

58 | 3 (2018)

PRISPEVKI

ZA NOVEJŠO ZGODOVINO

3



INŠTITUT ZA NOVEJŠO ZGODOVINO

INŠTITUT ZA NOVEJŠO ZGODOVINO

PRISPEVKI
ZA NOVEJŠO
ZGODOVINO

**DISSIDENTS
AND CULTURE
OF DISSENT**

Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino
Contributions to the Contemporary History
Contributions a l'histoire contemporaine
Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte

UDC

94(497.4) "18/19"

UDK

ISSN 0353-0329

Uredniški odbor/Editorial board: dr. Jure Gašparič (glavni urednik/editor-in-chief),
dr. Zdenko Čepič, dr. Filip Čuček, dr. Damijan Guštin, dr. Luboš Kačirek,
dr. Martin Moll, dr. Andrej Pančur, dr. Zdenko Radelić, dr. Andreas Schulz,
dr. Mojca Šorn, dr. Marko Zajc

Prevodi/Translations: Translat d.o.o.

Bibliografska obdelava/Bibliographic data processing: Igor Zemljič

Izdajatelj/Published by: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino/Institute of Contemporary
History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel. (386) 01 200 31 20,
fax (386) 01 200 31 60, e-mail: jure.gasparic@inz.si

Sofinancer/Financially supported by: Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost
Republike Slovenije/ Slovenian Research Agency

Računalniški prelom/Typesetting: Barbara Bogataj Kokalj

Tisk/Printed by: Medium d.o.o.

Cena/Price: 15,00 EUR

Zamenjave/Exchange: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino/Institute of Contemporary
History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana

Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino so indeksirani v/are indexed in: Scopus, ERIH Plus,
Historical Abstract, ABC-CLIO, PubMed, CEEOL, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory,
EBSCOhost

Številka vpisa v razvid medijev: 720

*Za znanstveno korektnost člankov odgovarjajo avtorji/ The publisher assumes no
responsibility for statements made by authors*

Fotografija na naslovnici: Študentsko naselje leta 1968, hrani MNZS

Table of Contents

Articles

- Albert Bing**, Titoism, Dissidents and Culture of Dissent 8
UDC: 329.052:323.281 (497.1)"1945/1990"
- Zdenko Čepič**, The Student Movement 1968/1971 in Ljubljana in
Wider Context26
UDC: 378.18:329.78(497.4)"1968/1972"
- Željko Oset**, Maks Samec and His Adapting to Academic Standards
After World War II42
UDC: 929Samec M.:001.891(497.4Ljubljana)«1945/1964«
- Mateja Režek**, Milovan Djilas and the British Labour Party, 1950–196058
UDC: 929Djilas M.:329(410)Lab»1950/1960»
- Aleš Gabrič**, Jože Pučnik on a Path to Becoming a Dissident78
UDC: 929Pučnik J.:329.052:323.281(497.4)"1965/1991"
- Josip Mihaljevič**, Većeslav Holjevac – Forgotten Dissident94
UDC: 929HOLJEVAC V.:323.281»1918/1945»
- Lidija Bencetič**, Journal *Istarski Borac/IBOR* in the Context of
the Culture of Dissent 113
UDC: 070.18:329.052 (497.5)"1945/1990"
- Jure Ramšak**, The Contours of Social Criticism in Late-Socialist Slovenia..... 130
UDC: 323.2(497.4)»1945/1991«

Historical Documentation

- Nevenka Troha**, Report Prepared by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's
Republic of Slovenia Boris Kraigher at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia on 9 March 1950
(published manuscript with comments) 148

Reviews and Reports

- Workshop: Parliamentarianism and Representative Democracy in Crisis of War,
Revolution, and Collapse of Empires, 2 October 2018, St. Petersburg
(Verena Mink) 171
- Andrej Rahten, Med Kakanijo in Wilsonio: poklicne in politične preizkušnje
Hansa Schwegla alias Ivana Šveгла (Aleš Gabrič)..... 174
- Bogo Zupančič, Plečnikovi študenti in drugi jugoslovanski arhitekti v
Le Corbusierovem ateljeju (Mojca Šorn) 178

Editorial Notice

Contributions to Contemporary History is one of the central Slovenian scientific historiographic journals, dedicated to publishing articles from the field of contemporary history (the 19th and 20th century).

It has been published regularly since 1960 by the Institute of Contemporary History, and until 1986 it was entitled Contributions to the History of the Workers' Movement.

The journal is published three times per year in Slovenian and in the following foreign languages: English, German, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Italian, Slovak and Czech. The articles are all published with abstracts in English and Slovenian as well as summaries in English.

The archive of past volumes is available at the **History of Slovenia - Sistory** web portal.

Further information and guidelines for the authors are available at <http://ojs.inz.si/index.php/pnz/index>.

Uredniško obvestilo

Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino je ena osrednjih slovenskih znanstvenih zgodovinsko-pisnih revij, ki objavlja teme s področja novejšje zgodovine (19. in 20. stoletje) srednje in jugovzhodne Evrope.

Od leta 1960 revijo redno izdaja Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino (do leta 1986 je izhajala pod imenom *Prispevki za zgodovino delavskega gibanja*).

Revija izide trikrat letno v slovenskem jeziku in v naslednjih tujih jezikih: angleščina, nemščina, srbsčina, hrvaščina, bosanščina, italijanščina, slovaščina in češčina. Članki izhajajo z izvlečki v angleščini in slovenščini ter povzetki v angleščini.

Arhivski letniki so dostopni na **Zgodovina Slovenije - Sistory**.

Informacije za avtorje in navodila so dostopni na <http://ojs.inz.si/index.php/pnz/index>.



SISTORY
ZGODOVINA SLOVENIJE



Articles

Albert Bing*

Titoism, Dissidents and Culture of Dissent

IZVLEČEK

TITOIZEM, DISIDENTI IN KULTURA DISIDENTSTVA

Prispevek obravnava vprašanje jugoslovanskih disidentov v zvezi s sistemom komunističnega upravljanja in delovanja države pod vodstvom Josipa Broza Tita. V širšem kontekstu je analizirana vloga kritične inteligence, tj. kulture disidentstva, v značilnih jugoslovanskih okvirjih. Prispevek vsebuje krajši pregled posebnosti jugoslovanskih disidentov, predvsem razlik v njihovem dojetanju, vrst kritik in medsebojnih odnosov, ki so jih imeli kot nasprotniki režima, pa tudi različnih usod posameznikov. Poseben poudarek je bil na stališču Zahoda do jugoslovanskih disidentov, ki se je precej razlikoval v primerjavi s stališčem do disidentov iz Sovjetske zveze in drugih držav realsocializma.

Ključne besede: Disidenti, Josip Broz Tito, titoizem, Jugoslavija, komunizem

ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the issue of the Yugoslav dissidents with regard to the system of communist governance and the functioning of the state led by Josip Broz Tito. In the wider context the role of critical intelligentsia – a culture of dissent – is analyzed within distinctive Yugoslav frameworks. The paper includes a shorter overview of the particularity of the Yugoslav dissidents, above all the differences in their perceptions, type of criticism, their mutual relations – as the opponents to the regime, and different destinies of individuals. Special emphasis was put on the West's position of Yugoslav dissidents which differed considerably in comparison with dissidents from the Soviet Union and other states of real socialism.

Keywords: Dissidents, Josip Broz Tito, Titoism, Yugoslavia, Communism

* Senior Research Fellow, PhD, Croatian Institute of History, Opatička 10, 10000–Zagreb, Croatia, albert1.bing@gmail.com

Titoism and Culture of Dissent

The nature of the post-war Yugoslav version of a dissident is closely related to the system of governance and values of the Yugoslav socialist society (Titoism), embodied by Josip Broz Tito. According to many indicators, the Yugoslav sovereign was an autocrat. But what was the nature of his dictatorship? How did he govern and what was the state he ruled? Josip Broz Tito, the first name of Yugoslav communism, the guerrilla leader who has gained fame and respect even with his ideological opponents during and after the Second World War, ruled the post-war Yugoslav communist state “with an iron hand in a velvet glove.” Historian Ivo Banac reveals in Broz’s individuality the persistent historical paradigm for the South Slav zone: “ill fate of the Balkans” which exhibits “the need for order in a mobile encampment, faith in an imperial idea as the sole guarantor against chaos.”¹ In this sense, British historian A. J. P. Taylor notes that “Marshal Tito was the last Habsburg.”² According to the writer Stanko Lasić, Tito was a hypocritical pragmatist, an extremely determined and skilled politician and a statesman who knew how to use his strength and turn defeats into a victory.³ For political emigrants, he was a Machiavellian, cruel communist dictator.⁴

As observed by Aleksa Đilas Yugoslavia was “a country that was difficult to explain and understand, perhaps even harder for those who lived in it and were not indifferent to it, but to those who do not carry that experience. It was a land full of paradoxes.”⁵ Anecdotally, Tito’s Yugoslavia was described as a country with “six republics, five people, four languages, three religions, two letters, and one Tito.”⁶ In the short resume on Tito’s Yugoslavia, Tvrtko Jakovina concludes: “Yugoslavia was a one-party dictatorship in which elections were not democratic, in which one could be prosecuted for singing an inappropriate song, the society in which the advancement of the service sought membership in the Communist Party, the state in which it was not free to believe and pray. Yugoslavia was not a free country, but it was the most liberal communist state in Europe.”⁷ What were repressive and liberal aspects in Tito’s Yugoslavia? How did they manifest themselves and how they were connected? What was the nature of dissent in Yugoslavia? What was the position of those who – in any way – questioned the political authorities? Who were the Yugoslav dissidents?

The questioning of freedom in the societies ruled by the undisputed authorities implies the emergence of critical thinking, resistance, and dissent. The relationship between authoritarian power and opponents to the regime had specific historical significance in communist societies. In the words of Vaclav Havel: “You do not become a

1 Ivo Banac, *Acta Turcarum* (Zagreb: Durieux, 2006), 32.

2 A.J.P. Taylor, *Habsburška monarhija 1809–1918* (Zagreb: Znanje, 1990), 323, 324.

3 Stanko Lasić, *Mladi Krlježa i njegovi kritičari 1914. – 1924* (Zagreb: Globus, 1987), 590, 591.

4 Jure Petričević, “Hrvatski nacionalni problem,” in: *Hrvatska revija*, Vol. 2–3 (1964): 200.

5 Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (1974–1990)* (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 495.

6 Martti Ahtisaari, *Beogradska zadaća – Kako je slaman Milošević* (Zagreb: Naklada Szabo A3 data, 2002), 23.

7 Tvrtko Jakovina, “J.B.T. Historiografija vs. Mitologija. Komunist kojega je Zapad podržavao,” *Večernji list*, April 30, 2005.

‘dissident’ just because you decide one day to take up this most unusual career. You are thrown into it by your personal sense of responsibility, combined with a complex set of external circumstances. You are cast out of the existing structures and placed in a position of conflict with them.”⁸ As well as other communist states Yugoslavia cherished a cult leader, carried out censorship and ideological manipulations and repressed those who opposed to the authority of Tito and Communist Party. The periodical clash with those disobedient in their own ranks was combined with the constant struggle with political emigration (which was considered as people enemies).

However, the system of political and social control characteristic to totalitarian regimes in the states of real communism significantly differed in the Yugoslav case. Unlike the other communist states Yugoslavia was under the strong influence of the West – especially in culture (from the early 1950s) and it was relatively open country. The Yugoslav cultural politics was one of the most significant indicators to Yugoslav distinctiveness; it was also relevant to the emergence of the specific Yugoslav culture of dissent as a result of a constant struggle of liberal-minded intellectuals and authoritarian rule. The Yugoslav ambiguities, and afterward the fact that the very state ceased to exist, are probably the reasons why it is not easy to deal with the complex Yugoslav past. A rational and critical approach to the phenomenon of Titoism and Tito’s Yugoslav state still present a challenge to historical analysis.

One of the problems of historical analysis can be identified in the deficit of historiographic synthesis of wider social scopes in the postwar period. Tito’s Yugoslavia broke up, and even while it lasted there were weak attempts of more significant historical synthesis to its past. Serbian historian Andrej Mitrović notes: “Concerning the past of Yugoslavia it is very important to stress that it has been not historically sufficiently explored. It doesn’t mean that there had not been valuable research, but in that context, two external indicators can be considered as well. How many histories of the Yugoslav state did we produce? Two, three, mostly in the eighties at the end of the decay of the state. In world history, every country has dozens of its history, ‘small’ and ‘big’, booklets and multi-editions ...”⁹ Many would argue that the “lack of history” was the problem of Yugoslav successor states and its people, but it certainly does not contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the Yugoslav past. Considering many “unsolved” historical issues one can observe that past places a burden on contemporaries as an eternal presence.

The phenomenon of culture of dissent in the Yugoslav society, including the that of dissidents, had its cyclic changes – variations that largely depended on the vague ambivalences of Titoism: “the ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ periods interchanged; after the period of release and relative liberalization the period of ‘clash’ would follow, and it was skillfully maintained as a balance between different ideological currents in party leadership and confrontation between republics.”¹⁰ Like the other communist states Yugoslavia had

8 Václav Havel: *From a political dissident to a dissident politician*, accessed August 13, 2018, <http://www.pehe.cz/Members/redaktor/vaclav-havel-from-a-political-dissident-to-a>.

9 Andrej Mitrović, “Javna, tajna i porodična istorija,” interviewed by Aleksandar Ćirić, *Vreme*, No. 429, Januar 9, 1999.

10 Ivica Župan, *Pragmatičari, dogmati, sanjari – hrvatska umjetnost i društvo 1950.–ih godina* (Zagreb: Ina industrija

a capillary system of social control based on censorship and ideological commissions and a privileged position of “socio-political workers” was maintained as the power lever. Following the cyclic changes of Yugoslav society the social power and control of one-party system slightly faded away, but almost until the very end of the Yugoslav state the Communist Party apparatus was a decisive factor in almost all aspects of public life. However, under Tito’s “scepter” some of the liberties in Yugoslavia have been developed that were unimaginable in other states powered by the communists. Strangely enough, in Yugoslav socialist society the ideological indoctrination conducted by the party apparatus “coexisted” with various forms of intelligentsia criticism; the compelling repertoire of the Communist “Reveille” and hymn – dedicated to the cult of Tito’s personality – was pervaded by jazz and rock’n’roll and the admiration of American film actors. According to Czech film director Jiří Menzel socialist Yugoslavia, as a country open to Western influences, has been perceived in communist bloc countries as “America of the East.”¹¹ Such a cultural climate would not be possible without a certain social cohesion and the main integrating factor was the Yugoslav sovereign.

An important instrumentality of authority was the cultural policy. Like in other aspects of the public sphere Tito had the most important role as supreme arbitrator. All other institutional mechanisms simply followed. Promoting the workers self-management at the beginning of 1950s the National Assembly “predicted that its success will depend on how rapidly the cultural development will advance.¹² With the “ups and downs” and parallel to the party propaganda a distinct “space of freedom” will be developed due to a relatively liberal cultural policy. And it wasn’t deprived of controversy. One of the central figures of the Croatian and Yugoslav culture and close associate to Tito – Miroslav Krleža, was often portrayed as the rebellious free spirit. As a writer, he frequently emphasized the destiny of an artist as someone who is doomed to dissent: “In order to practice his craftsmanship properly a writer must have the ability to be a dissident or even a defector in some ways, from the institutions, the nation, and the authorities. He is a prodigal son who returns to his father’s hearth just to be able to leave him again. Negation is his familiar form of acceptance of the world. The only one who radically understands and accepts this truth can really help the writer or the artist.”¹³ In 1952, at the Third Congress of the Yugoslav Writers’ Union in Ljubljana Krleža opposed socialist realism and announced the liberation of literature from ideological bonds. Broad cultural activity developed and, within it, various cultures of dissent.

Culture went through non-linear metamorphosis just as did the Yugoslav socialist society as a whole; from the Stalinist phase of showdown with “national enemies” – when there was strict censorship and rigid party control over all aspects of life including culture, until the end of the eighties when communist officials publicly stated that they were no longer able to control the social processes that ultimately led to the

.....
 nafta d.d. and Meridijani, 2007), 19.

11 Jiří Menzel, *Moja Hrvatska*, HTV, Documentary, August 18, 2011.

12 Predrag Matvejević, *Jugoslavensvo danas–Pitanja kulture* (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), 128.

13 Predrag Matvejević, “Mjera naše zrelosti,” *Školske novine*, January 7, 1982.

emergence of political pluralism. The film director Đorđe Kadrijević (*Praznik, Pohod*) who was a representative of socially engaged Yugoslav film – so-called *Blake Wave* – described the paradox of Titoism: “My films, albeit forbidden, went to world festivals and had great success.” On Tito’s role in cultural policy Kadrijević states the following: “As we know, Tito was the predominant personality in every aspect of our country. He was not an intellectual, he had no great education, no particular culture, but he had a genuine interest in art and he supported the artists. In Tito’s time culture was a constituent part of state politics and systems” (...) Although an adversary of modern art – in 1962 Tito spoke explicitly against abstract art – at the same time his ‘soft Stalinism’ enabled the Museum of Contemporary Art to be built quite unhindered. A similar paradox is the fact that the writer Borislav Pekić was imprisoned but afterward received prestigious literary awards such as *Nin’s* and *October’s*.¹⁴

An important component of the development of dissent related to the culture of young people who have been under the strong influence of the West since the 1950s and especially in the 1960s. This influence, despite the “changes”, will continue until the fall of the Yugoslav state. The influence of literature, film, and music – ranging from pop culture to avant-garde streams, were among the younger generations manifested by action that was not devoid of political connotations. Thus the conceptual artist Vladimir Dodig Trokut states that members of his 68th generation were considered a group of “humanists, nihilists, anarchists, anarcho-liberal, anarcho-humanist, dialectics, disbelievers, rebels and party defectors.” Members of the “rebel” youth had already formed attitudes in relation to the social situation and the cultural reality (dialectics of liberation and theology of freedom). As Trokut states, everything was happening under the watchful eye of the authorities, who made sure that the behavior of the “rebels” did not escape control; there were even occasional sanctions. On the other hand, some Communist leaders and intellectuals, such as Vicko Krstulović, Koča Popović, and Jure Kaštelan, guarded and supported the alternative path of the younger generation.¹⁵ Vicko Krstulović was known by the idea of establishing Dalmatia as a federal unit. Koča Popović performed high functions in the Communist nomenclature, but also acted as a surrealist (in his young days) and an independent intellectual who even opposed Tito himself. The academic and poet Jure Kaštelan – who in 1948 acted as a “cultural worker” in Agitprop of CC CPC – in 1968 published a new edition of the *Bible* that was sold in more than 200,000 copies.

Despite the rigid single-party communist system and the persecution of the disobedient, due to an ambiguity of Titoism various forms of a critical thought emerged. Some of the actors who criticized Yugoslav ideology and politics become dissidents.

14 Đorđe Kadrijević o Titu: Nije imao obrazovanje ali je znao da uzdigne kulturu | Zabava | Kurir, accessed June 18, 2018, <http://www.kurir.rs/zabava/pop-kultura/dorde-kadrijevic-o-titu-nije-imao-obrazovanje-ali-je-znao-da-uzdigne-kulturu-clanak-1889209>.

15 Dodig Trokut, Vladimir, interview by Albert Bing for COURAGE-project, December 22, 2016.

Who Were the Yugoslav Dissidents?

The phenomenon of a dissident in Tito's Yugoslavia can be considered from very different perspectives. However, so far no particular typology of the Yugoslav dissident has been formed in humanities and social sciences. There is no considerable attempt to synthesize the historical circumstances and motifs of dissidents; their dissociative "critical potential", the effector or forms of repression that the government has carried out against the "disinformation", as there is no complete phenomenological analysis of Titoism. The notion of dissident occurs in very different contexts; it is manifested and evaluated differently in certain phases of Yugoslav history as well as in different parts of Tito's Yugoslavia.

In general Yugoslav dissidents have been apostrophized as defectors of the Communist Party. They are also referred as the opponents of the regime; individuals who at some point emerged in public from "unacceptable positions" and were "excluded" from public life (although sometimes they were formally not members of the party or of party structures). In the wider context, they also appear as critics – free thinkers; their public criticism or "improper" thinking that questioned the socialist reality – very different manifestations of the culture of dissent – often led to conflicts with the authorities, including persecution and internment or isolation. Even in the last decade of the Yugoslav socialist state, when the demands for democratic reforms increasingly emerged and when it became clear that the party system is unsustainable – the practice of social control will continue despite the formal absence of censorship; according to Stipe Šušar's report at the Central Comity CPY's 7th Session in April 1987, between 1981 and 1985, there were 36 prohibitions of publications: ten newspapers, sixteen books, three journals, two calendars, two tourist brochures, one geographical map, one bulletin, and poster. Between 1982 and 1987, claims for "political delinquency" were raised against 2,443 persons (1,748 for verbal delict); the highest in Kosovo (1,020), followed by Croatia (473), Serbia without the province (306) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (291). In Slovenia, there were 90, in Montenegro 71, in Macedonia 51 and in Vojvodina 37 persons who were indicted (in court) for political crimes.¹⁶ However, the forms of "resistance" and "punishment" were very different, especially in comparison with the relationship between authorities and dissidents in other states where communists were in power. In short, attempts to further define the phenomenon of Yugoslav dissident face many problems. The arguments for this thesis are numerous.

Already at the level of perception of dissident one can observe very different opinions. Literate and publicist Miljenko Jergović thinks that Ivan Supek – one of the most prominent Croatian intellectuals of the post-war period, physicist and philosopher as well as the rector of the Zagreb University during the turbulent 1971 Croatian Spring – was not a dissident. Supek was first of all "a convinced leftist and a Democrat" (despite the fact that he was a member of the Communist Party before the Second World War; he left the Party in 1940, among other things, because of disagreement with the

¹⁶ Jović, *Jugoslavija*, 331.

party's interpretation of Albert Einstein's thesis that was dismissed as inadmissible in Moscow).¹⁷ On the other side one of the most prominent intellectuals in Croatian emigration, Bogdan Radica considered Ivan Supek to be a dissident, as did a student leader from the period of the Croatian Spring, Dražen Budiša. Introducing Supek's book *Heretic on the left* Budiša noted: "To preserve internal freedom, autonomous political thinking, and scientific activity, to be on the side of his people and belong to the left, it was possible only if one was a dissident. This has been shown in Supek's book."¹⁸ The controversy in the understanding of dissidence is related to some of the key moments of Tito's Yugoslavia, such as the break with Stalin in 1948. In the ranks of Yugoslav dissidents can be included the communist "deportees" who, following the resolution of Informbiro, agreed with Stalin (as well as a number of innocent persons who were guilty of being accused as "Stalinists"). At the same time while the purge against the Yugoslav Stalinists – dissidents from Tito's CPY – went on (by using the Stalinist matrix) Josip Broz was recognized in the West as the most important communist dissident after Lev Trotsky.¹⁹ Moreover, Yugoslavia itself got the label of dissident; in the words of François Furet: "... disconnected from the Stalin order, Tito introduces a new genre in the history of communism: the rejection of national communism."²⁰

Various interpretations of the character of "Yugoslav dissident" are related to real and apparent controversies. In this context, it is interesting to note how political emigrant Bogdan Radica – who was never a member of the Communist Party (he was a sympathizer of the Croatian Peasant Party) – is regarded as a dissident in today's post-communist perspective. On the Croatian historical portal Radica is apostrophized as "formally (...) the first Yugoslav dissident, even eight years before "Milovan Đilas"²¹. The reason for this was Radica's leaving Yugoslavia in 1945 for failing to accept the single-party system, although he actively supported the struggle of Tito's partisans in America during the WWII but disagreed with the one-party system and repression committed by communist authorities: "In accepting an ordinary dictatorship or semi-dictatorial regime man can compromise with himself as well as the society in which he lives. Who did not do it? But in the matter of accepting fascism or communism, that is, a system that demands the full submission of a lie-dogma, it is necessary for one to clarify it to himself and to his conscience and the society in which he lives, for which he has done all this and for what he has aspired."²²

The fact of Radica's active support to Tito's Partisans during World War II did not bother the Yugoslav regime's publicists to disqualify him not only as a "dissident" but as an "Ustasha" as well (since he belonged to Croatian political emigration). When

17 Miljenko Jergović, "Sumnjivo lice – Kako su izumrli građani u Hrvatskoj," *Jutarnji list*, April 7, 2015.

18 Dražen Budiša, na koricama knjige Ivan Supek, *Krivovjerac na ljevici* (Zagreb: Globus, 1992).

19 Albert Bing, "Disidenti/'divergenti', ljudska prava i osamostaljivanje Hrvatske," in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 408.

20 François Furet, *Prošlost jedne iluzije – Ogljed o komunističkoj ideji u XX. Stoljeću* (Zagreb: Politička kultura, 1997), 395, 396.

21 "Bogdan Radica – hrvatska veza sa svijetom," *Hrvatski povijesni portal*, accessed June 18, 2018, <http://povijest.net/bogdan-radica-hrvatska-veza-sa-svijetom/>.

22 Bogdan Radica, *Hrvatska 1945* (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1992), 240.

Radica met with Milovan Đilas in the late sixties in Princeton and New York (he wrote about meeting Đilas in the *Croatian Review* magazine), Zagreb daily *Večernji list* published the following information: “In America, Đilas met with some Ustasha leaders including the cutthroat ideologist Bogdan Radica.”²³ Much more interesting were the impressions of Radica after an encounter with Đilas “in an unforgettable conversation.” For Radica, Đilas was “one of the disappointed idealists who has lost faith in ‘his’ God” and “the rebellious angel of the official communist galaxy.” However, he was also a consistent follower of the “divine” emanation a dared to “face God” (Tito) for his “faith”, pointing to his “sin”: “To dream about at the perfect state, then to realize it and then to feel that it is a fake and weaker than any common and even bourgeois dictatorship, and to stand against it to such an extent that the faults are exposed by their own being, it is not a small and insignificant feat. This is certainly a strong and decisive step, which requires a lot of inner courage, which can only impose the search for truth in man (...) the clashes in the position of the heretics from the Communist theocratic society are not easy or simple, especially when society has all the means of modern government which was never achieved by any other authority, even by the Pharaoh or the Inquisition.”²⁴

The fate of many dissidents was intertwined in a variety of ways (among the other relationship between Tito as a dissident and his victims who have become dissidents). In the immediate post-war period, innumerable intellectuals in a short time were struck by a new power that left the policy of the National Front and imposed a communist political monopoly. Among them were writers of various political affinities such as Edvard Kocbek and Borislav Pekić. Despite the labeling by the authorities – Pekić was imprisoned, and Kocbek under supervision – both writers managed to publish remarkable and award-winning works. Politician and professor Dragoljub Jovanović who sympathized with the social ideas of the CP in the prewar Kingdom of Yugoslavia and came into conflict with the then authorities will become the victim of the communist regime.²⁵ “Always in opposition and a dissident” Jovanovic consistently fought for “multi-party system and freedom of speech.”²⁶ As a people’s deputy at the National Assembly of the FNRJ in 1947 Jovanović was prosecuted by the chief of Agitprop of CC CPY Milovan Đilas. When arguing the one-party system and promoting a form of pluralism in 1953/1954 Đilas himself – after confronting Tito – became a political victim and the most famous Yugoslav dissident. For a couple of times, he was sentenced to prison and then released (at the end of 1966 Đilas was finally granted amnesty after nine years spent in jail). He even traveled abroad and gave a series of interviews for the foreign press. However, he was constantly under the watchful eye of authorities and exposed to defamation; e.g. in 1984 *Večernji list* published a feuilleton (as mentioned previously) on his “traitorous behavior”.

The change in public climate was noticeably different in the second half of the eighties when a liberal press started to publish “floods of forbidden literature”; opening

23 Branko Vlahović, “Đilasov san o vlasti,” *Večernji list*, June 11, 1984.

24 Bogdan Radica, “Metapolitika Milovana Đilasa,” in: *Hrvatska revija*, Vol. 3 (1969): 255, 256.

25 Srdan Cvetković, *Portreti disidenata* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2007), 228.

26 Ibid.

also meant an intensified interest for the dissidents.²⁷ In an interview to liberal weekly *Start* Đilas was presented as a “revolutionary, an apostate, dangerous taboo–theme, multi–year political prisoner”; “About Đilas everybody knew everything and in fact very little is known and most of all as clichés: He is a traitor...”; “how many people know that he has spent his entire life dealing with literature? As every man who renounced his glorious past and shifted from ‘good’ to ‘evil’ boys, the portrait of Đilas is composed on semi–information, stereotypes, and mythologies about ‘the enemy of the state ‘no. 1’ (...) he was “a man who was dismissed in 1954. from all of his duties and classified as an anarchist and revisionist”; at the same time he was called by the press as ‘the last and largest Eastern European dissident after the Saharov rehabilitation’, and also the last living member of the pre–war ruling CPY Politburo. That triple position is sufficiently bizarre and intriguing to be completely ignored. At the very least, he is one of the most controversial witnesses of our recent history.”²⁸

Similar public engagements and even the connection to the same events reflected differently to the destiny of individual dissidents. Daniel Ivin, who was not a member of the Communist Party, deserved the qualification of the “suspect” by participating in the “dissident gathering in Zadar” in 1966 where he was “elected president of the publishing council of the first independent newspapers in Yugoslavia *Slobodna Rijec*”. The magazine was supposed to promote “multiparty” system (allegedly under the influence by Miroslav Krleža). Ivin was arrested and interned for two months in Belgrade’s central detention center. “The conspiracy group” consisting of intellectuals – Mihajlo Mihajlov, Predrag Ristić, Marijan Batinić, Franjo Zenko, Miro Glavurtić, Mladen Srbinović, Leonid Šejk, Slobodan Mašić, and others – was charged with the constructed indictment which included allegations about preparations for the assassination of comrade Tito.” After the indictment was dismissed and Ivin was released he got an invitation of St Antony’s College and so he went to England (“British diplomacy followed him as” the most rational member “of the Yugoslav group of dissidents because he was looking for a way how to democratize society”). He then worked at the Schweizerisches Ost–Institut in Bern where he published the book *Revolution and Evolution in Yugoslavia*. At the end of 1969, he returned to Yugoslavia and collaborated on the project of the founding of the Croatian Economic Bank with a prominent Croatian communist and politician Većeslav Holjevac. In 1970 he signed a contract with Television Zagreb for the series “Croatian Statehood Story” (both projects were ultimately not realized due to Holjevac’s death and repression after the collapse of Croatian Spring). In the continuation of his career, Ivin will write about the most famous Yugoslav dissident Milovan Đilas and about Andrija Hebrang, the most influential Croat communist who was killed in unknown circumstances. In the late 1980s, he was engaged in Croatia in promoting multiparty reform and human rights.²⁹ In

27 Milovan Đilas, “Vlast kao strast,” interviewd by Dina Julius i Dušanka Zeković, *Start*, No. 521, January 7, 1989.

28 Ibid.

29 Drago Pilsel, “Uz 80. rođendan Daniela Ivina,” *Regional Express*, accessed August 13, 2018, <http://www.regionalexpress.hr/site/more/uz-80.-rođendan-daniela-ivina>.

short, despite the dissident label Ivin successfully continued to work in Yugoslavia as well as abroad.

Mihajlo Mihajlov, an assistant at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zadar, had a different destiny. Like Ivin and other intellectuals who tried to organize a democratic forum in Zadar in 1966 Mihajlov was convinced that “social and political conditions have matured for the establishment of competitive organizations to the Communist Party”; he was actually exposed to the persecution since 1965 because of the essay *The Summer of Moscow 1964*, which was categorized as a “defamation” insulting the Soviet Union” (in time when Tito was establishing closer relations to USSR). Despite the authorities pressure, Mihajlov insisted on holding a Zadar summit and launching a magazine with the aim of establishing a review of democratic profiles which will become “the core of a democratic socio–political movement.”³⁰ He addressed his acquaintances in the West (among others PEN Secretary Arthur Miller) and the Yugoslav public with an open letter written to Josip Broz Tito.³¹ Mihajlov was arrested and prosecuted for, among other things, criminal offense “against the public order (...) by spreading false news.” Unlike Ivin, who returned to his homeland and cooperated with prominent political figures like Većeslav Holjevac, Mihajlov was sentenced to a long–term prison after which he went abroad. Along with Milovan Đilas, Mihajlov became one of the most famous Yugoslav dissidents whose fate was followed by the international public, but as a dissident he did not have any significant political influence.

Some individuals, such as Adem Demaçi and Marko Veselica, condemned for “hostile activity” and nationalism, were apostrophized as an Albanian and Croatian “Mandela” for serving long–term prison sentences. Prior to the conflict with the Communist authorities, Demaçi was – at least as a nominal – part of the “system” (from “Tito’s pioneer” to the opposition Albanian revolutionary), and Marko Veselica was one of the party personnel who actively participated in the suppression of student protests in Zagreb in 1968. A particular chapter on dissidence would be a story on intellectuals who confronted Communist authorities in different periods of Yugoslav socialism and with various motives. Many intellectuals, especially philosophers and sociologists gathered around the *Praxis* magazine, actively participated in student protests in 1968. Some of them, especially in Belgrade, experienced the exclusion of the Party, various forms of pressures and even dismissals.

Particularly interesting was the case of Predrag Matvejević. After completing his studies, Matvejević spent two years in Paris, where he acquired a Ph.D. in Sorbonne. He returned to Yugoslavia at the full swing of the student protest in 1968. The ban of his text “What is the common protest of the students of Europe” will be later evaluated “as his promotion in the line of disagreements.” A few years later he voluntarily “auto–suspended himself” from the League of Communists when “the critiques on his account became more and more laud”; he explained that he had joined the Party

30 K. Spehnjak, “Slučaj Mihajlov” u bilješkama diplomatskih predstavnika Velike Britanije 1966,” in: *Dissidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 362.

31 Ibid.

as a student “because he did not appear to be in the rift with the party in which were then Miroslav Krleža, Marko Ristic, Ivo Andrić, Ranko Marinković, Petar Šegedin, and many others.” Matvejević’s even dare to write an open letter to President Tito, in which – despite all his merits – he asked him to depart from his duties due to his age. He didn’t suffer any significant consequences.³²

In the later period of Yugoslavia, when the party was weakened many Yugoslav dissidents collaborated “irrespective of whether they were left or right”; Marko Veselica stated that “he regularly contacted Đilas and Belgrade lawyer Jovan Barović.”³³ Mihajlo Mihajlov – who had “more favorable status” than other Yugoslav dissidents due to his critical observations on the USSR – initiated the establishment of the Committee for Aid to Yugoslav dissidents in New York in 1979. The heads of the Committee were Milovan Đilas and future Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, later replaced by Vladimir Šeks.³⁴ After the death of Josip Broz Tito and the expectations of change, the dissidents were increasingly engaged. In October 1980, a group of 36 dissidents in the country sent a letter to the Presidency of the SFRY, requesting amnesty for those who were still in jail for verbal delinquency. In December 1980 a petition proposing the abolition of Article 133 of the SFRY Criminal Code – which sanctioned the false and malicious presentation of social and political opportunities in the country – was signed by 102 signatories.³⁵

Due to the general appearance of the collapse of communism “dissidents throughout Eastern Europe become louder (especially in Czechoslovakia – with Charter 77; and in Poland – with Solidarity)”;³⁶ this has only slightly affected the activities of Yugoslav dissidents.³⁶ The first organized initiative for democratic changes in Yugoslavia was inspired by the critically oriented intelligentsia of “left” provenance. Some of them were considered as dissidents or advocated the abolishment of any form of political pressure. In 1989 a number of Zagreb intellectuals promoted an “Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative” (the name of the organization was suggested by Branko Horvat and Predrag Vranicki). The president was Branko Horvat, followed by Nebojša Popov, while the organizing director was Žarko Puhovski. Other members of the board were Bogdan Bogdanović, Milan Kangrga, Lev Kreft, Shkelzen Maliqi, Vesna Pešić, Koča Popović, Milorad Pupovac, Ljubisa Ristić, Božidar Gajo Sekulić, Rudi Supek, Ljubomir Tadić, Dubravka Ugrešić, Predrag Vranicki, Jug Grizelj, and Nenad Zakošek. However, in the atmosphere of ever more pronounced national confrontations after democratic elections, the political supremacy was taken by the parties with national programs.

With the collapse of communism, and then the Yugoslav state, dissidents become a sort of relic of the past despite the fact that in some cases (like Croatia) some of the leading positions were occupied by communist dissidents (Franjo Tuđman, Stipe

32 Ingrid Badurina, “Otvorena pisma Predraga Matvejevića,” *Start*, January 7, 1989, 37, 39.

33 Željko Krušel, “Zapadu smetali jugoslavenski disidenti,” *Vjesnik*, October 1, October 2, 2005.

34 Ibid.

35 Jović, *Jugoslavija*, 333.

36 Ibid.

Mesić). New circumstances have also produced new controversies with regard to the phenomenon of a dissident. After the dramatic changes, “a few mentioned the dissidents and especially praised them.”³⁷ One of the probable reasons for the restrained attitude toward the dissidents in the post–communist period may be found in the difficulties of perception of dissident phenomenon; according to Mira Bogdanović, “the thinking of dissidents in former Yugoslavia ranged from total denial of their existence (Minić, 1999), to alleged dissident status of hundreds of thousands of winter walkers (Mihajlov, 1998).”³⁸ The post–communist and post–Yugoslav perspectives imposed new evaluation of dissent in Yugoslavia (primary anti–Yugoslav, national state, anti–communism). The “inflation” of victims of a regime and “dissidents” after the collapse of communism and Yugoslavia – especially in the ranks of “new” political and intellectual elites (most commonly converted communists) – certainly dimmed a clearer view of the historical retrospective of the Yugoslav dissident.

It is interesting to note the perception of the “new Croatian dissident” in the early 1990s; more precisely, the fate of individuals who “became dissidents and exiles from the new state of Croatia” despite the proclamation of democracy. Thus in an article “Why did the Croatian dissidents disappear” (dissidents from the period of socialist Croatia and Yugoslavia), the author registers the emergence of “new dissidents.”³⁹ As a paradigmatic example was the fate of Predrag Matvejević, author of “the most famous and most translated contemporary Croatian book *The Mediterranean Breviary*”; due to his political attitude and criticism which directly referred to Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, Matvejević become “persona non grata in his homeland or, more simply – a dissident.” As noticed by the author it was a paradox since Matvejević actively defended dissident Tuđman while he was prosecuted by the communist authorities in the early 1980s. Matvejević was then the president of the Croatian PEN and advocated suspension of persecution of individuals who opposed the communist regime. Only a few years later Matvejević and Tuđman found themselves in reverse positions with one significant difference: “In Tuđman case the authorities become displeased with him and he was persecuted, and in the case of Matvejević he was displeased with authorities so he becomes dissident of his own will.” In the category of “new dissidents” – the author also calls them “exiles” – were two writers Slavenka Drakulić and Dubravka Ugrešić and two actors Rade Šerbedžija and Mira Furlan. As a basic distinction between the “old” and the “new” dissidents author emphasize the fact that “virtually none of them was legally persecuted, no one of them has been deprived of a right of citizenship;” simply “they didn’t feel comfortable under Tuđman’s regime. So they chose their own paths and destinies, not wanting to share anything with the rule they perceived as regimes.”⁴⁰

37 Krušelji, “Zapadu smetali.”

38 Mira Bogdanović, “Jugoslavenski disidenti i hladni rat,” accessed June 26, 2018, <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0038-0318/2009/0038-03180902113B.pdf>.

39 Jure Ilić, “Zašto su nestali hrvatski disidenti?,” *Vjesnik*, April 4, 2001.

40 Ibid.

West and Yugoslav Dissidents

Probably the most important aspect of Yugoslav dissident status in regard to Titoism wasn't the objective critical potential or the effect of resistance to the authorities of the dissidents but the attitude of Western states and their political and intellectual elites. In the countries of liberal democracy, the perception of Yugoslav dissidents (as well as political emigration) was not the same as those towards the opponents to the Soviet Union and other communist states. One of the reasons for such distinction was embedded in the fact that Tito's regime was perceived "on the seductive theory of socialism with the 'human face'" which since the 1950s served as an alternative to a rigid Soviet model"; therefore, "it was not desirable that dissidents create an image on Tito's Yugoslavia as an unfree and repressive society."⁴¹

In a discussion of "communist renegades" at the meeting of Croatian and Serbian historians (under the 10th *Dialogue* at the Faculty of Philosophy in Osijek, 2005) former dissident Daniel Ivin testified: "The main factors of the West were in quite a disagreement with dissidents in Yugoslavia. Đilas and then others – *Praxis* first, Mihajlov group, then the Zagreb Spring and Belgrade Liberals, and others; Yugoslav dissidents were always more a nuisance than someone who should be supported... That is why the West's attitude to dissidents through whole Cold War period was a double-natured: a wholehearted support for those inside Soviet bloc and a somewhat confused or improper relationship with those in Yugoslavia, often none."⁴² Ivin's observation was consistent with the thesis of Mira Bogdanović who analyzed the position of Yugoslav dissidents during the Cold War: "In Eastern European countries, during the Cold War, dissidents have played a prominent role as an instrument of anticommunist ideological subversion. By contrast, Yugoslav dissidents have sentenced to marginal position thanks to the peculiar position of Yugoslavia between two opposing blocks."⁴³

Similar observations come from one of the most prominent intellectuals in the ranks of Croatian political emigration Bogdan Radica, who was in a position to communicate directly with some of the most famous Yugoslav dissidents. As an expert on geopolitics and international relations and a distinguished US and American culture expert Radica often published articles focusing on the relationship of the West – primarily America – to the rest of the world (*The World Between America and the Soviet Union, Democracy and Liberation from Communism, The World Revolution and America*, etc. published in *Croatian Review* in early 1960s). In his critical comments, he also recalls the position of Tito's Yugoslavia in cold-war conditions. Although the system embodied by the Yugoslav sovereign for Radica was a negation of liberty, and Tito himself was a communist Machiavellian dictator, he did not deny his statehood capacity, above all the ability to "manipulate" the West. Thus, he notes that Churchill's "Oxford and Cambridge boys who were so zealous on – so-called – Tito's charm – while they

41 Krušelj, "Zapadu smetali."

42 Ibid.

43 Bogdanović, "Jugoslavenski disidenti."

were in the Bosnian mountains and Dalmatian islands” (during WWII), mainly spoke on Josip Broz Tito affirmatively.⁴⁴ The roots of this phenomenon are more intriguing because he thinks that “English Machiavellianism is crueller than the one Machiavelli himself ever imagined;” and the Yugoslav leader overtook the Englishman himself with his Machiavellian skills.⁴⁵

Concerning this aspect of “the art of ruling”, Radica’s observations on the global influences of Tito’s “third path” are also interesting. In his opinion it has overshadowed the critical sharpness of the West, leading to a disadvantage of the Yugoslav dissidents. In the analysis of the success of the phenomenon of Titoism among the small peoples, Radica, not with surprise but also with bitterness, notes that “Tito was right” when “politics of his country organized to set aside and see what side would be victorious” in the conflict between America and Russia. Tito has “given to the intelligentsia and leadership of these peoples a technique and a mechanism for exploiting the West, ideologically and economically supported by the same West.” Moreover, “although Tito is still a communist who” in reality did not change his inner system, that fact did not concern anyone; “American official policy has supported Tito’s experiment with financial aid,” factually contributing to “increase Titos’s position in that part of the world.”⁴⁶ Following this observations, Radica also notes his own experiences from Cuba were “Russian, Chinese and Yugoslav communists ideologists operated by offering their own communist example.” What Radica was annoyed with was the case of Tito: “While I was in Cuba talking to Castro’s intelligentsia, I was listening to Tito’s fairy tales, not through propaganda, spread by Tito’s emissaries, but through what Cuban intelligentsia has read about Titoism in North American scientific publications. Whenever I was trying to suppress any system of argumentation, I was faced with the observation of an American economic writer from the most prominent US publications, such as *Foreign Affairs* or even *Problems of Communism*, which can not be said to be leftist, but rather represent the most responsible American point of view. So the USA breaks down and crashes the foundations of all its policies.”⁴⁷

Of course, the benevolent relationship between the West and the Tito’s Yugoslavia – as Radica registers, reflected in the international circumstances of the divided block. First of all the West considered dissidents as “ideological ally in the Cold War.”⁴⁸ However, in the case of Yugoslavia, the position of dissidents was determined by the inherent implications of the ambiguity of Tito’s system. The openness of Yugoslavia and the relative freedom of action of the intelligentsia and the media, especially in later periods, weakened the interest for the Yugoslav dissidents. Dissident movements were certainly under the strong influence of Western perception on dissent as a form of struggle for democracy and human rights in a totalitarian environment. However, until

44 Bogdan Radica, “Demokracija i oslobođenje od komunizma,” *Hrvatska revija*, December 1961, 341.

45 Ibid.

46 Bogdan Radica, “Svijet između Amerike i Sovjetskog Saveza – paradoksi našeg vremena,” *Hrvatska revija*, June 1960, 168.

47 Ibid., 174.

48 Pavle Rak, *Disidenti, kultura i politika*, accessed June 26, 2018, http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/98/192/192_23.HTM.

the collapse of communism in the late eighties, there was no adequate social background that could give rise to a more significant autochthonous political movement.

Nevertheless, Western estimates of dissident potential are also interesting to consider. Thus Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor at the time US President Jimmy Carter administration examines in 1978 what will happen with Yugoslavia after Tito's death (which "seeks to ensure the continuity of his truly great work through collective leadership").⁴⁹ Despite the recognition of Tito achievement "the ultimate goal of the United States in Yugoslavia was the removal of communist rule in any form." But the basic strategic goal of the United States for Yugoslavia is to preserve the status quo with respect to Soviet pretensions in the region after Titos's death. As a course of American strategy, he suggests taking the following measures: "To constantly and consistently point to the Stalinist tendencies in Soviet politics and thus 'intimidate' the Yugoslav communists and other leftists in the country and the world: – systematically assist and give publicity to various opposing groups in Yugoslavia. In connection with this much more 'advertise' should be put upon the various Yugoslav dissidents. In the same way, as it is done with Soviet and Czechoslovak dissidents. These 'dissidents' do not have to be highly anti-communist, perhaps even better, if they are 'humanistic' orientated (like members of *Praxis* and similar). These actions should be maximally linked to the 'human rights' campaign and the 'third basket' from Helsinki, which Yugoslav communists often call upon. Some international organizations for political convictions (Amnesty International) can also be used in this plan."⁵⁰

The ratings of the disadvantaged position of Yugoslav dissidents (and political emigration from Yugoslavia) in the West – in relation to the dissidents from the communist states of the East Bloc, coincide with experiences of the dissidents themselves (Marko Veselica, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Zdravko Gvero, Daniel Ivin...): "Dissidents in the former Yugoslavia had utterly different meaning – but also as an echo to the West – in comparison to those in the Soviet Union and other real-socialist countries."⁵¹ In this context it is also interesting to note Daniel Ivin's observation who claims that the posture of the West influenced the general attitude of the Yugoslav society towards dissidents: "The members of the wider civil and intellectual milieu, who usually give tone and color to the whole society, felt disdain to dissidents, so the sour and unwelcome support of the West was to a great extent justification for their behavior and their conscience. Enjoying certain advantages and benefits of the Yugoslav Liberalism of the Communist State vis-à-vis those in the Soviet bloc, those members of our society dissident was an unnecessary concern and even in their eyes the danger of losing their benefits and advantages. That is why the dissidents in Yugoslavia – unlike those in the Soviet bloc who lived only under one malediction – of their own authority, seemed to be under the triple curse: from their own authorities, then from their own society and partly from the West."⁵²

49 Mirko Đekić, *Upotreba Srbije – optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića* (Beograd: Beseda, 1990), 82.

50 Ibid., 83.

51 Krušelj, "Zapadu smetali."

52 Ibid.

Conclusion

Yugoslav dissidents have been profiled as a very different set of oppositions to communist rule. For these reasons, it is not possible to unambiguously determine the character of the Yugoslav dissident. To a large extent, the dissidents were linked to the various forms of a critical-oriented intelligentsia and political motives that developed after the opening of Yugoslavia towards the West in the early 1950s. As a system of authority and values, Titoism was based on ambivalences made up of the repression and control exercised by the communist authorities and on the other hand by allowing certain liberties whose boundary as the supreme arbitrator was mainly determined by Tito himself. Despite the periodic purges of political opponents who often become dissidents it can be argued that the development of critical thought and peculiar culture of dissent has been a persistent tendency in the development of the Yugoslav society. With the collapse of communism and the SFRY the Yugoslav dissidents lost importance as a political alternative.

Sources and References

- Ahtisaari, Martti. *Beogradska zadaća – Kako je slaman Milošević*. Zagreb: Naklada Szabo A3 data, 2002.
- Badurina, Ingrid. "Otvorena pisma Predraga Matvejevića." *Start*, January 7, 1989.
- Banac, Ivo. *Acta Turcarum*. Zagreb: Durieux, 2006.
- Bing, Albert. "Disidenti / 'divergenti', ljudska prava i osamostaljivanje Hrvatske." In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Kisić Kolanović, Nada, Zdenko Radelić and Katarina Spehnbjak. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Bogdanović, Mira. "Jugoslavenski disidenti i hladni rat." Accessed June 26, 2018. <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0038-0318/2009/0038-03180902113B.pdf>.
- Supek, Ivan. *Krivovjerac na ljevici*. Zagreb: Globus, 1992.
- Cukić, Mona. *Dorđe Kadijević o Titu: Nije imao obrazovanje ali je znao da uzdigne kulturu Zabava | Kurir*. Accessed June 18, 2018. <https://www.kurir.rs/zabava/pop-kultura/1889209/dorde-kadijevic-o-titu-nije-imao-obrazovanje-ali-je-znao-da-uzdigne-kulturu>.
- Cvetković, Srđan. *Portreti disidenata*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2007.
- Đekić, Mirko. *Upotreba Srbije – optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića*. Beograd: Beseda, 1990.
- Furet, François. *Prošlost jedne iluzije – Oglad o komunističkoj ideji u XX. Stoljeću*. Zagreb: Politička kultura, 1997.
- "Bogdan Radica – hrvatska veza sa svijetom." *Hrvatski povijesni portal*. Accessed June 18, 2018. <http://povijest.net/bogdan-radica-hrvatska-veza-sa-svijetom/>.
- "Václav Havel: From a political dissident to a dissident politician." *Pehe.cz*. Accessed August 13, 2018. <http://www.pehe.cz/Members/redaktor/vaclav-havel-from-a-political-dissident-to-a>.
- Ilić, Jure. "Zašto su nestali hrvatski disidenti?" *Vjesnik*, April 4, 2001.
- Jakovina, Tvrtko. "J.B.T. Historiografija vs. Mitologija. Komunist kojega je Zapad podržavao." *Večernji list*, April 30, 2005.
- Jergović, Miljenko. "Sumnjivo lice – Kako su izumrli građani u Hrvatskoj." *Jutarnji list*, April 7, 2015.
- Jović, Dejan. *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (1974 – 1990)*. Zagreb: Prometej, 2003.

- Milovan Đilas – Vlast kao strast. Interviewed by Julius, Dina and Dušanka Zeković. *Start*, January 7, 1989.
- Krušelj, Željko. “Zapadu smetali jugoslavenski disidenti.” *Vjesnik*, October 1 and October 2, 2005.
- Lasić, Stanko. *Mladi Krleža i njegovi kritičari 1914.–1924*. Zagreb: Globus, 1987.
- Matvejević, Predrag. “Mjera naše zrelosti.” *Školske novine*, January 7, 1982.
- Matvejević, Predrag. *Jugoslavensvo danas–Pitanja kulture*. Zagreb: Globus, 1982.
- Menzel, Jiří. “Moja Hrvatska.” *HTV*, Documentary, August 18, 2011.
- Mitrović, Andrej. “Javna, tajna i porodična istorija.” Interviewed by Aleksandar Ćirić. *Vreme*, January 9, 1999.
- Petričević, Jure. “Hrvatski nacionalni problem.” *Hrvatska revija*, Vol. 2–3, 1964.
- Pilsel, Drago. “Uz 80. rođendan Daniela Ivina.” *Regional Express*. Accessed August 13, 2018. <http://www.regionalexpress.hr/site/more/uz-80.-roendan-daniela-ivina>.
- Radica, Bogdan. “Demokracija i oslobođenje od komunizma.” *Hrvatska revija*, December 1961.
- Radica, Bogdan. “Metapolitika Milovana Đilasa.” *Hrvatska revija*, Vol. 3, 1969.
- Radica, Bogdan. “Svijet između Amerike i Sovjetskog Saveza – paradoksi našeg vremena.” *Hrvatska revija*, June 1960.
- Radica, Bogdan. *Hrvatska 1945*. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1992.
- Rak, Pavle. *Disidenti, kultura i politika*. Accessed June 26, 2018. http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/98/192/192_23.HTM.
- Spehnjak, Katarina. “‘Slučaj Mihajlov’ u bilješkama diplomatskih predstavnika Velike Britanije 1966.” In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić and Katarina Spehnjak. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Taylor, A.J.P. *Habsburška monarhija 1809–1918*. Zagreb: Znanje, 1990.
- Trokut, Vladimir Dodig, interview by Albert Bing, COURAGE–project. December 22, 2016.
- Vlahović, Branko. “Đilasov san o vlasti.” *Večernji list*, November 6, 1984.
- Župan, Ivica. *Pragmatičari, dogmati, sanjari – hrvatska umjetnost i društvo 1950.–ih godina*. Zagreb: Ina industrija nafte d.d. and Meridijani, 2007.

Albert Bing

TITOISM, DISSIDENTS AND CULTURE OF DISSENT

SUMMARY

The article deals with the phenomenon of specific Yugoslav dissidence and culture of dissent, primarily due to the international status of Tito's Yugoslavia and *Titoism* as a system of values and governance. The opening up of Yugoslavia to the West after the split with Stalin in 1948 led to the significant influence of Western culture on the Yugoslav communist society. This influence contributed to the appearance of criticism, which sometimes led to various forms of dissidence. However, due to a tolerant attitude of the Western countries towards Tito's communist regime, dissidents did not have the same status as those from the Soviet Union and other states of real socialism. Furthermore, Tito's ambivalent cultural politics – as an important aspect of his governance – also affected the status of Yugoslav dissidents. During the phases of liberalization of Yugoslav society criticism was tolerated and even encouraged to a certain extent. At the same time, the Communist party tried to control all aspect of the public sphere. The supreme arbitrator was often Tito himself.

Albert Bing

TITOIZEM, DISIDENTI IN KULTURA DISIDENTSTVA

POVZETEK

Prispevek obravnava fenomen specifičnega jugoslovanskega disidentstva (in kulture disidentstva) kot posledico mednarodnega statusa Titove Jugoslavije in *titoizma* kot sistema vrednot in upravljanja. Odpiranje Jugoslavije proti Zahodu je po sporu s Stalinom leta 1948 pomembno vplivalo na jugoslovansko komunistično družbo. Vpliv zahodne kulture je porajal razne kritike, kar je včasih pripeljalo do različnih oblik disidentstva. Zaradi strpnega odnosa zahodnih držav do Titovega komunističnega režima pa disidenti niso imeli enakega statusa kot tisti iz Sovjetske zveze in drugih realsocialističnih držav. Poleg tega je tudi Titova ambivalentna kulturna politika kot pomemben vidik njegovega upravljanja vplivala na status jugoslovanskih disidentov. V fazah liberalizacije jugoslovanske družbe so kritike do neke mere tolerirali in celo spodbujali. Hkrati pa je Komunistična partija poskušala nadzorovati vse vidike javne sfere. Vrhovni arbiter je bil pogosto Tito sam.

Zdenko Čepič*

The Student Movement 1968/1971 in Ljubljana in Wider Context

*Ev'rywhere I hear the sound of marching, charging feet, boy
'Cause summer's here and the time is right for fighting in the street, boy
Well then what can a poor boy do
Except to sing for a rock 'n' roll band
'Cause in sleepy London town
There's just no place for a street fighting man
No!*

(Street Fighting Man, The Rolling Stones (M. Jagger, K. Richards), 1968^{1!})

IZVLEČEK

ŠTUDENTSKO GIBANJE V LJUBLJANI 1968 IN 1971 V ŠIRŠEM KONTEKSTU

V letu 1968 so bili med političnimi dogodki tega leta (>>Praška pomlad<< in njen konec, predsedniške volitve v ZDA, protesti proti vojni v Vietnamu, ...) pomembni študentski protesti. Bili so po vsej Evropi, najbolj intenzivni v Parizu. Bili so tudi v Jugoslaviji, v Beogradu (začetek junija). V Ljubljani so bili študenti v svojih protestih bolj socialno usmerjeni kot pa

* Research Counsellor, PhD, Institute of Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, zdenko.cepic@inz.si

1 The song was created under the impression of student protests in Paris. The words of the song Mick Jagger wrote in spring of 1968 and published in the review *The Black Dwarf*, political and cultural newspaper (published between May 1968 and 1972) by a collective of socialists in United Kingdom (editor was Tariq Ali, British Pakistan writer, journalist, historian, filmmaker, political activist). Jagger wrote the song after he attended a 1968 anti-war rally at London's US embassy. He also found inspiration in the rising violence among student rioters in Paris. The author of the song Mick Jagger remembered: "It was very strange time in France. But not only in France but also in America, because of the Vietnam War and the endless disruptions ... I wrote a lot of the melody and all the words." This song originally titled and recorded as "*Did Everyone Pay Their Dues?*" containing the same music but very different lyrics. The song became well known in August 1968 (single); in December 1968 it appeared in album *Beggar's Banquet*. "*Street Fighting Man*" is the band's most political song. The song was released within a week of the violent confrontations between the police and anti-Vietnam War protesters at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Worried about the possibility of the song inciting further violence, Chicago radio stations refused to play the song.

politično. Več političnega je bilo v protestih študentov v Ljubljani aprila in maja 1971, ko so iz protesta zasedli Filozofsko fakulteto. Avtor na osnovi dokumentov slovenskega študentskega gibanja predstavlja delovanje študentov v Ljubljani leta 1968 in 1971.

Ključne besede: študentsko gibanje, študentski protesti, politika, Jugoslavija, Slovenija, Univerza v Ljubljani

ABSTRACT

In 1968, during the political events of this year (>>Prague Spring<< and its end, US presidential elections, protests against the war in Vietnam, ...) significant student protests took place. They were all over Europe, the most intense in Paris. They were also in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade (early June). In Ljubljana, students in their protests were more socially oriented than political. More political occurred in students' protests in Ljubljana in April and May 1971, when the Faculty of Arts students took over for eight days. The author presents the work of students in Ljubljana in 1968 and 1971 on the basis of the documents of the Slovenian student movement.

Keywords: student movements, students protests, politics, Yugoslavia, Slovenia, University of Ljubljana

The student movement is “a specific phenomenon of a relatively mass protest on the world scale, related to the tradition of proletarian movement for citizen’s rights and to the tradition of war and post-war intellectual movements”.² One can speak of the student movement as a historical phenomenon in particular in the late 1960s, when it was an organised political activity of students aimed at achieving certain political goals. Mass student movements were a characteristic of the late 1960s throughout the world. Although student protests started even before 1968 – at some universities in the USA, first at Berkeley where students protested against the war in Vietnam – the worldwide student unrest actually culminated in 1968. It, however, continued also after that year. In Slovenia it climaxed three years later.

The active and mass student movement of the late 1960s was on the one side marked by its world dimension stemming from similar social and economic issues, and on the other side movements in individual countries had certain specific features. They were reflected in diverse forms of protests as well as in the very causes for opposition and the goals which they wanted to achieve. The political demands of students varied across the countries. In the USA, they called for the end of war in Vietnam, in France

2 Darko Štrajn, “Nekoč je bilo študentsko gibanje?,” in: *Pričevanja, December 1985: študentske pomladi*, eds. Iztok Ilich et al. (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1986), 183, 184.

they fought against the authoritarian De Gaulle regime, in the “real socialism” countries they aspired for greater democratisation against the state bureaucracy, whilst in Yugoslavia they demanded greater consistency of the socialist self-management system.

The student movement – given the lack of any formal connectedness (organisational or substantive) between the students’ activities in various countries – were largely political. The causes were in the first place social and the movements were a response of students to the current social conflicts. They emerged as a critical “conscience” of economic and social relations and the contradictions in the society. They had ideological roots in Marxism and had a character of a “new leftist” movement. This was the case in western as well as eastern student movements. In Yugoslavia, students advocated socialism, but they wanted to make it better, more humane. What was common to all student movements was their anti-war, pacifist orientation enshrined in a slogan “Make love, not war”. Their political goals were aimed at changing the society towards greater democratisation and humanisation. Students wanted to save the world and change the social conditions. They were agitated by the social relations that were established by developing capitalism and contributed to increasing social disparities. Capital and consumerism brought the working classes to apathy, and the students considered themselves the chosen ones to draw attention to social problems. They wanted not only to explain the world, but to change it. Their intention was to “revolutionise the every day life”. Above all, the student movements were aimed at establishing students as a political subject of a society.

The student movement marked a certain historical period and was aimed at solving not only the problems of that period and but also more long-term ones. All student actions had a common purpose – social “purification”. As a consequence of the increasing social disparities in the capitalist world, and also in Yugoslavia, the students in the developed countries of the West expressed their demands for greater social justice. In the Eastern European countries of the Soviet political reality, however, the demands for political changes or at least political “loosening” were in the forefront.

Common to all students’ political activities in the late 1960s was the question against whom and against what their activities were oriented, what were their motives and reasons for action. They also shared their eruptive character, dynamism, radical views and goals. Each movement emerged from its own environment, from the critical attitude towards it, from the criticism of university system and the demands for reforms of the study process. At this stage, they wanted to become a subject or better, a partner in the reform of the university and study. This “mobilisation” phase was followed by a phase that went beyond the university and student problems, questioning wider social issues. The student movement turned into a political movement, and students wanted to become an important social subject capable of changing the world. They saw themselves as the essence of social change, as a substitute for the former revolutionary workers’ movement.

There were similarities and also great differences between student movements in the world, in Europe and even in Yugoslavia, where it evolved differently in various

university centres. It was the same and very different at the same time. Students were solving global problems on a local scale, as the movements in individual countries, including Yugoslavia, stemmed from diverse political, economic and social conditions. The methods of showing disapproval with the situation at universities and in the society were more or less the same everywhere, but the demands and goals varied. The student movement in Yugoslavia and Slovenia differed from that in the Western and Eastern Europe, as it did not reject the existing political system. It supported and approved it, but demanded greater consistency in its implementing. It supported the self-management socialism and considered it the best possible political system.

The student movement in Yugoslavia and Slovenia arose from the social and political reality of the 1960s. The outbreak in 1968 coincided with political, economic and social conditions emerging from the crisis of economic reform. The problems typical for a consumer society, to which Yugoslavia was entering at that time, came out, such as increasing social disparities, increasing wealth of selected individuals, difficulties in finding employment, looking for work abroad. In the political arena, this was a period of conflict between those in favour of greater centralisation and those in favour of de-centralisation and greater role of national entities – republics, and liberalisation of political and economic relations. The reform in the mid-1960s was meant to provide the economy a great momentum, but had many social consequences, i.e. consumerism, individuals gaining wealth usually in suspicious ways, social differentiation; all of these affected also students. In their public appearances in 1968, they clearly condemned these deviations and required “corrections”. They wanted to establish an ideal system.

* * *

The student movement in Europe is closely connected with the year 1968. Not only in European but also in the Yugoslav history, this year has a special significance. It was a turning point in many aspects. There were a number of events which shook the Yugoslav political reality, in particular the Yugoslav political leaders, who had to start searching for different solutions to the pressing problems. The student demonstrations in Belgrade in early June 1968 caused the first serious political uproar. “The Prague Spring” – an attempt of the new leadership to bring more democracy to the social system was also felt in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav political leaders approved of the events in the Czechoslovakia and during his visit to Moscow in April 1968, Tito tried to dissuade his counterpart Brežnjev from interfering in the Czechoslovak internal affairs. When Brežnjev decided for an armed “defence” of socialism and sent the armed forces of five Warsaw Pact countries to Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, the Yugoslav party leadership condemned the intervention and believed it was in fact a demonstration of power to Yugoslavia.³

3 Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992: nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevičeve in Titove Jugoslavije* (Koper: Lipa, 1995), 276.

In 1968, Slovenia and Yugoslavia entered the phase of “core liberalism”.⁴ The “party liberalism”, which was supposed to change the manner of operation within the party and also within the state and its system,⁵ marked the politics in the following years, up to its ending in 1972. The emergence and the end of the student movement and the “party liberalism” thus roughly coincided. Like “liberalism”, also student movement was swept away by the storm of “pseudo-revolution”, which after 1972 spread all over the Yugoslav society and was manifested in the overall “proletarization”.

It is difficult to decide where to place the student movement in the political struggle between the “liberal” and the “conservative” political poles. Their demands for greater efficiency of the socialist self-management political system were close to the “conservative” beliefs. “Conservatives” controlled the leadership of the party (the Union of Communists of Slovenia), whereas the party “liberals” were concentrated in the government. Although students chose the state authority as their main “adversary”, they were also very critical to the rigid party leadership. They were aware that it was the party that was behind the government and that it was not ready to change. Students supported the socialist self-management system, but they required the changes that would make it more efficient, democratic and humane.⁶

The student movement in Ljubljana was thus on the one side an expression of anti-capitalist views, and on the other side a criticism of communist power in Yugoslavia. Students in fact fought for communism against “communism”.

* * *

Most student protests in the world sparked off in 1968. Everywhere they happened suddenly and spontaneously. The reasons behind them varied. Although usually the eventual reason for a student revolt was rather banal, marginal, the real causes became clearer later. The problems which at first seemed marginal turned to be crucial. Although it all started in Germany at the beginning of the year, Paris soon became the epicentre of the student unrest in Europe, witnessing heavy student protests. Barricades were erected. Students were supported by workers’ general strike, which caused a chaos in France and put at risk the authority of General De Gaulle. Student protests started also in the Eastern European countries and in Yugoslavia. They were not mere imitations of protests in the capitalist countries, because they had different reasons and demands. In Prague, student protests were sparked off by poor living conditions, but soon also demands for democratisation were expressed, thus supporting

4 Božo Repe, “*Liberalizem*” v Sloveniji (Ljubljana: RO ZZB NOV Slovenije, 1992), 67.

5 The “liberals” wanted to change the manner of governing, but not the political system: socialism and self-management. They advocated the “correction” of the Yugoslav socialism, in particular in the economy; as for the political relations, they emphasised the need for rearranging the relations in the federative state, notably between the “centre” and the republics.

6 See “programme” of May 1970, *Tribuna*, Nov. 1970. “Revolucioniranje družbe in univerze,” in: Ciril Baškovič et al., *Študentsko gibanje: 1968–72* (Ljubljana: Republiška konferenca ZSMS, Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, 1982), 77–80.

the views of the “Prague Spring”. In Poland, the authorities set the workers against the students.

In Belgrade, the student unrests started in early June 1968. The reason was truly banal: they could not agree who would occupy more seats to watch some show, students or brigadiers. After the fight broke out, the police intervened with force. This led to a student uprising. Students were exasperated at the brutality and relentlessness of the police, who prevented them to march from the campus to the city centre. At first, students had no programme or specific goals. These were only formulated after the fight with the police, as police represented the authorities. They formulated their political and social demands and addressed them to the authorities. They protested against the inconsistencies of the Yugoslav society, but mostly from the perspective of the situation in Serbia and Belgrade. They called for more consistency in functioning of the socialist self-management system, for less social inequalities, in short, they demanded a better socialism. A few days after the protests, the president of the state and the party Tito commented it on the TV.⁷ In principle, he supported the students and this was the sole example in the world that the president of the state and the governing party supported the demands of the students. He also said that if he was not capable of solving the problems expressed by the students, he could no longer stay on his present position. On the other hand, he was also a little insulted, as given the scope of these protests Yugoslavia lost the status of being a non-conflict state.⁸

Also in Slovenia (in Ljubljana, at that time the only Slovene university) the student movement as a political subject emerged for the first time in 1968. On 6 June 1968 students organised a protest meeting in the student campus, because the management of the campus decided to let student rooms to tourists during the summer, which is why students had to vacate them. At the same time, the management also announced to raise the prices of rents. This led to the beginning of organised students' movement at the Ljubljana University. Although these reasons seem banal, there were in fact deeper motives behind them, with a social connotation. The students expressed social demands, such as “Also students from poor families should study, not only those from wealthy families”. They demanded greater role of students in managing the university, and they also reacted to the pressing social issues, such as gaining of wealth in dishonest ways, experts leaving the country to work abroad.⁹ One of the positions of the students was: “We want to use our knowledge at home”.¹⁰ Around 3000 students participated in the protests, and even representatives of Slovene government. The government expressed its readiness to listen to the students. It obviously feared the

7 Baškovič et. al., *Študentsko gibanje 68–72*, 36. It is a collection of 227 documents, notably articles published in the student magazine *Tribuna* in the period 1968–1972.

8 SI AS 1589, *Stenografske beleške sa IX. zajedničke sednice Predsedništva in Izvršnog komitete CK SKJ*, održane 9. VI. 1968, 77.

9 Students largely opposed to the experts leaving the country to work abroad – the “gastarbajterstvo”, which was very common in Yugoslavia after the economic reform in 1965. State employment services arranged the work abroad. In the period 1964–1969, 62,347 persons went to work to the Western-European countries through the state employment offices.

10 Baškovič et. al., *Študentsko gibanje 68–72*, 18, 19.

protests to get out of control. Despite the concurrence of the protests in Ljubljana and Belgrade, there was no connection between the two. The demands were nevertheless similar, e.g. unfair gaining of wealth. Student in Ljubljana only found out about the protests in Belgrade through private channels, i.e. letters from their friends in Belgrade.

Also the student movement in Slovenia went through different phases, from the “trade unionist” demands stemming from worsening of students’ material conditions to political demands. The political demands of students did, however, not go beyond the critical attitude to social discrimination and requests for social justice. In the following years however, the movement at the Ljubljana University became more radical and also political. It turned into a true student movement in terms of their demands and methods of work. This could largely be attributed to the students of social sciences, who by then took over the initiative of the student movement.

In 1969 and 1970, the student movement in Ljubljana focused their criticism to the foreign policy area and since 1970, they decisively intervened also in political questions, in particular those with the international dimension.

The foreign policy situation revived the students’ activities in Ljubljana. It was one of the main reasons for activation and radicalisation of student movement in Ljubljana. It all started on 14 May 1970, when a mass protest was organised against the USA military interventions in Cambodia.¹¹ The protest took place in the student campus, but the students also marched through the city centre burning American and Soviet flags, which hung out all around the town because of the world basketball championship. They called out slogans such as “Let’s exterminate Pentagon”, “To Vietnam with Coca-Cola”, “Vietnam – Czechoslovakia”, “Yankee go home”, “Peace-Freedom”, etc.¹² They protested against the visit of the American President Nixon to Yugoslavia and against Yugoslavia’s too friendly relationship with the Greek military regime.¹³ They were in general very critical to the Yugoslav foreign policy, to individual countries and leaders. In their letters to the Foreign Ministry, they demanded the Yugoslav government to break the contacts with non-democratic regimes in the world. Students reacted against all forms of fascism in the world by criticising the attitude of the Yugoslav authorities towards these phenomena. The Ljubljana student movement was in general – like other movements worldwide – a pacifist one.

Students in Ljubljana paid particular attention to the problems of Slovene minority in Austria and Italy.¹⁴ As a result of the fascist actions in Trieste and the Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro claiming Italy’s rights to the former zone B, they organised a protest on 12 December 1970, assembling 8000 people, among whom also the inhabitants of Ljubljana. They called it a national and not a political protest meeting, a “spontaneous political move aiming at the plebiscite unity of Slovene students, youth and other citizens.”¹⁵ In their letters to Tito, Foreign Ministry, and Yugoslav Assembly,

11 Ibid., 83–88

12 Ibid., 86.

13 Ibid., 83, 84.

14 Ibid., 111–20.

15 Ibid., 116, 117.

they addressed their demands for a different Yugoslav policy towards Slovenes in the neighbouring countries.

In the autumn 1970, the “international« issues were replaced by domestic ones. The student movement in Ljubljana became engaged also in the internal policy. They organised a literary marathon and a “teach inn” at the Faculty of Arts. Arresting and convicting one of the student leaders at the Belgrade University was the motive for their political engagement. The intellectual “elite” from the Faculty of Arts took over the leadership of the student movement.

The Ljubljana student movement obtained a political dimension and became massive in the spring 1971.

In April 1971, the students in Ljubljana moved from the “forum” work to the streets. Students went public and their demands to the authorities went beyond the merely student questions. Student activists understood this as a form of “direct democracy”. Student movement became a part of the town, a part of the urban environment as the student protests moved to the very centre of Ljubljana.

It started with the protest meeting on 14 April 1971, when students assembled on the road which passed along the Faculty of Arts, some other faculties and a high school. With this meeting, around 2000 students wanted to draw the attention of the government and the public to unbearable study conditions. The reason was in fact “ecological”. The road passing the faculties was in fact the main transit line for heavy trucks travelling from the West to the East of Europe. Because of the impossible conditions for study (noise and trembling of the houses), students demanded the heavy traffic to be moved out of the city centre. However, at the initiative of more radical student functionaries, this peaceful one-hour meeting turned into a spontaneous march to the city centre, where it was stopped by a cordon of helmeted police. The demonstrations ended quietly after three hours, although some calls were heard for a combat with the police. A poet Milan Jesih was even charged before court for “agitating for revolt and physical violence”, when he – under the influence of alcohol – metaphorically called for a more radical student action saying: “Too bad we didn’t make the barricades, put our snipers behind them and let them shoot the police straight between their eyes”. This was the first court proceeding of the authorities against students. It was followed by two more, which resulted in the radicalisation of the student movement. It became a fight against the repression of the state for expressing political opinion and demanding a more efficient state, which the authorities understood as criticism and opposition.

In late April, there was another hustling between the students and the police, when a group of fifty students protested against the visit of the president of the French Government Chaban-Delmas to Ljubljana; they were expressing support to the French left-wing movement by shouting “Vive le mai 68”, “Vive l’idée du mai 68”, “Long live the Paris Commune” (it was the 100 anniversary of the Paris Commune), “Down with bourgeoisie” and similar¹⁶ and they sang the Internationale. These demonstrations were stopped by the police.

.....
16 Ibid., 145.

The interventions of the police and the National Security Service and the court proceedings that followed provoked a conflict between the students and the state authorities. The repressive measures against the students led to the climax of student movement in Ljubljana, when students occupied for eight days the premises of the Faculty of Arts. The authorities' assessment was that the student movement could eventually become so radical that it would turn to violence. They understood the parols that hung out on the walls of the Faculty of Arts saying: "Students, it is time for a guerrilla, let us resist authoritarianism, and the rise of capitalism!" as a call for action against the authorities as well as an insult to the political system. What the author of the text had in mind was students' unconventional action; he expressed an opposition to the inflow of foreign capital to the Yugoslav economy in a "leftist" manner, because it was supposed to deny socialism and the self-management system. The police confiscated the poster and initiated criminal proceedings against the author; it also prohibited the public tribune where students wanted to raise the questions of noise, pollution and destruction of the nature as a sign of "hypocritical politics of the society ruled by alienation"¹⁷; as a consequence, also the student leadership reacted. They demanded that the police dismissed all criminal charges against the students. When receiving no answer from the court with regard to the criminal proceedings against the three students charged with attempts of a violent overturn of the social and state system, physical revolt and hostile propaganda, they decided for the occupation of the Faculty of Arts. On May 1971, students occupied the faculty and turned it into the "working colony". They organised debates, lectures, roundtables. Every morning they raised a red flag on the faculty roof singing the International. Professors and the faculty leadership supported them, as did the students from other faculties. Also the university organisation of the Union of Communists agreed with them, finding out that it was "the best school of self-management democracy and of self-raising the revolutionary awareness" and that "the development of the student movement was basically a very positive process, which is a constituent part of the democratisation of the society", because "the essential characteristic of the ideological and political thinking of the students was their desire to achieve a better, more humane socialism very quickly, over the night."¹⁸

Apart from the demands which provoked the occupation of the faculty, students also called for an improvement of the situation in the society, for general democratisation, for more clarity in economic and political decisions, etc.¹⁹ Therefore, the student movement understood the occupation of the faculty as a protest against the authorities' reaction to "certain forms of student movement", which in their opinion betrayed the basic "self-management principles of our society".²⁰ In the opinion of students, the reasons for such a reaction lied in the social relations, inefficient economic policy, social disparities (students warned against the "red bourgeoisie"), poor social position

17 Iztok Ilich, "Naša pomlad 1971," in: *Pričevanja, december 1985: študentske pomladi*, 88.

18 Baškovič et. al., *Študentsko gibanje 68–72*, 210, 303.

19 Ibid., 170.

20 Ibid., 201.

of the university and intellectuals in the society, as well as in “insufficient activity of the Union of Communists”.²¹ They saw the occupation as a means of amending the political and economic system and not as a means of change. “The society is free only if it dares to face the truth,” was the position of the student movement. In the occupation, they saw “a protest against everything that enslaves and takes away freedom, against alienation; it is a manifestation of our freedom and serious distress”. They wrote in the Manifest of the occupied Faculty of Arts: “By fighting for freedom of thought and freedom of science, we do not fight for power”. They called for more radical self-management, for its realisation, as this was the goal of all reforms. The student movement supported socialism, but required better relations in the society. It was enshrined in the slogan “for communism against ‘communism’”, and in “Our movement is a fight for socialism.”²² They justified their action by the fact that “nobody and nothing except our own conscious action could assure us socialism”. They believed that the party – the Union of Communists – should “become the conscience of the society” and has to “preserve its guerrilla character in its relation to institutions”. It was in fact an appeal for the “party” to withdraw from the state authority, from “the Stalinist concept of the party”.²³

The occupation ended after eight days. There was no special reaction to it from the authority. Media did not report much about it, which disturbed the students. The main newspaper “Delo” even tried to discredit them with an article about student demonstrations on the occasion of the visit of Chaban-Delmas, by saying that students called him a fascist. They believed the article caused them political damage and required a corrigendum. In the protests against the manipulations of the media, there are some similarities with the events in Berlin in 1968, when students fought against the Springer press.

The student movement in Ljubljana as a critical political factor thus culminated with the occupation of the Faculty of Arts. After this act, the mass activity of the movement waned. By many supporters leaving, it eventually broke up. Only the hard-line activist leaders with the most radical views remained active. They expressed their views in the magazine *Tribuna*, which was often confiscated. A group of students which also took part in the occupation of the Faculty of Arts tried to organise a left-wing “student party”, which was to preserve ‘the revolutionary air’ of the spring 1971. But still, the student movement was on the decline.

In the memories of student leaders, their activities of 1971 got mythical dimensions. They were convinced that their mission was to open the eyes of the people and the authorities. They aspired for being the representatives of the society who wanted a change. But criticism was also heard that “despite their pretentious words, they were just at the beginning, their actions were improvised, insufficient and superficial, only a little or even nothing was in fact achieved and their declarative equalisation with

21 *Ibid.*, 206. (5.5.5)

22 *Ibid.*, 167, 204.

23 *Ibid.*, 202, 203.

proletariat was in fact only a “masturbating” pretentiousness”.²⁴ One of the more radical student leaders said soon after the climax of the student movement: “My first impression is that we exaggerated. We exaggerated about the significance of our actions. We thought we were so important, but we were only nagging students whom only a few listened and almost none took seriously”.²⁵

* * *

The public opinion poll conducted in 1969 revealed how the public saw the student movements. It was made only a year after the student demonstrations stirred Europe and Yugoslavia in 1968. According to the poll, people considered social issues to be the main reasons for student protests in Slovenia, i.e. poor employment opportunities, low value of the work of experts and their leaving for work abroad, poor material conditions of students and limited opportunities for study: the problem of scholarships. More than a half of the surveyed people were favourably inclined to student protests. Only a small proportion (from 4 to 10%) considered student protests an expression of political problems; they believed students protested against the inconsistency of politics, discrepancy between the promises, declarations and practice, little opportunities for self-management at the university and inability of students to have any say within the university system, as well as a protest against bureaucracy and non-democratic actions of the authorities. A part of the public considered student protests only a replication of protests abroad, thus denying the students being a political subject. There was also a “hostile” position to students, saying that they were doing too well, that they did not know what they wanted, that the society and authorities were too generous to them and that they exploited democracy. Some said that it was not a student movement at all but only an activity of some eccentric individuals. The Slovene public considered protests more as a unique student action than an activity which was thought to awake also other layers of the population. The public opinion did not acknowledge student movement the role of a critical voice against the basic contradictions in the society.²⁶ In 1971, when students wanted to “revolutionise” the society, the public opinion was not explored, but it most likely remained basically the same: reserved and “conservative”.

The student movement in Ljubljana and elsewhere in the late 1960s and early 1970s could be described as diverse and interesting. If judged by the mark it left on the history, it could also be described as being “much ado about nothing”. It is above all a nice memory of its creators on their youth and ideals of that time.

²⁴ Ibid, 222. Mladen Dolar, “Prove yourself alive,” *Tribuna*, No. 1, 10. 10. 1971, 4.

²⁵ Ilich, “Naša pomlad 1971,” 179 (Jaša Zlobec).

²⁶ Peter Klinar, “Vzroki študentskih nemirov in protestov,” *Teorija in praksa: revija za družbena vprašanja* 8, No. 3 (1971): 386, 395.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- SI AS, Arhiv Republike Slovenije:
 - AS 1589, Štenografske beleške sa IX. zajedničke sednice Predsedništva in Izvršnog komitete CK SKJ, održane 9. VI. 1968, 77.

Literature:

- “Revolucioniranje družbe in universe.” In: Baškovič, Ciril, Pavle Gantar, Marjan Pungartnik and Pavle Zgaga. *Študentsko gibanje: 1968–72*. Ljubljana: Republiška konferenca ZSMS, Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, 1982.
- Ilich, Iztok. “Naša pomlad 1971.” In: *Pričevanja, december 1985: študentske pomladi*, edited by Iztok Ilich, Darko Štrajn, and Jaša L. Zlobec. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1986.
- Klinar, Peter. “Vzroki študentskih nemirov in protestov.” *Teorija in praksa: revija za družbena vprašanja* 8, No. 3 (1971): 381–96.
- Pirjevec, Jože. *Jugoslavija 1918-1992: nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadžordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije*. Koper: Lipa, 1995.
- Repe, Božo. “*Liberalizem*” v Sloveniji. Ljubljana: RO ZZB NOV Slovenije, 1992.
- Štrajn, Darko. “Nekoč je bilo študentsko gibanje?.” In: *Pričevanja, december 1985: študentske pomladi*, edited by Iztok Ilich, Darko Štrajn, Jaša L. Zlobec. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1986.
- *Tribuna*. “Prove yourself alive.” October 10, 1971.

Printed Sources:

- Baškovič, Ciril, Pavle Gantar, Marjan Pungartnik and Pavle Zgaga. *Študentsko gibanje: 1968-72*. Ljubljana: Republiška konferenca ZSMS, Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, 1982.

Zdenko Čepič

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT 1968/1971 IN LJUBLJANA IN WIDER CONTEXT

SUMMARY

Mass student movements were a characteristic of the late 1960s throughout the world. In Yugoslavia and in Slovenia, too. The student movement in Europe is closely connected with the year 1968. Not only in European but also in the Yugoslav history, this year has a special significance. The student movement is »a specific phenomenon of a relatively mass protest on the world scale. We can speak of the student movement as a historical phenomenon in particular in the late 1960s, when it was an organised

political activity of students aimed at achieving certain political goals. The student movements – given the lack of any formal connectedness (organisational or substantive) between the students' activities in various countries – were largely political. They emerged as a critical “conscience” of economic and social relations and the contradictions in the society. They had ideological roots in Marxism and had a character of a “new leftist” movement. Common to all students' political activities in the late 1960s was the question against whom and against what their activities were oriented, what were their motives and reasons for action. There were similarities and also great differences between student movements in the world, in Europe and even in Yugoslavia, where it evolved differently in various university centres. It was the same and very different at the same time. The student movement in Yugoslavia and Slovenia arose from the social and political reality of the 1960s. In Yugoslavia, students advocated socialism, but they wanted to make it better, more humane. Students supported the socialist self-management system, but they required the changes that would make it more efficient, democratic and humane.

The student demonstrations in Belgrade in early June 1968 caused the first serious political uproar. The reason was truly banal: they could not agree who would occupy more seats to watch some show, students or brigadiers. After the fight broke out, the police intervened with force. This led to a student uprising. At first, students had no programme or specific goals. These were only formulated after the fight with the police. Also in Slovenia, in Ljubljana (at that time the only Slovene university) the student movement as a political subject emerged for the first time in 1968. On 6 June 1968 students organised a protest meeting in the student campus, because the management of the campus decided to let student rooms to tourists during the summer, which is why students had to vacate them. At the same time, the management also announced to raise the prices of rents. This led to the beginning of organised students' movement at the Ljubljana University. Although these reasons seem banal, there were in fact deeper motives behind them, with a social connotation. Also the student movement in Slovenia went through different phases, from the “trade unionist” demands stemming from worsening of students' material conditions to political demands. In the following years however, the movement at the Ljubljana University became more radical and also political. It turned into a true student movement in terms of their demands and methods of work. In 1969 and 1970, the student movement in Ljubljana focused their criticism to the foreign policy area and since 1970, they decisively intervened also in political questions, in particular those with the international dimension (Vietnam War, Cambodia, Greek military regime, problems of Slovene minority in Austria and Italy). In the autumn 1970, the »international« issues were replaced by domestic ones. The student movement in Ljubljana became engaged also in the internal policy. The Ljubljana student movement obtained a political dimension and became massive in the spring 1971. The student movement in Ljubljana was thus on the one side an expression of anti-capitalist views, and on the other side a criticism of communist power in Yugoslavia. Students in fact fought for communism against “communism”.

In April 1971, the students in Ljubljana moved from the “forum” work to the streets. It started with the protest meeting on 14 April 1971, when students assembled on the road which passed along the Faculty of Arts; around 2000 students wanted to draw the attention of the government and the public to unbearable study conditions. The reason was in fact “ecological”. Road passing the faculties was in fact the main transit line for heavy trucks travelling from the West to the East of Europe. This peaceful one-hour meeting turned into a spontaneous march to the city centre, where it was stopped by a cordon of helmeted police. The demonstrations ended quietly after three hours. The repressive measures against the students led to the climax of student movement in Ljubljana, when students occupied for eight days the premises of the Faculty of Arts. The authorities’ assessment was that the student movement could eventually become so radical that it would turn to violence. On May 1971, students occupied the faculty and turned it into the “working colony”. They organised debates, lectures, roundtables. Every morning they raised a red flag on the faculty roof singing the International. Professors and the faculty leadership supported them, as did the students from other faculties. Apart from the demands which provoked the occupation of the faculty, students also called for an improvement of the situation in the society, for general democratisation, for more clarity in economic and political decisions, etc. The student movement supported socialism, but required better relations in the society. The occupation ended after eight days. There was no special reaction to it from the authority. The student movement in Ljubljana as a critical political factor thus culminated with the occupation of the Faculty of Arts. After this act, the mass activity of the movement waned.

Zdenko Čepič

ŠTUDENTSKO GIBANJE V LJUBLJANI 1968/1971 V ŠIRŠEM KONTEKSTU

POVZETEK

Študentsko gibanje je specifični fenomen svetovnega značaja. O študentskem gibanju kot zgodovinskem pojavu je moč govoriti zlasti ob koncu šestdesetih let 20. stoletja, ko je šlo za organizirano politično dejavnost študentov po vsem svetu, ki so želeli doseči določene politične cilje. Študentsko gibanje je bilo predvsem politično usmerjeno, čeprav ni imelo neke formalne organizacijske niti vsebinske povezave med študenti in njihovo dejavnostjo v posameznih državah. Nastalo je kot kritična »vest« ekonomskih in iz njih izhajajočih socialnih razmerij in protislovij takratne družbe v različnih državah. Ideološko se je naslanjalo na marksizem in je imelo značaj t. i. novo-levičarstva. V Jugoslaviji so poudarjeno zagovarjali socializem in ga želeli napraviti

boljšega, bolj človeškega. Skupna točka politične dejavnosti študentov ob koncu šestdesetih let je bilo vprašanje, proti komu in proti čemu je bila usmerjena ta dejavnost, kakšni so bili vzroki in kakšni povodi. Med študentskim gibanjem po svetu, v Evropi in v Jugoslaviji, kjer se je po različnih univerzitetnih središčih razvijalo različno, so obstajale nekatere podobnosti, pa tudi velike razlike. Bilo je enako in hkrati zelo različno. Študentsko gibanje v Jugoslaviji in v Sloveniji je izhajalo iz družbenih in političnih razmer, ki so opredeljevale jugoslovansko državo v šestdesetih letih.

Študentsko gibanje v Evropi je ozko povezano z letom 1968. To leto ima v evropski in tudi v jugoslovanski zgodovini posebno mesto in pomen. Bilo je v mnogočem prelomno leto. Študentske demonstracije v Beogradu v začetku junija so povzročile v Jugoslaviji v letu 1968 prvi resni politični pretres. Študenti so bili sicer za politični sistem socialističnega samoupravljanja, vendar so zahtevali spremembe, ki bi le-tega napravil bolj učinkovitega, bolj demokratičnega in bolj humanega. Delovanje študentskega gibanja v Ljubljani je bilo na eni strani izraz protikapitalističnega pogleda študentov, na drugi pa kritika komunističnih oblasti v Jugoslaviji. Borili so se za komunizem proti »komunizmu«.

Po svetu (večinoma v Evropi) so študentski protesti večinoma izbruhnili v letu 1968. V Beogradu v začetku junija 1968. Tam so izbruhnili zaradi resnično banalnega povoda: kdo bo zasedel več mest v dvorani na neki zabavni prireditvi, ali študenti ali brigadirji. Po prerivanju in pretepu med njimi je s silo nastopila policija. Njen nastop je povzročil študentske nemire. V Sloveniji (na ljubljanski, tedaj še edini slovenski univerzi) je študentsko gibanje kot politični subjekt tudi nastopilo v letu 1968. V študentskem naselju so študenti 6. junija 1968 pripravili zborovanje, ker je vodstvo študentskih domov sklenilo čez poletje oddati študentske sobe turistom, zato naj bi jih študentje izpraznili. Hkrati pa so napovedali podražitev najemnin za posteljo v študentskem naselju. To oboje je sprožilo začetek organiziranega študentskega gibanja na ljubljanski univerzi. Povod zanj je bil na videz banalen, vzroki pa so bili globlji in so bili socialno obarvani.

Za študentsko gibanje v Sloveniji so tako tudi značilne stopnje razvoja, od »sindikalističnih« zahtev (imenovane tudi »menzaške« zahteve), ki so izhajale iz slabšanja materialnih pogojev študentov, do politizacije. V naslednjih letih se je študentsko gibanje na ljubljanski univerzi radikaliziralo in je postalo bolj politično. Postalo je pravo študentsko gibanje, ki se je kazalo kot tako po vsebini in načinih delovanja. Študentsko gibanje v Ljubljani se je v letu 1969 in 1970 kritično usmerilo v zunanjepolitično dogajanje. Od spomladi 1970 so študentje bolj odločno posegli v politična dogajanja, zlasti tista, povezana z mednarodnim dogajanjem (vojna v Vietnamu, vojna v Kambodži, proti grški vojaški hunti, problemi slovenske manjšine v Avstriji in v Italiji). Jeseni 1970 je »internacionalno« problematiko začela zamenjavati domača. Študentsko gibanje v Ljubljani se je začelo ukvarjati tudi z notranjo politiko. Zares pa je politično vsebino in množičnost dobilo ljubljansko študentsko gibanje spomladi 1971, ko je doseglo vrhunec svojega poslanstva. Aprila 1971 je študentsko gibanje v Ljubljani prešlo iz »forumskega« dela na ulico. Začelo se je s protestnim shodom 14. aprila 1971 na

cesti, ob kateri je Filozofska fakulteta in še nekaj drugih fakultet ter srednja šola. S tem protestnim shodom, ki se ga je udeležilo nad 2000 študentov, so želeli opozoriti oblasti in javnost na slabe študijske pogoje. Vzrok je bil »ekološki«. Po tej cesti, ki je dejansko v centru mesta, je potekal tranzitni promet težkih tovornjakov iz Zahoda na Vzhod Evrope. Študenti so zaradi nemogočih razmer za študij (hrup in tresenje hiš) zahtevali preusmeritev prometa ven iz mestnega središča. Sicer miren enourni protestni shod se je na poziv bolj 'radikalnih' študentskih funkcionarjev spremenil v spontan pohod proti mestnemu centru, kjer jih je pričakal kordon policije v čeladah. Zborovanje je preraslo v demonstracijo, ki se je po treh urah mirno končala, čeprav je bilo slišati tudi pozive k spopadu s policijo. Konflikt med študentskim gibanjem in državnimi oblastmi pa so sprožili posegi policije oziroma Službe državne varnosti in sodni postopki proti študentom, ki so izražali svoje mnenje. Oblasti so namreč ocenile, da želi študentsko gibanje svoje delovanje radikalizirati do te mere, da bo začelo nastopati s silo. Povod za vrhunec dejavnosti študentskega gibanja v Ljubljani, ko so študenti za osem dni zasedli Filozofsko fakulteto, so bili represivni ukrepi proti študentom. 26. maja 1971 so študentje zasedli fakulteto in jo spremenili v »delovni kolonijo«. Organizirali so pogovore, predavanja, okrogle mize. Vsako jutro so ob petju Internacionale na strehi fakultete dvignili rdečo zastavo. Podprli so jih profesorji, vodstvo univerze, z njimi so solidarizirali tudi študentje drugih fakultet. Študentske zahteve, poleg tistih, ki so bile povod za zasedbo fakultete, so zadevale urejanje razmer v državi in družbi (obča demokratizacija), več jasnosti pri gospodarskih in političnih odločitvah ipd. Študentsko gibanje je bilo namreč socialistično naravnano, želeli pa so bolj urejene odnose v družbi. Zasedba se je končala po osmih dneh. Neke posebne reakcije proti študentom s strani oblasti ni bilo. Z zasedbo Filozofske fakultete je študentsko gibanje v Ljubljani kot kritični politični dejavnik doseglo svojo najvišjo točko. Po koncu zasedbe Filozofske fakultete pa se je aktivnost študentskega gibanja, ki je bilo ob manifestacijah, demonstracijah in drugih množičnih prireditvah množično, nehala. Doživelo je hiter osip in razpad.

Željko Oset*

Maks Samec and His Adapting to Academic Standards After World War II

IZVLEČEK

MAKS SAMEC IN NJEGOVO PRILAGAJANJE AKADEMSKIM STANDARDOM PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI

Prispevek obravnava akademsko kariero Maksa Samca (1881–1964) po drugi svetovni vojni. Čeprav je Samec po »čistki« na Univerzi v Ljubljani avgusta 1945 izgubil habilitacijo, so mu kot nenadomestljivemu znanstveniku ponudili drugo priložnost – postal je ustanovitelj novoustanovljenega Kemijskega inštituta pri Slovenski akademiji znanosti in umetnosti (SAZU). Za svoje delo si je prislužil številna priznanja in državna odlikovanja. Na inštitutu si je prizadeval za uporabo svojih akademskih standardov, vendar pri tem ni bil povsem uspešen, kar je bila tudi posledica upravnih reform in sprememb v raziskovalni politiki v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja.

Ključne besede: Maks Samec, Inštitut za kemijo, akademska svoboda, Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, Univerza v Ljubljani

ABSTRACT

The paper at hand deals with the academic career of Maks Samec (1881–1964) after World War II. Samec lost his habilitation upon the “purge” at the University of Ljubljana in August of 1945, but was offered a second chance as an irreplaceable scientist – he became the founder of the newly established Institute of Chemistry at the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA). He has earned numerous recognitions and state decorations for

* Assistant Professor, PhD, School of Humanities of the University of Nova Gorica, Vipavska cesta 13, Nova Gorica, zeljko.oset@ung.si

his work. At the institute, he strived to apply his academic standards, but was not entirely successful, which was also a consequence of administrative reforms and changes to research policy in the 1950s.

Keywords: Maks Samec, Institute of Chemistry, academic freedom, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, University of Ljubljana

Transformation of Slovenian Academic Community After World War II

The academic community in Slovenia changed essentially after World War II, mainly due to a stronger state role and an altered status of science. The state assumed the role of society modernizer, and science – especially technical – was perceived as an important tool of modernization. Therefore, the new authority allocated more funds for science and the number of research positions rose, both in the frame of University of Ljubljana as well as SASA.¹ Proportionally to stronger state role, the autonomy of institutions decreased. Despite all the changes and reforms, senior scientists preserved their influence and advocated autonomy, becoming a disturbing element in the political authority's hold on scientific institutions. After completing their mission, i.e. the education of scientific offspring, a group of senior scientists was retired in the years from 1957 to 1959. These have contributed decisively in the institutionalization of Slovenian science, as well as set an example of scientific conduct that was not fully followed by younger scientists. A conflict between the senior and the ambitious younger scientists was deliberately constructed or at least instigated, where the younger scientists have as a rule enjoyed political support.²

By focusing on pure research before World War II, Slovenian scientists have contributed in the treasury of world knowledge, thus working for the good of humankind.³ After World War II, however, their focus was redirected towards the benefit of people's

1 Aleš Gabrič, "Znanstvena politika v Sloveniji po drugi svetovni vojni in vloga Antona Peterlina," in: *Anton Peterlin 1908 – 1993: življenje in delo*, eds. Vili Bukošek et al. (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Institut Jožef Stefan, 2008), 300–05. France Kidrič, "V novi Jugoslaviji," in: *Letopis Akademije znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani: druga knjiga: 1943–1947* (Ljubljana: Akademija znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani, 1947), 5–7. David Movrin, "The Anatomy of a Revolution: Classics at the University of Ljubljana after 1945," in: *Classics and Communism: Greek and Latin behind the Iron Curtain*, eds. György Karsai et al. (Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani; Budapest: Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study; Warsaw: The Faculty of 'Artes Liberales,' University of Warsaw, 2013.), 141–68.

2 Aleš Gabrič, "Reforma visokega šolstva 1954–1961 ali kako uničiti ljubljansko Univerzo," in: *Nova revija*, 1994, No. 149, 115–20. Željko Oset, *Zgodovina Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti: razvoj najvišje znanstvene in umetniške ustanove, 1945–1992* (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 2017), 57–83.

3 See also Florian Bieber and Harald Heppner, eds., *Universities and Elite Formation in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe* (Wien, Zürich, Münster: LIT, 2015), 1–10.

community and with the local participators.⁴ In the West, a rise in cooperation of research sphere with the industry has been also present, both in producing technology for dual (military, civil) or an entirely military purpose, but a commitment to fundamental research work and free choice of research questions is preserved.⁵ In Slovenia – at least in the building of two institutes: the SASA Institute of Physics/Jožef Stefan Institute and Institute of Chemistry Boris Kidrič – the authority “determined” a priority research field which it was ready to finance substantially, a novelty at the time.⁶

The new era was marked by getting used to scientists being more dependent on authority, new rules of decision-making, lesser autonomy in determining research questions, and limitations in collaboration abroad. Scientists had to accept their loss of status as opinion leaders who publicly and quite freely discussed socially important political issues. These were still discussed in private meetings and expert gatherings, but their views were not made public.⁷

Because of this, senior scientists criticized the authority’s measures in private parties, ridiculed the rulers, complained about the changes and warned about too small investments in science.⁸ But they were still proud of their reputation, so they wanted to remain perceived in Slovenian science as self-dependent, independent from authority.⁹ At the same time, they also wanted to preserve the influence in their research groups.¹⁰

Slovenian Academic Community’s Transformation as a Research Question

Problems of transforming the Slovenian academic community after World War II were discussed in the beginning of 1990s within the scope of an in-depth research of the takeover of power and its subsystems by the Communist Party after World War II. On one hand, researching was encouraged importantly through democratization and the related procedure of rectification of the wrongs committed during communism, especially in the early stage, and on the other hand, it is part of a broader researching

4 Prim. Gabrič, “Znanstvena politika,” 300–05.

5 John Krige, *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 30–39.

6 Gabrič, “Znanstvena politika,” 300–05. Željko Oset, “Kemični inštitut (Borisa Kidriča) v letih med 1946 in 1959,” in: *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*, eds. Branko Stanovnik et al. (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo, 2015), 183–88.

7 SIAS 1931, II, 26, 50279.

8 Ibid., 50248.

9 France Kidrič emphasized, in the elections of Josip Broz for honorary member in August 1948, that SASA had decided by its own inclination for the election, and that it is not a Party or Party-dependent institution. Similar warnings were given by the president France Kidrič in October 1949 before the elections of new members. It was then that the legal provision on the authority confirming an academician’s election was applied for the first time. The president warned that this must not arouse an appearance of SASA’s subordination in public, so SASA asked the Slovenian authority’s opinion on the candidates before the elections. – Oset, *Zgodovina Slovenske akademije*, 201–03.

10 SI AS 223, b. 498, Uradna zabeležka o odstopu dr. Franceta Avčina kot predsednika sveta Inštituta za elektriško gospodarstvo.

of the historical period upon setting the historical distance and using comparative approach, which, after entering European Union, is in part encouraged through EU priority research goals.

Important work was done by the commission of Slovenian historians that prepared, upon request by the Slovenian parliament, the Elaborate on key characteristics of Slovenian politics between 1929–1955 (*Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929–1955, znanstveno poročilo* – written only in Slovenian language), published in 1995. Its focal point is in reviewing the political development and lines of force, i.e. “breaking points that are crucial to understanding and explaining the reasons for the ‘schism’ in Slovenian society”.¹¹ The University of Ljubljana and the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts have subsequently founded their own commissions, wanting to research their history in the first years after the communist takeover of power. The goal was essentially a rectification of wrongs and rehabilitation of professors, collaborators and academicians who were wronged, while a more wholesome valorization of the historical period has established itself simultaneously.¹²

New researches, a new research approach and documentation of material collections have contributed to partial rectification of wrongs, a better understanding of the historical period, and a new scholarship has formed. Important consequence of the discussion is a profound interest in selected scientists, resulting in the recent period in a large number of monographs and articles on scientists and cultural workers who have importantly marked Slovenian science, but too little was known about them.¹³ Maks Samec, a chemist, university professor at University of Ljubljana and the manager of Institute of Chemistry Boris Kidrič, can be qualified among such scientists who have marked the institutionalization of Slovenian science.

Academic Career of Maks Samec Until 1945

Samec made a successful academic career before World War II (articles, books, patents), became the dean of Technical faculty twice and head of University of Ljubljana (1935–1937). However, the focus of his work was the university chemistry institute. He received numerous recognitions and decorations, was named a regular member of SASA, the Yugoslavian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Academy of Sciences Leopoldina.¹⁴ He was, in short, one of the most respected professors of the Ljubljana

11 Zdenko Čepič et al., *Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929–1955: znanstveno poročilo* (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 1995).

12 Aleš Gabrič and Peter Vodopivec, eds., *Politični pritiski in izključevanja učiteljev in sodelavcev z Univerze v Ljubljani: poročilo Komisije za rehabilitacijo univerzitetnih učiteljev in sodelavcev* (Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, 2000). France Bernik, “Iz zgodovine SAZU,” in: *Letopis Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti: 46. knjiga: 1995* (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 1996), 147–50. Oset, *Zgodovina Slovenske akademije*, 215, 216.

13 Bukošek et al., *Anton Peterlin 1908–1993*. Anton Suhadolc, *Profesor Rihard Zupančič* (Ljubljana: A. Suhadolc, 2011). Stanovnik et al., *Maks Samec (1881–1964)*. Alenka Puhar, *Izidor Cankar, Mojster dobro zasukanih stavkov: življenje in delo Izidorja Cankarja, 1886–1958* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2016).

14 Tatjana Peterlin Neumaier, “Življenjepis Maksa Samca,” in: Stanovnik et al., *Maks Samec (1881–1964)*, 39–51.

University, but obtained some powerful opponents when running for its head position in February 1935.¹⁵ Because of defending strict academic standards and insisting on an outdated code of behavior, as well as modest job opportunities for young graduates, he fell out of favor with some of his younger colleagues, among them such who would become decision-makers after World War II.¹⁶

Maks Samec kept good relations with German scientists, particularly during 1930s, when the results of his research on food persistence were published. Due to successful research, good acquaintanceships among scientists, as well as support of the German consul in Ljubljana, he was elected for the correspondent member of Academy of Sciences Leopoldina in 1940, and also received a high Third Reich national award (an order of the German Eagle, 1st grade). He was highly recommended for both German decorations by the German consul in Ljubljana, who wrote in February 1940 in a report to German embassy in Belgrade that Samec, through “his research work, conducted in close collaboration with the German scientists, is one of Germany’s best friends”. In lobbying for the state recognition, he even characterized Samec as “unserer Mensch an der Universität”. Therefore, it is no surprise that Samec received an offer in autumn of 1941 to move together with “volksdeutschers” from Ljubljana province to Germany. Samec did not decide for this step, but wanted to preserve good relations with the German authorities. He also declined the position of Mayor of Ljubljana, offered by the German occupying authorities.¹⁷

The Post-war Purge and Irreplaceable Experts

At the post-war purge at the Ljubljana University, he was detached, removing his habilitation, but received a pay and a liability on support of his research. Samec obtained the status of irreplaceable scientist who can contribute to the realization of planned measures of the new people’s power and educate an adequately qualified generation of younger experts.¹⁸

Removal of Maks Samec’s habilitation – and the wider purge at the Ljubljana University – achieved its goal of intimidating scientists who thus became aware of their dependence on the authority, especially in the breaking period. It is the period which Anton Peterlin characterized as the period of partisan freedom.¹⁹ In this time, obtaining support and protection from visible representatives of the new authority

15 Željko Oset, “Gradnja kemičnega inštituta Univerze kralja Aleksandra I.,” in Stanovnik et al., *Maks Samec (1881–1964)*, 138–40.

16 Peterlin Neumaier, “Življenjepis Maksa Samca,” 52, 53.

17 SI AS 1931, VIII, 5, 7680–7686.

18 Oset, “Kemični inštitut (Borisa Kidriča),” 183–86.

19 Archives of family Peterlin, Notes of Anton Peterlin; Library of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, R 46/III-138. David Movrin, Fran Bradač, Anton Sovre, Milan Grošelj, Jože Košar and Fran Petre, “Latinsčina in grščina na ljubljanski univerzi v prvem desetletju po vojni,” in: *Keria: studia Latina et Graeca* 15, No. 2 (2013): 147–79. Puhar, *Izidor Cankar*, 88–105.

was required for deciding on guerilla collecting of apparatuses in the field,²⁰ valorizing one's inter-war activity, or continuing a scientific career.²¹

In the summer of 1945, Samec experienced a feeling of isolation and endangerment; information circulated about his ejection to Austria as part of deportation of the German minority from Slovenia. His younger colleagues spread rumors about his favor for Germans, a strong Germany and his displaying of the German high state decoration during World War II. He was also accused of a life of comfort before and during the war, but acknowledged at the same time his scientific excellence. By gaining support of the president of Slovenian government, he was personally "protected", so his adversaries retaliated against his supporting members at the University's chemistry institute: doc. dr. Marta Blinc²² and prof. dr. Marius Rebek.²³

New Research Policy and Irreplaceable "Cadres"

The new Slovenian authority's research policy was vaguely defined – perhaps the most thoughtful was the field of human resources, but the authority had to consider the scarcity of Slovenian academic community and a somewhat modest influence of younger scientists who were ideologically in its favor. Due to this scarcity, a group of irreplaceable scientists was formed, among which we can undoubtedly place the founders of big natural institutes at SASA (Maks Samec: Institute of Chemistry/Boris Kidrič/; Milan Vidmar: Institute for electrical economy; Anton Kuhelj: Institute for turbine machines; Anton Peterlin: Institute of Physics/Institute Jožef Stefan). Their interests varied: some wanted to connect the research work with the pedagogy process at the university (Peterlin),²⁴ others to found their institute anywhere in Slovenia, if provided with sufficient state support (Vidmar, Kuhelj),²⁵ and Samec simply wanted to continue his research work after his habilitation was removed.²⁶

In the post-war period, it held good for Samec, in the words of Slovenian government's president Boris Kidrič, spoken at SASA's request for the employment of Jakob Šolar, "for pedagogical work, no, for scientific work, do make use of him"²⁷

His younger colleagues presented him as an ideological opponent, and his

20 Gabrič, "Znanstvena politika," 303–05.

21 Milan Vidmar, *Spomini. II.* (Maribor: Založba Obzorja, 1964), 238, 239.

22 Marta Blinc, seen as Samec's protegee and a personal friend, lost her habilitation in the purge, her assets were nationalized, and she as a German was exiled from Ljubljana to Austria. She was only allowed to return in autumn 1947, when SASA arranged for her return on Samec's demand. – SIAS 1931, Lm, 105, 208927.

23 Rebek was exiled from Yugoslavia together with his wife on the pretext that she, as a German, was a hostile element, even though they had both collaborated with partisans during the war. Rebek claimed in his letters to colleagues, and also to the president of government, that Samec was irreplaceable, even more so in the new times, when development of technical branches was planned. – Anton Peterlin, "O slovenskem kemiku dr. Mariusu Rebeku," in: *Ameriška domovina/American home* (Cleveland, Ohio), 25. 2. 1983.

24 Gabrič, "Znanstvena politika," 309.

25 Oset, "Zgodovina Slovenske akademije," 81–83.

26 Peterlin Neumaier, "Življenjepis Maksa Samca," 52–55.

27 Archives of SASA, Predsedstvo 1938–1952, folder 14, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (11. 10. 1952).

disorderly attendance in the people's-front-organs only hardened the suspicions. Of course, regular visiting of all people's-front-sessions would in no way essentially change his position. Later, as Samec was working intensely in the field of enriching coal, for entire days and also during weekends, his rare visits of people's-front-sessions were no longer paid particular attention. Even more, his absence was proof that he is devoted to solving an important research problem, the solution of which was expected much of by the authority.²⁸

Maks Samec was, first of all, a researcher-workaholic who wanted to "do" as much as possible. Yet he was constantly accompanied by a sense of lost time from his Vienna period and the period of Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, when he had to struggle to ensure appropriate working conditions.²⁹

Samec pointed out several times in 1945 and 1946 that he only wanted to continue his scientific work, and the Slovenian authority (particularly Boris Kidrič) wanted an important scientific center to be formed in Slovenia. In early 1946, Boris Kidrič invited Samec to a meeting and suggested him to think about founding a large chemistry institute at SASA that would be home to chemists of Yugoslavia. The purpose of the institute would be to solve the fundamental problems of Yugoslavian economy in the field of chemistry, as well as educating the young generation, and international collaboration would be enabled.³⁰

Maks Samec, who remained in the field of colloid chemistry (food persistence), a less interesting economic question for a predominantly agricultural country, accepted the proposal by the president of Slovenian government. Despite this, he pointed out the research of food persistence as the central research question in his first work program in February 1946, whereas in the future, he intended to research the possibility for raising a culture to produce penicillin.³¹ His proposal did not appease the expectations of the Slovenian authority, so he sent another proposal of the new institute's research plan two months later. Samec suggested as the central research question the studying of the process of making metallurgical coke from domestic coals. In this, he pointed out that he had already conducted his preliminary research in the years 1928–1931 for Trbovlje coal mining company. He made it clear that the research results were encouraging in laboratory phase, however, the client then did not decide for test production due to it being unrewarding, since such coke was 25 per cent more expensive than imported one.³²

Samec's research of enriching coals was a research field the authority was willing to financially support. SASA passed the new research program proposal to the Ministry of industry and mining that positively evaluated the proposal,

28 Oset, "Kemični inštitut (Borisa Kidriča)," 168–72.

29 Peterlin Neumaier, "Življenjepis Maksa Samca," 45, 46, 64–66.

30 "Pot do moderne znanstvene ustanove," in: *Slovenski poročevalec* 15, 1954, No. 140.

31 Archives of SASA, Razna pošta, b. 7 (1946), No. 33/46.

32 *Ibid.*, No. 141/46.

since it was exceptionally important in the concept of Yugoslavian key economy development.³³

The proposal was officially endorsed in October 1946, therefore the head secretary of SASA prepared a statute, and SASA officially employed Samec, whereas the statute of the Institute of Chemistry was passed in December 1947 at SASA assembly. This changed Samec's position which he used to set up a laboratory, but he also managed to have his former close colleague Marta Blinc repatriated.³⁴

With successful running of the institute and encouraging research results, political scruples ceased to obstruct his re-election as SASA member; he was re-elected in December 1949 as member of SASA,³⁵ and three years later again as correspondent member of the Yugoslavian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb.³⁶

But he was also publicly promoted as a top home scientist. This strengthened patriotism and most of all the view that the authority was able by domestic knowledge to carry out industrialization, or broader, a transition to a socialist society. An important aspect for the Slovenian authority was the fact that Samec managed to do this as a Slovenian scientist who was more successful than the Serbian scientist Božo Popović, a former student of Samec, who was conducting coal enrichment for the Serbian academy of sciences. Therefore, it is no surprise that Samec was even awarded two Prešeren awards in 1949 and 1950. First one was for scientific results, important for reaching the five-year plan, while next year, the award was for successful work to produce metallurgic coke from domestic coal.³⁷

Maks Samec Under Surveillance

The main research project by the Institute of Chemistry was extremely important, the key cause for UDBA's³⁸ operative supervision of Samec in summer of 1948. Before, UDBA mostly gathered rumors about Samec, circulating among university professors, and extracts from documents, especially the German consulate in Ljubljana. But since Samec was very retained in public, while his social network was narrow, UDBA failed to obtain quality information on him.³⁹ Decision for his methodical supervision was made after the so-called Dachau trials, a mock political trial against former internees in German concentration camps, where much of technical intelligence was interrogated

33 Ibid., No. 184/46. Jože Prinčič, "Razvoj gospodarstva do sredine petdesetih let," in: *Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjene Slovenije do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 2*, eds. Jasna Fischer et al. (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino; Mladinska knjiga, 2005), 965–68.

34 SI AS 1931, VIII, 28, 7832, 7833.

35 Željko Oset, "Samec vnovič postane član Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti," in: Stanovnik et al., *Maks Samec (1881–1964)*, 168–72.

36 Samec belongs in a group of pre-war members of Yugoslavian academy of sciences and arts whose memberships were not returned on academy's revival in autumn 1947. – Ibid., 166.

37 Ibid., 167, 168. Peterlin Neumaier, "Življenjepis Maksa Samca," 59, 60.

38 The State Security Administration (Uprava Državne Bezbednosti) was the secret police organization of Yugoslavia, and it was best known at all times simply by the acronym UDBA.

39 SI AS 1931, VIII, 5, 7611.

and eventually sentenced, even pre-war communists. Interesting to UDBA regarding Samec were the interrogations of Boris Fakin and Boris Krajnc, a graduate and doctorate candidate of Samec. UDBA was mainly interested in his relation toward German scientists and his international contacts.⁴⁰

Even though the mentioned two made critical remarks about Samec, the reason of supervision was in the mere importance of the project for economic development. Samec was also aware of this, writing in a letter to the president of SASA in May 1948 how he was aware that he was under “a very strict supervision, like everyone who worked in an industrial facility”.⁴¹ Interrogation of Fakin and Kranjc thus “merely” sped up the procedure of establishing operative supervision over Samec, beginning in summer of 1948, when the Slovenian authority assigned a Ford automobile to the Institute of Chemistry, with a chauffeur who, under the alias “Ford Jože”, became the first UDBA collaborator and watched Samec.⁴²

UDBA began with detailed supervision in October 1948, after Samec became the chief of the group for chemistry in the Federal commission for the progress of production, and the federal ministry of economy called Samec and Božo Popović, head of competitive group in the Serbian academy of sciences, to an advocacy in order to clear up a (supposed) sabotage. Namely, the ministry did not appropriately evidence the memos that the scientists were sending. Even though an obvious miscommunication had taken place, UDBA decided to supervise Samec more closely.⁴³

Even concealing research results was sabotage. Samec faced a grave danger in the decision-makers’ incomprehension of the problem. This, that is, incomprehension, was not supposed to happen in Ljubljana, since the surveillance was coordinated by Milan Osredkar, also head of Ljubljana branch of the Federal commission for progress of production. Osredkar thus controlled Samec during work and in his free time.⁴⁴

Samec, too, was very afraid of sabotage, and called all collaborators of the Institute of Chemistry to discretion in using research results, also in contacts with journalists, who he suspected to be UDBA agents. Samec feared UDBA would send a “provoker” to obtain information on the research, only to use it in a process against him. But Samec already suspected in summer 1949 that UDBA managed to “thrash” one of the employees at the Institute of Chemistry, which he was very offended with.⁴⁵

What worried UDBA was mainly Samec’s poor family situation – health issues of his wife. Her condition, already bad before the war, deteriorated further after the war. Unbearable family situation also effected Samec’s health and, as a consequence, success of his scientific work. In summer of 1949, after the construction of the new building of the Institute of Chemistry started, Samec believed he would not live to see

40 Ibid., 7610, 7611.

41 Archives of SASA, Kemijski inštitut, 1948, Maks Samec’s letter to France Kidrič (17. 5. 1948).

42 SIAS 1931, LM, 105, 208930.

43 SIAS 1931, VIII, 5, 7619, 8075, 8076.

44 Ibid., 7753, 7754.

45 Ibid., 7730, 8013–15.

it built.⁴⁶ Osredkar and France Kidrič first convinced Samec into hospital treatment of his wife, but then a decision was made for her to “move” to Austria. Because of reduced stress in his private life, Samec functioned as if reborn, the early 1950s thus being among his most successful research years.⁴⁷

“Fight” with Reforms

Due to the success of the parade research project – the research of producing metallurgical coke – other research groups were able to form at the institute, among them for studying colloid chemistry. In 1950s, the institute’s financial dependence on a single project has proven to be an exceptional challenge for long-term stability. First serious blow was the abolishment of the Federal commission for the progress of production – the main financer of the institute – in autumn 1952 – and employment of the commission’s collaborators at the institute. An even graver blow was introducing a new funding model to the institute: self-maintenance. Until then, the institute received almost all its funds from the state, but now, it had to acquire the resources for its function on the market. By this, the authority wanted to strengthen collaboration of research institutes with the economy, but there was little demand for research favors of the institute. And when projects were acquired, these were tied to performing a specific task. Protests by manager Samec that such a model makes the pure research impossible had no effect. Not even renaming the institute after deceased Boris Kidrič helped.⁴⁸

Because of the new funding model and slow firing of excess workers, Chemistry Institute found itself in serious financial trouble. First crisis arose in summer 1955, solved by Slovenian government with allocating a research project to the institute. In the next crisis in spring of 1957, Samec suggested introducing social management of his own initiative. He expected that by proposing a management model to authority’s liking, he would gain support of Slovenian authority and additional funds for the institute’s function. To him, it was about finishing begun research before old age debilitation would appear. The government rejected the proposed change due to upcoming passing of legislation on scientific institutions, allocated the institute bridging funds and procured economic orders.⁴⁹

In autumn 1957, the republic Act on scientific institutions was passed, and in December 1958 a new decree stating that SASA, University of Ljubljana and Executive council of People’s Republic of Slovenia were cofounders of the Institute of Chemistry Boris Kidrič. The status change provided that the manager becomes advisor to the new institute leadership. Furthermore, it was provided that the institute maintain Samec’s research group after reorganization.⁵⁰

46 SI AS 1931, Lm, 105, 208930, 208931, 208933–38.

47 Peterlin Neumaier, “Življenjepis Maksa Samca,” 57–59.

48 Archives of SASA, Predsedstvo 1953–1963, folder 3, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (2. 12. 1955).

49 Oset, “Kemični inštitut (Borisa Kidriča),” 188–92.

50 Ibid.

Samec accepted the changes as executed fact and did not want to overly upset himself, well aware of futility of such action. He accepted the cabinet he was offered at the Institute of Chemistry, which enabled him access to laboratories. He later denoted the reform in a letter to SASA head secretary Milko Kos as “demolition of the institute”, blaming an undefined group of younger colleagues.⁵¹ He connected the reform with ambition of chemistry professors to conduct postgraduate studies at the Institute of Chemistry, which Samec firmly opposed.⁵²

Samec took very personally the breaking of the agreement on funding his research group – he first had to obtain research projects for its function, then, since 1960, he obtained funds from Foundation Boris Kidrič and SASA. In 1962, he gained a large research project (Modifying cereal starches by physical procedures in goal of spreading the use of these starches), supported by the US Ministry of Agriculture.

In line with his academic standards, Samec wanted to designate his successor in the fund as head of project. He chose Marta Blinc. After his death, the research group was joined to the Institute of Chemistry, determined as the project executant, while Marta Blinc decided to retire due to poor atmosphere.⁵³

To Samec, founding of the cabinet was a last major life break, enabling him to focus on his preferred research field (colloid chemistry), a chance to participate in conferences abroad, and foremost, relief from bureaucracy and fighting for funds. Research was a key part of his identity, therefore he experienced organizational changes personally. In October 1963, he wrote in a letter to SASA head secretary Milko Kos that the chance affected him personally. He even called it the “demolition of the institute”.⁵⁴ In some manner, he relived the trauma from summer of 1945. He estimated that his efforts in founding the Institute of Chemistry, even by researching a field less fond to him, was not adequately valorized. Despite adapting to post-war system of leading a research institute and science funding, he remained true to academic ideals conquered in his Viennese *alma matris*, and was therefore disappointed by actions of his younger colleagues who have in striving to prove themselves, in his view, violated those academic standards. In this way, his academic standards were violated in autumn 1963 at proposing candidates for new members. In the candidacy procedure, an awkward embarrassment occurred in who to suggest a candidate: academician (Samec), who was a scientific authority for the field, or someone outside SASA.⁵⁵ Candidates for the field of chemistry were Dušan Hadži, proposed by Samec, and Roman Modic, proposed by the “made side”.⁵⁶ Already after Samec’s death, Dušan Hadži, the first doctorand of Samec at SASA and collaborator at the Institute of Chemistry Boris Kidrič, won this “battle”.⁵⁷

51 Archives of SASA, Predsedstvo 1953–1963, folder 11, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (18. 6. 1963).

52 Archives of SASA, Predsedstvo 1953–1963, folder 5, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (6. 2. 1957).

53 Oset, “Samec postane vnovič član,” 175, 176.

54 Archives of SASA, Predsedstvo 1953–1963, folder 11, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (18. 6. 1963).

55 Archives of SASA, Skupščina 1962–1972, Zapisnik skupščine SAZU (3. 7. 1964).

56 Archives of SASA, Seje predsedstva 1953–1963, folder 11, Zapisnik seje predsedstva SAZU (18. 6. 1963).

57 “Members of the SASA,” SAZU, accessed September 10, 2018, <http://www.sazu.si/o-sazu/clani/umrli.html>.

Conclusion

Maks Samec was formed as *homo academicus* at the University of Vienna. Because of defending strict academic standards and insisting on an outdated code of behavior, favoring some members at his institute, as well as modest job opportunities for young graduates, he fell out of favor with some of his younger colleagues, among them such who would become decision-makers after World War II.

At the post-war purge at the Ljubljana University, he was detached, removing his habilitation, but as an irreplaceable scientist, he was awarded opportunity to restart his career. Samec had two main goals: perform research and educate young generation of chemists. His was granted substantial amount of funds upon presentation of politically desirable research – i.e. the research of the process of making metallurgical coke from domestic coals. He was still allowed to proceed with his research of colloid chemistry but due to the extent of organizational work, tutoring and health issues as well, to a lesser extent.

Samec successful running of the Institute and encouraging research results gained him public acclaim as a top home scientist and several important awards as well. However, due to the importance of the Institute core research, he was under UDBA surveillance. Samec has suspected surveillance, which was disappointed realization of wariness in his academic honor. Even more, he was disappointed in mid-1950's upon introducing the new funding model, so-called self-maintenance. Until then, the institute received almost all its funds from the state, but now, it had to acquire the resources for its function on the market. Protests by Samec that such a model makes the essential scientific work impossible had no effect. Not even renaming the institute after deceased Boris Kidrič helped.

The final blow to his academic standard was his retirement from the institute in 1959, which was for him the demolition of the institute. Samec adapted to the post-war system in Slovenian academic community (e.g. in terms of selecting research, preferred organization solutions and funding of research), and was aware of political cliffs and issues that could have been perceived as “sabotage”. Even though his academic standards were out-dated, he tried to live by them, therefore his biggest disappointment of the period after WWII was fumbled collegiality among scientists especially younger one.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- SI AS, Archives of the Republic Slovenia:
 - SI AS 223, Vlada SRS.
 - SI AS 1931, Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve RSNZ.

- SASA, Archives of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts:
 - SASA, Kemijski inštitut.
 - SASA, Predsedstvo SAZU.
 - SASA, Razna pošta.
- Archives' of family Peterlin:
 - Archives' of family Peterlin, Notes of Anton Peterlin.
- Library of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

Literature:

- Bernik, France. "Iz zgodovine SAZU." In: *Letopis Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti: 46. knjiga: 1995*, 147–50. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 1996.
- Bieber, Florian and Harald Heppner, eds. *Universities and Elite Formation in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe*. Wien, Zürich, Münster: LIT, 2015.
- Bukošek, Vili, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier, Janez Stepišnik, Janez Strnad, Saša Svetina and Anton Peterlin, eds. *Anton Peterlin 1908–1993: življenje in delo*. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Institut Jožef Stefan, 2008.
- Čepič, Zdenko, Tone Ferenc, Aleš Gabrič, Bojan Godeša, Boris Mlakar, Dušan Nečak, Jože Princič, Janko Prunk, Božo Repe, Anka Vidovič-Miklavčič, Peter Vodopivec and Milan Ževart. *Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929–1955: znanstveno poročilo*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 1995.
- Gabrič, Aleš and Peter Vodopivec, eds. *Politični pritiski in izključevanja učiteljev in sodelavcev z Univerze v Ljubljani: poročilo Komisije za rehabilitacijo univerzitetnih učiteljev in sodelavcev*. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, 2000.
- Gabrič, Aleš. "Reforma visokega šolstva 1954–1961 ali kako uničiti ljubljansko Univerzo." In: *Nova revija*, No. 149 (1994): 115–20.
- Gabrič, Aleš. "Znanstvena politika v Sloveniji po drugi svetovni vojni in vloga Antona Peterlina." In: *Anton Peterlin 1908–1993: življenje in delo*, edited by Vili Bukošek, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier, Janez Stepišnik, Janez Strnad, Saša Svetina and Anton Peterlin, 300–05. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Institut Jožef Stefan, 2008.
- Kidrič, France. "V novi Jugoslaviji." In: *Letopis Akademije znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani: druga knjiga: 1943–1947*, 5–7. Ljubljana: Akademija znanosti in umetnosti v Ljubljani, 1947.
- Krige, John. *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014.
- Movrin, David, Fran Bradač, Anton Sovre, Milan Grošelj, Jože Košar and Fran Petre. "Latinščina in grščina na ljubljanski univerzi v prvem desetletju po vojni." In: *Keria: studia Latina et Graeca* 15, No. 2 (2013): 147–79.
- Movrin, David. "The Anatomy of a Revolution: Classics at the University of Ljubljana after 1945." In: *Classics and Communism: Greek and Latin behind the Iron Curtain*, edited by György Karsai, Gábor Klaniczay, David Movrin and Elżbieta Olechowska, 141–68. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani; Budapest: Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study; Warsaw: The Faculty of 'Artes Liberales,' University of Warsaw, 2013.
- Oset, Željko. "Gradnja kemičnega inštituta Univerze kralja Aleksandra I." In: *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*, edited by Stanovnik, Branko, Maks Samec, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier and Željko Oset, 138–40. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo, 2015.
- Oset, Željko. "Kemični inštitut (Borisa Kidriča) v letih med 1946 in 1959." In: *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*, edited by Stanovnik, Branko, Maks Samec, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier and Željko Oset, 183–88. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo, 2015.

- Oset, Željko. "Samec vnovič postane član Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti." In: *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*, edited by Stanovnik, Branko, Maks Samec, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier and Željko Oset, 168–72. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo.
- Oset, Željko. *Zgodovina Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti: razvoj najvišje znanstvene in umetniške ustanove, 1945–1992*. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 2017.
- Peterlin Neumaier, Tatjana. "Življenjepis Maksa Samca." In: *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*, edited by Stanovnik, Branko, Maks Samec, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier and Željko Oset, 39–51. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo, 2015.
- Peterlin, Anton. "O slovenskem kemiku dr. Mariusu Rebeku." In: *Ameriška domovina/American home*. Cleveland, Ohio, 25. 2. 1983.
- Prinčič, Jože. "Razvoj gospodarstva do sredine petdesetih let." In: *Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjene Slovenije do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 2*, edited by Fischer, Jasna, Jurij Perovšek, Žarko Lazarevič, Ervin Dolenc, Bojan Godeša, Aleš Gabrič, Zdenko Čepič, Nataša Kandus, Igor Zemljčič and Mateja Rihtaršič, 965–68. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino and Mladinska knjiga, 2005.
- Puhar, Alenka. *Izidor Cankar, Mojster dobro zasukanih stavkov: življenje in delo Izidorja Cankarja, 1886–1958*. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2016.
- *Slovenski poročevalec* 15, No. 140 (1954). "Pot do moderne znanstvene ustanove."
- Stanovnik, Branko, Maks Samec, Tanja Peterlin-Neumaier and Željko Oset, eds. *Maks Samec (1881–1964): življenje in delo: zbornik ob 50-letnici smrti*. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti and Slovensko kemijsko društvo, 2015.
- Suhadolc, Anton. *Profesor Rihard Zupančič*. Ljubljana: A. Suhadolc, 2011.
- Vidmar, Milan. *Spomini. II*. Maribor: Založba Obzorja, 1964.

Online Sources:

- SAZU. "Members of SASA." Accessed September 10, 2018. <http://www.sazu.si/o-sazu/clani/umrli.html>.

Željko Oset

MAKS SAMEC AND HIS ADAPTING TO ACADEMIC STANDARDS AFTER WORLD WAR II

SUMMARY

In August 1945, Maks Samec lost his *venia docendi* during the post-war purge at the University of Ljubljana but retained a position as researcher till further notice. Thus, he was able to conduct research at the dislocated unit of the university's chemical institute. Samec and his wife were under threat to be expelled from Yugoslavia to Austria in a group of so-called "Volksdeutschers". Upon intervention from the Slovenian communist government, Samec (and his wife) was allowed to stay in Ljubljana as an irreplaceable scientist.

The Slovenian Prime Minister, Boris Kirdič, offered Samec to establish a new chemical institute within the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. New institute should research (primarily the production of metallurgical coal from Yugoslavian coals) and at the same time trained new, younger generation of researchers. Samec accepted the challenge in the new era that was marked by more assertive role of the state in academia, new rules of decision-making, lesser autonomy in determine research questions, and limitations and collaboration abroad. Even though Samec acknowledge new rules, he was still trying to enforce his personal academic standards. Due to his success, he was awarded public awards and honors as early as in 1949, moreover, he was promoted as role model for excellence and patriotism.

In 1959, he was retired during a reform in the academia thus a special chemical cabinet was established for him within the framework of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. He did not take it lightly, but he was aware about futility of protests.

Željko Oset

MAKS SAMEC IN NJEGOVO PRILAGAJANJE AKADEMSKIM STANDARDOM PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI

POVZETEK

Maks Samec je izgubil *venia docendi* na Univerzi v Ljubljani med povojno čistko profesorskega kadra; postavljen je bil na razpoložnje, kar pomeni, da je lahko nadaljeval z raziskovalnim delom v dislocirani enoti univerzitetnega kemijskega inštituta. Samcu in njegovi ženi je grozila izselitev iz Jugoslavije v Avstrijo v skupini Volskdeutscherjev, vendar sta bila umaknjena s seznama po intervenciji slovenske vlade. Samec je bil namreč opredeljen kot nenadomestljiv znanstvenik.

Predsednik slovenske vlade Boris Kidrič je Samca povabil, da ustanovi kemijski inštitut pri Slovenski akademiji znanosti in umetnosti, ki bo utemeljen na dveh stebrih: raziskovalno delo (v prvi vrsti gre za raziskovalno vprašanje izdelave metalurškega kokska iz jugoslovanskih premogov) in vzgoja znanstvenega naraščaja. Samec je sprejel izziv v dobi, ki jo je zaznamoval večji vpliv države v akademski skupnosti; nove oblike odločanja, manjša avtonomija pri izbiri raziskovalnih vprašanj in omejitve pri mednarodnem sodelovanju. Navkljub spremenjenim pogojem je na inštitutu uvedel stroge akademske standarde. Zaradi svojega uspešnega raziskovalnega dela in vodenja inštituta je že v nekaj letih po drugi svetovni vojni pridobil javna priznanja in nagrade. Še več; bil je promoviran kot zgled znanstvene odličnosti in patriotizma.

Samec je inštitut zapustil leta 1959 po izvedeni reformi, raziskovalno delo pa je nadaljeval v zanj ustanovljenem kabinetu na Slovenski akademiji znanosti in umetnosti. Spremembo je sprejel kot izvršeno dejstvo, zato se ni pritoževal, čeprav ga je odstranitev z inštituta osebno prizadela.

Mateja Režek*

Milovan Djilas and the British Labour Party, 1950–1960¹

IZVLEČEK

MILOVAN ĐILAS IN BRITANSKA LABURISTIČNA STRANKA, 1950–1960

Članek obravnava politično preobrazbo Milovana Đilasa skozi analizo njegovih stikov z britanskimi laburisti in odziv Laburistične stranke na afero Đilas. Po sporu z Informburojem so jugoslovanski voditelji skušali vzpostaviti alternativne mednarodne povezave tudi prek zahodnih socialdemokratskih in socialističnih strank, kot najprimernejši partner pa se je pokazala britanska Laburistična stranka. Uradni stiki z njo so bili vzpostavljeni leta 1950, ključno vlogo v dialogu z britanskimi laburisti pa je odigral predsednik Komisije za mednarodne odnose CK ZKJ Milovan Đilas. Po njegovi odstranitvi iz političnega življenja in obsodbi na zaporno kazen so se nekoč topli odnosi med britanskimi laburisti in jugoslovanskimi komunisti sicer ohladili, vendar vodstvo Laburistične stranke ni želelo tvegati poslabšanja odnosov z Jugoslavijo, zato se je na afero Đilas odzivalo zelo previdno. Čeprav je Jugoslavija ostajala avtoritarna država pod vodstvom komunistične partije, je v očeh Zahoda še vedno predstavljala pomemben dejavnik destabilizacije vzhodnega bloka, prijateljski odnosi med Laburistično stranko in jugoslovanskimi komunisti pa so temeljili predvsem na zunanjepolitičnih interesih obeh strani. V drugi polovici petdesetih let je pragmatični geopolitični premislek povsem prevladal nad ideološko afiniteto: zanimanje britanskih laburistov za jugoslovanski samoupravni eksperiment je občutno upadlo, zamrl pa je tudi jugoslovanski interes za demokratični socializem.

Ključne besede: Milovan Đilas, britanska Laburistična stranka, Aneurin Bevan, socializem, disidentstvo

* Senior Research Fellow, PhD, Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče Koper / Science and Research Centre Koper, Garibaldijeva 1, SI-6000 Koper, mateja.rezek@zrs-kp.si

¹ The paper was written as part of the research project N6-0039 *The Yugoslav Self-Management Experiment and the Discussion on Development of European Socialism between East and West*, which was financially supported by the Slovenian Research Agency.

ABSTRACT

The article deals with Milovan Djilas' political transformation presented through an analysis of his connections with the British Labourites, and with the reaction of the Labour Party to the Djilas Affair. After the dispute with the Cominform, Yugoslav leaders tried to initiate alternative international contacts through Western socialist and social democratic parties, considering the most suitable partner the British Labour Party. Official contacts with the latter were established in 1950, the key role in the dialogue with the British Labourites played by the head of the Commission for International Relations, Milovan Djilas. In the aftermath of the Djilas Affair, the once warm relations between the British Labourites and Yugoslav Communists grew rather cool, but the leadership of the Labour Party did not wish to compromise their relations with Yugoslavia, and therefore reacted to it with considerable wariness. Although Yugoslavia remained an authoritarian state under the leadership of the Communist Party, in the eyes of the West it continued to represent a significant factor in the destabilisation of the Eastern Bloc, and the friendly relationship between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists were primarily based on foreign policy interests of the two parties. In the second half of the 1950s, the relationship between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists rested, even more than before, on pragmatic geopolitical consideration and not on ideological affinity; the interest of the British Labourites in the Yugoslav self-management experiment decreased significantly, as did the Yugoslav interest in democratic socialism.

Keywords: Milovan Djilas, British Labour Party, Aneurin Bevan, socialism, dissent

Much has been written about Milovan Djilas,² much more than about the majority of Eastern European dissidents; but the question why the former Communist dogmatist and one of the closest Tito's co-workers³ turned away from Communism, becoming an ardent advocate of individual liberty and political pluralism, remains in many

-
- 2 Stephen Clissold, *Djilas: the Progress of a Revolutionary* (Hounslow, Middlesex: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983). Joshua Muravchik, "The Intellectual Odyssey of Milovan Djilas," *World Affairs* 145, No. 4 (1983): 323–46. Vasilije Kalezić, *Đilas, miljenik i otpadnik komunizma* (Beograd: Zodne, 1988). Momčilo Đorgović, *Đilas: vernik i jeretik* (Beograd: Akvarijus, 1989). Vladimir Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas: prilozi za biografiju* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1991). Desimir Tošić, *Ko je Milovan Đilas?: disidentstvo 1953–1995* (Beograd: Otkrovenje, 2003). Mateja Režek, "Defeat of the First Party Liberalism and the Echo of 'Djiliasm' in Slovenia," *Slovene Studies* 28, No. 1–2 (2006): 67–78. Dejan Djokić, "Britain and Dissent in Tito's Yugoslavia: the Djilas Affair, ca. 1956," *European History Quarterly* 36, No. 3 (2006): 371–95. Dobrilo Armitović, *Milovan Đilas: bibliografija sa hronologijom života i rada* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2008). Slavko Goldstein, "Predgovor: Povratak Milovana Đilasa u Hrvatsku," in: *Milovan Đilas, Vlast i pobuna: memoari* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2009). Jože Pirjevec, *Tito in tovariši* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2011). Veljko Stanić, "Unutrašnji emigrant: političke ideje Milovana Đilasa 1954–1989," *Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne* 6 (2014): 213–29. Aleksandar V. Miletić, "Unrealised Nordic Dream: Milovan Đilas and the Scandinavian Socialists," *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2015): 89–106. Tomaž Ivešić, "Padec Milovana Đilasa," in: *Milovan Đilas, Anatomija neke morale in 19 znamenitih člankov (oktober 1953 – januar 1954)*, ed. Tomaž Ivešić (Ljubljana: Inštitut Nove revije, 2015), 131–85. Etc.
- 3 In addition to the leader of the Party propaganda machine, Milovan Djilas, the closest circle of Tito's co-workers included the leading Party ideologist Edvard Kardelj and head of the Yugoslav repressive apparatus Aleksandar Ranković.

ways unanswered. Not infrequently has his rebellious stance been ascribed to personal grudges between Party comrades and to Djilas' fiery temper, which Vladimir Dedijer described as "a violent Dinaric type,"⁴ yet this can only be part of the equation. The present article does not aspire to provide a comprehensive answer to this complex question; its goal is to shed light on Djilas' contacts with the British Labourites, which influenced his political transformation, and outline the reaction of the British Labour Party to the Djilas Affair.

The conflict with the Cominform was for Djilas, like for other Yugoslav leaders, a dramatic personal experience and a major political turning point. Under the weight of complete political isolation, Soviet economic blockade and threat of military intervention, Yugoslav leaders soon started turning their gaze towards the West. To ensure Western economic and military aid, they had to moderate their image and prove that Yugoslavia was different from the Soviet Union, while striving to preserve their national independence and radical ideological image. It was in this context that the idea of self-management emerged. It is impossible to claim with certainty who its original author was. In several of the editions of his memoirs, Djilas asserted that he had come to the idea himself and explained it one rainy day to Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič in a car parked in front of his villa,⁵ whereas Tito's and Djilas' biographer Vladimir Dedijer insisted that the originator of the idea about workers' self-management was the leader of Yugoslav economic policy, Boris Kidrič.⁶ Regardless of the historical accuracy of Djilas' story about the birthplace of the idea of self-management, his memoirs clearly illustrate how decisions were made in Yugoslavia – within a closed inner circle of the Party leaders and from the top down, most often without any records. How the Yugoslav Party leadership operated in the field of ideology has been eloquently portrayed by the American historian Dennison Rusinow: "Ideology, like power, remained highly centralised, and the inner 'establishment' of Titoism in its formative years was still the small group of men, personally recruited by Tito after 1937 / ... / . They met at work and they met at play, they telephoned one another in the middle of the night, and they talked incessantly. Ideas were bounced from one to another until original authorship became undiscoverable as well as unrecorded."⁷ Milovan Djilas, Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič were the most zealous ideological debaters, but the final decisions were made by Tito, although "he would stand aloof from these theoretical discussions: due to his overworking, hierarchical superiority, as well as non-theoretical mind-set..." as Djilas wrote.⁸

In 1949 and 1950, the Yugoslav leaders abandoned the rigid imitation of the Soviet system and began experimenting with new ideas. In contrast to the Eastern Bloc, where the state was growing stronger, they began to propagate Marx's thesis

4 Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*.

5 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 296. Also Milovan Đilas, *Druženje s Titom* (Beograd: Zaslona, 1990), 57, 58. Milovan Đilas, *Pad nove klase: povest o samorazaranju komunizma* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1994), 110. Etc.

6 Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 384.

7 Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 49.

8 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 296.

on the withering away of the state. They attempted to approach this ideal through the introduction of workers' self-management and social ownership, as well as decentralisation of state power. Bureaucracy was seen as the greatest enemy of socialism, which, if its wings were not clipped, would transform into a ruling social class and then inevitably lead to the establishment of state capitalism like that in the Soviet Union. The critical reflections on the Soviet system also gave rise to thoughts of separating the Communist Party from the state. At its Sixth Congress in November 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) officially declared its renouncement of direct control and renamed itself the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Its fundamental task was defined as providing the masses with ideological guidance and education in the spirit of socialism. Surely, the early 1950s brought about some radical shifts, particularly in ideological terms, though the actual practice lagged far behind the declarative and normative standards.

“The Beginning of Something Much More Lasting and Deeper”

Following the Tito-Stalin split, the Yugoslav leaders, eager to improve their image in the West, initiated contacts with the Western Left that could be a valuable support to their policy. Towards the end of December 1949, at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPY, the foreign minister and leading party ideologist Edvard Kardelj announced a more “agile” foreign policy⁹ and the intention to search for alternative international connections, including the Western socialist and social democratic parties. To this purpose, the Commission for International Relations of the Central Committee of CPY was founded. It was headed by Milovan Djilas, with Vladimir Dedijer as its Secretary.

In the Yugoslav desire to establish alternative connections, the most suitable partner both in the fields of foreign policy and ideology was Western Europe's largest social democratic party – the British Labour Party. Between 1945 and 1951, with the Labourites as the ruling party in Britain, numerous socialist reforms were carried out, particularly the nationalisation of key industries, as well as reforms of the health care and social security systems. This made the Labour Party a palatable partner to the Yugoslav leaders from an ideological point of view, although, contrary to the Yugoslav Communist Party, it swore by political pluralism, rejected Marxism and class struggle, and advocated a gradual transition into socialism.

Due to the anti-communist climate in the West, the invitation to the British Labourites to visit Yugoslavia was not extended on behalf of the Communist Party,

⁹ Edvard Kardelj's paper *O spoljnopolitičkim pitanjima* on the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of CPY in: *Sednice Centralnog komiteta KPJ: 1948–1952*, eds. Branko Petranović et al., (Beograd: Komunist, 1985), 469–82. See also Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu: odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 92, 93. Čedomir Štrbac, “Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950,” in: *Jugoslovensko-britanski odnosi*, ed. Petar Kačavenda (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988), 332, 333.

rather on behalf of the Popular Front. Between 7th and 19th September 1950, Yugoslav Communists in the disguise of the Popular Front hosted the first official delegation of the Labour Party, consisting of Morgan Phillips, the General Secretary of the Labour Party, Sam Watson, the Chairman of the International Committee, and Harry Earnshaw, a member of the National Executive Committee.¹⁰ This was the first official visit by any Western social democratic or socialist party to Yugoslavia and it contributed appreciably to the further expansion of Yugoslav relations with the Western Left.¹¹ During their stay in Yugoslavia, the Labourites visited Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and some smaller towns. They held several meetings with Yugoslav leaders and visited factories, a copper mine, a collective farm, and even a notorious political prison in Sremska Mitrovica, where, ironically, Djilas would later be imprisoned. The Yugoslav side was represented by Milovan Djilas, Moša Pijade, Boris Kidrič and a few others. Towards the end of their visit, the Labourite delegation was received by the Yugoslav president Tito, who was at the same time President of the Popular Front and Secretary-General of the Communist Party. The discussions revolved around the liberalisation of economy, life standards, the issue of individual liberty and repressive policies, the different paths into socialism, and current foreign policy topics. They unfolded in the spirit of searching for common points, not differences, with the British guests giving plenty of leeway to their hosts. The Yugoslav side stressed their achievements, but also admitted that limitations existed, the latter blamed on Soviet remainders in domestic policy and the Soviet threat from outside. However, Djilas surprised the British visitors by the frankness with which he spoke of the recently held elections to the National Assembly. He admitted that the officially declared results did not reflect the true state of feeling within the country, since the pro-regime majority exercised a certain psychological and political pressure on the others.¹² These discussions with the British Labourites were characterised by a noticeable departure from the crude dogmatism of the first post-war years, but that should not be regarded as a pure pragmatic attempt on the part of the Yugoslav leaders to win the sympathies of Western Left, particularly not in Djilas' case. He noted in his memoirs that the debates with the representatives of the Labour Party were "very frank and convergent" and that "the Labourites, as well as other European socialists, were not just a transitional stage in our cooperation with the West, but an active force, and the cooperation with them plucked us from isolation, freeing us at the same time of the ideological prejudices about Communists as the sole true representatives of the working class and socialism."¹³

In a conversation between the representatives of the Labour Party and Tito on 18th September 1950, in which Milovan Djilas, Boris Kidrič, and Vladimir Dedijer

10 For more details about this visit, see Štrbac, "Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950." Aleksandar V. Miletić, "Prijem delegacije britanskih laburista kod maršala Tita u okviru njihove prve posete Jugoslaviji, 1950. godine," *Tokovi istorije* 1 (2011): 137–64.

11 Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, "The Yugoslav Communists' Special Relationship with the British Labour Party 1950–1956," *Cold War History* 14, No. 1 (2014): 36.

12 Clissold, *Djilas*, 217.

13 Djilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 300.

as interpreter also took part, the question about the different paths to socialism was raised. While the two sides acknowledged their respective rights to reach socialism their own way, the Labourites wished to emphasise individual liberty in this context. Sam Watson stated that the fundamental conception of the Labourites was to create a social order in which a factory worker could do his best at work and then, when he got off, be a completely free individual. When Watson challenged his Yugoslav interlocutors with the question whether they, too, wanted to follow this path, Djilas assented, saying that was the way “according to Marx.” Watson replied that they were not familiar with Marx themselves, but they did want the individual to be free “to criticise or cheer for whomever they choose,”¹⁴ thereby underlining the Labourites’ commitment to parliamentary democracy. Morgan Phillips added that although the Labourites might not proceed from Marxism, that did not mean they knew nothing about it, as there were several ministers in the British government who had studied Marx. Watson then reiterated: “The only way, and I say this as an old worker (he used to work as a blaster in a coal mine – note by M. R.), is to give people maximum freedom, because no initiative can develop without that.”¹⁵ This time, the call to confrontation was answered by Tito, who stressed that Yugoslavia was still insufficiently developed for that: “Up until recently, we lived in the very harsh conditions of a backward Balkan country. Freedom cannot be measured the same way in a developed country and in a backward country, where all possible instincts are present. It is precisely this backwardness that often, even against our will, imposes on us a certain brutality, brutality from our standpoint. Which is nevertheless necessary! I regard the whole country as a sort of school, and school requires a minimum of discipline. We re-educate people in it.”¹⁶ Later on, Phillips pointed out the specific revolutionary experience of Yugoslavia’s coming out of a liberation war, which was hardly reproducible in any European country, but could set an example for Asian countries liberating themselves from imperialist domination.¹⁷ This way he exhorted the Yugoslav leaders quite directly to cooperate with the “Third World.” Despite ideological differences between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party or Popular Front, the conversation proceeded in the spirit of mutual understanding and collaboration. In the end, Watson emphasised in his toast that the British side would do everything to help Yugoslavia and that they appreciated their hosts treating them as “intelligent human beings” and not hiding their difficulties from them.¹⁸

But the Labourites had no illusions about the Yugoslav regime. In his confidential report to the Executive Committee of the Labour Party about the visit to Yugoslavia, Morgan Phillips wrote that the Yugoslav leadership, with Tito at its head, were “100% communists” and that Yugoslavia was a communist country, but anyone who thought

14 The transcript of the conversation between Tito and the representatives of the Labour Party is published in its entirety as a supplement to the article: Miletić, “Prijem delegacije britanskih laborista,” 157.

15 *Ibid.*, 158.

16 *Ibid.*, 159.

17 *Ibid.*, 159, 160.

18 *Ibid.*, 162.

that this regime could be replaced by a parliamentary democracy modelled after the Western example, was sadly mistaken – at best, it could be replaced by a “Cominformist communist party.” He declared Yugoslavia “a police state” that was nevertheless quite distinct from the Soviet Union in terms of the freedom of expression and the privileges of the Party elite. He stressed that there were indeed fundamental differences in ideology and practice between the two parties, but that “Yugoslavia might prove to be an interesting experiment that could, if it succeeded along the lines which it seems to be developing, have an influence on other nations.”¹⁹

The British guests were rather impressed by the Yugoslav hosts and invited them to visit Britain. The President of the Commission for International Relations Milovan Djilas and its Secretary Vladimir Dedijer, also in the role of interpreter, travelled to London in January 1951. The real purpose behind this trip was a Yugoslav request for arms from the British government. Djilas was entrusted with the task of confidentially and personally communicating this request to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. He promised that it would be dealt with sympathetically,²⁰ and indeed, Yugoslavia received the requested support.²¹ In addition, Djilas held a lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) about Yugoslav-Soviet relations, which encountered a positive reception in the audience and in the media. On 4th February, *The Observer* wrote that Djilas views were more pre-Bolshevik Marxist than Leninist.²²

Djilas' visit to Britain was not only important from a military-diplomatic perspective, but also in light of Djilas' later dissent. There he met the leaders of both the Labour and the Conservative Parties, including Winston Churchill. But crucial for him was the encounter with the then Minister for Health in the Labourite government, Aneurin Bevan, leader of the left-wing of the Labour Party, the so-called “Bevanites”. Djilas met him on 31st January 1951 at a dinner organised by Prime Minister Attlee at Downing Street.²³ Later he wrote that he found Bevan to be “a dynamic personality, with a lively, unconventional mind,” and was most impressed by his “perspicacious line of thought and the concurrent stubborn, original and popular faith in socialism.”²⁴ Djilas was also otherwise quite enthusiastic about what he saw in Britain. Returning from London, he and Dedijer stopped in Paris, where Dedijer told the American journalist C. L. Sulzberger that Djilas was impressed with Great Britain and that he had found the workers' unions there to be a lot less bureaucratized than the ones in Yugoslavia.²⁵

In April 1951, Bevan resigned from the position of the Minister for Health following the introduction of prescription charges to help finance the Korean War. Three

19 Štrbac, “Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950,” 339, 340.

20 Clissold, *Djilas*, 217, 218. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, 250. Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 301. Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 360.

21 For more details about Western support in arms, see Ivan Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958* (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006).

22 Tošić, *Ko je Milovan Đilas*, 28.

23 Clissold, *Djilas*, 219. Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 364.

24 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 302, 348.

25 Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, 251.

months later he accepted an invitation to visit Yugoslavia, where he arrived together with his wife, Jennie Lee, also a prominent Labourite and a Member of Parliament. Their host Milovan Djilas welcomed them in Belgrade and joined them on their visit to Tito in the Brijuni Islands. The British guests spent their vacations immersed in political debates with their hosts in the relaxed atmosphere at the Adriatic coast. Bevan's biographer Michael Foot wrote that they had come away "with indelible memories of the special qualities of Yugoslav bravery, of their absolute resolve to resist Soviet encroachment, of the greatness of Tito, and with another possession more peculiar to Jennie and himself – an immediately established affinity with Milovan Djilas."²⁶ The socialising brought forth a friendship and a cross-fertilisation of ideas between the Bevan and Djilas, both corroborated by their correspondence. Soon after the Bevan returned to Britain, Djilas wrote to them: "It is understandable that – in different countries under different conditions – identical or similar viewpoints are being born. / ... / I think that the personal relationship established between both of you and ourselves is only *the beginning of something much more lasting and deeper* (emphasis by M. R.), the beginning of that unbreakable link between people who through different methods and even from different ideological positions truly fight for freedom."²⁷ Djilas and Bevan were not only similar in their political outlooks, but also in character. "They were both poets, romantics, unrestrainable individualists, strong unpredictable mountain types", noted Jennie Lee.²⁸ Vladimir Dedijer described them in much the same way, when he wrote that Bevan was known for his short temper, and that he, like Djilas, could be very charming, but would sometimes have sharp outbursts, so his wife labelled him "a violent Welsh type."²⁹

Djilas only later became aware of the divide between Bevan's way of thinking and his own, which originated in the different social realities of Yugoslavia and Britain. In his book *The Unperfect Society* Djilas described his conversation with Bevan and Jennie Lee in the summer of 1953 in Montenegro, which was focused on the issue of how to merge socialism and traditional political liberties. When Djilas suggested the answer could be workers' self-management, Bevan exclaimed: mixed economy. He believed that Britain should only nationalise the industries that would become more efficient if nationalised, while leaving the others in private hands, and that this way the British parliamentarism would not be weakened. "There was something in this Bevan's thought that linked up with my later realisations," wrote Djilas three decades later, "namely, that the impasse and limitedness in Communism, the impracticability of reforms in it, actually derive from the type of ownership, which is social or state in form and interiorised and absolutized as such, though in reality it is managed and commanded by Party bureaucracy through state and economic organs."³⁰

26 Michael Foot, *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography, Vol. 2: 1945–1960* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1973), 347. Clissold, *Djilas*, 220, 221.

27 Foot, *Aneurin Bevan*, 348. Clissold, *Djilas*, 220, 221.

28 Clissold, *Djilas*, 219.

29 Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 377.

30 Milovan Đilas, *Nesavršeno društvo: (i dalje od Nove klase)* (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1990), 115.

In 1952, Bevan published his first actual book, *In Place of Fear*, which in Britain became almost synonymous with all that the welfare state stood for and what it sought to achieve. By 1952, a consensus had formed in Britain that it was possible to create a society where all could live without the fear of being hungry, poorly housed, or of living with or dying in great pain – hence its title. In the book, Bevan presented his political views, including those regarding National Health Service, which he had established as the Minister for Health in the first post-war years. The writing is also somewhat autobiographical, as through Bevan's reflections on politics we retrace his path from a Welsh miner to a minister in the Labourite government. Interestingly, though not surprisingly given the Yugoslav political atmosphere in 1952, the publication of his book in Britain was immediately followed by a Serbian-language edition published in Yugoslavia.³¹

In February 1953, the Labour Party sent their delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Popular Front, which on that occasion changed its name to the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). The latter was supposed to take over from the Party the task of managing current policies, while the Party would mostly focus on ideological issues. Yugoslav leaders even went as far as trying to make the Socialist Alliance a member of the Socialist International, but nothing ever came of these endeavours. As Western socialists and social democrats saw in the Socialist Alliance merely a transmission of the Communist Party, much like they did in their predecessor, the Popular Front, they rejected its affiliation to the Socialist International.³² The greatest obstacle for establishing even closer relations with the Western Left was the Yugoslav single-party system. Clement Attlee, who visited Yugoslavia in August 1953, announced that the Socialist Alliance would not become a member of the Socialist International as long as Yugoslavia preserved its one-party system. He said: "With no opposition parties, the political life is dull, futile. It's a one-horse race," adding: "In Britain, I am the leader of the opposition, while here I am trying in vain to find a counterpart."³³

Aneurin Bevan, who had a serious inter-party dispute with Attlee, was visiting Yugoslavia at the same time, so his host Djilas made sure the two never crossed paths. Upon Bevan's wish to visit "authentic people" and backward areas, Djilas took him and his wife to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Montenegro. Later he wrote: "I bid my farewell from the Bevan in Cetinje, from where Dedijer accompanied them to see Tito: never did I suspect that that would be my last encounter with Nye – the discontinuation of selfless joint searches in socialism from two far ends of Europe, two different cultures and different experience."³⁴

During the first half of the 1950s, Djilas would slowly grow disillusioned with Communism. He believed that the class struggle was over and that the principal enemy of socialism in Yugoslavia was no longer the bourgeoisie, but bureaucracy, and that Yugoslavia should proceed towards democratic socialism. Contrary to Djilas, in

31 Aneurin Bevan, *Umesto straha* (Beograd: Biblioteka Trideset dana, 1952).

32 Mateja Režek, *Med resničnostjo in iluzijo: slovenska in jugoslovanska politika v desetletju po sporu z Informbirojem (1948–1958)* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005), 56, 57.

33 Ibid., 57, 58.

34 Dilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 348.

the mid-1953, the Yugoslav Party leadership adopted the opinion of the advocates of strong-arm politics, who saw in political liberalisation the beginning of the end of the Party's rule. This political shift was triggered not only by Stalin's death in March 1953 and by the prospects of a warming in relations with the Soviet Union, but also by Tito's perception that the power of the Communist Party had weakened. The often inconsistent directives from above led to confusion and lack of discipline among Party members, which resulted in apathy and public discussions on current policy as well as in the emergence of opinions that were not always in accord with the views of the Party leadership, at least its majority. In mid-June 1953, Tito called a Central Committee Plenum in Brijuni Islands and made clear that the leading role of the Party was to be reasserted. Djilas was not prepared to accept this about face. In the autumn and winter of 1953/54, he wrote several articles for the newspaper *Borba* calling for greater democratization of Yugoslav political life, attacking the bureaucracy, and making quite clear that the Party as it was had to go. He concluded his last article *League or Party* with the thought that the Leninist Party and State were obsolete and that at the current stage of development only reforms and evolution could be constructive.³⁵ He crowned his series of articles in *Borba* with the piece *Anatomy of a Moral*, which he published in the magazine *Nova misao* and in which he rebuked the morality of the political elite and inflamed the already smouldering personal grudges among Party leaders.

At the Third Plenum of the Central Committee on 16th and 17th January 1954, Djilas was accused of violation of party discipline, revisionism, "Bernsteinism," social democratic deviations, and bourgeois liberalism. All the members of the Central Committee, with the exception of Vladimir Dedijer and Djilas' former wife Mitra Mitrović, joined in the accusations, and the Serbian Party leader Petar Stambolić even reproached Djilas with having fallen under Bevan's influence. Djilas was excluded from the Central Committee and stripped of all political functions, and later he resigned from the Party. In January 1955, criminal proceedings were initiated against him because of an interview he had given to *The New York Times*, in which he openly criticised the Yugoslav system and advocated political pluralism. He was given an 18-month suspended sentence, but then in December 1956 he was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment for his article in the American leftist periodical *The New Leader* and his statement to the French press agency criticising Yugoslav apparent neutrality during the Hungarian Uprising. In October 1957, seven years of imprisonment were added to his sentence because of the book *The New Class*, a powerful critique of communist elite that made Djilas the most significant Eastern European dissident. He earned an additional five years in prison in 1962 with the book *Conversations with Stalin* and by 1966, when he was released from prison, he had served a total of nine years.

35 Milovan Dilas, "Zveza ali partija," *Ljudska pravica-Borba*, 4. 1. 1954, 2, 3.

British Labourites and the Djilas Affair

Djilas' political downfall somewhat complicated the relationships between the British Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists. The Labour Party did not protest to the Yugoslav authorities about it, but the reproach made at the Third Plenum in January 1954, that Djilas was under Bevan's influence, did not pass unnoticed. A few days after the Plenum, on 1st February 1954, Bevan wrote to Tito that he was surprised by what had happened as "nothing that I saw or was told when I visited Yugoslavia in August prepared me for these calamitous events." He underlined that he had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of another country, but "some remarks which have fallen from people of high position in your country have suggested that I have had a bad influence on Milovan's political outlook, and that our friendship has had something to do with his recent attitude. This does little credit to Milovan's robust character and mental poise and I dismiss it as merely the rancour of political controversy."³⁶ He concluded the letter saying that his only interest was the welfare of Djilas and Dedijer, who initially took Djilas' side.

Tito answered Bevan that during the discussion his name had only been mentioned once and that he was sorry it garnered such publicity, "because we do not believe that you exercised any influence upon Djilas as regards the road upon which he had embarked, i.e., the road of anarchist conceptions, because we know you as a realistic political worker." He added that Djilas had been relieved of all political functions, but was ensured the economic safety befitting a high official and his personal freedom was not curtailed. He was still a member of the Communist Party and could reflect and correct his "erroneous conceptions". "It is entirely and solely up to him," concluded Tito his letter to Bevan.³⁷

Djilas himself denied that Bevan had influenced his political stance,³⁸ but his former colleagues thought otherwise. Edvard Kardelj, who found himself in the role of chief prosecutor against Djilas at the Third Plenum, later told Dedijer that in the summer of 1953 Djilas had tried to persuade him that it was necessary to establish a second political party in Yugoslavia: "At that time, Bevan was visiting in our country. He must have greatly influenced Djilas, although not directly, rather implanting in his mind certain ideas. Djilas reflected about what Bevan had told him and started putting forward suggestions that a labour party should be founded in Yugoslavia. I told him I would not relate a word about this to Tito – although I should – nor would I inform the Politburo, as I hoped he would renounce such ideas. But he continued to spread these suggestions despite our conversation, so in the end, we were forced to discuss the case in the Politburo."³⁹ Up to 1953, there had been little divergence between Kardelj's and Djilas' theoretical views of the development of Yugoslav socialism, as foreign observers could

³⁶ Foot, *Aneurin Bevan*, 420.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 422.

³⁸ Dilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 348.

³⁹ Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Dilas*, 377.

also support. The British ambassador Frank Roberts wrote as late as January 1955 that with regard to theory, he found no major differences between Djilas and Kardelj – “the real distinction is in that Djilas wants this theory to finally come to life in practice, whereas Kardelj insists on the preservation, for a while at least, of a single-party system, in the circumstances of which self-management institutions are now little more than pretentiousness” – while also pointing out the danger of left-wing or right-wing despotism should the bourgeois ideas of democracy be freely allowed into the state.⁴⁰

As a result of internal and foreign policy situation, the retaliation against Djilas and the so-called “Djilasites” in 1954 was relatively mild. Tito wanted to silence and isolate him, not turn him into a victim and martyr. Also, he did not want to lose the favour of the West, which had been watching with suspicion Yugoslavia flirt with the Soviet Union for a while now. After Stalin’s death, the relationship between the two countries had been gradually improving, although Yugoslavia insisted on paving its own way into socialism. During the talks on reconciliation, the Soviet side even proposed that the blame for the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute should be pinned on Milovan Djilas and Lavrentiy Beria,⁴¹ the former head of the Soviet secret police, executed in December 1953, but Tito strongly rejected the Soviet suggestion since it would negate the significance of Yugoslavia’s resistance against Stalin. During 1955 and 1956 the Soviet-Yugoslav relations were completely restored, first at the state and then at the Party level. The relationship between the two countries was more or less stable from then on, although severely wavering on occasion: first as early as the end of 1956 due to Tito’s public criticism of the first Soviet intervention in Hungary.⁴²

Since the West was not willing to risk deterioration in the relationship with Yugoslavia, Western leaders were initially very cautious in their reaction to Djilas’ political downfall. Any irrational decision or behaviour could, in fact, push Yugoslavia to an even closer cooperation with the Soviet Union or even back inside the Soviet sphere of influence. The greatest problem therefore, at least at the beginning, for both the Yugoslav and Western authorities, was the Western media, which displayed considerable interest in Djilas’ case. In this context, the new British ambassador in Belgrade, Frank Roberts, made the assessment towards the end of 1954 that the Djilas Affair would not affect the relations between Yugoslavia and the West “unless the Western media continue to take so much interest in it to make the already irritable Yugoslav sense of independence reach a touchy point.”⁴³ In its dealings with Yugoslavia, the British conservative government gave precedence to political realism and pragmatism and never protested to the Yugoslav authorities with regard to the Djilas Affair. Also telling was the fact that the leading pro-Labour newspaper, *The Daily Herald*,

40 Katarina Spehnjak, “Velika Britanija i ‘slučaj Đilas’ 1954,” in: *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961: zbornik radova*, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 360.

41 Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu*, 582. See also Andrej Edemskii, “The Role of Milovan Djilas in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations 1944–1954,” in: *The Balkans in the Cold War: Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict*, ed. Vojislav G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2011).

42 For more, see Mateja Režek, “Vročica jesen 1956: sueška kriza, mađarska vstaja in vloga Jugoslavije,” *Annales, Series historia et sociologia* 24, No. 4 (2014): 609, 610.

43 Spehnjak, “Velika Britanija i ‘slučaj Đilas’ 1954,” 355.

never published any of Djilas' articles, despite the promise of Ernest Davies, a Labour Member of Parliament and former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who visited Djilas in Belgrade in 1954. In his memoirs, Djilas considered this as evidence of opportunism on the part of the Labour Party leadership in its relations with Tito.⁴⁴ Also, in 1954, the leadership of the Fabian Society, the oldest socialist organisation in Britain and a sort of think tank of the Labour Party, expressed through the Yugoslav embassy in London a wish to hold its summer school in Yugoslavia. The event was organised in cooperation with the SAWPY Commission for International Issues, headed by Marija Vilfan, and the summer school was successfully carried out from the end of August to mid-September 1955 on the Red Island (Crveni otok) near Rovinj.⁴⁵

More resolution about the conduct of the Yugoslav authorities towards their friend was demonstrated by Aneurin Bevan and Jennie Lee. After Djilas' incarceration in December 1956 and the extension of the term of imprisonment the following year due to his publication of *The New Class* in the United States, the Bevans made consistent efforts to have him released. Djilas experienced Bevan's death in 1960 "as a loss of a closest friend," later dedicating his classic work *Conversations with Stalin* to him.⁴⁶

In the spring of 1956, Morgan Phillips, General Secretary of the Labour Party and president of the Socialist International, interceded with Tito on behalf of Djilas in a private and confidential letter in which he protested against the way the Yugoslav authorities treated Djilas. He had been prompted to do this by Djilas himself, when on 12th April 1956 he sent Phillips a letter through secret channels, describing his situation, which had worsened appreciably after the suspended sentence in January 1955: he was kept in complete isolation, having his services pension withheld, while the members of his family and the friends who had not severed their contacts with him were pressured, as well. Djilas and his family lived on his wife's salary in a relatively comfortable apartment in Belgrade, but Djilas had been informed a short time before that they would have to move into a smaller apartment. Also, he suspected that his home was wired and that all his mail was screened. In the conclusion of the letter he stressed that he was writing "to acquaint you with the truth, hoping for your moral support" and not to seek intervention to his benefit or an offer of material assistance.⁴⁷

Some days later, on 21st April 1956, Phillips wrote to Tito that the Labourites had felt relieved in learning about Djilas' suspended sentence, but that the subsequent conduct of the Yugoslav authorities towards Djilas brought them to realise that their relief had been misplaced. He proceeded to list the discriminatory measures used by the Yugoslav authorities against Djilas and ended the letter saying: "I must confess that I am appalled that the country which in 1950 I supported in articles and public speaking, and in private documents to the then Foreign Secretary of our own government

44 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 388.

45 AJ 507, IX, 133/II-79, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze CK SKJ, Fabijanska škola na Crvenom otoku kod Rovinja, 29. 8.–12. 9. 1955.

46 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 349.

47 Djokić, "Britain and Dissent in Tito's Yugoslavia," 385–87.

– Ernest Bevin – should have slipped back into the evil ways of the Cominform countries. I do not know whether this is related to what appears to be a shift in the foreign policy of your country – that, however, is not my business. I am only concerned with the human aspect of administration, and I still hope that you can in your relation with individuals demonstrate to the world the fundamental superiority of a socialist system of society.⁴⁸

Phillips did not hide his disappointment over the Yugoslav political shift towards the Soviet Union and his writing also revealed that he had a thorough knowledge of Djilas' situation. Despite the letter being private and secret, it must have quite angered Tito. Contrary to Tito's confidential and conciliatory reply to Bevan in February 1954, the Yugoslav authorities responded publicly this time – with an article officially authored by the new head of the Commission for International Relations, Veljko Vlahović, published in *Borba* on 20th May 1956. While Phillips' letter focussed on the mistreatment that Djilas was subjected to by the Yugoslav authorities, the Yugoslav reply contained hardly any mention of him. The object of the article was to discredit Phillips as an irresponsible, uninformed and malicious person with a rather poor understanding of Yugoslav socialism and international politics. Apparently, the Yugoslav leadership was most annoyed by Phillips linking the actions of their authorities against Djilas with their shift towards the Soviet Union. In the reply they also rebuked the British for their imperialism, recommending to the Labourites that they concentrate on the conduct of the British government in Cyprus and Kenya instead of interfering with Yugoslav internal affairs.⁴⁹

The British Conservative government was anything but pleased with Phillips' protest letter to Tito. It had followed the Djilas' case primarily from the perspective of international relations and only started paying more attention to the Yugoslav dissident after his imprisonment at the end of 1956.⁵⁰ Speculations surfaced in the foreign press that Djilas' arrest might have been an attempt by the Yugoslav authorities to appease the Soviet Union. The truth is, their reckoning with Djilas had far more to do with internal than foreign affairs. Aware of the dissatisfaction of the population with living conditions, the Yugoslav leaders were afraid of the repetition of Hungarian events in Yugoslavia, so they decided to get Djilas out of their way before he turned into a Yugoslav Imre Nagy. By declaring in his article in *The New Leader* that the Yugoslav "national Communism" was incapable of carrying out reforms, and with his interview for the French press agency, in which he condemned the Yugoslav reserved policy towards the Hungarian Uprising, Djilas unintentionally made that easier for them.

After the sharp Yugoslav response to Phillips's intervention, Hugh Gaitskell, the new leader of the Labour Party and a prominent right-winger, postponed his visit to Yugoslavia in mid-1956,⁵¹ though, due to complex international developments that year, he changed his mind and stressed the need to repair relations with Yugoslavia.

48 Ibid., 388.

49 Ibid., 376.

50 Ibid., 382.

51 Unkovski-Korica, "The Yugoslav Communists' Special Relationship with the British Labour Party," 41.

Although the latter remained an authoritarian, single-party state, it still represented a potentially important factor in the destabilisation of the Eastern Bloc, especially when the Yugoslav leaders faced renewed criticism from the Soviet Union after the Hungarian Uprising. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, found convenient the Labourites' opposition to the Anglo-French-Israeli military action against Egypt after Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal.⁵² Pragmatic common interests in foreign policy ensured the continuing friendship between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists, and the reconciliation persisted despite some fundamental ideological disagreements between the two parties.

As an illustration of the depth of these divergences, let us examine more thoroughly the talks held during the visit of a delegation of the British Labour Party to Yugoslavia in 1960. Towards the end of August of that year, the highest representatives of the Labour Party, Hugh Gaitskell, Sam Watson, foreign policy adviser to the Labour Party Denis Healey, and secretary to its international department David Ennals, met in Ljubljana and Bled with Yugoslav leaders Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić, Milentije Popović, Mika Špiljak, Miha Marinko, and Vida Tomšič, who again appeared on behalf of the Socialist Alliance. For the greater part the talks were focused on foreign policy, particularly on the issues of the arms race, Soviet policy, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the German question, and other current international policy issues of the time. Subsequently, the focus shifted to the Yugoslav internal situation, prompting the Labourites to raise some provocative questions with their hosts, aimed at understanding the actual nature of the relationship between the Socialist Alliance and the Communist Party, as well as that between the Federal Assembly and Government, the functioning of workers' self-management, the system of economic planning, the responsibilities of the local authorities, the limitations on the freedom of speech, etc. During the conversation, Gaitskell repeatedly expressed his disagreement with the absence of political opposition in Yugoslavia and disapproval of the Yugoslav voting system, and considered the announced expansion of the decentralisation of power as well as of the competence of workers' councils and self-management in communes nonviable, impractical and, in the event of their hypothetical translation into practice, as leading to localism and anarchy.⁵³

At the end of the discussion, Gaitskell opened the Djilas' case. Kardelj argued that Djilas was an ambitious and power-hungry man whose actions practically forced the authorities to imprison him. Gaitskell kept pushing, stating that it was the Djilas' case that caused the deterioration of the relations between the Labour Party and Yugoslavia and saying he wanted to overcome that, but needed clear answers to do so. He also asked Kardelj what would have happened in Yugoslavia if Djilas had not been imprisoned. Kardelj's reply was that it would have aggravated the internal political situation and could have led to "an intervention from outside, / ... / because the

52 Ibid., 43.

53 AJ 507, IX, 133/II-247, Komisija za mednarodne odnose i veze CK SKJ, Stenografski zapisnik razgovora izmedju jugoslovenskih funkcionera SZDLJ i delegacije britanskih laburista u Ljubljani i na Bledu, 22.–23. 8. 1960, Zabeleška o razgovorima izmedju pretstavnika SSRNJ i Laburističke partije Velike Britanije, 22.–23. 8. 1960.

door to a discussion about the most various controversial political issues would have been opened”,⁵⁴ adding that time had proved them right, not Djilas. The Labourites insisted that the Djilas’ case was a matter of principle in relation to which the right and left wings of the Labour Party held the same position – that it was unacceptable to imprison a person because of his conviction or because he publicly expressed an opinion that was opposed to the views of the ruling party. Despite political and ideological divergences, the debate ended in friendly and conciliatory tones, and with a conclusion that although the perspectives of the two sides differed in many ways, there still existed a common interest that warranted further cooperation between the parties, particularly in the field of foreign policy.

The Djilas Affair somewhat cooled the once warm relationship between the British Labour Party and Yugoslav Communists, but the Labourites would not take the risk of having their relations with Yugoslavia deteriorate for Djilas’ sake. With regard to his case, there were no major differences in the positions of the left and right wings of the Labour Party: Aneurin Bevan and Jennie Lee, Djilas’ staunchest supporters, were in the left faction, and Morgan Phillips was not. Certain more prominent left-wing members even openly criticised Djilas and his work; for example, Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman, who had a very negative opinion of *The New Class*.⁵⁵ But regardless of the different personal views of Djilas, restricting the freedom of expression and incarcerating dissenters was unacceptable to all. Yet the leadership of the Labour Party never went further than standing by the private protests such as those of Bevan in 1954 and Phillips in 1956.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- AJ, Archives of Yugoslavia:
 - AJ, Archives 507, IX, 133/II, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze CK SKJ, Velika Britanija.

Literature:

- Arnitović, Dobrilo. *Milovan Đilas: bibliografija sa hronologijom života i rada*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2008.
- Bekić, Darko. *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu: odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955*. Zagreb: Globus, 1988.
- Bevan, Aneurin. *Umesto straha*. Beograd: Biblioteka Trideset dana, 1952.
- Clissold, Stephen. *Djilas: The Progress of a Revolutionary*. Hounslow, Middlesex: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983.

⁵⁴ AJ 507, IX, 133/II-247, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze CK SKJ, Stenografski zapisnik razgovora između jugoslovenskih funkcionera SZDLJ i delegacije britanskih laburista u Ljubljani i na Bledu, 22.–23. 8. 1960, 119.

⁵⁵ Djokić, “Britain and Dissent in Tito’s Yugoslavia,” 383.

- Dedijer, Vladimir. *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas: prilozi za biografiju*. Beograd: Prosveta, 1991.
- Djokić, Dejan. "Britain and Dissent in Tito's Yugoslavia: The Djilas Affair, ca. 1956." *European History Quarterly* 36, No. 3 (2006): 371–95.
- Đilas, Milovan. "Zveza ali partija," *Ljudska pravica–Borba*, 4. 1. 1954.
- Đilas, Milovan. *Druženje s Titom*. Beograd: Zaslón, 1990.
- Đilas, Milovan. *Nesavršeno društvo: (i dalje od Nove klase)*. Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1990.
- Đilas, Milovan. *Pad nove klase: povest o samorazaranju komunizma*. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1994.
- Đilas, Milovan. *Vlast i pobuna: memoari*. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2009.
- Đorgović, Momčilo. *Đilas: vernik i jeretik*. Beograd: Akvarijus, 1989.
- Edemskii, Andrej. "The Role of Milovan Djilas in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations 1944–1954." In: *The Balkans in the Cold War: Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict*, edited by Vojislav G. Pavlović, 185–219. Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2011.
- Foot, Michael. *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography, Vol. 2: 1945–1960*. London: Davis-Poynter, 1973.
- Goldstein, Slavko. "Predgovor: Povratak Milovana Đilasa u Hrvatsku." In: Đilas, Milovan. *Vlast i pobuna: memoari*. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2009.
- Ivešić, Tomaž. "Padec Milovana Đilasa." In: *Milovan Đilas, Anatomija neke morale in 19 znamenitih člankov (oktober 1953 – januar 1954)*, edited by Tomaž Ivešić, 131–85. Ljubljana: Inštitut Nove revije, 2015.
- Kalezić, Vasilije. *Đilas, miljenik i otpadnik komunizma*. Beograd: Zodne, 1988.
- Laković, Ivan. *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958*. Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006.
- Miletić, Aleksandar V. "Prijem delegacije britanskih laburista kod maršala Tita u okviru njihove prve posete Jugoslaviji, 1950. godine." *Tokovi istorije* 1 (2011): 137–64.
- Miletić, Aleksandar V. "Unrealised Nordic Dream: Milovan Đilas and the Scandinavian Socialists." *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2015): 89–106.
- Muravchik, Joshua. "The Intellectual Odyssey of Milovan Djilas." *World Affairs* 145, No. 4 (1983): 323–46.
- Nikolić, Kosta and Srđan Cvetković. *Rađanje jeretika: suđenje Milovanu Đilasu i Vladimiru Dedijeru 1955*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2011.
- Petranović, Branko, Ranko Končar and Radovan Radonjić, eds. *Sednice Centralnog komiteta KPJ: 1948–1952*. Beograd: Komunist, 1985.
- Pirjavec, Jože. *Tito in tovariši*. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2011.
- Režek, Mateja. "Defeat of the First Party Liberalism and the Echo of 'Djilatism' in Slovenia." *Slovene Studies* 28, No. 1–2 (2006): 67–78.
- Režek, Mateja. "Vroča jesen 1956: sueška kriza, madžarska vstaja in vloga Jugoslavije." *Annales, Series historia et sociologia* 24, No. 4 (2014): 601–14.
- Režek, Mateja. *Med resničnostjo in iluzijo: slovenska in jugoslovanska politika v desetletju po sporu z Informbirojem (1948–1958)*. Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005.
- Rusinow, Dennison. *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.
- Spahnjak, Katarina. "Velika Britanija i 'slučaj Đilas' 1954." In: *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961: zbornik radova*, edited by Slobodan Selinić, 350–62. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008.
- Stanić, Veljko. "Unutrašnji emigrant: političke ideje Milovana Đilasa 1954–1989." *Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne* 6 (2014): 213–29.
- Štrbac, Čedomir. "Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950." In: *Jugoslovensko-britanski odnosi*, edited by Petar Kačavenda, 331–41. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988.
- Tošić, Desimir. *Ko je Milovan Đilas?: disidentstvo 1953–1995*. Beograd: Otkrovenje, 2003.
- Unkovski-Korica, Vladimir. "The Yugoslav Communists' Special Relationship with the British Labour Party 1950–1956." *Cold War History* 14, No. 1 (2014): 23–46.

Mateja Režek

**MILOVAN DJILAS AND THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY,
1950–1960**

SUMMARY

After the conflict with the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslav leaders began to search for alternative international connections in the West. In this context, they tried to restore their own credibility in the eyes of the Western socialist and social democratic parties, whereby the most powerful Western European social democratic party, the British Labour Party, proved to be the most suitable partner both in the fields of foreign policy and ideology. Official contacts between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists in the disguise of the Popular Front, later the Socialist Alliance of the Working People, were established in 1950, which was followed by a brief, but vivacious period of exchange of ideas and views on the development of socialism in the early 1950s. Discussions between Yugoslav leaders and the British Labourites showed a considerable deviation of Yugoslav politics from the crude dogmatism of the early post-war years, but that should not be regarded only as a pragmatic attempt of the Yugoslav leaders to gain sympathies of the Western Left, certainly not in the case of Milovan Djilas. As President of the Commission for International Relations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Djilas played a key role in the dialogue with the British Labourites, and through personal meetings and correspondence, he and the leader of the left-wing of the Labour Party, Aneurin Bevan, formed a personal friendship.

In the first half of the 1950s, Djilas' illusions about the communist ideology and the Yugoslav socialism were gradually dispelled, and he became increasingly enthusiastic about democratic socialism. When, after Stalin's death in 1953, the top leadership of the Yugoslav Party experienced the prevailing influence of those who advocated hard-line policies and saw political liberalisation as the beginning of the end of the Communist Party rule, Djilas was not ready to accept the return to the old path. In a series of articles published in the autumn and winter of 1953/54, he denied the Communist Party no less than the right to a political monopoly, and what is more, he criticised the moral values of the political elite. Due to his views, he was excluded from the Central Committee in January 1954 and stripped of all political functions, and later he spent nine years in prison because of his dissident posture and the publication of books abroad.

After Djilas' political downfall, once warm relations between the British Labourites and the Yugoslav Communists grew considerably cold, but the leadership of the Labour Party did not want to risk the deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia, and therefore responded with great care when it came to the behaviour of the Yugoslav

authorities towards Djilas. Nevertheless, Aneurin Bevan, his wife Jennie Lee, and Secretary General of the Labour Party Morgan Phillips, who was at the same time President of the Socialist International, were more determined, although none of them went further than trying to act through personal correspondence with Tito. Although Yugoslavia remained an authoritarian state under the leadership of the Communist Party, in the eyes of the West it continued to represent a significant factor in the destabilisation of the Eastern Bloc, and the friendly relationship between the Labour Party and the Yugoslav Communists were primarily based on foreign policy interests of the two parties. In the second half of the 1950s, a pragmatic geopolitical consideration completely overshadowed ideological affinity; the interest of the British Labourites in the Yugoslav self-management experiment decreased significantly, as did the Yugoslav interest in democratic socialism, the idea that Djilas was so passionate about.

Mateja Režek

MILOVAN ĐILAS IN BRITANSKA LABURISTIČNA STRANKA, 1950–1960

POVZETEK

Po sporu z Informbirojem leta 1948 so jugoslovanski voditelji začeli iskati alternativne mednarodnopolitične povezave na Zahodu. V tem kontekstu so si skušali povrniti tudi verodostojnost v očeh zahodnih socialističnih in socialdemokratskih strank, pri čemer se je tako s političnega kot ideološkega vidika kot najprimernejši partner pokazala najmočnejša zahodnoevropska socialdemokratska stranka – britanska Laburistična stranka, ki je bila takrat tudi vladna stranka v Veliki Britaniji. Uradni stiki med Laburistično stranko in jugoslovanskimi komunisti v preobleki Ljudske fronte, kasneje Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva, so bili vzpostavljeni leta 1950, čemur je v začetku petdesetih let sledilo kratko, a živahno obdobje izmenjave idej in pogledov na razvoj socializma. Razprave jugoslovanskih voditeljev z britanskimi laburisti so kazale na precejšen odmik jugoslovanske politike od surovega dogmatizma prvih povojnih let, česar ne moremo pripisati zgolj pragmatičnim prizadevanjem jugoslovanskih voditeljev, da bi si pridobili simpatije zahodne levice, zagotovo ne v primeru Milovana Đilasa. Ta je kot predsednik Komisije za mednarodne odnose CK ZKJ odigral ključno vlogo v dialogu z britanskimi laburisti, skozi medsebojna srečanja in dopisovanja pa se je med njim in voditeljem levega krila Laburistične stranke Aneurinom Bevanom stkalo tudi osebno prijateljstvo.

Đilas je v prvi polovici petdesetih let postopoma izgubljal iluzije glede komunistične ideologije in jugoslovanske različice socializma ter se čedalje bolj spogledoval z demokratičnim socializmom. Ko so po Stalinovi smrti leta 1953 v jugoslovanskem

partijskem vrhu znova prevladala stališča zagovornikov politike trde roke, ki so v politični liberalizaciji videli začetek konca partijske oblasti, Đilas ni bil pripravljen sprejeti vrnitve na stare tirnice. V seriji člankov, ki jih je objavil jeseni in pozimi 1953/54, je komunistični partiji odrekel nič manj kot pravico do političnega monopola, za nameček pa se je obregnil še ob moralne vrednote partijske elite. Zaradi svojih stališč je bil januarja 1954 izključen iz CK ZKJ in razrešen vseh političnih funkcij, zaradi svoje disidentske drže in objave knjig v tujini pa je kasneje preživel devet let v zaporu.

Po Đilasovem političnem padcu so se nekoč topli odnosi med britanskimi laburisti in jugoslovanskimi komunisti občutno ohladili, toda vodstvo Laburistične stranke ni želelo tvegati poslabšanja odnosov z Jugoslavijo, zato se je na ravnanje jugoslovanskih oblasti z Đilasom odzivalo zelo previdno. Bolj odločni so bili Aneurin Bevan in njegova žena Jennie Lee ter generalni sekretar Laburistične stranke Morgan Phillips, hkrati predsednik Socialistične internacionale, vendar nihče od njih ni šel dlje od osebne korespondence s Titom. Čeprav je Jugoslavija ostajala avtoritarna država pod vodstvom komunistične partije, je v očeh Zahoda še vedno predstavljala pomemben dejavnik destabilizacije vzhodnega bloka, prijateljski odnosi med Laburistično stranko in jugoslovanskimi komunisti pa so temeljili predvsem na zunanjepolitičnih interesih obeh strani. V drugi polovici petdesetih let je pragmatični geopolitični premislek povsem prevladal nad ideološko afiniteto. Zanimanje britanskih laburistov za jugoslovanski samoupravni eksperiment je občutno upadlo, zamrl pa je tudi jugoslovanski interes za demokratični socializem, nad katerim se je tako navduševal Đilas.

Aleš Gabrič

Jože Pučnik on a Path to Becoming a Dissident

IZVLEČEK

JOŽE PUČNIK NA POTI DO DISIDENTA

Primer obračuna z Revijo 57 konec 50-ih let je bil eden najbolj razvpitih sporov slovenskih komunistov z mlajšo generacijo intelektualcev, ki so po drugi svetovni vojni oblikovali svoj svetovni nazor. Jože Pučnik je med somišljeniki, ki so pozornost pritegnili s svojo ostrino, še posebej izstopal. Že med študijem je v svojih člankih v Reviji 57 kritiziral režim. V najbolj spornem članku je analiziral razhajanja med idejami vladajoče elite in realnostjo ter med miselnostjo in delom komunistov dve desetletji prej, ko so delovali nezakonito, in po vojni, ko so se utrdili na oblasti. Konec leta 1958 in v začetku 1959 je bila Revija 57 večkrat tarča kritik vodilnih politikov in tema številnih sej visokih organov. Politiki so neprestano ponavljali, da gre za skupino mlajših intelektualcev, ki da je snovala ilegalno sovražno organizacijo, širila protidržavno propagando in dilasovstvo, pozivala delavce k štrajku itd. Višek obračuna je bilo sojenju Pučniku 30. marca 1959, v katerem je bil obsojen na devet let hude zaporne kazni.

Ključne besede: Jože Pučnik, Revija 57, intelektualci, komunistični režim, Slovenija

ABSTRACT

The case of settling scores with Revija 57 at the end of 50's is one of the most infamous disputes of the Communist government in Slovenia with a younger generation of intellectuals who had shaped their worldview after WWII. Jože Pučnik stood out among its contributors,

* Research Counsellor, PhD, Institute of Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, ales.gabric@inz.si

who attracted attention with the sharpness of mind. The criticism of the regime was during his study reflected in Pučnik's articles in the *Revija 57* magazine. In the most controversial article Pučnik analysed the discrepancies between the ideas of the ruling elite and reality, and between the mentality and the work of the Communists two decades earlier, when they were still operating illegally, and after the war, when they consolidated their official power. At the end of 1958 and in early 1959, the *Revija 57* magazine was repeatedly targeted by the leading politicians and became the subject of numerous sessions held by high-level authorities. The politicians reiterated that the magazine were a group of young intellectuals, who formed an illegal hostile organization, spread anti-state propaganda and djilasism, called on workers to go on strikes etc. The encounters and intimidations finally escalated in a trial held on 30 March 1959, in which Jože Pučnik was sentenced to nine years of severe imprisonment.

Key words: Jože Pučnik, *Revija 57*, intellectuals, communist regime, Slovenia

Contributor to the *Revija 57* Magazine with a Police Record

The case of settling scores with *Revija 57* is one of the most infamous disputes of the Communist regime with a younger generation of intellectuals who had shaped their world view after WWII. Jože Pučnik stood out among its contributors, who attracted attention with the sharpness of mind. His life experience distinguished him from most of the magazine's associates, as he had already experienced close encounters with the state security. As a grammar school student, he demonstrated the political aspect of his work when, due to disagreement with actions taken by the youth organization, he left the organisation and started publishing the *Iskanja* bulletin with a few of his friends. *Iskanja* was mostly a literary newspaper published by students without official permission and with articles written under pseudonyms. The unnamed author of the first issue editorial published in January 1951 was Jože Pučnik. This was confirmed decades later, when he said: "I'm still proud of being the first person to write an introductory article, a sort of a programme that was to a certain extent, oppositional and, of course, slightly romantic."¹

In fact, said editorial published in *Iskanja* stands out due to its sharpness of thought. A few years after the war, it was not normal for someone to write about the fact that the psyche of "today's man is chained in the shackles of legitimised violence". "The autocrat is trying to destroy the close ties among people," wrote the editor, and the reader could only smile at the thought of who this autocrat could be. "Plain speech is banned," was the motto of the editor, which was followed by a deliberation on fear and courage in the hearts of the people, all this just a year and a half before these exact two words,

¹ Janko Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik* (Ljubljana: Emonica, 1990), 24.

which appeared in the title of Edvard Kocbek's collection of novellas, insulted those in authority. In his outline of the situation at the time, Pučnik highlighted the violence of the government in the form of icy concrete of solitary confinement units, violent hands, "empty words accompanied by a hypocritical smile", and a "tense barbed wire resting on bloody bayonets" encircling it all. In order to overcome all of these issues, the editorial called for poetry and openness, so "that we would release from his violent numbness the healthy vital force and with it a decisive requirement for a free, open and beautiful word".²

A Socially Engaged Student

Pučnik then had to leave grammar school with several other colleagues and was forbidden to attend final exams. However, the punishment was subsequently reduced, and after returning from military service and completing secondary education, Pučnik enrolled as a student at the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana.³ He was active in the *Students' Union* (*Zveza študentov*) and in debates that brought him closer to the circle of the *Revija S7* magazine. He wrote several articles for a newspaper about the state of affairs in the society in Yugoslavia at the time. Although Pučnik was no different than others in voicing criticism, his words were usually very direct and easy to understand, while the articles of some other writers had to be read between the lines. He also differed from the central circle of the *Revija S7* magazine due to the social class from which he originated. While other rebels mostly originated from the bourgeoisie, from financially well-established backgrounds, which was especially the case with children of political officials, he came from a farming environment and was able to witness the poverty of the farming class from up close. He also differed by the fact that he had already faced the work of the police, although the thought of having to encounter police was also not foreign to many of his contemporaries. Janko Kos, for example, heard after his controversial discussions with Zihelr that it was allegedly discussed at party meetings whether or not to imprison him, but he was taken under the wing by two intellectuals from the upper political circles, Ferdo Kozak and Josip Vidmar.⁴ In early 1958, Pučnik's social engagement also led him to join the League of Communists of Slovenia, a move which elicited extremely controversial responses. When he informed his colleagues of this decision, he had a sense that "they would beat me up", while Primož Kozak asked him in private whether he was a police agent.⁵

The decision to join the political party in power provoked such unusual responses among his colleagues because it contradicted everything they thought and fought for. Their articles and conversations had a political note and criticised the system, opposed

2 Author's archives *Iskanja*, No. 1, January 1951, 1, 2. A copy of the newspaper was sent to me by the son of Jože Pučnik, Gorazd Pučnik, for which I would herewith like to extend my sincere gratitude.

3 SIAS 1931, t. e. 1146, 217, 218, 1, 2.

4 Janko Kos, *Umetniki in meščani: spominjanja* (Ljubljana: Beletrina, 2015), 166.

5 Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 24.

the values of the government, and, to an extent, also the value system of their parents, as children of politicians were also in their ranks. The criticism of the regime was also reflected in Pučnik's articles in the *Revija 57* magazine. In an article titled *The Moral Roots of the Personality Cult* from 1957, he devoted himself to this phenomenon in the Soviet Union, but clearly wrote among other things: "The problem of the personality cult is a general social problem in socialist systems and is not related only to Stalinism or the Eastern bloc."⁶ In the article *The Society and the State* from the same year, he touched upon the relationship of the individual with the society at large and advocated the rights of the individual because "the liberation of a person is a release from everything that is above and beyond them, be it God, a monarch or a state."⁷ In an article titled *Towards Freedom*, Pučnik emphasized the European tradition of values, embedded Karl Marx into it, and concluded with a reflection on freedom within the specific reality in Yugoslavia. Although he emphasized that, after the political revolution, there was a time to consolidate the new legal system, he also warned as follows: "The legal and political changes brought about by the new system are in themselves insufficient." The rights were all too often left at a formal level and could not be exercised by individuals in their actual lives. Values in Yugoslavia, stressed Pučnik, have a long way to go before they will be transformed from theory to reality.⁸

In several articles, Pučnik argued that the state should be built to suit the people and not in a way so as to demand that people to personally submit themselves to the will of the state. Although Pučnik made no references to Tito in the outline of the personality cult, and although he did not point out that a different principle was in place in Yugoslavia when emphasizing the rights of the individual in relation to the state, it was clear to readers that his ideas were not only about general problems, but about problems that people faced at home at every step. Pučnik's articles reveal a person whose views on social issues were quite different from those of the government and who also openly advocated these principles in public.

The leadership of the League of Communists of Slovenia discussed the issues raised by *Revija 57* more seriously for the first time at the meeting of the ideological committee on 26 November 1957. The rise of criticism at *Revija 57* was evident by the mere fact that, in the case of its predecessor, a magazine called *Beseda*, communist ideologists only attacked its ideological premises, while in the case of *Revija 57*, they also talked about the integration of informal groups that could, in the future, create a political opposition block. The *Revija 57* team was accused of being a part of the younger generation which had not yet comprehended the great changes occurring in the society after 1945 and which lacked criticism when assessing the western society. From this point of view, *Revija 57*, according to the party leaders, had an overly strong influence on the students of the Faculty of Arts. Ideologists found the power of the *Revija 57* circle at the humanities departments especially dangerous, as it hindered

6 Jože Pučnik, *Članki in spomini 1957–1985* (Maribor: Obzorja, 1986), 9.

7 Ibid., 21.

8 Ibid., 39, 40.

the League of Communists of Slovenia in its planned transformation of the university according to its own taste and its indirect (ideological) influence on the future generations of intellectuals.⁹ The government was able to exercise more political pressure on *Revija 57* than on the *Beseda* magazine because the former had, in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Publishing, a formal publisher. However, the Yugoslavian Federation of Students in Ljubljana did not utilise this power, as publisher Janez Vrhunc, according to those in power, did not play his role, since he did not prevent the publication of any article that the ideologists assessed as controversial or inadequate. The University Committee of the League of Communists therefore dismissed Janez Vrhunc and in March 1958 appointed in his place Rado Jan, the secretary of the basic organization of the League of Communists at the Faculty of Arts.¹⁰

Those working for the *Revija 57* magazine were aware of the political connotations of their work. Pučnik mentioned that he and the circle of colleagues, including Janko Kos, Taras Kermauner, Veljko Rus, Primož Kozak and others, held “many political discussions.”¹¹ One such conversation, which carried on long into the night, took place in the summer of 1958 at Primož Kozak’s home. There, it was agreed that everybody of them would write contributions on the social and political reality of the time. However, one should not ignore a fact that those describing Pučnik’s work have so far not emphasised. The agreement among the young intellectuals came to an end shortly after the seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Ljubljana in April 1958. Party ideologists saw the event as a turning point because of the new programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia that was adopted there. On the one hand, the programme offered some novelties introduced into socialism by Yugoslavian communists after the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union a decade earlier, but on the other hand, the ruling party’s announcement was about the manner in which the society and the state would be developed in the following period. The programme was written at a time of newly aggravated relations with the Soviet Union and in light of the discontent shown by other communist countries. The Congress was important for the internal political scene because it was the first time that the topic of relations between Yugoslav nations was addressed at such a high-level event. They added to the traditional political opponents those who allegedly advocated fake liberalism and, by defending the rights of the individual, actually spread anarchism. Attempts to leverage the artistic and scientific sphere in the name of freedom in order to promote anti-socialist ideas were also met with contempt.¹²

In such circumstances, any criticism directed at the party and the state (and, indirectly, at the new programme of the ruling political party) was even less welcome than usual. What is more, such criticism fit neither the Yugoslavian government, which was

9 Aleš Gabrič, *Socialistična kulturna revolucija: slovenska kulturna politika 1953 – 1962* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995), 269-71.

10 Mateja Režek, “Ideološko ozadje ukinitve Revije 57.” *Nova revija* 13, No. 151/152 (1994), 196.

11 Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 26.

12 Mateja Režek, *Med resničnostjo in iluzijo: slovenska in jugoslovanska politika v desetletju po sporu z Informbirojem: (1948–1958)* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005), 191–202.

afraid that other countries might utilise it as evidence that citizens were dissatisfied with the state, nor the Slovenian authorities, which, in the period of intensified inter-ethnic relations, wanted to have Slovenian intellectuals as allies rather than critics of state policies.

An agreement by the *Revija 57* authors to write and publish contributions on the current social situation was therefore made in the wake of unfavourable political conditions. Only Jože Pučnik, who was the only one to put his views on paper, fulfilled the commitment made to his friends to write articles on the social situation at the time. He already had a good draft in his drawer because he had written an article about the party for the *Naši razgledi* magazine, which he had sent to the members of the editorial board to read. Pučnik was received by Vlado Vodopivec, the then Secretary of State for Culture and Education, and, according to Pučnik, Vodopivec said something like this: “This article is interesting because you are right. But we are approaching a new phase of Stalinism. Please remove this article, we cannot publish it. This is what I wanted to say to you in a friendly manner.” After speaking to his friends, Pučnik rewrote the article and offered it to *Revija 57* to be published, but even the magazine had reservations about whether to publish such a sharp text. Ultimately, the majority decided to publish it, and the representative of the magazine’s founder in the editorial board, Rado Jan, assumed a behind-the-scenes censorship role and prevented the publication of the article. Pučnik initially responded by saying that, in accordance with the old tradition, they should publish some empty white pages in order to make it clear to the readers that the authorities prevented the publication of some of the material confirmed by editors.¹³

In a controversial article titled *Our Social Reality and Our Illusions*,¹⁴ Pučnik analysed the discrepancies between the ideas of the ruling elite and reality, and between the mentality and the work of the Communists two decades earlier, when they were still operating illegally, and after the war, when they consolidated their official power. According to Pučnik, after the Communist Party came to power, it suffered a severe crisis from which it could not recover, since on the one hand, it formally wanted to be nothing more but society’s ideological leader, but on the other hand, it completely merged with the government in real life. Although the government relied on the rule of the people, the split between its ideology and the people was growing deeper, wrote Pučnik, and asked the question: “It goes without saying that much of the blame for such a social atmosphere in Slovenia rests with the Party and autocratic forums and their antagonistic understanding of society. Distrust and extreme tension, their constant sense of the ‘people’s power’ being in jeopardy, and suspicious speculations about the constant presence of ‘enemies to our socialist social system’ have now become chronic. One often asks themselves: Do these people have even the slightest sense that they live among their own people and in a state community in which they also are the holders of power?”¹⁵

13 Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 27.

14 SIAS 1931, t. e. 1146, 217, 218, 64–73. Pučnik, *Članki in spomini*, 50–70.

15 Pučnik, *Članki in spomini*, 69.

The Government Exercises Power over Revija 57

Albeit Pučnik's article was by no means a real cause for the government's actions, the authorities used said article as a reason for exerting pressure on a group of young intellectuals. In July 1958, the editorial board of *Revija 57* was notified that the *Secretariat for Culture and Education of Slovenia* proposed the removal of their subsidy, so in the next few months the Board repeatedly appealed to the competent state body, either through personal contacts or in writing, to prevent this.¹⁶ However, it was not successful, since an official proposal presented in September 1958 by the *Fund for the Promotion of the Publishing Activity* at the *Council of Culture and Education of Slovenia*, listed *Revija 57* among those magazines the subsidies of which were to be withdrawn. The *Council of Culture and Education of Slovenia* rejected the proposal after a stormy debate. However, the Council supported the proposal of its own President, Boris Kocijančič, to keep subsidizing the magazine until the end of the year, when "both the magazine and the *Students' Union* would have to seriously reconsider the criteria which led the commission to make a proposal to withdraw the subsidy". This was why *Revija 57* could not "count on a subsidy in the coming year if the ideas discussed in the magazine deviated from our cultural policy".¹⁷ The editorial board of the *Revija 57* magazine was thus threatened to no longer publish politically undesired articles, otherwise they would lose the subsidy at the end of 1958. In the political reality of the time, this would have resulted in a cancellation.

The debate spread to forums which were supposed to oversee *Revija 57*. On 4 October 1958, the *Central Committee of the People's Youth Organisation of Slovenia* and the *University Committee of the Students' Union* met at a joint session. It was deemed that *Revija 57* did not deal with real problems of the present time. When a youth organisation official provided the simple fact "that *Revija 57*, which is the bulletin of the *Students' Union*, is reaching beyond the university by addressing current issues",¹⁸ he pointed out either intentionally or unintentionally something that the government feared the most.

In October 1958, only a month before the first proposal was made to cancel *Revija 57*, the government launched a campaign that led to the magazine's ultimate cancellation. As a formal reason, they cited the sharp criticism of society in issues 5–6 of the second year of the magazine, although similar criticism could also be found in previous issues of the magazine. In the above issue, the first sharp criticism was contained right at the beginning, in the editorial. Namely, the editorial touched on the meeting of the *Council for Culture and Education of the Slovenian People's Republic* and the proposal to withdraw its subsidy for *Revija 57*. At the end of the magazine, two articles were published discussing the anniversary of the closing of the *Prešeren Theatre* in Kranj and the resulting negative consequences as well as criticism directed

16 Vital Klabus, "Pričevanje o Reviji 57 in Perspektivah." *Borec* 48, No. 551/552 (1996), 113, 114.

17 Režek, *Ideološko ozadje ukinitve Revije 57*, 198, 199.

18 SI AS 1799, t. e. 83, Zapisnik seje predsedstva CK LMS in uni. odbora ZŠJ, 4 October 1958, 7.

at publishers who, due to their beliefs, refused to accept a poetry collection by Dane Zajc into their programme.¹⁹

Jože Pučnik's *Our Social Reality and our Illusions*, which was just one of the many disruptive articles, but also the most controversial, was deemed by Boris Zihlerl as "djilasovskian". Before it was even printed, the article was given to Zihlerl to read by "a representative of the *Students' Union* in this editorial board", i.e. Rado Jan, who asked Zihlerl "what to do with this article". Zihlerl replied: "You are the representative of the *Students' Union* in this editorial board and if you have given veto to the board, then you have the right to appeal to the person who sent you to this editorial board, that is to the *Students' Union*, to decide in this matter." Zihlerl reported to the leading politicians that "this is exactly what happened and the *Board of Student's Union* rejected the publication of this article". However, because the editorial board threatened to publish an empty page in place of the censored article, "the representative of the *Students' Union* again came to me for advice on what to do".²⁰

In October 1958, police investigators launched an investigation against *Revija 57*. The confiscation proposal no. 5–6 was just the beginning, as it soon became apparent that after the issue that had already been prepared for printing was confiscated at the Kočevje printing house on 31 October 1958, the government authorities would go even further. The publication of the controversial contribution was by no means a sufficient reason for a wider police campaign, since the publication of the article had already been blocked by the representative of the *Students' Union*. Far more had to be done for a more extensive campaign; the campaigns undertaken a decade earlier had been a sign that it would be best for intimidation purposes and for the judicial process as such to focus the investigation on proving the attempts to organize an anti-state political organization. The main target of the investigation was Jože Pučnik, who was arrested on the same day as the magazine issue was seized. House searches were carried out at Pučnik's home and the homes of some of his colleagues, several people from the magazine circles were brought in for questioning, and the *Revija 57* archives were seized from the editor Vital Klabus. Editors Venko Taufer and Vital Klabus complained to the interior affairs bodies and county authorities of the *Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Ljubljana*, which, however, did not affect the decisions made by the government authorities at the highest level. This marked the beginning of long-term interrogations for Pučnik and, at least initially, it was not entirely clear to him what the authorities wanted from him. He did not want to discuss the views of his friends and, during discussions about his contributions, he disagreed with the comments of the investigators who considered these views as calls to anti-government actions.²¹

Because the editors did not yield to political demands and did not agree to withdraw certain articles, on 5 November 1958 the Ljubljana District Court complied

19 SI AS 1589, IK, t. e. 12, *Revija 57*.

20 SI AS 537, t. e. 27, *Seja predsedstva SZDLS*, 6 November, 1958, 47, 48.

21 SI AS 2027, t. e. 14, *Dopis uredništva Revije 57*, 2 November, 1958. SI AS 1589, IK, t. e. 12, *Revija 57* in *Naši nadaljnji ukrepi in rezultati preiskave proti skupini Revija 57*. Rosvita Pesek, *Pučnik* (Celovec: Mohorjeva, 2013), 79–89.

with the request of the public prosecutor and confiscated the magazine.²² The political fate of the magazine and its authors was decided on the following day, on 6 November 1958, at the session of the *Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Slovenia*. Through the following questions, its members indicated the future confrontation with the *Revija 57* magazine: How can the writers of such articles be working as teaching assistants at the university?; Why is such a magazine receiving a subsidy?; Is it an organized campaign to provoke the dissatisfied into a revolt?; It is not true that there are too few magazines because don't young people have the *Mlada pota* magazine?²³

In mid-November 1958, the state security directed the investigation against the (imaginary) illegal organization, which was allegedly founded by Jože Pučnik. After interrogating those working for the magazine, it was established that most of the editorial board agreed with the publication of contributions deemed by the police as "hostile propaganda", namely they agreed that they were preparing the founding of the Založba 1551 publishing house, where they would also publish works by such writers as Sartre, and that they planned to expand the editorial board with "negative elements", such as Lojze Kovačič and Janko Kos. According to a report of the Internal Administration, young intellectuals felt "that the measures are a staged and a non-serious matter which intends to cause anxiety among them, and they must not fall for it". The fact that the magazine was also defended by some prominent cultural workers of the older generation was also seen as a problem. Among them, the Internal Administration first mentioned Josip Vidmar. Vladimir Kralj allegedly said that the affair was triggered by the "anti-cultural people from Kranjska [central part of Slovenia], who will, however, have to quit at the request of Belgrade", while praises for young people also came from the Catholic intellectual circles, i.e. from Anton Vodnik and Edvard Kocbek.²⁴

Jože Pučnik also counted on the possibility that the matter could calm down quite quickly, but he did not know what was happening outside the prison walls. It was not until mid-November, when he was informed that the investigation had been extended pursuant to Article 117 of the Penal Code, which sanctioned illegal association against the state system, that it became clear to him that a nasty confrontation was in sight. Pučnik's activities in the framework of the legally functioning *Students' Union* and clubs at the Faculty started to be categorised as calls to organise. His involvement was seen only as hiding behind an external façade with the interest of spreading his own anti-state ideas. They began to take the words which he wrote in his articles or spoke at forums out of context, especially those that government officials found the most alarming. The word organization invoked fear, because it could imply that anyone else, not just the leaders in the ruling political parties, were able to discuss political matters in the country. Less than a year after the first major workers' strike in socialist Yugoslavia broke out in Trbovlje, government officials found that a mere reference to

22 SIAS 537, t. e. 27, Seja predsedstva SZDLS, 6 November, 1958, 40–42.

23 Ibid., 1958, 40–56.

24 SIAS 1589, IK, t. e. 12, Naši nadaljnji ukrepi in rezultati preiskave proti skupini Revije 57.

the word strike was almost equal to a declaration of war. Six months after the *League of Communists* adopted the best political programme, the leading Communists found any debate on the Constitution or the political system utterly outrageous. For Jože Pučnik, it was hard to comprehend what was he being accused of: “I do not know, for a long time I did not understand what they really wanted. They accused me of setting up an illegal organization, but I felt that they were not convinced about it either.”²⁵

The indications that the police authorities highlighted in their reports for the top government circles in November 1958 were presented by the leading Slovenian Communists in a redacted form at the plenum of the League of Communists of Slovenia on 5 December 1958. They announced a strong response to the activity of those intellectuals of the younger generation who allegedly acted contrary to the interests of the state. Boris Zihlerl spoke about ideological political issues, and although he did not name his opponents, he referred a few times to *Revija 57*, thereby directing his criticism at those who allegedly had too much influence on young people.²⁶ An explanation of the situation concerning the *Revija 57* magazine was given in greater detail by Janez Vipotnik. With regard to Jože Pučnik, he found that he was accepted into the *League of Communists* too quickly and without sufficient consideration. The information that, at the time, “Pučnik was incarcerated due to his anti-state activities”²⁷ was stated by Zihlerl as a simple fact which was not to be questioned. With regard to the 40 people who were considered to be a part of the magazine’s circle, he found that they wanted to “address social problems from the perspective of intellectuals who were oriented towards non-class division” and that they were not completely on the same page in terms of their convictions. The employees of *Revija 57* allegedly committed a serious political violation because “the group wanted to have a literary evening after the strike in Trbovlje, where they wanted to express solidarity with the phenomenon in Trbovlje in a political manner”. Vipotnik described the magazine’s circle using a distinctly political vocabulary and a very negative connotation. Vipotnik tried to prove that *Revija 57* did not have a significant impact on the generation of students, which raised doubts about why the *League of Communists of Slovenia* was so involved in and why it took on a phenomenon that was supposed to be so marginal.²⁸

In December 1958 and in early 1959, the *Revija 57* magazine was repeatedly targeted by the leading politicians and became the subject of numerous sessions held by high-level authorities. The politicians reiterated that the magazine were a group of young intellectuals who formed an illegal hostile organization, spread anti-state propaganda and djiliasism, called on workers to go on strikes etc. The process was accompanied by strong media campaigns, but the opposing side did not get a chance to defend itself. The interrogations continued, and the two editors, Klabus and Taufer, as well as Taras Kermauner were each sentenced to ten days in prison. The encounters

25 Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 27.

26 SI AS 1589, IK, t. e. 7, Stenografski zapisnik IX. plenarne seje CK ZKS, 5 December, 1958, 2–13.

27 Ibid., 32.

28 Ibid., 32–36.

and intimidations finally escalated in a trial held on 30 March 1959, in which Jože Pučnik was sentenced to nine years of severe imprisonment.²⁹

Finding Causes for a Strict Confrontation with *Revija 57* and Pučnik

In the judgment against Jože Pučnik, the court summarized the positions which had been served by the investigators. In a very unconvincing explanation, the court confirmed that there had been an attempt to set up an illegal organization, which allegedly intended to unconstitutionally overthrow the government. By referring to the article *Our Social Reality and our Illusions*, they attempted to prove the hostile propaganda and the defendant's negative attitude towards the social reality.³⁰ After the trial, Pučnik's friends congratulated him for his strong posture; however, this triggered additional measures inflicted by the government authorities.

Subsequent assessments of the judicial confrontation with Jože Pučnik vary, but there is little doubt about some common highlighted points, i.e. that the trial was a judicial construct and an attempt to intimidate the young generation of intellectuals and that the imposed sentence was disproportionately high even by the then case-law criteria. Some also emphasize the fact that Pučnik was the only one without a strong bourgeois and political support base, and therefore, in the company of friends who had fathers in prominent positions, he served as an example to everyone else of what might have happened had they continued along this path. However, by overly limiting the issue to the influence exerted by important fathers, one can easily miss some important emphases. As has already been pointed out, the communist government saw the group related to the *Revija 57* magazine, contrary to its predecessor, the *Beseda* magazine, as very political. However, members of the young generation of intellectuals did not see themselves in the role of (political) opposition at that time. Especially not Jože Pučnik, who had been, after all, a member of the *League of Communists of Slovenia* until his arrest and who, through legal forms of action, had tried to express what the party should correct if it wanted to act as a workers' avant-garde. Unlike those who are too quick to label themselves using terms such as opposition, dissidence, or a dissident in describing their own past, Peter Božič's assessment was based on contemplation and analysis, which attempted to logically embed the concept of the term opposition into the context of overall events. Božič saw the arrival of Pučnik to *Revija 57* as a turning point after which the debate spread from only being in the cultural sphere to integrating cultural and social notions by placing them "into a realistic social space opposite the official one, which was still marked with the ideology of the PARTY". Therefore, according to Božič, Pučnik's role was marked "with the different content framework

29 SIAS 1589, III, t. e. 68, Informacije, No. 49, 11 March 1959, 6, No. 57, 9 April 1959, 10 and No. 59, 18 April, 1959, 4. Klabus, "Pričevanje o Reviji 57 in Perspektivah," 116, 117.

30 Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 68–74.

of *Revija 57* alone, and thus the first alternative to the party programme as well as the opposition were also de facto created.³¹

However, a participant in numerous discussions of this generation, Janko Kos, pointed out that there must be, nevertheless, a longer journey from criticising the government and drawing ideas that were in glaring contradiction with the party programme to developing a comprehensive alternative programme: “Can I gather some kind of a new ideology from all of this – a political, social and cultural ideology that could be set against the party doctrine? I doubt it, simply because no one has ever formulated it in any obvious way.”³² In the title of Kos’ book describing the events, he used the term *disputants* for the group to which he belonged. The notion of disputing was best used by Jure Ramšak in his doctoral thesis in which he analysed social criticism in Slovenia during a somewhat later period, i.e. the 1970s.³³

The protagonists from the *Revija 57* magazine are unanimous in assessing that Jože Pučnik was a step ahead of others, and that he, in addition to writing, acting as an organizer of talks, clubs, seminars, and activities in the framework of legal forums, the League of Communists, and the *Students’ Union*, also performed purely (political) organizational work. However, regarding assessments of whether this was politics or, more precisely, political opposition, opinions differ, even to the point of arguing that the entry into the real political scene can only be placed in the 1980s and the 57th issue of the *Nova revija* magazine, and that before that, there were only conceptual fragments that were not yet political enough in the area of activities by magazines that mostly dealt with culture.³⁴

The other side, i.e. the top of the ruling *League of Communists of Slovenia*, was much more uniform in its assessments of *Revija 57*. The word opposition was expelled from publicly used political vocabulary, but it was used several times when the narrow circles of the highest political authorities discussed their actual and alleged opponents. In the 1950s, high-level political circles were more or less clear that they no longer had to fear the pre-war generation of politicians. This applies both to those who, after the experience of the early post-war years, became passive, and those who experienced communist prison. Although the police monitored potential opponents of the government for many years, officers of the State Security Administration (UDBA) kept getting an increasing number of reports on how various older-generation politicians continued to meet with old political figures, but that these were merely meetings with drinking buddies to comment current events. People who faced the repressive measures of the post-war government were even worse off, as they had to face everyday existential problems after their release from prison. The decreasing need for controlling the older generation of regime opponents started to divert the attention of the police and politicians to the younger critics of the government.

31 Peter Božič, “Moja prva srečanja s Pučnikom,” in: Lorenci, *Jože Pučnik*, 89.

32 Janko Kos, *Ideologi in oporečniki: spominjanja* (Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete; Beletrina, 2015), 85.

33 Jure Ramšak, “Oporečništvo v samoupravnem socializmu: vsebina in položaj družbene kritike v Sloveniji, 1972–1980” (doktorska disertacija, Univerza na Primorskem, 2013).

34 Cf. Taras Kermauner, “Epilog ali nov začetek?,” *Borec* 48, No. 551–552 (1996): 246.

Among them, those who dealt with political issues came to the forefront. According to party ideologists, they were by no means true Marxists. The attention of the leaders in the country was increasingly directed to the new generation raised in the new Yugoslavia, which was more indifferent to pre-war predicaments and very sensitive to deviations in post-war reality. The Slovenian Party leadership started considering the possibility that the young generation of intellectuals could be seen as a new type of opposition in 1957, one year after the political turmoil in Hungary and Poland. The main cultural ideologist of the Communist Party of Slovenia, Boris Zihelr, reported to the top leaders of the *League of Communists of Slovenia* that the events had also had a great influence on intellectuals in Yugoslavia and that the leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about the direction of the controversy: "Not only in Slovenia, but also elsewhere, cultural workers express the opinion that it would be necessary to revise the points on the leading role of the working class in the process of building socialism and in today's social development, as recent events have shown that the leading factor in this regard are intellectuals, especially writers. This doubt was also expressed in interviews with a delegation of Polish writers whom our writers first asked how they were preparing the October events, and further in discussions regarding the new *League of Communists of Yugoslavia* programme."³⁵

The fear of denying the relevant fundamental principles on which the communist authorities were based was more and more present. These words reflected the thought that the avant-garde should no longer be based on the working class or the party that was supposed to be its personification, but on intellectuals. Such a view of the social involvement of the young generation of intellectuals was not limited to narrow-minded ideologists, such as Boris Zihelr, but was also adopted by political pragmatists, such as Boris Kraigher. In light of the scandal with the *Revija 57* magazine, he did not agree with the assessment that the *Revija 57* team did not have a political concept and that the concept was not the driving force of their operation. The basis for his opinion was that "these people sometimes react inappropriately to certain political measures, which means that it is then truly necessary to prevent the tendencies that led the Hungarian revolution to become a counter-revolution from becoming a reality in Slovenia as well". Due to a quite strong sense of fear that things might (in the future) go beyond that which was allowed, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia warned that even the good thoughts that grow in the wrong garden could trigger unfavourable consequences because "the Hungarian anti-Stalinist campaign brought the struggle directly into the arms of counter-revolution, although I do not agree with the way the Russians responded to this". In the political glossary of terms used by the leading communists, Kraigher said that good ideas and good initiatives could never hurt anybody. However, it would have presented a double risk if they had given incentive to those inspired by the Western-style multi-party system (in the party jargon, this was also considered a counter-revolution). It could pose a risk within the internal policy as the political monopoly of the ruling party could crumble, and

35 SI AS 1589, IK, t. e. 7, Minutes of the Executive Committee CK ZKS, 14 May, 1957, 6, 7.

the risk within the foreign policy if the tension with the Soviet Union would increase and lead to an unpredictable outcome. The uprisings against the communist authorities in Poland and Hungary of 1956 were therefore a warning to the highest-ranking political leaders that it was better to react more quickly and prevent actions that they considered extremely political. According to Kraigher's estimates, "after the events in those countries, some people in Slovenia found courage when they saw that something can indeed be done, and therefore they are taking certain steps in this direction". Kraigher also remarked that it was perfectly clear to him that those who would think about such moves are no Edvard Kocbek, although Kocbek maintained contacts with people whose names had been recorded in police files. When he thought about the people for whom it would be a mistake to "give them the freedom to act in the name of the freedom of cultural engagement and in the name of democracy", he said that "this completely applies to that guy Pučnik". His articles and his defence for the right of workers to strike were everything that the leading Communists did not want to tolerate in their home yard.³⁶

The Slovenian political leadership thus considered the younger generation of intellectuals in a purely political context, analysed its work using political vocabulary, and ultimately also began to deem it as a political problem. In the 1958 Annual Report of the Ministry of the Interior, i.e. at the time of the cancellation of *Revija 57*, and during preparations for the process against Pučnik, it was clearly recorded for the first time that the old pre-war opposition was no longer the main threat, but that the threat was now coming from elsewhere: "Regarding the hostile propaganda activities of the remnants of bourgeois parties, it is important to emphasize that this propaganda was mainly limited to various discussions and comments, i.e. that there were no organized forms of hostile activity among them, but that the problem is posed by young intellectuals who do not agree with the socialist system in our country."³⁷

This younger generation quite unanimously defended the view that every individual has the right to express their opinion. However, during talks with politicians and in interrogations conducted by investigators, they denied the suspicions and allegations that this was just a step towards establishing an organization aimed at destroying the existing social order. The ruling circles had a completely different opinion. In a special report drawn up by the State Security Directorate during the affair surrounding *Revija 57* for the Slovenian political leaders, the young generation of intellectuals was for the first time seen as potential opposition: "Together with those who are like-minded, they are trying to create an opinion that they are being persecuted as opposition, but constructive and progressive opposition, which is persecuted precisely for this reason by the government. However, by doing so, the government showed it was no longer progressive."³⁸

36 SI AS 537, t. e. 27, Seja predsedstva SZDLS, 6 November, 1958, 52, 53.

37 SI AS 1931, A-13-O, Letno poročilo za leto 1958, 3, 4.

38 SI AS 1589, IK, t. e. 12, Naši nadaljnji ukrepi in rezultati preiskave proti skupini Revije 57, 4.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- SI AS, Arhiv Republike Slovenije:
 - SI AS 537 – Republiška konferenca Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije.
 - SI AS 1589 – Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije.
 - SI AS 1799 – Centralni komite Ljudske mladine Slovenije.
 - SI AS 1931 – Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične republike Slovenije.
 - SI AS 2027 – Društvo slovenskih pisateljev.

Literature:

- Božič, Peter. „Moja prva srečanja s Pučnikom“. In: Lorenci, Janko. *Jože Pučnik*. Ljubljana: Emonica, 1990, 88–93.
- Gabrič, Aleš. Socialistična kulturna revolucija: slovenska kulturna politika 1953 – 1962. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995.
- Kermauner, Taras. “Epilog ali nov začetek?” *Borec* 48, No. 551–552 (1996): 241–52.
- Klabus, Vital. “Pričevanje o Reviji 57 in Perspektivah.” *Borec* 48, No. 551–552 (1996): 111–36.
- Kos, Janko. *Ideologi in oporečniki: spominjanja*. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Beletrina, 2015.
- Kos, Janko. *Umetniki in meščani: spominjanja*. Ljubljana: Beletrina, 2015.
- Lorenci, Janko. *Jože Pučnik*. Ljubljana: Emonica, 1990.
- Pesek, Rosvita. *Pučnik*. Celovec: Mohorjeva, 2013.
- Pučnik, Jože. *Članki in spomini 1957–1985*. Maribor: Obzorja, 1986.
- Ramšak, Jure. “Oporečništvo v samoupravnem socializmu: vsebina in položaj družbene kritike v Sloveniji, 1972–1980.” Doktorska disertacija, Univerza na Primorskem, 2013.
- Režek, Mateja. “Ideološko ozadje ukinitve Revije 57.” *Nova revija* 13, No. 151–152 (1994): 194–206.
- Režek, Mateja. *Med resničnostjo in iluzijo: slovenska in jugoslovanska politika v desetletju po sporu z Informbirojem: (1948–1958)*. Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005.

Aleš Gabrič

JOŽE PUČNIK NA POTI DO DISIDENTA

POVZETEK

Med slovenskimi političnimi zaporniki v času komunističnega režima je Jože Pučnik specifičen primer. Čeprav je sodeloval s številnimi drugimi intelektualci pri ustvarjanju podobe različnih revij, je s svojo kritično ostjo in nato posledično usodo političnega preganjanca predstavljal poseben primer.

Med sodelavci Revije 57, s katerimi je oblast obračunala ob koncu petdesetih let, je izstopal že po tem, da je že imel mesto v policijskem doseju. Leta 1951 je namreč sodeloval v reviji mariborskih srednješolcev *Iskanja*, čemur so sledila zaslivanja sodelavcev revije in grožnje z onemogočanjem nadaljnje šolanja. Po vpisu na Filozofsko fakulteto v Ljubljani je bil agilen v Zvezi študentov in v javnih razpravah, ki so ga približali krogu Revije 57. Za časopis je napisal več prispevkov o tedanjih domačih družbenih razmerah. V kritičnosti Pučnik ni bil izjema, toda njegove besede so bile običajno zelo neposredne, lahko razumljive, medtem ko je bilo pri člankih nekaterih drugih piscev treba brati tudi med vrsticami. Družbena angažiranost je Pučnika v začetku leta 1958 pripeljala tudi do vstopa v Zvezo komunistov, kar je naletelo na burne odzive med sodelavci Revije 57, ki so posumili o vzrokih, ki so Pučnika vodili do takšne odločitve.

V Reviji 57 je v letih 1957 in 1958 Pučnik objavil več kritičnih člankov o aktualnih družbenih in političnih razmerah. Najbolj pa je razburkal stališča sodelavcev in politikov s člankom, v katerem je analiziral razhajanja med idejnimi postavkami vladajoče elite in stvarnostjo ter med miselnostjo in delom komunistov pred dvema desetletjema, ko so še bili v ilegali, in po vojni, ko so se utrdili na oblasti. Oblast je v sklopu širšega obračuna s humanistično inteligenco ob koncu petdesetih let na seznam škodljivih zadev uvrstila tudi krog Revije 57. Ker poskusi mehkega utišanja besed mlajše intelektualne generacije niso uspeli, je oblast posegla po ostrejših metodah. Ob koncu leta 1958 in v začetku 1959 je bila Revija 57 večkrat tarča kritik vodilnih politikov, tema številnih sej visokih organov, očitkov, da gre za skupino mlajših intelektualcev, ki je snovala ilegalno sovražno organizacijo, širila protidržavno propagando in dilasovstvo, pozivala delavce k štrajku, vse skupaj pa je spremljala močna medijska gonja proti reviji. Višek obračuna pa je bil marca 1959 sodni proces proti Jožetu Pučniku, na katerem je bil ta obsojen na devet let zopora. Ostrina obračuna je bila presenetljiva za tedanje slovenske politične razmere. Pogled v zakulisje dogajanj v krogih najpomembnejših slovenskih oblastnih krogov pa pokaže, da je bil ta posledica ocen, v katerih je Uprava državne varnosti mlajšo intelektualno generacijo prvič ocenila kot možno potencialno opozicijo in jo namesto stare garde politikov postavila na prvo mesto med tistimi, ki so jih ocenjevali kot potencialne organizatorje opozicije.

Josip Mihaljević*

Većeslav Holjevac – Forgotten Dissident

IZVLEČEK

VEĆESLAV HOLJEVAC – POZABLJENI DISIDENT

Hrvaški politik Većeslav Holjevac (1917–1970) velja za enega najuspešnejših županov mesta Zagreb. Kljub temu sta njegova osebnost in politično delo javnosti danes malo znana. Njegove zasluge na kulturnem področju so šle večinoma v pozabo, prav tako pa tudi dejstvo, da je bil edenn najpomembnejših hrvaških disidentov. Njegov primer razkriva vprašanje hrvaškega gibanja za nacionalno reformo, znanega pod imenom Hrvaška pomlad. Zaradi močnega značaja ga ni bilo strah braniti lastnih stališč celo v bojih s tovariši komunisti, ki so zasedali pomembnejše funkcije v hierarhiji Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije, kar je povzročilo njegov politični zaton. Članek predstavlja ključne trenutke njegovih disidentskih in političnih nesoglasij s tovariši, zaradi katerih si je v partiji prislužil status odpadnika. Prav tako obravnava trditve, da naj bi Holjevac postal vodja Hrvaške pomladi.

Ključne besede: Većeslav Holjevac, disident, Zveza komunistov Jugoslavije, Komunistična partija Hrvaške, Hrvaška pomlad

ABSTRACT

Croatian politician Većeslav Holjevac (1917–1970) has been remembered as one of the most successful mayors of the city of Zagreb. However, his character and political work are scarcely known to the public today. His merits in the cultural sphere are mostly forgotten, as well as the fact that he was one of the most important Croatian dissidents. His case delineates the issue of the Croatian national reform movement known as the Croatian Spring. Due to his solid character he was not afraid to defend his standpoints, even in the fights with communist comrades who were higher in the hierarchy of the League of Communists

* Research Fellow, PhD, Croatian Institute of History, Opatička 10, 10000-Zagreb, Croatia, josip@isp.hr

of Yugoslavia, which caused his political decline. The article presents the critical moments of his dissent and political disagreement with his comrades that led him to the role of the party renegade. The article also discusses the claims that Holjevac was to become the leader of the Croatian Spring.

Keywords: Većeslav Holjevac, dissident, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, League of Communists of Croatia, Croatian Spring

Introduction

Većeslav Holjevac is partially known in Croatian history, primarily as one of the most beloved mayors of the City of Zagreb. The public image of Holjevac is mostly positive and often reduced to the successful urban development of Zagreb. His political career was promising at one point, but progressively faded and was finally over in 1967 due to his disagreement with some of his communist comrades who were higher in the hierarchy. In this article, I will try to show the key moments in his life that directed him to the path of the Party renegade. I will try to elucidate the reasons for his political decline and to show what kind of dissident he was.

There is not much written about Većeslav Holjevac as a dissident. Moreover, there are very few scientific papers written about him at all. To date, there is no historiographically relevant biography of his. The only monograph dedicated to him *Većeslav Holjevac: builder, visionary, warrior*, edited by Juraj Hrženjak,¹ includes some valuable articles and data but it cannot be considered a historiographical biography. The most serious monograph about Holjevac is the MA thesis written by Iva Kraljević, who analysed his presidency of the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia (EFC) in the period 1964-1968.² Unfortunately, it has not yet been published as a book, so its availability is quite weak. Holjevac was not much elaborated in the scientific articles as well, except for a few valuable articles by Iva Kraljević³ and the article written by Katarina Spehnjak on Holjevac in 1967.⁴ Besides, information about Holjevac can be found in several obituaries and small articles written in his memory,⁵ of which Slavko Goldstein's was

1 Juraj Hrženjak, ed., *Većeslav Holjevac: graditelj, vizionar, ratnik* (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske; Multigraf Marketing, 2006).

2 Iva Kraljević, "Većeslav Holjevac – predsjednik Matice iseljenika Hrvatske 1964. – 1968" (Magistarski rad, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 2007).

3 Iva Kraljević, "Matica iseljenika Hrvatske 1964. – 1968.," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 41, No. 1 (2009): 71–92. Iva Kraljević, "Uloga Komande grada Zagreba u životu Grada prvih poslijeratnih mjeseci 1945. godine," in: *1945. – Razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), 451–61.

4 Katarina Spehnjak, "Većeslav Holjevac u političkim događajima 1967. godine," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 32, No. 3 (2000): 567–96.

5 The list of obituaries can be found in *Hrvatski biografski leksikon*, Većeslav Holjevac, accessed July 26, 2017, <http://hbl.lzmk.hr/clanak.aspx?id=67>.

the most informative.⁶ Some sporadic information about him can be found in the published diaries and memoirs of his contemporaries.⁷

As far as the available resources are concerned, several important archival funds are consulted for writing this paper. I used three archival funds of the Croatian State Archives (HR HDA). The fund of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) (HR HDA, 1220), the fund of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRC) (HR HDA, 1081) and the fund of the Ministry for the newly exempted territories of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) (HR HDA, 1086). In the State Archives in Zagreb (HR DAZG), I consulted the People's Committee of the City of Zagreb archival fund (HR DAZG, 37). As a source for some of the data, I used the interview Tatjana Holjevac (daughter of Većeslav) gave on the radio show *Historical Controversies*.⁸ I also used Većeslav Holjevac's interviews he gave to the press in the 1960s, as well as some books and articles that directly or indirectly referred to Holjevac.

Military and Political Career

Većeslav Holjevac was born in Karlovac on August 22, 1917, in a family of workers. He attended high school in his native city, but due to the difficult financial situation, he had to quit school and become a commercial assistant. The then difficult situation of the entire working class led him to engage in the struggle for workers' rights, so he soon joined and became an active member of several trade unions. In the summer of 1939 he became a member of the Communist Party of Croatia (CPC),⁹ and in early 1941 he was a member of the CPC's District Committee for Karlovac.¹⁰

At the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia in 1941 he was a soldier of the regular army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia stationed in Zagreb area, near Samobor. After the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia on April 10, 1941, Holjevac organized the escape of a group of prisoners from Samobor and walked more than 50 km to Karlovac.¹¹ As a member of the Military Committee of the CPC's District Committee for Karlovac, Kordun and Banija, he was one of the organizers of the Partisan uprising in Kordun.¹² In the fall of 1942, Holjevac became Commissar of the Second Operation Zone and from the end of 1942 to 1945, the Commissar of the First Corps of the People's Liberation Army of Croatia, which, at the same time, was the Fourth Shock Corps of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.¹³

6 Slavko Goldstein, "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju," *Kritika* 3, No. 14 (1970): 618–27; this article was also published in Hrženjak, *Većeslav Holjevac*.

7 See for example Savka Dabčević Kučar, '71. Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost (Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997).

8 "Povijesne kontroverze" (radio show), *Third program of Croatian Radio*, November 17, 2017.

9 Većeslav Holjevac, *Zapisi iz rodnog grada* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1972), 48.

10 Milan Bekić, Ivo Butković and Slavko Goldstein, *Okrug Karlovac 1941*. (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1965), 21.

11 Holjevac, *Zapisi iz rodnog grada*, 71–84.

12 Bekić, Butković and Goldstein, *Okrug Karlovac 1941*, 238–42.

13 Hrženjak, *Većeslav Holjevac*, 154–57.

When the Partisan units entered Zagreb in May 1945, Holjevac participated in the final battles for the liberation of Trieste and Istria as Commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Yugoslav Army. However, the Command of the City of Zagreb was formed in Topusko during the war operations, and Holjevac was, as a lieutenant general, scheduled to become its commander.¹⁴ He took the command of the City of Zagreb on May 9, 1945.¹⁵ He performed the duty until the end of July 1945 when he was appointed deputy commander (he later became commander) of the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army for Istria and the Slovene Littoral.¹⁶ From 1947 to 1948 he was the head of the Military Mission of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) in Berlin.

In 1948 Holjevac completed his military career and started his political carrier on a high level. He was a member of the Central Committee of the CPC,¹⁷ a member of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (PRC) from 1947 until his death, a member of the Federal Assembly (of the FPRY), and served as a minister in the Federal Government in several mandates.¹⁸ In 1948, he was appointed Minister of the newly established federal Ministry for the Newly Liberated Territories. His primary task was the organization of state administration and economy in Istria and the Slovene Littoral regions that were annexed to the FPRY based on a peace agreement with Italy.¹⁹ He was in charge until 1950 when he was appointed Minister of Labor in the Federal Government. In 1951, he was appointed Minister of Transport and Maritime Affairs of the PRC's Government. In autumn 1952 he became the President of the People's Committee of Zagreb, which was equivalent to today's duty of the mayor of Zagreb.²⁰ Holjevac's mayoral mandate, which lasted more than a decade, was marked by significant projects that accelerated the development of Zagreb.²¹ He was in the mayoral position until the abolition of the People's Committees as administrative-representative bodies in 1963.²²

14 F. Kiseljak, "Zapisi i intervjui Većeslava Holjevca: Tri puta u Zagrebu," *Večernji list* (Zagrebačko izdanje), July 13, 1970, 4.

15 Kraljević, "Uloga Komande grada Zagreba," 452.

16 HR HDA, 1220, Dispatch Books of the Central Committee's Organizational Instructional Administration 1943 – 1946, book No. 1, dispatch No. 1037, July 23, 1945. According to Kraljević, "Uloga Komande grada Zagreba," 460.

17 The Communist Party of Croatia (CPC) changed its name to League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) in 1952.

18 See Holjevac files in the files of the PRC's Parliament members in HR HDA, 1081, box. 1768, 1773, 1778, 1790, 1793.

19 HR HDA, 1086, box. 1.

20 HR DAZG, 37, Sessions of representative bodies, Minutes of the meetings of the People's Committee of the City of Zagreb, book 15, 1952, Short record of the 23rd Session held on October 6-7, 1952.

21 More about his mayoral mandate and city projects see Josip Mihaljević, "Stota obljetnica rođenja Većeslava Holjevca (1917. – 1970.)," *Zagreb moj grad* (Zagreb) 11, No. 64 (2017): 6–11. Ivo Goldstein, "Novo lice grada," in: Goran Hutinec and Ivo Goldstein, *Povijest grada Zagreba*, vol. 2 (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2013), 174–241. Marko Blažević, "Vizionar suvremenog Zagreba," in: *Holjevac, graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, 42–44.

22 The function that was previously performed by the People's Committee was taken over by the City Assembly. The president of the City Assembly took over mayoral duties. Holjevac was not even elected to the City Assembly. HR DAZG, 37, Sessions of representative bodies, Joint Sessions of the City Council and the Council of Producers, book 94.

Party Conflicts and Disagreements

Slavko Goldstein believes that the first signs of Holjevac's disagreements with his Party comrades emerged in the period of the Second World War. He states that, after Vladimir Bakarić left his position as a political commissar of the Main Headquarters of Croatia in 1944, Holjevac was supposed to fill that position. He was the Commissar of the First Corps (the largest formation of the Croatian Partisan Army) and was then a Party member who had most experience as commissar and the one with the best reputation.²³ However, instead of Holjevac, Rade Žigić, former Commissar of the 6th (Lika) Division, which was a part of the Corps Holjevac commanded. So, Žigić was a person who was directly subordinate to Holjevac. Goldstein finds this "skipping" of Holjevac problematic: *"In the absence of a document that would give a reliable answer, we can only speculate: allegedly Veco²⁴ was not orthodox enough, he was not sufficiently 'red' commissar, in the Soviet sense of the word. Alternatively, perhaps he was skipped because of the national key. Due to the relatively large number of Serbs in the Partisan Army of Croatia, a Serb should have come to one of the most important positions? Or Veco was simply considered to be too young for such a duty."*²⁵

According to Slavko Goldstein, first Holjevac's significant disagreement with the party hierarchy after the war occurred at the Third Congress of LCC, which was held in May 1954. At that time Marijan Stilinović, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of LCC, due to his liberal attitudes was removed from the political leadership and political life.²⁶ Contrary to usual practice, Holjevac continued to maintain close relations with Stilinović, who was his friend and neighbour. According to Goldstein, this was a sufficient reason for the directive which came from the top, not to choose Holjevac for his next mandate in the Central Committee.²⁷ Although we cannot be sure that this was the reason, the fact is that Holjevac's absence from the next Central Committee was quite surprising given his reputation at that time.

Holjevac was known as an active person who skillfully avoided bureaucratic and formal obstacles. *Nova Hrvatska*, a journal of Croatian emigres in an article about Holjevac's sudden death in 1970, says: "In organisational works, he had no peers. As very few of them, he had succeeded in avoiding the influence of the communist bureaucracy that kills any initiative."²⁸ In that sense, his conflict with centralist bureaucracy was most important. That bureaucracy was considered an obstacle for Yugoslavia's progress, especially in Croatia and Slovenia. Many Croatian communists thought Croatia was investing too much in federal funds and the capital of Yugoslavia (Belgrade) while other republic centres were unjustly lagging behind. As a Mayor of Zagreb, Holjevac

23 Goldstein, "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju," 621.

24 Veco was the nickname of Većeslav Holjevac.

25 Goldstein, "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju," 621.

26 Zdenko Radelić, "Đilasovci u Hrvatskoj i hrvatska historiografija," in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 63.

27 Goldstein, "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju," 626.

28 "Iznenadna smrt Većeslava Holjevca," *Nova Hrvatska* 12, No. 2-3 (August 1970): 5, 6.

had shown that it was possible to develop other cities, their industry and infrastructure, despite the opposition of the centralist bureaucracy.

Moving the Zagreb Fair to a new location was the risky undertaking of Većeslav Holjevac. Namely, in the fall of 1955, Holjevac found out that Belgrade was planning to build a new trade fair that was supposed to have an international character and should become the central fair event for the whole of Yugoslavia. This meant that the Zagreb Fair would have lost its significance and probably had been abolished as redundant, although it had a long tradition.²⁹ Moreover, Zagreb would face an even higher degree of isolation. The Croatian Communist leadership did not see any problem in this, because they thought it reasonable for Belgrade, as the capital of Yugoslavia, to take precedence. Holjevac recognised the situation as a potential threat to the development and significance of Zagreb and reacted. He knew that the then location of the Zagreb Fair (Savska cesta) in the centre of the city was perspectiveless because the Fair could not spread due to the lack of space. He took full responsibility and decided to build a new fair at another, more favourable location. He neglected the five-year plan and ordered the entire Zagreb's constructional industry to build the Zagreb Fair on the southern shore of Sava in only one year. Numerous associates told him that this was an impossible mission, especially because the project did not have the financial support of the state.³⁰ However, the construction was completed within the deadline due to the maximum engagement, but also the financing model in which the states that were supposed to exhibit in Zagreb Fair build their pavilions themselves.³¹

Moving to a new location allowed the Zagreb Fair to remain the leading trade fair in Yugoslavia, which was not in favour of centralist-oriented politicians who, according to some opinions, have since become extremely dissatisfied with Holjevac. Moreover, Aleksandar Ranković, the most significant representative of the centralist circles within the top hierarchy of the Party, a longtime minister of interior, who had the greatest influence on the notorious State Security Administration (*Uprava državne bezbednosti* - UDBA), allegedly directly threatened Holjevac. A very well-informed journal of Croatian emigres *Nova Hrvatska*, wrote about Holjevac's conflict with Ranković saying that Holjevac risked his life in the case of Zagreb Fair.³² In 1972, at the Zagreb District Court on the trial that was conducted against Franjo Tuđman, Tuđman said that Holjevac was threatened with potential persecution "because he was building a new trade fair without permission and because he retained in Zagreb the money that was supposed to go to the federal government."³³

According to Tatjana Holjevac's testimony³⁴ Aleksandar Ranković threatened Holjevac that he would face the consequences if he builds a new trade fair in Zagreb. She said in the interview that the whole Holjevac family was monitored and

29 Mihaljević, "Stota obljetnica rođenja," 8, 9.

30 Ivan Strižić, *Hrvatski portreti: lice i naličje hrvatskoga bića*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: DoNeHa, 1996), 282, 283.

31 Rikard Štajner, "Skok preko Save," in: *Holjevac, graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, 49.

32 "Iznenadna smrt Većeslava Holjevca," 5, 6.

33 Franjo Tuđman, *Usudbene povjesticke* (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1995), 258.

34 "Povijesne kontroverze."

eavesdropped by UDBA.³⁵ Furthermore, she said that Ranković threatened Holjevac saying: “The Fair will go to Belgrade or you will go to Goli Otok!”³⁶ However, military general Ivan Gošnjak, federal secretary of defense, protected Holjevac by managing him a meeting with Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito. After four-hour talks, Tito gave support for the construction of the new Zagreb Fair.

There are no documents available which can confirm that Ranković’s threat happened. Holjevac was a relatively high-rank politician and respected person, with a big reputation as people’s hero to be openly threatened. However, if we have in mind Ranković’s way of action, it is not impossible that he threatened Holjevac. As a long-time head of UDBA and internal affairs, Ranković used these institutions not only against the enemies of the state or the enemies of the ruling Communist Party but also as a means of control within the Party. At the time of Ranković’s political peak, there was a belief that he and his service keep the files on his comrades and that, if necessary, something compromising could be found on almost everyone.³⁷ In that sense, he could have some file on Holjevac and some dangerous material against him. Perhaps this might have been the fact that Holjevac’s older brother Leon was a member of the Croatian Home Guard. At the end of the war, he even gained a military rank, although he did not participate in any military action, but earned the rank as a musician playing in the military orchestra.³⁸ In his memoirs, Holjevac describes his brother as a man who was interested only in music, not in politics.³⁹ In the last days of the war, the Partisans captured him somewhere near Zagreb and killed him. It was never established where and how he was killed. Većeslav could not find him and save him.⁴⁰ The death of Leon was a taboo topic in Holjevac’s family. Tatjana Holjevac said that her mother, Nada, did not allow her children to talk about Leon, as well as about Milovan Dilas or Andrija Hebrang until they became grown-ups.⁴¹ By all accounts, the fact that his brother was a member of Croatian Home Guard and killed by the partisans could have been information which Ranković could use against Holjevac.

One of the key questions of Holjevac’s biography is why did not he get a new mayoral mandate in Zagreb? His mandate expired in October 1963. According to many of his contemporaries, although his results in Zagreb were remarkable, his political views, Croatian patriotism and enormous popularity in the Croatian capital city were

35 UDBA’s file on Holjevac could not be found in the Croatian State Archives where that kind of records and other archival material created by UDBA are preserved (Archival fund HR HDA, 1561). It is hard to answer the question of whether the file existed or not, and if it exists why it is not placed in the Croatian State Archives.

36 Goli otok is a small island located in the northern Adriatic Sea which the communist authorities transformed into a secret prison, and labour camp used to incarcerate political prisoners.

37 See for example Josip Mihaljević, “Razilaženja u SKJ - marginalizacija Vicka Krstulovića,” in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić, Katarina Spahnjak (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 259.

38 “Povijesne kontroverze”.

39 His memoirs (*Zapisi iz rodnog grada*), which he prepared for printing before his death, were published posthumously in 1972.

40 Goldstein, “Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju,” 622.

41 “Povijesne kontroverze.”

not met with sympathies in the centralist circles in the Party leadership.⁴² Holjevac's emphasis on the need for stronger integration of Croatia was a thorn in centralists' side. In an interview he gave while he was still the head of Zagreb, he said that Zagreb needs to use its position more actively and to become a connecting point for all parts of Croatia and that it is a "great harm for Zagreb and for the whole community that we do not yet have modern road connections with Dalmatia."⁴³ Whether due to disagreement with individuals in the Party or for some other reason, the fact is that the Presidency of the Central Committee of LCC did not propose Holjevac for a new mayoral mandate.⁴⁴

After his mayoral mandate, Holjevac continued his political career as a member of the SRC's Parliament, member of the Executive Council of the Parliament, and in 1964 was elected as the new president of the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia (EFC). Although Holjevac's work in the EFC was considered by many as marginal, in the four-year period, he developed a significant activity in connecting the Croatian diaspora with their homeland. He extended the EFC's scope and activities. By the end of 1967 EFC co-operated with about a hundred emigrant organisations and more than five thousand individuals. At the time, Holjevac published his first book, *Croats abroad*.⁴⁵ It was the first systematically written book on Croatian emigrants, in which he reported that more than 25% of Croats live outside Yugoslavia.

Two significant conflicts that caused his final political decline happened during his mandate in EFC. In 1966, as the president of the Božidar Adžija Awards⁴⁶ Committee, Holjevac insisted on awarding Gajo Petrović and Milan Kangrga. They were part of the intellectual circle gathered around the critically oriented journal *Praxis*,⁴⁷ and as such, the highest Party officials considered their philosophical books unsuitable for the prize. The Party leaders considered their social criticism destructive.⁴⁸ In May 1966, the Secretariat of the LCC's City Committee of Zagreb wrote a complaint with objections regarding the award criteria and the case was discussed at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC LCC.⁴⁹ The Executive Committee rated the deci-

42 This is also one of the motifs of the novel by Josip Barković, *Rasplet u Rimu: roman o Zagrebačkom velesajmu* [Denouement in Rome: a novel about the Zagreb Fair] (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2002), in which the author presents the conflict between the advocates of more liberal political and economic ideas, and the orthodox communist bureaucrats, who supported central planning in economy and total control in social life.

43 Kiseljak, "Zapisi i intervjui Većeslava Holjevca," 4.

44 Kraljević, "Većeslav Holjevac – predsjednik Matice iseljenika Hrvatske," 17, 18. Barković, *Rasplet u Rimu*, 143, 144.

45 Većeslav Holjevac, *Hrvati izvan domovine* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1967).

46 It was the highest state award for scientific and cultural achievements.

47 More on Praxis intellectuals see Albert Bing, "Praxis and Korčula Summer School Collection," *COURAGE Registry*, 2018, accessed August 29, 2018, <http://cultural-opposition.eu/registry/?uri=http://courage.btk.mta.hu/courage/individual/n31917&type=collections>.

48 Dunja Bonacci Skenderović, "Radio Slobodna Europa o sukobima jugoslavenske vlasti i časopisa Praxis (1972. – 1975.)," in: *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 8, eds. Hans Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2004), 283. Kraljević, "Matica iseljenika Hrvatske 1964. – 1968.," 88.

49 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia 1964-1967, box. 30, Controversy over the 'Božidar Adžija' Awards in 1966, Record No. 02-413/1-1966, May 7, 1966.

sion to award the Praxis intellectuals as a “direct attack on CC LCC and the policy of LCC.”⁵⁰ The Party critique was also published in the daily press.⁵¹

Contrary to the Party’s judgement, as the chairman of the Awarding Committee, Holjevac continued to justify the Awarding Committee’s choice. He defended the decision stating that the Awarding Committee was composed of members who were recognised experts and academics.⁵² Because of this, the Republican Chamber of the SRC’s Parliament on the proposal of Miloš Žanko, but in fact on the instruction of Executive Committee of the CC LCC, decided to dismiss Većeslav Holjevac from the position of the chairman of the Awarding Committee. He was prepared to bear the consequences of his actions which is evident “from his indifferent and somewhat disinterested behaviour at the discussion of the Republican Chamber of the SRC’s Parliament.”⁵³

However, this was not the end of Holjevac’s conflicts with higher Party circles. His political downturn was related to Party purges that were conducted in Croatia after the publication of the Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language in March 1967. The Declaration was a manifesto of Croatian linguists who were dissatisfied with the published dictionaries and language praxis in Croatia in which the language was called Serbo-Croatian. Croat scholars gathered around *Matica hrvatska*, the leading cultural institution in Croatia, made the text of the Declaration and it was signed by the Society of Writers of Croatia, and seventeen other Croatian scholar and cultural institutions.⁵⁴

EFC was not a signatory of the Declaration, nor its President Većeslav Holjevac. However, as one of the leading representatives of the national and democratic reform wing of the LCC, Holjevac advocated the defence of Croatian national interests within the Yugoslav federation. For this reason, even though he was not a signatory to the Declaration, he was subjected to a Party investigation as a person whose “behaviour contributed to the appearance of the Declaration.” Paradoxically, the EFC’s Main Committee, led by Holjevac, condemned the adoption and publishing of the Declaration at its regular session on March 30, 1967.⁵⁵ Why did Holjevac found himself in the line of fire? The answer can be found in Vladimir Bakarić’s speech at the meeting of the CC LCC’s Presidency on April 3, 1967. He said: “I was unwilling to

50 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Record of the session of the Executive Council of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia held on May 12, 1966, p. 1: according to Iva Kraljević Bašić, “Većeslav Holjevac i Nagrada fonda Božidar Adžija 1966.,” in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović, et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 378.

51 “Kamuflirana politička akcija,” *Vjesnik*, June 25, 1966, I. Cf. Kraljević Bašić, “Većeslav Holjevac i Nagrada fonda Božidar Adžija,” 382.

52 *Ibid.*, 380.

53 *Ibid.*, 383.

54 “Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika,” *Matica hrvatska*, accessed August 20, 2018, <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/314/Deklaracija%20o%20nazivu%20i%20polo%C5%BEaju%20hrvatskog%20knji%C5%BEevnog%20jezika/>.

55 “Književni jezik Hrvata i Srba,” *Matica* 17, No. 6 (1967): 219. Cf. Marko Samardžija, ed., *Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju Hrvatskog književnog jezika 1967. – 2017.: vijesti komentari, osude, zaključci* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2017), 291–95.

involve comrade Holjevac into this thing if he has nothing to do with it, but we need to talk about the focal points of nationalism and to establish his attitude towards them.”⁵⁶

Some of Holjevac’s contemporaries, as well as some historians nowadays, believe that Bakarić was the crucial person responsible for Holjevac’s political fall. Josip Boljkovac, Holjevac’s friend and Party comrade, believed that the case of the Božidar Adžija Awards in 1966 was the beginning of the conflict between Holjevac and Bakarić.⁵⁷ Historian Ivo Goldstein claims that Bakarić wanted to eliminate Holjevac because he “bounced out of nomenklatura too much and was too liberal,” but also because Bakarić saw Holjevac as a direct competitor due to his popularity.⁵⁸

The case of Holjevac was also discussed at the Seventh Plenum of the CC LCC held on 19 and 20 April 1967. On that occasion, defending himself from the attack of pro-unitarist politician Miloš Žanko, Holjevac stated that he always sensed his national identity but that at the same time he always condemned chauvinism and nationalism.⁵⁹ The Plenum concluded that the CC LCC’s Executive Committee forms a Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia, solely to monitor the activities of the EFC’s president, Većeslav Holjevac and some of his associates and to establishing their political responsibility.⁶⁰

At the end of May 1967, the Commission held talks with Većeslav Holjevac and his associates.⁶¹ On June 22, 1967, the Commission wrote the report, in which it stated that the EFC was “one of the focal points of nationalism”, and accused Holjevac of being responsible for a “nationalist turn,” “an unhealthy climate suitable for further deformation in the EFC,” as well as for attempting to “formalistically justify criticized phenomena and actions.”⁶²

Holjevac was accused of being too openminded towards some Croatian organisations in USA. The authorities considered these organisations extreme and hostile to Yugoslavia. The Commission also held that the appeal for help that EFC sent to emigrants during the flood in Zagreb in 1964 was nationalistic because it was addressed to “Croatian emigrants and other Yugoslav citizens on temporary work abroad.” One

56 Vladimir Bakarić, *Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, vol. 2* (Zagreb: Informator; Mladost; Svjetlost, 1983), 367.

57 Josip Boljkovac, *Istina mora izaći van: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova neovisne Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, 2009), 144.

58 Ivo Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1918–2008* (Zagreb: EPH; Novi Liber, 2008), 492, 493. Cf. Dino Mujadžević, *Bakarić: politička biografija* (Zagreb: Plejada; Hrvatski institut za povijest – Podružnica Slavonski Brod, 2011), 268, 269.

59 *Sedmi plenum CK SK Hrvatske: O međunacionalnim odnosima* (Zagreb: Informativna služba CK SKH, 1967), 70.

60 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia 1964-1967, box. 30, A conclusion on the basis of a report submitted by the Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia, 1967, p. 1.

61 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia 1964-1967, box. 30, Stenographic log of the conversations conducted by the Commission.

62 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia 1964-1967, box. 30, Report submitted by the Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia, 1967. Cf. Tatjana Šarić, “Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia (1964-1967),” *COURAGE Registry*, accessed August 20, 2018, <http://cultural-opposition.eu/registry/?uri=http://courage.btk.mta.hu/courage/individual/n23156&type=collections>.

of Holjevac's "crimes" was the non-attendance on Republic Day celebration in 1966.⁶³ The accusations included the singing of Croatian songs on New Year's Eve.⁶⁴ He was accused of hesitating to condemn the Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language and its signatories, as well as inviting Franjo Tuđman and some other "Croatian nationalists" into EFC's Main Committee.⁶⁵

Holjevac was found guilty of political "deviation" and was suggested to resign from membership in the Central Committee of the LCC.⁶⁶ Consequently, he was forced to resign from the position of EFC's president, but he performed the duty until the election of a new president in 1968.⁶⁷

Was Holjevac Supposed to Become the Leader of the Croatian Spring?

Holjevac's contemporaries knew very soon that he was unfairly accused of being a nationalist.⁶⁸ Miko Tripalo, who at the session of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of LCC on June 27, 1967, discussed the EFC case, said that "Veco is a little bit infected with these nationalistic beliefs" soon changed his views. In the time of the Croatian Spring, at the second session of the LCC's Conference in July 1970, Tripalo said: "we should reconsider some of our decisions from the past regarding the Party relations towards some comrades." Slavko Goldstein thought Tripalo was thinking primarily of Holjevac.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Holjevac enjoyed great reputation and respect among the Serbs in Croatia not only because he was one of the leaders of the anti-fascist uprising in the Kordun area but also after the war because he was a man who understood the essence of the Serbs-Croats relations in Croatia and acted in order to improve relations between them. The case of his insistence on the awards to Gajo Petrović and Milan Kangrga in 1966, confirms, in a way, that the accusation for nationalism was meaningless. Namely, besides the fact that he did not share their viewpoints (Praxis philosophy was opposed to the Croatian national movement), both of them were Serbs.

Holjevac's resignation from membership in the Central Committee of the LCC was the end of his political career. He did not participate in the Croatian Spring in 1971, in which he would probably be one of the most important actors. One can

63 Ibid., 12.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 13–15. Cf. Tatjana Šarić, "Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena."

66 HR HDA, 1220, Executive Council, Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia 1964-1967, box. 30, A conclusion on the basis of a report submitted by the Commission for the Examination of Nationalist Phenomena in the Emigrant Foundation of Croatia, 1967.

67 Kraljević, "Većeslav Holjevac – predsjednik Matice iseljenika Hrvatske."

68 Goldstein, "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju," 626.

69 Ironically, Tripalo was one of the Party leaders who in 1967 attacked the adoption of the Declaration and its signatories, and after only a few years, as one of the leaders of the Croatian Spring, he experienced a political fall under the accusations of being a nationalist.

assume this, given his past work, but also because of his attempt to return to the scene in 1969/1970. Namely, in the last year of his life, together with some Croatian intellectuals and economists,⁷⁰ Holjevac participated in the attempt to establish a Croatian Economic Bank that supposed to be independent of Belgrade. They aimed to break the economic and financial inferiority of Croatia within Yugoslavia by financing large infrastructure projects and by encouraging entrepreneurship in Croatia.⁷¹ As the leader of that group, Holjevac had the idea of engaging the Croatian diaspora as a vital financing source for the future bank. He considered that the Croatians who worked abroad would gladly invest their savings in such a bank. The attempt to establish a bank, however, has failed.

Many Croatian emigrants have seen Holjevac as a potential leader of a future Croatian opposition. For example, Ivo Rojnica, wrote in his memoirs that it is “no exaggeration to say that Holjevac, giving his human, intellectual, organisational and political virtues, was potentially the most important man in Croatia.” He saw Holjevac as an ideal person, “not just as the leader of the unofficial opposition, but was also most suitable to take active leadership in Croatia at any time.”⁷²

However, after a shorter illness, Većeslav Holjevac died in Zagreb on July 11, 1970, before his 53rd birthday. He died of cancer after a few weeks of sickness. The mentioned Rojnica wrote in his memoirs in the 1970s that he arranged a meeting with him in July 1970 in a Western European country: “*On the very day when he was supposed to travel, on July 9, he suddenly felt sick and was urgently taken to a hospital, where he died on July 11. It was a public secret that Holjevac was poisoned, and I am giving this historical truth that he died in suspicious circumstances.*”⁷³

This was not just a rumour from emigration, but these scary rumours spread out in Croatia as well, and it can be heard even nowadays. In an interview he gave for the daily newspaper in 2012, Holjevac’s son Veco also expressed the suspicion that his father was poisoned. “*Our family doubt, which was backed up by various evidences we encountered later, is that our father is actually poisoned. When Boljkovac became the first Croatian Minister of Interior, he came to us with the question of whether we want to re-investigate our father’s death. He came of his own initiative, obviously with some solid clues. My sisters and I did not want to start the investigation, because we were aware of the fact that someone will only collect political points in that way, and that our father will never return.*”⁷⁴

According to his son’s suspicions, Većeslav Holjevac was assassinated because he was the most prominent leader of the Croatian reform movement which later

70 Josip Boljkovac, Šime Đodan, Danijel Ivin, Božo Singer, Ante Todorić, Marko Veselica, and Vladimir Veselica.

71 Josip Boljkovac, *Istina mora izaći van: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova neovisne Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, 2009), 139–41. Tihomir Ponoš, “Zašto 1970. nije osnovana Hrvatska gospodarska banka,” in: *Holjevac, graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, 76–78.

72 Ivo Rojnica, *Susreti i doživljaji: razdoblje od 1938. do 1975. u mojim sjećanjima*, vol. 2: 1945–1975 (Zagreb: DoNeHa, 1994), 296.

73 Ibid., 299. Cf. Marijan Grakalić, “Je li Holjevac ubijen?” *Globus*, February 28, 1991, 12.

74 In his memoirs published in 2009, Boljkovac mentions nothing on Holjevac being murdered or poisoned. Cf. Boljkovac, *Istina mora izaći van*, 145.

flourished in the Croatian Spring. Moreover, he said that in 1967, in Plješivica the forerunner of the HDZ⁷⁵ was established, which chose his father as its leader, and the whole group later ended up with Franjo Tuđman.⁷⁶

Some authors believe that Holjevac was a potential leader of the Croatian opposition. Ivan Strižić believes that in Belgrade Holjevac was considered “the Croat who would be most likely to become a person who will take over the Croatian helm and therefore he had to be eliminated at any cost.”⁷⁷ He even claims that the motive for the alleged murder was his reputation among Croatian Serbs and his good relations with them. Strižić believes that the supporters of the idea of Greater Serbia wanted to use the Serbs in Croatia for Greater Serbia goals, for which the good cooperation between Croats and Serbs in Croatia was considered an obstacle.⁷⁸

Holjevac belonged to the pro-Croatian circle of Croatian Communists, which, besides politicians and military officers like Ivan Šibl, Ivan Rukavina, Nikola Kajić, and Srećko Manola, included some important intellectuals such as writers Miroslav Krleža and Petar Šegedin, historians Vaso Bogdanov and Franjo Tuđman, artists Vanja Radauš and Krsto Hegedušić. Ivan Šibl mentioned in his memoirs that they were “some silent, sometimes even loud, constructive opposition in the Party,” and that they had, in some issues, views different from the Party line, and that they advocated democratisation and the improvement of the national relations in Yugoslavia.⁷⁹ Some called this group “Krleža’s intellectual circle” or even “Croatian shadow government,” describing it as a “semi-opposition” to Vladimir Bakarić and LCC’s Central Committee.” They were not satisfied with Bakarić’s leadership of the Croatian communists because they considered that “he does not protect Croatian interests sufficiently from the pressures and manipulations from Belgrade.”⁸⁰

Of all the above-mentioned, Holjevac was politically the most popular among Croatian people.⁸¹ Furthermore, he has already made an important step towards connecting the Croatian emigration with the homeland.⁸² Nevertheless, Savka Dapčević Kučar and Miko Tripalo, who couple of years earlier criticised Holjevac of “being infected with nationalist views,” became leaders of the Croatian national movement. It would be interesting to see what role Holjevac would play during the Croatian Spring if he was still alive at the time because he was still quite young but experienced enough.

75 HDZ is an acronym of the Croatian Democratic Union (Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica - HDZ), a political party founded in 1989 that won the first multi-party elections in Croatia in 1990.

76 Bojana Mrvoš Pavić, “Veco Holjevac: Sumnjam da je moj otac Večeslav otrovan,” *Novi list* (on-line), May 13, 2012, accessed May 27, 2018, <http://novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Veco-Holjevac-Sumnjam-da-je-moj-otac-Veceslav-otrovan>.

77 Strižić, *Hrvatski portreti*, 288.

78 *Ibid.*, 290.

79 Ivan Šibl, *Sjećanja III: Poslijeratni dnevnik* (Zagreb: Globus; Naprijed, 1986), 148.

80 Darko Hudelist, *Tuđman: biografija* (Zagreb: Profil, 2004), 306, 307.

81 Around 30,000 citizens attended his funeral, which was by far the largest funeral in Zagreb after the funeral of Stjepan Radić in 1928. See N. Fiegenwald, “Slava drugu Veci!” *Večernji list* (zagrebačko izdanje), July 14, 1970, 3.

82 It should be mentioned that Franjo Tuđman had his first contacts with Croatian emigrants through Holjevac. See Mate Meštrović, *U vrtlogu hrvatske politike: kazivanje Peri Zlataru* (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2003), 287. Tuđman’s link with Croatian emigrants may well be a crucial factor for his victory in the first multi-party elections in Croatia in 1990.

Strižić points out that Holjevac was “the source for the generations of young intellectuals and students who were carriers of the Croatian Spring.”⁸³

Conclusion

The analysis of Holjevac’s political carrier confirms the claims that he was a “self-confident person who did not give up his political views.”⁸⁴ Due to these characteristics, he occasionally came into conflicts with some of the leading figures of the then ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Already in 1954, he attracted attention as a person who did not blindly follow the usual party praxis because he did not distance himself from some comrades that were thrown off in Party purges. As a member of the pro-reform and anti-dogmatic wing within the Party, he advocated Yugoslavia’s decentralisation and the equitable development of all its republics and regions. These endeavours of his were in contravention to the aspirations of the intercessors of centralism, primarily in Belgrade. With his actions at the local level, Holjevac irritated centralist circles, even their most important representative - Aleksandar Ranković. Regardless of whether Ranković’s threats were real or not, Holjevac’s insistence on creating the new Zagreb Fair was a move against the will of a party official who was above him in the Party hierarchy. Similar to this was the case of awarding Praxis intellectuals in 1966, in which he ignored the instruction that came from Vladimir Bakarić that they should not be rewarded.

The adoption of the Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language in 1967 was an ideal moment for Bakarić to politically eliminate the disobedient and (perhaps) too popular Holjevac. Although he was not a signatory to the Declaration, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, proclaimed Holjevac as a nationalist. Holjevac’s insistence in Croatian patriotism was induced by the feeling that Croatia was withheld in Yugoslavia. That is why his political orientation was a struggle for “fair play politics” (*politika čistih računa*), which was the fundamental orientation of the Croatian Spring movement, which would flare up only a few years later. However, while Savka Dabčević Kučar and Miko Tripalo built up their popularity on that policy, Holjevac suffered a political fall. The difference was that Holjevac, as well as some others of his contemporaries, insisted on it too early, before the time in which it was possible to advocate such agenda publicly. Although he was one of the most popular Croatian politicians among the people, many years of isolation and early death prevented him to participate in the Croatian Spring.

Perhaps this fact holds the answer to the question why Croatian historiography has not published too much on Holjevac. While he was in high politics, he was still relatively young man, and was still relatively young when he experienced his political

⁸³ Strižić, *Hrvatski portreti*, 289.

⁸⁴ Spehnjak, “Većeslav Holjevac u političkim događajima 1967. godine,” 593.

downturn. So, he did not get the satisfaction, which many of his even less deserving party comrades experienced, to see some historians writing about his life. On the other hand, after the collapse of communism and the creation of the Republic of Croatia, Većeslav Holjevac was not perceived as a man meritorious for Croatia's national independence, because he did not participate in the Croatian Spring in 1971. So nowadays, Holjevac is one of the most cherished mayors in Zagreb's history, but he is still forgotten as a dissident.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- HR HDA, Hrvatski državni arhiv:
 - HR HDA, 1220, Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Hrvatske.
 - HR HDA, 1086, Ministarstvo za novooslobođene krajeve Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije.
 - HR HDA, 1081, Sabor Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske.
- HR DAZG, Državni arhiv u Zagrebu:
 - HR DAZG, 37, Narodni odbor grada Zagreba.

Literature:

- Bakarić, Vladimir. *Socijalistički samoupravni sistem i društvena reprodukcija, vol. 2*. Zagreb: Informator; Mladost; Svjetlost, 1983.
- Barković, Josip. *Rasplet u Rimu: roman o Zagrebačkom velesajmu*. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2002.
- Bekić, Milan, Ivo Butković, and Slavko Goldstein. *Okrug Karlovac 1941*. Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1965.
- Blažević, Marko. "Vizionar suvremenog Zagreba." In: *Većeslav Holjevac: graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, edited by Juraj Hrženjak, 42–44. Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske; Multigraf Marketing, 2006.
- Boljkovac, Josip. *Istina mora izaći van: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova neovisne Hrvatske*. Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, 2009.
- Bonacci Skenderović, Dunja. "Radio Slobodna Europa o sukobima jugoslavenske vlasti i časopisa Praxis (1972. –1975.)." In: *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara 8*, edited by Hans Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac, 279–97. Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2004.
- Dabčević Kučar, Savka. *'71. Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*. Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997.
- Goldstein, Ivo. *Hrvatska 1918–2008*. Zagreb: EPH; Novi Liber, 2008.
- Goldstein, Ivo. "Novo lice grada." In: *Povijest grada Zagreba, vol. 2*, edited by Goran Hutinec and Ivo Goldstein. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2013.
- Goldstein, Slavko. "Nacrt za Vecinu biografiju." *Kritika* 3, No. 14 (1970): 618–27.
- Holjevac, Većeslav. *Zapisi iz rodnog grada*. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1972.
- Holjevac, Većeslav. *Hrvati izvan domovine*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1967.
- Hrženjak, Juraj, ed. *Većeslav Holjevac: graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*. Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske; Multigraf Marketing, 2006.
- Hudelist, Darko. *Tuđman: biografija*. Zagreb: Profil, 2004.

- Kraljević Bašić, Iva. “Većeslav Holjevac i Nagrada fonda Božidar Adžija 1966.” In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić, and Katarina Spehnjak, 373–84. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Kraljević, Iva. “Matica iseljenika Hrvatske 1964. – 1968.” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 41, No. 1 (2009): 71–92.
- Kraljević, Iva. “Većeslav Holjevac – predsjednik Matice iseljenika Hrvatske 1964. –1968.” Magistarski rad, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 2007.
- Kraljević, Iva. “Uloga Komande grada Zagreba u životu Grada prvih poslijeratnih mjeseci 1945. godine.” In: *1945. – Razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Mario Jareb, and Katarina Spehnjak, 451-61. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006.
- *Matica* 17, No. 6 (1967): 219. “Književni jezik Hrvata i Srba.”
- Meštrović, Mate. *U vrtlogu hrvatske politike: kazivanje Peri Zlataru*. Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2003.
- Mihaljević, Josip. “Stota obljetnica rođenja Većeslava Holjevca (1917. – 1970.)” *Zagreb moj grad* (Zagreb) 11, No. 64 (2017): 6–11.
- Mihaljević, Josip. “Razilaženja u SKJ - marginalizacija Vicka Krstulovića.” In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić and Katarina Spehnjak, 241–70. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Mujadžević, Dino. *Bakarić: politička biografija*. Zagreb: Plejada; Hrvatski institut za povijest – Podružnica Slavonski Brod, 2011.
- *Nova Hrvatska* 12, No. 2-3 (1970): 5, 6. “Iznenadna smrt Većeslava Holjevca.”
- Ponoš, Tihomir. “Zašto 1970. nije osnovana Hrvatska gospodarska banka.” In: *Većeslav Holjevac: graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, edited by Juraj Hrženjak, 76–78. Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske; Multigraf Marketing, 2006.
- Radelić, Zdenko. “Đilasovci u Hrvatskoj i hrvatska historiografija.” In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić, and Katarina Spehnjak, 53–74. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Rojnica, Ivo. *Susreti i doživljaji: razdoblje od 1938. do 1975. u mojim sjećanjima, vol. 2: 1945-1975*. Zagreb: DoNeHa, 1994.
- Samardžija, Marko, ed. *Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju Hrvatskog književnog jezika 1967. – 2017.: vijesti komentari, osude, zaključci*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2017.
- *Sedmi plenum CK SK Hrvatske: O međunacionalnim odnosima*. Zagreb: Informativna služba CK SKH, 1967.
- Spehnjak, Katarina. “Većeslav Holjevac u političkim događajima 1967. godine.” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 32, No. 3 (2000): 567–96.
- Strižić, Ivan. *Hrvatski portreti: lice i naličje hrvatskoga bića*, 2nd ed. Zagreb: DoNeHa, 1996.
- Šibl, Ivan. *Sjećanja III: Poslijeratni dnevnik*. Zagreb: Globus; Naprijed, 1986.
- Štajner, Rikard. “Skok preko Save.” In: *Većeslav Holjevac: graditelj, vizionar, ratnik*, edited by Juraj Hrženjak, 49. Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske; Multigraf Marketing, 2006.
- Tuđman, Franjo. *Usudbene povjestice*. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1995.

Newspaper Sources:

- Fiegenwald, N. “Slava drugu Veci!.” *Večernji list* (zagrebačko izdanje), July 14, 1970.
- Grakalić, Marijan. “Je li Holjevac ubijen?” *Globus* (Zagreb), February 28, 1991.
- “Kamuflirana politička akcija.” *Vjesnik*, June 25, 1966.
- Kiseljak, F. “Zapisi i intervjui Većeslava Holjevca: Tri puta u Zagrebu.” *Večernji list* (zagrebačko izdanje), July 13, 1970.

Online Sources:

- Bing, Albert. "Praxis and Korčula Summer School Collection." *COURAGE Registry*, 2018. Accessed: August 29, 2018. <http://cultural-opposition.eu/registry/?uri=http://courage.btk.mta.hu/courage/individual/n31917&type=collections>.
- Mrvoš Pavić, Bojana. "Veco Holjevac: Sumnjam da je moj otac Većeslav otrovan." *Novi list* (on-line), May 13, 2012. Accessed: May 27, 2018. <http://novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Veco-Holjevac-Sumnjam-da-je-moj-otac-Veceslav-otrovan>.
- "Većeslav Holjevac." *Hrvatski biografski leksikon* (on-line). Accessed: May 27, 2018. <http://hbl.lzmk.hr/clanak.aspx?id=67>.
- "Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika." *Matica hrvatska*. Accessed: August 1, 2018. <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/314/Deklaracija%20o%20nazivu%20i%20polo%C5%BEaju%20hrvatskog%20knji%C5%BEevnog%20jezika/>.

Oral Sources:

- "Povijesne kontroverze" (radio show). *Third program of Croatian Radio*. November 16, 2017. <http://radio.hrt.hr/treci-program/ep/veceslav-holjevac/229498/>.

Josip Mihaljević

VEĆESLAV HOLJEVAC – FORGOTTEN DISSIDENT

SUMMARY

Croatian politician Većeslav Holjevac (1917–1970) has been remembered as one of the most successful mayors of the city of Zagreb. However, his character and political work are scarcely known to the public today. His merits in the cultural sphere are mostly forgotten, as well as the fact that he was one of the most important Croatian dissidents. The article presents the critical moments of his dissent and political disagreement with his comrades that led him to the role of the party renegade. The first dissident moment of his happened in 1954 when he did not distance himself from Marijan Stilinović, a Party comrade that was thrown off in a Party purge. However, maybe the crucial reason for Holjevac's political decline was his hard advocacy of Yugoslavia's decentralisation and the equitable development of all republics and regions. As a member of the pro-reform and anti-dogmatic wing within the Party, he struggled against the aspirations of the intercessors of centralism. In 1955 Holjevac insisted on creating the new Zagreb Fair, which was a move against the will of Aleksandar Ranković, an influential party official who was above him in the Party hierarchy. Similar to this was the case of awarding Praxis intellectuals with the "Božidar Adžija" Awards in 1966. The highest Party officials considered their philosophical books unsuitable for the highest state prize. Holjevac, who was the president of the "Božidar Adžija" Awards

Committee, ignored the instruction that came from Vladimir Bakarić that they should not be rewarded. The adoption of the Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language in 1967 was an ideal moment for Bakarić to politically eliminate the disobedient and (perhaps) too popular Holjevac. Although he was not a signatory to the Declaration, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, proclaimed Holjevac as a nationalist. Holjevac's case delineates the issue of the Croatian national reform movement known as the Croatian Spring. Due to his solid character, he was not afraid to defend his standpoints, even in the fights with communist comrades who were higher in the Party's hierarchy, which caused his political decline. The article also discusses the claims that Holjevac was to become the leader of the Croatian Spring.

Josip Mihaljević

VEĆESLAV HOLJEVAC – POZABLJENI DISIDENT

POVZETEK

Hrvaški politik Većeslav Holjevac (1917–1970) velja za enega najuspešnejših županov mesta Zagreb. Kljub temu sta njegova osebnost in politično delo javnosti danes malo znana. Njegove zasluge na kulturnem področju so šle večinoma v pozabo, prav tako pa tudi dejstvo, da je bil eden najpomembnejših hrvaških disidentov. Članek predstavlja ključne trenutke njegovih disidentskih in političnih nesoglasij s tovariši, zaradi katerih si je v partiji prislužil status odpadnika. Do prvega nesoglasja je prišlo leta 1954, ko se ni oddaljil od partijskega tovariša Marijana Stilinovića, ki je med čistko v partiji izgubil svoj položaj. Morda se ključni razlog za politični propad Holjevca skriva v njegovem zagretemu zagovarjanju decentralizacije Jugoslavije in pravičnega razvoja vseh republik in regij. Kot član krila znotraj partije, ki se je zavzemalo za reforme in zavračalo dogmatska stališča, se je boril proti težnjam zagovornikov centralizma. Leta 1955 se je Holjevac zavzemal za ustanovitev novega zagrebškega sejmišča, kar je bilo v nasprotju z voljo takrat vplivnega partijskega uradnika Aleksandra Rankovića, ki je imel v primerjavi s Holjevcem pomembnejšo funkcijo v partijski hierarhiji. Podobno se je zgodilo leta 1966, ko so intelektualcem iz časnika Praxis podelili nagrado Božidarja Adžije. Najvišji partijski uradniki so namreč menili, da njihove knjige s filozofsko vsebino niso primerne za najvišjo državno nagrado. Holjevac, ki je deloval kot predsednik komiteja za nagrado Božidarja Adžije, ni upošteval navodil Vladimirja Bakarića, naj skupine ne nagradi. Sprejetje deklaracije o imenu in položaju hrvaškega knjižnega jezika iz leta 1967 se je izkazalo kot izvrstna priložnost, s katero je Bakarić neposlušnega in (morda) preveč priljubljenega Holjevca izrinil iz politične sfere. Čeprav Holjevac ni bil med podpisniki deklaracije, ga je Izvršni odbor Centralnega komiteja komunistične

partije Hrvaške označil za nacionalista. Njegov primer odstira vprašanje hrvaškega gibanja za nacionalno reformo, imenovano Hrvaška pomlad. Zaradi močnega značaja ga ni bilo strah braniti svojih stališč celo v bojih s komunističnimi tovariši, ki so zasedali pomembnejše funkcije v hierarhiji partije, kar je povzročilo njegov politični zaton. Članek prav tako obravnava trditve, da naj bi Holjevac postal vodja Hrvaške pomladi.

Lidija Bencetić*

Journal *Istarski Borac/IBOR* in the Context of the Culture of Dissent

IZVLEČEK

ČASOPIS *ISTARSKI BORAC/IBOR* V KONTEKSTU KULTURE DISIDENTSTVA

Prvi hrvaški mladinski časopis *Istarski borac/IBOR* je z dvema krajšima vmesnima premoroma izhajal med leti 1953 in 1979 v Pulju. Časopis je izdajal Književni klub *Istarski borac*, in sicer z namenom ohranjanja hrvaškega jezika v Istri kot temeljnim vodilom. V sedemdesetih letih 20. stoletja je časopis prevzel značaj kritičnega medija in postopoma uvažal vse več kulturnih, lokalnih in družbenih tem, katerih ton pa socialistična oblast ni dobro sprejela. Jeseni 1979 je izbruhnil »primer IBOR«. Časopisu so istega leta ukinili financiranje, zaradi česar je prenehal izhajati. Povod za ukinitvev časopisa je bila sicer pesem z naslovom *Please, master* (hrv.: *Molim te, učitelju*) Allena Ginsberga, toda partijski dokumenti razkrivajo, da je bil razlog političen. Pričujoča razprava poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali je delovanje zadnjega uredništva časopisa *Istarski borac/IBOR* mogoče obravnavati kot kulturo disidentstva.

Ključne besede: *Istarski borac*, IBOR, kultura disidentstva, mladinski tisk, Jugoslavija

ABSTRACT

The first Croatian youth journal *Istarski borac/IBOR* was published in Pula from 1953 to 1979 (with two minor interruptions). The journal was published by the *Istarski Borac Literary Club* with the objective of preserving the Croatian language in Istria. The journal developed a reputation as a critical media in the 1970s, covering more and more cultural, local and social themes whose tone was not well – received by the socialist authorities, so the financing of the journal was cancelled in 1979 after which it ceased publication. The reason

* Research Fellow, PhD, Croatian Institute of History, Opatička 10, 10000–Zagreb, Croatia, lidija.bencetic@gmail.com

for the suspension of the journal was the poem “Please Master” by Allen Ginsberg, but the party documents reveal that the motive was also political. The question this article is trying to answer is whether the work of the last editorial board of *Istarski borac*/IBOR can be considered a culture of dissent.

Keywords: *Istarski borac*, IBOR, culture of dissent, youth press, Yugoslavia

Introduction

The youth journal of Pula Gymnasium students, *Istarski borac* was launched in Pula on October 15, 1953. The first issue of *Istarski borac* was released at the initiative of the literary section of the Branko Semelić Gymnasium and their mentor Ljubica Ivezić, with the subtitle Literary Section Gazette of the Branko Semelić Gymnasium. As of the second issue, the journal was called the “Istrian Youth Journal” and was financed by the National Youth District Committee, and this status was likely obtained through the party line. According to Ljubica Ivezić, the editorial section was reserved for ideological and political articles.¹

It was the first youth journal in Yugoslavia, which was published continually, with two interruptions (from 1964 to 1969 and from 1974 to 1976) until September 1979, i.e. until the “IBOR Case” arose. *Istarski borac* is important to the development of the Croatian language, literature and culture in Istria, especially in terms of the development of young writers and intellectuals who later became important to the development of culture, history and socio-political life in Istria. Ljubica Ivezić, the initiator of *Istarski borac*, explained it this way: the students “took on the task of using their literary and cultural work in the first place to fight for the affirmation of their domestic word, which was severely persecuted under the Italian fascism.”² In the introduction to the first issue of *Istarski borac*, the editorial board explained the reasons for launching the journal: “The authors of original works will find their topics firstly in their personal lives, then in Istrian and Yugoslav socialistic reality. With this kind of work, we will foster a love for the mother tongue, for our socialist country and our people. We will constantly prove to each and every one that the youngest Istrian generations do not want to substitute their beloved native tongue with a foreign one, nor their national government for dominion by foreigners ever again.”³ The journal was intended for young people from elementary school to university students and mostly financed by the Self-management Interest Community (SIC, croatian: Samoupravna interesna zajednica – SIZ) for the culture of the Municipality of Pula. The funding of the journal

1 Ljubica Ivezić, “I jedna važna obljetnica između na koju ne treba zaboraviti,” *Dometi* (Rijeka), No. 5–6 (1992): 95–100.

2 Ibid., 97.

3 *Istarski borac* (Pula), No. 1 (1953): 1.

was increased between 1973 and 1979, amounting from 20,000 dinars in 1973 to 50,000 in 1978 and 74,000 in 1979.⁴

However, as time passed, the circumstances, policies and generations changed and the editorial approach of *Istarski borac* also changed, and it no longer sided with the Party. A different attitude toward the journal was first reflected in critiques of their work presented at the Party's meetings as well as publicly, and later in the termination of their funding, which was the end of the journal. According to a member of the last editorial board, Boris Domagoj Biletić: "*Istarski borac* was the only truly democratic light of the written word not only by young people in Istria and beyond, sometimes formally but most often never under the control of any political institution, from the beginning of the 1950s until democratic changes in 1990"⁵

Did *Istarski borac/IBOR* really oppose the dogmas imposed by the Party and the self-managing socialist system that it was supposed to promote in its publications? Or was it about the generational gap and conservative social environment in which the journal was being published and where there was no place for poems like "Please Master"? Maybe it was a combination of one and the other, together with non-fulfillment of obligations by the editorial board that published only a half of the planned issues for 1978 and 1979?

The Youth Press in the 1970s and 1980s

The Yugoslav authorities used the youth press as a tool of youth organizations – Socialist Youth of Croatia (SYC, Croatian: Socijalistička omladina Hrvatske – SOH) and later the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Croatia (ASYC, Croatian: Savez socijalističke omladine Hrvatske – SSOH) to indoctrinate, educate and direct the activities of young people according to the guidelines of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC, Croatian: Saveza komunista Hrvatske – SKH).⁶ However, with its engagement and the introduction of numerous novelties (design, popular culture from the West, analysis of neglected social themes) the youth press established itself among young people inclined toward the LCC/SKH, but also among a wider reading audience, becoming some sort of a brand. Youth journals were funded either from the funds of the Republic Self-management Interest Community for Culture (RSIC, Croatian: Republička samoupravna interesna zajednica kulture - RSIZ) and its local affiliates or through the ASYC/SSOH.⁷ The book *The Yugoslav Youth Press* by author Marko Zubak should be consulted for a detailed description of the phenomenon of Yugoslav youth press.

4 HR HDA 1220, Savez komunista Hrvatske. Centralni komitet (further: HR HDA 1220, SKH. CK), No. D-11334, "Analiza glasila mladih Istre 'IBOR'", 20 November 1979, 2, 3.

5 *Istarski borac*, accessed December 18, 2018, *Metelgrad - Digitalizirani časopisi*, <http://library.foi.hr/m3/kds1.php?B=1&sqlx=S02008&ser=&sqlid=1&sqlnivo=&css=&H=pula&U=05>.

6 Marko Zubak, *The Yugoslav Youth Press: (1968–1980): student movements, youth subcultures and Communist alternative media* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa; Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2018), 307.

7 See: HR HDA 1231, Republička konferencija Saveza socijalističke omladine Hrvatske (HR HDA 1231, RK SSOH) and HR HDA 1605, Republička samoupravna interesna zajednica kulture (HR HDA 1605 RSIZ).

The youth press in Croatia went through sort of a crisis, primarily a financial one, but also a personnel crisis, in the 1970s. None of the youth journals were profitable, but they were financed from the republic or local budget because the political significance of their publication was greater than the financial one. Personnel problems are partly related to the inadequate number of highly educated young journalists, the “personnel void” created after the Croatian Spring in 1971 and the dismissal of a large number of journalists, as well as their inadequate ideological background.⁸ *Omladinski tjednik*, the only Croatian journal with a broader republic and federal media reach, stopped coming out in 1976.⁹ Several local youth journals - *Laus*, *Val* and *Riječ mladih* - were coming out in Croatia at the time, and Pula's youth journal was launched again in 1976 under the new name *IBOR*. In the same year, *Omladinski tjednik*, a journal whose launch has long been invoked by youth leaders from RC of ASYC/RK SSOH and the more prominent media (*Komunist*), replaced *Polet* as the republic youth journal.¹⁰

The Information Committee of the Republic Conference of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Croatia (RC ASYC/RK SSOH) held a meeting on May 29, 1980. The topic of the meeting was “current problems of the youth press” and the writings of *Studentski list*, *Omladinska iskra* and *Polet* were discussed. An analysis of the situation in the youth newspapers was prepared for the meeting, from which the expectations of the government and the relationship towards the youth press can be seen.¹¹ Their opinion is that “a lot of effort needs to be made to ensure that the youth press is truly an integral element of socio-political activities and in the role of the Alliance of Socialist Youth.”¹² At the same time, the role and tasks of the youth press should be judged “precisely from the standpoint of putting them into the function of accomplishing the complex tasks of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Croatia in social transformation and development of socialist self-management.”¹³ Furthermore, the ASYC/SSOH is of the opinion that youth newspapers in the self-managing society should work together with the ASYC/SSOH, and that the youth press serves not only to provide information, but must also work actively in the youth organization and the society as a whole. The ASYC/SSOH thought that in the youth newspapers there are visible deviations going to two extremes: “The youth newspapers informs about the actions of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Croatia in a dull, non-communicative and to youth unattractive newsletter style, and other, far more often is that youth newspapers ‘forget’ their founder, their social role, responsibility and tasks, and turn not to the ASYC/SSOH, as a socio-political organization of youth, but simply to young people, forgetting that as the ASYC/SSOH journal they should be, not only generationally, but necessarily ideologically committed, therefore in the function of interests and activities of youth that is socialist-oriented.”¹⁴

8 Željko Krušelj, *Igraonica za odrasle: Polet 1976.–1990.* (Rijeka: Adamić, 2015), 37.

9 *Ibid.*, 27.

10 *Ibid.*, 30, 31.

11 HR HDA 1231, RK SSOH, box. 586, “Aktualni problemi omladinske štampe,” May 27, 1980.

12 *Ibid.*, 1.

13 *Ibid.*, 2.

14 HR HDA1231, RK SSOH, box. 586, “Aktualni problemi omladinske štampe,” May 27, 1980, 2.

The aforementioned document about the state of the youth press in 1980 highlights that the overall information system is designed to activate and involve “working people” and youth in self-managing processes, in order to “objectively inform” the youth about the issues of “social life, work and creativity (...) and in the function of achieving the social tasks of the Alliance of Socialist Youth”. It is stated that the youth press has a great educational function in “explaining the essence and contradictions in our development, which clearly makes it an active element of the ideological struggle against provincialism (philistinism), bureaucratism, technocracy, nationalism, dogmatism, and other anti-socialist and anti-self-managing tendencies”.¹⁵ It is further stated that the youth press is largely focused on the “marginal problems of the society as a whole”, that it often problematizes the “marginal social groups and phenomena” and thus poses a certain “danger in the conceptual sense, not because these phenomena are not worth writing about but because in regards to the real problems, questions, and dilemmas concerning further development of society, these marginal problems are being overemphasized”, thus opening the possibility for the “manipulating anti-self-managing and anti-socialistic forces to misuse it”.¹⁶ It was also mentioned that the youth newspapers should distinguish themselves by “engaging and affirming in the revolution”, but how such youth attitude was known to become “a dogma, turn into criticism, leftism, result in incidents, prohibitions, and wrongly highlighted social issues”.¹⁷

The same document also states that the FR of Croatia had nine youth newspapers in the late 1970s: *Polet*, *Studentski list*, *Val*, *Laus*, *Pet*, *Omladinska iskra*, *Lok*, *Ibor* and *Omladinac*, all of them having in common unresolved material, personnel and spatial requirements.¹⁸

Istarski Borac Literary Club and Journal *Istarski borac* / IBOR

The Istarski borac Literary Club was the literary section of Pula’s high school students, established in 1953. At its beginnings, the club was called the Literary Section of the Branko Semelić Gymnasium, and after its first issue in 1977 it was renamed the Istarski borac Literary Club. The year of the club’s establishment was also the year when the journal of the same name was launched. Ljubica Ivezić was the mentor of the club during its entire existence, and also its founder. According to the editorial board of the first issue, the purpose of forming the club and launching the journal was to preserve the Croatian language and Croatian heritage in Istria and foster the development and affirmation of Istrian writers and intellectuals, cultural workers, journalists, scholars and politicians.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., 4, 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹⁸ Ibid., 7.

The activities of the Istarski borac Club are best known from the *Istarski borac*. The journal was published from 1953 to 1979, with two interruptions (1964 to 1969 and from 1974 to 1976) and it changed its name several times: 1953 to 1961 it was called *Istarski borac*, from 1961 to 1964, *Glas mladih*, from 1969 to 1974, *Istarski borac*, and from 1976 to 1979, *IBOR*.

In the twenty-six years of its existence, the literary club had produced numerous intellectuals and artists who left a great mark in the cultural history of Istria and Croatia and it achieved its basic objective: preserving the Croatian language. According to the Marija Petener-Lorenzin, author of the bibliography of *Istarski borac/IBOR*, this periodical “left a mark in the recent cultural history of Istria and journalistic production in this area,” so that the compilation of its bibliography became a necessity.¹⁹

“IBOR Case”

There was a debate going on among the government bodies of ASYC/SSOH and RSIC/RSIZ about the cessation of its funding even before *Istarski borac/IBOR* became the “IBOR Case”. The stated reasons for termination of funding were failure to fulfill the taken obligations, primarily half as many published issues as planned in the years 1978 and 1979, and not submitting annual work reports. After the “IBOR Case” became public, and after making a detailed analysis of the journal’s writing (see the succeeding text), objections were directed toward the journal’s wrong approach when writing about social issues and an “ideological orientation that is foreign to our self-managing socialist society”.²⁰

Dolores Petrinić thinks that *Istarski borac* was started “with the mission of spreading literacy and a positive attitude toward the Croatian language and literature”.²¹ And since it published texts that “reflected the current cultural and social issues in a reasoned and engaging way” and how the *IBOR* had a tendency of growing into a journal “that would seriously and critically address not only literature but also culture and society in general.” Petrinić believes that escaping political control led to the termination of the journal.²² The crucial moment was the publication of a translation of the English-language poem with paedophilic/homosexual content, “Please Master,” by Allen Ginsberg, published under the issue’s theme “Total Institutions.” The Istrian editions of the daily newspaper *Večernji list* and *Glas Istre* repeatedly wrote about the “IBOR Case,” and the youth journals in Zagreb also became interested. After several months of Party and media debate, funding for the journal was cancelled, and as the result of a private lawsuit by journalist Armand Černjul, the editorial board was convicted for defamation on October 8, 1980.

19 Marija Petener-Lorenzin, *Bibliografija časopisa “Istarski borac” – “Ibor”: (1953.–1979.)* (Pula: Istarski ogranak Društva hrvatskih književnika, 2006), 5.

20 HR HDA 1220 SKH. CK, No. D-11334, “Analiza glasila mladih Istre ‘IBOR,’” November 20, 1979, 2.

21 Dolores Petrinić, *Hrvatska književnost u istarskim časopisima druge polovice XX. st.* (Rijeka: Društvo hrvatskih književnika, 2007), 9.

22 *Ibid.*, 11.

Boris Domagoj Biletić was a member of the last editorial board of *IBOR*, and one of the people conditionally sentenced to one month and fifteen days in prison for defamation of the journalist Armand Černjul. As Biletić testified, the formal reason for the verdict was “quasi-naive: translation of the poem ‘Please Master’ by Allen Ginsberg (who wrote a dedication to the last editorial board a few years later). But the real reasons were, in fact, that in some youthful texts (...) we had dared to question them (the Party!), and we were additionally interested in anti-psychiatry, in the almost poetically pure student year of 1968 in Europe and here, i.e. student protests, the Croatian Spring, Jim Morrison, anarchism (...) Can you imagine, at that time, some young people in some place called Pula wrote, published, and were the leaders of the whole generation, and not under the umbrella of the so-called socialist youth?!²³”

***IBOR*’s Last Issue and Poem “Please Master”**

The last issue of *IBOR* dealing with the topic of total institutions or comprehensive institutions, with special emphasis on psychiatric institutions, came out in September 1979. Using the deductive approach, starting with the profiling of totalitarian institutions, focusing on psychiatric institutions and their patients, the editorial draws conclusions, referring to eminent historical personalities from the fields of philosophy, historiography and culture, that an artist can only be a person who is either on the border of madness or has already passed that boundary. This is backed up by a series of texts and poems, the most provocative among them being “Please Master” by American poet Allen Ginsberg. The poem deals about a paedophilic-homosexual relationship between a pupil and a teacher and is accompanied by a photo of a child named after the poem.

The poem aroused great controversy in Pula’s Party and youth circles, and in republic, local and youth publications, and it was the formal reason for abolishing the journal’s funding. Speaking of topics that were considered undesirable in conservative Pula, but also about the social circumstances in Yugoslavia that bothered the state-party leadership, the *IBOR* editorial board’s notable cultural-opposition activity was what ultimately led to the cessation of its funding.

Governmental Attitude Toward “*IBOR* Case”

The relation of socialist authorities toward the *IBOR* journal and the “*IBOR* Case” can be seen from the documentation of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Croatia (ASYC/SSOH), the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia

²³ *Matica hrvatska* [Matrix Croatica], <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/408/nacionalno-i-univerzalno-u-obzorima-zavicajnosti-23142/>.

(CC LCC/SKH CK) and the Republic Self- Management Interest Community for Culture (RSIC/RSIZ).

The work and funding of youth and other journals were followed by the RSIC/RSIZ Commission for Journals and Newspapers in Culture. In its report from February 1979, it mentioned *IBOR* and journal *Vrabac*, clearly stating that: "Following the work of these journals through 1978, the Commission concluded that contributions do not exceed the level of quality of the first attempts and therefore do not meet the criteria. The source of funding should certainly be the municipal SIC/SIZ for culture."²⁴ Two months later *IBOR* was again mentioned in the report of the same commission because it did not submit the report and was therefore denied payment of the remaining funds for 1978: "The Commission proposes that the journals which did not carry out the obligation of submitting the report even after the repeated warning be denied payment of the remaining funds. This refers to journals: *Čakavska rič*, *Dubrovnik*, *Haiku*, *Ibor*, *Polet* and *Vidik*."²⁵

Certainly the most important document pertaining to the "IBOR Case" is the "Analysis of Istria's Youth Journal "IBOR"". The document, signed under the name "Workgroup" and dated Pula, November 20, 1979, was created for the 37th session of the Municipal Conference Committee of the LCC/SKH Pula held on November 27, 1979. The main topic of the meeting was the journal *IBOR*. It is a seven-page document that analyzes *IBOR*'s work from 1973 to the latest issue 4-5 in 1979. The analysis focuses primarily on the editorial and associate staff of the journal, which, following the conclusions of the analysis is not up to the task, and does not give enough space to young authors instead forcing the affirmed authors. At the same time, *IBOR* was publishing primarily the works of the members of the Istarski Borac Literary Club, and very rarely the works of "young authors from the wider area of Istria".²⁶ It is seen from the document that the editorial board has been previously warned to give more space to the non-established authors. *IBOR*'s unfulfilled obligations were also pointed out, as fewer issues than planned were published annually. For example, eight issues were planned for the year 1978 and only three (1, 2-3 and 4-5) were realized. Another eight issues were planned for the next year (1979), five were officially published, while only two double issues (1-3, 4-5) were actually published. The topics that the journal dealt with were also problematic, they were not satisfactory because they "exclusively dealt with the issues from the area of the Pula commune".²⁷

From the document we find out that the Istarski Borac Literary Club had 50 members (20 high school students, 15 university students and 15 employees) in the final year of its publishing (1979), and was conceptually oriented toward three areas

24 HR HDA 1605, RSIZ, box 4, 57. Session IO (26.3.1979.), "Prijedlog programa časopisa za 1979. godinu," February 1979, 10.

25 HR HDA 1605, RSIZ, box 4, 58. Session IO (13.4.1979.), "Prijedlog za isplatu preostalih sredstava iz 1978. godine," April 1979, 2.

26 HR HDA 1220, SKH. CK, No. D-11334, "Analiza glasila mladih Istre 'IBOR'", November 20, 1979, 1.

27 Ibid., 1.

- culture, literary creativity and social issues.²⁸ The journal was criticized for not writing enough about young people “about young man’s role and place in our self-managing society, his problems and aspirations beyond the rock music and sports like problems of young people’s employment, student self-management, deviations in young people’s behavior”.²⁹ It was also pointed out that in most cases *IBOR*’s writing was destructive, and the reason for this was that for some authors “this approach and a way of writing about our social reality reflects their ideological orientation which is foreign to our self-managing socialist society”.³⁰

The Executive Board of the SIC/SIZ discussed the *IBOR* at its session on October 6, 1978, with a special emphasis on the “socio-political orientation and literary value of the journal”. It was then concluded: that the approved conception of the journal was not achieved; that the program orientation of the journal was to be taken over by the DC ASYC/OK SSOH Pula; that the journal should be made more “social” by applying the delegate principle, and that the funds are to be suspended until this condition are fulfilled.³¹ Soon the DC ASYC/OK SSOH Pula held another session which concluded that the financing of *IBOR* should be continued until a joint youth journal for whole Istria is launched and that one representative from the DC ASYC/OK SSOH Pula and the SIC/SIZ for Culture Pula should enter the editorial board of *IBOR*.³² Aliče Davosyr as a representative of the SIC/SIZ and Ljubo Marčeta on behalf of the DC ASYC/OK SSOH entered the editorial board. As the plan for the first half of 1979 was not realized, the Republic SIC/SIZ suspended the financing of *IBOR*.³³ The Istarski Borac Literary Club proposed that the journal should also be funded in 1980, but the Republic SIC/SIZ rejected it again. The SIC/SIZ thought that the *IBOR* “is not oriented toward socially acceptable movements and that it must contain socially acceptable content”. The analysis concluded that financing of *IBOR* should be continued but at the local level.³⁴ However, *IBOR*’s funding was nevertheless suspended. It is not possible to determine from the archives why weren’t the recommendations of the working group that made the analysis acted upon. The record of the session held on November 27, 1979, on which *IBOR* was discussed, does not exist. In the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb and in the State Archives in Pazin there is only a call to the session and the document “Analysis of Istria’s Youth Journal ‘IBOR’” but not the record of the session itself.

In the entire document, only one sentence mentions the last issue of *IBOR* (4–5/1979) because of which the entire “IBOR Case” was initiated. The sentence reads: “Meanwhile, the latest double issue 4–5/79 came out containing a lot of inappropriate articles especially for the age group journal is intended for i.e. young

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 2.

30 HR HDA 1220, SKH. CK, D-11334, “Analiza glasila mladih Istre ‘IBOR,’” November 20, 1979, 2.

31 Ibid., 4.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 5.

34 Ibid., 6, 7.

people”.³⁵ Such disregard for the content of the last issue gives the impression that the poem “Please Master” may not be a reason *IBOR*’s funding got canceled. Even more so because the emphasis of the key analysis was on non-fulfilling the obligations, the absence of young non-established authors and the ideological turn of the editorial board which is reflected in improper writing about the Yugoslav self-managing socialist society.

Media and “IBOR Case”

The “IBOR Case” had, in addition to great interest of the government, also caused great interest of regional media and youth journals. As mentioned earlier – it was mostly written about in *Glas Istre* and the Istrian edition of *Večernji list*, as well as the republican youth journals *Polet*, *Pitanja* and *Studentski List*. The republic newspaper *Vjesnik – Sedam dana* devoted a series of seven articles to the “IBOR Case” in which the case was analyzed in detail. The articles published in *Glas Istre* are of a more informative character and primarily present the conclusions of the DC LCC/OK SKH Pula and the DC ASYC/OK SSOH. The articles in the Istrian edition of *Večernji list* are signed by Armando Černjul, and are partly characterized by the informative approach and partly by the author’s engagement and his unreserved condemnation of the *IBOR*’s editorial board for the poem “Please Master”. Youth journals make room for discussion by publishing articles signed by *IBOR*’s last editorial board and articles by Armando Černjul, as well as texts by authors not directly related to the “IBOR Case”.

In one of Armando Černjul’s first articles about the “IBOR Case” published in the Istrian edition of *Večernji list* the author wonders whether people in *IBOR* think that Istria’s youth “for whom the journal is intended is interested in homosexual ranting?”³⁶ The *IBOR*’s editorial staff answered in the same newspaper to the allegations in relation to publishing the poem “Please Master”. They stated that the “unfortunate Ginsberg is a cause of much casual gossip and labeling of *IBOR*’s editorial staff from the “filters” of social morality such as A. Č. The civil terms “swear words” and “vulgarity” simply fade away as archaism compared to those as stylemes without which one period of literary creativity is missing in the world and here. It seems that the individuals must be repeatedly reminded of the well-worn statement that the appreciation of the artistic level of a particular literary work is mainly in the domain of poetics, literary criticism and aesthetics, and by no means a tool for political discredit by drawing out of the context of a whole.”³⁷ Černjul wrote his answer already in the next issue: “As for the poem ‘Please Master’ by A. Ginsberg, which is presented by the members of *IBOR*’s editorial staff, thinking perhaps that Pula and other places in Istria have problems with homosexuality in education, then they should have disclosed their opinion on their

³⁵ Ibid., 6.

³⁶ Armando Černjul, ‘Kome služi “Ibor”?’, *Večernji list* (Istrian), October 3, 1979, 6.

³⁷ *IBOR* Redaction, “Fusnote za A. Černjula”, *Večernji list* (Istrian), November 1, 1979, 6.

own, and not seek 'help' from the American poet and professor. How to otherwise explain to the reader of *IBOR*, and now 'Večernji List', that the people in *IBOR* are mistaken. They would have to look at the last page of the *IBOR*, on which the photo was published showing at best three year old lying prone on the road, surrounded by adults and signed 'Please Master'. If people in *IBOR* don't know what they have done with it, then they are not up to the job they are doing, because the photograph in the context of the poem 'Please Master' by which it is named, undoubtedly puts the innocent child into the center of homosexual lust. Everyone must be disgusted by it!"³⁸

A cosmopolitan, writer and scholar Predrag Matvejević also referred to "IBOR Case" in an interview for *Polet*. When asked by journalist Vladimir Cvitan: "When it comes to 'Ibor' and dismissing its editorial staff, it is generally taken as known that by publishing Ginsberg's poem 'Please Master' a mistake has been made?" Matvejević answered: "I think publishing one somewhat challenging poem of one good poet (a poem that speaks of homosexuality) is more mischief than a mistake. Do not forget that one issue of 'Domet' dedicated to erotics was nearly prohibited in Rijeka."³⁹ Regarding Matvejević's response in which he stated that the poem is of homosexual character, the question arises as to whether Matvejević was really familiar with the words of the poem and the fact that the editorial team accompanied the poem with a photograph which they named after the poem's title and which shows the boy of preschool age. Given the words of the poem and the photograph which is explicitly related to the poem, it is more than obvious that it is a poem of pedophilic character, while the homosexual part of the poem's character is probably less important because homosexuality was decriminalized in socialist Yugoslavia in 1977. Armando Černjul referred to an interview with Matvejević in the earlier mentioned article "Enough with crude disinformation". Černjul stated that Matvejević and journalist Cvitan give inaccurate information about the "IBOR Case" and how they are wrongly informed. Černjul thinks that one of the reasons for Matvejević's misinformation is the visit of *IBOR*'s editorial board to Professor Matvejević.⁴⁰

Slavko Kalčić and Aldo Monfardin, two members of the last editorial board of *Istarski Borac/IBOR*, published the article "IBOR Case" in the newspaper *Pitanja* in 1980. In the article they respond to the attacks in other newspapers, especially Armando Černjul's texts and the accusations from the DC ASYC/OK SSOH. As a defense to Černjul's accusations of vulgarism, and in relation to the poem "Please Master", they state that Černjul takes the photograph and the poem "out of the context of the issue's theme (Total institutions), pretending not to understand or indeed not understanding the term *literary*, simultaneously vulgarizing it and attacking *IBOR* with low blows using the arsenal of Christian moralism".⁴¹ Answering the accusations from the DC ASYC/OK SSOH (which were published in *Glas Istre*, issue from December 3, 1979), that many articles published in *IBOR* were "not suitable, especially for the age of those

38 Armando Černjul, "Bez kormila," *Večernji list* (Istrian), November 2, 1979, 6.

39 Vladimir Cvitan, "Intervju: Predrag Matvejević. Dosta gruba smjenjivanja," *Polet* (Zagreb), January 23, 1980, 9, 10.

40 Armando Černjul, "Dosta grube dezinformacije," *Polet* (Zagreb), February 6, 1980, 2.

41 Slavko Kalčić and Aldo Monfardin, "Slučaj 'Ibor,'" *Pitanja* (Zagreb), No. 3 (1980), 71-77.

the journal was intended for”, the editorial staff relativised these claims and said that such a label could “usually be found on Danish-Swedish film co-productions!”. They focused on the second part of the accusations, which state that part of the inscriptions is unacceptable “as a way of presenting our social reality”. The part about presenting “our social reality” is deemed crucial by *IBOR*’s editorial board, and they confirm it with Rakočević’s article published in the Istrian edition of *Večernji list* from December 4, 1979. In the article Rakočević accused them of publishing the texts with “views that are foreign to our self-managing and socialist society, impose a destructive approach to the treatment of social topics and problems, and instead of being a forum for young people, *IBOR* increasingly becomes a ground for the nebulous wisdom of individuals.”⁴² Further in the text, as a sort of conclusion, the authors pointed out that one “poem instead of giving aesthetic and cognitive pleasure resulted in extraordinary sessions, work groups (...) It is wrong, however, to think that the song missed its purpose. On the contrary, it fulfilled it entirely by bringing to light the hereditary illness of a closed community. Instead of a word no one listens to under the dome of deaf indifference, the poem has become the catalyst for the events.”⁴³ As a key part of their defense in this article, the authors emphasized the “Marxism” of their actions and the fact that “the coupling of sexual and political inhibition” is joined against them: “To speak out about this means to touch into the sacrosanctness of the ‘guardians’ of such activity. We come to an important problem in the whole case: isn’t the ‘freedom of speech’ lower in provincial conditions where the local totems rule, and where political and sexual are not yet free from taboos? It is not by chance that in one particular case sexual and political merge by cause and effect relationship as the initiators and the mechanisms of silencing. Historical analysis of the written/spoken word in relation to these two areas would show that they were, in fact, its limiters in societies without freedom/democracy. Boasting with progressive consciousness is not uncommon in these times, but progressive consciousness is not in Marxist phrases, but in Marxist deeds. We think that *IBOR*’s work is Marxist in its critical, open and argumentative writing. In the surroundings where ideas are often critiques for the local autocracy, every critique is known to be met with intolerance. That is why people in *IBOR* were marked as critics and were objected for not highlighting the positive examples from our reality”.⁴⁴

Verdict Against the *IBOR* Editorial Board

The “*IBOR* Case” was mostly covered by journalist Armando Černjul, writing for the Istrian edition of the daily newspaper *Večernji list* and *Polet*. It was his article in *Polet* (“Enough with crude disinformation,” February 6, 1980) that prompted *IBOR*’s editorial board to react with another article in *Polet* (“Photogenic falsifier,” February

42 Ibid., 73.

43 Ibid.

44 Slavko Kalčić and Aldo Monfardin, “Slučaj ‘Ibor,’” *Pitanja* (Zagreb), No. 3 (1980): 71–77.

19, 1980), in which they stated that Černjul has a “Zhdanovist temper”, that he is a “press-agent in the service of power”, and a philistine.⁴⁵ Černjul filed a private lawsuit for slander and defamation against the *IBOR*’s editorial staff. The court dismissed the part of the suit pertaining to slander, but ruled against members of the *IBOR*’s editorial board (Nevenko Petrić, Boris Biletić, Slavko Kalčić, Miomir Kalčić, Josip Ivančić and Ivan Pletikos) for defamation and assigned each “a month and a half suspended sentence and one year of probation.” At the request of the plaintiff (Černjul), and pursuant to the court’s decision, the verdict was published in *Polet*.⁴⁶

The trial was held at the County Court in Pula and the second-instance verdict was passed on October 8, 1980. The Council that issued the second-instance verdict was constituted of the Council’s president Zvonimir Pajdaš and members Ante Črnja and Milojka Vučković, while Željko Franješević defended *IBOR*’s editorial board. As mentioned earlier, the second-instance court rejected part of allegations referring to slander and the editorial board of *Istarski borac/IBOR* was only convicted for defamation. In addition to paying the cost of publishing the verdict in the *Polet* newspaper, the members of the editorial board were obliged to pay the costs of the criminal proceedings and each paid the sum of 200 dinars. The verdict contains the court’s belief that the offenders “will not repeat such and similar criminal offenses in the future.”⁴⁷

Conclusion

Following all that was said, it is evident that the “*IBOR* Case” is very complex and it is not easy answering the question of whether it classifies as a culture of dissent or not. The *IBOR* was discussed in the party circles even before it became a public case, i.e. prior to publishing the issue 4–5/79 and the poem “Please Master”. At the time *IBOR* was criticized for not giving enough space to young authors, not submitting reports, publishing only a half of planned issues for 1978 and 1979, and dealing primarily with the issues of the Pula commune. After the outbreak of the “*IBOR* Case”, Party’s analysis of the *IBOR* put an emphasis on the non-fulfillment of obligations, the absence of young non-established authors and the ideological turn of the editorial board, which is reflected in improper writing about the Yugoslav self-managing socialist society. The analysis ignored the poem “Please Master” only briefly stating that the last issue of *IBOR* was full of vulgarity. This disregard for content of the last issue gives the impression that the poem “Please Master” was perhaps not the reason why the financing of *IBOR* was cancelled and that the reason lies in the “destructive” writing of some authors – “this approach and a way of writing about our social reality reflects their ideological orientation which is foreign to our self-managing socialist society”.

⁴⁵ *Polet* (Zagreb), February 19, 1980, 2.

⁴⁶ *Polet* (Zagreb), November 5, 1980, 2.

⁴⁷ *Polet* (Zagreb), November 5, 1980, 2.

On the other hand, the editorial board thought that their writing is critical, but not (culture of dissent) towards Marxism: “We think that *IBOR*’s work is Marxist in its critical, open and argumentative writing” - but towards negative phenomena in society. Has the *IBOR*’s editorial board really thought that their activity was Marxist or was it a defense against an attack that would reduce the damage done to *IBOR* and to them as individuals – this remains an open question and is subject to further interpretation. The *IBOR*’s last editorial board can hardly be denied the courage to write about topics which were taboo and caused discontent in Pula’s conservative surroundings. However, the editorial board was probably aware that the same topics would bring about discontent from the Party and that their actions put them at the limits of tolerance. With this kind of work, the editorial board of *IBOR* showed courage and resisted, if not to Marxism as they themselves say, then to the community in which they lived and worked.

Sources and References

Archival Sources:

- HR HDA, Hrvatski državni arhiv, Zagreb:
 - HR HDA 1220, Savez komunista Hrvatske. Centralni komitet.
 - HR HDA 605, Republička samoupravna interesna zajednica kulture.
 - HR HDA 1231, Republička konferencija Saveza socijalističke omladine Hrvatske.

Literature:

- Krušelj, Željko. *Igraonica za odrasle: Polet 1976.–1990*. Rijeka: Adamić, 2015.
- Peternel–Lorenzin, Marija. *Bibliografija časopisa “Istarski borac” – “Ibor”: (1953.–1979.)*. Pula: Istarski ogranak Društva hrvatskih književnika, 2006.
- Petrinić, Dolores. *Hrvatska književnost u istarskim časopisima druge polovice XX. st.* Rijeka: Društvo hrvatskih književnika, 2007.
- Zubak, Marko. *The Yugoslav Youth Press: (1968– 1980): student movements, youth subcultures and Communist alternative media*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa; Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2018.

Newspaper Sources:

- Crnobori, Albino. “Što je za moju generaciju značio literarni klub ‘Istarski borac.’” *Istarski mozaik*, No. 5–6 (1968): 412–15.
- Cvitan, Vladimir. “Intervju: Predrag Matvejević. Dosta gruba smjenjivanja.” *Polet* (Zagreb), January 23, 1980, 9, 10.
- Černjul, Armando. “Dosta grube dezinformacije.” *Polet* (Zagreb), February 6, 1980, 2.
- Černjul, Armando. “Kome služi ‘Ibor?’” *Večernji list* (Istrian), October 3, 1979, 6.
- *Glas Istre*, 1979.

- IBOR Redaction. "Fusnote za A. Černjula." *Večernji list* (Istrian), November 1, 1979, 6.
- *Istarski borac*, 1953–1979.
- Ivezić, Ljubica. "I jedna važna obljetnica između na koju ne treba zaboraviti," *Dometi* (Rijeka) No. 5–6 (1992): 95–100.
- *Pitanja*, 1980.
- *Polet*, 1980.
- *Večernji list* (Istrian), 1979.

Online Sources:

- *Istarski borac*. Accessed December 18, 2018, *Metelgrad - Digitalizirani časopisi*. <http://library.foi.hr/m3/kds1.php?B=1&sqlx=S02008&ser=&sqlid=1&sqlnivo=&css=&H=pula&U=05>.
- *Matica hrvatska* [Matrix Croatica]. <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/408/nacionalno-i-univerzalno-u-obzorima-zavicajnosti-23142/>.

Lidija Bencetić

JOURNAL *ISTARSKI BORAC*/IBOR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CULTURE OF DISSENT

SUMMARY

Following all that was said, it is evident that the "IBOR Case" is very complex and it is not easy answering the question of whether it classifies as a culture of dissent or not. The *IBOR* was discussed in the party circles even before it became a public case, i.e. prior to publishing the issue 4–5/79 and the poem "Please Master". At the time *IBOR* was criticized for not giving enough space to young authors, not submitting reports, publishing only a half of planned issues for 1978 and 1979, and dealing primarily with the issues of the Pula commune. After the outbreak of the "IBOR Case", Party's analysis of the *IBOR* put an emphasis on the non-fulfillment of obligations, the absence of young non-established authors and the ideological turn of the editorial board, which is reflected in improper writing about the Yugoslav self-managing socialist society. The analysis ignored the poem "Please Master" only briefly stating that the last issue of *IBOR* was full of vulgarity. This disregard for content of the last issue gives the impression that the poem "Please Master" was perhaps not the reason why the financing of *IBOR* was cancelled and that the reason lies in the "destructive" writing of some authors – "this approach and a way of writing about our social reality reflects their ideological orientation which is foreign to our self-managing socialist society".

On the other hand, the editorial board thought that their writing is critical, but not (culture of dissent) towards Marxism: "We think that *IBOR*'s work is Marxist in its critical, open and argumentative writing" - but towards negative phenomena in

society. Has the *IBOR*'s editorial board really thought that their activity was Marxist or was it a defense against an attack that would reduce the damage done to *IBOR* and to them as individuals – this remains an open question and is subject to further interpretation. The *IBOR*'s last editorial board can hardly be denied the courage to write about topics which were taboo and caused discontent in Pula's conservative surroundings. However, the editorial board was probably aware that the same topics would bring about discontent from the Party and that their actions put them at the limits of tolerance. With this kind of work, the editorial board of *IBOR* showed courage and resisted, if not to Marxism as they themselves say, then to the community in which they lived and worked.

Lidija Bencetić

ČASOPIS *ISTARSKI BORAC*/IBOR V KONTEKSTU KULTURE DISIDENTSTVA

POVZETEK

Prvi hrvaški mladinski časopis *Istarski borac*/*IBOR* je z dvema krajšima vmesnima premoroma izhajal med leti 1953 in 1979 v Pulju. Časopis je izdajal Književni klub *Istarski borac*, in sicer z namenom ohranjanja hrvaškega jezika v Istri kot temeljnim vodilom. V sedemdesetih letih 20. stoletja je časopis prevzel značaj kritičnega medija in postopoma uvajal vse več kulturnih, lokalnih in družbenih tem, katerih ton pa socialistična oblast ni dobro sprejela. Jeseni leta 1979 je izbruhnil »primer *IBOR*«. Časopisu so istega leta ukinili financiranje, zaradi česar je prenehal izhajati. Povod za ukinitvev časopisa je bila sicer pesem z naslovom *Please, master* (hrv.: *Molim te, učitelju*) Allena Ginsberga, toda partijski dokumenti razkrivajo, da je bil razlog političen. Pričujoča razprava poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali je delovanje zadnjega uredništva časopisa *Istarski borac*/*IBOR* mogoče obravnavati kot kulturo disidentstva.

»Primer *IBOR*« je dokaj zapleten, zato odgovor na vprašanje, ali je pri njem šlo za kulturo disidentstva ali ne, ni preprost. O časopisu *IBOR* so v partijskih krogih razpravljali še pred javnim odprtjem primera oziroma pred izdajo številke 4–5/79 in pesmi *Please, master*. Takrat se je govorilo, da časopis ne daje dovolj prostora mladim avtorjem, da ne oddaja poročil o delu, da je leta 1978 in 1979 objavil pol manj številke, kot je bilo predvideno, in da se ukvarja predvsem s problematiko puljske komune. Po izbruhu »primera *IBOR*« je v partijski analizi opaziti poudarek na neizpolnjevanju obveznosti, izpustu mladih, še neuveljavljenih avtorjev in idejnem odklonu uredništva, kar naj bi se odražalo v nepravilnem pisanju o jugoslovanski samoupravni socialistični družbi. V analizi je sicer prezrta pesem *Please, master*, pri čemer je zgolj na kratko omenjeno, da je zadnja številka časopisa *IBOR* polna prostaštva. Tovrstno ignoriranje

vsebine zadnje številke zbuja vtis, da pesem *Please, master* ni bila razlog za umik financiranja časopisa *IBOR*. Nakazuje namreč, da je razlog vendarle »destruktivno« pisanje nekaterih avtorjev, saj da »tak pristop in način pisanja o naši družbeni stvarnosti odražata idejno opredelitev, ki ni v skladu z našo samoupravno socialistično družbo«.

Po drugi strani pa je samo uredništvo bilo mnenja, da je njihovo pisanje sicer kritično, vendar ni kritično (culture of dissent) do marksizma: »Menimo, da je delovanje časopisa *IBOR* marksistično po svojem kritično usmerjenem, odprtem in argumentiranem pisanju«, toda kritično naravnano do negativnosti v družbi. Vprašanje o tem, ali je uredništvo časopisa *IBOR* v resnici menilo, da je njihovo delovanje marksistično, ali je šlo zgolj za obrambo pred napadom, s katero so hoteli omiliti škodo, ki so jo utrpeli *IBOR* in člani uredništva kot posamezniki, je ostalo odprto in predmet naknadnih interpretacij. Nikakor pa zadnjemu uredništvu časopisa *IBOR* ne gre oporekati poguma, s katerim so se lotili pisanja o tabu temah, ki so izzvale nezadovoljstvo v konservativnem puljskem okolju. Kljub temu so se njegovi člani najbrž zavedali, da bodo ravno te teme povzročile negotovanje tudi v Partiji in da se s svojim delovanjem pomikajo proti sami meji tolerance. S takim delovanjem je uredništvo revije *IBOR* pokazalo pogum in se uprlo, če že ne marksizmu, kot so dejali sami, pa gotovo vsaj skupnosti, v kateri so delovali in živeli.

Jure Ramšak*

The Contours of Social Criticism in Late-Socialist Slovenia

IZVLEČEK

GABARITI DRUŽBENE KRITIKE V POZNOSOCIALISTIČNI SLOVENIJI

Tako kot na mnogih področjih družbenega življenja je samoupravni socializem tudi pri upravljanju družbene polemike oz. javnega življenja nasploh izkazoval dvoumnost in nejasnost, ki je bila vzrok mnogim posebnostim tega fenomena v Jugoslaviji. V ozadju Kardeljevega recepta za »družbeno odgovorno kritiko« je bilo leninistično razumevanje demokracije v socializmu, hkrati pa je bil jugoslovanski in slovenski prostor tudi pod vplivom zahodnih liberalnih konceptov. Upoštevajoč politični in ideološki kontekst poznega socializma, prispevek obravnava sistemski način soočanja z družbeno kritiko od konca šestdesetih do sredine osemdesetih let in ugotavlja, kakšen pomen je imelo to stanje za kasnejši razvoj demokratizacije. Preden so se v drugi polovici osemdesetih let zgodili veliki družbeni premiki, se je »pluralizem samoupravnih interesov« lahko v praksi artikuliral predvsem na način, da ni bil v kompeticiji s partijskim monopolom. V kolikor pa je do tega prišlo, je vodilna politična garnitura obračun najraje zaupala svojim »pooblaščenec«, sama pa zavzela arbitrarna stališča, prek katerih lahko prepoznamo nekaj ključnih značilnosti poznosocialističnega režima v Sloveniji.

Ključne besede: samoupravni socializem, družbena kritika, intelektualci, Zveza komunistov Slovenije, Edvard Kardelj

* Research Fellow, PhD, Institute for Historical Studies, ZRS Koper, Garibaldijska Street 1, SI-6000 Koper, Slovenia; jure.ramsak@zrs-kp.si

ABSTRACT

Self-management socialism displayed ambiguities and vagueness in handling social controversy and public life in general, giving rise to numerous peculiarities particular to this social phenomenon in Yugoslavia. While a Leninist interpretation of democracy in socialism constituted the background of Edvard Kardelj's recipe for "socially responsible criticism," Yugoslavia and Slovenia were at the same time under the influence of western liberal concepts. Considering the political and ideological contexts of late socialism, the article discusses the systemic way of dealing with social criticism between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, while trying to determine the impact of these circumstances on the subsequent evolvement of democratisation. Prior to the major social shifts of the second half of the 1980s, the "pluralism of self-management interests" could be articulated in practice primarily in a way that did not force it into competition with the Party. In those cases when this nevertheless occurred, the leading political establishment preferred to leave it to its "proxies" to deal with the transgressors, while itself taking on arbitrary positions that displayed some of the key features of the late-socialist regime in Slovenia.

Keywords: self-management socialism, social criticism, intellectuals, League of Communists of Slovenia, Edvard Kardelj

Introduction

In steering intellectual debates and in the public sphere in general, as in various other areas of social life, self-management socialism displayed ambiguities and vagueness, giving rise to numerous peculiarities unique to this social phenomenon in Yugoslavia that now make it difficult to compare the system or phenomenon with situations in central and eastern European 'real-socialist' countries. In the background of the idea of an organic connection between the social system and the engaged intellectual as a predisposition for a "socially responsible criticism," advocated by the leading Yugoslav ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, was essentially the Leninist conception of socialist democracy. This country, and its northernmost constituent republic of Slovenia in particular, situated at the intersection of liberal capitalism and state socialism, bore impacts of exposure to western intellectual and political currents, and the dynamics of public controversy were strongly correlated to the political (and judicial) culture, clearly distinctive in each of the Yugoslav republics.

Taking into account political oscillations, this article aims at profiling the cultural hegemony of self-management socialism between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s and ascertaining what this configuration meant for the vigour of the public sphere and the later democratisation process. Rather than scrutinising concrete forms of

individual intellectuals' engagement,¹ this article is based on an analysis of key theoretical texts and political documents in order to present the typology of the regime's classification of social criticism and the ways of dealing with its contents in the late socialist republic of Slovenia. The restraint in the use of repressive measures, the loose "rules of the game," which did not require a complete identification with the dominant ideology, the open borders, the mechanisms of catalysing public debate through the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP), the designation of the League of Communists [of Slovenia] (LC[S]) as the bearer of national interests, and a series of other influences led to the fact that even during the early 1980s there was neither complete identification nor direct opposition to the regime among the greater part of the intelligentsia. It is, therefore, difficult to draw a clear line between what was *allowed* to write or say in late-socialist Slovenia and what *wasn't*; however, any such attempt at illustrating the limits of acceptable social criticism should be taken as a basis for comparing the development of intellectual life within Yugoslav as well as central and eastern European contexts, and therefore as a prerequisite to the various debates addressed by this special issue.

Yugoslavia as a Model of Non-dissent?

Although all socialist systems shared a common frame of reference, from which the leading party groups derived their politics of the day, the dissimilarities between these had magnified over the first two decades after WWII to such a degree that individual countries could have more in common with other political systems than with other socialist countries. The extent of these differences can be appreciated particularly in terms of the following key variables: level of economic development, type of political culture and mode of communist takeover.² In close connection to these factors, it is also possible to trace differences in the phenomena of dissent and opposition, in the importance of the integration of critics into society and party circles since the early post-Stalinist era. The vigour of social criticism was strongly related to the degree of a country's political dependence on Moscow, to the economic and ideological capacity of a regime to preserve the loyalty of its citizens, the ability to curb religious communities, the level of cultural interconnectedness and openness to the West.³ Based on a survey of comparable factors that had a significant effect during the late-socialist period, the political scientist Rudolf Tökés remarked, towards the end of

1 For details on the trajectories of different Slovenian intellectuals during socialism see Aleš Gabrič, "Vloga intelektualca kot političnega subjekta v enostrankarskem sistemu," in: *Slovenija 1948–1998: iskanje lastne poti*, eds. Stane Granda and Barbara Šatej (Ljubljana and Maribor: Zveza zgodovinskih društev; Univerza v Mariboru, 1998), as well as other contributions by the same author.

2 Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in: *Change in Communist Systems*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 4, 28.

3 Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, "Comparative Perspective on Dissent and Opposition to Communist Role," in: *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe*, eds. Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs (Hants and Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), 231.

the 1970s, that Yugoslavia had always been a peculiarity in this sense, as it solved its internal conflicts with methods that significantly reduced (though did not annihilate) the potential of the opposition in the country.⁴

The most frequently quoted argument distinguishing between eastern European dissent and Yugoslav forms of opposition to the socialist regime is a considerably lower level of repression compared to the measures that the critics in 'real-socialist' countries were subjected to, which was particularly evident from the 1960s onwards.⁵ On account of that, Yugoslavia was missing one of the three conditions necessary for the existence of dissent delineated by sociologist Sharon Zukin in the early 1980s {1) public action, 2) criticism of the current conditions and their rejection, 3) administrative measures}, so that, to Zukin, Yugoslavia was "a model of non-dissent," as it inspired few statements that could be perceived as dissident and even fewer groups that could claim the status of dissidents.⁶

Before proceeding with an analysis of the status of social criticism in Yugoslavia, it is necessary to look at some preconditions that essentially defined its scope and significance in the specific Yugoslav environment. First, we should point out the "authenticity" of the Communist revolution in Yugoslavia, based on the wartime resistance movement under the leadership of the Communist Party, which rose to power principally owing to the majority support of the masses and only partially through assistance from Soviet troops, as was the case in east-central Europe.⁷ The National Liberation Struggle and revolution became key social integrative factors and an integral part of civil religion as an amalgamation of spontaneous and manipulated creation in Yugoslavia. At and after the end of the war, much of a potential opposition was exiled or liquidated, while a considerable part of uncompromised adherents to the left wings of pre-war bourgeois parties and movements was drawn to participate in the Liberation Front, slowly merging with the Communist majority.⁸

Of particular importance for the handling of the domestic situation was the 1948 break with the Soviet Union, which made of Yugoslavia a valuable ally of the West. According to the Croatian publicist Daniel Ivin, at the triumphant VI Congress of the LCY in 1952, the Yugoslav party itself assumed the position of a collective dissident, a renegade, although in the belief that it was faithfully following Marx's ideals. Due to its constant interest in preserving a stable multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, the West, in most cases, did not cultivate such sympathies for Yugoslav dissidents as it did for

4 Rudolf L. Tökés, "Introduction," in: *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, ed. Rudolf L. Tökés (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), 18.

5 Božo Repe, "Podobnosti in razlike med slovenskim (jugoslovanskim) in vzhodnoevropskim tipom socializma," in: *Evropski vplivi na slovensko družbo*, eds. Nevenka Troha et al. (Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 2008), 414.

6 Jasna Dragovič-Soso, "*Spasioci nacije*": *Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i ožvljanje nacionalizma* (Beograd: Edicija Reč, 2004), 36.

7 Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadžrdjevičeve in Titove Jugoslavije* (Koper: Lipa, 1995).

8 Sergej Flere, "The Broken Covenant of Tito's People: The Problem of Civil Religion in Communist Yugoslavia," *East European Politics & Societies* 21, No. 4 (2007): 681–703. Aleš Gabrič, "Opozicija v Sloveniji po letu 1945," *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 45, No. 2 (2005): 97–119.

their east-European contemporaries and denied them the support enjoyed by other fighters against Communism.⁹ The foreign policies of western countries were quite reserved towards nationalist movements, showing only slightly more sensitivity to human rights issues; although their official representatives were willing to turn not one, but two blind eyes to this sort of problem, as the omission of Yugoslavia from US reports on the implementation of human rights protection following the Helsinki Conference or leniency towards the host country at the Belgrade follow-up meeting in 1977 clearly demonstrate.¹⁰

The most important social prerequisite to reduce the incidence of dissent in the Yugoslav socialist system was most certainly a peculiar interpretation of Marxism, established after 1948. Among western philosophers and sociologists the opinion became consolidated that the Yugoslav system was where socialist humanism was particularly well-anchored, and where, accordingly, emphasis was placed on greater respect of individual rights and the needs of man as a well-rounded being. The underlining of the system's distinctness from its Soviet counterpart was a sort of security valve for a controlled release of criticism of the authoritarian elements of 'real socialism,' which the self-management system was supposed to have long reckoned with. This obsession with "Stalin's phantom," which persisted among intellectuals for quite some time, distracted Yugoslav critics from searching for flaws in their own socialist development.¹¹ The introduction of self-management attained to a rather highly institutionalised articulation of interests in individual communities of producers (workers), but the political highest-class never gave free rein to self-management and continued to use the levers of both bottom-up and top-down control.¹² This is probably the very origin of the paradox of Yugoslav self-management, as the philosopher Slavoj Žižek defined the discrepancy between the continuous official campaign for joining the self-management process and the regime's actual fear that its citizens would indeed act out Communism, their cynical attitude towards the ruling ideology presenting the least threat to it.¹³

9 Daniel Ivin, "Pojav disidenata u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji," in: *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 9, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 2005). Krsto Cvić, "Dinamika političke promjene unutar komunističke vlasti: primjer SFRJ," in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 38.

10 Oskar Gruenwald, *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism In Contemporary Yugoslavia* (South Hadley: Bergin, 1983), 277. Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija*, 351.

11 Predrag Matvejević, "Samoupravljanje u kulturno ustvarjanje," *Sodobnost* 27, No. 2 (1979): 190.

12 Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 170. Greuwald, *The Yugoslav Search*, 34–61. Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia," in: *Change in Communist Systems*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 114. Paul Shoup, "The Limits of Party Control: The Yugoslav Case," in: *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity & Diversity in One-Party States*, ed. Andrew C. Janos (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1976), 192.

13 Slavoj Žižek, *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion* (London-New York: Verso, 2001), 91, 92.

Undoubtedly, this contributed to relativising the “feeling of hopelessness” typical of ‘real-socialist’ countries,¹⁴ as did, specifically, the possibilities of travelling and working abroad. The resulting contacts with the West enabled a more comprehensive understanding of the situation there and the related critical distance to the problems of the liberal-capitalist system, neo-colonialism, US foreign policy, etc. Also significant, of course, was the increased standard of living, of great importance for Yugoslavia, even more so than for eastern European countries, and which in the very 1970s reached its highest point during the entire period of post-war development.

The attitude of the Yugoslav political establishment towards social criticism remains a very complex issue. In his well-known survey of the main currents of Marxism, Leszek Kołakowski pointed out that in Yugoslavia the public word may have enjoyed more freedom, but the repressive measures there were just as severe as in other socialist countries, and the elements of pluralism in social life could only stretch as far as it suited the leading group in the Party.¹⁵ There should be no doubt, therefore, that in terms of personal autonomy and restriction of civil rights Yugoslav intellectuals were still much closer to their eastern European peers than to those from western liberal democracies. Indeed, the line between the permitted and the prohibited was quite blurred and dependent on the current political situation in individual republics, and particularly on the personal history of the author of the criticism in question. In individuals who put their head on the block it was important whether they were members of the League of Communists or former partisans, whether they had international connections or enjoyed a good reputation abroad. In fact, the regime strived to preserve its image as a liberal system and looked for alternatives to harsh repressive measures (e.g., reassignment from teaching to research institutions, pressure to move abroad).¹⁶

Censorship formally did not exist, but the establishment spread a wide web of formal and informal mechanisms with a censoring effect and could, through specific methods, also reach outside the state borders, particularly into the environment of the Slovene minorities in neighbouring Austria and Italy. Rather than by repressive measures, the autonomy of an individual was most often restricted by “friendly” or even cautionary conversations, by a system of punishment versus reward, that trapped them in the nearly undetectable position of self-censors. Despite the relinquishment of some of the most obvious mechanisms of ideological control - e.g., the abolition of agitprop following the Cominform rift - the control was maintained through boards, faculty councils and editorial offices, where members of regime socio-political organisations held the majorities. Outwardly, the autonomy of cultural institutions was preserved, but inwardly they were controlled and run by the so called Party cells (basic organisations of the League of Communists). This was particularly evident in the period of late socialism, when a certain illusion of freedom was maintained: the leaders imagining

14 Srdan Cvetković, “(Ne)Tolerisani disidenti / specifičnost jugoslovenskog socijalizma 1953–1985,” in: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, eds. Nada Kisić Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 110.

15 Leszek Kołakowski, *Glavni tokovi marksizma. Tom III.* (Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1985), 538.

16 Dragović-Soso, “*Spasioci nacije*”, 38. Cvetković, *(Ne)Tolerisani disidenti*, 110–16.

they were not censoring and the authors imagining they were not being censored. Within this framework, ironically latitude was obtained by the surface adherence to Marxist forms in, for instance, introductions and conclusions, camouflaging less conformist philosophical or historiographic contents.¹⁷

The Self-management of the Intellect

“The social valorisation of mass reproductive forms of cultural activity” in the context of the restoration of ideological orthodoxy in the early 1970s implied a universal introduction of Marxist aesthetic criteria of art criticism and the “steering of currents of ideas,” in which there should no longer be any room for “ideas of the intellectualist value nihilism.”¹⁸ Accordingly, Franc Šali, the responsible for culture in the Central Committee of the LCS firmly rejected the thesis that culture in self-management would shed the class criteria.¹⁹ On the contrary, all philosophical, sociological and artistic-theoretical intellectual activities would have to be subjected to Marxist criteria. The Commission for Conceptual Issues of Culture with the Central Committee of LCS estimated that the penetration of bourgeois influences and the relativisation of the position of “scientific socialism” were enabled through the spheres of philosophy (the introduction of existentialism and phenomenology), sociology (reception of functionalism, structuralism and logical positivism) and art (separation of art topics from class topics, reception of consumer psychology, abstract avant-garde).²⁰ This was supposed to be countered by an in-depth Marxist criticism provided by communists in educational institutions, institutes and newspaper editorial offices.²¹ These were supposed to take over the task of “gardeners who [would] not let just any weed bloom and overgrow”, as one of the leading Slovene philosophers put it.²² The special role of generator and coordinator of Marxist (counter)criticism was entrusted to the Marxist Centre with the LCS established in 1972.

Taking into account the importance of the media in modern society, this sphere of social activity, too, was assigned a special role in the social transformation in keeping with the tenets of self-management. According to Edvard Kardelj, the public communication system had to reflect “the state of social consciousness in learning about collectively shared social interests.”²³ And for this social consciousness to be represented

17 Gregor Tomc, “Cenzurirani punk: analiza primera cenzure Punk Problemov,” in: *Cenzurirano: Zgodovina cenzure na Slovenskem od 19. stoletja do danes*, ed. Mateja Režek (Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2010), 244. Dean Komel, “Cenzura filozofije in filozofija cenzure,” in: *Cenzurirano: Zgodovina cenzure na Slovenskem od 19. stoletja do danes*, 285.

18 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 20, f. 121, Poročilo o delu Centralnega komiteja ZKS in aktivnosti ZKS med 3. in 4. konferenco Zveze komunistov Slovenije, 79–80.

19 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 551, f. 5790, Nekatera idejna vprašanja v kulturi, 22.

20 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 223, f. 503, Poročilo o dejavnosti ZK Slovenije v aprilu in maju 1973, supplement O idejnih tokovih v kulturi in njih izvori.

21 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 242, f. 730, Nekateri elementi za oceno družbenoekonomskih in idejnopolitičnih razmer v Sloveniji ter aktivnost ZKS (Ljubljana, 28. 11. 1974), 48.

22 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 1848, f. 87, Pristop k analizi idejne naravnosti izobraževalnega procesa, (Ljubljana, 8. 2. 1975), 4

23 Edvard Kardelj, *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja* (Ljubljana: ČZP Komunist, 1977), 220.

correctly, journalist-communists had to take upon themselves the responsibility of not letting any journalistic activity take place outside LC policy. In concrete terms, this meant acting in accordance with the instruction of the supreme body of LCS, which established that *“the struggle for an influence of the League of Communists over the press, radio and television [was] at the same time a struggle against the bourgeois concepts of freedom and autonomy, and against spontaneity in our social system.”*²⁴ It was particularly important that this instruction be adhered to by editors, who were organised in a special work group of magazine editors-communists, who were instructed to make sure, in the name of “the sense of formation of socialist consciousness,” that no article or other printed work be published which could “carry out a political diversion” through their contents.²⁵ As the high official Franc Šetinc informed his fellow journalists-communists, they were expected to perform “responsible” reporting, in other words self-censorship, which can be understood from his quote: “the freedom of creation and responsibility are just two sides of the same process, and there cannot be one without the other.” This responsibility included “friendly” control over one’s colleagues: *“It is not humane, in our relations to friends, to a colleague, to a journalist, not to be honest, straightforward in a Communist manner. It is a true humanity to help a person by timely drawing their attention to problems. [...] It is far better to help a person at the right time and even move them to another job if we think that they lack the conditions to exercise such a function.”*²⁶ In case the internal control proved insufficient, there was also an “expert analytical” group for the monitoring of press, radio, television, journalistic and editorial activities, newly founded with the Central Committee of the LCS, to keep a particularly close watch over the reporting.²⁷ In addition, a new law restricting the freedom of the press was passed in 1973.

We can draw the general conclusion that in the 1970s, the League of Communists maintained relatively strong control over the social state of affairs. After the political reckoning at the beginning of that decade, the situation calmed down and stabilised, the internal authorities recording a relatively stable security situation year after year. All this was, naturally, put down to greater political activity on the part of the LC, to the assertion of the SAWP as the largest front of socialist forces, and to the precedence given to political over administrative measures. At the same time, there was already the awareness of the subversive charge that a deterioration of the economy and a decline in full employment could have,²⁸ but the potential causes of instability on the threshold of the 1980s were still sought exclusively in an inadequate implementation of the principles of self-management.²⁹ It is no exaggeration to say that in the last decade of

24 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 302, f. 1256, Stenogram uvodnih misli Franca Šalija z razgovora s predstavniki slovenskih sredstev množičnega komuniciranja (Ljubljana, 11. 7. 1974), 9.

25 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 339, f. 2044, Kratka informacija o aktivnosti Zveze komunistov Slovenije v boju proti političnim odklonom v družbi in za njen nadaljnji razvoj (Ljubljana, 17. 3. 1977), 11.

26 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 286, f. 1065, Razgovor z aktivom komunistov – novinarjev (Ljubljana, 28. 10. 1974), 15/4, XVI/1, XVI/2.

27 Ibid., 65.

28 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 450, f. 3877, Zapisnik 14. seje predsedstva CK ZK Slovenije (Ljubljana, 29. 1. 1979), 2, 3.

29 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 453, f. 3891, Vojnopolična in varnostna ocena (Ljubljana, 9. 5. 1979), 22.

Kardelj's life, the principle of self-management reached the level of sole redemption, its deficient actualisation representing the cause, and its consolidation the cure for any social problem.

Within Certain Bounds

“Social criticism cannot be separated from political struggle.” With this motto we could sum up the essence of the thought of Kardelj, who, believing that social critics are not beyond the objective conditions of struggle for socialism, set the key parameters for social criticism in self-management socialism. His fundamental work dealing with this aspect of public life, *Beleške o naši družbeni kritiki* [Notes on Our Social Criticism], which focussed entirely on the treatment of social criticism, was first published in 1965 in the magazine *Sodobnost*, and then in 1966 and again in 1985 in the form of a monograph. Essentially, his conceptions of social criticism held up until the collapse of the regime, in his later *chef d'oeuvre Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja* [The Directions of the Development of the Socialist Self-Management Political System; 1977], his only additions were evaluations of some new phenomena of social criticism that had not been so widespread in the mid-1960s (the New Left, in particular).

It would be wrong to claim that Kardelj was not aware of the infrastructural value of social criticism and of the fact that an absence of criticism could pave the way to subjectivistic decision-making, bureaucratism and even political absolutism.³⁰ However, he did not fail to add an essential restriction to this relatively open conception of the public sphere: “But socialist society needs democracy in socialism, not democracy as a weapon in the fight against socialism.”³¹

Kardelj avoided directly prescribing a recipe for what the critical engagement of the “progressive” intelligence (a euphemism replacing Lenin's “honest” intelligence) should be, but by pointing out the consequences of public action he succeeded in achieving the very norm for an organic link between “progressive” criticism and the socialist form. The basic rule was that it should strive for synthesis, for a solution of problems arising from the materialistically conceived “objective nature of social movements.”³² From it society – so Kardelj – did not require infallibility, but rather a socialist point of departure and destination. Intelligentsia as a class is not automatically the actor of social progress; as a reflection of objective processes it can be a projection of the most progressive as well as the most reactionary social currents; therefore it should not only clearly convey the socio-historical interest of the working class, but

30 Edvard Kardelj, *Beleške o naši družbeni kritiki* (Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1985), 53, 54.

31 Kardelj, *Smeri razvoja*, 83.

32 The notion what ideal Marxist criticism of social practice and theory of the LCY by ideologists and cultural workers themselves should be can be gathered from the concept drawn up for the magazine of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY called ‘Kritika’ (SI AS 1589/IV, b. 324, f. 1745, Okvirni projekat koncepcije petnaestodnevne revije Predsedništva centralnog komiteta SKJ (Beograd, 31. 3. 1976)).

transcend the role of expert medium and become “the creative subject of advanced social action.” Criticism is thus organically linked to socialist progress, from which its “humane” responsibility also arises. Distancing, or the “philistinism of clean hands,” is not acceptable, nor is critical judgement from the position of ideal (albeit Marxist) constructions; criticism should stem from the current social practice without becoming a prisoner of “everyday empiricist practice.”³³

With respect to the restriction of the freedom of criticism, Kardelj had no doubt: “[S]ince the progressive forces of our socialist society are not neutral, like a speaker in the English Parliament, rather a protagonist of something specific - i.e., of the socialist social movement - it is clear that they cannot be limited solely to the formal defence of the freedom of criticism.” He allows a democratic battle of opinions that are “an organic expression of socialist socioeconomic relations,” and not of a “formalist absolute freedom.” Thus, criticism “cannot be ‘free,’ just like the political struggle for the restoration of old social relations is not ‘free.’” There is no absolute freedom, not even in self-management socialism, and in the context of class struggle any instance of criticism is a political act: “Social criticism from the perspectives of historical interests of two classes in diametric opposition is inevitably deeply contrasting. Within such relations any social criticism, however unbiased and strictly scientific or even abstractly theoretical it may seem, automatically becomes, to some degree or another, part of the political practice and therefore shares the fate of the political practice of one class or the other.” In this sense, criticism bears its own responsibility in relation to the effects of its action and at the same time determines the level of its own freedom, as the “more accountable to the truth and its socialist basis [it becomes], particularly when it comes to the fundamental issues of survival and progress of socialist forces,” the greater freedom it can enjoy.³⁴

Breaking the Bounds

“Responsible” social critics were therefore supposed to draw their own boundaries. For those “irresponsible” or even antisystemic critics who started “exploiting democratic freedoms” for their political battles, Kardelj saved various administrative measures, but advised prudence in their implementation.³⁵ Unless the constitutional order was under threat, which was a quite flexible category, and there was a danger of a counterrevolution, the principal Yugoslav ideologist preferred leaning towards the “preemptive” political battle, for which he was certain it could compensate for repressive measures almost entirely.³⁶ Still, this was not so much about introducing liberal principles, which Kardelj opposed all his life, as it was about a special strategy of settling accounts with opponents, which occurred particularly in Slovenia. It was, in fact,

33 Kardelj, *Beleške*, 22, 56, 69, 85, 93.

34 *Ibid.*, 41, 45, 49, 52.

35 *Ibid.*, 48.

36 SI AS 1589 IV, b. 1219, f. 571, *Razprava tov. Edvarda Kardelja na 18. seji P CK ZKJ* (Ljubljana, 26. 4. 1976), 23/2.

a coordinated political campaign with the goal of “isolating” ideological opponents, the ability to apply differentiation to negative phenomena in society, while administrative measures were reserved for emergency situations and therefore did not spark discomfort among the general population.³⁷

Based on the data on the low degree of political criminality and the estimates that in Slovenia there were only some 100 “adversely disposed” individuals who did associate among themselves, but failed to elicit a wider response with their ideas,³⁸ towards the end of the 1970s, the Presidency of the Central Committee of LCS reached the conclusion, which they also forwarded to their headquarters in Belgrade, that a positive atmosphere reigned among humanist scholars and artists and their agreement with the policy of the LC could be intuited.³⁹ Such an optimistic conclusion was not entirely ungrounded, although one should bear in mind that the majority of the intelligentsia clearly understood it was the monopoly of LC that threatened free cultural development, not the other way round.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in most publicly exposed intellectuals, even those who would later abandon the hegemonic self-management cultural scheme, we could not recognize complete identification or direct opposition to the ruling system until the end of the 1970s or even later.⁴¹

To understand the position of social criticism in late-socialist Slovenia, it is very important to take into account the increased level of inclusion of the general public into the mechanisms of public discussion about socially relevant issues. Acting the part of the primary catalyst of expert as well as general social points of view was SAWP. In the context of self-management transformation, it was assigned particularly the role of a forum of democratic discussions about concrete pressing issues, through which it was to transcend the status of LC transmission and become a factor of self-management conscience formation.⁴² To this purpose, Kardelj, pointed out the low threshold for entering this forum arena: *“Thus, a person need not have received a Marxist education and their ideological views need not be always and in every area aligned with Marxist ideology; one need not always agree with the opinions of the majority, either, to be committed to socialism as a form of actualisation of one’s socioeconomic and political interests.”*⁴³ But virtually in the same breath behind closed doors he added the warning that Communists should not allow the “enemies” to exploit “our” institutions and forums for their activity.⁴⁴ It would be wrong to assume, though, that the stressed integration of non-Communists into the building of self-management socialist society through SAWP would also mean that the League of Communists was (at least partly) relinquishing its political and

37 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 450, f. 3877, Magnetogram 14. seje Predsedstva CK ZKS (Ljubljana, 29. 1. 1979), 5/1-JK, 6/2-JK.

38 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 453, f. 3891, Vojnopolitična in varnostna ocena (Ljubljana, 9. 5. 1979), 26.

39 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 486, f. 4369, Idejni tokovi med inteligenco (Ljubljana, 13. 9. 1978), 2.

40 HU OSA, 300-10-2, b. 209, f. Intellectuals 1966–1983, Intellectual Ferment in Yugoslavia (Munich, 11. 11. 1980), 4.

41 See for instance Dimitrij Rupel, “Umetnostna proizvodnja in njene politike,” *Problemi* 17, No. 188 (1979): 63–70.

42 Kardelj, *Smeri razvoja*, 190, 191.

43 Kardelj, *Beleške*, 193, 194.

44 SI AS 1589/IV, b. 1219, f. 571, Razprava tov. Edvarda Kardelja na 18. seji P CK ZKJ (Beograd, 26. 4. 1976), 26/1.

ideological hegemony. The respect of its avant-garde and monopolistic role remained the prerequisite from which no social engagement emerging among the public before the second half of the 1980s could depart.

Significant data for determining the attitude of the authorities towards social criticism, which corroborate the above presented traits with concrete examples, can be found in the systematic survey of 76 highly visible critics compiled in October 1977 by the State Security Service (SSS).⁴⁵ It comprises individuals, almost a quarter of them members of LC, who were active in the fields of culture, education and research and who “in one way or another, publicly opposed or appeared against our sociopolitical order or LC policy.” Depending on the degree of opposition expressed against the socio-political regime and LC policy they were divided into three groups. The first group comprised 51 individuals, for whom it was assumed that sociopolitical organisations could “through concrete engagement, animate them to actively participate on the SAWP or LCS platforms;” in other words, that they could be co-opted into the system’s operation. The second group included 21 individuals “in purgatory,” whom the guardians of the regime considered still susceptible to the influences of sociopolitical organisations, but requiring further monitoring by the SSS. Deemed as “irreclaimable” were “only” four persons, whom the SSS was convinced required close surveillance.⁴⁶

With a combination of strong socialist cultural hegemony and weak repressive measures, the Slovene Communist Party managed to preserve the action of the intelligentsia in its *Herrschaft* well into the 1980s, even absorbing the first direct attempts at articulating the opposition agenda through culture and journalism (the emergence of the *Nova revija* magazine soon after Tito’s death).⁴⁷ Eventually, by the end of the 1980s, this current of anti-communist oriented critics had consolidated as the key antipode to the LC. An equally substantial impulse, if not more so, towards the disintegration of cultural hegemony of self-management socialism came in the mid-1980s from the left-liberal milieu. The circumstance that truly expanded the limits of social criticism in the final years of socialism was, in fact, their realisation that the distinction between society and state – even a self-management state – could not be annulled. A notion of civil society emerged that did not necessarily follow the logic of political competition with the LC, but managed, perhaps even more easily this way, to introduce into public debate all those topics that had never been discussed before, and in some cases would never be afterwards.⁴⁸

45 SIAS 1589/IV, b. 2606/6, f. sovrážna dejavnost, Pregled nekaterih kulturnih in prosvetnih delavcev (Ljubljana, 20. 10. 1977).

46 Viktor Blažič, Janez Gradišnik, Edvard Kocbek, Vinko Ošlak; all of them as a consequence of ‘bourgeois pluralism’ as a type of ‘hostile’ activity.

47 Stefano Lusa, *Razkroj oblasti: slovenski komunisti in demokratizacija države* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2012), 52–57.

48 Tomaž Mastnak, “Socialistična civilna družba, demokratična opozicija,” *Tribuna* 12, 1985/86, 8, 9.

Conclusion

A continuum of pluralism and monism. This is the scheme in which the German specialist for the history of south-eastern Europe, Wolfgang Höpken, placed the development, limitations and the democratic potential of Yugoslav self-management socialism at the beginning of the 1980s, avoiding this way the use of western ideologically tinted categories of liberal democracy and totalitarianism. The Kardeljan *pluralism of self-management interests* could not, in fact, be defined by the criteria of bourgeois multi-party system or by the then current theory of interest groups.⁴⁹ Through structural decentralisation, in the last decade of his life, Kardelj as its chief architect succeeded in establishing a system that, at least at a normative level, enabled full participation in “socialist democracy.” Whereas in fact, in the public sphere that social criticism penetrated, he left a series of anchors for the “subjective forces” (LC members) to weigh this criticism down, so that it remained faithful to the “objective nature of social movements” beating to the pattern of the ossified Party establishment, of course.

We cannot fully dismiss the notion that the “self-managers,” even those without the Party membership card, took advantage, at least in part, of the opportunity of participating in joint decision-making. But Kardelj was unable or unwilling to grant them majority. He was convinced that they should be led into socialism by the hand.⁵⁰ In the complex structure of the Yugoslav self-management system, which reached its acme with the constitutional changes in the 1970s, LC therefore preserved the exclusive part of ideological and political avant-garde of the working class. Not only did this entrust it with the role of guarantor of the existence of the regime, but also with the role of social hegemon that had the right answer to all open issues concerning current and future development. Pluralism could only reach the areas from which the Party was prepared to withdraw, while “self-management” interests could only be articulated in a way that did not put them in competition with the Party interests.⁵¹ Critical voices were not very audible in the “merry, spendthrift, hedonistic and megalomaniac” Yugoslavia,⁵² until the crisis prompted the masses, too, to start questioning the foundations of self-management socialism. Until the circumstances matured, intellectuals could not express their radical criticism. At least for Slovenia it can be said that the loosening after “day X” (Tito’s death) found the critically-prone activists quite well prepared, as in the more impervious years they dedicated themselves to actively monitoring the situations in the West and East. Armed with the knowledge about newly emerging social concepts they could, cautiously at the beginning of the 1980s, then ever more assertively, enter the public sphere with their idea of (socialist) civil society and claim their share in the process of democratisation.

49 Wolfgang Höpken, *Sozialismus und Pluralismus in Jugoslawien. Entwicklung und Demokratiepotential des Selbstverwaltungssystems* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984), 404.

50 Jože Pirjevec, “Tito in Kardelj: od ‘tovarišije’ do sovraštva,” *Annales. Series historia et sociologia* 21, No. 2 (2011): 505.

51 Höpken, *Sozialismus und Pluralismus*, 405.

52 Dragović-Soso, “Spasioci nacije,” 90.

Sources and Literature

Archival Sources:

- SI AS, Archives of the Republic of Slovenia:
 - SI AS 1589/IV, Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije.
- HU OSA, Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives:
 - HU OSA-300-10-2, Yugoslav Subjects Files I.

Literature:

- Cvetković, Srđan. "(Ne)Tolerisani disidenti / specifičnost jugoslovenskog socijalizma 1953–1985." In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić, and Katarina Spehnjak, 105–28. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Cviić, Krsto. "Dinamika političke promjene unutar komunističke vlasti: primjer SFRJ." In: *Disidentstvo u suvremenoj povijesti*, edited by Nada Kisić Kolanović, Zdenko Radelić, and Katarina Spehnjak, 23–40. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010.
- Dragović-Soso, Jasna. "Spasioci nacije": *Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljanje nacionalizma*. Beograd: Edicija Reč, 2004.
- Flere, Sergej. "The Broken Covenant of Tito's People: The Problem of Civil Religion in Communist Yugoslavia." *East European Politics & Societies* 21, No. 4 (2007): 681–703.
- Gabrič, Aleš. "Opozicija v Sloveniji po letu 1945." *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 45, No. 2 (2005): 97–119.
- Gabrič, Aleš. "Vloga intelektualca kot političnega subjekta v enostrankarskem sistemu." In: *Slovenija 1948–1998: iskanje lastne poti*, edited by Stane Granda and Barbara Šatej, 158–68. Ljubljana and Maribor: Zveza zgodovinskih društev; Univerza v Mariboru, 1998.
- Gruenwald, Oskar. *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia*. South Hadley: Bergin, 1983.
- Höpken, Wolfgang. *Sozialismus und Pluralismus in Jugoslawien. Entwicklung und Demokratiepotential des Selbstverwaltungssystems* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984).
- Ivin, Daniel. "Pojav disidenata u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji." In: *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 9, edited by Hans-Georg Fleck, 361–80. Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann. 2005.
- Johnson, Chalmers. "Comparing Communist Nations." In: *Change in Communist Systems*, edited by Chalmers Johnson, 1–32. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Kardelj, Edvard. *Beleške o naši družbeni kritiki*. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1985.
- Kardelj, Edvard. *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja*. Ljubljana: ČZP Komunist, 1977.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. *Glavni tokovi marksizma. Tom III*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1985.
- Komel, Dean. "Cenzura filozofije in filozofija cenzure." In: *Cenzurirano: Zgodovina cenzure na Slovenskem od 19. stoletja do danes*, edited by Mateja Režek, 283–89. Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2010.
- Linz, Juan J. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
- Lowenthal, Richard. "Development vs. Utopia." In: *Change in Communist Systems*, edited by Chalmers Johnson, 33–116. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Lusa, Stefano. *Razkroj oblasti: slovenski komunisti in demokratizacija države*. Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2012.
- Mastnak, Tomaž. "Socialistična civilna družba, demokratična opozicija." *Tribuna* 12, 1985/1986, 8, 9.

- Matvejević, Predrag. "Samoupravljanje in kulturno ustvarjanje." *Sodobnost* 27, No. 2 (1979): 185–99.
- Pirjevec, Jože. "Tito in Kardelj: od 'tovarišije' do sovraštva." *Annales, Series historia et sociologia* 21, No. 2 (2011): 501–08.
- Pirjevec, Jože. *Jugoslavija: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije*. Koper: Lipa, 1995.
- Pollack, Detlef and Jan Wielgohs. "Comparative Perspective on Dissent and Opposition to Communist Rule." In: *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe*, edited by Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, 231–66. Hants and Burlington: Ashgate, 2004.
- Repe, Božo. "Podobnosti in razlike med slovenskim (jugoslovanskim) in vzhodnoevropskim tipom socializma." In: *Evropski vplivi na slovensko družbo*, edited by Nevenka Troha, Mojca Šorn, and Bojan Balkovec, 407–15. Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 2008.
- Rupel, Dimitrij. "Umetnostna proizvodnja in njene politike" *Problemi* 17, No. 188 (1979): 63–70.
- Shoup, Paul. "The Limits of Party Control: The Yugoslav Case." In: *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity & Diversity in One-Party States*, edited by Andrew C. Janos, 176–96. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1976.
- Tökés, Rudolf L. "Introduction." In: *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, edited by Rudolf L. Tökés, xiii–xxiv. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979.
- Tomc, Gregor. "Cenzurirani punk: analiza primera cenzure Punk Problemov." In: *Cenzurirano: Zgodovina cenzure na Slovenskem od 19. stoletja do danes*, edited by Mateja Režek, 235–46. Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2010.
- Žižek, Slavoj. *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion*. London and New York: Verso, 2001.

Jure Ramšak

THE CONTOURS OF SOCIAL CRITICISM IN LATE-SOCIALIST SLOVENIA

SUMMARY

Self-management socialism displayed ambiguities and vagueness in handling social controversy and public life in general, giving rise to numerous peculiarities particular to this social phenomenon in Yugoslavia. While a Leninist interpretation of democracy in socialism constituted the background of Edvard Kardelj's recipe for "socially responsible criticism," Yugoslavia and Slovenia were at the same time under the influence of western liberal concepts. Considering the political and ideological contexts of late socialism, the article discusses the systemic way of dealing with social criticism between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, while trying to determine the impact of these circumstances on the subsequent evolvment of democratisation. It is principally based on an analysis of key theoretical texts and political documents in order to present the typology of the regime's classification of social criticism and the ways of dealing with its contents in the late socialist republic of Slovenia. The restraint in the use of repressive measures, the loose "rules of the game," which did not require

a complete identification with the dominant ideology, the open borders, the mechanisms of catalysing public debate through the Socialist Alliance of the Working People, the designation of the League of Communists as the bearer of national interests, and a series of other influences led to the fact that even during the early 1980s there was neither complete identification nor direct opposition to the regime among the greater part of the intelligentsia.

Despite the official assurance that it was not only necessary, but even indispensable, social criticism could not attain the position that it was supposed to have within "the pluralism of self-management interests". The Communist elite in power almost never acknowledged that it was justified and constructive, which however did not mean that it was entirely indifferent to its demands. In the period discussed, social critics could by no means interfere in the League of Communists' monopolistic authority or express doubts about the dominant ideological matrix. As a result of such self-assurance, communists always treated social criticism as an element of political struggle. The extent to which critical demands were taken into account usually depended on the argument of power of the critical exponent rather than the power of his/her arguments. Prior to the major social shifts of the second half of the 1980s, the "pluralism of self-management interests" thus could be articulated in practice primarily in a way that did not force it into competition with the Party. In those cases when this nevertheless occurred, the leading political establishment preferred to leave it to its "proxies" to deal with the transgressors, while itself taking on arbitrary positions that displayed some of the key features of the late-socialist regime in Slovenia. Well acquainted with the situations in the West and East, especially with the knowledge about newly emerging social movements Slovenian intellectuals however could, cautiously at the beginning of the 1980s, then ever more assertively, enter the public sphere with their idea of (socialist) civil society and claim their share in the process of democratisation.

Jure Ramšak

GABARITI DRUŽBENE KRITIKE V POZNOSOCIALISTIČNI SLOVENIJI

POVZETEK

Tako kot na mnogih področjih družbenega življenja je samoupravni socializem tudi pri upravljanju družbene polemike oz. javnega življenja nasploh izkazoval dvomnost in nejasnost, ki je bila vzrok mnogim posebnostim tega fenomena v Jugoslaviji. V ozadju Kardeljevega recepta za »družbeno odgovorno kritiko« je bilo leninistično razumevanje demokracije v socializmu, hkrati pa je bil jugoslovanski in slovenski prostor tudi pod vplivom zahodnih liberalnih konceptov. Upoštevajoč politični in

ideološki kontekst poznega socializma članek obravnava sistemski način soočanja z družbeno kritiko od konca šestdesetih do sredine osemdesetih let in ugotavlja, kakšen pomen je imelo to stanje za kasnejši razvoj demokratizacije. Razprava na osnovi razčlenbe ključnih teoretičnih besedil in političnih dokumentov prikazuje tipologijo režimskega razvrščanja družbene kritike in načine soočanja z njeno vsebino ter njenimi nosilci v socialistični republiki Sloveniji. Zadržanost pri uporabi represivnih ukrepov, ohlapna »pravila igre«, ki niso zahtevala popolne identifikacije z vladajočo ideologijo, odprtost meja, mehanizmi kataliziranja javne polemike skozi Socialistično zvezo delovnega ljudstva, prepoznavanje Zveze komunistov kot nosilca nacionalnih interesov in vrsta drugih vzrokov so privedli do tega, da še na začetku osemdesetih let pri večini inteligence ne moremo govoriti niti o popolni identifikaciji niti o neposredni opoziciji režimu.

Kljub uradnim zagotovitvam o potrebnosti in celo nujnosti družbene kritike, ta ni mogla zavzeti pomena, ki naj bi ga imela v »pluralizmu samoupravnih interesov«. Vladajoča partijska elita ji ni skorajda v nobenem primeru priznala njene upravičenosti in konstruktivnosti, kar pa še ne pomeni, da je bila do njenih zahtev povsem ravnodušna. V obravnavanem obdobju družbeni kritiki vsekakor niso smeli poseči v oblastni monopol partije in podvomiti v ustaljeno ideološko matrico. Na osnovi te zaverovanosti je bila družbena kritika vedno obravnavana kot element političnega boja. V kolikšni meri so bile kritične zahteve upoštevane, največkrat ni bilo odvisno od moči njenih argumentov, ampak od argumenta moči njenega nosilca. Preden so se v drugi polovici osemdesetih let zgodili veliki družbeni premiki, se je »pluralizem samoupravnih interesov« lahko torej v praksi artikuliral predvsem na način, da ni bil v nasprotju s partijskim monopolom. V kolikor pa je do tega prišlo, je vodilna politična garnitura obračun najraje zaupala svojim »pooblaščenecem«, sama pa zavzela arbitrarna stališča, prek katerih lahko prepoznamo nekaj ključnih značilnosti poznosocialističnega režima v Sloveniji. A dobro poznavajoč dogajanje tako na Zahodu kot Vzhodu, sploh kar se tiče novih družbenih gibanj, so lahko slovenski intelektualci s svojo idejo (socialistične) civilne družbe v začetku osemdesetih let sprva previdno, nato pa vedno bolj odločno začeli vstopati v javno sfero ter terjati svoj delež pri demokratizaciji.

Historical Documentation

Nevenka Troha: Report Prepared by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Slovenia Boris Kraigher at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia on 9 March 1950 (published manuscript with comments)

Introduction

After the war, the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS) in the then People's Republic of Slovenia was the only proper political force that controlled all levers of power. Those who held key positions in the Party also held the most important positions in the leadership in the so-called mass organisations, and also in authorities, the economy and other key segments of the society. Until the 2nd congress, which took place in November 1948, the KPS was led by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPS (PB CK KPS), as in that period, the Politburo also served as a plenum to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, and the Politburo as its executive body were elected at the 2nd Congress, which was convened in a time of upheaval for Yugoslavia that followed the Cominform Resolution which excluded both the Yugoslavian and Slovenian Communists from this organization of the World Communist Movement. The Politburo's previous members Miha Marinko (the secretary), Ivan Maček, Lidija Šentjurg, Boris Kraigher, Stane Kavčič, Viktor Avbelj and Janez Hribar were re-elected, while Jože Potrč and Ivan Regent were elected anew. Vladimir Krivic and Sergej Kraigher also became its members in April 1949 and March 1950 respectively.

Despite the election of members to the Central Committee, key decisions were still made at the Politburo meetings in the subsequent period, more precisely from 1952 onwards, after the KPS was renamed into the League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS) of the Executive Committee of the CK ZKS, which meant that the decisions were made by a narrow group of the leading Communists and the most important ones had to be taken in agreement with Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič, who were, besides Franc Leskošek, the key creators of politics exercised by the post-war Yugoslavian authorities. For this reason, the Politburo minutes of 26 January 1950 on appointments to important positions contain the following wording: "The question therefore remains open and will need to be reconsidered with comrades Kardelj and Kidrič."

This way, the Politburo discussed and adopted decisions on issues such as the still open question of the northern and western national borders, the elections, the economy, supplies, the agrarian reform, political situation and what was called the "activation of the masses", attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church and religion in general, the justice system, the education, especially the University, organisational issues, the international status, and the situation after the publication of the

Cominform's resolution. The Politburo decided on all important personnel issues as well as the appointment of ministers and other leading officials, the most important directors etc., and also on the personnel who occupied political functions.

Boris Kraigher

Boris Kraigher (Sv. Trojica in Slovenske Gorice, 14 February 1914–Sremska Mitrovica, 4 January 1967), son of doctor, writer and playwright Lojze Kraigher, entered the Technical Faculty in Ljubljana as a civil engineering student in 1932, but never finished his studies. He became a KPJ member in 1934, and was arrested in the same year and sentenced to two and a half years in prison. After returning from prison in 1937, he became the secretary of the Communist Organisation at the University and, later on, the secretary of the Youth Commission of the CK KPS and a member of the CK SKOJ, as well as a member of the CK KPS in 1940. From December 1941, he acted as its organisational secretary and co-opted to its politburo in May 1942. The same month, he was captured and sent to the Gonars concentration camp, which he managed to escape from in August of the same year, together with seven other inmates. From November 1942 to May 1943, he once again became the organisational secretary of the CK KPS and, until October 1944, acted as the political secretary of the Main Command of the NOV and PO of Slovenia. At the assembly of representatives in Kočevje, he was elected to the delegation for the 2nd AVNOJ session and elected a member of the Plenum of the Liberation Front (LF). In September 1944, he became a member of the Executive Committee of the LF. From March 1945, he served as the political secretary at the Authority Committee of the KPS for the Slovenian Littoral region, and as the political secretary of the Main Committee of the KP of Venezia Giulia as well as as the secretary of the Main Committee of the Slavic-Italian Anti-Fascist Union from August 1945 onwards. At the time of peace talks between the Allies and Associated Powers and Italy, Boris Kraigher was a key figure of the Slovenian as well as Yugoslavian leadership in Zone A and Zone B of Venezia Giulia, whereby he directly implemented their politics.

After the decisions about the Italian eastern border became more or less clear in June 1946, he was summoned back to Ljubljana, where he became the Minister of the Interior of the People's Republic of Slovenia (LRS). The State Security Administration (UDV), which was established in March 1946, was also under his authority, while its predecessor, i.e. the Service for the Defence of the People, was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. Kraigher was also the Minister of the Interior at the time of the most resonating post-war political processes, including the Dachau trials.

From December 1953 until 1963, he acted as president of the Executive Council of the People's Assembly of the LRS, and then served as vice-president of the Federal Executive Council until his death. As the president of the Committee for the Economy, he prepared the economic reform that was introduced in 1965 and managed it until

his death. He died in 1967 in a car accident near Sremska Mitrovica, upon returning to Belgrade after having spent the New Year's holidays in Slovenia. However, some people believe his death was no coincidence.

Boris Kraigher belonged to a narrow circle of the most important and most influential people among the Slovenian communists in the period from the beginning of the war to the mid-1960s. He was among the key decision-makers in the politics of the Slovenian Communists both in the time of the liberation movement as well as at the time when the Communist Party controlled all aspects of the society.

Meeting of the Politburo of the CK KPS, 4 March 1950

The agenda of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, which was held on 9 March 1950, included the following two items:

1. Analysis of the internal political situation and some other questions of the Internal Administration, UDV (State Security Administration), prosecution and courts.
2. Current problems and the situation in Trieste, Gorizia and Carinthia.

The first item was reported by Boris Kraigher, a member of the Politburo and the Minister of the Interior of the People's Republic of Slovenia. Only a summary of his report is available in the minutes of the meeting, while Kraigher's manuscript is kept by the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia along with outlines of the report presented at the above-mentioned meeting. A typewritten transcription of the manuscript is also preserved, the author of which is unknown. The transcription was made after the personal fund of Boris Kraigher was handed over to the then Historical Archives of the CK ZKS, as Lidija Šentjanc wrote in hand on the first page that the "concept in the manuscript is in the Hist. /oral/ Arch./ives/". The transcription contains errors, but also empty spaces for those parts that were illegible to the author of the transcription. The transcription of the manuscript and the accompanying text with the footnotes was prepared by Nevenka Troha. All words that were abbreviated by Kraigher are written in parentheses along with their meaning. Among other explanations, the footnotes state those parts from the minutes of the meeting that complement the content of the notes.

Nevenka Troha: Poročilo notranjega ministra LRS Borisa Kraigherja na seji Politbiroja Centralnega komiteja Komunistične partije Slovenije, 9. marec 1950 (komentirana objava rokopisnih beležk)

Uvod

Po končani vojni je bila Komunistična partija Slovenije (KPS) v tedanji Ljudski republiki Sloveniji edina realna politična sila, obvladovala pa je vse vzvode oblasti. Ljudje, ki so zasedali ključne položaje v partiji, so bili tudi na najpomembnejših položajih v vodstvih t. i. množičnih organizacij, v oblastnih organih, gospodarstvu in drugih ključnih segmentih družbe. Do 2. kongresa, ki je bil novembra 1948, je KPS vodil Politbiro Centralnega komiteja KPS (PB CK KPS), saj je v tem obdobju deloval tudi kot plenum centralnega komiteja. Na 2. kongresu, ki je bil sklican v za Jugoslavijo prelomnih časih, ki so sledili junijski resoluciji Informbiroja, s katero so bili jugoslovanski in z njimi slovenski komunisti izključeni iz te organizacije svetovnega komunističnega gibanja, pa sta bila izvoljena centralni komite in politbiro kot njegov izvršilni organ. V politbiro so bili izvoljeni njegovi dotedanji člani Miha Marinko (sekretar), Ivan Maček, Lidija Šentjunc, Boris Kraigher, Stane Kavčič, Viktor Avbelj, Janez Hribar, na novo pa Jože Potrč in Ivan Regent. Aprila 1949 je postal njegov član še Vladimir Krivic, marca 1950 pa Sergej Kraigher.

Kljub izvolitvi članov centralnega komiteja so se tudi v naslednjem obdobju ključne odločitve sprejemale na sejah politbiroja ali od leta 1952 po preimenovanju KPS v Zvezo komunistov Slovenije (ZKS) Izvršnega komiteja CK ZKS, torej v ozki skupini vodilnih komunistov in najpomembnejše tudi v soglasju z Edvardom Kardeljem in Borisom Kidričem, ki sta bila poleg Franca Leskoška člana Politbiroja CK KPJ in med ključnimi kreatorji politike povojnih jugoslovanskih oblasti. Tako je v zapisniku seje PB z dne 26. januarja 1950 ob imenovanjih na pomembne položaje zapisana navedba: »Vprašanje ostane zato še odprto in ga bo treba ponovno pretresti s tovarišema Kardeljem in Kidričem.«¹

Politbiro je tako razpravljal in sprejemal odločitve o vprašanjih, kot so bila še vedno odprto vprašanje severne in zahodne državne meje, volitve, gospodarstvo, preskrba, agrarna reforma, politični položaj in t. i. aktivizacija množic, odnos do rimskokatoliške cerkve in verstev sploh, sodstvo, šolstvo in v njegovem okviru zlasti univerza, organizacijska vprašanja, mednarodni položaj in seveda tudi razmere po objavi resolucije Informbiroja. Politbiro je odločal tudi o vseh pomembnejših kadrovskih vprašanjih ter imenovanjih ministrov in drugih visokih oblastnih funkcionarjev, najpomembnejših direktorjih itd., seveda pa tudi o kadrih, ki so zasedali politične funkcije.²

1 Darinka Drnovšek, *Zapisniki Politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS 1945–1954* (Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 2000), 192.

2 Več *ibid.*, 10–15.

Boris Kraigher

Boris Kraigher (Sv. Trojica v Slovenskih goricah, 14. 2. 1914 – Sremska Mitrovica, 4. 1. 1967), sin zdravnika, pisatelja in dramatika Lojza Kraigherja, je leta 1932 vpisal gradbeništvo na Tehnični fakulteti v Ljubljani, a študija ni dokončal. Član KPJ je postal leta 1934, še isto leto je bil aretiran in obsojen na dve leti in pol zapora. Po vrnitvi iz zapora leta 1937 je bil sekretar univerzitetne organizacije komunistov, nato sekretar mladinske komisije CK KPS in član CK SKOJ, leta 1940 pa član CK KPS. Od decembra 1941 je bil njegov organizacijski sekretar in maja 1942 kooptiran v njegov politbiro. Še isti mesec je bil ujet in poslan v taborišče Gonars, od koder mu je konec avgusta isto leto skupaj s še sedmimi taboriščniki uspel pobeg. Od novembra 1942 do maja 1943 je bil ponovno organizacijski sekretar CK KPS, nato do oktobra 1944 politični sekretar Glavnega štaba NOV in POS. Na zboru odposlancev v Kočevju je bil izvoljen v delegacijo za 2. zasedanje Avnoja ter za člana plenuma OF. Septembra 1944 je postal član Izvršnega odbora OF. Od marca 1945 je bil politični sekretar Oblastnega komiteja KPS za Slovensko primorje, od avgusta isto leto politični sekretar Glavnega odbora KP Julijske krajine in tajnik Glavnega odbora Slovansko italijanske antifašistične unije. V času mirovnih pogajanj med zavezniškimi in pridruženimi silami ter Italijo je bil tako ključna osebnost slovenskega oz. jugoslovanskega vodstva v conah A in B Julijske krajine in neposredni izvajalec njihove politike.

Potem ko so bile junija 1946 bolj ali manj jasne odločitve glede italijanske vzhodne meje, je bil Kraigher poklican v Ljubljano, kjer je postal minister za notranje zadeve Ljudske republike Slovenije (LRS). V njegovo pristojnost je sodila tudi marca 1946 ustanovljena Uprava državne varnosti (UDV), medtem ko je njena predhodnica, Organizacija za zaščito naroda, sodila pod obrambno ministrstvo. Kraigher je bil tako notranji minister tudi v času najodmevnejših povojnih političnih procesov, med njimi tudi dachavskih.

Od decembra 1953 do leta 1963 je bil predsednik Izvršnega sveta Ljudske skupščine LRS, nato do smrti podpredsednik Zveznega izvršnega sveta. Kot predsednik odbora za gospodarstvo je pripravil gospodarsko reformo, ki je bila uvedena leta 1965, in vodil njeno izvedbo vse do smrti. Umrl je januarja 1967 v prometni nesreči v bližini Sremske Mitrovice, ko se je vračal v Beograd z novoletnih počitnic v Sloveniji. Nekateri menijo, da njegova smrt ni bila naključje.

Boris Kraigher sodi v ozek krog najpomembnejših in najbolj vplivnih osebosti med slovenskimi komunisti v obdobju od začetka vojne do sredine šestdesetih let. Kot tak je bil med ključnimi odločevalci politike slovenskih komunistov v času osvobodilnega gibanja in v času, ko je komunistična partija kot edina stranka na oblasti nadzirala vse vzvode družbe.

Seja Politbiroja CK KPS, 4. marec 1950

Na dnevnem redu seje Politbiroja Centralnega komiteja Komunistične partije Slovenije, ki je bila 9. marca 1950,³ sta bili naslednji točki:

1. Analiza notranje politične situacije ter nekatera vprašanja Notranje uprave, UDV /Uprava državne varnosti/, tožilstva in sodišč.
2. Aktualni problemi in situacija v Trstu, Goriški in na Koroškem.

Pri prvi točki je bil poročevalec Boris Kraigher, član politbiroja in minister za notranje zadeve Ljudske republike Slovenije. V zapisniku seje je samo rezime njegovega poročila, medtem ko so v osebni fondu Borisa Kraigherja, ki ga hrani Arhiv Republike Slovenije, ohranjene Kraigherjeve rokopisne beležke, med njimi izhodišča za poročilo, podano na omenjeni seji.⁴ Ohranjen je tudi tipkopijski prepis rokopisa, katerega avtor ni znan. Prepis je bil narejen po predaji osebnega fonda Borisa Kraigherja takratnemu Zgodovinskemu arhivu CK ZKS, saj je na začetni strani rokopisni pripis Lidije Šentjurg, da je »koncept v rokopisu v zgod./ovinskem/ arh./ivu/«. Prepis vsebuje napake in tudi prazna, za avtorja prepisa nečitljiva mesta. Tu objavljeni prepis rokopisa in spremno besedilo z opombami sem pripravila Nevenka Troha. Cele besede, ki jih je Kraigher zapisal okrajšane, so navedene v poševnih oklepajih, prav tako tudi pomen kratic. V opombah pa poleg drugih pojasnil navajam tudi dele iz zapisnika seje, ki dopolnjujejo vsebino beležk.

Boris Kraigher, rokopisne beležke

P./olit/ B./iro/ CKKPS 9. III. 50

Notranji-pol./itični/ problemi:

1. Situacija: bande, ileg./alne/ org./anizacije/; kler; mešč./anske/ stranke, KS /krščanski socialisti/; meje; duhovščina – podatki... /*nečitljiva beseda*/ (19) KNOJ /Korpus narodne obrambe Jugoslavije/ in UDV /Uprava državne varnosti/ ter civ./ilna/ oblast
2. Pregarjanje sovražnika: smrtno obsodbe; stanje v zaporih – sodno kaznovani; DKD /družbeno koristno delo/ – upravno kaznovani⁵; preiskave, postopek; UDV, N. M. /Narodna (Ljudska) milica/,⁶ tožilstva, sodišča

3 Zapisnik seje politbiroja z dne 9. 3. 1950 je objavljen v *ibid.*, 198–200.

4 SI AS 1529, Boris Kraigher, šk. 22.

5 Upravne kazni na t. i. družbeno koristno delo (DKD) so brez sodelovanja sodišč izrekli krajevni in okrajni ljudski odbori, in to za obdobje do dveh let, a so po preteku kazni lahko izrekli ponovno, zato je bila nekaterim posameznikom svoboda odvzeta tudi za dlje časa.

6 Po osvoboditvi maja 1945 je Narodna milica postala edina uniformirana enota javne varnosti v Demokratični federativni Jugoslaviji oz. Federativni ljudski republiki Jugoslaviji. V Ljudski republiki Sloveniji se je razvila iz medvojnje Narodne zaščite. Zakon o Narodni milici iz leta 1946 jo je opredelil kot vojaško organizirano silo, delujočo v okviru republiškega notranjega ministrstva in podrejeno zveznim oblastem v Beogradu. V Sloveniji se je leta 1950 preimenovala v Ljudsko milico.

3. Kriminaliteta: pojavi, opadanje, aparat
4. Izvrševanje kazni: zavodi, taborišča, zaposlenost, režim
5. Požari: število, škoda; ukrepi, – stanje gasil./skih/ org./anizacij/, material
6. Promet: nesreče, ukrepi
7. Stanje v milici: organizacija, kadri – kaznovanje, samomori
8. PAZ /Prostovoljne akcije zasaditve/: organizacija, odbori, člani, del./ovni/ problemi
9. Tuji državljani: odnos, režim, ..., sovj./etski/ državljani
10. Društva
11. Matična služba, prijavno – odjavna
12. Aparat Notranje uprave
13. Aparat UDV
14. Aparat tožilstva
15. Preskrba tega aparata

Predlogi:

1. Deljeno diskutirati o problemih
Duhovščina + KS; IB /informbirojevci/⁷ – emigranti
2. DKD – linija – prej; danes
3. Skrb za gasilsko opremo
4. Preiskovalni postopek
5. Delo z juristi
6. Kadri: najnižja izobrazba!
7. Part./ijska/ organ./izacija/ v milici; v UDV
8. Na IO OF /Izvršni odbor Osvobodilne fronte/: banda, meje; I.B. – sovj./etski/ državljani; DKD – borba proti pasivni rezistenci!

Duhovščina

Govoriti o notr./anje/ pol.(itičnih/ problemih iz dveh razlogov:

1. ker o tem sploh malo govorimo;
2. ker nekaj bistvenih novih momentov, ki so že zahtevali in še bodo zahtevali nove ukrepe;
3. močno povečan aparat

7 Jugoslovanske oblasti so osebe, ki so jih imele za simpatizerje Sovjetske zveze in naj bi se strinjale z resolucijo Informbiroja, sprejeto junija 1948, ali pa tiste, ki so odkrito kritizirale stanje, razmere, oblastne organe ali politične voditelje v državi, označevale za informbirojevce. V Sloveniji jih je bilo v primerjavi z drugimi republikami relativno malo. Notranji minister Boris Kraigher je na 2. plenumu CK KPS 15. aprila 1949 navedel, da 72 odstotkov vseh do tedaj registriranih informbirojevcev izhaja iz vrst inteligence, zlasti akademikov in kulturnikov pa tudi študentov in dijakov, državnih nameščencev, svobodnih poklicev in razlaščenih slojev. Večinoma je šlo za člane KPJ in udeležence narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja. – Žiga Koncilja, *Politično sodstvo. Sodni procesi v dveh Jugoslavijah*. (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2015), 291–93. Aleš Gabrič, »Informbirojevstvo na Slovenskem«, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 33, št. 1–2 (1993): 163–75.

Novo: I/n/ zap./adna/ reakcija i/n/ IB razbiti – brez enotnega centra znotraj in zunaj⁸

Zaostrena razr./edna/ borba – neorganizirani, vendar vse pogostejši pojavi odpora in pasivne rezistence – zato ukrep DKD.

1. Pol./itična/ situacija

- Pojavi bande: Sl./ovenska/ Bistrica, Sežana, Postojna
- 5 3–4 čl./anskih/ oboroženih kur./irskih/ grup
- Sprovajanje⁹ ljudi – tihotapstvo
- Celje – Ptuj: oborožene krim./inalne/ bande s 30-timi podporniki
- 12 kulakov¹⁰ – 7 sr./ednjih/ kmetov
- Poljčane – Kamnik – 2 skrivača – zadruga
- Šoštanj – Slovenj Gradec: Požar /Franc/ (JA) /Jugoslovanska armada/¹¹ in 2 IZ

8 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: *Notranje politični položaj je karakteriziran po tem, da nimamo več opravka z organizirano reakcijo, kot preje, ko so centri bele garde skušali formirati organizacijo. IB je sploh ni imel (nekaj malega je poskušal Gustinčič /Dragutin/ še pred resolucijo IB), bilo je sicer vrsta poskusov, ki pa so bili organizirani iz špijonskih centrov iz Budimpešte, iz baze ob Blatnem jezeru, iz Gorice in še največ iz Trsta – Vidalijevci.*

Dragotin Gustinčič (1882–1974), politik, publicist. Leta 1915 je zbežal v Italijo in se v Rimu priključil Jugoslovanskemu odboru. Aprila 1920 je bil med ustanovitelji KPJ v Sloveniji. Leta 1924 je bil izvoljen v CK KPJ in v njegov politbiro, leta 1926 je bil član slovenske delegacije na 3. kongresu KPJ na Dunaju in član Pokrajinskega komiteja KPJ za Slovenijo. Med letoma 1929 in 1931 je bil v preiskovalnem zaporu v Beogradu. Maja 1931 je emigriral v tujino, živel večinoma v Sovjetski zvezi, predaval na Komunistični univerzi narodnih manjšin Zahoda in bil dejaven v balkanskem sekretariatu Kominterne. Od leta 1936 do leta 1939 se je bojeval v mednarodnih brigadah v Španiji in se nato vrnil v SZ. Bil je eden najvidnejših oblikovalcev nacionalnega programa jugoslovanskih komunistov in leta 1934 med avtorji Izjave treh partij (KP Avstrije, KP Italije, KPJ) o slovenskem narodnem vprašanju. Leta 1943 je branil disertacijo o nacionalnem vprašanju na Balkanu. Med letoma 1945 in 1948 je bil profesor in prvi dekan ekonomske fakultete v Ljubljani. Ker naj bi podpiral resolucijo Informbiroja, je bil leta 1948 izključen iz KPJ, upravno kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD in od 27. 7. 1950 do leta 1951 na Golem otoku. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaaroda.net/sr/lice/4339/>.

Vittorio Vidali (1900–1983), politik, rojen v Miljah pri Trstu. Bil je bil eden od vodij mednarodnega komunističnega gibanja in »poklicni revolucionar«, ki je deloval v različnih kontekstih in v nekaterih ključnih trenutkih zgodovine dvajsetega stoletja, in to tudi s pomembnimi nalogami znotraj obveščevalnih služb nekdanje SZ. Po koncu prve svetovne vojne se je vključil v komunistično partijo in postal vodja tržaških »Rdečih arditov«, paravojaške organizacije, ki se je spopadala s fašističnimi skvadrami. Umakniti se je moral v emigracijo in bil v začetku dvajsetih let v ZDA, kjer je postal sekretar italijanske sekcije Delavske stranke. Dvakrat v dvajsetih in tridesetih letih in nato v začetku štiridesetih let je bil v Mehiki z nalogami, ki so bile usmerjene v poenotenje lokalne komunistične partije na uradnih stalinističnih stališčih in proti trockistični opoziciji. Med špansko državljansko vojno je kot ustanovitelj Petega regimenta in izvrševalec pomembnih nalog v imenu stalinistične politične policije postal znan v mednarodnem komunističnem gibanju. Po drugi svetovni vojni je dobil nalogo vodenja informbirojevske KP Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja, torej na tako občutljivem območju, kot je bilo območje ob meji med Italijo in Jugoslavijo, ki je bilo od leta 1948 tudi meja med komunisti, ki so bili zvesti SZ, in »deviacionisti«, ki so ostali zvesti Titovi Jugoslaviji. Po priključitvi Trsta k Italiji leta 1954 je bil večkrat izvoljen poslanec in senator KPI v italijanskem parlamentu.

9 Vodenje ljudi.

10 Izraz je povzet iz ruščine in pomeni relativno bogatega kmeta. V skladu s teorijo marksizma in leninizma so bili kulaki razredni sovražniki revnih kmetov.

11 Franc Požar (1922–1950) je bil partizan od februarja 1942. Udeležil se je pohoda 14. divizije na Štajersko, bil komandant 2. bataljona Šerčerjeve brigade in nato 1. bataljona Tomšičeve brigade. Po osvoboditvi je ostal v Jugoslovanski armadi do junija 1946, ko je bil demobiliziran. Zaposlil se je pri Narodni milici v Slovenskih Konjicah in nato v Celju. Zaradi nepravilnosti in malomarnosti je bil januarja 1947 aretiran in obsojen na pet let prisilnega dela. Marca 1949 je bil pogojno izpuščen, 24. julija isto leto je bil ponovno aretiran, a po zaslišanjih ponovno izpuščen. Priključil se je skupini, ki se je zadrževala v okolici Belih Vod in hotela ustanoviti t. i. križarsko vojsko, v kateri bi zbirali kmete, nezadovoljne z novo oblastjo. Načrtovali so napade na postaje milice, viadukte in politične aktiviste. V UDV so to

- LM /Industrijsko zavodska Ljudska milica/¹² + 5 skrivačev
- Požar zajet v Škofji vasi in nato 3./4. III. banda v Belih Vodah
 - Ubiti – hiša požgana; ukradeno živijo klali in pri /*nečitljivo*/ prodajali po 100 din
 - Uboj aktivista;¹³ podporniki: vsi, kulaki in bajtarji
 - V zvezi s tem 35 v zaporu iz Šoštanja, 30 iz Sl./ovenj/ Gr./adca/.¹⁴ Še so na terenu banditi: Laznik /Franc/, Šumah /Franc/, Gostičnik /Gostenčnik Jože/.¹⁵
 - Banda še: Pohorje, Mar./ibor/ okolica – kurirske
 - Bloška planota
 - Več skrivačev
 - Anonimna pisma; grozilna pisma
 - Letaki 17. II. cca 1000 v Ljubljani
 - Mladinska 20 čl./anska/ skavtska organizacija?!
 - Ilegalne organizacije – nepovezane
 - V Kranju 5 – čl./anska/ I.B.
 - V Mariboru 10 čl./anska/ /pro/angl./eška/ ml./adinska/ org./anizacija/
 - V Ljubljani – študenti
 - Opozicijske liste: v mar./iborski/ oblasti 5 primerov, v gor./iški/ oblasti¹⁶ 1 primer¹⁷
 - I.B. kot organizirana opozicija razbita
 - Pošiljanje literature v slepo – zelo masovno
 - Od objave resolucije do danes: 317 odkritih I.B., 477 prikritih, 221 odkritih kolebljivcev, 319 prikritih kolebljivcev, 223 klevetniki
 - Vsega šlo skozi zapore: 367
 - Od tega: sodišče 76, DKD 116, 104 izpuščeni, 223 revidirali I.B. stališče

.....
 skupino opredeljevali kot »Požarjevo«. Del njenih pripadnikov je bil februarja in marca 1950 zajet. 24. 3. 1950 je bil Požar na sojenju pred ljubljanskim okrožnim sodiščem skupaj z Mihom Šumahom, Ivanom Podkrižnikom in Ivanom Berčnikom obsojen na smrt, drugi pa na večletne kazni. – Martin Premk, *Matjaževa vojska 1945–1950* (Ljubljana: Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, 2005), 279–90.

- 12 Industrijsko zavodska Narodna (Ljudska) milica je delovala do leta 1952. Varovala je pomembna podjetja in gospodarske organizacije. – Roman Lejlak, »Zgodovina slovenske policije«, *Lejlak.si*, pridobljeno 9. 7. 2018, http://www.lejlak.si/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120:zgodovina-slovenske-policije&catid=1:zadnje-novice&Itemid=50,3.
- 13 Uboj aktivista Franca Travničkarja sta 24. 2. 1950 izvršila člana »Požarjevo« skupine Jože Gostenčnik in Franc Šumah. – Premk, *Matjaževa vojska 1945–1950*, 288.
- 14 Sojenji sta bili 24. 3. 1950 pred ljubljanskim okrožnim sodiščem in 24. 8. 1950 pred mariborskim okrožnim sodiščem. – Ibid., 289.
- 15 Franca Laznika so aretirali šele leta 1959, Franca Šumaha pa poleti 1950. – Ibid., 289, 290. Kdaj je bil aretiran Jože Gostenčnik, mi ni znano.
- 16 Leta 1949 je bila LRS upravno razdeljena na Ljubljansko oblast s 13 okraji, Mariborsko oblast z 8 okraji, Goriško oblast s 6 okraji, glavno mesto Ljubljana s 5 rajoni in mesti Maribor s 3 rajoni ter Celje. Leta 1950 sta bili iz oblasti izvzeti še mesti Jesenice in Kranj.
- 17 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: *V zvezi z volitvami je 6 slučajev govora za opozicijske kandidate, a ni nikjer prišlo do zbiranja podpisov.*

- Vsega je bilo 9 primerov organiziranejši aktivnosti I.B.
- Grupa Stare¹⁸ – Brvar /Alojz/¹⁹
- Logar /Cene/²⁰ – Gorše /Mirko²¹/ - najmočnejša
- Premru /Lev/²² – Jurančič Ilija²³ – dijaki
- Vilar /Štefan²⁴/ – org./anizacija/ v M/urski/ Soboti in Lendavi, vezani na sov./etsko/ poslanstvo na Dunaju

-
- 18 Ivan Stare (1913), uslužbenec. Aretirala ga je kontraobveščevalna služba (KOS) JLA in ga predala UDV. Sodišče ga je obsodilo na 72 mesecev. Na Golem otoku je bil od 24. 12. 1948 do 22. 12. 1952. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/12891/>.
- Avugst Stare (1919), Ivanov brat, direktor. Obsojen je bil na 14 mesecev. Na Goli otok je prišel 13. 1. 1949. Izpuščen naj bi bil 9. 8. 1951, drugi vir pa navaja, da je tega dne umrl med prestajanjem kazni. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/12892/>.
- 19 Alojz Brvar (1918), poslovođa. Upravno kaznovan na 20 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 6. 1. 1949 do 22. 10. 1952, po drugih virih pa do 29. 11. 1953. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije-o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/992/>.
- 20 Cene Logar (1913–1995), filozof. Leta 1937 je doktoriral pri profesorju Francetu Vebru. V obdobju med vojnama je predvsem v reviji *Sodobnost* objavljali filozofske članke. Bil je udeleženec narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja in med drugim načelnik propagandnega oddelka pri Glavnem štabu NOV in POS ter urednik Ljudske pravice in Slovenskega poročevalca. Udeležil se je Zbora odposlancev slovenskega naroda oktobra 1943 v Kočevju. Po vojni je bil osumljen informbirojevstva in upravno kaznovan na 48 mesecev. Skoraj osem let je bil zaprt na Golem otoku, kamor je prišel 14. 2. 1949, in Grgurju ter izpuščen 18. 11. 1953. Aprila 1958 je bil ponovno aretiran, obsojen na dve leti in na Golem otoku od 4. 6. 1958 do 23. 12. 1960, po drugem viru pa do leta 1962 – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/7310/>.
- 21 Mirko Gorše (1926), študent, naj bi bil pobudnik iniciator ilegalne informbirojevske organizacije na ljubljanski univerzi. V prvem letu po izbruhu spora med KPJ in Informbirojem je bilo na različne načine kaznovanih 78 študentov, ki naj bi pripadali tej ilegalni organizaciji. Gorše je bil upravno kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 22. 2. 1949 do 1. 5. 1951. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/4137/>.
- 22 Lev (Leon) Premru (1931–2005), kemik, gospodarstvenik. Kot dijak je bil osumljen informbirojevske dejavnosti in pred vojaškim sodiščem v Ljubljani obsojen na osem let zapora. Čez štiri leta je bil pomiloščen. Na Golem otoku je bil od 14. 4. 1949 do 3. 12. 1953. Obsodba je bila leta 1992 razveljavljena. Doktoriral je leta 1965 na ljubljanski Fakulteti za naravoslovje in tehnologijo, kjer je leta 1971 postal docent in leta 1974 izredni profesor. Nato je delal na vodilnih položajih v podjetjih in bil med letoma 1980 in 1988 generalni direktor Leka. Leta 1985 je dobil Kraigherjevo nagrado, poimenovano po Borisu Kraigherju, kreatorju gospodarske reforme iz leta 1965 in notranjemu ministru LRS v času Premrujeve aretacije. – »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/11110/>.
- Na seznamu zapornikov na Golem otoku je tudi Vladimir Premru (1902), verjetno Levov oče. Obsojen je bil na 24 mesecev. Na Goli otok je prišel 8. 7. 1949 in tam umrl 4. 10. isto leto. – »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/5888/>.
- 23 Ilija Jurančič (1929), pravnik, sin Jožeta Jurančiča (gl. op. 33). Diplomiral je leta 1959 na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani in tam leta 1977 doktoriral. Sodeloval je v narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju. Od leta 1947 je bil uslužbenec organov za notranje zadeve, nato od 16. 4. 1949 do 29. 11. 1951 na podlagi sodbe vojaškega sodišča v Ljubljani na Golem otoku. Med letoma 1960 in 1984 je bil visokošolski učitelj za vrednotenje dela na VŠOD v Kranju, od leta 1980 kot redni profesor. Po drugih podatkih je bil upravno kaznovan na 12 mesecev DKD in na Golem otoku od 16. 4. 1949 do 16. 2. 1950 – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/5624/>.
- 24 Štefan Vilar (1929), dijak. Upravno je bil kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 29. 4. 1949 do 1. 5. 1951. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/14900/>.

- Grupa Erjavšek /Alojz/²⁵ ...
- Jereb /Viktor/²⁶ – Carl /Vladimir/²⁷ v Idriji
- Deste Bruno²⁸ v Kopru – razbita
- Kolovič /Ivan/²⁹ – krim./inalni/ ref./erent/ Grosuplje z mladinci v Šmarju nastopali kot krim./inalna/ banda
- IOOF – Majcen Franček³⁰ in še neki
- Noč /Vinko/³¹ – Jesenice
- Je še nekaj informatorjev: radio; I.B. tisk ima dopisn./ike/
- Pobegi I.B. v inozemstvo: vsega 11; 1 Trst, 2 Avstrija, 1 SZ, 7 Madž./arska/
- Mnogo aretiranih na poskusu bega

-
- 25 Alojz Erjavšek (1896), upravnik. Upravno je bil kaznovan na 48 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 16. 5. 1949 do 14. 2. 1954. »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/3665/>.
- 26 Viktor Jereb (1902), upravnik. Upravno je bil kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 8. 6. 1949 do 1. 5. 1951. »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/5189/>.
- 27 Vladimir Carl (1925), sodnik. Na seznamu zapornikov na Golem otoku vpisan kot Vladimir Karl. Upravno kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 1. 6. 1949 do 5. 5. 1951. »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/5888/>.
- 28 Bruno D'Este, politični delavec. Od septembra 1943 je bil kot predstavnik KP Italije član italijanskega Narodnoosvobodilnega odbora za Istro. Februarja 1947 je postal član Izvršilnega odbora Istrskega okrožnega ljudskega odbora, aprila isto leto član CK KP Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja.
- 29 Ivan (Janez) Kolovič (1927), nameščenc. Obtožen je bil ilegalnega oboroženega protidržavnega delovanja. Proti njemu in Marjanu Ferbežarju, Ivanu in Ani Strežek, Marici Mohorič in dijakom Anici Mohorič, Jožetu Mikužu, Tončki Marinšek, Božidarju in Vladimirju Magajni ter Dragu Ferbežarju je 22. novembra 1949 potekal sodni proces. Idejni vodja in organizator skupine naj bi bil Kolovič. Oborožena skupina naj bi se gibala predvsem v okolici Grosuplje, Ljubljane, Postojne in Sežane, kjer naj bi izvajali različne protidržavne dejavnosti, nato pa naj bi poskušali prečkati državno mejo. Skupina naj bi si nadela ime Stalinovi mladci, nosili naj bi značke v obliki rdečega trikotnika z rumenim napisom SSSR itn. Kolovič je bil obsojen na smrtno kazen z ustreljivijo, Mohorič in Ferbežar na osem, Strežek pa na šest let odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom. Ostalim je sodišče predvsem zaradi mladoletnosti izreklo nižje kazni odvzema prostosti ali poboljševalnega dela. Koloviču je bila s sodbo Vrhovnega sodišča LRS smrtna kazen spremenjena v kazen dosmrtnega odvzema prostosti s prisilnim delom. 7. novembra 1994 je Temeljno sodišče v Ljubljani prvotno sodbo zaradi procesnih napak razveljavilo. – Koncilja, *Politično sodstvo*, 295, 296.
- 30 Franček Majcen (1921–2001), filolog. V narodnoosvobodilno gibanje se je vključil jeseni 1941 v Ljubljani in deloval v Kocbekovem krogu. Bil je v raznih enotah, član poverjenišтва Izvršnega odbora OF za Ljubljano, član Pokrajinskega odbora OF za Štajersko in sekretar Okrožnega odbora OF za Prekmurje, kamor je bil poslan v začetku leta 1945. Po osvoboditvi je bil član mariborskega okrožnega odbora OF, novinar časopisa Ljudska pravica ter dopisnik tiskovne agencije Tanjug. Emigriral je na Madžarsko in delal v Budimpešti. Po otoplitvi odnosov med Jugoslavijo in SZ se je leta 1954 vrnil v Jugoslavijo in bil aretiran. Sodišče ga je obsodilo na 90 mesecev zapor. Na Golem otoku je bil od 14. 11. 1955 do 14. 11. 1961. Leta 1962 se je zaposlil v knjižnici Višje tehniške šole v Mariboru, kjer je bil vodja knjižnice ter ustanovitelj in vodja tamkajšnje založniške dejavnosti. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/7572/>.
- 31 Vinko Noč (1915), delavec. Upravno je bil kaznovan na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Golem otoku je bil od 26. 3. 1949 do 25. 9. 1950. – »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/9536/>.

- Gustinčič /Dragotin/³² – Jurančič /Jože/³³ – Möderndorfer /Vinko/³⁴
- obsojeni na DKD – pred sodišče ne! na svobodo ne!

Ruski emigranti:

- Vseh je 684, 170 žen in otrok, ostane 514!
- Ti so: 435 državljani FLRJ, 101 državljani SZ, 148 brez!
- 20 odpuščenih iz državne službe; 1 izgnan – še kakih 5 v kratkem
- Sovj./etski/ konzulat jih drži v rokah – oficirji so razgovarjali s 76 in 33 je agentov ugotovljenih.
- Aktivni so Madžarski obv./eščevalni/ centri za I.B.
- Čehi nimajo mnogo uspeha. »Nova češka ???«

Ostale obv./eščevalne/ službe:

- Niz novih nemških centrov. Identificirano je v Sloveniji 3217 sodelavcev o./bveščevanih/ s./lužb/
- Od st./arejših/ o./bveščevalnih/ s./lužb/ ugotovljeno 372 sodelavcev. 6 predvojnih centrov, oz. okupacijskih. Manj je ugotovljeno reaktivizacije.

Najresnejši problem je meja:

- Skozi zapore UDV je šlo 8762 preiskovancev; od tega na svobodo 1435.
- Ostalo: sodišče, adm/inistrativne/ kazni, poslani preko meje (203), drugim UDB-am³⁵, KOS-u /Kontra obveščevalna služba/ ...
- Od tega v zvezi z mejo 5.446 preiskovancev: poskus 2631, izvršen 2430, pomoč 385. 62,3 % vseh!

32 Gl. op. 8.

33 Jože Jurančič (1902–1998), učitelj, politični delavec. V šolskoreformno gibanje se je vključil po načelih t. i. delovne šole. Zaradi kritike tedanjih družbenih razmer so ga kazensko premeščali po različnih krajih na Štajerskem. Leta 1925 je postal član KPJ. V tridesetih letih je sodeloval pri organiziranju naprednega učiteljskega političnega gibanja, ki je leta 1936 preraslo v marksistično usmerjeni Učiteljski pokret. V narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju je sodeloval od leta 1941. Od aprila 1942 do septembra 1943 je bil v zaporih in koncentracijskem taborišču na Rabu. Septembra 1943 je postal politični komisar Rabske brigade, nato je bil mdr. načelnik odsekov za obnovo in socialno skrbstvo pri Predsedstvu SNOS, sekretar Oblastnega komiteja KPS za Štajersko, po koncu vojne do februarja 1946 pomočnik slovenskega ministra za prosveto. Osumljen je bil informbirojevstva, izključen iz KPJ in pred vojaškim sodiščem obsojen na šest let. Od 24. 4. 1949 do 1. 12. 1954 je bil zaprt v Bileči in na Golem otoku. Nato je bil zaposlen v raznih službah do upokojitve leta 1963. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije-o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/7623/>.

34 Vinko Möderndorfer (1894–1958), politik, učitelj, zbiratelj etnološkega gradiva. Leta 1921 je prišel na šolo v Mežici in pomembno vplival na gradnjo nove stavbe za osnovno in meščansko šolo (1926). Šolska oblast ga je preganjala zaradi komunistične propagande. Leta 1929 je postal upravitelj osnovne šole v Podkumu. Med drugim je zasnoval narodopisni zbornik v petih knjigah, izšli sta dve (1946, 1948). Pisal je tudi o gospodarskem in političnem položaju tamkajšnjih rudarjev. V aprilu 1948 so ga aretirali in upravno kaznovali na 24 mesecev DKD. Na Goli otok je prišel 22. 4. 1948 in bil izpuščen po treh letih in pol. Skoraj vsa njegova dela so šla v pozabo, ker jih oblasti niso dovolile ponatisniti, saj niso ustrezala tedanjim ideološkim normam. – »Dosije: Goli otok«, pridobljeno 3. 7. 2018, <http://www.noviplamen.net/dosije--o-golom-otoku/>. »Izložba«, pridobljeno 1. 10. 2018, <http://goliotok.uimenaroda.net/sr/lice/8253/>.

35 UDB = Uprava državne bezbednosti, slovensko UDV.

- Za kontrolo meje je močna agentura: cca 3000 na obeh straneh.
- 201 je ubit ne meji!

Kler:

- Organizirana hrbtnica reakcije – duhovščina.
- Kako to izgleda: 21 viš/ji/ kler, 22 dekanij, 606 župnij, 522 župnikov, 132 kaplanov, 26 samostanov, 125 redovnikov, 432 redovnic, 537 c./erkvenih/ pevskih zborov s 4978 člani, 392 ml./adinski/ krožki, aktivni verniki 413.800.
- Lj./ubljana/, Mar./ibor/ à 1300, Prim./orska/ 1500, Ljublj./ana/ à 200³⁶

Po udarcih v l. 48 duhovščina razbita.

- Udarec Bitenc /Mirko/³⁷ in vrsta drugih procesov.
- Demoraliziran Vovk /Anton/³⁸, manj Držečnik /Maksimilijan/³⁹
- Najbolj prefrigan Roman Tominec⁴⁰
- Linija Harley-a /Hurley Joseph/⁴¹

36 Ni jasno, na kaj se nanašajo navedbe v tej vrstici.

37 Mirko Bitenc (1898–1948), fizik, politik. Pred drugo svetovno vojno je bil profesor matematike in fizike v Celju, viden član Slovenske ljudske stranke in leta 1938 na listi Jugoslovanske radikalne zajednice izvoljen za narodnega poslanca za celjski okraj. Bil je rezervni major, ob napadu na Jugoslavijo mobiliziran, zajet in do kapitulacije Italije v vojnem ujetništvu. Po vrnitvi v Slovenijo je prevzel vojaški del Slovenske legije, dobil naziv komandanta vzhodne Slovenije in bil povišan v podpolkovnika. Izvedel je združitev Slovenske, Sokolske in Narodne legije. Pred koncem vojne je sodeloval pri pripravah za reorganizacijo Slovenskega domobranstva in slovenskih četnikov v Slovensko narodno vojsko (SNV), zato ga je predsedstvo Narodnega odbora 6. aprila 1945 potrdilo za pomočnika njenega poveljnika in ga povišalo v polkovnika. Maja 1945 je bil v taborišču v Vetrinju, nato v Rimu, kjer se je povezal z Mihom Krekom. Težišče njegovega delovanja so predstavljali oblikovanje obveščevalne mreže, organizacija kurirskih zvez, vzpostavitev komunikacijskih kanalov v Jugoslaviji in zunaj nje ter poskus organiziranja oboroženih enot in njihovega pošiljanja v Jugoslavijo. Zaradi tega je večkrat ilegalno odšel v Jugoslavijo. Skupaj z nekaterimi sodelavci je bil aretiran 20. 1. 1948 v Ljubljani. Na procesu pred vrhovnim sodiščem v Ljubljani sta bila 16. 4. 1948 Bitenc in Janko Soklič obsojena na smrt, drugi pa na različne zaporne kazni. Bitenc in Soklič sta bila usmrčena 10. 6. 1948. – Koncilja, *Politični procesi*, 244–259.

38 Anton Vovk (1900–1963), nadškof. Leta 1940 je postal ljubljanski stolni kanonik. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil mdr. predsednik škofijskega odbora za pomoč duhovnikom beguncem, ravnatelj bogoslovnega semenišča (1944), pooblaščen generalni vikar (1945). Leta 1946 je postal ljubljanski pomožni škof, leta 1959 rezidencialni škof in 1961 ljubljanski nadškof. Po vojni si je prizadeval za ureditev odnosov med Rimskokatoliško cerkvijo in državo, in to kljub hudim težavam, ki jih je imel z novo oblastjo. Med letoma 1951 in 1961 je upravljal slovenski del reške in nekaj časa tudi slovenski del tržaško-koprške škofije.

39 Maksimilijan Držečnik (1903–1978), škof. Doktoriral je iz filozofije (1930) in teologije (1938). Bil je profesor na visoki bogoslovni šoli v Mariboru in na teološki fakulteti v Ljubljani. Leta 1946 je postal mariborski pomožni škof, leta 1949 apostolski administrator in leta 1960 rezidencialni škof v Mariboru. Prizadeval si je za prenovo krajevne Rimskokatoliške cerkve v duhu 2. vatikanskega cerkvenega zbora.

40 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »Vprašanje delovanja duhovščine, ki ni več organizator reakcije. Najbolj nevarni so krščanski socialisti (Roman Tominec), ki skuša dati cerkvi vlogo ideološkega faktorja.«
Roman Tominec (1900–1991), teolog, umetnostni zgodovinar. Med okupacijo je bil večkrat zaprt: maja 1942 je bil po opravljeni zadušnici za Tonetom Tomšičem aretiran in določen za izgon, a zaradi bolezni septembra izpuščen; oktobra 1942 je bil ob smrti bana Natlačena določen za talca in na intervencijo izpuščen; 11. 4. 1943 je bil zaradi slovenske zastave na zvoniku frančiškanske cerkve osumljen sodelovanja pri tem dejanju; decembra 1944 aretiran in marca 1945 deportiran proti Primorski. V letih 1945 in 1946 je bil profesor verouka na učiteljskišči v Ljubljani, leta 1948 je bil izvoljen za kustosa province Sv. Križa in za provincijskega vikarja. Leta 1951 je postal predavatelj na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti.

41 Joseph Patrick Hurley (1894–1967), monsinjor, škof, papeški nuncij. Funkcijo papeškega nuncija v Jugoslaviji je nastopil 30. 1. 1946. Povojne jugoslovanske oblasti so iskale priznanje Svetega sedeža, pri tem pa so imele pred očmi mednarodni pomen takšne odločitve. A Hurley se je postavil na stran Rimskokatoliške cerkve in ni opravičil

- CMD /Cirilmetodijsko društvo/⁴²: močno omajal, cca 500 članov
- »Nova pot« močna revija: Cajnkar /Stanko/⁴³, Trstenjak /Anton/⁴⁴, Levičnik /Alfonz/⁴⁵
- Harley /Hurley/ »Una cosa interessante«⁴⁶
- Pokret proti Lampretu /Jože/⁴⁷, Umku /Mihael/⁴⁸, Bajtu /Anton/⁴⁹
- Linija dr. Toroša /Mihael/⁵⁰ – bo discipliniran

.....
 pričakovanj državnih oblasti, zato ga je papež po dobrih treh letih zamenjal. Jugoslavijo je zapustil poleti 1950 in se vrnil v ZDA.

- 42 Cirilmetodijsko društvo (CMD) je bilo društvo katoliških duhovnikov v Sloveniji, ustanovljeno septembra 1949, ko je nasledilo dotedanji Odbor duhovnikov OF.
- 43 Stanko Cajnkar (1900–1977), teolog, pripovednik. Leta 1938 je doktoriral iz teologije. Bil je profesor na bogoslovju v Mariboru, gimnaziji na Ptujju in od leta 1947 na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti. Pripadal je mladokatoliškemu gibanju okrog glasila *Križ na gori*. Ob nemški zasedbi je bil leta 1941 izgnan in je postal kaplan v Košani na Krasu, kjer je ostal do leta 1944. Nato je na osvobojenem ozemlju v Črnomlju poučeval na gimnaziji. V letih 1945–1974 je sodeloval pri verski komisiji LRS oz. SRS in bil izvoljen za poslanca v ustavodajno skupščino in svet narodov. Vrsto let je bil v vodstvu Cirilmetodijskega društva in odgovorni urednik njegovega glasila *Nova pot*.
- 44 Anton Trstenjak (1906–1996), filozofski antropolog, psiholog, teolog. Doktoriral je iz filozofije (1929) in teologije (1933). Specializiral se je v eksperimentalni psihologiji. Med letoma 1934 in 1939 je bil katehet na realni gimnaziji v Mariboru, med letoma 1940 in 1973 profesor filozofije in psihologije na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti. Bil je član SAZU, član Evropske akademije za znanost in umetnost v Salzburgu, predsednik in nato častni član Društva psihologov Slovenije; imenovan je bil za papeževega častnega premeta (1974). Prejel je Kidričevo nagrado, nagrado Anvoja, razglašen je bil za ambasadorja Republike Slovenije v znanosti, prejel je zlati častni znak svobode RS, častni doktorat Univerze v Mariboru in Univerze v Ljubljani.
- 45 Alfonz Levičnik (1869–1966), duhovnik, nabožni pisatelj. Leta 1905 je bil promoviran v doktorja teologije. Bil je kaplan v Cerknici, škofijski tajnik v Ljubljani, katehet na realki v Idriji in od 1904 do upokojitve leta 1926 profesor verouka na I. državni gimnaziji v Ljubljani. Pisal je članke vzgojne, prosvetne in religiozne vsebine ter učbenike. Deloval je tudi pri humanitarni organizaciji Karitas.
- 46 Prevod: Zanimivo
- 47 Jože Lampret (1903–1969), duhovnik, narodni delavec. Zaradi političnega delovanja, v katero je preraslo njegovo socialno udejstvovanje, je imel prve težave s posvetno in cerkveno oblastjo že v času šolanja. Kot duhovnik je nato deloval po župnijah lavantinske škofije, kjer je organiziral viničarje in delavce v naprednih strokovnih in prosvetnih društvi, študiral izkoriščanje proletariata in objavljala svoja opažanja v naprednih časopisih. Aktivno je sodeloval v delavsko-kmečkem gibanju in leta 1939 podpisal razglas Zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije »Kaj hočemo«, zaradi česar ga je oblast skupaj z drugimi podpisniki zaprla in januarja 1940 izgnala iz Dravske banovine. Zatočišče je dobil v Liki, kjer ga je zajela druga svetovna vojna. Takoj se je povezal s partizanskim gibanjem. Leta 1943 se je vrnil v Slovenijo, postal član SNOS in bil imenovan za verskega referenta 14. divizije ter se udeležil njenega pohoda na Štajersko. Med vojno je deloval kot partizanski duhovnik, nastopal kot politični aktivist na Štajerskem in bil zaradi svojega delovanja na ljubljanskem območju brez dovoljenja pristojnega škofa suspendiran že med vojno. Leta 1951 je bil zaradi svojega političnega delovanja (mdr. zvezni in republiški poslanec v okraju Celje okolica ter sekretar republiške verske komisije), zlasti v okviru Cirilmetodijskega društva, katerega pobudnik in soustanovitelj je bil, izobčen iz Cerkve. Ponovno posvetitev je dosegel decembra 1966.
- 48 Mihael Umek (1886–1966), duhovnik. Med letoma 1930 in 1961 je bil mariborski stolni kanonik in mestni župnik, nato pa stolni dekan. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil med redkimi duhovniki, ki jih Nemci kljub narodni zavednosti niso preselili. V 50. letih so ga oblasti večkrat kaznovale z denarnimi in krajšimi zapornimi kaznimi.
- 49 Anton Bajt (1913–1998), duhovnik. Kot župnik je služboval v Červinjanu (Furlanija) in Šmarjah pri Vipavi. Z narodnoosvobodilnim gibanjem je sodeloval od julija 1942 in bil od septembra 1943 verski referent Narodnoosvobodilnega sveta za Primorsko. Udeležil se je velikega zborovanja 30. 7. 1944 v Brancici, 6. 9. isto leto blagoslovil vojno zastavo Bazoviške brigade ob razvitju v Mlakah pri Štanjelu. V mandatni dobi 1950–1954 je bil republiški poslanec za Ajdovščino. Leta 1949 je postal prvi predsednik Cirilmetodijskega društva. Koncilski kongregacija je izobčila voditelje društva, dekret izobčenja je Bajt prejel oktobra 1950. Odstopil je kot predsednik društva, se odpovedal župniji in leta 1955 nastopil bibliotekarsko službo v Narodni in univerzitetni knjižnici v Ljubljani. Maja 1966 je zaprosil za odvezo od izobčenja in iregularnosti. Papež je dekret podpisal oktobra istega leta.
- 50 Mihael Toroš (1884–1963), teolog, pravnik. Leta 1921 je doktoriral iz cerkvenega prava, ki ga je nato skupaj s cerkveno zgodovino in pastoralno teologijo do leta 1947 poučeval na goriškem bogoslovju. Leta 1947 je bil imenovan za apostolskega upravitelja poreško-puljske škofije (temu se je odpovedal leta 1949), leta 1948 jugoslovanskega dela goriške nadškofije in leta 1955 še slovenskega dela tržaško-koprške škofije v Jugoslaviji. Ustanovil je malo semenišče

- Lampret dobro dela – se uveljavil kot nov ordinariat
- Nekaj več zunanega bleska – misliti na imenovanje za ministra!?
- Več podpore dr. Torošu: sedež Kostanjevica; m./oški/ sam./ostan/ Sv. Križ
- »Vse slabo je iz Slovenije«. Srebrnič /Josip/⁵¹ najzagrizenejši
- Ujčič /Josip/⁵² – bogat – tu revni!
- Materialno najbolj udarjeni – zato podpora!

- Ostale Cerkve: vse naše, razen lj./ubljanski/ del Evangelijske – Miselj /Vladimir/⁵³ in ostali
- Pisali M. M.⁵⁴ za cerkev; Pravoslavni, Starokatoliki, Jehova, Baptisti!!

- V cerkvi struja Tominec, Vovk ...
- osloniti se na K.S. /krščansko socialistično/ gibanje

.....
 v Vipavi in leta 1952 osnoval verski štirinajstdnevnik *Družina*. Po letu 1945 je navezal stike z novo oblastjo in se zavzel za dobre odnose med Cerkvijo in državo. Leta 1949 je podprl ustanovitev Cirilmetodijskega društva, a je pozneje izstopil.

- 51 Josip Srebrnič (1876–1966), škof. Doktoriral iz zgodovine in zemljepisa (1902) ter teologije (1907). Od leta 1910 je bil redni profesor cerkvene zgodovine na semenišču v Gorici, od leta 1919 do 1923, ko je bil imenovan za škofa na otoku Krku, pa na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti. Leta 1936 je skupaj z ljubljanskim škofom Gregorijem Rožmanom izročil papežu Piju XI. spomenico jugoslovanskih škofov o nevdržnem položaju slovenske manjšine v Italiji, leta 1942 pa pri papežu in Mussoliniju posredoval za taboriščnike na Rabu. Po drugi svetovni vojni so ga označili za kolaboracionista. Bil je konfiniran na Sušaku in po šestih mesecih brez sojenja izpuščen. Leta 1963 ga je papež Janez XXIII. imenoval za naslovnega nadškofa.
- 52 Josip Ujčič (1880–1964), nadškof. Doktoriral je leta 1908 in od leta 1918 predaval na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti. Novembra 1936 je bil imenovan za nadškofa v Beogradu in apostolskega administratorja banatskega. Bil je član disciplinskega sodišča univerze in cerkvenega sodišča v Ljubljani ter od leta 1936 apostolski vizitator bogoslovnih semenišč v Jugoslaviji. Med letoma 1956 in 1961 je bil vršilec dolžnosti predsednika škofovske konference. Leta 1960 je bil odlikovan z redom zaslug za narod I. stopnje.
- 53 Vladimir Vadim Miselj (1923–2010), protestantski pastor. Njegov oče je bil diplomat pri Društvu narodov v Ženevi. V Jugoslavijo se je vrnil avgusta 1945. Študiral je pravo, ekonomijo in teologijo. Osumljen je bil sodelovanja s Črtomirjem Nagodetom in 18 mesecev v zaporu ter na prisilnem delu. Kot nepoklicni pastor evangeličanske cerkve je do sredine osemdesetih let skrbel za ljubljansko evangeličansko župnijo. Med prvimi se je zavzemal za sodelovanja med krščanskimi cerkvami v Sloveniji.
- 54 M. M. je verjetno Metod Mikuž. Manj verjetno se kratici nanašata na Miho Marinka, ki bi ga Kraigher najbrž navedel kot Miho.
 Metod Mikuž (1909–1982), teolog in zgodovinar. Na ljubljanski Teološki fakulteti je doktoriral leta 1941, na Filozofski fakulteti pa leta 1946. Med vojno se je priključil osvobodilnemu gibanju in bil od januarja 1943 do konca vojne verski referent Glavnega štaba NOV in POS, od oktobra 1943 član plenuma OF, SNOO oz. SNOS in od novembra 1943 član Avnoja. Po osvoboditvi je bil izvoljen za zveznega poslanca. Leta 1947 je postal izredni profesor za zgodovino, leta 1956 pa redni. Kot predstojnik prve katedre za novejšo zgodovino na jugoslovanskih univerzah je opravil pionirsko delo na tem pedagoškem in znanstvenem področju.
 Miha Marinko (1900–1983), politik. Leta 1934 je postal član CK KPJ, ob ustanovitvi KPS leta 1937 član CK KPS in začasnega vodstva KPJ v domovini. Bil je med organizatorji NOB in prvi politični komisar GP NOV in POS. Od decembra 1941 do septembra 1943 je bil v italijanskih zaporih. Od julija do decembra 1944 je deloval na Primorskem in Gorenjskem. Med letoma 1946 in 1965 je bil sekretar politbiroja oz. IK CK KPS/ZKS, politični sekretar CK ZKS pa v letih 1965 in 1966, član Predsedstva CK ZKS med letoma 1966 in 1968, med letoma 1946 in 1953 sekretar IO OF, nato do 1961 predsednik GO SZDL Slovenije, med letoma 1946 in 1953 predsednik vlade LRS, od januarja do novembra 1953 predsednik Izvršnega sveta LRS ter nato do 1962 predsednik Ljudske skupščine LRS.

- iščejo vezi – Kocbek /Edvard/⁵⁵, Pokorn /Jože/⁵⁶
- Pokorn – Mohorič /Jaka/⁵⁷ nekoliko aktivna, Kocbek samo nerga
- Žumer Srečko⁵⁸; Janko Lavrič⁵⁹
- Imajo točno registrirane vse svoje pozicije v drž./avnem/ aparatu
- Praznoverje: pisma v prepisovanju ...

2. Ukrepi proti sovražniku:

- 59 smrtnih obsodb – izvršeno 29, pomiloščeno 25, v postopku 5
- (od 1. I. 1949 – 1. III. 1950)
- V glavnem banda, težje špijonaža, krim./inal/ umori ..., vojni zločini med okupacijo manj!

V zaporih:

- v KPD /Kazensko poboljševalni dom/ 1182
- v DzP⁶⁰ 511
- na delu v LRS (Ljudski republiki Sloveniji) 1339

-
- 55 Edvard Kocbek (1904–1981), pesnik, pisatelj in politik. Bil je eden od ideoloških vodij katoliške kulturne levice in urednik njene revije *Dejanje*. Med vojno je kot vodilni krščanski socialist (po aretaciji in ustrelitvi Aleša Stanovnika junija 1942) postal član IO OF, konec leta 1942 eden od podpredsednikov Avnoja, novembra 1943 poverjenik za prosveto Nacionalnega komiteja osvoboditve Jugoslavije (NKOJ), član predsedstva SNOO in nato SNOS. Marca 1945 je v koalicijski vladi Demokratične federativne Jugoslavije postal minister za Slovenijo. Po vojni je bil minister za Slovenijo v zvezni vladi (do leta 1946), podpredsednik IO OF in po vrnitvi iz Beograda leta 1946 tudi podpredsednik prezidija Ljudske skupščine LRS ter zvezni poslanec. Zaradi političnega spora okoli knjige *Strah in pogum*, ki je načela nekatera tabuizirana vprašanja iz slovenskega narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja (pogledi na likvidacijo političnih nasprotnikov, vprašanje izdajstva in ovajanja med partizani, problematika katoličanov med NOB), so ga leta 1952 prisilno upokojili in nadzorovali do konca življenja. Znova je začel objavljati šele po letu 1961, tri leta pozneje pa je prejel Prešernovo nagrado. Pravi šok pa je v slovenski javnosti povzročil izid njegove izpovedi v obliki intervjuja, *Edvard Kocbek – Pričevalec našega časa*, v kateri je spregovoril o povojnih pobjah domobrancev. Besedilo sta leta 1975 v Trstu kot knjigo izdala pisatelja Boris Pahor in Alojz Rebula.
- 56 Jože Pokorn (1904–1972), pravnik in ekonomist. Diplomiral je leta 1925 na Visoki šoli za svetovno trgovino na Dunaju, doktoriral pa leta 1931 na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. Sprva je bil odvetnik in ravnatelj Mestne hranilnice v Škofji Loki. Leta 1941 je bil zaprt in izgnan. Od septembra 1944 je bil član študijske komisije SNOS. Med letoma 1945 in 1948 je bil minister za pravosodje v vladi LRS in nato med letoma 1949 in 1951 član vlade LRS. Kot redni profesor na Ekonomski fakulteti v Ljubljani (1951–1967) se je posvetil finančnim vprašanjem. Leta 1968 je dobil Kidričevo nagrado.
- 57 Jakob Mohorič (1888–1976), pravnik in politik. Kot pripadnik levega krila krščanskih socialistov je sodeloval v krogu mladinov. Po letu 1935 je pripadal krogu t. i. Stare SLS in sodeloval z mlado krščansko socialistično strujo. Po okupaciji se je družil z Andrejem Gosarjem in njegovo skupino Združeni Slovenci, ki je hotela posredovati med OF in Slovensko zavezo. Po vojni mu je bilo onemogočeno javno delovanje, pozneje je spet dobil dovoljenje za odprtje odvetniške pisarne.
- 58 Srečko Žumer (1895–1983), sindikalni voditelj. Med prvo svetovno vojno je bil vojak na soški in zahodni fronti. Med vojnama je delal kot stavec in leta 1921 postal dejaven v Jugoslovanski strokovni zvezi, v kateri je uveljavil sodobna sindikalna pravila. V sporih z vodstvom SLS zaradi ideoloških in socialno teoretičnih vprašanj se je opiral na mlajše radikalne krščanskosocialistične intelektualce. Podpiral je delo Krekove mladine in veliko prispeval pri povezovanju krščanskih socialistov z levo fronto. Po okupaciji leta 1941 je odobril vstop krščanskih socialistov v OF; nekaj časa je bil v italijanski internaciji in v domobranskem zaporu. Oktobra 1943 je postal član SNOO, jeseni 1945 pa zvezni poslanec. Po odstranitvi iz politike in upokojitvi se je leta 1950 kot strojni stavec honorarno zaposlil pri časopisnem podjetju Slovenski poročevalec v Ljubljani. Leta 1975 je postal član Sveta republike.
- 59 Janko Lavrič (1900–nn), doktor prava. Svojo odvetniško pisarno je odprl leta 1929. Po vojni je bil kot sodelavec ministrstva za pravosodje predstavnik slovenske vlade v odvetniški zbornici.
- 60 DzP – verjetno domovi za preuzgojo.

- DKD 910
- izven LRS 1031
- Pob/oljševalno/ delo (Kočevje) 352
- Skupaj 5325

Izven LRS:

- Autoput 340
- N./ovi/ Beograd
- Bgd. /Beograd/ ... /nečitljivo/ 339
- Bgd. MUP /Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve/ 182

Vl. 49

- Pogojno odpuščeni 318, pomiloščeni 374, amnestija 558 + 208
- Vsega na DKD 2086
- Izpuščenih 1176, /v zaporu/ 910 I. III., /v zaporu/ 1594 I. I.; razveljavljeno 443, pog./ojno/ odp./ščenih/ 727; umrlo 6
- Vseh upravnih kazni preko Minota /Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve LRS/: 13.120
- Od tega: pretepi 31 %, alarm/antne/ vesti 11 %, delomrzništvo 10 %, c./estni/ promet 25 %, oviranje dr./žavnih/ org./anov/ 13 %
- Velik je procent ljudi, ki so kaznovani. Samo po liniji kriminala v prvem polletju 1949 kazensko preganjalo 1,3 % odgovornega prebivalstva LRS.

3. Odnos s tožilstvi in sodišči:⁶¹

- Boljši s civilnimi kot vojaškimi.
- Preiskave: kriminalne – gosp./odarske/ oni, splošno krim/inal/ mi.
- Napačno! Strokovne preiskave, obveščevalno delo, preveritve, upravno... vso pravno plat tožilstvo! To drugače postavljeno iz Bgd-a /Beograda/!

4. Kriminaliteta:

- na splošno pada

	splošna	Ekon./omska/
l. 1947	14.476	8.252
l. 1948	6.932	6.299
l. 1949	5.071	2.099

- Prej slaba evidenca

61 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »V zvezi s tem (obsodbe, kazni, požari, kriminaliteta) so največji problem tožilstva. Preiskovalnega dela je ogromno, vršijo preiskavo, UDBa po kontrarevolucionarni liniji, Notranja uprava za splošni kriminal, tožilstvo pa za gospodarski kriminal. / Pravilno bi bilo, da bi vse preiskave vodila tožilstva, UDB in Notranja uprava bi dajala le glavne ugotovitve, vsa druga zasliševanja pa tožilstva. Ta pa na krajih nimajo aparata, zato preiskave in zasliševanja vodijo miličniki, kar povzroča birokratizacijo. To je treba nujno spremeniti.«

- Pozneje razvoj pla./nskega/ gospodarstva!
- Nova kazniva dejanja: škodljivost, nemarnost v soc./ialističnem/ sektorju, zoper službeno dolžnost
- Umori padajo

		skupaj	raziskanih	ne/raziskanih/
Umori	1949	41	37	4
	1948	69	62	7
Malomarni umori	1949	17	17	
	1948	51	48	3
Detomori	1949	17	14	3
	1948	18	10	8

5. Prometne nesreče:

- 877 vsega (železnica, ... /, škoda 7,200.000, 127 smrtnih žrtev; cestnih /nesreč/ 805, 98 smrtnih žrtev; 75 % malomarnost, pijanost šoferjev;
- 241.045 dvokoles, 1847 os./ebni/ avto, 2424 tov./orni/ avto, 5.344 motocikli.

6. Požari:⁶²

- 1. 48 821, škoda 65,700.000; 1. 49 1348, škoda 173,400.000
- 26,5 % gozdnih požarov, 9,9 % na tov./arniških/ objektih
- Požigi ugotovljeni: 95
- Nezadostno gas./ilsko/ orodje
- Gasilska LM /Ljudska milica/: v Ljubljani – Maribor
- I.G. /industrijski gasilci/ 446 enot, 11.511 čl./anov/
- Pr./ostovoljne/ b./rigade/ 283 društev, 39.135 čl./anov/
- Sodelovali pri 1997 požarih; 22.470 čl./anov/; 64.800 del./ovnih/ ur
- Gas./ilsko/ orodje: cevi, zlasti gor./iška/ oblast; brez tradicije
- KLO /Krajevni ljudski odbor/ ne financirajo!
- Vse Minot in DOZ (Državni osiguravajoči zavod, Državni zavarovalni zavod) 20 milj./onov/

7. PAZ (Prostovoljne akcije zasaditve):

- 175 sad./itvenih/ tečajev, 5277 udeležencev
- 16 izobr./aževalnih/ tečajev, 451 udeležencev
- Raznih predavanj 42.600
- Obstoje: 9801 ekipa, 122.932 čl./anov/; 1979 odb./orov/, 20.228 čl./anov/
- /Skupaj/ 143.160 org./aniziranih/ v PAZ
- Razstave, ... /nečitljivo/ v Lj./ubljeni/ in Mar./iboru/

62 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »V zvezi z naraščanjem požarov se postavlja vprašanje gasilske opreme, ker je stara že precej uničena.«

- Lokacije 52 l. 48, 169 l. 49
- Pogozdovanje: 133,94 ha, 772.306 sadik, 213 kg semen

8. Tuji državljani

- 6293 inozemcev l. 49
- 3554 inozemcev l. 48
- Zelo omejeno kretanje. Januarja nove legitimacije.
- Dovoljenje za kretanje: 1837 enkratno; 278 potovanje; 898 ostalo; 229 mesečnih; 29 prosto v LRS.
- 260 kazni zaradi kretanja brez dovoljenj.

9. Matična služba

- Imeli smo 195 mat./ičnih/ okolišev; v načrtu 488 za 1157 KLO-jev; dela jih 253.
- Več tečajev.

10. Državljanstvo

- 2935 novih državljanstev; 1247 Primorci po izr./edni/ poti⁶³; 199 izgubilo državljanstvo;
- 11.030 opcij, potrjeno 7083, zavrnjeno 3127.⁶⁴ 194 vzetih državljanstev zaradi pobega.

11. Prij./javno/ odj./avna/ služba:

Urejena Lj./ubljana/ M/aribor/, Celje, Bled. Odvisno od os./ebnih/ izkaznic.
Ruski način – se spreminja!!

12. Orožje

10.500 orožnih listov; 8682 lovskih pušk.

13. Milica: »Lj./udska/ Milica«!⁶⁵

- Vsega cca 4400 na spisku, 4075 na mestu.
- Na postajah 1630, KPD 421, gasilska 88, gozdna 274, prometna 161, bataljon 530.
- Na okr./ajnih/ upravah: 711. 27 okr./ajev/, 4 raj/oni/, 3 mest/a/, 3 obl./asti/
- Oficirji 253, podofic./irji/ 796, milič./niki/ 2725, civ./ilni/ usl./užbenci/ 139.

Moralno-pol./itično/ stanje:

63 To so Slovenci, dotedanji državljani Italije, ki so 10. junija 1940 imeli stalno bivališče na območju, ki je po določitih mirovne pogodbe z Italijo iz februarja 1947 ostalo v Italiji, so pa februarja 1947 živeli na območju, ki je bilo priključeno k Jugoslaviji, in so v skladu z 20. členom te pogodbe v predpisanem roku vložili opcijo za jugoslovansko državljanstvo ter ga tudi dobili.

64 V skladu z 19. členom mirovne pogodbe z Italijo iz februarja 1947 so dotedanji italijanski državljani, ki so imeli stalno bivališče na ozemlju, priključenem k Jugoslaviji, v predpisanem roku lahko vložili opcijo za ohranitev italijanskega državljanstva. Pogoj je bil italijanski pogovorni jezik družine, po odobritvi opcije pa tudi preselitev na območje Italijanske republike.

65 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »Vprašanje milice bo treba prediskutirati.«

- 12 samomorov, 3 primeri s pripornicami, 9 miličnik s kaznjenci, 6 I.B., 8 religija, 30 kaz./enskih/ postopkov zaradi neprav./ilnega/ odnosa do civ./ilnega/ prebivalstva.

Šola Begunje. Nizek po./itično/- ideol./oški/ nivo!

- KPD: l. 48 186, l. 49 440
- IZ LM 452 podjetij, 2019 organov IZ LM; 21 oficirjev, 8 podof./icirjev/, 2 mil./ičnika/ iz splo./šne/ LM /Ljudske milice/
- Število se je znižalo od l. 48 zaradi odpuščanja po preverjanjih.
- Manjka: 1030 organov, 4 of./icirji/ in 42 podof./icirjev/!

14. Aparat Minota

Matična služba: referenti za drž./avljansko/ stanje 31, matičarji 461, skupaj 492.

Ostalo:

vse	1336	formacija	993	zasedeno
Od tega Minot	239		167	
oblasti	202		131	
Lj. mesto	175		109	
Maribor mesto	92		68	
DzP, DKD, KPD	129		69	
	837		539	

28 okraji, 599, zasedeno 454 à 16. 2.

V kriminalu: 302, dejansko na delu 172.

l. I. 48: Minot 690, Milica 2353

ofic./irji/ 230, podof./icirji/ 612, mil./ičniki/ 1.449, civ./ilna/ LM 62.

15. UDV /Uprava državne varnosti/ - kader:

	skupno	Oper./ativci/	Adm/inistracija	Tehn/ični/
	1390	757	310	263
uprava	690	294	167	179
Lj./ubljanska/ obl./ast/	118	76	36	6
M./ariborska/ obl./ast/	103	59	29	15
Gor./iška/ obl./ast	72	39	17	16
Ok./ajna/ poobl./aščenstva/	339	199	87	53

Prom./etna/ poobl./ aščenstva/	41	30	11	–
Ind./ustrijska/ poobl./aščenstva/	49	41	8	–
Obm./očna/ poobl./ aščenstva/	44	44	–	–

- I.B. 5 pred voj./aško/ sodišče
- 1 Jurančič Ilija⁶⁶ – Mermer
- 2 primera pobega Mar./ibor/: Dolinar⁶⁷ v S/ovjetsko/ zono Avstrija; IB žena sovj./etski/ državljani
- Smrke⁶⁸ z... /nečitljivo/ – pijanec; v angl./enško/ zono Avstrija
- 11 sumljivih odpuščenih iz UDB; 19 kaznovanih zaradi pijanstva
- Odpuščenih 54, disc./iplinsko/ kaznovani 68, sodno kaznovani 11

I. 48	900	520	206	174
+	506	262	149	105
1. III. 50	156 %	150 %	172 %	160 %

16. Preskrba

- 13.000 oskrbovalcev
- LM, IZ LM, Minot, matičarji, tožilstvo
- 540 celoten aparat: kuharice, kelnerice, ...
- Vse na račun oskrbovancev
- Lj./ubljana/ – Klub: 8 aretiranih

17. Metode dela⁶⁹

Ruske usedline in »razumljive ambicije«

1. Splošno nezaupanje – vse na podpis
2. Imeti v rokah personalo
3. Izkoriščati kontrolo
4. Voditi tožilstva in sodišča
5. Odnos do milice in kriminala
6. Vse dovoljeno – »v posebnem interesu«

66 Gl. op. 23.

67 Dolinar. Identitete mi ni uspelo ugotoviti.

68 Smrke. Identitete mi ni uspelo ugotoviti.

69 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »Vprašanje metod dela bo treba resno premotriti, ker smo pri tem delu največ kopirali sovjetske metode (vrbovanja). Imamo sorazmerno precej nemoralnih dejanj in prekrškov, tudi sorazmerno precej IB. To je precej posledica sovjetske prakse splošnega nezaupanja – pojav tendence imeti v rokah personalo in kontrolo, pritiska na tožilstva in sodišča. Opaža se preveč povezovanje državnih organov z organi UDB. Borba proti tem metodam je ena glavnih nalog partijske organizacije v UDBi in milice.«

7. Visoke zveze: partorg. /partijske organizacije/, ministrstva, ustanove, ..., vsi žele »dobre« odnose
8. gospodarstvo in sabotaže: slab aparat, ni izkušenj, IZ LM in pooblaščenstva!?
9. KNOJ – in odnosi: meje, alpinizem, turizem⁷⁰
10. Potna dovoljenja ? – zastoji, težave.⁷¹

Kraigherjevemu poročilu je sledila razprava, ki je v zapisniku politbiroja le povzeta in tudi ni navedeno, kdo so bili razpravljavci. V nadaljevanju so navedeni trije sklepi:

Diskusija:

- Zaostruje vprašanje dela milice, ki ima preveč nalog, ki niso njihove. So primeri, da miličniki sklicujejo seje KLO /krajevnih ljudskih odborov/ in dajejo naloge, pišejo poročila npr. o odkupih.
- Vprašanje koordinacijskih konferenc na okrajih, ki jih je treba nadaljevati, a preprečiti metode diktiranja s strani sekretarjev.

Sklepi:

1. Nekaj teh stvari bi bilo dobro govoriti na seji IO OF /Izvršnega odbora OF/, zlasti za pojasnitev družbeno koristnega dela.
2. Sprejme se predlog, kot stališče biroja, da naj bi milica ne vršila nobenih zasliševanj in preiskav, ampak samo poizvedbe za osnovne podatke. Vse registracije in administracijo je treba prenesti na odseke notranje uprave.
3. Zagotoviti je treba pravilno vodene koordinacijske konference, ki naj jih sklicujejo tožilci in ne sekretarji OK /okrajnih komitejev/. Direktivo CK KPJ⁷² glede samostojnosti tožilcev in sodišč je treba obdelati z vsemi OK.⁷³

70 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »KNOJ je precej oddvojen od terena, zato je precej težkih primerov slabih odnosov do ljudi.«

71 Zapisnik seje politbiroja navaja: »Odsek za potna dovoljenja je centraliziran, zato je precej težav in nepravilnosti npr. odklonitve so brez vsake argumentacije.«

72 Okrožnica CK KPJ z dne 28. 2. 1950 o organizacijskih vprašanjih, kjer je posebno poglavje o nalogah in položaju glavnih tožilcev.

73 Drnovšek, *Zapisniki politbiroja CK KPS/ZKS*, 199, 200.



38 ZBIRKA
RAZPOZNAVANJA
RECOGNITIONES

Aleksander Lorenčič
Jože Prinčič

**SLOVENSKA
INDUSTRIJA
OD NASTANKA
DO DANES**

Cena
.....
30 EUR

Reviews and Reports

Workshop: Parliamentarianism and Representative Democracy in Crisis of War, Revolution, and Collapse of Empires, 2 October 2018, St. Petersburg

In April 2017 EuParl.net welcomed the Center for Historical Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics St. Petersburg and its director Alexander Semyonov in its ranks. On the occasion of this recent membership and the numerous upcoming as well as elapsed Revolution centenaries the Center for Historical Research hosted an international workshop on »Parliamentarianism and Representative Democracy in Crisis of War, Revolution and Collapse of Empires« on October 2, 2018, in St. Petersburg.

As its title implies, the workshop addressed the impact especially of the First World War and its aftermath on the development of Parliamentarianism and Representative Democracy in Europe. Not less than seven European countries, namely Russia, Luxembourg, former Yugoslavia, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Finland, were addressed. This instance is insofar remarkable as the group of participants was small in number due to difficulties in the visa-process. Nonetheless had the workshop been fruitful and inspiring and offered the opportunity for interesting discussions.

A brief introduction by Alexander Semyonov and some remarks concerning the network's current work by Jure Gašparič, member of the Board of Directors of EuParl.net, opened the meeting.

In his keynote address, Alexander Semyonov (*Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg*) raised the question, if Parliamentarianism in Russia from a historical point of view was and is after all »doomed« or »in crisis«. His contribution turned out to be a persuading plea for a more differentiated history of Russian Parliamentarianism. »Doomed« thereby referred to a specific interpretation of the history of political representation that treats Parliamentarianism as naturally short lived and a »non-organic experiment« in Russian history, which resulted from the Empires defeat in the Russo-Japanese war 1905. Autocracy in contrary is claimed to be Russia's »natural political way«. This interpretation, which amongst others the American scholar Richard Pipes

was empathic on, is somewhat a Russian Sonderweg-thesis. It discredits all forms of political representation and of constitutional arrangements until this day. Thus its continuing popularity amongst Russian historians and the Russian public is for Semyonov one major reason for the ongoing crisis of Russian Parliamentarianism. Given this impact of the interpretation, Semyonov strongly argued for a new sight on the history of political representation, which on the one hand ought to take into consideration the emergence of an idea of political representation in the face of social and political crisis in 1905/6, that made possible the election of the first Russian parliament – the Imperial State Duma. On the other hand this new approach should also recognize that the Imperial State Duma was quite successful at its work. The bills it passed had for example a strong impact on the modernization of the Empire.

That the failure of Russian Parliamentarianism is not a mere destiny explainable through the alleged autocratic nature of Russian politics was also shown by Konstantin Tarasov (*St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg State Electrotechnical University »LETI«*), who emphasized the importance of soldiers organizations and the so called »committee class« in the development of the revolutionary process in 1917, which finally overthrew not only the monarchy but also the Provisional Government and with it Russian Parliamentarianism. Tarasov therefore highlighted the fragmentation of the Imperial Army in at least three political groups during the February and the October Revolution: first the nobles, who continued supporting the tsar, second the »middle-strata-soldiers«, who formed soldiers' committees and backed the introduction of a representative democracy respectively the Provisional Government and third the »peasant-soldiers« that were in favour of a direct democracy because parliamentary representation had failed to address their needs. He showed that all of these groups took action and influenced the outcome of the 1917s Revolution and thereby shaped Russia's Parliamentary and democratic history – which meant bringing it to an early end.

Whereas in Russia Parliamentarianism and Representative Democracy 1917 stopped being, Pasi Ihalainen (*University of Jyväskylä, Finland*) diagnosed »Springs of Democracy« both in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Finland during the period between 1917 and 1919. His contribution summarized the main results of his recently published book of the same title, in which he compared national and transnational debates on Constitutional Reforms in the mentioned countries. The given analysis, while specifying the common and distinctive features of national debates, unravelled the transnational links between the outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the gained constitutional compromises of 1918–19 in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Finland. The First World War, according to Ihalainen, not only caused a simultaneous development of the Reform process in all reviewed countries, but also lead to a crisis of political legitimacy in which the Russian Revolution appeared as an even bigger threat to the existing orders. Both war and revolution became catalysers for more or less enforced constitutional reforms and democratization processes, which lead to a redefinition of the concepts »people« and »parliament« and to »Springs of democracy«.

The development Ihalainen outlined also applied to Luxembourg. After the war and facing the possibility of a workers' uprising, the concept »people«, as showed by Renée Wagener (*University of Luxembourg*), has been politically redefined in the Grand-Duchy. To fortify her point of view she shed a light on the process of introducing universal suffrage in Luxembourg from the pre-war census to the first workers' strikes 1917 until its implementation in January 1919. Her primarily analytical focus were parliamentary discussions concerning the new constitution and in particular article 52 which determined suffrage. When finally adopted in January 1919 the constitution granted suffrage for men and women alike. Hence it was not less than a tremendous step of democratization, one little drop of bitterness was marring the overall evaluation of this development. As a matter of fact it hadn't been conviction or the women's influence that finally brought women's suffrage but short-term electoral considerations of Luxembourg's Conservative Party, hoping for women's votes to save the monarchy. Nevertheless the case of Luxembourg is yet another example how war and crisis eventually lead to a strengthening of representative democracy and Parliamentarianism.


Regarding the case of former Yugoslavia, »War, Crisis and Collapse of Empires« in contrary marked the starting point of an eventful history of Parliamentarianism in the first place. In an original approach Jure Gašparič (*Institute of Contemporary History, Slovenia*) analysed the fragility of Parliamentarianism and representative democracy in the newly formed multi-ethnic state. He showed, that the environment where any parliament holds its session as well as its assigned building precondition the self-awareness of its members and expert staff. Because of that Parliamentary buildings – and parliaments through it – are a means of communication with citizens. Their architectural appearance is not only a matter of aesthetic principle, but political convictions as well. In the case of Yugoslavia, as Gašparič pointed out, the characteristic of the different parliamentary buildings, starting with the Old King Court, followed by the Cavalry barracks (1920–1929) up to the Manjež Theatre (1931–36), where it was placed by Alexander I to discredit it as a talking shop, showed not only the unsolved national question of the multi-ethnic state but also the weakness of democracy itself. Nonetheless the construction of a new parliament building started right after the founding of Yugoslavia. This was to show the Ottoman Empire as well as the rest of the world, that Yugoslavia was an independent state. It wasn't until 1936 that the Parliament could move into its own building, the »House of the National Assembly«, which until today is the seat of the Serbian parliament.

The presentation of the panels were followed by a lively discussion that deepened the introduced topics and helped sharpening some research approaches. Particularly outstanding was yet the possibility of continuing to examine Gašparič's thesis at the historical site of Russia's first parliament, which the workshop's participants were offered to visit at the end of the conference. The gained first-hand experience and various explanations given by Alexander Semyonov on the »Tauride Palace«, which hosted the Imperial State Duma from 1906–1917, verified the correlation between

the parliamentary environment, the political meaning of Parliamentarianism and the state of democracy. Surrounded by the tsar's barracks the Duma could have easily been eliminated at any time. Unnecessary to say, that this location expressed another Parliament's weakness.

The excursion to the »Tauride Palace« concluded an informative conference, which put current approaches and questions of parliamentary research to the discussion and promoted academic exchange across borders.

Verena Mink



Andrej Rahten, *Med Kakanijo in Wilsonio: poklicne in politične preizkušnje Hansa Schwegla alias Ivana Švegla*

Celovec, Ljubljana in Dunaj:
Mohorjeva založba, 2018
(Zbirka Studia Diplomatica Slovenica,
Personae, 5), 259 strani

Andrej Rahten sodi med redke slovenske zgodovinarje, ki so v ospredje svojega raziskovalnega dela postavili diplomatsko zgodovino. Ob tej se je večkrat lotil še pisanja političnih biografij, kar v slovenskem zgodovinopisju prav tako ni vsakdanje. V tokratni knjigi je združil oboje – diplomatsko zgodovino in biografijo. Rahten se je lotil orisa življenjske poti Hansa Schwegla ali Ivana Švegla. Že na uvodnih straneh je pojasnil, zakaj dvojno pisanje istega imena. Njegov junak je bil za časa Avstro-Ogrske v dokumentih še zapisan z nemško različico zapisa Hans Schwegel, ki pa se je po prevratni dobi leta 1918 postopoma spremenila v slovenskega Ivana Švegla. Prav tako je na začetku dela pojasnil tudi obe »geografski« imeni, Kakanijo kot posrečeno izpeljanko iz K. u. K monarhije in Wilsonio kot Šveglovo graščino pri Bledu, ki jo je Woodrowu Wilsonu na čast preimenoval po ameriškem predsedniku, v katerega so bila na pariški mirovni konferenci po prvi svetovni vojni položena vsa upanja slovenskih članov jugoslovanske delegacije.

Uvodnim stranem sledi petnajst poglavij, ki jih je Rahten nanizal po kronološkem vrstnem redu, tako da v pripovedi sledimo Šveglovi poti od rojstva v Zgornjih Gorjah pri Bledu v času, ko je bila »Kakanija« še pomembna evropska sila, do smrti

in propada Wilsonie alias gradu Grimšče po Šveglovi smrti. V prvih poglavjih je avtor opisal Avstro-Ogrsko v času protagonistovega odraščanja, ko se je precej razlikovala od večine drugih evropskih držav, ki so bile enonacionalne in niso bile dualistične. Hans Schwegel je sledil stričevi poti, se pod njegovim vplivom in patronatom šolal za diplomata in diplomatsko-politični poti ostal zvest večino svojega življenja. Pot v službi avstro-ogrške diplomacije je začel v Združenih državah Amerike, kjer je prebil dosti časa, kar bi dandanes sicer označili kot zelo pomembno in ugledno. A nas Rahten ob tem opozarja, da je avstro-ogrška zunanja politika pogled usmerjala na vzhod, proti Balkanu, in da je bil severnoameriški prostor tedaj na obrobju pozornosti Dunaja. To se je spremenilo šele med prvo svetovno vojno, ko so se diplomati centralnih sil soočali s precej nevšečnostmi, od okrnjenja proračuna za delovanje do soočanja z idejami politikov, ki so si prizadevali za konec ostarele habsburške monarhije.

Ob razpadu monarhije po koncu vojne leta 1918 se je Ivan Švegel vključil v diplomacijo nove države in bil agilen v Parizu v času mirovne konference, ko je zveze iz starejše dobe preusmeril v nove čase, saj so se nekaj nepomembne ZDA uvrstile v središče svetovne diplomacije. Švegel je bil vsekakor eden najboljših poznavalcev Američanov med slovenskimi in jugoslovanskimi politiki, a tudi to leta 1918 ni moglo ublažiti nekaterih neugodnih posledic političnega preloma za Slovence na mednarodni ravni, ko je bilo slovensko ozemlje razkosano med matično državo in njene sosede.

Nestabilna leta prve jugoslovanske države, ko se je politična usmeritev pogosto spreminjala, z njo pa tudi vladna ekipa, se je odražala tudi na Šveglovi politični poti. Najprej zavetje Koroščeve Slovenske ljudske stranke, nato izvolitev v parlament na listi Radičeve Hrvaške kmečke stranke pa imenovanje za ministra v drugem letu diktature kažejo na zelo nenavadno politično pot. V stare tokove se je vrnila, ko je bil leta 1931 imenovan za veleposlanika v Argentini, a je že naslednje leto dočakal tudi upokojitev.

Po upokojitvi je večino časa preživel na posestvu Grimšče, od koder je opazoval jugoslovansko in svetovno politično dogajanje, zelo pa ga je skrbel vzpon nacistične Nemčije. Podpis münchenskega sporazuma, ko sta pred njo pokleknila zahodni velelisi, zmagovalki prejšnje vojne, je bil zanj napoved konca versajske Evrope. Začetek vojne pa je prinesel še začetek konca posestva Grimšče, saj so nemški okupatorji Šveglo odvzeli veliko premoženja, ki tudi po vojni ni bilo povrnjeno, saj so komunistični oblastniki z nacionalizacijo Wilsonie dokončali delo predhodnikov. O novi slovenski oblasti zato nikakor ni imel lepega mnenja, a se je z njo manj ukvarjal tudi zaradi vse pogostejših zdravstvenih težav. Kljub vsemu je dočakal visoko starost, saj se je leta 1962 poslovil od sveta v starosti 87 let.

Kot se za politično biografijo spodobi, avtor ni sledil le življenjski poti posameznika, temveč je leta njegovega šolanja, službovanja in političnega delovanja vseskozi vklapljal v širše politično dogajanje držav, ki jim je služil. Tako si sledijo zapisi o avstrijskem šolanju diplomatskega kadra in Šveglovih šolskih letih, oris diplomatske mreže Avstro-Ogrske v Ameriki in Šveglovo službovanje po konzulatih v različnih mestih, pariška mirovna konferenca in Šveglova vloga pri iskanju stikov jugoslovanske delegacije z ameriškim predsednikom, politični razvoj jugoslovanske kraljevine in Šveglove

politične preokupacije v tem času. Čeprav bi kdo ob površnem branju pomislil, da je glavni junak monografije le še en diplomat ali politik v kolesju diplomatsko-političnega sveta držav, v katerih so živeli Slovenci v 19. in 20. stoletju, stvar le ni tako preprosta.

Ivan Švegl se nam skozi Rahtenovo knjigo prikazuje kot večplastna, morda bi kdo pripomnil celo kot razdvojena osebnost. Ne le zaradi uporabe dveh zapisov svojega imena, življenja v dveh državah in služenja obema. Končno je bil do obeh v času njegovega obstoja enako skrajno lojalen, dosleden v doseganju svojih ciljev, spoštljiv do tistih, ki so se mu zdeli vredni spoštovanja, malce manj spoštljiv ali celo odbijajoč do tistih, ki jih je ocenjeval z zelo nizkimi ocenami. Avtor je poskušal pokukati tudi na tisto, bolj osebno plat življenja, ki jo v opisih diplomatov in politikov pogosto pogrešamo, na intimni odnos do bližnjih, žene ali drugih žensk. Ob tem je ugotovil, da – tako kot v številnih drugih biografijah ali avtobiografijah – tudi Švegl o tem ni zapisal dosti. Pa vendarle je skozi pisma podrejenih uslužbenk, posrednih podatkov, omemb žena in nekaj drobcev poskušal razvozlati tudi skrivnostni svet, ki ni le svet velikih idej, velike politike in drugih velikih tem, temveč svet majhnih ljubeznivosti, norosti, nespodobnosti in trenutkov, ki se jim v avtobiografskih zapisih pisci skorajda obvezno izognejo.

Skozi preplet diplomatske službe in odnosov na konzulatih, kjer je delal, se nam diplomacija tako ne kaže le kot pomembna mednarodna, meddržavna ali državna tema, temveč tudi kot konfliktno okolje različno sposobnih ljudi različnih značajev, kot povsem običajen službeni prostor z ustvarjanjem na eni strani prijaznih, na drugi pa napetih, če že ne sovražnih medsebojnih odnosov, ki z živžavom občasno spominja na tisto, kar v žargonu imenujemo »otroški vrtec«. Svet jugoslovanske politike pa se nam izriše kot podoba nenačelnosti, politikantstva, iskanja zvez in drugih nečednih potez, ki jih Slovenci žargonsko pogosto omenjajo kot »balkanska posla«; seveda povsem neupravičeno, saj enake zgodbe, dogodke in osebe srečujemo na vseh straneh političnega horizonta.

Avtor zgodbe ne postavlja le v omejen osebni okvir niti zgolj v okvir diplomatov in politikov, ki so izhajali z ozemlja današnje Slovenije. Vseskozi govori zgodbo diplomacije Avstro-Ogrske, politike Kraljevine SHS ali Jugoslavije, vse to pa umešča v širši kontekst. Razvita diplomatska mreža z veliko konzulati bi se nam lahko zazdela nerazumljivo potratna, če ne bi ob tem prebirali podatkov o izseljevanju državljanov iz države in njihovi razpršenosti v državah močnega priseljevanja. Prav tako bi nam dolgi opisi sprejemov jugoslovanskih/ slovenskih diplomatov pri predsedniku ZDA Woodrowu Wilsonu na mirovni konferenci v Parizu, ki jih deloma že poznamo iz druge literature, bili manj razumljivi, če ne bi bili opremljeni z razlago, da niti bistveno večjim in pomembnejšim delegacijam na mirovni konferenci ni uspelo izposlovati dveh obiskov pri njem v istem času.


Šveglava pot med Kakanijo in Wilsonio nam ob biografski podobi doslej manj znanega in na tako celovit način še neopisanega slovenskega diplomata in politika orisuje še nekaj splošnih značilnosti diplomacije in politike tedanjega in na žalost tudi še sedanjega časa. Ob prebiranju se sicer lahko nasmehnemo primerom, ko je bila na diplomatsko političnem polju za izbiro primerne kandidata sposobnost

posameznika pogosto nemočna v boju s strankarsko pripadnostjo in močjo zvez; a kaj, ko je nasmešek bolj kisel, ko pomislimo, da to ni le stvar preteklosti. Prav tako kot ni stvar preteklosti misel, da je vredno nagraditi sposobneže za njihove uspehe in ne nagraditi ali celo kaznovati nesposobneže za nedoseganje zastavljenih ciljev. Pa tudi z iskanjem zaslombe pri (političnih) stricah in oblastnikih se še vedno srečujemo na vsakem koraku. Andrej Rahten nam tako ob opisu življenjske poti enega politika v njegovem konkretnem življenjskem okolju orisuje še teme, ki so pravzaprav stalnica politične in diplomatske zgodovine.

Avtor ostaja v analizi na strogo profesionalni ravni. Iz Švegla ni poskušal narediti velikega heroja niti le žrtve spreminjajočih se razmer na političnem zemljevidu dela sveta, ki ga naseljujemo Slovenci. Rahtenov opis je zelo barvit, s spretnim vključevanjem različnih arhivskih virov, spominov in literature. Vztrajno nas opozarja na podrobnosti in razlike med avtobiografskimi zapisi junaka zgodbe v jeseni življenja, njegovih desetletja starejših zapisov v izvirnih dokumentih, pričevanjih njegovih sodelavcev in sodobnikov. Prav to prepletanje narativov daje celi podobi protagonista živopisen, osebni, človeški značaj. Ne gre torej za biografijo o velikem (»nečloveškem«) junaku brez napak, okoli katerega so se odvijali veliki dogodki. Gre za zgodbo o (še enem) diplomatu in politiku, z vsemi njegovimi posebnostmi, povedano skozi zapis zgodovinarja, ki se ne zadovoljuje s prehitrimi sodbami in sklepi. Hkrati nas avtor z navajanjem citatov iz Šveglovega avtobiografskega zapisa iz leta 1953, hranjenega v arhivu Slovenskega biografskega leksikona, prvič celoviteje seznanja s tem dragocenim pričevanjem, ki bi bilo že samo po sebi vredno objave.

Ocena ne bi bila popolna, če ne bi omenili še avtorjevega živahnega načina pisanja, ki bralca ne pusti ravnodušnega in ga pritegne k branju, vse dokler ne pride do konca zgodbe. Poglavja si sledijo logično, zapisi so posejani s povednimi in sočnimi citati, pritegnejo pa tudi hudomušne primerjave in namigi, ki še poglobijo bralčevo radovednost, kaj sledi.

Aleš Gabrič



Bogo Zupančič, *Plečnikovi študenti in drugi jugoslovanski arhitekti v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju*

Ljubljana: Muzej za arhitekturo in oblikovanje (MAO): KUD Polis, 2017, 232 strani

Arhitekturni zgodovinar dr. Bogo Zupančič (1960), muzejski svetnik v Muzeju za arhitekturo in oblikovanje v Ljubljani, je pionir in nosilec raziskovanja zbirk MAO s področja arhitekture 20. stoletja. Na osnovi arhivskega gradiva je pripravil številne razstave in napisal več monografij, ki odstirajo pomemben del slovenske arhitekturne zgodovine. Za svoje plodno publicistično delo je prejel dve Plečnikovi medalji (2006, 2018). Zadnjih deset let se poglobljeno ukvarja s tematiko Plečnikovih in drugih študentov arhitekture na izpopolnjevanju v Parizu. Rezultat njegovega dela sta mdr. razstava in znanstvena monografija *Plečnikovi študenti in drugi jugoslovanski arhitekti v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju* (2017).

Jože Plečnik (1872-1957) in Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (1887-1965), znan pod psevdonimom Le Corbusier, sta imela več stičnih točk. Pripadnika iste generacije sta v lokalnem in tudi univerzalnem prostoru nastopala kot nenadomestljiva akterja in sta kot taka (so)zaznamovala arhitekturno dogajanje 20. stoletja. Kljub temu se njune poti niso nikoli neposredno križale. Plečnik, ki se je vse bolj navduševal nad klasičnimi prvinami in načeli arhitekture, je Le Corbusieru, »guruju modernizma«, ki se je zavzemal za prelom s starim, očital, da s svojimi funkcionalističnimi zamislimi negira arhitekturo, in dejal: »Ko gledam moderne tokove, dobim občutek, da smo se v Evropi izgubili.«¹ Posreden stik med dvema velikanoma pa so predstavljali njuni študenti. Sposobnejši Plečnikovi učenci so se namreč po zaključku študija, ko so pridobili klasične osnove arhitekture, usmerili na pot modernizma, saj je bil »tako rekoč edina oprijemljiva oblikovna in konceptualna alternativa«.² Več slovenskih mladih arhitektov se je v iskanju novih tendenc tako pridružilo Le Corbusierju, saj Vurnikova šola, ko je bilo govora o moderni, ni pomenila prave konkurence.

Znanstvena monografija *Plečnikovi študenti in drugi jugoslovanski arhitekti v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju*, ki temelji na arhivskem gradivu ter številnih ustnih virih, znanstveni in strokovni literaturi, obsega tri vsebinske sklope. V prvem se avtor z vso minucioznostjo posveti življenju in delu sedmih Plečnikovih študentov arhitekture: Miroslavu Oražmu, Milanu Severju, Hrvoju Brnčiču, Marjanu Tepini, Jovanu Krunicu, Edvardu Ravnikarju in Marku Župančiču, ki so bili v letih od 1929 do 1940

1 Peter Krečič, *Jože Plečnik* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenija, 1992), 138.

2 Ibid., 142.

v Le Corbusierovem pariškem ateljeju na Rue de Sèvres 35. V drugem vsebinskem sklopu s kratkimi, a povednimi življenjepisi predstavi ostale slovenske arhitekta in gradbenike, ki so se med letoma 1925 in 1938 izpopolnjevali v Parizu in so skupaj z Le Corbusierovimi plečnikovci tvorili nerazdružljivo celoto. Ker avtor arhitektov ne želi deliti le po narodni pripadnosti, v tretjem vsebinskem sklopu obravnava tudi hrvaške in srbske arhitekta, ki so se izpopolnjevali na »35 S« in so bili skupaj s slovenskimi v Parizu obravnavani kot *architectes yougoslaves*.

Zupančič Plečnikove študente, ki so ustvarjali v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju, postavi v širši časovni, prostorski in družbeni kontekst. Opozori, da so že pred odhodom v Pariz naredili marsikaj pomembnega, spremlja pa tudi njihovo življenje in delo po vrnitvi v domovino, ko so konec 30. in v začetku 40. let 20. stoletja stopili na pot funkcionalistične arhitekture. Predstavi njihovo udejstvovanje v času druge svetovne vojne, ko so se opredelili za narodnoosvobodilno gibanje in se kasneje posvetili ustvarjanju spominske arhitekture. Pri tem poudarjeno opomni, da se Le Corbusier s spomeniško in nagrobno arhitekturo ni dosti ukvarjal, kar pomeni, da so njegovi praktikanti našli pot samostojnega oblikovanja, neodvisnega od vzora velikega švicarsko-francoskega arhitekta. Seveda to nikakor ne pomeni, da Le Corbusierova šola ni imela vpliva na graditev socialistične Jugoslavije. Prav njegovi učenci so po koncu druge svetovne vojne v družbeni klimi, ki je bila naklonjena novostim in spremembam, pripomogli k uveljavitvi modernizma. Ta je postal »[g]lavna smer modernističnih arhitektov, pod vodstvom Edvarda Ravnikarja«, ki si je »izborila posebno mesto, se uveljavila, vendar ne s slepim posnemanjem vzorov«. (str. 124)

Plečnikovi »corbusierovci« (Ravnikar, Sever, Tepina, Krunic, Župančič), otovorjeni z znanjem obeh mojstrov, so kot nosilci novih arhitekturnih smernic, usmerjenih v funkcionalizem, nekateri tudi po svojih študentih, hitro in korenito širili ideje »novega časa«. V nasprotju s slovenskim arhitekturnim dogajanjem je bilo dogajanje v Zagrebu in Beogradu usmerjeno v masovno gradnjo novih mestnih četrti in velikih blokovskih kompleksov ter tako v bolj neposredno prenašanje corbusierovskih vzorov na jugoslovanska tla.

Kljub začetnemu navdušenju je v drugi polovici 50. let 20. stoletja že zaznati odvrite vodilnih slovenskih arhitektov od Le Corbusierovih in drugih modernističnih idej. To velja predvsem za Edvarda Ravnikarja in njegov krog. Porajale in utrdile so se ideje, povezane s kritičnim regionalizmom, začelo se je navdušenje nad skandinavsko arhitekturo, strukturalizmom itd.

Znanstveno delo Boga Zupančiča nam torej oriše pot od ideje do prevlade modernističnih konceptov urbanističnega načrtovanja ter arhitekturnega oblikovanja v slovenskem in jugoslovanskem prostoru po končani drugi svetovni vojni. Razmere in napetosti v arhitekturi v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji v obdobju, ko je bilo arhitekturno gibanje razpeto med tradicionalizmom in modernizmom, med lokalnim in univerzalnim, osvetli na osnovi dela, prepričan, razmerij ter omrežij dveh velikih arhitektov, Plečnika in Le Corbusiera, pri čemer se osredini na Plečnikove študente, ki so se izpopolnjevali v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju in njegove zamisli vpletli v proces modernizacije družbe.

Med vsemi jugoslovanskimi arhitekti, ki so se pred drugo svetovno vojno izpopolnjevali pri Le Corbusieru, je največ slovenskih, kar deset od sedemnajstih, od teh desetih pa le trije niso bili Plečnikovi učenci. Trdimo torej lahko, da je za švicarskimi, francoskimi in severnoameriškimi arhitekti v ateljeju »35 S« delalo največ slovenskih, kar je »v svetovnem merilu svojevrsten fenomen, ki je lahko osnova za upravičeno samozavest«. (str. 208)

Med deli Plečnikovih študentov, ki so bili pri Le Corbusieru, tako po obsegu in količini del kot po izjemnosti izstopa arhitekturni, urbanistični in publicistični opus arhitekta prof. Edvarda Ravnikarja. Slovensko arhitekturno dogajanje je (bilo) prav zaradi Ravnikarja in njegovega kroga ter tudi drugih kakovostnih arhitektov v 2. polovici 20. stoletja prepoznano kot eno najmočnejših žarišč sodobne arhitekture v Jugoslaviji.

Znanstvena monografija *Plečnikovi študenti in drugi jugoslovanski arhitekti v Le Corbusierovem ateljeju* z vsebino, členjeno v 27 poglavij, podano na 232 straneh, opremljeno s 170 načrti, številnimi fotografijami, skicami in z drugim slikovnim gradivom, s skoraj 400 opombami, povzetkom v angleškem jeziku, seznamom literature in virov ter z imenskim kazalom ne skriva, kako veliko dela in znanja je bilo vložena vanjo. Delo dr. Boga Zupančiča, ki odgovori na mnoga in večplastna vprašanja, nedvomno predstavlja pomemben, domišljen in zrel prispevek k zgodovini slovenske, jugoslovanske ter evropske moderne arhitekture.

Mojca Šorn

THE INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY LIBRARY



The Institute of Contemporary History Library is a specialised library, collecting and storing the resources for scientific researchers and fans of contemporary history. Initially its materials mostly encompassed books and magazines on the history of World War II and history of the workers' movement. However, as the Institute's areas of interest expanded, its library has also procured materials about the political, economic, social and cultural history of Slovenians.

The library's basic collection consists of around 40.000 books about the contemporary history of Slovenia and the world. Initially the majority of books focused on the history of World War II and the workers' movement, while later the library started procuring literature about social and cultural history. We can state that with its collection of materials our library represents the most important historiographic collection about the history of the 20th century in Slovenia.




The library keeps around 200 titles of magazines, including all of the most important newspapers since Bleiweis's Kmetijske and rokodelske novice newspaper to cultural and professional magazines and all kinds of bound daily newspapers.

Opening hours: Monday – Friday: 8 a.m. to 1 p.m., Wednesday: 8 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Contact: + 386 1 200 31 28 or +386 1 200 31 32

Web page: <http://www.inz.si/knjiznica.php>



**KOROŠKI BOJ ZA
SAMOSTOJNO IN NEODVISNO
SLOVENIJO**
1989–1991

Damijan Guštin
Vladimir Prebilič
Uroš Svete

Cena
.....
39 EUR

VPOGLEDI
20

**LAKOTE IN
POMANJKANJE:
SLOVENSKI PRIMER**



Cena
.....
20 EUR

UDC

94(497.4)" 18/19"

UDK

ISSN 0353-0329

Albert Bing

Titoism, Dissidents and Culture of Dissent

Zdenko Čepič

The Student Movement 1968/1971 in Ljubljana in Wider Context

Željko Oset

Maks Samec and His Adapting to Academic Standards After World War II

Mateja Režek

Milovan Djilas and the British Labour Party, 1950–1960

Aleš Gabrič

Jože Pučnik on a Path to Becoming a Dissident

Josip Mihaljevič

Večeslav Holjevac – Forgotten Dissident

Lidija Bencetič

Journal Istarski Borac/IBOR in the Context of the Culture of Dissent

Jure Ramšak

The Contours of Social Criticism in Late-Socialist Slovenia

Nevenka Troha

Report Prepared by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Slovenia Boris Kraigher at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia on 9 March 1950
(published manuscript with comments)

