

# DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PATRIOTISM

## THE EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGE

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*Abstract*

The author of the article argues that educational narratives about democracy and patriotism cannot be simplistic. A more developed reflection on democracy is needed to settle its importance for the education question—can democratic ideas and the concept of patriotism go together? A discussion of various definitions of democracy and patriotism, and the characteristics of the chosen approaches is included in the article to show the complexity of the issues. The great challenge for civic education is to show

connections and gaps between democracy and patriotism. Patriotism and democracy are complex issues with many variants, among them some threatening ones, and they should be discussed deeply. Otherwise, education will create unreflective, narrow-minded people, who may be desired by autocratic politicians in order to manipulate them, but not by contemporary human beings and civil societies.

*Key words:* democracy, patriotism, nationalism, civic education.

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### **Demokratske vrednote in patriotizem. Izobraževalni izziv**

#### *Povzetek*

212 Avtorica članka zagovarja mnenje, da izobraževalni narativi glede demokracije in patriotizma ne smejo biti poenostavljajoči. Razviti je potrebno poglobljeno refleksijo o demokraciji, da bi se izkazala njena pomembnost za izobraževalno vprašanje o tem, ali demokratske ideje in koncept patriotizma lahko sovpadajo. Z namenom prikaza problemske kompleksnosti članek razpravlja o različnih definicijah demokracije ter patriotizma in o značilnostih izbranih pristopov. Za državljansko vzgojo je velik izziv, kako predstaviti povezanost in razhajanje med demokracijo in patriotizmom. Patriotizem in demokracija sta kompleksna problema z mnogimi različicami, med katerimi so nekatere celo ogrožajoče, zato je o njih potrebno temeljito razpravljati. V nasprotnem primeru bo izobraževanje ustvarjalo nerefleksivne, ozkoglede ljudi, kakršnih si nemara želijo avtorski politiki zato, da lahko manipulirajo z njimi, ne pa sodobna človeška bitja in civilne družbe.

*Ključne besede:* demokracija, patriotizem, nacionalizem, državljanska vzgoja.

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*Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy*—this is the title of the Freedom House Report edited in 2017. The authors, Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, alert that dramatic 10-Year Score declines in freedom have been observed in every region of the world, the largest ever. Key findings of the cyclical study conducted by Freedom House show that:

With populist and nationalist forces making significant gains in democratic states, 2016 marked the 11<sup>th</sup> consecutive year of decline in global freedom. There were setbacks in political rights, civil liberties, or both, in a number of countries rated “Free” by the report, including Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tunisia, and the United States. (Puddington and Roylance 2017, 1)

The crises of democracy in its various forms, especially the liberal one, have been announced many times from its origin onward. However, in recent years we could observe in some countries a real turn from the liberal forms of democracy to the illiberal ones. This turn is accompanied by a development of nationalistic ideas and movements along with the limiting of the public sphere and the centralization of power. In some countries, autocrats, as described by Puddington and Roylance, also forced changes in the content of education, making it an instrument of the new, illiberal vision of national ideology, often calling it “democracy.” The Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán stated that an illiberal country can be democratic and respect civil liberties. Whereas liberal democracy does not protect the national interest, illiberal democracy is better than liberal democracy because it values freedom but does not treat it as a preference; the highest priority is the prosperity of the national community. Most likely, civic societies do not provide a good solution because they only serve the elites, and not the national interests (cf. Orbán, “Full text”) Is the illiberal democracy still a democracy?

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The national interest is very often connected with the mild term *patriotism*. The main goal of this article is to analyze the relationship between ideas of democracy and chosen concepts of patriotism. It is important to settle what image of democracy is addressed to pupils during the educational process. The content

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of civic education in many countries is usually limited to its general definition, forms, and political institutions. The importance of formal social and political participation (e.g., voting in elections) is also underlined (cf. Schulz 2017).

As most students and adults are aware, the concept of *democracy* was coined five hundred years B.C. in ancient Greece. Less people know that nowadays, in the third millennium, there are numerous concepts, theories, definitions, variations, and classifications of democracy. The core binding them all together is the manner of an exercising of power—democracy is a system of government in which the power stems from the will of the majority. The primary criterion for division is, usually, the manner in which the will is being implemented. Students are taught that in the classic division into direct and indirect democracy, the main criterion is the entity which makes the key political decisions. In direct democracy, the citizens themselves actively participate in the process of political decision-making, while indirect democracy is of a representative nature—power is exercised by representatives elected in general elections.

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We need a more developed reflection on democracy to try to settle this question that is so important for education—can democratic ideas and the concept of patriotism go together? For many years a frequently seen variant of representative democracy has been the liberal democracy, characterized by political pluralism (multi-partite system), equality under the law, ensuring appeal procedures, respect for human and civil rights, and the civil society. According to Larry Diamond, these three key elements build democracy as a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections: the active participation of citizens, in politics and civic life; protection of human rights; rules of law, equally applied to all citizens (cf. Diamond 2004). Democracy, as Karl Popper and many other thinkers and researchers have stressed, opposes tyranny and dictatorship.

Independently of many concepts of democracy, according to the main contemporary criteria, democracy requires:

- universal access of citizens to the sphere of politics (the right to vote and to be elected), irrespective of social status, race, religion, wealth, being a part of a minority, with the delegation of rights to representatives elected in the course of elections (principle of representation);

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- the sovereignty of the state, that is, power is exercised by members of a social community living within the boundaries of a state;
- considering the elections as the main source of validity of power, and the need to regularly confirm mandate of the authorities through general elections;
- the possibility to form political parties and to select among alternative political programs;
- the accountability of those governing before those who are being governed, ensuring the functioning of specialized institutions for control of the authorities, meant to prevent the abuse of power and to ensure control, through the public domain, and the functioning of political opposition;
- the division of power supporting the control of the government and state institutions;
- formal protection of civil rights, limiting the interventions of the authorities into the lives of citizens (cf. Gulczyński 2010).

The two dominating systems of contemporary representative democracy (the most popular form) include parliamentary and presidential democracy. Under parliamentary democracy, the government, established by elected representatives, exercises executive authority under constant control by the parliament. Under presidential democracy, society through general elections appoints the president, who is the head of the state and also the head of the cabinet that he/she appoints. Legislative authority is vested in the parliament. Mixed systems also exist. There are certain hybrid democracies (mixed systems), which combine representative forms with direct activity; such is the case in Switzerland and in the United States, for example. In Switzerland, the central legislative authority is vested in the Federal Assembly, but legislative initiative is permitted, as are also referenda, of a binding nature, organized on the local and federal level. In the USA, many states have certain forms for citizens' initiatives (*ballot initiatives, ballot measures, ballot questions or propositions*).

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Nowadays, there even exist democratic constitutional monarchies, for instance in Great Britain, the Netherlands, or the Scandinavian countries, where the power of the monarch is limited, and is actually exercised by the democratic institutions.

As I mentioned, many theories of democracy have been developed over the centuries. They define the theory of democracy and its desired forms

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and institutions, as well as possible directions for development. Among the contemporary theories, three dominate: the aggregative, the deliberative, and various radical concepts.

The aggregative theory of democracy claims that the rights of citizens to collectively express their political will is the purpose of democratic processes. An important element of this theory are voting (the domain of politics), the procedures governing it, and the care to ensure the fulfillment of will expressed through it. Representatives of the aggregative theory have been discussing the advantage and forms of direct and indirect (minimalist) democracy.

Enthusiasts of direct democracy, on the other hand, support the concept of citizens creating the legislation directly, and not through their representatives. Political activity is considered as an inclusive and cognitive value, and the universal participation of citizens in political activities prevents elites from usurping the power.

216 In the opinion of Robert Dahl, the fundamental principle of democracy proclaims that under collective decisions, the interests of each member of the political community are taken into consideration to the same extent—which does not necessarily mean that these interests are satisfied to the same extent. He uses the term “polyarchy” with respect to societies in which a certain collection of institutions and procedures (related primarily to elections) operates that are seen as striving for such democracy (cf. Dahl 1995).

The second group of fundamental theories promotes deliberative democracy—its essence is deliberation, in other words, the analysis, consideration of various views and positions. It is not the elections, not the voting, but the deliberation process which enables the individuals to determine their needs and preferences, to solve conflicts and to reach consensus. Deliberation should be free from political and economic pressure.

The third concept is radical democracy, whose representatives focus on highlighting oppression by authorities. The role of democracy is to reveal oppressive relations between authorities and society, and to strive for their change.

The globalization process, which accelerated at the turn of the century, focused the attention of scientists to forms of democracy of global character. An increasing number of decisions which are key for the functioning of

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individuals and countries in various areas originated outside them. Under the concept of global (cosmopolitan) democracy, the need is stressed to develop a model that would ensure some kind of participation in the global, supranational policy for all people. The concept indicates that certain solutions, adopted in the national countries, could be somehow transposed to the level of global society. Fundamental values include law and order, absence of violence, and the peaceful solving of conflicts, as well as the equality of citizens in supranational communities. To make this goal real, it is necessary to develop appropriate international, parliamentary solutions, and social control.

One of the most important features of democracy is the civil society. In Western thinking, it is assumed that civil society can function only under conditions of democracy. Various forms have been identified, which determine the nature of citizens' participation (cf. Dahrendorf 1994).

Charles Taylor indicates two major sources of origin of the thoughts on civil society—the works of John Locke (the community, the society stem from the rights of nature and are, therefore, primary with respect to government, which is defined as trusteeship) and of Montesquieu (an extensive network of citizens' rights). Both concepts were continued and elaborated upon by successors of various historical and political backgrounds and orientations. Taylor, referring to *Montesquieu*, claims: “[...] civil society [...] is not so much a sphere outside political power; rather, it penetrates deeply into this power, fragments and decentralizes it [...]” (Taylor 1991,134).

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Irrespective of the philosophical roots and the numerous theoretical differences in the understanding and assessment of the phenomenon itself, the essence of civil society means a certain degree (differences are found here) of the society's sovereignty in its relations with the state, giving the civil society a clear subjectivity and some principles for organization. The state itself should develop a legislative and social framework for the existence and development of civil society.

For this goal, Thomas Paine fought already at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, writing in the famous pamphlet—originally published anonymously in 1776—*Common Sense: Addressed to the Inhabitants of America*: “Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one.” (Paine 1776, 1).

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The political dependence of America from the British crown, which Paine fought, is history nowadays, but Paine's works, with the most important one being *Rights of Man*, have been ingrained in the origins of the concept for the separation of society from the state, preceding the musings by Hegel (whose attitude toward the state was, of course, fundamentally different from Paine's) and by Marx.

In modern times, Ralf Dahrendorf wrote expressly on this matter, in his search for the right space for social ties that would remain non-destructive for freedom: "We need to be able to think of civil society—and to make it true—without dedicating even a single wasteful thought to the state." (Dahrendorf 1996, 16; my translation)

218 There is a clear opposition here. For the classic republican tradition, the characteristic notion of civil society was in the context of community and its welfare; in modern times, in liberal democracies, the essence of the concept refers to the individual, his rights and powers. This could result in the disappearance of the normative factor—citizenship. This postulate is visible in the works of Edward Shils, who considers civil society to be a special type of a society; its primary feature is the cognitive and normative, collective self-awareness shared by its members, different from their individual self-awareness (cf. Shils 1994). The institutions of civil society operate in the public sphere and perform the regulatory, normative function toward the economic system and the state. Civil society can function thanks to the citizenship attitude of its members—their participation in the community (which sometimes reduces individualism) for the purpose of acting for the common good of a given territory and the group inhabiting it. Primary ties—genealogical or ethnic ones—are irrelevant here.

The issue of the relationship between the nation and the civil society appears as a more difficult one, not only for theoreticians, but also in social practice. The notion of nation and the notion of civil society belong to two different orders, they express two different manners for the conceptualization of the social sphere. The nation is a type of a primal group. Under the European tradition, societies usually organized themselves based on national community. Strong national ties can be linked with the lack of acceptance for civil society.

The history of 19<sup>th</sup>- and 20<sup>th</sup>-century nationalisms caused the proponents of civil society to be reluctant toward the concepts of nation and nationality. The

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fear of “ethnic nationalism” meant that these two manners for the functioning of individuals were seen as opposing. David Miller, however, has a different opinion:

Without a common national identity there is nothing to hold citizens together [...]. Nationality gives people the common identity that make it possible for them to conceive of shaping their world together. The citizenship gives them the practical means of doing so. (Miller 1989, 245)

Ernest Gellner uses the concept of *civic spirit*, which he defines as a moral requirement, an inner imperative for participation in the social life, which does not require any additional stimuli or orders; this is a certain internalized sense of duty. Habermas and many others share similar thoughts about the citizens’ sense of community and identity. Gellner clearly stresses the individual’s freedom of choice, defining the civil society as: “[...] a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, none the less, entered and left freely, rather than imposed by birth or sustained by awesome ritual.” (Gellner 1994, 103)

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In Poland, Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński wrote of the sense of citizenship as the condition for the development of civil attitudes combined with a number of “civic virtues.” Citizenship is defined as the belief in the importance of certain values, in other words the “civic virtues,” such as brotherhood, solidarity, acceptance for the equality of rights, respecting the common good, cooperation, observance of jointly defined rules, and subjective treatment of fellow citizens. The cultivation of civic virtues builds a community from the loosely bound group of people (cf. Wnuk-Lipiński 2005,105).

Maria Magoska identifies three primary approaches to civil society: the sociological, the procedural, and the axiological (cf. Magoska 2001, 96–98). The sociological approach is based on de Tocqueville’s reflections, focusing on spontaneous civil activity, free from institutions of the state, and on the potential for self-organization. The procedural approach stresses the democratic entitlement of citizens to participate in social life using methods of dialogue, such as debates, agreements, mediations. The last, axiological approach refers

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to values and standards present in the civil society. Values such as pluralism, tolerance, trust, or social solidarity are emphasized.

Inka Słodkowska (2006) identifies three societal organizational forms: functional, revolutionary, and ethical civil society. The first kind of organization is typical for societies in durable, developed democracies. The key role is played by organizations from the so-called “mezzo” level, independent of the society and economy, acting to promote their social group interests, accepting the legal and political order. Citizenship is expressed through self-organization, assertion of needs, and involvement in their fulfillment. The revolutionary civil society is frequently a form of social movement. Most frequently, its ideological basis is the protest against state oppression, which gives a mandate for civil disobedience and revolutionary actions. According to Słodkowska, this type of civil society is typical for the times of political transformation, the shift from a totalitarian to a democratic system. At such time, transfer to the third type—the ethical civil society—is needed, in order to build a new structure, based on political values different from the previous ones—the democratic order.

220 The liberal model of citizenship and democracy has been contested as one that promotes the individualistic concept of a citizen, thus resulting in a weakening of community ideas and values, which in turn leads to the demise of social relations, the sense of responsibility for the community, and the motivation to get involved for the common good. The state itself is being accused of supporting principles which reduce citizens’ participation to the formality ensured by representative democracy in exchange for economic privileges or some scope of welfare.

Amitai Etzioni is the founder of the communitarian movement—an idealistic trend which results from the observation of development directions of contemporary societies. The communitarians attempt to restore the proper meaning of the community, referring to the old Puritan principles and traditional, ethical American values. They oppose liberal individualism by calling for involvement, for the sense of moral responsibility for the common good. The community is built by individuals who have a common history, who share moral and symbolic values. In Etzioni’s opinion, the state should directly serve society (and not individuals). At the same time, Etzioni is in favor of a strong state authority, but not subordinated only to the market. The authority

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should ensure an adequate balance between the autonomy of individuals and the need to yield to interests important for the wider community (cf. Etzioni 1994).

Liberals, on the other hand, reject “community” concepts, claiming that individuals, both in their private and social life, are guided by individual goals and moral principles, including the vision of good. The principles developed by John Rawls (cf. 1995), based on egalitarian legalism formulated in a situation of *the veil of ignorance*, namely the absolute right to freedom and the right to fair treatment, as well as Nozick’s libertarian concept of the minimal state and the different variations of rights-based liberalism (Hayek, Friedman) primarily underscore the right to freedom and the right to protection against being “appropriated” by the outside world. The minimum requirement of the state is supposed to ensure safety for its citizens, protect private property, protect the functioning of various social groups in which the individual participates voluntarily. Nozick (cf. 1999) proposes the concept of *self-ownership*: individuals belong to themselves alone, thus their affiliation to a community, state or God is questioned. He rejects the system of *the socialized ownership of people*, typical for approaches which believe other values to be more important than freedom. The individual has the right to select paths for individual development and for achievement of its goals, which includes also the scope of participation and forms of civil involvement—from a broad range of activity to an attitude which rejects political and social engagement. The communitarians respond that individuals live in a community which is older from them and, therefore, freedom—not being defined by the cultural and political rights of the community—is highly abstract and contrary to the socialization idea.

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A different concept of the contemporary civil society has been developed by Jürgen Habermas. The philosopher indicated two dimensions for the functioning of society: the substantive and the community. The first refers to the purpose and strategy for survival in the biological and economic sense. The second dimension is personal, based on interaction and communication. The duty of the community includes education, providing support, and solving problems. Communication is crucial for the community. It allows us to interpret a situation, to achieve understanding, and to engage in activity

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leading to a purpose. Consensus is achieved through the so-called perfect communication situation, which assumes the inclusion of all people, their equal right to speak their mind, to criticize and to discuss, their verity, and the absence of any coercion.

222 Habermas assumes the dual nature of social existence. He identifies the system (the state and the economy) and the *life world* (translated also as “world experienced”), but the line of division is not as straight as in many contemporary approaches, i.e., the state versus the society. The development of corporate capitalism, the democratic social state, technology, and mass consumption cause the borders between the public and the private, the individual and society, the world of systems and the world of life to overlap, disappear, or to form in a new manner (in traditional communities, the world of life and the system were unified, and became separated through the process of modernization). The concept of the *life world*, based on Husserl’s work, refers to the area which is common for all members of a given communication community. This is the everyday world, the one we experience. Elements of the world of life include the following: culture (the available, shared resources of knowledge), society (affiliation with social groups and solidarity), and personality, enabling communication. These elements construct both the private and the public domain and set the borders for communication activity. In the sociological sense, the system is a structure composed of the state and the economy. During the modernization process, the system colonized the world of life, damaging social integration and public awareness (cf. Habermas 2002). *The public* means the openness of the political life; the public opinion is the society’s voice in discussions with the state. Dialogue is possible only if the institutions which reproduce and create culture, such as science, education, and art, are autonomous. Habermas’ idealism has become the subject of criticism and numerous polemics.

However, his approach to deliberative democracy is also frequently criticized by supporters of radical democracy. Deliberation and consensus with the authorities supporting the model of (neo)liberal democracy (in its representative and liberal—also with regards to participation—variety) preserve the order in which the citizens are “political consumers,” as Chantal Mouffe (cf. 2005) named them, and lose their ability of political thinking.

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Equality and freedom are the democratic prerogatives of individuals and a common resource, possible only in a pluralist society in which the area of politics can be shaped through discourse. Mouffe (cf. 2000) stresses also the paradox of liberal democracy, which always involves a tension between the freedom of an individual and the rule of the majority.

The last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have shown a weakening trust in democracy, which is frequently perceived amongst the society as being elitist and not offering even a bare public security. A certain revival of democratic thought was seen in the 1990s, even certain new terms appeared in the language, such as *e-democracy*, *digital democracy*, *cyberdemocracy*, or *virtual democracy*, and even *virtual polis* (cf. Ogden 1994; Poster 1995). The birth of these new terms was preceded by the concept of *tele-democracy*, developed back in the 1970s. The power sometimes accorded to the tools of mediated communication appears to be exaggerated, although the use of new communication technologies opens new pathways for education, building motivation for involvement, and enables the simultaneous (although unequal, as suggested by the data on the so-called digital inequality) participation of millions of individuals and social groups in the virtual community. At the same time, it generates numerous new threats, such as manipulation of information, manipulation of people, and the lack of parallelization between the virtual and the real community. For the potential of electronic media to be used properly—ensuring benefits for both individuals and common good, for which the uneasy consensus is needed—, there must exist a certain level of “public enlightenment” and a recognized axiological order.

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Anthony McGrew (cf. 1999) proposes to organize the various streams of discussion on supranational democracy and citizenship, defining three normative approaches: the liberal-internationalist, the republican, and the cosmopolitan.

An example of the first one, in his opinion, is a document developed by an international group of experts *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995). The authors have decided it is time to build a vision of global governance,<sup>1</sup> based

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1 Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński (cf. 2005) proposes another translation of the English term “governance”—direction, which includes also informal, goal-oriented control.

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on global civil ethics expressed through the conviction that humanity can cultivate a common set of core values, such as: respect for life, freedom, justice and equality, mutual respect, care and integrity. The proposition would be supported by formal global management institutions, at various levels (national and supranational), which would take into account both the integrity of the nation and the state, and the identification with the indicated values. Citizens would be entitled to submit petitions to the United Nations Organization, which, aside from the General Assembly, would comprise of two additional institutions—the Assembly of Nations and the Civil Society Forum. The adoption of the core values would be tied to such an understanding of the global neighborhood which assumes the observance of eight fundamental rights, and the acknowledgement of a number of duties. Global citizens have the right to a secure life, equitable treatment, an opportunity to earn a fair living and provide for their own welfare, to define and preserve their differences through peaceful means, to participate in governance at all levels, to freely and fairly petition against injustice, to have equal access to information and equal access to the global commons. At the same time, citizens should acknowledge their obligation to contribute to the common good, to consider the impact of their actions on the security and welfare of others, to promote equity, including gender equity, to protect the interests of future generations by pursuing sustainable development and safeguarding the global commons, to preserve the humanity's cultural and intellectual heritage, to actively participate in governance, and work to eliminate corruption (*Our Global Neighborhood* 1995, 54). The rights and obligations of individuals in global societies, proposed under the mentioned document, reach significantly beyond the narrow political and legal entitlements. Responsibility is understood in a very broad manner—it encompasses the recommendation to care for the present achievements of humanity and the protection of future generations, as well as being active in the global decision-making process. Its range would be determined not only by individuals themselves, as activity of formal state institutions would also be required, and that of expert groups or various pressure groups.

The second approach described by McGrew—the republican one—is clearly different. The existing socio-political order is rejected as being unfair, serving the economic elites—and therefore any attempts at its reconstruction are considered

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aimless. Instead of transforming the national institutions of liberal democracy into supranational ones, they should be replaced by forms of participative democracy. This would enable the appearance of communities based on communitarian ideas, unlimited in territory, varied in terms of ethnicity, religion, or specific goals. The citizens should have guaranteed participation in the making of decisions applicable to them, and authority could be exercised by committees, constructed even through probabilistic selection. The committees would be accountable for their decisions directly before the citizens.

The third, cosmopolitan approach, is also the result of attempts to overcome the process of reducing the powers of national state institutions under conditions of globalization. An increasing number of decisions regarding significant issues of economy or security are transferred to the supranational level, which threatens democracy in its current forms. David Held (cf. 1992) proposes a new formula—cosmopolitan democracy, based on new institutions, new forms of communication with the society, and new methods for social participation. He proposes to build strong regional parliaments, such as the European Parliament, to create the institution of universal referendum for all those affected by the solution being voted on, to subject to social control the democratic institutions of global policy, and to develop rights that would allow entities and organizations to participate in governance (cf. Held 1997). 225

The authors of *Our Global Neighborhood* were right when they stressed the need for the “global neighbors” to share common, core values. The collective identity, required as basis for action, cannot be created without shared goals, based on collectively recognized values.

And this is the crucial problem for the supranational or global civil society—is it at all possible, in a world so varied and torn by ethnical, political, religious, and economic conflicts, to reach an agreement upon the axiological minimum that would allow us to build supranational citizenship? Would individuals and national groups not want to escape from the relativized, chaotic, unstable, and anomic post-modern world? This could lead to the appearance of separatist identities, searching for stable ground. Such ground can be provided by religious fundamentalism, ethnicity, various kinds of chauvinistic ideologies.

The above-mentioned challenges of democracy have resulted in democracy being criticized from its birth onward until contemporary

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times. The weaknesses of democracy include the lack of competences of the majority to make decisions (“the dictatorship of the ignorant”) and political opportunism (canvassing votes). Particularly, liberal democracies are accused of being covertly subordinate to market interests and of imposing the culture of consumerism, buying the passive attitude of citizens and abusing democratically elected governments. Nowadays, democracy is blamed for the helplessness against economic crises, massive migrations, and dependence upon financial institutions.

226 The weaknesses of democracy are a fuel for populist or autocratic ideas, and for the victories of political forces which, in the name of democracy, aim to focus on the nation’s interest. Consequently, some national leaders try to replace civil society with a national community concentrated on itself. The value which is often used by undemocratic politicians is patriotism understood and defined in a simple and emotional way as the love of the homeland. This is the kind of love which the majority appreciates. Politicians or teachers, as most people, have rarely questioned patriotism as a coveted value; however, similarly to democracy, patriotism has its opponents (the most famous ones include: L. Tolstoy, E. Goldman, G. Herve, S. Veil, M. Violi, H. Arendt). All of them analyzed the negative consequences of specific interpretations of patriotism, although in various ways. Patriotism is most frequently defined as the love for one’s homeland. Both terms—love and homeland—are not explicit. If we define love as a special emotional relationship which comprises dedication, care, sacrifice, pride, loyalty, and obligation, the question regarding behavioral manifestations of these emotions becomes significant. It appears that difficulties with the definition and research of patriotism result largely from the emotional load associated with the referent of this term and its political significance. Patriotic attitudes, contrary to the concept itself, can be morally ambiguous, differently assessed by various groups (e.g.: national or religious terrorism is condemned by some, while for others it is a method of fighting for their supreme values).

Followers and adversaries of patriotism, as well as researchers and thinkers, have been grappling for years with the homeland concept. Polish philosophers, writing of homeland, frequently make reference to Karol Libelt, a student of Hegel, who in his famous work *Miłość ojczyzny* (*The Love for the Homeland*;

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1844) analyzed nine factors which are key to determine the meaning of this term, arranging them in three dimensions (triads). The first dimension is material, comprised of the land (territory), the nation, and the law; the second is spiritual and includes national customs, language, and literature. The last, the most important triad, consists of the state, the church, and history. The homeland, combining all these factors, obtains an additive unity (cf. Stróżewski 2009).

However, it is not meaningless whether, in our definition of patriotism, we use as the primary category of identity territory, origin, history, elements of culture such as language and symbols, or the state and the law. Operational definitions of patriotism will differ depending on the selected criteria.

Henryk Hermann bases his classification of patriotism not on emotional criteria, but on molecular ones, identifying:

- national patriotism: a sense of special ties with one's nation to which one belongs by force of birth;
- state patriotism: a sense of an organic bond with the state, even a multinational one;
- civilization patriotism: a bond with a type of civilization, e.g., the European's bond with the Latin civilization (cf. Hermann 2012, 74).

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The author himself considers this catalogue as incomplete and inseparable. Using these categories, it is possible also to define a regional patriotism, amongst other kinds. In Hermann's thought, the important factor is the right to choose one's bonds, to self-identify.

The musings on definition also include work by psychologists. Emotional attitudes toward selected groups, including one's own nation, result from a specific condition of group awareness and group identity, and from the need for identification, built both on the sense of community and on the need to stress the distinction and uniqueness of one's group and territory.

Irrespective of the differences in definition, for the psychologists, the key element of patriotism is the sense of attachment to the group with which the individual identifies. In the broadest understanding, this can be any group (e.g., local patriotism, even professional patriotism), in the narrower understanding—a sense of identification with the nation. Our understanding of the nation—whether in ethnic categories, as a community of culture, or as the

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state—is not immaterial (cf. Skarżyńska 2008). The affinity and identification gives the group members a sense of safety and strength, which is especially important in a situation of threat. The sense of nationality appears already in children of kindergarten age.

Researchers of the phenomenon stress that positive aspects of patriotism (care for the welfare of the group) are accompanied by the easy co-presence of negative feelings toward others and readiness to aggression, acting to harm those who are considered strangers, and thus, as being worse. Many dissertations have been written on the threatening versions of patriotism, such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, and chauvinism.

That is why contemporary dictionaries, defining patriotism, point out that this is “a social and political attitude, a form of ideology combining devotion to one’s homeland, the sense of social ties and sacrifice for one’s nation with respect for others and for their sovereign rights.” This is a clear attempt to combine conflicting elements, sometimes even considered mutually exclusive by some of the already mentioned authors, such as affinity and readiness to sacrifice for one’s own nation with respect to the rights of others who do not belong to the group.

Igor Primoratz synthesizes the literature on the analyzed issue and defines five types of patriotism by applying non-uniform criteria:

1. Extreme patriotism: ideological ties to Machiavellianism, attitudes of the “our country, right or wrong” type (today, it is rather rejected in moral terms, although revived by extremist groups).

2. Strong patriotism: life of the individual is immersed in the group—the country, the nation, its history, tradition, values, symbols, rights, and position. The group offers all these features to the individual who should feel a part of it. This, however, does not mean the full acceptance of all attributes of the social group, e.g., all decisions of the political authorities. Patriotism was described in these terms by MacIntyre, for whom universal justice and solidarity of all people are more important than absolute loyalty.

3. Moderate patriotism, closer to the liberal approach, combines love for the homeland with the conviction of the need to observe humanistic principles, human rights, and universal good. A sensible feeling, which embraces both criticism and rejection; it is not an unconditional, egocentric patriotism.

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Its concept and ideas are described, among others, by Marcia Baron, who believes that we should appreciate the national cultural achievements in the same manner as we value the moral standing of our country, which means the right to criticize and to reject loyalty, including political loyalty when the moral principles are being broken. Moderate patriotism is not exclusive—the welfare of one's own country is important, but equally important is the welfare of other countries and of humanity as a whole. Stephen Natanson can be cited here, who attempts to soothe both republican and communitarian ideas by proposing reasonable, liberal universalism focused on the society.

4. Limited patriotism: love for one's homeland is not a moral obligation resulting from birth and it should also not be linked with the imperative of gratitude. What we receive from the state, we frequently pay back, e.g., through taxes. Patriotism in this approach includes the care for the prosperity of one's country and fellow citizens.

5. Ethical patriotism differs from the other types. It is not tied to the love for history and culture of the country or the nation, nor for its natural beauty, its international position, military, or sports strength, but stems from the belief in the moral strength of society, seen in the international and intercultural relations. The attitude to history of one's group is also based on moral principles—all the dark pages require analysis and justice as well as efforts to ensure that the evil does not repeat itself. Moral values, on which this kind of patriotism is based, and which it wants to instill, include social justice combined with respect for human rights, humanitarianism, human solidarity, and accountability for the course of events. The patriotic attitude will therefore be expressed in the fight to uphold these values and in the protest against their rejection (cf. Primoratz 2013).

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This list shows just how complex the issue of patriotism is. In order to simplify this complexity and clarify the most important differences, many researchers have built dichotomous classifications. Jarosław Makowski, the Polish sociologist, contrasts open patriotism (liberal, defined through civic involvement, respect toward democracy, and the conviction that the citizen's obligation is to care for one's country as a place for all citizens) with closed patriotism (possessive and exclusionary with limited tolerance for everything that is strange or non-national; cf. Makowski 2013,15).

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Similar views are shared by authors from other countries, such as Ervin Staub who in the early 1990s proposed the dualist, frequently cited, division into blind and constructive patriotism. The basis of both kinds is the positive emotional approach, fondness for one's nation and country, and positive identification. However, blind patriotism is exclusionary—it is built on the belief in the superiority of one's own group, on the conviction that one should cherish, nurture, and support only one's own values, history, morals, rights, and the readiness to impose one's own rules on others (as they are better). Criticism toward one's group is seen as absence of loyalty. Meanwhile, constructive patriotism assumes that the sense of community and affinity with the group is expressed in acting to its benefit. It rejects the belief of superiority with respect to others, the development-supporting values are important, and they are served by social criticism (cf. Staub 1997).

230 In a like vein, Joel Westheimer proposed his definition of two types of patriotism: authoritarian and democratic. Authoritarian patriotism is chauvinistic, ethical, totalitarian in the political sense; it assumes society is conformist and accepts social shortages. Democratic patriotism is indifferent toward genealogy, refers to democratic values such as respect for variety, critical and deliberative loyalty, as well as civic concern in the social dimension (cf. Westheimer 2009). It seems that under a generalized comparison, authoritarian patriotism would correspond to the blind, and the democratic is similar to constructive patriotism, as defined by Staub.

The musings on the concept of patriotism cannot omit constitutional patriotism. The term was created in post-war Germany, undoubtedly as an attempt to overcome the threat associated with nationalistic attitudes, arising in strong ethnic states or in cultural communities prone to consider themselves superior to other cultures. The idea of constitutional patriotism was formulated in the 1970s by Dolf Sternberger, a student of Hannah Arendt. In his opinion, the Roman Republic can be seen as the source of this idea—there, patriotism was expressed in civic attitude, and similar forms of patriotism, characterized with respect for civil rights, dominated (in Europe) until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The author contrasts the martyrdom vision of homeland with the concept of “homeland alive,” alive with the activity of its citizens who participate in the creation and implementation of democratic laws. He proposes that

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the civic state should take the place of the national, ethnic one. Sternberger was a proponent of citizenship that would be responsible, involved, based on provisions of constitutional law, and consistent with liberal and democratic values. He did not abandon patriotism related to the territory—but he saw it rather as a friendship with the state, whose institutions have a civic nature. The state and its institutions were to act as a stern guardian of the law, and its breaches would be punished (cf. Müller 2006).

The concept became popular in the second half of the 1980s, when a new interpretation was accorded to it by Jürgen Habermas during a famous historical debate. Similarly, Habermas bypassed the categories of nation and ethnicity. He believed that the law—including constitutional acts which are the source of values and principles—can serve as a platform facilitating communication, cooperation, and integration of the pluralist, multi-national, and multi-cultural European states, without the need for a unifying of cultural differences. Habermas opts for the development of the public sphere in which citizens live and cooperate as free, equal individuals building a democratic discourse (in line with his theory of communicative action). Thus, the concept is inclusive—everyone can participate in the discourse and creation of the law, irrespective of the racial or cultural differences, and the political and social integration depends on the will to determine its principles through the process of communication (cf. Müller 2006).

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This concept, especially after it was revived by Habermas, was and still is lively discussed and criticized in Europe. The European integration policy raises numerous controversies, as it is seen as a threat to national identity and identification. The shift of patriotism linked with the nation toward the non-emotional, pragmatic forms such as democratically recognized legal order, assuming more civic obligations than sentimental or moral ties—which was justified in post-war Germany—is hard to accept as the exclusive or fundamental type of patriotism in other parts of Europe and the Western world. The devotion to the homeland and its attributes, and the perception of its interests in the exclusive terms is strongly ingrained, and the events of the recent years, such as economic crises, the threat of terrorism, and mass migrations rather strengthen the comeback to closed national states.

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Civic patriotism seems to be the most important issue for the definition problems analyzed here. It is expressed through the activity of a social group, working for the benefit of its community usually outside the structures of the state—which it requires only to determine the legal and organizational framework, although sometimes civic activity can reach beyond this framework. Civic patriotism requires dedication to the welfare of others, solidarity, a certain degree of social cohesion, and in special cases—civil disobedience. Traces of civic patriotism can be seen in the concepts already referred to, including open patriotism as defined by Makowski, the constructive one by Staub, the democratic one by Joel Westheimer, and the constructive one by Habermas, especially with respect to negotiating the law.

232 The same types of patriotism are found both in the democratic countries as well as in the non-democratic ones. Democracy and the open principles of civic society support the manifestation of patriotic emotions, expressed equally by supporters of the multi-cultural approach and by xenophobes. Nowadays, the national state is the fundamental political unit—even if it brings together representatives of many cultures. The dominant, majority-based cultures, especially when confronted with a threat, turn to the selected democratic principles (political sovereignty, the right to manifest one's views, protection of social interests) and disregard other, such as civil rights of minorities, civil rights in general, human rights, respect for variety.

The aggregative theory of democracy recognizes as fundamental the right of citizens to collectively express their political will—not only through general elections. On the other hand, deliberative democracy enables individuals to determine their needs and preferences, to solve conflicts, and to reach consensus in a communication process free of political and economic influences. Can, however, individuals free themselves from such influences? Social practice demonstrates that this is very difficult—also due to the fact that everyone strives to protect their own economic interests.

The model of global, cosmopolitan democracy recognizes as fundamental the values of law and order (in light of supranational laws), the absence of violence, and peaceful solving of conflicts, as well as the equality of citizens in supranational communities. The migration crisis in Europe has demonstrated that certain countries clearly reject these values in order to protect their own

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interests. An explicit example here is the so-called “Brexit.” The rejection of the concept of global democracy in social practice is accompanied by an intensification of patriotic attitudes in their nationalist and chauvinist variety.

The principles of democracy—self-determination, freedom of expression, the sense of having a social mandate among the rulers in national states—could become a tool used to nurture closed patriotism. It seems that in most countries the development of democratic ideas was and still is accompanied by anti-democratic ideas (clearly visible also in historical events, including wars). Paradoxically, they are ingrained in democracy. I would include here the national myths, the support of hierarchy-based traditions, the vision of a nation’s history as a stream of victories and failures, or the stressing of a civilizational mission of the Western culture.

The great challenge for civic education which includes the issues of democracy, citizenship, and patriotism, is to show their connections and gaps. It is necessary to change the contents of education from its current oversimplistic and limited form to a more developed, complex set of concepts.

The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study conducted in 2016 shows that civic education for teenagers concentrates on understanding key civic and citizenship concepts, mostly the principles of voting and elections. The citizenship values like participating in community-based activities or understanding how to resolve conflicts are less explored issues. However, teachers mentioned the importance of such goals of civic education as: promoting the capacity to defend one’s own point of view; developing students’ skills and competencies in conflict resolutions; students’ participation in the local community or promoting students’ critical and independent thinking. Yet, the knowing of facts and key concepts dominates in the all school curricula (cf. Schulz 2017).

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During lessons, neither younger nor older pupils usually have the chance to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of democracy, its various forms (beside direct and indirect), its connections with civil society, its threats, its political alternatives, and the consequences of its lack.

Similarly, patriotism is defined only in an underdeveloped way as a highly positive love for the homeland. The homeland is very often understood as a nation’s place. Even in such a homogenous country like Poland in the recent

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years almost everything is “national.” For example, the anthem and flag are not “state” but “national.” The anniversaries of events important for the state, like Independence Day, are appropriated by nationalistic organizations (considering themselves as true patriots) to manifest their symbols and ideas including hatred and contempt for others. The difference between nationalistic and other closed forms of patriotism and democracy is huge, and educators have to settle how to interpret this chasm.

Patriotism and democracy are complex issues with many variants, among them some threatening ones, and they cannot be defined in a simple, single meaningful way. This results in creating unreflective, narrow-minded people, which may be desired by autocratic politicians in order to manipulate them, but not by contemporary human beings and societies.

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