

# SCHLEGLOV

## »POGOVOR O POEZIJI«

### IN PLATONOV »SIMPOZIJ«

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*Utemeljitelj nemške zgodnje romantike Friedrich Schlegel je v premisleku o pesništvu od začetka rabil filozofske ideje in pojme. Po drugi strani je v literarnem časopisu Athenäum za ta premiselek namesto privajene oblike razprave kmalu vpeljal literarnomorfno zvrst fragmenta. Spis »Pogovor o poeziji« (1800) pa je oblikoval kot dialog, ki s celotno inscenacijo, se pravi z govorom na izbrano témo in potem s pogovorom o njem znotraj izbrane družbe, še zlasti spominja na Platonov »Simpozij« (ok. 380 pr. Kr.). Vendar je Platonov »Simpozij« pogovor o lepem, Schleglov »Pogovor« pa simpozij o pesništvu. V tem se med njima zasnavlja tudi pomembna duhovnozgodovinska razlika.*

Ključne besede: Friedrich Schlegel, Platon, teorija, dialog, pesništvo, nova mitologija, alegorija, Lépo, nekažljivo, Absolutno

Vabilo na kolokvij »o dialogu literature in teorije« odpira kot prvo delovno področje zgodovino in zvrsti tega dialoga od romantike do zdaj. Na tem področju ali, bolje, medpodročju kot prvo, tako se vsaj zdi, imenuje slavno ime – Friedrich Schlegel. Naslov kolokvija in uvodne besede torej ponujajo v premiselek tako ustvarjalno odzivanje literature na teoretične »ideje in koncepte« kakor seganje teorije po literarnih predstavitvenih načinih v zadnjih dvesto letih, se pravi: obmejno in čezmejno delovanje s področja teorije na področje literature in narobe, njuno vzajemno delovanje, pri katerem naj bi vlogo pionirja imel mlajši izmed bratov Schlegel.

Vendar je za nas samoumevno, da teorija zarisuje področje literature in da ona pove, kaj je literatura, ne narobe. Zato je vprašanje, ki se najprej postavlja, kaj sploh je teorija. Ali še natančneje: iz katerega pojma teorije je izhajal Schlegel, eden izmed prvih piscev o literaturi, če ne celo prvi, ki je v zgodnji romantiki, na začetku modernega (samo)razumevanja literature, prestopil mejo teorije proti njej oziroma proti pesništvu?

Iz izročnega pojma. Ta pa se prekriva s pojmom novoveške znanosti.

Teorija je namreč v omenjeni pojmovni akcepciji *celota trditev, ki vzpostavljajo neko predmetno področje in v njem predstavljajo svoj predmet*, s tem da je pred-stavljanje temeljni način obdelave tega predmeta. Kot celota med seboj sovisnih, urejenih trditev je hkrati *sistem*. Teorija torej ni enkratno, ampak stalno videnje, v sistemu sovisnih trditev shranjena videnost predmeta – védenje o njem. Teorija literature na primer na predmetnem področju jezika objektivira, postavlja kot predmet svoje obdelave literaturo in je tako trajno védenje o predmetu »literatura«, ki pripada novoveški znanosti. Ta pa je zaradi množenja področij in predmetov obdelave venomer rastoča celota takšnih »področnih« teorij in kot taka »teorija dejanskega«, kot jo je opredelil Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 396 isl.).

Vendar se je Schlegel že na začetku svoje teoretično-literarne kariere nekoliko odmaknil od izročnega pojma teorije. Iz prvih poganjkov historizma v 18. stoletju je posnel, da je na teorijo treba gledati drugače, in našel gledanje, ki teorijo tudi vidi drugače in ki iz spremenjenega videnja teorije prav tako drugače gleda njen predmet. To gledanje izhaja iz reflektiranega, k sebi obrnjenega videnja, ki je spregledalo svojo lastno situiranost v času oziroma zgodovini, in s tem iz ovedenja te situiranosti ter njene neogibnosti pri zasnovi teorije. Predmet teorije poslej ni več en in isti za vse čase, ampak zmeraj znova predmet v ustreznem zgodovinskem obzorju, ki mu ga oriše historični pogled. Predmet postane *tisto, kar se in kot se kaže, kar je torej vidno v obzorju zgodovinskega časa*, in sicer v svojih zgodovinskih izoblikah, čeprav je Schlegel – naj to takoj poudarim – ob tem ohranil tudi interes za nekazljivo.

Skoraj smo že pozabili, da se zgodovina, tj. zgodovinopisje nekaterih nacionalnih literatur, predvsem romanskih, kot so italijanska, španska, portugalska in provansalska, začenja s preučitvami bratov Augusta Wilhelma in Friedricha in da sta, kar zadeva antično literaturo, prav onadva prestavila vrednostni poudarek z rimske literature, na katero je bil postavljen v renesansi in klasicizmu, na grško. Onadva sta tudi vpeljala razločevanje med klasično (antično) in romantično (moderno) literaturo, glede katerega se niti več ne zavedamo, da je pravzaprav izvor naše lastne zavesti o literarni modernosti. Vse to je delo njune pionirske historične zavesti, pa vendar je teoretično pri Friedrichu Schleglu daleč od tega, da bi bilo v popolnem nasprotju s historičnim. Nasprotno: *pojmovni substrat teorije se ohranja v Schleglovmu pojmu sistema*.

Sprva, med letoma 1793 in 1795, je mladi Schlegel še razmišljal o »možnosti objektivnega sistema praktičnih in teoretičnih estetskih znanosti« (KFSa I, 358).<sup>1</sup> Sistematizirajoči ali, natančneje, teoretičnosistemiški nastavek Schleglove estetike in poetike so osnutki iz leta 1795, ki so se v njegovi zapuščini ohranili pod naslovom »O lepoti v pesniški umetnosti« (»Von der Schönheit in der Dichtkunst«) in jih je sam metonimično poimenoval za »pesniškega Evklida« (prim. Behler 97), torej z imenom vélikega sistematizatorja antične geometrije, ki je v njegovi obdelavi postala pojem znanstvenega sistema. V teh osnutkih je na prvem mestu vzpostavitev »pravega pojma lepega« (= estetika), za njo prideta »teorija

presojanja lepega« (= kritika) in »nauk o vrstah umetnosti« (= tehnika), navsezadnje pa sledi še poetika kot teorija ali nauk »o samosvojem značaju pesništva« in njegovih vrstah, dramski, lirski in epski, itn. (KFSa 16, 5). Vendar Schlegel osnutkov ni dokončal, ampak je obrnil svoj pogled na teorijo in do teorije pesništva poskušal priti prek njegove zgodovine. Tako se je lotil zgodovine grškega pesništva ter v pismih Novalisu in bratu Augustu Wilhelmu iz leta 1794 zapisal skoraj isto: »Zgodovina grške pesniške umetnosti [poezije] je [popolna] naravna zgodovina lepega in umetnosti.«<sup>2</sup> Poleg tega v pismu Novalisu dodaja, da smo bili doslej še »brez prave teorije lepega«, v pismu bratu pa pripominja, češ »zato je moje delo – estetika« (KFSa 23, 204).

Skratka, v Schleglovih očeh je iluzija, če teorija skuša fiksirati svoj predmet – umetnost oziroma pesništvo, poezijo kot sukus umetnosti – zunanaj njegovega postajanja v zgodovini, v abstraktni brezčasnosti: *edina mogoča teorija pesništva* (in umetnosti oziroma duhovnega sploh) je *njegova zgodovina*, motrenje njegove zgodovinske menjave. Vendar celovito motrenje, ki postajanje svojega predmeta zajame z neke določene točke, tj. iz našega zdaj, do katerega je to postajanje prišlo, in ga izrazi v njegovih zgodovinskih sovisjih: projekt, ki ga je Schlegel sam ironično – z »nek« teoriji, ki je hkrati vendarle tudi »da« – poimenoval »historični sistem« (prim. Behler 116). V risu tega projekta so zasnovane tudi vélike estetike iz romantičnega obdobja, predvsem Schellingova in Heglova, ki nista več »teoretični sistem«.

Ko je Schlegel opustil delo na teoretičnem sistemu ali čisti teoriji, teoriji ne glede na historijo, je delovno pozornost obrnil od teorije lepega k zgodovini pesništva, *od lepega kot takega h konkretnemu izoblikovanju lepega v pesništvu*, in sicer prav v grškem pesništvu. Spis »O študiju grške poezije« (»Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie«), ki ga je napisal leta 1795 in z njim, po objavi dve leti pozneje, tudi zaslovel, prinaša takšen »historični sistem«: razdelano vrsto nasprotij med grškim in modernim pesništvom, s tem da je grško pesništvo, če se omejim le na najpomembnejše, za novoodprti historični pogled prikazovanje, ki je sólo lepo, torej lepi prikaz tega, kar se najprej že sólo kaže, pokaz pojavnega, čutnega oziroma končnega, modernemu pesništvu pa ne gre več za lépo, ampak ga žene interes za *das Interessante*, tisto, kar je »polno interesa« in interes zbuja – za neskončno.

Vendar se želim razgovoriti ob nekem drugem Schleglovem spisu – ob »Pogovoru o poeziji« (»Gespräch über die Poesie«) iz leta 1800. Ta spis je *dialog*. Schlegel se je že s svojimi literaturomorfnimi fragmenti, ki jih je med letoma 1798 in 1800 objavljajal v literarnem časopisu *Athenäum*, približajal literarnemu predstavitvenemu načinu, s tem dialogom pa se je sploh odmaknil od znanstvene oziroma teoretične razprave ter njenega monološkega postavljanja in dokazovanja trditev. Na splošno je dialog namreč mimetičen; ne prinaša dogajalno neumeščene govora o izbranem predmetu, ampak se giblje – ne samo, pač pa tudi – v prvini prikazovanja in si to prvino deli z mimetičnimi, prikazovalskimi umetnostmi, kot je pesništvo ali slikarstvo. Tak je dialog že pri Platonu: prikaz pogovora kot dramatičnega dogodka hkrati z značaji sodelujočih v njem.

Platon ni edini filozof, ki je pisal dialoge, je pa edini med filozofi, ki je pisal samo dialoge, in Schlegel jih je že pri šestnajstih letih vse prebral v izvirmiku. Zato ni presenetljivo, da je Schleglov »Pogovor« tako po zgradbi kakor tudi po govorni sestavi podoben Platonovemu »Simpoziju«.

»Simpozij«, napisan okrog leta 380 pr. Kr., je, tako kot nekateri drugi Platonovi dialogi, okvirjen s pripovedjo, v tem primeru s poročilom o simpoziju ob konkretnem dogodku, Agatonovi tragiški zmagi – pravzaprav ne le enkrat, ampak celo dvakrat –, poseben pa je v tem, da zvečine ne poteka kot pogovor, miselno intenzivna besedna izmenjava, v kateri navadno Sokrat izprašuje svojega sogovornika, ampak je v resnici oblikovan simpozijsko – kot zbirka govorov na izbrano témo. Prav tako je tudi Schleglov dialog okvirjen z uvodnim razmišljanjem ter poročilom o izmišljeni prijateljski družbi in njeni odločitvi za pogovor, njegovo osrednje tkivo pa spet tvorijo govori, s tem da je vsak izmed njih zarobljen z razpravo simpozijske družčine na izbrano aktualno témo v zvezi s pesništvo, ki jo je obdeloval.

V Schleglovem dialogu je poleg tega ohranjena avtorska anonimnost platonskega dialoga. V uvodu beremo: »Pričujoči pogovor naj bi drugega nasproti drugemu postavil povsem različne poglede, od katerih lahko vsak s svojega stališča v novi luči pokaže neskončnega duha poezije ...« (Schlegel, »Pogovor« 145). Različne interpretacije so v pogledih govorcev poskušale prepoznati mnenja Schleglovih sodobnikov, vendar brez uspeha. Zato se vse izjave vračajo k avtorju dialoga, ki pa kljub temu ostaja brez jasno razločljivega glasu v množici glasov, *avtor brez avtoriziranega teksta*. Najbolje je kratko malo reči: pri Schleglu, tako kot pri Platonu, se govori o temintem. Schlegel je torej z izbiro dialoga in izrabo možnosti dialogizacije opustil monološko izrekanje in sploh navadno teoretično ravnanje: v dialogu *ne postavlja pesništva kot predmet, ampak drugega proti drugemu postavlja poglede nanj* in tako pesništvo samo ob večpoglednem oziroma večglasnem približevanju odteguje popredmetenju.

Kako pa se, po drugi strani, o temintem govori pri Platonu? Ali pri njem obstaja teorija? Ali je iz večglasnega tkanja platonskega dialoga mogoče izločiti teorijo, sistematično organizirano védenje, o katerem je mogoče poučiti tudi druge, nauk? Denimo teorijo idej, ki bi bila jedro Platonovega idealizma?

Tu bi se rad navezal na Gorazda Kocijančiča, ki je lani izdal svoj – in sploh prvi – celotni prevod Platona v slovenščino: ena izmed temeljnih ugotovitev, ki jo ponavlja v spremnih spodbudah za branje Platonovih dialogov, je, da dialoško strukturirane Platonove misli ni mogoče speljati na nobeno monološko tezo ali nauk, tudi ne na teorijo idej.

V filozofskem pogovoru, ki ga uprizarjajo platonski dialogi, pot do cilja ni prehojena do konca, spoznanje ni doseženo. Sokratska dialektika je vodenje sogovornika v pogovoru do točke, na kateri se ta ove svoje nevednosti, ki se je Sokrat po drugi strani ves čas zaveda. Smisel znamenitega izreka »Vem, da nič ne vem« ni, da bi bil Sokrat, najmodrejši med ljudmi svojega časa, neveden v stvareh, ki so v dosegu človeškega spoznanja, ampak da spoznanje tega, kar v resnici je, ni mogoče. Sokratska dialektika torej vodi sogovornika po miselnih poteh tako, da ga pripelje v *aporio*, na

»brezpotje« in/ali v »zadrego«, se pravi v nevedenje brez izhoda. Dialog sicer je miselno utiranje poti proti temu, za kar Platonu gre, vendar to ni dosegljivo s spoznanjem, niti se razvoj misli v enem dialogu ne sklada nujno z razvojem misli v drugem.

Pa vendar dialog je pot. Kocijančič pravi: »Tu lahko le pripravimo pot. Zato je dialog vodenje po poti, korak za korakom, do cilja, ki je za Sokratovim nevedenjem« (Kocijančič, »Platonova filozofija« 808). Dialog je *priprava poti do cilja, nakazovanje nespoznavnega cilja samega*. In sokratska dialektika je vendarle tudi majevtika, babištvo, ki pomaga pri porajanju tega, kar je v človeku nesmrtno, tj. njegove duše, za tisto, kar ga kot smrtno bitje presega – čeprav je porodek lahko mrtvorojen. To, za kar dialektika pripravlja, vendar tja sama ne pripelje, namreč ni nikdar doseženo brez korenite zareze, ampak s preskokom v *exaíphnes*, v nekem »nenadoma«, ki je časovna ekstaza oziroma ek-staza iz časa. *Z zrenjem, ki kljub temu da je umsko, vendarle ni diskurzivno*.

Heidegger poudarja izstavljajno potezo novoveške znanosti kot »teorije dejanskega«, njen postavljalni poseg v predmet: teorija iz-stavi neko bivajoče v predmet tako, da si ga poda v svoji lastni pred-stavi. Zato po njegovem ni naključje, da se je v nemščini za latinsko besedo *contemplatio*, ki prevaja grško *theoría*, že v krščanskem srednjem veku uveljavila beseda *Betrachtung*, »motrenje«, ki po drugi strani etimološko izhaja iz latinskega *tractare*, »obravnavati«, »obdelovati« (prim. Heidegger 399–400); teorija kot motrenje je že obdelava. *Theoría* pri Platonu pa je *čisto, nediskurzivno, nerazdelovalno gledanje: zrenje*.

Platonova »teorija« zato nikakor ni motrilna obdelava dejanskega, te ali one pojavnosti, ampak zrenje tistega drugega, ki se samo ne kaže, ki se torej ne kaže telesnemu očesu. Je zrenje ejdosov oziroma idej ali »uzrtosti«, kot *idéo* prevaja Kocijančič, tega, kar se zrenju daje in ga, v njem samem pričujoče prav kot uzrto, sploh omogoča. Kot vrhunec filozofskega življenja, ki v ekstatičnem nenadoma prebije obzorje časa, pa jo z vodenjem na brezpotje pripravlja dialektika. Ta je tako priprava za vzpon človekove duše onstran tega, kar se kaže telesnemu očesu in je le na (ta) videz, k tistemu, kar se pokaže najvišjemu v duši sami, očesu uma. K resnično Bivajočemu. Se pravi k temu, kar je le »slutnja misli« in o čemer ni mogoče diskurzivno govoriti, pa je vendarle treba govoriti.

Zato tega, za kar Platonu v resnici gre, v dialogu niti Sokrat ne more ustrezno filozofskopojmovno ubesediti, saj se, kolikor obstaja le v nediskurzivnem sprejemanju uma, upira ubesedenju. Platon vsekakor na vso moč zagovarja filozofski način življenja, ki ga uteleša Sokrat in ki ni nič drugega kot nepopustljiv »živeti-proti« presežnemu, strinja pa se le s smerjo Sokratovega ubesedovanja, ne nujno tudi z ubesedenim samim.

Kot že rečeno, se misel o istem v platonskih dialogih lahko tudi drugače razvije: *theoría* ni zmožen le filozof, ampak – v drugi miselni konstelaciji – tudi umetnik, ki v skladu s sodobnim razumevanjem celo ni nič drugega kakor obrtnik.<sup>3</sup>

Pri Platonu je *theoría* kot nediskurzivno zrenje pred *poíesis*, pred »ustvarjanjem«, če ga vzamemo v širokem pomenu kot privajanje iz nebi-

vajočega v bivajoče, tudi pred umetniškim ustvarjanjem. Vsaka umetnost je poietična, se pravi ustvarjalna v tem širokem pomenu, in nekatere umetnosti neposredno od uzrtega v zrenju samem prejmejo napotilo ter ga uobličijo v prvini logosa. *Poiesis* v ožjem pomenu pa je pesništvo. To je pri Platonu lahko, prvič, umetnost, katere ustvarjanje je proizvodjanje verzov (»Simpozij« 205b–c), drugič, umetnost, ki ni privajanje iz nebivajočega v bivajoče po ejdosu ali ideji, uzrtni s *theorío*, kakor mizarstvo ali stolarstvo, ampak po *eikón*, zunanji podobi oziroma videzu ustvarjene stvari, kakor slikarstvo (»Država« 596b–602b), in tretjič, od boga navdihnjena in zato *maniké*, »blazneča« ali bogoblazna umetnost (»Fajdros« 245a). Tretja možnost je za pesništvo sicer najboljša, vendar Sokrat prav v »Fajdrosu« pravi, da pesništvo ne more prikazati tega, kar duša zre na nadnebnem kraju (247c): »Tega nadnebnega prostora [*Tòn dè hyperouránion tópon*] ni še nikoli slavil noben tukajšnji pesnik niti ga ne bo nikdar slavil tako, kot bi si zaslužil« (Platon, »Fajdros« 548).

S tem ko Platon o zrenju duše na nadnebnem kraju da govoriti Sokratu, tako da ta hkrati to zrenje odreče pesniku, v resnici izreka *filozofski mit*. Misel v ozadju, ki se nakazuje tudi v nekaterih drugih Platonovih dialogih, je, da se le filozofovo zrenje lahko nenadoma reši toka časa in se v brezčasju pridruži zrenju še neutelešene duše v večnosti, kajti stalna »teorija« je lahko le zrenje duše pred rojstvom. Tega, se pravi dušinega zrenja »nadnebnega prostora«, kot se tu imenuje sfera ejdosov, pa ne upodablja več pesniški, ampak Platonov lastni mit. Ali natančneje: *Platonov mit ni pesnikov mit, je pa vendarle pesniški*. Dušinega zrenja namreč ne diskurzivira, ampak podaja le »okoliščine« tega zrenja v predrojsnem. Filozofski *mýthos* se tako pokaže za poseben *lógos*, za tvegano, z izkustvenim nekrito, ustvarjalno besedo o nečutnem bivanju duše.

Pa vendar najvišje, h kateremu v svojem zrenju stremi duša, ni sfera ejdosov. To je še onstran nje, »onstran bitnosti« (»Država« 509b), onstran celote ejdosov kot večnih vzorcev stvari. Imenuje se Eno v »Parmenidu«, ideja Dobrega ali Dobro v »Državi« oziroma Lépo v »Simpoziju«.

V celoti gledano je »Simpozij« sicer zbirka hvalnic erosu, vendar na miselnem vrhuncu, ki ga doseže v Sokratovem govoru, postane govor o Lepem. Ta govor je dodatno okvirjen, saj Sokrat v svojem govoru predvsem obnavlja pogovor, ki ga je imel s svečenico Diotimo. Povzemajoč Diotimine besede, pa erosa sam ne isti več z lepim kakor prejšnji govorniki, ampak ga opredeli kot to, čemur lépo (in s tem dobro) ravno manjka in kar zato le stremi k njemu. Eros ni ljubljeno, ampak to, kar ljubi – ljubezen do lepega. Še več, kot želja lepega postane *želja Lepega*: potem ko se zbudi ob lepem telesu, se od njega vzpne k lepim telesom in od njih k lepim opravihom ter od teh spet k lepim naukom, vse dokler nazadnje ne seže proti Lepemu samemu. *Vzpon želje tako navsezadnje postane pot »teorije«*, iztezanje proti »širokemu oceanu Lepega« (210d). Zrenje Lepega: Dobrega: Enega.

Pesništvo je zato manj od teorije: *theoria* je za Platona akt sprejemanja razodevajočega se Lepega, pesništvo pa ni privilegirani kraj njegovega razodevanja.



Prav tu, v območju razmerja med presežnim »predmetom« platonsko mišljene teorije in pesništvom, tiči tudi velika razlika med Platonovim in Schleglovim dialogom, razlika z duhovnozgodovinsko težo: Platonov »Simpozij« je v poglavitem pogovor o Lepem, Schleglov »Pogovor« simpozij o pesništvu. Kaj to pomeni – pogovor o pesništvu namesto o Lepem?

Za odgovor na to vprašanje se je treba vrniti ne le k Schleglovemu razumevanju teorije, ampak predvsem pesništva, kot ga je razvil v »Študiju«.

Schleglov historični pogled se ne orientira po ekstatičnem nenadoma platonskega zrenja, ampak, izhajajoč iz svoje lastne situiranosti v času, po zgodovinski horizontali namesto po iz zgodovinski vertikali. Teorija je zanj še zmeraj védenje, v sovisnih trditvah shranjena videnost zgodovinsko vidnega. Vendar Schlegel, kot že rečeno, v »Študiju« ugotavlja, da ima moderno pesništvo v nasprotju z grškim interes za nekazljivo, in tako tudi sam, čeprav izhaja iz izročenege novoveškega pojma teorije, ohrani interes za tisto, kar je pri Platonu »predmet« *theoríe*, kar je torej ob dialektičnem urjenju in ekstatičnem vzponu duše uzrtno le njenemu očesu.

Vir grškega pesništva je po Schleglu mit, njegov izvir, kraj, kjer je prvič najprej privrelo na dan, pa Homer. Ta je mit prvi pesniško izoblikoval, zato sta njegovi pesnitvi »najlepši cvet najbolj čutne dobe umetnosti« (Schlegel, »O študiju« 107), dobe, v kateri *nič, kar se že samo ne kaže (ali prikazuje, pojavlja), nima mesta v umetnosti oziroma v pesništvu*. In ko Schlegel pride do Sofokla, ki naj bi v mojstrstvu prikazovanja segel celo še čez Homerja in sploh najviše v grškem pesništvu, pravi takole:

Seveda pa v svoj prikaz ne vmešava ničesar, *kar ne more biti prikazano, kar se ne more pojavljati*. [...] Božje kraljestvo leži onkraj estetskega horizonta in je v svetu pojavov le prazna senca brez duha in moči. In res, pesnik, ki [...] meni, da se lahko umakne z bomo zadovoljtvijo, ki omogoča pogled na kaznovano zlobnost, ali *zgolj z namigom na oni svet*, izkazuje najmanjšo mogočo mero umetniške modrosti (101–102; poudarka sta moja).

Vse, kar grško pesništvo potrebuje za svoj prikaz, se torej prikazuje v estetskem, tj. čutnem obzorju. Vse to najde v »svetu pojavov«, se pravi v *naravi*, ki hkrati pomeni čutni svet ali tudi, kot v skladu s sodobnim filozofskim besednjakom pravi Schlegel, »končno realnost« (53). Zato je v grškem pesništvu zmeraj prikazano le končno brez neskončnega. Vendar skoz Schleglovo povezovanje narave s prikazovanjem oziroma kazanjem preseva staro, grško razumevanje *phýsis* kot »vznikanja«, se pravi vznikanja v sebekazanje z vzniklim vred. Ko Schlegel naredi sklep, da je »zaradi izgube končne realnosti in omajanja dovršene oblike nastala težnja po neskončni realnosti« (prav tam; moj poudarek), je to torej mogoče razumeti tako, da je za moderno pesništvo ob tej izgubi postalo zanimivo *nekazljivo*. In ker se interes za nekazljivo po drugi strani lahko uresniči le v prikazu, ki združuje nadčutno s čutnim ali, v pojmovnosti sodobne filozofske metafizike rečeno, neskončno s končnim, se pravi *nekazljivo s kazljivim*, Schlegel tudi pokritizira pomanjkljivo prikazovanje pesništva po antiki, ki je nastajalo v okviru krščanskega izročila, kolikor to pesništvo »zgolj z namigom na oni svet«, brez razprostiranja nazornega podobja, naznačuje nekazljivo.

Namreč z namigom na »Božje kraljestvo«, ki v tem kontekstu postane izraz »metafizike« Nove zaveze ter označuje svetu pojavov nasprotni in hkrati nadrejeni nevidni svet.

O prihodnjem uresničenju interesa za nekazljivo pa se v poglobitnem govoru v *Pogovoru*.

V tem spisu je poudarek prav na pesniškem prikazu nekazljivega, na takšnem prikazu kot nalogi sodobnega pesništva. Besedo ima šest izmišljenih sogovornikov, izmed teh štirje z daljšimi govori. Téma tretjega govora je roman kot osrednja sodobna pesniška zvrst in téma četrtega slog Goethejevih del, vendar izstopa drugi, Ludovikov govor, ki ima za témo pesništvo zdaj oziroma njegovo nalogo in ga s tematizacijo dotlejšnjih pesniških epoh smiselno vpeljuje prvi govor.

Ludovikov govor je naslovljen kot »govor o mitologiji«, saj je naloga pesništva zdaj, v tej dobi, oblikovanje mitologije, *prikaz nekazljivega v novi mitologiji*. Ludoviko na začetku pravi:

Trdim, da naši poeziji manjka središče, kakršno je bilo za stare mitologija, in vse bistveno, v čemer pesniška umetnost zaostaja za antično, je mogoče združiti v besede: Nimamo mitologije. Vendar, dodajam, smo zelo blizu temu, da jo dobimo, oziroma je čas, da si začnemo resno skupaj prizadevati za to, da jo dobimo (Schlegel, »Pogovor« 158).

Nova mitologija bo po Ludovikovih besedah prišla po »povsem nasprotni poti« kot stara, ki je bila »prvi cvet mladostne fantazije« (prav tam). Ne more namreč več priti po naravni poti, ker je »mitologija novih [*der Neueren*] izgubila neposrednost čutnega«, kot potrebo po novi mitologiji pomenljivo, z namigom na Schleglove besede o »izgubi končne realnosti« iz »Študija«, utemeljuje Heinz Gockel (Gockel 132).

To kratko aluzivno ubesedenje novosti pesniškega in sploh človeškega stanja nam priklicuje pred oči kontekst sodobne filozofije. V Schleglovih očeh je *izguba neposrednosti čutnega* jasno pokazala Kantova kritična filozofija, pretres človekovega uma z nalogo razločiti umske zmožnosti, meje teh zmožnosti in območja njihove veljavnosti. Kant se je namreč že v predkritičnem obdobju odpovedal platonskemu »uzirajočemu umu« (*anschauende Vernunft*) in potem za osnovo vsakega spoznavanja vzel čutno zrenje (*sinnliche Anschauung*), vendar ob izključeni možnosti, da bi bila stvar v tem zrenju dana taka, kot je, v svoji neposredni nasebnosti. Kot trdi v svoji prvi kritiki, lahko pri stvari spoznamo le tisto, kar smo sami položili vanjo, se pravi, da je kot predmet spoznanja naš lastni preparat in da je ta predmet prav v svoji spoznavljivosti venomer zgrajen v človeškem spoznavnem aparatu. Ker torej naš spoznavni aparat ustvarja stvari kot spoznavne predmete v naši predstavi, je objektiviteta objekta zmeraj posredovana s subjektiviteto subjekta.

Na ozadju izgubljene neposrednosti čutnega pa je treba razumeti tudi Ludovikove besede, ki sledijo kot odgovor na to, od kod bo prišla nova mitologija. Ta se mora, ugotavlja Ludoviko, za razloček od stare, ki je prišla od narave, matere vsega čutnega, »razviti iz najgloblje globine duha; biti mora najbolj umetniška umetnina [*das künstlichste aller Kunstwerke*], kajti vsebovati mora vse druge« (Schlegel, »Pogovor« 158). Nova mitologija se



torej mora razviti in biti *najbolj umetniško in/ali najbolj umetno* ter zato naj-nenaravnejše, najduhovnejše umetniško delo, tisto najbolj pesniško, sukus pesniškega v pesniškem delu samem. Razvije pa se lahko ob pomoči nove filozofije, kolikor ta daje namig za njeno razvitje iz duha. »Idealizem«, zagotavlja Ludoviko, je »trdna točka«, iz katere bo izšla »velika revolucija« (prav tam), in s to točko bržkone meri na Fichtejevo filozofijo, saj je prav Fichte našel, kot pravi Schlegel že v »Študiju«, »temelj kritične filozofije« (Schlegel, »O študiju« 111), tj. temelj kantovske filozofije, na katerem je potem gradil nemški idealizem. Fichte je namreč prvi načel temeljno vprašanje nemškega idealizma, vprašanje o tem, kaj je še pred obstojem območij, v katera se pri Kantu naobrača delovanje uma. Se pravi vprašanje, kako nastaneta človekovo samozavedanje, ki šele omogoča načrtno spoznavno rabo uma, in svet, ki po drugi strani omogoča, da se delovanje uma sploh da kam naobrtni.

Temelj kantovske kritične filozofije je Fichtejeva teza, po kateri absolutni jaz postavi ne-jaz, svet, s *Tathandlung* – s »faktom-aktom«, dejanjem v emfatičnem pomenu besede, ki je za vsak posamezni, relativni jaz, ki vznikne z njim, vselej že dejstvo. Postavitev ne-jaza je namreč nujno dejanje jaza, da ta sploh dobi zavest o samem sebi. Kajti jaz se s pojmi lahko zajame in pojmuje kot jaz le, če si nasproti postavi ne-jaz, samega sebe si torej lahko zagotovi le, če se omeji z ne-jazom – čeprav ob prebuditvi samozavedanja izgubi absolutnost.

V Schleglovih očeh je jazova postavitev sveta, tetični akt jazovskega subjekta, ki ima status temeljne teze v Fichtejevem znanstvenem nauku, bržkone *pesniška* v širokem pomenu: *šele tedaj se to, kar se kaže, jazu sploh lahko pokaže za različno od njega*, kot njegovo zrcalno nasprotje in s tem hkrati kot porokovalna instanca njegove istosti. Pesništvo v ožjem pomenu pa je za Schlegla prikazovanje kazljivega in nekazljivega, enega brez drugega ali enega z drugim. Vendar v historično relevantnem pomenu, v pomenu visoke romantične poezije, vsekakor prikazovanje nekazljivega, nekazljivega v kazljivem, in sicer prek nove mitologije.

Vir te mitologije bo torej po Ludovikovih besedah idealizem, »trdna točka« v »najgloblji globini duha«, izhodišče za revolucijo duha, v kateri bo glavno vlogo imelo pesništvo. Nova mitologija tako za moderno pesništvo ne bo to, kar je bila stara mitologija za grško pesništvo – dar ali delo narave. Ne bo v naravnem sosledju kratko malo nadomestila stare, saj bo idealizem kot njen vir namesto narave v resnici *vir novosti mitologije same*. Zato mora – ne kot reprodukcija kazljivega, ampak *kot (re)produkcija nekazljivega* – privreti »iz ustvarjalne moči subjektivnosti«, kot pravi Manfred Frank, véliki poznavalec filozofije in literature v romantičnem obdobju (Frank, *Der kommende Gott* 206). Ker od narave ni mogoče pričakovati nove mitologije, morajo zdaj pesniki začeti črpati iz svoje lastne subjektivnosti in sami ustvariti mitologijo, ki bo po širini zajete snovi nekakšna univerzalna mitologija, antologija doslejšnjih mitologij, ne le antične, ampak tudi vzhodnih, na primer indijske.

Glavno besedo pri nastanku nove mitologije v pesniški subjektivnosti pa bo imela *domišljija*. Nova mitologija, napoveduje Ludoviko, bo namreč

stvaritev domišljije ob hkratni *Aufhebung*, odpravi, ukinitvi ali začasnem izklopu razuma:<sup>4</sup>

Kajti to je začetek vse poezije, da odpravi potek in zakone razumno mislečega razuma [*den Gang und die Gesetze der vernunftig denkenden Vernunft aufzuheben*] in nas znova prestavi v lepo zmedo fantazije, v izvirni kaos človeške narave, za katerega doslej še nisem našel lepšega simbola, kot je pisano vrvenje starih bogov (Schlegel, »Pogovor« 160).

Nova mitologija bo zvezno upodobljenje iz različnih mitologij, ki bo nastalo iz duha ob dejavni pomoči domišljije in nedejavnosti razuma, ter bo kot vélika prispodoba iz zgodbe in podobe dala zreti to, »kar sicer vedno uhaja pred zavestjo« (prav tam) – predzavestno, ki skupaj z zavestjo sicer tvori eno izmed značilnih nasprotij, skoz katera se giblje idealistična misel, poleg splošnega in posameznega, idealnega in realnega ali neskončnega in končnega.

V »Pogovoru« je torej poudarek na *domišljijem* prikazu nekazljivega, v katerem je izklopljen vsak racionalni, diskurzivni moment, vendar tako, da je pri tem *preskočeno tudi gledanje ali zrenje* v svoji omogočenosti od uzrtega samega in da *prednost pred njim dobi upodabljanje*. Domišljija kot *Einbildungskraft*, kot »moč« ali »zmožnost« (*Kraft*) »u-podabljanja« (*Ein-bilden*), tako postane samolastna, subjektivna moč, ki bo s tem, da je zmožna izoblikovati novo mitologijo in prikazati neprikazano, tudi udejanjila revolucijo duha, katero je pripravila nova idealistična filozofija. Prav v tem visokem vrednotenju domišljije se pri Schleglu kljub njegovemu platonističnemu interesu za nekazljivo prižene do vrhunca Platonu tuji romantični subjektivizem ...

Naj se vrnem k tekstu. Ludovikovemu govoru sledi pogovor, v katerem se spet oglasi Ludoviko sam in spregovori o tem, da je pesništvo po načinu, na katerega se nanaša na neskončno ali nekazljivo, *alegorija*: »... vsa lepota je alegorija. Ravno zato, ker je najvišje neizrekljivo, ga lahko izrekamo le alegorično« (162). Alegorija je očitno prikaz, ki je sam lep, vendar hkrati drugačen od lepega prikaza grškega pesništva, o katerem govori Schlegel v »Študiju«, in sicer po tem, da združuje neizrekljivo z izrekljivim, nekazljivo s kazljivim. Ali s Frankovimi besedami, ki jedrnato zajemajo v pojmovnosti nemškega idealizma: »*Alegorija* je – kratko rečeno – tendenca k Absolutnemu v končnem samem« (Frank, *Einführung* 291).<sup>5</sup>

Kolikor grški glagol *allegoréo* pomeni »govorim, izrekam drugače«, je alegorično govoriti za Schlegla izrekati, meniti, po-menjajoče namigovati na nekaj drugega, v končnem kazati na neskončno, Absolutno. Alegorično po-menjanje ni isto s tistim, na kar meri, s tem da ta njegova negativnost »obstaja v samo sebe kot pozitiv izbrisujoči se sprostivni pogleda [*Freigabe des Blicks*] na absolutno menjeno« (Frank, *Einführung* 294). Ko se torej to po-menjanje izbrše v pogledu, ki ga samo odpira, za njim ostane podoba, ki ni nič drugega kot podoba neskončnega v končnosti jezika.

In v tem pogledu gre pesniška alegorija dlje od filozofskega pojma. Schlegel to drugje pove takole: »Gre do vrat najvišjega in se zadovolji s tem, da zgolj nedoločno naznači tisto neskončno, božansko, ki se filozof-

sko ne da označiti in pojasniti« (KFSA 12, 210). Najvišjemu se torej lahko približa bolj od filozofskega pojma, ker ga ta v nobenem posegu ne more zajeti in določiti. Približa pa se mu tako, da pride vse »do vrat« vanj, ne da bi stopila skozi – v *nedoločni naznačitvi*, ki, čeprav racionalno nerazberljiva, vendarle daje po nazornosti bogato podobo, kolikor nedoločno nikakor ni nujno tudi že uborno. Tako je najvišja oblika izrekanja: »Vsaka alegorija pomeni Boga in o Bogu ne moremo govoriti drugače kot alegorično« (KFSA 18, 347).

Naj sklenem. Pri Schleglu se ob tem, da izhaja iz novoveškega pojma teorije, in ob izgubi neposrednosti čutnega, ob tem, da ohrani platonski interes za nekazljivo, in tem, da povzdigne domišljijo, izrisuje temeljito drugačen položaj pesništva kakor pri Platonu.

Platonu gre za zrenje nadčutnega, vélika konsekvence celotne njegove filozofije ni nič drugega kakor popolno zrenje Lepega onstran stvari namesto le delnega posredovanja nadčutnega v čutnem. Čutno, ki je deležno nadčutnega, je lahko le opora za vzpon duše k Lepemu, ki se mora, da bi segla proti Lépeju, postopno odvracati od lepote stvari in jo navsezadnje pustiti za seboj. Kolikor pa pesništvo (oziroma umetnost sploh) po drugi strani zmeraj deluje v območju esteze, tj. estetskega, čutnega posredovanja, ne more biti privilegirani kraj razodevanja Lepega. Umetniško prikazovanje, ki je prikazovanje v čutnem, v kamnu ali lesu, barvi, besedi, ni na ravni zrenja, ki mu še najbolj ustreza upodobitev v filozofskem mitu – zrenja, v katerem duša navsezadnje izkusi Lépo popolnoma zunaj čutnega, v čistem molku.

Nasprotno pesništvo pri Schleglu postane privilegirani kraj prikazovanja, jezikovnega upodabljanja Absolutnega (s tem da Absolutno samo ostaja zunaj njega, za lepega pa obvelja pesniški prikaz sam). Schlegel namreč ob kritiki poantičnega pesništva, ki naj bi, potem ko je zgubilo stik z mitologijo, shajalo le z bornimi namigi na Absolutno, zasnavlja sodobno pesništvo tako, da se pri tem ravna po nezgrešljivo platonističnem interesu za nekazljivo, čeprav je njegov lastni platonizem seveda posredovan skozi novoveški subjektivizem.

Pesništvo v Schleglovi zasnovi torej ni le reprodukcija sveta pojavov, ki ga po Fichteju z izvornim tetičnim aktom, tako rekoč z drugim stvarjenjem, postavlja jazovski subjekt. Pesništvo je na ravni svojega časa in odgovarja njegovemu zgodovinskemu izzivu le, ko se loti prikazovanja nekazljivega, in sicer z novo mitologijo kot tvorbo domišljije, ne da bi ta bila le naslednica stare mitologije, ki bi vzniknila kot dar narave v njenem sebekazanju, niti ponovitev postavljaljočega akta jaza, kolikor je v svoji novosti ravno prisposoba nekazljivega.

*V modernem pesništvu se nekazljivo pokaže šele v prikazu* – in nič drugače kot tako. Takšen prikaz je zato skrajno nenavaden po-kaz, paradokсна re-prezentacija ali po-navzočenje, po-uprisotnjenje. Kajti re- tu ne naznačuje naknadnosti, nobenega »biti-po«, kolikor pesniški prikaz v svoji srčiki ni prikaz pojavnega oziroma prisotnega, pa vendar hkrati jo naznačuje, kolikor je *prikaz tistega, kar je »prisotno« drugače oziroma v razliki od prisotnega*, onstran racionalno razberljive in pojmovno ubesedljive prisotnosti, kajti to kot nekazljivo sicer sploh ne bi bilo prisotno v območju čutnega in

bi nam ljudem, ki smo vselej že napoteni vanj in popotujemo v njem, ostalo povsem tuje.

Prav to, da nekako posreduje tisto, kar je samo po sebi sicer neposredljivo oziroma kar ni posredljivo drugače kot tako, pesništvo tudi dviguje v visoki položaj, ki ga dobi v Schleglovem »Pogovoru«. Ta dialog je zato eden izmed najpomembnejših izrazov romantične »umetniške religije«, nazora, ki umetnost vidi v položaju ali celo na mestu religije. In ker Schleglov dialog pesništvu v resnici namenja odlikovani položaja posrednika Absolutnega, je hkrati eden izmed temeljnih kamnov prihodnjega »dialoga med literaturo in teorijo«. Le da bo pesništvo v protiplatonskih oziroma protimetafizičnih poetikah prihajajočih modernih časov nemara prej postalo posrednik ne-čutnega namesto nadčutnega ...

## OPOMBE

<sup>1</sup> Prim. tudi Behler 97.

<sup>2</sup> Gl. za pismo Novalisu KFSa 23, 204, za pismo Augustu Wilhelmu Schleglu pa n. d., 188. V ogletem oklepaju navajam variantno ubesedenje iz pisma bratu. Prim. tudi Behler 98 in 94.

<sup>3</sup> Prim. Kocijančič, »Država« 1000: »Poznavanje eidosa, ki je drugje (tudi v 'Državi') stvar izredno zahtevnega dialektičnega vzpona *filozofa*, Sokrat tu [v deseti knjigi tega dialoga – op. V. S.] paradokso pripisuje vsakemu obrtniku.«

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Bowie to imenuje *suspension of reason*; prim. Bowie 54.

<sup>5</sup> Schlegel je »alegorijo« v drugi izdaji »Pogovora o poeziji« zamenjal s »simbolom«, upoštevajoč pomensko razločitev pojmov, ki se uveljavila prav v romantičnem obdobju. Navsezadnje pa je vseeno, ali tu stoji »alegorija« ali »simbol«; v obeh primerih gre za podobskost jezika, za jezikovno upodobljenje neprikazljivega. Prim. Buchholz 207: »Vprašanje, o katerem se je kontroveržno razpravljalo, ali Schlegel misli na 'alegorično' ali, kot popravlja poznejša različica, na 'simbolno' oblikovanje, je v tej zvezi drugotnega pomena, saj gre obkraj za *podobski* moment [*das bildliche Moment*], tj. za *tropično* izrazno formo.«

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# SCHLEGEL'S "DIALOGUE ON POETRY" AND PLATO'S "SYMPOSIUM"

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*In his reflection on poetry, Friedrich Schlegel, the founder of early German Romanticism, used philosophical ideas and concepts from the very beginning. On the other hand, for the purpose of reflecting on poetry, in the literary periodical Athenäum he soon introduced the literature-like genre of the fragment instead of the usual form of the treatise. His essay "Dialogue on Poetry" (1800), however, is written in the form of a dialogue whose entire staging – that is, speeches on certain themes followed by discussions about them among a selected group of persons – is reminiscent of Plato's Symposium (ca. 380 BC). Yet Plato's Symposium is a talk on the Beautiful, whereas Schlegel's "Dialogue" is a symposium on poetry. This is also where a significant difference lies between the two dialogues from the point of view of intellectual history.*

Keywords: Friedrich Schlegel, Plato, theory, dialogue, poetry, new mythology, allegory, the Beautiful, the unshowable, the Absolute

The invitation to the colloquium "on the dialogue of literature and theory" opens up the history and genres of this dialogue from Romanticism to the present as a first field of work. As the first in this field – or, better put, midfield – a famous name is mentioned (or so it appears): Friedrich Schlegel. The title of the colloquium and its introductory words thus lead us to reflect on the creative response of literature to theoretical "ideas and concepts," as well as on theory's reaching for literary representational modes in the last two hundred years; that is, on the action from the field of theory that goes along the border and crosses into the field of literature, and the other way around. It is a reciprocal action in which the role of pioneer was presumably played by the younger of the Schlegel brothers.

However, it goes without saying that theory circumscribes the field of literature and says what literature is, and not the other way around.



Therefore, the first question that arises is: what actually is theory? Or, more accurately: from which concept of theory did Schlegel proceed, being himself one of the first writers on literature, if not the very first, who in early Romanticism, at the beginning of modern (self)understanding of literature, crossed the border of theory towards literature and poetry, respectively?

He proceeded from a handed-down concept, and this concept overlaps with the concept of modern science.

In this conceptual acceptance, theory is *a whole of assertions that set a certain objective field and represent its object within it*, re-presentation being the basic mode of treatment of this object. As a whole of coherent, ordered assertions, it is simultaneously *a system*. Theory is thus not a single vision, but a continual seeing, a being-seen of the object preserved in a system of coherent assertions – a knowledge of it. The theory of literature, for example, objectifies, posits literature as the object of its treatment in the field of language, and is in this way a permanent knowledge of the object “literature” that belongs to modern science, while this is, because its regions and objects of treatment are multiplying, a constantly growing totality of such “regional” theories and, as such, “a theory of the real,” as Martin Heidegger defined it (Heidegger 46 ff.).

Schlegel, however, departed somewhat from the inherited concept of theory at the very beginning of his career in literary theory. Facing the first offshoots of historicism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, he realized that a new view of theory was needed, and found a way of looking that sees theory differently and, owing to this changed vision of theory, also looks at its object differently. This way of looking proceeds from a reflected, turned-towards-itself vision that came to see its own situatedness in time or history, and thus from a newly acquired awareness of this situatedness and its indispensability in the conception of theory. From now on, the object of theory would no longer be one and the same for all time, but time and again an object within a respective historical horizon drawn around it by a historical view. The object becomes *that which shows and how it shows itself, which is therefore visible within the horizon of historical time*, that is, in its historical shapes, although Schlegel – and I shall stress this immediately – also preserved an interest in the unshowable.

We have nearly forgotten that history – that is, the historiography of certain national, in particular Romance literatures, such as Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Provençal – began with the studies of the brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, and that, as far as Classical literature is concerned, the two of them transferred the value stress from Roman literature, on which it lay in the Renaissance and in Classicism, to Greek literature. The two also introduced the distinction between Classical (ancient) and Romantic (modern) literature, although today we are no longer aware that this distinction is actually the origin of our awareness of literary modernity. All this is the work of their pioneering historical consciousness, yet the theoretical in Friedrich Schlegel is far from being in complete opposition to the historical. On the contrary: *the conceptual substratum of theory is preserved in Schlegel's concept of the system*.

At first – that is, between 1793 and 1795 – the young Schlegel was still reflecting on “the possibility of an objective system of practical and theoretical esthetic sciences” (KFSa 1, 358).<sup>1</sup> The systemizing or, more accurately, the theoretical-systemic conception of Schlegel’s esthetics and poetics is embodied in drafts from 1795, which were preserved in his papers under the title “On Beauty in Poetic Art” (“Von der Schönheit in der Dichtkunst”), and which he metonymically named “the poetic Euclides” (cf. Behler 97), using the name of this great systemizer of antique geometry that, through his reshaping, became a model of the scientific system. In these drafts the establishment of “the true concept of the beautiful” (= esthetics) comes first. It is followed by “a theory of judging the beautiful” (= criticism) and “a doctrine of art genres” (= technique), as well as poetics as a theory or doctrine “of the peculiar character of poetry” and its kinds – dramatic, lyric and epic, etc. – which comes last (cf. KFSa 16, 5). Schlegel, however, did not finish his drafts, but changed his view of theory and tried to arrive at a theory of poetry through its history. He therefore began to study the history of Greek poetry and, in his letters to Novalis and his brother August Wilhelm in 1794, wrote nearly the same: “The history of Greek poetic art [of Greek poetry] is the [complete] natural history of the beautiful and of art.”<sup>2</sup> Further on in his letter to Novalis he adds that we have been “without a true theory of the beautiful” until now, and in the letter to his brother he remarks “that is why my work is – esthetics” (KFSa 23, 204).

Hence, in Schlegel’s eyes it would be an illusion for theory to attempt to fix its object – art or poetry, poetry as a succus of art – outside its becoming in history, in abstract timelessness: *the only possible theory of poetry* (and of art or the spiritual in general) *is its history*, a contemplation of its historical change. It should, however, be an integral contemplation that grasps the becoming of its object from a certain point of view – that is, from our “now” to which the becoming has come – and expresses it in its historical connections: a project that Schlegel himself ironically named, with a “no” to theory that is simultaneously a “yes,” “the historical system” (cf. Behler 116). Also belonging to the circle of this project are the conceptions of great esthetics from the Romantic period, particularly Hegel’s and Schelling’s esthetics which are no longer “a theoretical system.”

After abandoning his work on the theoretical system or pure theory – that is, theory irrespective of history – Schlegel turned his working attention from the theory of the beautiful to the history of poetry, *from the beautiful as such to the concrete shaping of the beautiful in poetry*, that is, in Greek poetry. His essay entitled “On the Study of Greek Poetry” (“Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie”), which he wrote in 1795 and which, after being published two years later, made him famous, introduces such a “historical system,” a series of oppositions developed between Greek and modern poetry. To say only what is most relevant: for a newly opened historical view, Greek poetry is a presentation that is beautiful in itself, hence a beautiful presentation of that which already shows itself first of all, a demonstration of the phenomenal, the sensible, or the finite, whereas modern poetry is not concerned with the beautiful anymore, but is driven by

the interest in *das Interessante*, in what is “full of interest” and rouses the interest: the infinite.

At this point, however, I would like to say a little more about another of Schlegel’s essays, entitled “Dialogue on Poetry” (“Gespräch über die Poesie”) from 1800. This essay is a *dialogue*. Schlegel had already come close to the literary representational mode in his literature-like fragments, which were published in the literary periodical *Athenäum* between 1798 and 1800, but with this dialogue he actually moved away from the scientific, or theoretical, treatise and its monological asserting and proving of assertions. In general, the dialogue is mimetic; it provides no speech about a chosen subject that would not have been placed within the action, but moves – not only, but also – in the element of presentation, sharing this element with mimetic, presentational arts such as poetry or painting. The dialogue is already like this in Plato. It presents a talk as a dramatic event, as well as the characters of those that take part in it.

Plato is not the only philosopher that wrote dialogues, yet he is the only one among them that wrote only dialogues, and Schlegel read all of them in the original Greek when he was sixteen. It is therefore not surprising that Schlegel’s “Dialogue” is similar to Plato’s “Symposium” with regard to both composition and speech structure.

Written in about 380 BC, “Symposium” happens to be framed within a narrative, as are some of Plato’s other dialogues. In this case, the narrative is a report on a symposium organized at a concrete event, a victory won by Agathon’s tragedy, and “Symposium” is actually framed by it not only once, but twice. It is, in turn, particular in that it mostly does not take place as a talk, as an intellectually intense exchange of words in which Socrates usually questions his co-speaker, but is really structured like a symposium – a collection of speeches on a selected theme. Likewise, Schlegel’s dialogue is also framed by an introductory consideration and a report on a fictional group of friends and their decision to talk, whereas the main texture of the dialogue is again made up of speeches, each of which is bordered by a discussion among the members of the symposium group on a selected current theme in connection with the poetry treated by each of them.

Furthermore, the authorial anonymity of Platonic dialogue is preserved in Schlegel’s dialogue. In the introduction we read: “The present talk should set completely different views against one other, each of which can show the infinite spirit of poetry in a new light from its own point of view” (Schlegel, “Gespräch” 281). Different interpretations attempted to recognize the opinions of Schlegel’s contemporaries in the views of the speakers, but without success. This is why all statements return to the author of the dialogue, who nevertheless remains without a clearly distinguishable voice in a multitude of voices, *an author without an authorized text*. It would be best to simply say: in Schlegel, as in Plato, there is a talking about this and that. So, by choosing the dialogue and using the possibilities of dialogizing, Schlegel has abandoned the monological theoretical manner of speaking and the ordinary theoretical treatment in general: in his dialogue *he does not posit poetry as an object, but sets different views of it against one*

another and in this way, by many-sighted or many-voiced approximation, removes poetry itself from objectification.

Yet, on the other hand, is there a talking about this or that in Plato? Does theory exist in Plato? Is it possible to separate theory from the many-voiced texture of Platonic dialogue, a systematically organized knowledge that can also be taught to others, a doctrine? A theory of ideas, perhaps, that would be the nucleus of Plato's idealism?

At this point I would like to refer to Gorazd Kocijančič, who published his – and indeed the very first – complete translation of Plato's works into Slovene in 2004. One of the basic findings that he repeats in his accompanying incentives to the reading of Plato's dialogues is that Plato's dialogically structured thought cannot be reduced to any monological thesis or doctrine, not even to the theory of ideas.

In the philosophical talk staged by Platonic dialogues, the way to the goal is not walked through to the end; knowledge is not reached. Socratic dialectics is the guiding of a co-speaker to the point where he becomes aware of his ignorance, which Socrates, on the other hand, is aware of all the time. The sense of the famous saying "I know that I know nothing" is not that Socrates, the wisest among men of his time, was ignorant about things within the reach of human knowledge, but that knowledge of what really exists is not possible. Socratic dialectics thus guides the co-speaker along the paths of thought so as to bring him to *aporía*, to "waylessness" and/or to "embarrassment" – that is, to unknowingness with no way out. The dialogue paves the way of thought to what is Plato's concern, yet this is not reachable by knowledge, nor is the development of thought in one dialogue in accordance with the development of thought in another.

Nonetheless, the dialogue is a way. Kocijančič says: "Here we can only prepare the way. The dialogue is therefore a guiding along the way, step by step, to the goal that is behind Socrates' unknowingness..." (Kocijančič, "Platonova filozofija" 808). It is a *preparing of the way without a goal, an indicating of the unknowable goal itself*. And Socratic dialectics is nevertheless a *majeutics*, a midwifery that helps to give birth to what is immortal in man (i.e., his soul), for that which surpasses him as a mortal being – although what is born can also be stillborn. Namely, what dialectics prepares us for, though does not carry us to, can never be reached without a radical caesura, but with a leap in *exaiphnes*, in a certain "suddenly," which is a temporal ecstasy or ec-stasy out of time. *With a seeing which, despite being the seeing of reason, is nevertheless not discursive*.

Heidegger lays the stress on the pulling-out-move of modern science as "a theory of the real," on its "positing" intervention in the object: theory pulls out a certain entity and sets it in an object by giving the entity to itself in *Vor-stellung*, in its own re-presentation. In his opinion, it is no coincidence that the Latin word *contemplatio*, which is a translation of *theoría* from Greek, was translated into German as *Betrachtung* 'contemplation' as early as the Middle Ages, yet etymologically stems from the Latin word *tractare* 'to treat' 'to deal with' (cf. Heidegger 55–56). As contemplation, theory is already a dealing with. In Plato, however, *theoría* is a *pure, non-discursive, nontreating looking: a seeing*.

Plato's "theory" is therefore by no means a contemplative dealing with the real, with this or that phenomenon, but a seeing of that other that does not show itself; which, then, does not show itself to the mortal eye. It is a seeing of eide; that is, of ideas or of "the seenness," as the word *idéa* is translated by Kocijančič, or of what gives itself to the seeing and makes it possible at all, because it is present in it precisely as the seen. And as a culmination of philosophical life that breaks the horizon of time in an ecstatic "suddenly," it is prepared, through a guiding to waylessness, by dialectics. Dialectics is thus a preparation for the ascent of man's soul beyond that which shows itself to the bodily eye, and is only for (this) appearance's sake, to what becomes visible to the highest in the soul itself, to the eye of reason. To what really is. To what is only "a premonition of thought" and cannot be spoken of discursively, but still needs to be spoken of.

Thus even Socrates cannot properly formulate what Plato's true concern is in philosophic-conceptual terms, because it resists formulation insofar as it exists only in the nondiscursive receiving of reason. Certainly, Plato pleads as much as he can for the philosophical way of life that Socrates is embodying and is nothing but an uncompromising "living-towards" the transcendent, yet he agrees only with the direction of Socrates' formulating and not necessarily with the formulated itself.

As already observed, in Platonic dialogues, a thought about the same thing can develop differently: it is not only the philosopher that is capable of *theoría*, but, in another constellation of thought, also the artist, who according to modern understanding is nothing but an artisan.<sup>3</sup>

As a nondiscursive seeing, *theoría* in Plato is before *poiesis*, before "creating," if this is broadly understood to mean a bringing from non-being to being – before the artistic creating as well. Every art is poetical, that is, creative in the broader sense, and certain arts receive an instruction immediately from the seen in seeing itself, informing it in the element of logos. In the narrower sense, however, *poiesis* is poetry. In Plato, first of all, this can be an art, the creating of which is a production of verses ("Symposium" 205b–c); second, an art that is not a bringing from non-being to being through eidos or an idea that can be seen by *theoría*, as is tablemaking or chairmaking, but through *eikón*, an external image or appearance of a created thing, such as painting ("The Republic" 596b–602c); and third, a divinely inspired and, therefore, *maniké*, "raving" or raved-by-god art ("Phaedrus" 245a). The third possibility is the best for poetry, but it is Socrates that says, precisely in "Phaedrus," that poetry cannot present what the soul sees in the super-heavenly place (247c): "The place beyond heaven [*Hos dè hyperouránios tópos*] – none of our earthly poets has ever sung or ever will sing its praises enough" (Plato 525).<sup>4</sup>

Whereas Plato has Socrates speak about the soul's seeing the super-heavenly place in a way that Socrates simultaneously renounces this seeing to the poet, he himself actually articulates *the philosophical myth*. The thought in the background, which is also indicated in some of Plato's other dialogues, is that only the seeing of a philosopher can deliver itself from the stream of time and, in timelessness, join the seeing of a not-yet-embod-

ied soul in eternity, for constant "theory" can only be the seeing of a soul before birth. Yet this seeing – a soul's seeing of the super-heavenly place, as the sphere of eide is called here – is no longer shaped by the poetic, but by Plato's own myth. Or, more accurately: *Plato's myth is not the myth of a poet, but it is nevertheless poetic*. Namely, in presenting only "the circumstances" of a soul's seeing in the pre-birth sphere, it does not discursify it. The philosophical *mýthos* thus shows itself as a special *lógos*, a risky, empirically uncovered, creative word about the insensible existence of the soul.

Yet the sphere of eide is not the highest that is strived for by the soul in its seeing. This is still beyond the sphere of eide, "beyond the essence [*epékeina tês ousías*]" ("The Republic" 509b),<sup>5</sup> beyond the whole of eide as the eternal paradigms of things. Its name is The One in "Parmenides," the idea of Good or the Good in "The Republic," and the Beautiful in "Symposium."

On the whole, "Symposium" is a collection of praises to eros, and yet, in the culmination of thought reached in Socrates' speech, it becomes a speech on the Beautiful. This speech has an additional framework, because here Socrates primarily resumes his talk with a priestess, Diotima. Epitomizing Diotima's words, he does not, however, identify eros with the beautiful as did the speakers before him, but defines it as precisely that which lacks the beautiful (and thus also the good), and is consequently merely striving for it. Eros is not what is loved, but that which loves – a love of the beautiful. Even more, as a wish for the beautiful, it becomes *a wish for the Beautiful*: after waking up alongside a beautiful body, eros ascends from it to beautiful bodies, and from these to beautiful works and, again, from these to beautiful doctrines, until it finally reaches the Beautiful itself. *The ascent of a wish thus ultimately becomes a way of "theory,"* a reaching out towards "the wide ocean of the Beautiful" "the wide ocean of the Beautiful" [*tò polù pélagos tetramménos tou kalou*] (210d).<sup>6</sup> A seeing of the Beautiful: the Good: the One.

Poetry is therefore less than theory: for Plato *theoria* is an act of receiving the self-revealing Beautiful, but poetry is not the privileged place of its revelation.

Precisely here, in the realm of the relation between the transcendent "object" of a platonically envisioned theory and poetry, lies the big difference between Plato's and Schlegel's dialogue from the point of view of *Geistesgeschichte*: Plato's "Symposium" is essentially a dialogue on the Beautiful, whereas Schlegel's "Dialogue" is a symposium on poetry. What does this mean – a dialogue on poetry instead of on the Beautiful?

To answer this question, we must return not only to Schlegel's understanding of theory, but, first of all, to his understanding of poetry as developed in his "Study."

Schlegel's historical view does not orient itself according to the ecstatic "suddenly" of Platonic seeing, but, proceeding from its own situatedness in time, according to the historical horizontal instead of the vertical that leads out of history. For Schlegel, theory is still knowledge, a being-seen of the historically seeable preserved in coherent assertions. Yet, as already



observed, in his “Study” he discovers that, in contrast to Greek poetry, modern poetry has an interest in the unshowable, and consequently, though proceeding from the handed-down modern concept of theory, he himself retains an interest in that which in Plato is “an object” of *theoria* – that is, which is seeable only to the eye of the soul, provided its dialectical training and ecstatic ascent have taken place.

According to Schlegel, the source of Greek poetry is a myth, and its spring, the place where it sprang up for the first time, was Homer. Homer was the first to form the myth poetically, and so his two poems were “the most beautiful blossom of the most sensible age of art” (Schlegel, “Über das Studium” 179), an age in which nothing that does not already show itself (or present itself, or appear) has a place in art or poetry. However, when Schlegel comes to Sophocles – who, in his opinion, surpassed even Homer and everyone else in Greek poetry in the mastery of presentation – he says:

Of course he does not mix in his presentation anything *that cannot be presented* [*nicht dargestellt werden*], *that cannot appear* [*nicht erscheinen kann*]. [...] The kingdom of God lies beyond the esthetic horizon, being only an empty shadow without spirit and power in the world of phenomena. And, indeed, the poet, who [...] thinks he can withdraw with a scanty satisfaction that makes possible a view of punished evilness, or *by merely a hint to the other world*, proves the smallest possible measure of artistic wisdom. (169–170; emphasis V. S.)

Hence, all that Greek poetry needs for its presentation presents itself in the esthetic, sensible horizon. Greek poetry finds all of this in “the world of phenomena,” in nature, which simultaneously means the sensible world and, as Schlegel says in accordance with contemporary philosophical vocabulary, “finite reality” (89). It is therefore always only the finite without the infinite that is presented in Greek poetry. However, the old, Greek understanding of *phýsis* as “emerging” – that is, an emerging into a showing-of-itself, along with the emerged – shines through Schlegel’s connecting of nature with the presenting or showing. His conclusion that “the tendency towards infinite reality came into being due to *the loss of finite reality* and the shakiness of the perfect form” (53; emphasis V. S.) can thus be understood to mean that which became interesting for modern poetry through this loss was *the unshowable*. On the other hand, because an interest in the unshowable can only be realized in a presentation uniting the supersensible with the sensible or, to use the concepts of philosophical metaphysics, the infinite with the finite (i.e., *the unshowable with the showable*), Schlegel also critically touches on the deficient presentation of poetry after Classical antiquity, which emerged within the framework of Christian tradition, inasmuch as this poetry indicates the unshowable “by merely a hint to the other world,” without spreading out graphic imagery. Namely, by this hint to “the kingdom of God” it becomes a term of New Testament “metaphysics” in this context, designating the invisible world, which is both opposite and superior to the world of phenomena.

However, the future realization of interest in the unshowable is essentially discussed in the "Dialogue."

In this essay, the emphasis lies on the poetic presentation of the unshowable, on such presentation as being the task of contemporary poetry. Here the dialogue is carried out by six fictional speakers, four of whom have long speeches. The theme of the third speech is the novel as the main contemporary poetic genre, whereas the theme of the fourth speech is the style of Goethe's works. Yet it is the second speech, that of Ludoviko, that stands out among them. Its theme is poetry now, or the task of poetry, and it is introduced by the first speech through the thematization of poetic epochs, which, until now, followed one another sensibly.

Ludoviko's speech bears the title "Speech on Mythology" because it is the task of poetry now, in this epoch, to form mythology, *the presentation of the unshowable in a new mythology*. At the beginning, Ludoviko says:

I claim that our poetry lacks a center such as mythology was for the old, and all the essential elements in which poetry falls behind that of antiquity can be summed up in the words: We have no mythology. Yet, I add, we are very close to getting it, or it is time to begin seriously endeavoring jointly to get it... (Schlegel, "Gespräch" 301)

In Ludoviko's words, the new mythology will come along "a completely opposite path" to that of the old mythology, which was "the first blossom of a youthful fantasy" (158). It cannot come along the natural path anymore, because "the mythology of newcomers [*der Neueren*] has lost the immediateness of the sensible," as the need for the new mythology is meaningfully (with a hint at Schlegel's word about "the loss of finite reality" in his "Study") substantiated by Heinz Gockel (Gockel 132).

This short allusive formulation of the novelty of the poetic and of the human condition in general brings before our eyes the context of contemporary philosophy. In Schlegel's eyes, *the loss of immediateness of the sensible* was clearly demonstrated by Kant's critical philosophy, a discussion of man's reason, the task of which was to discern the abilities of reason, the boundaries of these abilities, and the realms of their validity. Namely, in his pre-critical period, Kant already renounced the Platonic "seeing reason" (*anschauende Vernunft*) and took sensible seeing (*sinnliche Anschauung*) as the foundation of every knowing, *yet to the point of excluding the possibility that, in this seeing, a thing would be given as it is, in its immediate in-itselfness*. As he states in his first critique, we can know about a thing only that which we ourselves have put into it, which means that, as an object of our knowledge, the thing is our own preparation and that this object is, precisely in its knowability, each time built up in a human cognitive apparatus. And since our cognitive apparatus creates things as knowable objects in our representation, the objectivity of the object is always mediated by the subjectivity of the subject.

Against the background of a lost immediacy of the sensible, however, we must also understand Ludoviko's words that follow as an answer to the question where the new mythology will come from. In contrast to the

old mythology, which came from nature, the new mythology, as Ludoviko states, has to “develop from the most profound depths of the mind; it has to be the most artistic work of art [*das künstlichste aller Kunstwerke*], for it has to contain all the others” (Schlegel, “Gespräch” 301). The new mythology thus has to develop and be *the most artistic and/or the most artificial* – and, consequently, the most unnatural, the most spiritual work of art, that which is most poetic, the succus of the poetic in the poetic work itself. However, it can develop only with the help of the new philosophy, inasmuch as this gives a hint for its development from the mind. “Idealism,” Ludoviko assures, is a “firm point,” out of which “a big revolution” will come (302), and, speaking of this point, probably aims at Fichte’s philosophy, because it was precisely Fichte that, as Schlegel says already in his “Study,” discovered “the foundation of critical philosophy” (Schlegel, “Über das Studium” 186) – that is, the foundation of Kantian philosophy on which German idealism later began to build. Fichte was the first to broach the fundamental question of German idealism, the question of what comes before the existence of realms in which the functioning of reason is being applied in Kant. That is, the question of how they come into being; namely, the self-consciousness of man that alone makes possible the planned application of reason for the purpose of knowledge, and, on the other hand, a world that makes possible the functioning of reason to be applied to anything at all.

The foundation of Kantian critical philosophy is Fichte’s thesis, according to which the absolute I posits the non-I, the world, by his *Tathandlung* – a fact-act, an act in the emphatic sense of the word that is, for every single, relative I that emerges through it, already a fact. The positing of the non-I is a necessary act of the I by which the I acquires self-consciousness. For the I can grasp and comprehend itself by means of concepts only if it posits the non-I in front of itself; it will then acquire self-assurance only if it limits itself with the non-I – although when self-consciousness awakens it loses absoluteness.

In Schlegel’s eyes, the positing of the world by I, a thetic act of the I-subject having the status of a fundamental thesis in Fichte’s doctrine of science, is likely to be *a poetic one* in the broad sense of the word: *only then can that which shows itself be presented to the I as different from it*, as its mirror counterpart and, as such, as a guaranteeing instance of its identity. However, for Schlegel poetry in the narrower sense is a presentation of the showable and the unshowable, of one without the other or of one along with the other. Yet in the historically relevant sense, in the sense of high Romantic poetry, it is by all means a presentation of the unshowable, the unshowable in the showable – and through the new mythology at that.

According to Ludoviko, the source of this mythology, then, will be Idealism, “a firm point” in “the most profound depths of the mind,” a starting-point for the revolution of the spirit in which the main role will be played by poetry. So the new mythology will not be for modern poetry what the old mythology was for Greek poetry – a gift, or a work, of nature. It will not, in natural succession, simply replace the old one, because Idealism, as its source instead of nature, will indeed be *a source of the nov-*

*elty of mythology itself*. It therefore has to spring up – not as a reproduction of the showable, but as a (re)production of the unshowable – “from the creative power of subjectivity,” says Manfred Frank, one of the great connoisseurs of philosophy and literature in the Romantic period (Frank, *Der kommende Gott* 206). Because no new mythology can be expected from nature, poets must now begin drawing from their own subjectivity and create the mythology themselves – a mythology that, in view of the wideness of encompassed stuff, will be a sort of universal mythology, an anthology of mythologies until now, not only of Classical, but also Oriental; for example, India’s mythology.

However, the main role in the genesis of the new mythology will be played by the *imagination*. For, as Ludoviko announces, the new mythology will be a creation of the imagination along with a simultaneous *Aufhebung*, a cancellation or temporary “suspension of reason” (Bowie 54):

For this is the beginning of all poetry that it cancels the course and the laws of reasonably thinking reason [*den Gang und die Gesetze der vernünftig denkenden Vernunft aufzuheben*] and transfers us to the beautiful mess of fantasy, to the original chaos of human nature, for which I have not yet found a more beautiful symbol than a varied swarming of old gods. (Schlegel, “Gespräch” 305)

The new mythology will be a connective making of images out of various mythologies, generating from the mind with the active help of the imagination and the inactiveness of reason, and, as a great simile made up of a story and an image, it will let us see “what otherwise always runs away before the consciousness” (305) – the preconscious that, together with consciousness, is one of the characteristic oppositions alongside the general and the individual, the ideal and the real, or the infinite and finite, through which idealistic thought moves.

The stress in the “Dialogue,” then, is on the *imaginative* presentation of the unshowable, where every rational, discursive moment is turned off, yet in such a way that *also watching or seeing is sprung over* while being enabled by the seen itself, and *the making of images takes precedence over it*. As *Einbildungskraft*, as a “power” or “ability” (*Kraft*) of “making images” (*Ein-bilden*), the imagination thus becomes a unique, subjective power that, by being able to shape a new mythology and present the unrepresented, will enact the revolution of the spirit prepared by the new idealistic philosophy. It is precisely in this high evaluation of the imagination that Schlegel’s Romantic subjectivism so alien to Plato culminates, in spite of his Platonistic interest in the unshowable.

Let me return to the text. Ludoviko’s speech is followed by a talk in which Ludoviko himself speaks again, saying that poetry is, given the manner in which it refers to the infinite or the unshowable, *an allegory*: “... all beauty is an allegory. And precisely because the supreme is unsayable, it can only be said allegorically” (308). The allegory is obviously a presentation that is beautiful in itself, but different from the beautiful presentation of Greek poetry spoken of by Schlegel in his “Study” in that it unites the

unsayable with the sayable, the unshowable with the showable. Or in the words of Manfred Frank, which concisely draw on the conceptuality of German idealism: “The allegory – to put it briefly – is a tendency towards the Absolute in the finite itself” (Frank, *Einführung* 291).<sup>7</sup>

Inasmuch as the Greek verb *allegoréo* means ‘I speak, utter, in a different way’, for Schlegel to speak allegorically means to say, to mean, to meaningfully hint at something else, to point to the infinite, to the Absolute, in the finite. The act of allegorical meaning is not identical to what it aims at, and its negativity “exists in a release effacing itself to itself as a *positivum*: that is, in a release of the view [*Freigabe des Blicks*] of that which is meant absolutely” (Frank 294). Because this act, then, effaces itself in a view, which the act itself has opened, there remains an image that is nothing but an image of the infinite in the finitude of language.

In this respect, the poetic allegory goes further than the philosophical concept. Schlegel explains this elsewhere by saying: “It goes to the gates of the supreme and satisfies itself by only indeterminately indicating the infinite, the divine, which cannot be designated or explained philosophically” (KFSa 12, 210). The poetic allegory comes closer to the supreme than the philosophical concept does, because the latter cannot grasp and determine it in any intervention. It comes close by coming “to the gates” leading into it, without stepping through the gates – *in indeterminate indication* that, although it is rationally undecipherable, nevertheless gives a rich image as far as graphicality is concerned, inasmuch as the indeterminate is in no way necessarily anything poor. In this way the allegory is the highest form of saying: “Every allegory means God, and of God we cannot speak otherwise than allegorically” (KFSa 18, 347).

Let me conclude. In Schlegel – provided that he proceeds from the modern concept of theory and given the loss of immediacy of the sensible, and provided also that he preserves a Platonic interest in the unshowable and elevates the imagination – a fundamentally different position of poetry is drawn in comparison to Plato.

It is the seeing of the supersensible that matters to Plato; the great consequence of his entire philosophy is nothing but a perfect seeing of the Beautiful beyond things, instead of only a partial mediation of the supersensible in the sensible. The sensible, which shares in the supersensible, can only be a support for the ascent of the soul towards the Beautiful, and the soul, in order to reach towards the Beautiful, has to turn away from the beauty of things and finally leave it behind. On the other hand, inasmuch as poetry (or art in general) always operates within the realm of esthesis, of esthetic, sensible mediation, it cannot be a privileged place for the revelation of the Beautiful. Artistic presentation is a presentation in the sensible, in stone or wood, colors, or in words, and is therefore never on the level of seeing what the image made in a philosophical myth is best suited to. In this seeing the soul ultimately experiences the Beautiful completely outside the sensible, in pure silence.

In Schlegel, on the contrary, poetry becomes a privileged place of presentation of the Absolute, of making its images in language (whereas the po-

etic presentation prevails as beautiful, the Absolute itself remains outside it). Namely, Schlegel – who criticized poetry made after Classical antiquity that, after losing contact with mythology, got along only with poor hints at the Absolute – conceptualizes contemporary poetry by orientating himself after the unmistakably Platonistic interest in the unshowable, although his own Platonism is, of course, mediated through modern subjectivism.

In Schlegel's conception, poetry is thus not only a reproduction of the world of phenomena that, after Fichte, the I-subject posits with an original thetic act or with a second creation, so to say. Poetry is on the level of its time, and answers to the historical challenge of this time, only as it undertakes the presentation of the unshowable using the new mythology as a creation of the imagination. However, this mythology is neither a successor of the old mythology emerging as a gift of nature in its self-showing, nor a repetition of the thetic act of the I, inasmuch as, in its novelty, it is precisely a simile of the unshowable.

*In modern poetry, the unshowable shows itself only in the presentation – and in no other way. This is why such a presentation is an extremely unusual monstration, a paradoxical re-presentation or after-presentation, an after-bringing-into-being. For in this case the “re-“ does not indicate an afterwardness, no “being-after,” inasmuch as the poetic presentation is essentially not a presentation of the phenomenal or of that which is present, yet at the same time indicates it, inasmuch as this presentation is a presentation of that which is “present” differently or in its difference with the present, beyond the rationally decipherable and conceptually expressible presence, because this, as the unshowable, would otherwise not be present in the realm of the sensible at all, remaining completely alien to us humans who are always on the way to this realm and wandering within it.*

Precisely the fact that poetry somehow mediates what is in itself unmediateable, or cannot be mediated otherwise than in this way, elevates it to the high position given to it in Schlegel's "Dialogue." This dialogue is therefore one of the most relevant expressions of Romantic "artistic religion," of a view that sees art in the position of, or even at a place of, religion. And because Schlegel's "Dialogue" indeed assigns to poetry the distinguished position of mediator of the Absolute, it is simultaneously one of the foundation stones of the future "dialogue between literature and theory" – only that poetry will perhaps become a mediator of the nonsensible instead of the supersensible in the counter-Platonic or counter-metaphysical poetics of the coming modern times.

Translated by Suzana Stančić

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Behler 97.

<sup>2</sup> For the letter to Novalis, see KFSa 23, 204, and for the letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel, see KFSa 23., 188. I have cited a version of the formulation in the letter to his brother in parentheses. Cf. also Behler 98 and 94.



<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kocijančič, "Država" 1000: "The knowledge of eide that is elsewhere (also in 'The Republic') the matter of an extraordinary demanding dialectical ascent of the philosopher, Socrates here [in Book 10 of this dialogue – V. S.] paradoxically ascribes to every artisan."

<sup>4</sup> I am quoting the Greek original from the recent Italian bilingual edition of Plato's works (see "Bibliography").

<sup>5</sup> My translation. Cf. Plato 1130.

<sup>6</sup> My translation. Cf. Plato 493: "the great see of beauty."

<sup>7</sup> In the second edition of "Dialogue on Poetry," Schlegel replaced "allegory" with "symbol," taking into account the semantic differentiation of the concepts that asserted itself in the Romantic period. However, after all, it does not matter whether it is an "allegory" or "symbol" that stands here; in both cases it is about the imaginativeness of language, about making images of the unrepresentable in language. Cf. Buchholz 207: "The controversial question of whether Schlegel had in mind "allegorical" or, as corrected in the later version, "symbolical forming" is of secondary importance in this connection because the moment of an image [*das bildliche Moment*] – that is, the tropical form of expression – is at stake in both cases.

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