Filozofski vestnik
Les Politiques du Temp Politics of the Times
Sous la direction de /Edited by Jelica Šumič Riha
XXXII | 2/2011
Izdaja | Published by
Filozofski inštitut ZRC SAZU Institute of Philosophy at SRC SASA
Ljubljana 2011
CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana
32:1(082)
Les POLITIQUES du temp = Politics of the times / sous la direction de, edited by Jelica Šumič-Riha. - Ljubljana : Filozofski inštitut ZRC SAZU = Institute of Philosophy at ZRC SAZU, 2011. -(Filozofski vestnik, ISSN 0353-4510 ; 2011, št. 2)
ISBN 978-961-254-360-0
1. Vzp. stv. nasl. 2. Šumič-Riha, Jelica
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Sommaire / Contents
Filozofski vestnik
Les Politiques du Temps/Politics of the Times Volume XXXII | Number 2 | 2011
Une philosophie pour le 2ieme siecle / Philosophy for the 21st Century
7	Alain Badiou
Conference de Ljubljana
Politique et psychanalyse / Politics and Psychoanalysis
27 Jorge Aleman
Solitude: Common. Some Political Drifts in Lacan's Teaching
47 Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello
The Names of the Real in Laclau's Theory: Antagonism, Dislocation, and Heterogeneity
65 Jason Glynos
Fantasy and Identity in Critical Political Theory
89 Jelica Šumič Riha
Politics and Psychoanalysis in the Times of the Generalized Metonymization
Politiser la sante / Politicizing Health
115 Rodrigo de la Fabian
« De la fonction politico-clinique du temoignage »
135 Davide Tarizzo
Biopolitics and the Ideology of 'Mental Health'
Compter avec le sujet / Counting with the Subject
153 Bruno Besana
La forme d'un sujet a venir
187 Yücel Dursun
On "One" (Thing) that is Missing in Lacanian Thought
213 Notes on Contributors 217 Abstracts
Kazalo
Filozofski vestnik Politike časov
Letnik XXXII | Številka 2 | 2011
Filozopja za 21. stoletje
7	Alain Badiou
Ljubljansko predavanje
Politika in psihoanaliza
27 Jorge Aleman
Samota: Skupno. Nekaj političnih zametkov v Lacanovem poučevanju
47 Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello
Imena realnega v Laclauovi teoriji: antagonizem, dislokacija in heterogenost
65 Jason Glynos
Fantazma in identiteta v kritični politični teoriji
89 Jelica Šumič Riha
Psihoanaliza v času vsesplošne metonimizacije
Politizirati zdravje
115 Rodrigo de la Fabian
O politično-klinični funkciji pričevanja
135 Davide Tarizzo
Biopolitika in ideologija »duševnega zdravja«
Šteti s subjektom
153 Bruno Besana
Forma prihajajočega subjekta
187 Yücel Dursun
O »eni« (reči), ki manjka v Lacanovi misli
213 Notica o avtorjih 217 Povzetki
Une philosophie pour le 2ieme siecle Philosophy for the 21st Century
Alain Badiou*
Conference de Ljubljana
Dans Logiques des mondes, j'indique que quand un individu participe a un processus de verite, cela est signale par un affect. Pour chaque type de verite, il y a un affect different. J'ai choisi de parler d'enthousiasme pour la politique, de joie pour la connaissance scientifique, de plaisir pour l'art et de bonheur pour l'amour. Il est vrai que je n'ai pas vraiment decrit ces affects. Je ne suis pas entre dans une phenomenologie de leur valeur individuelle. Je vais probablement y remedier si j'arrive a ecrire le troisieme volume de la serie dont le titre general est l'etre et l'evenement : L'immanence des verites. Ce livre va porter sur l'ensem-ble de ce qui se passe pour un individu determine quand il s'incorpore a une procedure de verite, quand il est pris dans l'ldee. J'aurai a aborder des points nouveaux, en particulier celui de la distinction de ces affects : le bonheur, ce n'est pas le plaisir, le plaisir, ce n'est pas la joie, et l'enthousiasme differe des trois autres.
Mais quelle est la necessite generale d'un troisieme livre, apres L'etre et l'evenement et Logiques des mondes ?
Mettons d'abord les choses en perspective. On peut le faire assez simple-ment. L'etre et l'evenement peut etre considere comme la premiere partie d'une construction en trois temps. ll concerne principalement la question de l'etre. Qu'en est-il de l'etre, de l'etre en tant qu'etre comme le dit Aristote ? Qu'en est-il des voies et des moyens de le connaitre ? Ma proposition ontologique est que l'etre en tant qu'etre est multiplicite pure, c'est-a-dire multiplicite non composee d'atomes. L'etre est evidemment compose d'elements, mais ces elements sont des multiplicites qui sont elles-memes composees de multiplicites. On arrive toutefois a un point d'arret, qui n'est nullement l'Un - l'Un serait forcement un atome - mais le vide. Voila donc ma proposition sur l'etre. Quant a la connaissance de l'etre, ma proposition est d'identifier l'ontologie - le discours sur l'etre - a la mathematique. Par ailleurs, L'etre et l'evenement developpe en contrepoint une theorie des verites, qui est une theorie formelle des verites : les verites sont,
* EcoleNormaleSuperieure, Pariz, Francija
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comme toutes choses, des multiplicites ; il s'agit de savoir de quelle sorte. Le livre traite donc a la fois d'une theorie de l'etre et d'une theorie des verites, tout cela dans une theorie du multiple pur.
La deuxieme partie de cette construction, Logiques des mondes, s'attelle a la question de l'apparaitre. Il s'agit d'une theorie de ce qui, de l'etre, apparait dans des mondes determines et forme des relations entre les objets de ces mondes. Je propose de dire que cette partie de la construction d'ensemble est une logique. Il s'agit d'une logique en tant qu'elle ne porte plus sur la composition de ce qui est, mais sur les relations qui se tissent entre toutes les choses qui apparaissent localement dans les mondes. Apres donc une theorie de l'etre, une theorie de I'etre-la - pour employer un vocabulaire proche de celui de Hegel - c'est-a-dire de l'etre tel qu'il est place et dispose dans les relations d'un monde singulier.
Dans Logiques des mondes, la question de la verite est evidemment reprise. L'etre et I'evenement traitait de l'etre des verites en tant que multiplicites speciales, ce que, apres le mathematicien Paul Cohen, j'ai appele des multiplicites generi-ques. Avec Logiques des mondes, on entre dans la question des corps reels, de la logique de leurs relations, et en particulier dans la question de l'apparaitre des verites. Si tout ce qui apparait dans un monde est un corps, il faut aborder la question du corps d'une verite. Ce deuxieme tome a donc largement pour finalite une theorie des corps, qui puisse aussi etre une theorie du corps des verites. Alors que le premier tome a pour finalite une theorie des verites comme multiplicites generiques.
Le projet du troisieme tome sera d'examiner les choses du point de vue des verites. Le premier tome demande : Qu'en est-il des verites par rapport a l'etre ? Le second : Qu'en est-il des verites par rapport a l'apparaitre ? Le troisieme deman-dera : Qu'en est-il de l'etre et de l'apparaitre du point de vue des verites ? Ainsi j'aurai fait le tour de la question.
Une verite, du point de vue humain, du point de vue anthropologique, se compose d'incorporations individuelles dans des ensembles plus vastes. Je voudrais donc savoir comment se presentent, se disposent le monde et les individus du monde, lorsqu'on les examine a l'interieur du processus des verites lui-meme. C'est une question qui renverse en quelque sorte la perspective des deux premiers volumes. On se demandait ce qu'etaient les verites du point de l'etre et du
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point de vue du monde, on se demande maintenant ce qu'il en est de l'etre et du monde du point de vue des verites.
On trouve naturellement des esquisses de ce propos dans les deux reuvres an-terieures. L'etre et l'evenement, en particulier, contient une theorie assez com-pliquee du retour des verites sur le monde dans la figure du savoir. La these est que l'on appellera savoir, nouveau savoir, creation d'un savoir, la maniere dont une verite eclaire de fagon differente la situation ontologique. C'est comme dans Platon : on arrive a l'ldee en sortant de la caverne des apparences, mais il faut redescendre dans la caverne pour eclairer ce qui existe a partir de l'ldee. Et il faut le faire quitte a courir un certain nombre de risques. C'est en effet au moment du retour dans la caverne que le risque est le plus grand, au moment ou vous vous prononcez, du point de vue de ce que vous estimez etre des verites, sur le monde tel qu'il apparait, et donc sur les ideologies dominantes. Cette question du retour, je l'ai deja traitee dans L'etre et l'evenement sous le nom de theorie du forgage : on force une transformation du savoir a partir de la verite. C'est une theorie assez complexe, comme l'est deja, a vrai dire, la theorie du retour dans la caverne chez Platon. Platon, en fin de compte, n'en dit pas grand-chose, sinon que le retour est tres risque, tres difficile, incertain. Platon nous dit que ce retour, il faut y etre force, sinon on resterait dans le calme domaine de la contemplation des verites. En cela, le terme de forgage, utilise dans l'etre et l'evenement en ce qui concerne la relation d'une verite aux savoirs, est tout a fait a sa place. Ce n'est pas une procedure naturelle, spontanee.
Quant a Logiques des mondes, le livre ne comporte pas de theorie du forgage, mais une theorie des relations intimes entre la singularite du monde et l'uni-versalite d'une verite, a travers le phenomene des conditions concretes, appa-raissantes, empiriques de la construction du corps des verites. Je soutiens que la verite est un corps. A ce titre, elle est faite avec ce qu'il y a, c'est-a-dire avec d'autres corps individuels, et c'est ce qui s'appelle une incorporation. Cette incorporation nous eclaire sur la maniere dont une verite procede dans un monde et sur sa relation avec les materiaux de ce monde lui-meme, a savoir les corps et le langage. Vous savez que, dans Logiques des mondes, je pars de la formule : « Dans un monde, il n'y a que des corps et des langages, sinon qu'il y a des verites. » Je procede a un premier examen materialiste de ce « sinon que » : les verites sont aussi corps et langage, corps subjectivables. Pour eclairer la relation des verites aux corps et aux langages, j'utilise une notion qui est l'equivalent du
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forgage dans L'etre et I'evenement, a savoir, le concept de compatibilite. Un corps de verites est compose d'elements compatibles, en un sens a la fois technique et elementaire : ils se laissent dominer par un meme element.
Une verite, au fond, est toujours une multiplicite unifiee, dominee ou organi-see par quelque chose qui rend compatible ce qui ne l'etait pas necessairement. Pour prendre un exemple tres simple, une bonne partie de la conception de ce qu'etait un parti revolutionnaire consistait a creer une theorie ou intellectuels et ouvriers seraient compatibles, et ou la politique rendrait compatibles des differences de classe qui normalement ne le sont pas. La theorie de Gramsci de l'intellectuel organique, et d'autres theories voisines, sont de ce type. Elles ne traitent pas simplement des differences de classe en tant que conflit, elles creent aussi des compatibilites entre classes qui n'existaient pas, d'ou par exemple une theorie des alliances de classe. En esthetique, on a une situation du meme or-dre. Une ffiuvre d'art - consideree comme sujet - cree des compatibilites entre des choses qui etaient considerees comme non compatibles, absolument separees. Une peinture en cree entre des couleurs qui ne paraissaient pas destinees a aller ensemble, entre des formes qui etaient disparates. Elle integre formes et couleurs dans des compatibilites de type superieur.
Bref, le concept de forgage, au niveau ontologique, et le concept de compatibi-lite, au niveau phenomenologique, traitent deja du rapport entre la verite et la situation dans laquelle la verite procede. Le troisieme volume, si j'ai vraiment le courage de l'ecrire, systematisera tout cela. Il s'installera en quelque sorte dans les differents types de verite pour se demander : Que se passe-t-il quand tout un monde est aborde du point de vue de la verite ? Que se passe-t-il onto-logiquement quand on adopte le point de vue des multiplicites generiques sur les multiplicites ordinaires, quelconques, qui composent ontologiquement une situation ?
Et dans ce cadre, je traiterai des affects singuliers qui signalent, au niveau indivi-duel, le processus d'incorporation. Qu'est-ce que le bonheur amoureux ? Qu'est-ce que le plaisir esthetique ? Qu'est-ce que l'enthousiasme politique ? Qu'est-ce que la joie - ou la beatitude - scientifique ? Dans L'immanence des verites, tout cela sera systematiquement etudie.
La construction de ce livre a venir sera en somme assez simple. Je prevois un grand developpement inaugural, plus technique et plus precis, du probleme que je viens de vous presenter rapidement : le probleme de la relation entre les individus incorpores a une verite et les multiplicites ordinaires, pensees dans leur etre comme dans leur apparaitre mondain. Je prevois ensuite une deuxieme partie qui degagera les lois generales, les dispositifs formels, qui organisent les rapports au monde a partir du point de vue des verites. On aura ainsi une theorie generale de l'incorporation individuelle et des affects qui la signalent. On demandera : Qu'est-ce que l'eclaircie du monde du point de vue des verites ? Qu'est-ce qu'un obstacle ? Une victoire ? Un echec ? Une creation ? Une troisieme partie reprendra les choses procedure de verite par procedure de verite, en pro-posant une theorie systematique de l'art, de la science, de l'amour et de la poli-tique. Une telle theorie, meme si elle est esquissee dans de nombreux endroits de mon ffiuvre, n'y est presente nulle part. Voila le plan, ideal, dans son actuelle absence, de L'immanence des verites^
Je voudrais insister sur le fait que dans la second partie, je compte proposer une theorie de ce qu'il y a de commun entre les quatre procedures de verite et de leur unite virtuellement possible. Cette partie comportera en effet la reprise d'une theorie des verites, mais cette fois du point de vue des verites elles-memes. Il s'agira de se demander ce qui les identifie en elles-memes, non plus ce qui les differencie de l'etre anonyme ou des objets du monde. Mais il s'agira aussi de continuer mon interrogation sur la philosophie. Vous savez que, dans le Manifeste pour la philosophie, je la definis comme ce qui cree un lieu de compossi-bilite, un lieu de coexistence, pour les quatre conditions. Il reste a examiner si la philosophie ne s'appuie pas en outre sur une figure de vie qui integrerait ces procedures. C'est une question qu'on me pose assez souvent et j'ai l'intention de l'attaquer de front.
Cela revient d'une certaine fagon a se demander : Qu'est-ce qu'une vie complete ? Je ne parle pas seulement d'une vraie vie. Cette derniere question, je l'aborde d'ailleurs a la fin de Logiques des mondes. Qu'est-ce que la vraie vie, dont Rimbaud dit qu'elle est absente, mais dont je soutiens qu'elle peut etre presente ? C'est vivre sous le signe de l'ldee, c'est-a-dire vivre sous le signe de l'incorporation effective. L'autre question est voisine, mais differente : Y a-t-il une Idee des idees, c'est-a-dire une Idee de la vie complete ? On retourne ainsi a l'ambition de la sagesse antique. On retrouve cette aspiration initiale d'une vie,
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non seulement marquee par l'Idee et la verite, mais par l'idee d'une vie achevee, une vie ou aurait ete experimente en matiere de verite tout ce qui peut l'etre. Cette interrogation ira-t-elle jusqu'a supposer que peut exister un sujet philo-sophique ? Ce qui se tient pour ainsi dire au milieu des quatre conditions, ce qui circule conceptuellement de l'art a la science en passant par la politique et l'amoutr, c'est la philosophie elle-meme et non pas un sujet philosophique, dont l'existence est douteuse. La question du sujet va cependant hanter ce troisieme tome. Je me suis toujours defendu contre la these que la philosophie etait une procedure de verite comme les autres. Elle ne peut pas etre comme les autres, puisqu'elle depend de leur existence, alors que ni l'art, ni la science, ni l'amour, ni la politique, ne dependent de l'existence de la philosophie. Il est donc evident que la philosophie est decalee par rapport aux quatre type de procedures de verite. Toutefois la question de savoir si on peut neanmoins indiquer la place d'un sujet philosophique est ouverte. S'il y a un sujet philosophique, de quoi s'agit-il ? Qu'est-ce qu'avoir acces a la philosophie ? Qu'est ce qu'etre dans la philosophie ? Il n'y a certainement pas d'incorporation philosophique, au sens ou on la trouve chez le militant politique, l'artiste, le savant ou l'amant. Et pourtant on a bien acces, dans la philosophie, a une pensee consistante, et non pas a rien. La question reste ouverte : Si on suppose l'existence d'un sujet de la philosophie, quelle en serait la place ? Est-il, comme quelques unes de mes metaphores le suggerent, un centre absent ? Il est clair que la philosophie propose une doctrine generale de ce qu'est un sujet de verite. Mais comment entre-t-on dans cette proposition philosophique, comme s'y alimente-t-on ? De quelle nouvelle maniere permet-elle de faire retour sur les procedures de verite ? Comment, enfin, peut-elle ouvrir la voie a la vraie vie ou a la vie complete ? Ce sont les questions que je vais poser. Il est clair que mes approches de ces questions ont toujours ete quelque peu hesitantes. Je suis devant un probleme non regle. Ce n'est pas parce que ma philosophie est systematique qu'elle pretend avoir resolu tous les problemes !
Il faut dire que jusqu'a ce jour j'ai eu tendance a aborder certains problemes ne-gativement, en rejetant plutot qu'en proposant. Ainsi j'ai rejete la these sophisti-que selon laquelle la philosophie n'est une unification generale des choses que parce qu'elle est une rhetorique generale. Le tournant langagier du XXe siecle a fondamentalement abouti a un type de doctrine qui assimile la philosophie a une rhetorique generale. Cela peut aller jusqu'a la these de Barbara Cassin : il n'y a pas d'ontologie, uniquement une logologie. C'est le langage qui decoupe et
constitue tout ce qu'on a propose comme forme de l' etre. Le XXe siecle a connu une tendance, a la fois academique, critique, antidogmatique, qui s'est centree progressivement sur la puissance creatrice du langage. Derrida est en plein dans cette tendance. Ä mes yeux, cela fait de la philosophie une rhetorique generale, rhetorique subtile, moderne, tout ce que l'on voudra. Mais, je l'ai dit a plusieurs reprises, je ne suis pas dans ce registre-la. Je m'inscris dans la discussion entre Platon et les sophistes. Comme le Cratyle l'etablit, nous, les philosophes, nous partons des choses et non des mots.
Donc, negativement, j'ai deja pris une serie de positions sur l'acces a la philosophie. Sur un mode plus affirmatif, j'ai designe ce que j'ai appele des operations philosophiques : j'ai donc parle non pas d'evenements, mais d'operations. Deux d'entre elles m'ont paru impossibles a contester. En premier lieu, les operations d'identification : la philosophie repere des verites, en particulier des verites de son temps, a travers la construction d'un concept renouvele de ce qu'est une verite. Deuxieme operation : a travers la categorie de verite, la philosophie rend compossibles des registres differents et heterogenes de verite. Il s'agit d'une fonction de discernement et d'une fonction d'unification. La philosophie a tou-jours ete prise entre les deux. Le discernement aboutit a une conception critique, distinction de ce qui est vrai et non vrai, l'unification aboutit aux differents usages de la categorie de totalite et de systeme.
Je maintiens ces deux fonctions classiques de la philosophie. J'ai toujours af-firme que j'etais un classique. Je montre que la philosophie elabore, en contem-poraneite avec ses conditions, des categories de verite qui lui permettent de dis-cerner ces conditions, de les isoler, de montrer qu'elles ne sont pas reductibles au train du monde ordinaire. Par ailleurs, elle essaie de penser en quelque sorte un concept du contemporain, en montrant comment les conditions composent une epoque, une dynamique de la pensee, dans laquelle tout sujet s'inscrit.
Tout cela je l'ai deja accompli. Mais il faut aller plus loin et se demander quel est le rapport de la philosophie a la vie. C'est une question primordiale. Si l'on ne peut dire a quoi la philosophie sert du point de vue de la vraie vie, elle n'est qu'une discipline academique supplementaire. Le troisieme volume tentera donc aussi de creer la possibilite d'un abord frontal de cette question. Il s'agira de reprendre la question platonicienne du rapport de la philosophie et du bonheur.
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En somme, il faut passer d'une doctrine negative de la singularite universelle des verites a une doctrine immanente et affirmative. Je suis frappe moi-meme par le fait que je n'ai traite pour l'instant des verites, et par consequent du sujet - le sujet est le protocole d'orientation d'une verite, verite et sujet sont absolument lies -que d'une maniere differentielle. Je me suis demande quel type de multiplicite est une verite. Qu'est-ce qui la differencie d'une multiplicite quelconque ? C'etait le propos fondamental de L'etre et I'evenement. Deja a cette epoque j'etais donc dans l'exception. Si une verite est une exception aux lois du monde, on doit pouvoir expliquer en quoi consiste cette exception. Si on est dans le domaine de l'ontologie, de la theorie de l'etre, de la theorie mathematique de l'etre, on doit pouvoir expliquer mathematiquement quel est le type de multiplicite qui singu-larise les verites. M'appuyant sur la theorie des ensembles et les theoremes de Cohen, je montre que cette multiplicite est generique. En d'autres termes, c'est une multiplicite qui ne se laisse pas penser a travers les savoirs disponibles. Aucun predicat du savoir disponible ne permet de l'identifier. C'est a cela que sert la technique de Cohen : a montrer qu'il peut exister une multiplicite indis-cernable, qui ne se laisse pas discerner par les predicats qui circulent dans les savoirs. De cette fagon, la verite echappe au savoir au niveau de son etre meme. Cela parait une determination positive des verites : elles sont des multiplicites generiques. Mais a y regarder de pres, il s'agit d'une determination negative : ce sont des multiplicites qui ne sont pas reductibles au savoir disponible. La definition de la verite passe donc par une demarche differentielle et non pas par une construction intrinseque ou immanente.
Dans Logiques des mondes, la verite est definie comme corps subjectivable. Quels en sont les caracteristiques propres ? Il y en a plusieurs, mais l'une est centrale : le protocole de construction de ce corps est tel que tout ce qui le compose est compatible. Toutefois, cette compatibilite n'est au fond qu'une caracte-ristique relationnelle de ce qu'est une verite. Ä l'interieur d'une verite, on trouve une relation de compatibilite entre tous ses elements. C'est une caracteristique objective. Dans les deux cas, je suis donc parvenu a une determination objective precise, respectivement de l'etre d'une verite et de l'apparaitre d'une verite. Mais il manque une determination subjective, precisement. Tout cela ne nous dit pas ce qu'est la verite vecue de l'interieur de la procedure de verite, c'est-a-dire ce qu'elle est pour le sujet de verite lui-meme.
Mes reponses a ces questions restent, a mon avis, trop fonctionnelles. Je dis que le sujet est au niveau ontologique un point, un moment local de la verite. Au niveau phenomenologique, je dis qu'un sujet est une fonction d'orientation de la construction d'un corps subjectivable. Ce sont des definitions fonctionnelles qui restent elles-memes objectives. Il faut desormais parvenir a quelque chose qui materialise, ecrit, organise le protocole de verite, vu cette fois de maniere immanente, c'est-a-dire subjective en tant que tel. Dans Theorie du sujet, je distinguais le « proces subjectif » et la « subjectivation ». Pour utiliser cette distinction, je dirai que L'etre et I'evenement et Logiques des mondes contiennent des choses decisives sur le « proces subjectif », mais la « subjectivation » reste obscure, traitee negativement et de fagon purement differentielle. La subjectivation est la fagon dont on subjective de l'interieur le protocole de verite. Il manque une intuition de ce qu'est une subjectivation.
Mais comment traiter de fagon convaincante de la subjectivation ? Et quels sont les protocoles formels d'un pareil traitement ? Pour l'instant je sais en tout cas une chose : cela va supposer une transformation formelle de la categorie de negation. Si les protocoles subjectifs d'une verite se composent de ralliements ou d'incorporations des individus au devenir d'une verite, la question est alors de savoir comment fonctionne la difference individuee a l'interieur du protocole de verite. C'est une question qui m'a toujours interesse. Prenons un exemple tres simple. Deux personnes regardent un tableau. On aura un fragment d'incorpo-ration, fragment signale par un certain affect, par un travail de l'intelligence, par l'immobilisation du regard sur le tableau. Je me place plutot du point de vue du spectateur que du createur, pour bien indiquer qu'une verite est constamment disponible a l'incorporation. Cet acte de subjectivation qu'est l'incorporation est-il identique chez les deux spectateurs ? S'agit-il d'identite ou de compatibili-te ? On ne peut pas dire en tout cas que la dualite au sein de cette experience - il peut y avoir par ailleurs des millions de personnes dans cette meme experience -va rompre l'unite du sujet. Comment est-ce possible ? Une grande partie du scepticisme en ce qui touche aux verites s'enracine dans ce type d'experience. Ä chacun sa verite, disait Pirandello ! « A chacun sa verite » implique qu'il n'y ait pas de verite du tout. Dans le cas d'un tableau, il y aura un objet unique qui va se disloquer selon les perceptions des uns et des autres.
Pourquoi, maintenant, cela conduit-il au probleme de la negation ? Parce que tout le probleme est de savoir quel est le type de negation auquel renvoie cette
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difference. Chacun voit le tableau a sa maniere, la perception de l'un n'estpas la perception de l'autre. Mais que signifie « n'est pas » ? Ce qui disloque la perception et conduit au scepticisme, c'est l'idee que ce « n'est pas » est une negation classique, c'est-a-dire que l'une des perceptions peut et doit etre contradictoire avec l'autre.
Sur quelle theorie de la negation peut-on alors s'appuyer pour eviter cette consequence sceptique de la negation ordinaire ? La reponse est que l'on doit prendre appui sur la theorie de la negation paraconsistante, le troisieme type de logique (apres la classique et l'intuitionniste) decouvert par le Bresilien Da Costa, dans lequel le principe de contradiction n'est pas valable. Le formalisme nouveau qui sera donc introduit a grande echelle dans ce troisieme tome sera la negation paraconsistante, laquelle contredit explicitement le principe de non contradiction. Ce formalisme permet que des perceptions contradictoires, des lors qu'il s'agit d'une verite, puissent coexister sans interrompre l'unite de cette verite. Cela m'interesse d'autant plus qu'au creur de l'amour se pose un probleme de ce genre, si l'on admet, ce qui est ma these, que l'on doit partir, pour le comprendre entierement, de la coexistence d'une position feminine et d'une position masculine - positions a certains egards entierement disjointes.
Si donc le formalisme majeur de L'etre et l'evenement a ete la theorie des ensembles et le theoreme de Cohen, si le formalisme majeur de Logiques des mondes a ete la theorie des faisceaux, la topologie, et donc largement la logique intuitionniste, le formalisme du troisieme volume sera la logique paraconsistante, avec toute une meditation sur les limites du principe de non-contradiction.
Ceci etant, il n'y a pas que les formalismes. Ils ne sont en fait que des sortes d'echafaudages pour la construction conceptuelle, et ils supposent en fait une bonne dose d'intuition. On peut soutenir que tout philosophe part d'un contact subjectif a la verite - son point personnel de rencontre avec la verite en quelque sorte. C'est ce point qu'il cherche a transmettre a travers sa philosophie. Mais en meme temps, il sait, au fond de lui-meme, que ce point n'est pas transmissible, etant son contact absolument propre avec la verite. Cela n'explique-t-il pas, en particulier, la difficulte que Platon eprouve a definir l'ldee du Bien ? Ne risque-ton pas d'arriver, en ce point, a l'ineffable ? Cela arrive dans beaucoup de dispositions philosophiques. On aboutit a un point qui est l'ultime point reel. Ce dernier, conformement a ce qu'en dit Lacan, ne se laisse pas symboliser. Spinoza,
par exemple, nomme un point ultime qui est l'intuition intellectuelle de Dieu, mais il n'en donne pas d'intuition reelle. Preuve en est que la meilleure approximation en est la beatitude eprouvee dans le savoir mathematique. Or, le savoir mathematique est du deuxieme genre de connaissance, non du troisieme. L'in-tuition du point ultime echappe donc. Quant a Platon, il declare expressement, dans la Republique, qu'il ne peut donner qu'une image du Bien, et rien d'autre. L'Immanence des verites sera en partie une tentative d'encercler au maximum ce point, avec l'espoir de le reduire en tant que point ineffable. Il s'agira de le ren-dre aussi peu ineffable que possible et donc aussi transmissible que possible. Je ne sais pas pour autant, a l'heure actuelle, jusqu'ou je dois aller dans cette direction. Mais je sais que je me separe ici de Platon.
Platon part d'une experience philosophique de l'ldee, mais la necessite de trans-mettre cette experience reste chez lui largement exterieure au contenu de l'expe-rience elle-meme. C'est pourquoi il affirme qu'il faudra forcer les philosophes a se faire politiques et pedagogues. Quand on les aura amenes a l'Idee du Bien, ils n'auront qu'une idee, c'est d'y rester ! Cette necessite de transmettre, qui vient du dehors de l'experience meme de la verite, est pour Platon une exigence so-ciale et politique. Il faut que cette experience puisse etre partagee au niveau de l'organisation generale de la societe. Si l'on ne transmet pas, on laisse les gens sous l'empire des opinions dominantes. Il faut donc « corrompre » la jeunesse, au sens qui etait celui de Socrate, c'est-a-dire lui transmettre les moyens de ne pas etre asservie aux opinions dominantes.
Je partage entierement cette vision de la philosophie. Et je suis tres attache, comme on le sait, a sa didactique. Mais il faut reconnaitre que chez Platon il y a une obscurite sur la question de savoir quelle est la nature de la verite. Cette verite, il ne l'a pas vraiment dite. On sait qu'il y a eu des interpretations ab-solument contradictoires de Platon. Il a pu etre vu, chez Galilee et beaucoup d'autres, comme l'exemple meme du rationalisme scientifique. Mais chez les neoplatoniciens il a ete tenu pour l'exemple meme de la theologie transcendan-te. Ces divergences s'expliquent par le fait que Platon n'a pas dit grand-chose de cette verite dont il parle. Il en a en quelque maniere reserve l'experience.
Pour moi, les verites existent, je les caracterise, j'ai dit et je dirai de maniere explicite - dans L'immanence des verites - comment et pourquoi elles existent. Il est vrai que la transmission est ici difficile. Ce qu'il faut transmettre, c'est que
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les verites, en tant qu'elles existent, sont en exception du reste. Platon lui aussi d'ailleurs presente l'ldee du Bien comme exceptionnelle. L'ldee du Bien n'est pas une Idee ! Elle depasse de beaucoup l'ldee en prestige et en puissance, selon un passage de la Republique souvent commente. Qu'est-ce que cela peut bien etre ? La theologie negative dira que c'est Dieu, et de Dieu on ne peut rien dire. Du cote du rationalisme, on trouve l'interpretation de Monique Dixsaut et de bien d'autres - la mienne aussi, en l'occurrence. Elle consiste a montrer qu'il y a un principe d'intelligibilite qui n'est pas reductible a l'ldee elle-meme. Que l'Idee soit principe d'intelligibilite se situe naturellement au-dela de l'Idee com-me principe regional de l'action ou de la creation.
Platon est un personnage fondateur et d'une importance tres grande pour moi. Mais il faut reconnaitre qu'il est fuyant. Il montre une obliquite, que favorise d'ailleurs le dialogue, car on ne sait jamais exactement qui parle et qui dit la verite. Cela coule comme un torrent ; au terme, on a bien saisi le probleme, mais non la solution. On ne sait pas exactement en quel sens s'est prononce Platon. C'est un peu une deception organisee. Par exemple, les interlocuteurs de So-crate, dans la Republique, lui font remarquer qu'il est grand temps qu'il defi-nisse cette Idee du Bien dont il les entretient depuis assez longtemps deja. On voit alors Socrate faire des manieres et dire a peu pres : « Vous m'en demandez beaucoup trop ! »
Ce n'est pas mon genre. J'essaie au contraire de dire le maximum de ce que je peux dire. Je suis un platonicien plus affirmatif et moins fuyant que Platon. J'es-saie du moins ! C'est la conception que je me fais de la philosophie : un exercice de transmission de quelque chose qu'on pourrait se contenter de declarer intransmissible. En ce sens, c'est cela l'impossible propre de la philosophie, son but, son terme. Je suis donc engage dans la lutte contre le scepticisme contem-porain, le relativisme culturel, la rhetorique generalisee, exactement comme Platon etait engage contre les sophistes. Il s'agit pour moi d'affirmer la position d'exception de la verite, mais de ne pas la declarer pour autant intransmissible, car ce serait endosser une faiblesse considerable par rapport au nihilisme dominant.
Je laisse toutefois ouverte la possibilite que le concept de verite, et plus encore ce que j'appelle son ideation, ce qui veut dire l'incorporation d'un individu au devenir d'une verite, soit, comme cela parait bien etre le cas chez Platon, assez
malaisement transmissible. Il est a ce propos tout a fait interessant d'observer le programme d'apprentissage de la philosophie dans la Republique : i. Arithmeti-que, 2. Geometrie, 3. Geometrie dans l'espace, 4. Astronomie, 5. Dialectique. Or, dans le passage sur la dialectique, comme tout le monde peut le remarquer, il n'y a presque rien ! On se contente donc d'enregistrer que l'apprentissage phi-losophique est a base de mathematique et d'astronomie, donc refere explicite-ment a une condition scientifique. Au dela de cette base, « dialectique » nomme quelque chose de different. Mais cette difference reste abstraite, elle n'est pas plus claire que l'idee du Bien.
Faut-il alors se rallier a la these fameuse de Bergson selon laquelle chaque phi-losophe trouve dans sa conscience un point insaisissable ? Comme le dit Bergson, « En ce point est quelque chose de simple, d'infiniment simple, de si ex-traordinairement simple que le philosophe n'a jamais reussi a le dire. Et c'est pourquoi il a parle toute sa vie » ?
Si dans ma philosophie je vois un point de ce genre, c'est celui que nous avons cerne et identifie, et qui consiste en fait a penser jusqu'au bout la subjectivation du vrai - et non pas seulement l'existence du processus de verite. C'est ce que j'appelle l'incorporation, non saisie dans sa logique objective, mais ressaisie du point de vue de l'individu lui-meme, dans le moment ou il prend part a l'activite d'un Sujet, parce qu'il est incorpore au devenir-corps du vrai. L'intuition de cette incorporation est accompagnee en general d'un affect singulier qui n'est, sans doute, rien d'autre que ce sentiment de difficulte a transmettre dont nous par-lions. C'est le probleme qui sera l'objet de l'ffiuvre que je projette et dont nous avons parle.
J'hesiterai toutefois a dire que l'obstacle est la simplicite. Cette simplicite est evidemment typique de l'ontologie bergsonienne, une ontologie non pas ma-thematique, mais vitaliste. Le point radical d'une ontologie vitaliste consiste a se situer dans le differentiel pur du mouvement ou de la duree pure. C'est en effet la l'experience de la simplicite absolue et en meme temps le fondement de la pensee pour Bergson. Mais quand l'ontologie est mathematique, comme c'est le cas pour moi, on part d'une complexite intrinseque, d'une multiplicite pure qui ne renvoie pas a une simplicite originaire autre que le vide. Que du vide on ne puisse d'ailleurs rien dire, cela va de soi.
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Finalement, je suis d'accord avec Bergson sur le fait qu'il y a un point origi-naire de l'experience, point que toute la didactique philosophique s'efforce de rejoindre et de transmettre. Mais je pense que l'experience de ce point est l'ex-perience concentree d'une complexite et non l'experience d'une simplicite. Je suis au fond assez d'accord avec Spinoza. L'exemple que Spinoza propose pour le troisieme genre de connaissance, connaissance intuitive et absolue, est celui d'une demonstration mathematique qui serait ramassee en un point. Cela me convient. Quand on a veritablement compris une demonstration mathematique, on n'a plus besoin des etapes : on a compris quelque chose qui se rassemble en un point. Cela dit, la didactique est obligee de reprendre les etapes, car il y a une complexite de ce point, complexite cachee, dans la mesure ou nous avons affaire a un point. Ce n'est pas la meme chose d'avoir une complexite contractee et une simplicite pure comme chez Bergson.
Plutot que vitaliste, je crois que je suis a la fois materialiste et platonicien. Je peux partir d'un fait qui m'a beaucoup frappe. Althusser a lui-meme soutenu, avec une force particuliere, l'idee que la contradiction principale de la philosophie etait entre le materialisme et l'idealisme. Or, pour aller jusqu'au bout de cette these dans les conditions du materialisme moderne, compte tenu de la ma-thematique, de la science moderne, du bilan general du materialisme, il s'est vu contraint d'introduire la notion de materialisme aleatoire. Pour des raisons fort nombreuses, il fallait faire une place ineluctable a la question du hasard dans tout materialisme contemporain, la plus spectaculaire de ces raisons etant le de-veloppement de la mecanique quantique. Dans l'unite de plan materialiste que je developpe, l'existence objective des multiplicites est bordee, si je puis dire, par la possibilite de l'aleatoire, par la possibilite que quelque chose survienne qui ne se laisse ni prevoir, ni calculer, ni reincorporer a partir de l'etat de choses existant. C'est ce que j'appelle un evenement. Il y a quelque chose comme un point absolu hasardeux, hasardeux au sens ou il ne se laisse pas organiser par ce de quoi il procede. Je n'ai besoin de rien d'autre qu'un tel point hasardeux. Un evenement me suffit pour deployer l'exception du vrai. Et je ne sors pas du materialisme, qu'aucune raison intrinseque ne contraint a etre organiquement lie au determinisme. Le determinisme n'a ete que l'une des conceptions possibles du materialisme.
Comme on le sait depuis les origines du materialisme, le determinisme est in-suffisant, puisque, des l'atomisme primitif, le clinamen, cette deviation sou-
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daine des atomes, sans lieu ni cause, introduit un evenement soustrait a toute determination - j'en ai longuement parle dans Theorie du sujet. J'admire tout particulierement les premiers materialistes, consequents, heroi'ques, Demo-crite, Epicure, Lucrece, qui dans un monde peuple de dieux, de superstitions, introduisent la these radicale qu'il n'y a que des atomes et du vide. Toutefois, ils ont bien du se rendre a cette evidence qu'ils ne pouvaient deduire l'evene-ment du monde des seuls atomes et du vide. Il faut un troisieme terme, qui a la forme d'un hasard pur. Finalement, quand je dis : « Il n'y a que des corps et des langages, sinon qu'il y a des verites », j'accomplis un geste epicurien. Je dis qu'il y a une exception. Mais cette exception n'est fondee elle-meme que sur l'existence de l'evenement. Et l'evenement n'est rien d'autre que la possibilite de l'aleatoire dans la structure du monde. Je ne pense pas du tout qu'avec l'intro-duction des evenements je sorte du materialisme. Certains ont juge qu'il y avait la un nouveau dualisme. On m'a dit: « Vous introduisez de l'exception, ce n'est plus du materialisme ». Mais il se trouve que les consequences d'une exception sont entierement situees dans un monde. Il n'y a pas de plan sensible et de plan intelligible, de plan de l'evenement et de plan du monde qui soient distincts. Je soutiens d'ailleurs que l'on peut interpreter Platon en faisant l'economie de cette dualite du sensible et de l'intelligible, qui releve plutot d'un platonisme vulgaire. Certes, Platon s'exprime souvent ainsi. Mais n'oublions pas son cote fuyant, retors, et l'utilisation tres frequente des images.
Pour en revenir a l'evenement, a l'aleatoire, il faut bien insister sur l'existence d'une coupure. Il y a l'avant et l'apres. Cette coupure ne fait pas passer d'un monde inferieur a un monde superieur. On est toujours dans le meme monde. Les consequences de la coupure ont certes un statut d'exception par rapport a ce qui ne depend pas de la coupure. Mais il va falloir demontrer que ces consequences sont organisees selon la logique generale du monde lui-meme. C'est une demonstration, c'est un labeur que je m'impose a chaque fois. Mes amis vieux-marxistes, comme Daniel Bensai'd, qui m'accusent d'introduire un element miraculeux, sont simplement des materialistes mecanistes. Marx, deja, et meme Lucrece, croisaient le fer contre eux.
Ajoutons que quand vous etes un materialiste non mecaniste, c'est que vous etes dialecticien. Je crois en effet que l'on peut considerer mon entreprise philo-sophique comme une vaste traversee de la dialectique. J'ai maintenu, de bout en bout, l'idee que le statut ontologique des verites est un statut d'exception : ex-
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ception du generique par rapport a ce qui est constructible, exception du corps subjectivable par rapport au corps ordinaire, exception de mon materialisme par rapport a un materialisme simpliste pour lequel il n'y a que des corps et des langages. Or, la categorie d'exception est une categorie dialectique, la pensee de l'exception ayant toujours lieu sur deux versants contradictoires. Il faut penser une exception comme une negation, puisqu'elle n'est pas reductible a ce qui est ordinaire, mais il faut aussi ne pas la penser comme miracle. Il faut donc la penser comme interne au processus de verite - non miraculeuse - et la penser malgre tout comme exception.
C'est peut-etre ce que Lacan voulait signifier par « extime » : a la fois intime et exterieur a l'intime. Or, on est bien la dans le noyau de la dialectique. Chez Hegel, par exemple, la negation d'une chose est immanente a cette chose, mais en meme temps la depasse. Le noyau de la dialectique, c'est ce statut de la negation, comme un operateur qui separe et inclut a la fois. En ce sens-la, je dirai que je suis de fagon continue dans la dialectique, et tout particulierement dans Theorie du sujet, livre encore tres lie au marxisme classique et a ses develop-pements maoi'sants. Dans Theorie du Sujet, il n'y a pas de theorie generale des quatre conditions de la philosophie, pas plus d'ailleurs qu'il n'y a de theorie generale de l'evenement. Les categories fondamentales de L'etre et I'evenement n'y sont qu'en creux, comme ce qui permettrait de reunifier ce qui reste quelque peu fragmentaire dans Theorie du sujet. Mais on peut dire que je poursuis d'un bout a l'autre de mon entreprise philosophique, de Theorie du Sujet il y la trente ans au futur L'immanence des verites, une meditation sur la negation. Je cherche tout simplement a rendre raison de la possibilite du changement, de la possibilite de passer d'un certain regime des lois de ce qui est a un autre regime, par la mediation du protocole d'une verite et de son sujet. Je suis donc dans la pensee dialec-tique. Mais comme ma pensee dialectique inclut une figure du hasard, elle est non deterministe. Je rappelle que la dialectique hegelienne est implacablement deterministe. En cela elle est une grande pensee typique du XIX siecle. Elle est le spectacle de l'auto-developpement de l'absolu dans la necessite immanente de ce developpement. Je suis evidemment tres eloigne de tout cela. C'est la raison pour laquelle j'ai avec Hegel un rapport serre et complique en meme temps. Il ne faut pas oublier que dans mes trois grands livres, Hegel est un auteur minutieu-sement discute : dans Theorie du sujet, a propos du processus dialectique lui-meme, dans L'etre et l'evenement a propos de l'infini, dans Logiques des mondes, a propos de l'etre-la, des categories de l'etre-la. Dans L'immanence des verites,
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je discuterai directement le concept hegelien de l'experience de la conscience, et aussi le concept hegelien de l'absolu. J'ai donc toujours eu une discussion intime avec Hegel, mais aussi avec Marx, Lenine, les grands revolutionnaires dialecticiens, a propos de la condition politique. Simplement, avec la presence d'un element aleatoire, j'introduis un principe de coupure qui n'est pas exacte-ment homogene aux principes classiques de la negation. C'est pourquoi finale-ment j'utiliserai trois logiques differentes et enchevetrees : la logique classique, la logique intutionniste et la logique paraconsistante.
Cette triade renvoit probablement a ma definition de la philosophie, sur laquel-le je vais conclure. La philosophie, est cette discipline de pensee, cette discipline singuliere, qui part de la conviction qu'il y a des verites. De la, elle est conduite vers un imperatif, une vision de la vie. Quelle est cette vision? Ce qui a valeur pour un individu humain, ce qui lui delivre une vie veritable et oriente son existence, c'est d'avoir part a ces verites. Cela suppose la construction, tres compliquee, d'un appareil a discerner les verites, appareil qui permette de circuler au milieu d'elles, de les compossibiliser. Tout cela sur le mode de la contemporaneite.
La philosophie est ce trajet. Elle va donc de la vie, qui propose l'existence des verites, a la vie qui fait de cette existence un principe, une norme, une experience. Que nous donne l'epoque dans laquelle nous vivons ? Qu'est-ce qu'elle est ? Quelles sont les choses qui y ont de la valeur ? Quelles sont les choses qui n'y ont pas de valeur ? La philosophie propose un tri dans la confusion de l'expe-rience, d'ou elle tire une orientation. Cette elevation de la confusion a l'elevation est l'operation philosophique par excellence et sa didactique propre.
Cela suppose un concept de la verite. Cette « verite » peut tres bien recevoir un autre nom. Ainsi, dans toute une partie de l'reuvre de Deleuze ce que nous appelons ici « la verite » s'est appele « le sens ». Je peux identifier, dans n'im-porte quelle philosophie, ce que j'aurais, moi, nomme « verite ». Cela peut etre nomme « Bien », « esprit », « force active », « noumene » Je choisis « verite » parce que j'assume le classicisme.
Il faut donc un tri, et pour cela il faut une machine a trier, c'est-a-dire un concept de verite. ll faut montrer que cette verite existe vraiment, mais qu'il n'y a pas pour autant de miracles et qu'il n'est pas necessaire d'avoir des dispositifs trans-
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cendants. Certaines philosophies tiennent a ces dispositifs transcendants. Mais ce n'est nullement ma voie. On revient alors a la question simple, la question initiale : Qu'est-ce que vivre ? Qu'est-ce qu'une vie digne et intense, non reductible aux stricts parametres animaux ?
Je pense que la philosophie doit inclure, a la fois dans sa conception et dans sa proposition, la conviction que la vraie vie peut etre experimentee en immanence. Quelque chose doit signaler la vraie vie de l'interieur d'elle-meme, pas seu-lement comme un imperatif exterieur, comme un imperatif kantien. Cela releve d'un affect lequel signale, indique, en immanence, que la vie vaut la peine d'etre vecue. Il y a chez Aristote une formule que j'aime beaucoup et que je reprends volontiers : « Vivre en immortel ». Il y a d'autres noms pour cet affect, « beatitude » chez Spinoza, « Surhomme » chez Nietzsche. Je crois qu'il y a un affect de la vraie vie. Cet affect n'a pas de composante sacrificielle. Rien ne negatif n'est exige. Il n'y a pas, comme dans les religions, de sacrifice dont la recompense est demain et ailleurs. Cet affect est le sentiment affirmatif d'une dilatation de l'individu, des lors qu'il co-appartient au sujet d'une verite.
J'ai compris assez recemment cette incroyable obstination de Platon a demon-trer que le philosophe est heureux. Le philosophe est plus heureux que tous ceux qu'on croit plus heureux que lui, les riches, les jouisseurs, les tyrans... Platon y revient sans cesse. Il nous livre d'innombrables demonstrations de ce point : seul est veritablement heureux celui qui vit sous le signe de l'Idee, et c'est le plus heureux de tous. Ce que cela signifie est assez clair : le philosophe experimentera, de l'interieur de sa vie, ce qu'est la vraie vie.
La philosophie, c'est donc trois choses. C'est un diagnostic de l'epoque : qu'est-ce que l'epoque propose ? C'est une construction, a partir de cette proposition contemporaine, d'un concept de verite. C'est enfin une experience existentielle relative a la vraie vie. L'unite des trois, c'est la philosophie.
Politique et psychanalyse Politics and Psychoanalysis
Filozofski vestnik | Volume XXXII | Number 2 | 2011 | 27-45
Jorge Aleman*
Solitude: Common
Some Political Drifts in Lacan's Teaching
"What speaks is just about solitude^" Encore Seminar, Jacques Lacan
Paradoxical solitude
We have chosen these two terms, solitude: common, separated in this case by a colon, which implies a relationship of conjunction and disjunction between the two terms, or a 'sameness' in the difference. From this solitude: common formula, in the present essay we will present the possible relationships between the analytic discourse elaborated by Jacques Lacan and the political thinking that may eventually rise from it.
The term solitude comes directly from Lacan's teaching, since he uses it, although on few occasions, to make reference to the solitude of the subject within its empty constitution. The Lacanian subject emerges as emptiness, without substance and without the possibility of being represented in its totality by the signifiers that establish it. Its solitude is radical, as long as no 'intersubjective' or 'loving' relationship can definitely eliminate that empty and exceptional space. This empty space is assigned to be filled with those signifiers that represent, identify, or fix it in accordance with certain ideals or mandates, according to different operations. At the same time, this subject without substance, empty in its 27 essence, is also called on to imagine a possible completeness through different fantasy strategies that are more determinately aimed at veiling that structural emptiness. Nonetheless, this subject we are speaking about here, the Lacanian subject, is unthinkable without its relationship to the Other that logically precedes it. The solitude of the subject does not come from a solipsism in which it is able to found itself through a reflexive act that positions itself before the world. It is not a solitude which comes from any potency that the subject itself may have to constitute. Its solitude, on the contrary, results from the fact that even though the subject is constituted in the Other's field, its mode of emergency is
* Psychoanalyst, University of Buenos Aires and National University of San Martin
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such that it is impossible that it can establish a stable, definite, common quality-based relationship, with the Other symbolic-partner that actually constitutes it. The Lacanian subject's solitude is equivalent to its structural dependence in relation to the place of the Other which does not allow for the establishment of a common ontological foundation. Even though the subject's life stands in its existential orientation as devoted to the Other, supported by the Other, opposed to the Other, rejected by the Other, loved by the Other, claimed by the Other, desired, humiliated, etc., these different positions always belong to a fantasy order that inscribes itself in an ontological gap constituted by the absence of relationship.
In contrast, the classic term 'common' does not arise in Lacan's teaching, not even in a metaphorical way. The 'common', as termed by Negri and Hardt, has in general, in most authors, an ontological origin with a deep Deleuzian mark. When talking about the 'common', Negri refers to a potency which is unlimited, cognitive, affectionate, which refers to intellectual work, and is singular, in the sense that it is transversal to the particular-universal relationship. This singularity reaches its extreme when it is seen as being able to 'produce' a different subjectivity from that deployed under the merchandise form in a capitalist production mode.
From a Lacanian point of view, it must be clarified from the outset that terms such as 'production', 'potency', 'life', terms that come from the so-called 'desir-ing-production of the Deleuzian field', constitute an 'oblivion', a rejection of the ontological dimension of the emptiness of the subject, in its paradoxical solitary constitution in relation to the Other. That is why we are obliged in this text to find for this term 'common' a Lacanian logic, different from the one established in Negri's Deluzian construction. In the Lacanian 'common' that we seek to deal with here, the gap, the ontological hiatus, should manifest itself in all its consequences. There is no potency, no production, no life that is not interrupted by the 'cause' of this ontological fracture.
Yet in trying to cope with these two terms, we find in the relationship between them a privileged way of articulating the singular condition of the subject and the collective dimension of politics. To say it in a slightly Heideggerian way, 'common' and 'solitude' refer to and name the same ontological hiatus, the
same irreducible gap, and come from the same signifier matrix in which they constitute each other.
Not knowing and collective experience
Lacan cannot be more explicit regarding solitude. In the Encore Seminar, once the logical impossibility of the sexual relationship has been established, he states that the only thing that is 'effectively written' in the speaking being is solitude. Perhaps that is the reason why he claimed with his known sarcasm that he was not lacking reasons to laugh, but someone to share it with. Without a shadow of a doubt, this statement about the radically solitary character of he who talks at his own risk presents one of the typical tensions that traverses the psychoanalysis and politics relationship. Namely, as we have already formulated, on the one hand, a strictly singular character, in solitude and without possible equivalents, of the advent of the subject to a speaking, sexed, and mortal existence; and, on the other hand, as Lacan himself presents it, this singularity can only become intelligible in a collective logic that he develops using different names throughout his teaching. From the already mentioned Other's field that, as is known, always refers to a symbolic order, to his theory of discourses, where each of them always presents a particular structure according to their own conditions of emergence, since within them such heterogeneous elements as signifiers and drives co-imply one another in a paradoxical logic. At the same time, this structure is transindividual as it never arises from the reflexive act of an already established consciousness, due to the constitutive potency of Master signifiers, identifications, the ideals of a person, and super-ego instances, which assume a 'collective' form, as long as we understand 'collective' not as a quantity phenomenon, but as the matrix from which social bonds are constituted. Finally, all these issues may be summed up in the following statement: the first emergence of the subject is always within the so-called 'Master's discourse'. Although, regarding the 'Master's discourse', we must assume that, in its contemporary forms, this discourse, which has always been supported under the insignia of permanence, lineages, time and duration, in short, symbolic heritage, at present sees itself badly eroded, volatilized, by the incessant corrosion of the unlimited circulation of merchandise. This, however, does not prevent the fact that the so called 'Master signifiers' still preserve their symbolic efficiency.
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It is true that whenever Lacan talks about the position of the analyst in the act that implicates him in the cure, he refers in different ways to this solitude here evoked. Thus, to introduce solitude, or the solitary character of existence when bringing the unconscious into play in the experience of the cure, can be seen as the best way to address the problem that emerges when psychoanalysis is confronted with the experience of the collective that politics always implies.
The analysis, in the completion of the cure, radicalizes the experience of solitude, as long as the subject manages to drift apart from the Master signifier, which constitutes the logical matrix of its identifications. This separation -which cannot be just considered as an erasure - allows the subject, at the same time, an unprecedented distance, a perspective in 'anamorphosis' on what is its own fantasy, which is always saturated with the constitutive potency of the Other's figures.
In this way, the subject in the experience of the end of analysis subverts the identifications that both dominated the it and abandon it to its surplus jouis-sance. An example of this crossroads between solitude and the collective which Lacan himself faced would then be the following: how the end of the analysis would be articulated, an experience that is far away from an identification, with a collective construction of a School that would in no way present a space where the more inert and sedimented identities that are always promoted by the life of the institution itself would once more return. We should remember that Lacan had assumed as his own political challenge, as a cause that emerged from his own relationship with the experience in psychoanalysis, that the School would constitute itself as a collective experience that would not be dominated by the identifications supported by the Master signifier.
For the same reason, Jacques Lacan's School, defined by him as a basis of operations for the 'discontents in civilization', faces from the beginning the following questions:
How is a subject that has succeeded in distancing itself from identifications incorporated into a collective instance?
Does the collective exist outside its own reference to the Master signi-fier?
What is a group constituted by subjects who in a contingent way have traversed the level of identification?
How is belonging organized away from identification and, therefore, from that which Freud called 'mass psychology'?
These questions refer to a problematic and difficult distinction between the collective relationship with the cause and the ideal. Whereas the cause is the empty place from which the common can eventually be brought about in a contingent and retroactive way, the ideal is always an agglutination in masses that seals the invention of the political act of enunciation. It was precisely this problem that obliged Lacan to distinguish his School from analytic societies, as the latter are inevitably supported by the logics of identification.
The 'price', if we are allowed this expression, which Lacan had to pay for conceiving a School that would work against the tide of identifications, was to conceive it as an inconsistent group, such as 'not-all', a concept that Lacan elaborated starting with the 20th Seminar, i.e. at the juncture when his 'logic of sexuation' was presented. Unlike a society ruled from its own centre by a knowledge capable of defining what a standard analyst is, that is, an analyst for all cases, Lacan states that his School is centred around an emptiness, a 'not knowing' that must be preserved by means of the School's procedures, which should never erase or fulfil it definitely. When this emptiness is not localized in an appropriate way, its confusion with 'nothingness' and, finally, with 'nullity' arises. This explains, according to Lacan, why on many occasions 'nullities' are what end up standing at the command of institutions.
Lacan designated this operation as the 'confusion concerning zero'; that confusion which is established between the non-numerical one of the emptiness marked by the signifier and the zero of quantity. Furthermore and recalling this Lacanian tension between the subject's solitude and the collective construction of the School, this opens up the access to an example of the way that a transformation of the subject can be conceived and, at the same time, where that transformation can succeed in bringing about a collective, new, and different relationship, with a cause. This new and different relationship with a cause, understood as an emptiness of 'not knowing', is what we propose to call 'common' in the text here presented. It is effectively a 'common' constituted topologi-
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cally by a central and, at the same time, external emptiness, a topological figure which Lacan refers to at different moments in his teaching.
This core function of both the emptiness of not-knowing and the possibility of the open and undecidable group of the non-identified, could be a possible starting point which psychoanalysis may offer as a proposal to think the immanent logic of political transformation, even in its emancipatory condition, provided that it is not entirely dominated by the metaphysic of a homogenizing totality.
Some time ago we published a short essay in Argentina: Para una izquierda la-caniana... (For a Lacanian left^). In it we sought, in a conjectural way and in first person through 'ellipses' that appeared everywhere, to present the tension here evoked between psychoanalysis and politics, a tension that, in one's own personal case as in many others, demands a reformulation of the classic approaches of the left.
Although at the beginning we stated, as is shown by means of the ellipsis in the title, that this was a speculation which did not try to found any point of identification in its consistency, that there is not and cannot be a group, institution, or subject that can belong to something that is called the 'Lacanian left'. Nevertheless, the syntagma in question took on a peculiar imaginary consistency and was refuted and rejected as if it were, for some, a new universal foundation of the leftist project; for others, a strategy to settle the left; for some others still, an attempt to turn Lacan into a leftist thinker.
We let keen readers ponder for themselves the unusual fervour of all these reproaches, which were precisely clarified at the beginning of the text. The fact is that the words 'left' and 'Lacanian' are not meant to go together, since they come from fields that keep an insurmountable distance between them and, surely for that reason, the expression inevitably promotes various misunderstandings, which perhaps now reach a greater intensity when we seek to link the word 'solitude' with the word common. But the desire to found any group or current has never existed, nor have we pretended to ignore all that which in Lacan's teaching poses an obstacle to the left's illusions and promises, instead we have tried to make a new punctuation, availability, and opening which work alternatively in different senses. On the one hand, it should undermine usual leftist political stances destabilizing its semantics, still dominated by progressivism, utopia,
and revolution. Progressivism, utopia, and revolution being three representations that in their temporality and spatiality are still ruled by the metaphysics of the totality. In this metaphysics the process of transformation is orientated by an identifying logic that continues to maintain an exclusive relationship with the so-called mass psychology. In view of elucidating this issue, our speculation concernig the 'Lacanian left' proposal is an attempt to think of the possibility of a left stream that could have a space in this historic time in which metaphysics has completed its full itinerary.
On the other hand, we have tried to broach, from the perspective of the analytic discourse and its experience of the real, the experience of the common, more precisely, to ask whether there is something in common preceding all the differences generated by traditions and cultural identifications. The common, we insist, is to be seen not as the Deleuzian potentiality, but rather as the contingent response to the ontological hiatus that constitutes all speaking, sexed, and mortal beings in the same way. At the same time, we have tried to renew the question concerning the possibility of a left-wing stance, if reasons such as the following are accepted: the division of the subject is sublation; the surplus jouissance is historically irreducible by any dialectics of overcoming; the labour of repetition of the death drive shatters the illusions of progress of any civilization; the politics and discourse of the Master maintain the will for the working of things; the revolution is the return of the same to the same place - sometimes with deadly consequences; the singularity of jouissance and desire, ultimately, cannot be subsumed under the 'for all' of the political thing of the Master.
We could continue to quote other reasons regarding different aspects of Freud's work and Lacan's teaching which show us categorically how the so-called arguments of the left are shattered in their ontologically more secure basis when facing the logic of the analytic discourse. At the same time, perhaps these kind of reasons are precisely the ones that would have provoked many Lacanians to abandon paths which have historically been designed by the left, and that philosophers were the ones who would look favourably upon Lacan, in order to renew what in Marxism has still remained unthinkable: subjectivity in its discursive materiality.
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If this is the case, why have we preferred the 'Lacanian left' formula that returns to the issue of the common, instead of inquiring about the subject's solitude in any of its usual aspects?
These aspects remind us that we are irreducibly alone when facing the 'being there' of our castration and finitude, and that the rest is just illusion. Yet, in spite of these considerations, we can still maintain left-wing ideas, not despite Lacan's teaching, but owing to several drifts in his teaching that open up the possibility of a conception of post-metaphysical emancipation. We do not state that the paths of this teaching necessarily lead to a leftist stance. In fact, we can see some colleagues who, based on Lacanian arguments, have built a sceptical perception in politics, or a lucid conservatism, or an ironical and diagonal reading of political phenomena. Thus, it is necessary to specify that, despite everything, relevant moments of the Lacanian itinerary form a resonance box promising to resound again, in all their modulation, the issues of the left. For that, we will present different aspects.
First of all, we claim that Marxism, as a desire, found a place in Lacan's teaching on mourning, starting from the assumption that outside the home is where mourning can be truly accomplished, and that this home can only be the unique 20th century materialist theory urging us to continue to think of a practice that would work on the impossible real. Obviously, we are referring to Lacan's teaching. But, from this perspective, it is necessary to insist that the work of this mourning must have as a condition of possibility that the psychoanalysis-politics relationship, their bordering relationships of conjunction and disjunction, cannot be subsumed under the internal movement of philosophy. We do not seek to bring the real under the idea, as Badiou attempts to do, since in so doing, that is, in domesticating the Lacanian real in the guise of a Platonist idea, an attempt is made, by means of a figure of the 'immortal subject', as defined by Ba-diou, a subject, ultimately, 'faithful to the process of truth' and thus a guarantor of the entire operation, to dissolve once more the analytic discourse in philosophy. This is particularly true of a philosophical ethics in which, again according to Badiou, only those who are 'faithful and immortal' thanks to the articulation of an idea, deserve the name of the subject. In view of this, Badiou's theoretical project can be seen as a psychoanalysis without psychoanalysis, where this faithful and immortal subject, being already definitely identified with its signifying reality, conceals that it is but a dead subject. It is strange that Badiou,
knowing Lacan, does not realize that such an identity between the Subject and its symbol serves as a gravestone that perpetuates it in its name.
The same can be said of Žižek, who, despite his psychoanalytical readings, always refers them to a pre-Lacanian philosophical problem of an emancipatory logic characterized as a conflict between the universal of reason and a universal embodied by the 'excluded', 'those of the part without part' - as defined by Ranciere - who will always spontaneously know how to organize their counterattack, which is to say, without any political intervention. In both stances, psychoanalysis becomes a guarantor of the philosophical operations and, for the same reason, it cannot become this new field where the process of mourning could be possible. A practice that works with the impossible real, and it is here that our proximity to Ernesto Laclau's theoretical development can be seen, implies that when the collective field emerges ontologically fractured, in the same conditions that the subject and, thus, hegemonic decisions come to occupy the place of the so called 'objectivity' - since they are the only ones which take responsibility for the fractures emerging from the real - the discourse of philosophy has come to its end, not to its historical, datable ending, but to the ending experience concerning the constitution of a new frontier. In this philosophical end, in the space of its intimate exteriority, the political should appear.
At the same time, it should be noted that these objectives are maintained without any ground, in the classical sense of the term. Lacan cannot be the new ground for the left; on the contrary, he is its 'disfoundation' or, if you will, the demonstration that only the absent cause is really operative, never as a previously established option of knowing, but retroactively set by the series of events. It consists in a wager without the Other of the guarantee, yet leads us to neither Rorty's ironical relativism, nor to the historicist constructivism of Foucaultian inspiration. The ontological gap, Lacan's 'crossed ontology', renders possible a series of logical operations with the 'half saying' of truth, which work as 'contingent foundations' or as 'quasi transcendental', allowing for the beginning of a far-reaching intelligibility. It does not consist in presenting a compact and consistent narrative, since this is structurally incompatible with the real put into play in the operation. We may point out, however, that all the logical, topologi-cal, and rhetorical conditions are present, to account for how speaking, sexed, and mortal existence is, within its own constitution, a political fact susceptible to being inscribed in a will of transformation.
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To refer to this inscription of the subject in a transforming will, it is inevitable to briefly mention the famous historical issue called 'voluntary servitude'.
Throughout these five centuries, this voluntary servitude presented by La Boetie has been reformulated in different ways, with different theoretical strategies, and pointing at different political problems. In any case, one thing is true: so-called emancipation can be better imagined if it involves an 'external oppression', since in such circumstances a force that seems external and alien prevents the subject from realizing its own essence. We know that throughout the centuries this modulated, with variations, the semantics of emancipation, namely, the liberation of a so-called force oppressed by the dominating interests. But what happens if one admits that, for various reasons, the oppression is not just external, that the Master is supported by the investment of the submissive and, yet, one does not want to give emancipation, justice, or equality up? The recourse to naWe belief in the emancipatory project does not make sense any longer; emancipation demands to be reinvented with what we already know of the subject and its relationship with the real. Here we have a typical problem of what we consider to be, in a speculative way, the 'Lacanian left'. In this sense, for us, the very expression 'will' is problematic. What is a will that is different from that which has been put into play in totalitarian projects? What are the conditions to think of a will that has gained supports other than those that have been put to work in the sacrificial voluntarism of the left and in the heroic deci-sionism of fascist tradition? We should remove the term will from the metaphysics that presided over it in the 20th century and ask about the possibility of the emergence of a collective will, a will that is contingent, not planned in advance, and not inspired by ideals yet capable of breaking with the servitude circuit. This would require that we ask ourselves seriously about what a human col-36 lective is capable of or wether it is just devoted to the identifying exaltation. Of course, when we think of will, we do not refer to the critical deliberation which the left of social democratic tradition refers to. Neither do we refer to some great collective act, but rather to an unprecedented series that conveys a new desire, a desire that retroactively invents its cause, because it does not need to have a pre-given reason, in short, a desire that can be recognized in what Lacan in his day called a 'decided desire', being a logical support. As is well known, these terms were brought into play by Lacan in reference to the peculiarity of 'case by case' logic. It should be noted, however, that the notion of voluntary servitude refers to a collective issue; secondly, we would replace 'peculiar' with 'singular'. The
emergence of a popular will is a singular political experience, and thus 'universal', although in Lacanian terms we speak of a fragmented universal, traversed by incompleteness and inconsistency. Taking up the term will, yet interpreted in accordance with the Lacanian logic of 'decided desire', we would insist that it is not possible to think of an even partial interruption of voluntary servitude.
A Lacanian Left^
This proposal of a political will that would be grounded in the 'decided desire', reveals its true problematic extension if we consider that capitalism is described by Lacan as a circular unending movement, from which we cannot determine an exit point. Furthermore, we can neither name the setting where such exit point may be situated historically, nor that which will come after its consummation. However, capitalism is not an eternal, necessary, quasi-natural reality, where the human condition reaches its final realization step. On the contrary, it is about affirming, once more, its contingency, and so the always possible advent of another way of 'being with the others' different from what is known in capitalism. Here lies the historical and unsurpassable tension that presides over the horizon of our political thinking.
Finally, we would like to recall that being leftist is to consider that the exploitation of the labour force carried out under the form of merchandise is an abuse of the absolute difference. It is quite different to accept the disturbing 'homology' between the surplus jouissance and the 'surplus value', the homology that in the final analysis leads us to think of the strange possibility, as was affirmed by Lacan himself at a certain point, of the fact that 'the subject is always happy' from the viewpoint of the solitude of its jouissance, that accepting exploitation as if within itself there were another feature of the necessary and eternal human 37 condition, and, at present, a step away from being 'founded' by any cerebral disposition. The hierarchy of the market is not the difference, but a numerical and equivalential tergiversation. The praxis of psychoanalysis can engage in a conversation with the ontological difference only if it is interpreted in political terms. As we have stated before, at the end of philosophy, psychoanalysis and politics can present, in different ways, the logic that responds to the impossible real of the absolute difference.
At this point it is interesting to observe in many contemporary philosophical operations a presentation, on the one hand, of capitalism in its systemic condition, ruled by an unlimited circuit of the merchandise form and, at the same time, once this unlimited and without exterior character of capitalism is presented, the axiomatization of equality and the theoretical configuration of a communist hypothesis are presented to us without the need to account for the internal logical transformation of this passage.
We must insist that if there is an unmistakable specificity in the Lacanian analytical discourse, it is in his constant concern for putting the possibilities and impossibilities of the social links transformation to the test when the real of the surplus jouissance is in play. At the same time, sometimes some psychoanalysts themselves provoke a misunderstanding: since Lacan presented the capitalist discourse as a circular movement without any exterior break, where, in short, the subject gains access to its surplus jouissance without ever encountering any impossibility whatsoever, with this a new version is coined, in this case a La-canian one, of a Kojevian end of history presented as a totality without an operational exterior, what Kojeve together with Bataille would call 'a terminating negativity'. In some essays Žižek draws inspiration from this view.
Finally, talking about solitude today requires that we remember that although the discourse of the Master in its contemporary guise presents the fissures in its historical foundations that once served as semblance, it nevertheless preserves its function, that of concealing and veiling the singularity of the subject. By contrast, the subject in the radical solitude of the sinthome in the cure can invent another way of reading or interpreting the 'for all' that supports the world. And this is what we can consider as a political fact, in the more radical sense of the 38 term, which is a way of stating that, regarding other theoretical stances of the provisionally called 'Lacanian left', our point of view is that what is more radical in Lacan's teaching as regards political thinking lies in his elucidation of the experience of the cure and within the logical construction of his School.
Common
What is the common, if the starting point is not the 'for all' that aims at an ideal point, a final point, utopian, without fractures or antagonisms, an order of a society reconciled with itself, as was believed historically by the classical left?
What is the common, if it is considered as that that emerges from the 'there is no sexual relationship', the common arising from the sinthomatic solitude that results from the unconscious, without dialectics or any overcoming? In other words, the common as the term where the absolute difference can come into play?
From this perspective, the names of the common come from the 'there is not': there is no sexual relationship, no metalanguage, no Other of the Other. At the same time, these three 'there is not' signal that a certain civilization, the capitalist one in this case, is not supported just by violent and exterior oppression, but also by the complicity of the subject in its fantasized and ideological response to the different 'there is not'. Moreover, the ideology is the 'fantasy' outside the analytic experience. Social life is ruled by the fantasized response to these three 'there is not' that speaking beings have in common. We propose, by contrast, to think of the common from the 'there is no' logic in order to open up a new possibility for the enigmatic 'being with the others' which, in his day, Heidegger left and replaced with the expression people, a romantic expression in his case, which always pretends to present itself as a fixed and stable identity, and which recently Laclau has re-established in its logical dignity since he considers the people as a hegemonic invention-construction produced through different discursive operations.
Marx himself refused to think of the common because it supposed an already established assumption called 'community'. It is in Lacan's teaching, from the sinthomatic solitude, as that which is already inscribed in the 'no relationship', that we have the opportunity to understand the common from a new perspective. The common without an identitary basis, distinct from the homogenizing characteristics of capitalism, precidings all divisions of labour or bourgeois hierarchies, irreducible to any utilitarian calculation of the semblances. Our common is what we can do together with the emptiness of that 'there is not'. It is neither the characteristic that unifies us, nor the potentiality that constitutes us; the common is the singular of the sinthome, the solitude that invents the social link so that it becomes a political will. But the common considered in these new terms requires certain precisions:
a) If Freud has always seen 'mass psychology' as a prolegomenon of totalitarianism, Lacan, by contrast, seeks to isolate a perspective of the common
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which may be differentiated from the capitalist or totalitarian 'for all'. A being together, a being with the others, in a project without guarantees, where the common is not already given but is rather conceived in terms of a contingency that can be found in art, in love, in friendship, and in the specifically political order. We should remember that this experience of the common is possible when the sinthome of each of us names the radical and singular solitude of the subject at the point at which it distances itself from the Other's figures. What is important to note here is that when facing the impossibility of the sexual relationship, there is no attempt here to consider love as a simple veil concealing this impossibility. This is because, according to Lacan, the requirement of something true is always put into play whenever we deal with impossibility. The contingency that is capable to temporarily erase impossibility must have the dignity of an experience of transformation; and love, for Lacan, is situated within this perspective.
What, then, is the only material evidence of this matrix of the common with which speaking beings have been connected? The materiality of the common comes from the link between the real with lalangue. There is no other matrix of the common than that event which precedes the differences between what is taught and what is learned, between those who work and those who give orders, have been established, before grammar has been learned and good or bad schools been entered, and also precedes the 'general intellect' of Marxist reference, which is evoked by Italian philosophers.
The solitary encounter with the real of lalangue, the first trauma, is paradoxically the only point that presents the existence of the common as that which escapes the homogenizing 'for all' of 'mass psychology'. For this reason, this solitary encounter with the common of lalangue cannot be subsumed under either individualism or under the so-called private sphere. In fact, it constitutes the vanishing point of those spheres, the point of their deconstruction. Perhaps, for these reasons, linguists and logicians who have been courageous enough to discern what is put into play in the first encounter with lalangue have never wished to abandon the project of emancipation, even when the latter appears to be shattered in its foundations and supported solely by its absent cause. Thus, the emancipatory narrative demands, and in this it follows the analytic discourse, that the common manifests itself not only in its incompleteness (belonging to the masculine logic), but also in its inconsist-
ency (the sphere defined by the feminine logic). There cannot be a compact emancipatory narrative that seeks to erase the specific interruptions of the ontological hiatus and the contingent manifestation of impossibility.
b) Sexed and mortal speaking existence belongs, in first place, to the not-all of the common and not to the universal, which is always supported by an exception. Being African, Arabian, Latin-American, belongs to the universal, which is always already a second derivation with respect to the first belonging of the speaking being to the common of lalangue. This is what, to our mind, Lacan clearly sensed: what the excluded mass is deprived of is the possibility of transforming the traumatic, sinthomatic, and solitary encounter with lalangue into a social bond.
ln a certain way, the subject can be included in a collective transformation process when perceiving that it is something more than its own identifications and, in so doing, it also faces, finally, its responsibility for the way of living in lalangue.
The Not-All
Based on what has been developed thus far, namely, by translating the issue of
solitude and 'non relationship' into the field of the common, we can suggest the
following:
a) The contemporary Master discourse nourishes the 'for all' with a mercantile individualism that permeates the State itself, and only leaves a 'sub-development' piled up in its surplus jouissance for the excluded. Thus, this 'for all' might be thought of as a fracture. Although the Master discourse's aim is, ultimately, that the 'everything works', it cannot break free from the antagonisms constitutive of the political. This constitutive antagonism results from the division of the subject itself, a division between the sinthomatic common of lalangue and the figures that tie us to its Master signifiers. From such a perspective we can claim that the political arises from the real encounter with lalangue, whereas politics is to be considered as a 'know how', yet one that implies this encounter. In the encounter of the real with lalangue, the 'for-all' is rendered incomplete and thus becomes inconsistent. These are the moments when the experience of the common may let political invention occur.
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b)	But this political invention must still recognize the present metamorphosis of the poverty conditions within the logic of the contemporary capitalist discourse. Namely: poverty is not just the deprivation of 'material needs', as Marx thought, but consists in being alone with the surplus jouissance and confronting the eclipse of the symbolic. If poverty was previously characterized as a minus, a lack, at present, from the perspective of the surplus jouis-sance and its objects, it is considered to be a place of the excess and condensation of jouissance, call it drugs, weapons, games, etc. What characterizes the contemporary poverty of the capitalist discourse, is, ultimately, the poverty of the consumer, even an excessive consumer, because the consumer is the one who has been deprived of everything. Hence, we are not dealing here with the excluded any longer, i.e. those who could only lose their chains, since today, from the viewpoint of the surplus jouissance, there can always be something else to lose. Thus, as has been stated by Ernesto Laclau, the so-called 'class struggle' cannot be thought within the domain of its mere endogenous and automatic working; it demands, first of all, consent to reject the terms of exploitation, since it is not an immanent dynamics, but an act capable of inventing a subject outside the strategies of the capitalist exploitation.
c)	Pretending to naturalize the exploitation under the pretext that there is no 'distributive justice' is, as we have already mentioned, a rejection of the absolute difference. The absence of distributive justice, as Lacan claims, rather implies that within the common a dimension that is irreducible to the calculation of the value will always exist. Perhaps the psychoanalyst may be in charge of protecting this place, since the common is what cannot be exchanged as a value, namely, the lalangue in which every speaking being finds his or her sinthomatic place.
Hence, it can always be suggested that the analyst should avoid expressing an utterance of his/her political or social ideology; in short, he/she should not show off his/her Master signifiers, as this is required by the very logic of the direction of the cure.
Nonetheless, the 'ideology' returns in everybody, after even through the use of the Lacanian formulas that, as we have said before, constitute a basis for a new style of lay conservatism or for an ironical adoption of the semblances of tradition. If, however, we seek to act on the real within the cure, the problem
of how the 'absent foundation' becomes a cause must be emphasized once more. Assuming that the 'absent foundation' of the 'non relation' as a cause could constitute the condition for a School considered as an 'operational base of the discontents of civilization', a solution formulated by Lacan, appears to be even more daring than the expression 'Lacanian left'.
The rhetorical figures of the saint, the committed warrior, the decided worker, constitute Lacan's various attempts to elaborate what the operation of the subject consists in when it places itself beyond the level of identifications. They are sinthomatic names of the 'being there' in political action.
At the same time, we will insist that this beyond is always grounded in a 'not-all' logic, which, even when Lacan formulates it as if it belonged to the feminine, should not be mixed up with any kind of gender identity.
Whereas both the logic of the all and of the masculine exception always call for the restoration of a new Master signifier that guarantees the order of the 'for-all', the 'not-all', which could account for the emancipatory moment, constitutes itself in a relationship with the others that only retroactively, after the contingent invention of a new limit, gives us its true transformative reach.
d) The left cannot be utopian since the emergence of the analytic discourse, as there will never be a constituent reconciled with itself and without fractures. It cannot be revolutionary, since there is no break that would allow for everything to start again, if such an event occurred eventually, it can only be considered as a sign of the efficacy of the death drive, and since it cannot be progressist, its time will be that of the 'future anterior': 'what I will have been, for what I am going to be'. Dealing with the return of the past without nostalgia and with the energy of what is coming: is not this the war wagered against desire?
So in order to finish with this thorny question, knowing that there are still many interesting readings related to the final part of Lacan's teaching, we will allow ourselves a quasi-ontological digression that will bring together the previous aspects of our elaboration in all its complexity.
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In Lacan's teaching, the common never appears as an immutable essence, it always emerges from 'there is not', it has no other solution other than appearing either as the 'all' and the 'exception in the masculine logic' or as the 'feminine not-all'. In this sense, the common emerges from an ontology of a one which is always fractured, failed, as Laclau would say. The common we are dealing with here cannot be supported axiomatically by means of the simple communist hypothesis whereby 'every speaking being is the same as any other speaking being', as that hypothesis demands, in order to be proposed at all, a reference to the totality under its axiomatic form. The sinthom-atic common, the common such as solitude presented until now, is originally exposed to the vicissitudes of the differences between the all, the exception, and the not-all. These logical modalities, as is known, were elaborated by Lacan as a response to the impossibility of the sexual relationship, and are known as the formulas of sexuation.
The masculine 'for-all' is not equality, because it is a universal that is supported by a radical exclusion that functions as a constitutive exception, an exception outside the law that, at the same time, constitutes it for all. From this masculine logic, we can grasp different realities in its phenomenology, which we will illustrate in the following examples: the exceptional tyrant who supports as a limit the bureaucracy of the 'for-all'; the intelligence service outside the rules of the game of the for-all democratic universe; the deadly and obscene superego hidden in the exercise of symbolic law; the hero as a man of exception who condenses, in his singularity, the cause of a mass movement; the lover who, with his law of the heart, proclaims his singularity as a universal law; the proletariat constituting a part of the whole and, at the same time, being the future messiah, the part of those without a part; the new god different from the ontotheological tradition, or the present financial coup in Europe that, in a new state of exception, suspends the democratic rules of the game. These disordered examples in their radical heterogeneity are meant to show why in his day Lacan stated that thought spontaneously and inevitably strives for the 'for-all'. As if it were an iron law of thinking that leads us to grasp, in any discursive reality, a neverending game between the whole/all and the exception. Thus, despite the fact that examples may be quite varied and open, nevertheless they are governed by that logic.
It is clear that if common only manifests itself through these modalities, it is impossible not to have them, and the dream of its elimination is useless and dangerous. Nevertheless, we should continue to wonder about Lacan's last teaching, in which he tried to elaborate his shocking 'woman does not exist' formula as a universal, presenting this difficult and elusive logical modality of not-all, which, on many occasions, is confused and slides spontaneously in its interpretation towards the logic of the incompleteness of the whole/all and the exception.
There is no way of introducing the not-all without its inevitable reference to the whole/all and the exception. Nonetheless, it is in the domain of the not-all that we can think of this enigmatic 'x' of a process of subjectivization of the political that is not, from the outset, limited to the identifications that totalize it.
In the 'not-all', although the subject is referred, from the beginning, to the phallologocentric law that constitutes it, as the formula itself indicates, not all 'x' is governed by the function of the law; this allows us to think of a relationship of the subject with the real outside the law. With this part of the real outside the law, perhaps the subject may put into play an invention of the social link, 'a love without boundaries', as was expressed by Lacan, a new kind of will which is gained neither by the identifications of the ideal of the ego, nor by the deadly circuits of the superego. Since it is about the real outside the law, we cannot deal with this real through the transgression of the law; the transgression is characteristic of the masculine logic of the limit and its crossing. In the unlimited not-all, it is about the contingent invention of a limit that does not proceed from the universal of for-all, but from the common of lalangue. This invention takes place each time, through temporary processes, an invention, even minimal, sets a limit which is not foreseen by the programme.
Although these reflections may be considered as an irrelevant drift with respect to our attempt to think of the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics, especially the politics which is always driven and besieged through its urgent conditions, it is in our own experience as analysands where we can return to those marks of the determined heritage and legacy that provides us with the only pertinent way of finding the urgent answer.
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Filozofski vestnik | Volume XXXII | Number 2 | 2011 | 47-64
Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello*
The Names of the Real in Laclau's Theory: Antagonism, Dislocation, and Heterogeneity
Introduction
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe opened the way towards Post-Marxism with the publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics in 1985. With his theoretical development, Ernesto Laclau has become one of the most outstanding theorists regarding the relation between political thinking and psychoanalysis, especially Lacanian psychoanalysis.
This work is aimed at analyzing such relation. Theoretical tools of psychoanalysis are used to locate the implicit postulates in Laclau's work. However, it is worth clarifying that it is not the objective of this work to search for the main elements of Lacanian theory in Laclau's work; i.e. the following questions are not intended to be answered: Where is the object a in Laclau's theory? Where is the master-signifier located? Where is the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real? It is not possible to establish a point to point correspondence between the two theories. From our perspective, this comparison would be senseless because they are two different theoretical stances, and do not require further explanation if tackled from linguistics: each element acquires signification with regard to the relation it establishes with the other elements within a given structure. Therefore, as they are two different works, it is impossible to institute a point to point relation. Moreover, the characteristics of Lacan's work differ from La- 47 clau's, becoming impossible to compare. For example, in Lacan's work, several theories are included but they do not constitute a system, and they can only be understood regarding the specific problem where they emerged. But in Laclau's work, a certain intention of systematicity can be seen.
The present work is aimed at reading Laclau from a psychoanalytical viewpoint in order to locate the underlying postulates. Three fundamental aspects may be distinguished in Laclau's theory: antagonism, dislocation, and heterogeneity.
* University of Sun Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Antagonism
With Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics in 1985, Laclau and Mouffe began a prolific theoretical production that was soon called Post-Marxism. ln that book, after reviewing and deconstructing Marxism, the authors provide the conceptual keys to escape from essentialism, i.e. the notions of antagonism and hegemony.
ln order to build their theory, Laclau and Mouffe propose as an ontological principle the understanding of the social as a discursive space. Therefore, the idea of social structuration responds to a rhetorical model. Their idea of discourse not only refers to linguistic elements (the oral or written word) but to any relation of signification. "Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second sense to the primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted." (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 110). Thus, they postulate that the discursive field superimposes the field of social relations which are considered as such because they have and produce meaning.
Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as a "structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice". This definition leans towards Foucault's idea of discursive formation as regularity in dispersion. But, by rejecting the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, Laclau and Mouffe distance themselves from it. Also, while they followDerrida in order to generalize the concept of discourse by saying that "the absence of transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely", they distance themselves from him when they turn to psychoanalysis. This distancing was later reaffirmed by 48 Laclau when he elaborated the concept of heterogeneity, which, from our perspective, may be compared to the Lacanian surplus-jouissance (this idea will be analysed in detail at the end of this article).
Therefore, if everything is the play of differences, we are located in the domain of radical contingency where every identity is relational because each element is what the other is not. But this infinite play requires a certain fixation so that meaning may be produced. If we remain within a constant displacement of elements, we would face such a dispersion of meaning that signification would be impossible - like psychotic thinking. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe introduce Lacan's
concept of point de capiton or nodal point, which, in their own terminology, is called the empty signifier, i.e. the signifier or particular element that assumes the structurally 'universal' function within a discursive field. That element allows a certain suture or fixation - always partial - of the play of signification so that the signifier chain can acquire some meaning. The concept of articulation is understood as: "a practice instituting the nodal points which partially fix the meaning" (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 113).
A nodal point makes possible this fixation of the signifier's displacement - although always precariously. And this partial fixation takes place because the nodal point is so only if it is overdetermined. Laclau and Mouffe took the concept of overdetermination from Althusser, borrowed while modifying it according to Freud's early works. In fact, Althusser postulated that there is nothing within the social that is not overdetermined as a way of expressing that the social order is consistent with the symbolic order. Therefore, it lacks a founding principle. However, he reintroduces a renewed form of essentialism by affirming the existence of an overdetermination by the economy in the last instance. The latter idea is unacceptable for Laclau and Mouffe because it would mean going back to the binary pair essence-accident, but in a Marxist format: material base-superstructure, where the relations of production (which are located in the material base) have the final word. Furthermore, it erases all the complexity involved in the overdetermination: "If the economy is an object which can determine any type of society in that instance [tha last instance], this means that, at least with reference to that instance, we are faced with simple determination and not overdetermination. If society has a last instance which determines its laws of motion, the relations between the overdetermined instances and the last instance must be conceived in terms of simple, one-directional determination by the latter" (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 99).
Crucial here is Lacan's returning to Freud, more specifically, to Freud's concept of overdetermination in his famous text The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). There, he inverts the binary opposition waking state-dream in which Descartes had established the supremacy of the waking state and dismissed the dream as a waste. Freud proposes a hermeneutics without an ultimate foundation from a two-level topology: the manifest content (the text that the dreamer remembers when he wakes up, characterized by being meagre, paltry, and laconic) and the latent content (the dream-thoughts, characterized by being copious, varied,
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and extensive). The dream work consists in transferring the latent contents to the manifest contents, that is, the transference of elements from one text to the other (from the text of the dream to the conscious text). But, what is at work there such that a copious, varied, and extensive text turns into a meagre, paltry, and laconic one? The dream work, says Freud, the unconscious translates one text into another through the mechanisms of condensation and displacement. But this does not mean, strictly speaking, that something is lost during that translation operated by the unconscious. That could only be deemed so if we consider a point to point translation. But what Freud shows is that the unconscious works in a different way, such that several elements remain condensed and others are displaced. "The fact that is at issue in this explanation can be expressed differently by saying: each element of the dream content (that is, the text we remember) appears as overdetermined, being the substitute of multiple dream-thoughts" (Freud, 1900: 291). But what do Laclau and Mouffe take from Freud's ideas? Mainly the existence of another logic which is not controlled by the principle of non-contradiction, that is, the logic of articulation. The nodal points - which refer to articulation - are the elements where the largest amount of associative chains converges. In other words, they are the overdetermined elements, that is, the elements that condense the highest amount of dream content by mere association. Therefore, the empty signifiers are overdetermined elements because they condense elements from different associative chains, and anchor, always precariously, certain meaning.
With respect to the concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe introduce the concept of overdetermination in order to analyze identity, totality, and hegemony. A hegemonic articulation takes place when a particular element assumes at a certain moment the representation of a totality which is entirely incommensurable with regard to itself. This element assumes such representation because it was overdetermined when condensing the highest amount of associative chains. Thus, not only a certain fixation of meaning is obtained, but also a certain idea of totality can be accessed through the mediation of such particularity which assumes the representation of universality. That is, the hegemonic articulations suppose suturing effects. A hegemonic relation articulates the differences through an element (which has become a nodal point or empty signifier, etc.) that assumes the representation of the totality. Furthermore, it embodies a certain configuration which is no more than a sutured order, since the suture
indicates the impossibility of the fixation of an order as a coherently unified totality.
The field of differences or divisions in constant movement will always be excessive without the possibility of the fixation of an order as a coherently unified totality. That is, the order would never embrace the totality of differences or divisions. Thus, the openness of the social is constitutive because such excess of the social prevents the closure of the order as a unified or full totality. The social as such cannot be more than a failed attempt to 'domesticate' the field of differences. A hegemonic articulation is the only possibility to create a precarious order where there is not one. This explains the famous phrase: "The social is articulation insofar as 'society' is impossible" (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 114).
This concept of hegemony is closely related to the concept of antagonism. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe define antagonism as the "limit of all objectivity" (Laclau/ Mouffe, 1985: 122). That is, antagonism, far from being an objective relation, shows the limits of objectivity. It is the experience of the limit of order. The possibility of a hegemonic construction exists precisely because of the existence of antagonism. Without antagonism, 'society' would be possible as a unity without fissures, a coherently unified totality constituted by full identities. Then, the possibility of 'the social' as a hegemonic relation would simply be eliminated. "Antagonism, far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits of every objectivity are shown - in the sense in which Wittgenstein used to say that 'what cannot be said can be shown'. But if, as we have demonstrated, the social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society - that is, an objective and closed system of differences - antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility of a final suture, is the 'experience' of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter's impossibility of fully constituting itself" (La-clau/Mouffe, 1985: 122). It is well known that this definition of antagonism was highly appreciated at that time by Žižek (1990), who stated: "It is not an accident that the basic proposition of Hegemony - 'society does not exist' - evokes the Lacanian postulate 'la Femme n'existepas' (Woman does not exist). The real achievement of hegemony is crystallized in the concept of social antagonism: far from reducing all reality to a kind of language-game, the socio-symbolic field is conceived as structured around a certain traumatic impossibility, around a certain fissure that cannot be symbolized. In short, Laclau and Mouffe have, so
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to speak, reinvented the Lacanian notion of the Real as impossible; they have made it useful as a tool for social and ideological analysis" (Žižek, 1990: 249). What Žižek is saying, and we agree, is that Laclau and Mouffe's great achievement was to conceive the idea of antagonism as the limit of all objectivity, that is, the reformulation of Lacan's idea of the real as impossible. In other words, the antagonism is conceived as a traumatic kernel around which the order is structured (the socio-symbolic field), i.e. the social.
It was also Žižek who highlighted a second definition of antagonism given by Laclau and Mouffe: "But in the case of antagonism, we are confronted with a different situation: the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution" (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 122). Žižek points out a problem here because this definition of antagonism is tied to the idea of the subject that Laclau and Mouffe took from Foucault. And Foucault's notion of subject-positions has as a hidden implication which is, at some point, the illusion of fullness. Žižek claims, then, that with such Foucauldian argument, Laclau and Mouffe intend to attack "the notion of the subject as a substantial, essential entity, given in advance, dominating the social process and not being produced by the contingency of the discursive process itself; against this notion, they claim that what we have is a series of particular subject-positions (feminist, ecologist, democratic, etc.) the signification of which is not fixed in advance: it changes according to the way they are articulated in a series of equivalences through the metaphoric surplus which defines the identity of every one of them" (Žižek, 1990: 250). The difficulty lies in that "the subject-position is a mode of how we recognize our position of an (interested) agent of the social process, of how we experience our commitment to a certain ideological cause. But, as soon as we constitute ourselves as ideological subjects, as soon as we respond to interpellation and assume a certain subject-position, we are a priori, per definitionem deluded, we are overlooking the radical dimension of social antagonism, that is to say, the traumatic kernel symbolization of which always fails" (Žižek, 1990: 251). Žižek is saying that if antagonism is also defined by "the presence of the 'Other' [that] prevents me from being totally myself", a possible defeat of that 'other' (enemy) would lead to an abolition of antagonism and, consequently, my identity would be fully constituted and a substantial subject would appear. However, we are able to escape from the substantial subject if we consider the following postulate: "it is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity
with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an impossibility, and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest of reality upon which we 'project' or 'externalize' this intrinsic immanent impossibility" (Žižek, 1990: 252).
Broadly speaking, we agree with Žižek's argument. Although, it is important to point out that with respect to their concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe clarified that even though the idea of hegemonic articulation opens the possibility of separately specifying the identity of the articulated elements, such identities are also precarious because it is impossible to anchor the meaning of the elements to an ultimate literality. Therefore, not only an order is open, but also the elements comprising the hegemonic chain are open because they cannot constitute themselves as full and closed identities. Furthermore, it is important to note that Laclau and Mouffe consider subject-positions to be tinged by the logic of overdetermination, implying that each subject-position is always overdetermined by the others. Thus, each subject-position acquires an open and incomplete character showing the "politically negotiable character of every identity" (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 131). Therefore, not only a particular social force (a political identity) is conceived as an open identity, but also the elements which comprise it are also open elements, with the impossibility of constituting themselves as full or closed identities.
If we are interested in this last definition, this is because it opens the possibility of interpreting, from Lacan's perspective, antagonism as an effect of the real in the imaginary. This is the first turn in the development of Laclau's theory -shared with Mouffe until this point. Here, Laclau emphasizes the imaginary, i.e. he problematizes antagonism in terms of the imaginary. It is worth remembering that, for Lacan, the imaginary is defined as the place of the Ego par excellence, with its phenomena of illusion governed by the Gestalt laws. The register of the imaginary is essentially related to the image, to the representation (insofar as what is presented again instead of an absence), to the attempt at the synthesis, unification, or closure of meaning.
Thus, the definition of antagonism as "the presence of the 'Other' [that] prevents me from being totally myself" implies some manner of inscription of the traumatic real, constitutive of every identity. The possibility of establishing a frontier which delimits a 'self' and 'others' is a way of 'representing the irrepresent-
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able'. We will consider Laclau and Mouffe's definition of antagonism by turning to Wittgenstein. They define it as a 'testimony' of the impossibility because it is a relation that shows the limits of all objectivity insofar as "what cannot be said can be shown". And here we focus on the testimony function and the term 'showing'. They both definitely belong to the order of the image, that is, strictly speaking, to the register of the imaginary.
At this point, we would like to introduce the metaphor of the mirror that Lacan used to understand the constitution of the Ego. Identities can only constitute themselves through their relation with the other, with what it is not. Thus in all the cases, the configuration of the identity implies the establishment of a difference, and the success of its affirmation lies in its capacity to exclude the other. But at the same time, the identity depends on the definition of the other for its constitution. Therefore, a specular relation necessarily expresses an antagonistic relation, insofar as "the presence of the 'Other' [that] prevents me from being totally myself". Thus, because of the impossibility of an identity constituting itself as closed, I constitute my presence through identification with the other. This other who acts as a mirror lets me know of my presence, but at the same time, it threatens it.
Therefore in this mise en scene of the rivalry with the other, antagonism is constitutive of the identity. The latter will distinguish its presence by exclusion, in order to differentiate itself from the pure separation of elements. Antagonism represents this specular relation leading to the establishment of the identity which, in its precariousness, sees itself threatened because its existence depends on the presence of the other.
54 Dislocation
From the publication of New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (1990), a second turn in Laclau's theory can be identified. It is characterized by the rad-icalization of the concept of antagonism and the abandonment of Foucault's notion of subject-positions. In addition, Laclau took into account the above-mentioned Žižek's objections and introduced the concept of dislocation (1990), i.e. the failure of the structure to close as such. Every identity (and social object) is dislocated per se because it depends on an outside that denies it and, at the same time, is its condition of possibility. Since the field of identities is relational
because the social subjects do not constitute themselves in a purely external way (the ones from the others), the identities can never constitute themselves fully, but they form a system impossible to become closed, which always depends on the determined outside that constitutes it.
One of the key ways of considering the specificity of the dislocation concept is to conceive it as the source of freedom. In this respect, Laclau points out: "Dislocation is the source of freedom. But this is not the freedom of a subject with a positive identity - in which case it would just be a structural locus -rather it is a freedom of a structural fault which can only construct an identity through acts of identification" (Laclau, 1990: 60). From this quotation we may deduce two key issues. First of all, the structure is already dislocated and that structural gap is considered as a source of freedom because there are no structural determinations for the subject. For this reason, the structural gap is the place of the subject, the moment of decision beyond the structure. Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous point, Laclau's notion of subject acquires specificity at this juncture of his work because he abandons Foucault's idea of subject-positions, present in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and establishes a precise differentiation between the notions of subject, identity, and identification. Thus, there would be no positive identity; the subject could only have access to something similar to identity through identification.
Dislocation would be, then, the place of the subject in New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, the place of an absence where the subject equals "the pure form of the structure's dislocation, of its ineradicable distance from itself" (Laclau, 1990: 60). As a consequence, and based on Lacanian theoretical tools, we may claim - regarding the subject in this second stage of Laclau - that it is no longer a matter of subject-positions as imaginary identifications, but a subject constituted by the lack. In short, from the arguments involved in the abandonment of the notion of subject positions, the subject of the lack emerges and, as a result of the radicalization of the notion of antagonism, the relevance of dislocation comes up.
What is the difference between antagonism and dislocation, then? The answer is found in the words of the author: "The idea of constructing, of living the experience of dislocation as antagonistic, based on the construction of an enemy, already assumes a moment of discursive construction of the dislocation which
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makes possible its domination, in some way, in a conceptual system which is in the base of certain experience Then, in New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, l attempted to develop a notion of negativity to deepen the moment of dislocation, previous to every form of discursive organization, or discursive overcoming, or discursive suture of that dislocation" (Laclau, 1997: 126). In the previous point, we define antagonism as designing what cannot be said, or as a testimony of impossibility. Thus, antagonism is already a way of giving meaning to what is impossible to symbolize, and as to showing, it is an imaginary manner of inscription of what continues to elude. To define a specular frontier between friends and enemies, an antagonistic relation as a limit to objectiveness implies doing something with the traumatic kernel inherent in every identity. In the dislocation concept, instead, we find a radical exclusion between the 'real' and the 'symbolic'. In this case, dislocation appears deprived of the possibilities opened by the symbolic order. Dislocation not only defies its capture by the 'symbolic', but it keeps itself in an outwardness without law. The dislocation means that it cannot be operated with the symbolic on the real.
To sum up, we identify as the second turn of Laclau's theory the disjunction between the 'real' and the 'symbolic' which is implied in the notion of dislocation.
Heterogeneity
ln his last book, On Populist Reason (2005), Laclau focuses on an inspiring reflection about populism. He introduces a key innovation that determines the third turn of his theory: the concept of heterogeneity.
56 Laclau's notion of populism refers to 'people' as plebs that claim to be the only legitimate populus. That is, a partiality (the plebs, the least privileged) that wants to function as the totality of the community (the populus, the people as the abstract name of such community). Thus, populism appears when a part is identified with the whole and there is a radical exclusion within the communitarian space. ln other words, in a populist articulation an equivalential relation needs to prevail, among a plurality of social demands. It puts into play the figure of the 'people' and establishes an antagonistic frontier between 'us, the people' and 'them, the enemies of the people'. Then, the 'people' of populism emerge due to the impossibility of every order (objectivity, identity, etc.) to close itself as
a completely coherent and unified sameness. The 'people' of populism is part of the unachievable search for the fulfilment of the community. As a consequence, the 'people' implies a radical frontier because its own presence is the effect of antagonism, constitutive of the social order. So, "without this initial breakdown of something in the social order, there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, or, ultimately, people" (Laclau, 2005: 113).
Furthermore, another key issue that Laclau introduces in this stage of his theoretical development is the dimension of affect in the figure of the 'people'. The introduction of this dimension means that the basic proposition of Laclau and Mouffe, i.e. 'society is impossible', gains new scope. That is, the 'people' constitute themselves from the 'impossibility of the society'. How do we understand this statement in the third stage of Laclau's theory? The social order is not presented as something homogeneous; there is nothing in common among the members of the social field because the nature of the subject is the impossibility of relation. Precisely what constitutes a multiplicity of heterogeneities of a community is the impossibility of the social relation: the common ground is the impossible, the heterogeneous, the real. If there is an affective tie it is because this relation is impossible. In short, as there is no relation, there is an affective tie. We will now analyze the affective dimension.
Laclau incorporates the affective dimension, using as a primary source Freud's book Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921). In contrast to the Hobbesian theoretic model, the constitution of the people surpasses the figure of the leader as a transcendent element which gives meaning to what is represented, as is shown in Freud's above-mentioned book (Freud, 1921: 110) and reintroduced by Laclau in On Populist Reason (Laclau, 2005). But are we denying the notion of transcendence in the argument of Laclau about the people? No, but we have to analyze what kind of transcendence Laclau refers to, based on psychoanalysis.
The diagram in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego presents a formula of the constitution of a mass of people with a leader. Freud shows the centrality of affect (identification and infatuation) in this articulation, since the identification tie, which is established among the members of the mass, is possible due to a relation of the idealization of a leader by each member. Freud states that a mass that has a leader is "a number of individuals who have substituted one and
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the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego. This condition admits graphic representation":
Ego Ideal Ego Object -1-
s x External ' object
(Freud, 1921: 109-110)
The text and the graphic show the relations among the elements that are part of the articulation. Each of the unbroken parallel lines is one of the members of the mass, and in each line, the following instances are represented: the ego ideal, the ego, and the object1. At the same time, in the dotted lines the 'libidinal tie' is observed: among the egos by identification and among the ego ideals by infatuation with the leader. However, these libidinal ties are possible because each subject has renounced directly sexual satisfaction in relation to the object of the drive since the investiture of an 'external object' (it renounces the sensual love tendency). Thus, every directly sexual satisfaction is excluded and the subject remains tied to the 'external object' by drives that are inhibited in their sexual aim (the tender emotional trend), referring to the idealization or being in love. According to the direction of the arrows in the graphic above, there is a kind of logical counterclockwise movement: the satisfaction of the ego is renounced; the external object is invested, having taken the place of the ego ideal (idealiza-58 tion) and the concomitant identification of the egos as well.
In Freud's graphic, we can find a kind of knot which expresses the affective bonds established in a mass of people. This knot is relevant for our analysis because it shows a key element: those small objects which have no bonds connecting each other, however, are those that make articulation possible. (Notice that in the graphic there is no line of dots traced among them and their centre is
1 On the symbolic, imaginary, and real character of these instances, see: Biglieri, P. and Per-ello, G., ed., (2007), and Perello, G. (2006).
empty). These objects - similar to the Lacanian object a - anticipate something that can be called 'transcendence'. So, from a Lacanian perspective, we can assert that this transcendence is not ontological. Or, speaking specifically about ontology, we should say the ontology of the 'real'.
What does the ontology of the real mean? To understand the manner in which 'reality' is instituted, as well as its foundations and meanings - problems that belong to the field of ontology, we reintroduce Lacan's reference to the "unconscious cause" that appears in Seminar XI. There, Lacan states that every effect is submitted to the pressure of a "causal order" as long as it is a "lost cause", i.e. a cause inherently an empty space. In other words, that the unconscious cause is inherently an empty space means that it is neither a being nor a non-being. This unconscious cause is defined as an interdiction. Lacan says in a cryptic way, "the prohibition that brings to being an existant" (Lacan, 1979: 128). According to Miller2, to put into play a negative entity, a nothing that, however, is not nothing, that is like a call to being, introduces a rupture in the plane of immanence. This rupture is a determining factor for the emergence of the Lacanian subject. With respect to any plane of immanence - real, vital, or merely in terms of what is given - putting into play that negative entity opens a transcendent distance, the possibility to go beyond (in reference to Freud's notion of "beyond the pleasure principle"). In other words, it is what elsewhere Miller called Lacan's structure with a beyond: there is a beyond of everything that is given. In addition, this concept introduces what Miller names a "transfactual dimension", which is essential in Lacan (Miller, 2006: 213).
In view of this we could, we claim that the subject in Laclau is a headless sub-ject3. Precisely because transcendence, as is observed in Freud's graphic and in
2	"The setting in motion of such a negative entity - a nothing, yet a nothing that is not precisely nothing, that is a kind of call to being - introduces in fact (while determining the birth of the Lacanian subject and the destruction of the Hartmannian ego in psychoanalysis) a decisive break at the plane of immanence (expression taken from Deleuze) whether it is real, biological, natural, or merely given. With respect to every real, vital entity, to set into motion such a negative entity opens a transcendent distance, a beyond. It is even the principle that last year or two years ago I called in Lacan the structure with a beyond; there is a beyond of everything that is given. And this introduces what I called a transfactual dimension - essential in Lacan" (Miller, 2006: 213).
3	The notion of a headless subject is taken from Lacan (2003:188), referring to the way of expressing the drive, because the drive is articulated in terms of tension, outlining the edges in a
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Laclau's work, is not located in the place of the leader; instead, it is placed in a beyond, in a foundation that is not (exactly) a foundation. As a consequence, we can speak of a 'headless subject' to illustrate Laclau's figure of the people.
Thus, we hold the figure of a 'headless subject' because, from our perspective, Laclau's great finding in On Populist Reason (2005) is that, when analyzing the problems of populism, he specifies the notion of heterogeneity. The author manages to circumscribe this notion, distinguishing it from the concept of antagonism, and taking it beyond the idea of dislocation. The heterogeneity is defined by the detour of the people and ends at the centre of his theoretical proposal: "the brake involved in this kind of exclusion is more radical than the one that is inherent in the antagonistic one: while antagonism still presupposes some sort of discursive inscription, the kind of exteriority we are referring to now presupposes not only an exteriority to something within a space of representation, but to the space of representation as such. I will call this type of exteriority social heterogeneity" (Laclau, 2005: 176).
The antagonism that underlies discourse already assumes some form of inscription, as contingent, but at the same time necessary, for the construction of the system. The heterogeneous, instead, is not inscribed; it is the real as a waste product from the process of signification. That is to say, from now on we are considering the real not only in its relation to antagonism, but mainly to the heterogeneous or, in psychoanalytic terms, as a surplus-jouissance. The heterogeneous is not placed in the 'inside' or the 'outside'. It is placed at a point of extimacy. Using this neologism, Lacan means that the most intimate is located on the outside and announces its presence as a strange body that recognizes a constitutive rupture of the intimacy (Miller, 1987).
It is in this sense that the 'people' in Laclau can be considered as a structure with a beyond. The transcendence is not located in the place of the leader; it is located beyond it, in the nothing that, however, is not nothing. For that reason, we claim that the figure that corresponds to 'people', as it is presented by Laclau, is that of the 'headless subject', as far as it is anchored in an empty transcendence. To use Laclau's terminology, the place of the transcendence is
topology where what is produced in the course of the drive is a circuit around an absence.
the names of the real iN LACLAUs THEORY
heterogeneity, not only a radical difference. More precisely and to use psychoanalytic concepts, heterogeneity refers to surplus-jouissance.
In conclusion, in this third turn of Laclau's theorization, we understand the heterogeneity as a real not only in its dimension of a lack in the symbolic order - as could be conceived in the dislocation notion - but in its dimension of pleasure.
Corollary
We have analyzed Laclau's work from a perspective that introduces elements of psychoanalysis and determined three stages: a first stage that corresponds to the centrality of the concept of antagonism, which represents the solution of the imaginary order to the impossibility of society, and in this respect, as the im-aginarization of the real that prevents and makes possible the systematicity of the signification system. In the second stage, Laclau's theory is organized from his idea of dislocation as an expression of the disjunction between the symbolic and the real, as the constitutive impossibility of the symbolic to deal with the real. And finally, the third stage is characterized by the concept of heterogeneity, as the surplus-jouissance. Heterogeneity emerges as a waste product of the reason that supports the configuration of the 'people', involving the affective dimension; like a lost cause that drives the social knotting.
The progressive idea of thinking of these three concepts as evolutionary stages of a theoretical development may emerge as a reflective temptation. However, we claim that these three elements should not be considered as one surpassing the other, i.e. as dislocation surpassing antagonism and heterogeneity surpassing dislocation. Instead, these three concepts together should be placed in the same theoretical field, because all of them arise as a consequence of Laclau having dealt with different problems throughout his work. Each of these concepts is useful for considering different problematics. For example, antagonism is useful for thinking about the specular other, not as the different or the Other, but in terms of the constitution of self, i.e. allowing the construction of a certain identity, at least, by identification. The concept of dislocation, by contrast, is useful? Insofar as it shows the limits of the symbolic order in dealing with the real. Thus, the deficiencies of what is instituted to solve a lack impossible to articulate can be evidenced. In fact, dislocation questions the blind confidence in the institutional possibility of overcoming the obstacles and romantic pro-
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posals of consensus. Finally, heterogeneity can help us reflect upon subjective responsibility, according to Lacan's notion of 'lost cause', highlighting this time the double meaning of cause: as a cause that should be defended, and as what causes, as a foundation. On the one hand, the lost cause is a failed cause because, in the best of cases, it never fulfils itself completely. On the other hand, it is a lost cause because, in contrast to what academic knowledge teaches us, "if the cause is taken away, its effect will disappear" (Ablata causa tollitur ef-fectus). For Laclau, the effects appear in the absence of the cause. These two meanings of 'lost cause' imply that there is no certainty regarding the starting points or destinies because there are no ultimate foundations to start from and give meaning. In line with this concept, there are no final aims established a priori which can be achieved in a complete (and finished) way. Therefore, such 'lost cause', as a function of the impossible, does not involve powerlessness, paralysis, or resignation. It implies "an experience that intends to transform the absent foundation into cause" (Aleman, 2009: 14), that is to say, it implies an ethical position because, when considering the 'lost cause', "there will always be something missing or excessive. In short, there will always be a real insisting on not being inscribed" (Lacan, 1988: 82). And this absence of certainties evokes a call to become involved in political struggles and to adopt an ethical posture. So the call to political militancy can be linked to the fact that we do not have anything guaranteed in advance, we do not know how events will develop and, as it is not possible to establish the path towards a reconciled society in a transparent and certain way - in addition to society always being impossible, we do not know to where this incessant irruption of the real into the symbolic-imaginary order may lead us; and finally, this call to militancy lies in the inextricable nature of heterogeneity.
Bibliography
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Badiou, A. (2000), "Lacan y lo real" en Badiou, A., Reflexiones sobre nuestro tiempo. In-terrogantes acerca de la etica, la politica y la experiencia de lo inhumano, Buenos Aires: Del Cifrado. Biglieri, P. and Perello, G. ed. (2007), Imagine There's no Woman. MIT. Copjec, J. (2006), Imaginemos que la mujer no existe. Etica y sublimacion. Buenos Aires: FCE.
Derrida, J. (1989), Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. New York: Routledge.
Fink, B. (1995), The Lacanian Subject. Between language and jouissance. Princeton University Press.
Fink, B. (1999), A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Theory and Technique. Harvard University Press.
Foucault, M. (1969), Archeologie du savoir. Gallimard, Paris.
Freud, S. (1900), "La interpretacion de los suenos. (Primera parte)," en Obras Completas vol. iv. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1998.
Freud, S. (1914-1916), "La represion" (1915), en Obras Completas vol. xiv. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1998, pp. 135-152.
Freud, S. (1916-1917), "23® Conferencia. Los caminos de la formacion de sintoma", en Conferencias de introduccion al psicoanalisis (Parte iii). En Obras Completas vol. xvi. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1998, pp. 326-343.
Freud, S. (1916-1917), "24® Conferencia. El estado neurotico". Obras Completas vol. xvi. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1998, pp. 344-356.
Freud, S. (1920-1922), "Psicologia de las masas y analisis del yo". Obras Completas vol. xviii. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, 1998, pp. 63-136.
Lacan, J. (1953), Escritos, Tomo i. Buenos Aires: Siglo xxi, 1985.
Lacan, J. (1960), "La observacion sobre el informe de Daniel Lagache", en Escritos, Tomo ii. Mexico: Siglo xxi, 1984, 650-660.
Lacan, J. (1955-1956), El seminario3: Las Psicosis. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1990.
Lacan, J. (1956-1957), El seminario 4: La relacion de objeto. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1996.
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Lacan, J. (1964), The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis. Penguin Books, London, 1979.
Lacan, J. (1972-1973), El seminario 20: Aun. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1985.
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Laclau, E. (1996), Emancipation(s). London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (1997), Hegemonia y antagonismo; el imposible fin de lo politico. Santiago de Chile: Cuaro Propio.
Laclau, E. (2005), On Populist Reason. Verso, London, New York.
Laclau, E. (2008), Debates y combates. Por un nuevo horizonte de la politica. Buenos Aires, FCE.
Miller, J. (2006), La experiencia de lo real en la curapsicoanalitica. Buenos Aires, Paid-os.
Miller, J. "Extimidad", en El Analiticon. Fundamentos delpsicoanalisis, Barcelona, Silicet ii, (1987), pp. 13-27.
Mouffe, Ch. (2007), En torno a lo politico. Buenos Aires, FCE.
Perello, G. (2006), "La psicologia de las masas^ de Freud como antecedente del concepto de populismo de Laclau. Una lectura critica". En Memorias de las xii Jornadas de Investigation de la Facultad de Psicologia de la uba y ii Encuentro de Investigadores de Psicologia del Mercosur, "Paradigmas, metodos y tecnicas", Buenos Aires: 2006, pp. 459-461, tomo iii.
Stavrakakis, Y. (2007), The Lacanian Left. Psychoanalysis, theory, politics. Edinburgh University Press.
Žižek, S., "Beyond Discourse - Analysis", in New Reflections of Our Time. Verso, London, New York.
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Jason Glynos*
Fantasy and Identity in Critical Political Theory1
In an article entitled 'Philosophy's Gaudy Dress: Rhetoric and Fantasy in the Lockean Social Contract', Linda Zerilli draws our attention to a section in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that John Locke added in its fourth edition of 1700, four years before his death. The section is entitled 'Of the Association of Ideas'. She claims this section introduces a kind of torsion into his Essay because it goes against the grain of his otherwise consistent and loud valorisation of reason and correspondingly loud castigation of rhetoric as a 'gaudy dress' or, more straightforwardly, as 'the Abuse of Words'.
In that section he appears to reveal a more ambivalent attitude toward rhetoric and an at least implicit recognition of the powerful grip that certain chance associations can exert over us. Consider the following extract:
It is of a young gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that, though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that, or some such other trunk had its due position in the room. John Locke (1993: 222-223), Book 2, Chapter 33, Paragraph 16
In light of this, Zerilli imagines Locke asking himself: well, 'if a trunk can take on such significance for a Gentleman, what is to keep another equally unremarkable object from assuming the same strange status in the subject's fantasy life? The answer is: nothing - [and] therein lies the disruptive power of association for an education in reason' (Zerilli 2005: 152). In drawing out the implica-
1 I am deeply indebted to my many interlocutors over the years, whose very helpful feedback was received while presenting aspects of earlier versions of this paper at the following universities: Liege (Oct 2008), Essex (Dec 2008), Oxford (March 2009), Cyprus (March 2010), UCL (May 2010), and San Juan (Aug 2010).
* University of Essex, Colchester, Velika Britanija
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tions of this insight for an analysis of the Lockean social contract Zerilli draws on the Italian philosopher Ernesto Grassi, arguing that rhetoric and fantasy are a potent 'source of inventive political and philosophical thinking' and 'the very "ground" of rational thought' (Zerilli 2006: 479).
In a similar way it has been suggested that 'there is no way of understanding political identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame'. So claims Jacqueline Rose in her book States of Fantasy because, for her, it is fantasy that provides the sticky psychic glue that binds together the elements of social and political reality (Rose 1996: 4). Far from confining fantasy to the private life of the individual, fantasy is here understood to play a crucial role in forging a people's collective and political will.2
And yet the category of fantasy rarely features in the debates of political theorists and philosophers. Rose suggests that '[o]ne of the reasons the idea of fantasy has a hard time getting into the political argument is^ because it is seen as threatening political composure' (Rose 1996: 7). By this I take her to be making the point that talking about fantasy in a formal context defined by the dominant, disciplinary norms of political science threatens to reproduce the erstwhile experience of bringing up the topic of sex with one's parents. Reacting in this way, however, risks overlooking a crucial point about political life. For political authority and people's obedience are rooted in the hopes and fears that our fantasies help dramatize. In this vein Rose points to Max Weber's insight that, beyond tradition, charisma, and legality, the obedience of the people rests on 'fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power-holder, [and] hope for reward in this world or in the world beyond' (Weber 1991: 79, as cited in Rose 1996: 8).
2 It is clear that the appeals to the term 'fantasy' are not so infrequent in the context of social and political studies, as well as political journalism and the media at large. 'As the job market plunges, the fantasy politics prevail' - so reads one of Polly Toynbee's headlines. Or elsewhere, she summarizes a prevalent, though often unstated, collective desire in terms of a plea: 'Please can we have our bubble back'. This is the way Polly Toynbee (2009) expresses the unstated wish animating the collective complicity of 'just about everyone' to return to business as usual in the wake of the credit crunch. That the full extent of the fall-out has yet to become clear has not prevented governments, investors, entrepreneurs, especially homeowners and consumer-citizens in general, wanting a quick return to the alleged 'good old days'. 'Please can we have our bubble back' summarizes the all too palpable fear that the chance for meaningful, structural change might already be lost.
A recent analysis of the American social and political landscape takes this insight to heart. In her book The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post 9I11 America Susan Faludi charts how, in the wake of 9/11, there was a sustained effort by the media, entertainment, and advertising industries to graft a very specific fantasy onto America's psychic wound, based on the Cold War narrative, particularly of the 1950s. The Cold War narrative was successfully installed not simply on account of the sheer force of intent, backed by huge resources, but also because it tapped into memories and fantasmatic evocations of the baby-boom childhood of 'nuclear family "togetherness", redomesticated femininity, [and] Cold Warrior manhood' (Faludi 2007: 4).
Folded into this narrative, of course, were all the Hollywood classics of this period, especially the John Wayne films, to which the Turner Broadcasting Corporation devoted all of its Christmas 2001 programming. A massive array of media, entertainment, and advertising outlets spun a seductive web of 'rescue and protect' fantasies about revenge and American invincibility; about male virility, feminine frailty and childhood vulnerability. By the end of 2005 the airwaves were packed with 'cowboy-code-of-honour types who never throw the first punch but are relentless and invincible once riled' (Faludi 2007: 8). In these images and a whole array of accompanying statements Faludi discerns an underlying 'Lone Ranger'/'Dirty Harry' fantasy of the John Wayne or Clint Eastwood types, reinforced by media portrayals of George W. Bush's cowboy dress and swagger. This 'rescue and protect' fantasy was disseminated with gusto to the American public (and beyond) - a public which appeared ready and willing to embrace it.
Why does Faludi take an interest in these fantasies? She does so because they 67 carry consequences (Faludi 2007: 380). Their wide dissemination and consumption make sense of many things according to her, including the comparative absence in the US media of public democratic contestation of US foreign policy; draconian curtailment of civil liberties; and regression in matters of women's security and political voice, both at home and abroad. (Faludi is, of course, keen to point out that these consequences result not only or even primarily because of fantasy.) Fantasies facilitate, or contribute to, these consequences according to Faludi because they shape the way we 'see' reality, including its problems and solutions, and therefore they structure the way we act in the world. Faludi takes
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special note of the widespread and widely tolerated denigration of women that, she feels, is a direct result of women departing from the scripts of constructed rescue fantasies (Faludi 2007: 23-57).3 A key part of this construction process involved placing women in the position of someone in need of rescue and protection. In this regard, she trains her critical gaze on the widespread and widely disseminated stories in which women and children appear as victims. As Faludi puts it:
In the post-9/11 reenactment of the fifties Western, women figured largely as vulnerable maidens. Never mind that the fatalities that day were three-to-one male-to female and that most of the female office workers at the World Trade Center (like their male counterparts) rescued themselves by walking down the stairs on their own two feet^ (Faludi 2007: 6-7)
According to Faludi this myth was so powerful that it was immune to what she calls 'the antibiotics of common sense or statistical hard evidence' (Faludi
2007: 186).4
Taken together these claims appear to suggest that Faludi thinks we need to get 'closer' to reality and that fantasies are to be defined and evaluated on the basis of their ability or inability to reflect that reality faithfully. So the political and ideological significance of fantasy is understood here as a function of a 'correspondence theory of truth', a view which is widely held by others, including journalists, as well as many academics who appreciate the symbolic significance of political argument. Fantasy, then, tends to be construed as a kind of false-consciousness. More than that, we might add that fantasy tends to be construed as a kind of bad, or morally regressive, false-consciousness.
3	Rescue fantasies are opposed by Faludi to female liberation for example (Faludi 2007: 54).
4	For Faludi this is a product not just of the power and political economy of the media in the US, but also because these stories tap into a specific cultural history that succeeds in interpellating a good portion of the public (Aitkenhead, D. '9/11 Ripped the Bandage off US Culture', The Guardian, 18 February 2008). The fact that several narratives (eg., the Pearl Harbour narrative) were attempted shortly after 9/11, but failed to interpellate, suggests that 'successful myths' need some form of background historical and experiential validation, including fantasmatic resonance.
Insightful and informative as Faludi's work is, the way she relates fantasy to 'reality' and to questions of critique tends to underestimate the complexity of their relation and thus the strategic and tactical challenges facing those who might wish to contest and transform that reality. In order to make sense of this claim, I explore the appeal and content of the category of fantasy, situating my remarks in relation to a critical political theory, by which I mean a theory grounded in a political ontology that offers a basis for problem-driven empirical research but also a rationale for both normative and ideological critique. Apart from Susan Faludi's work, I draw on the political analytical work of William Connolly, Jacqueline Rose, and Judith Butler, among others, using them as case illustrations with which to consider the explanatory and critical implications of the concept of fantasy for questions of identity, political identity in particular.
Why Fantasy?
Despite the above-noted tendency to construe fantasy in predominantly episte-mological terms, as illusion or myth, there remain good reasons to affirm fantasy as a productive analytical and critical category. The attraction of the concept of fantasy can be understood in part by reflecting on the emergence and development of poststructuralist political theory and analysis. Central, in this regard, are what have been labelled the linguistic and affective 'turns'. The linguistic turn (Rorty 1967) signalled an appreciation of the symbolic dimension of political practices (Edelman 1964), especially the importance of discourse and identity in thinking about political mobilization. Nationalist, feminist, environmental, and gay and lesbian movements elevated in importance the stories people tell each other in shaping their identity. More importantly, it highlighted the constructed character of identity and discourse, calling for subjects to affirm this constructed and contingent character (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Connolly 1995).	69
These developments were welcomed by many because they marked a move beyond standard analyses that emphasized the 'givenness' of class, gender, and other interests. They pluralized perspectives on political mobilization and engagement beyond those grounded in interest-based rationalities. Nevertheless, there were many who felt that emphasizing the contingent and constructed character of discourse and identity underestimated the inertia and force of social norms and practices. According to this view, the roles of emotions and passions had been neglected - or at least had not been given their proper due. The
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so-called 'affective turn' thus indicates a need or demand to acknowledge affects as central to political theory and analysis (cf. Massumi 1996; Ahmed 2004; Stavrakakis, 2007).
The influence of Lacan's work on these two 'turns' (the linguistic turn and the affective turn) is fairly clear. One can think, for instance, of the turn to Lacan's 'point de capiton' by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). One can also appeal to the importance attributed to the category of enjoyment (jouissance) by many scholars in the study of political phenomena, especially in relation to the 'grip' of ideology (Glynos 2001; see also Glynos & Stavrakakis 2004 and Žižek 1989).
The category of fantasy, together with associated concepts like identification, split subjectivity, the unconscious, and so on, can be invoked as a key category because it captures the combined centrality of the symbolic and affective dimensions of social and political life. This is something that has been emphasized by Laclau himself in relation to the category of discourse (see, for example, Laclau in Glynos & Stavrakakis 2010; see also Glynos & Stavrakakis 2008). To date, however, there have been few systematic attempts to ascertain in a general way the political and ideological significance of fantasy. Moreover, most analyses that invoke the term 'fantasy' rarely elaborate the ontological, conceptual, and methodological parameters in detail or unproblematically, and so l believe we still need to determine the specificity and worth of the category of fantasy for critical political theory and analysis in a more systematic and nuanced manner.
Fantasy
Of course the definition of fantasy is contested. But for purposes of offering an initial sketch, we could say, following Freud, that it denotes a framing device that subjects use to 'protect' themselves from the anxiety associated with the idea that there is no ultimate guarantee or law underlying and guiding our social existence. This guarantee has been given many names, certainly when one takes the long historical view: God, Reason, the Senses, the Laws of History, and so on. But this guarantee can in principle take any form whatsoever, including a seemingly innocuous 'piece of Household stuff', such as a trunk.
With this as background we can say that fantasy also furnishes the subject with a schema that mediates between publicly affirmed ideals on the one hand, and the darker side of those aspirations and aims on the other hand - a side that subjects would rather not consciously or officially affirm. The operation of fantasy is especially evident when responses to events appear disproportionately charged or invested with emotion, sometimes qualified as 'irrational' emotion. This is particularly clear when an 'Other' (immigrant Other, racial Other, religious Other, sexed Other, and so on) is cast as an urgent threat to someone's (or a nation's) 'way of life'. But the logic of fantasy is such that features of its narrative tend to resist public official disclosure because they are in some way socially prohibited or unsettling. This is the transgressive dimension of fantasy. For example, while it may be possible for the tabloid press to blame immigrants or single mothers for many of the problems with the welfare system, it is not so often that one finds individuals making such pronouncements in a public, official capacity.
Consequently, individual and collective fantasies often appear to make it difficult to contest and debate the norms of a social practice in an open or democratic fashion. The documented phenomenon of 'dog-whistling' can serve to briefly illustrate this idea. Dog-whistle politics typically concerns the transmission of implicit messages to a select group of voters - messages that contravene a widely and officially affirmed social norm. In the UK context, Michael Howard's 'Are you thinking what we're thinking' electoral campaign of 2005 is a classic example. Take the claim that 'it's not racist to impose limits on immigration'. Just like Freud's account of dream censorship, such statements appear incontestable, yet the emotional charge in the expressions suggests there is something more at stake: it taps into fantasies about how (e.g. immigrant) 'others' are responsible for the theft of, or threat to, our 'way of life'. A Freudian-inspired conception of fantasy adds to our understanding of these phenomena because it supplements accounts that rely exclusively or heavily on 'false consciousness' or 'moral corruption' to explain them. Of course, questions of 'truth' and 'morality' do have an important role to play in coming to terms with social and political phenomena. But the appeal to fantasy and desire suggests that intimations of anxiety in the face of uncertainty and contingency are powerful drivers of such responses, and that these must be taken seriously because they help shape the significance we attach to the 'truth' and 'morality' of such phenomena.
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Yet because fantasmatic desires are often transmitted implicitly, it becomes difficult to engage publicly and productively in related normative and political debates. It follows that it also makes it difficult for scholars to assess the place and role of fantasy in critical political analysis more generally. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that understandings of fantasy tend to vary considerably, as do understandings of the ideals in terms of which the role of fantasy can be critically assessed. What resources, then, are available to us for purposes of fleshing out with greater precision the logic of fantasy?
From a Lacanian point of view, one can start with the claim that 'realizing one's fantasy is impossible'. Realizing one's fantasy is impossible in the sense that the subject (as a subject of desire) survives only insofar as its desire remains unsatisfied. Rather than satisfying desire, fantasy structures desire. It does so, usually, through a narrative that promises a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome, or that foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves too threatening or insurmountable. But the obstacle, which often comes in the form of a prohibition or a threatening Other, transforms impossibility into a 'mere difficulty', thereby creating the impression that its realization is at least potentially possible. The many obstacles identified as reasons for procrastinating, for example, create the impression that it is possible to achieve 'fullness' while also maintaining one's self as a desiring subject. But the role of fantasy is actually to structure desire through a dialectic of fullness and lack, maintaining one's sense of being as a subject of desire. So the status psychoanalysis gives to fantasy is not so much epistemological as it is ontological and (as we will see shortly) ethical. In other words, the appeal to fantasy in critical analysis should be understood primarily as a means to access the structure of desire and enjoyment, rather than as a means of dismissing a belief or worldview as untrue or irrational because it does not conform to a particular understanding of reality.
What gives a narrative a specifically psychoanalytic inflection, then, is the fan-tasmatic logic structuring the subject's desire. It furnishes the subject with an ideal and an impediment to the realization of an ideal, investing the narrative with a beatific or horrific hue. The logic of fantasy also produces an enjoyment (Lacan's jouissance, also linked to Freud's libido), often associated with the transgression of an ideal. Crucially, however, fantasy purports to offer a foun-dational guarantee of sorts, in the sense that it offers the subject a degree of
protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation with the radical contingency of social relations. Fantasy, therefore, is not merely a narrative with its potentially infinite variations at the level of content, although it is of course this too. It also has a certain 'logic' in which the subject's very being is implicated: the disruption or dissolution of the logic leads to what Lacan calls aphanisis, a kind of vanishing of the subject as a subject of desire.
Nevertheless, Lacanians are fond of using the expression 'crossing the fantasy' as an ethical imperative, and this may give one the idea that what we must do is overcome or go beyond fantasy. In one sense, of course, this is true, but in what sense exactly? This is an important point because it is crucial that fantasy is not demonized or, to put it in milder terms, that we do not attribute to fantasy an exclusively negative valence, as those do who treat it epistemologically as a synonym for illusion or myth. This is because fantasy has an ontological status vis-ä-vis the subject: it is a necessary condition for political mobilization and change as much as it is functional to social passivity and maintaining the status quo. From an ontological point of view, in other words, fantasies are inelimi-nable and essential to action, whether these are characterized as normatively progressive or regressive. As Jacques-Alain Miller put it in a 1983 lecture,
if Lacan talks about the 'crossing of the fantasy', it is not in order to talk about the 'lifting or disappearance of the fantasy'. In the case of the fantasy, the question is rather [_] to see what is behind, which is difficult, because there is nothing behind. Nonetheless, this is a nothing that can take various guises, and the crossing of the fantasy amounts to taking a walk on the side of those nothings. (Miller 2010)
By appealing to the idea of a logic, then, I seek to emphasize how a Lacanian perspective (but certainly not only a Lacanian perspective) insists on investing fantasy with ontological and ethical significance. What many Lacanians call 'crossing the fantasy' coincides with what I call the dissolution - or, to be more precise, a loosening - of this logic. It means not abandoning fantasy or going beyond fantasy, but rather acquiring a different relation to the fantasmatic object, one in which the subject is less 'in thrall' to it. This is one way to understand the Lacanian idea of an 'ethics of the real'.
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Fantasy, Identity, Critique
So far I have focused on fantasy, but what about identity? How might we conceptualize the relationship between fantasy and identity, and political identity in particular? In a first sweep we could say that the more we are invested in fantasies - the more we are locked into its logic - the more likely we are to read aspects of our experience in terms of that fantasmatic narrative. By appealing to a logic of fantasy, then, I aim to capture something about the way a subject is (strongly) attached to, or (over)invested in, a fantasmatic narrative.
Consider again the 'rescue and protect' fantasies described by Susan Faludi. There we saw how a powerful attachment to rescue fantasies translated very quickly into the 'dogma' of scripting firemen as heroes. Indeed the 9/11 commission itself was accused of dishonouring the 'heroes' when it tried to examine the pathways that led to the death of so many firefighters. The media, as well as New York mayors Bloomberg and Giuliani, clung to 'the image of the New York firefighter as cavarlyman charging willingly, knowingly, to certain death' (Faludi 2007: 381). And even when different stories were told about systemic, infrastructural, equipmental, and support failures before and after 9/11, these were quickly sidelined by the dominant narrative of rescue and heroism (Faludi 2007: 381-3). This was as true of people's responses to firefighers' experiences as it was of people's responses to the 9/11 event more generally.
For instance, many - individual firemen included - had stepped forward to categorically reject the honour of manly heroism. Instead they sought to offer a more complex picture of the events that unfolded in the run-up to, and aftermath of, 9/11. But these stories did not receive much media attention at all. Faludi identifies a series of initiatives which reveal a whole range of 'alternative' responses by ordinary citizens made visible through private recordings of people's dreams and stories in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and she charts how this nuance and creative energy was marginalized by the dominant fantasmatic narrative (Faludi 2007: 13-14, 377-380).
The implication is that the more invested one is in fantasy, the more one understands and experiences life in accordance with this template; and conversely, the less likely we are to experience the creative potential involved in offering alternative readings and interpretations of events for purposes of political mo-
bilisation or other forms of action. Certainly, the subject tends to use fantasy as a way to protect itself from ambiguities, uncertainties, and other features which evoke intimations of anxiety. But it is precisely those ambiguities that open up possibilities for critical distance and alternative becomings, including alternative political and economic pathways. So the problem lies not with fantasy as such so much with the way it engages the subject. In an important sense it is irrelevant that the fantasmatic script diverges from a 'consensus reality'. The problem, rather, lies more with the subject's strong attachment to, or libidinal overinvestment in, fantasy; and that this mode of attachment, in turn, has political and normative implications.
As a counterpoint to my reading of these events, consider Faludi's earlier reference to fantasy and myth as something which concealed the 'true' facts of the matter. The fantasy of heroic men rescuing women and children from the inferno involved erasing the fact that most victims of the 9/11 attacks were men and that most women saved themselves. But consider now the possibility that as a matter of 'hard facts' more women were victims in the 9/11 attacks. The point here would be that this 'fact' would actually not necessarily change the way it gets caught in the logic of fantasy, by which I mean the way the subject is libidinally invested in its narrative. The Lacanian insight here suggests that understanding this aspect of fantasy is essential when trying to tease out more fully its political and ideological role.
What is at stake, then, is not so much the content of fantasy (and its convergence with, or divergence from, a consensus reality) but the mode of our attachment to this content. In a similar vein we can refer to Lacan's often quoted insight that even if a patient's wife really is sleeping around with other men, his jealousy can still be treated as excessive or pathological. So the 'trouble' with fantasy emerges in two steps. First, when a subject becomes hooked into its logic, in the sense that the subject has become strongly attached or gripped by it (this is the ideological aspect). Second, when this logic serves to bolster certain ideals that are not only contestable but also questionable (this is the normative aspect). This view of fantasy clearly forces into contact (and forces us to think the relation between) the ideological and normative aspects of critique. But this view provokes a further series of questions, namely, whether there are modes of subjectivity beyond those embodied in the logic of fantasy and desire, what their conditions of possibility might be, and with what implications for think-
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ing about social and political identity and practice (cf. Glynos 2008; Glynos and Howarth 2007). These are questions that have yet to receive sufficient detailed empirical and critical attention in the literature. There are, however, several studies that move decisively in this direction. Consider, for example, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style.
Fantasy and Identity, American Style
In an incisive critical analysis of contemporary political life in the United States, Bill Connolly is alert to the potency of fantasy in shaping the American social and political scene. In this respect there are many points of convergence between his and Faludi's analyses. However, in Capitalism and Christianity, American Style Connolly is explicit in trying not to remain at the level of fantasmatic content. If not in name, then at least in sense, the aspects and role of fantasy I have outlined thus far find themselves neatly expressed in this study.
Connolly offers a powerful and fairly comprehensive diagnosis and critique of what he calls America's 'evangelical-capitalist resonance machine'. Emerging in the 1970s in the wake of the demise of Keynesian economics, the evangelical-capitalist machine produced a political programme whose demands provoked resonances across creedal and class differences - demands for lower taxes for the rich, demands for lower welfare expenditure, demands for pre-emptive wars, demands to affirm as necessary the collateral damage wrought by the Abu Gh-raibs and Guantanamos of this world, demands for punitive immigration measures, demands for less state interference on matters of consumer choice, such as the choice to purchase an SUV, and so on. These are demands that, according to Connolly, sideline more egalitarian, pluralist, and ecological demands, and for this reason it is crucial to understand the process by which these processes of chaining take place.
Central to Connolly's diagnosis is the distinction he draws between ethos and belief - a distinction that is similar to the fantasmatic mode/content distinction discussed earlier. It is a distinction which is expressed in different ways, the spirituality/creed pair being one. In this view, the evangelical-capitalist machine resonates because the spiritualities coursing through the evangelical and capitalist wings of the 'machine' reverberate with one another - more specifically, they spring from a common and deep sense of entitlement and revenge. Of
course, these spiritualities are not normally expressed in a public-official capacity. As noted earlier, this resistance to public-official disclosure is often a characteristic feature of the logic of fantasy. As Connolly puts it 'our behaviour may express intensities we officially deny' (Connolly 2008: 8; see also 4). In fact, this transgressive dimension often functions as a potent driver of collective identification and mobilisation precisely because it remains silent (Connolly 2008: 54). In this view, fantasy's power derives from the enjoyment embodied in such shared transgression. Dog-whistle politics, we recall, is sustained in part by means of stoking precisely this enjoyment through the deft use of silences. Silences facilitate the practice of plausible deniability, which is a tried and tested way of targeting and binding particular constituencies. It rarely fails to provoke the expected reaction of flummoxed impotence on the part of their liberal critics, transmitting paroxysms of joy to those 'in the know' and, in doing so, further consolidating the collective identification such enjoyment underpins.
This is not to say there are no exceptions to the 'silence rule'. But such exceptions can be said to underline the tactical and strategic significance of the public-official silences. Connolly refers to an incident in 2005, in which a group of parents and community citizens in Dover, Pennsylvania, succeeded in their political and legal campaign against a local school board's decision to introduce 'Intelligent Design' into the classroom. In response to this action, the American evangelical leader Pat Robertson addressed the community in the following way:
I'd like to say to the good citizens of Dover: if there is disaster in your area don't turn to God, you just rejected him from your city. And don't wonder why he hasn't helped you when problems begin, if they begin. I'm not saying that they will, but if they do, just remember, you just voted God out of your city. And if that's the case, don't ask for his help because he might not be there. (Robertson 2005, as cited in Connolly 2008: 52)
Connolly's central thesis suggests that this evangelically-expressed ethos of entitlement, resentment and revenge resonates with the ethos underpinning much cowboy capitalism. Anyone can make real his American dream of hitting the jackpot, so long as one brings a little invention and athletic energy to one or another of the widely available 'how-to-get-rich' manuals^ and maybe a bit of luck which, in any case, will be well deserved. This is a potent headline fantasy which is commonly shared, and high levels of investment in this fantasy may
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go some way to explaining both why a substantial (near-majority) proportion of twenty-year olds believe they'll be earning salaries in their fifties which will put them in the top 5 per cent of the population (Connolly 2008: 33-4) and why guilt and ressentiment are not unexpected supports of associated regressive and reactionary political demands when fantasmatic ideals fail to materialize.
What are the implications of such fantasmatic analysis for social and political identity? Clearly, these fantasmatic narratives fuel and reinforce a sense of resentment and entitlement. lt makes it possible for those lower down on the wealth and income scale to identify with those on much higher rungs, consolidating their collective political position against those who preach egalitarianism and the virtues of care for the other and for the environment. It also makes it possible for an alliance across class and creed to consolidate itself by identifying a common enemy in those who threaten these visions of plenty and glory. Though this is not explicitly or systematically thematised by Connolly, what appears crucial in understanding the sense of resentment and entitlement and the way this resonates outwardly throughout the evangelical-capitalist machine is the strength by which subjects are attached to, or invested in, underlying fantasies.
Many might say, of course, that this powerful attachment to fantasy betrays a predictable and dangerous narrow-mindedness. But the creative potential of this mode of attachment should not be underestimated, since the ethos associated with fantasmatic overinvestment can be, and is, regularly deployed innovatively. As new circumstances arise and new grievances emerge, these must be articulated as demands that are compatible with the more familiar ethos of resentment and entitlement. This is a creative act. But - and l think this is by no means incompatible with what Connolly says - l would add that 78 this is a 'closed creativity'. It is 'closed' precisely in the sense that a logic can be discerned, a logic linked to a mode of overinvested fantasmatic attachment and thus to the tendency to fit all that one encounters into a mould that preserves this mode of attachment - in this case a mode cashed out as a function of ressentiment. And here it is worth emphasizing how a logic rooted in ressentiment and revenge can be as effective in inflecting progressive demands as it is in inflecting regressive demands.
Moving beyond the logic of fantasy, then, entails the adoption of a distinct ethos, not so much a distinct set of beliefs. Such an ethos promises greater po-
litical potential because the frame through which the world is experienced is no longer understood as grounded in an external guarantee. A key role of fantasy is to protect us from ambiguity by providing us with a script with which to shuffle vulnerability and uncertainty to the margins. Once detached from fantasmatic guarantees, we can begin to discern a more expansive, 'open' creative potential in the uncertainties and ambiguities that become visible - including potential for political mobilisation. As Connolly puts it, '[t]o accept a messy conception of the world is to emphasise simultaneously its capacity for surprise, its tragic potential, and possible lines of creative action to take' (Connolly 2008: 10).
The political significance of sustaining a distinction between the content and mode of fantasy is that the adoption of a different mode may facilitate the construction of linkages across a wide range of doctrinal elements into an alternative counter-hegemonic formation: 'it opens a window to the formation of a new political assemblage' (Connolly 2008: 61; see also 9, 16). So what is interesting from the point of view of political and ideological critique is not only the specific content of fantasies - this is certainly important from a normative point of view. What is crucial as well, especially from the point of view of those concerned with the possibilities of social transformation and of those espousing the value of a deep pluralism, is the mode of the subject's attachment to that content. This is how I would read Connolly's remark that '[i]t is important, for both political and ethical reasons, to distinguish those who fill a doctrine with extreme entitlement and revenge from those who do not do so' (Connolly 2008: 52).
Fantasy and Political Identity, Zionist Style
The relationship between fantasy and identity can be further explored with reference to a study by Jacqueline Rose, who tackles a theme similar to the one pre-occupying Connolly, and who invokes the mode/content distinction in a similar, albeit more implicit, way. Rose's intervention centres on a question often provoked by Israelis and Jews who criticize Israeli state policy - a question, however, that was also very clearly and visibly on the lips of many US citizens and commentators in the wake of the US government's decision to go to war in Afganistan and Irak. Iterating the formulation of the question by Daniel BenSimon and Gideon Levy she asks: Is the true friend of a nation state the loving critic or the unthinking patriot? Is the true friend of a nation one who identifies with it automatically or one who wants it to be just? (Rose 2005: 134)
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This, however, produces a further question: 'What would happen to a political or religious identity, even the most binding, if it could see itself as contingent, as something that might have taken another path? Can you be devoted to an identity - or would you be differently devoted to an identity - if you knew it was also unsure?' (Rose 2005: 96) Rose acknowledges the difficulty of going beyond rigid forms of identification governed by the logic of fantasy, thereby foregrounding a crucial challenge: 'How do you begin to address^ the problem of a political identity whose strength in the world, indeed its ability to survive as an identity, relies on its not being able, or willing, to question itself?' (Rose 2005: 152) One pathway open to us - the pathway Rose explores - is the genealogical pathway. She suggests that this sort of self-questioning can be found at the root of Israeli national identity. Rose implies that this sort of self-questioning can be brought more firmly into consciousness through a historical inquiry whose aim is to reveal the irreducible pluralism lying at the origins of the Israeli national idea and ideal (Rose 2005: 107).
In The Question of Zion, with which she explicitly calls to mind Edward Said's 1979 The Question of Palestine, Jacqueline Rose offers us an exemplary account of how fantasy and political identity intersect. Based on a series of lectures delivered at Princeton University in 2003, she attempts to answer two questions arising out of her attempt to grapple with the curious turn of events in which 'one of the most persecuted peoples of the worlds [came] to embody some of the worst cruelties of the modern nation-state' (Rose 2005: 115-6). First, how did the Zionist self-image of Israel first arise and what were its dominant and less dominant strands (the historical question); and second, what is it 'about Zionism that commands such passionate and seemingly intractable allegiance' (the psychoanalytic question) (Rose 2005: xiii).
Israeli views about Israel, argues Rose, are underpinned by a narrative which is hardly ever talked about: Zionism (Rose 2005: xii). But this 'not talked-about Zionism' is actually a particular version of Zionism that was by no means the only one that was originally on offer. The interpretation that has come to define Zionism today is Theodor Herzl's interpretation - an interpretation very much rooted in an earlier messianic outlook. This is an important historical point, according to Rose, because messianism tends to flourish in dark times, and messianic legend tends to 'drench' itself 'in "uninhibited fantasies" about the catastrophic aspects of redemption', wherein a prominent place is reserved for settling scores
and thus satisfying a desire for historic revenge (Rose 2005: 17, 19). Theodor Her-zl's The Jewish State won the hearts of the European Jewish masses because it appeared in 1940 in the thick of war, in the context of ongoing hardship and despair, and because he was very good at exploiting anti-Semitism as a way to convince state leaders (whether of Central Europe or of Turkey) of the need, viability, and validity of a separate Jewish state.
In this way Herzl retained the ethos of a past messianism rooted in redemption and revenge, but transposed it from a religious to a political register: 'Secular Zionism's revolution was to move salvation from the heaven to the plains: "[it] does not expect the return to Palestine to be brought about by a miracle, but desires to prepare the way by its own efforts"' (Rose 2005: 33). Nevertheless, Rose finds traces of messianic redemption in the writing of major visionaries, advocates, and historians of Zionism, such as Herzl, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Scholem (Rose 2005: 28-43). Use of terms such as 'Kingdom of Israel' and 'Congregation of Israel' cannot but conjure all the religious associations it explicitly disavows: 'We are talking of the "slow but steady" penetration of the civic culture by a vision that many of Israel's citizens do not explicitly embrace Messianism, as unconscious inspiration, is in the air and soil of Israel' (Rose 2005: 54). A very particular expression of entitlement and revenge was thus set up, within which to articulate grievances emanating from European anti-semitism and the pogroms of Eastern Europe. These grievances were put to an international audience and persuasively articulated as a need and demand for the inauguration of a new state.
But Rose shows that there was an alternative sensibility in play at the moment of Zionism's inception, also pointing out that its one nation-state form was not a necessary one. Her historical and documentary analysis reveals that Herzl's vision was not the only way Zionism's unconscious dimension could be, nor was, articulated (Rose 2005: 68). Herzl pressed this unconscious dimension in the service of a very specific set of political objectives culminating in the establishment of a separate nation state in Palestine. There was a powerfully articulated alternative however. The dissenters' way was to make visible both the dangers and positive potential of this unconscious Messianic aspect, advocating the need to be attentive to this dimension of Zionism. It has been suggested that Jews and Israelis often do not know that there was this history of dissent (Ellis 2002: 35, 138). Martin Buber, Hannah Arendt, Hans Kohn, and Ahad Ha'am
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each believed that Zionism could have taken a different path to the one it did take, and to this day their views continue to provide a 'resonant, melancholic, counternarrative to [Zionism's messianic version of the] birth of a nation-state' (Rose 2005: 70).
Martin Buber, for example, envisioned not partition but partnership - a partnership between two nations, a Jewish nation and an Arab nation, with equal political rights and 'united in the enterprise of developing their common homeland and in the federal management of shared matters' (as cited in Rose 2005: 75). The presentation of a two-nation state as an alternative to Herzl's one-nation state, however, was underpinned by a worry about the 'absolutizing' ethos critics discerned at the root of Herzl's proposal. Hans Kohn, in particular, was explicit in suggesting that an 'absolute' form of nationalism 'allows you the illusion of mastering the unmasterable: the enigma of life, destructive gesticulations, the dark beasts It allows you, like the ego, to believe you could be sufficient unto yourself' (Rose 2005: 80). In light of Buber, Kohn, and Arendt's writings, then, it is clear that Rose feels that 'Zionism^ had the opportunity to forge a model of nationhood, neither belligerently nor pre-emptively, but ambivalent, uncertain, obscure, something closer to this disquieting and transformative space. But did not take it' (Rose 2005: 86).
The consequences of being firmly and resolutely attached to a political identity through a logic of fantasmatic overinvestment is that political options appear stark and dichotomic: 'So often in discussion of Zionism we seem to be faced with a false alternative: acknowledge^ suffering or castigate the injustice of the Israeli state (the charge that any critique of Israel is anti-Semitic merely rides on the back of this false choice)' (Rose 2005: 115). Alternative and more creative political pathways are blocked off in this way. And so a messianic 'militarization of suffering' comes to bolster an ethos of revenge and entitlement in a zero-sum game, supporting and supported by the belief, for example, that 'Israeli submission would invite further aggression'. 'When we seem weak' says a former adviser to the Likud government, 'we are attacked' (Rose 2005: 131).5 Certainly, a genealogy of Zionism shows how the militarization of suffering and
5 "According to this logic, every achievement of the Palestinians in negotiations is perceived as a crushing internal defeat (Yasser Arafat's return to Gaza after the Oslo Accord became a national humiliation)" (Rose 2005: 131).
the nation-state became victorious within it. But it also shows that it was not necessary.
Mourning as a Pathway Through Fantasy?
Returning to our earlier discussion of the US reaction to 9/11, we recall similar sorts of consequences flowing from fantasmatic overinvestments. Of course, an important part of Susan Faludi's analysis pointed to an epistemological, and thus fairly conventional, non-psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy as myth or illusion (see also Faludi 2007: 385, 387, 388). However, in discussing possible ways forward she introduces an interesting and important shift in perspective, disarticulating 'truth' from reality and rearticulating it to an ethical stance, suggesting we look at the 'truth' of our weakness and vulnerability in the eye and have the character to address that directly (Faludi 2007: 377).
A turn to a 'truth in weakness' is clearly promising because it appears to go beyond somewhat staid 'false-consciousness' conceptualizations of fantasy. This idea, however, is not developed in detail. Nevertheless, this is a lead we should perhaps follow rather cautiously since, as we saw in the analysis presented to us by Jacqueline Rose, nothing progressive or ethical necessarily follows from simply acknowledging and affirming weakness and vulnerability. Much depends on how this is done. In fact a shift from 'mastery' to 'weakness' can easily serve to preserve a subjective mode of fantasmatic overinvestment. Rose points out, for example, that Israel, one of the most powerful and bellicose nations in the world, "still chooses to present itself as eternally on the defensive, as though weakness were a weapon, and vulnerability its greatest strength" (Rose 2005: xiii).
That nothing progressive or ethical automatically follows a shift to the position 83 of victim and vulnerability is something other scholars are keen to point out too. Consider Wendy Brown's discussion of 'wounded attachments' (Brown 1995: 5276). Brown also speaks to the dangers of fantasmatic overinvestment from the point of view of the position of vulnerability and injury. Her worry is that making past and present injury the basis of political demands often ends up reinforcing one's psychic attachment to this injury as well as reinscribing the (fantasmatic) conditions which make such injury possible. The claim here is that the enjoyment (jouissance) procured in 'reliving a certain punishing recognition reassures us not only of our own place (identity) but also of the presence of the order out
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of which that identity was forged and to which we remain perversely beholden' (Brown 2001: 56). It is easy to underestimate the debilitating effects of ressentiment and guilt associated with the thought that others are responsible for the theft of our enjoyment. If so, we can hypothesize that the enjoyment associated with our investment in fantasies of victimization and rescue may constrain the possibility of transformation just as much as fantasies of control and mastery. The possibility of transformation may thus be facilitated through the adoption of a different mode of enjoyment and relation to fantasy, something that 'might take shape as a certain ironic ethos or as a spirit of radical, critical patriotism -or it might take some other form, as yet unthought' (Brown 2001: 59).
Perhaps, then, Faludi's turn to vulnerability as an alternative point of political identification taps into an important intuition that may actually lead us down a path that avoids the pitfalls identified by Rose and Brown - a path that both Rose and Brown could affirm. Judith Butler's work on mourning is helpful in this respect (cf. Eng and Kazanjian 2003), offering one way of thinking through the Lacanian idea of 'crossing the fantasy'. The appeal to mourning is attractive for Butler because it points to the notion of loss, and the pain linked to loss, as a potential catalyst for subjective transformation and political engagement:
Perhaps [_] one mourns when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one will be changed, possibly for ever. Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a transformation) the full result of which one cannot know in advance. There is losing, as we know, but there is also the transformative effect of loss, and this latter cannot be charted or planned. One can try to choose it, but it may be that this experience of transformation decon-stitutes choice at some level. (Butler 2004: 21).
Mourning achieves this because it demonstrates that loss is, at a fundamental level, relational in character:
[T]he attachment to "you" is part of what composes who "I" am. If I lose you, under these conditions, then I not only mourn the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself. Who "am" I, without you? When we lose some of these ties by which we are constituted, we do not know who we are or what to do. On one level, I think I have lost "you" only to discover that "I" have gone missing as well. At another level, perhaps
what I have lost "in" you, that for which I have no ready vocabulary, is a relationality
that is composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but is to be conceived as the
tie by which those terms are differentiated and related.
(Butler 2004: 22)
Mourning thus creates a kind of 'mindfulness of vulnerability' that can become the basis of political claims, an ethos clearly opposed to claims animated by ressentiment, and opening up a pathway to alternative forms of political identification, including national identifications. As Butler puts it, '[w]e have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building' (Butler 2004: 34). Mourning can produce a different way of imagining community or thinking about national identity. Since all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody, Butler suggests we can think of constructing a (tenuous) 'we' in relation to loss (Butler 2004: 20).
The conditions which make life grievable, are thus central to a form of politics that is non-belligerent or beyond ressentiment. When soldiers' coffins (of both sides) are shuffled to the margins of public official and popular media discourse, when there is no place for public and performative recognition of our common vulnerability or of ourselves as always in a process of 'becoming' rather than as an always-already 'us', then those conditions are lacking. What we get is a 'denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) [that] can fuel the instruments of war' (Butler 2004: 29). A repudiation of mourning is manifest, for example, in Bush's declaration ten days after Sept 11 that 'we have finished grieving and that now it is time for resolute action to take the place of grief' (ibid.)
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Fantasy is a useful device with which to explore and probe the political and ideological dimension of a practice or narrative. This is because it foregrounds the combined significance of the symbolic and affective dimensions of life. Moreover, a psychoanalytic perspective can facilitate a move away from an epistemo-logical or moralizing understanding of fantasy, placing the emphasis instead on its ontological and ethical status. In this view, it is not simply the content of fantasy that is important, but also the mode of our attachment to it, our libidinal investment in it. With detachment from (rather than abandonment of) fantasy
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comes the possibility of affirming an ethos of becoming and embracing a greater potential for resignification, which is a key precondition for a form of political mobilization marked by deep pluralism.
The trouble with fantasmatic over-investment appears in an especially stark form in George Lucas's Star Wars epic. At a key moment in Star Wars Episode3: The Revenge of the Sith, Anakin - who is later baptized 'Darth Vader' by Darth Sidius, Lord of the Sith - reveals to Master Yoda how, in his sleep, he has seen a future in which a loved one suffers pain and death. In response to this revelation Yoda cautions him as follows:
Careful you must be when sensing the future, Anakin. The fear of loss is a path to the dark side.
But Anakin insists that he will not let his horrific vision come true. So Master Yoda is forced to be more explicit about what is at stake. He says:
Death is a natural part of life. Rejoice for those around you who transform into the Force. Mourn them, do not. Miss them, do not. Attachment leads to jealousy. The shadow of greed, that is.
[You must] train yourself to let go of everything you fear to lose.
Is the model of the Jedi expressed here by Master Yoda a model for the subject we can, or even ought to, emulate? Indeed, what kind of subject is Yoda calling forth? Some might say that what is at stake is precisely the possibility of an ethics beyond desire and the mode of fantasmatic attachment that this presupposes. There is enough ambiguity in Master Yoda's formulation, however, for us to remain fairly confident that others will disagree.
Either way, what I hope to have shown by engaging with a number of case illustrations is the value of drawing a distinction between fantasmatic mode and fantasmatic content on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between a mode of enjoyment associated with closure (an 'ideological' mode of being) and a mode of enjoyment associated with openness (an 'ethical' mode of being). While the former has a logic, more specifically a fantasmatic logic of overinvestment that grips through transgression, guilt, and ressentiment, the latter escapes attempts at capture - indeed, it appears to entail the dissolution or loos-
ening of such a logic, ushering forth a different sort of ethos that signals a commitment to recognizing and exploring the possibilities of the new in contingent encounters.
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Miller, J.-A. (2010[1983]) 'Two Clinical Dimensions: Symptom and Fantasm', The Symptom 11, http://www.lacan.com/symptom11/?p=268.
Rorty, R. (ed.) (1967) The Linguistic Turn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rose, J. (1996) States of Fantasy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rose, J. (2005) The Question of Zion, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stavrakakis, Y. (2007) The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Weber, M. (1991) 'Politics as a Vocation', in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W. (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge.
Zerilli, L. (2005) 'Philosophy's 'Gaudy Dress': Fantasy and Rhetoric in the Lockean Social Contract,' The European Journal of Political Theory 4(2): 147-164.
Žižek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso.
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Jelica Šumič Riha*
Politics and Psychoanalysis in the Times of the Generalized Metonymization
A Politics of Rhetoric
Rhetoric returns today in force, if not with a vengeance in contemporary theori-zation of politics. This is because some of the most perspicacious political thinkers, not only explain politics by means of rhetoric, but go so far as to say that "metaphor, metonymy, synechdoche (and especially catachresis as their common denominator) are ontological categories describing the constitution of objectivity as such."1 Indeed, following Laclau here, one could say that politics is possible only if it is situated in the terrain where tropological movement supplements the hole in the symbolic Other, thereby constituting a groundless ground for the structuration of social life. In raising the value of the catachresis to the level of operational concept with his theory of the hegemonic suture, Laclau, thereby indicated the degree to which it would be impossible to grasp anything of the contingent production of the social link in the space of discursivity that is structurally incomplete, without a necessary recourse to the unsolvable tension between metaphor and metonymy. Politics, in this view, has to be rethought on the basis of the opposition between the contingent character of the instituting moment of society and its enabling conditions of (im)possibility.
While this pivoting of perspectives casts a different light upon politics, it also throws into relief what is at stake in the ancient quarrel between politics and 89 rhetoric. Indeed, setting out from the premise that, as such, the symbolic order, the social order included, has no other basis than the sheer contingency of the laws of language, ultimately, the laws of metaphor and metonymy, rhetoric is supposed to provide a vantage point from which the fundamental groundlessness of the dominant discourse which shapes our reality can be appreciated, that is to say, thrown into question.
1 E. Laclau, "An Ethics of Militant Engagement" in P. Hallward (ed.) Think Again. Alain Badiou and the future of Philosophy, Continuum, New York, London 2004, p. 137.
* Institute of Philosophy, SRC SASA
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In a certain sense, the relationship between politics and rhetoric, which is thus both antinomian and complicit, could be read rhetorically, that is, as revolving around the polarity of metaphor and metonymy. Contemporary rhetoricians namely attempt to show how the unlimited play of displacements and substitutions, which can neither be controlled nor stopped, makes a direct challenge to the politics which stands for the moment of closure, the moment of arrest of this unending movement. The implication here is that the politically subversive and therefore emancipatory potential of rhetoric consists first and foremost in its capacity to reveal what politics tries desperately to conceal: the impossibility of establishing the socio-political order otherwise than through a hegemonic act of closure, an act which is, in and of itself, groundless. This means that the opposition between politics and rhetoric according to which politics is supposed to prioritize the closure of the constitutively incomplete social field, while rhetoric would privilege the metonymic endless displacements, can only be sustained if rhetoric is identified with an operation of de-totalization, an operation challenging the contingency of the closure of the structurally non-totalizable social field. To put the matter in other terms still: by resisting the movement of closure, metonymy brings on a disjunction between being and appearance, that is, the inevitability of slippage, non-correspondence between the being taken in its genericity, as it were, that is to say, devoid of all identity or predicate, and the master's discourse which can only operate through a logic of predication.
However, the polarity between politics and rhetoric is tenable solely if politics is reduced to the institutional moment of the social or, to borrow Lacan's term, to the master's discourse. Having the performative power of the signifier to structure the social field by assigning to the members of a given society a place and a function, a 'mandate', as Lacan calls it, the master's discourse thereby determines what counts and what is of no account, what is visible and what is not, ultimately, what exists and what does not. Bearing in mind this ontological dimension inherent in the discourse of the master, the crucial question for every oppositional politics worthy of the name is of course: how can that come into being which, within the framework of the master's discourse, remains invisible, that which, basically, does not exist?
It is from such a perspective that political implications of Lacan's conception of the symptom can be appreciated. From the start, Lacan namely conceived of the symptom as that which disrupts the smooth working of the social order, betray-
ing the subject's resistance to total alienation in that order. The point here is that the symptom can generate its subversive effects precisely to the extent that it operates like a metaphor,2 that is to say, as a quilting point which, by reconfiguring relations between elements of a given situation in a different way, momentarily reveals the possibility of an entirely unprecedented type of the socio-discursive arrangement.
It should be noted that, in contrast to the famous battle between deconstruction-ists and Lacanians which has pitched metonymy against metaphor, the present debate over the meaning and value of rhetoric for contemporary theorizing of politics is, on the contrary, shaped by the primacy of metonymy over metaphor. Certainly, it is not by accident that contemporary rhetoricians set out from the assumption that metonymy precedes and dominates metaphor. It is not by accident precisely to the extent that rhetoric itself is seen to be putting forward the affinity between metonymy and contingency. In prioritizing metonymy over metaphor, contemporary rhetoric could, thus, be regarded as promoting a logic of the contingent in the field of politics. Against the necessity of the social order put up by the dominant discourse, rhetoric postulates as its axiom the necessity of contingency.
It is in this connection that the primacy of metonymy takes on great interest. In a discursive universe where metaphor is the structuring principle, the metonymic slippage, indeed, provides the only way for the inscription of the inexistent - a term used by A. Badiou, to designate an invisible excess, a remaindered part of a social space which is integral to it but which is unaccountable within the hegemonic articulation of that space. Proceeding from the irreducible incommensurability between the metaphorical closure and the ceaseless metonymic slippage, contemporary rhetoricians set out to track down a point that escapes the imposed discursive arrangement, a vanishing, yet always specific, determinate point of the inexistent that singularizes the given regime of mastery. While it is true that the mere apparition of the inexistent brings into relief the contingency of the transcendental regime of discursivity which constitutes our social reality, it is also true that the decisive issue is exactly how to inscribe the constitutive lack of a signifier in this discursive arrangement for those who have paid the
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2 Indeed, for Lacan, "the symptom is a metaphor". J. Lacan, "The Instance of the Letter", Ecrits, trans. by Bruce Fink, W.W. Norton & Company, New York and London 2006, p. 439.
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price for the institution of the social order through their exclusion. The question of the inscription of the inexistent is crucial because, in a discursive space organized by the master discourse, the inexistent cannot be presented or, better, represented as such. The inexistent, strictly speaking, can only ex-sist, it cannot exist, for to exist it would have to be articulated in terms of the existing structure of placement. What is at stake in the emergence, within the structure of places provided by the discourse of the master, of that which remains outside its grasp is therefore the question of how to assert the impossibility of the inscription of the inexistent as the sole mode for its inscription.
In this respect, the primacy of metonymy has to be viewed in the context of the multifarious attempts the contemporary theorization of politics makes to come to grips with the constitutive incompletion of the social, ultimately, with the fundamental groundlessness of the acts of political constitution. In such a context, it is all the more important to take into account the fact that there are two possible ways of coming to terms with the non-closure of the political space of discursivity: the operation of supplementation and the operation of complementation. Situated on the basis of a negation of all grounding in the real, the metaphorical suture and the metonymic displacement represent two different ways of making up for this hole in the symbolic Other, two strategies for dealing with the radical absence of a formula which would inscribe the institution of the social in the real. It could then be said that metaphor succeeds in closing the discursive space of a given situation by producing a suppletory device under the guise of a catachrestic signifier, a semblance, in the very place where the Other is lacking. Giving body to the ineliminable lack of grounding, the catachrestic signifier is ultimately nothing but the metonymy of the hole in the Other. Supplementing the lack in the social Other with a catachrestic signifier, the operation of metaphor effects the suturation of the social, but at the price of concealing the fundamental groundlessness of such an operation. Due to the structural impossibility of the social order thus imposed to subsume the totality of a given social situation, the metaphorical totalization itself is hollowed out. Metaphor, in sum, fails to provide a true solution to the hole in the Other. In fact, inasmuch as the institution of the social order is groundless, every instance destined to supplement the lack in the Other appears to be nothing more than a semblance, a symbolic stand-in for the lacking real grounding.
In contrast to metaphor, where the barrier resisting suturation is crossed, metonymy avoids such a totalizing movement. Oscillating between a radical absence of all order and the institution of an order through the master's catachresis, metonymy indicates a place for a possible, yet unattainable structural closure, as it can only be situated in infinity. A place for the totalization of the social space is thus preserved, reserved, as it were, without ever being realized. Put differently, as the infinite movement generated by the lack in the Other, metonymy, paradoxically, gives rise to a belief in the possibility of a final closure. It could then be argued that whereas metonymy places the bar on politics, more exactly, on every single attempt to politically constitute the social, only to preserve the socio-symbolic Other from being barred, metaphor, on the contrary, by raising the powerlessness of metonymy to the status of structural impossibility, implies that the social Other, as such, is originally lacking, incomplete. Far from sending the question of the final closure back to the Other, and thereby making this Other consist, metaphor sends politics back to the incommensurable difference between the order of the signifier and the order of the real. It is on this basis that it is possible to conclude that, in contrast to metaphor which validates the irreducible hiatus, or chasm, separating the social order from its real grounding, and thus pointing to the Other which does not exist, metonymy, should rather be viewed as running away exactly from what metaphor ratifies, namely that the Other is, from the outset, originally, hollowed out.
This impossibility of defining a space of discursivity as a closed system, this failure of the Other to ensure a stable foundation for the establishment of the social order has ruinous repercussions in both registers, metaphor and metonymy. However, only metaphor, by providing a new master signifier, is capable of rendering a given situation legible, an operation which involves the forcing, the crossing of the bar that separates two incommensurable orders: the symbolic order and the order of the real, whereas metonymy literally lives for the preservation of this bar, which provokes, on the side of metonymy, an infinite quest for the constitutively lacking complement. In order to emphasize the importance of this point, Lacan makes a rather disconcerting assertion: metonymy, in his view, testifies to "a flight in the face of the anxiety of origins"3 exactly at the point, Lacan continues, where "logical rigor" is required.
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3 J. Lacan, "In Memory of Ernest Jones: On His theory of Symbolism", in Ecrits, p. 591.
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This brings us to one of the most important and the most laden with consequences for elaborating emancipatory politics at the present time: the current privileging of metonymy over metaphor. The seemingly ostentatious connection between politics and rhetoric may find confirmation in the involuted relationship between metaphor and metonymy in the present context of globalization: in the present context of the globalized metonymization, the symptom can no more "take on its revolutionary effect"4 as it has lost its status of a metaphor.
Expanding on a point which has also been made by Ernesto Laclau, we could take a step further and argue that what prevails in the era of a "general rhetorization"5 is a regime of mastery that relegates the metaphoric closure to a relatively subordinate role. In effect, not only is even a provisory stabilization brought about through the metaphorical totalization, radically called into question, worse, it exists only for the sake of generating a whole process of metonymization, which seems to have the effect of generating the perpetuation of the new variant of the master's discourse, without allowing a truly novel order to come into being.
Our point is namely that the modifications of the discourse of the master, the total hegemony of a discourse that is structurally metonymic, has decisive consequences for the transformative power of the politics of rhetoric, ultimately, for its capacity to change the present transcendental regime of discursivity. In fact, once the dominant discourse itself appears to be structured as an endless series of metonymic displacements, there seems to be no room left for the rhetorical subversion which consists chiefly in showing how the hegemonic, i.e. the metaphorical suture of a given social space, is already contaminated by metonymic displacements.
No effective subversion of the dominant discourse can be achieved by means of metonymy as this discourse itself, far from being threatened by its incompleteness, literally lives off its own impossible closure. Hence, in the era of the generalized rhetoric, i.e., in the era in which metonymy prevails, rhetoric seems to be oddly incapable of effecting a cut in the dominant discourse and thereby of undermining the state of affairs resulting from it. On the contrary, it seems to be rather a continuation of this discourse. As a result, rhetoric finds itself singu-
4	J. Lacan, "Comptes-rendus d'enseignement", Ornicar n° 29, 1984, p. 24.
5	E. Laclau, "The Politics of Rhetoric", in B. Cohen, J. H. Miller and A. Warminski (eds) Material Events, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2000, p. 247.
larly disarmed when it comes to tackling the chances of an oppositional politics in its contemporary conjecture, i.e. in a discursive universe in which metonymy as the organizational principle prevails.
Raising this objection implies an associated concern about the possibility of changing a discursive universe in which metonymy appears to be the structuring principle, as the constantly renewed attempts to move away from the here and now appear to be always reincluded within the dominant discourse and serve to continuously uphold it. Hence, contemporary oppositional political must pursue a different path if it is to enable us to face the present deadlock where nothing appears to stop the expansion of metonymy. This is why the question of an emancipatory politics that could bring about change capable of breaking decisively with the present impasse of metonymization looms higher than ever in the history of politics.
We can find an understanding of the specifically political consequences of this impasse in Lacan's discussion of the relationship between politics and the unconscious.
"The Unconscious is Politics"
"I do not say 'politics is the unconscious' but simply 'the unconscious is politics'"6. What is so striking about Lacan's concessive formulation that will guide us is that, under the guise of continuity, an unexpected inversion is produced, as politics seems to be occupying, contaminating even, the unconscious itself, the sole domain which is within the competence of psychoanalysis. With this intrusion of politics into the unconscious, the very subject-matter of psychoanalysis, something is surreptitiously added that suspends, ruins even, the classic Freudian thesis: "politics is the unconscious"7. What this thesis according to which the unconscious dominates politics immediately implies is that the social bond at stake in politics is governed by a certain logic that operates unbeknown to men thus brought together, a logic that "is already operative in
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6	J. Lacan, unpublished seminar "La logique du fantasme" (1966-67), the lesson of 10 May
1967.
7	Although this thesis is not found in exactly this form in any of his texts, it should be attributed to Freud.
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the unconscious",8 namely the logic of the signifier. Only in this sense can La-can himself maintain that the discourse of the master, this being his name for politics, is the discourse of the unconscious. From such a perspective, it may well appear that the formula: "politics is the unconscious", merely sums up the two preceding, now classic, definitions of the unconscious furnished by Lacan himself: "The unconscious is structured like a language" and "The unconscious is the discourse of the Other". Yet such a view is rendered extremely problematic from the moment that it appears that the Other itself is challenged, or does not exist at all.
For the claim now seems to be more radical, requiring not just that collective formations in the field of politics be analyzed as unconscious formations,9 that is, as resulting from the tropological shifts, but that the unconscious itself must be accounted for as being linked to, indeed, dependent upon, the discourse of the master. Thus, when Lacan in his seminar on The Other Side of Psychoanalysis stresses that "[A]s stupid as this discourse of the unconscious is, it is responding to something that stems from the institution of the discourse of the master himself,"10 he thereby implies that any modification of the master's discourse will have decisive consequences for the discourse of the unconscious. To begin with, in fact, it is worth noting that when Lacan claims that "the unconscious is politics", he is not only taking into account that "something changed in the master's discourse"11, announcing in that way a suspension, at least in part, of the validity of Freud's formula, thereby confining it to the era in which the Other still existed. By stating that "the unconscious is politics", Lacan can be seen to be already suggesting here that in a world in which the Other has become problematic, even nonexistent a new and more radical conception of the unconscious is required. Clearly, it is not the same to designate the unconscious as the discourse of the Other when the latter still existed, or when the existence of the Other is quite obviously, that is to say, at the level of hegemonic discourse, called into question.
8	J. Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in Ecrits, p. 673.
9	Freud was indeed the first to show, in his famous Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, that for there to be a group, it is necessary that its members are hooked up to the same identificatory signifier.
J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Book XVII, trans. by Russel Grigg, W.W. Norton, New York, London 2007, p. 91.
11 Ibid., p. 207.
This shift in Lacan's theory of the unconscious could thus be seen as a direct effect of the precariousness, in the field of politics, of the very link, the agency of the Other, on which the structural equivalence between the discourse of the unconscious and the master's discourse was founded. Taken further, it is clear that this move from the first to the second formula has direct implications for La-can's theory of the subject. In the first formula, the emphasis is on the alienated subject, the subject called into being by the Other, ultimately, the subject as an effect of the signifier. The first formula thus makes it possible to account for the fact that the subject is produced by discourse, that is, determined through the "action of the structure", yet manages to retain some capacity for action which will change the structure of which it is but an effect. The second formula, by contrast, is articulated to the barren Other. Consequently, if politics was at the outset viewed by Lacan as the paradigm of the master's discourse, the emergence of a new discourse, the capitalist discourse, problematizes the notion of the Other as a guarantor, thus shaking up the basic laws of the constitution of the social order and changing what constitutes social reality for us.
Hence, if the focal point of this essay is this replacement of the initial Freudian thesis: "politics is the unconscious", by Lacan's new one: "the unconscious is politics", this is because this substitution announces a switch of paradigms, a transition from one discursive regime to another: from a regime in which the political field is structured by the reference to the Other which operates through identification, prohibition, repression, the matrix of this regime being, of course, the master's discourse, to a regime in which politics as a field is articulated to the barred, inexistent Other and where the incompleteness of the space of dis-cursivity appears to be irrevocable and irreparable.
Retroactively, the statement "Politics is the unconscious", can then be viewed as a formalization of the equivalence between the master's discourse and the discourse of the unconscious, as indeed they are both conceived as the discourse of the Other, more exactly, like a language which is organized by the instance of the Other. The second formula amounts to the reversal of the first: if the first formula, insofar as it is centred around the famous point de capiton, provides us with a formula of metaphorization, the second formula is one of the generalization of metonymy, or, rather, of the general metonymyzation. Taking into account the mutation of the discourse of the master resulting from the total hegemony of the capitalist discourse and thus opening a perspective lacking a
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quilting point, the second formula can therefore be viewed as a formula forged by Lacan for the era of the nonexistent Other, that of the not-all, an era of a discourse without conclusion.
The difference between the first and the second formula, can therefore be exemplified in a shift that has been taking place in contemporary theorizing of politics over the past few decades - namely, a drift away from a perspective in which the realms of rhetoric and politics are viewed as antinomian towards an understanding of politics in terms of an open-ended, undecidable space of discursivity which requires tropological displacements for its very constitution. Now this concerns our problem directly: to evaluate the contemporary possibility of change in the present conjecture while taking into account the mutation of the master's discourse, that namely which is articulated to the lack in the Other, to the barred Other, and which Lacan, as is well known, designated as the discourse of the capitalist.
One of the great merits of Lacan's approach such as it is announced by the statement "the unconscious is politics" lies not only in his highlighting the deadlocks that the emancipatory politics faces in a universe of the inexistent Other. Our claim is namely that in opening the perspective of the not-all, Lacan indicates at the same time the possibility of a fundamentally different politics, one which is not restricted to the resistance to and/or the subversion of the master's closure by uncovering its radical contingency.
What follows is an attempt to outline the space of the problem of the not-all and to show if and to what extent politics and psychoanalysis are able to face and to resist the deadlicks inherent to the generalized metonymization while theoriz-98 ing and practicing new forms of the non-segregationist collectivity. Our aim in this essay is to contribute towards an understanding of this complex issue, and in particular to look at the political and theoretical difficulties associated with the construction of the universal in an infinite universe, a universe without a beyond.
From the not-all to the "for all"
We set out from the assumption that, for psychoanalysis and for politics of emancipation, there must be another perspective, another angle under which it
is possible to conceive of a way out while breaking with the prevailing conception of a solution in terms of a subversion of the existing hegemonic arrangement.
In what follows we propose to explore the status of the "for all" in politics and psychoanalysis by analyzing and bringing into question the seemingly self-evident relationship of the mutual exclusion between politics and psychoanalysis. In order to expose an affinity in dealing with the not-all in politcs and psychoanalysis, it is necessary to move beyond the traditionally hostile polarities of the singular and the universal and to reverse the usual perspective, according to which there is no passage between the domain of the singular and the domain of the universal. We will then move on to consider the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics from the point of view of the collectivity "for all" constituted through a complex practice of disidentification and production of the generic or, to use Agamben's term, "whatever" singularities.
Our starting assumption is that politics and psychoanalysis encounter the same structural impasse that of dealing with an irreducible heterogeneity. Indeed, the central issue in analysis is precisely that of a knot which "holds the subject together", an instance that links together three registers that would otherwise remain disconnected: the symbolic of his or her representation, the real of his or her enjoyment, and the imaginary consistency of the body's image. What the analysand learns at the end of his or her analysis is that nothing holds together these three instances, the real, the imaginary and the symbolic - except the symptom or sinhom as Lacan termed it in his later teaching.
Politics, likewise, irrespective of the type of government, confronts the impossible-real under the guise of a similar impasse: how to hold together singularities which have nothing in common. Modern politics, at least from the French Revolution onwards, has treated this impossibility of the social bond by constructing a form of collectivity which would be "for all". It is a paradoxical collectivity since the condition for its very constitution requires the exclusion of the exception, of some otherness that is presumed to be evading the universalisation.
One could then say, what is really at stake between psychoanalysis and politics is the issue of heterogeneity. Politics and psychonalysis thus appear to be two different languages for articulating heterogeneity that are in confrontation with
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each other. But is the heterogeneity in psychoanalysis the same as that which we encounter in politics? What is at issue here is precisely the question: under what conditions is it legitimate to bring together politics and psychoanalysis?
Indeed, any attempt to relate psychoanalysis to politics is far from obvious. According to the received idea, there seems to be no common ground permitting their encounter. In this view, psychoanalysis is presumed to be defending the rights of the singular, of that precisely which resists the universal. Indeed, psychoanalysis is by definition the domain of the "not for all". As such, psychoanalysis cannot, without losing its competence, force the boundaries of confidentiality imposed by its practice to wander into a domain in which, on the contrary, something is valid only insofar as it applies to all. From this view, psychoanalysis has no competence in the domain destined "for all". Politics, by contrast, designed as the order of the collective, deals with the masses, with the multiple. In so far as politics is preoccupied with the question of that which is valid for all, in can only turn a blind eye to the singular: the proper object of psychoanalysis. For politics, in which there seems to be no place for the singular, it would be an illigitimate step to make the opposite move: from the "for all" to that of the "only for one". Indeed, if we follow the received idea, what makes their encounter impossible, is a double interdiction of the passage from the register of the singular to that of the multiple.
We propose to reverse this perspective and to examine under what circumstances the relation between these two domains, that of the "for all" and that of the "irreducible singularity", can be established. So the very fact of posing the question of heterogenity in politics and psychoanalysis, requires the construction of a site, a scene for their encounter.
Our guide in this pivoting of perspective, will be Lacan. We will refer, more specifically, to his Television, in which he presents both his critique of politics as a way out of capitalism and the task of psychoanalysis in a universe governed by the capitalist discourse: "The more saints, the more laughter; that's my principle, to wit, the way out of capitalist discourse - which would not constitute progress, if it happens only for some."12
12 J. Lacan, Television, trans. J. Mehlman, W.W. Nortin & Co., New York 1990, p. 16.
However, it is important to consider how psychoanalysis can emerge as a way out of the capitalist discourse. It is true that Lacan harboured some ambitions concerning the role of psychoanalysis in our world, as he puts it. First of all it should be noted that to propose psychoanalysis as a solution, as the way out of capitalism, is only possible in the very specific circumstance of the collapse of the belief in the emancipatory power of politics. In this rather enigmatic remark Lacan namely pinpoints one of the greatest problems we face today: the growing impasses of the way out of capitalism, i.e. of a master's discours that yields to the generalized metonymization. At the same time psychoanalisis, according to Lacan, faces a paradoxical task: to find a way out of a discourse which is considered to be limitless, "eternal", a discourse which precisely knows of no way out. It could, then, be said that what Lacan proposes as a solution is animated by the "passion of and for the real": to invent, to force even, in the situation of an impasse, a radically new solution, that of an immanent transcendence.
It seems that psychoanalysis, according to Lacan, is capable of succeeding there where the politics of emancipation failed: to find a way out of the growing impasses of capitalism. Indeed, one is tempted to say that psychoanalysis emerges as a tenant-lieu, place-holder of the impossible, absent emancipatory politics. Or to be even more precise: psychoanalysis is a new name for the politics of emancipation - with all the consequences which follow from this substitution.
Politics of symptom or politics of love?
What then is the politics of psychoanalysis? Indeed, what politics might result from psychoanalysis? Actually, there exist two interpretations of the politics of psychoanalysis respectively termed the "politics of symptom" and the "politics of love". Both of these interpretations which have their partisans and critiques are to a certain extent grounded in Lacan's work in particular as they both take as their point of departure the irreducible heterogeneity inherent in the subject as a kernel of the real resisting the dominant social bond. There is something in the subject which makes him/her other, unlike any other in the community to which he or she belongs. While both of these paradigms refuse the antinomic relation between politics and psychoanalysis, they nevertheless differ in outlining the crucial stake of such a politics proper to psychoanalysis.
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According to first reading, the politics of psychoanalysis is a "politics of symptom". The task of psychonalysis is to examine contemporary modes of the social bond in relation to the symptom. The symptom here is conceived as a specific fixing of jouissance proper to each subject. The symptom is that which in the subject resists universalisation. The central stake in this politics of symptom is to uncover the tension between the social bond and the symptom. More particularly, to reveal the incompatibility between the allowed and the forbidden jouissance. Thus, there is, on one hand, jouissance, such as is prescribed by the social Other, and, on the other hand, there is the symptom as a mode of enjoyment, particular to each subject and which is as such irreducible to the standard jouissance. Thus, the jouissance under the guise of the symptom is a jouissance which presents a threat to the social bond.
There are two structural consequences that follow from this politics of symptom. The first is that the conclusion to be drawn from the conflict of these two jouissances is that nothing can "hold together" subjects-symptoms, nothing can bring together these irreducible modes of jouissance. From this perspective then, jouissance can be seen as the impossible-real of the social bond. Jouis-sance, as a symptom, is that irreducible otherness on which no collective logics can be grounded. The final lesson to be drawn from psychoanalysis insofar as it ventures into the domain of the social and politics is then what we would propose to call the "solipsisim of enjoyment". In other words, politics and psychoanalysis are in an antinomic relation.
There is however a problem that this "politics of symptom" cannot solve. Capitalism as the hegemonic social bond brings into question what is supposed to be the central issue of this politics: the tension between the prescribed, standard jouissance, and jouissance provided by the symptom. Thus the politics of symptom may well have been applicable in Freud's times. Today, however, there seems to be no place for such a politics of symptom precisely to the extent that the capitalist discourse itself dissolves the tension between the singular and the universal. Capitalism is namely that exceptional social bond, indeed, in a sense it could be considered to be an aberration among social bonds, since it realises what in all the other bonds seems to be impossible: its compatibility with enjoyment. Capitalism is namely a social bond which does not demand that the subject sacrifice his/her enjoyment. On the contrary, the capitalist social bond is a bond that adapts itself to the "trifle", the private enjoyment of everybody. It
is offered as an apparatus which, thanks to the scientific development and the market, is able to provide the subject with the lacking enjoyment.
So, from this perspective, not only does enjoyment not endager the capitalist social bond, but, on the contrary, capitalism is a discourse in which the "democracy of enjoyment" rules. This is because, in the capitalist discourse, the subject appears to be dis-identified and, consequently, needs to attach oneself to anything that could provide one an identity. The second consequence is that the subject of the unconscious is completed by products thrown on the market. This is why Lacan inamed the subject of the capitalist discourse, "the proletarian", this being a name for the subject which is inseparable from his or her plus-de-jouir, object a. We are dealing here with an obscure subjectivation which depends on the conversion of the surplus-value, that is to say any product thrown on the market, into the surplus-jouissance, the cause of the subject's desire. We would suggest that it is precisely this indistinction between the surplus-value and the surplus-jouissance which makes it possible for the capitalist production of "whatever objects" to capture, indeed to enchain the subject's desire (its eternal "this is not it!"). From this perspective, it could be said that capitalism, insofar as it promotes the solipsism of enjoyment, promotes at the same time a particular communal figure, that which J.-C. Millner termed a "paradoxical class", a community in which its members are joined or held together by that which disjoins them, namely enjoyment.
The second paradigm of the politics of psychoanalysis is to a certain extent the reversal of the first one. What is at issue here is to show that enjoyment, precisely as an irreducible heterogeneity, is the point at which psychoanalysis encounters politics. Far from precluding all social bond, enjoyment appears rather as a foundation for that politics which could be termed, for lack of a better term, the "politics of love". At issue in this paradigm is love for one's neighbour rather than the solipsism of enjoyment.
The texts of reference here are, of course, Civilisation and its Discontents and The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, two texts having as their point of departure the presupposition that what makes the otherness of the other is enjoyment insofar as it is evil. For Freud, the evil jouissance I suspect in the Other justifies my reservations with regard to him, the reason why the Other does not deserve my love since I can give my love only to the one who is like me. For Lacan, on the contrary, it is
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precisely this evil jouissance that the Other and I have in common. This irreducible otherness of jouissance is what joins us together. And this is why Lacan can claim that "that fundamental evil which dwells within this neighbour it also dwells in me."13 This is why Lacan in his "Kant with Sade" reproaches Sade, but in an indirect way Freud too, with the misrecognition of his own enjoyment. Sade, just like Freud, Lacan says "refuses to be my neighbour".
The reason for this refusal, according to Lacan, is that "Sade does not have neighborly enough relations with his own malice [mechancete] to encounter his neighbour in it",14 backing away, just like Freud, from the Christian commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour like thyself^'. Nothing then, to follow Lacan, is closer to me than that which I try desperately to avoid, this nameless, evil enjoyment that I encounter not only in the Other but in me too. On the other hand, it is precisely because, like myself, the Other is in the same position in relation to that what Lacan calls la chose la plus proche, that thing which is closest to me being of course jouissance, that I can love the Other. What is difficult to swallow here is not the idea that the Other is unfathomable, enigmatic, wholly other. What is unthinkable is this sameness at the level of enjoyment. That which radically separates me from the Other, his or her absolutely particular enjoyment, is at the same time that which we have in common: this immanent otherness. Paradoxically, enjoyment as this extimate otherness is the foundation of sameness.
The crucial point of Lacan's interpretation of the love of one's neighbour, far from a postmodernist exaltation of the irreducible otherness of the Other, is designated here as a strategy for handling this irreducible immancut otherness. Love, insofar as it is beyond all transaction, this non-reciprocal love, in the final analysis, as a renouncement of any direct equivalent to be given in return, all promise of payment, this wholly unmotivated, gratuituous love, love as a gift without recompension, is what Lacan proposes as a solution to the impasse caused by the encounter with the enjoyment in the Other, with the otherness of the Other. This "real" love - real in the sense that it demands the impossible - to love somebody for that which turns hatred and aggression against me - is a possible strategy for handling that otherness in me, for neutralising it.
13	J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. D. Porter, Tavis-tock/Routledge, London 1992, p. 186.
14	J. Lacan, "Kant avec Sade", Ecrits, p. 666.
lt is precisely at this point that the political implications of love of thy neighbour can be drawn out. Love of thy neighbour as a way of dealing with enjoyment is precisely what Derrida perceives as a chance for democracy. According to Derrida, "there is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity." But, Derrida adds, "there is no democracy without a 'community of friends', without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal".15
ln this second interpretation of the politics of psychoanalysis, only psychoanalysis, by bringing to light enjoyment as the irreducible singularity common to me and my neighbour, as this sameness in otherness, can elaborate a theory of the subject appropriate to democracy. lndeed, a theory of subject that is necessary to democracy.
A nonreciprocal love for thy neighbour severed from all utility, is the point at which politics and psychoanalysis necessarily meet. lndeed, such a love can be seen as a model for a nonsegregationist community. This is because the indifference to the useful which situates love beyond all altruist utilitarianism, signifies a radical mutation in the field of politics, a mutation which concerns precisely the status of the Other. For the break with the useful characterises not only love and friendship, but also hatred, as Freud himself points out in his Civilisation, because my enemy is not interested in the profit he might gain from the wrongdoing he inflicts on me. This leads to a somewhat unexpected conclusion: if the refusal of the utility, the indifference as to the possible gain is what friend and enemy have in common then the distinction between the friend and the enemy disappears.
The crucial question here is of course: what consequences can be drawn from the disappearance of the demarcation line between friend and foe, in the final analysis, from the collapse of the figure of the Other for the social bond and, consequently, for politics? This is precisely the central issue in Schmitt's theory of politics. As is well known, Schmitt situated the friend/enemy discrimination at the core of politics. ln Schmitt's view, a mere agglomeration of fellow men can never bring about the desired homogeneity of the community. At this level, not only is the other not an other at all, but this specular relation is governed
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15 J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. G. Collins, Verso, London, New York 1997, p. 22.
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by a lethal alternation: if it is you, I am not, and if it is me, it is you who are not. Schmitt's greatest merit is to have pointed out the intrinsic complicity between enmity and the Other. If we are to follow Schmitt, for homogeneity to be established at all the existence of an instance of dissimilarity, an element of otherness is required, that which at the level of the relationship between semblables, fellow men, is precisely lacking. Schmitt's introduction of the friend/enemy distinction can thus be understood as an attempt at diffusing the hatred that the fellow men would otherwise vent against one another through the "exportation" of this inherent aggressivity elsewhere. From this perspective, the role of the Other is ultimatelly pacifying.
On the other hand, however, hatred is never completely domesticated. As Schmitt himself is forced to acknowledge, the establishment of such a constitutive Beyond is always incomplete since the Other is always contaminated by antoth-er figure of the enemy, the enemy within the community. This other Other, by being unlocatable, indiscernible, corrodes the communal being, threatens the community with its dissolution. From the very start, there are then two figures of the enemy and not simply one: the symbolic enemy that Schmitt calls the political enemy. And there is yet another figure of the Other: the "real" or internal enemy. Whereas the first figure is essentially pacifying, the second activates the absolute destructive hostility leading to a permanent civil war.
In the present constellation of globalisation, we are facing a situation in which, strictly speaking, there is no instance that could play the role of the "constitutive outside", no instance of the "they" that would render possible the construction of the "we", since both "we" and "they" are always already "in", included. It is essential to realise how contemporary otherlessness, paradoxically, opens up the possibility for the emergence of a hatred that nothing can appease. The proliferation of the hated real others in an era of the nonexistence of the Other is necessary since - once the figure of the external, political, "symbolic" enemy is eliminated, once everybody is included - anybody, myself included, can occupy the place of the radical, real other. For what characterises present-day globalisation is namely the denial of all exclusion.
The exclusion of the exclusion did not, however, make the exclusion disappear, it has only become internal and thus invisible. It is precisely because the frontier between the included and the excluded is ultimately invisible, as there is no
sign, no attribute that would help me determine who is "in" and who is "out", that, in a universe without beyond or limit, a universe that knows of no exception, anybody can, in principle, find himself/herself occupying the place of the real, dehumanised Other.
This is precisely the reason that the "politics of love", a politics which aims at the impossible articulation of the otherness and the social bond, the impossibility of counting and the necessity of counting, remains forever contained within the perspective of the promise, it is forever "to come", ä venir, never in the here and now. In other words, such a politics cannot provide us with a satisfactory answer to the question: how is it possible to justify the legitimacy of the move from the singular to the universal. The politics of love is satisfied with the ceas-less affirmation of the singularity of otherness. That is why it cannot indicate a way in which this singularity could be asserted politically, in which way to politicise the singularity of the singular by introducing another principle of counting: that of counting the uncounted, the uncountable. Ultimately, what such a conception of politics in terms of love misrecognises is precisely the irreducible gap between counting and the impossibility of counting as the sole site in which the politics of emancipation can be situated. We propose to call the politics of emancipation that politics that organises a confrontation between counting and the impossibility of counting, an operation that reveals the constitutive impossibility of institutionalising a collectivity "for all", a collectivity in which what is at stake is precisely the predicate determining the belonging to the community, the demarcating line between inside/outside, us/them.
It is precisely at this point that the politics of emancipation encounters psychoanalysis. We would argue that psychoanalysis can show us how it is possible, in spite everything, to think and to practice a collectivity "for all" as an open, nonsegregationist collectivity. For the great merit of Lacan's proposed solution in Television consists in recasting the question of the universal, of the "for all", from the perspective of the infinite. Clearly, the solution proposed by Lacan is a paradoxical solution since we are dealing here with an "interior way out", if I may say so, a paradoxical way out which implies no transgression, no forcing of a barrier, since there is no barrier separating the outside and the inside. In view of this interiour way out, everything depends, of course, on the way in which we understand Lacan's statement: "It would not constitute progress if it happens only to some". Does the expression "not only for some" imply "for all" or not?
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Our claim is that it points in the direction of the "for all". To be sure, this is a very peculiar "for all" since, in the not-all, that is, in an infinite universe in which this "for all" is situated, it is impossible to state the universality of the predicate.
To fully grasp the political implications of this articulation of the "for all" to the "not-all", we must distinguish between two forms of the not-all: the not-all of incompleteness and the not-all of inconsistence. The first not-all is what we usually refer to as the all or the universal, to use its traditional name. This category designates a unity constructed through the limitation, put more precisely, through the exclusion of an exception. And there is another form of the not-all, the inconsistent not-all which can, paradoxically, be obtained, not through the exclusion of the exception, but through its inclusion. By the very fact of subtracting the exception from a series we render it limitless, non-totalizable.
Now, what exactly is the status of the exception in the not-all? We cannot simply state: there is no exception to the universal function, for instance, "All As are B". We should rather say: if there is an exception we don't know where to find it. From the perspective of the not-all, the exception is seen as being erratic, it is everywhere, yet nowhere to be found. It could then be said that the exception is generalised. We could also say, for instance, that we are all exceptions.
It then follows that the first figure of the not-all is subtractive or segregationist, because the price to be paid for the constitution of the "all" is the exclusion of those who do not posses the required predicate. A "true" not-all is non-segregationist because, from the outset, all exception is undecidable, indeterminable. Consequently, such a not-all is open, inclusive, in a word: "for all". We can see here a solution to the impasse that Schmitt confronted: how to conceive of a community when there is no Other from which the members of the community are to be distinguished. It could then be said the politics of the non-segregationist not-all is symetrically inversed compared to that proposed by Schmitt as it consists in including the Other rather than in excluding the Other. Not of course in the name of respecting the rights of otherness, openness to the Other, but in order to bring into question the communal identity, the supposed homogeneity of the group.
It is this second aspect of the not-all, one in which it is impossible to determine the existence of a totalizing exception that can best be illustrated by the politics
inherent to Lacan's School: Ecole de la cause. For there is yet another way of dealing with the problem of the structural non-totalization.
A shift in Lacan's reflections on politics in general and the functioning of a psychoanalytical institution whose principal task would be the transmission of a radical singular experience such as can only be encountered in an analysis, is marked by a paradoxical thesis according to which: a group is the real, that is, according to his vocabulary, a radical impossibility. Yet the real of the group is that which is precisely at stake in the foundation of his School: Ecole de la Cause, School of the Cause. If we propose to consider Lacan's thesis about the real of the group seriously, this is precisely because Lacan, while insisting on the impossibility of the group, by founding his School nevertheless succeeded in demonstrating that there is a way of dealing with this impossibility.
Lacan's solution to the impasse of collectivity consists in opening his School "to everybody", which is to say "to anybody". If there is absolutely nothing to define the analyst, no pregiven predicate or property on which his identification could be grounded, then the only solution is to call on all who are willing to work in the Freudian field. By inviting to his school anybody, without any qualification, Lacan created an open, empty space destined to be inhabited only by a special kind of work, the work of the "determined workers"16, be it analysis or not, as he puts it.
As the expression "determined worker" suggests, it is the work that decides the belonging to the collectivity. This also implies that this work cannot be standa-rised. The work to be done is by definition indeterminable since it cannot take place unless there is a transference to the cause. This expression, "determined worker", emphasizes the importance of the fidelity to a cause, the willingness of everyone involved in it to risk himself or herself and his or her desire in the pursuit of what is ultimately unknowable. All that the work to be done by everybody requires, and that despite the fact that neither its quality nor quantitiy can be prescribed, is a new relation to the cause; in the final analysis: the task that everybody is confronted with is that of inventing psychoanalysis.
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16 This expression was introduced by Lacan in his "Fouding Act", in Jacques Lacan, Television. A Callenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, p. 100.
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It is precisely in this sense that in Lacan's School it is impossible to distinguish good, determined workers from idlers. Rather, School of the Cause is to be seen as a collectivity that is profoundly non-segregationist. It is non-segregationist because the presence of an element allegedly heterogeneous to the collectivity, a non-analyst, is not only tolerated but required in order to bringing into question the predicate: to be an analyst.
This collectivity "for all" thus serves us as a model for the anonymous egali-tarianism in so far as it renders visible the functioning of both universalist, although incompatible logics: the one that is grounded in the exception, and the other that takes as its departure point the axiom according to which: "there is none who has not got it", namely the capacity to be a determined worker.
The paradox of the politics implied in Lacan's School resides namely in the fact that it is situated precisely at the level of that which cannot be represented nor counted as it is what is left after the operation of disidentification. In short, it is situated at the level of the pure, whatever singularity. Yet it is precisely this irreducible singularity that Lacan's School proposes to take into account, to 'count'. For the ambition of Lacan's School is not only to find a way out of the traps of identification. It is above all to find, to force, a passage there where there is a non-passage, an impasse, a deadlock, of the group. What is at stake in the foundation of the Ecole de la Cause is a paradoxical project: to universalise the singular.
We can see now that what is at stake in the distinction of the two logics of the universal is eminently political. At issue here is the way in which the logics of the not-all is set to work, made operational there where the segregationist logics operate, there where the exclusion, be it visible or invisible, reigns.
From this perspective, Lacan's School can be viewed as a special collectivity "for all", that of workers, a collectivity which implies the disidentification practised at the level of the group: everyone ought to become anyone, a whatever singularity. This is not to say that one discovers oneself as already being such. On the contrary, one only becomes such: anyone. This is a subjective transformation that everyone has to accomplish at his/her own risk. This is because the collectivity "for all" is ultimately grounded in a cause that sets us to work. As such, it
includes in the real a radical novelty: a paradoxical collectivity that is at once not-all, non-totalisable and yet at the same time "for all", offered to all.
Such a collectivity "for all" that is grounded in the real of the group, which is to say in its impossibility, is certainly a forcing: a forcing of saying, because what characterises such a collectivity is precisely the advent of an allegedly mute, uncounted, invisible instance that starts to speak out and, in so doing, asserts its presence: "We are here". But it is also a forcing of all social order and its counting. For what is at issue here is not to correct the miscount made by the social order by including those who were left outside, those who did not count, but rather to accomplish, in view of those uncounted and counted alike, the operation of transfinitisation, an operation that aims at constituting an open, non-segregationist for all that is governed by the logic of the "one by one". How many members will count this "for all" of the not-all? It doesn't matter. It is not about the numbers. On the condition, however, that it remains, just like a Canto-rian aleph, indifferent, impervious, to both all addition and all subtraction. This is because this paradoxical interior way out is nothing other than the constitution of a local, temporary, provisional collectivity "for all". It is not to remain forever. All that remains forever, ultimately, is its name and its call.
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Politiser la sante Politicizing Health
Rodrigo de la Fabian*
« De la fonction politico-clinique du temoignage »
1. Introduction
Dans le livre d'Axel Honneth de 1992 La Lutte pour la Reconnaissance^, l'auteur situe la theorie sociale de la lutte pour la reconnaissance, d'inspiration hege-lienne, par opposition a la tradition liberale hobbesienne. Hobbes pensait que la reaction « naturelle » d'un homme lorsqu'il rencontre un autre homme, etait la distance, la mefiance et la lutte pour la survivance. La raison de ceci, c'est qu'il concevait la nature humaine comme eminemment individuelle, egoiste et autonome, en supposant le pacte social comme un calcul economique qui aidait a preserver, de fagon paradoxale, cette autonomie mise en danger par la lutte entre les individus. Selon Honneth, Hegel va retenir l'idee que la societe et la loi humaines sont construites a partir d'une certaine forme de lutte, sauf qu'il va redefinir cette lutte d'une toute autre maniere. En effet, Hegel va identifier la presence d'un pacte « precontractuel » (Honneth, 1995, p. 42) operant deja dans la lutte decrite par Hobbes. C'est-a-dire que Hegel pense que si l'on ne presuppose pas ce minimum de reconnaissance mutuelle operant deja dans l'etat de nature hobbesien, on ne pourrait pas simplement penser la coexistence des sujets, pas meme pour se disputer. Pour Hegel, le crime, comme par exemple le vol, ne s'ex-plique pas comme une consequence de la passion egoiste. Le voleur n'accomplit pas le crime par convoitise, mais en tant que sujet exclu du droit a la propriete ; par le vol, il cherche a etre reconnu, a montrer a l'autre qu'il existe et qu'il a les memes droits. De la meme fagon, pour l'agresse, la violence issue du vol qu'il experimente, tiendrait surtout au sentiment du manque de reconnaissance en tant que sujet de droit, manque qui est vecu comme une injure, comme un Missachtung, un dis-respect selon Honneth. Donc, ce que le crime et l'injure mettent en evidence, c'est justement l'existence de ce proto-pacte anterieur a la violence. Pour le voleur, le fait de commettre le vol, implique qu'il veut etre reconnu par le
1 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The moral Grammar of Social Conflict, Polity Polity Press, Cambridge 1995. (Honneth, 1995)
* Facultad de Psicologia, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
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proprietaire, pour l'agresse, le desir de vengeance montre a quel point sa subjectivity depend de la reconnaissance du voleur. Ä ce sujet, Honneth ecrit :
Au contraire, dans leur propre orientation-action, les deux sujets ont deja favorable-ment pris l'autre en compte, avant de s'engager dans les hostilites. En fait, les deux doivent deja avoir accepte l'autre d'avance comme un partenaire pour l'interaction et dont ils acceptent que leur propre activite soit dependante. Dans le cas du sujet sans propriete, cette affirmation prealable est mise en evidence dans la deception avec laquelle il reagit face a la saisie inconsideree de sa propriete par l'autre. Dans le cas du sujet avec propriete, par contraste, la meme affirmation prealable est demontree par l'empressement avec lequel il reprend l'objet a l'autre ; la definition de la situation comme si elle etait sa propre interpretation-action. En vertu du contenu proposi-tionnel de leurs orientations-actions, les deux parties ont simplement deja reconnu l'autre, meme si cette entente sociale n'est pas thematiquement presente. (Honneth, 1995, pp. 45-46. La traduction est mienne.)
La lutte presuppose donc une affirmation premiere, une reconnaissance. Dans ce contexte, Honneth nous propose differents modes de reconnaissance qui vont de l'amour, en tant que reconnaissance de la condition individuelle de l'etre hu-main, en passant par la loi, qui reconnait la dimension universelle de l'individu, pour arriver a une forme plus achevee de reconnaissance, celle de la solidarite - estime sociale -, c'est-a-dire, la reconnaissance de la condition particuliere du sujet dans un contexte universel. Ainsi, la lutte pour la reconnaissance est teleo-logiquement mue par la quete ultime de reconnaissance biographique - parti-culiere - l dans un contexte collectif ou social. Vu de l'autre cote, cela veut dire que l'injure, qui est a la base des mouvements sociaux et des querelles individuelles, est une consequence de la sensation de n'etre pas reconnu par l'autre : soit en tant que sujet d'amour, de loi ou digne d'estime sociale.
Or, le but de cet article est d'interroger justement la naturalisation du champ intersubjectif ou une certaine circularite entre l'injure et le crime tend a monopoliser le vise du politique, en laissant en dehors la question historico-contin-gente de la production du proto-pacte, de l'affirmation premiere. Autrement dit, ce que Honneth laisse en dehors de la lutte politique, c'est la question capitale de la creation des conditions minimales de reconnaissance ou, eventuellement, une injure et un crime peuvent se perpetrer. Ou encore : il me semble qu'il y a une forme de violence qui, si l'on veut, est anterieure ou laterale a la question
du crime et de l'injure ; violence qu'implique l'exclusion de certains sujets hors du proto-pacte, et par consequent, hors de la possibility du crime et de la lutte pour la reconnaissance.
Le but de cet article est d'explorer dans un premier temps les conditions de cette forme d'exclusion puis, dans un deuxieme temps, d'essayer de trouver, tant du cote du politique que du cote de la clinique psychanalytique, des strategies pour se rapprocher de l'exclu avec qui il n'y a plus un cadre d'intelligibilite pour ga-rantir le proto-pacte dont nous parle Honneth.
2. Reconnaissance, reconnaissabilite, apprehension.
Dans son dernier livre dont le titre en frangais est Ce qui fait une vie: Essai sur la violence, la guerre et le deuil2 a propos de l'invasion de l'Irak par les Etats-Unis et, en general, de la guerre menee par cette nation contre le terrorisme, Judith Butler se demande quelles sont les conditions d'intelligibilite qui font que cer-taines vies sont reconnues comme precieuses, qu'il faut proteger et dont la perte fait pleurer une nation, tandis que d'autres vies, infrahumaines, facilement tua-bles, ne sont pas dignes d'etre pleurees. Ä ce sujet, elle ecrit : « Une vie qui ne peut pas etre pleuree, en est une dont on ne peut pas porter le deuil parce qu'elle n'a jamais ete vecue, c'est-a-dire, elle n'a jamais compte comme une vie. » (Butler, 2009, p. 38. La traduction est mienne.) Ä partir de cette evidence historique, c'est-a-dire, a partir d'une certaine forme d'exclusion qui situe l'exclu en dehors du champ d'intelligibilite, Butler va preciser les conditions historiques implici-tes dans le phenomene de la reconnaissance :
Si la reconnaissance est un acte ou une pratique entrepris par au moins deux sujets, et qui, comme le cadre hegelien le suggere, constitue une action reciproque, alors la reconnaissabilite decrit les conditions generales sur lesquelles la reconnaissance peut avoir lieu et a lieu. [_] une vie doit etre intelligible comme une vie, elle doit se conformer a certaines conceptions de ce qu'est une vie, de fagon a devenir reconnais-sable. (Butler, 2009, pp. 6-7. La traduction est mienne).
Butler va donc distinguer entre reconnaissance, reconnaissabilite et intelligibi-lite. La reconnaissance est l'acte entrepris par deux sujets ; ce qui suppose a
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2 Judith Butler, Frames of War. When is life Grivable? Verso, London 2010. (Butler, 2009)
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la base un champ commun entre eux dans lequel la rencontre a lieu. Tel que Honneth le dit, la reconnaissance suppose une sorte de proto-pacte, elle suppose une acceptation d'une communalite intersubjective qui cree les conditions minimales, meme pour se disputer a mort. Ce proto-pacte qui instaure la possi-bilite d'aimer ou de hair est une donnee premiere, exterieure a l'histoire et non discutee par Honneth. Au contraire, Butler va montrer que cette communalite est un fait historique, qui n'est garanti par aucune forme substantive susceptible de determiner avant la lettre les traits qui produisent la difference entre l'humain et l'inhumain. En ce sens, dit Butler, l'intelligibilite serait le cadre historique qui etablirait le domaine de ce qu'on peut connaitre. Or, si tout acte de connaissance n'est pas un acte de reconnaissance, inversement, on ne peut pas faire la meme affirmation, puisque tout acte de reconnaissance est un acte de connaissance. Donc, Butler va distinguer, a l'interieur du champ d'intelligibilite, la dimension de la reconnaissabilite. Avec ce neologisme, elle identifie les particularites so-cio-historiques qui creent les conditions singulieres dans le champ de l'intelligi-bilite pour la reconnaissance.
Mais le texte de Butler ne va pas dans le sens de la creation d'une nouvelle conception de la reconnaissance. En revanche, en mettant en lumiere les conditions historiques de la reconnaissance, elle cherche surtout a montrer ses limites. Si la reconnaissance n'est pas garantie par une communalite a-historique, c'est-a-dire, si la reconnaissance est un acte contingent, il peut alors y avoir des rapports entre etre humains qui ne peuvent pas s'expliquer dans un contexte de lutte pour la reconnaissance, parce qu'ils ont lieu en dehors de tout pacte social, en dehors de ce champ intersubjectif minimal qui garantit la possibilite de se situer dans un plan d'interaction en commun. Entre les vies qui peuvent etre pleurees et celles qui n'ont pas cette dignite, il y a un abime qui brise sinon le champ d'intelligibilite, surement les conditions de reconnaissabilite. Selon Butler, les vies qui n'ont pas la possibilite d'etre pleurees, ne sont pas des vies degradees, injuriees, parce qu'elles sont simplement en dehors de ce qu'on peut qualifier comme etant une vie humaine. Donc pas de lutte possible : les pierres des Palestiniens ne touchent pas les Occidentaux et pas seulement parce que ces derniers sont plus puissants. Si, selon les termes de Hegel, le crime est une fagon de revendiquer la sensation de ne pas etre reconnu par l'autre, pour qu'il soit possible, pour que la pierre puisse faire mal, il est alors necessaire que le besoin de reconnaissance de l'agresse depende en quelque sorte de celui qui commet le crime. Or, justement, l'absence de reconnaissabilite brise ce circuit
intersubjectif. Pour utiliser une expression levinassienne, les Occidentaux ne sont pas seulement plus puissants que les Palestiniens, parce qu'ils sont au-de-la du champ du pouvoir, ils sont la ou les Palestiniens ne peuvent plus pouvoir3. Les pierres des Palestiniens peuvent faire mal aux corps qu'eventuellement elles frappent, mais elles ne font pas mal a la subjectivite du frappe, justement parce qu'elles sont absolument muettes. Voila le type de non-rapport entre ceux qui ont la dignite pour etre pleures et ceux qui ne l'ont pas.
Donc la reconnaissance ne peut pas etablir un lien avec ceux qui sont radi-calement exclus du champ de reconnaissabilite. La consequence politique de cette denaturalisation des conditions historico-contingentes qui permettent la reconnaissance, c'est que le denuement des radicalement exclus ne peut pas etre directement reconnu. Autrement dit, la politique de la reconnaissance est encore prise dans un registre aristocratique tant qu'elle naturalise le terrain egalitaire ou la reconnaissance a lieu. En effet, seul un aristocrate, qui veut re-produire ses propres conditions de vie, peut « naivement » croire en ce champ de communalite a-historique. Si on etait tous des Atheniens, alors la lutte pour la reconnaissance aurait suffi pour comprendre les luttes sociales. Mais, parce que les Barbares existent encore, la question politique posee par Butler a du sens. La theorie morale de Honneth est construite sur un presuppose : la condition d'etre humain est quelque chose d'evident en soi, tandis que Butler nous montre les conditions historico-contingentes des categories qui definissent la dimension de l'humain. Dans ce contexte, la question est : comment peut-on reconnaitre l'interpellation de ceux qui sont en dehors du proto-pacte ? Quelles sont les conditions pour que quelqu'un pris dans l'a priori historique4, pour re-prendre le concept de Foucault, forme par l'intelligibilite, la reconnaissabilite et la reconnaissance, puisse se sentir responsable de la souffrance de ceux qui ont ete radicalement exclus ? Or, Judith Butler va proposer une autre forme de rapport avec eux, un rapport qui n'est pas purement negatif ou exclusif. Il s'agit de « l'apprehension » :
[_] on pourrait distinguer entre « apprehender » et « reconnaitre » une vie. « Reconnaissance » est un terme plus fort, qui decoule des textes de Hegel [_]. « Apprehension » est un terme moins precis, car il peut impliquer le « marquer », le « registrer », le «
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3	E. Levinas, Le temps et l'autre, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1983, p. 62. (Levinas,
1983)
4	Michel Foucault, L'archeologie du savoir, Gallimard, Paris 1969. (Foucault, 1969)
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prendre acte » - ackowledging - sans une cognition pleine. Si elle -l'apprehension -est une forme de savoir, elle est liee a la sensation et a la perception, mais pas tou-jours - ou pas encore - sous une forme conceptuelle de savoir. Ce que nous sommes en mesure d'apprehender est certainement facilite par des normes de reconnaissance mais ce serait une erreur de dire que nous sommes entierement limites par les normes existantes de reconnaissance lorsqu'on apprehende une vie. Nous pouvons appre-hender, par exemple, que quelque chose n'est pas reconnu par la reconnaissance. En effet, cette apprehension peut devenir la base d'une critique des normes de reconnaissance. (Butler, 2009, pp. 4-5. La traduction est mienne.)
Butler essaye de trouver une fagon de penser un rapport possible entre ces deux formes de vie, sans invoquer la capacite humaine de s'affranchir de ces conditions socio-historiques. Si Foucault a cree ce concept un peu etrange, presque oxymoronique appele « l'a priori historique », je voudrais evoquer cette pos-sibilite d'un rapport a la fois historiquement determine mais pas totalement, comme une « transcendance historique».
Apprehender une vie n'est pas reconnaitre, dit Butler. L'acte d'apprehender garde dans son creur une certaine opacite constitutive, opacite qui, comme on va le voir, ne limite pas l'apprehension mais qui est plutot la condition de son existence. En effet, Butler considere la reconnaissance comme un acte trop pris dans la lumiere5, c'est-a-dire, que le trait qui etablit la condition de communalite est une positivite qui s'offre donc a la coherence et a l'unite. Pour utiliser un concept de Lacan, on peut dire qu'il s'agit de l'Un unifiant6. En d'autres termes, la reconnaissance est etablie a partir de ce que deux personnes, ou plus, ont en commun et non pas a partir de ce qui les distingue et les separe. Donc, un rapport etabli a partir de ce qui nous separe radicalement est la question en jeu dans la distinction entre reconnaissance et apprehension et dans ce que j'ai appele « transcendance historique».
Dans l'ffiuvre de Butler, ce trait qui permet de penser l'apprehension, qui etablit un champ commun non pas a partir de l'Un unifiant, mais de la difference, de
5	Judith Butler, Giving and Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press, New York 2005, p. 41. (Butler 2005)
6	Jacques Lacan, L'envers de la psychanalyse. Le seminaire, livre XVII, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1991, p. 180. (Lacan, 1991)
l'intervalle, c'est la precarite7 ; la vulnerability de la vie humaine ; ou pour eviter la notion d'« humain », encore trop metaphysique, je dirais la vulnerability de la vie en tant que sociale.
La precarite, dit Butler, implique le fait de vivre socialement, c'est-a-dire le fait que notre vie soit toujours, en quelque sorte, entre les mains des autres. La vul-nerabilite implique le fait d'etre expose a la fois a ceux que l'on connait et a ceux que l'on ne connait pas pour la plupart (Butler, 2009, p. 14). L'apprehension est donc la fagon dans laquelle la precarite de l'exclu peut etre partialement entendue.
Mais la precarite, en tant que trait opaque, n'est pas, pour Butler, quelque chose que l'apprehension peut capturer, mettre en lumiere. Il est un peu paradoxal, dit Butler, de penser que d'une part, il faut produire des normes suffisamment plurielles permettant la democratisation des normes de reconnaissance de la precarite - de fagon a ce que plus de gens acquierent le droit d'etre pleure - et d'autre part, de penser que la precarite ne peut pas etre reconnue complete-ment, qu'elle reste toujours opaque.
La precarite ne peut pas etre correctement reconnue. Elle peut etre apprehendee, prise, rencontree et presupposee par certaines normes de reconnaissance tout comme elle peut etre refusee par ces normes. [_] nous ne devons pas penser que la reconnaissance de la precarite maitrise ou capture voire connait pleinement ce qu'elle re-connait. (Butler, 2009, p. 13. La traduction est mienne.)
L'objet de l'apprehension, la precarite, a partir de laquelle est etabli un champ de communication entre des sujets qui se trouvent dans un rapport d'exclusion, implique de mettre en relief la double question de l'opacite qui nous habite. Opacite par rapport a nous-memes et opacite pour les autres. Si la lutte pour la reconnaissance hegelienne est mobilisee par le desir d'effacer la distance entre qui je suis pour moi et pour les autres, l'apprehension, par contre, est mobilisee par le desir de cette limite. L'apprehension ne cherche pas a effacer la limite opaque, mais a la soulever en tant que condition d'exclusion commune. La question de l'apprehension implique la possibilite de penser comment l'element differen-
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7 Judith Butler, Precarious life. The power of mourning and violence, Verso, London 2004. (Butler, 2004.) Cf. Butler, 2009.
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tiel, l'abime qui separe les vies dignes d'etre pleurees de celles qui ne le sont pas, et devient directement un point de communion. En outre, l'acte d'apprehension implique la production d'une communalite qui n'est pas garantie par un champ de reconnaissabilite prealable.
La precarite est le point dans lequel notre constitution subjective est assujettie aux autres, l'impossibilite d'etablir une identite coherente, une identite unifiee. La lutte pour la reconnaissance est une quete qui cherche a effacer ce point d'opacite. Elle a surement une valeur politique. Comme le montre Butler, il faut avancer dans la production de normes de reconnaissance plus democratiques, mais on ne peut pas oublier que cette lutte peut redoubler l'exclusion de ceux qui se situent en dehors du champ de reconnaissabilite. Il ne faut pas oublier que nous ne sommes pas tous des Atheniens.
La responsabilite politico-sociale de democratiser, de pluraliser les normes de reconnaissances, est un effet de l'apprehension de l'alterite de l'exclu. Butler se demande ce qu'il faut faire pour provoquer un sentiment d'indignation vis-a-vis des inegalites et des formes d'exclusion, comment creer les conditions politiques qui rendent possibles que les vies qui ont le droit d'etre pleurees commencent a pleurer pour les vies qui ne l'ont pas. En particulier, elle se demande comment representer la vulnerabilite des oppresses de fagon a creer l'indignation et la responsabilite chez les Americains.
3. De la fonction politique du temoignage
Je voudrais introduire un autre concept, que l'on ne trouve pas chez Butler, mais chez Agamben8, pour essayer de repondre a cette question. Il s'agit de la fonc-tion politique du temoignage. Que ce soit a travers une photo ou un discours, etc., ce rapport sans rapport que l'apprehension habilite, aurait pour fonction de temoigner des exclus, de fagon a remettre en question la methode habituelle de construction des normes de reconnaissance.
Je voudrais seulement retenir le creur de la question du temoignage chez Agamben, en particulier le mouvement qu'il fait pour se debarrasser du paradoxe de
8 Agamben, Giorgio: Remnants of Auschwitz. The witness and the Archive, Zone Books, New York 2002. (Agamben, 2002)
Primo Levi, selon lequel, la Shoah est un evenement sans temoin. Le survivant, dit Levi, par le seul fait d'avoir survecu, n'est pas le vrai temoin de l'horreur. Le vrai temoin, le temoin integral, c'est l'effondre, celui qui n'a plus de voix. Or, selon Agamben, cette limite du temoignage decelee par Levi est en fait la condition de sa possibilite. L'impossibilite pour le survivant de representer l'effondre met en acte, de fagon performative, l'impossibilite pour l'effondre de prendre la parole. Deux impossibilites, celle de l'exclu et celle du survivant qui s'entretis-sent. La seule fagon de rendre hommage a l'exclu est de ne pas pouvoir le faire, en creant une certaine communalite dans l'impossibilite. Si le survivant nomme l'effondre, alors le fait que ce mot soit prisonnier de l'a priori historique rend invisible la violence de l'exclusion. On compte les morts des exclus, on compte les morts palestiniens ou irakiens, mais ces nombres, pris dans le dispositif dis-cursif de la guerre, ne font que confirmer la matrice d'exclusion. Le seul nom possible pour l'exclu cotoie l'impossibilite pour le survivant de le nommer.
Se sentir interpele par l'exclu, etre perturbe par sa souffrance sans pouvoir evi-ter d'en temoigner, depend de la possibilite de produire un champ minimal d'in-telligibilite. Je voudrais mettre l'accent sur la question de la production, en tant que vraie demarche politico-reflexive qui implique de questionner les normes de reconnaissance acceptees. La possibilite ouverte a quelqu'un de se decaler du dispositif discursif, la possibilite donc, de devenir la proie des sans-voix, im-plique une activite critique. Si on ne veut pas reintroduire une metaphysique de la raison, c'est-a-dire, si on essaye de rester tout pres des determinations histo-rico-discursives, alors il faut aussi penser aux conditions de production de ce decalage. Il faut y penser de fagon historico-strategique, justement parce qu'il n'y a pas de garanties transcendantales - telle que la raison - d'ou soutenir une critique. En fait, la critique fait partie de son objet, de sorte que la production du decalage depende du dispositif discursif que l'on critique. Ceci a deux consequences avec lesquelles nous allons critiquer Agamben et nous rapprocher de la clinique psychanalytique.
Agamben identifie l'exclu, le temoin integral, avec une figure propre des Lagers : der Muselmann. On ne sait pas vraiment pourquoi dans les Camps de Concentration, on a ainsi nomme les gens qui etaient des morts-vivants, des prisonniers qui deambulaient sans espoir, ayant perdu toute forme de resistance, dociles et incoherents. L'hypothese la plus plausible, selon Agamben, c'est qu'ils ont ete nommes ainsi a cause du prejuge qui caricature le rapport entre les musulmans
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et leur dieu particulierement devot et meme soumis. Or, par rapport a cette cate-gorie, Agamben est explicite : der Muselmann est la derniere forme d'exclusion possible, au-dela il n'y a que la chambre a gaz. Le Lager, dit Agamben, etait un dispositif de biopouvoir qui cherchait a separer le bios - la vie parlant, le survi-vant - du zoe - la vie purement organique (Agamben 2002, pp. 155-156). Et der Muselmann est son produit le plus sophistique : un homme reduit a n'etre que zoe. Voila l'impossibilite du cote de la victime.
De l'autre cote, c'est-a-dire, du point de vue du survivant, pour Agamben l'impos-sibilite a laquelle il se heurte est la consequence de la limite du langage humain a signifier. Donc, si le survivant en parle, il va alors necessairement rencontrer cette limite, impossibilite qui, dans le temoignage, doit s'effondrer sur celle de der Muselmann. Donc, ce qui representait pour Levi l'impossibilite de porter te-moignage, devient chez Agamaben une possibility dans une impossibility. Selon lui, c'est justement l'impossibilite du survivant d'en parler qui lui donne la pos-sibilite de temoigner du radicalement exclu. Pour etre plus precis, la possibilite du temoignage dependrait d'une double impossibilite : celle de l'exclu qui est en dehors de tout cadre de reconnaissabilite et qui par consequent, n'a plus acces a la parole, et celle du temoin, qui, meme en ayant acces a la parole, ne trouve jamais les « bons mots » pour en parler. Par rapport a ceci Agamben ecrit :
Cela signifie que le temoignage est la disjonction entre deux impossibilites de porter temoignage ; ceci signifie que le langage, afin de porter temoignage, doit donner la place au non-langage afin de demontrer l'impossibilite de porter temoignage. Le langage du temoignage est un langage qui ne signifie plus et alors, il avance vers ce qui est sans langage, au point de prendre sur lui une autre insignifiance - celle du temoin integral, celle qui, par definition, ne peut pas porter temoignage. Pour porter temoignage, il n'est donc pas suffisant de ramener le langage a son propre non-sens [...]. Il est necessaire que ce son insense - le son emis par le Muselmann - devienne, a son tour, la voix de quelque chose ou de quelqu'un qui, pour des raisons toute autres, ne peut pas porter temoignage. Il est donc necessaire que l'impossibilite de porter te-moignage, la « lacune » qui constitue le langage humain, s'effondre, laissant la place a une impossibilite de temoigner differente - celle qui n'a pas de langage. (Agamben, 2002, p. 39. La traduction est mienne.)
L'impossibilite generale du langage d'arriver a une signification - la « lacune du langage », selon Agamben - contre laquelle se heurte celui qui veut porter temoi-
gnage, devrait donc collapser sur une toute autre impossibilite, celle de l'exclu. C'est alors a partir de l'articulation disjonctive entre ces deux impossibilites de natures diverses que le temoignage devient possible selon Agamben. Il s'agirait d'une forme de reconnaissance dans le temoignage de ce que l'on ne peut pas re-connaitre dans l'autre. Reconnaissance dans laquelle le survivant offre sa propre opacite pour que l'opacite de l'exclu puisse trouver une certaine place parmi les vivants. On est donc tres pres de la notion d'apprehension chez Butler.
Alors, il me semble que dans cette conception de temoignage chez Agamben, il y a une certaine a-historicite qu'il faut doublement questionner. D'un cote, der Muselmann est une cristallisation de la victime, en devenant une sorte de mesure universelle de la souffrance humaine par exclusion. L'utilisation faite par Agamben de der Muselmann, lui permet de resoudre d'une fagon a-histo-rique la question tres subtile de l'apprehension. En effet, Butler critique la position conservatrice qu'implique la defense des droits a la vie, comme si la vie pouvait exister en tant que telle, en dehors des conditions contingentes de sa reconnaissabilite. Dans le meme sens, la victime n'existe pas avant de creer les conditions historico-politiques qui lui permettent d'etre interpellee par sa souf-france. C'est-a-dire que la figure de der Muselmann, le sens de sa souffrance, ne peut pas etre directement extrapole en dehors des camps de concentration sans l'idealiser et le faire sortir des conditions historiques de sa production. L'apprehension, donc, implique un rapport avec cette singularite historiquement situee dans sa particularite avant d'etre positionnee dans un champ de reconnaissa-bilite commune ou, en passant par les lois generales de la reconnaissance, elle deviendrait plus abstraite et, par consequent, comparable a d'autres formes de souffrance. En deuxieme lieu et dans le meme sens, je me demande si du cote du survivant, l'impossibilite generale, non historique, inscrite dans le langage, est la limite la plus appropriee pour faire resonner la voix des sans-voix. Pour etre plus precis, je me demande quelles sont les consequences politiques de croire que la limite universelle et a-historique du langage est le ressort qui permet au temoin de se decaler des normes de reconnaissance dominantes. Ou bien, la meme question mais posee autrement : quelles peuvent etre les consequences de penser qu'une partie inherente de la critique politique des formes de reconnaissance habituelles devrait chercher a creer les conditions de production, toujours historiquement situees, d'une telle limite ? Si cette limite est la condition necessaire pour l'ouverture vers des formes de vies qui sont en de-hors du champ de reconnaissabilite, alors il me semble tres important d'essayer
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de repondre a ces questions. Et je vais tenter une reponse du point de vue de la clinique psychanalytique.
4. De la reconnaissance au temoignage dans la clinique psycha-nalytique
Dans les premiers seminaires et textes de Lacan, nous trouvons une forte influence de la theorie hegelienne de la reconnaissance. En fait, pour lui, le but de la cure psychanalytique etait intimement lie a la reconnaissance intersub-jective. Pour comprendre la place centrale de ce concept dans le premier Lacan, il faut se souvenir de sa definition du desir : « le desir est le desir de l'Autre ». « De l'Autre » dans le double sens du genitif ; l'Autre etant a la fois la cause du desir et son destinataire. « Le desir humain est, chez le sujet humain - dit Lacan en 1954 - realise dans l'autre, par l'autre, - chez l'autre comme vous dites. »9 Le desir humain est donc un desir de reconnaissance, un desir de desir. Dans ce sens, Lacan va identifier le refoulement non pas comme un acte prive, mais comme un acte intersubjectif. Ä ce sujet, il dit : « C'est a ce niveau que le sujet a a reconnaitre et a faire reconnaitre ses desirs. Et s'ils ne sont pas reconnus, ils sont comme tels interdits, et c'est la que commence en effet le refoulement. » (Lacan, 1975, p. 287). Le refoulement est donc un manque de reconnaissance que la cure psychanalytique devrait transformer. Or, pour preciser le type de reconnaissance intersubjective qui devrait operer dans le processus de la cure, Lacan va introduire une distinction capitale entre la dimension imaginaire et symbolique de la reconnaissance (Lacan, 1975, p. 276).
La reconnaissance imaginaire se dirige vers un semblable, quete qui s'avere tou-jours decevante, toujours frustrante. La raison en est que le semblable ne peut nous reconnaitre qu'en tant que moi, c'est-a-dire, comme une forme d'objectiva-tion du sujet. Or, du point de vue de Lacan, toute forme d'objectivation rate la reconnaissance du sujet.
Par rapport a ceci, Lacan dit :
9 Jacques Lacan, Les ecrits techniques de Freud. Le seminaire - livre I, Editions du Seuil, Poche, Paris 1975, p. 277. (Lacan, 1975)
Nous avons toujours discerne deux plans sur lesquels s'exerce l'echange de la parole humaine - le plan de la reconnaissance en tant que la parole lie entre les sujets ce pacte qui les transforme, et les etablit comme sujets humains communicant - le plan du communique, oü on peut distinguer toutes sortes de paliers, l'appel, la discussion, la connaissance, l'information, mais qui en dernier lieu, tend a se realiser l'accord sur l'objet. Le terme d'accord y est encore, mais l'accent est mis ici sur l'objet considere comme exterieur a l'action de la parole, et que la parole exprime. (Lacan 1975, p. 175)
Donc, selon Lacan, l'echange de la parole aurait lieu sur deux plans : le plan de la reconnaissance symbolique du dire et le plan imaginaire du dit, de l'ob-jet exterieur a l'action de la parole. Le plan symbolique implique la reconnaissance du sujet en tant que tel, du sujet non objective dans le dit, mais dans la fluidite du dire. Or, ce qui permettrait la reconnaissance symbolique, c'est un pacte different de l'accord au niveau imaginaire. L'accord, au niveau imaginaire, porte toujours sur l'objet, sur une exteriorite par rapport a l'acte de parole. Pour Lacan, toute reconnaissance a ce niveau est fondamentalement instable et est fondee sur un pacte prealable. Le seul fait de s'adresser et d'etre l'objet d'une adresse, implique de donner a l'Autre une position de privilege. En 1960, Lacan ecrit : « le pacte est partout prealable a la violence avant de la perpetuer, et ce que nous appelons le symbolique domine l'imaginaire »'0. En d'autres termes, si le pacte est prealable a la violence, il se derobe donc a l'histoire. C'est-a-dire, les sujets historiques pris dans un plan intersubjectif ne peuvent sinon confirmer le pacte symbolique.
Lacan va identifier le plan du dire comme parole pleine et le plan du dit comme parole vide : « La parole pleine - ecrit Lacan - est celle qui vise, qui forme la verite telle qu'elle s'etablit dans la reconnaissance de l'un par l'autre. La parole pleine est la parole qui fait acte. Un des sujets se trouve, apres, autre qu'il n'etait 127 avant. » (Lacan 1975, p. 174)
En ce sens, l'analyste, selon Lacan, devrait contribuer a la production d'une parole pleine et pour ceci, il faudrait qu'il se situe non pas du cote du petit autre mais dans le grand Autre comme un vrai sujet 11. L'analyse du transfert irait dans
Lacan, Jacques, « Subversion du sujet et dialectique du desir » (1960). In Ecrits II, Editions du Seuil, Poche, Paris 1971, p. 290. (Lacan, 1971)
11 Jacques Lacan, « Introduction du grand Autre » in Le moi dans la theorie de Freud et dans la technique psychanalytique. Le seminaire, livre II, Editions du Seuil, Poche, Paris 1980. (Lacan,
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le sens de la reduction des figures imaginaires par lesquelles l'analyste va etre recouvert par le transfert, de fagon que l'analyste puisse se situer, finalement, comme le veritable interlocuteur, la vraie cause du desir, c'est-a-dire, dans le grand Autre en tant que sujet capable de produire la levee du refoulement a travers la reconnaissance symbolique.
Mais ce modele de cure, ou la reconnaissance occupait une place centrale, ne va pas durer longtemps chez Lacan. L'importance du reel et l'invention de l'objet petit « a » vont vite bouleverser cette vision de la cure analytique. En premier lieu, la critique de Lacan quant a la completude du symbolique va limiter la possibilite de la reconnaissance. En d'autres termes, le fait que le grand Autre soit castre, implique qu'il va toujours rester une marge, un residu, un differend du sujet que l'Autre ne peut pas reconnaitre. C'est-a-dire que le vrai sujet n'existe ni du cote des individus, ni du cote du grand Autre. En deuxieme lieu, les pro-gres dans la theorie du surmoi et, en particulier, l'appropriation par Lacan de la geniale intuition freudienne de la loi insensee et non satisfaisable du surmoi, lui font decouvrir la dimension surmoique de la reconnaissance. Dans Malaise dans la Civilisation, Freud affirme que les renoncements faits au nom du surmoi, au lieu de l'apaiser, le rendent encore plus puissant et sadique. Avec cette intuition, Freud venait de demasquer la fantaisie nevrotique du renoncement au desir, pour attendre qu'il soit un jour rendu comme signal de reconnaissance du surmoi. Freud se convainc que demander une reconnaissance du surmoi pour recuperer le desir est un chemin voue a l'echec. En des termes lacaniens, ceci implique que si le grand Autre est castre et en plus habite par une loi insen-see, demander sa reconnaissance constitue un acte profondement alienant qui conduirait a donner existence et consistance a une subjectivite fantasmatique qui nous tyrannise. En troisieme lieu, le fait d'avoir etabli une distinction nette entre demande d'amour et desir, va contribuer a la redefinition de ce dernier. Pour Patrick Guyomard12, chez Lacan, il ne faut pas demander le desir - le de-mander serait un piege surmoique - mais il faut l'affirmer. De cette fagon, en 1960, Lacan definira le desir avec une citation de Paul Eluard : le dur desir de
1980) et Jacques Lacan, Intervention sur le transfert (1951). In Ecrits II. Editions du Seuil, Poche, Paris 1999.
12 Patrick Guyomard, La jouissance du tragique. Antigone, Lacan et le desir de l'analyste, Aubier, Paris 1992, p. 25.
durer13. Le desir, a la difference de la demande, plutot que de chercher la reconnaissance de l'Autre, cherche a se perpetuer ; desir de desirer plutot que desir de l'Autre.
Ceci va transformer la conception du traitement chez Lacan. En comparant les citations suivantes, la difference devient evidente, particulierement en ce qui concerne le rapport entre traitement et fonction de la reconnaissance : En 1955, Lacan dit :
L'analyse doit viser au passage d'une vraie parole, qui joigne le sujet a un autre sujet, de l'autre cöte du mur du langage. C'est la relation derniere du sujet a un Autre veritable [_]. (Lacan, 1980, p. 338)
Tandis qu'en 1960, Lacan dit :
Que nous dit Freud ? - sinon qu'en fin de compte, ce que trouvera au terme celui qui suit ce chemin, n'est pas essentiellement autre chose qu'un manque.14
Donc, pour Lacan, a la fin de l'analyse, l'analysant devrait trouver non pas un sujet, mais un manque, c'est-a-dire qu'au lieu d'incarner un sujet, l'analyste de-vrait presentifier l'objet petit a15. Lacan va meme tellement distancier le but de la cure de la reconnaissance intersubjective qu'il va montrer qu'il existe un rapport d'exclusion entre le sujet et sa representation au niveau de l'Autre (Lacan 1973, « Le sujet et l'Autre : l'alienation » ; « Le sujet et l'Autre : la aphanisis »). C'est-a-dire que si l'Autre se subjectivise, l'individu s'objectivise, de sorte que l'analyste doit s'objectiver pour que l'analysant puisse se subjectiver.
La notion de sujet lacanien va etre radicalement bouleversee par ces change-ments. Au debut de son reuvre, le sujet etait l'effet intersubjectif de la reconnaissance symbolique, tandis que des les annees soixante, le sujet va se situer la ou toute norme de reconnaissance echoue. Par consequent, l'analyste, au lieu d'in-
13	Jacques Lacan, L'ethique de la psychanalyse. Le seminaire - livre VII, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1986, p. 357.
14	Jacques Lacan, Le transfert. Le seminaire - livre VIII. Paris : Editions du Seuil, 2001. (Lacan,
2001, p. 52).
15	Jacques Lacan, « En toi plus que toi » in Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. Le seminaire, le livre XI. Editions du Seuil, Poche, Paris 1973. (Lacan, 1973).
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carner le sujet du grand Autre, devrait rendre presente la castration de l'Autre, l'objet petit a.
Ä ce sujet, Lacan ecrit :
Cet a se presente justement, dans le champ du mirage de la fonction narcissique du desir, comme l'objet inavalable, si l'on peut dire, qui reste en travers de la gorge du signifiant. C'est en ce point de manque que le sujet a a se reconnaitre. (Lacan, 1973, p. 301)
On peut donc dire que le sujet lacanien n'est pas l'effet d'une reconnaissance, mais plutot de ce que le grand Autre ne peut pas reconnaitre en lui. Le sujet peut se reconnaitre non pas dans le champ intersubjectif, mais en etant confronte au fait que le grand Autre echoue a le reconnaitre. C'est pour cela qu'on peut affir-mer que le sujet lacanien est la consequence d'un echec, de l'echec a devenir sujet au sens de la reconnaissance intersubjective.16
Il me semble qu'avec cette conception, Lacan s'insere fortement dans la tradition clinique psychanalytique du travail avec l'exclusion. Au debut de son reuvre, Lacan avait defini le refoulement comme ce que les normes de reconnaissance excluaient et par consequent, il cherche une forme de reconnaissance qui peut donner consistance au sujet. Comme Honneth, Lacan avait trop confiance en une certaine dimension du pacte qui pourrait garantir la pacification de la lutte pour la reconnaissance. Or, apres les avancees theoriques que nous avons de-crites brievement, Lacan va se heurter a l'evidence que cet horizon de neutralite universelle de la loi qui permettrait de creer les conditions de la reconnaissance au-dela des contenus historiquement objectives, etait brise. Alors, Lacan va faire un mouvement genial : a la difference de Honneth, il ne cherche pas a trouver de nouvelles formes de reconnaissance, plus democratiques, plus inclusives. Pour Lacan, toute forme de reconnaissance est fondamentalement alienante. Le bouleversement theorique consiste donc a installer le sujet de l'inconscient juste dans l'intervalle, dans le point aveugle des normes de reconnaissance.
16 Mladen Dolar, Beyond Interpellation. Qui Parle, Vol. 6 Spring/Summer 1993 et Vladimir Sa-fatle, La passion du negatif: Lacan et la dialectique, Georg Olms Verlag AG, Hildesheim 2010.
La clinique psychanalytique, et plus particulierement la repetition transferen-tielle, met en evidence la limite de tout pacte symbolique a contenir et a definir le champ intersubjectif. L'exclusion a laquelle la psychanalyse est confrontee n'est pas de l'ordre de l'imaginaire, de la lutte pour la reconnaissance ; il s'agit de l'exclusion du reel par rapport au symbolique. La repetition transferentielle met en jeu une dimension traumatique de la subjectivite qui n'est pas simple-ment affectee par un manque de reconnaissance, mais qui est hors du champ de reconnaissabilite. On comprend bien alors la logique profondement analytique de l'avance theorique lacanienne.
Or, il me semble que cette fagon de penser la clinique a des consequences qu'il faut repenser. Si la premiere notion de sujet chez Lacan etait une conception sociale, je pense que sa deuxieme conception devient plus « liberale». Effective-ment, la reconnaissance comme mecanisme fondamental de la subjectivation, va etre remplacee par une sorte d'acceptation tragique du manque de l'Autre et de la solitude proprement antigonienne dans laquelle le sujet advient au monde. Litteralement, il n'y a pas de temoins possibles pour l'acte constitutif de la subjectivite.
Mon hypothese est que selon Lacan, l'analyste conduit un processus de cure premuni avec l'a priori du manque au niveau symbolique17. En ceci, Lacan et Agamben sont tres proches. Tous deux pensent a la fagon de rapprocher le manque de l'Autre au manque particulier de l'analysant ou bien de l'exclu dont on porte temoignage. Mon hypothese est que c'est justement ce rapprochement qui empeche Agamben de porter temoignage et Lacan d'apprendre - dans le sens de Butler - l'alterite de l'analysant.
5. Du moment politico-social de la critique des normes de reconnaissance : contingence est reconnaissance.
Plus haut, j'ai pose quelques questions que je voudrais reprendre : politique-ment et cliniquement parlant, quelles sont les consequences du fait de croire que la limite universelle et a-historique du langage est le ressort qui permet au temoin de se decaler des normes de reconnaissance dominantes ? Ou autrement
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17 Rodrigo De La Fabian, Une critique du paradigme tragique en psychanalyse a partir de la conception ethique de la subjectivite chez Emmanuel Levinas. De l'assomption tragique au soup-gon comique de la castration, L'evolution psychiatrique 75 (2010) 565-581.
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dit : quelles peuvent etre les consequences de penser qu'une partie inherente de la critique politique et de la position clinique par rapport aux formes de reconnaissance habituelles devrait chercher a creer les conditions de production, toujours historiquement situees, d'une telle limite ?
Pour Butler, le point qui permet de creer un champ de communalite dans la difference, c'est est la precarite, la vulnerabilite des individus. Or, il me semble que la seule fagon de porter temoignage et de pouvoir faire sortir la clinique psychanalytique du solipsisme tragique passe par la possibilite de mettre en acte cette vulnerabilite. Et justement, la certitude du manque symbolique est a mon avis chez Agamben comme chez Lacan, une derniere defense face a la peur de la perte de maitrise que cela implique, une derniere barriere face a la perfor-mativite de l'acte de mettre en jeu leur propre vulnerabilite.
La precarite est un concept a la fois socialement et historiquement situe. Sociale parce qu'elle implique le fait d'etre intimement construit et toujours dependant des autres. De plus, la precarite implique que les formes de dependance sont historiques. Cette derniere dimension determine justement le fait qu'on ne puis-se pas reconnaitre directement les exclus. Si la precarite etait seulement une question propre a la nature sociale humaine, elle deviendrait alors un domaine de reconnaissabilite a-historique. Le manque qui pourrait faire vibrer la voix des sans-voix - sans les objectiver - doit etre un manque aussi historique que celui de la victime.
Je suis donc d'accord avec Judith Butler lorsqu'elle affirme que chez Lacan, il y a une sacralisation de la fonction de manque (« religious idealization of failure » Butler, 1999, p. 7618). C'est-a-dire que le manque est mis hors l'histoire par La-can. Au contraire, plutot que de reposer sur la certitude de l'existence d'une limite a-historique, il me semble que la position analytique ainsi que la question politique du temoignage des exclus, impliquent la production critique de limites historiquement situees, des normes dominantes de reconnaissance dans un certain domaine discursif. Critique qui cree les conditions pour etre eventuel-lement perturbee par une autre impossibilite, c'est-a-dire pour devenir temoin de la vulnerabilite de l'autre. Et le savoir analytique et la lutte politique pour la
18 Butler, Judith: Gender Trouble. Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York, London: Routledge, 1999.
reconnaissance, au lieu de resoudre a priori la question du manque, devraient etre une critique qu'ouvre la possibilite d'apprendre la vulnerabilite de l'autre qui se situe hors du champ de reconnaissabilite a travers sa propre vulnerabilite, mise en acte de fagon historiquement contingente.
Mais, qu'est-ce que « mettre en acte la vulnerabilite de fagon contingente et historique », pourrait signifier ? La certitude de l'existence du manque dans le langage, chez Lacan et Agamben, evite de poser la question de la fonction capi-tale qu'aurait la production historico-contingente des critiques des normes de reconnaissance. En effet, pour pouvoir entendre la voix des sans-voix - dans le domaine politique - ainsi que celle du trauma qui se repete dans le transfert -dans le domaine analytique - ; il me semble qu'il ne suffit pas de s'appuyer sur cette certitude transcendantale.
En revanche, la fonction de l'apprehension chez Butler nous conduit vers une autre voie. Elle ecrit : « apprehension peut devenir la base d'une critique des normes de reconnaissance. » (Butler, 2009, p. 5. La traduction est mienne). L'ap-prehension de la vulnerabilite des autres serait donc une fagon de prendre acte -acknowledge - de ma propre vulnerabilite. C'est-a-dire aux antipodes de Lacan et d'Agamben ; ce n'est pas parce que je confie que ga manque que je peux donner la possibilite a l'exclu d'etre en quelque sorte reconnu. Au contraire, c'est parce que l'exclu m'expose au manque que je peux en meme temps critiquer les normes de reconnaissance dominantes, en lui offrant de fagon non revendica-tive cette revelation opaque et le reconnaitre dans son alterite. La vulnerabilite n'est pas un manque stable d'ou l'on peut extraire une certitude ; etre vulnerable implique plutot etre d'expose a l'autre de sorte que je ne puisse meme pas choisir ma propre mort. Dans la torture, par exemple, Butler montre qu'il s'agit d'exploi-ter le lien qui nous raccroche aux autres au point d'etre depossede de la possibi-lite de couper ce lien par la mort (Butler, 2009). Un etre vulnerable ne peut pas se confier a la negativite de la mort comme derniere garantie de la liberte.
Mais il est vrai que, si l'on est toujours pris dans des normes de reconnaissance et si, en plus, nous ne pouvons plus nous confier au manque universel du lan-gage pour en sortir, alors il n'y a aucune garantie d'entendre la voix des sans-voix. Il nous faut donc repenser la maniere d'articuler la double impossibilite dont nous parle Agamben : au lieu de la confiance au manque universel du lan-gage, je propose la critique, dirais-je etique, des normes de reconnaissance -
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du champ de reconnaissabilite - et puis, eventuellement, la question politique de la rencontre - toujours contingente - avec la voix des sans-voix. Lorsque Butler dit que l'apprehension peut devenir la base de la critique des normes de reconnaissance, elle montre que la dialectique critique suppose un instant social et contingent indepassable : c'est en passant par l'exclu qu'un cadre nor-matif peut etre critique. Mais cette rencontre contingente presuppose le moment de la critique interne au cadre normatif, critique qui peut me rendre sensible a la contingence de la rencontre avec l'exclu. Le moment etique de la critique est un mouvement solipsiste en soi, du moins jusqu'a ce qu'il rencontre l'autre manque, le manque de l'exclu. Pas pour le reconnaitre - au sens de Honneth -mais pour offrir l'ouverture du cadre normatif, issue de la rencontre contingente avec lui, comme s'il s'agissait d'une caisse de resonance ou sa voix sourde pour-rait trouver une surface d'inscription sonore. Il ne s'agit donc pas, comme chez Agamben et Lacan, d'offrir la certitude d'un manque universel et impassible. Il s'agit plutot de lui offrir, de mettre a sa disposition, le ravissement de la maitrise du Moi, effet de la contingence de la rencontre avec l'autre dont je depends.
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Davide Tarizzo*
Biopolitics and the Ideology of 'Mental Health'
Modern political power has two branches: the sovereign and the biopolitical. With the former, the state makes laws, with the latter, it governs. The people of a state amount to all the 'citizens' who assert their lawmaking will and exert their collective sovereignty through their institutional representatives: the people are a collective subject. Conversely, the population of a state amounts to all those 'human beings' who are controlled, governed, managed by the state's machinery - on economic, health, and educational levels: the population is therefore a collective object. However, the people and the population consist of the same individuals, seen as subjects of state sovereignty or as objects of state biopower. This cleavage between the people and the population, between citizens and human beings, between the subject and object of the modern state power is inscribed in the founding political documents of European modernity, the most important of which reads in its very title: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. At the heart of modern political power there has been, since its very beginning, a precise albeit ambivalent and schizophrenic program: the subjectification of citizens as the people, the objectification of human beings as the population; citizens and human beings who are subjects and objects of the same power: 'us'.
Of the two branches of modern power, the sovereign and the biopolitical, I will here thematise only the latter, attempting in particular to emphasise the de- 135 subjectifying effects of biopolitical rationality. Once it can be established that 'we', as sovereign subjects of state power, are also and simultaneously biopo-litical objects of the same power, it is obvious to maintain that the biopolitical rationality - that is to say, the kind of rationality that structures the managerial, administrative, and governmental action of the state machinery - tends to exert on us de-subjectifying effects. However, this does not reveal what these effects are. I propose to distinguish three levels of biopolitical rationality.
* University of Salerno, Italy
I will call the first level the economistic matrix; the second, the epidemiological apparatus, and the third, the ideological order of biopolitical rationality. By briefly analysing these three levels, or registers, of biopower's effectiveness we might understand certain characteristics of the 'mental health' construct and of the role that it has in our societies.
1. The Economistic Matrix
We all know what economics is. We all know that at present to govern means first and foremost to control, to manage the patrimony of the community, to increase it as much as possible - there is no stasis in today's economy; one cannot stand still, but must either grow or perish. Economics, though, is a discipline that has its own rules, its own grammar - a fact that is by and large ignored, or at least neglected. And if economics is at the heart of the current art of governing, it can be presumed that the rules and grammar of economics form the matrix of the entire biopolitical rationality. What are these rules? Perhaps the most important one is signalled in the title and in the contents of one of the masterpieces of twentieth-century economics, the monumental essay by Ludwig Von Mises, The Human Action. Human being is action. But, all things considered, what does economics do? It studies, analyses, and tries to make foreseeable, manageable, and governable, economic actions, economic behaviours. These behaviours have two essential characteristics:
1)	They are indeed to be regarded as behaviours, that is to say, as actions that follow one another without being necessarily attributable to an economic agent who rationally masters the sequence of her choices and behaviours.
2)	However, they are to be regarded as rational because, if there were no ra-136 tionality underlying economic behaviours, they could not be analysed and
managed on the basis of a regularity that makes the formulation of forecasts possible.
The two characteristics of economic behaviour, that is to say, that it is a form of behaviour and that it answers to some kind of rationality, have to be clearly distinguished. The rationality underlying economic behaviour - the rationality that allows us to construct a sequence of actions, choices, and preferences arranged in mathematical models - needs not be the rationality of an economic agent whose choices might be a response to a utilitarian calculation. This does
not mean that it is impossible: in the past, this kind of economic agent, the homo economicus, was the central focus of economic theories. Yet economics can now relinquish such an idea, and it does so, abandoning the assumption - after all, highly imaginative - that there are economic subjects who make choices on the grounds of a rational calculation of their own interests and profit margins. What lies beyond the pleasure principle, in the form of what lies beyond the utility principle, has long since erupted into the field of economic science, for instance with Tibor Scitovsky, an economist who even quotes Sigmund Freud. The homo economicus, the rational economic agent, the profit maximiser, has given way to the disoriented person of today's economy, moved by forces the existence and the telluric trajectories of which she is partially unaware.
This is why economic behaviours need not be traced back to a centre of im-putability, understood to be an interested agent, a homo economicus, a subject responsible for rational and foreseeable choices, unerringly motivated by obstinate research, perfectly mindful of one's own personal gain. This premise no longer holds true in the current economic science, which, on the contrary, tends to shift the rationality that underpins economic behaviours elsewhere, into a space of de-subjectified rationality. For an economic science to be possible, the only necessity is a surface of phenomena, a surface of segments or behavioural areas whose rationality can even overstep the borders of individual rationality. The human being who is the object of economic analysis is, in this sense, a behavioural human being [uomo comportamentale], a person segmented into isolated and disconnected actions. These, together with the isolated and disconnected actions of all other human beings, become the field of application of rationalising mathematical models that track down regularity and seriality in economic behaviours irrespective of the individual economic agents' - thus the individual subjects' - intentions and calculations.
This is the first vector of the de-subjectification of biopolitical rationality. Economics is interested in the behavioural human being, a person whose behaviours become visible to economic analysis only insofar as they are considered en masse, together with the isolated and segmented behaviours of other people, and introduced in interpretative mathematical models that cannot see nor grasp the singularity, the historicity, or the subjective qualities of those behaviours. For this person we could also resort to the definition of 'populational human being' [uomo popolazionale].
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From this perspective, the difficulty is that those who act and continuously reconstruct specific interpretations of their own economic behaviour, supplying at the same time specific subjective evaluations, are still human beings, subjects, speaking beings. It is difficult to deny that these subjective evaluations interfere with the processes of economic choice and action. Hence the necessity of implementing a managerial and anticipatory rationality of economic analysis with ad hoc techniques.
The range of these techniques in the most advanced theoretical models - for instance, in the so-called behavioural economics proposed by high-level scholars such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the cognitive psychologist who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002 - is to include the economic agents' subjective and qualitative self-evaluations in the objective and quantitative (mathematical) rationalising models of economic behaviours. The operation of including the residual subjective component of economic actions in analytical grids that completely de-subjectify economic conduct is carried out through ad hoc technical protocols. The whole set of these technical protocols can be indexed under a single overall definition: the techno-rationality of evaluation.1 The techno-rationality of evaluation denotes here some kind of techno-managerial a priori of economistic rationality. Evaluation is a prosthesis of the technical implementation of biopolitical rationality. Its function is that of making possible the total transformation of the behavioural human being into the populational human being.
In order to achieve such a result, it is necessary to introduce a third dimension: the evaluative human being [uomo valutativo]. She is both the subject and the object of evaluations, but she is the subject of evaluations only insofar as she 138 can become the object of those same evaluations. Let us consider Kahneman's example. His idea is that it is possible to elaborate an objective and quantitative measure of people's well-being (so-called 'objective happiness'), beyond the subjective and qualitative evaluations that people give regarding their own well-being. One takes into account the immediate self-evaluations that subjects give daily with regard to their current well-being, leaving out their retrospective evaluations, their historical reconstructions, and their own personal memory
1 Jacques-Alain Miller, Jean-Claude Milner, Evaluation. Entretiens sur une machine d'imposture, Agalma, Paris 2004.
of the past (which is always compromised, according to Kahneman, by serious cognitive deficits). This set of detailed and qualitative self-evaluations made by individual human beings is then entered into mathematical models for the quantitative evaluation of the overall well-being of the population. It is clear that, in this way, there is a transition from a heterogeneous set of subjective self-evaluations of one's own well-being to a homogeneous scale for the objective evaluation of happiness. It is also clear that this is the result of a technical operation, a practical routine of data collection and elaboration (data given by subjective self-evaluations) combined with an abstract theoretical model. The result is, in the end, a human reality that runs on two distinct tracks: on the one hand, there is the subjective level of every single speaking being, who gives subjective and superficial evaluations of her individual well-being; on the other hand, there is the objective level of economistic techno-rationality, which gives, on the contrary, objective and in-depth evaluations of the well-being of the very same speaking beings - considered en masse as the population.
All this - the economistic matrix of biopolitical rationality and its implementation within the techno-rationality of evaluation - is not irrelevant to the notion of 'mental health' that is becoming widespread. If we intersect what has been said so far with the WHO definition of health, according to which health is "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being", we can infer that: 'mental health', i.e. 'mental well-being', emerges as measurable, quantifiable, and hence objectively assessable, only in behavioural and 'populational' terms. The mind, or the psyche, eventually disappears within the very frame of 'mental health', which becomes a matter of behaviours, rather than mental states, and, what is more, it becomes a matter of the populational human being's behaviours, rather than a specific person's, with a forename and a surname. The behavioural-populational-evaluative human being becomes the subjectum, the deep anthropological foundation against which one has to measure, compute, and, if necessary, correct the behaviours and the superficial self-evaluations of every single speaking being. The biopolitical machine does not cease to function because this subjectum produces a radical de-subjectification of human beings. On the contrary, this is precisely its direction, its deepest vocation. Today's cognitive-behavioural therapies are but one of the many peripheral appendices of this machine, an appendix that has the merit of lucidly showing its intention: to de-subjectify the subject. Or, in slightly different but equivalent terms: to 'psychoticise' the subject.
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2. The Epidemiological Apparatus
Side by side with the economistic matrix of biopolitical rationality that outlines the profile-less and quality-less face of biopolitical humanity, there are certain 'apparatuses' of biopolitics that unfold its performativity. The most important of these apparatuses is, probably, epidemiology, a discipline whose history and impact on the practices of government (from the mid-nineteenth century on) should be carefully studied. I will not dwell on this theme, as interesting as it is sensitive, but will confine the discussion to the essentials.
'Apparatus' [dispositif] is a notion coined by Michel Foucault, who understands it, more or less, as follows: an apparatus is a texture of entwined discursive and extra-discursive practices - however heterogeneous - that articulates itself in the forms of what we could define as an acted-out knowledge [sapere agito]. According to Foucault, the apparatus typically intertwines the said and the unsaid in a making [fare]. The apparatus is a system of relations internal to this making. Its habitual function is to "respon[d] to an urgent need".2
Foucault was also the first to supply a clear definition of biopolitical power as the other side of sovereign power. His definition of biopower and, most of all, sovereign power is not the one that I employed at the beginning of this article, but it emphasises an important aspect of biopower that is, at this stage, useful to underline. While sovereign power, as Foucault explains, is the power to "faire mourir et laisser vivre" ["make people die and let them live"], in that it exerts a right of life and death on the totality of its subjects, biopower is, on the contrary, a power to "faire vivre et rejeter dans la mort" ["make people live and disallow life to the point of death"].3 It is a power that takes care of human beings, raising and nursing them, in view of safeguarding and possibly increasing their well-being, understood in primis as economic well-being, but also as education, hygiene, physical and mental health, and so forth. Hence biopower means, first
2	Michel Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh'. Trans. by Colin Gordon, in Gordon, C. (ed.), Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Pantheon Books: New York 1980, p. 195.
3	Translator's note: to maintain consistency throughout the text, we have chosen to modify the official English translation of 'faire mourir et laisser vivre' and 'faire vivre et rejeter dans la mort', translated by Robert Hurley as 'to take life and let live' and 'to foster life and disallow it to the point of death', respectively (Michel Foucault. The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books: New York 1978, p. 138).
and foremost, to make people live: this is, from a Foucauldian perspective, the governmental making, the government's making, the making of a biopolitical state that takes the lives of the subjects upon itself. In line with this tendency, the epidemiological apparatus is the apparatus that, again in Foucault's words, "enables one to observe, measure, and permanently improve the 'state of health' of the population, in which illness is only a variable that depends on a long list of factors".4 Foucault himself never fully explored the scientific history of epidemiology and limited himself to locating the prodromes of the first public health policies in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, this history is particularly interesting and can be divided into two broad phases: the classic epidemiology of the nineteenth century and the new epidemiology of the second half of the twentieth century (which was partially anticipated by the developments of Nazi German epidemiology in the thirties). Two different aspects of the governmental making people live correspond to the two historical phases of epidemiology. The first phase is the epidemiology of mortality, according to which the governmental making people live means not to die. The second phase is the epidemiology of risk, according to which the governmental making people live takes on the meaning of making people live a better life. In this second phase, the exhortation that biopower sends out to all of us is no longer Do not die!, rather, it becomes the mysterious imperative Live!, whose intensity is not directly measured by the negative and unambiguous marker of death. To get an approximate idea of the differences between the two historical phases of epidemiology and the corresponding aspects of governmental making, it should suffice to point to the different research that initiated them.
The classic epidemiology of mortality was born in London around the mid-nineteenth century, during a series of severe cholera epidemics. John Snow and William Farr, a physician and a statistician respectively, compared the mortality rates in a number of districts, and noticed that the rate increased where water was provided by a certain company. They deduced that the illness could have been transmitted through the water and not the air, as was commonly believed. The authorities did not listen to them. Nevertheless, their embryonic research represents a first and rather accurate model of the epidemiological evaluation of mortality. The assessment had two aims: 1) To derive from the epidemiologi-
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4 Michel Foucault, La politique de la sante au XVIII siecle (1979), in Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris 1994, vol. III, p. 731. Our translation.
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cal survey an etiological inference: water was the cause of the epidemics. 2) To derive from the results of the survey an administrative regulation: to stop a certain company from supplying water. Epidemiology therefore came into being to analyse and manage public mortality, the mortality of populations increasingly concentrated in the dense urban realities that created new problems for public administrators. Epidemiology emerges, in the context of the new Public Health Policy, as an apparatus to decipher and contain populational mortality. Do not make people die.
The new epidemiology came into being a century later, also in England, with Richard Doll's and Bradford Hill's studies on the correlation between cigarette smoke and lung cancer. Doll and Hill compared the morbidity rates between smokers and non-smokers. They deduced that there is a relationship between smoking and becoming ill. Yet it was difficult, in this case, to translate the epide-miological inference into an etiological one: medicine was not able to articulate the cause-effect nexus between smoke and cancer. So, what about the evidence of epidemiological evaluation? At this point, it changes its status. The epide-miological apparatus is no longer interested in univocal causal factors, that is to say, in factors to which one could ascribe the unambiguous causation of a certain effect (for instance: water as the unambiguous cause of the spreading of cholera). The apparatus is now interested in risk factors. If we cannot say that smoke univocally causes lung cancer, we can at least say that smoke increases the risk of lung cancer. Although the difference might seem minimal, it is crucial. This difference introduces us to the risk society, our society. By increasingly widening the spectrum of epidemiological evaluation, everything can become a risk factor for this or that illness, for this of that ailment. Thus, risk progressively becomes active, albeit concealed, in every aspect of reality - physical, psychic, social. A governmental counter-dynamism is directly opposed to this 'active-ness of risk', dedicated to containing the reach and impact of the risks that are lurking everywhere. To contain and govern the risks to which our lives are exposed no longer means, simply, to fight mortality. It also and especially means to fight all the impairments, not necessarily just the lethal ones, that our life can experience - in the shape of chronic illnesses, for instance, or a diminishing of our potentiality. To govern risks means to improve life, its performance, and its so-called 'quality', regardless of the meaning that life itself has or can have. It means to introduce a silent and enigmatic imperative: Live! - or Live a better life!^ Why?
The question - why live? - makes sense only when a subject able to ask it of himself appears. Yet the populational human being, the object of the epidemio-logical survey, is not a subject; she is only a behavioural human being, a human being whose risky behaviours are now assessable, in the light of their possible optimisation. The contemporary epidemiological apparatus, just like any other governmental apparatus, has but one purpose: to optimise behaviour and human performance, in order to increase their performativity. It is not particularly important to ask which continuously changing parameters ground the case-by-case measuring of our vital performance on which the performativity of our conduct is based. These details do not alter the overall functioning of the governmental apparatus. On the contrary, it is crucial to understand the relationships between apparatus and evaluation.
Apparatus and evaluation are the two fundamental techno-managerial a priori of the biopolitical society. To use the Foucauldian definition of apparatus, we could say that the technique of evaluation is, every time, an apparatus: it is an acted-out knowledge, a governmental act that responds to an emergency. The epidemiological evaluation, for instance, is a measuring, a calculation of risk, produced with a view to the creation of an administrative regulation in response to the emergency risk. This measuring/calculation does not coincide with a simple theoretical enunciation. Governing risk is a practice that supports and even encourages the dynamism of risk. Doll and Hill formulated their epidemiologi-cal evaluation, following the evolution of the health conditions of a number of 'cohorts' of British physicians who smoked several cigarettes per day. They supported the activeness of risk to accurately evaluate and govern it. To evaluate risk means to manage risk also in the sense of administering it. Another example would be that today, when new medicines are tested and numerous relevant epidemiological evaluations are produced, the activeness of risk (in this case the risk being that of more or less serious side effects) is blatantly urged and stimulated, though always with a view to risk governance. The epidemiological evaluation then - like any other evaluative technique, including the one Kahne-man conceived to measure 'objective happiness' - is an acted-out knowledge and it is, in this sense, a Foucauldian apparatus.
This does not mean that all the apparatuses are evaluations or that they include evaluative protocols. Foucault, in fact, does not speak of 'evaluation' in his works. There is no doubt, for instance, that the university is to be regarded
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as an apparatus from a Foucauldian perspective. Yet there has been a university without evaluation - even if we have lost its memory. What then is the relationship between apparatus and evaluation? And why are we witnessing the proliferation of evaluations in every nook and cranny of the biopolitical society? Why does our society look as though it is destined to be transformed, more and more, into a society of evaluation? The reason is possibly that the techno-rationality of evaluation is the best means of offering an additional rationality to the biopolitical and economistic government of our society. If the biopolitical and econo-mistic government of the population is a government of behaviours and not of subjects, then this government will tend to de-subjectify as much as possible the rationality of its regulations, it will tend to homogenise as much as possible its administrative rationality into the anonymous and de-subjectified rationality of the population that it manages - a task that evaluation accomplishes in all its varieties.
Evaluation, in its essence, is nothing other than a technical procedure, thanks to which the gaze that society casts on itself is rendered unbiased, neutral, impersonal, anonymous, and de-subjectified, that is to say, 'objective'. This technical procedure shapes, in turn, the logic - the kind of rationality - with which society manages itself, through its own state machinery (or its generic institutional machine). Evaluation, by virtue of these characteristics, is no longer, nowadays, one of many apparatuses. It is the techno-managerial protocol that most reinforces and nourishes the governmental apparatus, or the numerous governmental apparatuses, of the biopolitical society. This holds true for all kinds of evaluation (impact evaluation, process evaluation, decision-making evaluation, and so forth) but it is especially true of epidemiological evaluation, which has a localised but paradigmatic impact, capable of directing the biopolitical machinery, from now on, towards insidious forms of social epidemiology, imitating the model of medical epidemiology.
To return to the issue of 'mental health', the epidemiological apparatus of bio-political rationality transforms the old nosology of behaviours into something different: an epidemiology of behaviours, that is to say - following what has thus far been advanced - a government of the behavioural risks devoted to the increasing optimisation of our conduct. This epidemiology of behaviours, which tends to blur the distinction between a medical and a social epidemiology, leans
towards the future. The key concept that enables us to get ahead of the still diffident Foucauldian diagnosis of the biopolitical society is that of 'optimisation'.
From a Foucauldian perspective, there is, on the one hand, sovereign power with its 'laws'; on the other, biopolitical power with its 'norms'. If sovereign power issues 'laws', which all must obey, on pain of death, biopower spreads 'norms', which all obey, not because they are imposed by threatening death, but because they are spread through different means - such as school education. Thus norms trace the boundaries of 'normality', says Foucault, the boundaries that substantiate and give greater detail to the limits of 'legality' in the biopo-litical society. I believe that, in this case, Foucault's diagnosis is wrong or, at least, incomplete. It holds true for the past, it applies dramatically less to the present.
Our time abhors 'normality' and norms, and it has done so since its birth, and increasingly so, for a very simple reason: it has nothing to do with the ultimate inspiration of our time, of the modern era. 'Normality' is a straitjacket that has been placed on our autonomy, our freedom, which can be limited or, worse, stigmatised for no reason, by anyone. This probably explains the unusual success of Foucault as a person, and his elevation to his present-day stature in many circles. His 'critique of normality' is consistent with the categorical imperative that moves our society's process of modernisation: 'do what thou wilt', 'obey only yourself', 'be as autonomous as possible'. This is what modernity prescribes, this is what dispels all processes of normalisation of conduct, directing us to more elastic models of social management.5
Yet, if the rigid norms of behaviour no longer exist, or, at least, if they tend to disappear, if there is no longer a 'normality' to look up to, how is it possible to govern our behaviours? It is in this context that the epidemiological apparatus of biopolitical rationality reveals all its effectiveness. To govern risk means 'to optimise' our behaviours. This does not mean to 'normalise' behaviour. It means to increase the performativity of our conduct, it means to improve our behavioural performance. According to this view, an optimised behaviour is one that gives access to the widest spectrum of further behavioural options. An op-
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5 Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on Control Societies'. Trans. by Martin Joughin, in Negotiations 1972-1990, Columbia University Press: New York 1995, pp.177-182.
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timised behaviour is plastic, flexible, and reactive, capable of diversification in order to face the variable environmental circumstances. A behavioural stance associated with risk, on the contrary, is a stance that impoverishes or stiffens our behavioural potentiality, in which our vital functions are expressed. What our behaviour means has no role in this context, along with normality. What matters is only that one behaviour makes other behaviours possible. What matters is the range, no matter how wide, of possible preferences and behavioural performance that can be compromised and risked by a certain behavioural stance, which can and has to be optimised for this very reason. In this light, governing the behavioural human being takes a clear direction: to make the behavioural human being behavioural to the highest degree, capable above all of assuming new and diverse behaviours, extremely faithful to what we all fundamentally are: autonomous yet speechless subjecti, reduced to the behavioural substrata of biopolitical humanity. A dynamic human being, from the Greek dynamis, literally, a potential human being.
3. The Ideological Order
The third level of the biopolitical machine is that of ideology, a concept which has multiple definitions. I propose a definition of ideology that I deem applicable to the discourse expounded here, and maybe even exportable beyond it.
Ideology is, first and foremost, order. It is order because it coincides with a certain arrangement of the discursive space, with a layout of enunciations in a certain hierarchical order. It is an order because it consistently expresses a certain order understood as a command, as an imperative, inseparable from a statement of fact. One could even say that ideology emerges every time a series of constative statements assumes a purely performative value - but this, all in all, would only prove that the constative/performative dichotomy is not the best instrument for explaining what ideology is.
Could we define ideology as an apparatus? It is definitely a surface of enunciations that are articulated in an acted out knowledge. Nevertheless, ideology cannot be reduced to an acted out knowledge; rather, it is that edge of the enunciation that comes before an acted out knowledge and incites, promotes, and enjoins this acting out. With ideology we find ourselves on the edge, at the external limit of the apparatus. In what particularly concerns the biopolitical ma-
chinery, ideology can be conceived of as a cog in the machine, whose movement conditions the movement of its many apparatuses, without ever coinciding with any one apparatus.
Hence, once again, where and why does the ideological order come into being? I will not be able to completely argue my answer: the ideological order emerges where an epistemological construct - that is, a concept or a judgement of knowledge - acquires an axiological surplus value that transubstantiates it. This means, first of all, that ideology always emerges in the field of knowledge and that, secondly, ideology is always knowledge that has transubstantiated into value, or value transubstantiated into knowledge. It is much easier than it might seem at first sight.
Let us take a notion such as that of 'life'.6 Foucault, looking at the role that this notion plays in the modern science of life, has defined it as an "epistemologi-cal marker", that is to say, a meta-discursive concept that has the function of circumscribing the boundaries of a jagged and disjointed epistemic field. 'Life', in this sense, does not have a precise referent in reality, it does not signify any given recognisable object - as would be the case for an organism, a cell, DNA. Rather, it 'points to' the fact that a set of scientific propositions belongs to the same discursive field: the science of life, biology. There are many such notions -which we could also call the 'metaphysical radicals' of modern science: apart from 'life', we could think about 'labour' (the metaphysical radical of economic science), 'language' (the metaphysical radical of linguistic sciences), 'human nature' (the metaphysical radical of anthropology), 'mental health' (the metaphysical radical of psychiatry), and many more.
Let us return to 'life'. When this simple epistemological mark doubles as an axiological marker, we enter, ipso facto, into the field of an ideology of 'life' that charges the scientific (in the case at issue, biological) proposition with an injunctive value. At this point, life as such, life in its merely biological acceptation, and hence its preservation, boosting, proliferation, and the constant improvement of our biological conditions and performance, become ideological prescriptions. It is useless to ask what is the sense of this living a better life, this continuous reinforcement of our 'life' - that matches the uncanny feeling of an
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' Davide Tarizzo, La vita, un'invenzione recente, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2010.
intrinsic defectiveness and infection of our 'life'. It is useless because ideology does not argue but orders - giving voice to the invisible anxiety that nourishes the fantasy of 'risk'.
Set in the epidemiological apparatus of biopolitical rationality, the ideological order of 'life' promotes, therefore, the imperative Live! that maintains the engine of the biopolitical machinery. The governmental making people live can become a making people live a better life only in the presence of an ideological order of living better that makes the scientific description of 'life' coincide with the in-junctive prescription of 'life', its boost, its reinforcement, its optimisation. Only at this stage can the epidemiological evaluation function as an apparatus of constant monitoring and governance of our behaviour, to be adapted day by day to the order of living a better life.
Let us now move on to 'mental health'. In this case we are also facing an epis-temological marker, that is to say, a meta-discursive concept that 'points to' the fact that a jagged set of propositions belongs to the same epistemic field, to the same family of scientific disciplines: psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, etc. There is no definition of 'mental health' that is shared by all these psy- dialects. Rather, the very idea of 'mental health' is a source of fierce disagreements. But what happens if one accepts and promotes the idea of 'mental health', notwithstanding the problem of its preliminary definition? What happens is that an epistemological marker, 'mental health', doubles as an axi-ological marker. The problem of the definition of 'mental health' turns into the problem of its prescription. To define 'mental health' means, from this moment on, to prescribe 'mental health', because it is only by beginning with its incessant prescription that we can head for its definition - albeit fragmentary and 148 intrinsically re-workable. This is what imposes the ideological order of 'mental health', such as it is embodied, for instance, in the DSM and its ensuing editions, destined to swarm in sxcula sxculorum: to derive, every time, a definition of 'mental health' from its prescription, that is to say, to systematically update the definition of 'mental health' in light of a periodic re-qualification of treatments; to produce and to maintain in operation a theoretical order beginning with a practical order, with an injunction in which the epistemological value and the axiological surplus value of the same propositions is blurred. Needless to say, this order seems the more effective the more it proves itself to be integrable with the governmental and bioeconomic apparatuses with which it will mesh.
From this, a series of insistent buzzwords springs: screening, for instance, the prevention of mental disorders, the promotion of 'mental health', and so on. All these words are internal to a medical logic that is no longer the passive and hospitable logic of listening, but the logic of management and active, not to say intrusive, manipulation of conduct. But from this a series of paradoxes also springs. First of all, the paradox of a 'mental health' that exists only as an outcome, the effect of a prescription, thus becoming a product, goods to purchase from the relevant reseller, in primis drug resellers, who do not restore but manufacture health, improving and boosting it, against the background of a congenital instability. Secondly, the paradox of a 'mental health' that, when it cannot be prescribed on the grounds of a preliminary definition, can nevertheless be prescribed according to evaluation protocols that tend, in their call for objectivity, to ruthlessly de-subjectify the potential carrier of 'mental health'. Thirdly, the paradox of a 'mental health' that no longer responds to criteria of normality or normalisation, given that there are no norms that offer an a priori definition of 'mental health', but rather to the criterion of the behavioural optimisation of the populational human being.
Given these paradoxes, one could speculate that depression, asthenia, mood disease, and lower behavioural responses arise now as the ultimate protest, the last form of subjective resistance against the demands of the biopolitical and de-subjectifying optimisation. Yet one could also speculate the opposite, that is to say, that depression and asthenia are the subjective reverse that the process of optimisation pre-supposes and, at times, seems to hallucinate, as if it were its area of intervention, with a view to a de-subjectifying boost in performance. This offers, in two lines, the coordinates of one of the main dilemmas currently raised by the epidemiological approach to psychopathological phenomena: is there or is there not all this depression in the world?
Translated from the Italian by Alvise Sforza Tarabochia
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Compter avec le sujet Counting with the Subject
Bruno Besana*
La forme d'un sujet a venir
Introduction
Les pages qui suivent ont pour but d'offrir une premiere presentation, quelque peu schematique, d'une possible lecture formelle du concept de sujet, en se servant de certaines formulations positives et negatives qu'Alain Badiou et Gilles Deleuze en ont donne. Du point de vue negatif, l'article reprend l'idee d'une separation radicale du concept de sujet de tout objet specifique, et en particulier de l'idee d'« humanite » ; du point de vue positif, l'article se focalise sur les elements qui, chez les deux auteurs, permettent une definition du sujet indepen-dante de la presence d'un type d'objet donne. En somme, il s'agit ici de reperer le concept de sujet a travers une procedure de separation : comme le remarquait d'ailleurs Althusser, la philosophie peut produire un objet conceptuel d'ana-lyse, disponible pour la science, en s'attaquant avant tout a l'identification ideo-logique de ce dernier avec un etant donne, ou avec une situation specifique. En particulier, Althusser remarquait comment, afin de comprendre les mecanismes des processus ou une nouveaute radicale est produite, il est necessaire de sepa-rer nettement ces derniers de l'idee (au sens de l'eidolon, l'image) d'homme, il est necessaire de defaire l'identification imaginaire entre humanite et production du changement. Sans rentrer ici dans une analyse du theme de l'anti-huma-nisme chez Althusser1, ni aborder sa categorie de « science » et son refus de la categorie de « sujet », on se limitera ici a adopter la prospective methodologique 153 selon laquelle un concept (ici, le concept de sujet) devient disponible pour la pensee seulement dans la mesure ou il est soumis a une procedure de separation une procedure qui defait l'identification que le sens commun opere entre le concept et une classe donnee d'objets (ici, l'humanite).
1 On verra en particulier Louis Althusser, « La querelle de l'humanisme » et « Notes sur la philosophie », contenus dans Louis Althusser, Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome II, Stock/ Imec - Le livre de poche, Paris 1995.
* Institute for Cultural Inquiry, Berlin
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Pour saisir l'origine du probleme de cette separation chez Gilles Deleuze et Alain Badiou, il faut revenir a l'analyse foucaldienne consistant a observer comment les sciences de l'homme, en faisant progressivement du sujet humain (avec ses forces constitutives, a savoir le travail, le langage et la vie) un objet d'analyse, en determinent la disparition en tant que sujet. Revenons donc brievement sur cette analyse. Au centre de la lecture que Foucault offre de ce probleme dans Les Mots et les Choses, se trouve l'analyse du surgissement de l'homme en tant que figure nouvelle, resultat d'un ensemble de forces constitutives (travail, langage, vie), dont la relation change drastiquement dans le passage qui va du « monde avant le XVIIe siecle » a « l'age classique ». Dans le premier, comme le synthe-tise Gilles Deleuze, « les forces dans l'homme » (notamment pour Foucault le travail, le langage et la vie) « entrent en rapport avec des forces d'elevation a l'infini2 », elles restent ouvertes dans un « depli », s'articulant dans une infinie circulation de resonances et d'analogies, dont l'unification a lieu en derniere instance en Dieu. Au contraire, dans la seconde periode, ces memes forces trou-vent leur point d'unification dans l'homme comme figure autonome : la finitude de l'homme y devient « un fait acquis3 ». L'individualite de l'homme apparait alors quand un ensemble de forces, se liberant de leur unification structurelle
2	Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, Minuit, Paris 1986, p. 132.
3	Celle-ci est la these centrale de la deuxieme partie de Les mots et les choses. Voir en particu-lier Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, Gallimard, Paris 1966, pp. 262 suiv. Pour Foucault, l'homme advient comme figure autonome, quand dans le champs des forces constituees par le langage, un passage a lieu d'un regime generalise des similitudes et des resonances - dans lequel l'homme n'est qu'un fragment d'un Cosmos dont l'organisation reflete le grand dessein divin - a un regime de la representation dans lequel le plan divin de la creation est repense en fonction de la separation des especes, selon laquelle des caracteres specifiques et determines sont attribues a chaque classe d'etants: Dans ce passage qui va d'un « jeu de similitudes (qui) etait autrefois infini » a un monde dans lequel « une enumeration complete (est) possible, soit sous la forme d'un recensement exhaustif [_] soit sous la forme d'une mise en categorie » (ibid., p. 69), l'homme est enfin saisi comme un objet d'analyse specifique, bien individualise et identifiable. Ainsi trouve comme un objet specifique, l'homme apparait neanmoins progres-sivement comme une figure subjective, qui rentre en conflit avec la place qu'il occupe en tant qu'objet. Et cela, car le caractere specifique de l'homme est qu'il « ne se loge pas dans la nature par l'intermediaire de (sa) nature regionale, limitee et specifique qui lui est accordee par droit de naissance comme a tous les etres. Si la nature humaine s'enchevetre a la nature, c'est par les mecanismes du savoir et leur fonctionnement » (ibid., p. 321). Le savoir est la specificite regionale a travers laquelle l'homme entre en relation avec les objets qui occupent les autres regions : et le savoir n'est pas seulement un trait positif qui caracterise ce type specifique d'etant qu'est l'homme, mais est aussi surtout ce qui le caracterise comme cet etant qui serait capable de surmonter la nature limitee de ses limitations positionnelles.
en Dieu, convergent a former cette figure nouvelle, qui des lors apparait - tout en etant articulee par ces forces - comme une figure contenue et unifiee en el-le-meme, et occupant la place bien definie et autonome d'une espece. Mais en meme temps, l'homme apparait aussi comme irreductible a cette place : il apparait en effet comme ce mouvement par lequel une nouvelle figure vient a vivre, produit des transformations (du travail) et des discours. L'homme apparait en transformant la situation oü son existence en tant que figure autonome etait impossible, il apparait en somme non pas comme un objet defini par une place, mais comme le sujet ou point-pivot d'un processus de transformation. En ap-paraissant donc a travers la transformation active du jeu de ces forces qui le composent, un tel « sujet humain » - comme le souligne Deleuze - est tout de suite divise : d'un cote il se presente comme le centre d'une activite autonome, comme le « sujet de » deliberations et actions, comme le maitre du langage, l'or-ganisateur du travail et le manipulateur de la vie ; et de l'autre cote il apparait en meme temps comme « sujet a » « ces forces obscures de la finitude (qui) ne sont pas d'abord humaines4 ». Le sujet humain est ainsi expose a une contradiction mortelle, entre son statut de sujet et son statut d'objet assujetti a ces forces qui le definissent et le depassent en meme temps : et c'est cette contradiction qui, dans la celebre analyse qui cloture Les mots et les choses5, produit la dissolution de la figure du sujet-humain. Le point suggere par Deleuze est donc qu'a la fin de Les mots et les choses, ce qui disparait, ce n'est pas tellement l'homme, mais l'identification de l'homme et du sujet : l'homme disparait en tant que sujet, car il devient un objet stable, identifiable a travers l'analyse de ses forces constitu-tives (et donc analyse par les sciences de l'homme)6. Ce qui disparait n'est donc pas l'homme, qui est au contraire desormais parfaitement identifie, mais le pro-cessus de transformation entre un regime d'identification et un autre, processus qui etait vehicule par la figure determinee de l'homme.
Le sujet parait donc etre en quelque sorte equivalent a la transformation entre un mode d'identification et un autre : ce qui veut dire qu'il n'est ni identique
4	Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p. 94.
5	Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, p. 398.
6	Le meme nffiud peut etre repere en ce qui concerne les « sciences de l'homme » : des qu'il est pose en tant qu'objet d'analyse, l'homme peut etre analyse comme resultat stable d'une serie de forces, mais par une telle approche, ce qui se perd est exactement le mouvement de transformation par lequel les forces qui le composent se sont rendues independantes de leur unification en dieu, et ont converge dans la position autonome de l'homme.
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a la figure - par exemple l'homme - ou ce processus se fait, ni identique au seul processus de transformation (qui est anonyme). Deleuze, dans son livre sur Foucault, propose alors de lire le sujet comme le processus « impersonnel » -mais toujours identifie de maniere provisoire a une figure donnee - qui a pro-duit l'identification de la figure de l'homme et qui, une fois identifie avec cette figure, ne peut que se soustraire au regard qui essaye d'etablir cette coincidence comme une necessite. En ce sens Deleuze remarque que le meme processus qui porte a la figure autonome de l'homme finit par s'ouvrir a nouveau a une figure ä venir, a « un troisieme tirage (dans lequel) les forces de l'homme entreront en rapport avec d'autres forces, de maniere a composer encore autre chose, qui ne sera plus ni Dieu ni l'homme7 ». Le but de Deleuze est alors ici de suggerer que le sujet n'est identifiable ni avec un processus de transformation, ni avec la forme presente d'une figure, d'un objet determine (l'homme), mais plutot avec une « figure qui vient » : une figure dont l'identite ne peut pas etre parfaitement reperee au present, mais qui s'annonce en agissant dans le present, ou elle interrompt l'identification stricte du sujet avec une figure determinee - a savoir l'homme.
C'est en partant de ces considerations qu'il est possible de lire le sujet comme ce dont la permanence est possible, pour autant qu'il fuit les modes d'indenti-fication que lui-meme produit. Plus precisement, a travers les travaux de Gilles Deleuze et d'Alain Badiou, le sujet peut etre pense selon trois caracteres, qui ne sont pas lies ä telle ou telle autre classe contingente d'objets : le sujet est pense en premier lieu comme une fracture interne dans l'identite d'un objet donne ; deuxiemement comme une serie d'operations qui elargissent cette fracture mais surtout lui donnent une forme, la constituant comme une nouvelle figure ; et en-fin comme ce qui fait signe vers l'egale capacite de chacun (ou de chaque chose) de produire de telles operations.
Alain Badiou affirme clairement une telle distinction entre le sujet et une classe determinee d'objets, en declarant que « le point de depart absolu est qu'une theorie du sujet ne saurait pas etre la theorie d'un objet8 ». En ce sens, il pre-sente une serie de definitions negatives du sujet. En premier lieu, contre tout possible reductionnisme biologique ou sociologique, « un sujet n'est pas une
7	Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p. 94.
8	Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, Seuil, Paris 2006, p. 59.
substance9 » : il n'est ni un animal humain, ni un element d'un Etat ou d'une communaute, un « sujet a un pouvoir ». Inidentifiable avec une res extensa, le sujet n'est non plus une res cogitans, le cogito etant pour Badiou - plutot que l'adjectif qualifiant la substance que l'on appelle sujet - une fracture imperson-nelle qui intervient dans la consistance d'une forme d'organisation du present (de maniere analogue a la verite lacanienne, qui fait trou dans l'edifice du sa-voir). Mais s'il n'est pas un type specifique de substance, « un sujet» n'est pas non plus, soutient Badiou, « l'organisation d'un sens de l'experience. Il n'est pas une fonction transcendantale10 » : en effet - comme d'ailleurs pour Deleuze11 -un sujet transcendantal n'est que l'elevation au role d'a-priori universellement valides de nos modes courants, mais contingents, de relation avec le monde ; il est en somme une generalisation des proprietes relationnelles de l'animal hu-main. Le sujet n'est donc ni identifiable avec l'homme, ni necessairement active par un ensemble d'experiences perceptives organisees par les operations de la conscience : la perception ne definit pas le sujet, mais seulement un mode possible de relation d'un objet avec un autre, et la perception consciente n'est qu'un caractere positif de l'animal humain, qui en tant que tel ne nous dit rien sur ce qu'est un sujet12. Egalement, meme si l'on pense, en suivant le premier Husserl, le sujet comme unification interne d'un ensemble de vecus, ceci ne definit pas le sujet, mais plutot la genese des processus conscients de l'animal humain. Le sujet n'est ni necessairement active par un ensemble d'experiences perceptives, ni identifiable avec l'homme, ni avec les operations de la conscience.
Le sujet comme exces sous condition
En excluant ainsi toute identification materielle, Badiou pointe a penser le sujet en termes exclusivement formels, le point de depart a cela etant que « c'est
9 Alain Badiou, « D'un sujet enfin sans objet », dans Cahiers Confrontation, N. 10 - Apres le
sujet, qui vient ?, Aubier, Paris 1989, p. 15. Cet article correspond a la meditation 35 de L'etre et l'evenement. On suit ici le premier, car certains arguments y sont formulas d'une maniere plus concise et efficace. Ibid.
11	Voir Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens, Minuit, Paris 1969, 14eme et 15eme series.
12	Si l'apparition d'un sujet est donc liee - comme l'on verra bientot - a l'apparition d'un moment d'interruption dans une situation, alors la conscience peut avoir une fonction subjective, seulement si elle a une relation avec une telle interruption. C'est en ce sens que « pour moi, la conscience est au mieux un lointain effet des agencements reels et de leur cesure evenemen-tielle » (Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, p. 185).
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a Lacan que nous devons [^] le frayage d'une theorie formelle du sujet, dont l'assise soit materialiste13 ». Ce que Badiou repere chez Lacan c'est l'identifica-tion du sujet avec la constante inscription - sous forme d'un symptome - d'un element excessif et vide (a savoir, le desir) qui d'un seul geste excede, fracture et lie ensemble les topiques du symbolique, de l'imaginaire et du reel. En genera-lisant une telle logique, Badiou definit le sujet comme « le statut local (d'une) procedure, une configuration excedentaire de la situation14 » dans laquelle il apparait. Plus precisement, pour Badiou, « tout sujet » est en exces sur la situation ou il apparait en tant qu'il « est une exception forcee, qui vient en second lieu15 ». L'hypothese de Badiou est que si un sujet est en meme temps sous condition d'une situation materielle, et en exces sur celle-ci, c'est qu'il depend de la seule chose qui n'existe en celle-ci que sous la forme d'une fracture radicale - a savoir, un evenement. Un sujet est alors defini comme une serie d'actions qui de-plient progressivement dans une situation les consequences d'un evenement.
Plus precisement, ce qui a lieu dans un evenement est la declaration de l'appari-tion d'une verite qui vient interrompre le mode suppose « naturel » selon lequel les elements de la situation sont connus, classifies et representes. Une verite qui se manifeste de maniere evenementielle, comme interruption de la consistance organisationnelle d'une situation - nous rappelle Badiou en suivant Lacan -« n'est pas une qualification de la connaissance » mais « un trou dans le sa-voir16 »: elle n'a aucun contenu specifique, mais se presente simplement comme une separation. Ceci est par exemple le cas de la declaration d'egalite : l'egalite ne peut pas etre demontree a l'interieur d'une situation - situation qui se fonde au contraire sur une logique selon laquelle ses objet sont penses, representes et organises en leur attribuant des places inegales ; bien au contraire, l'egalite apparait comme vide de tout « sens ». Elle ne peut apparaitre qu'en interrompant -158 par exemple en recourant a la violence revolutionnaire - la pretendue evidence selon laquelle une certaine inegalite - un certain mode de representation des elements de la situation, qui le distribue en leur accordant des roles, des places et des statuts inegaux - serait naturelle. Et Alain Badiou d'ajouter: « la dessus
13	Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, p. 56.
14	Alain Badiou, « D'un sujet enfin sans objet », p. 16.
15	Alain Badiou, Theorie du sujet, Seuil, Paris 1982, p. 106, voir plus en general ibid., pp. 102-115.
16	Alain Badiou, « D'un sujet enfin sans objet », p. 14.
Lacan est paradigmatique. Le sujet est convoque comme effet-de-bord, ou fragment delimitant, d'une telle trouee17 ».
En termes plus generaux, une verite expose donc la contingence du mode par lequel tout element d'une situation est classifie et represente selon des carac-teres positifs. En meme temps - si l'on suit l'ontologie du multiple qui git au fondement de l'emprise conceptuelle de Badiou - une verite expose que tout terme singulier, congu au niveau ontologique comme un pur multiple, depourvu de tout fondement premier, elementaire, et donc se divisant infiniment, a pour « essence de se multiplier de fagon immanente18 », et donc d'etre toujours en exces par rapport a la maniere par laquelle il est represente en tant qu'element inegalement localise et classifie dans la situation selon ses caracteres specifi-ques19. Une verite est donc l'exposition de deux choses : premierement, le fait que la loi d'une situation - la maniere par laquelle ses elements sont structures, representes, hierarchises - n'est pas une realite necessaire et encore moins naturelle, mais une construction contingente ; et deuxiemement que tout element est egalement constitue par un exces infini par rapport a son mode present d'identification20. En rapport a cela, le sujet est une sequence d'actes qui, en partant d'un evenement, construisent la manifestation et l'organisation d'un tel exces de tout element (exces par rapport a soi-meme et par rapport a la position inegale par laquelle il est identifie dans la situation).
En ce sens, un sujet est sous tous egards ce que Badiou appelle une « singula-rite ». Comme Peter Hallward le synthetise, une singularite est un terme qui « est presente dans la situation mais comme une anomalie fondamentale, comme
>7 Ibid.
18	Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, Seuil, Paris 1988, p. 43.
19	Pour Badiou un element qui n'excede en rien le mode par lequel il est classifie, organise, re-presente, n'est pas simplement un element contenu dans une serie de sous-ensembles emboi-tes qui en definissent la place, mais est lui-meme un sous-ensemble ayant soi-meme comme seul element. Ceci definit pour Badiou la normalite (ou la normalisation) : quand chaque element est presente et aussi represente comme un sous-ensemble, rien dans la situation ne peut plus etre considere comme etant en exces sur les modes par lesquelles chaque chose dans la situation regoit une place stable et hierarchiquement organisee. Badiou appelle au contraire singularite tout element qui soit present sans etre completement represente, sans etre a son tour un sous-ensemble.
20	L'egalite - qui est pour Badiou exemple archetypique de verite - est donc avant tout l'exces egal de tout element sur le mode par lequel il est inegalement represente dans une situation.
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quelque chose ou quelqu'un etrangement hors place, comme une violation de l'ordre que les choses seraient censees avoir21 ». Presentee dans une situation, dans laquelle elle apparait, une telle singularite n'y est neanmoins pas repre-sentable comme « un objet » de celle-ci, etant donne qu'elle n'a aucun contenu ou caractere positif specifique selon lequel elle pourrait etre classifiee ou re-presentee (localisee par un sous-ensemble precis, inclus dans d'autres sous-ensembles, et qui aurait seulement elle pour element). Une singularite apparait en somme comme une unite, elle est donc « presentee » ; mais en meme temps, etant donne que de telles singularites n'ont rien par quoi etre representees, il s'en suit que le sous-ensemble de la situation qui les contient apparait comme vide22. Cela est par exemple le cas des immigres irreguliers politiquement actifs : en tant que « immigres irreguliers » ils peuvent bien sur etre representes comme sous-ensemble de la situation (ils peuvent etre encadres par des lois, mis au doit par l'opinion publique, poursuivis activement par la politique), mais leur activite politique n'a pas moyen d'etre representee (ils n'ont pas de papiers pour voter, les partis politiques ne les acceptent pas parmi leurs adherents). Le sous-ensemble qui les presente apparait alors comme vide de tout contenu ; et il est exactement une telle inconsistance qui, pour Badiou, se manifeste comme un point subjectif : son caractere specifiquement subjectif etant celui d'etre active-ment « en exces sur la loi23 » de la situation, et de devoiler ainsi la contingence des lois par lesquelles chaque element de la situation est represente comme un sous-ensemble, comme une identite objective qui peut etre nommee dans la situation en fonction de ses caracteristiques positives et de ses fonctions. (En ce cas, les immigres politiquement actifs devoilent la contingence de l'identifica-tion de la politique avec le systeme partitique de representation.)
De son cote Gilles Deleuze - qui est souvent decrit comme le fossoyeur de l'idee de sujet - a bien souligne l'importance de ces points dans lesquels quelque chose d'excessif est en meme temps devoile et deplie. Le point genetique de cette idee peut etre repere dans l'un de ses premiers textes, dans lequel il demande : « pour decouvrir l'essence » de quelque chose, au lieu de la question « qu'est ce
21	Peter Hallward, Badiou - A Subject to Truth, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis -London 2003, p. 99. Notre traduction.
22	Egalement, du point de vue de la representation, on peut aussi penser la singularite comme un sous-ensemble vide, comme un terme dont « les composantes [_] ne peuvent pas etre di-rectement confirmees ou classifiees » par la loi de la situation (Ibid., p. 100).
23	Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, PUF, Paris 1997, p. 82.
que ? », « il se peut que des questions du type : qui ? combien ? comment ? ou ? quand ? soient meilleures24 ». Un tel deplacement de question suggere que ce qui definit « l'essence » n'est pas un « quelque chose », une unite supposee, do-tee d'une identite definie, et fournissant un support (une substance) pour une serie de predicats et de transformations. Pour Deleuze, des questions telles que « comment ? ou ? quand ? » ne definissent pas des predicats qui se disent acci-dentellement d'une essence, mais au contraire introduisent au compte de l'es-sence ce que la question de l'identite d'un objet (qu'est ce que x ?) ne peut pas prendre en compte : elles y introduisent notamment l'idee de relation, et plus precisement de relation entre forces (comment ? combien ?). Ce qui revient a dire qu'un objet resulte defini essentiellement dans sa singularite par ce qui, en en determinant les transformations, depasse ou excede son identite presente avec soi-meme. En meme temps pour Deleuze - si l'on suit la maniere par laquelle il aborde dans les memes annees cette question, et notamment dans Difference et repetition - il est aussi insuffisant de reduire l'essence de quelque chose a une logique interne, unifiee, qui articulerait la succession de ses transformations. En refusant - avec la simplicite drastique des gestes philosophiques classiques de refondation - tant l'essentialisme quant la primaute hegelienne de la transformation sur la substance, Deleuze part de l'idee que ce qui arrive a quelque chose ne doit plus etre mis au compte de ce qui est externe ou accidentel25.
Conformement a cela, au fil des «uvres suivantes, Deleuze insistera sur l'im-portance strategique que jouent pour la pensee ces objets dans lesquels les forces par lesquels ils sont constitues et transformes deviennent directement perceptibles. C'est le cas, dans Cinema, de ces images, appelees « images-cris-tal » qui laissent apparaitre « un peu de temps a l'etat pur26 » : la particularite de ces objets (parmi les exemples, nous trouvons dans L'image temps certaines sequences cinematographiques, ou encore certains usages de miroirs ou de de-
24	Gilles Deleuze, « La methode de dramatisation » (1967), dans Gilles Deleuze, L'Ile deserte, Minuit, Paris 2002, p. 131.
25	L'idee de l'essentialite des attributs « accidentels » dans la definition de l'essence d'un etant singulier est ancree par Gilles Deleuze dans la lecture de la logique stoicienne des categories. On verra a ce propos Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens, deuxieme serie, et aussi Victor Goldschmidt, Le systeme stoicien et l'idee du temps, Vrin, Paris 1953, pp. 13-25.
26	Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, L'image-temps, Minuit, Paris 1985, p. 110, voir plus en general cha-pitres 4 et 5, passim.
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guisements27) est que, au lieu d'apparaitre comme des unites localisees dans l'espace, dans le temps et par un systeme de classification, elles se manifestent plutot comme des tensions singulieres entre une forme presente et une serie de strates, de diverses sequences de faits, dont l'objet est une condensation, et sur lesquelles l'objet est un point perspectif. Le cristal est d'un cote identique a ces forces : il est ces forces, il n'existe pas independamment d'elles. Et de l'autre il differe constamment d'elles, parce que leur action est constamment en exces par rapport a sa forme actuelle, et parce que sa forme actuelle les excede28. Un tel objet apparait alors comme le conflit entre une forme presente - localisee dans l'espace, le temps et descriptible selon la logique de la situation dans la-quelle elle occupe une fonction donnee - et un ensemble de forces diverses, une serie d'accidents contingents qui ne peuvent pas etre ramenes a une logique commune, et dont elle est la condensation. Ainsi exposant le conflit entre ces deux aspects, cet objet excede la possibilite de le classifier selon un genre, une classe ou une espece d'objets, et apparait donc strictement comme une singu-larite. En tant que tel, il n'apparait pas comme une chose qui, par sa densite, occupe une place, un temps et une fonction definis, mais plutot comme une fracture, comme un point de transparence dans lequel les forces et les accidents qui le constituent deviennent perceptibles - comme le suggere la metaphore du cristal par ses proprietes optiques.
Un objet normal est alors celui qui est pourvu d'une identite, c'est-a-dire celui qui est identique a la place et a la fonction determinees par le fait d'etre un specimen d'une categorie donnee d'objets : d'un tel objet on dira qu'il est determine specifiquement, mais qu'il n'est pas defini singulierement (de maniere analogue pour Badiou, dans un objet normal il n'y a aucun ecart entre presentation et representation : il est non seulement element d'une situation, mais il est aussi un sous-ensemble de la situation, contenant soi-meme comme seul element. Autrement dit, en tant qu'element il n'excede en rien la maniere par laquelle il peut etre specifiquement analyse). Ä l'oppose de cela, une singularite
27	Ibid., pp. 94-99. Ces exemples, comme Ranciere l'a note, sont peu et assez decevants. Voir Jacques Ranciere, La fable cinematographique, Seuil, Paris 2001, p. 158. Sur l'emploi des exemples voir ibid., pp. 151 suiv.. Ces exemples fournissent avant tout un paradigme ou une hyperbole d'un aspect que l'on retrouve finalement dans n'importe quel objet.
28	Ces forces sont ainsi d'un seul coup des elements essentiels et des accidents irreductibles a une structure causale. C'est pour cette raison que la notion d'« essentialite de l'accident » (ou d'« evenement qui ne laisse plus de place a l'accident ») joue un role si important chez Deleuze. Voir Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens, p. 179.
se definit essentiellement comme un element qui exprime un conflit entre sa forme presente, objectuelle, specifique, et une serie d'accidents - ces derniers n'etant donc en rien inessentiels (de fagon analogue, chez Badiou, une singula-rite, comme l'on a vu, expose un conflit entre la presentation d'un element, et la representation de cet element dans un sous-ensemble lui assignant une place specifique suivant la logique organisationnelle de la situation). La singularite d'un objet est alors determinee par sa capacite d'exposer ses transformations -y compris celles qui sont couramment nommees « accidentelles » - comme etant des elements qui le definissent essentiellement. L'objet en question neanmoins n'en resulte pas plus precisement identifie : en effet, si au niveau specifique un objet est identique aux caracteres de l'espece a laquelle il appartient, au niveau singulier il n'est pas defini par des categories « plus specifiques », mais plutot par le conflit meme entre son identite specifique et les modes singuliers de sa transformation.
En outre, pour Deleuze, une singularite n'est pas seulement definie par un contraste entre sa forme presente et un ensemble de forces, mais aussi par un processus de desidentification - ce que Deleuze met par exemple en evidence dans son analyse des portraits et des triptyques de Bacon. Deleuze souligne comment la forme actuelle des corps portraitures est presentee par Bacon comme le resultat d'un processus de defiguration, par lequel deviennent visibles les forces dont la forme actuelle est le resultat. En particulier il remarque l'usage que Bacon fait de « diagrammes » qui redoublent et accompagnent les formes : ces diagrammes exposent les forces qui d'un cote convergent dans le point « pers-pectif » que la forme actuelle a sur elles, et qui de l'autre hantent, derangent et defigurent constamment l'equilibre present de la forme. Une veritable « fonc-tion soustractive » du diagramme expose la singularite de l'etant non seulement comme une tension, mais comme un constant se-soustraire a la fixite de son identite presente29. Par l'exposition d'une telle procedure soustractive, la chose singuliere est alors identifiee comme la forme presente d'un processus qui tend a fracturer l'identification d'une chose avec sa place, et donc aussi a interroger la logique qui produit une telle procedure d'identification.
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29 Gilles Deleuze, Logique de la sensation, La difference, Paris 1984. On verra en particulier les chapitres 8, 10 et 12.
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Ä partir de cela, Deleuze porte son attention sur ces objets dans lesquels les cri-teres de desidentification par rapport a leur identite « objective » (d'objet) sont plus evidents. C'est a partir de ces objets qu'il faut lire le traitement que l'idee de sujet subit dans son travail. Il est en effet bien connu que Deleuze fait du concept de sujet une cible polemique : mais, a bien y regarder, la veritable cible polemique n'est pas tellement le concept de sujet, mais plutot l'identification du sujet avec une fonction fixe, objectifiee, telle par exemple le sujet considere en tant que centre original d'aperception consciente d'ou une relation noetique avec le monde devient possible. Ce qui est pris comme cible polemique est en somme la reduction du sujet a l'identite reflexive, fermee, du « moi-je ». C'est en ce sens qu'il faut lire un celebre passage d'un de ses derniers articles, dans lequel le sujet (le sujet dans le sens banal de « ce-que-je-suis-deja », le sujet em-pirique comme centre conscient de perception) est insere dans une liste d'objets singuliers qui realisent une procedure de desidentification : « on s'interroge sur ce qui fait l'individualite d'un evenement : une vie, une saison, un vent, une bataille, cinq heures du soir On peut appeler hecceite ou ecceite ces individuations qui ne constituent plus des personnes ou des mois. Et la question nait de savoir si nous ne sommes pas de telles hecceites plutot que des moi30 ». Dans ce passage l'hecceite est definie comme « l'individualite d'un evenement », comme ce qui peut etre congu et nomme comme « une chose » ou « une indivi-dualite », mais qui en meme temps est aussi un changement ou transformation (une bataille, un certain temps). Et en effet, le terme « hecceite » se divise im-mediatement selon deux lignes de sens : d'un cote il est un « heac », une multi-plicite d'elements disperses (le soldats d'une bataille, les differents faits qui ont lieu a cinq heures du soir), mais de l'autre il est le « ecce ! », la manifestation evenementielle de ces differents elements en tant que synthetises dans l'appa-raitre d'un acte de transformation (la bataille, la difference entre cinq heures et une minute auparavant). L'hecceite est donc la manifestation, comme forme d'une individualite, de l'evenement d'une fracture ou d'une contradiction : la fracture entre un ensemble d'elements et forces heterogenes, et la synthese qui les exprime dans un acte de transformation. Ainsi insere parmi les elements qui forment la liste de telles individualites evenementielles, le sujet apparait comme ce qui va au dela, ou plutot fele, la relation reflexive moi=je. « Je » est un sujet non parce qu'il serait un objet specifiquement caracterise par une capacite
30 Gilles Deleuze, « Reponse a une question sur le sujet » (1988), dans Gilles Deleuze, Deux regimes de fous, Minuit, Paris 2003, pp. 327-328.
reflexive et une activite noetique, mais parce qu'il rompt cette identification, pour autant que son individualite est definie par une serie d'evenements qui ne peuvent pas etre pris en compte sous la definition d'une telle identite.
Ainsi felee, identifiee par une non identite - par une contradiction entre deux poles qui en determine le mode evenementiel d'apparition - l'hecceite a un mode particulier de presence, d'etre-au-present. Et en effet, « hecceite » est le terme que Deleuze emploie pour repondre a la question « apres le sujet, qui vient», originairement posee par les editeurs de la monographie dont est extraite la citation precedente31. Ce « venir apres » signifie bien sur la necessite de depasser le terme « sujet », qui - identifie avec un centre originaire de reflexivite cense regler des activites noetiques - serait desormais devenu rien de plus qu'un objet spe-cifique identifiable par des proprietes determinees : en ce sens la substitution du terme « sujet » par le terme « hecceite » souligne la necessite de restituer le sujet a sa capacite de se depasser, en defaisant son identification actuelle avec une forme ou un objet donne. Mais si l'hecceite est donc bien, pour Deleuze, ce qui « vient apres » le sujet, il faut en meme temps considerer, comme l'ecrit Jacques Ranciere dans son texte pour le meme journal, que la reponse a la question « qui vient apres le sujet » est inevitablement que « le sujet, est precisement ce qui vient apres32 » - deja inclus, comme il l'est d'ailleurs dans le « qui » de la question meme. C'est en ce sens qu'il faut comprendre la substitution du sujet que Deleuze opere avec une pleiade d'autres termes (non seulement haecceite, mais aussi superjet ou surpli33) : ces termes identifient une certaine non-iden-tite - aussi bien terminologique - du sujet avec soi-meme, le sujet etant ainsi chaque fois identifie avec ce qui vient a sa place pour defaire son identification presente avec un objet (aujourd'hui, l'homme comme individu supportant la re-flexivite qui regle les activites noetiques). Exactement en ce sens, « surpli » est le terme auquel Deleuze a recours pour decrire le fameux « troisieme tirage » qui 165 viendrait defaire le « pli » ou l'homme-sujet se referme une fois libere du depli de ses forces s'unifiant en Dieu. Le sujet, nous l'avions vu au debut, ne s'identifie
31	L'article parut une premiere fois dans Topoi no. 7, Who Comes after the Subject?, Dordrecht -Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company, septembre 1988, et fut ensuite traduit en frangais dans Cahiers Confrontation, no. 20 Apres le sujet, qui vient?, Aubier, Paris 1989.
32	Jacques Ranciere, « Apres Quoi », dans Cahiers Confrontation, n. 20 Apres le sujet, qui vient?, Aubier, Paris 1989, p. 194. On remarquera bien sur que le sujet est ici identifie a un « ce », et non pas a la position anthropologique d'un « celui » ou « celle ».
33	Voir Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p. 140, et Gilles Deleuze et Felix Guattari, Qu'est ce que la philosophie, Minuit, Paris 1991, p. 198.
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en effet pas avec une de ces figures (depli, pli, surpli) mais avec la fonction que la figure « a venir » opere au present en defaisant la relation speculaire, identitaire, entre une figure et un objet donne : en ce sens le sujet s'identifie avec le surpli en tant que ce qui, tout en n'existant pas encore (il est une figure « a venir) defait au present l'identification du sujet et de l'homme. Le sujet est ainsi ce qui se consti-tue en apparaissant dans le present comme une figure « qui vient », et qui habite le present comme un trou ou une inconsistance.
Le texte de Deleuze sur l'reuvre theatrale de Carmelo Bene va dans cette direction. Deleuze y remarque comment, dans ses reecritures des «uvres de Shakespeare, Bene ampute d'abord le texte de certains de ses elements, produit une strategie de minorisation de la langue qui parvient a « un minimum de constan-te et d'homogeneite structurale34 », et porte les personnages a une condition de blocage, ou ils sont progressivement depossedes de leur maitrise, reduits a un etat d'aphasie et d'incapacite a gerer leur relation avec l'espace35. Une telle procedure de defiguration qui agit sur plusieurs niveaux vise a « la constitution du personnage36 », a la constitution d'un nouveau caractere produit en erodant la consistance de la situation et en se soustrayant a la fixite d'une identite donnee, assuree a sa place et capable de maitriser son environnement. Ce qui en resulte est un veritable sujet, une figure presque completement desidentifiee de tout objet, une figure qui prend forme dans la situation a travers rien d'autre qu'une serie d'actes qui ruinent ses criteres d'identification. Irreductible a « l'homme » ce nouveau caractere subjectif ne parvient jamais a une forme complete, mais est present dans le present comme annonce d'une subjectivite nouvelle, a-venir, un veritable « peuple qui manque37 ».
Le sujet comme consistance d'une interruption
Le sujet s'articule donc sous condition d'une inconsistance, d'une interruption ou fracture dans les criteres qui en permettent l'identification. Mais, en seconde instance - on vient de le voir avec l'exemple de Carmelo Bene - le sujet apparait
34	Gilles Deleuze, « Un manifeste de moins », dans Gilles Deleuze et Carmelo Bene, Superpositions, Minuit, Paris 1979, p. 100.
35	Voir ibid., pp. 103-110, pour l'aphasie et les travaux de limitation du langage, et pp. 115-119 pour les modes de limitation de la capacite d'agir des personnages.
36	Ibid., p. 91.
37	Gilles Deleuze, « Un manifeste de moins », p. 126.
comme la constitution progressive de la consistance de cette fracture - ou plutot de ce processus de desidentification : le sujet apparait en somme comme l'in-dividualite d'un evenement, comme la figure (certes, toujours a venir ou man-quant a sa place) de ce meme processus de desidentification. D'une maniere analogue pour Badiou, comme Alberto Toscano l'a remarque, si certes l'action subjective « est co-extensive d'une pratique de separation38 », en meme temps le « sujet » n'est pas seulement le nom d'une interruption evanescente, mais au contraire « vient nommer la capacite organisee de ce "manque-a-etre", de se tourner contre la structure, de forcer la representation afin qu'elle inclue son reel39 ». Le sujet n'est en somme pas simplement une interruption inconsistante, mais est aussi la maniere par laquelle cette interruption s'incorpore progressive-ment dans une situation, dans un present.
C'est a travers le concept d'image que Deleuze a analyse l'idee du sujet comme constitution d'une consistance ou incorporation a partir d'un moment d'inter-ruption. En ouverture de L'image mouvement, en partant du refus de l'image comme medium correlationnel, comme projection mentale du monde dans le sujet qui lui fait face, Deleuze en vient a soutenir que les images sont les choses elles-memes40 ». Ainsi congue, comme Anne Suavagnargues l'explique bien -l'image « n'est pas une representation de la conscience, ni un representant de la chose. Elle est prise au sens bergsonien comme une "apparition", un systeme d'actions et reactions au niveau de la matiere elle-meme41 ». L'image est donc immediatement double. D'abord, dans sa forme la plus generale, elle est une « image perception ». Non pas « pergue » mais « perception », l'image est une synthese d'une multiplicite de forces et de relations qui agissent l'une sur l'autre, et qui viennent ainsi former une chose sur laquelle elles continuent incessam-ment d'agir, en en determinant la transformation : l'image, la chose actuelle, est la perception perspective sur ces memes forces dont elle est la synthese.
38	Alberto Toscano, « Communism as separation », dans Peter Hallward (ed.), Think Again, Continuum, London/New York 2004, p. 141.
39	Ibid., p. 141.
40	Encore plus, Deleuze en parvient a une equivalence complete des deux : une image est de-finie comme « l'ensemble de ce qui apparait » (Gilles Deleuze, L'image mouvement, Minuit, Paris 1983, p. 88), et de l'autre chaque mouvement-matiere est affecte du nom d'image (ibid., pp. 83 suiv.), au point qu'il en dit « toutes les choses, c'est-a-dire toutes les images », cf. Gilles Deleuze, Pourparlers, p. 62.
41	Anne Sauvagnargues, « De la capture de forces a l'image », dans Revue d'esthetique, no. 45, Place editeur, Paris 2004, p. 61.
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Deuxiemement, une telle image est une variation constante : une chose-image, en synthetisant sans cesse un ensemble de forces dont les relations sont changeantes, est une variation continue entre un certain etat ou moment de synthese et le suivant. Ainsi constituee comme variation, l'image perception est bien une force qui, agissant dans le present, apparait a autre chose : elle apparait comme effet reactif sur ce meme monde de forces dont elle est la contraction. L'image donc, loin d'etre la representation d'un objet pour un sujet, est plutot une chose, divisee en deux poles : une perception-synthese qui change constamment, et un « perceptible », c'est-a-dire l'inscription de ce meme changement comme reaction sur ce dont elle est la synthese ou perception.
Mais si une chose est d'un cote une contraction et une perception, et de l'autre une reaction et une expression, il n'y a pas une relation mecanique entre ces deux moments : « il y a un ecart entre l'action subie par ces images et la reaction executee42 ». On est ici a un tournant fondamental : pour Deleuze chaque objet, comme il est l'expression d'un ensemble de forces, est deja une difference au moins minimale entre une forme actuelle, presente, et l'ensemble des forces virtuelles dont il est la contraction et sur lesquelles il est un point de vue. En effet, s'il etait tout simplement une expression actuelle d'un ensemble de forces, un objet finirait par n'etre qu'une actualisation evanescente, immediatement defi-gure par ces memes forces qui le constituent et qui - comme elles sont dans une relation constamment changeante - s'exprimeraient immediatement apres com-me quelque chose d'autre. Certes un objet est le resultat expressif d'un ensemble de forces, mais en meme temps c'est seulement en tenant ces memes forces a distance qu'il peut avoir une duree, qu'il peut exister, qu'il peut reussir a etre plus que leur simple point d'expression evanescente. Toute chose, en d'autres termes, en tant qu'image, est deja une difference ou plutot une felure : la difference ou felure entre un ensemble de forces contractees, et l'expression de la variation entre differents moments de cette contraction. Le fait important est que l'extension et la nature d'une telle felure sont loin d'etre depourvues d'influence, et sont meme ce qui permet d'evaluer proprement ce qu'est un sujet.
En ce sens, Deleuze pose que moins une action subie est immediatement ex-primee et convertie en reaction, plus les forces que l'en subit dans cette action
42 Gilles Deleuze, « Trois questions sur six fois deux », dans Gilles Deleuze, Pourparlers, Mi-nuit, Paris 1990, p. 62.
peuvent etre tenues a distance, et plus une selection de celles-ci devient pos-sible43. En effet « c'est cet ecart », pose entre un ensemble d'actions subies, et une expression reactive, « qui donne (aux images) le pouvoir de stocker d'autres images44 ». L'introduction d'une fracture entre action et reaction donne a l'ima-ge la possibilite de suspendre l'immediatete de l'expression reactive, et d'elargir la perception des forces qui agissent sur elle45. Par cela, l'objet acquiert la capa-cite de selectionner, de stocker, et de former ainsi une capacite de reaction plus etendue, un spectre plus vaste de reactions possibles. Pour Deleuze, c'est cela le veritable moment d'introduction d'un supplement proprement subjectif.
Nous en arrivons ici au point de distinction et d'indiscernabilite du sujet et de l'objet. Le sujet est donne par (est le « prendre forme de ») une serie d'operations qui produisent une fracture dans l'identite d'une chose avec elle-meme. Mais paradoxalement, c'est exactement ce supplement subjectif, ce plus-un vide, qui permet a tout objet d'exister, d'avoir une extension temporelle. Encore plus, l'extension d'un tel supplement non seulement unifie, mais singularise l'objet : l'extension d'une telle fracture constitue en effet ce qui differencie un objet/su-jet d'un autre qui reagit aux memes forces. Autrement dit, si tout objet est au moins d'une maniere minimale subjectif (le supplement vide subjectif etant ce qui permet a tout objet d'etre un objet, de ne pas etre un point evanescent de l'expression immediate d'un ensemble de forces), l'extension de cette felure de-terminera sa singularite, sa difference individuelle avec lui-meme (avec, c'est-a-dire, les forces qu'il est), et en meme temps determinera combien il est subjectif, c'est-a-dire combien il differe d'une classe d'objets reconnaissables selon des criteres positifs specifiques.
Dans cet espace, une fois les forces mises a distance et selectionnees, ces meme forces « me tendent leur face utilisable, en meme temps que ma reaction retar-dee, devenue action, apprend a les utiliser46 ». C'est ici que le sujet se constitue. Cette felure, nous dit Deleuze, constitue une incurvation de l'univers : l'univers, les forces qui affectent une image, sont ici tenues a distance, et en meme temps, dans cette felure qui les tient a distance, elles sont incurvees dans un point pers-
43	Voir Gilles Deleuze, L'image mouvement, pp. 90 et suiv.
44	Gilles Deleuze, « Trois questions sur six fois deux », p. 42.
45	Ceci constitue le premier « caractere subjectif » de l'image : la perception comme selection. Voir Gilles Deleuze, L'image mouvement, pp. 90-94.
46	Gilles Deleuze, L'image mouvement, p. 95.
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pectif, dans un « dedans ». Une telle operation de creation de la consistance (un « dedans ») d'une fracture (la distance entre une perception et une reaction) est exactement ce qui constitue le plus central « aspect materiel de la subjecti-vite »47. Comme il l'explique dans Le pli, le sujet - loin d'etre « donne au preala-ble » et oppose aux Gegenstände - « sera plutot ce qui vient au point de vue, ou plutot ce qui demeure au point de vue48 » : le sujet est constitue comme capacite de durer ou de resister dans la fracture, dans le point meme de convergence d'un ensemble de forces qui le constituent en tant qu'objet. C'est par une telle acti-vite d'extension et de manipulation de cette fracture vide qu'il parvient a exister dans le temps, a devenir une presence qui dure, et, en meme temps, a se singu-lariser, a se soustraire a l'identite avec sa definition specifique, objectuelle.
Soustrait ainsi aux forces qui le constituent, et assurant en meme temps - a partir de ce meme lieu vide qui en constitue le point de vue - l'unification de cel-les-ci dans l'unite presente d'un objet, le sujet est donc identifie avec un perdurer dans (et de) ce point de soustraction. On peut alors compter deux mouvements par lesquels le sujet est constitue : d'un cote, la production d'une fracture, d'un point de soustraction qui est aussi point de mise en perspective ; et de l'autre la constitution d'une permanence ou consistance, par laquelle le vide ou distance qui separe perception et reaction et qui permet la constitution du point de vue vient progressivement prendre forme. Un tel sujet ne peut donc etre defini se-lon aucune propriete positive qui en permettrait la classification, en etant au contraire identifie par une structure de desidentification, par une serie d'actions par lesquelles la fracture entre les deux poles qui en constituent l'identite (la forme presente et les forces constitutives) est maintenue ouverte : raison pour laquelle l'on dira qu'un sujet ainsi constitue est deux fois lie au vide, comme supplement vide et comme pratique soustractive.
Conformement a cela, Deleuze identifie le sujet avec une double strategie d'in-terruption et de connexion entre moments d'interruption. C'est dans ce sens que, par exemple, la fameuse analyse du role de James Stewart dans Fenetre sur cour montre comment un nouveau personnage subjectif - qui vient avec toute une
47	Ibid., pp. 94-95. Ceci est le deuxieme aspect, central, de la subjectivite : la possibilite de conversion de la reaction en action. Le troisieme aspect consiste en la generation d'une qualite nouvelle de l'image, une affection irreductible au compte analytique de l'ensemble des forces dont l'image est la synthese expressive. Voir ibid. pp. 96-97.
48	Gilles Deleuze, Lepli, Minuit, Paris 1988, p. 27.
nouvelle dramaturgie narrative et visuelle - est developpe (litteralement) dans l'espace d'une fracture, d'une interruption qui a lieu dans la structure routiniere du present : la jambe fracturee de James Stewart est ce par quoi le personnage principal cesse d'etre un element logique et bien place d'une intrigue, d'une situation structuree par des actions solidement liees l'une a l'autre. Ä partir de son « impuissance motrice », « c'est toute l'image mouvement qui est remise en question, par la rupture des liens sensori-moteurs49 » - liens qui connectent objets, faits et action dans un ensemble bien structure. C'est en effet une telle « impuissance » qui, en fracturant l'ordre bien enchaine des faits, vient produire differents point de fracture dans le scenario - ce qui donne la possibilite de connecter ces differents points de fracture en faisant ainsi apparaitre la consis-tance d'une nouvelle figure subjective et d'une nouvelle dramaturgie50.
Quoique dans des termes fort differents, pour Badiou aussi le sujet est identifie avec une incorporation, avec la constitution progressive de la « consistance » d'une interruption. Premierement, dans L'etre et l'evenement, le sujet est presente comme une serie d'actions qui incorporent dans la situation la fracture produite par l'evenement, et qui, plus specifiquement, y incorporent la verite exposee par ce dernier. Le sujet en ce sens « est defini conjointement par une situation [_] par l'evenement et par une regle de connexion qui permet d'evaluer la depen-dance d'un multiple existant quelconque au regard de l'evenement51 ». Ä travers cette these - qui constituera plus tard l'argument central de son livre sur Saint Paul - Badiou soutient fondamentalement ceci : premierement, que le sujet peut
49	Gilles Deleuze, L'image mouvement, p. 277. « L'impuissance » motrice du personnage est une formulation qui suggere bien l'idee d'une absence de liberte, de fracture dans l'horizon « normal » du sujet humain. Un nouveau personnage subjectif se constitue en somme ici par la suspension du caractere le plus communement accepte dans la definition du sujet, a savoir sa liberte - la liberte etant un terme non seulement absent du vocabulaire deleuzien, mais tres souvent pointe comme illusion metaphysique, ou du moins comme terme vague, imprecis, doxique.
50	On peut aussi penser ici a l'analyse que Deleuze conduit du travail de Carmelo Bene, dans laquelle il apparait qu'une nouvelle figure subjective est articulee d'un cote par des strategies soustractives d'interruption de l'ordinaire, d'amputation de mots et de parties fonctionnelles des corps, et par addition d'elements dysfonctionnels, et de l'autre par la connexion recipro-que entre ces differents elements d'interruption. Deleuze et Guattari conduisent egalement une analyse de la maniere dont une nouvelle figure subjective surgit, dans les lettres de Kafka, par l'articulation de la fracture ou de la non-coincidence entre sujet de l'enonce et sujet d'enoncia-tion (voir Gilles Deleuze et Felix Guattari, Kafka, Minuit, Paris 1975, pp. 53 suiv.).
51	Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, p. 259.
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etre pense formeliement, mais non pas en abstrait, etant au contraire toujours enracine dans une situation particuliere ; deuxiemement, qu'il n'est pas un objet normal, defini specifiquement par la place et la fonction qu'il occupe dans la situation ; troisiemement, qu'il est defini comme une serie d'actions qui connec-tent « tout multiple quelconque » (c'est-a-dire tout element de la situation) avec l'evenement, en appliquant a la specificite de la situation la verite exposee par l'evenement, et en deconnectant par cela les elements des determinations spe-cifiques qu'ils ont en tant qu'objets de la situation. Tel est par exemple le cas du sujet qui se constitue par une serie structuree d'actions qui appliquent a des cas specifiques le fait qu'une revolution qui declare l'egalite radicale a eu lieu, et qui le fait en declarant que chaque element qu'il rencontre est egalement en exces par rapport au role specifique et inegal que la situation lui attribue. Par ce proces, chaque element se trouve deconnecte de la place et de la fonction par lesquelles il est organise, represente et hierarchise dans la situation : par rapport a l'evenement, en effet chaque element est considere sans egard a ses caracteres positifs, et a sa collocation inegale et specifique dans un sous-ensemble donne. Le sujet est ainsi identifie non pas avec une res, mais avec un proces. « Dans la guise de l'evenement » auquel il est suspendu « le sujet est subjectivation52 » : il est un processus dans lequel il constitue sa propre consistance au fur et a me-sure qu'il detache chaque element de la fonction et de la place qu'il occupe dans la situation, et au fur et a mesure qu'il organise des relations reciproques entre les differents termes ainsi deconnectes. Par cette double procedure « tout sujet est articulation d'une subjectivite et d'une consistance53 ».
Un sujet produit donc une serie d'actes de deconnection; mais afin de donnir une consistance a l'ensamble de ces actes, il doit se constituer un corps organise, un corps pourvu d'organes, de parties efficaces, qui puissent operer dans telle ou telle autre situation donnee, y produire des deconnections et mettre en rapport les differents termes ainsi deconnectes. Si « le sujet est incorporation de l'evenement a la situation54 », son corps sera l'instrument ponctuel et necessaire d'une telle incorporation. Loin d'etre une chose parmi d'autres, un tel corps est
52	Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 85.
53	Ibid., p. 96.
54	Alain Badiou, « D'un sujet enfin sans objet », p. 17.
« ce type tres singulier d'objet apte a servir de support au formalisme subjectif, et donc a constituer, dans un mode, l'agent d'une verite possible55 ».
Le sujet est donc d'un cote un formalisme, et de l'autre cote un corps : il est un formalisme, car il n'est pas une entite originaire, mais une procedure de desi-dentification, de de-specification - une procedure de singularisation produite par l'apparition d'un exces de quelque chose par rapport aux criteres qui l'iden-tifient specifiquement ; et il est un corps car un tel exces n'existe que pour autant qu'il se donne une forme consistante, qui devient progressivement presente dans le present, contre le present.
Le sujet comme universalisation
Le premier trait formel du sujet est donc l'exposition d'une fracture dans laquel-le devient perceptible l'exces propre de n'importe quelle chose par rapport a des criteres specifiques d'identification ; le deuxieme trait formel est la constitution d'une sequence d'actions qui donnent consistance a une telle interruption.
Le troisieme trait formel est qu'un corps subjectif ainsi constitue tend non seu-lement a se stabiliser dans une forme presente, mais aussi a universaliser l'ex-position d'une telle fracture. Deleuze souligne a plusieurs reprises la capacite de propagation des moments d'interruption a partir desquels ce que l'on peut appeler un « corps subjectif » vient se former. Cela est notamment le cas de la ritournelle56, ou de son analyse du « I would prefer not to » bartlebien. Auant
55	Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, p. 473. Ce theme est traite en particulier dans Logiques des mondes. On remarquera que, en evidente polemique avec Gilles Deleuze, le sujet est doue d'un « corps avec organes ». Un organe est structure selon deux criteres : sa subordination ideale a la trace d'un evenement, et son « efficacite », qui est toujours prouve « localement, point par point » (ibid., p. 492). Il n'y a donc pas de moyen de savoir en avance combien d'or-ganes un sujet aura, etant donne que cela depend de sa capacite de faire face a differentes situations concretes, et de construire une continuite coherente d'actions. Je dois cette derniere remarque a Frank Ruda.
56	Voir Gilles Deleuze et Felix Guattari, Milleplateaux, Minuit, Paris 1980, ch. 11. La ritournelle est un moyen de creation d'une figure nouvelle a partir de la repetition d'une serie de moments d'interruption, de mise a distance. Le point de depart de l'analyse de la ritournelle est le cas du jeu du fort-da, dans lequel le processus de constitution d'une nouveaute est declenche par une action qui, en tant que telle, apparait comme quelque chose de completement dysfonctionnel, comme un moment d'interruption d'une bonne logique de manipulation des objets. Ä travers le jeu du fort-da - de maniere semblable a ce que l'on a vu dans le cas de l'image-sujet dans
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a ce dernier cas, Deleuze observe comment la phrase de Bartleby apparait etre divisee en deux : d'un cote elle est une expression completive, qui ne peut pas se soutenir a elle seule, et demande a etre completee par une proposition su-bordonnee ; mais de l'autre, dans le texte de Melville, elle est utilisee sans que rien ne vienne la completer. Ainsi l'expression « I would prefer not to », meme depourvue de toute proposition subordonnee, est intelligible, mais - a cause de son manque d'objet - elle ne peut pas etre consideree simplement comme un cas extreme d'expression de refus, comme une forme radicale de negation : cette reponse a plutot pour effet de laisser son sens en suspens, et ainsi d'inter-rompre la division logique parmi reponses affirmatives, negatives et dubitatives. La phrase apparait alors comme un « nonsense », comme un exces qui vient interrompre le bon fonctionnement d'une structure logique qui organise diffe-rents types de propositions57. Elle apparait comme une singularite irreductible a la logique linguistique qui articule differentes dimensions de la proposition, elle apparait en somme comme une « proposition neutre » ou comme un « point neutre » dont un nouveau sens et une nouvelle position subjective peuvent etre produits58.
Mais ce qui nous interesse surtout ici, c'est le fait que pour Deleuze l'expression de Melville fonctionne comme une « formule », pourvue d'une « capacite d'in-fecter» : Bartleby « ajoute lui-meme : "mais je ne suis pas un cas particulier", "je n'ai rien de particulier", "I am not particular", pour indiquer que toute autre chose qu'on pourrait lui proposer serait encore une particularite tombant a son
L'image mouvement - une triple logique de selection des inputs, de mise a distance des inputs et de creation d'une nouvelle affection est produite. Mais en ce cas, plus specifiquement, la consistance de cette logique est donnee par la repetition d'un geste d'interruption introduit dans une situation de manipulation des objets.
57	En ce sens la lecture fournie par Deleuze est tres eloignee de celle d'Agamben : la ou pour Deleuze la formule est un acte qui interrompt la distribution et la difference du positif, du negatif et du dubitatif, pour Agamben elle est plutot une pure potentialite, une potentialite qui, etant completement negative, etant une « potentialite de ne pas », reste toujours en exces sur toute actualisation. Dans les deux cas neanmoins les deux auteurs identifient cette phrase comme le point genetique d'un exces proprement subjectif. Voir Giorgio Agamben, Bartleby, ou de la contingence, Circe, Paris 1995, passim. Voir aussi Giorgio Agamben, « Bartleby », dans Giorgio Agamben, La communaute qui vient, Seuil, Paris 1990, pp. 39-43.
58	Pour une analyse plus detaillee du sens comme exces qui fracture l'unite structurale des differents elements de la phrase on verra en particulier Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens, cha-pitres 3, 5 et 8.
tour sous le coup de la grande formule indeterminee59 » : la suspension du sens -la suspension d'effets calculables produits par des phrases comprehensibles -affecte d'abord un ensemble de plus en plus vaste de phrases possibles qui lui sont adressees, et, a travers cela, affecte toute la situation : une certaine hesitation, une certaine incapacite d'agir, s'empare en effet progressivement des autres personnages du compte60. Encore plus, Deleuze observe que ce dernier aspect traverse l'ensemble de l'ffiuvre de Melville, qui se constitue autour d'une serie de portraits d'inusuels « pionniers americains », une serie de portraits de personnages qui sont capable de se deconnecter de roles specifiques qu'ils sont censes occuper. Leur trait commun serait celui de « se liberer [_] de la fonction du pere61 », de se liberer des causes qui les determinent dans un role donne : Melville ne se servirait pas de ces personnages afin de raconter des individuali-tes rebelles ou fermees dans leur isolement, mais au contraire pour suggerer une « fonction d'universelle fraternite62 », qui produit la possibilite de « faire naitre le nouvel homme ou l'homme sans particularites constituant une societe de freres comme nouvelle universalite63 ». Ce que Deleuze suggere ici, c'est que la connexion parmi plusieurs de ces figures produit une nouvelle humanite, un « peuple qui vient », fondamentalement caracterise comme etant « sans parti-cularites » (sans specificites qui permettraient de le classifier dans une classe donnee d'objets) ; un peuple « neutre », mais en un sens actif, c'est-a-dire ca-racterise non seulement par la capacite de chacun a realiser une serie d'actes de separation, de desidentification, mais par une possibilite d'expansion infinie de ce processus : en effet une telle collectivite, est universellement extensible, car elle ne prevoit aucun contenu positif comme critere d'appartenance, mais seulement la capacite, propre a chacun, d'accomplir un acte de separation par rapport art aux propres criteres d'identification64.
59	Gilles Deleuze, « Bartleby, ou la formule », dans Critique et Clinique, Seuil, Paris 1993, p. 90.
60	On remarquera en outre bien sur que l'effet est proprement « departicularisant » : ce qui saute, ce sont les particularites specifiques qui permettent de classifier les different phrases en fonction des reponses possibles qu'elles peuvent obtenir.
61	Ibid., p. 108.
62	Ibid., p. 101.
63	Ibid., p. 108.
64	En ce point, un tel « universalisme vide » est tres proche de l'idee, avancee par Nancy ou Blanchot, de « communaute de ceux qui n'ont rien en commun », ou encore de l'idee d'Es-posito de « communaute nihiliste ». Pour ces trois auteurs en effet ce n'est que le « rien », l'absence de tout caractere positif, qui peut etre « mis en commun », et qui constitue le seul paradigme possible capable de defaire activement l'identification exclusive d'une communaute
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Or, si ce troisieme caractere du sujet n'est que partiellement developpe par Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou en fait au contraire un theme central, qu'il developpe en particulier a travers l'idee de « procedure generique ». Par cette expression, Ba-diou entend mettre en evidence comment la procedure subjective - etant fondee sur des operations de disjonction qui ne demandent aucun contenu positif spe-cifique - peut etre repetee pour chaque element d'une situation, independam-ment des caracteres specifiques de ce dernier. Une procedure generique est ce par quoi le sujet demontre, a travers une serie d'actions, qu'« il n'y a pas d'eve-nement qui puisse etre l'evenement d'une particularite » et que « le seul correlat possible de l'evenement est l'universel65 ». Cela est possible car tout element d'une situation (ou du moins tout element qui vaut la peine d'etre analyse)66 est, du point de vue ontologique, une singularite : en effet chaque element est une pure multiplicite, et en tant que telle, elle est en exces par rapport au mode dans lequel, dans une situation, il est inegalement represente comme une unite douee de differentes fonction et place (comme appartenant a un different sous-ensemble). L'adresse universelle de la procedure generique - qui tend a la de-qualification de chaque element, a la deconnexion de son mode de representation - est donc possible car chaque element est ontologiquement deja en exces sur sa representation dans la situation : comme le souligne Badiou « la these
avec tel ou tel autre caractere positif (origine, sang, culture, richesse, religion, etc.). Voir a ce propos Maurice Blanchot, La communaute inavouable, Minuit, Paris 1983 ; Jean-Luc Nancy, La communaute desoeuvree, Christian Bourgois, Paris 1983 ; Roberto Esposito, « Communaute et Nihilisme», dans Roberto Esposito, Communaute, Immunite, Biopolitique, Prairies ordinaires, Paris 2010.
65	Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 80. Le texte est legerement modifie : Badiou se refere en effet ici a l'adresse universelle du christianisme et il parle donc non pas d'evenement, mais d'« un evenementiel ».
66	Meme si l'humanite n'est ni raison suffisante ni raison necessaire pour qu'un sujet puisse apparaitre, il en reste qu'il y a des situations, que Badiou appelle « naturelles », dans lesquelles l'apparition d'un sujet - et donc retrospectivement aussi l'apparition d'un evenement - est impossible, et ou il n'y a donc rien qu'il vaut la peine d'analyser. Les situation naturelles sont pour Badiou opposees aux situations historiques, dans lesquelles existe une partie specifi-que (ce qu'il appelle « site »), qui presente un certain degre d'inconsistance avec la logique representationnelle de la situation. Dans les situations historiques, si et quand un evenement a lieu, l'inconsistance exposee par l'evenement peut etre connectee avec l'inconsistance du site, ce qui declenche la procedure d'incorporation des consequences d'un evenement dans laquelle un sujet vient a apparaitre. Une situation naturelle, en d'autres termes, est une situation ou tous les elements sont normaux, dans laquelle il n'y a aucune singularite, et ou par consequent un evenement ne peut pas avoir lieu. Voir a ce propos Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, pp. 141-147 et p. 194.
ontologique profonde est que l'universalisme suppose que l'on puisse penser le multiple comme exces sur soi67 ». Finalement la procedure consiste en l'ex-tension constante de l'exposition d'un tel exces de chaque element sur le mode par lequel il est expose comme une unite, representee comme un sous-ensemble specifique de la situation68 : l'universalite de la procedure et la singularite de chaque element se montrent donc comme deux aspects inseparables.
Un sujet se realise donc comme singularite par le travail d'organisation d'une procedure generique, mais ceci se fait toujours en trouvant les moyens ade-quats (les organes) qui lui permettent d'exposer et de connecter les singularites de chaque element - des moyens qui changent donc a chaque fois en fonction des particularite de la situation oü le sujet agit. Par l'action du generique le sujet en un seul geste devient singulier, il acquiert une existence pleinement (meme organiquement) singuliere, et defait un nombre de plus en plus important de particularites. Son travail deconnectif, quoique chaque fois ancre dans une situation concrete, consiste en la deconnection d'un element par rapport au mode particulier de representation de cet element comme un sous-ensemble qui occupe une place determinee et accomplit une fonction donnee. Ainsi l'adresse universelle de l'action subjective est activee a travers une procedure generique, au fondement de laquelle se trouve le fait que les differences ne peu-vent etre ni ignorees, ni soutenues, mais doivent etre « traversees » : les « differences sont ce a quoi on adresse l'universalite et finalement (elles sont) ce qu'il fait traverser pour que l'universalite elle-meme s'edifie, ou pour que la genericite du vrai soit deployee de fagon immanente69 ». En relation a une telle fonction universelle, structuree comme une procedure generique, le sujet sera alors defini comme la « configuration locale d'une procedure generique dont une verite se soutient70 ».
67	Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 82.
68	Un element est en effet normalise pour Badiou lorsqu'il est rendu completement identique aux criteres par lesquels il est « classifie » dans un sous-ensemble donne, qui n'inclut que ce seul element. La normalite (absence de toute singularite) est donc obtenue quand tout element est aussi un sous-ensemble.
69	Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 105, voir plus en general tout le chapitre X.
70	Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, p. 429. Comme Žižek le remarque, ce troisieme aspect du sujet est immediatement connecte avec le premier : « l'identification d'une non-part » (l'identification du sujet comme singularite, irreductible a un objet identifie comme part spe-cifique d'une situation) « avec l'Universel » etablit « une sorte de court-circuit [_] le paradoxe d'un singulier-universel, d'un singulier qui apparait faisant office d'Universel ». Slavoj Žižek,
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Eternite et inactualite
Ä travers une telle adresse universelle, ce qui est constitue est un veritable contre-present, un present qui devient de plus en plus consistant dans et contre le present. Comme Deleuze le remarque, un sujet, ou une singularite individuelle, est en meme temps maximalement « present » et « inactuel71 » : le sujet, iden-tifie avec la constitution progressive d'une figure et d'un corps nouveaux a partir de la synthese de differentes operations de deconnexion, gagne une intensite maximale de presence (au point qu'il est decrit comme « l'individualite d'un evenement ») en defaisant progressivement les criteres par lesquels il est recon-nu comme un objet specifique - et ceci agissant non tellement contre le present, contre les modalites courantes d'organisation du present, mais plutot indepen-damment ou indifferemment de celles-ci. On pourra alors dire que la ou un objet est maximalement representable dans le present (il est pleinement identifie par des criteres nommables qui lui accordent une place et une fonction), mais est minimalement present (sa singularite est completement evaporee, etant donne qu'il est identique aux criteres qui l'identifient specifiquement), le sujet est au contraire ce qui est present comme soustraction a ces criteres. Present comme soustraction, le sujet est donc present comme une forme qui reste toujours a venir. Plus encore, un tel sujet est a-venir (ou l'etre-a-venir est une figure du present) dans le sens ou il vise a la constitution d'un espace generique ou inac-tuel. Comme on l'a vu dans le cas de la lecture que Deleuze offre du travail de Melville, ce dernier vise - par le reperage de differents personnages dont la presence se forme par soustraction aux lois qu'identifient quelqu'un en tant que present - a la constitution progressive d'un veritable « peuple qui manque ». La presence d'un tel manque a donc la dimension universelle d'un peuple, qui se constitue par une progressive action deconnective - et qui a une extension proprement infinie, car il ne se fonde sur rien d'autre que le vide meme de ces actions deconnectives. C'est une telle extension progressive d'un vide ou d'un
« From Purification to Subtraction », dans Peter Hallward (ed.), Think Again, Continuum, London/New York 2004, p. 166.
71 Voir a ce propos Gilles Deleuze et Felix Guattari, Qu'est ce que la philosophie, p. 107. On re-marquera que dans ce passage ce qui est « inactuel » loin d'etre « absent », a au contraire une actualite maximale, quoique paradoxale : le texte insiste sur le fait que ce qui est « inactuel » est « present » en tant que « divise en deux », ou appartenant a une double temporalite, par laquelle il est en meme temps present, et present-comme-encore-a-venir.
espace de deconnexion, de dequalification, qui vient progressivement former ce contre-present auquel Deleuze donne le nom d'inactualite.
Pour Badiou, de fagon similaire, le propre du sujet consiste en l'interruption du present et en la « production d'un nouveau present72 ». Le sujet acquiert consis-tance, devient « present » - comme vu - a travers une procedure generique qui deploie l'adresse universelle d'une verite. Une telle verite a une temporalite spe-cifique : elle est eternelle, et son action est infinie. D'abord, dans son adresse universelle, elle demande un travail infini pour deconnecter chaque element du mode specifique par lequel il est represente. Et en meme temps elle est eter-nelle : l'egalite, par exemple, est vide, depourvue de tout contenu specifique, contingent ou determine, car elle n'est rien que l'infini et eternel resurgir de l'acte meme qui defait des inegalites specifiques et contingentes. En tant que vide elle n'a aucun contenu qui puisse etre efface ou modifie, et elle est donc eternelle.
Le paradoxe est que seule une telle eternite « vide » peut produire un plein present, lorsque le present, en tant que tel, tend a se consumer. En effet une presence maximale - un changement radical - est produite seulement par l'inter-vention de l'eternite d'une verite, sous la forme d'une construction progressive des consequences qui en decoulent. Au contraire, sans l'intervention d'une telle fracture et de la procedure subjective qui suit, le present tend a se perdre dans une pure continuite amorphique : laisse a sa « normalite », a sa « naturalite », le present devient une sorte d'eternite « plate » ou « sans changement », dans laquelle chaque chose est finalement immobilisee a sa place, fixee dans une identite pure et immobile avec le sous-ensemble auquel elle appartient73. C'est donc par l'intervention d'un sujet qui declare une verite eternelle - porteuse d'une adresse universelle - que le present commence a changer en ouvrant une nouvelle sequence, qu'il se soustrait a un temps plat, indistinct, a une sorte d'eternite ou tout resterait a sa place.
Ainsi, le present constitue par les objets et leurs relations tend a devenir un minimum de realite, une realite immobile ou derealisee, ou tout etant est identique a une classe, a une espece (Deleuze) ou a un sous-ensemble (Ba-diou), lorsque le sujet se constitue au contraire par l'extension et la solidi-
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72	Voir Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, pp. 58-62.
73	Je dois cette remarque a Jelica Šumič-Riha, qui a presente cette idee dans un travail intitule « The 21st Century has yet not begun », Berlin, KW Institute for Contemporary Art, 16/11/2010.
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fication d'un present dont la presence est maximale car fracturee, divisee -pour Badiou - entre present et eternite, ou - pour Deleuze - entre present et inactuel (un a-venir agissant dans-l'actuel comme un non-actuel).
Conclusion : necessite et contingence
Il y a donc une serie de conditions formelles par lesquelles un sujet et un nou-veau present peuvent apparaitre : a) un critere soustractif : une fracture qui expose l'exces d'un objet par rapport a son mode present d'identification, et qui montre en meme temps la contingence des criteres sur lesquels cette identification a lieu ; b) un critere synthetique : la stabilisation d'une telle fracture dans une nouvelle figure, qui reste neanmoins toujours « a venir », toujours fracturee dans son identite ; c) un critere d'expansion infinie : le fait qu'une telle consis-tance n'est possible qu'a travers la connexion avec d'autres points, dans lesquels des operations semblables ont lieu. Ceux-ci sont donc les criteres minimaux a travers lesquels on peut penser le sujet sans le reduire a un objet donne. Ceux-ci sont les criteres minimaux qui permettent de distinguer l'individualite specifi-que d'un objet, et la singularite d'un sujet.
Deja chez Deleuze (une fois que l'on a mis en evidence que l'apparent refus de la categorie du sujet est plutot le refus du sujet comme categorie specifique d'ob-jets) on peut trouver une articulation assez etendue de ces trois criteres formels. Mais dans son ffiuvre, ces criteres se revelent etre en derniere instance appli-cables a n'importe quel etant : comme on l'a vu, pour Deleuze, chaque chose, afin de perdurer dans son existence, doit etre au moins minimalement subjective, doit pouvoir realiser au moins une desidentification minimale et des forces qu'elle exprime, et des criteres qui l'identifient. Le travail de Deleuze fournit certes un ensemble de criteres formels aptes a comprendre comment fonctionne un sujet, mais ne permet guere de comprendre les criteres qui differencient une chose (qui doit etre au moins minimalement subjective) d'un sujet pleinement forme (capable de produire une nouveaute, de produire un changement radical qui depasse ses seules limites et affecte l'ensemble d'une situation).
Au contraire si l'on considere le travail d'Alain Badiou, ce probleme est resolu. Pour Badiou un sujet est seulement possible en relation a un evenement, dont il deplie les consequences ; et un evenement est une fracture unique, radicale et rare qui est reconnaissable car elle concerne et vise tous les elements d'une situa-
tion. Mais avec Badiou un nouveau probleme surgit. Pour Badiou evenements et sujets sont rares, la plupart des situations n'etant point subjectives mais compo-sees seulement d'objets « normaux ». Badiou, afin d'expliquer une telle rarete, se base sur la distinction entre nature et histoire : il appelle « naturelles » toutes les situations qui sont completement « normales », c'est-a-dire ou tout ce qui est presente est aussi represente, et ou par consequent aucun element singulier n'apparait74 et aucune fracture n'est introduite dans la representation des elements, et il appelle historiques toutes les situations qui ne sont pas naturelles. Mais pour Badiou, la nature n'est pas simplement de facto normale, elle l'est aussi de jure. Autrement dit, elle est structurellement normale, et elle ne peut produire des singularites sous aucune condition : « le rester-la stable d'un multiple peut etre interieurement contredit par des singularites, que le multiple en question presente, mais ne represente pas. Pour penser pleinement la consis-tance stable d'un multiple naturel, il faut sans doute interdire ces singularites interieures75 ». Ainsi pour Badiou, l'apparition de singularites dans la nature est logiquement prohibee, elle est impossible. Le probleme est que la distinction entre de telles situations naturelles et ces situations ou un formalisme subjectif peut apparaitre est a son tour completement objectuelle : c'est la distinction en-tre le domaine historique de l'humain et le domaine de la « nature » (une nature entendue selon le sens commun de « ce-qui-n'est-pas-humain ») : en effet « par humanite », il declare, « j'entends ce qui fait support pour des procedures gene-riques, ou procedures de verite76 », c'est-a-dire pour des procedures subjectives. L'humanite devient ainsi le seul support du sujet, ce qui implique qu'il y a une part de la nature (l'homme) qui par nature echappe a la normalite de la nature, lorsque le reste de la nature n'y echappe pas.
Bien sur Badiou n'entend guere etablir par la une equivalence complete entre « humanite » et sujet (la desidentification des deux etant d'ailleurs l'un des points de depart de son idee de sujet) : en ce sens il y a pour Badiou des hu-mains qui ne sont pas des sujets (celles et ceux qui se reduisent simplement au maintien de leur vie ou de leur mode de vie et a la manipulation du langage communicationnel) et des sujets qui ne sont pas des corps humains (non seu-lement un animal humain, mais aussi une reuvre d'art, un theoreme ou une
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74	Voir notes 19 et 68.
75	Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, p. 146.
76	Alain Badiou, Conditions, Seuil, Paris 1992, p. 258. C'est Ozren Pupovac qui a porte mon attention sur ce passage.
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action collective peuvent etre le support d'une procedure de verite). Mais l'hu-manite fonctionne ici neanmoins comme la condition de possibilite minimale, naturelle, pour que des singularites puissent avoir lieu : autrement dit, le sujet a lieu dans le champ de l'histoire humaine en tant que naturellement opposee a la nature. Pour Badiou « il est rationnel de penser l'a-normal, l'antinature, donc l'histoire, comme omnipresence de la singularite - tout comme nous avons pen-se la nature comme omnipresence de la normalite77 ». Mais qu'est-ce qu'une telle « rationalite » si non une observation empirique (« il y a des situations naturelles, completement normales, et il y a des situations subjectives, qui ont affaire a l'histoire humaine »), elevee au role de declaration de principe (« il est rationnel de penser qu'il y a des situations qui par principe sont interdites d'anormali-te ») ? La rationalite de la division entre nature et histoire est donc finalement a son tour naturalisee, et en derniere instance l'element subjectif y fait figure de rien de plus qu'un attribut positif et specifique de l'animal humain.
Chez Deleuze la theorie du sujet reste incomplete, un principe subjectif circulant de maniere indistincte dans chaque phenomene naturel, sans que l'on puisse bien identifier un seuil effectif ou une nouveaute subjective apparait dans toute son etendue ; chez Badiou le sujet est soutenu par le corps humain, qui est cense etre cette part de nature qui, par nature, est soustraite a la nature et est capable de construire un sujet. Chez les deux auteurs, une sorte de quatrieme critere na-turaliste est ainsi ajoute, qui vient completer la theorie formelle du sujet, en sou-lignant ainsi que les trois premiers criteres seraient necessaires, mais non pas suffisants. Mais l'introduction d'un tel critere naturaliste va a l'encontre de l'idee meme d'une identification purement formelle du sujet, a l'encontre de l'idee de l'identification du sujet avec une procedure de desidentification - ce qui en premier lieu avait permis de separer sujet et objet de la maniere la plus radicale.
L'humanite ne peut donc pas donc fonctionner comme quatrieme condition, comme remplissage d'une theorie formelle du sujet. Il est certes vrai qu'une lon-gue tradition identifie l'humanite non pas par des caracteres biologiques don-nes, mais plutot par une capacite vide d'adaptation ; et il est aussi vrai, que, plus radicalement - Lorenzo Chiesa et Aaron Schuster travaillent aujourd'hui dans cette direction - l'humanite peut etre identifiee non pas par une capacite de s'adapter a des conditions donnees, mais par la capacite de se soustraire a
77 Alain Badiou, L'etre et l'evenement, p. 194.
des determinations78. Il en reste neanmoins que, dans les deux cas, un tel manque de determinations et une telle capacite de se soustraire aux determinations apparaissent comme des caracteres positifs, specifiques, definissant du point de vue biologique ou comportemental la classe d'animaux a faible specialisation que les humains forment.
Si le sujet est donc a penser a travers une separation radicale avec la categorie de l'humain, c'est parce que le sujet est une procedure de desidentification, radi-calement disjointe de la finitude de n'importe quel objet - fut-ce un objet defini empiriquement par certaines capacites de desidentification. Une telle procedure, bien entendu, a toujours lieu dans le cadre contingent d'un objet donne, mais un tel objet reste toujours contingent, et nul objet specifique ne peut donc etre considere comme condition du sujet. Le sujet, en tant que procedure de separation qui tend a sa propre universalisation, est doublement detache de la finitude de l'objet contingent ou il a lieu : d'un cote cette procedure peut etre universelle-ment repliquee, et de l'autre, elle apparait comme etant toujours singuliere, et ne peut donc pas etre identifiee avec un caractere specifique d'une classe d'objets. L'humain au contraire - meme a le penser a travers l'idee d'indetermination et de soustraction - est toujours une categorie objectuelle specifique, doublement detachee de l'infinitude, et doublement vouee a une disparition : d'abord, car l'identification d'un sujet avec l'humain est en soi un protocole de disparition de la singularite radicale d'une procedure dans la specificite d'une classe d'ob-jets, et deuxiemement car l'humain, comme tout objet, est voue a la disparition. D'une maniere ou d'une autre, l'humanite subira une fin temporelle : elle fi-nira soit par ses propres moyens, soit par une catastrophe naturelle, soit, le cas echeant, par l'epuisement du soleil ou par le retrecissement de l'univers, comme Ray Brassier a souligne afin de mettre en evidence la necessite de separer le sujet de l'humain79. En somme, l'identification avec l'humanite ne peut pas constituer 183 un quatrieme critere necessaire d'identification du sujet, car une telle identifica-
78	On ne songera a cela seulement dans un sens biologique, mais aussi dans un sens politique, notamment a travers l'idee, tant marxiste que sartrienne, de soustraction par rapport a ces determinations par lesquelles l'alienation est produite. Comme Sartre le montre dans Critique de la raison dialectique, cela signifie en tout premier lieu soustraction par rapport a l'objecti-fication dans laquelle le besoin de l'autre individu me jette - et dans laquelle on se jette soi-meme par l'action meme d'objectification de l'autre - en face d'un besoin commun. On verra Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, Gallimard, Paris 1960, pp. 358 suiv.
79	Voir Ray Brassier, « Solar Catastrophe », dans Philosophy Today, No. 47, DePaul University Press, Chicago 2003, pp. 421-430.
tion produit le mouvement contraire a celui qui definit le sujet : elle re-identifie le sujet avec une espece, et ainsi elle le desingularise ; et elle rend impossible de le penser comme une procedure infinie, et ainsi le desuniversalise.
Bien entendu le sujet peut fort bien passer a travers l'humain - et ceci de manie-re particuliere en fonction de l'indetermination qui le caracterise et en fonction de sa capacite soustractive. Mais une telle relation entre le sujet et l'humain -quoiqu'elle soit de duree exceptionnelle - reste toujours, sous le profil logique, une relation contingente. Si l'identification avec l'humain ne peut donc pas etre elevee au role de critere necessaire ou formel, il reste neanmoins vrai que les trois conditions que nous avons enoncees ne sont pas suffisantes. Il est donc necessaire de trouver une quatrieme condition, mais celle-ci doit etre directement deduite des trois premieres - ou, plus precisement, de leur insuffisance. Les trois premiers criteres formels forment une structure necessaire d'identification du sujet, mais ils ne sont pas suffisants a l'identifier. D'un cote une telle insuffi-sance ne peut pas etre depassee simplement en ajoutant l'humanite au titre de quatrieme condition necessaire, car cela signifierait « re-objectualiser » le sujet, en le mettant sous condition d'une espece ou classe d'objets. De l'autre cote, les trois premieres conditions sont certes necessaires, mais elles ne forment en rien un sujet metaphysique ou abstrait, qui simplement s'incarnerait a chaque fois dans telle ou telle autre situation concrete. Ce qu'il faut donc faire, c'est themati-ser l'insuffisance meme des trois premieres conditions, en relevant qu'elles sont toujours activees par des raisons strictement materielles et contingentes (dont on ne peut donc pas en prendre une et l'elever au role de cause necessaire). La quatrieme condition sera donc que les trois premiers criteres, formels et necessaires passent toujours par une contingence, qui est la condition suffisante de la realisation du sujet. Autrement dit, au lieu d'elever une contingence donnee 184 au role de necessite « naturelle », on doit declarer la necessite de completer les criteres d'identification du sujet, necessaires mais insuffisants, par un critere suffisant, mais toujours changeable et contingent. Je tiens cette contingence comme le symptome meme de l'excessivite du sujet, du fait que le sujet n'est pas une chose, mais plutot une action materielle.
Si, aujourd'hui, il y a encore peut-etre une necessite d'affirmer la relation entre l'humain et le sujet, celle-ci n'est pas due a une hypothetique relation necessaire entre les deux, mais simplement au fait contingent que l'animal humain continue a etre un lieu pratique ou des raisons suffisantes d'apparition du sujet
se forment. Mais une telle place de la praxis migre constamment vers d'autres supports : aujourd'hui un tel deplacement a lieu vers des «uvres d'art, des actions collectives ou des theoremes qui - comme Badiou l'a montre - peuvent etre consideres a tous les effets des sujets. Mais il n'y a aucune raison pour qu'une telle migration ou deplacement ne continue pas. Etant necessairement complemente par une condition pratique, le sujet change de support : par exem-ple a travers la decouverte de nouveaux supports physiques aux marges de l'humain, ou par la decouverte d'autres sequences subjectives dans d'autres regions de ce qui est.
Ce qui compte, c'est d'un cote le travail theoretique d'identification des crite-res formels du sujet, et de l'autre cote le travail praxique d'identification des points les plus probables d'apparition de nouvelles figures subjectives dans un moment et un lieu determines. Mais cette derniere tache constitue un lieu vide que la philosophie peut nommer, mais ne peut pas reperer, et ou la question de la praxis se manifeste en toute sa force. Penser les conditions du sujet laisse donc necessairement la place a la praxis, a des actions contingentes de desiden-tification par lesquelles un sujet a venir realise le singulier, met l'universel en perspective et permet l'apparition du nouveau.
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Yücel Dursun*
On "One" (Thing) that is Missing in Lacanian Thought
Although this paper deals principally with One, considering the conclusions it draws, it will by no means be restricted to One.1 No matter how primarily it focuses on showing that the theme One in Lacanian thought is confined to one-sidedness, the crucial consequences of Lacan's leaving this aspect 'incomplete' will be highlighted. In brief, the following arguments will be addressed throughout the paper:
1.	Lacan's understanding of One is one-sided, and it elaborates the reality of One from one aspect only; thus, the incomplete aspects of this reality should also be elucidated.
2.	Comprehending the aspect that has been left incomplete is possible through a representation of it, but one that does not involve the concept of One.
3.	One such representation opens up varied opportunities to think.
4.	In addition, the representation's significance is that it qualifies as a representation that explains the disjunction - as well as 'one'ness - in language and thought.
The above-mentioned arguments will be developed in three sections. In the first section, Lacan's reflection on One will be dealt with in a detailed way. The second section traces the consequences of Lacan's thought - as described in the first section. The third section presents our position and theses based thereon.
1 Indeed for quite some time - that is, since I started to contemplate Two - I have definitely wished for Two to appear in the title of this article. However, whenever I set myself to write about Two, I was inclined to have 'One' in the title, thereby clearly feeling the need to discuss One at some length.
* Ankara University, Philosophy Department.
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I. Lacan and One
Imagine that you are a primary school pupil, and you are just learning to count. You have started to identify objects quite recently, and your teacher is trying to teach you to count using these objects. Take a second and try to imagine what your teacher might be doing in this situation. We can assume that the teacher, for this purpose, points at an object - probably something in the immediate classroom environment, such as a table, chair, pencil, or eraser - and says to you, "one desk, one chair,^" or does this by putting the symbol '|' on the black board. We can then assume that the teacher points at the desks (or chairs, etc.) in a row, calling each one of them: "two desks, two chairs,^" and turns again to the blackboard to make another '|' symbol. Thereupon, she points at all the '|'s on the board and writes or says "two". It is not difficult to imagine that the teacher would keep doing this to teach you to count to, say, ten.
To understand One, Lacan gives quite a similar example. Let us focus on this scenario: When contemplating One and - in general, identification - what is important for Lacan in this example is that '|', which shows '1 desk', '1 chair', should be understood. More importantly, the moment at which such a symbol originates or emerges should be focused on (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961). Thus, Lacan's intention is to show the relationship between the rigor (la rigueur) of the sign and 1 (Lacan, 1961-1962: 29 November 1961). At this point, the term 'la rigueur' is used on purpose because this term draws attention to the fact that when we have a closer look at the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, ...7 - so easy for us at first sight - we realize that it has, in fact, a porous structure. There is a tightly woven structure, and its porosity had always been there well before sign '|' was positioned. In other words, if we were to review the process in slow-motion mode, we would be able to perceive that, when counting, "two and three do not come rather quickly" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962). This statement signals that a counting process, started well before the counting we do daily and which entails an ordinary counting act, has readily been in play. We need to go back to our teacher and her or his operation on the blackboard to further elaborate on this. Lacan, at this very point, scrutinized the emergence of the mark '|' to use a concept borrowed from Freud - This concept is called einziger Zug, i.e. trait unique and Lacan perfectly describes the unique feature of the sign.
Trait Unique (einziger Zug) and Unary Trait (trait unaire)
Lacan indicates that this term, coined by Freud, is not a new term: in set theory in the field of mathematics, unaire is used in place of einziger/unique and serves the same purpose (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961): to investigate the trait that creates the identification, or the oneness, of the sign '|' as a significant; that is, to study what was mentioned above as tight. The unary trait will help perceive not only the emergence of the sign '|' as a signifier, but also the counting 'process' of the unary trait, which is the foundation of any signifier - and which constitutes the essence of the signifier (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961) according to Lacan. At the same time, the process of the unary trait, "brings its effect to bear on the most radical characters of what is called Thinking" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962).
To return to our case, it can be said that what arises before us in understanding the emergence of sign '|' is, above anything else, the unity, or one-ness of the sign. However, how do we make this decision? Or, stated differently, where does this originate? It is not a simple question; to be able to explain how the unary trait of the symbol has become possible, we need to imagine another scenario. The scenario is about the hunting experience of a man living in prehistoric times.
Here Lacan asks us to imagine the primitive hunter making a stroke on an animal rib-bone for each animal he has hunted. The primitive hunter hunts, and he makes one stroke for every hunting experience of his. He wants to remember his next hunting experience by making another stroke. In a sense, he achieves a reproduction of his adventures.
Examining the case, we have two options: The first is the analysis of the appearance of the first (and the following) strokes. The second, so closely related to the first that they almost overlap, is analyzed simultaneously: This is about counting as these strokes appear. That is, this entails elaborating on what kind of a counting process the primitive hunter carries out.
Let us take a closer look at the first circumstance in the primitive hunter scenario. Lacan first explains the unary trait that exists in the emergence of the stroke (and in the counting process that naturally occurs) by its qualitative difference.
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He wants to clarify what the possibility of a gap - that is, the space between the first stroke and the next - in fact, means. He maintains:
What I mean, on the contrary, is that here we see arising something which I am not saying is the first appearance, but in any case a certain appearance of something which you see is altogether distinguished from what can be designated as a qualitative difference: Each one of these traits is not at all identical to its neighbor, but it is not because they are different that they function as different, but because the signifying difference is distinct from anything that refers to qualitative difference (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961)
Lacan first focuses on the qualitative difference of each appearance before he understands how the first appearance occurred. And it is in this context that he discusses the unicity of the unary trait, which forms the basis of the qualitative difference and the qualitative difference that is derived from 'signifying difference'. At the basis of every qualitative difference lies a feature that is unique to the unary trait. In fact, it is this feature that makes the sign one and only, distinct from the others.2 A more fundamental and radical difference provides the basis for the unary trait. It is so fundamental that it is already in existence when the first stroke appears; any character appears to be different from another at the very moment it comes into being, and it entails neither variety nor variation (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961). In this sense, the unary trait should be taken as being related to an extreme reduction of all occasions that bring about qualitative difference (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961). It is just like appreciating the unicity of a knitting pattern of a piece on cloth rather than the pieces of fluff on it, or its colour or design. Therefore, the sole property of the unary trait is expressed by its unicity (Chiesa, 2006: 75).
On the other hand, qualitative difference can also be perceived through 'signifying sameness'. The sameness in question is "constituted precisely by the fact that the signifier as such serves to connote difference in the pure state" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961). In other words, sameness (la memete) is a result of difference alone. Signifying difference reveals sameness each time.
2 That is why Lacan does not believe in tautology (i.e. A implies A) (Lacan 1961-1962).
To get back to the hunter case to clarify this point, Lacan makes the following comment: "I am a hunter I kill one of them [animals]. It is an adventure. I kill another of them, it is a second adventure which I can distinguish by certain traits from the first, but which resembles it essentially by being marked with the same general line" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 6 December 1961). Taking closer look at the case in which the hunter makes strokes for his adventures, what can we say about the appearance of the first stroke? Where did this first stroke come from? Just like a child unaware of the notion of 'counting', the hunter makes a stroke symbolically representing his first experience, which he has first imagined and distinguished from his second experience intuitively (Chiesa, 2006: 76). In other words, what he really does is to make a stroke for the 'same general line' connecting the two adventures to each other, and this is in fact the 'difference' between the intuitively retrieved experiences of the hunter, who is unaware of the notion of counting. Thus, separation and difference, which combine them along the same line is shown by a single stroke. Unaware of the counting notion as he is, by way of making the first stroke, the primitive hunter has counted his first experience as 1. Starting from the very first stroke, this basic difference inherently continues through the coming strokes. Although the difference that inherently exists in strokes will soon be overshadowed by every single stroke that is made, this basic difference will reappear after a while as the previous condition will be repeated in another form.3 This, in a way, explains why it is inherent in counting. We will later return to the 'primitive hunter' example, which has a key role in Lacan's reasoning of One.
It is worth noting two issues at this point. First, as one can see, there was a setting conducive to counting before the primitive hunter starts to count number 1. The fact that the primitive hunter first distinguishes his experience from other experiences before he counts his experience with a stroke is the background to this setting. The condition that makes distinction possible is what initiated counting long before. That is, distinguishing the first experience lays forward the distinctiveness of the other and, due to this, its difference. However, it is this different-from characteristic that will initiate counting. That is, the first stroke having been made, that difference will be marked. The following strokes will be made to mark difference/s in the same manner. To better grasp this argument,
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3 Because ability to discriminate between the strokes is at stake and 'counting' will also be required for them.
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one needs to avoid the fallacy that the hunter made those strokes because of the similarity among his experiences. As a matter of fact, what brings the strokes together is not a similarity, as such, but the very basic 'different-from' thing.
As, one can see, the characteristic that makes us count as one, that is, the unary trait (traite unaire) is the difference. Nevertheless, according to Lacan, this difference "which not alone supports, but which supposes the subsistence alongside it of one plus one and one again (suppose la subsistance a cote de lui de un plus un et encore un), the plus being only meant there to mark well the radical subsistence of this difference" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962). Therefore, the subsistence of the difference, also supporting the qualitative differences, is not one that can be considered alone. What we call difference supposes others that are in the immediate vicinity and that are subject to the difference. In addition, as with the primitive hunter, the result of counting is only for the difference. As a result of this, 1, marking the first experience of the primitive hunter, follows a counting act that has already started. To summarize, we would show one of those that are in the immediate vicinity of the difference as one, and another as one, and the result as one. And the difference would remain both basic and radical. The difference would have brought the others around itself adding them up ('plus'), and the difference itself would have remained. Hence, the stroke of the primitive hunter would have marked the difference itself (that is, as a 'plus').
At this point, we see that the primary characteristic of the unary trait that makes us count as 1 - the first stroke of the hunter - is derived from a fundamental difference. This same basic difference is the very thing creating the unicity of the unary trait and revealing its unity function. Lacan utilizes Euclides' monas (unit) definition to better explain where, in this sense, the real thing rendering the signifier its unity comes from. As long as the unary trait (trait unaire) is taken as difference as support, it fits Euclides' definition of monas. According to Eu-clides' definition, Lacan defines monas as a concept "through which something is distinguished from what surrounds it", and monas is "the factor that makes a whole, or a One in the unitary sense of the function" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 13 December 1961).
The function of difference that cannot vanish or be reduced is therefore to give anything its 'one'ness. We also see that the same difference - owing to its redu-
cable self ('plus') - gives anything its unicity and singularity. If then becomes clearer why Lacan uses the term 'rigor' (la rigueur) for the signifier.
At this point we have to look at the radical difference in question more closely: To understand the counting that starts before 1 and the situation of the unitary function at the very beginning, we need to return to Lacan's reflections on this issue and study them more extensively.
Lack, Privation, and Exclusion
The concept of difference in Lacanian literature is associated directly with the concepts of lack and privation. In this literature, true comprehension of lack and privation is closely related to the contexts in which they are used. When approached from this angle, no matter how similar the meanings 'lack' and 'being deprived' seem to conjure up, the most important difference between the two is expressed by Lacan as follows: "Lack is only graspable through mediation of symbolic", and the other one is "something real" (Lacan, 1962-1963: 30 January 1963). Although there is not much point in delving deeper into Lacan's concepts of the symbolic and real, his following example is still worth mentioning: "As I told you, privation is something real. It is clear that a woman does not have a penis. But if you do not symbolize the penis as the essential element to have or not to have, she will know nothing of this privation. Lack for its part is symbolic" (Lacan, 1962-1963: 30 January 1963). Such definition of lack is complemented by an ascertainment that lack, in fact, is 'radical' (Lacan, 1962-1963: 30 Jannuary 1963). At this point, Lacan believes that this lack being radical can be explained best by the concept of privation. Now we need to start the discussion of 'unary trait' from where we left off to better describe Lacan's belief that lack is radical.
We have seen that what supports the unicity of the unary trait (traite unaire) was a fundamental difference. In a way, Lacan has likened this to Euclides' monas to explain that this characteristic again plays a key role in the emergence of the signifier's unity (unite). However, what Lacan aims to communicate by using this term is not that the unary traits come together to form a unity. In the proclamation that totality and unity form solidarity, the aim is not to say that there is an inclusion relation that involves totality and unity in itself. What is meant here is not that being total is according to units. Rather, unit is not the primary thing that is the basis of the unity of the total; on the contrary, it is whatever is
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yucel dursun
meant by the fact that unity is the unity of a whole (l'unite d'un tout) (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962).
Because of this, Lacan long criticized 'inclusion' and 'inclusion/exclusion opposition', which he always saw as a source of misunderstanding that has caused so many unsolved problems in the rationale of class. Lacan maintains that the real essence of class lies neither in its intension nor extension, but that it always supposes classification (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 62). At this point, Lacan asks us to behold the exclusion that is inherent in the very structure of the class and which, in a way, is a "radical support" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962).
But, what does 'exclusion' mean as a 'radical support'? I believe that understanding this point in Lacanian thought plays a key role in understanding - on the most basic level - his reflection on One and, in general, his whole doctrine. After all, according to Lacan, even existing basically hinges on an exclusion relationship (e.g. ex-sistere) (Lacan, 1971-1972: 15 March 1972). Indeed, Lacan traces this relation far back to logical operators such as 'some, at least one' (3x), 'whole' (Vx).
It is helpful to scrutinize Lacan's examples to understand what exclusion relation means. Although these examples show the same classification logic as in 'mammals' and 'vertebrates', they are closely related to the issue we mention above. They are particularly related to the counting that previously started and that allows for the count as 1. As mentioned earlier, the thing that made the primitive hunter make the first stroke and count it as one is derived from a basic difference. The primitive hunter used to make one stroke for the difference. That is, the unary trait that makes the stroke count as one was the 'difference'. The difference in question now can be expressed in terms of the lack of the stroke. The unary trait can be its 'lacking' as it can be counted as one; that is, it produces one stroke. Thus, it can be said that the counting of the one that 'lacks' appears as one stroke.
Lacan claims that the unary trait can be 'lacking' (manquer), and he exemplifies this, using mammals: Zoology mammals cannot be classified based solely on the materiality of the mamma. The reason for this is that it has to first distinguish, or separate, the mamma; such distinction is possible through the definition of the lack of the mamma. Lacan introduces the unary trait whereby the zoologist
can define the lack of a mamma as -1. The case in which the mamma cannot cease to exist is (-1); that is, the exclusion of the previous one. In its particular proposition, in other words in the case of some mamma existing, the unary trait is +1. Hence, mammae never existing and their existing in the universal and particular sense are classified. Lacan demonstrates these using a circle chart divided into fourths. The bottom right quadrant displays the non-existence of the mamma and thus is signified by the unary trait -1. On the other hand, in the upper left quadrant, the direct opposite of it, is the impossibility of the mamma's being non-existing in the universal sense and the unary trait is (-1). Finally, in the bottom left is +1.
Figure 1
Lacan leaves the upper right quadrant blank, and that is where he both demonstrates the fundamental logic of exclusion and shows this logic in the classification of mammals. Lacan takes the unary trait as -1 also for this area, for privation itself is showed by -1. At this point, one may wonder "on what basis it is so?" This question can be formulated as follows: "Could it be that there is no mamma?" The answer to this question is "not possible, nothing maybe". The second response, "nothing maybe", leads us to the basis of the idea conveyed to us by this quadrant of the circle. Lacan states that he locates the "real" itself start- 195 ing from "not possible" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962). In other words, "not possible" is the origin of enunciating (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962). Thus, the reply "not possible" proclaims privation in which exclusion is grounded as though taking as a base an impossible place. This proclamation constitutes the possibility of the other quadrants of the circle graph. It is, indeed, nothing but the statement "nothing maybe"; that is, the idea conveyed in the bottom right quadrant. In this quadrant, -1 points to "the logical foundation of any possibility of an universal affirmation" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 14 March 1962), thereby revealing the upper left quadrant of the circle graph as -(-1), universal affirmation.
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A much deeper place, "the uncounted circuit", is the base upon which -1 -standing separately in the upper right quadrant - establishes the aforementioned possibility. The privation here is the privation of "the uncounted circuit" (du tour non compte). The privation of the Real^ The unary trait has appeared as real since "to be real" presupposes "computation, counting, to be grounded" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 14 March 1962). Thus, it has become clear that what lies at the root of the stroke the primitive hunter counts as 1 is a privation of real as not possible (Lacan, 1961-1961: 7 March 1962).
II. Lacan's One-Sidedness Tracing Exclusion
In light of the discussion to this point, I would like to draw the readers' attention to a few issues: First, upon closer examination, Lacan bases 'possibility', which is a natural consequence of the relation of exclusion, leaving apart, and making an exception, upon 'impossibility'. What makes 'possibility' legitimate is 'impossibility'. Its enunciation as a privation is a real thing. It - stated differently, 'the possibility of impossibility' - is the origin of what makes the primitive hunter count as 1. The counting, which is said to have started previously, starts from there already. That is, it starts from a place that is much prior to the counting subject. If this is so, in my opinion, Lacan's theme of 'impossible' could be further investigated and this prior counting re-examened.
Excluded privation was possible through the enunciation of nothing. And what lay at the root of this enunciation was "not possible" (Lacan, 1961-1962: 7 March 1962). Therefore, what lay at the root of all things real was 'impossible'. However, here, one point is worth highlighting: Lacan does not regard 'impossibility' as the opposite of 'possibility' in any way whatsoever. According to him, it makes more sense to state it as follows: "As the opposite of the possible was the real, we would opt for defining the real as the impossible. I, personally, do not see anything that contradicts it^" (Lacan, 1998: 6 May 1964). This is a natural consequence of the logic of exclusion, and we can also state this as follows: All things that are called real are the 'possibility of impossibility', which is also the 'impossibility of possibility'.
!S !S
What about the 'impossibility of the impossible'4 and the 'possibility of the possible'? If what the impossible excludes is the possible, what can be said of the 'impossibility of the impossible' and the 'possibility of the possible' from this viewpoint?
Above anything else, the following should be said about the impossibility of the impossible: Since this is not 'the possibility of the impossible', both the enunciation of the possibility of nothing (i.e. the possibility of all things real) and the 'impossibility of possibility' are impossible. Nevertheless, it is right at this point, where 'the impossible is impossible', that we should start introducing the possible because the impossibility of the impossible is confirmed here. This possibility is not 'the possibility of the impossible', for what is in question is not the impossible but the impossibility of the impossible. What can be said about this possibility? This possibility cannot be impossible because, if it were so, it would be 'the impossibility of the possible'; this, as mentioned above, is impossible. This is a situation wherein the possible is possible. If we look at this from another perspective, just as Lacan considers the real from two perspectives, this could also be called 'the impossibility of the impossible'.
For the time being, let us leave out the topic of the impossible until we take it up again while discussing 'the error of counting', and let us return to counting. Hence, the analysis Lacan carried out regarding the case of the primary school pupil should be reviewed. To sum up, this analysis covers:
i)	how 1 emerged;
ii)	what supports counting as 1;
iii)	the investigation of what (the foundation of) 1 is.
The case of the primitive hunter is important for Lacan as it allows him to explain the essence of his reflects on this issue. However, this example could have well been cleared of its rich associations and stated as follows:
I have a blank sheet in front of me, and I am looking at it, wondering how a 'dot' can appear on it. I want to discover how the first dot appears just as I want
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4 The 'impossibility of the impossible' is not the same as 'not impossible'. While 'not impossible' entails affirmative negation, the other entails negative negation.
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to learn how the first stroke of the primitive hunter appears and how his first adventure is counted as 1. However, I am leaving aside the issue of counting to deal with it later in the paper.
In such a situation, we have two choices regarding the appearance of the dot: The first choice is closely related to Lacan's logic of 'exclusion' that we attempted to expound above; that is, understanding what causes the appearance of the dot on the paper. It seems wiser to raise this question: How is the appearance of the dot distinguished? What enables us to distinguish the dot from, say, the rest of the sheet? The fact that the dot is distinct from the page is the first thing that enables us to distinguish the dot. But how is it possible that the dot is distinct from, say, the page? The distinctiveness becomes possible by means of one difference. As in the example of the primitive hunter, what creates the dot is the difference. For example, this is the contrast that appears on the page as a dot. The dot is, so to speak, the stroke made for the difference. Lacan claims that just as the stroke is formed with the difference, so is the dot. What, then, can be said about the subsistence of the dot? According to Lacan, the stroke appears as the difference, the stroke co-exists with the difference that causes the stroke. Similarly, the dot and its difference (e.g. contrast) exist concomitantly. If we are to analyze this in terms of the precedence and antecedence of what appears and what makes it appear, we would have to say this: first the subsistence of the difference (what makes it appear), then the dot, which concomitantly appears with the subsistence of the difference.
The second choice is rather related to the rationale of 'inclusion'. What could be said if we consider the dot from the viewpoint of its state of having emerged and if we look at what may emerge rather than its agent?
The dot, without relying on anything else, will be distinguished from the rest of the sheet by its emergence alone. This having been accepted, the subsistence of the difference - which helps distinguish and makes distinctiveness possible -will soon be envisaged. Therefore, soon after the dot appears as a possible position, it will coexist with the difference. Then, if we are to evaluate the second choice in terms of the precedence/antecedence of what appears and what makes it appear, we should assert the following: first the dot concomitant of the existence of the difference, then the existence of the difference.
The first and the second alternatives are dissimilar. The following is a before-and-after illustration of these two alternatives:
First Alternative (before)	o (difference)
(after)	o * (difference and dot)
Second Alternative * o (dot and difference) o (difference)
Figure 2
Whereas the dot, signified in Figure 2 by *, is in an exclusive relationship in the first alternative, it is in an inclusion relationship in the second alternative. Going back to the issue of counting will shed more light on what these alternatives point at.
As a natural consequence of the rationale of exclusion, Lacan established 'the possible', basing it on 'the impossible'. The same rationale applies to 'existence' and 'inexistence' (l'inexistence). "Existence can be established by being based on non-existence." It is evident enough in the illustration in the earlier circle graph. "Inexistence," on which existence is based, is not "nothingness" (le neant), and it can be taken as a number (number 0). What is more, that is one of the numbers that make up the sequence of whole numbers (nombres entiers), and there is "no theory of whole numbers if you do not take into account what is involved in zero" (Lacan, 1971-1972: 19 January 1972).
The Pascal's Triangle and the Recurrence of Inexistence
Among the justifications on this topic, the most prominent one is Frege's "Foundations of Arithmetics" ("Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik"). On the other hand, Lacan makes an evaluation also tracing back to Frege's justification of whole numbers starting from 0. He makes very important points regarding One and the aforementioned counting, which we will elaborate later in the paper. The following is a summary of this evaluation:
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1. Frege's justification of 1 starting from 0 is significant when 1 is considered as the signifier of inexistence.
2.	Frege considers the number of objects belonging to a concept as the concept of number that is number N. Then, the consecutive numbers form. In this case, if you count starting from 0 (0 1 2 3 4 5 6), what comes next is 7, but 7 what? This is 7 of something. This is 7 of the inexistent, the inexistent that lies in the foundation of repetition.
3.	In the arithmetic triangle,
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 3 6 10 15 0 1 4 10 20 0 1 5 15 0 1 6 0 1
Figure 3
this is evident in the fact that all is enframed by 0. That there is no difference between 0 and 0 lays the ground for the derivation of 1. The requirement of distinguishing the distinction among all these 0s - that is, distinguishing that there is no difference between them - is absolutely necessary for the derivation of 1. Thus, what is recurrent is repeated as inexistence. Repetition is posited at first as the repetition of 1, qua the 1 of inexistence? 4. There is not a single 1, but the 1 that is repeated and the 1 that is posited in the sequence of whole numbers (Lacan, 1971-1972: 19 January 1972).
In addition, Lacan does not find Frege's logical derivation of 1 from 0 plausible satisfying (Lacan, 1971-1972: 15 March 1972). Lacan implicitly states the source of this problem in his discussion of the lack in counting.
Now let us move on to this discussion of Lacan, which he presents independently from Frege's reasoning, but not leaving this aside completely.
First of all, Lacan criticizes the conception of One that Plato presents in the Par-menides dialogue (Lacan, 1971-1972: 15 March 1972). A summary of this criti-
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cism, without going into detail, goes as follows: A Platonian will prefer to call it 'something of the One' (il y a de l'Un-y a de l'un) to 'One'. In brief, Lacan does not accept Plato's 'One', which does not allow any 'one thing'. That is why Lacan uses this term. Nevertheless, according to Lacan, when one looks at it from the viewpoint that Plato is unknowningly a Lacanian, if we may say so, something that belongs to One is one thing that dissolves from it. As it cannot be related to anything except the sequence of whole numbers, it is not anything but the One. After all, it also lies at the basis of the fallacy in Frege's logical derivation of 1 from 0; that is, 1 that is lacking at the level of 0. It is because of this lack of One that the sequence of whole numbers is revealed/formed. From 0 to 1, just as the lack of One yields '2', '3' and the others are produced because the same lacking continues.5
In addition to these, One, that is, One lacking, does not mean the same thing in all contexts. Something which starts, from One as all and that then continues are no longer the same; that is, these are not univocal. Bifidity of the One exists. This is an issue that is brought up in Plato's dialogue (Lacan, 1971-1972: 15 March 1972).
Then, in Lacan's discussion of One, it can be inferred that both One - that is, One as y a de l'un, which is issued in the logic of number and the real One, which is in fact based on the real One - are not the same as the One that Plato elaborates in the Parmenides dialogue and that Hegel refers to in Science of Logic.
This is true at least from the viewpoint of Lacan. Lacan's One is grounded not in sameness but in difference. One begins at the level at which there is One lacking. (Lacan, 1971-1972: 19 April 1972). It does not begin any earlier.
What constitutes One is formulated by the lack. The 1 in the first repeated line of the Pascal Triangle begins from its lack: 0 (Lacan, 1971-72: 19 April 1972). That means counting is, as 1 of 0, the repetition of 1, the repetition of inexistence, and the repetition of a basic and radical lack.
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5 In fact, as can be seen later, 2 is inaccessible (Lacan 1971-1972: 10 May 1972).
Reconsideration of the Lack in Counting
To better understand Lacan's line of thinking in his accounts and reasoning of the exclusion, a reexamination of the Pascal Triangle is needed.
I propose the following model, which comprises 1s, for the representation of the Pascal's Triangle.
1	1
11	1 1
11 11	=	12 1
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1111111111111111 1 4 6 4 1
Figure 4
The question at this point is this: "How is counting realized?" Here, recalling La-can's primitive hunter example and the example we cited through the "appearance of the dot" is required. The first option as regards the appearance of the dot gains importance for the present discussion. The first alternative in Figure 2 indicated that it occurred like this:
o (difference) o * (difference and dot)
Thus, this figure could be used to represent the primitive hunter counting his first stroke as 1. In the light of the way Lacan presents this, in essence, we can see this figure in the Pascal's Triangle illustrated in Figure 4. Specifically, what 1 counts as 1 in the first line is not itself. That takes whatever precedes as 1. This can be likened to the case of soldiers counting themselves during their daily gatherings; the first soldier in the row calls out "one", meaning that 'there is no other soldier' in the row before him. When the first soldier calls out 1, he is marking the non-preceding soldier in the row with 1. Similarly, when the next soldier calls out "two", he counts the soldier that comes before him in the row. In other words, he counts that 'there was no soldier before the first soldier' and 'the first soldier', by means of which he does not count himself but he marks
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those that precede. As a matter of fact, the first soldier's 'one' comes out at the point where the soldier distinguishes himself from the soldier before him. He calls this differentiation 1. The soldier counts as 1 what he perceives as 'non-existing' before himself. He does not count himself - not yet! His differentiation will be done by the next soldier after himself. Accordingly, he will be counted later. The nature of counting as to such deferment is further explained in the illustration of the Pascal's Triangle below.
Figure 5
The innermost box counts the one before it as 1. The next box puts the mark 1 for the innermost box before it, and another 1 is transferred from the box that it has counted. That is, it has counted 1 1. The following box marks the next box with 1, and it puts 1 1 for the boxes it has counted. As 1 transfers from the innermost box that is in front of it, it counts 1 1 1 1. The next box puts 1 for the next box in front of it, and puts 1 1 1 1 for those it has counted. It puts 11 for those counted by the next box in front of this one, and because the innermost box in front of it transfers 1, the final count is as such; 1 1111 11 1. This goes on like this recursively. We can depict it for all levels:
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^),,^,1),,^,1)1,1),,^,1)1,1)1,1,1,1),,^,1)1,1)1,1,1,1)1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1
^ : symbolizes the one that is ahead at the start.
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The essence of the counting that takes place here could also be described by this analogy: What is called 'counting' is constructing storeys in a building. In the Pascal's Triangle, this starts with making the mark 1 that stands at the front. The next one marks, or repeats, whatever it sees before it. The second line is an entire repetition of the first line for it and the one that is in front of it. The third line, or the third storey, marks those that come before it as they are. That is, it marks the second line, the first line, and the one in front of it. This goes on in this fashion. The mark at the beginning is basically different from the one that stands before (the lack resulting from the fact that the mark did not exist before), so counting is delayed, and it takes place in the repetition. The first storey is counted only after the second storey.
Let us examine this according to the first alternative presented in Figure 2.
In this figure, parallel to Lacan's explanation, we take the terms as o: 0 and *: 1. When we take the difference as 0 and the dot as 1 - the appearance of 1 in this situation is as follows:
0
0 1
Because 1 is realized owing to the difference and because the difference is not eliminated when 1 is produced, according to this figure, with the next 1 the following is produced:
0
0 1.
Accordingly, it appears at the other 1 as
0
0 1
0 1. As the appearance of each 1 is based on the difference, it continues like this:
0
0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
Since the appearance of 1 is as 0 0 1 in this continuing sequence, each 0 is connected with the 0 1 below because 0 1 is formed as 0 1 on the grounds of that 0. At this point, the Pascal's Triangle and whole numbers form as follows:
The appearance of the first 1 is the first 1 in the Pascal's Triangle. Let us jot down every new 1 below. Then, the following picture will emerge:
However, the first 1 has already been derived, so it should have been shown next to the 1 at the bottom. That is, we should have shown or counted the 1s up to that particular 1. As a result, the picture for now is as follows: 1
1 1 When we jot down the 1 which then emerges, this will produce	1
1 1 1
However, to show the 1s that have been derived up to the emergence of this 1, we have to jot down the previous ones next to it. The present picture, then, is as follows:
1
1 1
1 1 1 1.
A sequence which goes on like this (0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1^) produces the sequence resulting in the Pascal's Triangle and whole numbers. Obviously, every new number is like constructing a new storey. This takes places in the appearance of every new 1. In addition, the lack of 1 on the level of the first 0 delays the counting process exactly by One. And, in fact, there is no 2, which has been derived by means of 0 and 1. The generation of numbers is exponential, as in adding storeys. Number 2 is inaccessible.
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A Closer Focus
Lacan claims that the 1 in question here was derived from the lack indicated by 0 (Lacan, 1971-1972: 10 May 1972). That was the lack of One. What produced 1 was the lack of One at the level of 0.
It can be claimed that this is the reality of One from one aspect only and it finds its real meaning in Lacan's statement regarding "the inaccessibility of 2". In the following part I will attempt to elaborate the other aspect of this reality detailed above.
Once again, let us first have a look at the first alternative of Figure 2, or the figure that involves repetition in counting. Now a greater focus on the delay in the genesis of 1 in this figure is required.
The figure showed the genesis of 1 as follows:
0
0 1. When exactly is 1 counted? The fact that 1 appears because of the lack of One at the level of 0 delays it by One on the level of 0. Because, at the level of 0, 1 will always be missing by One, 2 (Two) is inaccessible. However, when do we start to count the delay? This is how 1 and the difference - which concomitantly exist - are delayed according to the lack at the level of 0; that is, One is lacking. This could have been expressed as follows: the delay of 1 after the difference that exists at the same time according to the lack at the level of 0. Each situation can be illustrated as follows:
0 1	0 ---- 1
Figure 6
The lack of One also determines/establishes what distinguishes 1 from 0. Having mentioned this difference, let us show this difference on the right-hand side of Figure 6. The illustration on the left is more of an illustration pointing to the fact that the lack is radical. The illustration on the right, however, depicts that
0
0
the lack propagates itself in the form of difference. Furthermore, both the radical lack and the (radical) difference that play a role in the genesis of 1 are seen here. The radical lack is the lack of One at the same time. And the difference is both the difference of 1 and the difference of the lack. More specifically, it both is derived as 1 and does not disappear as the difference because the lack is radical, and the separateness between both differences is due to difference being radical. Then, let us show the difference with #, but because it is repeated, let us put another #. And let us represent the lack being radical, the without-One state,
with the void in between. Then, the new representation is like this: # #
This representation also means the inaccessibility of Two.
III. Toward the Conclusion The Rationale of Inclusion and One
Let us now return to the dot example and focus on the second alternative in Figure 2. We will consider the possible consequences of the second alternative. To this end, we will review what consequences we drew from the first alternative:
1)	Counting is always delayed; thus, it is a post-process (a posteriori);
2)	The delay is owing to the lack of One;
3)	A radical lack is prior to what is counted as 1;
4)	Therefore, the thing that is counted in this alternative is at the 'utmost' front; it is ^=0, or without One, the radical lack;
5)	'The possibility of the impossible' is where this alternative finds its basis;
6)	This is described within the rationale of exclusion.
A reconsideration of the other alternative in the light of this summary obliges us to pose this question: Where is the place of counting in this alternative? The related figure will be retrieved within this discussion. The figure was as follows:
o
o
207
s !s !s
*
208
The only thing that seems related to counting can be shown by the symbol 'o'. In the first alternative it is this difference that is subject to counting. Now, let us return to the first alternative before we dwell further on this difference that could be subject to counting in the second alternative.
In the first alternative, we counted 1 for what is in the front, that is, for ^=0, or we rather used 0 1 for ^=0. ^=0 stands for a one-less situation where dot (*) in the first alternative does not exist, or where it falls later as 1. Focusing on the situation itself, can we call one-less, as ^=0, the difference in the second alternative? As is clear in the discussion above, if the difference in the second alternative is made subject to counting, this difference is either ^=0 or it is before or after. The after (a posteriori) situation has been elaborated well enough in the light of the Lacanian elabortion. This brings us to an analysis of the remaining two situations.
First of all, let us examine the case where the difference is in front of ^=0. If we assume that the difference is ^^=0 and start counting, this will yield ^^=0, ^=0, and 0 1. However, because of the counting of we have to read 0 1 as 1. The reason for this is that, as we found out earlier, counting continues as in 0 0 1 0 1 0 1... However, because of ^=0, 0 1 should remain 0 1. Then, in the event that ^^=0 is in the front, we should consider the two-term counts such as 0 1 as One because 0 1 is both 0 1 and 1. Put differently, in this situation, # # will be # due to ^^=0. This points toward One and the genesis of One. However, it is One which generates, pointing to the prior rather than the posterior.
The # #, which we arrived at by counting minus 1, is the counting forward of the difference. The counting of the difference backward, on the other hand, is #. Considering also the second alternative, counting backward indicates 'before' as 'the impossibility of the impossible' or 'the possiblity of the possible' in the example with the dot.
It is time we examined the second alternative, or the situation where the difference in the second alternative is the same as ^=0; the notations so far are #, as the indicator of One, and separate from this, # #, as the indicator of Two. This is the case where ^^=0 is equal to ^=0. Sameness can be demonstrated in two ways: Either via ^^=0 or ^=0. When it is demonstrated through ^^=0, as regards the second alternative of the case with the dot, a backward counting of the dif-
ference is specified. When it is demonstrated through ^=0, on the other hand, as regards the first alternative of the dot example, a process of counting forward of the difference is specified. However, in both situations the specification of the sameness is achieved through some kind of strife because the 'difference' brings about counting. Nevertheless, because of the counting which is caused by the 'difference', the flux of the sequence 0 0 1 0 1 0 will go on.
Consequently, if we re-examine all three situations that result from the comparison of the first and second alternatives as to the dot, we have to use the following notations: the situation of a posteriori counting of the difference (# #); and the situation of counting backward the difference (#). If the first and the second alternatives are expressed together, we have to resort to # and # #. Because the next representation will involve a depiction of the permanent difference and the Sameness together, it will be in either of the ways shown below.
#	or	# #
# # #
(Specification of sameness as to the second alternative)/(Specification of sameness as to the first alternative).
In other words, thus, we can call it the permanent difference together with the specification of before and after.
Interpreting the Symbol # and the Final Word
Now we have the following separate options as regards the representation with #.
#
# , # # , # # or # #
#
Then how should we read these options and #? First of all, separate from each other as these options are, the last representation ( #
# # or # # # )
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210
is rather a representation that deals with the relation of One with Two. This is twofold: from One to Two and from Two to One. The previous representation (# #) is geared toward Two, and the one before that (#) is geared toward One.
While the representation that complies with Lacanian thought is # #, in Hegel's
#	and
# # # #
# are together.
#
That is, # #
#. The representation # can be said to have a position that can make thinking prior. The reason for this is that, considering the different states of the condition above, the display of 'one-ness' and 'differences' can only be achieved based only on the symbol #. In addition, this representation is conducive to
different ways of thinking. For example, in the case with the dot, according to
#
# # and
# #
#, where the first and the second alternatives are considered together, we can consicder the Pascal's Triangle under the representation of # #
#; there should
be another triangle that is prior to the Pascal's Triangle according to the other
side of this representation; that is, #
# #.
And that is a reversed triangle. Though it may be difficult to imagine, the representation predicts this. It should be so according to a counting that includes ^^=0. It is a flow moving in the reverse direction. And it is only one of the many things than can be claimed based on this representation.
As can be clearly understood from the representation of #, the Lacanian doctrine of One is a one-sided doctrine which perceives One without One. It can be said that the other side of the reality regarding it is 'completed' when the other alternatives showed by # are considered. It is also worth noting that this is ex-
actly how disintegration in language and thought and 'one'ness can be looked at from a higher perspective thanks to an opportunity provided by #.
References
CHIESA Lorenzo. "Count-as-one, Forming-into-one, Unary Trait, S1", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, 2006.
LACAN Jacques. "L'identification", Seminaire IX, unedited French Manuscripts, 19611962.
LACAN Jacques. "L'angoisse", Seminaire X, unedited French Manuscripts, 1962-1963.
LACAN Jacques. "...ou pire", Seminaire XIX, unedited French Manuscripts, 1971-1972.
LACAN Jacques. "Identification", Seminar IX, Translated by Cormac Gallagher from the unedited French Manuscripts,1961-1962.
LACAN Jacques. "Anxiety", Seminar X, Translated by Cormac Gallagher from the unedited French Manuscripts,1962-1963.
LACAN Jacques. "_Or worse", Seminar XIX, Translated by Cormac Gallagher from the unedited French Manuscripts,1971-1972.
LACAN Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XI The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalyis, Translated by Alan Sheridan, W.W. Norton & Company, New York,
1998.
KRUTZEN Henry. Jacques Lacan Seminaire 1952-1980, Index referentiel, Anthropos, 2003.
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Notes on the contributors
Jorge Aleman is a psychoanalyst, poet, member of the AMP, Honorary Professor at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and Universidad Nacional de San Martin (UNSAM), and Cultural Advisor at the Argentine Embassy in Madrid. His many publications include La-can en la razon postmoderna, Coleccion Itaca, Miguel Gomez Ediciones, Malaga 2000, and Inconsciente, Existencia y Diferencia Sexual, Sintesis Editorial, Madrid 2001.
Alain Badiou is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure. He is one of the most important contemporary philosophers. For many years a Maoist, he remains a committed political activist. In addition to several novels, plays, and political essays, he has published a number of major philosophical works, including Theory of the Subject, Being and Event, Manifesto for Philosophy, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Gilles Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, Conditions, Metapolitics, Briefing on Existence, Saint Paul, The Foundation of Universalism, Logics of Worlds, and Second Manifesto for Philosophy.
Bruno Besana is a founding member of the Versuslaboratory research collective, and former fellow of the ICI Kulturlabor and of the Jan Van Eyck Academie. He has published on contemporary philosophy, namely on the works of Alain Badiou, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Ranciere. With Oliver Feltham he has edited a book on Alain Badiou (Ecrits autour de le pensee d'Alain Badiou, L'Harmattan). Forthcoming, with Ozren Pupovac, is the book More than a Lot (Re:Press, Melbourne), an edited volume on the concept of multiplicity in contemporary thought.
Paula Biglieri is a researcher at the Sociopolitical Identities and Discourse Analysis Studies Center at the National University of San Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina. She has a Ph.D. from the National University of Mexico - Political and Social Science.	213
Yücel Dursun is an associate professor at the Department of Philosophy at Ankara University in Turkey. His academic interests are especially focused on French philosophy, classical German Idealism, the philosophy of mathematics, and play. He has recently been working on Badiou's philosophy and the Two. His articles on Hegel's dialectic play and the Two have been published in several national and international journals. He is the author of the book "Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in Philosophy and Mathematics" (in Turkish), Ankara, 2004.
Rodrigo de la Fabian, studied psychology at the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP), Santiago de Chile. He subsequently did his master's and doctoral studies in psychoanalysis at the Universite Paris-Diderot (Paris VII). He is currently working as a psychoanalyst and is an Associate Professor at and Director of the Graduate School of the Faculty of Psychology at the UDP. Since completing his doctoral thesis - which was on the works of E. Levinas and J. Lacan - he has worked in the intersecting fields of psychoanalysis and philosophy. In particular, his intellectual work concerns the ethical-political consequences of different ways of conceiving and producing subjectivity and subjectivation processes. His research work is currently focused on the recognition paradigm, confronting authors such as: Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Agamben, Butler, Honneth, Fraser, Taylor, among others. He recently published an article on Levinas and Psychoanalysis entitled: "Une critique du paradigme tragique en psychanalyse a partir de la conception ethique de la subjectivite chez Emmanuel Levinas. De l'assomption tragique au soupgon comique de la castration". "A critique of the tragic paradigm in psychoanalysis based on Emmanuel Levinas's ethical conception of subjectivity. From the tragic assumption to the comic acknowledgement of castration." (L'evolution psychiatrique 75 (2010) 565-581).
Jason Glynos teaches political theory at the Department of Government, University of Essex. He has published widely in the areas of poststructuralist political theory and La-canian psychoanalysis, focusing on theories of ideology, democracy, and freedom, and the philosophy and methodology of social science. He is co-author of Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (Routledge, 2007), and co-editor of Politics and the Unconscious (Special Issue of Subjectivity, 2010) Traversing the Fantasy (Ashgate, 2005), and Lacan & Science (Karnac, 2002). His current research explores the contributions of discourse analysis and psychoanalysis to the development of a critical political economy.
Gloria Perello is a researcher at the Sociopolitical Identities and Discourse Analysis Studies Center at the National University of San Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina and is 214 a psychoanalyst.
Jelica Šumič Riha is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nova Gorica and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, SRC SASA, Ljubljana. She has published a number of philosophical works, including Politik der Wahrheit, with Alain Badi-ou, Jacques Ranciere, and Rado Riha, ed. Rado Riha, (Turia + Kant, Vienna 1997); she has edited and contributed to an anthology on Universel, Singulier, Sujet, with Alain Badiou, et al. (Paris, Kime, 2000), and Mutations of Ethics (Založba ZRC, 2002). She is currently working on a forthcoming volume on Volonte et desir (Harmattan, Paris, 2012), as well as on Ethics of Silence (Založba ZRC, 2012).
Davide Tarizzo is a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Salerno and a Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Naples "L'Orientale". He is also Scientific Adviser to the Ph.D. Program in Political Philosophy at the Istituto Italiano di Sci-enze Umane, Naples. He has edited Italian translations of many books by contemporary thinkers, such as Georges Canguilhem, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, Alain Badiou, Stanley Cavell, Hannah Arendt, and Ernesto Laclau. He is a regular contributor to Italian and foreign journals of philosophy and the humanities. Since 2011 he has been Section Editor of Politica Comun. A Journal of Thought. His main publications include the following: Il pensiero libero. La filosofia francese dopo lo strutturalismo (Raffaello Cortina, Mi-lano, 2003), Giochi di potere. Sulla paranoia politica (Laterza, Roma-Bari 2007), Introduzi-one a Lacan (Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2011, third edition).
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Abstracts | Povzetki
Alain Badiou Ljubljana Lecture
Key words: truth, affect, negation, philosophy, life
While Logics of Worlds already emphasized that one's participation in a process of truth is signalized by an affect and already pointed out some of the affects connected with these processes (enthusiasm, joy, pleasure, beatitude), the further elaboration of this topics remains the task of the third part of the Being and Event, which has yet to be written and is entitled The Immanence of Truths. The first part of the lecture discusses the very reasons for this work, its necessity, and its place in my opus thus far. The task of The Immanence of Truths is to elaborate the question of how somebody is incorporated into a truth-process, how this relates to the question of the subject and the very role of philosophy itself. The latter is not the process of truth in a similar manner as its four conditions, it does presuppose them, but not the other way around. A short sketch of the inner structure of The Immanence of Truths follows and the argument in favour of the transformation of the formal category of negation. The role of the paraconsistent logics in The Immanence of Truths is to conceptualize the process of truth. The aleatory, the contingent character of any event namely means that we have to insist that there is a cut and that the truth is in the position of an exception, but which, however, is not something untransmittable. Concerning the question of the transmission and the ineffable, I distance myself in relation to Plato's as well as to Bergson's treatment of this question. For me, the category of an exception is a dialectical category. It has to be thought on one hand as a negation, which is not a miracle of some sort, and on the other as something inner, immanent (perhaps that was aimed at by Lacan with the term 'extimacy'). The negation is namely an operator which simultaneously divides and includes, it is also part of the dialectical thought which includes the contingent and is therefore not deterministic. 217 Everything that has been said so far has consequences for the functions of philosophy and concerns the question of the relationship between philosophy and life. Philosophy for me as a discipline departs from the conviction that there are truths. It is triple, being at the same time the diagnostics of an age, the construction of the concept of truth, and the existential experience of true life i.e. the immanent experiment of what is a true life, "what is it to live". This is signalled by the affect of true life and by the formula "to live as an immortal", which does not entail any kind of sacrifice or recompense.
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Alain Badiou
Ljubljansko predavanje
Ključne besede: resnica, afekt, negacija, transmisija, filozofija, življenje
Če že delo Logika svetov poudarja, da participacijo nekoga v procesu resnice signalizira afekt in če že v njem nastopajo nekateri afekti v navezavi na procedure resnic (entuzi-azem, radost, ugodje, blaženost), pa je podrobnejša razdelava te problematike naloga tretjega dela Biti in dogodka, ki ga je šele treba napisati in ki nosi naslov Imanenca resnic. Prvi del pričujočega predavanja razdela razloge, zakaj je to delo nujno in ga umesti v kontekst mojega dosedanjega dela. Naloga Imanence resnic sestoji iz razdelave tega, kako je nek individuum inkorporiran v resnico, s čimer postavlja v ospredje vprašanje subjekta in samo mesto ter vlogo filozofije. Ta ni procedura resnice na enak način kot ostali njeni štirje pogoji, jih sicer predpostavlja, obratno pa ne velja. V nadaljevanju sledi kratek oris zgradbe Imanence resnic, utemeljitev in vloga transformacije formalne kategorije negacije oziroma navezave na parakonsistentno logiko, ki edina omogoča teoretizirati proces resnice. Aleatorni, naključni značaj dogodka, namreč pomeni vztrajati pri obstoju reza in položaju resnice kot izjeme, ne pa tudi netransmisljivega. V točki problematike transmi-sije in neizrekljivega se zato distanciram tako od Platona kot tudi od Bergsona. Obenem vztrajam pri tem, da je kategorija izjeme dialektična kategorija, po eni strani jo je treba misliti kot negacijo, ki pa ni čudež, po drugi strani je vendarle nekaj notranjega, imanen-tnega (nemara je Lacan na to meril z izrazom »ekstimno«). Negacija je namreč operator, ki hkrati ločuje in vključuje in je del dialektične misli, ki vključuje naključno, zaradi česa ta misel ni deterministična. Vse to pa ima konsekvence za samo funkcijo filozofije in zadeva vprašanje, kakšno je razmerje filozofije do življenja. Filozofija kot disciplina izhaja iz prepričanja, da resnice so. Je hkrati troje: diagnostika dobe, konstrukcija pojma resnice in eksistencialno izkustvo, ki je povezano z resničnim življenjem oziroma z imanentnim eksperimentom, kaj je resnično življenje. To signalizira afekt resničnega življenja, formula »Živeti v nesmrtnem«, pri čemer ne gre za nobeno žrtvovanje ali rekompenzacijo.
Jorge Aleman
Solitude: Common. Some Political Drifts in Lacan's Teaching
Key words: Lacan, Lacanian-left, solitude, common, not-all, psychoanalysis, politics
Two terms, solitude and common, were chosen in order to develop some reflections on the articulation between difference and sameness in Lacan's teaching and to tease out some political implications therefrom. In this context, an analysis of the collective experience of transmission such as is practiced and theorized in Lacan's Ecole de la cause enables a critical evaluation of the so-called Lacanian left.
Jorge Aleman
Samota: Skupno. Nekaj političnih zametkov v Lacanovem poučevanju
Ključne besede: Lacan, lacanovska levica, samota, skupno, ne-vse, psihoanaliza, politika
Dva termina, samoto in skupno, smo izbrali za razvitje nekaterih refleksij o artikulaci-ji med razliko in istostjo v Lacanovem poučevanju in da bi iz njega izluščili nekatere politične implikacije. V takšnem kontekstu nam analiza kolektivnega izkustva prenosa, kakršnega prakticira in teoretizira Lacanova Ecole de la cause omogoča kritično oceno tako-imenovane lacanovske levice.
Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello
The Names of the Real in Laclau's Theory: Antagonism, Dislocation, and Heterogeneity
Key words: antagonism, dislocation, heterogeneity, the real
This article presents an overview of Ernesto Laclau's theory of hegemony from his first work as co-author with Chantal Mouffe of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985) to his last work On Populist Reason (2005). To that end, this corpus is analyzed with theoretical tools from Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to locate the implicit postulates in Laclau's work and to organize his work into three main stages. We propose an interpretation of such theory from a psychoanalytic perspective through three key concepts: antagonism, dislocation, and heterogeneity.
Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello
Imena realnega v Laclauovi teoriji: antagonizem, dislokacija in heterogenost
Ključne besede: antagonizem, dislokacija, heterogenost, realno
Članek predstavlja pregled Lacanove teorije hegemonije od njegovega dela Hegemonija in socialistična strategija (1985), ki je nastalo v soavtorstvu s Chantal Mouffe, do njegovega poznega dela Opopulističnem umu (2005). Celoten omenjeni opus je tako analiziran s pomočjo teoretskega aparata lacanovske psihoanalize, da bi se lociralo implicitne postulate v Laclauovem delu in se ga razdelilo v tri glavne faze. S psihoanalitične perspektive je predlagana interpretacija omenjene teorije s pomočjo treh ključnih terminov: antago-nizma, dislokacije in heterogenosti.
219
Jason Glynos
Fantasy and Identity in Critical Political Theory
Key words: Lacan, Butler, Connolly, Rose, psychoanalysis, politics, fantasy, identity
In this essay I explore the appeal of the psychoanalytic category of fantasy for critical political theory, by which I mean a theory grounded in a political ontology that offers a rationale for both normative and ideological critique. I draw on the work of William Connolly, Susan Faludi, Jacqueline Rose, and Judith Butler, among others, to consider the explanatory and critical implications of the concept of fantasy for questions of identity, and political identity in particular. I argue that fantasy is a useful device with which to explore and probe the political and ideological aspects of a practice or narrative because it foregrounds the combined significance of the symbolic and affective dimensions of life. Moreover, a psychoanalytic perspective can facilitate a move away from an epistemologi-cal or moralizing understanding of fantasy and political identity, shifting the emphasis instead toward a more ontological and ethical understanding.
Jason Glynos
Fantazma in identiteta v kritični politični teoriji
Ključne besede: Lacan, Butler, Connolly, Rose, psihoanaliza, fantazma, politika, identiteta, politika
V tekstu se ukvarjam z raziskavo privlačnosti kategorije fantazme za kritično politično teorijo, ki zame pomeni teorijo utemeljeno v politični ontologiji in ki ponuja princip tako za normativno kot ideološko kritiko. Pri tem se pri razpravi o pojasnilnih in kritičnih implikacijah pojma fantazme za vprašanja identitete in posebej še politične identitete navezujem na delo Williama Connollyja, Susan Faludi, Jacqueline Rose in Judith Butler ter številnih drugih avtorjev. Trdim, da je fantazma pripraven pripomoček za preučitev in raziskavo političnih in ideoloških vidikov prakse ali pripovedi, saj v ospredje postavlja kombinirano pomembnost simbolnih in afektivnih razsežnosti življenja. Še več, psihoanalitična perspektiva nam lahko omogoči oddaljitev od epistemološkega ali moralizi-rajočega razumevanja fantazme in politične identitete, saj premakne poudarek na bolj ontološko in etično razumevanje.
220
Jelica Šumič Riha
Politics and Psychoanalysis in the Times of the Generalized Metonymization
Key words: politics, psychoanalysis, rhetoric, metaphor, metonymy, emancipation
In this essay I propose to explore the status of the not all in politics and psychoanalysis by analyzing and bringing into question the seemingly self-evident relationship of the mutual exclusion between politics and psychoanalysis. I would argue that in order to expose an affinity in dealing with the 'not all' in politics and psychoanalysis, it is necessary to move beyond the traditionally hostile polarities of the singular and the universal and to reverse the usual perspective according to which there is no passage between the domain of the singular and the domain of the universal. I then move on to considering the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics from the point of view of the community 'for all' constituted through a complex practice of disidentification and the production of the 'whatever' singularities.
Jelica Šumič Riha
Psihoanaliza v časih vsesplošne metonimizacije
Ključne besede: politika, psihoanaliza, retorika, metafora, metonimija, emancipacija
V tekstu predlagam, da je treba raziskati status ne-vsega v politiki in psihoanalizi, tako da analiziramo dozdevno samoumevno razmerje vzajemne izključitve med politiko in psihoanalizo. Zato, da bi izpostavili afiniteto »ne-vsega« v politiki in psihoanalizi, se je nujno treba premakniti onstran tradicionalno sovražnih polarnosti med singularnim in univerzalnim, obenem pa je treba sprevrniti običajno perspektivo, po kateri med območjema singularnega in univerzalnega ni prehoda. Nadaljujem z razpravo o razmerju med psihoanalizo in politiko z gledišča skupnosti »ne vseh«, ki je vzpostavljena s kompleksno prakso dezidentifikacije in produkcije »kakršnihkoli« singularnosti.
Rodrigo de la Fabian
On the Politico-clinical Function of Testimony
Key words: Honneth, Lacan, recognition, politics, psychoanalysis
Axel Honneth considers the contemporary political scenario in terms of a struggle for recognition among different individual or collective identities. But if recognition is based on a normative framework of intelligibility, then it can only be sensitive to those political claims that are already identified by that framework. Then the recognition paradigm is limited in terms of the possibility of making visible claims that are not intelligible. This paper discusses Honneth's conception of recognition through two different authors
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and traditions: on the one hand the paper uses Judith Butler's conceptions of 'recogniz-ability' and 'apprehension' in order to re-think recognition in the political domain and, on the other hand, it uses Lacan's conception and criticism of the recognition paradigm to argue with Honneth in the psychoanalytical domain. So, the main hypothesis of this paper is that a certain re-reading of Gorgio Agamben's conception of testimony through Judith Butler's criticism of the recognition paradigm can produce a new approach to exclusion in the political field as well as in psychoanalytical practice. In this sense, the act of witnessing would be a type of recognition that, instead of confirming the intelligibility framework, performs and offers to the excluded the limit of the framework.
Rodrigo de la Fabian
O politično-klinični funkciji pričevanja
Ključne besede: Honneth, Lacan, politika, pripoznanje, psihoanaliza
Axel Honneth sodobni politični scenarij razume v terminih boja med različnimi individualnimi ali kolektivnimi identitetami za pripoznanje. Toda, če je pripoznanje osnovano na normativnem okvirju inteligibilnosti, je lahko dovzetno le za tiste politične zahteve, ki jih ta okvir že identificira. Potemtakem je paradigma pripoznanja omejena z gledišča možnosti narediti vidne zahteve, ki niso inteligibilne. Članek se ukvarja s Honnethovim pojmovanjem pripoznanja s pomočjo dveh različnih avtorjev in iz drugačnih tradicij: na eni strani uporabi pojmovanje Judith Butler »prepoznavljiosti« in »dojetjem« zato, da bi ponovno premislil pripoznanje na političnem področju, na drugi strani uporablja Laca-novo pojmovanja in kritiko pripoznanja na psihoanalitičnem področju. Glavna hipoteza članka je potem v tem, da lahko določeno ponovno branje pričanja pri Giorgiu Agambe-nu skozi kritiko paradigme pripoznanja pri Judith Butler lahko proizvede nov pristop k izključitvi na političnem področju kakor tudi na področju psihoanalitične prakse. V tem pomenu je akt pričanja tip pripoznanja, ki namesto tega, da bi potrdil okvir inteligibilno-sti, izključenim uprizori in pokaže mejo tega okvirja.
Davide Tarizzo
Biopolitics and the Ideology of 'Mental Health'
Key words: biopolitics, ideology, mental health, economy
Modern political power has two branches: the sovereign and the biopolitical. With the former, the state makes laws, with the latter, it governs. Of the two branches of modern power, the sovereign and the biopolitical, this essay attempts to thematise only the latter, trying in particular to emphasise the de-subjectifying effects of biopolitical rationality and focusing on the three levels of biopolitical rationality: its economistic matrix, its epidemiological apparatus, and its ideological order. By briefly analysing these three levels,
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or registers, of biopower's effectiveness we might understand certain characteristics of the 'mental health' construct and of the role that it has in our societies.
Davide Tarizzo
Biopolitika in ideologija »duševnega zdravja«
Ključne besede: biopolitika, ideologija, duševno zdravje, ekonomija
Moderna politična oblast ima dve veji: suverena in biopolitično. S pomočjo prve država ustvarja zakone, z drugo vlada. V pričujočem prispevku tematiziramo zgolj drugo vejo moderne oblasti, biopolitično, pri čemer skušamo izpostaviti desubjektivirajoče učinke biopolitične racionalnosti. Osredotočamo se na tri ravni slednje: na njeno ekonomsko matrico, na njen ideološki aparat in na njen ideološki red. Kratka analiza teh treh ravni ali registrov učinkovitosti biooblasti nam omogoča, da razumemo določene značilnost konstrukta »duševno zdravje« in vloge, ki jo ta ima v naših družbah.
Bruno Besana
The Form of the Subject to Come
Key words: Badiou, Deleuze, materialism, the subject, human animal, representation
Is it possible to have a materialist definition of the subject which nonetheless separates the latter from any given type of object? In this article I start from the criticism - which both Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze provide - of the identification of the subject with a given type of substance, provided with specific modes of correlation with other objects. Namely, I try to show how for both authors the identification of the subject with a res - be it the res cogitans, the human animal, or even the conditions of the possibility of experience of the latter -, pins down the subject to a specific place and function, and in this way ultimately provides a representation of the subject as a specimen of a given category of objects. More precisely, the identification of the subject with a specific class of objects is exposed by Deleuze as the very structure that tends to reduce the transformative ca- 223 pacity of the latter into the limits of a finite form; in a similar way, Badiou exposes this identification as one of the fundamental features of reactionary ideology. The article also shows how it is in this sense that one needs to read Deleuze's refusal of the subsump-tion of the subjective process under the sole name 'subject', especially when the latter is identified with the cognitive structures of the human animal. Aiming nonetheless at maintaining a materialist definition of the subject, both authors stress the idea that the subject is an always singular process in which a new figure is created via a process of disidentification from a specific class of objects. This article then follows in particular three formal characteristics that Deleuze and Badiou find for the subjective process: first, that a subject appears as (or under condition of) a fracture or an inconsistency in the
mode of organization of a class of objects; second, that a subject tends to turn such an evanescent fracture into a new body; and finally that a subject exposes such moments of disidentification and of production of novelty as being infinitely repeatable and universally valid. Starting from this, the article concludes by identifying a set of internal limits and contradictions in Badiou's and Deleuze's positions (namely a re-naturalization and re-anthropologization of the category of the subject) and by highlighting a series of developments in contemporary philosophy that allow the further elaboration of further the idea of the subject as an always singular (and yet universally repetable) practice of disidentification from a specific class of objects.
Bruno Besana
Forma prihajajočega subjekta
Ključne besede: Badiou, Deleuze, materializem, človeška žival, reprezentacija
Je možna materialistična definicija subjekta, ki pa bi slednjega ločila od kakšrnega koli danega objekta? V tekstu pričenjam s kritiko, ki jo podajata tako Alain Badiou kot Gilles Deleuze, identifikacije subjekta z nekim danim tipom substance, ki je obdarjena s specifičnimi modusi korelacije z drugimi objekti. Poskušam namreč pokazati, kako je za oba omenjena avtorja poistovetenje subjekta z res - pa naj gre za res cogitans, človeško žival ali celo možnost izkustva zavesti slednje -, subjekta pričvrsti na specifično mesto in funkcijo, na ta način pa konec koncev priskrbi predstavo subjekta kot vzorca za dano kategorijo objektov. Poistovetenje subjekta s specifično vrsto objektov Deleuze izpostavi ravno kot strukturo, ki se nagiba k zmanjšanju zmožnosti transformacije slednjih v mejah končne forme; Badiou izpostavlja na podoben način to poistovetenje kot eno izmed
^^ temeljnih potez reakcionarne ideologije. Članek pokaže tudi, kako je v tem smislu treba razumeti Deleuzovo zavračanje, da bi subjektivni proces subsumirali pod eno samo ime »subjekt«, še zlasti tedaj, ko je slednji poistoveten s spoznavnimi strukturami človeške
d.
živali. Oba avtorja skušata ohraniti materialistično definicijo subjekta in zato poudarjata idejo, da je subjekt vselej singularni proces, v katerem se formira nov lik preko procesa
224 dezidentifikacije s specifičnim razredom objektov. V nadaljevanju izpostavljam tri formalne značilnosti, ki jih Deleuze in Badiou izpostavljata za subjektivni proces: prvič, da se subjekt pojavlja kot (ali pod pogojem) preloma ali nekonsistence v načinu organizacije razreda objektov; drugič, da subjekt ta izginjajoči prelom pretvori v novo telo; in na koncu, da subjekt izpostavlja takšne momente dezidentifikacije in produkcije novega kot nekaj, kar je neskončno ponovljivo in univerzalno veljavno. Izhajajoč iz tega članek na koncu identificira niz notranjih meja in protislovij v Badioujevem in Deleuzovem stališču (namreč renaturalizacija in reantropologizacija kategorije subjekta), obenem pa opozori na serijo razvojev sodobni filozofiji, ki omogočajo nadaljnje razvitje ideje, da je subjekt vselej singularna (in vendarle univerzalno ponovljiva) praksa dezidentifikacije od specifičnega razreda objektov.
Yücel Dursun
On 'One' (Thing) that is Missing in Lacanian Thought
Key words: one, two, Lacan, difference, representation
This article demonstrates that Lacanian thought on One is narrow and does not completely cover the whole reality of One. A better understanding of One and Two could be facilitated by using the representation '#', which can explain both disjunction and unity in language and thought. In addition, it presents some possibilities in abstract thinking. The first section of the paper considers Lacan's doctrine on One and difference. The following section elaborates on the defect of this doctrine, focusing especially on its onesided apprehension, and introducing the derivation of the representation '#'. In the last section, the representation '#' and its usage are briefly explained.
Yücel Dursun
O »eni« (reči), ki manjka v Lacanovi misli
Ključne besede: eno, dvoje, Lacan, razlika, reprezentacija
Članek dokazuje, da je lacanovska misel Enega preozka in da ne pokrije vse realnosti Enega. Boljše razumevanje Enega in Dvojega omogoča predstava oziroma reprezentacija »#«, ki lahko pojasni tako disjunkcijo kot enotnost v govorici in misli. Poleg tega predstavlja nekaj možnosti abstraktnega mišljenja. Prvi del članka se ukvarja Lacanovim naukom o Enem in razliki. Nadaljevanje razdela pomanjkljivosti tega nauka, pri čemer se posebej osredotoča na njegovo enostransko dojemanje, ter vpelje izpeljavo predstave »#«. Zadnji del na kratko pojasnjuje reprezentacijo »#« in njeno rabo.
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