Unfortunately the plans appeared to be 
viewed solely as a project management tool with few of 
the team members privy to the plans. Furthermore, they 
were viewed as not likely to change.  However, the owners 
changed the scope of the project a number of times, but 
the team was unwilling or unable to revise the plan.  When 
the author joined the project, the original plan, although 
initially of high quality, was outdated and useless.  The 
team was in a totally reactive mode.
advanced than in the U.S. or Italy.  Perhaps this is due to 
the large amount of big projects and UAE’s willingness to 
bring in the best international consultants. In the UAE, 
owners understand project management and are willing 
be involved with it early in the project.
U.S. project management is less developed, particularly 
in the design industry.  While there is an intellectual 
understanding of getting off to a good start, few teams are 
given time to really plan their work. Detailed risk analysis 
and communication planning is almost nonexistent.  Few 
firms have standard project management approaches or 
tools.
Italy is perhaps the furthest behind in developing 
project management as a discipline. There is a reluctance 
to plan, share plans, or collaborate in planning.
3.2 Project Initiation
Project Initiation - Vdara
The Vdara project in Las Vegas had extensive project 
initiation efforts by the design team since the project in 
its initial stages was not very well defined by the owner. 
However, one component, the stakeholder’s identification 
and analysis, was inadequately addressed, a fact that was 
not recognized by the team at the time.  This immense 
and extraordinarily complicated project had at least 75 
stakeholder organizations, each with numerous members. 
The team was itself, a stakeholder on numerous other 
components of the master project.   At the inception of 
the project at least one full time person should have been 
working to clarify the stakeholder community and define 
its needs.
Additionally, because of the massive capital investment, 
owners of privately owned projects in Las Vegas are under 
tremendous pressure to complete the projects and start 
their revenue stream as soon as is humanly possible. 
This pressure is transferred to the design teams.  In this 
instance, the team settled for a less than optimum project 
charter. The result was unnecessary confusion during the 
project’s execution.
Project Initiation - Varesine
Upon joining the Italian Varesine project team in Milano, 
the author saw evidence of strong project initiation 
and planning activities performed earlier by the team. 
However, in spite of that fact, there was fundamental 
misunderstanding between the team and the owner.   The 
Italian team of Jacobs did not understand the extent to 
which the owner expected them to lead the entire team 
during the design phases.  This led to other team members, 
and even the owner, taking the leadership role, causing a 
great deal of confusion and erosion of trust.  It is critical 
on multi-cultural projects that extra effort is extended to 
assure that all stakeholders in the project understand the 
project charter in the same way.
Project Initiation – The Great Mall of Dubai
The Great Mall of Dubai project team, like the Las Vegas 
project team, was under great pressure to get started 
and get done quickly.  The project initiation phase was 
generally well done and proved a good foundation for 
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Project Planning – The Great Mall of Dubai
The Dubai project had good planning from the start 
with adequate plans shared with all team members. A 
quantitative and qualitative risk analysis was performed 
with mitigation strategies identified.  Communication 
planning, however, was weak which caused some problems 
due to the geographic dispersion with the design team in 
Boston, and the owner in Dubai.
Project Planning – Lessons Learned
■ On large projects hold extra meetings to coordinate 
and to explain the project plan.  Make sure the sub-
teams fully integrate into the main projects.
■ Never think the project plan is done.  It is a work in 
progress.  Respond to all of the owner’s changes with a 
plan revision.
■ Always do a formal communications plan as a separate 
document in the overall project plan
3.4 Project Execution
Project Execution – Vdara
The Vdara project was exceptionally difficult during 
execution because it was heavily phased; meaning 
construction was commenced long before the design was 
completed.  At times, the construction team was only 
one or two floors behind the design team.  The owners 
introduced major changes during the design process. In 
one instance the scope was changed from 1 condominium 
building plus two 500 room hotels, to a single 1,500 room 
hotel.  However, throughout this phase, the team performed 
strongly enough for the owner to transfer additional work 
to the team from one of the other design teams.
Project Execution – Varesine
The Varesine project in Milano was not phased, so 
simpler to execute in some respects.  The owner was very 
demanding, however, with many special studies and extra 
requests during the execution phase.  Seeing the disruption 
to the project team, the author formed a special, separate 
team, lead by a project manager, to be available for special 
requests from the owner.  This allowed the main team to 
work relatively undisturbed.
Project Execution – The Great Mall of Dubai
The schematic design phase of the Great Mall of Dubai 
project was executed smoothly with a normal amount 
of difficulties associated with working at great distances. 
Some unpaid, owner initiated, revisions to the design were 
performed by the team due to misunderstandings caused 
by the inaccessibility of the top level people and their lack 
of direct involvement in the project.
Project Execution – Lesson Learned
■ Find a way to structure a separate team during times 
of very heavy workload to address unexpected items. 
Make sure the sub-team has a project manager so that 
it can be truly independent.
3.5 Project Controls
Project Controls - Vdara
The Vdara project in Las Vegas, was controlled through 
regular project reviews, conducted monthly, where the 
effort and the time required to complete each budgeted 
task was assessed and compiled.  This was done through 
reviewing a representative sample of the deliverables 
(drawings).  A representative sample was used since 
the quantity of drawings made it impossible for them 
to be reviewed monthly.   Weekly review meetings were 
conducted with the team and the owner to address 
open issues impacting project progress and to offer 
supplementary information to assist the owner with its 
decision making.  A monthly report was prepared for 
external consumption highlighting progress, decisions, 
staffing and upcoming cash flow requirements as well as 
any new open issues.  Internally, the design team prepared a 
monthly statement for its management projecting staffing 
requirements, verifying the projected financial outcome 
of the project and assessing the owner’s current level of 
satisfaction with the design team.  Although the team 
anticipated changes to the project, the magnitude was not 
foreseen.  As a result, change control was understaffed, 
causing a lag in claims processing for additional design 
fees.  At times, the project team was working ahead of 
formal authorizations, causing fee revision negotiations 
to occur after the additional work was already completed. 
This put the team in a weak negotiating position.
Project Controls - Varesine 
Varesine, in Milano, was controlled in much the same way 
as the Las Vegas project with regular meetings, monthly 
reviews and monthly reports.  After the author joined 
the team and the project plan was updated, it was used to 
evaluate the team’s progress in a more effective manner 
than earlier on the project.  Unlike the Las Vegas project, 
the Varesine project benefited from a monthly “cold-
eye” review which was a presentation by the team to 
management.  This served to highlight unaddressed issues 
and bring previously unforeseen risks to the attention of 
the team.
Project Controls - The Great Mall of Dubai
The Great Mall of Dubai was controlled in the same way 
as the other projects except that there were fewer regular 
meetings due to the time and expense of travel.  Review 
meetings were accordingly carefully planned and well 
orchestrated often lasting two days or more.  Changes to 
the scope were carefully controlled and addressed when 
they first arose.  Owners in the UAE place much more 
value on the end product and less on the process than do 
owners in other parts of the globe.  Review meetings and 
phase close out meetings focused heavily on proving to 
the owner that every drawing anticipated at the beginning 
of the project was provided, regardless of whether it was 
ultimately needed or not.  Owners in the U.S. particularly, 
view the list of deliverables as an approximation of what 
they will get at the end of the design.
Project Controls - Lessons Learned
■ Employ extra staff as soon as changes occur to assure 
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that claim processing does not get delayed
■ Utilize “cold-eye reviews” regularly
■ If review meetings occur infrequently, organize them 
with great care.
3.6 Close-out
All of the above projects were closed out efficiently and 
quickly with documents and files packaged and archived 
into standard filing systems. Unfortunately, none of the 
companies have a strong “lessons learned” system, so 
none of the experiences on the project were captured in 
a formal way.
4. Cultural Differences
Although the multi-cultural environments of these projects 
certainly impacted them every day in many ways, their size 
and complexity caused the projects to generate a culture of 
their own that dominated the teams. Regardless, there are 
some fundamental differences between the projects that 
can be explained by their cultural environments.
The Las Vegas Vdara project was driven by a “can do” 
attitude fueled by a willingness to take calculated risks--a 
typical U.S. and in particular, Las Vegas mindset.  When 
a seemingly impossible task was identified, the first 
statement heard was usually: “How can we do that?”. One 
almost never heard: “That can’t be done.” Unfortunately, on 
occasion, this resulted in the project team “just doing it”, 
when a pause to plan might have been more appropriate. 
Keeping the U.S. team on target in a controlled manner 
was a challenge.
In contrast, the Milano project environment was often 
focused on the impossibility of the task.  Italy’s complicated, 
often conflicting and often changing construction codes 
and authorities seemed to make the simplest of problems 
into an unsolvable problems.  Keeping meetings focused 
on decision making required significant effort.  However, 
once aligned to a clear vision with a clear process, the 
Italian team’s performance was reliable.
In the UAE, the environment is, in a way, a combination 
of the above two projects.  It is similar to the “can do” 
attitude of the Las Vegas Vdara project except driven by a 
larger appetite for risk.  However, it is also complicated by 
unwritten rules, changing laws and unexpressed opinions 
and evaluations.  In the UAE, one can experience the 
excitement of ambitious visions, but at the same time, 
never be sure that they are real. Clear and specific project 
charters are indispensible in this environment.
5. Conclusions
Large, complicated international projects are exciting and 
professionally rewarding endeavors for project managers. 
They require the best management skills, strong soft skills,
and practical knowledge of the fundamentals.
Large projects such as these usually require more than 
one project manager. One should attempt to overstaff the 
project management role at the beginning of the project.
There will always be more project management tasks
than can be imagined at project inception.  Time spent at 
the beginning in planning and organizing pays off 10 to 1
later on.
Cultural differences are important on international
projects but should not be overemphasized at the 
expense project planning and control.  Disappointing 
performances on these projects were, perhaps, amplified
in some instances by cultural differences, but were not the
root causes.
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Michael S. Tomasik je menedžer in arhitekt z izkušnjami vodenja velikih kompleksnih projektov, projektnih timov in 
projektnih pisarn. Za sabo ima ogromno uspešnih mednarodnih projektov, vključujoč projekte na Srednjem Vzhodu. 
Zraven gradbenih projektov ima izkušnje v zdravstvu, letalski industriji, bolnišnicah, izobraževanju, trgovini za zasebni 
in javni sektor, državnih in lokalnih vladah. Zaposlen je bil v podjetjih Jacobs, Leo A Daly, Hillier, Rossetti Associates 
Architects in The Smith Group. Poučeval je projektni menedžment na dodiplomskih študijskih programih na Lawrence 
Technological University. Je ustanovitelj slovenskega podjetja Axioma plus d. o. o., specializiranega za projektni 
menedžment, usposabljanje in mentorstvo pri voditeljstvu. 
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