© Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retriveal system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Title: Democratisation Processes in Poland and Slovenia: Comparative Study Editors: prof. dr. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa (University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland), prof. dr. Miro Haček (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Reviewers: prof. dr. Bogomil Ferfila (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), prof. dr. Jacek Wojnicki (University of Warsaw, Poland) CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 321.7(497.4:438)(0.034.2) 323(497.4:438)(0.034.2) DEMOCRATISATION processes in Poland and Slovenia [Elektronski vir] : comparative study / editors Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Miro Haček. - El. knjiga. - Maribor : Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement, 2016. - (Lex localis) Način dostopa (URL): http://www.lex- localis.press/index.php/LexLocalisPress/catalog/book/50 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 (pdf) 1. Turska-Kawa, Agnieszka 288079104 First published in 2016 by Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Grajska ulica 7, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia www.lex-localis.press, info@lex-localis.press For Publisher: assoc. prof. dr. Boštjan Brezovnik, director Editorial Board: prof. dr. Žan Jan Oplotnik (University of Maribor, Slovenia), prof. dr. Marko Kambič (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), prof. dr. Franc Grad (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), prof. dr. Borce Davitkovski (SS Cyril and Methodius University Skopje, Macedonia), prof. dr. Vesna Kranjc (University of Maribor, Slovenia), prof. dr. Hellmut Wollmann (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany), prof. dr. Gernot Kocher (Karel Franzens University Graz, Austria), prof. dr. Duško Lozina (University of Split, Croatia), prof. dr. Roberto Scarciglia (University of Trieste, Italy) Price: free copy DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. Democratisation Processes in Poland and Slovenia: Comparative Study Editors: dr. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa dr. Miro Haček December 2016 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Democratisation processes in Poland and Slovenia: Comparative Study AGNIESZKA TURSKA-KAWA & MIRO HAČEK1 Abstract Edited volume is researching the behaviour of democratic institutions of state regulation, to ascertain their relationship and openness to citizens and their initiatives, and is examining the possibilities of civil society forming policies. Special emphasis is being put on latest (non)democratic processes in both case study countries, i.e. Poland and Slovenia. In practice both countries rank in all aspects among liberal democracies. On the other side, there are different sorts of meagre democracies: exclusive, non-liberal, delegation and patronising. The book presents selected Slovenian and Polish constitutional regulations, as well as the organisation and actions of political authorities. Authors are seeking answers to different questions, for instance the question of the extent to which both countries have managed to approach the ideal model of democratic regulation since democratisation processes in 1990s. Authors are aplying different methods when dealing with the mentioned subjects among which transitional, modernisation and structural methods are worth mentioning. Keywords: • Poland • Slovenia • democracy • transition • political system CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Ph.D., University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Poland and Central and Eastern European Countries at the, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: agnieszka.turska-kawa@us.edu.pl. Miro Haček, PhD, Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: miro.hacek@fdv.uni- lj.si. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Table of Contents Introduction 1 Agnieszka Turska-Kawa & Miro Haček Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based 3 on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 Rafał Glajcar & Sebastian Kubas The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization 23 Process in Former Yugoslav Republics Miro Haček Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: lustration in Post- 37 communist Europe Peter Rožič & Peter J. Verovšek Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 61 Małgorzata Lorencka, Małgorzata Myśliwiec & Waldemar Wojtasik The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political 77 Institutions in Slovenia Marjan Brezovšek & Miro Haček The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of 89 Parliamentarism Marjan Brezovšek Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 111 Mariusz Kolczyński & Agnieszka Turska-Kawa Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the 131 Accession Simona Kukovič & Miro Haček Media and Journalism Transformation in Poland 143 Marian Gierula & Patrycja Szostok The Development of Local Government in Slovenia 167 Simona Kukovič & Marjan Brezovšek ii DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY Table of Contents Local Media in Poland in the Period of Social and Political 185 Transformation Katarzyna Brzoza, Monika Kornacka-Grzonka & Robert Rajczyk The Distinctions of Local Political Leadership in Slovenia: The Mayoral 203 Political Career Simona Kukovič City Categories and their Position in Polish Local Self-Government 221 System Marta Obrębska & Sylwester Wróbel Social Reforms in Poland in the Transformation Period 239 Marian Mitręga, Natalia Stępień-Lampa, Bożena Zasępa & Paweł Grzywna DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Introduction AGNIESZKA TURSKA-KAWA & MIRO HAČEK1 According to its political systems, in practice Poland and Slovenia rank in all aspects among liberal democratic countries (together with Estonia, Czech Republic, Lithuania etc.). On the other side, there are different sorts of meagre democracies: exclusive, non- liberal, delegation and patronising. According to the Freedom in the World measurement, Slovenia and Poland are both examples of consolidated democracies yet with some measurements it can also be found lower down the scale (for example, both are experiencing problems with corruption). Although such measurements are not completely accurate, most of them rank Slovenia among the most successful countries in transition, and Poland still among only seven examples of consolidated democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, but trends in the last few years are more negative than positive. But we have to bear in mind that, besides a consolidated democracy for political stability we should also consider inclusiveness, the capacity to include citizens in the decision-making process and the efficiency of the political system, that is the ability and capacity of the political system to resolve problems, to make decisions and implement them. The assumption for political efficiency is an established procedure and a rounded legal system; the existence of the rule of law is therefore one of the key elements of a stable democracy. Presented monograph is comprised of fourteen mostly multi-authored chapters, seven from each of two case-study countries. Motivation to write this book lies in the research to examine the actual behaviour of democratic institutions of state regulation, to ascertain their relationship and openness to citizens and their initiatives and check the possibilities of civil society forming policies in both political systems; special emphasis is being put on latest (non)democratic processes in both countries. The book presents – especially to the European publics – some of Slovenian and Polish constitutional regulations, as well as the organisation and actions of political authorities. It is of course hard to consider all aspects involved in such book projects, but at the same time authors obviously wanted to consider as many factors of democracy realisation in CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Ph.D., University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Poland and Central and Eastern European Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: agnieszka.turska- kawa@us.edu.pl. Miro Haček, PhD, Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: miro.hacek@fdv.uni-lj.si. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.1 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 2 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček: Introduction Poland and Slovenia as possible. Authors sought answers to different questions, for instance the question of the extent to which Poland and Slovenia have managed to approach the ideal model of democratic regulation since introduction of democratisation processes in 1990s. Authors are applying different methods when dealing with the mentioned subjects among which transitional, modernisation and structural methods are worth mentioning. As it was stressed, the chapters in this book are the result of research conducted by authors from Poland and Slovenia. Due to the analysis of comparable problems and the use of analogous methodology a comparative conclusions were possible, which are of great value in political sciences. They enable the investigation of similarities between particular elements of democratization processes in Poland and Slovenia; at the same time this leads to the detection of ensuing differences. Such research has an important practical function – it gives the authorities knowledge which helps them to make optimal decisions, it supplies them with analysis based on experiences, which enables them to avoid mistakes in similar circumstances and, for countries which find themselves on earlier stages of democratization, provides help to their authorities to prepare and implement optimal solutions. For this reason this book is meant not only for students and researchers of the problem, but also for all those politicians who are interested in presented solutions, in the process of their implementation and the consequences of that implementation in both Poland and Slovenia. As the editors we hope that the analysis in this volume will contribute to the exploration of other areas of democratic change and, at the same time, will result in closer cooperation between scholars. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006– 2016 RAFAŁ GLAJCAR & SEBASTIAN KUBAS 1 Abstract The article focuses on the analysis of democratization process in Poland between 2006 and 2016. Two authors try to examine the quantitative perspective of the evaluation of the process basing on four indices: freedom rating and democracy score by Freedom House, democracy index by the Economist Intelligence Unit, democracy status by Bertelsmann Foundation. Taking advantage of the indices they formulate a scale of seven common elements that appear in every index. Such a mechanism allows them to answer question on how useful is quantitative method in political science in Polish example of democratization. The authors firmly state that this approach plays a complementary role in comparison with a qualitative method. The results of their research reveal multileveled and sometimes ambiguous character of the qualitative indices used in political science. Keywords: • democratization process • Poland • quantitative analysis CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Rafał Glajcar, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Poland and Central and Eastern European Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: rafal.glajcar@us.edu.pl. Sebastian Kubas, Ph.D., University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Poland and Central and Eastern European Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: sebastian.kubas@uj.edu.pl. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.2 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 4 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 1 Introduction Democratisation is a category of change of the regime and transformation of political system. Pridham (2000: 5–16) identifies three approaches to democratisation in the context of political change. The functional approach combines the perspective of political change with cultural, social and economic changes. From the perspective of transnational theories, democratisation is the derivative of different international events, and from the genetic one, it depends on internal determinants which are of unstable, conflicting, and first of all, dynamic nature. Defining democratisation is difficult among others because of the numerous approaches to the issue and the ambiguous concepts used by researchers. This is pointed out e.g. by Schedler (1998: 92), who writes that scholars studying the issue of democratisation use different expressions to refer to the same phenomena, which leads to unclear and incoherent concepts. Yet, democratisation is definitely a process of political change with the aim of consolidation of procedures and values of the democratic regime in the state and the society. Adam Przeworski (1991: 14) and Geoffrey Pridham (2000: 16-24) emphasise that it is a change from authoritarianism to democracy, but this way they exclude the possibility of democratisation of totalitarian regimes. Laurence Whitehead (2002: 27) stresses the long- term and complex character of democratisation, whose aim is to establish the rule of law. Atilla Ágh (1998: 7-12) points out similar properties, adding that democratisation takes lace in politics, culture, economy and in the society. Larry Diamond (1999: 1-8) defines democratisation using the procedural minimum of free elections. We understand democratisation as a long-term and complex process involving thorough restructuring of the state and society, with the objective of implementing democratic procedures and values. Democratisation is not a uniform process. It has several stages, such as: the erosion of the former regime, transition, and consolidation. The last stage which means introducing and stabilising democratic procedures and values in the state and the society is the problem of our analysis. After 1989, Poland entered the path of political change that can be referred to as democratisation. Its two first stages, erosion of the regime and transition, are things of the past. But the consolidation of democratic solutions is still in progress. The authors of the paper intend to study the scope and depth of the process of implementing democratic procedural solutions in Poland in the years 2006–2016. The analysis of the issue can be qualitative, quantitative, or both. The latter approach seems the most appropriate, with the functional description of democracy being the most significant and quantitative analysis serving a supplementary role. Zbigniew Blok represents a similar attitude, writing that in the process of explaining democracy we should start with the qualitative DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 5 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 analysis of the democratic function, and only then refer to a certain amount of general knowledge about democracy (Blok, 2010: 76). The article is an attempt to analyse the evaluation of the process of democratisation in Poland in the years 2006–2016 based on the following four indices: a) Freedom rating according to Freedom House Table 1: Freedom rating for Poland according to Freedom in the World (Freedom House) in the years 2006–2015 Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Freedom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 rating Civil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 liberties Political 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 rights Source: original study based on: Freedom in the World. Poland. Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world–2016 (15 June 2016). Table 2: Detailed results of the studies of political rights and civil liberties as components of the freedom rating in Poland in the years 2014–2015 (Freedom in the World, Freedom House)* Political rights Civil liberties Political Personal Freedom Associational Years pluralism Functioning Rule autonomy Electoral of and and of Total of and Total process expression organizational participati government law individual and belief rights on rights 2014 12 16 10 38 16 12 13 14 55 2015 12 16 10 38 16 12 14 14 56 Source: original study based on: Freedom in the World. Poland. Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world–2016 (15 June 2016). * In the years 2006–2016, Poland was always considered as an electoral democracy. b) Democracy score according to Freedom House 6 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 Table 3: The results of evaluation of the areas of functioning of a democratic country in Poland based on Nations in Transit reports (Freedom House), included in the democracy score in the years 2006–2016* Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Electoral 1.75 2 2 2 1.75 1.5 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.5 1.5 process Civil society 1.25 1.5 1.25 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Independent 1.75 2.25 2.25 2 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.75 media Judicial framework and 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.75 independence Corruption 3.25 3 3 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.5 3.5 3.5 National democratic 2.75 3.25 3.5 3.25 3.25 2.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.75 governance Local democratic 2 2.25 2.25 2 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.5 1.5 1.5 governance Democracy 2.14 2.26 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 2.14 2.18 2.18 2.21 2.32 score Source: original study based on: Nations in Transit. Poland. Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/poland (15 June 2016). * In the years 2006–2016, Poland was always considered as a consolidated democracy. c) Democracy index according to the Economist Intelligence Unit Table 4: The value of democracy index for Poland according to the Economist Intelligence Unit divided into the five studied areas (2006–2015)* Index 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Electoral process and 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 pluralism Functioning of 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.43 6.43 6.43 5.71 5.71 government Political 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.67 6.67 participation Democratic 5.63 5.63 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 6.25 4.38 political culture Civil liberties 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 Democracy 7.3 7.3 7.05 7.12 7.12 7.12 7.47 7.09 index DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 Source: original study based on the reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit. Bibliography contains full list of the reports. * In the years 2006-2016, Poland was always considered as a flawed democracy. d) Democracy status according to the Bertelsmann Foundation Table 5: The value of democracy status for Poland in the years 2006–2016 according to the Bertelsmann Foundation* Political Stability of Rule Political Democracy Years and social democratic of Stateness participation status integration institutions law 2006 7.8 9.5 9.3 9.8 9.8 9.2 2008 7.5 8.5 8.8 9.5 9.8 8.8 2010 7.8 9 8.8 9.8 9.8 9.0 2012 8 9.5 9.3 9.8 9.5 9.2 2014 8.5 9.5 9.3 9.8 9.8 9.4 2016 8.5 10 9.3 10 9.8 9.5 Source: original study based on: Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Poland. http://www.bti- project.org/en/reports/regional-reports/east-central-and-southeast-europe/ (16 June 2016). * In the years 2006–2016, Poland was always considered as a consolidated democracy. Then, we analyse the usability of indices and exploratory value. The hypothesis adopted in the paper is that due to the aggregative character of democratisation indices, which simplifies the perspective of the political situation, they are of supplementary and auxiliary character with relation to qualitative analysis. The Polish case serves as an example. We pose two study questions, which help us verify our hypothesis. We want to find out to what degree the evaluations of the indices are coincident and how the evaluations of indicators within the analysed indices have changed over the last decade. 2 Indices Measuring The Advancement Of Democratisation Process The indices measuring the advancement of democratisation processes discussed in this article are only the point of reference for formulating conclusions concerning the study questions made in the introduction and the verification of the main hypothesis. Literature on political studies includes many other, more or less accurate concepts, whose aim is to create objective criteria for measuring democracy (see e.g.: Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946–2013; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi & Przeworski, 1996; Vanhanen, 2000, Van den Bosch, 2014). They provide the basis for classifying countries in different groups, taking into consideration the advancement of democratisation processes and/or quality of democracy. They indicate new areas in the study of democracy or at least give new perspectives of research, yet sometimes they generate the phenomenon of 8 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 "privatisation of studies": the pursuit of popularity in the world of science by producing just another tool. It is worth noting that if democratisation is a process ultimately leading to the implementation of democratic procedures and values at the level of state structures and the society, the fundamental question is how to understand democracy, which is to becomèthe only game in town` (Przeworski, 1991: 26). The answer is not so easy, as it is argued by Dahl (1995: 13) and Sartori (1962: 4–5), who emphasise the difference between the normative and descriptive definition of democracy. Besides, all concepts, definitions and their operationalization may evolve with the change of objectives and context of research (Collier & Adcock, 1999: 562). This is proved by individual indices that are to reflect the advancement level of democratisation processes. First, they are based on different inventories of indicators describing the development/regression of democracy. Second, the indicators used as part of each index have different significance. Third, indicators assumed in each index are very general. And fourth, the authors of the indices use their original categories of political regimes, arbitrarily deciding where thènumeric boundaries` between them are. This is perfectly well illustrated with the example of Poland in the years 2006–2016, since some indices classify it as àconsolidated democracyànd others, as àflawed democracy`. In addition, Bogaards (2010) demonstrated how different researchers created their own original typologies of political regimes on the basis of the same data (from Freedom House and Polity indices). This situation leads to the question of the explanatory usefulness of indices measuring the advancement of democratic processes. We have to conclude that the scientific usefulness of indices measuring democratic processes depends on the context of the study. In the case of studies on political regimes, the scope and range of research is especially significant. It is of primary importance whether the research involves case studies or comparative politics. The discussed indices are usually useful in comparative analyses, especially if they are devoted to political regimes within a specific geographical and cultural region (e.g. Central Europe or Latin America). They refer to quantitative methods, which on the one hand ensures diligent operationalization of the variables used, and on the other hand makes it possible to quite precisely establish the scope of similarities and, in particular, the measurement of differences between the analysed regimes. There is one more problem connected with the use of the discussed instruments. As part of comparative studies, they often reveal associations between different areas of human activity (political, economic, cultural and social) and – what is very important – generate new study questions being the expression of identifying certain developmental processes. In case studies, indices measuring the advancement of democratic processes have a completely different role. In such studies, indices provide the possibility to show the achievements of a regime in the process of democratisation (or in selected areas the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 9 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 indicators refer to) in a longer time frame. The indices are helpful in grasping certain tendencies (developmental or regressive), but due to generalisations `hiddenìn the indicators they do not give answers to specific questions concerning among others the genesis, specificity, multidimensional consequences or forecast related to maintaining a certain condition. As a result, with reference to the methodological directive formulated in the context of comparative analyses (the more studied cases, the fewer variables used in the comparisons, and conversely, the fewer analysed cases, the more variables) (Rose, 1991: 453–454), it must be assumed that case studies make it necessary to study the nature of political phenomena and processes very deeply. Therefore, because of revealing some tendencies, indices measuring democratic processes may be treated as a starting point for in-depth qualitative analyses. The ultimate course of democratisation as part of a specific case can be best grasped by its description. The description should lead to the establishment of a proper factual database necessary for interpreting and identifying differences determined by the place, time and conditions of democratisation. 3 The Course Of Democratisation Process In Poland In The Light Of Selected Indices In order to find the answer to the question about the range of coincidence between the evaluations of progress in democratisation in Poland based on the indices discussed in this article, it is necessary to use a relevant tool to compare the studied phenomena. Hence, we arrange and unify the names of indicators being part of different indices. Actually, they all analyse the same or similar phenomena. Then, we construct a uniform scale of values used by the indices and refer these values to a percentage-based scale, and then a point-based scale to add clarity to the situation. In table 6, we show seven common categories of indicators used in the four indices we analyse. These are: 1) electoral process, 2) human and civil rights and liberties, 3) state and administration, 4) legal state, 5) political participation, 6) civil society, and 7) political culture. The indicators of democracy were attributed exactly to the categories of the four main indices. Table 6: Seven common categories of indices of four democratisation indices: freedom rating, democracy score, democracy index, status index Democracy Democracy Democracy Index Freedom rating score index status Electoral Electoral Electoral Electoral process process and - process process pluralism Human and civil Freedom of Independent rights and expression and Civil liberties - media liberties belief; Personal 10 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 autonomy and individual rights National democratic State and Functioning of governance; Functioning of Stateness administration government Local government democratic governance Judicial Legal state Rule of law framework and - Rule of law independence Political Political Political Political pluralism and - participation participation participation participation Associational Political and and Civil society Civil society - social organizational integration rights Democratic Stability of Political culture - Corruption political democratic culture institutions Source: original study. Table 7 presents uniform values of the seven categories of indicators divided by us in a 1–10 scale, where 1 is the minimum and 10 is the maximum score. Table 7: Data from freedom rating, democracy score, democracy index and status index expressed in points on the basis of seven common index categories and referring to the evaluation of the democratisation process in Poland in the years 2006–2016 Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 f.r. - - - - - - - - 10 10 Electoral d.s. 8.7 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.7 9.2 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.2 9.2 process d.i. 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 Human and f.r. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.4 9.4 civil rights d.s. 8.7 7.9 7.9 8.3 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.1 and liberties d.i. 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 f.r. - - - - - - - - 8.3 8.3 State and d.s. 7.7 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.1 administration d.i. 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.4 6.4 5.7 5.7 d.st. 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.8 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 11 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 f.r. - - - - - - - - 8.1 8.7 Legal state d.s. 7.9 7.9 7.5 7.9 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.1 d.st. 9.3 9.3 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 f.r. - - - - - - - - 10 10 Political d.i. 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.7 6.7 participation d.st. 9.8 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 10 f.r. - - - - - - - - 10 10 Civil society d.s. 9.6 9.2 9.6 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 d.st. 7.8 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.8 8 8 8.5 8.5 8.5 d.s. 6.2 6.6 6.6 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 Political d.i. 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 6.2 4.4 culture d.st. 9.5 9.5 8.5 8.5 9 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 10 f.r. – freedom rating, d.s. – democracy score, d.i. – democracy index, d.st. – democracy status. Source: original study based on: Freedom in the World. Poland, Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world–2016. Nations in Transit, Poland, Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/poland. The Economist Intelligence Unit, available at http://www.eiu.com/home.aspx. Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Poland, available at http://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/regional- reports/east-central-and-southeast-europe/ (16 June 2016). This is the basis for the analysis of the democratisation process evaluated by the indices. In the 2006–2016 period, three indices (freedom rating, democracy score, democracy index) assessed the electoral process in Poland well, because the value of the indicators was from 10 points in freedom rating in 2014 and 2015 to 8.3 in democracy score in the years 2007–2009. In the years 2006–2015, democracy index consistently gave the electoral process 9.6 points, and freedom rating in 2014–2015, 10 points. Only democracy score recorded a change in Polish electoral system: in the years 2006–2010 it was given between 8.7 and 8.3 points, and from 2011 to 2016 the value of the indicator increased from 9.2 up to 9.6 points. This means that there were no serious reservations about the electoral law, the existing electoral system or the voting procedure. The indicator of human and civil rights and liberties taken into consideration by three indices (freedom rating, democracy score, democracy index) has a relatively good rate, but not as good as the electoral process. Even freedom rating after eight years of assessing the indicator at the maximum level of 10 points (2006–2013) lowered it to 9.4 points (2014–2015). In the years 2006–2015, democracy index consistently attributed 9.1 points to this indicator. Democracy score noticed a change in the functioning of human and civil rights and liberties. Whereas in the years 2006–2013 this indicator was rated between 8.7 and 7.9 points, in 2014–2015 it had the value of 7.5 points, and in 2016, only 7.1 points. So in the years 2006–2016, the value of the indicator dropped by 1.6 points. 12 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 The assessment of operation of state and administration differs greatly between the indices, with the difference of 3.9 points between the best and worst rate (best 9.8 according to democracy status in the years 2006–2012 and 2014–2016, worst 5.7 according to democracy index in the years 2014–2015). Both freedom rating and democracy score evaluate the functioning of state and administration at a similar level. In the former index, the indicator was given 8.3 points in the years 2014–2015, and in the latter one, it had between 8.1 and 8.3 points in the 2012–2016 period. Before, democracy score had rated this indicator lower, and the greatest drop occurred in 2009 (6.9). State and administration is assessed the worst by democracy index. In the years 2006–2015, this indicator had the value of 6.4 to 5.7 points. There was a clear drop in the rate between the years 2011–2013 and 2014–2015. In the first period, democracy index gave the indicator the highest rate (6.4), and in the second, the lowest (5.7). Democracy status consistently evaluated state and administration highly – except the years 2012 and 2013, when the indicator received 9.5 points, in all the other years it was given 9.8 points. The assessment of the indicator concerning the observance of law in Poland by democracy status in the years 2006–2016 was parabolic: in 2006 and 2007 it reached 9.3 points, in the years 2008–2011 it dropped to 8.8 points, and from 2012 to 2016 it again rose to 9.3 points. Both freedom rating and democracy score evaluate the legal state lower than does democracy status. In 2014, freedom rating gave this indicator 8.1 points, and in 2015, 8.7. The assessment of this indicator according to democracy score had a downward tendency virtually all the time, decreasing from 7.9 points in the years 2006–2007 and 2009 to 7.5 points between 2010 and 2015 (and in 2008). In 2016, its value dropped to 7.1. There is a clear discrepancy in the evaluation of political participation indicator. Freedom rating in the years 2014–2015 gave it 10 points, and democracy status attributed 6.1 points to it in 2006–2013 and 6.7 in 2014–2015. We can say that democracy status has noticed an improvement in political participation recently, but it still evaluates it relatively low, whereas democracy index, to the contrary, regards political participation in Poland as high quality. Three indices (freedom rating, democracy index, democracy status) positively assess civil society. The difference between the highest (10 points in 2014–2015 according to freedom rating) and lowest value (7.5 points in 2008–2009 according to democracy status) was 2.5 points. The discrepancy in the assessment of the indicator is evident if we compare democracy score and democracy status. The former index observes a downward tendency, because after the indicator was given 9.6 points in 2006 and 2008, in all the other years it was only 9.2 points. Democracy status increased the evaluation of civil society in Poland from 7.5 points in the years 2008–2009 to 7.8 in 2006, 2007, 2010– 2011, and then to 8 points in 2012–2013 and even 8.5 in 2014–2016. Freedom rating gave civil society in Poland 10 points in the years 2014–2015. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 13 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 Evaluation of political culture in Poland by democracy status significantly differs from evaluation by democracy score and democracy index. Democracy status between 2006 and 2016 rates this index (after the initial drop) higher and higher (in the years 2006– 2007 – 9.5 points, in 2008–2009 – 8.5 points, in 2010 – 9, in 2011–2015 – 9.5, and in 2016 – 10 points), whereas democracy score and democracy index rate it lower and lower. The assessment of political culture according to democracy score in the years 2006–2009 rose from 6.2 to 7.1 points, and then decreased to 5.8 in the years 2014–2016. Democracy index records a constant decreasing tendency in political culture, as in the years 2006– 2009 it gave the indicator 5.6 points, and from 2010 to 2015, 4.4 (except the year 2014, when the rate was 6.2 points). 4 Analysis of Indices The results presented in the previous section clearly show how difficult it is to make a comprehensive evaluation of the degree of advancement of democratic process in a country based on different indices following original methodological assumptions. It is worth emphasising that this difficulty does not refer to the initial phase of democratisation (transition) but to the consolidation phase (between the seventeenth and twenty-seventh year after the beginning of system change). Still, it is worth trying to make some conclusions concerning the case of Poland. 4.1 Electoral process On the basis of the definition by Schumpeter (1947: 269), real contest elections are the modus procedendi of functioning of all democratic regimes. The extremely simple definition developed by the economist was subject to extensive criticism and charged with minimalism, as it only stresses one aspect of democracy. That is why Diamond (1996: 21) proposed to differentiate between the èlectoral democracyànd `liberal democracy`. But even if we consider the extensive criticism of Schumpeter's definition to be grounded, we must also remember that no democracy can function without elections. The conducted analysis showed that the electoral process in Poland meets the democratic standards. It must even be emphasised that this indicator is rated the highest by the indices. In the normative dimension, the greatest success in the studied period was definitely the adoption of the Election Code: a legal act that comprehensively regulates the electoral matters. It replaced five separate electoral acts. In terms of electoral practice, the most significant fact is that the elections in Poland are free. Free elections should be treated as the basic guarantee of democracy. The thing is not whether the principle is included in the Constitution as a guarantee. The implementation of the principle depends on specific solutions and electoral practice. We may ask, of course, whether universal elections in Poland provide no opportunity for reservations concerning the implementation of the basic democratic standards. It must be 14 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 said clearly that there are some doubts or even charges connected with the violation of these standards, more or less justified (in the studied period, the greatest number of reservations occurred in the case of self-governmental election in 2014). But there is an efficient system of verifying them, and judiciary authorities ensure the observation of law. Moreover, there is no political system in which no regulations have ever been violated. They are implemented by people, who may violate them consciously or unconsciously. Regarding Polish electoral experiences from the years 2006–2016, there is no basis for a charge concerning an institutionalised mechanism of election falsification. If the mode of power recruitment is considered to be the first condition for democracy, then referring to Diamond' theory, Poland definitely meets the requirements for an electoral democracy, and this is confirmed by the indicators of particular indices. Still, there is a certain discrepancy (though a little one) between the three indices that involve this indicator. 4.2 Human and civil rights and liberties With respect to human and civil rights and liberties, the initial phase of transformation also had a positive impact. First, political programmes of all parties exercising power in Poland after 1989, irrespective of their political affiliation, emphasised this aspect as one of the most important elements. Second, the strategy of integration with Western political and defence structures adopted at the beginning of the 1990s forced the rulers to develop the area of human and civil rights and liberties (both in the normative dimension and in the political practice) in accordance with the standards of consolidated democracies. Positive changes in the area of human and civil rights and liberties in Poland occurred in three dimensions: axiological, the dimension of relationships with the environment of the political system, jurisdiction (Garlicki, 2006: 89). The numerical data (values) of individual indicators concerning human and civil rights and liberties in Poland can hardly be questioned. Especially the normative (constitutional) dimension of implementing rights and liberties is impressive (in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 the chapter on these issues is the longest). But in practice, there are some weaknesses in this area. First of all, on the basis of democracy score we can see the process of weakening media independence that has been progressing in Poland in the years 2006–2016. This trend is unquestionable. It must be emphasised that over the analysed decade the power alternated twice. It shows that the tendency for authorities to control media is independent of the political circle that comes to power. It can be assumed, then, that taking control of the media by the current authorities is one of the elements of governance in Poland. Second, the elements that the indices often point out as disturbing human rights and liberties in Poland are the lengthiness of court proceedings or repeated application of pretrial detention to a single person. These practices, revealing the weakness of the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 15 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 judiciary, also lead to lower rates of advancement of democratic processes concerning human rights and liberties. So it proves that there is still much to do in the practice of human rights and liberties in order to complete the process of democracy consolidation. 4.3 State and administration The indices included in the analysis show that in the years 2006–2016 the elements categorised as the state and administration had a good, although not fully satisfying, level. The processes of governance meet the assumptions of democracy but the practice of political life still leaves a lot to be desired. The indicators reflecting this category cover a wide range of issues referring to the functioning of the state and its administration, but they do not allow to precisely identify the areas that need improvement. At the most general level, some conclusions can of course be formulated, but in-depth qualitative analysis is needed to draw up detailed recommendations concerning the activities aimed to improve the existing situation. However, taking into consideration the values of the discussed indicators we can make two basic conclusions on the processes of exercising power and the functioning of Polish administration in the years 2006–2016. First, they prove the imperfection of state institutions, meaning that they are still not very effective in implementing the basic functions of the state (e.g. low quality of law) or public policies. One expression of this is the low effectiveness of activities taken, understood as the relationship of effects to expenditure. The report on good governance ordered by Polish Ministry of Regional Development in 2008 shows that the areas of good governance directly creditable to the state position Poland much lower than developed countries. Thus, low quality of executing power mostly results from the weakness of the state (Wilkin at al, 2008: 139– 140). The authors of the report point out three reasons for this: 1) incomplete transformation, 2) many institutional solutions have not been adjusted to the local conditions, 3) sphere of the quality of the state was neglected at the first stage of transformation (ibid.). These observations cannot be verified only on the basis of the value of the discussed indicators within each index. But provided they are accurate, they point out that the condition of the state and state administration in the years 2006–2016 is a specific heritage or reflection of decisions made (or not made) during the first 10-15 years of transformation. The analysis of data included in the quoted indices in the long run confirms that after 1989 there was a significant change in this regard, proving the progress of democratisation, but in the latest decade (2006–2016) there was actually no improvement, and some indicators even suggest periodical regressions. Second, the quality of governance processes is analysed through the evaluation of the current activity of public authorities (as the democracy index shows, governance in 16 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 Poland is much better at the territorial level than at the state level). This, in turn, depends on political parties that control public authorities and individuals who hold certain offices. As a result, the activity of public authorities is not only the consequence of acceptance or non-acceptance of certain systemic (institutional) solutions but is also a reflection of the political style dominant in the period, reflecting the political culture of the elites. But even now it must be stressed that in the analysed decade the model of party leaders' governance became dominant in Poland, with a high level of concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister. As pointed out by Matyja, it led to the construction of a new, monocentric party model, which assumes the passivity of party structures in the formulation of politics, adjusting to the changes of strategy determined by the leader, and practically eliminating or marginalising potential competition or centres of internal criticism (Matyja, 2013: 491). This, in turn, leads to strengthening clientelistic practices, which translates into the functioning of public authorities and may be one of the elements inhibiting further development of democratic practices. 4.4 Legal state The issues connected with the achievement of what this article calls legal state need some explanation. We must realise that the comments below refer more or less directly to two concepts often used in source literature in a similar context. These are the rule of law and Rechtsstaat. There are two main functions of the rule of law: protecting individuals from arbitrary and disproportional use of state authority and protecting citizens and their property from illegal activity of other individuals (Bedner, 2010: 50–51). The concept of legal state, also included in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, according to Sokolewicz (1992: 1) means that all the activity of the state affecting its citizens should be based on the law. The state achieves this general goal by meeting three requirements: 1) state authorities are bound by acts, 2) citizens are guaranteed the right to legal proceedings, 3) the competencies of state authorities are clearly separated, preferably by means of the (tripartite) separation of powers. The indices discussed in the study show that the evaluation of Poland involving issues of the category of legal state is good, but not very good. It reflects the reservations against the judiciary, especially the lengthiness of court proceedings. Although each ruling team takes different actions to improve the activity of courts, they do not prove to be effective. That is why at the level of values of respective indicators in the discussed indices we do not see any significant improvement in the years 2006–2016. What is more, it seems that at the end of the analysed period (in 2015), Poland began another phase, which may be expressed in a stronger trend of regression of democratisation processes in this respect (this is evident e.g. in democracy score). It is connected with the escalating disagreement concerning one of the focal institutions in the political system, Constitutional Tribunal. After Prawo i Sprawiedliwość took over the rule in Poland, tension between two values – democracy and the rule of law – became DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 17 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 evident. Actually, it is nothing new – as pointed out by Farejohn and Pasquino (2003: 243), they are based on different institutional systems. Democracy refers to electoral institutions, governments and parliaments. Law functions through courts, lawyers etc. In Poland a kind of tug-of-war has occurred, potentially resulting in setting the rules of a new balance, whose space is determined by two poles. The issue is whether the Constitutional Tribunal will really be able to regulate and organise social interactions, thus limiting the competence of authorities that refer to direct, democratic legitimisation, or whether the Parliament, claiming the right to independent authority to establish any law, will effect actual incapacitation of the Constitutional Tribunal. This problem does not only fit the area of advancement of democratisation processes, but first of all leads to the question of whether the situation in Poland is an expression of fundamental redefinition of contemporary democracy, or at least one of its aspects. 4.5 Political participation Political participation covers several important planes connected with citizens' participation in public life. The most significant ones are probably participation in elections and membership in political parties. These phenomena are measurable. Their high level proves good condition of democracy, while a low one may demonstrate citizens' withdrawal from the interest in public affairs. Obviously, apart from electoral participation and membership in political parties, political participation may manifest in other forms of civic activity, e.g. participation in referenda, public consultations, people's legislative initiative, people's veto etc. Electoral participation in Poland is not high. It is not impressive, not only in comparison with Western European countries, but also in comparison with former socialist countries pursuing democracy. In the latest four Sejm elections in Poland the voter turnout was 40.6% (2005), 53.8% (2007), 48.9% (2011), and 50.9% (2015) (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza…). For comparison, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, the situation was as follows: In the Czech Republic, the voter turnout in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament election in 2006 was 64.5%, in 2010, 62.6%, and in 2013, 59.5% (Český statistický úřad). In Hungary, the level of electoral participation in 2006 was 64.4%, in 2010 also 64.4%, and in 2014, 61.7% ( Nemzeti Választási Iroda). Cześnik (2007: 214–217) argues that the low voter turnout in Poland cannot be explained by institutional, structural or historical variables. They have a measure of importance, but not much. There is a relatively high degree of fluctuation of groups of citizens, who participate in one election but are passive in the next. Electoral participation in Poland is affected by the fact that people with higher financial standing and education participate in elections, which causes unequal representation of interests in legislative authorities. 18 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 The democracy index we studied does not rate political participation in Poland very highly. Until 2013, it only gave this indicator 6.1 points out of the 10 possible. Interestingly, in the years 2014–2015 the rating slightly rose, up to 6.7 points. In that period, freedom rating assessed political participation in Poland as excellent, giving it 10 points, which does not seem to correspond to the reality. 4.6 Civil society Civil society is one of the key institutions of contemporary democracy. Out of many definitions of civil society, we would like to point out the definition by Schmitter (1997: 230), who claims that civil society is a system of self-organising intermediate groups that is independent of public authorities and private entities, engages in public activity, does not try to replace the state authority and acts within the established rules. In a democratic regime, the goal of functioning of this sphere independent of state authority is to contribute to greater social awareness concerning own needs and the satisfaction of the needs, which are not satisfied by the state. In Poland social activity increased in the 1980s, which contributed to the birth of Solidarność and opposing the socialist state authority. As a result, in 1989, transformations began whose aim was to institutionalise the democratic solutions. However, as time passed, many researchers began to point out the weakness of social structures in the new state, and thus, the lack of development of civil society, which should follow systemic changes. Can we say that civil attitudes have consolidated in Polish society? Research results and expert opinions prove otherwise. The reasons for this state of affairs are the lack of acceptance for free market requirements, institutional and awareness heritage of the communism, great differences in people's income, and acute social conflicts as well as the mental condition and traditional ways of thinking that cause the persistence of demanding attitudes and expecting many welfare provisions from the state (Wolff- Powęska, 1999: 160). Out of the studied indices, democracy status shows an improvement in the quality of civil society in the latest decade, democracy score finds a constant positive and upward trend in this indicator, and freedom rating points out a very good level of civic society in Poland in the years 2014–2015. 4.7 Political culture In social sciences, political culture has many different definitions. Some scholars only perceive it in psychological categories. This is how political culture is understood among others by Almond and Powell (1966: 50), and in the Polish context, Wiatr (1999: 189). The other attitude includes in political culture not only psychological attitudes and orientations but also behavioural phenomena. Regardless of whether we perceive political DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 19 R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 culture narrowly or broadly, it determines specific features of the relationship between the authority and state on the one hand and the society on the other hand. Political culture is much more than the expression of current attitudes and behaviours of citizens and political actors. The character of political culture is largely affected by institutional and historical variables, which – like a genetic code – determine specific behaviour patterns for many generations. The period of socialism in Poland contributed to the society's withdrawing from interest in public life. The barriers set in front of the citizens by the communist party, the low political awareness in the society, and the sense of meaninglessness of engaging in public matters led to the formation of apathy and passivity. This is the heritage Polish political culture received at the beginning of system transformations (Garlicki & Noga- Bogomilski, 2004: 169). After 1989, there was some hope for successful democratisation both of the state and the society. Whereas democratic structures and procedures were relatively quickly implemented in the institutional dimension, in the area of political culture based on consolidated mental patterns of orientation and behaviours, democratisation has been much slower. It seems, however, that in the third decade of system transformations in Poland, political culture still does not have the qualities characteristic of societies living in countries with consolidated democracy, which is proved by the low level of citizens' trust in political institutions or little involvement in public and political life. Analysing the indices that measure the advancement of democratisation processes, we can see one common and unquestionable characteristic. All of them give political culture a very low rating, and democracy index in 2010–2013 and 2015 even awarded political culture in Poland less than 5 points. Both this index and democracy score agree that in the years 2006–2016 the level of political culture in Poland was becoming lower and lower. In this context, the results of democracy status, which observes constant improvement of political culture in Poland and in 2016 awarded it the maximum score of 10 points, are puzzling. 5 Conclusion Political scientists, or more broadly, representatives of social sciences, are still looking for optimal tools to evaluate the quality of democracy within the framework of a political system. It is the main reason for constructing various measures or indices. Depending on the specific goals of studies, they involve different determinants. They most often concentrate on institutional aspects, although many of them also refer to social or political determinants (Sroka, 2014: 32–33). The number of variables considered in the indices makes it difficult to compare the data they include. This article was an attempt to compare data from four indices with the use of our original classification including specific indicators of the tools in each group. The aggregate character of indicators within the 20 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY R. Glajcar & S. Kubas: Democratisation in Poland in the Light of Quantitative Analysis Based on Selected Indices of the years 2006–2016 indices made it even more difficult. It also confirmed that the analysis of values of the indicators only has a real explanatory meaning if it is enriched with qualitative analysis. The differences between the values of respective indicators in different indices confirm that the obtained results and conclusions depend on what the authors of a study want to emphasise. The corresponding methodological obscurity (the lack of specific information on how the research was carried out) occurring in different indices is a significant element limiting the possibility of regarding their results as sufficient for reliable description of advancement of democratisation processes. Still, the indices discussed in the study should not be ignored. They may be a kind of guideline, showing the direction of changes in selected areas, and the developmental or regressive trend in the democratic process. Sometimes they also allow to see thèsystemic inability` to progress, when the indicators remain at the average level for a long time. In the case of Poland, this element is very well visible. True, in the years 2006–2016 the value of indicators did change, but the changes were not revolutionary. The fluctuations were negligible, and they were not always an expression of democratic progress, sometimes they suggested à step backwards`. 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Haček The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics MIRO HAČEK 1 Abstract Besides three basic conditions consolidated democracies should also fulfil several other conditions that have not attracted such attention of scientific analyses, as have the three basic conditions; those conditions are economic consolidation, the rule of law, the existence of an organised civil society, an efficient country bureaucracy and a relative autonomy of political society (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 14–18). Chapter put an emphasis on the processes of democratic consolidation in the former Yugoslav republics in the period since the volatile and violent breakup of socialistist Yugoslavia twenty-five years ago. It is clearly evident from various democratic consolidation measurements that most of former Yugoslav republics have so far not been successful in reachin the level of consolidated democracies and that democratisation trends are not positive. Keywords: • democracy • economy • consolidation • former Yugoslavia • republics • Slovenia CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Miro Haček, Ph.D., Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: miro.hacek@fdv.uni-lj.si. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.3 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 24 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics 1 Introduction: Processes of Social and Political Modernisation The disintegration of the socialist political system forced several countries of Central and Eastern Europe1 to undertake fundamental changes that were to constitute a system resembling that is present in Western societies. These states saw themselves as genuinely part of Western civilisation for they had several common historical, cultural and economic elements. Consequently their prime development strategy was oriented to social modernisation, particularly in the sense of adopting two main institutional characteristics – a market economy and a parliamentary democracy (Tomšič, 2002: 125). How are the concepts of social and political modernisation to be understood? Social modernisation includes key changes in all aspects of human thought and human activities. Its elements, such as economic growth, urbanisation, development of education and establishment of the mass media are historically interlinked with the advancement of democracy. Nevertheless, establishing various democratic institutions usually lagged behind general progress (Zajc, 2000: 13). Political modernisation will, for the purposes of this article, be defined as the rationalisation of authority (dismissing various traditional, family-based, local or religious authorities and replacing them with secular and legitimate national authority) and the consolidation of sovereignty of the nation state versus external influences or internal regional and local powers. It further requires a division of power between legislative, juridical and executive authorities, established relations between them, and the protection of professional fields from arbitrary political influence (judiciary, armed forces and civil administration). Political modernisation also represents the growing political participation of citizens in establishing their interests or introducing modern purchasing affairs. This can significantly reduce the supervision of citizens by the state or any other informal sources of power (Huntington, 1993). According to its definition and historical experience, the concept of political modernisation correlates with an increase in political independence. The right to independence and self-regulation originate from the right to mutiny against any foreign or unjust authority (‘ ius resistendi’). It also represents the people’s right (people as a self- protecting entity) to change government, demand the government’s responsibility or establish its own government (Zajc, 2000: 16–17). In the context of the former socialist systems, the right to mutiny and the right to self-determination enabled the formation of not only new but also more democratic states.2 In spite of achieving different levels of social and economic development, researchers disclosed many common characteristics of the reasons for the political modernisation seen among Central and Eastern European countries. The first of these common characteristics is a legitimacy crisis. Up until the late 1980s the monistic systems of CEE had based their legitimacy entirely on ideological suppositions: of no-conflict societies; of the established belief in their ‘historical right’; and of their expertise in the nature of human development. The democratic version of legitimacy proved to be more attractive DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 25 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. to citizens, especially in socially and economically less developed countries, even more so when compared with the state’s limitless and unsupervised power and the irresponsibility of its electors (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17). The second of the common characteristics is the systematic restraint of human rights. Totalitarian and authoritarian systems theoretically and practically opposed those constitutional regulations that were based on the individual, and had respect for the inalienable rights of the citizens and of all the people. Particularly restricted by the authoritarian powers were the freedom of thought and freedom of expression – the pillars of an autonomous civil society. Also highly restricted was the freedom of public gathering which created circumstances fitting the monopolisation of power and the creation of authoritarian single party system. The third of the common characteristics was the complete ineffectiveness of the socialist system. They could not fulfil the material expectations of its citizens or solve the ever- growing problems. Socialist systems were increasingly falling behind in the race with democratic and competitive states. The fourth of the common characteristics were the very high costs of repression. Undemocratic systems tend to break all social linkages except their own, which they form and enforce systematically. They sustain an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust where any kind of opposition is severely sanctioned. The result of uncertainty and repressiveness is the so-called ‘subculture of fear’, which weakens people’s ability to independently plan and act in order not to worsen their individual position. Gradually all the rights and institutions, which could ensure the success of a collective action, disintegrate. Nevertheless, in undemocratic systems there is a relationship between tolerance of political opposition and the costs of its repression. Expensive tolerance necessarily signifies an even more expensive repression. The more the costs of repression exceeded the costs of tolerance the higher became the possibility of altering the political system (Dahl, 1990; see also Kukovič and Haček, 2014). The key reason for the political democratisation of CEE countries were the restraints on social development imposed by communist rule. In these countries the process of social development could be marked as inorganic top-down modernisation based on the idea of homogenised and disciplined society. It effectively suffocated any alternative realisation of social potential. Reforms and ideas were legal as long as they did not collide with the monopoly’s legitimacy, based on the idea of a classless society. This was the origin of the system’s incapability to ensure sustainable development, self-reproduction, the absorption of constant social changes and adjustment to the complex circumstances (Tomšič, 2002: 126). The term democratic transition relates to the process of dismissing the authoritarian regime, authoritarian entities or undemocratic legislation and to the establishment of the constitutional regulation and formation of procedural rules for political competition. This process of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system usually evolves evolution. The establishment of a fully democratic system must necessarily be preceded by liberalisation – while still within the old regime’s framework, certain rights must be restored or expanded in order to serve as protection of the individual or greater social 26 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics formation, against arbitrary interventions of central powers. This enables the creation of political opposition, articulation and popularisation of new ideas and consequently also an increase in public support (Tomšič, 2002: 130). The democratic consolidation requires the establishment of a suitable institutional framework. Schmitter understands consolidation as ‘a process of transformation of random agreements, prudent norms and more or less accidental decisions (formed in the period of transition) into a generally known and regularly practiced relations of cooperation and competition. These must be voluntarily accepted by all individuals and groups enrolled in the democratic exercise of power’ (Schmitter, 1994: 60). To put it more simply, the process of democratic consolidation is finished when no relevant actor seeks to politically exist outside the frameworks of democratic institutions (Tomšič, 2002: 131) or ‘when also the defeatists try to succeed only through democratic institutions’ (Przeworski et al, 1996: 40). Before we can even discuss democratic consolidation, at least three basic conditions must be fulfilled. The first is the existence of a country because otherwise there can be no free elections or human rights. The second condition is that no democracy can be consolidated before the process of democratic transition has ended. A necessary but not also a sufficient prerequisite to finish the democratic transition is free, general and democratic elections. In many cases of free, general and democratic elections it became obvious that governments de facto lacked real decision-making power, which in spite of the institute of democratic elections remained in the hands of the former rulers or other powers. The third condition of democratic consolidation is therefore the necessity of democratic rule. If democratically elected authorities violate the constitution, restrict human rights, interfere with the work of other independent authorities and do not govern within the limits of the rule of law, then we cannot talk of a democratic regime. It may be concluded that only democracies can be consolidated democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16). If we are to talk about a consolidated democracy, then we must also fulfil other conditions than those mentioned above. Linz and Stepan list five more interlinked prerequisites: economic consolidation, the rule of law, the existence of an organised civil society, an efficient country bureaucracy and the relative autonomy of political society (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 14–33). In this article we tend to analyse the processes of democratic transiton and consolidation in the former Yugoslav republics from early 1990s, when socialist Yugoslavia finally broke apart, to the 2016, when now-independent countries will celebrate their first quarter-centrury anniversaries. We will put an emphasis on various internationally recognized measurements that try to cover a combination of elements that influence the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in the Linz and Stepan’s (1996) traditional trajectory. Following their work, we will especially particulally analyse economic transition and consolidation processes in all former Yugoslav republics, and test the assumption that this is the one particular prerequisite of democratic consolidation DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 27 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. that suffered most direct effects of failed peaceful transformation in areas of former Yugoslavia that plunged into post-independence wars and conflicts. 2 Measurements of Democratic Consolidation We can measure the success of democratic transition and democratic consolidation through various indexes. The most frequently used index is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is composed of various economical, social, demographic and other indicators. The precision and ability to determine any country’s stage of development of the HDI is much greater than any other composite index or statistical indicator. The Human Development Index marks some of the fundamental achievements in a certain society, such as the average length of life, dissemination of knowledge, economic development and certain life standards. The Human Development Index is a more profound indicator than for example revenue per capita, because the latter is only one of the many means of human development but not also its final result. Table 1 shows values of the HDI index from 1995 to the latest available measurement in 2014. Besides the actual value of the index, it also gives two kinds of information. The first one regards the stage of development a specific country has achieved, whereas the second one shows the country’s position in the world ranking. The results mentioned are entirely congruent with frequently published economic indicators – Slovenia scored best among the former socialist countries in all time periods between 1995 and 2014. Between 1995 and 2014 some former Yugoslav republics advanced in their world rankings, but their progress is very diverse; Slovenia for instance gained 12 places, Croatia 29 and Serbia 14, but on the other hand, the FYR Macedonia and Montenegro stayed largerly on the same level between 1995 and 2014. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is more troubling, as it actually lost 19 places between 2005 (when it was for the first time included in the measurement) and 2014. It is also clearly visible that Slovenia lowered its score in the period after 2010, mostly due to the negative impacts of global economic crisis. Table 1: Human Development Index (HDI)* in Central and Eastern Europe in 1995– 2014 COUNTRY 1995** 2000** 2005** 2010** 2011** 2012** 2013** 2014** SLOVENIA 0.887; 0.879; 0.917; 0.828; 0.884; VHD- 0.892; 0.874; 0.880; CROATIA HD-37 0.759; HD-29 0.809; HD-27 0.850; VHD 0.767; - 29 HD- 21 0.796; VHD- VHD- 0.767; VHD-25 0.812; VHD-25 0.818; MONTENEGRO MD- - 76 HD- - 48 HD- - 47 51 0.769; HD- 46 0.771; HD- V21 H D- 0.791; VHD 0.789; - 47 HD- VHD 0.802; - 47 HD- BOSNIA AND - - 0.803; 49 0.710; HD- 54 0.733; HD- 47 HD- 52 0.735; 51 0.731; HD- 49 0.733; HD- HERZEGOVINA HD-66 68 74 HD-81 86 85 SERBIA - 0.710; - 0.735; HD- 0.766; HD- 0.769; 0.745; HD- 0.771; HD- FYR 0.749; MD-80 0.772; 0.801; 70 0.701; HD- 59 0.728; HD- HD-64 0.740; 77 0.732; HD- 0. 66 747; HD- MACEDONIA MD-80 MD-65 HD-69 78 78 HD-78 84 81 * The Human Development Index is measured on a 0 to 1 interval, where 1 represents a fully developed country and 0 represents a completely undeveloped country. 28 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics ** Countries are divided into three groups: high human development (marked HD), medium human development (MD) and low human development (LD). From 2006 there was also a fourth group added, very high human development (VHD), for the most developed countries in the world. Next to this mark we placed information about the individual countries’ places in the world ranking. *** Ranking among listed former socialist countries. Source: Human Development Report; available at http://hdr.undp.org/ (14 June 2016). Very similar to the Human Development Index is the Democracy Index, measured annually by an organisation called Freedom House and presented in a special report – Nations in Transit. The Democracy Index is composed of seven indicators. It includes evaluations of electoral systems, civil society, free media, democratic government at both national and local levels, independence of the judiciary, and the spread of corruption. Every indicator is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of the democratic process and 7 represents the lowest level. Nations in Transit encompasses all former socialist countries including the successor countries to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. All included countries are divided into five groups. The highest group includes countries with the best ratings in the Democracy Index, i.e. consolidated democracies. Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 1.00–1.99 closely embody the best policies and practices of liberal democracy (Freedom House, 2016):  The authority of government is based on universal and equal suffrage as expressed in regular, free, and fair elections conducted by secret ballot. Elections are competitive, and power rotates among a range of different political parties.  Civil society is independent, vibrant, and sustainable. Rights of assembly and association are protected and free of excessive state pressures and bureaucracy.  Media are independent, diverse, and sustainable. Freedom of expression is protected, and journalists are free from excessive interference by powerful political and economic interests.  National and local governmental systems are stable, democratic, and accountable to the public. Central branches of government are independent, and an effective system of checks and balances exists. Local authorities exercise their powers freely and autonomously of the central government.  The judiciary is independent, impartial, timely, and able to defend fundamental political, civil, and human rights. There is equality before the law, and judicial decisions are enforced.  Government, the economy, and society are free of excessive corruption. Legislative framework, including strong conflict-of-interest protection, is in place so that journalists and other citizens feel secure to investigate, provide media coverage of, and prosecute allegations of corruption. From former Yugoslav republics, only Slovenia consistenly ranked among consolidated democracies, mostly scoring below 2.00, but in the latest report from 2016, Slovenia again touched the treshhold of 2.00; while still remaining the consolidated democracy, some DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 29 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. challenges largely associated with corruption, juditiary and independent media contributed to a slightly lower score. Table 2: Democracy Index in the period 1997 to 2016 Slovenia Croatia Bosnia and FYR Montenegro Serbia Kosovo FR Herzegovina Macedonia Yugoslavia 1997* 2.00 4.00 - 3.90 - - - - 1998* 1.94 4.25 5.35 3.95 - - - 4.90 2000* 1.95 4.19 5.13 3.44 - - - 5.50 2001* 1.94 3.25 4.94 3.75 - - - 4.63 2002* 1.81 3.25 4.56 4.13 - - - 3.63 2003 1.79 3.79 4.54 4.29 - - - - 2004 1.75 3.83 4.29 4.00 - - 5.50 - 2005 1.68 3.75 4.18 3.89 3.79 3.75 5.32 - 2006 1.75 3.71 4.07 3.82 3.89 3.71 5.36 - 2007 1.82 3.75 4.04 3.82 3.93 3.68 5.36 - 2008 1.86 3.64 4.11 3.86 3.79 3.79 5.21 - 2009 1.93 3.71 4.18 3.86 3.79 3.79 5.14 - 2010 1.93 3.71 4.25 3.79 3.79 3.71 5.07 - 2011 1.93 3.64 4.32 3.82 3.82 3.64 5.18 - 2012 1.89 3.61 4.36 3.89 3.82 3.64 5.18 - 2013 1.89 3.61 4.39 3.93 3.82 3.64 5.25 - 2014 1.93 3.68 4.43 4.00 3.86 3.64 5.14 - 2015 1.93 3.68 4.46 4.07 3.89 3.68 5.14 - 2015 2.00 3.68 4.50 4.29 3.93 3.75 5.07 - 2016 2.00 3.68 4.50 4.29 3.93 3.75 5.07 - * different methodology was used before 2003 in calculating democracy index, only evaluating electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance. Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit; available at http://www.freedomhouse.org (20 June 2016). Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 3.00–3.99 are ranked as semi-consolidated democracies. Among former Yugoslav republics Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are being consistently ranked among semi-consolidated democracies, but none of them sees recent positive trends that would lead toward consolidated democracy status. Those countries are still electoral democracies that meet relatively high standards for the selection of national leaders, but exhibit some weaknesses in their defense of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016):  The authority of government is based on universal and equal suffrage as expressed in regular elections conducted by secret ballot. While elections are typically free, 30 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics fair, and competitive, irregularities may occur. Power rotates among a range of different political parties.  Civil society is independent and active. Rights of assembly and association are protected. However, the organizational capacity of groups remains limited and dependence on foreign funding is a barrier to long-term sustainability. Groups may be susceptible to some political or economic pressure.  Media are generally independent and diverse, and freedom of expression is largely protected in legislative framework and in practice. However, special interests—both political and economic—do exert influence on reporting and editorial independence and may lead to self-censorship. While print media are largely free of government influence and control, electronic media are not.  National and local systems of government are stable and democratic. While laws and structures are in place to promote government transparency and accountability, implementation is lacking. The system of checks and balances may be weak, and decentralization of powers and resources to local self-governments incomplete.  The framework for an independent judiciary is in place. However, judicial independence and the protection of basic rights, especially those of ethnic and religious minorities, are weak. Judicial processes are slow, inconsistent, and open to abuse.  Corruption is widespread and state capacities to investigate and prosecute corruption are weak. Efforts to combat the problem produce limited results. Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 4.00–4.99 are typically electoral democracies that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders; those countries are either transitional or hybrid regimed. Among former Yugoslav republics FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are currently in this category, although FYR Macedonia was in the period 2005-2013 ranked among semi-consolidated democracies. Also Kosovo, although not universally recognized as sovereign country, is very close to this category. Democratic institutions in those countries are fragile and face substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear (Freedom House, 2016):  National elections are regular and competitive, but substantial irregularities may prevent them from being free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common.  Civil society is independent and growing, and rights of assembly and association are generally protected. However, philanthropy and volunteerism are weak, and dependence on foreign funding is a barrier to long-term sustainability. Democratically oriented NGOs are the most visible and active groups, especially during election seasons, and may be subject to government pressure.  Media are generally independent and diverse. Legislative framework to protect media may be in place but is not matched by practice. Special interests—both political and economic—exert influence on reporting and editorial independence, DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 31 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. and may lead to self-censorship. Harassment of and pressure on journalists may occur.  National and local systems of government are weak and lacking in transparency. While the balance of power is fragile, a vocal yet fractionalized opposition may be present in parliament. Governance may remain highly centralized. Local self- government is not fully in place, with some local or regional authorities owing allegiance to the central authorities who appointed them.  The judiciary struggles to maintain its independence from the government. Respect for basic political, civil, and human rights is selective, and equality before the law is not guaranteed. In addition to the judiciary being slow, abuses occur. Use of torture in prisons may be a problem.  Corruption is widespread and presents a major impediment to political and economic development. Anticorruption efforts are inconsistent. If we compare scores and reports from 1997 to 2016, the most noticeable characteristic is the recent regression of almost all former Yugoslav republics in terms of their democratic consolidation, most noticeably of FYR Macedonia in terms of reassignment to lower group, and regression in the grades of several other countries, most noticeably in Slovenia in recent period. There are also few cases of progress (Kosovo in recent period, Croatia after president Tuđman’s death, FYR Macedonia in mid 2000s, etc.), but the differences between 1997, 2005 and 2016 grades are not substantial in most cases. We can also notice that all former Yugoslav republics apart of Slovenia received especially concerning low scores in the fields of independent media, spread of corruption and judicial framework and independence (Freedom House, 2016). Table 3: Nations in transit 2006 – ratings of specific indicators and the collective Democracy Index for a group of consolidated democracies DEMOCRACY COUNTRY EP CS IM NGOV LGOV JFI CO INDEX SLOVENIA 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.25 1.75 CROATIA 3.25 2.75 3.75 3.50 3.75 4.25 4.75 3.71 SERBIA 3.25 2.75 3.25 4.00 3.75 4.25 4.75 3.71 BOSNIA AND 3.00 3.75 4.00 4.75 4.75 4.00 4.25 4.07 HERZEGOVINA MONTENEGRO 3.50 3.00 3.25 4.50 3.50 4.25 5.25 3.89 FYR 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.82 MACEDONIA KOSOVO 4.75 4.25 5.50 5.75 5.50 5.75 6.00 5.36 The Democracy Index score is an average for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework (JFI) and Corruption (CO). Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit; http://www.freedomhouse.org (20 June 2016). 32 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics Table 4: Nations in transit 2011 – ratings of specific indicators and the collective Democracy Index for a group of consolidated democracies DEMOCRACY COUNTRY EP CS IM NGOV LGOV JFI CO INDEX SLOVENIA 1.50 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.50 1.75 2.50 1.93 CROATIA 3.25 2.50 4.00 3.50 3.75 4.25 4.25 3.64 SERBIA 3.25 2.25 4.00 3.75 3.50 4.50 4.25 3.64 BOSNIA AND 3.25 3.50 4.75 5.25 4.75 4.25 4.50 4.50 HERZEGOVINA MONTENEGRO 3.25 2.75 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.00 5.00 3.82 FYR 3.25 3.25 4.50 4.00 3.75 4.00 4.00 3.82 MACEDONIA KOSOVO 4.50 3.75 5.75 5.75 5.00 5.75 5.75 5.18 The Democracy Index score is an average for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework (JFI) and Corruption (CO). Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit; http://www.freedomhouse.org (20 June 2016). Table 5: Nations in transit 2016 – ratings of specific indicators and the collective Democracy Index for a group of consolidated democracies DEMOCRACY COUNTRY EP CS IM NGOV LGOV JFI CO INDEX SLOVENIA 1.50 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.50 1.75 2.50 1.93 CROATIA 3.00 2.75 4.00 3.50 3.75 4.50 4.25 3.68 SERBIA 3.25 2.25 4.50 4.00 3.50 4.50 4.25 3.75 BOSNIA AND 3.25 3.50 4.75 5.75 4.75 4.50 5.00 4.50 HERZEGOVINA MONTENEGRO 3.50 2.75 4.50 4.25 3.50 4.00 5.00 3.93 FYR 3.75 3.25 5.25 4.75 4.00 4.50 4.50 4.29 MACEDONIA KOSOVO 4.75 3.75 5.25 5.50 4.50 5.75 6.00 5.07 The Democracy Index score is an average for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework (JFI) and Corruption (CO). Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit; http://www.freedomhouse.org (20 June 2016). Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that Slovenia scores best among all former Yugoslav republics in all measured indicators in all three periods – 2006, 2011 and 2016. Freedom House estimates Slovenia’s main lags are civil society, corruption and independent media, where Slovenia lays behind some of other consolidated democracies in the Central and Eastern European region. For all of the other former Yugoslav republics, we can clearly see four most problematic areas, i.e. independent media, national democratic governance, judicial framework and especially, corruption. Here are differences between Slovenia and other DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 33 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. former Yugoslav republic also the biggest. The smallest differences can be observed, however, in the civil society, which is apparently quite independent and active throughout former Yugoslavia, largely due to the legacy of active and vibrant civil society that already existed in former socialist Yugoslavia. 3 Conclusions History teaches us that democracy was losing with the economic and social crisis which encourages imagination and exploration of a more efficient social order. If citizens feel they do not gain anything from democracy, they will easily take farewell. Moreover, in every society, especially in transitional societies, there is a part of the culture, which is not democratically oriented and where someone could implement totalitarian or authoritarian structures. So what can be done democracy not to remain so fragile, to strengthen it or even prevent the revitalization of totalitarianisms or the emergence of new ones? 1. Education for democracy: it is necessary to consolidate the democratic public opinion and, what is even more important, to consolidate and develop the democratic values. It seems that the democratic political culture is the strongest guarantee for maintaining and ensuring "sustainable development" of every democracy. 2. Democracy has to be structurally improved: we have to provide greater transparency of democratic processes and opportunities for greater involvement of citizens. Who should carry out these processes, in particular education for democracy. First institution that should be metioned here is certainlly educational system. The role of the education system in shaping our culture as a support for the active citizenship. Through the implementation of its basic social functions (the transfer of official knowledge) the school performs a variety of other social functions. It can be understood as an important element of social development; as a factor, influencing the development of every individual; as an element for the transfer of traditions, the knowledge of generations. The school also intervenes in the primary socialization and in addition to the family it also shapes a part of the societal value form, which is more permanent. It should also be taught what is worth to be rejected and what not, what values and social structures should be maintained and preserved in the society. The school can significantly contribute to the creation of an active democratic citizenship. Secondly, science. The duty of science is to seek for and to establish scientific truth. Social science and humanistic disciplines and in this context the historical one have a particular important role; especially the latest should make a clear distinction between democracy and its standards on one side and totalitarian systems on the other. It should clearly present the historical forms of totalitarianisms. Let me remind our left-oriented intellectuals of the correct position of the also left-oriented John Keane, who in his most recent work on democracy claims that 'forgetting or remembering the wrong things is dangerous for democracy'. Thirdly, politics or its central organizations and institutions such as the parliament, government, political parties, 34 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics movements, political elites presenting a powerful socialisation factor have a central role in the education for democracy. Politics should be most attentive to totalitarian phenomena and patterns and detect them in everyday life. And fourtly, the media should be the most important democratic factor during the transition. They have an immediate effect on public opinion and do not break deeply into the culture, into the core of values, however, in long term these effects are not negligible. At least for Slovenia we can say that the media have not carried out their mission in promoting democratic institutions and democratic political culture. They criticized the parties and the parliament (where the representatives of the people seem only to be fighting and generally doing useless things only). They sharply criticized the alleged privileges of the members of the parliament. Generally they were very reluctant to the old political nomenclature and were negatively oriented towards the new political elites and new political parties (Haček and Brezovšek, 2014). A democracy becomes consolidated when the rate of risk3 decreases in proportion to its age (Dahl, 1990: 16–17). Dahl (ibid.) further claims that the probability of attaining democratic consolidation is greater when democracies “operate” successfully during a given time span in political, social, economic and other terms. On the basis of our research and other similar ones, we can confirm this claim, as one former Yugoslav republic is stable and consolidated democracy (Slovenia) and three are stable semi-consolidated democracies (Croatia, Serbia, Monte Negro). What is more worrisome, however, are constant negative democratisation trends, we are observing in the last few years, not only in the former Yugoslav area, but also across Central and Eastern Europe Notes: 1 International terminology usually calls these countries CEE countries (Central and Eastern European countries). 2 America’s gaining of political independence from Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, also called the ‘American revolution’, enabled the American states to form entirely new republican, democratic and social regulations where people for the first time elected and controlled the authorities. Subsequently, the right of self-determination correlated with growth of national self- awareness – this triggered liberation aspirations of European Christian nations living in the Ottoman Empire (Greeks, Serbs Montenegrins etc.). It also brought about the liberation of a group of nations living under the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War (Slovenians, Croats, Serbs, Czech, etc.) (Zajc, 2000: 16). 3 The rate of risk stands for the probability that a democratic rule will transform into some other form of rule, but with undemocratic properties. This rate is higher for countries that have only recently become democratic systems, for countries that can be defined as economically underdeveloped, yet with existing and operational democratic institutions, etc (Przeworski et al., 1996: 35–52). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 35 M. Haček: The Quantitative Analysis of Chosen Indices of the Democratization Process in Former Yugoslav Republics. References: Dahl, A. R. (1990) Transition to Democracy. Address delivered to the symposium on “Voices of Democracy” (Dayton, Centre for International Studies), available at http://www.freedomhouse.com (20 June 2016). Freedom House (2016) Nations in Transit, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org (20 June 2016). Haček, M. & Brezovšek, M. (2014) The processes of democratisation and trust in political institutions in Slovenia: comparative analysis, In: Annales, Series historia et sociologia, 24(1), pp. 1–12. Huntington, S. P. (1993) The third wave: democratization in late twentieth century (London: University of Oklahoma Press, Norman). Human development report, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/ (20 June 2016). Kukovič, S. & Haček, M. (2014) The processes of economic consolidation in countries of former Yugoslavia, In: Journal of Comparative Politics, 7(1), pp. 36–51. Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996) Toward Consolidated Democracy, In: Journal of Democracy, 7(2), pp. 14–33. Przeworski A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A. & Limongi, F. (1996) What makes democracies endure?, In: Journal of Democracy, 7(1), pp. 39–55. Schmitter, P. C. (1994) Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy, In: Journal of Democracy, 5(2), pp. 57–74. Tomšič, M. (2002) Politična stabilnost v novih demokracijah (Political stability in new democracies) (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče). Zajc, D. (2000) Parlamentarno odločanje (Parliamentary decision-making) (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences). 36 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe PETER ROŽIČ & PETER J. VEROVŠEK 1 Abstract While lustration represents the major mechanism of transitional justice in East-Central Europe, some post-communist states have adopted such measures to limit the participation of former communist elites while others have not. We explain lustration by exploring the foundations of personal and collective responsibility under dictatorship. We first ground our key variables in legal and social theory and then test their influence using a Boolean approach with data from seventeen states. We argue that two sets of historical conditions suffice to explain the adoption of lustration in post-communist Europe. The first is the presence of an especially repressive form of communism. The second combines membership in the Warsaw Pact with the absence of interwar democratic experience. Keywords: • lustration • historical legacies • political accountability • East- Central Europe • Qualitative Comparative Analysis CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Peter Rožič, Ph.D., Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053, USA, email: prozic@scu.edu. Peter J. Verovšek, Ph.D., Harvard University, 33 Kirkland St, William James Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA, email: verovsek@fas.harvard.edu. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.4 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 38 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe 1 Introduction Since 1989 post-communist Europe has pioneered lustration as a mechanism of transitional justice that investigates the links between public actors and the previous regime.1 These vetting procedures often result in the banning of certain individuals from the public sphere. Despite the success of some states in limiting the political participation of those with strong ties to communism, only ten out of the seventeen post-communist states included in this study had implemented lustration by the last major expansion of the European Union in 2007.2 Recent studies have explained this variation by focusing on present political factors. It is no secret that politicians exploit the communist past to attack the legitimacy of political opponents and to enhance their own credentials (Letki, 2002; Stan, 2006; Łoś, 1995). Lustration may also result from fears of political exposure or elite calculations (Nalepa, 2010). Political agents have many reasons for drawing on the past to ensure electoral gains and to achieve institutional reforms to their benefit (Szczerbiak, 2002; Williams et al., 2005). Despite the importance of present political considerations, historical factors also play an important role in the decision to lustrate (Killingsworth, 2010; Welsh, 1996). Although they are often treated as a single phenomenon, the historical legacies of the states within the ‘communist bloc’ differ significantly. Since past experiences help to establish and maintain national identity, culture and political legitimacy, these differences may influence political developments in the aftermath of regime transitions. References to the past played a visible role in parliamentary debates about lustration in East-Central Europe. For example, the experience of harsh repression, which allowed no ‘steam to be released’ (Moran, 1994), strongly affected the decision to lustrate in Czechoslovakia (and later in the Czech Republic). Conversely, in Slovenia – and in the former Yugoslavia more generally – where the secret forces were not as oppressive, influential post-communist leaders, including France Bučar, the first speaker of the post- communist Slovenian national assembly, spoke out against lustration. Previous democratic experience is also important in the domestic politics of lustration. We highlight this factor as it often affects the perceptions of individual political agents regarding their country’s experience of communism. A Czech State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ‘my parents telling me about the interwar democracy in Czechoslovakia’ played an important role in his decision to pursue and lobby for lustration.3 Instead of focusing on present political factors, we turn our attention to historical legacies. We identify crucial factors within such legacies by drawing on developments in political, legal and social theory. We then test the effects of these past variables on lustration across DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 39 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe the entire post-communist region. This allows us to pinpoint the crucial differences in the historical experiences of the states in East-Central Europe that help to explain the decision to lustrate. We isolate two explanations for lustration. The first is a repressive communist regime. The second combines membership in the Warsaw Pact with the absence of democratic experience during the interwar period. These finding allow us to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for lustration in East-Central Europe based on differing historical legacies.4 Our findings thus complement existing work by highlighting the past factors that influence the decision to lustrate in the present. After defining lustration, we provide a theoretical groundwork for debates about the relationship between the past and lustration. By examining the origins of personal and collective responsibility under dictatorship we identify the relevant causal factors. We then use Boolean algebra to examine the effect of these past factors on lustration in post- communist Europe and test the results against alternative explanations. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our results and on the questions they raise for the study of lustration and transitional justice. 2 Defining and Coding Lustration Lustration encompasses a broad constellation of meanings. In East-Central Europe, ‘Each country possesses its own specific meaning due to the multiplicity of solutions to the problems of dealing with the communist past’ (Czarnota, 2009: 310). Most obviously, different states have chosen to lustrate different public positions. Lustration is a political and legal mechanism distinct from both criminal adjudication and administrative purges following a change in government. It limits the political participation of former elites and their collaborators by holding individuals to account for their activities under the previous regime. Some countries have tried to move away from a blanket policy of collective guilt by requiring individuals to address their personal involvement with the communist regime. Based on this information lustration either bans certain individuals from the public sphere or provides them with clearance and reappoints them to their positions.5 We classify cases into one of two general categories. A country’s lustration law is ‘implemented’ if at least one person’s links to the previous regime were reviewed following the procedures laid out in a lustration law.6 This criterion takes into account that in some countries these laws were adopted but not implemented (Horne, 2011; Stan, 2009a). According to this definition, ten out of seventeen countries of East-Central Europe have had a lustration law implemented in some measure (cf. Table 1). For instance, while Czechoslovakia and Germany adopted and implemented the most 40 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe sweeping measures of lustration (Kosar, 2008; Schwartz, 1994), early lustration laws in Albania and Bulgaria were limited in scope (Austin and Ellison, 2008; Metodiev, 2009). Table 1: Typologizing Lustration by Country (1991-2007) Lustration Lustration Law Outcome Absent BiH; Mac; Mnt; Svk Bul (92a, 93; 98); Cro (98, 99); Hun (94b); Pol(92); Rom (97); Attempted No lustration Svn (92, 97) Adopted Alb (93); Cro (02); Pol (92, 06); Srb (03); Svn (94) Alb (91, 92, 93, 95, 98); Bul (92b, 97; 02); CZE (91) and Cz (92); Implemented Est (95); GDR (91); Hun (94a, 96); Lat (94, 95); Ltu (91, 98, 99, Lustration 07); Pol (97); Rom (06) Note: Country Abbreviations. ALB Albania; BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina; BUL Bulgaria; CRO Croatia; CZ The Czech Republic; CZE Czechoslovakia; EST Estonia; GDR the German Democratic Republic; HUN Hungary; LAT Latvia; LTU Lithuania; MAC The Republic of Macedonia; MNT Montenegro; POL Poland; ROM Romania; SRB Serbia; SVK Slovakia; SVN Slovenia. Discrepancies among the different sources have been harmonized (Closa Montero, 2010; Horne, 2011; Rožič and Nisnevich, 2015, Stan, 2009a, Stan and Nedelsky, 2015). Non-implementation, the second possible outcome, can occur in three different ways. For example, some lustration laws were declared partly or fully unconstitutional by constitutional courts (as Poland in 1992 or Hungary 1994), or struck down by a presidential veto (as in Poland in 2002) or the parliament (as in Bulgaria in 1995). In cases where lustration laws have been rejected after having been approved by the legislature we define a lustration law as ‘adopted.’7 This category includes cases where a lustration law was passed but was not implemented. Finally, we code cases as ‘absent’ of lustration if a state has never tried to pass lustration laws. Certain cases are more difficult to code than others. For example, we code Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovakia as cases where lustration was ‘absent’. In 1996, post- independence Slovakia dropped a 1991 lustration law it had inherited from Czechoslovakia. While Slovakia has embraced an ‘active process of dealing with the past’ (Ursachi, 2007: 68), as an independent state it has not stipulated any legal sanctions against the implicated persons nor has it used political punishments to bar them from running for or remaining in public office. By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina implemented comprehensive vetting measures after the 1992–95 war (Fithen, 2009). However, this mechanism for screening local police forces and electoral candidates was imposed by the international community and ignored the communist era (Elster, 1998). Bosnian approach does not fit the definition of lustration, since it is not a political mechanism of transitional justice addressing collective responsibility for past abuses (Kritz, 2002). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 41 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Since ‘absent,’ ‘attempted’ and ‘adopted’ all refer to states where lustration laws have not come into force, this allows us to apply a binary coding procedure that defines lustration as ‘implemented’ or ‘non-implemented’. While dichotomization is conceptually and theoretically useful, it reduces the variation in the strength of lustration policies. In order to mitigate this problem, we provide an additional robustness check adapting multi-value conceptualization approaches to lustration. Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we outline the theoretical developments that legitimized political approaches to transitional justice, including lustration. Since the Nuremburg trials (1945–46) and the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann (1961–62) transitional justice has become the focus of scholars and practitioners alike. In trying to understand why the past matters for transitional justice and how it affects lustration, we have to examine the historical and theoretical conditions that made this approach to transitional justice possible. 3 The Theoretical Underpinnings of Transitional Justice Our focus on the impact of historical legacies emphasizes how the persisting effects of important past experiences limit the scope of current actions and can account for lustration in contemporary politics. While scholars agree on the explanatory importance of the past, there is no consensus on how and why it matters for lustration. Although historical legacies are ‘slippery’ (Kopstein, 2003: 233), we argue that they affect political actors by shaping both the cognitive context and the institutional environments in which they make their decisions. Although these frameworks are somewhat malleable, they are surprisingly resilient and have lasting repercussions. Variations in past experiences help to explain lustration because the region’s overlapping historical legacies shape the preferences of political actors as well as the constraints on their choices. Legacies represent those ‘patterns of behaviour or thought that are transmitted from the past and enacted in the present’ (Kubik, 2003: 318). Our historical model assumes that the decision to lustrate is affected by manifold institutional legacies that remain stable over time.8 Drawing on debates in political, social and legal theory, we argue that three past structural factors suffice to explain lustration in East-Central Europe: membership in the Warsaw Pact, previous democratic experience, and the level of oppression in the previous regime. Membership in the Warsaw Pact As an approach that focuses on the past behaviour of individuals, lustration is linked to an understanding of personal responsibility. In the modern process of individuation, everyday decisions link the past actions of the self to the present. Since decisions made in the past determine individuality, the concept of life history takes on a crucial role (Durkheim, 1968; Kierkegaard, 1987; Taylor, 1991). Modern individuals maintain the self by appropriating their actions and carrying them into the future. 42 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Acknowledgement of the past can only function as a principle of individuation if unique individuals are willing to take responsibility for their actions. Although they may exhibit regret, free agents are expected to acknowledge and take responsibility for their actions (Erikson, 1980). Members of modern societies are obligated to remember, appropriate and thematize the past, even if they repudiate it in the present. Jürgen Habermas notes that ‘self-consciousness is articulated not as the self-relation of a knowing subject but as the ethical self-reassurance of an accountable person’ (Habermas, 1992: 168, emphasis in original). By taking personal responsibility for their actions individuals vouch for their identity, establishing the continuity of the self over time. Membership in the Warsaw Pact is crucial in understanding the adoption of lustration, because the influence the Soviet Union exercised through this agreement made it possible for individuals in its satellite states to interpret communism as an imposition from the outside. Like individuals, who seek to rid themselves of responsibility for their actions by citing extenuating circumstances such as coercion, whole societies can cite foreign influence in an attempt to abrogate responsibility for past actions. Thus authoritarian rule can be written off as an illegitimate outside imposition (Linz, 1978). While it is not clear if the ‘obeying orders’ argument succeeds, as individuals can be assumed to have reflected on and endorsed the procedure they were following before executing its commands (Chiu, 2011), this does not change its political utility. Within the Warsaw Pact, the communist secret police was often perceived as an extension of the KGB. This facilitated the lustration of individuals who could be accused of betraying the nation to a foreign power. Working with the KGB thus ‘amounted to working with the representative of an occupying force’ (Nalepa, 2010). This argument is especially viable in areas like the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, which experienced a harsh crackdown in 1968. Although this raises issues of national identity formation and collaboration with an occupier, it creates a very different dynamic than in the former Yugoslav republics or Albania, where communism ruled with comparatively little outside influence.9 Prior Experience of Democracy The increasing individuation of society and its demand of accountability for the past bolster ideas of legal and political responsibility. These principles were strengthened in the wake of World War II. After the horrors of Auschwitz and the Nazi regime, the jurists at Nuremburg were faced with the task of punishing acts they wanted to condemn, but for which no legal basis existed. In order to overcome the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (‘no crime, no wrongdoing without the law’), the Nuremburg Charter (1945) created a legal category not bound by prohibitions against retroactive justice. Using ‘a set of novel principles of law’ (Schwelb, 1949: 178) the Charter declared that ‘Crimes against humanity: namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts’ could be prosecuted ‘whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated’ (Nuremberg Tribunal, 1947: I.11). Principle II of the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 43 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Nuremburg Principles codified many of the sociological developments in the understanding of individuation and the responsibility of individuals for their life histories into law. ‘The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law’ (UN International Law Commission, 1950: par. 97). Holding individuals responsible for crimes that were not illegal when they were committed was a bold step in the protection of human rights. Without it lustration would not be possible. These developments are intimately connected with the underlying assumptions of representative democracy, which sees society as the product of individuals acting under the influence of their consciences. In order to participate in the processes of opinion- and will-formation through the public sphere, civil society and institutions of government, democratic citizens must be capable of forming and taking responsibility for their actions (Habermas, 1996). In addition to their formal rights, citizens must be both capable and have the opportunity to discover and affirm their interests – a requirement Robert Dahl called ‘enlightened understanding’ (Dahl, 1989). This conception of democracy increases the existing responsibility of citizens to reflect on the legal regime and to disobey laws or orders if these go against their conscience. In a representative democracy individuals are neither cogs in the machine of state nor indistinguishable parts of a giant, corporatist body politic (Arendt, 1951). Instead, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, they are expected to think for themselves (Kant, 2006). John Stuart Mill observed that since ‘the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded, when the person himself is able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them’ (2008: 245). The dangers involved in punishing the innocent through measures that rely on collective guilt can be overcome by creating differential penalties based on the positions and responsibilities of individuals within the collective (Alexander, 1983; Offe, 1993). While oppressive political systems can subdue the assertive behaviour encouraged by free institutions, democratic experience before communism makes individuals more aware and resentful of human rights violations. It also increases the probability that individuals and societies will renew their self-protecting habits by prosecuting rights violations once they are given the chance to do so. In debating lustration, some of the post-communist states in Europe explicitly referred to interwar democratic experience as legitimating transitional justice (Harrison, 2003). Overall, post-communist countries with a ‘distinct pre-communist history and Western political culture to fall back on were also the ones to pursue transitional justice most vigorously’ (Stan, 2009b: 241). We thus expect the states of East-Central Europe that have a pre-communist experience of democracy to pursue lustration to prevent the re-emergence of authoritarian structures. 44 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Past Oppression Although the post-war developments concerning personal responsibility mostly involve legal-criminal adjudication (Douglas, 2001; Shklar, 1964), they are important in legitimating political measures such as lustration. In addition to laying the foundations for individual responsibility for past crimes, these principles held the ruling party collectively to account for the crimes committed under its leadership. During the occupation of Germany, the Allied Control Council in Berlin issued a series of ‘Denazification directives’, excluding individuals from employment without trial or criminal indictment based solely on their status as high-ranking party members. This kind of purging often occurs in democracies, where incoming administrations often release large portions of the civil service to mark a break with the past (Chiu, 2011). However, such turnover differs from transitional justice in that it is not the product of legal requirements and does not imply responsibility for any wrongdoing. The post-war denazification efforts have served as a model for other transitions ever since. For example, after 1974 Greece purged the state apparatus and the military of the members of the junta regime. Under the U.S. influence, Iraq also carried out de- Ba’athification in 2003. These and other efforts to hold the ruling elite or party members accountable were based on the principle that taking responsibility for one’s past as an individual is not something one can do in isolation from others. Jeffrey Blustein notes that ‘people are often motivated to take responsibility for their past because others… hold them responsible’ (Blustein, 2008: 69, emphasis in original). The idea that individuals and ruling elites can be held responsible for their actions under the previous political system also originated in the aftermath of World War II. The horror generated by this ‘radical evil’ has continued to drive the application of these new legal principles (Kant, 1934). Since lustration builds on the idea that party members can be held responsible for the crimes of the previous regime, states where the authoritarian regime exerted greater control and committed more numerous crimes are expected to adopt lustration laws. The oppressive nature – the ‘harshness’ or ‘nastiness’ of the communist regime – thus emerges as a crucial factor in the adoption of lustration (Ekiert, 1996; Grzymała-Busse, 2002). When state oppression was less harsh, we expect to find no lustration in the subsequent post-communist regime. On the other hand, widespread human rights abuses including the levels of police state or of penetration of the secret police in society may increase the demand for justice (Elster, 1998). Although it may be related to membership in the Warsaw Pact, we treat the oppressiveness of the Communist regime as a separate causal condition. While it could be argued that the members of the Warsaw pact experienced harsher communist regimes on the whole, there are important exceptions. For example, communism was significantly less harsh in Hungary that in Albania, which for most of the communist period was DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 45 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe outside the Warsaw Pact. Conversely, in Slovakia communism was perceived as less harsh despite Czechoslovak membership in the Pact (Nedelsky, 2004). While lustration is a political, not a legal-criminal measure, the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 set the precedent for holding bureaucrats responsible for their criminal acts on behalf of the ancien régime (Arendt, 2006 [1963]). Many of the lustration laws in post-communist Europe build on the precedents set in Jerusalem by screening and proceeding even against ‘the lower ranks of the state bureaucracy’ (Karstedt, 1998: 16). These historical developments in political, social and legal theory explain approaches to justice that ignore historical injustices are unpalatable to most transitional societies. In an era where individuation is based on the construction of a coherent life history, neither societies nor individuals can set aside whole decades of the recent past. In order to understand how the past affects lustration, we must interpret it through the theoretical and legal principles that underlie this form of transitional justice. Alternative Explanations: Crushed Uprising and Transition In addition to these three explanatory factors, we also take other possible variables suggested by the existing literature into consideration. The first factor focuses on the occurrence of a violent crush of massive organized dissent. As expressions of the unmediated will of the population to work together to create a new political beginning, suppressed popular uprisings are powerful reminders of regime’s oppressive nature and of the people’s desire to take control of their government (Arendt, 1951). The experience of a crushed popular revolt may help to persuade nascent democracies to remove individuals associated with the communist regime from the political arena. Advocates of lustration have often referred to the examples of the uprising in Eastern Germany in 1953, of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Prague Invasion of 1968, the putting down of Croatian Spring in 1971, and the Polish marshal law of 1981. For instance, in Czechoslovakia the contemporary considerations of the Prague spring have led to an informal but influential theory of the ‘two communisms’, sharply distinguishing the regimes before and after 1968 (Elster, 1998). Including a causal condition accounting for significant suppressed uprisings could explain the presence of lustration in these cases. While this factor captures the nature of oppression discussed above, a sudden crush of massive dissent produces different effects from the broad penetration of the secret police in society or the degree of regime complicity. Since political competitiveness, public opposition, and forms of massive expression of discontent are pillars of democratic culture, the experience of a violently crushed protest movement may persuade nascent democracies to remove those responsible for past repression from the political arena. Another set of explanatory factors concerns the type of political and economic transition from communism. The mode of transition may impact the types of institutions that develop. For example, the level of continuity of the old regime’s various elites may 46 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe explain the choice to lustrate. This claim relies on the assumption that institutional choice becomes a strategy by which elite actors seek to gain access to power resources, which in turn affects transitional justice. In order to account for the potential impact of elite turnover on lustration at the time of regime change, we adopt two proxy variables. The first is the balance-of-power at the first election (McFaul, 2002). The second measures elite displacement as a result of the democratic transition (Fish, 1997). Both correspond to other indices of elite change, communist displacement and continuity (Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995). In addition to its political and social ramifications, post-communist transitions produced simultaneous economic reforms. The speed of democratization after 1989 correlates with economic liberalization. For instance, states that were more developed before the transition and those that grew faster immediately following the fall of communism implemented a greater degree of democracy (Fidrmuc, 2003). As a result, they may also exhibit a greater propensity to lustrate. To account for this explanation, we include a causal condition for the pace of liberalization from 1989 to 1991 (see Table A.1 in Appendix). Finally, social capital is often credited with sustaining transitional justice. We test if social trust sustains lustration through the support for the current political regime. Support for the new regime at the time of transition could explain lustration since the new regimes are perceived as breaking with the past (David, 2011). 4 Testing the Effects of the Past on Lustration We analyse the effects of historical legacies on lustration using the methodology of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Our findings are based on new data from 17 states in East-Central Europe for the period of 1991–2007. The non-variance research design of QCA allows us to eliminate trivial factors and combining multiple conditions in causal explanations. QCA is a case-sensitive approach that leaves room for complexity through multiple conjunctural causation and equifinality, in which the same outcome can result from a combination of conditions. For example, it allows us to formulate closely related theoretical expectations as it treats them not as correlations but case-informed set- theoretical relationships (Emmenegger et al., 2013). This configurational perspective is particularly appropriate for the study of lustration, as theoretical propositions can be stated in terms of necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions (Ragin, 1987). QCA also allows us to analyse an intermediate number of cases (Rihoux and Marx, 2013). We rely on the crisp-set QCA (csQCA) methodology using conventional Boolean or dichotomized sets. This provides the simplest operationalization of relevant difference and strong analytic leverage in terms of parsimony (Rihoux et al., 2013). Although dichotomization has the disadvantage of information loss––phenomena are rarely either DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 47 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe completely present or completely absent––it allows us to apply a deterministic approach to causal inference and generate explanatory models with no contradictions and high consistency.10 Using the rules of Boolean algebra and the Quine minimization algorithm (Caramani, 2009), we are able to isolate the key and most parsimonious conditions for lustration.11 Having coded conditions dichotomously (see Table A.1, appendix, for coding criteria), we generate a truth table to illustrate the combinations of the relevant causal conditions for lustration. Each row in the table represents a given combination of past conditions that are theoretically associated with lustration (see Tables 2 and A.2-6 in online appendix). Table 2: Truth Table: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991–2007) Oppress WP IntDem Lustr Country Yes No No Yes Alb No No No No BiH, Cro Mac, Serb, Mnt, Svn Yes Yes No Yes Bul, GDR, Lith, Rom Yes Yes Yes Yes Cz, Est, Lat No Yes No Yes Hun, Pol No Yes Yes No Svk No No Yes - Yes No Yes - The csQCA Boolean minimization test shows that there are no necessary conditions for lustration in East-Central Europe. The most parsimonious or minimal formula for explaining lustration is:12 Formula 1 shows that there are two sets of sufficient conditions that explain lustration in East-Central Europe between 1991 and 2007. First, in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the former German Democratic Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, the presence of a harsh, oppressive regime logically suffices to explain the adoption of lustration laws. Second, the combination of membership in the Warsaw Pact and the absence of previous democratic experience explain lustration in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, German Democratic Republic, Lithuania and Romania. The test results also show that the model has high explanatory power as three conditions suffice to explain 10 (positive) cases, meeting the below 10 percent benchmark test (i.e., the model has less than 10% chance of being generated on random data (Rihoux et al., 2013: 180)). Furthermore, other measures point to the goodness of fit of the model used. 48 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Consistency scores for the solution amount to 100% and for both subsets of explanatory conditions expressed in the formula, consistency amounts to 1.00 (showing the extent to which the statement is consistent that the condition is sufficient for the outcome). Finally, the raw coverage of the first subset in Formula 1 is to 0.75 and of the second 0.50 (showing a high proportion of cases in which the outcome has been explained). In addition to identifying the conditions for the implementation of lustration laws, our approach allows us to account for the absence of lustration. The most parsimonious formula for explaining the absence of lustration is: According to Formula 2, there is a necessary condition for the absence of lustration. In Slovakia, which dropped the lustration measures in 1996 after its independence in 1993, as well as in all the former Yugoslav republics, the absence of a particularly harsh communist regime resulted in the absence of lustration. This necessary condition was coupled with the experience of interwar democracy in Slovakia and with the absence of significant influence of the Soviets through the Warsaw Pact in the former Yugoslav republics.13 This model also shows a high goodness of fit as the consistency of solution as well as of both subsets amounts to 1.00 while the coverage for both subsets equals 0.50. In general, these results confirm our theoretical arguments. The oppressiveness of the communist regime, previous democratic experience and membership in the Warsaw Pact explain the use of lustration in some states in post-communist Europe and its absence in others. Nevertheless, two caveats are in order. First, while the three factors we theorize are all causally important, they do not carry equal causal weight. If isolated factors were sufficient as such, our theory would predict lustration in Slovakia, since it had a pre-war democratic regime and belonged to the Warsaw Pact. However, because Slovak pre-war democratic and post-war Soviet experiences were combined with lower levels of repression, the oppressive nature of the regime outweighs the causal importance of the other factors. Second, the alternative explanations we tested – the experience of crushed dissent, regime exit and support, and education – are neither necessary nor sufficient. While these factors might be important in specific cases, they do not carry causal weight in the region as a whole (see Tables A.2-6, according to which the most parsimonious formulae are significantly longer than the results presented above). In order to provide additional confirmation for our argument, we test these results against a multi-value variable approach, relying on as few logical assumptions as possible. First, we adapt two incomplete indexes of lustration to provide additional variation on the outcome (Horne, 2011). Second, we disaggregate the scores of interwar democracy into DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 49 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe three different categories in order to account for cases that were neither democratic nor fully authoritarian.14 The multi-value QCA analysis using Stan’s index (Stan, 2009a) confirms our results. Countries with most ‘vigorous’ lustrative approaches were the ones that experienced medium to high levels of interwar democracy and high oppression (Formula 3). Those that experienced only ‘mild transitional justice’ were the ones with intermediate scores for interwar democracy (4). Countries with ‘weak’ transitional justice had no interwar experience of democracy, but belonged to the Warsaw Pact (5). The states Stan defines as having ‘resisted attempts at transitional justice’ resisted lustration because they either had a pre-war democracy but lacked oppression or lacked the Warsaw Pact membership but were oppressed (6). The analysis of the negative cases we introduced earlier yields identical results (as to in 6). Using Letki’s index (2002) we find that the states that ‘sufficiently lustrated’ their past have an intermediate score for interwar democracy combined with harsh oppression or membership in the Warsaw Pact (7). Next, an accordingly low or high level of interwar democracy is sufficient to explain what Letki calls the ‘insufficiently lustrated’ outcomes in Poland, Rumania and Slovakia (8).15 The ‘non-lustrated’ countries experienced the lowest levels of interwar democracy (9). 5 Conclusions and Extensions Our argument is open to two different readings. On one level, we identify the most salient aspects of the communist past in the contemporary politics of the states in East-Central Europe. For example, the combined historical legacies of the Warsaw Pact membership and the absence of pre-authoritarian democracy affected several post-communist 50 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe regimes’ lustration outcomes (cf. Formula 1). While Bulgaria, Hungary or Poland historically did not have a particularly democratic regime before the arrival of communism, their elites did use explicitly and frequently the ‘occupation’ argument. They referred to the occupying foreign KGB legacies stemming from their Warsaw Pact membership (Leffler, 1992; Trachtenberg, 1999). On a deeper level, our analysis indicates that high levels of state-sanctioned oppression are crucial in enabling democratizing political elites to carry out lustration in the present. The oppressiveness of the ancien régime explains seven out of the ten cases where lustration was successfully implemented and all of the cases where lustration did not occur. On the one hand, in several of countries exiting a less oppressive communist regime implemented only a mild form of political retribution. On the other, the Albanian, Czech and other post-communist governments referred to their oppressive past elites as highly threatening to the new order and thus needy of lustration. Both the strong and the weak reading of our analysis show that the past is a crucial factor in understanding lustration as a regional phenomenon in post-communist Europe. As is true of many studies, this one raises more questions than it answers. The most interesting regards the extent to which these findings can be applied to other areas of transitional justice. For example, do they hold for other approaches to transitional justice and countries transitioning from non-communist regimes? It may be that the oppressive nature of any regime, not just a communist one, affects the implementation of transitional justice. Similarly, previous democratic experience may be an important factor for all states transitioning to democracy. Even membership in the Warsaw Pact, a historical factor specific to East-Central Europe, may have broader significance as a proxy for foreign influence in general. Answering these questions will require further research in the exciting new research program into transitional justice. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 51 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Appendix Coding Criteria and Dichotomization Thresholds The following criteria (cf. Table A.1) offer rules for determining the thresholds that inform the Truth table 2. Table A.1: Overview of Conditions, Outcomes and Coding Thresholds Condition Abbr. Binary Coding Source(s) yes, if at least one lustration law is Lustration Lustr Authors; See Table 1 implemented yes, if average Polity 2 score higher Authors, relying on Pop-Eleches Interwar Democracy IntDem than 2 throughout 1919-1938 (2007) yes, if massive organized dissent was Crushed Dissent Crush Authors crushed by regime yes, if Warsaw Pact member until Warsaw Pact WP Authors 1990 yes, if average Polity 2 score is lower than -7 for the period of each Authors; Calculations based on Oppression Oppress country’s communist rule; CZ and Polity2 and CIRI SVK are coded differently yes (more reform), if a value on Fish’s index of displacement of Elites Displacement Displ former communist incumbents in (Fish 1997) first elections is above the mean of 4.37 yes, if after the first multiparty legislative elections the balance of Power Balance at Bal power is in favor of the anti- McFaul, 200216 Transition communists and victory represents more than 60 percent of the vote yes, if the 1989-91 pace of Authors; Calculations based on Liberalization pace Lib liberalization is above the median of Fidrmuc, 2003 (EBRD indicators 0.3 of progress) yes, if the public support for the new post-communist system of Support Regime Sup Rose, 2007 government is above the median of 55 yes, if the percent of gross enrolment Data on tertiary school enrolment Tertiary Education Edu is higher than the median of the 17 in 1986 from the WDI dataset states selected (17.7) ((World Bank 2012)) Note: Despite the fact that several countries have adopted several lustration laws, we assign a positive value on the outcome only once. Our assumption is that the past factors do not account for differences within different lustration laws of a country. Threshold for Hypothesis 2 (Interwar Democracy) Using Polity 2 scores (Marshall et al. 2006) for the entire 1919-1938 period, we code countries {YES} when they have an average Polity score above ‘2’, which for example assigns {NO} to Hungary. We justify the dichotomization of data for the prewar 52 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe democracy from relevant empirical sources (Capoccia 2005; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1996; Pop-Eleches 2007). Threshold for Hypothesis 3 (Past Oppression) Using Polity 2 scores,17 we compute an average score for the entire period of each country’s communist rule. We assign a positive {YES} value to regimes with an average Polity score lower than ‘-6.9.’18 According to these scores, for example, the former Czechoslovakia (-6.8) was less oppressed than Bulgaria (-6.91) but more than former Yugoslav republics (-6.56). According to these scores, the difference between CZE and less oppressive regimes is so significant that we code CZE as oppressive and former Yugoslav republics as not. Moreover, based on substantive grounds, we assign an oppressive, {YES} level to the Czech Republic (and not to Slovakia, for which the Polity score was calculated only as a part of Czechoslovakia) since the literature suggest a harsher totalitarian regime in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia (Linz and Stepan 1996; Nedelsky 2009).19 Table A.2: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991-2007), Rows with Cases Oppress WP IntDem Crush Lustr Country Yes No No No Yes Alb No No No No No BiH, Mac, Serb, Mnt, Svn Yes Yes No No Yes Bul, Lith, Rom No No No Yes No Cro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cz Yes Yes Yes No Yes Est, Lat Yes Yes No Yes Yes GDR No Yes No Yes Yes Hun, Pol No Yes Yes No No Svk DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 53 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Table A.3: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991-2007), Rows with Cases Oppress WP IntDem Crush Displ Bal Lustr Country Yes No No No No No Yes Alb No No No No No Yes No BiH, Svn Yes Yes No No No No Yes Bul No No No Yes Yes Yes No Cro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cz Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Est, Lat Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes GDR No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Hun, Pol Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Lith No No No No No No No Mac, Mnt, Serb Yes Yes No No No No Yes Rom No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Svk Table A.4: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991-2007), Rows with Cases Oppress WP IntDem Crush Displ Bal Lib Lustr Country Yes No No No No No No Yes Alb Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Bul No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Cro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cz Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Est, Lat No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Hun, Pol Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Lith No No No No No No No No Mac,/Mnt,/Serb(Lib:0) Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Rom No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Svk No No No No No Yes No No Svn, /BiH(Lib:0) No No No No No Yes Yes No /BiH(Lib:1) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes /GDR(Lib:0) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes /GDR(Lib:1) No No No No No No Yes No Mnt,/Serb(Lib:1) 54 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe Table A.5: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991-2007), Rows with Cases Oppress WP IntDem Crush Displ Bal Sup Lustr Country Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Bul Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cz Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Est, Lat No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Hun Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Lith No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Pol Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Rom No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Svk No No No No No Yes No No Svn, /BiH(Sup:0) Yes No No No No No No Yes /Alb(Sup:0) Yes No No No No No Yes Yes /Alb(Sup:1) No No No No No Yes Yes No /BiH(Sup:1) No No No Yes Yes Yes No No /Cro(Sup:0) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No /Cro(Sup:1) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes /GDR(Sup:0) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes /GDR(Sup:1) No No No No No No No No /Mac,/Mnt,/Serb(Sup:0) No No No No No No Yes No /Mac,/Mnt,/Serb(Sup:1) Table A.6: Legacies and Lustration by Country (1991-2007), Rows with Cases Oppress WP IntDem Crush Displ Bal Edu Lustr Country Yes No No No No No No Yes Alb Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Bul No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Cro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Cz No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Hun, Pol Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Lat,/Est(Edu:1) Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Lith No No No No No No Yes No Mac,/Mnt,/Serb(Edu:1) Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Rom No No No No No Yes Yes No Svn, /BiH(Edu:1) No No No No No Yes No No /BiH(Edu:1) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes /Est(Edu:0) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes /GDR(Edu:0) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes /GDR(Edu:1) No No No No No No No No /Mnt,/Serb(Edu:0) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No /Svk(Edu:0) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No /Svk(Edu:1) DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 55 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe We add to the existing hypotheses and to the tables above an alternative explanation on the role of education and its potential impact on lustration. While education is associated with democracy in general terms,20 it may have an inverse relationship to lustration. Higher education may lead to more tolerance towards the “tainted” personnel. Moreover, shortly before the transition, certain states proved to have higher rates of tertiary education enrollment ratio than the countries that moved to democracy more quickly. We treat this hypothesis as an alternative explanation only as it does not add significantly to our argument. Notes: 1 Lustration was pioneered by Czechoslovakia based on Greek ( catharsis) and Roman ( lustratio) purification rituals. In Czechoslovak secret police, ‘lustrace’ was a counter-intelligence program designed to root out spies by screening individuals who were suspicious to the Communist Party and its secret services. After the fall of communism, the significance of the term was reversed to describe the process of weeding out members of the old nomenklatura. 2 Since much of the relevant literature is based on lustration in Europe between 1991 and 2007, we also work within this framework, which allows us to test existing hypotheses. As the end of a significant period of accession to the European Union (EU) with the entry of Bulgaria and Romania, 2007 represented an important milestone. In complying with the EU rules and procedures, post- communist elites lustrated their ranks without being asked to do so by the EU. The externally influenced democratization process may have opened a window of opportunity for domestic elites to use lustration before their respective countries became part of the EU. We restrict our analysis to those countries of post-communist East-Central Europe (17) that have been seriously considering accession to the EU since 1991, or have been in principle able to do so in regards to the restrictive EU accession standards. These criteria exclude countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and others. 3 Author’s Interview, Prague, October 05 2011. Anonymity required by the interviewee. 4 The omission of present factors does not constitute an omitted variable problem, even if they are relevant to a small number of cases in probabilistic methods. Since our approach is logical (i.e., deterministic), we are able to isolate and test crucial past factors without diminishing the potential role of the present factors. By using a deterministic model, we point to multiple causation by determining past inferences from all the possible cases across East-Central Europe. 5 In addition to lustration, states in East-Central Europe have sought to decrease the influence of the former Communist Party by using different means such as confiscating its property, penalizing the use of communist propaganda, and opening communist files to the public. Yet, while access to the files might be necessary to carry out lustration, merely granting access to classified documents is insufficient. Lustration must target individual occupants or candidates of important public positions and can sanction the individual based on the information received. 6 Our definition of ‘implemented’ lustration does not exclude the fact that in some countries partial lustration was conducted with specific potential political gains in mind. By these gains a selective lustration would implicate a competing political party, while members of the ruling party are shielded from the consequences of the process. 7 The category “adopted” refers to instances of a lustration law being enacted by a parliament or an executive body but not put into action. The non-implementation in these cases could be a consequence of a subsequent judicial, executive or legislative decision or of weak political will and 56 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe - poor institutional capacity. In Serbia, for example, soon after the 2003 adoption of a lustration bill, the law became a dead letter. In order to count as “implemented,” specific institutions must be carrying out the implementation of an adopted program (XXX1, 2012). 8 This view of historical legacies––as rather stable, homogenous and singular––may resemble “unproblematic” realist theories. However, as this essay shows, legacies are less monolithic and more frangible as societal and political actors are often affected by multiple legacies, as laid out under various hypotheses below. 9 The political arrangements covered by the membership in the Warsaw Pact were not all equal among the country members. For example, while Romania was a member state, it did not take part in the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 or boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. However, in order to explain the results through a dichotomous measure, we code the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact as ‘1’ or ‘yes’ (see Table A.1. Appendix). 10 The consistency measure captures the degree to which a configuration of explanatory conditions explains an outcome: higher consistency indicates higher validity of the analysed exploratory model (see Rihoux et al., 2013). 11 We use the tabulation method of the Quine algorithm for minimization of our Boolean values, as coded in Table A.1. Applying the Quine minimization process, causal factors that are trivial across seventeen cases drop out. Using a software program TOSMANA, we first find the prime implicants of our Boolean functions and then find the essential implicants to cover the function (see Rihoux and De Meur 2009). We use a similar logical method for the multi-value testing (see formulae 3- 9). The results we provide in the paper report the most parsimonious solutions for all the models and the most “complex” solutions for the main model. 12 As a result of the Boolean minimization, a minimal or parsimonious formula is the most simple to characterize, i.e., with the fewest explanatory conditions involved, by including logical remainders for reduction. The parsimonious solution permits the use of any remainder that will yield fewer causal conditions. We can also report the most complex solution, which avoids counterfactual cases by excluding logical remainders (rows without cases, rows 7-8 in Table 2). Since the consistency test score for the “oppression” condition is 100% and since the most parsimonious test did not drop “oppression” (i.e., as necessary), there is high degree of confidence that the parsimonious formula is not too parsimonious and therefore appropriate for evaluation. 13 Several authors exclude the cases in former Yugoslav republics assuming that Yugoslavia’s post- conflict situation renders it unique in the region. However, Slovenia experienced a very short conflict and still did not lustrate its past. Lack of membership in the Warsaw Pact cannot explain the Yugoslav exceptionalism since Yugoslavia was not the only communist state outside the influence of the Warsaw pact. 14 Based on Polity 2 scores for the interwar period, we introduce a “medium” democracy score for East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania. 15 While logically and mathematically consistent, this parsimonious formula (8) is theoretically troubling as it explains the relative weakness of lustration policies in Romania, Poland and Slovakia through a sufficient condition of interwar democracy regardless of its level. This empirical result additionally exposes the contested coding procedures that we have avoided by our operationalization of lustration. 16 McFaul’s typology is based on the first multi-party legislative elections that determined the composition of a state’s legislature for 1989–92. Various elections demonstrated the balance of power in favour of the ancien régime, of the challengers, or it remained unclear or even (the middle category). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 57 P. Rožič & P. J. Verovšek:. Historical Legacies and Political Accountability: Lustration in Post-communist Europe - 17 We take the average Polity 2 score for both time periods as a proxy for democracy in first and oppression in the second. Since such averaging could be very sensitive to the specific choice of the time period, we perform robustness checks to the extent the data are available. For example, the “extrajudicial killings” variable of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI), is highly correlated to our dichotomous variable of oppression (r = 0.94). The CIRI’s variable represents a relevant robustness check as extrajudicial killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). However, the data available for CIRI are from 1980 onwards only––which compels us to use Polity2 instead. 18 In order to maximize the number of comparisons in this small-N study across the cases under investigation, we rely on the binary logic of Boolean algebra. This choice constrains us to use variables with only two categories from the continuous “polity2” variable, determining the values of the variable. 19 Based on this literature, we do not claim that Slovakia, for instance, lacked oppression during the communist regime but that the level of suppression there was lower than in the Czech lands, which were more oppressed than countries such as Hungary (Polity 2 average score of -6.43) or Poland (- 6.56) (XXX1, 2012). 20 According to Lipset, “education presumably broadens peoples’ outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices” (Lipset, 1959: 79). Others have followed this line of thought and found that educated people are more likely to reject authoritarian alternatives to democracy (See Almond and Verba, 1963; Dalton, 1988). References: Alexander, L. 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World Bank (2012) World Development Indicators 2012. 16th edition ed. (Washington DC: World Bank). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 MAŁGORZATA LORENCKA, MAŁGORZATA MYŚLIWIEC & WALDEMAR WOJTASIK 1 Abstract A political system is a dynamic formation, changing both internally and at the level of relations with the environment. This paper introduces the key planes of evolution of the political system in Poland. Its study hypothesis assumes the relationship between the theoretical framework of democratic transformation and the form of the ultimate systemic solutions in Poland. The authors analyse the current changes occurring in relations between the institutions of legislative and executive authority. The context of the paper is the system change promised by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) after the 2015 election won by the party. This change is supposed to affect the bodies such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the judiciary, and special services. Keywords: • political system • Poland • party system • electoral system CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Małgorzata Lorencka, Ph.D., University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Developed Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: malgorzata.lorencka@us.edu.pl. Małgorzata Myśliwiec, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Developed Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: malgorzata.mysliwiec@us.edu.pl. Waldemar Wojtasik, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Developed Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: waldemar.wojtasik@us.edu.pl. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.5 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 62 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 1 Introduction The democratisation experiences after 1989 in Central Europe are largely connected with evolution processes of political systems. The ultimate form of democratic practice involves the construction of institutional order in the state, its adaptation to the changing internal and external conditions, and the search for the best solutions from among ideal ones and the ones that are politically feasible. Solutions adopted at the beginning of political transformation (often directly drawing on theoretical models) were very quickly tested in the specific local circumstances and quickly changing democratic political culture. As a result, the original institutional solutions of political systems have been considerably transformed since then. The initial form of institutions in Polish political system was the combination of the possible change of socialist model solutions and the democratic experiences from the 1918–1939 period. The peaceful and transactional character of system change in the beginning led to limited implementation of democratic models, and some of the adopted solutions even did not fit the inventory of political pluralism (Wojtasik, 2013: 25–38). But this allowed to largely avoid the phase of democratic experiments and pointless search for an ideal model. The specific mode of Polish democratisation also meant earlier introduction (even before 1989) of some institutions of democratic political system, which were to imitate solutions known from consolidated democracies. These include the State Tribunal (in 1982) and Constitutional Tribunal (in 1985). The paper introduces the key elements of evolution of the political system in Poland. Its study hypothesis assumes the relationship between the theoretical framework of democratic transformation and the form of the current systemic solutions in Poland. The authors look for the answers to the following study questions: (1) What is the tradition of Polish political system operating under the democratic regime? (2) What is the relation between the democratic transition model and the form of political system in Poland? (3) Does the change in relationships between legislative and executive authorities in Poland fit the mode of departure from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism? (4) How does the electoral system influence the formation of the party system? (5) How real is a non- democratic change after the 2015 election? 2 Tradition and Transition The loss of independence, which became the reality of Poland after three partitions in 1772, 1793 and 1795, still affects the operation of the political system of the state. The lack of possibility to form, develop and consolidate original patterns of the structure of legislative, executive and judicial branches, relationships between these three segments of power, and their relationship with the environment of the Polish political system in the nineteenth century meant that after the regaining of independence in 1918, Poland had to use patterns created in other European states. Basing on models formed, developed and DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 63 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 consolidated in very different historical, social, economic and even geographical realities, combined with the necessity to merge lands functioning for over than 120 years in different political realities in a single state, resulted in political and constitutional instability of the Second Polish Republic. The efforts to create the Polish political system formally began in 1918 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1918 no. 1 item 1; Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1918 no. 2 item 2; Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1918 no. 12 item 24; Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1918 no. 17 item 39). In 1919, the so-called Small Constitution established the committee system of governance (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1919 no. 19 item 226). It meant that the highest authority of the state was comparable to the Sejm (the unicameral central parliament), whose political decisions were executed by the Chief of the State (politically accountable to the Parliament) and the Council of Ministers. However, it was a temporary solution, requiring further detailed regulations. The text of the first full Constitution of the Second Republic was adopted by the Polish Parliament on 17 March 1921 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1921 no. 44 item 267). The political system established by its regulations, was modelled on the parliamentary system of French Third Republic. The Constitution established a bicameral parliament with the Sejm as the first chamber and the Senate as the second one. The position of the Parliament was superior to the other authorities of the state. In certain cases both chambers were united to form the National Assembly, whose most important competence was to elect the President of the state and to periodically revise the Constitution. The term of the Sejm lasted five years. The term of the Senate began and ended with the term of the Sejm. The Constitution did not specify the number of deputies to the first chamber (it depended on regulations of the electoral law), and the number of Senate members had to be equal to 1/4 of the number of deputies. The legislative initiative corresponded to that of the Government and members of the Sejm. The Senate did not have this competence, but it had the right of a suspensory veto and amendments to the bill. The Council of Ministers had to get a vote of confidence from the Sejm before starting to perform its duties. It was also politically and constitutionally accountable to the first chamber of the Parliament. The President was elected for a seven-year term by the National Assembly, by an absolute majority of votes. However, the catalogue of the President's political competences was very limited and characteristic of the head of state in the parliamentary political system. It is also worth mentioning that the Constitution of 1921 announced the establishment of extensive self-government. In the first years of its existence, the Second Polish Republic was based on the idea of parliamentary system in the horizontal aspect, and the idea of wide decentralisation in the vertical division of political power. The Constitution announced political will to grant all Polish regions (organised in voivodeships) a wide catalogue of competences, modelled on those in the Silesian Voivodeship on the basis of the Constitutional Law adopted by the Polish Parliament on 15 July 1920 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1920 no. 73 item 497). 64 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 In the mid 1920s, disputes between deputies of different parties represented in the Polish Parliament caused many political crises. That situation caused disappointment and criticism of the parliamentary system. Besides, due to the multinational composition of the Second Republic and a significant increase of financial needs of the political centre, many of its representatives started to present a negative attitude to the idea of wide decentralisation. The result of this state of political matters was the May Coup carried out by Marshal Józef Piłsudski between the12th and 14th May 1926. The military action made possible the amendment of Constitution (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1926 no. 78 item 442). It strengthened significantly the position of the President. The President was among others granted the right to dissolve the Parliament and to publish his own decrees having the force of law. The amendment of 1926 also opened the possibility to liquidate the autonomy of Silesian Voivodeship. This way, Poland started its evolution towards the authoritarian system with a strong position of the head of state. The legal basis of the presidential system in Poland was the Constitution adopted by the Parliament on 23 April 1935 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1935 no. 30 item 227). Its legal provisions guaranteed the central position of the head of state in the new political system. The President was elected for a seven-year term by the Assembly of Electors (made up of presidents of both chambers of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the first President of the Supreme Court, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces and 75 electors chosen from among the worthiest citizens by the Sejm (50) and the Senate (25)). However, the leaving President had the right to indicate his candidate for the office. In that case, a general election had to take place and the voting citizens had to choose between the presidential candidate and the candidate of the Assembly of Electors. In the new Constitution, the President received a superior authority in relation to the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. He was not politically or constitutionally accountable to the Parliament (he was only àccountable before God and history`). The Constitution gave him the prerogative to publish decrees having the force of law without the requirement of the countersignature of respective ministers; he could appoint the Prime Minister and ministers, convene and dissolve the Sejm and the Senate, and set deadlines for their sessions. He also had the right to appoint his successor in the period of war. At the same time, the political competence of the Parliament was radically limited. The constitutional heritage of the Second Polish Republic had no significance for the political reality of the People's Republic of Poland established after the Second World War. The Small Constitution of 19 February 1947 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1947 no. 18 item 71) and then the Constitution of 22 July 1952 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1952 no. 33 item 232) established a non-democratic political system modelled on the political system of the Soviet Union. However, Poland was never transformed into a fully installed totalitarian regime. Careful analysis shows that some fundamental elements of the Polish politics of that period did not really fit the ideal totalitarian regime type. In the opinion of Juan José Linz: “... in each of the four key typological dimensions of totalitarianism – most clearly in pluralism but also in mobilization, ideology, and leadership – Poland DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 65 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 contained some totalitarian but never stronger authoritarian tendencies.` (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 44–45, 256). Regarding the idea of pluralism, Linz and Stepan point to the following characteristics: “No significant economic, social, or political pluralism. Official party has de jure and de facto monopoly of power. Party has eliminated almost all pre- totalitarian pluralism. No space for second economy or parallel society.` (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 44). Poland's reality never matched that description. In the area of economy, Władysław Gomułka proposed the so-called `Polish road to socialism`, based on tradition of peasant cooperatives and not on collectivised state farms. In the area of social and political pluralism, the most significant role was played by Polish Catholic Church, which maintained relative autonomy all the time between 1945 and 1989. It helped to resist the incorporation of all citizens into totalitarian structures. This first of all refers to the area of ideology. The strong attachment of many Poles to the Catholic faith helped to protect them from the influence of elaborate and guiding ideology of communism. The opportunity to participate in the activities of Church organisations and groups protected many Polish citizens from the dangers of communist mobilization. Furthermore, relative autonomy of the Polish Catholic Church gave that structure the power to negotiate with the communist regime. Another issue is the role of one party system. In the Polish reality between 1945 and 1989, Polish United Workers' Party was not the only political entity in the party system. United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) and the Alliance of Democrats (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) were recognised as its satellites, but that construction at least gave the impression of pluralism. It was also much more difficult to control the political structure divided into three parties. Besides, in that situation it was very difficult to endorse the leadership of one charismatic person. The lack of fixed patterns of political institutions and procedures, as well as non- democratic experience of the communist period, made the democratic transition process more complicated. However, according to Juan José Linz, the process initiated by the regime representatives and accepted by part of the democratic opposition should be classified as àpacted transition` (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 255). It means that in the case of Poland the more authoritarian than totalitarian character of the political regime helped to develop strong democratic opposition. Thanks to that, at the end of 1980s, part of communist leadership and part of opposition decided to start a dialogue leading to political agreement (Kowal, 2012). Between 6th February and 5th April 1989, the Round Table Talks took place in Warsaw. The political result of this event was the agreement to introduce the democratic opposition into the process of state governance, but with the leading role of representatives of the former communist regime in the process. Due to the absence of a coherent concept of the future structure of political system, the Round Table agreement opened a period of constitutional experiments. The Small Constitution of 1992 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1992 no. 84 item 426) and the Constitution of 1997 (Journal of Laws Dz.U. 1997 no. 78 item 483) constructed a very eclectic political system, modelled on different patterns used in other European states but hardly referring to the pre-war Polish tradition. Thus, for example, Poles elect the President more or less like the French do, but the President does not have the competences comparable with the French head of 66 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 state. However, the strong social legitimacy arouses to questions about the possibility of strengthening the role of President in Polish political system. The bicameral Parliament and the Council of Ministers accountable to it, created in accordance with the model similar to the German one play the key role in the political system. However, there are more and more calls for a change of that state of affairs in favour of the presidential system. 3 The Process of Parliamentarisation of the Political Regime One of fundamental democratic changes in Poland was the pluralisation of political life, whose important element was the introduction of free parliamentary elections involving real contest. Although the decision to reintroduce a bicameral parliamentary model in Poland drew on political tradition, it also resulted from the character of political contract made at the roundtable between the contemporary authorities and the democratic opposition (the roundtable negotiations took place between 6th February and 5th April 1989). A fully free Senate (upper house) election was to be a substitute for the former pluralism and at the same time provide an alibi for a contractual Sejm (lower house) election, whose result was to guarantee that the regime parties would retain their authority. The actual electoral contest involved 35% of seats in the Sejm, with the competition between representatives of the current authorities and the opposition. The initial phase of democratisation of the political system in Poland resulted in the adoption of a hybrid model (closer to authoritarian than democratic solutions). This model could probably be best defined using the concepts of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010) and transactional regime (Glajcar, 2015: 171). The adoption of arrangements concerning the procedure of parliamentary election in 1989 meant that the mechanism of democratisation stopped halfway through and there was an obvious need to complete the democratic changes in the future. The 1989 ordinance was only established for one election. The next one, planned for 1993, was to be performed on completely different conditions, without determining at the time whether the majority or proportional formula would be applied (Antoszewski, 2002: 57). In addition, the need to complete the democratisation processes triggered the need to change the Sejm election ordinance and replace it with a procedure compliant with democratic standards. The dynamics of democratisation, however, resulted in the issue of the next election receding to the background after the change of power arising from the June election. Consequently, it was left to be determined in the future. This could also have a rational basis, as the contemporary parliamentary parties did not know the future form of the political arena and thus did not know who would benefit from the adopted solutions. The forces of Solidarność could not predict whether they would be united in the subsequent election like in 1989, or whether a process of disintegration would begin. The post-communist left wing was more unsure of their future and the success of internal sanation starting with the liquidation of the Communist Polish United Workers Party ( Polska Zjednoczona DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 67 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) and the establishment of Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SdRP). The formation of a democratic political regime is based on the choice between different versions of parliamentarism and presidentialism. In Central and Eastern European countries, presidentialism was very specific. Taking into consideration the possible evolution towards authoritarianism (which did occur in Belarus and partly in Russia), post-communist countries decided to choose the model of weak presidency or presidency balanced with the power of other authorities (semi-presidentialism). The Polish case has an additional specificity due to the transitory nature of the adopted institutional solutions. It is worth emphasising that the source of this provisional character was the need to adapt to the dynamically changing situation, not the current intentions or political interests. The office of president was restored in Polish political system on the basis of the Round Table agreements, being part of a political contract ensuring the maintenance of power on the part of the regime forces. Just like in the case of contractual Sejm election, the presidential election was excluded from political competition procedure; the office was to be manned by a representative of the existing authorities, though the opposition, empowered with the success in the parliamentary election, also had a real chance of success in the contest for the presidential office. However, so as to keep the previous arrangements and to avoid the expected political crisis, the Solidarność side did not present their candidate, so the only candidate for the office of president was W. Jaruzelski. On 19th July 1989, the National Assembly elected the President. 544 deputies took part in the roll-call voting, and 537 valid votes were cast. 270 members of the National Assembly voted for Wojciech Jaruzelski, 233 were against, and 34 abstained from voting. This result (exceeding the required legal majority only by one vote) affected the style of Jaruzelski exercising his authority, especially that he was aware of his poor legitimacy and did not try to become the key figure on Polish political scene (Glajcar 2004: 153). The 1989 election served the creative function, leading to the actual establishment of a new state authority. W. Jaruzelski received the legitimacy to exercise authority (at least in the normative sense), because the choice of his candidature was the last attempt to literally perform the contract made at the Round Table (Alberski 2001: 114). This election reduced the level of political conflict at least for a time and caused some stabilisation, facilitating the performance of systemic reforms. Andrzej Antoszewski (1998: 59–60), using the change of the actual position of the head of state in relation to the parliament and government as the criterion, identifies five phases of transformation of the political regime in Poland after 1989: (1) normative (but not real) semi-presidentialism during the presidency of W. Jaruzelski; (2) normative and real semi-presidentialism during the presidency of L. Wałęsa until the Small Constitution coming into force; (3) limited semi-presidentialism after the Small Constitution coming into force; 68 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 (4) evolution towards parliamentarism after the 1995 presidential election; (5) rationalised cabinet parliamentarism pursuant to the Constitution of 1997. In order to improve the stabilisation and legitimisation of democratic change, the position of president in the system of power, especially in countries with some institutional traditions, should also be related to some historical concepts. The drafts of restoration of the office of president, proposed even in the 1980s, were such an attempt to draw on the solutions of the Second Polish Republic. The most serious one, presented and discussed in 1982, provided for the introduction into the system of People's Republic of Poland a president with quite broad competence elected in general elections. Assessing that draft from today's perspective, it can be regarded as a specific concept of PZPR's èscape forward`, as the party was losing its popularity with citizens (Ciapała, 1999: 14). However, because it would maintain the non-democratic system of power, this concept did not evoke any response on the part of democratic opposition, and the regime side itself did not treat it seriously or as a priority. Yet, it can be surmised that the political concepts of the 1980s facilitated the re-introduction of president into the political system. As a result of the transformation of Poland's political system after 1989, whose crucial moment was the adoption of a new Constitution on 2nd April 1997, a unique model of the executive was developed. Its most characteristic property is both president and prime minister having real capacity to take executive decisions. The dispute concerning the purposefulness of maintaining such solutions has already been going on for more than ten years. The authors and supporters of the solution primarily emphasise that such a system construction forces the political actors to look for a compromise, which should be treated as a constitutive element of Polish political system. Its opponents, in turn, perceive it as the main element of the state's weakness, claiming that the sharing of powers between the president and the prime minister promotes non-creative conflicts (Glajcar & Wojtasik, 2013). The model of presidency in Poland, introduced by the 1997 Constitution, is by no means `strong`. However, the principle of the head of state being elected in universal elections has been retained, which ensures the validity of the presidential office equal to that of the Sejm or Senate. Such legitimisation equality may be the reason for tensions between the parliament and the president, even though the Constitution tries to prevent them (Antoszewski, 1999: 109). The process outlined above displays the features of transition from semi-presidentialism towards parliamentarism. Anna Chorążewska (2008: 11–16) identifies the following key properties of parliamentarism: (1) dualism of the executive, expressed in the fact that apart from the head of state there is a government in the country (led by the prime minister), being an independent state authority; (2) at least partial neutralisation of the activity of the head of state, mainly expressed in the need of countersignature for some of their acts; (3) the executive has the right of legislative initiative; (4) parliamentary accountability of the executive; (5) the executive's right to dissolve the parliament. These characteristics of parliamentarism attribute the executive DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 69 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 power to two constitutionally separate but functionally connected entities: the president, and the government. In parliamentarism, the president is a kind of specific backup authority, with limited influence on the current rule and referring in their activity to the received authorisations and powers. This specificity of the systemic role of the head of state may be the result of the following factors: (1) the plebiscite character of presidential elections; (2) sharing some powers with other authorities; (3) having an inventory of personal prerogatives. 4 The Effect of the Electoral System on the Party System in Poland One of the foundations of democracy is cyclical elections, which on the one hand mean the dynamic establishment, development and demise of political parties, and on the other hand, the formation and consolidation of a party system (Antoszewski, 2002: 137). They lead to thèstructuring of the partisan scene, crystallizing large and small, ruling and opposition parties` (Turska-Kawa, 2015: 11). Thus, when analysing election results, they should be considered from institutional and procedural perspectives (Wojtasik, 2012: 14), because mutual relations between political parties are influenced by a number of factors, e.g. the legal rules of activity of political entities, or socio-economic conditions (Sobolewska-Myślik, 2004: 103–104). The democratisation of political system in Poland in 1989 led to the adoption of political pluralism principle, which ended the period of dominance of the communist party (cf. Chmaj, 2010: 357–358). On 28th July 1990, the first act on political parties was adopted. It was very general, allowing both registered and non-registered parties to function (the record model). The goal of the adopted legal solutions was to achieve the broadest possible participation in elections (e.g. of entities such as Solidarność trade union). Along with the adoption of the constitution in 1997, another act on political parties was voted through, with greater formal requirements (the registration model). These changes resulted in the development of a multipartisan system in Poland. As Andrzej Antoszewski (2002: 51) observed, the most evident characteristic of the process of development of electoral democracy in Poland is the instability of the Sejm electoral system. Out of the five parliamentary elections in the 1989–2001 period, only two were organised on the basis of the same election ordinance. Since 2005, the rules of organising elections have been similar, and they are included in the Electoral Code of 5th January 2011 (Skotnicki, 2011). The lack of stability of electoral regulations has led to greater instability of the party scene. Three stage of development can be identified in the process of party system evolution in Poland after 1989 (Wojtasik, 2009: 152–153):  the stage of disintegration of political movements in the years 1989–1993;  the stage of natural two-block character based on the influence of post-communist division in the years 1993–2004;  the stage of marginalisation of the post-communist left wing and dominance of right wing parties after 2004. 70 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 Analysing the change at the electoral plane, the following factors need to be considered: the shape, boundaries and size of electoral districts, the national list and the voting threshold (or resigning from them), voters' rights during the election, and the way of converting votes into seats (Glajcar, 2006: 24–38). The proportional election formula was applied in Sejm elections (4-year term), apart from the 1989 election. The parliamentary election in 1991 was also based on this formula. The country was divided into 37 electoral districts receiving 7 to 17 seats each (the mean size of a district was 10.6) (Alberski 2009, 140). Out of the 460 Sejm seats, 69 (15%) were divided into party lists at the national level using the modified Sainte-Laguë method. Receiving extra seats was conditional on obtaining at least 5% of votes nationwide or obtaining seats in at least 5 electoral districts. Most of the seats, however, were allocated to lists at the electoral district level using the Hare-Niemeyer method, with no threshold determined by the legislator. This choice of methods, commonly considered as favourable to weaker parties, gave seats in the Sejm for 29 electoral committees without establishing any minimum share, thus causing a high level of party fragmentation and inability to form a stable cabinet. At that time, the effective party number at the election level (EPN-E) reached the top value of 13.86, and in the parliament (EPN-P), 10.45 (Table 1). Both the Solidarność camp and post-communist left wing were subject to disintegration. Table 1: Index of effective party number in the years 1991–2011 Index 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 Mean EPN-E 13.86 9.80 4.59 4.50 5.86 3.32 3.74 6.51 EPN-P 10.45 3.88 2.95 3.60 4.63 2.82 3.00 4.48 Source: Alberski (2009: 143). The second phase of evolution of the party system towards two-block political competition began when a new Sejm election ordinance was adopted and an early election was organised in 1993. The number of electoral districts was increased up to 52 (the mean size of a district was 7.5). Three election thresholds were introduced: 5% of votes for a political party, 8% for an electoral coalition nationwide, and 7% for the national list. The previously applied methods of seat allocation were replaced with the D'Hondt method. The election resulted in power alternation, as left wing parties – Democratic Left Alliance ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and Labour United ( Unia Pracy, UP) – were the winners of the election and formed the government together with the pivotal Polish Peasants' Party ( Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) whereas a number of right wing parties were left out. SLD was considerably overrepresented, receiving 20.4% of votes but 37.17% seats (Glajcar, 2006: 32). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 71 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 Table 2: Support for the two largest parties in the years 1991–2015 (%) 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 2015 Electoral level 24.31 35.81 60.96 53.72 51.13 73.69 69.07 61.67 Parliamentary 26.52 65.87 79.35 61.09 61.96 81.52 79.13 81.09 level Source: Alberski (2009: 143; 158). Another Sejm election took place in 1997, after the 4-year term of the chamber and the adoption of the new constitution. For the first time, no significant changes were introduced to electoral law, so the competing parties could better prepare to the rules of competition. Political forces were aggregated into two large blocks: the centre-right coalition of Solidarity Electoral Action ( Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS) and the centre-left coalition of Democratic Left Alliance ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) (the ratio of concentration of support for the two greatest political forces in the parliament was 79.35% of seats). Before the following election in 2001, the electoral system was changed once again. The number of electoral districts was reduced to 41, which received between 7 and 19 seats (the mean size of a district was 11.2). The repartition of extra seats in the form of a national list was abolished. The d’Hondt method was replaced with the modified Sainte- Laguë system, but it was restored before the successive election in 2005 (Alberski, 2009: 140). Table 3: Results of Sejm elections in the years 2005–2015 Year 2001 2005 2007 2011 2015 Electoral Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats committee (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 9.5 44 26.99 155 32.11 166 29.89 157 37.58 235 Platforma 12.68 65 24.14 133 41.51 209 39.18 207 24.09 138 Obywatelska Polskie Stronnictwo 8.98 42 6.96 25 8.91 31 8.36 28 5.13 16 Ludowe Sojusz Lewicy 41.04 216 11.31 55 13.15 53 8.24 27 7.55 - Demokratycznej* Liga Polskich 7.87 38 7.97 34 - - - - - - Rodzin Samoobrona 10.2 53 11.41 56 - - - - - - 72 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność – 5.6 - - - - - - - - - Prawicy** Ruch Palikota - - - - - - 10.02 40 - - Nowoczesna - - - - - - - - 7.60 28 Kukiz ‘15 - - - - - - - - 8.81 42 Mniejszość 0.36 2 0.29 2 0.20 1 0.19 1 0.18 1 Niemiecka * In the Sejm elections of 2001, 2007 and 2015, SLD ran as an election coalition with several other parties. ** This election coalition did not exceed the 8% threshold nationwide. Source: original study based on the website of the National Electoral Commission, http://pkw.gov.pl/ (9 July 2016). After the period of frequent changes of the rules of electoral competition in the 1990s, in 2005 the rules were finally stabilised, which led to considerable changes in the party scene. Large coalitions were replaced with new parties. Two new political parties were established in 2001: Civic Platform ( Platforma Obywatelska, PO), and Law and Justice ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PIS), which began a gradual process of dominance of right wing forces in Polish party system and the marginalisation of the left wing, which did not make it into the parliament in 2015. The 2005 election proved to be the breaking point in the structure of contemporary party system (Markowski, 2006: 18). PIS managed to redefine the main dimension of party competition and replace previously underlying historical and cultural differences with economic ones (Pacześniak, 2014: 84). Research of the Polish General Election Survey confirmed that since 2005, the division into thèliberal Polandìdentified with PO and thèsolidary Polandòf PiS has been clearer for the voters than the division into left and right wing (ibid.). The electoral and party system in Poland after 1989 was subject to a long process of changes, from the system of extreme party fragmentation up to imperfect bipartisan competition. The gradual process of stabilisation of electoral law regulations and the institutionalisation of political parties contributed to the consolidation of the party system. Political competition between two post-Solidarność parties, the right-wing PiS and the centre-right PO, became a characteristic element of Polish party system after 2005, thus making it different from the contemporary standards of western democracies. This direction of changes was illustrated by the latest parliamentary election of 25th of October 2015, in which PiS was the unquestionable victor, receiving the absolute majority of seats in the Sejm. It must be added that it was the first party to have gained independent majority in the parliament in the history of Poland after 1989 (in the 2007–2015 period, PO existed as a political coalition with PSL). The contemporary party system of Poland is also characterised by the emergence of new populist political forces, being the expression of common dissatisfaction, such as Palikot Movement ( Ruch Palikota), Kukiz’15, Modern ( Nowoczesna), or in the past, Self- DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 73 M. Lorencka, M. Myśliwiec & W. Wojtasik: Evolution of the Political System in Poland after 1989 Defence ( Samoobrona). On the other hand, the aggregation level of support for the two main political parties is growing. Beneficial changes also include the process of power alternation, first between the right and left wing, and now, between PIS and PO. The negative side of Polish transformation is the low level of election participation (e.g. 40.57% in the 2005 election) (Piasecki, 2012: 203), the high level of electoral volatility (between 1993 and 2005, electoral volatility between blocks almost doubled) (Markowski, 2007: 249) and the antagonistic dimension of political competition between the main actors of the party scene. 5 Conclusion The evolution of Polish political system has brought it to the state in which it meets the boundary conditions for democratic solutions. This does not mean, however, that the adopted construction of political institutions protects the political system from the risk of non-democratic degradation. The relationships generated between the institutions of legislative and executive authority after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015 resemble the quasi-monopoly of a single party, PiS. The situation is complicated even more due to the fact that the most important decision-making entity (the leader of PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński) does not hold any position in executive authorities, but is an ordinary member of parliament. All this means that the actual relations between the centres of authority differ from the assumed model. As a result, the real power both of the Prime Minister (Beata Szydło) and the President (Andrzej Duda) in Poland is significantly weaker than the constitutional solutions might suggest. Even more interesting is that the profound change of political system institutions promised by PiS does not concentrate on the most important executive or legislative authorities but on the Constitutional Tribunal, the judiciary, and special services. This may indicate the intention to maintain the institutionally dysfunctional type of relationships between the President, the Government, and the Parliament. 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(2009) System partyjny i partie polityczne w procesie transformacji systemowej (The party system and political parties in the process of systemic transformation), In: Glajcar, R. & Wojtasik, W. (eds.) Transformacja systemowa w Polsce 1989–2009. Próba bilansu (Katowice: Wydawnictwo REMAR), pp. 42–65. Wojtasik, W. (2012) Funkcje wyborów w III Rzeczypospolitej. Teoria i praktyka (Functions of elections in the Third Polish Republic. Theory and practice) (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego). Wojtasik, W. (2013) Functions of elections in democratic systems, Political Preferences, 4, pp. 25– 38 76 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia MARJAN BREZOVŠEK & MIRO HAČEK 1 Abstract After the collapse of the non-democratic regime in the early 1990s, public opinion surveys became important factor in the process of democratic decision-making. Authors are analysing the results of public opinion surveys, which bring together data on the attitude of the general public towards democracy, (dis)satisfaction with the political situation and (dis)satisfaction with most important political institutions; special emphasis is given to the general public’s (dis)trust toward the democratic institutions in comparative (European) perspective. Based on the data obtained authors allocate Slovenia’s position compared to other established European democracies as well as post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the scale of the relationship of the dimensions of societal trust in political power. Keywords: • democratisation • trust • politics • institutions • Slovenia CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Marjan Brezovšek, Ph.D., Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: marjan.brezovšek@fdv.uni-lj.si. Miro Haček, Ph.D., Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: miro.hacek@fdv.uni-lj.si. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.6 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 78 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia 1 Introduction: Processes of Democratisation In Slovenia In all post-socialist countries, democratisation was a process that resulted in the establishment of a democratic political system similar to that of Western European countries. It is a process of changing the regime from the beginning to the end and includes the concepts of transition and consolidation. The consolidation of democracy is a process that encompasses the complete establishment of new democratic institutions, the adoption of democratic rules and procedures, and the general acceptance of democratic values. Political changes that stem from the top can also play an important role in accelerating democratic processes, yet they can also repress the political socialisation of citizens. For countries in transition, transforming the administrative and political institutions is particularly important, because the positive outcome of the whole democratisation effort largely depends on how these institutions are seen to be successful in the eyes of the public. The transition itself is a unique process. For a successful transition towards a more effective society, every country first has to define two elements and then define a third one. Since every country has its own tradition, the realisation of its success lies, on the one hand, on the starting point of its development and the development of its surroundings and, on the other hand, on the capacity to understand the development of the society. The understanding and steering of these ‘society flows’ lies within the competence of public administration systems that are, in comparison to the established systems, under greater stress, since they have to adapt and reorganise the institutions of public administration (Brezovšek, 2000: 239). When thinking of the legitimacy of democratic systems, we cannot avoid a discussion regarding the trust in political institutions. Since they focus on the institutionalisation of society’s actions – which become more efficient, stable, and predictable under their influence – they represent the core foundations of society. Citizens rely on political institutions since there is a belief that not all of our fellow citizens can be trusted. Institutions act as mediators that, within the legal framework, force all citizens to respect certain legal and ethical norms, which consequently results in a higher level of trust. The greatest threat to the trust established between institutions and citizens is the systematic misuse of democratic principles. According to Sztompka (1999), citizens who live in a democracy develop trust in democracy that is the highest form possible for the system. When this basic trust is misused, the level of trust in all other ideals connected to democracy decreases. Our standpoint is that trust in political institutions and the legitimacy of the democratic system are closely dependent on each other. Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998: 307) point out that the concept of democratic consolidation is not identical to economic success, because economic effectiveness is also possible in non-consolidated democracies or even in non-democracies. Political scientists therefore focus above all on political indexes of democratic consolidation. Gasiorowski and Power DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 79 M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia (1998) offer three basic criteria of successful democratic consolidation: successful execution of second parliamentary elections, successful swap of the executive branch with the usage of constitutional means (peaceful exchange of political power), and successful survival of the democratic system for twelve straight years. Additional criteria are frequently added: for instance, the relationship of citizens with democratic institutions, wide concordance on the rules of the political game, and trust in democratic political institutions and political elites (Fink Hafner, 2000: 13–14). We will emphasise the latter in this paper, locating Slovenia among other comparable democratic European countries according to public opinion surveys concerning public (dis)trust in political institutions. This will allow the authors to assess Slovenia’s position among other European countries on the scale of the relationship of the dimensions of societal trust in political power (Haček and Brezovšek, 2014). 2 (Dis)trust in Political and Administrative Institutions The public administration and civil service system are components of governance that can also be analysed from this so-called political point of view; citizens most commonly perceive these components as a secondary structure of the government and usually as the least respectable structure (Brezovšek, 1997: 184). Public opinion can be an important source of bureaucratic power within the public administration system, yet how public opinion affects the system of civil servants and public officials remains quite an under- researched area (Meier, 2000: 52). Some researchers even believe that public opinion has a prevailing influence on the work of civil servants. Page and Shapiro (1981) researched 357 major changes in public opinion. They compared those changes within the same timeframe for the work and outputs of public administration and concluded that as many as 87 percent of different public policies were adapted in line with the changes in public opinion. The findings of Gray and Lowery (1988: 121) are similar. They studied tax and education policies and concluded that both had adapted themselves to public opinion. Peters and Hogwood (1985) linked public opinion and the growth of the civil servant system1 and proved that when public opinion expressed open support of a certain public policy, the civil servant system had strengthened. One main characteristic of public opinion is its instability; it changes frequently and often in a short period. This characteristic is directly opposed to the characteristics of the civil servant system. For this system, stability and predictability are crucial for enabling quality in administrative work over a long period. However, it is true that some sub-systems of public administration can exploit public opinion support to promote their own policies. The importance of support for an individual policy is usually higher than the need to have an average high level of support for the whole public administration and the civil servant system. The comparative data from Eurobarometer research presented in Table 1 focuses on satisfaction with democracy as societal and political system in EU member states. If we 80 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia compare the surveys over the years, then, some changes in satisfaction can be detected. In general, one of the most common observations is that in all new democratic systems (shaded rows) there is a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy itself, and trend is rather negative in recent period. Similarly, in Slovenia, more than two-thirds of citizens are dissatisfied with democracy in the country. The question remains as to how much of such dissatisfaction fragile post-socialist regime can withstand before this dissatisfaction changes into a denial of the legitimacy of the whole societal and political system and when the legitimacy of various political institutions is at risk. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction could also be connected to the outcomes of the democratic transition and consolidation processes and not democracy as a type of social-political relations itself.2 In this case, dissatisfaction can also be expressed through the existing mechanisms like elections, referendums, political protests, and so forth. Other research (Newton and Norris, 1999: 67–72) found out that there is positive connection between disintegration processes of contemporary societies (especially because of growing inequalities, that are with the impact of global economic crisis becoming even more evident), with drops of public trust towards key state political institutions. Table 1: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU member states (total satisfied; in percent) EU Member State 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 AUSTRIA 71 75 80 78 70 64 BELGIUM 70 68 66 56 57 63 BULGARIA / / 26 25 24 21 CROATIA / / / / / 24 CYPRUS 63 63 61 54 33 24 CZECH REP. 45 58 51 45 30 47 DENMARK 91 93 94 92 90 86 ESTONIA 45 43 53 45 38 49 FINLAND 83 78 77 69 78 75 FRANCE 57 45 65 54 60 49 GERMANY 61 55 66 62 70 70 GREECE 68 55 63 31 11 19 HUNGARY 37 46 24 35 29 35 IRELAND 77 75 69 57 50 59 ITALY 46 53 40 47 27 30 LATVIA 45 41 43 32 42 47 LITHUANIA 34 23 24 17 21 30 LUXEMBURG 83 83 73 83 84 76 MALTA 48 48 53 45 49 62 NETHERLANDS 71 75 80 75 75 74 POLAND 30 38 48 54 48 59 PORTUGAL 39 30 36 29 25 25 ROMANIA / / 36 20 13 25 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 81 M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia SLOVAKIA 25 25 35 36 29 22 SLOVENIA 57 54 48 38 26 27 SPAIN 64 71 77 53 32 22 SWEDEN 76 74 80 84 86 82 UNITED 63 60 62 59 60 65 KINGDOM EU 25/27/28 58 57 57 51 47 50 AVERAGE Sources: Standard Eurobarometer 62 (Autumn 2004); available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm; Standard Eurobarometer 65 (January 2007); available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_en.pdf. Standard Eurobarometer 70 (November 2008); available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_en.htm. Standard Eurobarometer 73 (November 2010): available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb73/eb73_anx_full.pdf. Standard Eurobarometer 78 (November 2012): available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb78/eb78_anx_en.pdf. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (November 2014); available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ eb/eb82/eb82_en.htm (all in June 2016). General trust in the country is also reflected in the trust in major political institutions (Inglehart, 1999). Table 2 shows trust towards three key political institutions (political parties, national parliament and national government) in all EU member states in period from 2004 to 2014, and compares average trust in all EU member states with average trust in all ten new member states from CEE. We can also quite clearly observe that levels of public trust towards all three political institutions are lower in eleven new members states from CEE compared with other, mostly older member states with longer democratic traditions; especially this is obvious in the caees of political parties and national parliaments. Sadly, Slovenia is the country with lowest levels of trust towards both political parties and national parliament. We can also see, especially in recent period, that there is major difference in term of public trust in three political institutions between northern Europe (i.e. Finland, Sweden, Denmark) and southern Europe (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain). If we take another look at the data presented in Table 1, it is not hard to see the connection between the satisfaction with democracy and public (dis)trust into major political institutions in various (groups of) countries in the EU. We can also observe negative trends in distrust towards key political institutions in the period from 2004 to 2014, marking period of deeply rooted political crisis not only in CEE, but also in older democracies, especially in southern European countries. 82 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia Table 2: Trust in political institutions (tend to trust; in percent) POLITICAL PARTIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL PARLIAMENT EU Member State 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 AUSTRIA 23 38 38 40 33 28 45 55 50 54 49 50 51 56 54 52 50 53 23 29 25 20 23 18 38 47 36 22 38 33 46 50 40 28 40 36 BELGIUM BULGARIA / / 7 15 14 10 / / 15 43 25 19 / / 8 25 18 14 CROATIA / / / / / 10 / / / / / 16 / / / / / 18 CYPRUS 26 20 29 23 9 6 65 56 65 43 16 23 63 44 63 40 15 20 CZECH 10 15 12 12 8 12 27 34 20 32 11 30 18 22 16 12 9 17 REPUBLIC DENMARK 39 49 54 49 36 34 56 56 60 50 42 50 70 75 75 72 63 61 ESTONIA 17 21 19 20 16 13 47 54 48 53 35 51 41 41 37 39 29 39 FINLAND 26 36 36 30 36 29 67 65 68 49 62 47 68 69 71 55 66 61 FRANCE 13 10 13 14 12 6 29 20 31 25 30 17 38 31 36 36 32 23 GERMANY 13 22 22 19 21 21 33 39 42 32 41 48 39 40 41 39 46 49 GREECE 17 25 14 9 5 8 50 43 23 25 7 11 61 56 32 23 9 14 HUNGARY 18 29 8 29 18 14 40 48 16 40 27 33 38 47 16 41 29 29 IRELAND 18 32 23 17 12 13 39 42 33 21 18 23 40 44 36 22 18 23 ITALY 20 26 16 18 8 9 28 34 26 25 17 18 31 40 27 26 11 18 LATVIA 6 6 5 4 6 9 26 25 16 13 17 28 21 21 9 6 13 22 LITHUANIA 16 10 10 6 13 9 38 21 16 13 21 32 23 14 11 7 13 17 LUXEMBURG 35 41 39 40 22 25 67 65 60 66 57 51 64 58 56 52 48 47 MALTA 28 25 34 25 20 24 46 38 50 33 34 56 44 40 57 33 29 51 NETHERLAND 34 42 51 45 33 33 38 42 66 47 47 52 49 55 64 54 53 55 S POLAND 5 9 7 15 17 13 13 22 20 28 23 26 8 13 13 24 20 21 PORTUGAL 17 19 17 15 17 11 27 34 31 20 22 17 43 41 38 28 23 20 ROMANIA / / 14 10 9 13 / / 25 12 20 26 / / 19 10 13 17 SLOVAKIA 9 10 16 25 19 14 22 21 46 38 32 27 25 27 41 38 30 26 SLOVENIA 17 19 17 11 9 6 35 38 36 27 15 13 36 37 34 23 12 9 SPAIN 28 31 30 14 6 5 51 44 44 20 11 11 48 41 40 21 9 10 SWEDEN 24 23 34 37 35 30 41 36 56 57 59 54 56 56 64 66 68 67 UNITED 14 31 34 15 18 18 18 12 32 30 29 26 25 37 36 30 24 26 KINGDOM EU 25/27/28 20 24 23 21 17 14 40 40 38 34 30 29 42 42 38 33 29 30 AVERAGE CEE 8/10/11 12 16 12 15 13 9 31 33 26 30 23 27 26 28 20 23 19 21 AVERAGE Sources: Table of results. Standard Eurobarometer 62 (Autumn 2004): Public opinion in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm; Table of results. Standard Eurobarometer 65 (January 2007): Public opinion in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_en.pdf; Table of results. Standard Eurobarometer 70 (Autumn 2008): Public opinion in the European Union. Available at DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 83 M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_full_annex.pdf; Table of results. Standard Eurobarometer 73 (November 2010): Public opinion in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb73/eb73_anx_full.pdf; Table of results. Standard Eurobarometer 78 (November 2012): Public opinion in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (November 2014): Public opinion in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_en.htm (all in June 2016). The most appropriate mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of public trust towards the key administrative and political institutions are periodic public opinion surveys, which are also an important element in the preparation of strategic government decisions and actions. If we compare the annual measurements of public attitude towards certain political and administrative institutions, we can see fluctuations in the public mood and attitude and, consequently, to inquire about the reasons for this situation. In general, the public opinion polls show that new democratic systems are faced with a relatively high degrees of dissatisfaction with democracy, and therefore also with the democratic institutions. Slovenia does not differ much from this general framework, rather the opposite, since on average, more than half of the citizens are not satisfied with the democratic regime. In Table 3 we can see that the level of discontent substantially risign in 2010 due to the growing impact of the global economic crisis and a sense that the politics is being inefective dealing with the crisis. In 2013 and the first half of 2014, the level of dissatisfaction were the highest ever, namely 87 percent. The question is, how high can frustration tolerance actually be and how much can the "fragile" post-socialist democratic political system bear, before the high levels of dissatisfaction transfer into the denial of the legitimacy of the democratic political system and its key institutions. Table 3: Satisfaction with the democracy (in percent) Year SATISFIED UNSATISFIED NO REPONSE 1998 31 58 11 1999 39 49 12 2000 40 48 12 2001 42 46 12 2002 44 46 10 2003 38 55 7 2004 41 51 8 2005 34 59 7 2006 39 51 11 2007 36 58 6 2008 39 55 6 2009 32 62 6 2010 11 86 3 2011 12 84 4 2012 12 85 3 84 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia 2013 8 87 5 2014 8 87 5 Source: Politbarometer. Data from last conducted survey in each calendar year is shown. From 2014, data from June survey is shown. The question was: »Are you generally satisfied or unsatisfied with the development of democracy in Slovenia?« If we take a look into the measured trust towards the selected institutions in Slovenia, we can clearly see (Table 4) that the trust towards the state administration is relatively low, but still slightly higher than the level of trust towards the majority of other established political institutions. The reasons of relatively low levels of trust in the state administration, may be found in the "inheritance" of the administrative system of the former non-democratic regime, which is understandable relatively unpopular, as well as the slow public administration reform in Slovenia in general. Distrust can be explained also because of - often unjustified - allegations that the state administration and the entire public sector in Slovenia are ineffective and inoperative, which certainly does not contribute to their positive reputation. To make the picture clearer, an analysis of the longer period of public opinion measurements is needed. It may be noted that in 1994 there were still relatively high levels of trust to the key institutions of the Slovenian political system (the President: 47%; army: 54%; police: 55%; the courts: 58%; public offices: 51%; mass media: 50%). In the coming years, however, trust slowly decreased. In some political institutions the levels of trust towards the administrative and political institutions halved and therefore declined to such an extent that it has been turned into distrust. It may be noted that in the period between 1998 and 2009, the levels of trust towards the government, the national parliament, the prime minister, political parties and the state administration was below-average, but still quite stable. In 2010, however, Slovenia recorded an additional loss of confidence in all six listed institutions, with a similar trends and the reasons as somewhat earlier (Table 3) indicated in the measurement of citizen’s satisfaction with democracy. Analysis of trust towards selected six national institutions (Table 4) shows that Slovenes exhibit highest levels of trust towads the President of the Republic, which in 2007 received a value of 4.0. Then, the levels of trust dropped in the first half of 2014 to a value of 2.9, which is the lowest ever, but this value still represents (by far) the highest level of trust among all listed administrative and political institutions. Lowest levels of trust of Slovenes “enjoy” political parties, which have received the highest value in 2000 (2.7), and the lowest value in 2013 and 2014 (1.8). Sharp decline in the perceived levels of trust towards the national government and parliament, which fell from 3.3 and 3.1, respectivelly, in 2000 to 1.8 in the first half of 2014. Table 4 also shows that trust levels in the national administrative and political institutions (except in the case of the prime minister) were the lowest ever in the first half of 2014. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 85 M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia Table 4: Trust towards the chosen institutions in Slovenia Year GOVERNMENT PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF POLITICAL STATE THE PARLIAMENT THE REPUBLIC PARTIES ADMINISTRATION GOVERNMENT 1998 2,7 3,2 2,6 3,6 2,3 / 1999 2,9 3,4 2,8 3,8 2,4 / 2000 3,3 3,7 3,1 3,9 2,7 / 2001 3,1 3,5 2,9 3,9 2,6 / 2002 3,1 3,4 3,2 3,7 2,7 / 2003 2,9 3,2 2,9 3,3 2,5 / 2004 3,1 3,4 3,1 3,6 2,6 3,0 2005 2,8 3,0 2,8 3,5 2,5 2,9 2006 2,9 3,2 2,8 3,2 2,6 / 2007 2,8 2,7 2,9 4,0 2,6 3,1 2008 3,0 3,2 3,0 3,4 2,5 3,0 2009 2,7 2,9 2,7 3,5 2,4 2,9 2010 2,1 2,1 2,1 3,1 2,0 2,7 2011 2,0 2,2 2,1 3,1 1,9 2,6 2012 2,0 2,0 2,2 3,0 2,0 2,7 2013 2,0 2,2 2,0 3,0 1,8 / 2014 1,8 2,1 1,8 2,9 1,8 / Source: Politbarometer. Data from last conducted survey in each calendar year is shown. From 2014, data from June survey is shown. The question was Can you please evaluate your trust towards listed state institutions? Please evaluate levels of trust on the scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “I do not trust at all”, and 5 means “I trust completely”. 3 Concluding thoughts The definite answer to the question of why trust in democracy and in various political institutions is decreasing in Slovenia and other EU member states remains hard to answer with high degree of confidence, although we can search for answers in recent drops of trust in political and administrative institutions in the (political) consequences of global economic crisis that revealed majority of mishaps and deficiencies of contemporary democratic political and economic systems. Later is especially true for Slovenia, where series of political scandals, corruption cases, cases of blunt political inefficiency and dubious role of media certainly contributed towards drops of public trust into political institutions and democracy as the form of political system itself.31One can also wonder if one of the impacts of the economic crisis is also decrease of the importance of democratic values in the society. Inglehard (1997) claims that societies that are increasingly critical of hierarchical authorities are at the same time more participative and claim a more active role in the policy-making process. Political leaders and senior civil servants are 86 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia interacting with ever more active and more informed and educated citizens, who are simultaneously more critical of their actions. An alternative approach reveals that sympathy does not necessarily mean trust, but it can also be interpreted as some sort of obvious predictability, meaning that citizens do not a priori trust the institution but, since we can foresee its reactions and behaviour in the future, which should be consistent with those in the past, we trust the bureaucratic processes instead. The dimensions of trust between citizens and political institutions cannot be measured only through the parameter of trust/distrust, but at best as a relationship of “inductive anticipation” (Warren, 1999). We can conclude that the legitimacy of the system increases with the level of trust in political institutions. However, is complete trust in favour of democracy, or could it be that a constant on-going critique and sober judgment of the everyday actions of political bodies is, in fact, in the best interests of a consolidated democracy? Notes: 1 Growth of the civil servant system mainly refers to quantitative growth and not so much to growth in the quality of the system. 2 This emphasis is supported by a number of public opinion polls. For instance “Democracy in Slovenia” survey, carried out in March 2011 among 907 respondents across the country, asked whether democracy is the best possible form of governance and whether democracy in spite of its imperfections, is still better than other types of social-political relations. Respondents strongly agreed with both statements; on the scale from 0 to 4, where 0 represents “strongly disagree” and 4 “strongly agree”, first statement got estimation 3.49 and the second one 3.38. 3 In analysis made by Bovens and Wille on Dutch case of decrease of public trust towards political institutions, they analyse ten possible explanations, divided into two major groups, a) political variables and b) economic and socio-cultural variables. Political variables listed are government performance deteriorated, dissatisfaction with Balkenende cabinets and policies, rise of drama democracy and Fortuyn, increase of political scandals and changing political culture. Economic and socio-cultural variables listed are deteriorating economy, changing role of media, change in expectations and values, generational change and loss of social capital (Bovens and Wille, 2008: 287). References: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (2011) Politbarometer (Political Barometer Survey) 2007–2011 (Ljubljana: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre). School of Advanced Social Studies (2011) Raziskava Demokracija v Sloveniji (Democracy in Slovenia Survey) (Nova Gorica: School of Advanced Social Studies). Bianco, T. W. (1994) Trust: Representatives and Constituents (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Bovens, M. & Wille, A. (2008) Deciphering the Dutch drop: ten explanations for decreasing political trust in The Netherlands, In: International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(2), pp. 283–305. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 87 M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia - Brezovšek, M. (1997) Upravna kultura v Sloveniji (Administrative culture in Slovenia), In: Brezovšek, M. (ed.) Politološki dnevi – zbornik referatov (Ljubljana: Slovensko politološko društvo), pp. 175–187. Brezovšek, M. (2000) Uprava in demokratični prehod (Administration and democratic transition), In: Fink Hafner, D. & Haček, M. (eds.) Demokratični prehodi I. (Ljubljana: Založba FDV), pp. 239–257. Clark, J. & Wildavsky, A. (1990) The Moral Collapse of Communism: Poland as a Cautionary Tale (San Francisco: ICS Press). Dahl, R. A. (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Elster, J., Offe, C. & Preuss, U. K. (1998) Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Fink Hafner, D. (2000) Teoretske premise proučevanja demokratičnih prehodov (Theoretical premises of democratic transitions studies), In: Fink Hafner, D. & Haček, M. (eds.) Demokratični prehodi I. (Ljubljana: Založba FDV), pp. 5–26. Gamson, W. A. (1968) Power and Discontent (Homewood: The Dorsey Press). Gasiorovski, M. J. & Power, T. J. (1998) The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation, In: Comparative Political Studies, 31(6), pp. 740–771. Gray, V. & Lowery, D. (1988) Interest Groups Politics and Economic Growth in the U.S, In: The American Political Science Review, 82(1), pp. 109–131. Haček, M. & Brezovšek, M. (2014) The processes of democratisation and trust in political institutions in Slovenia: comparative analysis, In: Annales, Series historia et sociologia, 24(1), pp. 1–12. Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Inglehart, R. (1999) Trust, Well-Being and Democracy, In: Warren, M. (ed.) Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 88-120. Linde, J. & Ekman, J. (2005) Sources of institutional trust in Central and Eastern Europe , In: Arbeitsrapporter, Working Papers, no. 96. (Uppsala: Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University). Meier, J. K. (2000) Politics and the Bureaucracy (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers). Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (1997) Trust, Distrust and Scepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies, In: The Journal of Politics, 59(2), pp. 418– 451. Muller, E. N. & Jukam, T. O. (1977) On the Meaning of Political Support, In: The American Political Science Review, 71(4), pp. 1561–1577. Newton, K. & Norris, P. (1999) Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance? , In: Pharr, S. & Putnam, R. (eds.) Disaffected democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 52–74. Page, I. B. & Shapiro, Y. R. (1981 ) Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. Paper presented on the annual meeting of APSA (New York City: New York). Peters, B. G. & Hogwood, W. B. (1985) The Pathology of Public Policy (Oxford: Clarendon). Peters, B. G. (2001) The politics of bureaucracy (London and New York: Routledge). Sartori, G. (1993) Totalitarianism, Model Mania and Learning from Error, In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5(1), pp. 5–22. Shlapentokh, V. (1989) Public and Private Life of the Soviet People (New York, Oxford University Press). Sztompka, P. (1999) Trust: a sociological theory (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press). 88 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek & M. Haček: The Processes of Democratisation and the Issue of Trust in Political Institutions in Slovenia - Warren, M. E. (ed.) (1999) Democracy & Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Weatherford, M. S. (1989) Political Economy and Political Legitimacy: The Link Between Economic Policy and Trust, In: Clarke, H. D., Stewart, M. & Zuk, G. (eds.) Economic Decline and Political Change (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), pp. 225-253. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism MARJAN BREZOVŠEK 1 Abstract According to the Constitution of Slovenia (1991), the general representative body of the Slovenia nation is the National Assembly. In this article author deals with some characteristics and doubtfulness of the regulation of the National Assembly such as structure, competences, management, mode of decision – making, legislative procedure and efficiency. Key questions of legislative activity are still attached to the failure to comply with the regular legislative procedure, insufficient role of the legal profession, inadequate assessments of the effects of regulation, insufficient public cooperation and lack of transparency in lobbying. The operation of Slovenian parliament is the result of political and historical heritage, the peculiarities of the transitional development and the structure of the political space. Keywords: • Slovenian parliament • constitution • National Assembly • representatives • legislative procedure. CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Marjan Brezovšek, Ph.D., Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: marjan.brezovsek@fdv.uni-lj.si. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.7 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 90 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism 1 Introduction The Republic of Slovenia, in conformity with the new Constitution (1991), is a democratic republic with a dominant representative democracy. The Constitution entirely bases the configuration of the state on the principle of the division of power (General Provisions). These are the grounds for a parliamentary system following the German counterpart, especially in the light of forming a new government and its responsibility to the National Assembly. By doing so, the constituent organ attempted to secure the stability of the Government and the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the Constitution does contain some material inherited from the former socialist system, which influences the relationship between the Government and the National Assembly. This is why the Slovenian system resembles more the associative socialist system rather than a modern parliamentary system. The Constitution does not introduce a strict division of power, nor does it introduce a pure parliamentary system because the President is elected directly and has the power to reject or abrogate any law (Haček et al., 2013: 38).1 Figure 1: Configuration of state authority by the 1991 Constitution Source: Grad et al (1999). Figure 1 shows that the writers of the Constitution emphasised the role of legislative authority – the National Assembly – as the central and most important holder of state power. By introducing a parliamentary system in Slovenia, the National Assembly obtained the classical role of a legislative body. ‘Concrete constitutional solutions introduce “centralism” of the National Assembly, thus weakening the Government in the formal and the actual sense’ (Zajc, 2000: 5). The Government is therefore presented as a less powerful organ, whereas other organs (President of the Republic, National Council) DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 91 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism have almost no connection to other holders of power, which indicates their position in the Slovenian state. The Slovenian Parliament is the informal designation of the general representative body of the Slovenian nation and the legislative body of the Republic of Slovenia. According to the Constitution of Slovenia, the general representative body of the Slovenian nation is the National Assembly. The general public in Slovenia often refer to the National Assembly alone as the Slovenian Parliament. However, the National Council, the representative body of basic social groups, also performs a further, if minor, part of the legislative body. 2 Characteristics and Doubtfulness of the Current Regulation The term representative body usually marks a state organ that represents the people as a whole, and decides over the most important matters in society. Normally this organ’s prime function is legislation (ratifying laws) and is thus referred to as the legislative body. A modern representative and legislative body is usually called a parliament. In the former constitutional arrangement the representative body was named the Socialist Assembly and was in many ways different to its contemporary equivalent. By the principle of the Rule of the Assembly (unity of power), the Socialist Assembly represented the highest organ of the state’s power and moreover an organ of social self-government. According to this design it was composed of the Chamber of United Work, the Chamber of Municipalities and the Socio-political Chamber. None of the three chambers of the Socialist Assembly was de facto a body of representatives of all the people, but actually represented the most important social interests in the state (Haček et al., 2013: 43). The former constitutional regulation did not originate from the system of general political representation or political pluralism, but was instead based on the representation of concrete social interests and on the idea of pluralistic self-managed interests. According to this, committees were formed from various social structures by a system of delegates, which replaced the usual elective way of forming the representative body. The position and role of a legislative organ in the new Slovenian Constitution is fundamentally different from its predecessor and is formed on the same grounds as in most modern parliaments. Compared with its predecessor, the National Assembly as a representative body originates from the principle of representing all citizens (without regard to their special interests, actual social position or role). The new regulation provides for the representation of particular social interests in the National Council (Haček et al., 2013: 43) Therefore, there are two legislative organs in Slovenia’s contemporary regulation and they have very different positions and authority. The first is the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (a representative body of all the people) and the second is the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia (a representative body of particular social 92 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism interests). Their relationship is not perfectly clear and has been the subject of many political and professional disputes. The key question is whether there are two chambers of the Slovenian parliament or whether the National Council is a special state organ that simply does not fit into any of the power divisions. The National Council cannot pass laws but can indirectly participate in their ratification (legislative initiative, suspensive veto). Its competencies clearly show its inferior position vis-à-vis the National Assembly, which is the only body that can pass laws. But since the National Council does hold certain competencies, even if very limited, we can talk of an imperfect bi-cameral Slovenian parliament whereby the National Council represents the second chamber in its broadest sense.2 When assessing the position of a state organ it is necessary to focus on its competencies (functional perspective) (Haček et al., 2013: 43–44). In 2008, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia recognized the Slovenian Parliament as incompletely bicameral. 2.1 The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia Structure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia The Constitution (Article 80) defines the National Assembly as a representative and legislative body, therefore a collegial body of 90 directly elected representatives (Members of Parliament – MPs). Elections must be general and based on an equal right to vote and the secrecy of voting. The number of representatives is relatively low compared to other parliaments, which causes problems in its functioning.3 The National Assembly represents Slovenian citizens because MPs are elected on the basis of a general right to vote. The National Assembly is therefore a representative body where people’s sovereignty is expressed through elected representatives (as opposed to a direct democracy) (Haček et al., 2013: 44). The National Assembly also represents members of the Italian and Hungarian national community (minorities) where both (and each) have one MP guaranteed, without regard to the size of the community. Besides the majority of representatives of the Slovenian nation (88 members of parliament), we therefore have two members who represent particular minority interests. The representation of national communities enjoys a special constitutional protection, which would be undisputable if their competencies were limited to those interests only. Both representatives of national communities hold the power of veto when passing a law regarding the constitutional rights or position of national communities but otherwise have the same competencies as all other representatives. Their position and functioning in the National Assembly is not limited so they can engage in forming a government and all other activities. Some people find this situation disputable due to the unexpressed general political will of the electors (Haček et al., 2013: 44). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 93 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism Table 1: Number of representatives, by sex NUMBER PERCENTAGE YEAR M F M F 1996 83 7 92 8 2000 78 12 87 13 2004 79 11 88 12 2008 78 12 87 13 2011 61 29 68 32 2014 59 31 66 34 Source: Commission for Mandates and Elections (2014). Table 1 shows the number of representatives by sex. At the beginning of the 2000–2004 term of office, there were 12 female and 78 male representatives in the National Assembly, whereas at the end of that term of office there were 14 female and 76 male representatives. In the previous term of office (1996–2000), there were fewer female representatives – it started with 7 and finished with 11 female representatives. In 2004, 11 female MPs were elected to the National Assembly and their number remained the same throughout that term. Four years later (in 2008), 12 women were elected and there were 14 at the end. The parliamentarian elections held in December 2011 represent a turning point as 29 women were elected as the members of the National Assembly. Currently, there are 31 female MPs, amounting to 34 % of the total number of deputies (Official website of the National Assembly, 2014). Table 2: Age structure of representatives AGE/ 30 OR 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70 OR MORE TOTAL YEAR LESS no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 1996 - - 25 28 35 39 22 24 6 7 2 2 90 100 2000 3 3 16 18 34 38 29 32 5 6 3 3 90 100 2004 2 2 9 10 44 49 22 24 13 14 - - 90 100 2008 1 1 12 13 27 30 34 38 14 16 2 2 90 100 2011 2 2 14 16 27 30 35 39 12 13 - - 90 100 Source: Commission for Mandates and Elections (2014). Table 2 shows that most of the representatives in the 2000–2004 term of office were aged between 40 and 49. The situation was very similar to the preceding term of office. A majority of representatives in the 2004–2008 term were of this age as well. However in the 2008–2011 term of office, the composition of the National Assembly got relatively “older”, as the highest percentage of MPs was in the range from 50 to 59 years. The same is true of the last parliamentarian elections held last December when a majority of elected candidates were in this age span. As an interesting curiosity, we add the following data: 94 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism in the 2008–2011 term of office, the average age of representatives was 50 years; the average age of representatives elected in December 2011 is 49. In the current composition of the National Assembly, the youngest member is a 27-year-old female representative, whereas the oldest one is a 69-year-old male (Haček et al., 2013: 45–46) .4 As an interesting fact, we include the table showing the educational structure of representatives in the last four terms of office. We can ascertain that a majority of representatives have had high-school education (with the number of PhDs and MAs/MSc’s increasing with every subsequent case); the number of those having secondary education has remained approximately the same until elections in 2011 when dropped to 16 %; and also the number of members with higher education somewhat decreased in the 2008–2011 and in the 2011–2014 term of office. Table 3: The educational structure of representatives HIGH-SCHOOL EDUCATION HIGHER SECONDARY MA AND PhD OTHER EDUCATION EDUCATION MSC 1996– 6 (7 46 (51 4 (4 %) 16 (18 %) 18 (20 %) 2000 %) %) 2000– 7 (8 38 (42 8 (9 %) 19 (21 %) 18 (20 %) 2004 %) %) 2004– 7 (8 42 (47 10 (11 %) 13 (14 %) 18 (20 %) 2008 %) %) 2008– 9 (10 42 (47 10 (11 %) 8 (9 %) 21 (23 %) 2011 %) %) 4 (4 45 (50 2011– 19 (21 %) 8 (9 %) 14 (16 %) %) %) Source: Work reports of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office. The party structure of the National Assembly has varied over time, but the number of parliamentary parties has been relatively stable. At the 1992 elections eight parties made it to the National Assembly, which is one less than in the 1990 elections. At the 1996 elections the number of parties that made it to the National Assembly was seven. This figure increased to eight at the 2000 elections but dropped back to seven at the 2004 elections. At the 2008 parliamentarian elections, seven political parties managed to gain seats in the National Assembly as well and the number of parliamentarian parties is the same in the current composition of the National Assembly, too (Haček et al., 2013: 46). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 95 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism Table 4: Election results for the Assembly (former system) and the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (percentage of votes of those parties which made it through the threshold) POLITICAL 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2014 PARTIES5 SZD, Democratic Party 9.5 5.1 - - - - - - ZSMS – Liberal Party LDS – Liberal Democratic 14.5 23.4 27 36.2 22.8 5.2 - - Party SKZ, SLS – Slovenian People’s 12.6 8.6 19.3 - 6.8 5.2* 6.8 - Party SLS-SKD – Slovenian People’s - - - 9.5 - - - - Party SNS – Slovenian National Party - 10.2 3.2 4.3 6.3 5.4 - - SKD – Slovenian Christian 13 14.5 9.6 - - - - - Democrats SDZ, SDSS, SDS – Slovenian 7.4 3.3 16.1 15.8 29.1 29.3 26.2 20.9 Democratic Party ZKS – Party of Democratic Renewal 17.3 13.5 9 12.1 10.2 30.5 10.5 5.9 ZL-SDP, ZLSD, SD – Social Democrats ZS – Greens of Slovenia 8.8 3.7 - - - - - - DeSUS – Pensioners’ Party - - 4.3 5.1 4.0 7.5 7 10.2 NSi – New Slovenia – Christian People’s - - - 8.6 9.1 - 4.9 5.5 Party SMS – Youth Party of Slovenia - - - 4.3 - - - - LS – Liberal Party 2.1 - - - - - - - SSS – Socialist Party 5.3 - - - - - - - ZARES – New Politics - - - - - 9.4 - - Zoran Janković List – Positive - - - - - - 28.5 - Slovenia Citizens’ Alliance of Gregor - - - - - - 8.4 - Virant SMC – Party of Modern Center - - - - - - - 34.6 United Left - - - - - - - 5.9 Alliance of Alenka Bratušek - - - - - - - 4.3 *Together with the SMS – The Youth Party of Slovenia. Source: National Electoral Commission, 2012 and 2014. The current party structure of the National Assembly is the following: Party of Modern Center (SMC) has 36 seats, the SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party) has 21 seats, the DeSUS (Pensioners’ Party) 10 seats, the SD (Social Democrats) 6 seats, the United Left has 6 seats, the NSi (New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party) 6 seats and the Alliance 96 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism of Alenka Bratušek has 4 seats. The ratio between the government and the opposition in the National Assembly after the 2014 elections was as follows below. Table 5: Coalition and opposition structure in the current (2014-) mandate POLITICAL PARTY NUMBER OF SEATS SMC 36 DeSUS 10 COALITION SD 6 TOTAL 52 SDS 21 United Left 6 OPPOSITION NSi 5 Alliance of Alenka Bratušek 4 TOTAL 36 NATIONALITIES 2 TOTAL 90 Source: Official website of the National Assembly (2014). Now, let us have a look at the National Assembly from the aspect of political elites’ recruitment. Table 6 shows the numbers of re-elected MPs in comparison to the preceding terms of office. It is evident that the greatest number of re-elected MPs was at the 2000 parliamentarian elections, i.e. 44 representatives, which was almost one half of all the MPs. High percentages of re-elected MPs were recorded at the two subsequent regular parliamentarian elections held in 2004 and 2008, that is 46 %. At the most recent (early) parliamentarian elections, this percentage somewhat decreased (to 36 %). Table 6: Number of re-elected MPs between 1996 and 2014 YEAR NUMBER PERCENTAGE (%) 1996 29 32 2000 44 49 2004 41 46 2008 41 46 2011 36 40 2014 32 36 Source: Work reports of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office. National Electoral Commission, 2014. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 97 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism 2.2 Competences of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia The National Assembly attends to all duties that are typical of modern parliaments. As a representative body it is an expression of the people’s sovereignty, where political parties represent different political options. Besides its representative role, the National Assembly also performs other state functions, which can be roughly divided into legislative, elective and supervisory functions. In this framework and by its competencies it is authorised to make not only decisions that concern the law but for example also policies that concern different areas of social life. Besides its decision-making function, there are also functions of creating legitimacy, recruiting, socialising and educating (Haček et al., 2013: 48). The competencies of the National Assembly are determined in the Standing Orders and are divided into two large groups: the first group consists of competencies where the National Assembly mainly accepts substantial decisions, whereas the second group regards appointing people to important political and public functions. In the light of its legislative function the National Assembly accepts changes and amendments to the Constitution, ratifies laws and other general acts, national programmes, declarations, resolutions, recommendations, standpoints and decrees, the national budget and final account of the budget, it ratifies international agreements, calls a referendum, and accepts its own standing orders. The National Assembly no longer requires special constitutional grounds for ratifying laws because that it is already provided in its constitutional position, where it is the only body with the legislative function. In practicing its legislative function it is not entirely independent because the National Council can force the National Assembly to re-pass a law that has already been accepted. The National Assembly can re- pass such a law, but only with a majority of all representatives whereby its decision becomes incontestable (Haček et al., 2013: 48). The legislative function of the National Assembly can be directly affected by a referendum or a citizen’s initiative. In light of its elective function, the National Assembly elects, nominates and relieves the Prime Minister and ministers, the President and Vice-President of the National Assembly, members of the Constitutional Court, the five members of the Judicial Council, the Governor of the Central Bank, members of the Court of Audit, the Ombudsman etc. Most of these functionaries are nominated by the President of the Republic of Slovenia and elected by the National Assembly. In modern parliaments it is typical for the chief of state to elect most of these functionaries himself (on the proposal of the government) and rarely in combination with the parliament. The National Council has more elective functions than other modern parliaments, which is most probably a legacy from the former ‘rule of the Assembly’ (Grad, 2000: 182; Lukšič, 2001: 16, Haček et al., 2013: 49). It is typical of ‘Assembly systems’ to focus all power on the legislative organ, which decides on everything, and out of which all other holders of state power emerge. Overstressing its elective function to such an extent interferes with executive powers and 98 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism mingles with the relationship between the assembly and the government. Scruples concerning overburdening of the assembly are also relevant when we talk about the Assembly’s other competencies – when it confirms or certifies acts of public institutes, agencies, foundations etc. In light of its supervisory function, the National Assembly orders parliamentary investigations, rules over votes of no confidence in the government, and decides on bills indicting the President of Slovenia, the Prime Minister or a minister to the Constitutional Court. The supervisory function of the National Assembly can be divided into two: the function of political supervision, which concerns the actions of the executive power and is practiced via a parliamentary investigation or by accepting various unbinding acts (declaration, standpoint, decree etc). Another important competence of the National Assembly is deciding about a state of war and a state of emergency or the employment of the defence forces. The National Assembly also verifies the term of office of MPs and decides on the immunity of MPs and members of the Constitutional Court. Finally, it also evaluates and decides on its own work, which is regulated by the Standing Rules (which are passed with a 2/3 majority of MPs present) (Haček et al., 2013: 49). Management of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, the Council and Deputy Groups The parliament is usually run and represented by the president of the parliament. It is the same in Slovenia. The Constitution determines that the President of the National Assembly is elected by a majority of all representatives. They must be elected from among the representatives and are treated as an individual organ in spite of them being the leader of the Parliamentary Presidency. The main competence of the President of the National Assembly is to represent the Assembly and its work. Representing the National Assembly’s work primarily refers to taking care of relationships with the National Council, the President of Slovenia, the Government and other organs defined in the Constitution. When managing the Assembly’s work the president convenes and leads parliamentary sessions and also ensures that the standing rules are being obeyed (which leads to a series of further duties). Besides the President of the National Assembly, the Standing Rules also anticipate at most three Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly. One of these three must be elected from the group of representatives of the biggest opposition party. The National Assembly can dismiss the President and Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly if it is dissatisfied with their work (Haček et al., 2013: 49–50). The Council of the President of the National Assembly is a consultative body, composed of the President of the National Assembly, Vice-presidents, leaders of Deputy Groups, and representatives of national communities (minorities). A decision of the council is accepted if it is supported by those leaders of Deputy Groups whose parties hold a majority in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, if at least one-fifth of all MPs still oppose (in writing) a decision made by the Council, then the National Assembly has the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 99 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism final vote on it without any discussion or explanatory voice (except in cases of decisions on the timing of parliamentary sessions, decisions discussing points on the agenda, and decisions on the timing of representatives’ discussions) (Haček et al., 2013: 50). The Council of the President therefore decides on the length of sessions of the National Assembly, the length of specific points on the agenda, the length of discussions, it also decides on accepting the annual work programme of the National Assembly and the term programme for the period of two months in advance etc. The Council also decides over the parties’ number of places in specific working bodies and which Deputy Groups will get the leading positions in specific working bodies. However, the Council does not decide on the sequence of ratifying the laws. Precedence is on the side of a bill that was submitted first, whereas second place goes to a bill proposed by the government. But the Council can decide on: a proposed bill passing through the fast-track procedure (except when the Prime Minister combines it with a vote of no confidence), a proposed bill passing through a short procedure, a proposed preliminary discussion of a certain bill and alike. Some of these matters were previously assigned to the National Assembly (Haček et al., 2013: 50). MPs are representatives of the people, but nevertheless a major role is played by the parties, which inside the parliament form so-called deputy groups. Deputy groups play an important role in the National Assembly’s work because their leaders participate in the Council’s organisation of the Assembly’s work and in matters concerning the competencies of the Council. Deputy groups participate in submitting amendments to bills. When forming a government the President of Slovenia must consult regarding the nominations with leaders of the deputy groups, whereas in the second round of elections of the Prime Minister they can nominate a person themselves.6 Deputy groups are composed of representatives of the same party whereby each representative can be a member of only one deputy group.7 Every party can establish only one deputy group (a minimum of three MPs). Representatives of national communities are not members of any deputy groups but due to their special position they form a deputy group on their own. The question is whether they actually have common interests and whether they are in a privileged position compared to other deputy groups (Haček et al., 2013). Mode of decision-making and operating of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia The National Assembly operates in long-lasting ordinary sessions, which are not time limited by the Constitution. However, the Standing Rules determine sittings should be convened in the last seven workdays of every month of ordinary annual sessions. Ordinary sessions are convened by the President of the National Assembly in accordance with either the programme of work of the National Assembly, the decree of the National Assembly, the agreement of the Council, or on the Government’s proposal. The National Assembly can also be convened outside of ordinary sessions, namely at emergency sessions. The Slovenian particularity is that emergency sessions can be convened by the 100 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism President of the National Assembly if so proposed by at least one-quarter of the representatives or the President of Slovenia (Haček et al., 2013: 54). The President of the National Assembly can also convene an emergency session by decree of the Council, but only in special circumstances when matters cannot be discussed in an ordinary session in time. The new Standing Rules also impose time limits on representatives’ discussions in parliamentary sittings. Discussion time must now not be shorter than five minutes for an individual representative, and ten minutes for a Deputy Group. Deputy Groups can demand an expansion of their available time by multiplying the number of their representatives with the individual’s disposable time. The joint time must then be between 20 minutes and 90 minutes, whereby an (individual) Deputy Group can use this right on five agenda points only. In the case of budgetary acts or interpellations this time is doubled. Deputy Groups must file their demands for discussion time already in the session of the Council, where the time plan for a plenary sitting is appointed. However, there can be some exceptions. The National Assembly can, upon the President’s or representative’s proposal, rule a ‘ne bis idem’ over certain representative’s discussion. Time limits also apply to explanations of a vote – Deputy Groups have at most three minutes whereas individual representatives have two minutes each. The new Standing Rules also permit an obstruction, which has to be announced and explained in advance by the president of the Deputy Group (Haček et al., 2013: 54–55). There is also permission for three priority questions regarding the procedure. The National Assembly, similar to other modern parliaments, only rules if the majority of representatives is present at a sitting. Decisions are made by a majority of declared votes – votes that were in favour or against a certain proposal, not including representatives who abstained from voting. This is true of all cases except where a special majority is prescribed by the Constitution or a certain law. Special majorities can be: an absolute regular majority, a relative qualified majority, and an absolute qualified majority. The majority of all representatives elect the Prime Minister and the same majority is required to re-pass a law that was rejected by the National Council. A two-thirds majority of representatives present is required to pass the Standing Rules and the Law on Referendum. Lastly, a two-thirds majority of all representatives is required to pass an Election Law or to alter the Constitution (Haček et al., 2013: 54). 8 Voting in parliament is not determined by the Constitution but by the Standing Rules and certain laws. The Standing Rules state that the vote must (usually) be public, with three alternatives: by using a voting device, by a show of hands or by every representative’s declaration out loud. In some specific cases a secret vote is designated. This happens when electing, for example, the Prime Minister, President and Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly, or when deciding (on the request of the proposer or Deputy Groups) about very sensitive subjects such as a constitutional bill indicting the President, the Prime DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 101 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism Minister or a minister. A secret vote is provided by using a specific voting procedure, whereby representatives vote by ballots and a voting box. Legislative procedure in the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia When defining the legislative procedure, the authors of the Standing Rules took examples from the oldest parliamentary democracy, Great Britain, and Germany. Standing Rules of the National Assembly accepted the solution that once a bill is submitted to the National Assembly it becomes its property. The bill is then perfected to reach its final form. The parliamentary legislative procedure starts by submitting a proposed law (bill). This can be done by the Government, individual MP, at least 5,000 voters or the National Council. The regulation in which the Government and representatives have the right to submit bills fits in with the institutionalisation of the legislative initiative of classical parliamentary democracies. That is also the framework for the Slovenian parliament’s practice, whereby most of the laws are proposed by the Government. The right of 5,000 voters to submit a bill to the National Assembly originates from the concept of the citizen’s initiative. Once a bill is submitted, the duty of the President of the National Assembly is to first check whether there is an equal or similar bill already in the legislative procedure. If so, he prevents the new procedure from being started. When there are no such obstacles, the President of the National Assembly sends the submitted bill to the National Assembly and to Government (whenever the latter is not the proposer of that bill) (Haček et al., 2013: 56). Before submitting their bill, proposers can suggest a preliminary discussion of basic inquiries and social relations that are to be settled by this bill. A preliminary discussion can be used by the National Assembly to answer a cluster of basic inquiries on social relations that should be addressed by a law. These discussions take place in working bodies, whereas notice about the preliminary discussion is passed by the Council of the President of the National Assembly. The proposer of the law prepares a demonstration to the National Assembly in which he addresses the circumstances in the social field concerned and proposes how this field should be regulated. The prime intention of the preliminary discussion is to express the representatives’ standpoints to the proposer before he finishes with the bill. This is particularly useful when submitting a bill in a field where interests are widely dispersed. The preliminary discussion enables the closing of the gap among these interests and therefore increases the chances of the bill being passed once it is submitted (Haček et al., 2013: 56). The National Assembly uses a three-phase discussion legislative procedure. This means that the National Assembly applies the praxis of first, second and third readings known to all classical parliaments around the world. The first discussion (reading) is done by submitting the bill to the representatives. A group of at least ten representatives has the right to demand (within 15 days) a discussion in the National Assembly of the reasons for 102 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism accepting this bill, and its principles, goals and main solutions (a general discussion). At the end of the first discussion the National Assembly decides whether the second discussion will operate with unchanged wording of the bill, or whether the proposer should include decrees and expressed standpoints of the representatives. The National Assembly also decides whether the second discussion will happen in the same or a following sitting. The legislative procedure can finish at the end of the first discussion if the National Assembly so rules (Haček et al., 2013: 56–57). The second discussion of a bill is first carried out in the parent working body and then in the National Assembly, based on the parent working body’s report. If there was no previous debate over the bill, then the presidents of the Deputy Groups can explain their party’s standpoints. The second discussion includes debating and voting over a bill’s individual articles and is therefore a very thorough discussion of the bill. In this phase MPs ratify changes and supplements to the articles by the means of an amendment. The third discussion ends the legislative procedure of the National Assembly. In the third discussion the National Assembly debates and votes on the bill as a whole. Only the already amended articles can be discussed and further amended. Amendments can only be proposed by the proposer of the bill, the Government (if it was not the proposer), and the Deputy Groups. In the third discussion MPs examine the bill from the perspective of its consistency and its place within Slovenian legislation. Once the discussion is finished, MPs can ratify it. A ratified law must be enacted by the President of Slovenia and published in the Official Gazette. It comes into force 15 days after it was published (Haček et al., 2013: 57). The proposer of a bill can propose that the National Assembly discuss the bill in a shortened procedure if there are minor changes to be made or parts of the law to be dismissed. The proposer can propose that the bill be discussed in a shortened procedure if there are only minor changes to be made, or if the law (or part of it) is to be abolished. The shortened procedure must be approved by the Council, whereby the President of the National Assembly designates the parent working body and assigns the bill to be discussed in it. The shortened procedure skips the general (first) discussion and carries out the second and third discussions in one parliamentary sitting. The second discussion therefore starts with a debate in the parent working body. The Standing Rules also enable an emergency (‘fast-track’) procedure for passing a law, but this procedure needs to be justified by extraordinary state interests such as a defence emergency or natural catastrophe. In an emergency procedure the first discussion is skipped, and the second and third discussions are carried out in one parliamentary sitting. Whenever the National Assembly rejects a proposition to pass a law in the fast-track procedure, the bill enters the ordinary procedure. The fast-track procedure differs from the ordinary one by the fact that amendments can be submitted even verbally; however the written version must be submitted before the amendment is put to a vote (Haček et al., 2013: 57). The problem is DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 103 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism particularly in the extensive usage of shortening procedures, in many cases even more problematic in crisis situations. Table 7: Adopted laws according to the type of legislative procedure 1992– 1996– 2000– 2004– 2008– 2011– 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2014 Constitutional - 2 4 (0.8%) 1 (0.2%) - 2 (0.7%) 151 101 148 209 141 72 Regular (40.2%) (30%) (34.2%) (43.6%) (39.4%) (27.7%) 181 172 184 107 83 85 Urgent (48.2%) (50%) (42.2%) (22.9%) (23.2%) (32.8%) 42 100 152 134 100 Shortened 68 (20%) (11.2%) (22.8%) (32.3%) (37.4%) (38.0%) Source: Work reports of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office. Act to become law should travel through all levels of parliamentary procedure. In particular important legislation should not skip any procedural steps; some steps could be missed in coordination laws or acts amending the particular act. In the event of war, natural disasters or emergency needs of the country, when law by urgent procedure is adopted, the whole process does not travel through all levels of the procedure, as the first discussion is omitted, and the second and third are discussed at the same session. In praxis, urgent and shortened procedures predominate over the normal procedure, which is not justified by the crisis, and it’s causing a series of problems with speedy and emergency solutions. Efficiency of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia ‘Efficiency of modern parliaments is related to a determined, rational, and economical process of decision-making’ (Zajc, 1997: 59). Parliament, as a central organ of political system, must establish its own legitimacy. Part of such legitimacy is gained by the inclusion of citizens, another part by transparency and most of it by efficiency. Legitimacy therefore depends on the manner of the parliament’s ability to translate social demands into responsible decisions, and its degree of understanding social conflicts. Parliament’s efficiency depends on its constitutional position in the political system, on its functions and particularly on its institutionalisation and internal organisation. From this point of view, some interesting changes are brought by the new Standing Rules (Haček et al., 2013: 58). Before 2002 there were many provisions in the Standing Rules that antagonised modern parliamentarianism (and the division of power). For example, they permitted the return of a bill to its creator (usually the Government). By doing so the parliament lost ownership over the bill, which is one of the principles of modern parliamentarianism. The former Standing Rules used a three-phase legislative procedure (like the current one) but it 104 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism enabled the return of a bill to a previous phase, which allowed endless opportunities to amend the bill. This proved to be irrational and uneconomical. The result of such an arrangement was an invasion of poorly written and badly prepared bills, as well as the suffocating of parliament by submitting a pile of amendments to every bill. The top priority of the new Standing Rules (2002) was the higher efficiency and rationalisation of the National Assembly’s work. This was to be achieved mostly through the introduction of a short legislative procedure (the possibility of skipping the first discussion and performing the second and third discussions in a single sitting) but also by increasing the responsibilities and competencies of the working bodies, increasing the competencies of the Council of the President of the National Assembly, and changes related to planning and limiting the MPs’ extensive discussions (Haček et al., 2013: 58). The short history of Slovenia’s democratic parliament is, in light of the legislative procedure, problematic in two major ways. First, there were a great number of altered laws, which implies the adopting of many bad solutions. This means the National Assembly failed to translate social demands into responsible decisions and that it had to spend money and time twice over in order to solve a single problem. Second, there was a huge amount of amendments, which completely transformed the bill, and also used a lot of money and time. In Table 8 we see the first statistics of the efficiency of the new Standing Rules. In the 1996–2000 term of office, the National Assembly adopted 633 acts: two were constitutional laws, 186 were laws, 290 ratifications, and as many as 155 laws that amended other laws. In the 2000–2004 term of office, the National Assembly adopted 679 acts, out of which there were four constitutional laws, 169 laws, 243 ratifications, and as many as 263 (almost 40 % of all acts) laws that amended other laws. Prior to the adoption of the new Standing Rules in July 2002, the National Assembly ratified 175 decisions annually. In 2003, it ratified only 144 decisions, but 186 were ratified in 2004. Two interesting facts can be noticed if we compare the first half of the term of office when the old Standing Rules applied and the second half when the new Standing Rules were in force. The number of ratified laws varies between the years but in that period the number decreased by ten percent. The opposite situation is seen in the case of laws on altering other laws. In 2003 there were 57 such laws, which is a little less than in the first half of the term of office (in 2001 there were 68, and in 2002 there were 63 of such laws), but then the number dramatically increased to 75 laws on altering laws. Similar fluctuations (less adopted acts, but many more amendments to the existing laws instead) could be traced in the 2004–2008 term as well. This term saw somewhat less acts adopted, namely 632: one constitutional act, 149 acts, 162 ratifications and 318 acts on amendments to existing acts plus two acts of notification. In the 2008–2011 term of office, this figure was even lower, i.e., 468, which was due to the early dissolution of National Assembly. Composing this number were 88 adopted acts, 270 acts amending existing acts, 108 ratifications and two acts of notification. Constitutional acts were not adopted in this term. In the period from December 2011 to December 2012 15 acts, 90 acts amending existing acts, 35 ratifications and one act of notification were adopted. In the whole period of 1996–2012, 7 constitutional acts, 607 acts, 1,096 acts on amendments to DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 105 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism existing acts, 838 ratifications and 5 acts of notification were adopted altogether. Statistics prove parliamentary work often repeats itself and that there were many bad, imprudent and deficient laws. Of course that is the consequence of gaining independence when there is a great need for new democratic legislation for a new democratic state. These conditions were worsened by pressures to harmonise the Slovenian legislation with the Acquits Communautaire of the European Union. Another problem was incongruent legislation – sometimes laws, which regulated relative fields or which regulated similar social areas simply overlapped. The new Standing Rules reduced the chance of passing unsuitable laws, which should eventually decrease the amount of laws on altering other laws. These should only appear if there are major social or global changes (Haček et al., 2013: 58-59). Table 8: Acts adopted in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office ADOPTED ACTS 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2011 2011–2014 TOTAL Constitutional laws 2 4 1 - 2 9 Laws 186 169 149 88 46 638 Laws on amending 155 263 318 270 211 1,217 laws Ratifications 290 243 162 108 84 887 Acts of notification - - 2 2 2 6 Total 633 679 632 468 345 2,757 Source: Work reports of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office. A very important indicator of the efficiency of the new Standing Rules is the number of submitted and accepted amendments. The number of amendments proposed by parent working bodies increased from about 800 in 2001 to more than 1,000 in 2002 and 2003. In 2004, it even reached 1,300 amendments (in 2000–2004 term of office, the total number was 4,308). In the preceding term (1996–2000), working bodies proposed a total of 3,200 amendments; in the subsequent term (2004–2008), the respective figure was 3,039. In the term of office of 2004–2008, the most amendments were proposed in 2006 (1,558). This was primarily due to the preparations for the Council of the EU Presidency. There has been a noticeable change in the role of the parent working bodies, which represents their better performance and higher integration into the legislative process (typical of modern parliaments). Available data show that a great majority of amendments proposed by the working bodies are passed. The contrary applies to amendments proposed by individual MPs. In the term of 1996–2000, they proposed 4,431 amendments (only 1,554 were actually adopted); in the 2000–2004 term, this number was 7,618 (only 2,481 were adopted) (Haček et al., 2013); in 2004–2008 term, they proposed 8,324 amendments (3,670 were passed) and in the term of 2008–2011, the respective figure was 6,256 (of these, 3,369 were adopted). In the term of 2011–2014, they proposed 5,570 amendments, of these 3,565 were adopted. We conclude that the percentage of adopted 106 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism amendments that were proposed by MPs has been slowly increasing (from 35 % to 53 % during the 2008–2011 term of office and it is still increasing – data from 2014 shows that 64 % of proposed amendments by MPs were actually adopted). Table 9: Number of proposed and adopted amendments, with respect to terms of office and proposers 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2011 2011–2014 S R D D D D D E E E E E E S S D S D S D S D S D O O O O O O P P E E E E E S P S P S P S P S O O S O S O S O S O S R R A R A R A R A R A P P P P P P P P P P P Working body 3,200 2,950 4,308 3,905 3,039 2,931 1,260 1,196 562 555 MPs 4,431 1,554 7,618 2,481 8,324 3,670 6,256 3,369 4,992 2,998 Government 3,677 2,334 2,661 1,893 259 203 87 70 16 12 Total 11,30 6,838 14,587 8,279 11,621 6,807 7,603 4,635 5,570 3,565 8 Source: Work reports of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2008–2011 and 2011–2014 terms of office. The number of amendments submitted by the Government demonstrates the biggest increase in the efficiency of the new Standing Rules. In 2001 the Government submitted 1,400 amendments and nearly 1,000 of those were ratified. The latter is the number of government amendments in 2002 and the National Assembly ratified 750 of them. The efficiency of the new Standing Rules is evident in 2003 and 2004 when the Government submitted less than 100 amendments. In the three subsequent terms, this number would decline further, as the Government submitted 259 amendment proposals in the 2004– 2008 term; in the term of 2008–2011, this number was 87; (Haček et al., 2013: 60–61) and in the period of December 2011 to July 2014 the number of Government submitted amendment proposals was only 16. This is a consequence of the new Article 135 of the Standing Rules, which prohibits Government amendments to ‘its own’ bills. The consequences of such an arrangement are better-accomplished government bills. Naturally, there are also some problems with this new regulation. The new time limits in discussions reduced the opposition’s chance to object to and debate bills. There is only a vague possibility of citizen participation (and the participation of interest groups for that matter) in the sessions of parent working bodies. This deficiency must be addressed and rectified (communication with citizens). Still problematical is the legal initiative, which is falling into the hands of the Government. The abuses of the fast-track (urgent) procedure and problems related to supervision of the National Assembly have strengthened. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 107 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism 3 Instead of Conclusion: Some Development Problems of Slovenian Parliamentarism 1. In autumn 2014 Slovenian Parliament entered into seventh term after independence and the creation of a new state, but the last two terms (2008–2011 and 2011–2014) were for the first time shortened. In the initial period after 1990 parliament successfully aligned with the new Constitution and modernized previous legislation, in the second period it succeeded to harmonize legislation with EU acquis communautaire and thus reached a relatively high level for at least the formal institutionalization, stability and predictability of the legislative procedure. After 2008, with the onset of the economic crisis, parliament stepped into its third period, characterized by the political instability, the replacement of coalition governments (in the sixth term), delays in its operation and declining public confidence. The performance in this period was affected by both external (economic and migrant crisis) and internal (the circulation of political elites and the emergence of new political parties) factors. 2. A high degree of "volatility" of the electorate and the flood of newly established political parties, not only threatens the democracy, but also affects on the functioning of the parliament. Particular effect on the performance of the parliament has new politicians that with their inexperience in the operation in the political arena complicate and prolong the decision-making processes and quality of the policies. The low percentage of re-elected MPs hinders the creation of more experienced parliamentary elite. Notwithstanding the improved educational structure, newly elected MPs should acquire the relevant experiences and institutional knowledge; their political socialization is therefore longer process. The frequency of the introduction of “new faces” in the political (parliamentary) life can instead the search for new concepts and solutions effectively mean just the preservation and continuation of old patterns of political action. Raising the electoral threshold and majority electoral system are often mentioned as possible solutions for those problems, as both are often perceived as a factor of stability in young democracies. 3. A special problem of legislative activity is very poor implementation of European and national normative documents. Key questions of legislative activity are still attached to the failure to comply with the regular legislative procedure, insufficient role of the legal profession, inadequate assessments of the effects of regulations, insufficient public cooperation and lack of transparency in lobbying (Igličar, 2016). The Slovenian legislative practice barely a third of the legislation is adopted by regular (three-phase) legislative procedure. Although parliament did significant legislative work, largely because of a crisis situation, this is still no excuse for a high number of laws adopted by the urgent and shortened proceedings. External circumstances certainly help to keep the legislative process manageable, but also trigger all kinds of problems and seriously 108 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism undermine the quality and enforcement of expert elements of legislation, and hinder the policy coordination process. An important indicator of this situation is an extremely large number of special sessions of parliament. 4. Slovenian parliament in the most important issues is not functioning as deliberative democratic body, but serves largely for the subsequent sanctioning of decision, which had previously been adopted by heads of coalition political parties. This means that parliament has difficulties to perform the functions of conflicts resolution and legislation adoption related to the conflicts between the coalition and the opposition. This is not related to the unconstructive partisan fights, but to the lack of real substantive and democratic debate and difficulties in overcoming the significant ideological differences, which are a reflection of the historical divisions in Slovenia. We live in a time of unproductive extremes, demagogy and method of disabling the opponents using the "ad hominem" attacks. 5. The position of parliament in young democracies such as Slovenia is also linked with the position and role of political (legislative) leaders. Our leading politicians have become masters in shifting the burden of responsibility to the others. Selected strategy in the last two mandates is to systematically create the impression of powerlessness and entrapment in the international environment. This means lack of important decisions and reliance on external factors (EU, ECB, OECD, IMF). Leaders survival strategy is the result of steering between the references to the international requirements (Brussels) and by exerting pressure on its own electorate, opposition and civil society. 6. The first condition for the consolidation of democracy is the establishment of an institutional framework and appropriate political and representative institutions (parliament), which happened relatively quickly. However, the operation of such institutions is always the result of political and historical heritage, the peculiarities of the transitional development and the structure of the political space (political-cultural patterns). Interruption with old anti-liberal value system is generally difficult; construction and operation of all new political institutions, including the parliament, runs slowly and with obstacles. Gradualist model of democratic consolidation has in times of crisis proved less successful compared with sharp cuts of the past. Democratic consolidation is largely dependent mainly on the professionalization of political and thus also parliamentary elite. With a half-implemented reforms Slovenia did not achieve desired effects; because of the dispersion of interests and disunity we maintain unconsolidated status quo and are missing opportunities for development. Slovenian parliamentarism is this facing major challenge. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 109 M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism Notes: 1 In a pure parliamentary system the Constitutional Court proposes the abolition of a law to the parliament once it has independently considered it. Further, the President of the Republic is elected by the parliament. 2 The drafters of the Constitution did not define the present National Council as part of the parliament, but assigned this function to the National Assembly. 3 Suggestions lean towards 120 representatives (also by a possible abrogation of the National Council). 4 Data as of March 2013. 5 Abbreviations represent the (original) Slovenian names of the parties. 6 This right does not only belong to the Deputy Groups but also to groups of 10 MPs. A Deputy Group can be significantly smaller (three MPs). Some wish to add Deputy Groups to groups of 10 representatives wherever they can. 7 Representatives can reject this right. But representatives who do not integrate into Deputy Groups thereby renounce a number of rights of co-operation in the National Assembly. 8 If the governing coalition does not have a two-thirds majority in parliament, then it will also need the votes of the opposition in order to pass more demanding decisions. The opposition can use this situation in order to gain as many as possible political concessions in the areas of its interest. In such cases there is a demand for more lively leadership of the National Assembly, which has to recognise these interests and try to make them form a compromise. References: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (1991) Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Ljubljana: National Assembly). National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2000) Report of the National Assembly on the work in mandate 1996–2000 (Ljubljana: National Assembly). National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2004) Report of the National Assembly on the work in mandate 2000–2004 (Ljubljana: National Assembly). National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2008) Report of the National Assembly on the work in mandate 2004–2008 (Ljubljana: National Assembly). National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2011) Report of the National Assembly on the work in mandate 2008–2011 (Ljubljana: National Assembly). National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2014) Report of the National Assembly on the work in mandate 2011–2014 (Ljubljana: National Assembly). Grad, F. (2000) Parlament in vlada (Parliament and government) (Ljubljana: Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia). Grad, F., Kaučič I., Kristan, I. & Ribičič, C. (1999) Državna ureditev Slovenije, tretja izdaja (State regulation of Slovenia, 3rd edition) (Ljubljana: Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia). Haček, M., Brezovšek, M. & Kukovič, S. (2013) Slovenian democratic evolution and praxis (Zagreb and Ljubljana: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and Faculty of Social Sciences). Igličar, A. (2016) Nosilna vprašanja zakonodajne dejavnosti, In: Štajnpihler, T., Igličar, A. & Pavčnik, M. (eds.) Odprta vprašanja zakonodajne dejavnosti (Ljubljana: SAZU), pp. 9-20. Lukšič, I. (2001) The political system of the Republic of Slovenia (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče). 110 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Brezovšek: The Institutionalisation of Slovenian Democracy: Development of Parliamentarism Zajc, D. (1997) Moč in nemoč slovenske parlamentarne demokracije (Strength and weakness of the Slovenian parliamentary democracy), In: Brezovšek, M. (ed.) Demokracija – vladanje in uprava v Sloveniji (Democracy-governance and administration in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Slovenian political science association), pp. 9-25. Zajc, D. (2000) Parlamentarno odločanje (Parliamentary decision-making) (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY A. Turska-Kawa & M. Haček Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 MARIUSZ KOLCZYŃSKI & AGNIESZKA TURSKA-KAWA 1 Abstract The article presents changes occurring in Polish voters after 1989. The discussion refers to three overlapping planes. The first of them is socio-political cleavages in Poland: stable systems of polarisation of the political community, within which certain social groups support specific political entities perceived to be the representatives of those options. The second plane of the analysis is the psychological characteristics of party electorates. The psychological approach assumes that voters are individuals with specific internal predispositions, which moderate their behaviours. The variables considered in the paper are authoritarianism, paranoid thinking, and political alienation. Analyses of psychological changes in particular segments of party electorates provide many study areas aimed at the search of the causes of breaking up the relations between a voter and a political party, for example they generate questions concerning a change in the electoral message, changes in the directions of political parties' activity, or the approval for new party leaders. Changes at the level of political communication are the third plane of analyses presented in the paper. Keywords: • voting behaviours • cleavages CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Mariusz Kolczyński, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: rafal.glajcar@us.edu.pl. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Ph.D., University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Unit of Political Systems of Poland and Central and Eastern European Countries, Bankowa 12, 40-007 Katowice, Poland, email: agnieszka.turska- kawa@us.edu.pl. DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.8 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 112 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 1 Introduction The events of 1989 were really profound changes in the political, economic, legal and cultural system, which surely had their impact on the whole community. Scholars who analyse the tendencies and transformations occurring in these areas often approach them from the point of view of specific models, so as to universalise and compare them with other countries from the post-communist bloc. According to Jerzy Szacki, this approach makes it difficult to perceive the great diversity of the changing societies, with their differences in history, political culture, mentality, and ambitions (1999: 30). This article presents changes occurring in Polish voters after 1989. The discussion refers to three overlapping planes. The first of them is socio-political divisions providing some criteria, which group people within a community. What is essential here is the divisions additionally caused by political differences. As Oddbj ørn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough (1995) point out, a political party transforms social divisions into cleavages by ensuring coherence and organised expression to otherwise underdeveloped and partial beliefs, values and experiences of members of some social groups or group clusters. The paper points out the vital points of clear social divisions with reference to politics. After 1989, they were used to design electoral messages and polarise the voters. The second plane of analysis of changes in electoral behaviours after 1989 is the psychological characteristics of party electorates. The psychological approach assumes that voters are individuals with specific internal predispositions, which moderate their behaviours. The significant variables are e.g. needs, values, expectations, priorities, and personality dispositions. Analyses of psychological changes in particular segments of party electorates provide many study areas aimed at the search of the causes of breaking up the relations between a voter and a political party, for example they generate questions concerning a change in the electoral message, changes in the directions of political parties' activity, or the approval for new party leaders. Changes at the level of political communication are the third plane of analyses presented in the paper. 2 Socio-Political Cleavages One of the key concepts of socio-political cleavages, being the classic concept in political science, is one proposed by Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990). For the authors, a socio-political cleavage is a stable system of polarisation of a political community, within which certain social groups provide support for certain political directions and parties perceived as representatives of those options, whereas other social groups support opposite political directions and parties that represent them. The year 1989 in Poland marked a transition from party-based nominations to universal elections of state authorities, which is considered as one of the most important transformations of Polish political arena (Zieliński, 1996: 32).1 In the PRL (People's Republic of Poland) period, voters did not have a real possibility to support the candidates; they could only choose between those who had been accepted by the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 113 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 communist authorities. Regaining the basic political liberties, especially the freedom of political expression and the right of association for political purposes (Antoszewski, 2006: 77 ff.), initiated a number of processes, which led to voters focusing around different axes of socio-political cleavages. The collapse of communism in 1989 led to the development of two camps, divided with the so-called post-communist cleavage (Grabowska, 2004). Mirosława Grabowska observes that communism was a complete series of events and processes, both long-term and rapid, taking place in different spheres of the social reality, touching people's emotions, forcing people to confront their values, concerning the fundamental sphere of identity, impressing a permanent mark on the biographies and lifestyles of individuals and whole communities (Ibid.: 100). The author also holds that the cleavage caused the formation of two camps with dramatically different approaches to the ancien regime. The post-communist camp had a strong organisational, financial and human resources base, which outclassed the anti-communist camp in this respect. The power of the new parties was only the awareness of Polish society, cemented with the idea of free and independent Poland. There were also clear differences in the issues related to religious practices and beliefs. In time, differences related to parties' origins gradually disappeared, but the remaining factor, dividing the two sides the most, was the attitude to governmental coalitions over the communist cleavage. Post-communist parties were much more in favour of such coalitions, unlike post-Solidarność elites that consistently refused any cooperation with the post-communist side in the form of a governmental coalition. According to Grabowska, this proves that the social identities developed as a result of the cleavage were permanent. Characteristic of this cleavage was a huge importance of trade unions in the 1990s, which served an auxiliary role for political parties (Wojtasik, 2011: 75). Giving the political arena the trade union character resulted from the mode of transition from the socialist system to democracy, in which the “Solidarność” trade union was one of the key sides, and a large trade union centre also existed within the regime side. As a result, All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions ( Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ) later became part of the coalition of post-communist Democratic Left Alliance ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), and in the 1997 election, the committee of Solidarity Electoral Action ( Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS), was established. In time, the importance of trade unions in the party system began to decrease, as a result of e.g. new legal regulations concerning elections and political parties, the process of institutionalisation of political parties and the loss of social importance of trade unions. The year 2001 was the unprecedented defeat of the ruling parties and a significant loss of importance of the post-communist cleavage. The experience of AWS and a series of various disputes and affairs with the participation of prominent politicians of the ancien regime, generating the disintegration of SLD (Grabowska, 2006), led to the establishment of a coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and Labour United ( Unia Pracy, UP) after 114 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 the 2001 election, i.e., bonding the post-communist and post-Solidarność elements. What is more, that election gave rise to another significant socio-political cleavage, determined by the attitude to the perspective of Poland becoming part of the European Union, becoming more and more obvious at the time. New entities emerged among Polish parties, which were strongly opposed to the pro-European policy: the League of Polish Families ( Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) and Self-Defence ( Samoobrona). LPR and Samoobrona were the first parties in the Sejm that did not have either post-communist or post- Solidarność origin; they were not associated with parties previously represented in the Parliament, either. These parties based their electorates on the emerging cleavage between Eurosceptics and Euroenthusiasts. Research shows that the parties became popular with two special segments of voters who had a negative attitude to the European Union. LPR, whose message involved nationalistic demands (referring e.g. to the loss of sovereignty or subordination to economically stronger EU states), won right-wing voters. Samoobrona, with its populist message (referring e.g. to the deterioration of financial standing of farmers and the poorest class), reached the left-wing electorate (Markowski & Tucker 2010). The election in 2005, with the victory of Law and Justice ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), initiated the cleavage which – as Mirosława Grabowska (2010) argues – did not replace the post-communist one but was rather based on it, moving the centre of gravity to the inside of the post-Solidarność camp, which was internally diversified from the beginning. The main political sides of the cleavage are Law and Justice and the Civic Platform ( Platforma Obywatelska, PO). The division between them is largely of ideological and lifestyle nature. Put simply, PiS refers to the national and trade union heritage, while PO refers to the democratic one. PiS addresses the social groups for which Polish transformations meant a loss, those who need a welfare state, the people who are more traditional and religious. And this electorate produces stable voters for PiS. As for PO, they send their message to those who benefited from the transformations, to more progressive, liberal and secular circles, and find their supporters there. The elections in 2007 (victory of PO), 2011 (victory of PO) and 2015 (victory of PiS) politically consolidated the PO-PiS division, showing that the real electoral contest was between these two camps. In the inter-election period, the cleavage was even clearer due to disputes with the political context, largely concerning moral or social issues. For example the events following the Smolensk plane crash, which initially integrated the Polish nation, were soon attributed to political actions, generating many division lines between the PO and PiS camps. The lines involved accusations of wrong decisions in relationships with Russia against the ruling party PO, as well as monthly meetings, numerous monuments and commemorative plaques to commemorate the victims of the Smolensk crash organised or pushed through by circles associated with PiS, aimed to demonstrate that PiS cared and PO did not. Another clear division between PO and PiS is the attitude to the relationships between the Church and the authorities. In the public discourse, PiS clearly stands for the integration of the sacred and the profane, which is evident, among others, in supporting religion lessons at school, maturity exam in religion, DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 115 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 supporting a higher school run by a priest, and consulting representatives of the clergy before taking political decisions. 3 Psychological Changes in Party Electorates The above-mentioned socio-political cleavages were not internally homogeneous: ideological, socio-economic and psychological issued were undergoing evolution, and that was reflected particularly in changes of party electorates. Psychological variables mostly occurred in the non-observable qualities of voters. These characteristics are given the status of intermediate variables in moderating electoral behaviours. This model in a way is a departure from perceiving voters as classical 'black boxes', all reacting the same way when exposed to the same external stimuli. Paranoid thinking. Paranoid thinking is the belief in the existence of hidden powers that govern the world and in the conspiracy theory. In the mid-1990s, this variable did not significantly diversify party electorates, but this changed at the turn of the century (BS, 1999). Generally, the paranoid approach intensified in all the electorates except AWS voters. Especially intensive conspiracy thinking was typical of the voters of Polish Peasants' Party ( Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) and SLD. It also increased, although to a lesser extent, in the electorate of the Freedom Union ( Unia Wolności, UW). At the beginning of the 21st century, the belief in the existence of hidden powers that govern the society and conspire against Poland was the strongest in the electorate of Samoobrona (BS, 2002). This attitude also proved to be strong among those who supported PSL and LPR. The change of the balance of power on the party arena in 2001 helped limit the conspiracy thinking among the supporters of the winning parties: SLD and PSL. But whereas among the followers of SLD the scale of conspiracy-based perception of politics returned to its relatively low level of 1996, among the voters of PSL these attitudes were much more common than in the mid 1990s. After the first decade of the 21st century, the general index of paranoid thinking dropped to the level of the mid 1990s (BS, 2011). The index continued low in the electorate of SLD. The belief in the existence of hidden powers that govern the society and conspire against Poland was much more popular among those who supported PiS. Remarkably, contrary to the general tendency, in this group the attitude has become even stronger since the beginning of the 21st century. The reasons for that might have been the change in voter's social profile (higher share of elderly, less educated and poorer people) and taking over some of the electorates of LPR and Samoobrona. The belief in the conspiracy of hidden powers was the weakest among PO supporters, and in that group it has further decreased. The index of paranoid thinking also dropped among PSL voters, who displayed this attitude at the average level typical of the whole society. So apparently exercising power promotes the lowering of conspiracy and paranoid attitudes in the electorate of the victorious camp. 116 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 These results are compatible with the diagnosis of dispositional anxiety in the supporters of Polish political parties found by Turska-Kawa (2010). In that study, anxiety was understood as a behavioural motivation or disposition which makes a person susceptible to perceiving a broad spectrum of objectively harmless situations as dangerous and responding to them with anxiety states, disproportionately strong given the seriousness of the danger (Sosnowski & Wrześniewski 1983: 395). Obtained results show that the significantly highest level of anxiety occurred in the electorate of PiS, and its lowest index was observed in the supporters of PO. In 2015, the general index of political paranoia significantly increased, similar to 1999 (138/2015). The attitude had very different intensity in particular electorates. The belief in the existence of hidden powers that govern the society and conspire against Poland was much more popular among those who supported PiS and the voters of the new party Kukiz’15. The level of paranoid thinking was definitely lowest in the electorate of the Modern party ( Nowoczesna) led by Ryszard Petru. The level of belief in conspiracy of hidden political powers was less frequent than average among the supporters of PO and the United Left ( Zjednoczona Lewica, ZL). PSL supporters displayed an average level of political paranoia. Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is an attitude that involves the belief in hierarchical organisation of social relations, in the effectiveness of power-based solutions, and in the need to submit to authorities. In the 1990s, the occurrence of authoritarian attitudes was common throughout the society in Poland. But at the end of 1990s, the intensity of this attitude began to differ between electorates (BS, 1999). The authoritarian orientation was the least frequent among the supporters of UW, and relatively weaker in the electorate of UP. The strongest authoritarian attitudes occurred in the supporters of PSL. In the early 21st century, the level of authoritarian attitudes slightly decreased among the followers of the SLD-PSL coalition ruling since 2001, but in the case of PSL the level was still high (BS, 2002). The strongest authoritarian attitudes were definitely manifested by those who voted for Samoobrona. The followers of newly established PO were the least authoritarian. After the first decade of the 21st century, the general intensity of authoritarian attitudes in Polish society clearly decreased (BS, 2011). This was naturally reflected in weaker authoritarian attitudes in all the electorates. The most marked changes in this respect took place among the followers of SLD and PSL. But still the persons voting for PSL, apart from those who voted for PiS, had one of the highest indices of the authoritarian attitude. The lowest indices of authoritarian attitudes were again observed among those who voted for PO. The next diagnoses of 2015 demonstrated further weakening of the belief in the effectiveness of solutions based on power and the need to submit to authorities among Polish voters (138/2015). As for particular electorates, the adherents of PiS displayed the DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 117 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 strongest authoritarian approach. The voters of Nowoczesna proved to be much less authoritarian. The followers of PO and those who declared support for Kukiz’15 committee or ZL had a level of authoritarianism lower than average. Political alienation. Political alienation is the sense of alienation from the world of politics, the lack of influence on that sphere, and distrust in political mechanisms and elites. In the 1990s, distrust in politics, the lack of sense of influence on the government's activity and attributing negative motivations to politicians were almost universal (BS, 1999). In the mid-1990s, the voters of post-communist SLD gaining popularity in support polls manifested the strongest sense of political subjectivity. In the late 1990s, there was a clear growth in attitudes of rejection of the sphere of politics among SLD followers, perhaps caused by the election of 1997, which they lost. This attitude also intensified among PSL supporters. In the case of electorates of the ruling party coalition, however, the sense of civil subjectivity grew. Political alienation mainly decreased among the supporters of UW and – to a lesser extent – AWS. In the early 21st century, the highest political alienation level characterised the followers of Samoobrona and LPR (BS, 2002). The voters of PSL also had a relatively strong alienation approach, which is surprising given the party's participation in the ruling coalition. The adherents of the ruling SLD had a relatively lowest sense of alienation from the world of politics, followed by the potential voters of PO. After the first decade of the 21st century, the intensity of alienation attitudes in Polish society dropped, although the index was still quite high (BS, 2011). In terms of particular part electorates, the highest level of political alienation was displayed by those who supported PiS, although there was a little positive change as compared to the beginning of the 21st century. The intensity of political subjectivity of the followers of the ruling parties (PO and PSL) clearly grew. In SLD electorate, the change was also little but positive. A study by Turska-Kawa (2012) produced a similar outcome. The lowest level of political alienation was found in the electorate of PO. It was the highest among those who supported PiS and Ruch Palikota. The result achieved by the voters of PiS comes as no surprise: it was the largest opposition party, whose rhetoric was openly against the policy of the government. As for Ruch Palikota, the low level of political alienation might have been connected with the social context of the party's origin: its programme was largely addressed at social minorities, which had been poorly represented in the Sejm officially and whose rights had not been publicly articulated (Wojtasik, 2012). Having their interests ignored in the political discourse may have led to their higher level of political alienation, connected with the lack of approval for the social and moral order developing in Poland, supported indirectly by the ruling party. In 2015, the highest average level of alienation attitudes occurred in the electorates of Kukiz’15, PiS, Zjednoczona Lewica and PSL (similar levels in all of them). Attitudes of 118 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 distancing from and distrust in the world of politics were much weaker among the supporters of PO and Nowoczesna (138/2015). The presented analysis of psychological variables of voters after 1989 shows certain regularities. First, democratic processes in the Polish society are accompanied by departure from authoritarian attitudes. The belief in the effectiveness of power-based solutions and the need to submit to authorities was quite common in the 1990s, but each successive diagnosis demonstrated the weakening of such attitudes. Despite lowering the general indices, the electorate of PiS is still strongly authoritarian. Second, exercising power promotes greater political subjectivity. The sense of being part of the victorious camp generates greater support for the system, expressed among others in weaker alienation attitudes. Third, parties that base their brands on criticism, open opposition and negative rhetoric gain greater support from more paranoid and more alienated electorate. Fourth, taking into account the outlined socio-political division established in Poland after 2005, whose axis is the support for PO on the one hand and PiS on the other, it is worth emphasising that the psychological characteristics of electorate of those parties also sanction the division. The adherents of PO have a significantly lower level of political alienation, dispositional anxiety, political paranoia and authoritarianism than those who voted for PiS. 4 The Role of Political Parties in the Process of Development of Political Attitudes and Voting Behaviours The intensity and pace of the process of forming attitudes, opinions and behaviours connected with voting may be almost naturally correlated with the successive stages of development of the party system. Many organisational ideas were raised in the short history of Polish transformation: in the beginning, many of the new political parties had elementary problems with defining their market identity2: 1) in the axiological dimension – two groups of values prevailed: values associated with past situations (in the case of the majority of right wing parties) or instrumental values regarded as the necessary basis for current political activities; due to the 'post-socialist axiological gap', the few parties that referred to the values of liberal capitalism did not meet the expectations of most segments of the electorate; 2) in the social dimension – it is hard to define the social base of the emerging political parties or the social communities (target market segments) to which each political offer was addressed. Thus, in the early 1990s, a disturbing phenomenon appeared in the social reception, which prevented stable development of the political arena: an average voter may have had an impression that political parties were not established to articulate concrete values (because they had evident problems with self-identification) or the interests of certain voter groups, but to satisfy politicians' personal ambitions. In this context it may be said that the campaigns preceding elections in the first half of the 1990s clearly showed the existence of a historical developmental gap of the party system. They also demonstrated DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 119 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 the scale of difficulty faced by political leaders, who had to decide what ideological or programme values to refer to in building modern political parties3 and only then work out an effective concept of how to reach citizens with those values (Kolczyński, 2007: 169). An obvious result of this state of affairs was gradual departure from communication concepts, stressing the priority role of political (ideological) values in the development of persuasive political messages, in favour of marketing-style activities, referring to the needs, interests and expectations of the target groups identified in the given context and the resultant far-reaching standardisation of content4 and formal routine. In Polish political reality, the professional, market approach to organising and carrying out projects related to the course of political competition, particularly electoral competition was more and more popular from the moment of the presidential election in 1995, and it finally became dominant. In other words, the option of adapting the marketing model of activity won in the functioning of Polish political parties, which reflected standards typical of projects carried out in Western democratic countries. Its characteristics were advanced mediatisation of communication and personalisation of the political (electoral) process, expressed in the dominance of messages building the image of the candidate or party over messages referring to programme content, and the growing role of professional political advisers. The intensity of evolution of the marketisation and mediatisation of activities of the contesting entities (especially concerning the organisation and carrying out of electoral campaigns), measured with the speed of adaptation and social approval of new solutions, was largely dependent on factors resulting from decisions made at successive stages of development of Polish political system. They obviously stimulated the transformations of the party system approached from two perspectives, the organisational and the competitive one. The growing dynamics of political contest accompanied by the gradual development of Polish media market (and thus, limiting barriers in free access of political subjects to mass media) promoted the reorientation of political communication projects towards pragmatic concepts of political marketing. So paradoxically, the instability of Polish party system and relative weakness of each party (the lack of strong, ideologically different parties with stable electorates) created favourable conditions for gradual disideologisation of the political offer, expressed in growing personalisation of political competition. Evaluating the projects carried out during the stages of development of Polish party system, we can identify at least four basic orientations of activity of political parties in Poland aiming to achieve political/electoral support (objective: the development of desired voting behaviours) and/or stable political preferences (objective: development of political attitudes), especially visible during the preparation of electoral campaigns and the campaigns themselves (Kolczyński 2013). These are: pre-marketing orientation (propaganda and activation orientation based on ideology), quasi-marketing (primary 120 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 disideologisation) orientation, well-developed market orientation, and well-developed market polarisation orientation (the phase of marketing-emotional replication). 4.1 Pre-Marketing Orientation (Propaganda and Activation Orientation Based on Ideology) – Until 1995 It involved traditional techniques of influence, with communication focused on the fundamental values, primarily associated with political attitudes to the ancien regime. The communication projects were characterised by the dominant position of political message senders, and the lack of effort to obtain information providing basic recognition of the needs and expectations of message recipients. The chaotic development of the party system, determined by (a) ideological references that were abstract for the people5, (b) the rules of election ordinance, and (c) political initiatives initiated “top-down”, in isolation from the socio-political reality (actually having little in common with the expectations and needs of any segment of Polish society6 was not conducive to creating effective and consistently market-oriented political offers. To the contrary, the course of this process made a considerable number of citizens dissociate themselves not only from political actors but also from the modernisation processes. The intellectual passivity of political elites, the lack of ideas for the formation of modern political parties with programmes oriented at the future, and the social consequences of radical economic reforms soon led to the state of secondary political withdrawal of a considerable part of citizens7, 8. Doubtless, this situation was largely the result of unfavourable socio-cultural determinants. Political transformations began in a very complex cultural context – the 1980s. It was a period of advanced political anomie: the degeneration of many basic social and political values, resulting in the social response in the form of gradual political withdrawal. From this perspective, it seems doubtful whether the parliamentary election of 1989 can be regarded as the event with fundamental importance for the process of development of political values providing the axiological basis for Polish systemic transformation. The relatively low voter turnout (62.32%) should be a clear signal for Polish political elites, suggesting that a substantial part of the society was not motivated or engaged in the course of political transformations in any way. The reasons for that may have been: (a) political compromise (the arrangements of the so-called “Round Table”) underlying the transformations in 1989 was definitely not conducive to the full articulation of new political values, (b) it is debatable to what degree the leaders of the Solidarność side were prepared (or at least predisposed) from the conceptual point of view to accept the creation and propagation roles in the new axiological system (as the agents of changes), (c) the obvious lack of elementary civic habits related to the new areas of social activity. In this context, if the 1989 election can be referred to as the founding election (Grabowska & Szawiel, 2001: 183) it is so mostly because of the successful development of a strong positive conviction concerning the important position of regular, free and honest elections and the universal civic right to participate in elections in the system of values of a democratic state (Garlicki, 2007: 34). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 121 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 4.2 Quasi–Marketing (Primary Disideologisation) Orientation - 1995–2000 During the campaigns of that time, politicians often used many marketing instruments tested in the countries with well developed democracy: from professional advisers (among others, the presence of Jacques Seguel in Aleksander Kwaśniewski's campaign team in 1995), through the increasing importance of research in campaign preparation (segmentation of the political market and targeting), up to attractive and formally diversified media messages (e.g. in the campaign of AWS in 1997) and greater significance of paid forms of political advertising9. Organisational consolidation of the main subjects of political competition led to a clear situation in which it was possible to choose from among three well defined (left-wing, centre and right-wing) modern market political offers, which were effectively propagated, primarily with the use of mass media. Unfortunately, the expectation that with the baseline level of organisational consolidation of political subjects this situation would also be a strong impulse for the consolidation of political preferences, facilitate stronger identification with political parties and stimulate greater political activity involving the support for political parties did not come true10. 4.3 Well-Developed Market Orientation – 2001–2007 The parliamentary election of 2001 was undoubtedly not only a stage in development of Polish political market. It also confirmed in Polish system conditions the efficacy of marketing concepts of political activities: (a) individual political subjects, both the poll leader SLD and political parties that were new to the market (PO and PiS) managed to formulate effective campaign strategies with a clear reference to the needs and expectations of different electorate groups; (b) PO implemented the first genuine electoral media strategy in Poland11; the strategy fully met the market needs of a new political group: to become known to the voters, to create a certain image of the party and party leaders, and to reach potential supporters with the basic programme concepts; (c) electoral offers of the leading competition participants were less focused on the programme resulting from consolidated ideological values, and more on instrumental values and the figure of the party leader or leading candidates. The course of political competition in that period (especially the projects carried out during the parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns in 2005) in Poland proves great advancement in the process of modernisation of political activities/campaigns. The changes involved the following: (a) the strategic importance of the direction of political activities (including the extension of strategic horizon)12, (b) advancing professionalization of the market activities13, (c) dramatic increase in the intensity of gathering information necessary to rationalise the decision-making process, (d) orienting communication activity at mass media. 122 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 New quality strategic solutions connected with the change of plane of political competition (and of the topics utilised in political competition) were not only a significant achievement of the 2005 campaign but also an important moment in the history of development of Polish party system. It was a moment when the process of looking for new concepts of market competition began: competition between two right-wing parties with Solidarność (opposition) origin, with relative marginalisation of parties originating in the former system. Political and market consequences of strategic repositioning of PiS in 2005 proved more complex and permanent than initially expected and were not limited to the spectacular victory in parliamentary and presidential elections. The effectiveness of taking the market opportunity and redefining their offer so as to make it acceptable for the segments of the electorate that usually support left-wing parties paradoxically maintained the communicatively regressive tendency of broadly addressing campaign messages. What is more, adopting the quasi conflicting system of competitive positioning between PiS and PO contributed to relative marginalisation of the other political parties, creating conditions that were conducive to the use of new quality marketing instruments oriented at active image creation: (a) special emphasis on party leaders (focusing the message on the leader14), (b) emotionalisation of the political offer, (c) marginalisation of a simplified axiological message15 and (d) visible contextual direction of the strategy with consideration of political needs and expectations of different segments of potential voters identified in market studies. One of the basic elements of activities taken in that period was the intensification of emotional influences: projects involving so-called political soft sale, first used at such a scale, actually being professional manipulation affecting the emotional state of potential voters. With a relatively low level of political loyalty of Polish voters, positive emotional attitude is more and more often the basis for elementary bonds between the senders and recipients of political messages16. It was rightly assumed that emotions could be a specific 'filter' through which potential voters would perceive and interpret political events (including campaigns), thus directing the process of making electoral decisions. It also seems necessary to take into account the fact that the choice of “emotional” (de facto “emotional/conflicting”) strategy option by Polish political parties perfectly well suited the bipolar context of political competition between PiS and PO, and first of all met the needs and expectations of media broadcasters, for which the emotionalisation and dramatization of the political offer is one the key determinants of attractive messages aired during electoral campaigns. There is no doubt that the direction of activity of each political party well reflects the radical changes in the relations between political and media entities, leading to the situation in which political actors more and more often adapt to the logic of media functioning, trying to keep the (more and more limited) influence on the topics presented by the media (especially in the periods preceding elections at various levels). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 123 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 Changes in the market position of political parties confirmed the effectiveness of marketing orientation of electoral/political strategies17 and the importance of both professional political advisory and professional preparation of individual politicians and party organisations for successful carrying out of electoral/political plans. The triumph of contextual variants of the market strategy also resulted from the progressing disideologisation of electoral competition and pragmatic direction of campaign activities. The instrumentalisation of values, pragmatism and emotionalisation of the language of politics significantly simplified political messages, which were in fact reduced to the contents focused on the leader(s) of the party. 4.4 Well-Developed Market Polarisation Orientation (the Phase of Marketing- Emotional Replication) – 2007–2015. The results of the 2007 parliamentary election, which largely confirmed the legitimacy of the adopted strategic options18, strengthened the belief in high efficacy of conflicting positioning of one's own political offers, leading to the situation of nearly routine re-use of tested patterns of activity19. In the case of PO, the unique (for Polish political context) branding strategy was continued, with its subtle focus on the positive emotional charge: PO managed to depart from traditionally understood image-building politics20 and initiated modern soft politics 21 activities aimed at the formation of its political brand. There were continuous consistent efforts to broaden the support, addressing political appeals to all the segments of potential voters that did not declare clear support for PiS, this way marginalising the left wing on the Polish political market. Despite obvious problems with the proper balance of proportion between the basic axiological and pragmatic components of their political offer, PiS adopted the strategy of on-going competition positioning based on the continuation of the concept of 'great market polarisation'22. The 'political vacuity' of the adopted concepts was in a way concealed by the aggressive media (actually, only TV) orientation: it was largely thanks to media activity (despite the lack of content) that the market dominance of PO and PiS and a specific status of the marketing 'trend setters' were consolidated. Looking for (and testing) new political/marketing solutions was evident during the presidential campaign of 201023: Jarosław Kaczyński's campaign, very creative and charged with high market risk, was interesting from the perspective of search for new models of political competition. It was carried out contrary to the stereotypical PiS connotations and actually defying the core elements of the previous image of the leader. The concept of radical rebranding of J. Kaczyński's image can be regarded as one of the most interesting strategic solutions in the short history of Polish democracy. Efficient and professional carrying out of campaign projects (both direct and media ones) was also noteworthy. Despite the disappointing election outcome, the campaign was an interesting 124 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 experience in terms of the limits of social/electoral acceptance of strategic concepts that are radical and unorthodox from the marketing point of view. From the point of view of PO, the new strategy of PiS and the political consequences of the presidential election (confirming the dominant market position of PO, retaining the fundamental lines of division between the urban and rural electorate, region of residence and level of education, and the limited activation ability of the leading political entities) almost automatically led to the adoption of the strategic option of 'electoral duo', which was a creative extension of the concept from 2005. Since the beginning of 2010, PO had been implementing the classic variant of the marker leader strategy almost in its original form, involving the achievement and maintenance of market initiative as well as controlling and, if necessary, responding to the activities taken by the key rivals. But it is also evident that the 2011 parliamentary campaign to a great extent confirmed the limited ability of Polish political parties (and their advisors) to creatively look for new strategic solutions, which needed to be applied in the situation of clear exhaustion of the 'conflict formula' of political competition. Nevertheless, after the 2007 election, hardly any communication differed from the political routine: copying the tested strategies of action, methods of creating the electoral message and at the same time failing to look for new advertising formats, more suited to the social, cultural and demographic changes in basic parameters of the electorate. The observed modification of strategic concepts of Polish political parties was in a way forced by the attempt of changing the electoral law. The amendment of the Election Code adopted by Polish parliament in February 2011 (prohibiting paid forms of political presentation/spots in traditional electronic media) and the previous limitations concerning the financing of political parties created (at least in the legislator's intention) a new quality system of factors determining the way of organising and carrying out electoral campaigns24. This resulted in a change of communication electoral strategies: (1) reducing the intensity of using TV spots in favour of other types of advertising (the increasing role of outdoor advertising) or other forms of communication controlled by political senders (mostly on-line), and (2) basically different function of the Internet (especially with possible limitations of / ban on the broadcasting of TV spots) – despite the visible “strategic helplessness” of political message senders, the 2011 campaign was an important stage in the development of the concept of applying that medium in the process of political competition. Undoubtedly, professional activities of PO can be praised from the marketing perspective. The 2011 campaign also served as another step in improving long-term market strategy involving systematic development of the political brand. The adopted concept of influences can be defined as the model of professional strategy creation, fitting the classic variant of 'market leader strategy'. Given the relatively high poll results of the party, its prominent politicians (especially the leader), and the improving rates of the government and the prime minister, PO skilfully combined activities that stressed the symbols of DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 125 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 rulership, which summed up the achievements of Donald Tusk's government and emphasised the strong points of the finishing term of office25. Political competition in the 2014–2015 election cycle26 brought unexpected political and social consequences. The results of the next election taking place in the complex context determined by the clear erosion of the formula of exercising power by the PO-PiS team and the resultant changes in positions of particular entities on the political market (found in polls) did not only lead to the thorough reconstruction of Polish political scene but also led to market restitution of fundamental community values. Voters clearly rejected the offer of “moderate stabilisation” in favour of new social projects of PiS, skilfully strengthened with the personal offer suggesting profound (political, social, cultural and generational) transformation of Polish right wing. What should be stressed in this context is the formulation of a very clear electoral offer: Poland needs changes (it's time for a 'good change')  the change should be based on fundamental values and needs of Polish people  the good change is guaranteed by PiS. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość very pragmatically met the unclear social expectations ('the need of change') resulting from the exhaustion (or burnout) of the form of exercising power by the PO-PSL coalition. Personnel changes in PO after Donald Tusk becoming the President of the European Council led to an evident crisis in party leadership, resulting in the lack of ideas not only for the on-going rule but also for electoral campaigns. The severe defeat in presidential election (Bronisław Komorowski) and parliamentary election (PO) gave the opportunity to carry out PiS's political projects that brought into political and public discourse the values that caused strong social and emotional diversification, regardless of their practical importance. The reference to values was only an ostensible move away from the strategy of radical polarisation of the leading entities, implemented since 2007, with its ever-present conflicting orientation of activities and the political offer/message. In fact, despite objective political changes, the basic concept of influence did not change. It involved the emphasis on retaining previously developed political attitudes and preferences, with the core position of emotional calls oriented at maintaining the necessary tension, following the simple pattern of influence: competition  political conflict  dramatic message  stimulating emotions that facilitated voters' engagement in campaign activities and, finally, activation on the election day. 5 Conclusion The clear paradox of political competition in Poland, with the key importance of market- oriented election projects, is the deepening disproportion between the intensity of activities aimed at developing the desired voting behaviours and the ultimate effect of those efforts. Departure from political values, which are the foundation of traditionally, understood political/electoral offer more and more often leads to the diminishing political activation of citizens/voters. Communication strategies of most political entities getting 126 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 similar (which leads to the disappearance of their organisational and market identity) makes political competition lose the real dimension of competitiveness: from the target perspective, the contest becomes unattractive, does not sufficiently engage emotions and only to a limited degree stimulates interest in the course of market events. Furthermore, it can be said that professionalization of political actions, considerably limiting citizens' active participation in campaign procedures, not only results in gradual lowering of the level of political activation, weakening of political and/or party preferences, but first of all in the development of a passive observer of reality (or, in an extreme case, total political inertia). Observing the process of development of Polish party system and individual parties during the system transformation, we can see many interesting concepts of forming the desired electoral behaviours: from instrumental use of basic socio-political values (especially in the first transformation period) through skilful defining of practical, axiologically neutral political goals, up to professional guiding (or even manipulation) of public emotions. The emotionalisation of voting behaviours is undoubtedly one of the determinants of Polish transformation. It is promoted by the bipolar system of Polish political market (the post-communist side and the post-Solidarność side – until 2005, the liberal/centre-right side and the right side – from 2005), which facilitates market positioning of Polish political entities and the stimulation of the desired emotional connotations with each participant of the electoral contest, and as a result, the expected voting behaviours. These changes are reflected in the internal structure of party electorates. The above analysis shows certain regularities: First, democratic processes in the Polish society are accompanied by departure from authoritarian attitudes. The belief in the effectiveness of power-based solutions and the need to submit to authorities was quite common in the 1990s, but each successive diagnosis demonstrated the weakening of such attitudes. Despite lowering the general indices, the electorate of PiS is still strongly authoritarian. Second, exercising power promotes greater political subjectivity. The sense of being part of the victorious camp generates greater support for the system, expressed among others in weaker alienation attitudes. Third, parties that base their brands on criticism, open opposition and negative rhetoric gain greater support from more paranoid and more alienated electorate. Fourth, taking into account the outlined socio-political division established in Poland after 2005, whose axis is the support for PO on the one hand and PiS on the other, it is worth emphasising that the psychological characteristics of electorate of those parties also sanction the division. The adherents of PO have a significantly lower level of political alienation, dispositional anxiety, political paranoia and authoritarianism than those who voted for PiS. It appears, then, that apart from the broadly understood electoral context) the weakest link in the process of forming electoral behaviours is the clear lack of purposeful activities taken by the participants of political competition between elections. This competition is unattractive, does not sufficiently engage emotions and only to a limited degree stimulates DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 127 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 interest in the course of market events and politics in general. From this point of view, various activities to engage potential voters may significantly affect individual and collective determinants of decisions concerning certain voting behaviours. Notes: 1 In accordance with the political contract made at the Round Table, actual electoral competition between candidates supported by the current rulers and the opposition involved 35% of the seats. 60% were reserved for the coalition of Polish United Workers' Party ( Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), United People's Party ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL) and the Alliance of Democrats ( Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD), and the remaining 5%, for Christian Social Union ( Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna, UChS). 2 Mirosław Karwat rightly points out that party identity is determined by four basic attributes: (1) the social base, (2) the traits of its members, (3) the mode of action and the character of its organisational bond, (4) ideological goals and principles and the character of ideological bond (Karwat, 2008: 161–162). 3 It was hard to expect that the simple diversification ('us' – post-Solidarność forces, and 'them' – post-communists) would guarantee a long-term political success, especially that autonomous political groups were gradually emerging in the post-Solidarność camp. 4 Standardisation of the communicated content is manifested in the instrumental treatment of simplified political values that are acceptable for the broadest circles of political recipients, i.e. designing the message content that optimally fits the current political context. 5 In their programming concepts, parties not only referred to the heritage of the real socialism (parties originating from the previous system) but also to the political concepts of the Second Polish Republic. 6 The primary segmentation (structuralisation) of Polish political market initiated with the activity of Lech Wałęsa and his political circle at the time (so-called “war at the top” in May 1990) did not produce the expected modernisation effects, so it can be said that the division of the political arena did not translate into relatively permanent diversification or structuralisation of different voter groups. 7 The syndrome of “secondary withdrawal” was well illustrated with the voter turnout (43%) in the parliamentary election of 1991, which really began the development of the political market. 8 In many cases, withdrawal is permanent. Polish studies have identified a category of citizens who are completely passive in terms of politics, do not display any interest in political events and do not wish to participate in elections at any level ( permanent non-voters). As conservatively estimated (Raciborski, 2003: 111) approx. 20% of Poles have never been voting in elections since 1989. 9 In the electoral campaign before the 2000 presidential election, four candidates (Marian Krzaklewski, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Andrzej Olechowski, Janusz Kalinowski) purchased TV broadcast time. 10 In the short-time perspective, only the electorate of Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej did consolidate. 11 Platforma Obywatelska spent on paid TV spots nearly as much as all the other parties altogether; the allocation of PO's expenditure was also interesting: it was the only committee to spend more on advertising campaign in commercial channels – 63.3% of the total expenditure (see more in Kolczyński, 2003). Generally, it can be assumed that the new concepts of political influence were well received due to the changes occurring on the media market: the 2001 election was a marked 128 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 - beginning of non-public TV broadcasters' engagement in campaign communication. This way, they departed from the practice of distancing themselves from current electoral affairs. Notably, in the parliamentary electoral campaign in 2001 over 46% of the expenditure on paid electoral spots was allocated in commercial TVs, which have been significant actors of Polish political scene from then on. 12 Yet, the clear tendency to send the electoral message to a broad group of voters, with the typical 'catch all' approach, leads to the conclusion that the implemented strategies were general; there were no systemic strategies typical of fully developed marketing approach in politics. 13 In 2005, all the major parties used the services of external agencies specialising in promotional activities (advertising agencies, media houses) and/or specialists in certain areas. 14 An interesting consequence of personalisation and mediatisation of the campaign is very high interest of mass media in activities connected with human resources: the stage of creating candidate lists, “political transfers” and list registration clearly attracts media's attention and enables taking primary activities to ensure market positioning of the political entity. 15 Confrontation focused on two different visions of Poland was skilfully replaced with image-based competition, using in communication the illusory political values creating the impression of political diversity and alternative electoral offer created by the main entities of political competition. 16 The starting point in the process of stimulating certain emotions is communication activities, which spectacularly use the symbols of political confrontation to attract attention and create the politically desirable image of the reality. 17 From this approach, effectiveness must be regarded as a function of adjusting to the market even if the activities taken during the campaign contradict the profile of the party (including the arguments propagated before). 18 Granted, in the case of spectacular victory of PO it is hard to question the effectiveness of electoral strategy. But even in the case of the loss of power on the part of PiS, it must be remembered that the party obtained more votes than in the victorious election of 2005. 19 With few exceptions, e.g. before the European Parliament election in 2009, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość attempted to thoroughly modify its political strategy with the use of interesting image-creating activities, so as to regain (at least partially) the strategy initiative lost to PO. 20 Hard politics – the image construed around the programme offer and/or real achievements of a political party and the attributes of its leaders 21 Its basic points of reference are: mutual trust, community of values and strong emotional bonds, as well as time precise and clear difference from political rivals. 22 Still, the conflicting orientation of the political competition strategy, at least in the communicative dimension, produced a clear, dichotomous cleavage of the political market (with little margin of strategic freedom for other political entities). 23 The 2010 presidential election, taking place in a unique context of the Smolensk crash, was a serious challenge for Polish political marketing specialists. The early date of the election required the campaign teams to display high organisational skills, involving quick selection of new candidates and developing the strategic assumptions anew (or thoroughly modifying them with consideration of the new candidate). 24 The decision of Constitutional Tribunal overruling the changes in the ordinance (July 2011) was made when the electoral campaign was already in progress (the campaign actually began with the session of jubilee convention of Platforma Obywatelska in Gdańsk (11/06/2011) and the Youth Congress of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Warsaw (11/06/2011)) and the re-orientation of the adopted electoral strategy necessitated high strategic flexibility and organisational skill. DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 129 M. Kolczyński & A. Turska-Kawa: Changes in Voting Behaviours in Poland after 1989 - 25 The outstanding element was the political pop form of audio-visual advertising: the spots had the form of attractive and simple short videos, perfectly suiting the expectations of voters used to on- line channels of communication. 26 It included four elections scheduled directly one after another: European Parliament (2014), self- governmental (2014), presidential (2015) and parliamentary (2015). References: Antoszewski, A. (2006) Wzorce rywalizacji na arenie wyborczej (Patterns of competition on the electoral arena), In: Antoszewski A. (ed.) Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego). Bartolini, S. & Mair, P. (1990) Identity, competition and electoral availability: The stabilization of European electorates, 1885–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 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Haček Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession SIMONA KUKOVIČ & MIRO HAČEK 1 Abstract The Republic of Slovenia has - already at the time of promulgation of the independence - expressed the willingness and aim to become a full member of the European Union (EU). The official negotiations for the entry launched in March 1998 and in May 2004 Slovenia became a full member of the EU. Since then, Slovenia is represented in all EU institutions and it is involved in the decision making process within those institutions. EU law became part of the national legislation especially in areas where Slovenia transferred its sovereign rights to the EU. In the paper the authors put an emphasis on the attitudes of the Slovenian citizens towards the European Union and its institutions from the accession in 2004 until today; authors conclude that citizens’ positive attitudes towards the integration have dropped significantly since the accession in 2004, and drops are especially visible in the last few years when Slovenia and also European Union are facing not only economic, but also political crisis. Keywords: • Slovenia • European Union • attitude • integration • accession CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Simona Kukovič, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: simona.kukovic@fdv.uni-lj.si. Miro Haček, Ph.D., Professor, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, email: miro.hacek@fdv.uni-lj.si DOI 10.4335/978-961-6842-73-0.9 ISBN 978-961-6842-73-0 © 2016 Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor Available online at http://books.lex-localis.press. 132 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession 1 Introduction: The Accession Process and Slovenia's Admission to the European Union From the time of declaring independence, the Republic of Slovenia had expressed a willingness to become a full member of the European Union (EU), identifying this as an objective both in strategic development documents and at the highest levels of political engagement. As the relevant development documents1 indicate, the optimal long-term development of Slovenia’s economy is seen to be inextricably linked to the country’s accession to full EU membership, and soon after the country’s liberation, this became a key objective. Diplomatic relations between Slovenia and the EU were first established in April 1992, as Slovenia proposed finalisation of the Europe Agreement and asked for support with the restructuring and consolidation of its economy. In April of the following year, a co-operation treaty was signed, and later that year, the Slovenian Government requested commencement of negotiations on conclusion of the Europe Agreement. In June 1996, a treaty was enacted in respect of Slovenia’s integration into the European Community. The signatories were Slovenia, all EU Member States, and the European Communities. Along with some other former socialist states, Slovenia then commenced negotiations on full EU membership. This European treaty2 enabled political dialogue and closer commercial co-operation, and it established the grounds for technical and financial support from the EU as well as supporting Slovenian integration into the EU (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2005: 55). All political parties excepting one (the Slovenian National Party) supported integration and signed a joint treaty on co-operation for this purpose. The National Assembly passed a decree on the priority of discussing European legislation, thereby accelerating adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, and membership of the European Union became a national commitment (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2005: 56). In November 1996, Slovenia and the EU signed a provisional agreement on trade, which came into force in January 1997, enabling activation of the trade section of the Association Agreement defining the free trade area between Slovenia and the-then EU15. In May 1997, Slovenia adopted the fundamental points of initiation of its strategy on EU accession, confirming a desire to attain full membership of the EU, and in June that year the European Commission presented its views on candidate states (the so-called Agenda 2000). Because this opinion was favourable towards Slovenia, the country was allotted to the primary group of states entering negotiations, and talks officially opened on March 31, 1998. During several years of negotiations, an accord was arrived at detailing the conditions of Slovenia’s accession. Slovenian legislation was harmonised with European provisions, and certain exceptions, together with transitional periods, were set down. (Government Portal Life in the EU, 2012). Accession negotiations between Slovenia and the EU were completed in 2002, the Treaty of Accession of Slovenia to the EU was signed in April 2003 and, on May 1, 2004, Slovenia became part of the European family of nations. In consequence, the EU Acquis Communautaire became part of Slovenian legislation, and European affairs became internal affairs for Slovenia and its people (Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 100–101). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 133 S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession It is crucial for Slovenia to represent its interests in a clear and efficient manner at the supranational level, and to do so uniformly and in a coordinated fashion. So it is that Slovenia is represented at all of the Union’s institutions3 and takes part in all decision- making. The EU’s legal order became part of Slovenian legislation, especially in respect of those matters within the scope of EU competences. In areas belonging to the exclusive competence of the EU, Slovenia has ceded part of its sovereign rights to the Union. Since decisions made at the supranational level are of great significance and exert a strong influence on every Slovenian citizen’s daily life, the coordination of Slovenian representatives at EU level, and the formulation and coordination of Slovenian perspectives on European issues is of crucial importance. Today, Slovenia can participate in Community programmes designed primarily for social and economic progress and mutual integration. Slovenia now contributes part of its gross national product (GNP) to the joint EU budget and is granted financial support inter alia for agricultural and countryside development and for sustainable growth and more coordinated regional socio-economic development within the framework of the European Cohesion Policy. As a Member State of the EU, Slovenia has also participated in negotiations on financial policy, and Slovenian citizens have access to labour markets in other Member States, as well as to education and unrestricted travel throughout Europe and access to European funds. (Government Portal Life in the EU, 2012; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 101– 102). 2 Satisfaction of Slovenians With Eu Membership and Life in the EU The overview of statistical data on attitudes of Slovenian citizens towards membership and life in the EU extends back to 2004, detailing support for EU membership. Among the ten acceding countries in Spring 2004, the highest support for EU membership was recorded in Lithuania (52 percent of survey respondents saying it was good for their country to become a member of the EU), followed by Malta (50 percent). Slovenia, at 40 percent, was at the lower end, higher only than Latvia (33 percent) and Estonia (31 percent). However, the citizens of Slovenia, Hungary and Lithuania most often expressed expectations of certain benefits as a result of their country’s membership: in Slovenia, 64 percent expected benefits while in Lithuania and Hungary the percentage was 58 percent, respectively). In the period 2003–2004 (measured from Spring 2003 to Spring 2004), the trend of support for EU membership in Slovenia reflected the average for new Member States at the time of the referendum on Slovenia’s accession (Spring 2003), when support reached its peak (57 percent), followed by a trend of decreasing support to 40 percent – a drop of 17 percent. In the period 1999–2002, support in Slovenia was continuously below the average for new Member States (by between 5 percent and 11 percent). However, the percentage of inhabitants of Slovenia who maintained that EU membership would be detrimental to Slovenia was consistently lower as well, ranging from 7 percent to 17 percent (Eurobarometer 62, 2004: 18; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 106). 134 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession For the people of Slovenia, their worst fears related to increased difficulties for the country’s farmers (67 percent of responses), which was a topic frequently promoted by opponents of Slovenia’s accession to the EU, and the migration of jobs to countries with lower production costs (63 percent). The latter probably reflected previous similar experiences in the Slovenian economy – such as the case of Tobačna Ljubljana, which moved its production activities abroad to reduce production costs – and the fact that Slovenia has the highest labour costs of all new EU Member States, making other locations more attractive to foreign corporations. This was followed by fears of increased illegal drug trafficking and international organised crime (58 percent), based on Slovenia’s strategic geographical position connecting Western Europe to the former Yugoslavia and south-eastern Europe. Concerns that Slovenia might become a net contributor to the European budget (57 percent) were also frequently advanced by opponents of Slovenian entry to the EU. Even supporters of Slovenia’s membership listed these same four problems. On the other hand, fears about declining use of the Slovenian language and the loss of Slovenian national identity and culture were relatively rare (Eurobarometer 62, 2004; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 106). Subsequently, in the autumn of 2004, 52 percent of survey respondents said EU membership of Slovenia was a good thing, while only 5 percent thought it was bad. Only Slovakia, Luxembourg and Ireland had a higher percentage of favourable responses. At this time, most Slovenians were convinced that Slovenia had benefited from becoming part of the EU (58 percent), whereas 28 percent thought that it had gained nothing, which was slightly better than the average for the EU25 as it then was. Those who said that Slovenia had not benefited from EU membership were primarily the unemployed (40 percent), or those with primary-only education (32 percent), born in European states outside the EU (33 percent), the self-employed (39 percent) and those who were dissatisfied with levels of democracy in the EU (41 percent). The opinion that Slovenia had gained from membership was endorsed by a majority of survey respondents who were male (64 percent), students or highly educated (65 percent), to the right on the political spectrum (65 percent), managers (67 percent), civil servants (68 percent) or satisfied with democracy (68 percent) (Eurobarometer 62, 2004; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 107). Data published in the spring of 2005 presented a somewhat altered picture of these attitudes. This time, EU membership of Slovenia was deemed a good thing by 49 percent of respondents while 9 percent said it was bad. By comparison with the preceding Eurobarometer survey, one can see a slight decrease in satisfaction and an increase in dissatisfaction. It could be argued that, after a year of membership, “Euro-optimism” had declined a bit as the initial enthusiasm dissipated. However, this decline might equally be attributed to high-profile pre-referendum campaigns against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in some EU Member States, which may have prompted a general increase of Euro-scepticism and Euro-criticism. There were still no signs of any dramatic change, though, as surveys conducted around the first anniversary of EU membership DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 135 S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession showed that it had brought about few if any major shifts in the life of the average citizen, which would only become tangible with the adoption of the Euro and the introduction of Schengen control of external borders. In other new Member States at that time, many people simply had no idea whether their country’s membership was to be considered good or bad. At the time, the most satisfied respondents were to be found in the Benelux countries and in Ireland (Eurobarometer 63.4, 2005: 17; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 107–108). Table 1: Trust of Slovenians towards the EU and key EU institutions (in %) European European European Union Parliament Commission 2004 60 66 64 2005 55 66 64 2006 70 73 73 2007 65 63 61 2008 60 62 61 2009 50 46 46 2010 48 49 51 2011 38 43 40 2012 39 48 47 2013 34 38 40 2014 37 35 34 2015 41 41 42 Source: Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2016 (Number 62, 63.4, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83), available at www.ec.europa.eu. Numbers represent percentages of respondents who expressed trust towards the European Union as a whole or towards specific listed institutions. As of the Fall of 2010, data show that 48 percent of Slovenian respondents trusted the EU, while 46 percent did not. Across the EU at the time, 43 percent of respondents said they trusted the Union and 45 percent said they did not. By comparison with the previous survey, trust in the EU had increased slightly (by 1 percent in both Slovenia and the EU as a whole) while the level of distrust had decreased (by 2 percent in both Slovenia and the EU as a whole). It is also interesting to note that for more than half of Slovenian respondents, the EU meant freedom of travel, studies and employment (54 percent), and the new Euro currency (53 percent). More than a quarter of respondents associated the EU with wasting money (29 percent), bureaucracy and crime (both 26 percent), while 25 percent of Slovenians associated the EU with peace. As in earlier opinion polls, Slovenians demonstrated good knowledge of EU institutions: a majority responded they had heard of the European Parliament (96 percent), followed by the European Commission and the European Central Bank (both 92 percent), with the Council of the EU in last place (87 percent). The degree of trust in institutions increased with respect to the preceding survey and was somewhat higher for all the institutions than the average across all Member States. In 2010, more than half of Slovenian respondents said they 136 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession trusted the European Commission (51 percent) while slightly fewer expressed trust in the remaining institutions, all three of which enjoyed 49 percent support (Eurobarometer 74, 2011: 3–4; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014). Data published in Autumn 2011 show that 38 percent of Slovenian respondents trusted the EU, while 56 percent did not. At the same time, 43 percent trusted the European Parliament while 49 percent did not, and slightly fewer (40 percent) trusted the European Commission while 45 percent did not. Some 48 percent of Slovenians were satisfied with how democracy works in the EU while 46 percent were not satisfied. More than half (57 percent) of Slovenians understood how the EU works; higher than the EU27 average (42 percent). The great majority of Slovenia respondents (99 percent) said they had heard of the European Parliament, followed by the European Central Bank (93 percent) and the European Commission (88 percent). For more than half of Slovenians, the EU still represented freedom to travel, study and work (57 percent), and the Euro (56 percent). More than a third of respondents associated the EU with wasting money (36 percent), with lower figures for bureaucracy (33 percent), unemployment and crime (29 percent) and peace (28 percent) (Eurobarometer 76, 2011; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014). Table 2: Familiarity among Slovenians with key EU institutions (in %) Council of European European European Court of the European Parliament Commission Central Bank Justice of Union the EU 2004 74 95 90 74 83 2005 79 95 92 76 77 2006 81 97 91 77 82 2007 86 96 91 88 84 2008 88 94 90 91 na 2009 88 96 91 91 na 2010 87 96 92 92 na 2011 83 99 88 93 na 2012 87 98 92 95 95 2013 88 98 94 95 95 2014 na 97 93 94 na 2015 na 98 97 96 na Source: Eurobarometer survey from 2004 to 2016 (numbers 62, 63.4, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83), available at www.ec.europa.eu. Respondents were asked “Have you heard of…?” Numbers represent percentages of respondents, who answered positively to the above question. Data published in Autumn 2012 indicate that 60 percent of Slovenians included in the survey understood how the EU works, an increase of 3 percent from the previous survey. In the 2012 survey, we can see that 98 percent of Slovenian respondents had heard of the European Parliament; followed by the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice of the European Union (95 percent), the European Commission (92 percent) and the Council DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 137 S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession of the European Union (87 percent). Slightly more than half (51 percent) of Slovenian respondents were satisfied with how democracy works in the EU while 44 percent were not (2 percent fewer than in Autumn 2011). 51 percent said that for them personally the EU meant freedom to travel, study and work, while 43 percent associated the EU with the Euro, 28 percent with waste of money, and peace (28 percent), bureaucracy (27 percent) and unemployment (23 percent). The data about trust in the EU and in European institutions are also very interesting, with expressions of distrust in the EU at 57 percent. Compared with data from autumn 2011, trust in the European Parliament and in the European Commission increased slightly (for the European Parliament an increase of 5 percent, to 48 percent), as did trust in the European Commission (up 7 percent to 47 percent)). Some 57 percent of Slovenian respondents trusted the Court of Justice of the European Union, followed by the Council of the European Union and the European Central Bank, both at 43 percent (Eurobarometer 78, 2012; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014). Data published in Spring 2013, showed that 63 percent of Slovenian respondents distrusted the EU, which is 6 percent more than in Autumn 2012. Furthermore, 28 percent of survey participants said that in general the EU conjures up a fairly negative or very negative image for them, while 66 percent of Slovenian respondents did not agree with the statement that “EU makes the quality of life better in Europe” (the EU27 average was 49 percent). As to how satisfied Slovenian respondents were with how democracy works in the EU, for most part they were not. Data show that more than half of the survey participants (51 percent) said that they are not satisfied in this regard,4 compared with the EU27 average of 46 percent. Moreover, 65 percent of survey participants disagreed with the statement “My voice counts in the EU”. On the other hand, 53 percent of Slovenian respondents disagreed with the statement “Slovenia could better face the future outside the EU”. This is consistent with data indicating that 48 percent see themselves in the near future as both Slovenians and Europeans (Eurobarometer 79, 2013; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014). Looking at some additional data, published in spring 2013, we can see that 98 percent of survey participants from Slovenia had heard of the European Parliament; followed by the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice of the European Union (both 95 percent), the European Commission (94 percent) and the Council of the European Union (88 percent). Some 61 percent claimed to understand how EU works.5 In this survey, more than half of Slovenian respondents expressed distrust not only in the EU, but also in European institutions in general: 58 percent distrusted the European Central Bank, 56 percent distrusted the European Parliament, 53 percent distrusted the Council of the European Union and 52 percent distrusted European Commission. The only exception is the Court of Justice of the European Union, with only 41 percent distrusting this institution while 54 percent expressed trust (Eurobarometer 79, 2013). As to the question of what the EU means to them personally, Slovenian participants highlighted freedom to travel, study and work (50 percent), the Euro (40 percent), bureaucracy (33 percent), 138 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession waste of money (28 percent) and unemployment (28 percent), peace (26 percent), more crime (24 percent), cultural diversity (19 percent), and a stronger say in the world (18 percent). Only 13 percent of participants connected the EU with democracy, 13 percent with loss of national identity, 12 percent with economic prosperity, 11 percent with not enough control at external borders, and only 8 percent with social protection (Eurobarometer 79, 2013; see also Haček and Kukovič, 2014). Latest Eurobarometer (83, 2015), published in late spring 2015, shows that 52 percent of Slovenian respondents distrusted the EU, which is 9 percent less that in 2013. Further, only 17 percent of the respondents said that in general the EU conjures up a fairly negative or very negative image for them, which is 11 percent less that in similar survey from 2013. At the same time, 54 percent of Slovenian respondents did not agree with the statement that “EU makes the quality of life better in Europe” (the EU28 average was 39 percent); both figures are 10 percent down compared with 2013 data. As to how satisfied Slovenian respondents were with how democracy works in the EU, most respondents (49 percent; EU28 average was 46 percent) express their satisfaction, and 45 percent of survey participants said that they are not satisfied in this regard, compared with the EU28 average of 41 percent. Consistent with the slightly improved data in Eurobarometer survey 83 (2015) was also the result with the statement “My voice counts in the EU” – while 51 percent of the respondents still disagreed with that statement, this still represents 14 percent less disagreement that in survey from 2013. Interesting, at the same time only 44 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement “Slovenia could better face the future outside the EU”, which is 9 percent less that in same survey from 2013. At the same time level of knowledge on the EU institutions remained very high, as 98 percent of survey participants from Slovenia had heard of the European Parliament; followed by the European Commission (97 percent) and European Central Bank (96 percent). Some 69 percent claimed to understand how EU works, up by 8 percent from 2013 survey. Distrust towards key EU institutions diminished a bit from 2013, as 59 percent of respondents expressed their distrust towards the European Parliament and 58 percent expressed their distrust towards the European Commission. To the largest part of the respondents (51 percent) EU still represents freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU. Still, only 17 percent of the respondents connected EU with the democracy, only 16 percent with the stronger presence in the world and only 9 percent with social protection (Eurobarometer 83, 2015). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 139 S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession 3 Conclusion Slovenia became a full member of the European family in May 2004. Since then, Slovenia has been represented in all EU institutions and is involved in the decision-making process within those institutions. EU law became part of domestic legislation, especially in those areas where Slovenia transferred its sovereign rights to the EU. As has been noted here, Slovenia has hosted some very important events in the last decade since becoming a full member of the European Union—not only for Slovenia, but for the whole EU. First, in the first half of 2008, Slovenia was the first former socialist member state to take over the very responsible task of the Council Presidency. Second, on January 1, 2007, Slovenia (again as the first new member state from the 2004 accession) joined the Eurozone and introduced the common European currency, the Euro. Finally, on December 22, 2007, Slovenia became a member state of the Schengen Area and ceased border controls on international land and maritime borders within the EU (Haček and Kukovič, 2014: 111). The main objective of this paper was to analyse the first decade of Slovenian EU membership specifically in terms of citizens’ attitudes. We compared the results of public opinion surveys on satisfaction with the EU from the time of accession to the present. Support for EU membership reached its peak at 57 percent in Spring 2003 – at the time of the successful referendum on Slovenia’s accession to the EU – but after that period, support started to slowly decrease. Going back to Autumn 2004, one finds that 52 percent of survey respondents said EU membership of Slovenia was a good thing, and only 5 percent thought it was a bad thing. The latest data, published in Spring 2015, present a very different picture, as 52 percent of Slovenian respondents expressed distrust towards the EU. Of further concerning is the finding that nearly half of Slovenian citizens (45 percent) said they were not satisfied with how democracy works in the EU; but on the bright side is should also be said, that both indicators show positive trends since 2013 measurement. The satisfaction of Slovenian citizens with the EU is decreased quite significantly since the accession, and the same observation can be made about trust towards the EU and its major institutions. Any definitive explanation of these low levels of satisfaction and trust remains elusive, although we can probably find at least partial answers in recent events, most especially in the global economic crisis and its political and economic impacts, which hit Slovenian especially hard as a state of especially permanent political crisis extends into a eight straight year. There seems little doubt that the generally negative view towards the political sphere among Slovenia’s citizens over the last few years must be taken into account. In general, we must conclude that Slovenian citizens are still much less satisfied with the EU compared to the period of accession to the EU, although some positive trend in the most recent periods can be observed. 140 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession Notes: 1 See, for instance, Slovenia's Economic Development Strategy, The Strategy of International Economic Relations of Slovenia, and the Strategy for Improving the Competitiveness of the Slovenian Industry. 2 The EU is based on the rule of law. This means that every action taken by the EU is founded on treaties that have been approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU member countries. For example, if a policy area is not cited in a treaty, the Commission cannot propose a law in that area. A treaty is a binding agreement between EU member countries. It sets out EU objectives, rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its member countries. Treaties are amended to make the EU more efficient and transparent, to prepare for new member countries and to introduce new areas of cooperation such as the single currency. Under the treaties, EU institutions can adopt legislation, which the member countries then implement. The main treaties are: Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1952); Treaties of Rome, European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community treaties (1958); Single European Act (1986); Treaty on European Union—Maastricht Treaty (1993); Treaty of Amsterdam (1999); Treaty of Nice (2003); and Treaty of Lisbon (2009) (for more information, see Europa.eu, 2012a). 3 The four most important institutions of the EU are the European Council, comprising heads of EU Member States and the EU itself, which determines general political guidelines for the EU; the European Parliament, composed of directly elected representatives, which represents the European people; the European Commission, whose members are appointed by the Member States' governments, which takes care of the interests of the EU as a whole; and the Council of the European Union, bringing together representatives of Member States' governments and defending individual countries' interests. Additionally, there is a whole range of other institutions, e.g. the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Auditors, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, among others (for more information, see Europa.eu, 2012b). 4 For comparison, in the survey conducted in Autumn 2012, 44 percent were not satisfied, and in the survey conducted in Autumn 2011, 46 percent were not satisfied. 5 This is 3 percent more than in the survey conducted in Autumn 2011 and 1 percent more than in the survey from Autumn 2012. References: European Commision (2004) Eurobarometer 62: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2004 (Brussels: European Commision), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion /archives/eb /eb62/eb62_sl_nat.pdf (June 2016). European Commision (2005) Eurobarometer 63.4: Public opinion in the EU - Spring 2005 (Brussels: European Commision), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb64/eb64_sl_nat.pdf (June 2016). Brussels: European Commision (2006) Eurobarometer 66: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2006 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf (June 2016). DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA: COMPARATIVE STUDY 141 S. Kukovič & M. Haček: Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards the European Union Since the Accession - European Commision (2008) Eurobarometer 68: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2007 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf (June 2016). European Commision (2008) Eurobarometer 70: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2008 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_en.htm (June 2016). European Commision (2010) Eurobarometer 72: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2009 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_vol1_en.pdf (June 2016). European Commision (2011) Eurobarometer 74: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2010 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_si_si_nat.pdf (June 2016). European Commision (2011) Eurobarometer 76: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2011 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf (June 2016). European Commision Eurobarometer 78: Public opinion in the EU - Autumn 2012 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm (June 2016). European Commision Eurobarometer 79: Public opinion in the EU - Spring 2013 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_anx_ en.pdf (June 2016). European Commision Eurobarometer 81: Public opinion in the EU - Spring 2014 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_anx_en.pdf (June 2016). European Commision Eurobarometer 83: Public opinion in the EU - Spring 2015 (Brussels: European Commision), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_anx_en.pdf (June 2016). Europa.eu (2012a) EU treaties. Available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision- making/treaties/index_en.htm (June 2016). Europa.eu (2012b) EU institutions and other bodies. 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