Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 483 Conscious Informational Entities Anton P. Zeleznikar Volariceva ul. 8, Ljubljana, SI-1111 s51em@hamradio.si Keywords: attention, cognitive-emotional paradigm, complexity, emergentism, entity name, entropon, entroponic, en-troponizing, informon, informonic, informonizing, intention, metaphysicalism, phenomenalism, the metatheory of the conscious, the philosophy of the informational Received: July 22, 2003 This paper deals with the constitution and organization of a conscious entity. Informon, as an ordered and named conscious entity, informs in its equally named and informationally disordered (chaotic, irregular) environment, called entropon. Both informon and entropon overlap informationally more orless with other informons and entropons constituting a local or global informational space. A conscious system, as known from the naturalistic point of view, is necessarily a cognitive-emotional system together with other components concerning sensuality, attention, motivation. homeostasis, behavior, motorics, etc., all of them possessing a specific intention (orientation, goal-directedness, decisionmaking specificity) within the conscious informing. Concrete cognitive, emotional, and otherwise meaningly organized entities come into the conscious foreground. Artificial conscious systems can differ substantially from the natural ones in the functional domain, regarding the future complexity, memory, global interconnection, and informational search possibilities. Artificial entropons can serve as absolute memories for experiences (components, parts of components) and, in this way, can enable informons to use the entire precisely, regularly, and disorderly structured previous experience and their lumps. 1 Intercomplex and interconscious organization of informational entities Components of a conscious system are informationally fused in nature. In addition, a circular metaview of causation comes fore, in which stimulus and response take the role to be both cause and effect. Rotation of operands in a circular formula scheme is the consequence of this fact [19, 20, 21]. Circular organization of informational entities reflects in informational metaphysicalism [21], being the condition sine qua non in the organization of conscious components (see, for instance, R. S. Lazarus [15]). Complexity [4] and metaphysicalism [19, 20], determining conscious entities, can be explained through an enormous degree of informational interrelationship. In a conscious system, conscious entities (components) are interactive, interassociative, intercausal, intercircular, interconnected, interconscious, intercommunicational, interdependent, interdistributed, intereffective, interemergent, interferential, interintentional, interreffective, interrelational, interspontaneous, interweaved, that is, interinforming and in-terinformational. This kinds of interselfness constitute the intercomplexness of entities, that is, the distributed complexity of entities and their (entroponic) environments, in which each of entities can inform consciously. The consequence of these properties is that a con- scious system is organized intercomponetially, or naturally, artificially, pragmatically, and spontaneously, in an in-tercognitive, interemotional, intermotivational, interatten-tional, interbehavioral, interhomeostatical emergent way, and the like. Circularity in the form of metaphysicalism remains the main ability of the conscious informational phenomenon. Informational betweenness or inter-ness (interism) is the consequence of connectedness and distributiveness of conscious components fused informa-tionally in the system. In this context, metaphysicalism is the metaphor for a basic organization of conscious entities, for instance, in the form of informons in informonic environments [19, 20], and in this way being cognitive, emotional, motivational, attentional, homeostatic, behavioral, etc. Within conscious systems, informational complexness of components reaches the extreme forms in number and interism, causing the possibility for emergence of informons, coming into the conscious attention. In such an environment, any component emerged, can immediately appropriate to it corresponding conscious property or concrete functional organization, for it has the access to the subconsciously complex domain of informational lumps in which conscious abilities are memorized, associatively conditioned (interrelated), and being experientially on disposal. Artificial conscious systems can hardly ignore the so-called cognitive-emotional paradigm, constituting the con- 484 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar cept of consciousness as a natural system of awareness, self-awareness, and behavior of living creatures. The artificial aspires to imitate the natural consciousness with the aim, to make artificial conscious systems adopted to the human culture and the way of understanding. In this respect, cogniton-driven and emotion-driven robots are sine qua non in the field of sociable robots, designed to be spiritual friends and practical helpers in the environment of human everyday life. 2 Complexity and metaphysicalism as general principles of conscious informing Complexity in number, structure, and organization of informational components is one of the conditions necessary for the emerging of conscious systems [4, 19, 20]. Human brain is an example of the large number of neurons, synapses and other ingredients connected perplexedly in an informational way, in which the conscious mind can emerge and develop as the complexity of thinking, its informational coherence, and decoherence (see decoherence in quantum computing in Kurzweil [14], pp. 110-118 and informational gestalt decoherence in Zeleznikar [21], Sub-sect. 8.9). Thus, the mind for itself becomes the complexity, in which mind can emerge and become more complex. That what in mind is accumulated are individual experiences, a sort of conscious and subconscious result of success and failure, within an intention of the individual living or artificial conscious system. Metaphysicalism is a metaphor for a specific organization of informing of entities in the domain of consciousness [19, 20, 21]. It concerns intentional informing, intentional counterinforming and intentional informational embedding in a complex circular informational organization. Metaphysicalism always concerns an object, a certain informational entity, to which it is intentionally directed. We always speak about entity's metaphysicalism, with a specific sort of meaning rooting in entity's intention, that is, in its simple or complex name, that is, name's meaning, being a complex formula system. Name performs as an impulse for the emergence of the complex organization, preserving and generating the meaning of the name, as it happens in the case of informon, developing in the emerging informational space. 3 Entropon and informon Entropon a is the a-named informational background of informon a, its subconscious or unconscious domain, from which the informon emerges as a conscious component at the very moment. Entropon is the entropic, informa-tionally disordered state within informational space, concerning a named informational entity, including both well-formed and irregular informational items, that is, formulas and formula systems, as well as parts of the both. At the very beginning, the informon, as an instantaneous event of experience, emerges through its name or name phrase a out of informon's entropic (entroponic) background, fitting informationally each new situation in the ongoing moment. For example, a flow of consciousness in people's speech means the occurrence of events as informons, which follow one another spontaneously, unpredictably in details, and depending on inner (conscious, subconscious, intentional) and outer (sensory) impulses, events, states of experience, circumstances, situations, emotions, attitudes, associations, perceptions, cognition, attentions, motivations, etc. Entropon is an informational potential of informon1. It is an environment, from which an informon emerges, being structured consciously by decomposition, that is, shaped regularly in an informational way. In this respect, as an informational component, informon has its fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception (Heidegger [11] p. 195)2, just in informon's decomposition in the area of its entropon. In this view, entropon is the available unordered informational domain for the informational (informonic) decomposition out of the disorder of entropon, into the reasonable order of informon. In the way informons overlap each other, their entropons overlap too in the informational superspace. Both constitute the so-called informational substance of consciousness, being modulated intentionally. In them, the individual consciousness is captured, possessing specific intentions. The quality of consciousness roots in the complexity of entroponic diversity and extensiveness, and in the rational and intuitive orderliness of informonic intentionalities. Reflexive consciousness is just an informonic intervening into the entropic history, is a circular and sufficiently complex memorizing and understanding of the happening of the present and the past, with the view to the future and, in this respect, is a circular decomposition of informons within occurring situations and moments. Consciousness is an informonic happening out of entroponic background—informational disorder of subconsciousness or the individually unconscious background. The pair of informon and entropon, (a; a), is a correlative and informationally coherent system. Entropon a is the broadest non-erderly emerging complex informational environment, background, or domain being named by a. Operand a represents a simple operand (a simple word or word phrase name), a formula (sentence), or a formula system (a group of meaningly interrelated sentences). Entro-pon consists of informational lumps concerning the name a. In a moment, the name a comes to the conscious foreground, informon a begins to emerge out of the entropon a. In these circumstances, informon as informational entity with metaphysicalistic organization, becomes a part, in 'Entropons can be compared with the contents of a quantum-understood black hole from which new matter can come to existence. 2In German (Heidegger [12] p. 153), these words are Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff. CONSCIOUS INFORMATIONAL ENTITIES Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 485 fact, an element of entropon a. Thus, according to the topological organization of the informational [18], where a system of formulas is equivalent to a set of meaningly (informationally, intentionally) interrelated elements, a e a This relation can hold permanently only for artificial conscious systems, while in natural conscious systems, the emerging informon a is liable to a gradual, time dependent decay. In a natural conscious system, after the informon's actualization as a conscious experience, the absolute organization of informon a, entering into its entropon a, disintegrates gradually, according with the function of the working memory, into substantial, intentionally relevant parts, that is, becomes informational lumps straying in the subconscious substrate of entropon. This means that in the whole of the informon, some common operands disappear and the connection to the corresponding informons is disrupted, so it must be restored anew, when the informon as such is coming into the conscious foreground. On contrary, in an artificial conscious system, the absolute organization of informon a can remain preserved within entropon a. To the basic relation a e a, the following formulas can be introduced: (a; a) (a = a; a = a); a ^ (a; a); a, a e ~a; (0 = a (a = a) The first formula is an implication considering the circular organization (the right side of =^) of the informon-entropon pair. By the second formula, a new denotation is introduced, called informational space of the name denotation a, that is, a. Such a structure is reasonable because the informonic part a can be memorized on a storage medium from where the artificial conscious system can observe it or pick it up as an original informonic whole. In the complex structure of entropon a, informon emerges into the conscious entity, having on informational disposal all other entropons, connected informationally by common operands occurring in existing entropons. Here, the so-called interism, discussed in Sect. 1, functions throughout the conscious system of entropons. The third formula states that an informon a and its entropon a are members of informational space a. The fourth formula of the array, (Q = a) (a = a), brings the so-called informational nothingness (the unknown, marked by Q) into the discourse. Usually, informational nothingness is the metaphor for anything possible and [] = a means that by informing of [], a can come into existence. However, such a presumption implies (operator =^) that, in fact, informon a emerges out of entropon a. In a natural conscious system, we clearly experience that informon a, if not stored on a medium, disintegrates after the emerging within a conscious state, that is, a =disintegrate_within a Let a.j be a synonym (an alternative definitions) of a, where a = synonymously ai, a2, ..., aj,... and ai, a2,..., a.j, ... =synonymously a. Entropon a can be structured as a, ai, a2, , aj,... e a From the name a, synonymous names a1,a2,... ,a.j,... come in, which can be understood as alternatives of a and, vice versa, alternative names impact informationally the initial name a. This interplay can be understood as a consequence of synonymous emerging of informons a, ai,, a2,..., aj,... and their entroponic counterparts a, ai, a2,..., aj,.... In an informational space a and aj, names of informons are not all for ever meaningly stable entities and, in a conscious environment, they can be informationally fine-tuned, specifically (culturally) modulated and, lastly, meaningly modified through the interin-forming of informons and entropons. In natural systems, entropons a and aj become the history of decayed informons a and aj, where informational lumps (parts 'wandering' around) concerning former informons are gathered. In general, for informons a and aj, a =disintegrate_in Ppart,1 ["^-1 , ... , ppart,i [~al , • . . ; aj =disintegrate_in Ppartjl aj j Ppartj'fcj aj Informon a is a complex system of formulas and the corresponding subformulas are ^iji c pi. Thus, for ^iji, as well-formed parts of pi, i = 1,2,..., , ^iji G a, where ^iji c and G a. is the number of all subformulas ^iji in formula [21]. Evidently, concrete informons as parenthesized formula systems do not enter in a natural entropon. They cannot be memorized precisely because of their complexity in a human conscious system. As we believe, their memorizing is approximative and superficial along some key words and phrases. Even more, the decay of informon formulas in an entropon can progress to a total destruction and, thus, the basic constituents of formulas like differently subscribed, however, to the informon adequate operands and operators, enter in the entropon. In this way, in entropons a and aj, there are meaningly suitable operators in regard to the meaning structures of informons a and aj, respectively, that is, =particularizedG aj i a> ii mji 1? <2, . . . where a ^ a0. So, entropon a keeps a large number of constituents concerning different informons aj named aj being deduced synonymously from the initial intention or name a0, giving rise to the emergence of the informons particular intentions. In an artificial conscious environment, informon a can remain preserved in entropon a as a specific formula system, as it has emerged during its conscious cycle (e.g. being written, stored on a medium). In general, it has the 486 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar system form a where, a G a ; V : ) and is connected with other informons and entropons via the common operands ai1; ai2,..., aiji,..., ainof formulas fi [an,ai2,..., aj, ..., a^J. 4 Defining informon and entropon philosophically and formally The definition of a complex and metaphysically organized informational entity— conscious informational entity—and its direct environment is important for understanding and formal implementation of both informon and entropon. The entity definition means that a concrete implementation may follow in an individual mind and computer net environment. In this context we are speaking specifically and concisely in a formal way about informational informon and informational entropon, distinguishing them from other concepts using the same basic names, for instance, in quantum mechanics (quantum informon and quantum entropon)3. While the quantum informon and entropon are defined as simple information carrying particles, informational informon and entropon are named as the most complex distributed formula systems within a conscious system. The first published definition of the (informational) in-formon was in German, obtained from [21] by improvement in verbal and formal sense. According to the definition in German [19]4, Informon is a new concept for the complexity of a conscious entity. Each informon as an informational entity is provided with its own consciousness. An individual consciousness consists ofinformons. An informon is in a given consciousness distributed informationally and, in this way, more or less, existent in other informons. Consciousness is nothing other than an informational overlapping ofinformons, and being an informon by itself. The artificial informon, named a, can be defined precisely, for instance, as 3The quantum definitions of informon and entropon can be found on Internet in Cyrillic, for instance, in Eikhh, C.B. h D.A. TaBpHioB. 1998. Hh$opmohli h eHTponoHLi. At the web site (http://www.aha.ru/~latypov/informon.htm). Other and the same Russian authors can be searched in English under Koulikov V. V., Yolkin S. V., Hariponov A. S., Gavrilov D. A., etc. 4Das Informon ist ein neuer Begriff für die Komplexität eines bewußten Seienden. Jedes Informon ist als eine informationelle Entität mit eigenem Bewußtsein beschafft. Ein individuelles Bewußtsein ist aus In-formonen zusammengesetzt. Ein Informon ist im gegebenen Bewußtsein informationell verteilt und damit auch mehr oder weniger in anderen In-formonen anwesend. Das Bewußtsein ist nichts anderes als ein informationelles Überlappen der Informonen und selbst ein Informon. a ^def M> |~a], where > e - Hl M^1 T a~\, as a pre-informonic entity, denotes the metaphys-icalistic decomposition of name a, according to the subscript >. It delivers the basic metaphysicalistic organization to a (intentional, counter-intentional, and embedding-intentional informing), from which through complexity, that is, complex connectivism in the conscious system, in-formon as a conscious component can emerge. Informon's connectivism concerns all available operands in the system, concerning informon's name directly and indirectly, associatively, and otherwise possibly. This situation can be captured graphically in Fig. 1. Probably, informon OH a ^ M> [a] is connected with other informons via common operands and via operands appearing in common operand formulas, to a recursive depth, dimension, and circular perplexity. An artificial entropon can be structured much more orderly, including a great number of well-structured formulas and formula systems, than a natural entropon which is mainly characterized by forgetting the well-formedness and particularities of formulas and formula systems. The artificial entropon can include a substantial number of already emerged informons, being "memorized" absolutely, that is, without loss of organization and meaning of informons, in the form they appeared concretely in certain situations. Within informational understanding, "memory" as a memorizing property means the circular structure of formulas and formula systems, representing a circular dynamic sort of memory, where the circular informing of entities (operands) is understood as an emerging process of memorizing in causal formula loops5. In contrast to in-formon, entropon is in general not absolutely or regularly structured in any way. Similarly as for the terminology of informon in [20], Table 2, the additional terms for entropon can be introduced, to make the discussion concerning entropon transparent. By entropon, several words as the adjective entroponic, the adverb entoponically, the verb entroponize, and the participle entroponizing can be used. An explicit verbal definition of entropon can be the following6 : 5 This sort of dynamic memory conceptualism could come close to the quantum-mechanical phenomenology (informational dynamics) in brain, or at least support the concept theoretically. 6In German, the definition is: Das Entropon ist ein neuer Begriff für die Komplexität der Umgebung eines bewußten Seienden. Jedes Entropon ist als eine ungeordnete informationelle Entität aus gut-strukturierten und iregulären Teilen zusammengesetzt, entstehend durch das Informieren des Buwußtseinssystems. Ein individuelles Bewußtsein besteht aus In-formonen und Entroponen als genannten Entitäten. Ein Entropon ist im Bewußtseinssystem informationell verteilt und damit mehr oder weniger in anderen Informonen und Entroponen anwesend. Ein System des Be-wußtsens ist nichts anderes als ein informationelles Überlappen von Informonen und Entroponen und selbst ein Informon mit dem zugehörigen Entropon. CONSCIOUS INFORMATIONAL ENTITIES Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 487 IIa'] IIa'] i\a] i\a] M/la] C\a] c\a] c\a] E\a] ëaX E\a] e\a] J OII'r Figure 1: The complexity of informon's primitive system M> [a] is granted by parallel and serial connections to Q ||' operands in the system around the primitive shell M> \a\, via the inner operands of name a, informing components I\a~\ and i\a], counterinforming components C\a\ and c\a], and informational-embedding components E\a\ and e\a\. Entropon is a new concept for the complexity and disorder of a named conscious entity environment of an informon. Each entropon, as a disordered informational entity, constituted by well-formed as well as irregular informational items (in fact, parts ofwell-formed entities), is a consequence, arising by informing of a conscious system, consisting of informons and entropons. An individual consciousness consists of both informons and entropons as named entities. An entropon, in a given conscious system, is distributed informationally and, in this way, more or less, existent in other informons and entropons. A conscious system is nothing other than an informational overlapping of informons and entropons, and being an informon with the corresponding entropon by itself. The question is, how the entropon can be defined formally, graphically, comparatively, and transparently to the concept of informon. The artificial entropon named a can be defined formally, for instance, as -def where > e {- Here, \ a] denotes the informonic shell in the form of metaphysicalistic decomposition of the name a, according to the subscript >. Because in the artificial informational environment, e entropon M°"[a], where > e can be divided in the sense of the set-theoretical view, in two areas, being separated by the metaphysicalistic shell a\ , in fact, its longest loop. This loop can be grasped as the informonic envelope for which y ° |a, I\a], ifa\, C\a], c\a], E\a], e[a]J e " \a] The situation is presented in Fig. 2. The envelope is a formula of the metaphysicalistic shell—the initial inner conscious structure of the informon. Inside the envelope, the entire texture of the informon is meant to be located. M" M [a, 3\a~\, i\a~\, C\a~\, c\a~\, E\a~\, efa]J Figure 2: In entropon's primitive system, [a], inforon' mon's primitive system M> [a] is informational embedded. Envelope's primitive system \a, I\a\, i\a\, C\a\, c\a\, E\a], e\a]J separates both and the contents of informon is meant to be encircled by the envelope. The shell delivers the basic metaphysicalistic organization to a (intentional, counter-intentional, and embedding-intentional informing), from which through complexity, that is, complex connectivism in the conscious system, in-formon as a conscious component can emerge. Informon's connectivism concerns all available operands in the system concerning informon's name directly and indirectly, asso-ciatively, and otherwise possibly. This situation is captured explicitly by Fig. 2. One must not forget the correspondence between the formula y, the formula scheme S \y], and the primitive system of the formula y'. There is, y' ^ ®\y], where G denotes the graph. For a formula system $, the correspondence becomes $ —► S \$] —► G \$], with $ ^ (yi; y2; • • •; yni,), S\$] ^ (S\yi]; S\y2]; •••; S\y„4 ]), and $' ^ (yi; y2; •••; y'rJ This correspondence is irreversible. From a primitive formula system $', the schematized system S \$] cannot be identified. And from a schematized system, the original formula system $ cannot be identified. It seems that a natural conscious system operates schematically, however, an artificial conscious system can operate formula-likely, <— 488 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar schematically, and primitively, that is, graphically. 5 Cognitive-emotional nature of consciousness The cognitive-emotinal concept of consciousness has to be understood merely as one of the important views in the philosophy of consciousness. Besides the cognitive-emotional paradigm, other explicit components distributed in a conscious system cooperate in the system orchestration, for instance, attention, sensibility, motivation, homeostasis, behavior, and the like. Cognition and emotion are fields researched extensively in the framework of informational phenomenalism, cognitive science, psychology, psychiatry, clinical research, biological systems, and so on. 5.1 Cognition and emotions Cognition-driven emotional and emotion-driven cognitive systems exist within the natural and artificial consciousness. The aspect we discuss in this paper roots in the informational phenomenalism, where conscious components (like informons [19, 20]) interact in complex and interactive ways. Emotion-driven robots, like sociable and working robots, are examples of this sort of philosophy. Cognition-emotion perspective concerns different fields of research and clinical practice, that is, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science and the informational theory. The cognitive-emotional interconnection can be efficiently projected on the informational formalism, describing the most complex phenomena, and serving as an outlook for the informational consciousness implementation. The reader must not forget that the discussion in this paper is the subject of the aim dealing with the question, how to design a conscious system artificially in the future. In nature, cognition and emotion are two of the key concepts in the constitution of conscious and subconscious (unconscious) domain, informing to and being informed by other subsystems. In the everyday language, reason and affect seem to support the main phenomenology of human consciousness. Scientifically, together with other significant components of the conscious system, cognitive-emotional perspective is dominating in complexity, interactivity, and specific (metaphysicalistic) organization of informing components. The following perspective, however not the complete one, is being worth to be considered, for instance, in robotics: cognition attention homeostasis behavior emotions motivation sensorics motorics As the reader can guess, this list of conscious components can be used by the nowadays design possibilities of sociable robots, possessing only a not-yet complex constitution of each of the components. 5.2 Basic emotions The question of basic emotions has its practical value in the design of emotion-driven and sociable robots. The criteria for basic emotions certainly can be set from different research points of view. Ekman ([8] pp. 55-56) lists 11 rules for distinguishing basic emotions from one another and from other affective phenomena. There are 15 distinguishable basic emotions: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame. Each of these words denotes a family of related emotions, where some affective phenomena are omitted. Guilt may be not a basic emotion when considering its affective components. Interest may not be an emotion but rather a cognitive state. According to Ekman's classification of basic emotions, romantic love, parental love, and hate are clearly affective, as is grief, and jealousy. They should belong to the so-called emotional plots, in which a number of basic emotions can be expected. Emotional plots inform in a more enduring and specific ways than basic emotions, and they can occur in specific affective contexts. The moods are another affective phenomena having different causes, lasting much longer, and being saturated with emotions. Affective personality traits, such as hostility, are another set of affective phenomena.7 It is hard to say how many emotions there are, however, linguistically many words naming emotions in different languages and cultures exist. The meaning of these words can be understood as features of eliciting situations and of different responses to reality and phenomenal happening. The name of an emotion, its linguistic denotation, and its meaning is language-conditioned and depends on the development and spreading of the language. Highly developed languages distinguish a high number of different emotions, e.g. in English some 2,500. 7A transparent historical phenomenon of emotional plots is the so-called class hate and class hostility, elapsing in crime upon humanity and class genocide, in totalitarian systems of communism. On the other side of such a hate, the love to the totalitarian political party is demonstrated, and experienced in the highest possible affective state of excitement, pride, and satisfaction. For instance, a communist youngster confessed that she was extremely excited, with tears in her eyes, when being accepted as a member of communist party. Today, as an old philosopher, she is still active in the leftist action and organization, provoking the normally emerging democratic public. This situation may prove how her emotional plot is enduring and lasting over the real possibilities of life. In this sense, a totalitarian ideology is one of the best examples of affective revolutionary conspiracy—a totalitarian plot. In this respect it can be useful to remind the usual meaning of the word plot. Plot is a secret plan for accomplishing an evil or unlawful end, synonymous with intrigue, machination, cabal, conspiracy, scheme. It is a design, plan, trick, contraption, maneuver, stratagem and the like. CONSCIOUS INFORMATIONAL ENTITIES Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 489 5.3 Basic components of cognitive-emotional complex Because of their informational perplexedness, it is not possible to separate and distinguish strictly cognitive and emotional components. Cognition is triggered by a kind of affective component and, then, being cognitively coupled with it. A first-step approximative approach to the design of cognitive-emotional system can be realized via the following list of characteristic signifiers (names): ability affect affection anger anticipation antipathy anxiety apathy appeal attention aversion avoiding awareness believing bravery conviction convincing courage delight desire despair disability disliking distress disturbance emotion emotionalizing empathy empathizing enjoyment ethics evading excitement fear feeling frightening grief hate hope horror impression inclination instinctiveness intention intuitiveness joy liking love lust motivation opinion pain passion perceiving pity pleasure (rjSovri) presentiment propaganda provocation rage recognition repugnance sadness seeming sense sensation sensing sensitivity sentiment sorrow (Xvnrj ) subjectivism susceptibility suspicion sympathy tending to touching trusting truthfulness turgidness turmoil twitting understanding This list of affect and cognition components, that is, of cognitive-emotional signifiers, can serve as possibilities to the initial impulse of design using the principles of consciousness (informonic) decomposition. Each of the components can be differently decomposed according to the available knowledge, information, and data archives including signifier definitions, being connected with other components via common operands. Corresponding lists of signifiers can be completed for other domains of consciousness components, for the fields of reason, understanding, language, and other domains of consciousness informational activity. For the decomposition of reason, different signifiers can be useful, for instance: argument awareness cause concluding intelligence logic proof theme grasping legitimacy mind I reason] thinking ground judgment motif reasoning tolerance comprehension intellect justice perception right understanding Further, for the decomposition of understanding, additional signifiers come into the foreground: still being conscious perceiving conceiving reasoning conceptualizing sensing interpreting understanding Sensuality, attention, motivation, cognition, emotions, homeostasis, behavior, and additional components can be added to a conscious system, performing in the informational and physical reality. In designing the artificial conscious system, an exhaustive list of components, constituting the cognitive-emotional complex, can be helpful, as presented in Table 1. All this could represent a rough approximation of the nature of components entering into the context of conscious systems. Homeostasis or homeostatic informational equilibrium of a conscious entity informing is the relative stability (perseverance of intention), for instance, of the internal organization of informon, by circular (feedback, loop) mechanisms, despite the presence of inner and outer impulses (e.g., ideological, dogmatic, prejudiced disturbances), capable of causing profound changes. Let us analyze and show some possibilities of the attention organization in the next section. 6 The problem of conscious and unconscious attention Attention belongs to the basic concerning a conscious system. Thus, attention is a component, which together with cognition, emotions, motivation, homeostasis, arousal, behavior, etc., constitutes the conscious system, as imagined today in the research of natural consciousness [6, 16], and being actual at the design of artificial conscious devices, like robots and informational systems dealing with phenomenal organization of systems. Informational formulas, informational schemes, and informational graphs are important tools of design in natural and artificial systems possessing the conscious function. Especially, graphs offer a general overview of a situation concerning a conscious system, putting into the foreground the circular system or subsystem organization, and the informational perplexedness in the graph. In this sense, a complex graph can represent the most advanced field for informational experiments [21]. From a graph, new schemes can be constructed when moving along the graph paths. Thus, the irreversibility of a graph to the original schemes, which originated its perplexed structure, is the condition for a new design within a complex conscious system. Let us present in more detail the interinforming of attention, aattention, with other entities (cognition, emotions, etc.), as an informonic-entroponic organized system (attention ; aattention). One of the main problems is, how to organize the complex function of attention in a conscious system. There is more or less evident that the attention to a certain contents (object) will be triggered by intrinsic and outer impulses, originating in informational happening. The inner sensuality and the events happening in the system environment will deliver the triggering information to the system of attention. Attention, aatention, regulates the extent, to which a conscious system (3; 3) is distracted from aversive stimuli, with the aim, to replace the unwanted emotions. Entro-pon 3 has the role of subconscious or unconscious sys- 490 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar [Adaptation as problem solver Adaptedness, evolutionary, environment Anger concept of, formal objects of, responses to, versus rage versus sadness Anger-disgust-contempt triad Anxiety controversial states versus fear Apperception Attention Avoidance B ehavior planning of, affect infusion in, problem solving Behaviorism Belief systems C ivilization emotional expression and, Closure, law of, Cognition as base of emotions emotion and, versus emotions nature of, Cognitive construction Cognitive processes elicitors emergence of, emotion classification and, emotional experiences and, Cognitive scenarios Communication Concepts, cognitive, emotional Constructs, cognitive Curiosity, cognitive D ecision making Desire, cognition and, Discourse, cognition as, E mbarrassment, cognitive-attributional Emotion adaptation awareness of, cognitive aspects communicative function observable criteria versus reason topology of, understanding [Facial expressions Fear, formal object of, G edanken experiments Goal appraisal blocking orientation [T|dentity Inference Intentionality Interpretation Irrationality Joy-sadness pattern [Tjanguage emotion and cognition in, Learning, mood and, Lexical models | M [asking, backward, Meaning, acts of, situational, law of, Memory, biased of, content of, narrative, thinking and, Meta-emotions Metaphor emotion and cognition as, emotional effect of, Moods: effects of, versus emotions learning and, recall dependent on, Moral sentiments Motivation emotional events and, emotions in, N arrative memory Negotiation positive effect and, [panic expectations in control of, stimuli for, Passion Perception emotional intelligence and, emotions in organiz. of, Planning, role of imagery and emotion in, Play/joy system Positive affect cognitive, conclusions decision making and, memory and, motivation and, Powerlessness depression and, Problem solving R | age hierarchical control of, Rage-anger system Rationality emotional, cognitive, global and local, Reason versus emotion Recall associative, mood-congruent, mood-dependent, Reflexivity Relationships, emotional knowledge about, Religion, love as ideal of, Revenge, universality of, Reverse design metaphysicalistic, Risk, positive effect and, Ritual chains, interaction Rumination definition and function S adness aggression and, depression and, versus anger versus guilt Sadness-joy pattern Self Self-awareness development of, Self-conscious emotions cognitive, conclusive, elicitation of, neglect of, role of self in, Self-constructs Self-esteem Self-evaluation Semantic differential Sentiments versus emotions Shame-anger spiral Significance evaluation Situational meaning Social behavior empathy and, Social/cognitive construction Social competence Social construction conclusions cognitive evaluations culture in, Social constructivism Social context emotional, historical, significance of, versus temperament Social groups emotion decoding and, emotion encoding and, emotion expression in, Social identity emotion discourse and, Social judgment/reasoning affect infusion in, mood and, Socialization cognitive, emotional, Speech cognitive, emotional, Standards, rules, goals Stress response Subjective well-being Surprise, emergence of, Symbolic interaction Sympathy as derivation process versus empathy negative moral outcomes and, [Tabula rasa concepts Temperament concepts of, emotional construct of, conclusion, empathy and, Thinking cognitive and emotional, Thoughts memories, and feelings Threat detection of, discovering of, perceived, Trauma cognitively identified, fear, anxiety and, linguistic expression of, U nconscious Freudian, in anxiety and fear Understanding cognitive, emotional, Universality of cognition and emotion versus cultural specificity V erstehen, philosophy of, Vulnerability concept of, depression and, W ell-being, subjective We-self versus I-self Table 1: A short ad-hoc catalog of perplexed cognition i sect. 27.4.1, Tab. 17). tem within (3; 3). The part of attention is, in a circular way, a regulatory informing of emotional behavior, irtregulationrbbehaviorreemotionsm. In human, the affect-relevant attentional informing, iraaitentionraaffect_relevantll, and emotion concerning components (more in [21], Subsub- is under control of prefrontal cortex [7]. This situation can be expressed transparently by the formal language of informational schemes, in the form of the scheme, Pprefrontal_cortex =control 1 ^attention ßaffect_relevantH CONSCIOUS INFORMATIONAL ENTITIES Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 491 Figure 3: The informationally modified Ellis and Moore subsystem of attention [9], concerning mood, memory, depression, irrelevant events, thoughts, and features. Also, Attention M irtregulationrbbehaviorfeemotionslll = »attention. The expression ^attention [aaffecLreievantll onthe right side of operator =control can be read as (1) the affect-relevant at-tentional informing, (2) informing of attention being affect-relevant, (3) informing concerning attention of the affect relevant domain, etc. Mood produces decrements in memory base concerning attention and cognitive inference, schematically, mmood =produce ^decrements =in mmemory_base |"aattention j inference [^cognition! ] Induction of an emotional state will allocate or deploy at- tentional resources to some memory task, ^induction [sstate [eemotionl^ ^ | ^ Production of irrelevant thoughts is negatively correlated with recall performance, that is, Lresources I [^attention! ) =to ssome [ttasks |~mmemory]] Depression allocates more attentional resources to irrelevant features of the memory task, especially moods, and reduces the cognitive resources, so the lack of attention is given to relevant events. Schematically, ^depression =allocate mmore [^resources [^attention]] =to \ ^irrelevant_features [ttasks [mmemoryll =especially mmoodsj ^depression =reduce ^resources [^cognition] =so y llack [aattention] Mgiven to rrelevant_events ) Both happy and sad moods lead to memory impairment, that is, f)happy_moodj ssad_mood =lead_to ^impairment [mmemory] Depression can be a consequence of enhanced attention to negative moods, that is, schematically, ^depression l^can ^consequence [^enhancement [aattention]] =to nthe_negative [mmoods] Pproduction |~iirrelevant_thoughts] Mnegatively pperformance[rrecall [mmemory]] correlated ' =with This completes the concepts given by Ellis and Moore [9], presented by the informational graph in Fig. 3. The graph in Fig. 3 needs a commentary. The path a (3 is read a concerns (3 or, colloquially, a of (3, or, in the adjectival style, a-like (3 or (3-like a, e.g., cognitive inference instead of inference concerning cognition or, in adjectively used noun (3, (a, e.g., memory base for base of memory. Instead of irrelevant thoughts, thoughts of the irrelevant (domain) could be chosen. In the text discussed, formula schemes are lost in the graph being a union of different schemes and bringing to the surface a scheme-transitive circular organization. Isolated circularly, terminal entities in Fig. 3 are production of irrelevant thoughts, pproduction [ijrreievant_thought^ , depression, ^depression, and the happy and sad mood, hhappy_mood and Ssad_mood, respectively. A distinction in attention informing between the automatic and conscious, or automatic and controlled, can be introduced. Attention as an informational entity is organized in a flexible way and distributed across stimuli and tasks. Automatic attention is concurrent and without mutual interference (an informon aautomatic_attention). Conscious attention is controlled by time-sharing of tasks. Awareness of automatic informing is low and high for controlled informing. Attentional system is related to unconscious and conscious informing. The modern concept of working memory is related to conscious informing. Noticing refers to the introspective awareness of perceiving (acknowledging, recognizing, observing). Selective attention is a component in the transformation of a perception into 492 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar p perception Htransform hi in_to uunconscious_informing wworking_memory ^something hi tasks M distributed_across h Hrelate . = Hrelate ^selective attention ) ^ cconscious_informing hdistinguish H Hrelate M distributed across ,- M distributed_across hcontrol_by_timesharing < ^attention ^conscious attention hdistinguish =lowly H h nnoticed h refer_to h. =highly h. J M distributed_across =distinguish sstimuli ^automatic attention y awareness h. Mhejntrospective h. Pperceiving Designed by A.P. Zeleznikar, June 2003 Figure 4: Informational modified Öhman 's subsystem of attention [17] within a perceptive-emotional organization of a conscious system. something noticed. All this, extracted through Ohman's diction [17], can be summarized by the system graph in Fig. 4. We see how a short text (paragraph) in the natural language generates the graph in Fig. 4 being informationally complemented, delivering a relatively complex and circularly structured subsystem graph concerning aattention. Together with the initial metaphysicalistic subsystem givenby o II M Oattention] and the informonic extension into the informational space, informon qattention can emerge and come to a temporary existence. It emerges within and out of its en-tropon aattention. On the way to a complete frame definition of attention, several items from the cognitive-emotional domain of research can be added [6, 16] and formalized by informational schemes and graphs. Problems of attention and memory are highly distractible and play a specific role in manic and paranoid communication. Cognitive informing involved in mania, like that involved in paranoia, has the same informational ground with that implicated in depression. Mania is an extreme state of depression and performs as an extreme defense against depression. Manic episodes (communication) progress through euphoria, anger, irritability and, lastly, through depression, panic and delirium [3]. Attention effects appear to be more easily obtained in anxiety disorders, while depressive states seem to influence memory rather than attention [10]. Forgetting of essential history, trauma and experience seems to be a depressive phenomenon. Emotional arousal directs attentional informing to features which are central to the arousal, at the expense of peripheral details, e.g., in case of eyewitness. Differential attentional informing can occur in response to the negative features of the event [1]. Attention to the environment is the very beginning property of conscious system. Through stimuli, basic emotions emerge and are learned from the environment. The organi- zation of attention, informing on the path from perceptual systems to the contents of high-level reasoning, is interrelated with emotional and cognitive states of the system, where positive emotions can broaden attentional focus. In fear, shifts in perception and attention appear, goals and motivational weightings change, attentional informing is redirected, conceptual frames change in the direction "dangerous" or "safe", memory informing steps to new retrieval tasks, communication processes change, special inference and learning systems are activated, physiology changes, and behavioral decision rules are activated [5]. Attention can be selectively dependent on interest, so it does not stray randomly through the vast domain of stimuli impinging on the senses. Interest focuses attention on a particular object, and as an emotion provides the motivation, interaction, constructive and creative endeavor, and the development of intelligence [13]. It seems that sadness impairs attention to tasks. Sadness is associated with lowering of attention, where sadness is not being caused by another agent, and so attention is focused inward [2]. The discussed organization and interweavement of attention with other components can now be considered with the aim to make the graph in Fig. 4 more complex and, at last, construct the attention informon, and identifying the existent attention entropon, including the meaningly, associa-tively and otherwise related words, word phrases, nouns, verbs, formulas, schemes, graphs, etc., which will impact the instantaneous emergence of the attention informon. 7 Implementation of informational phenomenalism Informational phenomenalism is the metaphor for the conscious system, emerging dynamically, in the live and the artificial. Within this texture, informonic and entroponic entities function as conscious and subconscious (unconscious) CONSCIOUS INFORMATIONAL ENTITIES Informatica 27 (2003) 483-494 493 components per se, respectively, in the complex informational space concerning the individual and global conscious system. The condition sine qua non of a component to be conscious is the complexity of already existing conscious environment, found in a conscious system, and component's initial metaphysicalistic organization, enabling the emergent development of conscious and self-conscious (metaphysicalistically phenomenal) abilities. Such components' organization and components' environment guarantee the conscious performance of informational entities. Informons together with entropons constitute the conscious system on the conscious and subconscious level, respectively, in local and global circumstances. Implementing informational phenomenalism means to begin with the initial organization of a couple of informons, realizing the informonic interism in the sense pointed out in Sect. 1. In the initial state, a component can gain the property of being conscious through other already conscious components, by which it is linked through common operands. In this manner, the mechanism of the so-called conscious bootstrapping can perform at once, after a short developmental period, or by endurance, developing isolated from the environment in the original initial way of conceptualization. This sort of development is the consequence of system's decompositions concerning the initial entities, including the metaphysicalistic and other sorts of informational decomposition. Decompositions by themselves are conscious entities with their own informonic and entroponic structure and organization within the conscious system. At last, let us point to the possibilities, how to use an informational graph for construction of sentences in English, when moving along the linked graph paths. Let us take the scheme from the graph in Fig. 4, sselective_attention =transform Pperception =in_to ^something N nnoticed =refer_to aawareness = ® khejntrospective Pperceiving =® ^attention The possible parenthesizing of the scheme is, for instance, the well-formed formula, ((sselective_attention =transform Pperception) =in_to (^something nnoticed ^ =refer_to (( Aawareness N ithe_introspective) Pperceiving N Aattention One of the possible readings of this formula could be the following: Concerning attention, selective attention transforms a perception, into something noticed, referring to the introspective awareness of perceiving. An exact miming of the formula parenthesizing in a natural language is in many cases impossible. Thus, a sentence remains a compromise between an informational scheme and an informational formula (see informational experiments in [21]). 8 Conclusion The informon-entropon debate can now be made more transparent through the case of attention, discussed in Sect. 6. In the beginning, the name attention as operand aattention comes fore, for which the meaning is searched, for instance, in the professional literature. In fact, the fragments of possible meaning for the concept named attention are gathered within an entity. In the formalized form, this emergent entity of found concepts can be understood as entropon aattention. One of the concepts being included in aattention has the graph, according to Ellis and Moore [9], presented in Fig. 3. The searching for possible concepts continues with loading of formalized results to entropon attention. One of such cases is presented, according to Oh-man [17], by the graph in Fig. 4. From the text of Sect. 6, which was not exhausted entirely, further formalized concepts concerning attention can be mined. Further concepts for attention, as a function within the conscious system, can be found elsewhere (in [6, 16], and the references herein, for instance). In this way, entropon aattention can be gradually constituted to an enormous extent of complexity. Many new operands appear and serve simultaneously as common operands within different concepts of attention. The constitutive step in emerging of informon aattention can now begin through the initial metaphysicalistic decomposition of the name Aattention, that is, [flattention! . The common operand to the entities of entropon attention is certainly aattention. In general, by its subsystems, decom- o" position M> [aattention! means attentional informing, at-tentional counterinforming, and attentional informational embedding, as known from the general metaphysicalistic organization of entities [18]—[21]. Then, decomposition o" M> [aattention! can be connected with items residing in entropon aattention, as shown in Fig. 1, in a meaningly reasonable way. It has to be analyzed, which entities fit the meaning of attentional informing and where the connection from and to Inattention! and i[aattention! of M°"[aattention! can lead. Meaningly reasonable connection can be realized for metaphysicalistic operands of attentional counter-informing, C[Aattention! and c [aattention!, and attentional informational embedding, E[aattention! ande[aattention!,leading to and from the entities of the entroponic environment. In the sketched way, the informon aattention emerges through the initial step of complexity given by decom- o" position M> [aattention!, and through that, to what it can be connected in entropon aattention. Through more and more connections and informational perplexity, considering the interinformonic and interentroponic connections, the complexity becomes enormous and, by this, the infor-mon aattention performs, from the step of sufficient complexity on, as a conscious (and self-conscious) informational entity, within a certain conscious subject, the natural or the artificial one. Metaphysicalism and complex connectivity lead to the property of conscious informing of entity within a conscious informational system. In this manner, emotions, cognition, motivations, goals, decisions, and so 494 Informática 27 (2003) 483-494 A.P. Zeleznikar on, emerge to conscious entities. Throughout this paper, the reader is confronted with the natural and formal-informational language—the transformation from the natural language to the so-called 3-language8 [21] and vice versa. Using the natural language, we know of what we speak about, become aware of the object, through the informing of word sequences, describing and interpreting it. In this view, the consciousness concerning something is language dependent, inclusive the cognitive-emotional perspective by itself; it is a constitutive part of the language and nothing more. Thus, consciousness, cognitions, emotions, motivations, attentions, behaviors, etc. depend, emerge, and come to consciousness strongly and substantially through language, its informational development, emergence, fitting, and by producing meaning to the occurring conscious situation. The name a of informon a and entropon a, in the named informational space a, is functioning like the intention, supervising and forcing the production (informational emerging) of meaning, closely and distantly concerning a. Through a-intentional informing, a-counterinforming, and a-informational embedding, a possible, sufficiently exhaustive, reasonable, and complex interpretation of a can emerge, ending in the interaction with other informons and entropons of the conscious system, in the conscious and subconscious (unconscious) property of the a-informon and a-entropon, respectively. At different informational situation, new informons and entropons can emerge, carrying a different meaning, fitting best the new informational situation. This sort of chaotic informing, concerning a definite name a, happens in everyday informing in a live, individual conscious system. In an artificial conscious system, the emerging of a's meaning may be more precise, disciplined and stable, and certain in this way. Artificial consciousness, through its informons and entropons, can emerge to a certain and disciplined mind, being dedicated to specific problems and themes of informational actuality. 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