

Abstract: *The paper addresses the issue of the national identity, which due to global forces, transnational interdependencies and increasing individualisation takes on different meaning. The study reveals that national identity remains important in people's lives but it co-exists along with supranational identities. National identity is subjected to contemporary global processes, which influence thin cultural sediment in individuals' lives, lacking a strong sentimental meaning. The latter does not mean those sediments are irrelevant. The more intense is the transformation of national identity and more as its importance in comparison with the traditional semantic fields decreases, the greater is the impact of thin cultural influences. By using fuzzy-set analysis, we consider which factors operate in favour to thin part of continuum and co-influence the transformation of national identity. We intend to demonstrate the impact of developmental trajectories of societies and deep values, traditional patterns of perception of other nationalities as well as economic and political factors on the conceptual continuum of cultural influences, which enable and condition also the formation of identification with the European space.*

Keywords: *Fuzzy set, national identity, global transformations*

Introduction

Nowadays, national identities have become to be seen in a light of a defensive response to a growing awareness of an increasing global connectivity (Beck 1999). The connections at the global or transnational level affect established and rooted perceptions of place, which are expressed in "dis-embedding" of local ways of doing things. The national environment, where national identity emerges, has become intertwined

with global influences. The nation-state is successfully facing the challenges of global and transnational processes. An important component of the power of nationalism and the nation-state is its concurrent supranational, transnational political and cultural form. There are different models of national identities, but as Smith says (Smith 1991: 13), “modern nationalism and identities reflect a profound dualism...sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasised”. Different models of contemporary national identities have been not just theoretically considered but also empirically tested. Focusing on ISSP (1995), which subjected issues of national identity to empirical scrutiny by fielding a module of seven questions dealing with the understanding of national identity, Smith and Jones (2001) identified two distinct dimensions of national identity. The first is the ascribed/objectivist dimension based on the high significance attributed to the ‘country of birth, extended residence and religious faith’ but also to citizenship. The second is the civic/voluntarist dimension, linking ‘the respect for laws and institutions to national sentiment (feelings) and to fluency in the national language, viewed in this context more as a facilitator of civic virtue rather than as an ethnic marker’ (ibid. 105-106).

Smith and Jones have hypothesized that forces such as post-industrialism and globalization tend to favour the more open voluntaristic form of national identity over the more restrictive ascribed form. By using multi-level models in order to evaluate hypotheses they argue that independently of individual differences in socio-demographic characteristics, the higher a country’s degree of post-industrialism, the higher is the relative commitment of its population to the more open and inclusive civic/voluntarist dimension (more in 2001: 212-213). As the modern identities are never constructed solely out of either ethnic or the civic models, macro-level process like globalisation and internal differentiation affect not only the differences in relative commitment to each of the two dimension, but also the overall strength of national sentiment more broadly conceived and combining both dimensions. Their evidence

provides some support for the hypothesis that people from countries with high degrees of globalisation place less importance not only on the objectivist dimension when compared to the subjectivist one but also on either form of national identity, as do residents of countries with high degrees of internal differentiation.

In our paper, we would like to represent, which factors influence the meaning of traditional semantic fields referring to thick cultural influences, which refer to essential, fundamental, exogenous and holistic view of culture,. The culture as a fundamental part of the society has changed its meaning due to global transformation reflecting in political, cultural and economic exchanges. It has become essential that culture is constantly recreated through the behaviour of people and it is not a given, immutable, and natural fact. Due to global transformations influencing all pores of social life, the cultural context has become a venue of intertwining of “thin” and “thick” cultural influences (Mishler and Pollack 2003). Thin cultural influences refer to individualist, endogenous, ambivalent views on culture. In order to understand the contemporary identifications (including the national ones), one needs to pay attention to a dialectic relationship between both cultural poles. In the front of the interests is therefore a relation between everyday practices and rooted values. We presume that transformation of the latter leads to a more thin side of the cultural continuum. Further, we are interested in factors influencing the thin dimension of national identity and thus decreasing its meaning. We hypothesise that according to differences between both cultural poles, the factors should follow those divisions.

Measuring the two dimensions of national identity

We believe that the operationalization of the national identity and its intensity is in fact somewhat more complicated than implied by Smith and Jones (2001). It may be argued that what they actually measured was mostly the significance attributed to various elements applied when *considering others as members or non-members of a particular imagined (national) community*. On the other hand, these indicators do not tell one much about the intensity of the individuals' own feelings of national identity and the relevance of national identity for them. For instance, claiming that birth and residence are important for the national identity does not necessarily imply that national identity *as such* is important. We are dealing with the concepts that are theoretically and empirically closely (cor)related but not identical.

An alternative indicator intended to measure national identity may be found in the more recent 2003 ISSP National Identity survey in the survey question on 'how close a respondent feels to her/his country' with the four-level Likert scale. The principal component analysis of this variable combined with several other questions from the same ISSP dataset that may also imply the intensity of national identity demonstrated that the feeling of closeness to one's country forms the same component with the belief that the country's 'television should give preference to country's films and programmes' (cf. ISSP Research Group 2003) explaining 58 per cent of the variance of these two variables.

We have assumed that the combination of these two variables may be considered as an indicator of national identity but one should also take into account the theoretical assumptions of Smith (1991) and the empirical findings of Smith and Jones (2001) about the two dimensions of national identity. The principal component created from the two variables could be understood as being closer to the Smith's ethnic and Smith and Jones ascribed/objectivist understanding of national identity.

Using the principal component analysis on the ISSP 2003 dataset, we have confirmed the existence of the same two dimensions of *understanding* national identity as identified by Smith and Jones (2001) on the previous ISSP 1995 dataset. The ascribed/objectivist dimension consisted of being born in the country, living there for most of one's life, belonging to the dominant religion, and having the ancestors of this nationality (the last variable was only included in the 1995 dataset and was thus not used by Smith and Jones but it also clearly belongs to ethnic-objectivist-ascribed dimension). The voluntarist/subjectivist dimension, on the other hand, included the respect for the country's political institutions and laws, the feeling of country's nationality and being able to speak the language. Citizenship has a more ambivalent meaning with only slightly higher loading on the subjectivist dimension than on the objectivist one. This is hardly surprising because of its combined nature: being 'a civic' element on the one hand but also strongly conditioned by birth and long-term residence in a given country, on the other hand.

Including the – one may call it national-cultural identity component – scores to the principal component model of understanding national identity has clearly confirmed the ascribed-objectivist nature of this type of national identity indicator. Individuals with higher scores on the national-cultural component – are also more likely to attribute greater intensity to the ascribed/objectivist items (see Table 1).

Table 1: Rotated Component Matrix(a) of national identity variables

	Component	
	1	2
How proud are you being country national	,462	,269
Important: to have been born in[Country]	,748	,241
Important: To have[Country Nationality] citizenship	,468	,560
Important: To have lived in[Country] for most of one's life	,629	,412
Important: To be able to speak [Country language]	,137	,696
Important: To be a [religion]	,660	,096
Important: To respect[Country Nationality] political institutions and laws	-,065	,752
Important: To feel[Country Nationality]	,331	,632
Important: To have[Country Nationality] ancestry	,784	,162
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1= kombinacija closecountry+ television	,635	-,045

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Source: ISSP Research Group 2003; own calculations

In addition, we have also considered the aspect of national pride as a potential indicator of national identity. In the most generalised sense, it can be found in the ISSP 2003 question on how proud a person is on being a country's national. National pride does not belong to the same component as the closeness to the country and belief that the television should give priority to the country's films and TV programme. Consequently, it cannot be combined in the same index of national identity but considered as something clearly different. Nevertheless, when combined with the items on understanding national identity, high levels of national pride also turn out to be closer to the ascribed/objectivist understanding of national identity – though not as clearly as our national-cultural identity component.

The close positive relationship of both national-cultural identity, as we have defined it, and the national pride with the ascribed/objectivist understanding of national identity can be confirmed not only at the individual but also on the macro level: namely, countries with stronger national-cultural identity and higher national pride according to the ISSP 2003 survey tend to be significantly more characterised by ascribed/objectivist understanding of national identity. Consequently, one may consider a national-cultural identity index based on the combination of 'country-closeness' and 'TV-programmes' variables as a suitable measure of ascribed/objectivist national identity that is able to demonstrate not only the understanding of national identity but also its intensity for any individual respondent or country as a whole. In addition we may also use the 'national pride' measure, which is also – though less clearly – primarily linked to the ascribed/objectivist understanding of nationality. For the purposes of our further research, we have used the question on national pride from the more recent EVS 2008 dataset.

However, the ISSP 2003 dataset includes no question that would measure the intensity of national identity and be at the same time positively correlated to the subjectivist/voluntaristic understanding of national identity. Perhaps, this might even imply that people that understand national identity in the more subjectivist way (and more in terms of thin culture) are also less likely to identify firmly with their nation. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case. Although, we found no such question in the ISSP survey, the question whether a person belongs to her/his 'country as a whole' in the European Values Study (EVS) from 2008 provides an interesting insight. It can be noted that the European countries, where greater proportions of populations identify with their 'country as a whole' are also characterised by comparatively higher belief that national identity is based on the national feelings and respect for the national institutions (Spearman rho equals 0.25 and 0.26 respectively). Unfortunately, the correlation cannot be tested at the individual level because the EVS question on belonging to the country as a whole is not a part of the same dataset/survey as the ISSP set of questions. Despite a weak correlation that cannot be statically confirmed due to the small number of units (i.e. European countries), this may be relevant especially due to the fact that the identification with the country as a whole also seems to be *negatively* correlated or not correlated to the ascribed/objectivist understanding of national identity. Although this is clearly an issue that requires further research, we decided to use the question on belonging to the country as a whole from the EVS dataset as a provisional and approximate indicator of a more subjectivist/voluntaristic type of national identity (until one can identify a better indicator or simply demonstrate that no such indicator can be found because of presumably weaker feelings of national identity by the people who generally understand it in a more subjectivist sense).

Anyway, one should be aware that we are dealing with more than one dimensions of national identity and one can hardly assume that all of them are shifting in the same way under the impact of a variety of factors related to different aspects of globalisation and (post)modernisation. On this point,

we would like to consider which factors operate in favour to thin part of continuum and co-influence the transformation of national identity.

The fuzzy set model

By using fuzzy-set methods as designed by Charles C. Ragin (2000), we intend to explore which factors have an impact on the role and the meaning of the national identity in the contemporary world and thus to place the national identity on the conceptual continuum of cultural influences. The method of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) operates with membership of cases in conceptual sets constructed from the independent – causal – conditions and dependent – outcome variables. Each case included in the analysis must be able to provide the data on selected indicators, where one of the indicators must be labelled as the outcome. Other indicators are treated and analysed as potentially necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the presence or absence of the outcome (Ragin, 2000).

Why using the fuzzy-set approach instead of the classical statistical models? Firstly, here we are primarily interested in the comparative research, i.e. the differences between the countries' prevailing patterns at the macro level, and not in the analysis at the individual level (though we admit this would also provide very relevant additional insights). This implies a small number of units hardly optimal for the classical quantitative approaches.


And secondly, we assume that the fuzzy-set approach may provide some insights that simply cannot be provided by classical statistical methods. Modern social systems, particularly at the macro and global level, are characterised by extremely complex causal relationships between different factors. Some factors may be sufficient but not necessary for a certain result: the same result can also be caused by different factors. On the other

hand, some factors may be necessary but not sufficient for a certain result: despite the presence of such a factor the result may be absent. Both situations may be relevant and worthy of further analysis but the classical regression based approaches, for instance, would very likely dismiss such factors as statistically insignificant.

As the key factors of influence (i.e. independent conditions) that may contribute to the decline of the thicker, objective, ascribed forms of national identity in the European countries we expose: development, transnational practices, cosmopolitanism, postmaterial values, and identifications with the European space. An additional, alternative hypothesis may be that these factors do not only contribute to the shift from the thick (objectivist, ascribed, ethnic, cultural) national identity to the thin (subjectivist, civic, voluntaristic) one but also to the decrease of all forms of national identity. According to the previous research by Smith and Jones (2001), both may be the case.

As the springboard for further theorizing and consideration we take most of the EU countries. Let us therefore take a closer look on the selected factors, which we believe can shed a light on our research question.

Figure 2: The model



Transnational participation

Participation at transnational scale is seen as an important factor of transformation of contemporary identities. It can change the meaning of territory and erode the importance of its borders, which gradually may become less visible in individuals' imagination of self and other. Transnational practices and connections can also encourage solidarity among individuals and forge feelings of belonging linked to transnational social sphere. Herein, more fluid and multi-layered identifications can emerge existing aside national identity. Its meaning can thus perhaps become less intensive and more flexible. People willing and able to engage in cross-border interaction and mobility are exposed to new social and cultural influences, which are seen as a new source of opportunities. They are also more likely to subscribe to cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners and global governance (Mau 2008, Kuhn 2011: 818). This

argument is further supported by intergroup contact theory, which argues that increased contact between social groups fosters mutual understanding and lowers intergroup boundaries (Kuhn 2011). Attitudes that ensue from such connections are marked also by the recognition of increased interconnectedness of political communities and the readiness to legitimise international assignment of accountability (Kuhn 2011).

In terms of measurement, transnational participation is referred from particular attitudes towards transnational connectivity, from transnational social networking and actual transnational participation. The parameter consists from four dimensions: the proportion of people that think they have benefit from less expensive communication costs when using a mobile phone in another EU country, the proportion of people that think they have benefit from less border controls when travelling across Europe, a proportion of people that have a family member or a relative living in another European country, a proportion of people that have a friend living in another European country.

Table 2: transnational participation

States	mobilephones	lessbordercontr	relatives	Friends
HU Hungary	13,0	18,0	17,0	20,0
LV Latvia	32,0	53,0	32,0	24,0
PL Poland	57,0	64,0	31,0	23,0
SK Slovakia	64,0	76,0	29,0	25,0
PT Portugal	22,0	41,0	35,0	18,0
ES Spain	14,0	35,0	18,0	23,0
CZ Czech Republic	42,0	54,0	21,0	23,0

SI Slovenia	40,0	60,0	28,0	29,0
DK Denmark	27,0	52,0	31,0	43,0
NL The Netherlands	28,0	64,0	22,0	37,0
SE Sweden	27,0	45,0	29,0	59,0
BG Bulgaria	8,0	17,0	18,0	15,0
AT Austria	28,0	55,0	25,0	34,0
FI Finland	34,0	51,0	28,0	31,0
DE Germany	26,0	62,0	22,0	27,0
FR France	14,0	43,0	19,0	29,0
IE Ireland	41,0	45,0	41,0	31,0
UK The United Kingdom	30,0	32,0	23,0	33,0

Development

We hypothesise that a higher level of development in society enables more intensive participation of individuals at transnational and supranational level and thus influence their attachment to a national environment and consequently national identity. Different dimensions of development referring to economic growth, but also to social prosperity and common well-being reflect the modern transformation of the social order. The first remarkable transition was one from traditional to industrial societies, while the second denotes the transition to post-industrial societies (Bell 1973). The greater role has been assigned to a role of knowledge and education, which goes along also with the changes in value systems.

Recognising the impact of economic modernization and wealth on an individual's value orientation is at the forefront of scholarly interest ever since Karl Marx till the contemporary works of Inglehart and Bell (Gerhards 2009). Having more spare time enables individuals to gain new knowledge, to travel and to socialise with groups and organizations, reaching beyond the local and national environment. The economic standard not only conditions the processes of economic modernization and democracy but also enables the consolidation of post-materialist values. People increasingly take an interest in the world around them and in the environmental issues (Inglehart 2000). Development thus reflects the changes in value system, which may weaken national sentiments and offer the ability to participate in transnational environment. Higher income provides people with more resources to be mobile, while other dimensions of development raise the wish to travel and make contacts abroad.

Another important aspect of development, which we intend to take into account, is education. Several discussions have been devoted to the important role of knowledge as a factor of progress in the broader socio-economic context, which occurred simultaneously with the recognition of social change in the period of post-Fordism, reflexive modernity, risk society, social capital, and transdisciplinarity (Adam et al. 2005). Education plays a key role in integrating into the labour market, in social stratification and mobility, and in achieving life goals and opportunities. Knowledge has been recognised as an essential component of international economic competencies, but at the same time affecting also the wider social, economic and cultural domains such as values, opinions, political interests, and social participation (Müller and Kogan 2009). On the one hand, the higher level of education refers to individuals' motivation to achieve higher goals in different life stages, which is reflected in the life-long education involvement. In the so-called "post-industrial" society, technical, social and political relations have become much more complex, leading to a growing demand for specific or specialized knowledge of individuals. "Knowledge society" or "information society" is largely based on individual motivation and efforts. Education and the skills have become considered as an

innovation potential, while at the same time, individual efforts and investments in education have become to be seen as a valuable achievement (Mau and Verwiebe 2010). One can say that more time one invests in learning and gaining new experiences and information, the more interesting and worthy lives she or he perceives to have. Individuals are able to gain more skills in order to operate in social environment and become more individualised and reflexive in their decision-making. A higher level of education and the achievement of additional qualifications require and enable better expertise in foreign cultures, languages and literature. The latter, together with other forms of education, presents an important part of cultural capital and other resources that an individual possesses (Inglis and Hughson, 2003: 172). We hypothesise that more individualised and reflexive individual is, less important national collective identity may become. Or at least, those identities become more combined with other more fluid identifications, which individual reflexively constructs instrumentally. Another important aspect refers to enrolment in transnational and supranational space, which can weaken traditional identities rooted in national environments. Education is an important aspect of someone's possibility to participate on transnational level. As Mau and Mewes (2012: 180) argues, people with high level of education that may be regarded as the pioneers of social transnationalism, as their networks frequently stretch across national borders and they are significantly more active in terms of transnational mobility. Human capital presents a basis for successful integration and participation in a supranational level. Education has been even regarded as a potential for "transnational competence" (Mau and Mewes 2012). Confluence of the transformed value system, the role of knowledge and the perceptions of traditional semantic fields of nation-state has been explored in a study concerned with values and civil society among the countries of the European Union (Gerhards 2009). More educated people easily exceed rooted territorial and cultural limits of traditional boundaries. Those boundaries refer to cognitive culture maps and also to actual physical borders.

As regards the measurements of the dimension of development we refer to Human Development Index (HDI). As opposed to purely economic measures, the HDI is composite index capturing life expectancy (at birth), education (measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ration) and the standards of living (measured by the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity).

Table 3: Development

States	HDI
HU Hungary	0,805
LV Latvia	0,783
PL Poland	0,795
SK Slovakia	0,818
PT Portugal	0,795
ES Spain	0,863
CZ Czech Republic	0,841
SI Slovenia	0,828
DK Denmark	0,866
NL The Netherlands	0,89
SE Sweden	0,885
BG Bulgaria	0,743
AT Austria	0,851

FI Finland	0,871
DE Germany	0,855
FR France	0,872
IE Ireland	0,895
UK The United Kingdom	0,849

Source: see appendix

Globalisation

We presume that the global integration of national environments insinuates on a certain impact on a national identity, as globalisation has influenced the meaning of nation states. However, the question is what is the actual impact of globalisation on individuals? Countries with a high level of globalisation may have more transnationally engaged population. But the latter is perhaps not as straightforward as one might think. The global integration of national environment is also associated with a sense of security. Increased economic and political insecurity, which can have a negative effect on people participation in global or transnational sphere, is more pronounced in highly globalised countries. As Hofmeister and Breitenstein (2008: 481) find out “the degree to which a society or nation is engaged in transnationalisation processes can be quite different from the degree to which an individual within that society is engaged” (cited in Kuhn 2011: 816). Even in highly globalised countries, a substantial proportion of the population continues to operate on a purely local or national level. Many academic debates have been dedicated to the issue of globalisation as a homogenisation processes or rather as more complex processes contesting local, regional, national or even supranational identities (for a detailed review see Hedetoft 1999). Strategies of identity negotiation have

gained an increased importance in a light of globalisation studies; therefore, we intend to test the impact of global integration of particular national state on national identity.

The parameter of global integration consists of stock of direct foreign investment - at home, stock of direct foreign investment – abroad, divided by the GDP official exchange rate.

Table 4: globalisation

States	Stock of FDI at home	Stock of FDI - abroad	GDP oer
HU Hungary	94,9	30,3	126,9
LV Latvia	13,36	1,037	28,38
PL Poland	194,9	44,89	487,7
SK Slovakia	53,09	4,309	91,92
PT Portugal	128,2	64,25	212,7
ES Spain	663,1	739,2	1352
CZ Czech Republic	129,2	16,47	196,1
SI Slovenia	17,91	9,755	45,62
DK Denmark	120,7	222,2	313,6
NL The Netherlands	608,9	971,9	773,1
SE Sweden	356,5	385,4	526,2
BG Bulgaria	52,29	2	51,02

AT Austria	151,5	204,2	398,6
FI Finland	84,32	148,8	250,1
DE Germany	932,8	1464	3.401
FR France	1110	1702	2.609
IE Ireland	260,5	338,1	210,4
UK The United Kingdom	1262	1793	2441

Source: see appendix

Cosmopolitan attitudes

The issue of cosmopolitanism is tightly intertwined with social reactions to the globalising world. In front is the interconnectedness of societies and people around the globe. Increased number of social processes exceeds national boundaries and one can notice that people more and more shop internationally, marry internationally, educate themselves internationally etc. Accordingly, as Beck (1999) emphasises, people increasingly combine multiple loyalties and identities in their lives. But one should pay attention not only to people who just live transnationally or globally, but are also engaged in a lively debate about political, cultural, economic and social values, and share mutual respect to other social and cultural groups. Being cosmopolitan can be conceived in many different ways. As a scholarly approach it plays an important role in large number of sociological, anthropological, political and cultural studies of, for instance, migration, transnationalism, citizenship, multiculturalism or urbanity (see Pichler 2009). Vertovec and Cohen (2002) for instance recognise six types of cosmopolitanism; a socio-cultural condition, a kind of philosophy or worldview, a political project towards building transnational institutions, a political project for recognizing multiple identities, an attitudinal or

dispositional orientation, and a mode of practice or competence. Herein, it is the cosmopolitan attitudes, the respect to other groups, and the awareness to diversity, to which we pay attention. Cosmopolitan attitudes strongly oppose to traditional national conception, while being cosmopolitan is associated with feelings of closeness to people beyond the nation-state. It has been argued that identities of cosmopolitans are said to be open, reflexive, broader in their perspectives and inclusive of difference according to the central features of cosmopolitanism itself (Vertovec and Cohen 2002; see Pichler 2009: 4-7). Accordingly, we presume that cosmopolitan attitudes are an important factor influencing the intensity of national identity.

The parameter consists of three dimension showing which country is less cosmopolitan: the proportion of people that reject immigrant, Muslims or people of other race as their neighbours.

Table 5: cosmopolitanism

States	rejectimmigrant	rejectmuslims	rejectrace
HU Hungary	15,4	11,2	9,2
LV Latvia	21,0	29,7	14,3
PL Poland	17,5	25,8	12,4
SK Slovakia	16,0	22,2	14,5
PT Portugal	7,8	14,0	10,3
ES Spain	4,4	13,2	4,0
CZ Czech Republic	29,8	30,7	22,1
SI Slovenia	28,6	29,3	28,8
DK Denmark	6,9	12,8	4,6

NL The Netherlands	14,1	17,5	9,9
SE Sweden	7,0	16,2	5,9
BG Bulgaria	17,9	19,2	20,5
AT Austria	23,5	31,3	17,8
FI Finland	15,3	22,8	9,1
DE Germany	12,0	26,4	4,7
FR France	4,2	7,4	3,4
IE Ireland	14,3	23,2	11,7
UK The United Kingdom	14,2	12,4	5,6

Post-material values

Identifications and peoples' attitudes toward collectivities and territories are embedded into a wider value and moral system of particular society. We lean on the presumption that the increased participation in the global system and processes, which is linked to the economic development and transnational participation of individuals, influences the transition from material values to more individual preferences. These values reflect particular economic certainty as well as other types of feelings of security. In a postmodern society, where a new system of values has emerged, one can notice that hierarchical, centrally controlled bureaucratic institutions became less acceptable (Inglehart 2000). In general one could say that postmodern society is characterized by weakened loyalty and trust in institutions. A sense of collective belonging has begun to lose its importance and reduced the meaning of patriotism. The requests of personal freedoms, which coincide with the decreasing importance of traditional practices, have influenced the visibility of traditional boundaries

(local, national, etc.) (Inglehart 2000; Held and McGrew 2002). Modern discourse of the self is based on certain spatial and temporal structures that are associated with the nation-state, industrial and urban way of life and the recognition of the Other (Delanty 2000). On the contrary, postmodernity in a way represents a turn away from the domination of the self over “Others” and reflects the post-colonial, post-holocaust discourse. It calls into question the existence of a universal discourse of identity, and allows the possibility of multi-layered and multiple identities to exist, which may influence the role of national identity in individuals’ perception. Postmodern values give the priority to self-expression as opposed to supporting authorities and stress tolerance and the acceptance of other groups and promote cultural diversity. In that regard, cultural diversity is understood as a stimulating and desirable fact, not seen as a threat to particular social entity (Inglehart 2000). We therefore assume that the transformation of cultural and social values and orientations have an impact on the national identity.

The post-material values are induced from the index of post-material values calculated from prevailing values in particular national society.

Table 6: postmaterial values

States	Postmaterial index
HU Hungary	-25,7
LV Latvia	-23,7
PL Poland	-30,1
SK Slovakia	-22,4

PT Portugal	-34,3
ES Spain	-20,5
CZ Czech Republic	-18,6
SI Slovenia	-7,2
DK Denmark	7
NL The Netherlands	8,1
SE Sweden	11,9
BG Bulgaria	-40
AT Austria	-13,8
FI Finland	-0,3
DE Germany	5,9
FR France	-12,4
IE Ireland	-25,6
UK The United Kingdom	8,5

Source: appendix

Identification with the European space

We argue that the identifications with the EU are transnational ones, while intensity of identifications at the European level depends on the participation in the European (transnational) social fields. Particular symbolic capital, embracing social and cultural capital, substantially

influences the existence of the European (transnational) habitus and accordingly the identifications. We believe that the nation-states enable individuals unequal levels of access to these fields, which could reveal the role of identification with European space and dialectic relationship between thick and thin cultural influences on individuals or social groups. European identifications could thus contribute to the transformation of national identity, reflecting a lower attachment to traditional semantic field of the nation state. The parameter consists of: the proportion of people saying that in the near future see themselves as being more European than 'national' and the proportion of people feeling to be European citizens.

Table 7: European identity

States	moreeurop	citizen
HU Hungary	6	70
LV Latvia	11	44
PL Poland	7	72
SK Slovakia	13	79
PT Portugal	8	65
ES Spain	11	75
CZ Czech Republic	4	55
SI Slovenia	7	64
DK Denmark	5	67
NL The Netherlands	10	63
SE Sweden	6	66

BG Bulgaria	7	48
AT Austria	7	63
FI Finland	7	76
DE Germany	12	72
FR France	12	56
IE Ireland	6	72
UK The United Kingdom	4	41

Source: appendix

The outcome – national identity

The **first** parameter of **national identity** consists of the proportion of people claiming to be proud or very proud of their nation. The **second** parameter consists of proportion of people feeling to be close or very close to their country, and proportion of people agreeing of strongly agreeing that television should give preference to their country's films and programmes. The **third** parameter consists of proportion of people that claim to belong to a country as a whole.

Table 8: national identity

States	pri	clo	tel	bel
HU	85,5	85,3	61,5	68,4
LV	78	57,4	44,8	72,6

PL	95,7	66,5	54,5	51,5
SK	90,7	85,9	49,6	72,3
PT	94,5	92,5	70	67,9
ES	92,2	94,6	48,1	52,6
CZ	84,3	84	56,9	57,9
SI	93,2	82,8	47,1	68,9
DK	90,9	55,9	45	70,3
NL	86,8	49,7	18	72
SE	87,8	68,2	15,7	62,8
BG	80,3	87,5	72,6	81,1
AT	89,4	91,3	42,3	64,4
FI	92,6	55	24	79,7
DE	75,1	73,9	31,5	36,8
FR	90,7	76,5	37,9	66,4
IE	98,8	84,6	50,4	53
UK	90,8	74,6	29,5	62,1

Source: appendix

Calibration

The fuzzy set method approach seems to be very useful for examining the complexity of identification, while it is based on the data that cannot be limited to dichotomous 'crisp' sets. Raw data on the selected variables is calibrated into scores of membership in the qualitatively defined conceptual sets. The fsQCA software translates the membership scores of those cases in both the causal conditions and the outcome into a truth table that offers both an overview of the different configurations producing the outcome and a measurement of the importance of each of those combinations in explaining the end result. This truth table serves as the basis for developing the current qualitative analysis, both in regard to the overall pattern of necessary, sufficient, and irrelevant conditions for the outcome, and the exceptional cases diverging from those overarching trends ((Ragin 2008).

By grasping calibration (Ragin 2008: 91), we determine the membership of fuzzy sets. An additional value of the fuzzy sets is hidden in its qualitative definition of sets and set membership. The latter enables the comparisons between elements which have, until now, being named as 'unmesurable' (more on this in Adam et al. 2005). The fuzzy sets constructed through the selection of variables allow for membership scores of individual cases between 0 and 1. Calibration of variables is the process of translating the raw data available on those variables for each case into fuzzy scores of set membership. According to Ragin (2000, 2008), the whole process of calibration must be approached with carefulness and with constant interaction between the data and the theoretical concepts. Ragin claims, that most of the social sciences use uncalibrated measures "which simply show the positions of cases relative to each other" where on the other hand calibrated fuzzy set offers the further comparisons between cases since being calibrated means the values are adjusted to conform the dependably known standards. When values are calibrated they are also much easier to interpret for a reader. The study employ the direct method of calibration

conducted by the fsQCA software after setting four qualitative anchors chosen on the basis of theoretical knowledge of the cases, to allow for an objective assessment.

The calibration undertook two phases. In the first phase, the fuzzy scale was selected. It consists of four qualitative anchors. The four-value scheme uses four numerical values 0 (with verbal label fully out of the set), 0.33 (with verbal label of more out than in), 0.67 (more in than out) and 1.0 (with verbal label fully in the set). The four-value scheme is especially useful in situations where researchers have a substantial amount of information about cases, but the evidence is not systematic or strictly comparable from case to case (Ragin 2008). The software used the anchors to calculate set membership scores for raw data. The defined parameters consist from standardised values, which allow greater objectivity – on a basis of such values, the anchors are defined.

The following tables illustrate the calibration of each parameter, and final values of fuzzy set membership.

Table 9: the average values of standardised values of each dimension of the parameters

states	co	de	euf	GlF	pm f	tpf	ni1	ni2	ni3
HU	-0,46667	- 0,8	- 0,0 5	0,49330 2	-0,8	-1,35	- 0,5	0,9	0,4
LV	0,8	- 1,3	- 0,3 5	0,25364 7	-0,7	0,2	- 1,7	- 0,6 5	0,7
PL	0,36666	-	0,2	0,24583	-1	0,72	1,1	-	-

	7	1,1		8		5		0,0 5	1,2
SK	0,26666 7	- 0,5	1,6	0,31222 3	-0,6	1,02 5	0,3	0,5	0,7
PT	-0,66667	- 1,1	0,0 5	0,45239 8	-1,3	-0,2	0,9	1,4	0,3
ES	-1,13333	0,6	1,0 5	0,51860 2	-0,5	- 0,92 5	0,6	0,7 5	- 1,1
CZ	1,63333 3	0	-1,1	0,37141 8	-0,3	-0,05	- 0,7	0,7	- 0,6
SI	1,8	- 0,3	- 0,1 5	0,30321 1	0,4	0,45	0,7	0,3 5	0,4
DK	-1,03333	0,6	- 0,3 5	0,54671 6	1,2	0,52 5	0,3	-0,7	0,5
NL	-0,23333	1,2	0,3	1,02237 7	1,3	0,25	- 0,3	- 1,7 5	0,7
SE	-0,8	1,1	- 0,2 5	0,70496	1,5	0,72 5	- 0,2	- 1,1 5	- 0,2
BG	0,53333 3	- 2,3	- 0,8 5	0,53099 8	-1,7	- 1,52 5	- 1,4	1,2 5	1,5

AT	1,16666 7	0,3	-0,2	0,44618 7	-0,1	0,12 5	0,1	0,5	0
FI	-0,03333	0,8	0,4	0,46605 4	0,8	0,22 5	0,6	-1,4	1,4
DE	-0,2	0,4	1,0 5	0,35236 7	1,2	-0,05	- 2,2	0,4 5	- 2,5
FR	-1,43333	0,8	0,3 5	0,53890 4	0	- 0,62 5	0,3	-0,2	0,2
IE	0,1	1,3	0	1,42252 9	-0,8	0,75	1,6	0,5	- 1,1
UK	-0,66667	0,2	- 1,7 5	0,62576 8	1,3	- 0,27 5	0,3	-0,5	- 0,2

The anchors

CO: -1.5,-0.5,0.8, 1.8; EU: 1.6,0.5,-1,-1.8 ; GL: 1.5,0.5,0.3,0.1

PM: 1.5,0.5,-0.5,-1.7; DE: 1.3,0.4,-0.8,-2.3; TP: 1.1,0.5,-1,1.6; ni1 =1.6,0.6,-0.7,1.7; ni2 = 1.4,0.4,-0.8,-1.8; ni3 =1.4,0.7,-1,-2.5

Table 10: Final fuzzy values

states	cof	def	euf	Gl	pmf	tpf	ni1	ni2	ni3
HU	0,48	0,03	0,25	0,47	0,0 2	0,02	0,07	0,82	0,37

LV	0,05	0,02	0,15	0,02	0,03	0,35	0	0,07	0,5
PL	0,12	0,03	0,35	0,02	0,01	0,75	0,82	0,25	0,03
SK	0,15	0,05	0,95	0,06	0,04	0,93	0,33	0,57	0,5
PT	0,62	0,09	0,29	0,33	0	0,2	0,71	0,95	0,33
ES	0,87	0,38	0,82	0,51	0,05	0,05	0,5	0,74	0,04
CZ	0,01	0,09	0,04	0,13	0,08	0,25	0,05	0,71	0,09
SI	0	0,13	0,21	0,05	0,43	0,48	0,57	0,47	0,37
DK	0,83	0,91	0,15	0,53	0,89	0,53	0,33	0,06	0,41
NL	0,35	0,92	0,4	0,83	0,92	0,38	0,11	0	0,5
SE	0,71	0,94	0,18	0,65	0,95	0,75	0,14	0,02	0,17
BG	0,08	0	0,06	0,52	0	0,02	0,01	0,93	0,97
AT	0,02	0,35	0,2	0,31	0,14	0,32	0,24	0,57	0,23
FI	0,25	0,94	0,45	0,38	0,71	0,37	0,5	0,01	0,95

DE	0,33	0,35	0,82	0,1	0,8 9	0,25	0	0,11	0
FR	0,94	0,66	0,43	0,53	0,1 8	0,1	0,33	0,18	0,29
IE	0,2	0,9	0,27	0,94	0,0 2	0,78	0,95	0,57	0,04
UK	0,62	0,47	0,01	0,59	0,9 2	0,18	0,33	0,1	0,17

The results of the fuzzy set analysis,

At first, by using SUBSET/SUPERSET ANALYSIS offered by fsQCA programme, we showed that all three chosen dimensions of national identity do not have a relevant influence on each other and are actually not correlated. The latter is evident in a table x1, x2 and x3.

Outcome: ni1

	Consistency	raw coverage	combined
ni2*ni3	0.554896	0.312187	0.167621
ni2	0.500701	0.595993	0.172626
ni3	0.510067	0.507513	0.159297

The consistency of the correlation between national pride and other two parameters is very low. The consistency measures the level of sufficiency of each condition in its relation to the result. If we draw the analogy to

statistical analysis, the consistency expresses the level of statistical significance, which should be over 0,80. The solution coverage is also very low. Combining raw coverage again with the statistical interpretation it reveals the relevancy of the correlation of particular dimension with others.

Outcome: ni2

	consistency	raw coverage	Combined
ni1*ni3	0.615132	0.262272	0.217276
ni1	0.595993	0.500701	0.264761
ni3	0.565436	0.472651	0.217405

The consistency between feelings to be close or very close to one's country, and agreeing of strongly agreeing that television should give preference to their country's films and programmes with other two parameters is also very low. The same is with coverage, which do not exceeds over 0.3.

Outcome: ni3

	consistency	raw coverage	combined
ni1*ni	0.523810	0.313758	0.1372

i2			06
ni1	0.507513	0.510067	0.1596 98
Ni2	0.472651	0.565436	0.1503 91

A correlation between belonging to a country as a whole and other parameters reveals similar results when focusing on a consistency and also on a coverage solution. This demonstrates that the three indicators of national identity can in fact be considered as separate dimensions.

Before we calculate the necessary and sufficient conditions by using truth table, we use the SUBSET/SUPERSET ANALYSIS of each dependent variable and independent variables - factors of influence. By making this research step we intend to rationalise the selection of potential factors of influence and its combination on each parameter of national identity. As a dependent variable we choose the absence of parameter, as we want to reveal, which variables influence the potential absence of particular dimension of national identity. As the most likely candidates, with a consistency over 0,85, turned out to be:

Outcome: ~ni1 (the absence of national pride)

	consistency	raw coverage	Combined
glf	0.865136	0.502082	0.679643
pmf	0.872612	0.456286	0.651419

The relevant factors of influence on national pride might be globalisation and postmaterialist values.

Outcome: ~ni2 (the absence of being close to one's country and agreeing of strongly agreeing that television should give preference to their country's films and programmes

	consistency	raw coverage	combined
Def	0.913223	0.609936	0.769180
Pmf	0.996815	0.575897	0.755075
Tpf	0.850969	0.525299	0.687582
Cmf	0.965889	0.494940	0.699993
def*pmf	1.000000	0.457222	0.672792
def*glf	0.883978	0.441582	0.644273
cmf*def	0.961847	0.440662	0.660497
cmf*pmf	1.000000	0.415823	0.641611
cof*def	0.963883	0.392824	0.623615
cmf*def*pmf	1.000000	0.371665	0.606588
Tcsf	0.953995	0.362466	0.596000

As relevant factors of influence on the second dimension of national identity (feelings to be close or very close to their country, and agreeing of strongly agreeing that television should give preference to their country's films and programmes) one can see a variety of variables and also their combinations. Being most influential factors (especially when combining

consistency with coverage) turned out to be development and postmaterialist values; and also education and transnational practices. What seems to be interesting is the combination of those factors. As an influential factor one can see the combination of development and postmaterial values (def*pmf) and development and education (cmf*def). The sign * in the results stands for - and.

Outcome: ~ni3 (the absence of belonging to the country as a whole)

	consistency	raw coverage	combined
Tpf	0.888227	0.495017	0.685759
Cof	0.891403	0.490864	0.682877
Euf	0.854063	0.427741	0.620457

Based on the consistency criteria (passing the 85% threshold) participation in transnational participation, cosmopolitanism and identification with the European space seem to be sufficient conditions for the lack of belonging to the country as a whole.

The SUPERSET/SUBSET analysis serves as an orientation for a truth table analysis, which reveals sufficient conditions for the outcome, while taking into account all the existing combinations. The Truth table analysis is provided by the fsQCA programme applying Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The results are summarized in the following tables:

~ni1 = f(glf, pmf)

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 2.000000; consistency cutoff: 0.969310

	consistency	raw coverage	unique coverage
pmf	0.872612	0.456286	0.456286

solution coverage: 0.456286 solution consistency: 0.872612

A sufficient condition for the absence of the national pride are postmaterial values. The consistency is high, but the coverage is relatively low, which may imply the presence of other variables, which are not included in the research model but may also contribute to the lack of national pride. As we have showed above, the national pride is more correlated to ascribed/objective model of national identity. Postmaterial values enable the alienation from belongings exclusively linked to traditional territorially bounded entities and cultural homogenous units. However, the national pride also denotes different perspectives on a nationality conditioned with ethnic philosophy. For some nations, for instance Slovenians, the national pride refers to a culture and language, while for Frenchs, for instance, it is linked to a pride of referring to a country.

Further we test whether the lack of postmaterial values are also a necessary condition for the presence of the national pride as a particular dimension of national identity

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: ni1

	Consistency	Coverage
~pmf	0.866444	0.442833

It turns out that it is the absence of postmaterial values is a necessary condition for the presence of that particular dimension of national identity. This implies that this aspect of national identity cannot be strong where significant postmaterialist values are present. On the other hand, the absence of postmaterialism does not necessary imply the presence of national pride. The lack of postmaterialism may be a necessary condition for national pride, while the presence of postmaterialism may be sufficient for the absence of national pride. Once again, it is quite clear that more rooted values are of great importance when considering an objective/ascribed model of national identity.


Model: $\sim ni2 = f(cm, cof, def, euf, glf, tcsf, pmf, tpf)$

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000 consistency cutoff: 0.886227

	consistency	raw coverage	unique coverage
pmf	0.996815	0.575897	0.079117
Def	0.913223	0.609936	0.152714

solution coverage: 0.728611 solution consistency: 0.924154



The absence of feelings to be close or very close to their country, and agreeing of strongly agreeing that television should give preference to their country's films and programmes may be influenced by development or postmaterial values, which, due to high consistency and a relatively high coverage, may be a sufficient condition for the absence of this aspect of national identity. The latter is correlated, as already noted above, with objectivist/ascribed model of national identity and it is no surprise that postmaterial values again have some influence on its absence. Higher levels of development in terms of Human Development Index are also linked to changes in value system, and enable the consolidation of post-material values, which may weaken national sentiments

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: ni2

	Consistency	Coverage
~pmorde	0.908836	0.687169

When calculating necessary conditions, it turns out that the absence of postmaterial values combined with the absence of development are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the presence of this particular dimension of national identity. With its high level of development combined by the high levels of national identity, Ireland seems to be an exception to this rule but this is not entirely true – its case can be explained by a specific combination of low postmaterialism combined with high HDI.

Model: $\sim ni3 = f(tpf, cof, euf)$

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000 consistency cutoff: 0.886543


	consistency	raw coverage	unique coverage
Cof	0.891403	0.490864	0.122093
tpf*~euf	0.942959	0.439369	0.145349
~tpf*euf	0.912779	0.373754	0.036545

solution coverage: 0.730897 solution consistency: 0.905350

The sufficient condition for the absence of belonging to a country as a whole is the presence of cosmopolitanism or transnational practices or identification with the EU. One can find interesting that the dimension of

national identity, which refers to a civic/subjectivist model, is influenced more by practices and attitudes, and not by changes in more rooted values of the society. The model is highly consistent and includes significant coverage demonstrating that cosmopolitanism, transnational practices or identification with the European space are sufficient for the comparative absence of national identity in terms of belonging to the country as a whole.

As we have argued, the civic/subjectivist model is linked to thin cultural influences, which are more endogenous, rational, and individualist. The particular dimension of national identity follows those characteristic and is thus more shaped by individuals' interests and particular attitudes, which are selected according to the situation.



The reversed situation, i.e. searching for the necessary conditions for the presence of belonging to the country as a whole does not generate a sufficiently consistent solution. The cases of Slovakia, Finland, France and Denmark demonstrate that belonging to country as a whole may still be possible in several cases despite comparatively higher levels of transnational practices, cosmopolitanism and transnational practices.

Concluding remarks

Measuring national identity in an empirical way, we have been able to reconfirm – in line with the previous studies – that national identity is clearly a multi-dimensional concept, which can be observed both at the micro (individual) and the macro levels (cross-national comparisons in the global context). It may also be argued that these dimensions broadly correspond to the distinction between the objectivist, ascribed (often more ethnicity and primordially based) aspects of national identity and, on the other hand, its subjectivist, voluntarist aspects. Moreover, it may be added that the first dimension may corresponds to the national identity in terms of thick culture, which is more stable and given, while the second one corresponds to the thin aspects of national identity that are more dynamic and more a matter of individual choices. What we have observed are not only the differences in the two different *understandings* of national identity but the *presence* of the two dimensions of national identity feelings in cross-national comparison.

Based on our results, one cannot simply claim that the thicker aspects of national identity are being gradually replaced by the thinner ones. Nor it can be argued that the national identity as such is losing its relevance in general due to the same global processes. Instead, one may argue that different aspects of national identity are changing because of different social processes.

In order to observe changes in the first dimension of national identity, the thick cultural characteristics need to be transformed. The crucial role is

played by historically rooted values, which are transmitted from one generation to another. Thick culture is holistic and demands changes in a belief system of a society as a whole. Individual practices are of no importance in that sense. The culturally thicker aspects of national identity thus seem to be more closely related to the general value system prevailing within an individual nation state. This is related directly to the value system in terms of the presence of postmaterialist values and – more indirectly – to the societal development as operationalized by the Human Development Index indicator combining the aspects of wealth, health and education. The relative presence of development and postmaterialism have thus turned out to be the sufficient for the relative absence of the national identity dimension based on closeness to one's country combined with a strong desire to protect its culture by the national TV. On the other hand, the lack of development or postmaterialism is necessary for the presence of this aspect of national identity.

Using another aspect of national identity, also closer to its thicker understanding, namely the national pride, generates a less straightforward picture due to lower coverage levels of the model. However, the sufficient impact of the (relative) presence of postmaterialist values on the (relative) absence national pride, seems quite consistent with the observations related to the other objectivist-ascribed aspect of national identity.

The changes in the levels of belonging to the country as a whole, which seem to be closer to the thinner, subjectivist-voluntarist aspects of national identity, on the other hand, are more influenced by some more specific processes and attitudes, including cosmopolitan orientations (in terms of accepting foreigners as neighbours), transnational practices and identifying with the European space. This may imply that concrete individual experiences with the foreigners, engaging in transnational practices or entering the European space contribute to the decreasing belonging to the country as a whole as an aspect of national identity.

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