13
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original scientifi c article                   DOI 10.19233/ASHS.2018.02
received: 2017-09-24 
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA
Primož ŠTERBENC
University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, Cankarjeva 5, 6101 Koper, Slovenia
e-mail: primoz.sterbenc@fm-kp.si
ABSTRACT
The aim of the article is to explain backgrounds of the current destructive war in Syria. More specifi cally, the 
article tries to provide answers to two interrelated questions. First, why the protests and the war erupted? And 
second, why the war has been so protracted? In order to do that, the article analyses political, economic, and 
religious (sectarian) aspects of situation in Syria since the late Ottoman period, with emphasis on the rule of the 
Baath party. During the rule of Hafi z al-Assad Syria was stable country due to generous socio-economic policies of 
the regime, although limited latent sectarian tensions existed. Situation unravelled during the rule of Bashar al-Assad 
as his regime implemented neo-liberal measures which alienated traditional supporting bases of the Baath party and 
intensifi ed tensions between the Sunnis and the Alawites. Consequently, during the »Arab spring« protests erupted. 
The regime responded with repression and incitement to sectarian violence, which led to militarization of the upris-
ing. One needs to take into account the consequences of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 since this had caused 
fi erce struggle between Sunni and Shia regional players (Iran and Saudi Arabia) which eventually turned Syria into 
the battleground and provoked protracted war.
Keywords: Syria, war, socio-economic situation, sects, external interference
COME COMPRENDERE LA GUERRA IN SIRIA
SINTESI
L’articolo intende spiegare i retroscena dell’attuale guerra distruttiva in Siria. Più precisamente, cerca di rispon-
dere a due questioni. La prima, perché sono scoppiate le proteste e la guerra? La seconda, perché la guerra si è così 
prolungata? L’articolo analizza gli aspetti politici, economici e religiosi (settar i) in Siria, dal periodo ottomano in poi, 
concentrandosi sul periodo di potere del partito Baas. Al tempo del governo di Hafi z Al Asad, lo stato siriano, grazie 
ad una politica socioeconomica positiva – nonostante la persistenza di limitate tensioni settarie – fu caratterizzato 
dalla stabilità. La situazione peggiorò nel periodo governativo di Basar Al Asad, a causa degli interventi neoliberali 
che alienarono la base tradizionale del partito Baas, intensifi cando le tensioni tra sunniti e alaviti. Di conseguenza, 
durante la “primavera araba” scoppiarono le proteste. Il regime rispose con la repressione, sollecitando la violenza 
settaria, il che portò alla militarizzazione della rivolta. Bisogna anche prendere in considerazione le conseguenze 
dell’invasione dell’Iraq nel 2003 a guida dagli Stati Uniti che causò aspri confl itti tra attori regionali sunniti e sciiti 
(Iran e Arabia Saudita) che alla fi ne trasformò la Siria in un campo di battaglia e provocò una guerra di lunga durata.
Parole chiave: Siria, guerra, situazione socioeconomica, comunità religiose, interventi esterni
14
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, there has been a violent civil war in 
Syria between Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime and 
the rebels. The war can for certain be described as one 
of the most catastrophic confl icts in the world after the 
World War II. By 2016 alone, 470,000 people died and 
1.9 million were wounded. More than 4.8 million peo-
ple fl ed the country, while 6.6 million of the population 
resettled all over the country. As estimated by the United 
Nations’ report, already by 2013 Syria had slipped 40 
years backwards, according to human development 
criterion. A half of all Syrian hospitals was closed in 
2015, only a half of Syrian children attended school, 
while 80 % of Syrians lived in poverty. As a result of 
the lack of vaccination, the country has been stricken 
anew by diseases such as typhus and measles, which 
had been eliminated long ago. The average lifespan of 
a Syrian decreased from 70 to 55 years of age between 
2011 and 2015 (data from Phillips, 2016, 1). The United 
Nations’ report assessed that 1.2 million houses had 
been demolished or damaged by 2013, which is one 
third of all houses in Syria (data from International Crisis 
Group Report) (Syria’s Metastasising Confl icts, 2013, 1).
The extreme destructiveness and long duration of the 
confl ict in Syria is not a coincidence but a logical conse-
quence of two factors. Firstly, after 1971 Syria had been 
a stable state for nearly three decades, however, in the 
ten years preceding the outbreak of war internal confl icts 
and tensions were increasing as a result of the deteriora-
tion of economic, social, political, environmental and 
(inter)religious situations. Secondly, the destructiveness 
and long duration of the Syrian confl ict is further incited 
by the external factor, namely, deep involvement of 
strong external players who support both the Sunni re-
bels and the Shiite-dominated regime. In this sense, it is 
possible to argue that the Syrian confl ict is so destructive 
and long-lasting mainly because Syria is predominantly 
a battlefi eld for powerful external protagonists, whose 
aim is to reach a broader geopolitical and ideological 
goals through the indirect and reciprocal fi ght.
In the Syrian War, external protagonists support the 
two opposite sides in a rather balanced way. The regime 
is supported by Iran and other Shiite actors (Lebanese 
Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Afghan Shiites) and Rus-
sia, and the rebels are backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, the United States, 
Great Britain and France.1 According to some studies 
(Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000), this kind of »bal-
anced« support of external forces to the warring sides 
in civil wars causes the long duration of such confl icts.
The purpose of the present article is to illustrate 
the complex backgrounds of the war in Syria, both 
internal and external, covering historical, religious, 
political and economic elements. The article focuses 
on two research questions: What prompted the revolt 
that fi nally led to the war? And Why is the war so 
fi erce and long-lasting? The latter question focuses on 
external involvement. In the fi rst part, we examine the 
situation in Syria from the late Ottoman period to the 
beginning of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, including the late 
Ottoman period, the period of the French mandate and 
the period of the Baath party’s rule − especially the 
presidency of Hafi z al-Assad. The emphasis is placed 
on the economic and social situation, on the distribu-
tion of wealth in Syrian society, considerable attention 
is also paid to the situation of religious communities, 
in particular the Alawites and the Sunnis. The second 
part defi nes the situation in Syria during the presidency 
of Bashar al-Assad, disclosing the elements that caused 
the rise of tension and led to protests in March 2011. 
In the third part, the article reviews the social structure 
of the protesters and the supporters of the regime, the 
dynamics of protests and the response of the regime, 
the militarization of the protests and the outbreak of 
the Civil War. Special attention is paid to the position 
of the Alawite community, including the process during 
which the regime, in order to retain power, abused the 
Alawites’ historically conditioned fear. The fourth part 
is dedicated to the role which external Sunni and Shiite 
supporters, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, played 
in the Civil War and their impact on the aggravation 
and duration of the confl ict. Also, the impact of events 
in Iraq on developments in Syria is examined. Less 
emphasized are some specifi c policies of Qatar and 
Turkey. The article does not include an analysis of the 
interference of Russia and the Western countries.
LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD, THE PERIOD OF FRENCH 
MANDATE AND THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE 
UNTIL THE BAATHIST ASSUMPTION OF POWER
In the Ottoman Empire, the reforms, known as the 
Tanzimat (1839–1876), were carried out in the 19th 
century and were aimed at the complete reorganization 
of the state and the relations between the Sultan and 
his subjects. The reforms were an attempt to respond 
to the series of defeats the Empire experienced in the 
war with the Western powers and to the rise of national-
ist movements in Europe. The two aims of the reform 
were to halt the collapse of the Empire and to better 
counter the external pressures in the form of Western 
military successes and an ever-increasing integration 
into the global capitalist economy. The reforms led to 
two main effects, which had a far-reaching impact on 
the socio-economic situation in Syria. The fi rst impact 
was centralization of power, which deprived local Syr-
ian leaders of considerable power, while the second was 
1 This kind of external support is described in the work of Phillips (2016) and in the International Crisis Group Report (Syria’s Metastasising 
Confl icts, 2013, 1).
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
the introduction of private property and landownership 
(Abboud, 2016, 14–15).
By the mid-19th century, the Syrian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire had been integrated into the global 
capitalist system, leading to a growing European eco-
nomic impact which was refl ected in the transformation 
of Syria into a predominantly agricultural economy 
that exported to European markets. In this context, the 
introduction of private landownership, through the pro-
cess of concentration of the land, ultimately led to the 
creation of an extremely wealthy and infl uential social 
class of landowners which, on the basis of the Law of 
the Provinces adopted by the Ottoman Empire in 1864 
incorporating landowners into the political system, 
became the dominant socio-economic protagonist in 
Syria. The emergence of the social class of landown-
ers consolidated the class structure in Syria and clearly 
outlined the divisions and confl icts between landowners 
and peasants (Abboud, 2016, 15–16).
During the French mandate (1920−1946), the French 
colonial rulers further fostered the private owner-
ship of the country, when previously public land was 
awarded to the landowners’ elite and tribal leaders, in 
exchange for their political submission and support of 
French policies. In addition, the French set up a parlia-
ment in which, during their mandate, landowners had 
the biggest infl uence. The result was the exceptional 
socio-economic polarization of Syrian society, where 
most infl uence and power was exercised by 3,000 
landowners and their families that formed less than one 
per cent of the population, but owned more than half of 
all private land. The landowners elites also controlled 
all important political, professional and administrative 
positions. Ninety per cent of all Syrian inhabitants who 
worked the land, either as share-croppers or as landless 
peasants, were at the bottom of the socio-economic 
scale (Abboud, 2016, 16–18).
After Syria gained independence in 1946, enormous 
inequality and polarization of Syrian society caused 
great political instability. Tensions grew between the 
elites that dominated the country and the political inter-
ests, demands and ideological orientation of the major-
ity of society. Tensions led to various forms of political 
protests, such as street demonstrations and frequent 
coup attempts. During this time, two important politi-
cal forces, the army and the bureaucracy who were not 
Image 1: Damascus, Syria: The Syrian society has always been a mosaic of ethnic groups and confessions. In the 
background is Saladin, the fi rst sultan of Egypt and Syria and the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty (January 2011, 
photo: Lukas Wank, Shabka)
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under the control of the landownership elite, emerged. 
In accordance with the general post-colonial trend, the 
army was extremely powerful and politicized, and saw 
the fastest way to its power through coups. After 1954, 
offi cers who were the Baath party members began to 
dominate (Abboud, 2016, 21–22; Phillips, 2015, 364).2 
BAATHIST ASSUMPTION OF POWER 
AND HAFIZ AL-ASSAD’S REIGN
A group of three offi cers from Syrian army (Muham-
mad Umran, Salah Jadid and Hafi z al-Assad), who came 
from the minority religious community of the Alawites 
and were the members of the Baath Party, launched a 
coup without spilling any blood on 8th March 1963 
and, thus, overthrew the rule of landowners’ elite.3 The 
emergence to power of three Alawite offi cers was no 
coincidence as the Alawites were represented in the Syr-
ian army above average and this was the consequence 
of two factors.4 Firstly, during their mandate, the French 
mainly included those belonging to Syrian minorities 
(mainly the Alawites and the Druze) in the military for-
mations they established, as they were less susceptible 
to the nationalist tendencies of the Sunni majority and 
were even ready to fi ght against them. And secondly, 
the Alawites, who throughout the history of Syria were 
the socially and economically marginalized community, 
were willing to enter the French-established military 
units because they believed this was the only way to 
improve their social position. On the other hand, the 
Sunnis were not willing to engage in the army because 
they opposed the French (Christian) rule, and, in addi-
tion, the Sunni landowners and families dealing with 
trade greatly underestimated the military profession. 
In addition, during the time of independent Syria, the 
poor and uneducated Alawites enrolled massively in 
the Syrian military academies because this was for them 
the only possible channel for vertical mobility. This 
led to the fact that the Alawites were in above-average 
numbers among the offi cers in the Syrian armed forces.5 
It should be added that the Alawites (and the members 
of other religious minorities) were also more willing 
to be included in the Baath Party because its program 
was secular. In addition, due to its socialist ideology, 
the party itself successfully recruited membership in 
rural areas, where the members of religious minorities 
traditionally lived (Bou-Nacklie, 1993, 649–652, 657; 
Goldsmith, 2015, 68–69; Khoury, 1987, 80–81, 525; 
Seale, 1988/1990, 26–27, 34, 60–63, 76–80).
The three Alawite offi cers fi rst increased the domi-
nance of the Alawites in the Syrian army through more 
purges, thus consolidating their position of power. After 
1966, the Baathist regime, in which Salah Jadid took the 
lead, carried out radical socialist, economic and social 
reforms − a revolution from above.6 Several land reforms 
were carried out, which granted peasants and agricultural 
workers the land that had previously belonged to the 
landowners’ elite. Such measures were not a surprise, 
given the fact that the Alawites had traditionally belonged 
to the vast social class of peasants who had worked the 
land owned by the Sunni landowners. In addition, nation-
alization of industry and fi nance was carried out, public 
planning, as the main distribution mechanism, replaced 
the market, and the public sector became the main engine 
2 Two intellectuals educated in France, Michel Afl aq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, established an intellectual circle in Damascus − the Move-
ment of the Arab Revival (Baath). In 1947, they formally established the Baath party in Damascus. The Party identifi ed its objectives as 
follows: 1. unity and freedom of the Arab nation (merging of the existing, artifi cially created Arab countries into a major Arab political 
entity); 2. liberation from any external infl uence and hegemony; and 3. socialism in the form of land reform and public ownership of 
natural resources and large industry (Ahmad, 1984/1991, 198; Hiro, 1996, 6, 18, 41; Seale, 1988/1990, 30–31, 33–34, 47).
3 The original Muslim community split into the Sunni and the Shia branches after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 due to dis-
agreement regarding the question who could be a legitimate successor to the Prophet. The proto-Sunnis claimed that any devout Muslim 
elected by the Muslim community can be the successor, and the proto-Shiites argued that Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn 
Abi Talib (Ali) could be the only legitimate heir. The crystallization of the split into the Sunnis and the Shiites occurred after the Battle of 
Karbala in 680, in which the Sunni military units killed Ali’s younger son Hussein and his escort. As for the doctrine, the most important 
difference between the Sunnis and the Shiites is in relation to the Imamate (Imams). While the Shiites attribute a cardinal role to the 
Imamate, the Sunnis place no real importance to this institution. The Sunnis were socio-politically privileged through the predominant 
part of the history of the Muslim world. Today, out of 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, 85 to 90 % are the Sunnis and 10 to 15 % the 
Shiites (Donner, 1999, 18; Halm, 1987/1991, 1, 17; Keddie and Cole, 1986, 1–2; Nasr, 2006, 34; Sachedina, 1981, 19; Šterbenc, 2005). 
The Shiites are further divided into more (sub)groups: the Twelvers, the Zaydis, the Ismailis (the Nizaris and the Mustalians), the Druze 
and the Alawites. The Sunnis can be divided on the basis of the four legal schools (the Hanafi , Maliki, Shafi i, Hanbali) (Šterbenc, 2005, 
115–254). In Syria, the Sunnis are the majority religious community (65 % of population), while minority religious communities are 
the Alawites (12 %), the Christians (8 %), the Druze (3 %), the Ismailis – the Nizaris (1 %) and the Twelvers (1 %) (Daftary, 1990/1992, 
533–534; Phillips, 2016, 47, 52). The Sunni Kurds form 10 % of the population (however, their primary identity is ethnic). 
4 The Alawites are a group of the so-called extreme Shiites, characterized by the fact that they attribute to Ali and the remaining eleven 
Imams, recognized and respected by the Shiites-Twelvers, a status close to divine (their perception of the divine is rather abstract). As a 
result, they are regarded as extremists by the Twelvers, and as heretics by the orthodox Sunnis. The Alawite religious beliefs are highly 
syncretistic, since they contain elements of Christianity (celebrating Christmas and Easter) and paganism, as well as the belief in the 
posthumous transmigration of the soul. The Alawite rules for everyday life are somewhat liberal because they allow drinking alcohol and 
they do not require that women be veiled in public. In addition, the Alawites do not pray in mosques and they honour the shrines of the 
Alawite „saints“ and holy men (Goldsmith, 2015, 7–8, 217; Mazzaoui, 1987/1993, 176).
5 In 1963, 65 % of the Syrian army offi cers were the Alawites and even higher was the percentage among the privates (Goldsmith, 2015, 74).
6 In December 1964, al-Assad and Jadid degraded Muhammad Umran in politics (Seale, 1988/1990, 95–96).
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
of economic development. Private entrepreneurship was 
severely limited and economic cooperation with the West 
was reduced (Abboud, 2016, 28–29; Goldsmith, 2015, 9, 
80; Khoury, 1987, 520; van Dam, 1978, 42–44).
Hafi z al-Assad deposed Jadid in November 1970, 
and in March 1971 he became the President of Syria. He 
started a partial de-radicalization of economic and social 
policy, led by the belief that Jadid’s politics had been too 
radical, which in the short term benefi ted the Alawites 
and the members of other minority religious communi-
ties, but it had dangerously alienated a considerable part 
of the Sunni population. He partially liberalized eco-
nomic policy, thus creating certain opportunities for the 
private sector (among others, for the Sunni merchants). 
Al-Assad leaned against the four pillars of power. The 
fi rst was the Baath party, which implemented the state 
policies. The second pillar was corporatism, which 
comprised various social forces (such as the students 
and farmers) that were subordinated and incorporated 
in the regime. The third pillar was the state bureaucracy, 
which increased due to the state’s socialist policies, so 
that it employed almost 25 % of Syrians in the 1980s. 
In the public sector, the regime massively employed the 
Alawites, who were moving considerably from their tra-
ditional settlements in the mountains of the northwest of 
the country (Jabal al-Sahiliyah) to the cities. The fourth 
pillar was the enlarged army and the security services, 
which employed primarily the Alawites in order to en-
sure the regime’s security. The socio-economic position 
of the Alawites (education, employment, infrastructure) 
generally improved (Abboud, 2016, 29–31; Goldsmith, 
2015, 80, 84–85, 108–109; Ziadeh, 2011/2013, 17–26).
During the Baathist rule in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
redistributive policies greatly improved the economic 
life of peasants and the poor. The policies of nation-
alization and the distribution system which put forward 
rural development and fostered agricultural production 
improved rural life. The expansion of the public sector 
created a massive social base of the regime and created 
jobs for the middle class. Thus, public servants, urban 
workers and rural peasants (including the Sunnis), along 
with the members of minority religious communities, 
became a strong supportive social base for the regime. 
However, Hafi z al-Assad realized that, in order to pre-
serve his authority, he could rely solely on the Alawite 
community from which he descended. On the other 
hand, the Alawites felt that they needed al-Assad’s re-
gime so that they would not fall into the inferior social 
Image 2: Tadmur/Palmyra, central Syria: Bashar al-Asad on the left, his father Hafez on the right (February 2010, 
photo: Lukas Wank, Shabka)
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
status where they had been subordinated to the Sunnis 
(Abboud, 2016, 29, 37; Goldsmith, 2015, 82–83).  
  
BASHAR AL-ASSAD’S REIGN
When Hafi z al-Assad died on June 10, 2000, due to 
a heart attack, his son Bashar quickly replaced him as 
the President; such a smooth transfer of power was only 
possible as the older Assad, during his last years of life, 
had removed from power all the infl uential members of 
the regime who could compete with his son in assuming 
the leadership of the state (Goldsmith, 2015, 126–127, 
129; Ziadeh, 2011/2013, 37, 45). As the President, 
Bashar al-Assad faced major socio-economic problems 
in the country, and with his own policies, the situation 
worsened considerably, thus creating fertile ground for 
the outburst of dissatisfaction of the substantial part of 
the Syrian population, which broke out in March 2011.
INCREASING SOCIO-ECONOMIC TENSIONS, 
PRESERVING POLITICAL DICTATORSHIP AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER
Already in the mid-1980s, the regime of Hafi z al-
Assad faced economic (fi scal) problems, largely due to 
the rapid decline in oil prices and, thus, the reduction 
of income from the (modest) Syrian oil exports and 
the aid that Syria was receiving from the Arabian Gulf 
States. In addition, the Syrian state-run economic model 
was devoted primarily to inclusiveness, stability and 
dependence on the state, but failed to provide economic 
development. The model was eventually exhausted be-
cause it pursued spending on the cost of accumulation. 
This led to a series of moderate economic reforms in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, which did not stop the deteriora-
tion of the situation. Consequently, after assuming the 
leadership of the state, Bashar al-Assad was confronted 
with a whole range of complex economic and social 
problems. The economic development of the country 
was averted by the lack of investment, rigid market 
regulation, retrograde bureaucracy, ideological opposi-
tion to economic liberalization, expensive food and fuel 
subsidies, rigid currency controls, high-level corruption, 
and the private sector that was too fragmented to be able 
to lead capital accumulation. Of particular concern was 
the fact that the state was no longer able to create a suf-
fi cient number of jobs in the public sector; a high birth 
rate (in 2010, 55 % of the population was under the age 
of 24) and rising unemployment required the creation of 
as many as 300,000 new jobs per year (Abboud, 2016, 
32–34; Hokayem, 2013, 25–26; Lesch, 2012/2013, 8; 
Ziadeh, 2011/2013, 37).
Bashar al-Assad therefore decided to implement 
more radical socio-economic reforms, directed towards 
liberalization. The reforms were motivated by a neo-
liberal economic approach, and their red thread were 
privatization and marketization. In this sense, the state 
was increasingly losing its leading role in the society, 
while dismantling the institutions that had connected 
the state and the society (including the public sector 
and trade unions), and the fi scal mechanisms that sup-
ported this connection (including the tax system). The 
public sector monopolies were slowly eliminated, while 
the private sector’s investment in banking, insurance, 
education system and other areas increased. The broad 
government subsidy system and the system of govern-
ment fi xing of the highest prices for basic foodstuffs and 
housing were abolished (Abboud, 2016, 34–36).
However, al-Assad’s policies have further distorted 
the economy and increased corruption and nepotism. 
Marketization did not extend the foundations of the ac-
cumulation, what is more, only those close to the regime 
benefi ted from the privatization. Although al-Assad 
claimed that they aim for a „social market economy“, 
he did not satisfy many of the social demands of the Syr-
ians. In 2000−2010, the standard of living deteriorated, 
while the possibility of social mobility was reduced. 
Unemployment rates continued to raise, wages lagged 
behind the rising cost of living, and price rising caused 
the economic uncertainty of millions of Syrians. The in-
equality greatly increased, while 30 % of the population 
lived below the poverty line (11 % below the survival 
line). Since the regime, on the basis of a market logic, 
was eliminating the privileges of the agricultural sector 
and redirected the funds to the cities, the countryside 
was severely neglected (mostly the Sunni peasants), 
with which the Baath Party alienated its most important 
social support base.7 Consequently, there were mass mi-
grations of peasants from rural areas to the peripheries of 
cities, they mostly settled in the slums. One needs to add 
that during this time, the socio-economic situation of the 
greater part of the Alawite community deteriorated, both 
in rural and urban areas. Nevertheless, the Alawites did 
not stop supporting the regime because they continued 
to believe that Bashar al-Assad alone could provide 
them with security against social degradation and the 
potential revenge of the Sunnis (Abboud, 2016, 36–38; 
Goldsmith, 2015, 159–161, 165; Hokayem, 2013, 
28–29; Lesch, 2012/2013, 7–8, 107–108; Phillips, 
2015, 367; Phillips, 2016, 46–47).
During the reign of Hafi z al-Assad, there was an 
unwritten „social contract“ between the regime and the 
population, on the basis of which the former secured the 
economic security through subsidies, jobs in the public 
sector and free education and healthcare system, while 
in return, the Syrians renounced their political freedom. 
During the reign of Bashar al-Assad, the regime ceased 
to adhere to the agreement, nevertheless, it did not allow 
political freedom but responded to the ever increasing 
political demands with severe repression, which was car-
7 Pursuing its policies, the regime alienated also the second part of its traditional support base – the workers (Hokayem, 2013, 28).
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
ried out by 50,000 to 70,000 members of the intelligence 
and security services (Mukhabarat), which were increas-
ingly prominent in the Syrian society (Goldsmith, 2015, 
182–183; Perthes, 2004, 17–19; Phillips, 2016, 44–45).
From 2006 to 2010, Syria was also struck by a severe 
drought, when between two and three million people 
were plunged into extreme poverty and the Syrian agri-
cultural sector was devastated. The rural population of 
all religious communities, including the Alawites, had to 
fi ght for survival, while tens of thousands of Syrians were 
forced to fl ee to the cities, so that 160 villages in north-
ern Syria were completely emptied (the worst affected 
region was the north-eastern region of the governorates 
of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, Idlib and Raqqa). 
The regime did not take any measures to alleviate the 
suffering of the rural population, but even exacerbated 
the situation (for example by demolishing the temporary 
residences of migrants in cities). Drought, together with 
market reform measures, led to a real humanitarian 
disaster for the majority of population. The particularly 
affected and, consequently angry were the Sunni peas-
ants who had been the core pillar of support of the Baath 
Party for decades (Goldsmith, 2015, 183–184; Phillips, 
2015, 367; Phillips, 2016, 46). 
TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE SUNNIS AND THE ALAWITES
Since Syria gained independence, there was a 
certain tension between the Sunnis and the Alawites. 
In independent Syria, the Sunnis felt threatened by 
the members of minority religious communities, since 
these were supposed to be a centrifugal force. After the 
Baathist assumption of power, the tensions between the 
greater part of the Sunnis and the Alawites increased. 
Hafi z al-Assad tried to prove that he was the President 
of all the Syrians and the „true“ Muslim,8 however, a 
part of the Sunnis thought his regime was an „Alawite 
regime“, for he appointed the Alawites to important 
posts in the administration and army, and in addition, 
his were the actions of nepotism. The Alawites were 
perceived as threatening soldiers or intelligence due to 
their control of the security services, and the autoch-
thonous Sunnis in Damascus and Aleppo were unhappy 
with the arrival of the „inferior“ Alawites to their proud 
„Islamic“ cities. An important indicator of latent tension 
were the events of January 1973, when mass protests 
took place in Aleppo, Homs and Hama because the 
new constitution did not stipulate that the president of 
the state must be a Muslim.9 It showed how important 
religion still is and that many Sunnis fi nd problems with 
the religious roots of al-Assad. On the other hand, these 
events were ground-breaking for the Alawites because 
their historically conditioned fear of the Sunnis’ domina-
tion and their persecution was awakened (Goldsmith, 
2015, 83, 85, 88; Ziadeh, 2011/2013, 140). 
The Sunni anti-Alawite sentiment escalated in the 
years between 1976 and 1982 when the rebellion of the 
Muslim Brotherhood against the regime was supported 
by many Sunnis. At that time, the Alawite community 
supported the brutal use of force by which Hafi z al-As-
sad fi nally defeated the resistance of Islamists in Hama 
in February 1982 (the Muslim brothers showed that they 
had an antagonistic attitude to the „heretical“ Alawites). 
During the reign of Bashar al-Assad, a large part of 
the Sunnis associated the Alawite community with the 
regime and accused it (mainly because of the individual 
Alawites who were close to the regime and made their 
fortunes for that) of usurping both money and power, 
despite the deteriorating socio-economic situation of the 
Alawites.10 Most of the Sunnis still regarded the Alawites 
as the „false“ Muslims (Goldsmith, 2015, 93–106, 163, 
185–186, 261; Phillips, 2016, 47).
OUTBREAK OF THE SYRIAN WAR
After the „Arab spring“ arose in the Arab world at the 
end of 2010, the process reached Syria in March 2011. 
This was no coincidence, given the dissatisfaction that 
had accumulated during the reign of Bashar al-Assad. 
However, internal structural factors, the regime’s re-
sponse to the protests, the militarization of the uprising 
and external interference ultimately led to the outbreak 
of a long-lasting war.
PROTESTS AGAINST THE REGIME (THE UPRISING)
On 17th December 2010, in Tunisia, Mohamed 
Bouazizi set himself on fi re due to humiliation he had 
been subjected to by the authorities. On the same day, 
in his birthplace, Sidi Bouzid, protests erupted and 
later extended to the capital of Tunis, and on 14 January 
2011 they led to the dismissal of the autocratic Presi-
dent Ben Ali. This triggered a wave of protests against 
8 He promoted inclusive Syrian nationalism, and appointed some Sunnis (Mustafa Tlass, Abdul Halim Khaddam) to important civilian posi-
tions in the government. He prioritised the Sunni culture, so that the Islam which was taught in schools was Sunni Islam. In his birthplace, 
Qardaha, he actualized two architectural projects with an Islamic note. In memory of his late mother, he built a luxurious mosque, and 
in memory of his deceased son Basil, a large cemetery complex which emphasized the Islamic character of Basil with its engraved notes 
from the Koran (Lawrence, 1998, 71; Phillips, 2015, 365–366).
9 Al-Assad later ordered the Syrian Assembly to amend the Constitution with the provision that „President’s religion is Islam“ (Ziadeh, 
2011/2013, 140). The question was whether the Alawites are Muslims. The Alawites were supported by a prominent member of the 
Lebanese Shiite-Twelver clergy, Musa al-Sadr, who proclaimed that the Alawites are a part of the Twelver Shiism according to doctrine 
(Ajami, 1986, 174; Goldsmith, 2015, 89–90).
10 Bashar removed certain experienced Sunnis from prominent government offi ces (Tlass and Khaddam), and appointed the members of his 
extended family. Consequently, the Alawites dominated in the ruling elite even more (Phillips, 2015, 366).
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dictatorships in the Arab world and was referred to as 
the „Arab Spring“, which spread to the majority of Arab 
countries. Syria was no exception. Under the infl uence 
of the general regional trend, a group of teenagers in 
early March 2011 wrote on the wall of their school in the 
south Syrian city of Deraa: „Doctor, your turn next“ (this 
referred to al-Assad) and „Down with the regime.“ The 
teenagers were taken to Damascus by the Syrian security 
authorities and tortured. After authorities refused all their 
parents’ requests for their release, the parents, along with 
hundreds of other Syrians, began protesting in front of 
the main mosque in Deraa on 15th March. The security 
forces responded by shooting and killing four protest-
ers. The following day, after the funeral of the killed 
revolters, around 20,000 other protesters, shouting anti-
regime slogans and smashing the regime symbols came 
to the streets. After the protests continued, the security 
forces surrounded the city on 23rd March and attacked 
the demonstrators, but it was already too late. On the 
news of the demonstrators killed in Deraa, protests had 
already extended to several other parts of Syria (Lesch, 
2012/2013, 56–57; Phillips, 2016, 40–41, 49–50).
Structurally, the outbreak of protests in the city of 
Deraa, located in the southern province of Houran, was 
no coincidence. Houran was in fact affected by virtually 
all the negative elements that occurred during the reign 
of Bashar al-Assad. Similarly to other peripheral regions 
in Syria, Houran had once prospered due to favourable 
agricultural and administrative policies of the regime; 
since the 1980s, the Syrian authorities increasingly 
reduced public investment in infrastructure and services 
in most rural areas due to economic problems, which 
affected the lives of millions of the Syrians. Houran was 
also struck by a severe drought and, in addition, Deraa 
was, in a religious sense, homogeneously Sunni, while 
the commander of the security forces was an Alawite 
who imposed brutal measures (Hokayem, 2013, 42–43; 
Phillips, 2016, 49–50).
A mixture of factors that brought the city of Deraa to 
revolt was also present in other parts of Syria that joined 
the uprising against the regime early on: the north-west-
ern province of Idlib was affected by the regime’s neglect 
and high unemployment; the city of Hama, which was 
a homogeneous, conservative Sunni city, still resented 
the Alawite-dominated regime its brutal repression of 
the rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982; the 
religiously mixed city of Homs received a lot of regime 
funds, however, the Sunni residents there believed that 
the city’s Alawite areas were privileged both in infra-
structure and employment, and therefore, opposed the 
regime, while the Alawites remained loyal. In Damascus, 
the structural (economic and sectarian) backgrounds of 
the insurrection were well visible.11 The regime was 
opposed by predominantly Sunni neighbourhoods of 
Darayya and Eastern Ghouta (notably Douma), which 
were affected by poverty and underemployment, and, 
besides, they absorbed rural migrants. The conservative, 
middle-class neighbourhoods of Barzeh and Midan, and 
the poor Sunni sector of Qaaboun also revolted. On the 
other hand, the Alawite inhabitants of the Damascene 
municipality of Mezze 86 attended the pro-regime gath-
erings organized in mid-year of 2011. These gatherings 
were also attended by the inhabitants of Damascus from 
the middle and upper classes who materially benefi ted 
from the regime policy of economic liberalization (Glass, 
2015, 121–122; Hokayem, 2013, 43–46).
It can be summarized that the uprising featured the 
following: it started as predominantly Sunni, it was 
conducted in the Syrian geographical periphery and 
included lower-classes of the society; when deciding 
whether to join the revolt or stay loyal to the regime, 
local circumstances and possible resentments were 
important; among the initial reasons for the revolt there 
were no clearly perceptible Islamist motivations; sectar-
ian slogans were present in the regions where more than 
one religious community lived, but they did not appear 
in many other regions. Despite the fact that the revolt 
started as predominantly Sunni in character, all the Sun-
nis did not join, nor was it a primarily sectarian revolt. 
Many Sunnis continued to support the al-Assad’s regime 
for various reasons: to some, the regime provided jobs in 
the public sector and the military, others cooperated with 
the authorities economically; some were the members of 
the Baath Party, while others still remembered the insta-
bility before the arrival of Hafi z al-Assad; some feared 
having an Islamist government, others were satisfi ed with 
al-Assad’s foreign policy which was defying Israel and 
the West (Glass, 2015, 94; Hokayem, 2013, 49–50).
Within a few weeks, the protests developed into a 
movement that was more organized and already had a 
national dimension, but it was not centrally coordinated. 
The protesters started to express common demands, pri-
marily requiring a regime change through the dismissal 
of the repressive bodies, the resignation of the President 
al-Assad, and the exclusion of political, security and 
economic elites from political life. In addition, they de-
manded political reforms that would include the abolition 
of the laws on the state of emergency, establishment of 
independent courts, adoption of a new constitution, and 
introduction of more representative political institutions 
that would not be subject to authoritarian control. The 
protest movement (the uprising) was becoming more and 
more organized and this was mainly due to the spontane-
ous establishment of the so-called Local Coordination 
Committees whose members were local activists who 
joined broader networks (Abboud, 2016, 57–58, 66–67).
11 Fanar Haddad (in Phillips, 2015, 359) defi nes „sectarianism“ and „sectarian“ as „discrimination, hate or tension“, based on differences 
between sects. In the context of this article, the term „sect“ has the same meaning as the term „religious community.“
12 However, the regime could defi nitely rely on the Alawites, the Twelvers and most of the Christians; at the beginning of the uprising, the 
Druze tried to maintain a neutral status while a large part of the Ismailis-Nizaris joined the protest. Later, the Druze and the Ismaili-Niz
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THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME, 
THE MILITARIZATION OF THE OPPOSITION 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR
After the start of the protests (the uprising), the regime 
could rely on several social groups, which, due to its (pre-
vious or current) policies, remained faithful: the Sunni 
merchants from Damascus and Aleppo, benefi ting from 
infrastructure projects, increased trade and opening of 
private schools and universities for their children; public 
offi cials whose salaries were increased at the start of the 
protests; some tribes in the east of the country which 
cooperated with the regime; the members of religious 
minorities who were satisfi ed with secular arrangement 
and feared the revenge of the Sunni authorities;12 many 
of the Sunnis saw the regime as a rampart protecting 
from the Islamism and Jihadism; the older Syrians feared 
re-slipping into instability as it existed before 1971, and 
the younger ones feared the possibility of a similar chaos 
that existed in Iraq after 2003 (Phillips, 2016, 51–52).
Despite the fact that many of the Alawites participated 
in the early peaceful protests in Homs and Damascus, 
the majority of the Alawite community members contin-
ued to support the regime for three reasons: there was a 
collective memory of the long history of Sunni domina-
tion of the Alawite community and people were afraid 
of returning to the second-class status; the Alawites 
were disproportionately employed in the public sector 
(the military, the intelligence services, the bureaucracy) 
and, therefore, did not want to oppose the regime that 
paid them;13 and many Alawites suspected that it was a 
rebellion of Islamists and consequently feared the Sunni 
sectarian violence. It is important to point out that the 
most elite divisions of the Syrian army (the Republican 
Guard, the Third Corps and the Fourth Armoured Di-
vision) were almost entirely composed of the regime-
faithful Alawites (Goldsmith, 2015, 196–197; Phillips, 
2016, 52; Syria’s Mutating Confl ict, 2012, 24–25, 27).
The regime responded to the protest with a dual 
policy. On the one hand, it started with a series of 
embellishing political reforms aimed at meeting certain 
demands of the protesters (the abolition of the State of 
Emergency Act which had been in force since 1963, the 
release of 200 political prisoners, the appointment of a 
new Prime Minister) and, on the other hand, it exercised 
increasingly brutal repression (arrests, torture, kidnap-
ping, murders, fi ring at demonstrators), which caused 
more and more deaths (Abboud, 2016, 58–60). 
The regime also employed some subtle but far-
reaching measures. In order to maintain in force, sectar-
ian feelings were promoted in the Alawite community in 
order to set the grounds for the acceptance and imple-
mentation of violence against the members of the Sunni 
community. This was extremely important because the 
Alawite-dominated security services used violence 
against the protesters. In this sense, it can be estimated 
that the regime implemented the policies envisaged by 
the constructivist interpretation of the infl uence of reli-
gion on the outbreak of a violent confl ict. The construc-
tivist explanation is that the political „entrepreneurs“, 
in order to gain or retain authority (power), encourage 
the members of their own religious community to ac-
cept and implement violence against the members of 
other religious communities. However, constructivism 
emphasizes that political entrepreneurs are successful 
in doing so only if they can rely on some already exist-
ing intersubjective religious (social) frameworks, such 
as religious traditions, for example, a religiously-based 
collective historical memory. Members of a community 
can be mobilized appropriately if there is a long history 
of antagonistic relations between two communities.14
At the time of the fi rst protests, the regime revived 
the old „fears of sectarianism.“ In the state media, the 
protesters were labelled as the sectarian Islamists. The 
Alawite community was targeted for manipulation 
as the gangs organized by the regime (the Shabiha) 
brought sandbags to the Alawite villages, claiming that 
the neighbouring Sunnis were attacking the Alawites. 
Soon after the outbreak of protests, when the sectarian 
confrontation did not yet begin at all, as a result of the 
regime manipulation in the Alawite community, rumors 
were circulated about what the „terrorists“ were doing 
to Alawite corpses. The regime could take advantage 
of the intersubjective basis formed by the Alawite col-
lective memory of the long history of Sunni domination 
and the repression against the Alawites.15 Consequently, 
the Alawites began to accept the violence of the regime 
and also decisively participated in its implementation, 
11 Fanar Haddad (in Phillips, 2015, 359) defi nes „sectarianism“ and „sectarian“ as „discrimination, hate or tension“, based on differences 
between sects. In the context of this article, the term „sect“ has the same meaning as the term „religious community.“
12 However, the regime could defi nitely rely on the Alawites, the Twelvers and most of the Christians; at the beginning of the uprising, the 
Druze tried to maintain a neutral status while a large part of the Ismailis-Nizaris joined the protest. Later, the Druze and the Ismaili-Niz-
arite groups split into the supporters of the regime and the supporters of the opposition, but both groups generally did not get involved in 
the confl ict. The regime managed to organize a Druze pro-regime militia (Hokayem, 2013, 47–48; Phillips, 2015, 369; Syria’s Mutating 
Confl ict, 2012, 27).
13 It was important that the regime could rely on the loyalty of the high offi cers in the armed forces, as more than 90 % of the generals were 
the Alawites at the time when Bashar al-Assad came to power (Goldsmith, 2015, 131).
14 The constructivist explanation can be found, for example, in Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000, 647–657) and Šterbenc (2011, 248–254). 
15 Historically, the Sunni dynasties of the Seljuks, Mamluks and Ottomans used repression against the Alawites. During its uprising against 
the regime (1976–1982), the Muslim Brotherhood also exercised brutal sectarian violence against the Alawites; among other brutalities, 
they were systematically killing the Alawite intelligentsia (Goldsmith, 2015, 21, 30–33, 37–38, 40–41; Seale 1988/1990, 316–317, 
324–329).
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
believing that they were under threat of collective anni-
hilation. Thus, even the educated Alawites in Damascus 
demanded the killing of all the Sunnis living in Homs, 
and the majority of the Alawite community defended 
the solutions based on „destruction,“ „eradication,“ 
and „purifi cation“ (Phillips, 2015, 369; Syria’s Mutating 
Confl ict, 2012, 24–25).16 
It should be stressed, however, that the regime was 
by no means the sole culprit for the intensifi cation of 
the confl ict and the transition to a destructive war. 
As Phillips points out, the Sunni-dominated countries 
have also promoted sectarianism on the anti-regime 
side, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey supporting 
Sunni anti-regime militias with pronounced sectarian 
(anti-Alawite) elements in order to overthrow the re-
gime and extend their infl uence in Syria. Moreover, the 
Gulf States allowed the collection of fi nancial resources 
for sectarian militia in Syria on their territories. The 
regime-controlled transnational media in Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia also intensively promoted anti-Alawite 
and anti-Shiite feelings in the wider region (Phillips, 
2015, 370). Thus, the constructivist interpretation can 
also be applied to the operation of the Sunni-dominated 
countries, which, in terms of intersubjectivity, could 
rely on a strong anti-Shiite and anti-Alawite oriented 
Salafi st and Wahhabi ideology and tradition that were 
present in the Gulf.17
In the summer of 2011, the process of militarization 
of the revolt began, due to the escalation of the violence 
of the regime, the protesters’ need for self-defence and 
the inability of the protests to lead to a political transi-
tion process. The fi rst armed rebel units were mostly the 
Sunni deserters (ordinary soldiers, privates) from the Syr-
ian army, joined by some activists, and in July 2011, the 
Free Syrian Army was formed as the nominal umbrella 
organization under which various units were merged, 
soon joined by the escaped Syrian army offi cers. The 
rebels obtained weapons mostly from the seized re-
gime’s arsenals or they bought it in black market. Due to 
armed fi ghting and casualties both on the regime’s and 
the rebels’ sides, Syria slid into the Civil War some time 
between August 2011 and January 2012.18 However, 
peaceful protests against the regime, parallel to armed 
confl icts, continued long after the outbreak of the Civil 
War (Abboud, 2016, 87; Hokayem, 2013, 81–83, 86; 
Phillips, 2015, 358). It is possible to agree with Glass 
(2015, 20–21) that the external aid for the Sunni anti-
regime fi ghters led to the fi nal militarization of the Syrian 
uprising and the domination of the armed rebels over 
peaceful protesters. At the beginning of 2012, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia began sending armed rebels the arms, 
money and non-lethal military equipment, while Turkey 
assisted in logistics. These countries also supported the 
armed struggle against the regime in the following years 
(Phillips, 2016, 137–140). As a result, violence spread 
throughout Syria, and the confl ict became more lethal 
and claimed thousands of victims each month.
Despite the fact that the fi rst armed rebels linked to 
the Free Syrian Army were more secular, the sectarian 
domestic and foreign Sunni Islamist groups, with vary-
ing degrees of radicalism, soon became predominant in 
the armed rebellion. The reasons for this were mainly 
three. Firstly, in the catastrophic atmosphere of the 
war, religion provided a more solid identity and gave 
meaning to suffering and sacrifi ce. Secondly, religious 
groups were more organized and disciplined. Thirdly, 
the armed groups that needed weapons and other mate-
rial resources for successful combat began to compete 
for the favour of foreign sectarian-driven donors (Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar), which required them to show the high-
est level of Islamism. Consequently, the war became 
dominantly sectarian, since the Islamist groups acted on 
the basis of a common idea of  the struggle of the Sunnis 
against the Shiite regime, but at the same time it was 
increasingly radicalized (Hokayem, 2013, 95–98; Lister, 
2015; Phillips, 2016, 129–130; Tentative Jihad, 2012).
 
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE
 
The war in Syria would not have become so severe 
and would not be so long if it was not intensely inter-
fered by external protagonists who wanted to achieve 
wider regional goals through the victory of their proxies 
in Syria. As a result, Syria has become a sort of battle-
ground, where bigger and stronger external protagonists 
have been fi ghting. The war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran needs to be highlighted, which, to a signifi cant 
extent, overlaps with the fi ghting between the broader 
Sunni and Shiite sides. This confrontation cannot be 
understood without understanding the consequences of 
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION OF IRAQ
During the reign of Saddam Hussein (1979–2003) 
and the Baath Party (1968–2003), the Arab Sunnis 
who constitute only a minority of the Iraqi population, 
dominated in the society and politics, while the Arab 
Shiite majority was clearly subordinated.19 The US-led 
invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003 and later the 
16 Phillips (2015, 362–363, 368–369) provides the thesis on the regime manipulation with the Alawite community, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the existence of historical confl icts. However, in terms of theoretical basis, he does not refer to constructivism.
17 The work of the ultra-conservative Sunni theologian Ahmad ibn Taymiyya infl uenced greatly the founder of Wahhabism − Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Taymiyya was extremely hostile towards all the Shiites, and in 1305 he issued the fatwa in which the Alawites 
were proclaimed heretics and enemies of Islam (Goldsmith, 2015, 34–36; Mabon, 2013/2016, 85–86; Nasr, 2006, 94–96). 
18 In accordance with the widely accepted political science defi nition, the civil war occurs when, in one year, the number of combat deaths 
on both sides reaches 1000 (Phillips, 2015, 358).
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occupation changed the situation, as the Americans 
overthrew the Sunni ruler and by enabling democratic 
elections in January and December 2005 they paved 
the way for the majority of the Shiites to take power.20 
This was an epochal historical change, since the Iraqi 
Shiites came to power for the fi rst time since 163821 in a 
country that is extremely important for all the Shiites.22 
Iraq, which is one of the three most important Arab 
countries, became the fi rst country in the Arab world, 
in which, based on the democratic process, the Shiite 
majority started to dominate (Dawisha, 2009, 236–240; 
Nasr, 2006, 170, 186–202; Pelham, 2008, 180–185; 
Šterbenc, 2005, 360). 
The Shiite takeover of power in Iraq did not merely 
alter the power relations in this country, but also caused 
decisive changes in the wider region. One can point out 
three respects.23 Firstly, the (democratic) rise of the Iraqi 
Shiites to power inevitably inspired the Shiites in the 
Arab countries where, despite being in large numbers, 
they were still socially and politically marginalized 
(subordinated to the ruling Sunnis). Therefore, they 
began to express demands for the improvement of their 
position, mainly referring to democracy. This happened 
in Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.24 Sec-
ondly, in general, the impact of the Shiites in the wider 
area was strengthened, as there was a kind of revival of 
Shia, which was also based on material indicators. For 
example, the Shiites began to control the same amount 
of the world oil supplies as the Sunnis.25 Thirdly, the 
regional (geopolitical) infl uence of the strongest Shia 
force, Iran,26 was greatly increased, because the country 
had good relations with the new Shia rulers in Iraq.27 
Moreover, even before 2003, Tehran cooperated closely 
with the Alawite-dominated regimes of Hafi z and 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as well as the Shia Twelvers’ 
movement Hezbollah, which controls the south of 
Lebanon. Iran thus spread its infl uence all the way to 
the Mediterranean Sea (Goldsmith, 2015, 122–125; 
Nasr, 2006, 169–184, 211–226; Norton, 2007/2009, 
34–36, 135–138; Ostovar, 2016, 114–116; Pelham, 
2008, 204–206, 215).
The great increase in the infl uence of Shia and Iran 
in the region led to the collapse in the balance of power, 
which greatly irritated the Sunni-dominated states, es-
pecially the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar). Whereas during the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980–1988) their vast support of Saddam Hussein 
prevented the spread of Iran’s infl uence on Iraq, this 
was now the fact. They started referring to the emerging 
„Shia crescent“, which was expected to stretch from Iran, 
through Iraq and Syria, to the south of Lebanon, while 
the Sunni infl uence was expected to decline ever more.28 
The countries came up with several measures to curb 
the spread of the Shia infl uence, and have been inclined 
to the Sunni groups in Iraq which brutally attacked 
the Shiites there. Namely, the strengthening of identity 
policies (sectarianism) further intensifi ed the Sunni-Shia 
clashes in the region, which in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 
led to a highly destructive Sunni-Shia Civil War in which 
the Shiites won (Barnes-Dacey and Levy, 2013, 7–8; 
Blagojević and Ščekić, 2017, 543; Cockburn, 2016, 
129–159; Mabon, 2013/2016, 54; Nasr, 2006, 241–242; 
Pelham, 2008, 215–219; Phillips, 2016, 18, 20–21).
The development of events particularly intensifi ed 
the traditional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
the leading Sunni and Shia forces,29 and in this sense, 
a kind of a Saudi-Iranian regional cold war erupted.30 
Saudi Arabia was extremely negative about the great 
19 In Iraq, the (Arab) Shiites account for 60 %, the (Arab) Sunnis for 20 %, and the Kurds for 17 % of the population; the rest are mem-
bers of other ethnic and religious groups (Ethnoreligious Groups, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_ethnoreli-
gious_1992.jpg, 25. 5. 2005).
20 The Iraqi Shiites are the Twelvers. The Twelvers gained their title because they attach special importance to the twelve Imams who, in the 
years 656–874, led the main stream of Shiism (Momen, 1985, 23–45; Šterbenc, 2005, 115–137).
21 In 1638, the Sunni Ottomans ended the reign of the Iranian Shiite (Twelver) dynasty of the Safavids in Iraq (Šterbenc, 2005, 344, 360).
22 In Kufa, southern Iraq, the founder of Shiism Ali established his base, and in addition, there are four Shiite (Twelver) shrines (Najaf, Karba-
la, Kazimayn and Samarra) in Iraq. The vast majority of today’s Shiites belongs to the Twelvers; the Twelvers are (mostly) also the Shiites 
living in Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon (Šterbenc, 2005, 73, 116, 177–191). 
23 Various authors highlight the decisive infl uence of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Cockburn (2016, 10) argues that the US-led 
invasion of Iraq „was the earthquake whose aftershocks we still feel“. Phillips (2016, 18) emphasizes that the invasion of Iraq was an 
„important turning point“.
24 In Bahrain, the Twelvers make up 70 % of the population; in Yemen, the Zaydis make up 42 % of the population; in Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia, the Twelvers make up 38 and 10 to 15 % of the population respectively.
25 In the countries with the Shiite governments (Iran, Iraq and Azerbaijan), there was the same amount of global oil reserves in comparison 
to the Sunni Arab countries (Pelham, 2008, 215).
26 In Iran, during the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722), the Twelver Shiism was permanently established as a state religion for the fi rst time. In 
addition, Iran is the culturally and intellectually most dynamic country in the Muslim world, and in Qom, Iran, there is the most import-
ant Shiite theological centre (Nasr, 2006, 213–215; Savory, 1980).
27 During the reign of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqi Shiite politicians fl ed to Iran. After 2003 they returned and won the elections (Phillips, 
2016, 18–19).
28 In 1986, the US envoy Pearson was already warned by the leadership of the Sunni-dominated countries, in private talks, that Iran wants 
to defeat Iraq in order to establish the „Shia Crescent,“ ranging from Lebanon, through Iraq, to the Persian Gulf (Crist, 2012/2013, 171).
29 On the one hand, this rivalry is largely a classical secular struggle for the infl uence of the two regionally most infl uential states, and on 
the other hand, it overlaps with the wider regional Sunni-Shia sectarian confl ict. The authorities in Saudi Arabia and Iran (after the Is-
lamic Revolution of 1979), in terms of identity and legitimization, rely on religion (Sunnism–Wahhabism and Shiism), and they compete 
24
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
increase in both Iran’s and Shia infl uence, mainly for 
two reasons. Firstly, it was feared that the Saudi Shiites 
living in the east of Saudi Arabia would secede, which 
would be a disaster for the monarchy as all of its oil 
fi elds and oil reserves are in this area. Riyadh had long 
been accusing Tehran of calling the Saudi Shiites for 
rebellion, and these accusations intensifi ed after 2005, 
when the latter demanded more rights for themselves.31 
As the Saudi Shiites protested strongly during the „Arab 
Spring“ in 2011, the concerns of the Saudi authorities 
were further strengthened.32 Secondly, because of the 
fact that Saudi Arabia and Iran compete in Islamic legiti-
macy, and the Saudi ruling house legitimizes its power 
with Islam, the Saudis saw severe undermining of their 
power in the great increase in Iranian infl uence in the 
region. Because of all these fears, Saudi Arabia played 
a major role in the brutal suppression of the Shiite dem-
onstrations in Bahrain in March 2011 (Barnes-Dacey 
and Levy, 2013, 7–8; Hadžikadunić, 2013, 141, 147; 
Mabon, 2013/2016, 54, 70–72; Phillips, 2016, 19–20; 
Wehrey, 2013).
SYRIA AS THE BATTLEFIELD FOR EXTERNAL 
PROTAGONISTS
After the protests in Syria in March 2011, the Sunni-
dominated Arab Gulf States and Turkey acted against 
the al-Assad’s regime reconcilably and tried to resolve 
Syrian tensions through diplomatic channels for several 
months. The Saudis feared that the dismissal of al-Assad 
would further strengthen the revolutionary process in the 
region, which would jeopardize their rule, while Turkish 
President Erdogan and Qatari emir Hamad bin Khalifa 
al-Thani cooperated closely with the Syrian leader 
before the outbreak of protests. But as early as in July 
2011, when al-Assad intensifi ed the repression against 
protesters, the external Sunni protagonists drastically 
changed their attitude towards the Syrian regime and 
began to overthrow it (Hassan, 2013, 18–19; Phillips, 
2016, 65, 68–69, 70–75).
The Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
saw the Syrian confl ict as a decisive battle for the con-
trol of a key country in the geographical centre of the 
region. They believed that, from a geopolitical point of 
view, the replacement of the regime in Syria would bring 
a decisive change in the region, since Iran and its allies 
would be adversely affected. Namely, if the pro-Iranian 
regime was toppled in Syria, and instead, the Sunni re-
gime was established, cooperating with the Gulf States, 
it would be possible to signifi cantly and even decisively 
weaken the two pro-Iranian protagonists: the Hezbol-
lah in Lebanon and the Shia regime in Iraq. The Iraqi 
Sunnis, who, after being defeated in the Civil War, have 
more or less adopted the idea of being in a subordinate 
position, would again be able to oppose the Shia rulers. 
In Lebanon, Hezbollah would lose its dominant role and 
be subordinate to the Sunnis. Consequently, an Iranian 
infl uence zone, extending to the Mediterranean, would 
be abolished. Saudi Arabia also wanted to demonstrate 
its commitment to the Sunni Islam and help the Syrian 
Sunnis in their struggle against the „heretical“ Alawite 
regime. In addition, Saudi Arabia was convinced that 
the collapse of the Syrian regime and, consequently, the 
weakening of Iran, would bring easier control over the 
persistent Saudi Shiites (Al-Rasheed, 2013, 36–37; Has-
san, 2013, 17–18, 23).
Qatar, on the one hand, thought similarly as a part of 
the Sunni bloc, which wanted to deal the blows to Iran 
and the Shiites in the region, and, on the other hand, 
along with Turkey, Qatar had additional motivation to 
support Syrian rebels.33 Doha and Ankara wanted to 
increase their infl uence in the region more distinctively, 
using as their instrument the Islamist Movement of 
Muslim Brotherhood that had its branches in different 
countries. The latter had already come to power in Tuni-
sia and Egypt, and with the fall of the al-Assad’s regime, 
this was expected to happen in Syria. Qatar also had 
an additional, geo-economic motive for the destruction 
of the Syrian regime, as al-Assad, in 2009, rejected the 
Qatari proposal to construct a gas pipeline that would 
with each other in Islamic legitimacy, or, where a more authentic Islam is claimed. More on this can be found in, for example, Mabon 
(2013/2016, 43–44, 53, 85–91, 96–98).
30 The countries compete in the ideological and geopolitical fi eld. The ideological competition is based on the ethnic (Arab-Persian) and 
religious-sectarian (Sunni-Shia) divisions. The sectarian dispute was particularly widespread following the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 
1979, when the new Iranian regime began calling for the overthrow of the Saudi ruling family. The geopolitical competition is based on 
several elements: a relationship with the United States’ military presence in the region; relation to Palestine; the issue of potential posses-
sion of nuclear weapons; fi ghting through proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain; and petroleum policy (Mabon, 2013/2016, 42–77). 
31 After the Islamic Revolution, the new Iranian authorities really began to call the Saudi Shiites to rebellion, and in November 1979 the 
revolt broke out. But the revolt was essentially a consequence of the socio-economic marginalization of the Shiites in the monarchy 
(Mabon, 2013/2016, 54; Wehrey, 2013, 6–7).
32 Since the Saudi authorities are not abolishing the marginalization of the Shiites, the latter have radicalized after 2009. In March 2009, an 
important member of the Saudi Shiite clergy, Nimr al-Nimr, in his Friday sermon warned the Saudi authorities that the Shiites only have 
one option more: to separate from the monarchy (Wehrey, 2013, 8–10). The marginalization of the Saudi Shiites is essentially due to the 
pressure of the infl uential Wahhabi clergy on the Saudi authorities, since Wahhabism, which is an offi cial religion in Saudi Arabia, treats 
the Shia Twelvers as polytheists (mushrikun). The Wahhabi doctrine requires hostility towards polytheists (Goldberg, 1986, 231–232). 
33 However, due to Turkey’s support for Syrian rebels the Syrian regime withdrew from predominantly Kurdish areas in northern Syria. This 
caused signifi cant problem for Erdogan as he feared that creation of Kurdish proto-state in Syria would encourage separatist ambitions 
of Turkish Kurds (Phillips, 2016, 111, 210–211). On attitude of Turkish authorities towards the Turkish Kurds see, for example, Abbas and 
Zalta, 2017.
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
bring the Qatari natural gas through Saudi Arabia, Jor-
dan and Syria to Turkey and further in Europe (Cafi ero 
and Wagner, 2015; Phillips, 2016, 38, 69, 74).
Consequently, in February 2012, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia started providing arms, military equipment and 
money to Syrian rebels, while Turkey provided logistic 
support and supported the rebels with intelligence. The 
Sunni forces also persisted with this policy in the com-
ing years. All three countries also supported the political 
organization of the Syrian anti-regime opposition (Phil-
lips, 2016, 105–125).
Iran as well saw a decisive regional battleground in 
Syria, where they were to defend their most essential 
interests. They (increasingly) perceived Syria as a zero 
sum game, as the fall of the al-Assad’s regime would 
lead to a major change and more hostilities toward 
Iran. Tehran was aware that the Syrian war represented 
a great opportunity for its regional Sunni rivals. If the 
Syrian regime was replaced by the Sunni and pro-Saudi 
authorities, Iran would lose its most important Arab ally. 
Furthermore, the „strategic bridge“ would be lost, the 
bridge through which Tehran was providing arms to the 
Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, and thus deter Israel 
from possible attacks against Iran. In Lebanon, the Syr-
ian and the Lebanese Sunnis could jointly act against 
Hezbollah, and the Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis could put 
some pressure on the Shia authorities in Iraq; the fall 
of the latter would be the worst possible scenario for 
Iran. It is important to understand that even before the 
war in Syria, the Iranian regime had a paranoid feeling 
of encirclement, since the external protagonists (the 
United States, Israel, the Sunni-dominated countries) 
were supposed to plot a conspiracy or a great strategy 
for Iranian collapse. For this reason, Iran believed that 
Syria is the fi rst line of defence against the combined 
efforts of their regional and non-regional enemies, not 
only to replace the al-Assad’s regime, but also to isolate 
and demolish the Islamic Republic. In other words, the 
threat in Syria could be existential for Iran (Goodarzi, 
2013, 25–28; Ostovar, 2016, 205–207).
For this reason, soon after the demonstrations 
erupted in Syria, Iran started to help the al-Assad’s 
regime, and with the progress of the war, Iranian aid 
intensifi ed. Tehran supported the regime fi nancially, 
materially (including oil), with arms and in logistics. 
Other external Shia protagonists also helped the Syrian 
regime. Several thousands of the Lebanese Hezbollah 
fi ghters battled on the side of the Syrian regime only 
because the Lebanese Shiites were aware that the fall 
of al-Assad would cause their considerable attrition, 
which would be exploited by the Lebanese and Syrian 
Sunnis and Israel. The Iraqi Shia authorities were also 
aware that the collapse of al-Assad would have led to a 
strong Sunni assault on the Iraqi Shiites, therefore, they 
helped the Syrian regime fi nancially, and they also al-
lowed Iranian planes to fl y over their airspace. Between 
2011 and 2014, Iraqi Shia militias were fi ghting in Syria, 
and further on, even the units of Afghan Shiites, organ-
ized by Iran. All this meant that the al-Assad’s regime 
was supported by a broad transnational Shia alliance 
(Al-Khoei, 2013; Lebanon’s Hezbollah Turns Eastward, 
2014; Nasr, 2013, 157; Ostovar, 2016, 208–219; Phil-
lips, 2016, 149–150, 159–165).
Given that the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia 
and the Shia camp led by Iran both see Syria as a de-
cisive battlefi eld, which would ultimately determine 
their wider position in the region, it is no coincidence 
that both camps support the rebels and the regime so 
strongly and persistently. This situation, however, is 
causing aggravation of the confl ict and long-lasting war. 
This is not a coincidence, since some studies (Regan, 
2002; Skrede Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004) establish 
that the involvement of external protagonists in civil 
wars, supporting one of the sides, increases brutality and 
longevity of these wars.
CONCLUSION
Being a unique sum of two extremely negative fac-
tors, an internal and an external one, the war in Syria is 
one of the worst clashes, if not even the worst one, since 
World War II. The internal sectarian tensions have been, 
to some extent, latently present since 1963 when the mi-
nority of the Alawites gained a dominant socio-political 
role in the country. However, these tensions were some-
what neutralized by the generous economic and social 
policies of Hafi z al-Assad which also met the needs of 
the predominant part of the majority − the Sunnis. As 
Bashar al-Assad started to eliminate such policies, sec-
tarian confl icts were increasing along with the growing 
social tensions, which consequently led to protests and 
revolt due to the »encouraging« external circumstances 
(»the Arab spring«). The brutal and cynical response of 
the regime, together with external interference, led to 
the fi nal outbreak of the Civil War.
Once the war in Syria started, the external factor be-
came clearly evident. The Sunni − Shiite Pandora’s box, 
opened by the US attack on Iraq, indirectly caused the 
extreme destructiveness and long duration of the Syrian 
confl ict. The big question is when this confl ict can be 
stopped, since many internal and external protagonists 
need to agree to do so. Thus, it can be concluded that 
Syria and its people are a great and tragic victim of the 
wider (geo)political, (geo)economic and ideological 
confl icts, which were, to a large extent, caused by the 
Western aggressive thrust aimed at the region.
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Primož ŠTERBENC: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE WAR IN SYRIA, 13–28
KAKO RAZUMETI VOJNO V SIRIJI
Primož ŠTERBENC
Univerza na Primorskem, Fakulteta za management, Cankarjeva 5, 6101 Koper, Slovenija
e-mail: primoz.sterbenc@fm-kp.si
POVZETEK
Namen članka je razložiti ozadja obstoječe destruktivne vojne v Siriji. Natančneje, članek skuša odgovoriti na 
dve vprašanji. Prvič, zakaj so izbruhnili protesti in vojna? In drugič, zakaj je vojna tako dolgotrajna? Članek analizira 
politične, ekonomske in religijske (sektaške) vidike položaja v Siriji vse od poznega osmanskega obdobja, pri čemer 
je poudarek na vladavini stranke Baas. V času vladavine Hafi za Al Asada je bila Sirija zaradi darežljivih družbeno-
ekonomskih politik režima stabilna država, čeprav so obstajale omejene latentne sektaške napetosti. Položaj se je 
poslabšal v času vladavine Bašarja Al Asada, ker je režim uveljavljal neoliberalne ukrepe, ki so odtujili tradicionalno 
podporno bazo stranke Baas in intenzivirali napetosti med suniti in alaviti. Posledično so med »arabsko pomladjo« 
izbruhnili protesti. Režim je odgovoril z represijo in razpihovanjem sektaštva, kar je vodilo v militarizacijo vstaje. 
Treba je upoštevati posledice ameriško vodenega napada na Irak leta 2003, ker je le-ta povzročil oster boj med 
regionalnimi sunitskimi in šiitskimi akterji (Iranom in Savdsko Arabijo), kar je nazadnje Sirijo spremenilo v bojišče in 
povzročilo dolgotrajno vojno.
Ključne besede: Sirija, vojna, družbenoekonomski položaj, religijske skupnosti, zunanje vmešavanje
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