JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE MACEDONIAN EQUITABLE 
REPRESENTATION VS. PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM: THE LACK OF 
INTERACTION BETWEEN EU ACCESSION 
REQUIREMENTS  
 
 
Sanja VRBEK
1
  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
The paper discusses the problem of lack of interaction between 
different EU accession requirements as an intrinsic feature of 
the EU external governance that impacts the quality of the 
Europeanisation outcomes in the candidate countries. It takes 
the Macedonian equitable representation policy of the smaller 
ethnic communities as a case study, and discusses its interplay 
with the requirement on Public Administration reform. On the 
basis of a qualitative analysis of the EU Progress Reports and 
a desktop research on the implementation of the equitable 
representation policy vis-à-vis the Public Administration reform, 
the paper infers that the EU approach seriously fails in linking 
these interrelated accession requirements. This contributes to 
overlooking the real roots of the problems, and additionally 
reflects on the lack of clear guidelines and recommendations 
for the candidates. Thus, EU fails to establish a right ‘diagnosis’ 
and ‘therapy’ for the country, which leads to suboptimal 
Europeanisation outcomes.  
 
Key words: EU external governance; Macedonia; Ohrid 
Framework Agreement; Policy on Equitable Representation; 
Public Administration Reform. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Europeanisation of the candidate countries has been established as an 
independent research discipline focused on the European Union (EU) 
external governance as one of the crucial factors in the candidate countries’ 
democratic and economic reformation. In spite of the initial enthusiasm with 
regard to the EU’s transformational power, the research eventually has 
become more interested in the limitations of the Europeanisation process. 
These limitations come to the surface mostly in those policy areas that lack a 
                                                 
 
1
 Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             29 
 
 
clear legal basis in the EU acquis. They are often manifested as suboptimal 
policy/institutional solutions implemented by the candidate countries. In this 
context, the paper recognizes the lack of interaction between different 
accession requirements as a serious intrinsic shortcoming of the EU external 
governance, responsible for the suboptimal Europeanisation outcomes. It 
departures from the assumption that in policy areas where the EU accession 
conditionality stands on ‘shaky’ legal basis, and lacks clear policy/institutional 
models, the interaction of different, but interrelated accession criteria is an 
important factor in providing clear guidelines for the candidate country’s 
reform. 
 
This problem, although recognized in the Europeanisation literature, has not 
been researched extensively. Moreover, it has been completely underplayed 
in the research of the Western Balkans (WB), a region offering a more 
complicated context than the Central Eastern European (CEE) enlargement. 
The WB’s complexity does not only imply a lack of clear membership 
prospect, but also unresolved statehood issues and disputes with 
neighbours; vivid memory of military conflicts; security challenges; ethnically 
heterogeneous population; all of which lead to a new, more demanding 
conditionality. This new conditionality not only lacks a legal basis in the 
acquis, but the EU, as an actor responsible for the monitoring and guidance 
of the process, lacks the appropriate experience, due to the absence of 
these problems at the previous enlargements. Thus, the capacity of the EU 
to provide as clear and detailed language as possible in its documents (the 
Accession Partnership and the yearly Progress Reports) in order to fill the 
legal gap is challenged.  
 
The paper’s hypothesis is that the EU does not provide clear guidelines for 
the candidate countries, due to a lack of interaction between different, but 
interrelated accession criteria. This contributes to the emergence of 
suboptimal policy and institutional outcomes implemented within the 
candidate countries.  
 
The Macedonian policy on equitable representation of the smaller ethnic 
communities is taken as a case study, and is discussed from the aspect of its 
interplay with the requirement on Public Administration reform (PA). The aim 
is to assess the EU approach towards these two different, but directly 
interrelated requirements from the political acquis. Therefore, a qualitative 
analysis of the EU Progress Reports on the Macedonian progress is 
conducted. In addition, the EU assessment of the reform is contrasted with 
the main dilemmas and problems deriving from the implementation of the 
reforms on the ground. The purpose of the paper is to assess the capacity of 
the EU approach to address these dilemmas and problems; hence, to 
answer whether the interaction of different, but interrelated accession criteria 
is crucial for the quality of the reforms undertaken by the candidate country.  
 
In the next chapters, the paper provides a brief literature review, followed by 
a desktop research noting the main challenges and problems of the policy on 
equitable representation vis-à-vis the PA reform. Then, these observations 
are contrasted with the conclusions from the qualitative analysis of the EU 
Progress Reports. Eventually, it infers a conclusion about how the lack of 
interaction between different accession criteria impacts the Europeanisation 
policy/institutional outcomes. 
 
 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             30 
 
 
2 THE INTERACTION OF DIFFERENT ACCESSION CONDITIONS 
THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE  
 
The membership in the European Union is a strong incentive for the potential 
candidates and the candidate countries to undergo radical transformation. 
The transformational power and capacity of the EU external governance
2
 is 
especially evident when the macro-level democratization and marketization 
of the candidate countries are analyzed.
3
 Thus, the most common reference 
to Freedom House ratings, foreign direct investments, or GDP growth, 
serves as a strong argument for the success and power of the EU 
enlargement governance. The context of asymmetrical relationship
4
 between 
the EU and the candidate countries enables the Union, through a clearly 
linked conditionality to the prospect of membership, to initiate reforms of the 
candidates’ legal and political systems.  
 
However, the success of the Europeanisation process is questionable when 
the different policy areas are analysed individually. Here, the 
Europeanisation literature is not united with regards to the effects of the 
accession process. For instance, Grabbe concludes that, despite the 
shortcomings, the Europeanisation effects in the candidate countries are 
much broader and deeper in scope compared to the member states.
5
 
Contrary to that, Goetz argues that the effects of the process are shallow and 
reversible, since the candidates’ aim is to circumvent deep Europeanisation 
and ‘locking in’ effects, counting on their uploading capacity once they 
become member states.
6
 However, the reality is somewhere in between. 
Accepting the cynical line of Goetz implies an assumption that the candidate 
countries have a strong policy making capacity in different EU related areas. 
However, the candidates are usually weak states, and often do not have a 
clear idea, nor an expertise on EU policies. Therefore, they do not have the 
capacity to ‘rebel’ against the ‘locking in’ effects strategically, by 
implementing shallow institutions to be reversed once they become member 
states. Thus, the sub-optimal results of the policy/institutional outcomes do 
not derive from the strategic decision of the candidates to circumvent radical 
changes until they become member states, but rather from the interplay of 
both domestic and EU conditions. 
 
Whether the EU conditionality will be successful, depends on the 
attractiveness of the membership prospect among the national actors, the 
speed of adjustment and illegitimate and inefficient institutions dating back to 
communist times.
7
 The process is additionally challenged by the intrinsic 
features (problems) of the EU conditionality strategy, recognized by Grabbe: 
1. Lack of institutional templates; 2. Uncertain linkage between fulfilling 
particular tasks and receiving particular benefits; 3. Lack of transparency 
about how much progress has been made and what the standards of 
compliance are (complex requirements, not amendable to quantitative 
                                                 
2
 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and 
Boundaries,” Journal of common market studies, 37, 2 (1999), 211–232. 
3
 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, “Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s 
Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government,” Journal of 
common market studies, 42, 3 (2004), 523. 
4
 Andew Moravcsik and Milada A. Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement,” 
East European Politics and Societies, 17, 1 (2003), 46. 
5
 Heather Grabbe, “Europeanisation goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU accession process,” in 
The Politcs of Europeanisation, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 303.  
6
 See Klaus H. Goetz. Europeanisation in West and East: A Challenge to Institutional Theory. Paper 
prepared for 1
st
 Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bordeaux, September 26–28, 2002.  
7
 Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanisation affect Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity,” Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 4 (2001), 1014. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             31 
 
 
targets); 4. Inconsistencies within the EU’s advice to applicants; 5. Complex 
actor’s constellations involved, meaning that different EU institutions give 
different advice and signals.
8
  
 
Hence, Grabbe partly tackles the problem of interaction between different 
accession criteria, when pointing to the inconsistencies within the EU’s 
advice to the applicants. Namely, she points out the tension between 
“decentralisation versus control and efficiency, and democratic legitimacy 
versus fast and full implementation of the acquis”
9
, generated by the collision 
of the EU requirements on regionalisation and democratisation. The 
requirements on subsidiarity, sub-national government autonomy and more 
participatory decision-making have clashed with those EU requirements that 
encourage the exclusion of both the sub-national actors and parliaments 
from the accession process, on the advantage of the executive.
10
 
 
A somewhat different, but representative example of lack of interaction 
between different sets of requirements is found in the Bulgarian accession. 
Here, the lack of linkage between the political criteria for membership and 
the reforms required under specific acquis chapters lead to the paradox that 
the Commission praised the high degree of formal legal harmonisation within 
the chapter Justice and Home Affairs, but criticized the country for its failure 
to comply with the rule of law principle from the political conditionality.
11
  
 
Similarly, in 2003, the Macedonian equitable representation policy of the 
smaller ethnic communities challenged the consistency of the EU 
conditionality requirements.
12
 Namely, the country progress was conditioned 
by the improvement of the Albanian representation within the central and 
local institutions, which assumed budget implication in terms of increased 
public spending. At the same time, EU demanded cuts in the administration 
and decrease of the public expenditure, as a requirement from the economic 
conditionality. Thus, the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
which has been set by the EU as the most important part of the political 
conditionality, and crucial for any step forward with regard to the Macedonian 
accession, came directly in collision with the economic set of conditions. 
 
These problems of clashing accession requirements have been raised within 
the theoretical discussion of the concept of conditionality. However, the 
concept has been criticised for being narrow and thus, incapable of 
establishing a clear causal relationship between the EU approach and the 
candidate countries’ compliance record.
13
 It means that there is no 
straightforward link between the application of the conditionality and the 
change within the candidate countries. Any possible causal relation is 
disturbed by other (e.g. domestic) factors, which also shape the final 
outcome. Hence, a more comprehensive theoretical framework has been 
developed by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, as an answer to this 
criticism.
14
 Namely, three models explaining the rule transfer in the candidate 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 1023–24. 
9
 Ibid., 1023. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 See Vladimir Shopov. Projecting Political Influence: Beyond EU Conditionality. Paper presented at the 
European Neighbourhood Policy conference, Sofia, April 11–12, 2008, 8. 
12
 Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment 
to the Process (Oxford: St. Antony’s College, 2003), 13. 
13
 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, Europeanisation and Regionalization in the EU’s 
Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 2. 
14
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanisation of 
Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1–29.  

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             32 
 
 
countries have been designed – the external incentive model, the social 
learning and the lesson drawing model; the former embodying the logic of 
the rational institutionalism and the latter two, the logic of the social 
institutionalism. By contrasting the two logics, the literature on 
Europeanisation anchors the rational, rather than the social constructivist 
logic, as the most relevant to explaining the successful rule transfer in the 
candidate countries.
15
 The ‘new’ theoretical models developed for the 
candidate countries are not quite ‘new’, since they rely on the same 
theoretical lines as those developed for the EU member states.
16
 However, 
the novelty is that they shift the academic focus on a spectrum of EU and 
domestic factors for the explanation of rule transfer in the candidate 
countries.  
 
The upgraded theoretical framework is relevant to the paper, to the extent 
that it refers to the issue of interaction between different sets of 
conditionality. In this context, the social learning model is to be mentioned, 
as it partly tackles the problem. Its variable “legitimacy of rules and 
processes”, is measured inter alia by the presence of cross-conditionality 
(implying dissonance between the EU accession criteria and the 
conditionality of other international institutions). However, since the 
Europeanisation literature has rejected the social constructivist approach, it 
also rejects the ‘legitimacy’ of the accession requirements as a relevant 
factor in the explanation of the Europeanisation outcomes. More precisely, 
the theory sets the “high credibility of treats (exclusion) and promises 
(membership)”
17 
and “the size of the governmental adoption costs”,
18
 both 
variables from the external incentive model, as the only relevant factors in 
the rule transfer of the political acquis. Similarly, the credible membership 
perspective was recognized as the only relevant factor in the rule transfer of 
the acquis conditionality.
19
 Hence, the Europeanisation literature concludes 
that the rules’ legitimacy and cross-conditionality have no impact on the 
process of successful rule transfer in the candidate countries. These 
conclusions are based only on a formal compliance with the EU standards 
and norms, implying that an adoption of the relevant legislation and a 
positive EU assessment are the only criteria for determining successful rule 
transfer.
20
 Since a formal compliance does not equal a genuine 
transformation, the current Europeanisation literature has pretty limited and 
superficial reach in explaining the process. Thus, cases like Slovakia (after 
Meciar’ rule) or Latvia are considered to be success examples of the 
Europeanisation transformative power;
21
 nevertheless, there are serious 
shortcomings registered even after the EU accession.
22
 The conclusions of 
                                                 
15
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (ed.), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
16
 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in new member and candidate states,” Living Reviews in European 
Governance 1, 3 (2006). Available at http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2006-3/ 
(28 October 2011). 
17
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Conclusions: The impact of the EU on the Accession 
Countries,” in The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and 
Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 213.  
  
18
 Ibid., 213.  
19
 Ibid., 215–216. 
20
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (ed.), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
21
 Judith G. Kelley, “Does domestic politics limit the influence of external actors on ethnic politics?” Human 
rights review, 4, 3 (2003): 49–50; see also Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Conclusions: 
The impact of the EU on the Accession Countries,” in The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern 
Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2005). 
22
 Kyriaki Topidi, “The Limits of EU Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia,” Journal on Ethnopolitics 
and Minority Issues in Europe, 1 (2003). Available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2003/nr1/Focus1-2003_Topidi.pdf (28 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             33 
 
 
the Europeanisation literature with regard to successful rule transfer are 
unable to explain the persistence or emergence of problems in the candidate 
countries even after the positive EU assessment. This is the gap in the 
literature that the paper aims to address by analysing how the interaction of 
the different EU accession requirements contributes to the (sub)optimal 
policy/institutional choices implemented by the candidate countries. 
 
 
3 THE COLLISION OF THE FAIR REPRESENTATION POLICY AND 
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM  
 
Macedonia was granted a candidate status in 2005, as a reward for the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework agreement (OFA). This means that 
the provisions of the OFA have been fully incorporated into the Macedonian 
legal and political system.
23
 Moreover, the silence of the Accession 
Partnership, regarding any particular legal requirements in this area, means 
that all major legal questions of OFA are closed and that a satisfactory legal 
framework is set in place. This, inter alia, refers to the legal framework of the 
policy on equitable representation of the smaller ethnic communities. It 
implies that any problems emerging from the implementation can be resolved 
within the present legal framework.  
 
This paper, however, claims the opposite. The present legal framework 
accommodating the principle on fair representation and its implementation 
are in collision with the PA reform, precisely the merit requirement. 
Furthermore, the current EU approach does not contribute to a solution, but 
encourages the status quo situation. This is due to the artificial division and 
lack of interaction between the requirements on fair representation and on 
the PA reform in the EU official documents. 
 
Since, from a legal point of view, the equitable representation policy is a 
closed question, the Accession Partnership only has required from the 
authorities to “upgrade and implement the strategy on equitable 
representation of non-majority communities, notably by providing adequate 
resources and imposing effective sanctions for failure to meet targets”.
24
 This 
leads to a conclusion that the legal rules successfully accommodate the 
grievances of the minorities; hence, the administrative capacity and the 
implementation dynamic are the only problems that need to be addressed in 
the future. 
 
However, the situation on the ground is different. The problems that emerge 
from this policy cannot be effectively tackled within the present legal 
framework. Nevertheless, both the Accession Partnership and the Progress 
Reports are silent regarding any concrete measure for improvement of the 
legislation. The Progress Reports and the Accession Partnership are EU 
instruments, through which the vague Copenhagen criteria (particularly the 
political ones) are more closely specified. Neither the PA reform
25
 nor the fair 
representation policy stands firmly on the acquis; therefore, the EU develops 
                                                                                                                                                                  
November 2011); see also Geoffrey Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political 
Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities,” Democratization, 14, 3 (2007), 453. 
23
 Zoran Ilievski and Dane Taleski, “Was the EU's Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a 
Success?” Ethnopolitics, 8, 3 (2009): 359.  
24
 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/212/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, 
priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and repealing Decision 2006/57/EC, Brussels, 2008. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:080:0032:0045:EN:PDF (20 October 2011). 
25
 Antoaneta Dimitrova, “Enlargement, Institution building and the EU’s administrative capacity 
requirement,” West European Politics, 25, 4 (2002), 177–180. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             34 
 
 
more precise conditionality and guidelines through these instruments. This 
aims to secure, on the one hand, clearer information about the future tasks of 
the candidate country, and, on the other hand, better transparency of the EU 
assessment. The issue of ‘clarity’ of the tasks is crucial, due to the 
candidates’ lack of policy-making capacity and “protectorate mentality”
26
 
characterising their political cultures. In such a context of weak states, the 
EU Progress Reports are the most credible reference point for any future 
reform steps. Thus, by not properly articulating the problems and the 
recommendations, EU indirectly contributes to the status quo of the reform.  
 
The policy on equitable representation, on the one hand, supports Grabbe’s 
observation that quantified targets could be the answer to the problem of 
“moving target”
27
 and flexible Commission assessments. The statistics on the 
increase of the percentage of the smaller ethnic communities within the PA 
were used as one of the main arguments for the successful implementation 
of the OFA; thus, they were crucial for the EU decision to grant Macedonia 
the candidate status. However, this policy has also shown that quantified 
targets are not sufficient guidelines for the establishment of optimal policies 
on the ground. Although, the aim of the reform was to establish more just 
and inclusive public administration reflecting the ethnic parameters set by the 
2002 census, in reality, its implementation was reduced to a dubious process 
of filling posts, only for the sake of meeting the required percentage. 
Moreover, the reform was praised by EU only on statistical grounds, referring 
exclusively to the percentage of employed civil servants belonging to the 
smaller ethnic communities. This was the case even when significant number 
of the new employees de facto did not go to work, but stayed at home while 
being paid from the state budget.
28
 They served as a quantitative argument 
for the success of the reform for both the EU and the national politicians.
29
 
 
Grabbe also referred to the “speed of adjustment”
30
 as a feature of the EU 
approach that leads to a more successful convergence with the EU 
requirements in the candidate countries. But even in this aspect the 
Macedonian case of equitable representation provides a counterfactual 
example. Here, the speed of the reform has been clearly to the detriment of 
its quality. The EU pressure for speedy reform has derived from the specific 
context of latent interethnic tensions being kept under control, only by fast 
and visible results of the OFA implementation. Any slower implementation 
not only would have raised suspicions among the Albanian ethnic community 
about the political will for reform, but would also have negatively impacted 
the Commission assessment, thus, the euro-integration progress.  
 
In spite of the ‘quantitative’ success and the positive EU assessment, this 
policy faced the experts’ criticism from the very beginning. The critics, on the 
one hand, focused on the negligence of the smaller ethnic communities at 
the expense of the Albanian ethnic community; and, on the other hand, 
                                                 
26
 Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment 
to the Process (Oxford: St. Antony’s College, 2003), 17. 
27
 Heather Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,” International Political 
Science Review, 23, 3 (2002), 251. 
28
 This problem became visible in 2009. However, it was not mentioned and addressed in the 2009 
Progress report.  
29
 Мери Јордановска и Владимир Николовски, “Фиктивни рамковни вработувања за мир во 
коалиција,“ Нова Македонија, октомври 9, 2009. Available at 
http://www.novamakedonija.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=109999232&id=9&setIzdanie=21808 (20 October 
2011); also see Светлана Унковска, “Договор за рамковни игри со бројки,“ Утрински весник, 
август 9, 2010. Available at http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=1E5B4D07C9A0554 
D88F1CD73CCEC9F45 (12 October 2011).  
30
 Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanisation affect Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity,” Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 4 (2001), 1015. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             35 
 
 
focused on the negative impact this policy had on the overall Public 
Administration (PA) reform, particularly the implementation of the merit 
principle.
31
 It was pointed out that the Macedonian fair representation policy 
deviates from the general understanding of the positive discrimination 
concept assuming open competition, rather than automatic preference of the 
disadvantaged group. This is also in breach of the idea of positive action 
embedded in the EU law, although in a different context, which clearly 
opposes measures giving an automatic preference to individuals who belong 
to the disadvantaged group.
32
 In the Macedonian case, the candidates from 
the smaller ethnic groups are not recruited in an open competitive procedure 
with candidates from the majority; but the recruitment procedure is 
conducted exclusively among them.
33
 Therefore, a candidate does not get 
the position on the bases of his competitive skills compared to those of all 
possible candidates and, then, on the basis of his affiliation to the 
disadvantaged group; but solely and automatically on the latter.  
 
Another problematic aspect of the recruitment procedure of candidates from 
the non-majority ethnic communities was the abolishment of the expert’s 
exam as an employment requirement during the first phase of its 
implementation (2004–2006);
34
 otherwise compulsory in the regular 
recruitment procedure. Moreover, the recruitment procedure has been 
divided between two institutions; the regular recruitment procedure has been 
conducted by the Civil Service Agency, whereas the Secretariat for 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA) within the 
Government has been responsible for the ‘OFA employments’.
35
 Therefore, 
the OFA employments have been perceived as an opportunity window by the 
political parties representing the minorities in the government, who usually 
have the power over SIOFA, to secure electoral support by ‘bribing’ their 
voters with employments.
36
 This kind of employment faced the criticism of 
partisan influence; and the policy on equitable representation was accused of 
being directly responsible for undermining the merit system within the PA.
37
 
 
In spite of the positive EU assessment
38
 of the reform, there is obviously an 
absence of legal mechanism that consolidates the merit principle with the 
principle of fair representation. The relevant legislation
39
 stipulates the need 
                                                 
31
 See Marija Risteska. Policy brief no.19: Ten Years after the OFA. Paper presented at the conference 
One decade after the Ohrid Framework agreement: Lessons (to be) learned from the Macedonian 
experience, Skopje, June 24–26, 2011.  
32
 The EU law sets the basic principles of positive discrimination in the area of gender equality. Although, 
the context is different, it is representative of the EU idea about the concept of positive discrimination in 
general. The relevant case law, Abrahamsson v Fogelqvist (C-407/98) clearly established that 
automatic preference to candidates from the under-represented sex is in breach of the EU law. See 
Penelope Kent, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 192–193. 
33
 See Marija Risteska. Policy brief no.19: Ten Years after the OFA. Paper presented at the conference 
One decade after the Ohrid Framework agreement: Lessons (to be) learned from the Macedonian 
experience, Skopje, June 24–26, 2011, 11. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 2010 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–2011, 
Brussels, 2010, 21. 
36
 See SIGMA. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: The Public Service and the Administrative 
Framework Assessment May 2008. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/48/41637503.pdf (27 
October 2011), 3. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 2009 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, Brussels, 
2009, 13; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 2010 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, 
Brussels, 2010, 11.  
 
39
 See Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia. Law on Civil Servants, 76, 7 June 2010, art.12. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             36 
 
 
for balance of both principles, but fails to provide clear legal mechanisms to 
address their potential collision in practice. More precise, but equally useless 
language can be found in the “Strategy for Just and Equitable 
Representation”. Here, the general idea of the positive discrimination 
concept is clearly stated: if a candidate belonging to the smaller ethnic 
community for which the post is reserved, has the same qualifications as the 
candidate belonging to the majority ethnic community, the authorities are 
encouraged to employ the candidate from the group subjected to a positive 
discrimination.
40
 Nevertheless, this part of the Strategy is obsolete since it 
refers to an implementation of a positive discrimination in a context of open 
competition, which is not ensured in practice by the current equitable 
representation policy design.  
 
Unlike the Macedonian case, other systems of positive discrimination are 
familiar with legal mechanisms that consolidate principles of merit and fair 
representation. For instance, the South Tyrolean system, in spite of its 
shortcomings, is considered to be one of the most successful examples of 
positive discrimination.
41
 The mechanism
42
 applied within the South Tyrolean 
system stipulates that in case it is impossible to find a qualified candidate 
belonging to the group for which the post is reserved, the post is given to the 
most qualified candidate of one of the other two linguistic groups. The latter 
group has to return such ‘off quota’ post in some subsequent recruitment 
procedure.  
 
This, differently from the Macedonian experience, presupposes competition 
among candidates from all groups. The reserved post is not given by 
automatism to a candidate of the disadvantaged group for which the post is 
reserved, but on the bases of his/her competitiveness and skills. 
Furthermore, this mechanism answers some of the recent problems the 
South Tyrolean system of fair representation faced, which might not be alien 
to the Macedonian case in the future. Namely, a lack of interest among the 
German speaking community for employment in the health service and the 
court administration has been registered, due to the low salaries in these 
public sectors.
43
 This made the required percentage impossible to reach. 
However, the abovementioned legal mechanism addressed the challenge, by 
providing more flexible distribution of the posts, corresponding to the real 
needs of the labour market. 
 
At first glance, this problem seems impossible to happen in the Macedonian 
context, due to the high unemployment rate.
44
 However, it is not an 
impossible scenario. It has already occurred, but on a significantly smaller 
(minor) scale compared to the South Tyrolean case. Nevertheless, it is an 
interesting situation
45
 that challenged the capacity of the legal framework to 
deal with similar problems of larger scale in the future. In 2007, the Ministry 
of Defence faced a problem to fill the yearly quotas for the non-majority 
ethnic communities, even after lowering the selection criteria. There was 
                                                 
40
 See Government of Republic of Macedonia. Strategy for Just and Equitable Representation, 2007, 23. 
41
 Emma Lantschner and Giovanni Poggeschi, “Quota system, Census and Declaration of Belonging to a 
Linguistic Group, and Quota System,” in Tolerance Established by Law. Self Government and Group 
Rights: The Autonomy of South Tyrol, ed. Joseph Marko, Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 219–233. 
42
 Ibid., 222. 
43
 Ibid.  
44
 The latest information from the Statistical office for 2011 registers unemployment rate of 31.3%. State 
Statistical office of Republic of Macedonia, Key indicators – Labour market, Skopje, 2011. Available at 
http://www.stat.gov.mk/OblastOpsto_en.aspx?id=14 (1 December 2011). 
45
 Игор Илиевски, “АРМ со пропустлив филтер за малцинските заедници,“ Дневник, декември 4, 
2007. Available at http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=6F23B774957E3A4BB36BD177D6B0C59 
5&arc=1 (11 October 2011). 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             37 
 
 
simply no interest among the smaller ethnic communities for the reserved 
posts in the army. Several awareness raising campaigns were conducted by 
the Ministry of Defence, as well as concrete measures to advertise this 
employment possibility. However, all efforts (direct visits on the field, TV and 
newspaper advertisements) were fruitless. This problem neither provoked 
inner debate for a more flexible approach to the issue of fair representation, 
nor ‘caught the eye’ of the EU reports. It is very possible that the former was 
only a consequence of the latter, since the EU is the only reference point 
with regards to the decision, when and what needs to be reformed. 
 
 
4 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EU PROGRESS REPORTS 2006 –2011 
 
The EU Progress Reports are the most exploited reference points within the 
public debate in the candidate states about the future reform steps. 
Therefore, the paper analyses the language of these documents and their 
capacity to guide the candidate country in addressing the key problems on 
the accession path. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of the EU 2006–2011 
Progress Reports has been conducted. The focus of the analysis is placed 
on the interaction of the criteria on equitable representation and PA reform.  
 
The qualitative analysis shows that the equitable representation policy and 
the PA reform, although interrelated, are separately approached by the EU 
Progress Reports. The issue of equitable representation has been addressed 
exclusively as a minority protection measure, independently from the PA 
reform. It has been tackled under a special title “Minority rights, cultural rights 
and protection of minorities”, within the political criterion assessment. 
Similarly, the part of the progress reports dealing with the PA reform, did not 
thoroughly refer to the issue of fair representation. Before 2009, the equitable 
representation policy was not even mentioned in the part of the Progress 
Report dealing with the PA reform. Thus, in this period the policy on 
equitable representation was exclusively dealt with under the title “Minority 
rights, cultural rights and protection of minorities”, while the PA reform was 
exclusively discussed under a special title “Public administration”.  
 
There has been a slight change, rather formal than substantial, in the 
approach from 2009 onwards. In the 2009 Progress Report for the first time, 
the issue of fair representation was mentioned in the context of the PA 
reform, urging more coherent approach by the state institutions in securing 
the representation of all ethnic communities. In addition, it required 
strengthening of the “planning of the human-resource needs across the 
entire civil service...”
46
 Reading between the lines, EU was provoked by the 
varying record of the policy implementation across the PA, and reminded the 
government that the principle of equitable representation must not be 
implemented selectively, but at all levels and by all PA institutions. However, 
this did not represent a drastic shift, since the issue of equitable 
representation was again discussed under the title discussing minority rights 
and exclusively from the aspect of the number of employments from the 
smaller ethnic communities.
47
 
 
                                                 
46
 See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 2009 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009–2010, 
Brussels, 2009, 12. 
47
 Ibid., 21. 

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             38 
 
 
In the 2010 progress report, for the first time, under the title “Public 
administration”, the recruitment of a large number of employees from non-
majority communities conducted on “quantity basis and without matching the 
needs of the institutions with the required training and qualifications”
48
, was 
recognized as a problem. Moreover, it was noted that the recruitment 
procedure was subjected to “undue influences”. In addition, the progress 
report urged the authorities to address the lack of coordination between the 
Civil Servants Agency (CSA) and the Secretariat for Implementation of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA), in the area of planning. Due to a lack 
of other guidelines, a logical conclusion follows that the shortcomings noted 
can be effectively addressed only by a better coordination of CSA and 
SIOFA.  
 
In addition, the PA reform was criticised for undermining the merit principle 
within the general recruitment procedure. The 2010 report noted that “the 
final stage of the civil servant’s recruitment does not guarantee a 
transparent, merit-based selection, as it leaves too large room for 
discretion”.
49
 Furthermore, the vagueness of the legislative framework with 
regards to the application of external vs. internal recruitment procedure was 
another target of criticism. Again, the EU did not register any causal link 
between the implementation of the fair representation policy and the general 
state of the art within the PA.  
 
The 2011 progress report, consistently to the previous, registered the 
problem of mismatch of the employment under the positive discrimination 
measure and the real needs of the institutions. It again referred to the 
problem of political influence on the recruitment procedure.
50
 Although, these 
questions have been raised in both parts of the Progress Report on “Public 
administration” and “Minority rights, cultural rights and protection of 
minorities”, the EU again failed to recognize any causal link, or at least to 
discuss the current design of the equitable representation policy as 
problematic for the implementation of the merit principle in the PA.  
 
The 2011 Progress Report is critical of the amendments of the Civil Servants 
Law, stating that “the rules on recruitment, appraisal and promotion; 
appointment of senior managers; and termination of employment”
51
 remain 
the weakest link of the PA reform. However, it is not clear whether EU finds 
connection between the general situation of the PA and the similar problem it 
has recognized in the case the fair representation policy. The progress report 
does not clarify whether the former is the generator of the latter, or simply its 
consequence. By failing to establish or clearly to reject any interdependence 
between these two questions, EU fails to identify the reasons behind the 
problems depicted in the progress report.  
 
The 2011 progress report has a consistent approach also with regards to the 
quality of the guidelines and recommendations. Again, they fail to address 
the main problems and challenges registered. The latest 2011 report, second 
year in a row, advises better coordination between the state institutions; now, 
                                                 
48
 See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 2010 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–2011, 
Brussels, 2010, 11. 
49
 Ibid., 10. 
50
 See European Commission. Commission Staff Working Documents The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 2011 Progress Report accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011–2012, 
Brussels, 2011, 10.  
51
 Ibid., 9.  

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS             39 
 
 
between the SIOFA and the Ministry of Information Society and 
Administration (MISA), which took over the CSA responsibilities. This type of 
superficial and technical guidelines contributes to nothing more, but 
sustaining the status quo instead of tackling the roots of the problem. It only 
raises the chances for repetition of the same wording in the next Progress 
Report, implying no substantial improvement. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
The fair representation policy, as it is designed and implemented at the 
moment, contradicts the merit principle that EU requires within the PA 
reform. Thus, the analysed case study has shown that the ‘lack of 
communication’ between the different requirements prevents the EU from 
detecting the real reasons behind the problems noted in the progress 
reports. Additionally, it fails to provide adequate guidelines for the future 
steps of the candidate country.  
 
The present EU approach only has a capacity to provide a snapshot of the 
state of the art; however, fails clearly and analytically to link the interrelated 
problems and establish the right ‘diagnosis’. It risks overlooking the present 
and anticipating the future problems, as well as suggesting appropriate 
solutions to them. Substantial guidelines and recommendations in the EU 
Progress Reports, beyond some technical observations and directions, are 
missing; thus, the Reports do not go step further from the prevailing 
descriptive assessment provided. In a context of passive political culture and 
‘protectorate mentality’, where the reform process follows exclusively ‘top-
down’ logic, the current EU approach contributes for nothing more, but 
sustaining the status quo. 
 
The paper takes a rather limited aspect of the EU conditionality; thus, its 
conclusions do not pursue universality and exclusivity in explaining the sub-
optimal results of the Europeanisation outcomes in the candidate states. The 
main aim of the paper is to bring a new, relevant and previously neglected 
factor into the focus of the Europeanisation research agenda. 
 
 
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