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Ob 60-letnici Nata in 5. obletnici slovenskega članstva v zavezništvu

*»V davnih časih so tisti,
ki so bili znani kot dobri vojaki,
zmagovali, dokler je bilo to še enostavno.«*

Sun Cu

On the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of NATO and the 5th Anniversary of Slovenia's Membership in the Alliance

*»Anciently those called skilled in war
conquered an enemy easily conquered.«*

Sun Tzu

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PO PETIH LETIH ČLANSTVA V ZVEZI NATO – PRESENETLJIVO DOBRO ZA SLOVENIJO

UVOD

Zveza Nato je leta 2009 dopolnila šestdeset let obstoja. Te častitljive obletnice smo se spomnili tudi v Sloveniji, in sicer s seminarjem z izvirnim naslovom *NATO – Young at 60*, ki ga je skupaj z Ministrstvom za obrambo Republike Slovenije februarja 2009 na Brdu pri Kranju organiziral Evroatlantski svet Slovenije. Na seminarju smo ugotovili, da države zelo različno doživljajo to obletnico. Tiste, ki veljajo za ustanoviteljice zavezništva, gledajo na 60 let drugače kot tiste, ki so se članstvu pridružile v zadnjih desetih letih. Republika Slovenija je ob Natovih 60 let postavila svojih prvih pet let članstva. Priprave nanj so potekale več let, prilagajanje standardom in načrti za članstvo so povzročili veliko sprememb, največ v vojaški organizaciji in obrambnem sistemu, veliko v normativnih aktih, pri varovanju tajnih podatkov, delovanju vlade, ogromno pri diplomatskem in strokovnem delovanju v organizacijski in poveljniški strukturi Nata. Legitimnost slovenskega članstva izhaja iz uspešnega referenduma leta 2003, ko je 66 odstotkov udeležencev glasovalo za članstvo Republike Slovenije v Natu. Po petih letih lahko rečemo, da Slovenija uspešno gradi svoj ugled, utemeljen na trdni referendumski odločitvi, verodostojno sodeluje v skupnem obrambnem načrtovanju, aktivno deluje v zavezniški poveljniški strukturi in operacijah kriznega odzivanja ter gradi svoje zmogljivosti, ki se povezujejo v skupne Natove sile. Po petih letih lahko tudi rečemo, da je Slovenija zgodovinsko priložnost za uvrstitev med države zahodne demokracije presenetljivo dobro izkoristila. Še več, integracija v zavezništvo je ustvarila razmere za uspešno spreminjanje nekdanje slovenske varnostne strategije opiranja na lastne sile v strategijo zavezniške varnosti.

NATO KOT ZGODOVINSKA PRILOŽNOST

Ob ocenjevanju petletnega slovenskega članstva ter spoštovanju Natovih skupnih 60 let ne smemo pozabiti, da slovenska pot v Nato vendarle ni bila tako premočrna, kot se zdi zdaj, po petih letih, ali kot morda mislijo nove kandidatke, ko razglašajo

svojo pripravljenost ali celo upravičenost do članstva. Slovenija je pripravljenost za članstvo v svoje dolgoročne varnostne dokumente zapisala že kmalu po mednarodnem priznanju. 30. marca 1994 je vstopila v Partnerstvo za mir, ki je bilo nekakšna aktivna čakalnica za članstvo. Med tem, ko se je Nato sam v sebi uspešno transformiral iz zavezništva za teritorialno obrambo članic v zavezništvo za vseevropsko in celo zunajevropsko varnost, je v Sloveniji potekal podoben proces odpiranja v mednarodno politiko. Država, ki je gradila nacionalno obrambo za varovanje pred morebitnim ponovnim napadom iz preostanka nekdanje skupne države, se je predvsem po letu 1995 vse bolj odpirala tudi v Jugovzhodno Evropo. Leta 1997 je zaradi nedokončane preusmeritve v zunanji politiki in zaradi mednarodnopolitičnih okoliščin na Natovem vrhu v Madridu ostala brez povabila v članstvo. Politične elite v Sloveniji te zavrnitve niso dobro sprejele. Za krivca so razglašale nepripravljenost Slovenske vojske, vendar je bila takrat slovenska zunanja politika pretirano izolacionistična in izključena iz prispevkov k mednarodni varnosti, da bi članice Nata lahko prepričala v svojo pripravljenost prispevati sile v zavezništvo. Slovenska vojska je kritike dobro razumela. Z akcijskim načrtom za članstvo in tranzicijsko usmerjenostjo v nadaljnjo reorganizacijo in modernizacijo ter ob podpori celotne obrambne politike se je vse pogosteje in številnejše udeleževala mednarodnih operacij (Alba, UNFICYP, UNTSO, Sfor, Kfor), v katerih je vztrajno gradila podobo zanesljive in profesionalne zaveznice. Hkrati je nastajal koncept poklicnega popolnjevanja vojske, v katerem je množico sorazmerno slabo usposobljenih obveznikov in rezervistov nadomeščala vse bolj usposobljena in premestljiva poklicna vojska. Leta 2004, ob vstopu v članstvo, je bilo v vrstah Slovenske vojske in na Ministrstvu za obrambo že precej visoko izobraženih in v tujini šolanih vojaških in obrambnih profesionalcev, sistem dolgoročnega in srednjeročnega obrambnega načrtovanja je bil vzpostavljen. Res je sicer, da je na obrambnem ministrstvu in v družbi ostalo še veliko dvomljivcev, ki so bili skeptični do zagotovitve varnosti v Zavezništvu in so v svojih kritikah gojili predstave o starih naborniških časih, večina pa je vendarle verjela v prednosti zavezniške kolektivne obrambe. Zavest o nujnosti povečanega prispevka k mednarodni varnosti se je povečala zlasti po 11. septembru 2001, predvsem s sodelovanjem v operacijah, ki presegajo 5. člen Washingtonske pogodbe, kar postaja nujna sestavina članstva v Natu. Načeli solidarnosti in pravične delitve bremen v Zavezništvu sta še najbolj ponotranjeni na Ministrstvu za obrambo. Javnost teh načel še ni povsem dojela, tudi del politične elite še vedno misli, da je članstvo v Natu mogoče na podlagi svobodne presoje, kje bomo in kje predvsem ne bomo udeleženi. Tako se – zlasti ob nevarnejših operacijah ter tam, kjer se učinki operacije ne vidijo takoj ali na prvi pogled – krepi nezaupanje v Natove operacije ter potreba po širši notranjepolitični udeležbi pri procesu odločanja o sodelovanju sil v teh operacijah. Najbolj jasno je to mogoče opazovati ob slovenski vključenosti v Natovo misijo urjenja iraških varnostnih sil NTM-I ter ob sodelovanju v operaciji Isaf v Afganistanu, ob čemer se krepi zahteva po vse večji razpravljalni vlogi državnega zbora. Ob spremembah, ki potekajo znotraj Zavezništva, vse to kaže na dinamičen proces spreminjanja in iskanja odgovorov na nov Natov strateški koncept. Ta naj bi ob ohranitvi konsenza v političnem odločanju našel odgovore na vprašanje prihodnjega širjenja, pa tudi izboljšanja učinkovitosti odzivanja ter novih nalog in izzivov za vojaške in vedno bolj izpostavljene nevojaške civilne podporne zmogljivosti.

SLOVENSKO ČLANSTVO V NATU IN INTEGRACIJA

Članstvo v Natu pomeni, da so članice pripravljene na sodelovanje v različnih vrstah operacij, tako po 5. členu Washingtonske pogodbe kot tudi tistih zunaj njega. Ta pripravljenost se kaže v resničnih prispevkih, ne le v obljubah, ki jih države pogosto uporabljajo v primerih, ko gre za operacije Združenih narodov. Članice so se na vrhu v Bukarešti leta 2007 zavezale, da bo polovica njihovih sil pripravljena za premeštev, deset odstotkov teh sil pa bi moralo biti pripravljenih oziroma angažiranih na operacijah pod Natovo zastavo. Kar nekaj članic teh obveznosti še ne izpolnjuje, med njimi so tako stare članice kot tiste, ki so se priključile ob zadnjih treh širitvah. Natova transformacija namreč ni zadela le držav, ki so se priključile med zadnjimi, saj so se vse države morale prilagoditi tem spremembam in opustiti poglede na obrambo znotraj ozemlja iz obdobja hladne vojne.

Za članice Zaveznitva torej še ni konec priprav na sodelovanje v skupnih aktivnostih. Po vstopu v članstvu je treba nadaljevati notranje prilagoditve vojaške organizacije, da se standardno opremi in usposobi za skupno delovanje v Natovih zmogljivostih. Šele integrirane večnacionalne strukture predstavljajo stvarne zmogljivosti za nacionalno in kolektivno obrambo.

Proces integracije je treba razvijati tudi in predvsem pri zavezniškem političnem odločanju, usklajevanju in obrambnem načrtovanju. Predstavniki Slovenije uspešno delujejo v Natovih delovnih telesih in odborih, politični in vojaški predstavniki (predsednik vlade, zunanji in obrambni minister, direktor za obrambno politiko, direktor za oborožitev, načelnik generalštaba in vojaški predstavniki pri Natu) pa uspešno zastopajo stališča slovenske zunanje in obrambne politike. Pripadniki obrambnega sistema so vključeni v Natovo poveljniško strukturo. Vrsta enot je uspešno končala proces transformacije v Natovih odzivnih silah. V operacijah zunaj 5. člena Washingtonske pogodbe pod vodstvom Nata ima Slovenija 0,6 odstotka skupnih sil, kar jo uvršča med verodostojnejše članice, čeravno pri graditvi zmogljivosti ni tako uspešna. Slovenija skuša sodelovati tudi pri ustvarjanju Natove politike do Zahodnega Balkana, pri čemer vztrajno in nenehno na vseh ravneh poudarja nujnost vključitve vseh držav regije v Zaveznitvo.

Pri varovanju zračnega prostora se je Slovenija oprla na zavezniške zmogljivosti, kar velja tudi za sodelovanje v skupnih silah za strateški transport. Center za nadzor zračnega prometa na Brniku ter Pomorski operativni center v Ankaranu sta zmogljivosti za slovenski nadzor nad zračnim ter pomorskim prometom. V sklepni fazi je tudi proces vključitve oziroma pripojitve v Natovo strukturo sil, ki bo okrepil sodelovanje med različnimi enotami Slovenske vojske in enotami v Natovih korpusih ter tako omogočil skupno urjenje in usposabljanje vojaških poveljstev in enot. S standardizacijskimi postopki sledimo zahtevi po poveztljivosti ter primerljivosti v Zaveznitvu. Na račun prispevka v Natov investicijski program gradimo v Cerkljah ob Krki letališče za dvojno uporabo.

Nato je v obdobju od leta 2004, ko je bila Slovenija sprejeta v Zavezništvo kot polnopravna članica, doživljal zahtevne procese spreminjanja. To je bilo obdobje transformacije, ki prinaša tudi jasna spoznanja o nujnih spremembah za prihodnost. V Sloveniji smo razumeli in sprejeli te izzive. Zavedamo se, da so največji izziv za Zavezništvo njegova transformacija in pravilno dojetje sprememb v varnostnem okolju ter odzivanje nanje. Tako v ospredje vedno bolj prihajajo energetska varnost in ekološka vprašanja ob asimetričnih grožnjah, ki navadno nimajo več pravih vojaških oblik. Čaka nas obdobje hibridne tehnologije in hibridnega bojevanja in le vprašanje časa ter razpoložljivosti virov je, kdaj bomo vanju lahko ali morali vstopiti. Zato leta 2009 z organizacijo ključnih seminarjev aktivno sodelujemo pri nastajanju novega Natovega strateškega koncepta. Slovenija tako postaja vse bolj zanesljiva in usposobljena zaveznica.

Finančna in gospodarska kriza, ki smo jima priča, bosta imeli negativne posledice za hitrost razvoja in modernizacije slovenskega obrambnega sistema, vendar ga ne bi smeli ustaviti ali celo zamrzniti za več let, saj bi to pomenilo resnično nazadovanje. Politična skepsa, ki se pojavlja ob sodelovanju v nekaterih operacijah zunaj 5. člena Washingtonske pogodbe, mora omogočiti skupen premislek in razvoj strateških premis prihodnjega delovanja zveze. Slovenija je svojo zgodovinsko priložnost izkoristila za svojo varnost in za to, da bi državam naslednicam nekdanje Jugoslavije pokazala pravilnost poti v evroatlantske integracije. Zdaj je čas, da svojo priložnost razume tudi kot izhodišče za aktivno soustvarjanje Natove politike delovanja in odločanja v kriznih razmerah.

SKLEP

Pet let članstva ter šestdeset let obstoja sta dve različni dimenziji procesov, ki v Natu potekajo za vse članice, in sicer nenehne medsebojne povezljivosti, usklajevanja in skupnega delovanja. Članice Zavezništva se odzivajo na spremembe v varnostnem okolju, gradijo nove koncepte, upoštevajo asimetričnost sodobnih groženj, priznavajo prednostni vrstni red in dolgoročnost energetske ter okoljske varnosti. Slovenija je v procese povezljivosti, premestljivosti in vzdržljivosti pri vodenju operacij uspešno vključena in želimo si, da bi se uspešnosti zavezniške obrambe zavedale vse politične elite. Tako kot se je Zavezništvo razvijalo iz politične integracije v zvezo, ki z operacijami, ki jih vodi v imenu oziroma po mandatu OZN, prispeva k svetovnemu miru in varnosti, tako se mora tudi slovensko članstvo v Zavezništvu nadgraditi z uspešno certificiranimi enotami, ki z izpolnitvijo Natovih standardov postajajo mednarodno primerljive (lahka bataljonska bojna skupina, bataljonska manevrska bolnišnica ROLE-2 LM, bataljon JRKBO) in usposobljene na ravni, ki nam omogoča polno zaupanje v svoje oborožene sile. Naj ne zveni preveč samovšečno, če zapišemo, da nas veliko držav ocenjuje kot prijetno presenečenje na večini področij integracije v Zavezništvo. Ta ocena pa ni dana za vselej, kajti tudi v prihodnje se moramo truditi, da ohranimo verodostojnost svojega prispevka in sledimo nastajajočim spremembam. Še več, prizadevati si moramo, da postanemo soustvarjalci sprememb ter prihodnosti skupnega varnostnega okvira.

SURPRISING ACHIEVEMENTS OF SLOVENIA AFTER FIVE YEARS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, NATO celebrated sixty years of existence. This venerable anniversary was also marked in Slovenia by a seminar with the very original title *NATO – Young at 60*. The seminar was organised by the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, together with the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, and took place in February 2009 at Brdo pri Kranju. At the seminar, we discovered that different countries experience this anniversary in various ways. The founding members of the Alliance see the period of 60 years from a different perspective than those who have joined the Alliance in the last decade. In addition to the 60 years of NATO, the Republic of Slovenia is also celebrating its first five years of membership. The preparations for membership took place over several years, and the alignment with the standards and membership plans brought about many changes. The majority of these changes were introduced in the area of military organisation and the defence system, many of them in the fields of regulatory acts, the protection of classified information and the functioning of the government, and a great many changes occurred in the area of diplomatic and expert activities within NATO's organisational and command structure. The legitimacy of Slovenia's membership is based on the successful referendum in 2003, when 66 percent of voters opted for the membership of the Republic of Slovenia in NATO. After five years we can say that Slovenia has successfully built its reputation based on a strong referendum decision and that it is a credible participant in common defence planning. It plays an active role in the allied command structure and in crisis response operations, and is building capabilities which are being integrated into the joint NATO forces. After half a decade, we can also say that Slovenia has made surprisingly good use of the historic opportunity to be ranked among the Western democracies. What is more, with integration into the Alliance, circumstances were created for a successful transition from the former Slovenian security strategy of relying on its own forces to the strategy of allied security.

NATO – A HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY

In assessing the five years of Slovenia's membership and paying respect to the entire 60 years of NATO, we should not forget that Slovenia's path to NATO was nevertheless not as straight as it seems now after five years, or as the new candidate countries might think when they proclaim their readiness or even eligibility for membership. Soon after its international recognition, Slovenia endorsed its readiness for membership in its long-term security documents. On 30 March 1994, it joined the Partnership for Peace, wherein the country actively waited for admission to membership. NATO itself successfully transformed from an Alliance for territorial defence of the member countries into an Alliance for pan-European or even extra-European security, and a similar process took place in Slovenia, the process of entering into international politics. The country, which had built its national defence in order to protect itself against possible new attacks from what remained from the former common state, was becoming more and more open to South-Eastern Europe, especially after 1995. In 1997, due to incomplete reorientation in the area of foreign policy and to the international political situation at the NATO summit in Madrid, Slovenia did not receive an invitation for membership. This rejection was not well accepted by the political elites in Slovenia. They cast guilt on the unpreparedness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The truth is, however, that the Slovenian foreign policy of that time was too isolationist and excluded from contributions to international security to be able to persuade NATO members of its readiness to contribute its forces to the Alliance.

The Slovenian Armed Forces understood the criticism. With its Action Plan for membership and the transition-type orientation into further reorganisation and modernisation, as well as with the support of the entire defence policy, it participated more and more often and with greater numbers in international operations (ALBA, UNFICYP, UNTSO, SFOR, KFOR), where it consistently built its image as a reliable and professional ally. At the same time, the concept of manning the army with professional soldiers was developed, which meant replacing the multitude of relatively poorly trained conscripts and reservists with an increasingly well-trained and deployable professional army. In 2004, upon accession to membership, the Slovenian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence already had many military and defence professionals who were highly educated and trained abroad, and a system of long-term and medium-term defence planning was established. Although it is true that there were still many doubters within the defence ministry and the society who expressed their scepticism about the provision of security within the framework of the Alliance and who cherished the notion in their criticism of the old times of conscription, the majority still believed in the advantages of allied collective defence.

Awareness of the urgent need for an increased contribution to international security was strengthened, especially after 11 September 2001, and mostly with participation in operations beyond Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which is becoming an essential part of NATO membership. The principles of solidarity and of fair

burden-sharing within the Alliance have been embraced to the greatest extent at the Ministry of Defence. The public has not yet fully comprehended these principles, and a part of the political elite still believes that NATO membership is possible on the basis of an independent decision on where we will, and above all where we will not, participate. This increases, especially in the case of dangerous operations and where the effects of peace operations are not visible at first glance, mistrust regarding NATO operations and the need for wider participation of domestic policy in the process of decision-making on the participation of forces in such operations. This is most evident when considering the issue of integration of Slovenia into the NATO NTM-I mission for training Iraqi security forces, as well as the issue of participation in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, both of which strengthen the requirement for an increasingly more important role of the National Assembly in the relevant discussions. In the light of changes taking place outside the Alliance, these facts taken together constitute a dynamic process of changing and searching for responses to the new NATO strategic concept. While preserving the consensus in political decision-making, this concept should find answers to the question of future enlargement, as well as to the question of improving the response effectiveness and new tasks and challenges faced by the military's capabilities, and by more and more exposed non-military civilian support capabilities.

SLOVENIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND INTEGRATION

Membership in NATO means that the member countries are ready to participate in various types of operations, both Article 5 and non-Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This readiness is confirmed by real contributions and not by the mere promises often given by countries in relation to United Nations operations. At the Bucharest Summit in 2007, the member countries made a commitment that half of their forces would be ready for deployment, and ten percent of those forces would have to be ready or engaged in operations under the NATO flag. Quite a number of members have not yet fulfilled these obligations, among others some old members, as well as some that have joined the Alliance during the last three enlargements. NATO transformation included more than just those countries that were among the last to join the Alliance, since all the countries had to adapt to these changes and abandon the notion of defence within the territory from the Cold War period.

For the members of the Alliance, the preparations for participation in joint activities are obviously not yet concluded. After membership accession, the internal adjustments within the military organisation have to be continued in order to reach a standard level of equipment and training for joint operations within NATO. Only when the multinational structures are integrated can they represent real capabilities for national and collective defence.

The process of integration has to be further developed, above all in the areas of allied political decision-making, coordination and defence planning. Slovenia's representatives operate successfully in NATO subsidiary bodies and committees, and both

political and military representatives (Head of the Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Defence Policy Director, Armaments Director, Chief of the General Staff and military representatives to NATO) successfully represent the views of Slovenian foreign and defence policies. Members of the defence system are integrated into the NATO command structure. A series of units have successfully completed the process of transformation within the NATO Response Forces. In non-Article 5 NATO-led operations, Slovenia contributes 0.6 percent of the total forces, which ranks it among the more credible members. However, Slovenia was less successful in the area of capabilities-building. The country also endeavours to cooperate in forming NATO policy regarding the Western Balkans, persistently and constantly stressing at all levels the necessity of integration of all the countries of the region into the Alliance.

In the area of air policing, Slovenia has relied on the allied capabilities, and the same is true for participation in joint forces for strategic transport. The Air Traffic Control Centre in Brnik and the Maritime Operational Centre in Ankaran are capabilities for Slovenian control of air and maritime traffic. The process of integration into or joining the NATO force structure is in the concluding stage and will strengthen the cooperation between various units of the Slovenian Armed Forces and units in the NATO corps, and thus enable collective training and education of military commands and units. With the standardisation procedures we want to fulfil the requirement for interoperability and comparability within the Alliance. Due to the contribution to the NATO investment programme, we are building a dual-use airfield in Cerklje ob Krki.

Since 2004, when Slovenia was accepted into the Alliance as a full member, NATO has gone through demanding processes of change. This has been a period of transformation, bringing a clearer picture of the necessary changes for the future. Slovenia has understood and accepted these challenges. We are aware that the greatest challenge for the Alliance is its transformation and proper comprehension of changes in the security environment, as well as reacting to these changes. In this way, issues are more and more coming to the forefront that are related to energy security and ecology, as well as asymmetric threats which usually no longer have real military forms. We are now entering an era of hybrid technology and hybrid warfare, and it is only a matter of time and availability of resources before we will be able, or forced, to take part in them. Therefore, with the organisation of key seminars in 2009, we are actively participating in the formation of the new NATO strategic concept. Slovenia is thus becoming an increasingly reliable and competent ally.

The financial and economic crisis we are now facing will have negative implications for the speed of development and modernisation of the Slovenian defence system. However, we should not stop or even freeze the development process for a number of years, for this would actually represent a regression. The political scepticism due to participation in certain non-Article 5 operations must enable joint reflection and the development of strategic premises regarding the future functioning of the Alliance.

Slovenia used its historic opportunity for the sake of its own security, and in order to show the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia the right path to Euro-Atlantic integrations. Now is the time to understand this opportunity as a starting point for active participation in the shaping of NATO's policy of operation and decision-making in crisis situations.

CONCLUSION

Five years of membership and sixty years of existence are two different dimensions of processes which take place in NATO for all the member countries, the processes of continuous mutual interoperability, coordination and combined operation. Members of the Alliance react to changes in the security environment, develop new concepts, consider the asymmetric character of modern threats, and acknowledge the order of priorities and the long-term need for energy and environmental security. Slovenia is successfully integrated into the processes of interoperability, deployability and sustainability in the conduct of operations, and we want all the political elites to be aware of the effectiveness of allied defence. Just as the Alliance developed from political integration into a group of countries which contributes to world peace and stability with its operations, led on behalf or under the mandate of the UN, Slovenian membership in the Alliance also has to be upgraded with successfully certified units which, by fulfilling the NATO standards, become comparable internationally (Light Battalion Battle Group, Battalion Manoeuvre Hospital ROLE-2 LM, CBRN Defence Battalion) and trained up to a level enabling us to have complete confidence in our armed forces.

It should not sound overly complacent to say that, according to many countries, we are a pleasant surprise in the majority of areas related to the process of integration into the Alliance. However, this assessment does not have eternal value, for we also have to do our best in the future to preserve the credibility of our contribution and follow the emerging changes. What is more, we must make every effort to become participants in the process of creating the changes and the future of the common security framework.

UREDNIŠKI UVOD

Uvodnik »V davnih časih so tisti, ki so bili znani kot dobri vojaki, zmagovali, dokler je bilo to še enostavno,« je stavek iz knjige Umetnost vojne enega najpomembnejših kitajskih taoističnih bojevnikov in filozofov Sun Cuja. Mojster Sun ima veliko razlagalcev, ker je univerzalnost njegovih sporočil v marsičem uporabna za današnje čase. Zato smo citirani stavek uporabili kot iztočnico za letošnjo tretjo številko Biltena Slovenske vojske. Zasnovali smo jo kot znanstveno-strokovni prispevek na obrambno-varnostnem področju, namenjen šestdesetletnici Nata, ki si je za to priložnost izbral slogan *Mlad pri šestdesetih* (Young at 60).

Osrednja značilnost obdobja, s katerim se soočamo, so intenzivne spremembe v varnostnem okolju in prilagajanje tem spremembam. Pri tem je definiranje vojaškega delovanja, pa tudi vojaških zmag, pogosto povsem drugačno od uveljavljenih pojmovanj in dosedanje prakse. Seveda pa v sedanjih okoliščinah ne moremo mimo gospodarske krize in recesije, ki postavljata vprašanja, ali je nujno vlagati v obrambno-varnostna podsistema ali pa ju je dovoljeno oslabiti ter poskrbeti najprej za preživetje drugih družbenih podsistemov. Zaradi tega se pojavljata vprašanja, ali tudi pri obrambno-varnostnem področju gre najprej za preživetje ali pa za pogum za spremembe. Ti vprašanja sta pravzaprav zgodovinska stalnica. Po koncu prve svetovne vojne in zlasti med veliko gospodarsko krizo so bili tisti, ki so vlagali v preživetje zunaj obrambno-varnostnega področja, vedno šibkejši. Tudi brezmejna oboroževalna tekma in pretirano vlaganje vanjo med hladno vojno sta spravila na kolena vrsto nacionalnih ekonomij in etatično plansko gospodarstvo. Odgovor na vprašanje, kako v sodobnih razmerah zagotavljati obrambo in varnost, nikakor ni enopomenski in preprost. Ali, kot bi zapisal mojster Sun Cu, v davnih časih je bilo preprosto zmagovati. Zato sta potrebni modrost in preudarnost pri strategijah, doktrinah, vizijah in prenovah, ne le vojsk, temveč tudi obrambno-varnostnih sistemov na nacionalni in nadnacionalni ravni. Ob tem smo nemalokrat postavljeni pred vprašanja, ali lahko majhne države k temu kaj prispevajo ali pa naj bodo zgolj opazovalci dogajanj in dejanj velikih. Zadevo bi lahko pojasnjevali tudi s slovenskim primerom mlade države, ki je dopolnila osemnajst let in je že pet let polnopravna

članica v Severnoatlantskem zavezništvu in Evropski uniji. Tak primer omogoča izmenjavo novih pogledov, drugačnih idej, nakazuje dodatne možnosti spreminjanja in prilagajanja ter ne nazadnje vnaša mladostni duh.

V uredniškem odboru smo poskušali odgovoriti na vprašanje, kaj lahko prispevamo k potrditvi slogana *Mlad pri šestdesetih*. Zato smo pri snovanju te številke želeli predvsem s premišljenim izborom vsebin in avtorjev, ki so povezani z delovanjem Republike Slovenije na obrambno-varnostnem področju, ter z različnih zornih kotov predstaviti nekatere poglede na Nato in EU ob peti obletnici našega članstva. Na drugi strani pa želimo s temami, kot sta uvajanje zmogljivosti omrežnega delovanja (angl. Network Enabling Capabilities) in različni vidiki integracije, ki spremljata pojav transformacije kot globalne paradigme in procesa spreminjanja obrambno-vojaških sistemov ter vloge vojske, prispevati svoje izkušnje k sodelovanju in oblikovanju skupnih politik znotraj Nata in EU.

Ker so prispevki v tej številki Biltena v angleškem jeziku, je prav, da dodamo še uredniško pojasnilo. Najprej je tu namera, da se tudi v mednarodnem okolju pojavimo s temami, ki kažejo slovenske izkušnje po petih letih integracije in članstva v Zavezništvu. Pri tem smo posebej veseli sodelovanja tujega avtorja. Tako se širi krog sodelujočih in odpirajo tudi možnosti objavljanja prispevkov v tujini. Pri oblikovanju tokratne številke je bilo to sodelovanje z londonskim IISS (angl. International Institute for Strategic Studies), od koder prihaja tudi priznani avtor Bastian Giegerich. Publikacija se tako simbolično spogleduje z novimi pristopi in izzivi v prihodnosti.

Bilten Slovenske vojske je leta 2009 vstopil v enajsto leto izhajanja. Na začetku aprila 2009 je izšla prva številka v enajstem letniku in v novi grafični podobi. Izdaja ima pomenljiv naslov *V službi miru*, njena vsebina pa je namenjena mednarodnim operacijam in misijam. Z izbranimi temami tretje številke smo v uredništvu poskušali nadaljevati uresničitev namena, da bi se s kakovostjo in več znanstvenimi prispevki publikacija uvrstila na višjo raven. Ali nam je uspelo doseči, da postanemo bolj prepoznavni v mednarodnem prostoru, boste sodili bralci oziroma domača in tuja strokovna javnost, ko boste prebirali v nadaljevanju uvodnika povzete prispevke avtorjev.

Pri tem nas veseli, da je uvodni prispevek napisala dr. **Ljubica Jelušič**, ministrica za obrambo, ki nam predstavlja nekatere aktualne vidike petletnega obdobja slovenske integracije v zavezniško strukturo.

Dr. **Milan Jazbec** v članku z naslovom *Nato ob šestdesetletnici: od hladne vojne do medkulturnega dialoga* predstavlja Natovo delovanje in razvoj, ki ju po njegovem mnenju zaznamujeta dva komplementarna vidika, širitev Zavezništva in njegova transformacija. Kot pravi, ob 60. obletnici lahko trdimo, da so članice Nata še vedno zainteresirane za ohranitev članstva v njem in da obstaja velika pripravljenost za sodelovanje med članicami in nečlanicami oziroma tistimi državami, ki bi članice Zavezništva želele postati.

Primož Šavc v članku z naslovom *Slovenske izkušnje pri obrambnem planiranju in članstvo v Natu* osvetli ne samo zadnjih pet let članstva v Zavezništvu, temveč povzema ključne spremembe, ki jih je sam doživel in so danes sestavni del osemnajstletne zgodovine samostojne Slovenije. Njegove izkušnje so povezane z njegovo udeležbo v postopku pridruževanja Slovenije zvezi Nato ter z obrambnim planiranjem v Sloveniji in Zavezništvu. Avtorjeva razmišljanja so zelo kritična, zato lahko dileme in ugotovitve, povezane s teoretičnimi izhodišči in praktičnimi izkušnjami, prispevajo k razumevanju stvarnosti obrambnega planiranja v prihodnje. Ali tudi bodo, pa je še odprto vprašanje.

Brigadir **David Humar**, polkovnik **Ivan Mikuž**, podpolkovnika **Samo Zanoškar** in **Dejan Groff** ter major **Leon Holc** v članku *Vključevanje Slovenske vojske v Nato in vojaško strukturo Evropske unije* vodijo bralca po prehojeni poti Slovenske vojske skozi obdobje priprav na članstvo v Natu in vojaških strukturah EU ter njene aktivnosti po vstopu v obe integraciji, predstavljajo ključne elemente prispevka Slovenske vojske v mednarodnih varnostnih strukturah in delijo z bralcem svoje poglede na prihodnost.

Dr. **Damir Črnec** nas v članku *Izmenjevanje obveščevalno-varnostnih izkušenj z Evropsko unijo in Natom* seznanja z delovanjem obveščevalno-varnostnih struktur v zvezi Nato in Evropski uniji ter sodelovanjem obveščevalno-varnostnih organizacij držav članic s temi strukturami, vključujoč slovenski prispevek. Predstavi in poudarja pomen sodelovanja, ki se je v zadnjih letih zelo povečalo in je eden ključnih stebrov pri zagotavljanju nacionalne in mednarodne varnosti.

Dr. **Anton Bebler** je pripravil članek z naslovom *Pot Slovenije v Nato*, v katerem predstavlja obsežen seznam različnih dejavnikov, ki so nanjo vplivali. Eden izmed njih je nedvomno slovensko javno mnenje, ki se je na referendumu pokazalo s podporo članstvu v Natu. Na podlagi javnomnenjskih raziskav ugotavlja, da je slovenska javnost kritična do aktivnosti Zavezništva v Iraku in Afganistanu. Pri tem se sprašuje, kako to vpliva tudi na zaupanje, ki ga ima slovenska javnost v Natu.

Generalmajor mag. **Alojz Šteiner** se je v članku z naslovom *Čas je za transformacijo* posvetil vprašanju transformacije s teoretičnih vidikov, njenega bistva in izzivov. Pri tem trdi, da transformacijska paradigma in transformacijski proces predstavljata aktualen okvir za obrambno-vojaško področje, a se hkrati sprašuje, kako ju v obdobju gospodarske recesije uresničiti v majhnih državah, kot je Slovenija.

Dr. **Uroš Svete** in podpolkovnik **Zoran Jankovič** v članku *Izkušnje Republike Slovenije pri uvajanju zmogljivosti omrežnega delovanja* opozarjata na pomen uvajanja omrežnih zmogljivosti. Pri tem izpostavljata, da je ne glede na velikost sistema, ki se transformira v omrežno delovanje, treba k omrežnemu delovanju pristopati celostno in upoštevati tehnološko, doktrinarno ter človeško komponento, sicer ni mogoče doseči uspeha in uresničiti bistva te zmogljivosti.

Mag. **Anton Travner** nas v članku z naslovom *Schengen, evolucija, širitev ter vstop Slovenije v skupno schengensko območje* informira o značilnostih schengenskega območja, njegovi zgodovini, razvoju in aktivnostih Republike Slovenije za njegovo uveljavitev. Avtor je pri njegovem uvajanju aktivno sodeloval in nas tako seznanja s prednostmi in slabostmi rešitev ter nekaterimi smernicami za njegovo prihodnost.

Dr. **Bastian Giegerich** v članku z naslovom *Vključevanje evropskih držav v Nato: vojaški in politični kazalniki* seznanja bralca s kazalniki držav članic Zavezništva, kot so gibanje obrambnega proračuna, aktivnosti in udeležba posameznih držav v mednarodnih operacijah na kriznih območjih, z obrambnimi reformami ter vplivom javnega mnenja. Kazalniki na vseh štirih področjih pomembno medsebojno vplivajo in se v vsaki državi članici izražajo drugače, kar vpliva tudi na Zavezništvo.

Dr. **Anton Grizold** in **Rok Zupančič** v članku z naslovom *Pet let v Zavezništvu in 60 let Zavezništva: Slovenija in Nato* razpravljata o obletnici Zavezništva in posebej o njegovi vlogi v Afganistanu. Zanima ju, ali se je Zavezništvo na primeru Afganistana pokazalo kot uspešno, ali dosega zastavljene cilje in ali je še organizirano tako, da lahko kljubuje sodobnim varnostnim izzivom. Avtorja sta se še posebej posvetila vlogi Slovenije kot članice Zavezništva in EU v Afganistanu, ki je po oceni avtorjev zelo pomembna.

Nato po šestdesetih letih delovanja išče nove poti in zagon, kar se kaže tudi v nameri po oblikovanju novega strateškega koncepta (angl. Nato Strategic Concept-NSC). Iz objavljenih prispevkov izhaja, da je tudi Republika Slovenija uspešno zaključila prvih pet let integracije v Zavezništvo. Pri tem je skladno s postavljenimi cilji uvedla številne spremembe na obrambno-varnostnem področju, številne pa jo še čakajo, med njimi takšne, ki predstavljajo izziv za vse članice Nata. Tudi avtorja tega uvodnika sva imela priložnost spremljati te spremembe in biti njihov del. Zato s pričakovanjem zreva v prihodnost.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Editorial »Anciently those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered« is a sentence from *The Art of War*, written by one of the most important Chinese Taoist warriors and philosophers, Sun Tzu. Master Sun has many interpreters, as the universality of his messages is, in many ways, still applicable nowadays. For this reason we have used this sentence to stand at the beginning of this year's third issue of the *Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*. The issue has been designed as a scientific and professional contribution in the field of defence and security, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of NATO which, for this occasion, has chosen the slogan 'Young at 60'.

The main characteristics of the current period are intensive changes in the security environment and adjustment to these changes. The definition of military operations and military victories is at this time often completely different from the established concepts and earlier practices. In the face of the current circumstances, we of course cannot ignore the economic crisis and recession, which pose the question of whether it is necessary to invest in defence and security subsystems, or whether it is permissible to weaken them and first take care of other social subsystems. We are thus faced with the question of whether the field of defence and security needs to deal with the issue of survival first or whether it is a matter of gathering courage for change. These questions are, in fact, constant historical features. After the end of World War I and particularly during the Great Depression, those who invested in survival outside the field of defence and security were always weaker. The endless arms race and excessive investments in it during the Cold War forced a range of national economies and nationalised planned economies to their knees. The answer to the question of how to provide defence and security in the current situation is multifaceted and complex – as Master Sun Tzu would have put it, it was easy to prevail in ancient times. That is why wisdom and prudence are essential in strategies, doctrines, visions and the modernisation of armies, as well as of defence and security systems at national and transnational levels. We are often faced with the question of whether small countries should contribute in this matter or act merely as observers of

developments and actions of large countries. We could use Slovenia as an example of a young country which has reached the age of 18 and has been a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union for five years. Such an example enables the exchange of new outlooks and different ideas, indicates additional possibilities for changes and adjustments, and ultimately brings more of a youthful spirit.

The editorial board has tried to answer the question of what we can contribute to confirm the truth of the slogan 'Young at 60'. In planning this issue, we have carefully selected contents and authors connected to Slovenian operations in the field of defence and security in order to present several different views of NATO and the EU on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Slovenia's membership in both organisations. With topics such as the introduction of Network Enabling Capabilities and various aspects of integration, which accompany transformation as a global paradigm, and the process of changing defence and military systems and the role of the military, we wish to contribute Slovenia's experience in cooperation and the establishment of common policies within NATO and the EU.

Since the articles in this issue of the *Bulletin* are in the English language, it is appropriate to add an editorial explanation. First, there is the intention of presenting the international environment with topics which show Slovenia's experience after five years of integration and membership in the Alliance. In this respect we are particularly pleased with the cooperation of the foreign author. The circle of participants is thus expanding and the possibilities for publishing articles abroad are presenting themselves. In designing the current issue we have participated with the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) in London, where the renowned author Bastian Giegerich is based. The publication is thus symbolically considering new approaches and future challenges.

In 2009, the *Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces* entered its 11th year of publication. At the beginning of April 2009, the first issue of the 11th year was published with a new graphic design. This issue carried the meaningful title of *In the Service of Peace*, its contents dedicated to international operations and missions. By carefully selecting topics for the third issue, the editorial board has tried to realise the intention of placing the publication at a higher level through increased quality and a larger number of scientific articles. The readers, including national and foreign expert public, reading through the summaries of the articles in the second part of this editorial, will judge whether or not we have managed to achieve the intention of becoming more recognisable in the international environment.

We are pleased that **Dr Ljubica Jelušič**, Minister of Defence, has contributed the introductory article. She presents several topical aspects of the five-year period of Slovenian integration in the Alliance structure.

Milan Jazbec, PhD, in 'NATO at Sixty: From the Cold War to Intercultural Dialogue', presents NATO's operations and development, which in his opinion

are marked by two complementary aspects: the enlargement and transformation of the Alliance. As he states, at the time of NATO's 60th anniversary, we can say that NATO members are still interested in retaining their membership and there is great readiness for cooperation between members and non-members (or those countries that wish to become members).

Primož Šavc, in 'The Slovenian Experience of Defence Planning and NATO Membership', throws light on the last five years of Slovenia's membership in the Alliance and summarises the key changes which he himself has seen and are today an integral part of the independent Slovenia's 18-year history. His experience is linked to his participation in the process of Slovenia's accession to NATO and to defence planning in Slovenia and the Alliance. The author takes a very critical approach and the dilemmas and conclusions he presents, linked to theoretical bases and practical experience, may contribute to an understanding of the reality of defence planning in the future. Whether or not this will be the case remains to be seen.

Brigadier **David Humar**, Colonel **Ivan Mikuž**, Lieutenant Colonels **Samo Zanoškar** and **Dejan Groff**, and Major **Leon Holc**, in their article entitled 'Integration of the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO and the Military Structure of the European Union', lead the reader on the path the Slovenian Armed Forces have taken so far, i.e. through the period of preparation for membership in NATO and the EU military structures as well as the Armed Forces' activities after Slovenia's accession to both integrations. The authors present the key elements of the Slovenian Armed Forces' contribution to international security structures and share with the reader their views of the future.

Damir Črnčec, PhD, in 'Exchange of Experiences in Intelligence and Security with the European Union and NATO', acquaints the reader with the operation of defence and security structures in NATO and the European Union and with the cooperation of intelligence and security organisations of member states with these structures, including Slovenia's contribution. He presents and emphasises the importance of cooperation which has been greatly enhanced in recent years and is one of the key pillars in the provision of national and international security.

Anton Bebler, PhD, has prepared an article entitled 'Slovenia's Road to NATO' in which he presents a comprehensive list of various factors which contributed to Slovenia's accession to NATO. One of the factors was undoubtedly Slovenian public opinion which, in a referendum, showed strong support for NATO membership. On the basis of public opinion polls, Bebler, PhD, ascertains that the Slovenian public is critical of the activities of the Alliance in Iraq and Afghanistan and wonders how this affects the confidence the Slovenian public has in NATO.

Major General **Alojz Šteiner**, in 'It is Time for Transformation', addresses the question of transformation, its essence and challenges, from the theoretical point of view. He claims that the transformation paradigm and transformation process

present a topical framework for the field of defence and military and at the same time wonders how to realise the two in a small country like Slovenia during the time of economic recession.

Uroš Svete, PhD, and Lieutenant Colonel **Zoran Jankovič**, in their article entitled 'Experience of the Republic of Slovenia in the Introduction of Network Operation Capabilities', draw attention to the importance of introducing network capabilities. They emphasise that, regardless of the size of the system which is being transformed into a network operation, such an operation requires an integrated approach and consideration of technological, doctrinal and human components, otherwise success cannot be achieved and the essence of this capability cannot be realised.

Anton Travner, in 'Schengen, Evolution, Enlargement and Slovenia's Entry into the Common Schengen Area', provides the reader with information on the characteristics, history and development of the Schengen area and the activities of Slovenia in relation to its establishment. The author actively participated in the establishment of the area and acquaints the reader with advantages and disadvantages of the solutions as well as with several guidelines for the future of the Schengen area.

Bastian Giegerich, PhD, in 'NATO Integration of European Countries: Military and Political Indicators', acquaints the reader with indicators of the member states of the Alliance, such as movements in the defence budget, the activities and participation of individual countries in international operations in crisis areas, defence reforms and the influence of public opinion. Indicators in all four areas strongly interact and are manifested differently in each member state, which in turn also affects the Alliance.

Anton Grizold, PhD, and **Rok Zupančič**, in 'Five Years in the Alliance and 60 Years of the Alliance: Slovenia and NATO', discuss the anniversary of the Alliance and particularly its role in Afghanistan. They are interested in whether the Alliance has proved successful in the case of Afghanistan, whether it is achieving the set objectives and whether it is still organised in a way that enables it to face modern security challenges. The authors have paid special attention to the role of Slovenia as a member of the Alliance and the EU in Afghanistan, which, according to the authors, is very important.

After sixty years of operation, NATO is searching for new methods and a fresh impetus, which is also evident in its intention to form a new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). The published articles point to the fact that Slovenia has successfully completed the first five years of its integration in the Alliance. In accordance with its set objectives, Slovenia has introduced many changes in the field of defence and security, while many still await it, including those that present a challenge to all NATO members. The authors of this editorial have also had the opportunity to follow these changes and be part of them. They are therefore looking into the future with expectation.

NATO OB ŠESTDESETLETNICI: OD HLADNE VOJNE DO MEDKULTURNEGA DIALOGA

NATO AT SIXTY: FROM THE COLD WAR TO INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Review paper

Povzetek Namen tega članka je raziskati medsebojno dinamiko okoliščin, ki so vplivale na ustanovitev in razvoj Nata ter potek njegovega razvoja. Podrobneje so predstavljene različne faze in preobrati, značilni za ves proces, kot tudi posamezni vidiki, po katerih ta proces izstopa. Osrednja pozornost je namenjena zavedanju, da je ključno vlogo pri tem imelo mednarodno varnostno okolje, kot tudi, da se je Natu uspelo odzvati na spremembe in se z njimi spoprijeti. Ne samo, da je v obdobju hladne vojne ubranil Zahodno Evropo, temveč je tudi po njem zagotovil varno okolje za evropske integracijske procese. V šestih desetletjih je Nato uspešno uresničeval svoje poslanstvo, hkrati pa preživel tudi burno obdobje sprememb. Vse te napore opredeljujeta dva dopolnjujoča se vidika, in sicer širitev Zavezništva in njegovo preoblikovanje. Za dosednji razvoj Nata sta značilni dve obdobji visoke in eno obdobje zelo nizke dinamike širitve. Zaradi izjemno zapletenega in negotovega varnostnega okolja ni pričakovati še ene faze nizke širitvene dinamike, temveč kvečjemu nasprotno. Večje izzive, zlasti v procesu odločanja, predstavlja delovanje v oddaljenih delih sveta in Afganistanu. Na prihodnji položaj Nata bi lahko odločilno vplivali odnosi z Rusijo in tako preizkusili njegovo sposobnost za vključitev drugih akterjev na področju upravljanja varnosti, ne samo znotraj zavezništva, temveč tudi širše.

Nadaljnji interes za članstvo je jasen, hkrati pa vlada precejšnje in nenehno zanimanje za sodelovanje. To dejstvo lahko pripišemo tudi obsegu aktivnosti pod okriljem Zavezništva, ki vključujejo operacije po 5. členu (kolektivna obramba) in zunaj 5. člena (krizno upravljanje) ter najrazličnejša druga področja (kot na primer človekoljubno pomoč, razoroževanje, politično-vojaške zadeve, znanost, zdravstvena vprašanja, okolje itn.).

Ključne besede *Nato, širitev, preoblikovanje, članstvo, kandidatke, Slovenija.*

Abstract This paper aims to explore the mutual dynamics between conditions, which influenced the establishment and development of NATO, and the way its evolution has been carried out. It exercises a closer look at different phases and turning points, which characterize the whole process, as well as at selected aspects for which this process stands out. We focus on the understanding that international security environment played a crucial role in this process as well as that NATO was capable of reacting to changes and to cope with them. It achieved not only to defend Western Europe during the Cold War era, but also offered secure environment for the Post-Cold War European integration process to be exercised. The organization was able to carry out its mission, but also to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. Two complementary aspects define this endeavour, namely the enlargement of the Alliance and its transformation.

Two periods of high enlargement dynamics and one of a very low, characterize the development of NATO so far. Due to highly complex and uncertain security environment, we do not expect another phase of low enlargement dynamics, but rather on the contrary. Among major challenges, primarily to the decision-making process, further outreach and Afghanistan stand out. Relations with Russia would decisively define future positioning of NATO and put to test its capability to include other actors in the security management not only within, but also globally.

Further interest for the membership is obvious as well as interest for cooperation remains high and stable. This is also due to the scope of activities, pursued by the Alliance, which includes Article 5 (collective defence) and non-Article 5 (crisis management) operations and also a wide range of other areas (like humanitarian assistance, disarmament, politico-military issues, science, medical issues, environment etc.).

Key words *NATO, enlargement, transformation, membership, aspirants, Slovenia.*

Introduction Rarely has a single year been as rich in symbolism as this of the NATO's current anniversary.¹ This, however, does not directly influence NATO's jubilee, although one could say that it at least indirectly broadens the context of its understanding and deepens the demanding side of its contemplation. Still it additionally stimulates and encourages the need to analyse and generalize the Alliance's development and its current as well as future positioning.

This paper aims to explore the mutual dynamics between conditions, which influenced the establishment and development of NATO, and the way its evolution has been carried out. We will have a closer look at different phases and turning points, which to our mind characterize the whole process, as well as at selected aspects, for

¹ In 2009 we also remember 20 years of the end of the Cold War, 50 years of establishing the EFTA, 60 years of the founding of the Council of Europe, 90 years of the Versailles Peace Conference, 220 years of the French Revolution etc.

which this process stands out. In addition to the methods of analysis, generalization and comparison the author also tries to make use of the method of observing through one's own participation (Gilli, 1974)². The first part of this contribution focuses primarily on historical aspects and serves as a point of departure for subsequent elaboration.

Among several reasons for contemplating the case of NATO, the following shall be specifically pointed out: how the organization was able to carry out its mission as well as why and how it managed, at the same time, to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. If we accept the understanding that the end of the Cold War also means the end of stability and certainty, according to the then international circumstances, we have to also understand the current and future uncertainties to be able to cope with them and face them. For NATO – but also for other actors – this would be of crucial importance.

1 THE APPEARANCE AND ITS CIRCUMSTANCES

The complexity, which arose after the end of World War II, called for international structures which would be able to carry out the universal mission of the newly established UN on a broader regional level and on areas such as security. Additionally to this, it was also the need and aspiration of the Western world to provide its own security against the threat from the East, if we sum up the ideological aspect of the dividing line, which cut Europe in two parts.³ Three decades after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the former WWII ally was, due to ideology which was demonstrated through a totalitarian form of a political system and the way of governance, on the other side geographically, politically and ideologically. The defeat of the Axis, which helped to unite otherwise structurally different WW II Allies, was accomplished and the way to new and divergent confrontation was open.

In the blossoming era of typical nation states the territorial unity and its defence were among top priorities and there was nothing to speak against it also after WW II. The need for achieving stability and security as well as to defend the Western Europe and North America, complementary to its economic development, brought to life the idea of a common defence organization. The North Atlantic area, defined by the territory and nation states between the western coast of North America and the Iron Curtain in Europe, carved out this security umbrella in the Treaty Organization, which was established on April 4 in 1949 in Washington.

² *The author was State Secretary at the Slovenian Ministry of Defence from December 2000 to November 2004. Being a career diplomat, he has been dealing with NATO already for a decade and a half also as a practitioner. Hence, in his paper he tries to contemplate and generalize his and other experiences, gained through numerous discussions with colleagues during the past years.*

³ *Yugoslavia, which formally departed from the Eastern Bloc in 1948, remained a socialist country, outside formal structures, and went its own way. This was demonstrated since mid 1950s in the nonalignment movement, where the country was, along with Egypt and India, its founding member.*

The Treaty laid down basic values, principles and procedural aspects of the organization. Stemming from the UN Charter, the text put forward the three following values, for which NATO stands: “territorial integrity, political independence and security of any of the Parties” (Article 3). Furthermore, as the corner stone principle, Parties agreed “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Article 5). Such an event shall exercise in their “right of individual or collective self-defence” (ibid.), initiating the assistance to the Party (or Parties) in question. Following to this, an armed attack is deemed to include the territory of any of the Parties as well as the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of them (Article 6). The enlargement process was codified in Article 10 defining that “The Parties may by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. Also the possibility to quit the membership was included in the text, stipulating that “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after” (Article 13) the US Government receives the notice of denunciation of the Party concerned.⁴

Broadly speaking, we can detect at least two outstanding phases of the Alliance’s development during the past six decades: the Cold War period (also the Article 5 era) and the current, post Cold War period (the non-Article 5 or out of area). Additionally, we could also mention the next, future phase of the Alliance (the post Article 5 or perhaps even the “advanced outreach era”).⁵ (Comp. Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009, p. 67)

2 ENLARGEMENT AS A DRIVING FORCE

Much of the post WW II period was characterized by resistance against the enemy from the East. This was necessarily demonstrated in the concentration of the ever-increasing number of conventional forces in Europe, along the dividing line. But this, at the same time, also forwarded all of the internal structural dynamics of NATO towards the preparation for countering possible attack and for developing capabilities for a potential counter attack. One could say that the organization was partially cemented inwards and not much of structural interest was executed outwards. In other words, during the Cold War the enlargement process was, however obvious, still de facto limited to a few remaining countries within the Western Europe. When, from this point of view, the membership quota was fulfilled this dynamics practically vanished.⁶

⁴ This has not been the case so far, contrary to continuously expressed aspirations for membership.

⁵ It would undoubtedly be interesting to note that the Article 5 was never activated during the first period, while its activation took place during the second one (non-Article 5), although not executed in practice (after the 9/11 events).

⁶ Twenty-seven years went by between the second and the third enlargements and seventeen between the next two, while only five between each of the post Cold War ones.

To understand the broader importance of enlargement as a process, one has to bear in mind that “throughout its long history, NATO has rightly considered that the key driver for any successive enlargement should remain the political interest (...).” (Ibid.); understandably, since the Alliance was founded to contain a possible Soviet aggression as well as to provide conditions for the post WW II development of the Western Europe. Nevertheless, military imperatives that heavily influenced the enlargement process, depended on the assessment of the strategic landscape and were basically two: first, geography (access to some key sea areas, the possibility to project power from there, the requirement to keep a geographically coherent air space), and second, what amount of manpower contribution new members would bring as well as whether defence of the territory would imply the deployment from elsewhere or not; it has been broadly accepted, that the Alliance has fulfilled this mission during the Cold War period. (Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009, pp. 68-69)

The first three enlargements – interestingly, there have been six of them so far, half in each of the two phases – went very well along these criteria: “The first round of enlargement resulted in a significant improvement of the strategic posture of NATO in the South, with a land front easy to defend in depth, thanks to Yugoslav help.⁷ (...) It is fair to say, in sum, that this enlargement (with West Germany – M.J.) was the most convenient, from the military standpoint, for the Alliance. (...) /T/ toward the end of this historical period, NATO strategic posture was much better off than at its inception.” (Ibid.) Perhaps this has also resulted in the use of the same criteria (geography and strategic importance) for the post Cold War enlargements. One of the most important arguments of Slovenian authorities for the membership was to achieve the coherence of the Alliance’s territory: Slovenia’s acceptance would close the territory between Italy and Hungary as well as incorporate the historically strategic important Ljubljana Gap. Slovenia aside (as part of former Yugoslavia it was never a member of the Warsaw Pact),⁸ the immediate post Cold War aspirants strived for the membership “in order to get its protection against a possible resurgence of Russian expansionism.” (Ibid.) Although NATO managed to geographically embrace practically the whole Europe also through the three post Cold War enlargements, these arguments (geography and Russia) do not anymore respond to the current security environment and the nature of its threats. One could even speculate, too, had it been for geography and Russia, it would have been very difficult to prove the existence of the Alliance at all.

As far as the enlargement dynamics is concerned, things radically changed in the beginning of the 1990s. The majority of newly established countries (or those, regaining their independency) explicitly expressed their ambition to join NATO (Jazbec, 2001, pp. 11-19). It could be rather easy to argue that this fact actually did

⁷ *The same author also adds the following conclusion: “In fact, as some recently released documents have shown, since 1951 there has been a secret bi-lateral pact between Yugoslavia and the United States, already developed at the military staff level, whereby the government of Yugoslavia committed itself, in case of aggression from the East, to fight on NATO side.” (Ibid.) Compare also Bebler (2009).*

⁸ *One can assume that this is also the reason why Slovenia never used the so-called Russian factor as an argument for NATO membership.*

not surprise politicians and bureaucrats at the Alliance's Headquarters, but what is much more important is that it offered a primary opportunity to the organization to not only rethink its *raison d'être*, but to grab a rare historical opportunity. A huge group of aspirant countries⁹ encouraged (and perhaps also forced) policy planners to start the process of the post Cold War enlargement. This came out later on also as the complementary process of transformation of the Alliance.

Three rounds of the post Cold War enlargement during the last decade and a half almost doubled the number of members (from 16 in 1982 to 28 in 2009) and exercised additional structural pressure on the efficiency of the decision making process.¹⁰ At the same time the changed security environment forced the Alliance to transform and reorganize itself, both its administrative and military structures. The need for higher efficiency, faster and smoother response as well as a different type of field outreach resulted in an almost unprecedented internal dynamics, never seen before. As a matter of fact, the structural dynamics impregnated the Alliance and practically paved the way forward.

We present the discussed enlargement process and its dynamics (members and year of accession) in Table No 1.

Table No 1:

Membership Dynamics

1949	1952 (3)	1955 (3)	1982 (27)	1999 (17)	2004 (5)	2009 (5)
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States	Greece Turkey	Federal Republic of Germany	Spain	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	Albania Croatia
12	2	1	1	3	7	2
12	14	15	16	19	26	28

⁹ NATO at that time consisted of 16 members, while in the early 1990s 10 – 15 countries expressed the ambition to join the Alliance.

¹⁰ Some argue that the first post cold war enlargement took place in the autumn of 1990 with the membership of the East Germany (comp. Bebler, 2009). We, however, share the opinion, that this could not be counted as an enlargement, since East Germany de facto joined NATO after and as a result of German reunification, and not after going through the membership procedure as such.

If we have a look at the time frame of enlargement, three periods were to emerge out of it, namely: two times so far the Alliance has grown extensively in a rather short time, while there was a long period of almost standstill dynamics in-between. During the first six years (the establishment plus two enlargements) the Alliance expanded to 15 members and during the last decade it expanded by 12 members (through three rounds). In the meantime, from 1955 to 1999, during 44 years the Alliance grew by only one single member (Spain in 1982). The period of extremely low enlargement dynamics dominates more than two thirds of the Alliance's history. Furthermore, as far as the criteria, procedures and the duration of the admission process in each enlargement are concerned, one could also notice, that during the first period the admission process was short, while during the second period an obvious expansion of this process is evident. (Comp. Bebler, 2009)

The general nature of this dynamics is presented in Table No 2.

Table No 2:

Time Span of
Membership
Dynamics

No of Years	0	3	3	27	17	5	5
No of Members	12	2	1	1	3	7	2

This would bring us again to the already expressed finding, namely, that during the Cold War period the Alliance expanded to the region of Western Europe, for the defence principle. When this was practically fulfilled, the process came to a standstill, i.e. its dynamics remained in the back stage. The Alliance focused its activities on the structural upgrading of numerous projects and processes, which helped enhance and strengthen primarily its defence capabilities in numerous areas. The end of the global bipolarisation as well as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought the issue of enlargement again on the agenda almost over night.

This resulted in three consequent processes. First, the need for stability and security of broader Europe gained on its importance, since the end of the Cold War resulted also in new destabilization of the wider eastern part of the continent. Second, a deep and extremely demanding process of the restructuring of defence systems in Europe took place. In its eastern part, former socialist armies and defence system were practically dismantled and built from scratch, while in its western part transformation started from territorially oriented to reaction oriented (for more on this Jazbec, 2002, pp. 38-42 and Kotnik, 2002). Main aspects of this process have been the rightsizing of the armed forces (size and structure), defence capabilities and defence resources (human and financial) as well as the question of capabilities as a whole (deployability in particular). Third, since the countries emerging or regaining their statehood after the change in 1989, were rather weak militarily, the enlargement notion gained much on political importance. This whole picture was primarily a complex and an

evolving reflection of changes in the security environment. The enlargement process up to 1990s rested on its static, what resulted in its defence orientation. The enlargement afterwards, though, stemmed from its dynamics. Therefore we could distinct two major enlargement patterns in the history of the Alliance (more on this in Bebler, 2009): the first one primarily driven-driven and the second one driven by defence and political ambition.

Having in mind a group of aspirant countries, mainly from the Western Balkans (comp. Jazbec, 2007 as well as Watkins and Gligorijević, 2009)¹¹ and Eastern European neighbourhood, including the Caucasus, the question arises, what could be the next pattern. Generally speaking, it would primarily depend on the future development of NATO and fulfilment of the membership criteria by a given country. Additionally, one can expect that enlargements after 2010 will take place in a quite complex and uncertain environment (Friedman, 2009), as well as having in mind a more obvious global role of NATO (although for the time being not clearly defined, what this could encompass). Still, we do not tend to see the next phase of a decrease in the enlargement dynamics.

Furthermore, the profundity of the swift change in the international community after the collapse of the Berlin Wall shows that NATO as a structure, built more than half a century ago in a totally different environment, offered crucial assistance in the integration of new states which emerged or regained statehood during this period: “NATO provided the stability that helped Europe to integrate. For ex-communist states, NATO has been a stepping stone into the EU.” (Have combat, 2009). This unique complementarity, when NATO enlargements preceded those of the EU, has “significantly reduced the likelihood of a conventional large-scale war in Europe – a historic achievement.” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007, p. 8) The way this integration was managed helped to start the process of transformation of these structures, but also showed the way forward in their adaptation to new circumstances. For NATO this has reflected in its process of transformation, which is, complementary and parallel to the enlargement, the key driving force of its contemporary conceptualisation.

3 THE TERRITORY AND BEYOND

During the period of the first 40 years of the Alliance it was rather easy to formulate and exercise its territorial determination. Nothing stood against it and it seemed a highly appropriate solution to the then stable and generally pretty much secure international circumstances. Also at the beginning of the 1990s things did not look much different from this point of view. This impression was additionally bolded by the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, attended by foreign

¹¹ *The first next member shall be the Republic of Macedonia, which completed its accession process, together with Albania and Croatia. However, it hasn't been included in the membership because of the name dispute and the blockade from Greece, introduced at the Bucharest Summit in spring of 2008. According to the promise from this summit the candidate country will be accepted upon decision of NAC, once the dispute is solved. For more, see Kosanic, 2009.*

ministers and representatives of 16 NATO member countries as well as 9 Central and Eastern European countries in late December 1991.¹² Their ambition was to enter the Alliance, what fit in the proven defence sample.

As the former Soviet Union dissolved and war in Yugoslavia was progressing, it became obvious that the rebirth of nationalism and the increased appearance of intrastate conflicts are changing the reality and perception of security. Its management via defence tools, i.e. within the territorial membership frame, was put to test when it appeared that not the members but the neighbourhood was seriously in jeopardy. Since this could also indirectly threaten the Alliance, it affected the way it operated so far in pursuing its mission. The breach of basic values, which NATO stands for (democracy, human rights, the rule of law etc.), in particular during the war in Bosnia, brought the Alliance to its first operation outside its territory. This showed to be the most important change in the history of the organization and of its mission. It has above all proved to be a complementary one to the core mission. When a few years later the activity of the same kind was repeated in Kosovo, the experience resulted in expanding the collective defence of the Alliance with out-of-area operations.¹³ At the same time a change to the so-called expeditionary modus originated. It was obvious in both of the mentioned cases that the EU was not in the position to put forward a solution. We could put this in other words: it was obvious in both cases that the EU has not developed tools, which would enable it to efficiently exercise its ambition of a security and defence player.¹⁴

One could say that two aspects came out of this newborn experience. Firstly, it became obvious that NATO, due to drastically changed security environment and in of absence of similar so efficient actors, has to move beyond the pure territorial / collective defence principle, which characterized its first four decades. And secondly, it pointed to a possibility that membership as such could cease to be the only and primary criteria for offering defence. Both of this aspects go well along the current notion in international affairs that territory is important, but it's values what stand out in any case. It perhaps also shows that membership is only one – though formally most important – structural part of the integration process. However, integration ambition should have also other ways of being demonstrated, which should reach beyond membership. Speaking in terms of globalisation, membership should preferably stick to a closer regional frame, while global outreach should try to rest on loose but flexible tools of synergic cooperation.

From this point of view, one could see three possible explanations for the Alliance's future development: "(1) NATO institutionally wants to continue leading crisis management operations, and as the EU is assuming more responsibility for operations

¹² *Representatives of Slovenia, Croatia and other states, which emerged out of former Yugoslavia, did not attend, since none of these countries was recognized at that time and except for Slovenia, war was spreading around the area of the former socialist state.*

¹³ *It is also important to bear in mind that with its first two out-of-area operations the Alliance stood in defense of Muslim populations in two countries.*

¹⁴ *Both experiences also push the EU forward in creating such tools.*

in Europe, the Alliance is focusing where there is more need; (2) the unexpectedly heavy requirements of the Afghanistan operation mean that NATO needs more commitments; and (3) a desire by some members to give NATO a global political role.” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007:27) Hence, the Alliance moved from purely collective defence (defending territory) to complement this with defending values (out-of-area operations) and further on – or more precisely expressed – to securing individuals as holders of these values.

4 CHALLENGES AND THEIR FRAME

One would hardly say that NATO faces other challenges than the rest of the major international players. Generally speaking, this would then mean that we should take into account a set of security threats or challenges, which have dominated global environment recently, having in mind the fact that the current composition of security is rather complex and complicated, while its perception includes various areas of human existence and activities. We try to present them comparatively and structurally in Table No 3 (comp. Jazbec, 2008).¹⁵

Table No 3:

Structural
Comparison
of Current
Security
Threats

Seven Dimensions	Six Clusters	Seven Aspects
Economic	Economic and social threats (incl. poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation)	Uncertainty
Food	Inter-State conflict	Unpredictability
Health	Internal conflict (incl. civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities)	Combined
Environment	Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons	Universal
Personal	Terrorism	Complex
Community	Transnational organized crime	Dispersed
Political		Interdependent

We could say that during the Cold War main threats derived from the possibility of military destruction (inter state wars), whilst the current security threats derive primarily from internal (intra state) conflicts as well as from the global environmental context. They endanger above all economic and social aspects of contemporary societies (poverty, diseases, health etc.). They target primarily individuals, and in particular children, women, elderly and disabled. Additionally to this, weak democratic institutions offer a fertile ground for corruption, organized crime and

¹⁵ For seven dimensions compare Axworthy, 2001:4, for six clusters compare *A more secure world*, 2004, and for seven aspects compare Buzan et al, 1998, Friedman, 2009, Gärtner et al, 2001, Jazbec, 2002 etc.

trafficking, which together with environmental issues (air, water, food) presses for new, global and cross – agency approach in facing them.

Therefore, generally speaking, we could notice a fundamental change in the way international, in particular social events and trends, are structured and function. This is primarily due to the highly increased development of communication and transportation technology, which orbited the proliferation of information and media influence as well as the possibility to commute and migrate (Brzezinski, 2009, Jazbec, 2005 and 2006, Reiter, 2003). Their consequences for security architecture and policymaking are all-encompassing, broad and deep. They de facto bring the world together and push for complementary activities of global actors within the frame of a possible global governance. Understanding this global frame means also bringing closer concrete challenges, which NATO faces today because of what it is, what its mission is and how does it act. These challenges rest *via facti* within the above-presented global viewpoint and refer directly to the Alliance itself.¹⁶ It is our impression they could be observed as internal and external priorities, with two particular points that stand out.¹⁷

Internal priorities or challenges refer directly to the Alliance’s capability to plan and act. They are from one point of view the results of different international environment, but from another one primarily the consequence of the enlarged membership. The external ones derive from the dynamics of the global environment and differ along the timeline. However, they are interdependent and firmly bound together, as Kupchan observes: “NATO at 60 has to make some tough decisions on Russia, consensus and reach.” (2009)

A brief, summary-like presentation as well as comparison of the challenges discussed follows in Table No 4.

Table No 4:

Challenges
for NATO

Internal	External
Capabilities	Afghanistan
Structures	Russian Federation
Decision making process	Enlargement
Transformation	Dealing with new threats
New Strategic Concept	Transatlantic link
Collective defence	Global outreach

¹⁶ Compare Have Combat, 2009, Jazbec, 2009.b, Keller, 2009.a, Kupchan, 2009, Scheffer, 2009.a and 2009.b etc.

¹⁷ Methodologically speaking it would be difficult to make such a clear divide between complexity of challenges and their different types. However, a certain level of mechanical division has to be brought in for the clarity of the present discussion.

Two comments should be added to the above presented. First, as far as the main challenges are concerned, Afghanistan and Russia stand out. Second, there is a general question of the future development of the Alliance.

Referring to the first one, there is, however, a clear need to introduce an explicit distinction in the nature of this categorization. Afghanistan is perceived as one of the main security threats nowadays. This is particularly due to a variety of numerous components, which produce this rather unique result (like weak state institutions, a terrorist harbour along its border with Pakistan, extremely poor living conditions /physical, social, educational etc./, drug production etc.). Combined with threats deriving from the situation in Pakistan (weak state in a possession of nuclear weapons), the statement is clear. Regarding Russia, it could be quite clear that relations between the Alliance and the successor of the Soviet Union present a huge challenge (Comp. Khudoley, 2009 as well as Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009). But here the nature of this challenge is of completely different kind. We would understand it as a need to find the way of mutual, long-term and global cooperation in facing contemporary security threats. This relation should advance from a rather low (or formal) level of cooperation up to now to flexible engagement, which would lead to further, deeper and mutual integration of Russia in the security management as well as of cooperation between the two players.

Referring to the second one, a rather clear vision of the Alliance's future mission is to be developed. After the big bang enlargement of 2004, voices could be repeatedly heard from some of the then new members, in particular after the war in Georgia in August 2008, that NATO should focus more, if not primarily on its core mission, i.e. collective defence. This in general terms responds to the fact that through "the most recent enlargements the Alliance has also come to include a large number of states that still regard security far more traditionally and regionally compared to some of the older Alliance members." (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007: 10) At the same time, though, since mid 90s of the previous century, NATO is developing its out-of-area operations leading to a simple fact that "NATO is already a global player." (Ibid. p. 26) The idea of its global outreach presents one of highly desirable trends for NATO, seen in this way by many outsiders as well as by not less many insiders. We would strongly argue for further transformation of the Alliance, not only as far as its internal challenges are concerned, but also for its external ones. The Alliance should remain strongly anchored in its core mission (collective defence of its territory), which would consequently allow it to follow in a more focused manner already expressed global political (dialogue) and security (beyond territory) aspects.¹⁸

Last but not least, the NATO of today presents a much different organization than that of yesterday. This is far from being purely a rhetorical statement. Starting rather soon after the end of WW II as a group of twelve Western countries, driven by the territorial defence principle, today it offers its core frame to twenty-eight members.

¹⁸ This could be of significant importance also in carving out its relations with Russia.

Additionally to this, several groups of aspirants, partners and cooperative countries form its global network with different levels of intensity. These are as follows:

- 28 member countries
- 18 PfP members in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia
- 7 members of the Mediterranean dialogue
- 3 MAP countries (2 new members, however, in transition to force goals system)
- NATO – Russia Council
- NATO – Ukraine Commission
- Global partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea
- Various forms of cooperation with countries like China, India, and Pakistan.

NATO currently performs its activities at eight locations in three geographical regions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, the Mediterranean Sea, and along the coast of Somalia). These activities include different forms of membership, partnership, dialogue, cooperation and assistance.¹⁹ One could also say that the Alliance exercises interaction within the area of two billion people (half of billion within the membership space), where also three world religions communicate (Roman-Catholic, Orthodox and Islam). This would not mean that NATO is engaged in the intercultural dialogue, but it quite convincingly presents the scope of its activities in the Post-Cold War period. Overall, “in its security manager role, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, and a forum for discussing politico-military issues are all tasks NATO engages in” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007, p. 33), including activities in areas like science, medical issues, environment etc.

To sum up, the development of the time, geographical and cultural span, which determined the emergence of NATO in the past and that of today, shows how deep, broad and basic the evolution of the Alliance has been. From ideologically driven Cold War to flexible and loose matrix of the era of intercultural dialogue, which both offered different challenges and threats but also oriented the transformation and initiated new tools, the organization managed to continuously fulfil its mission. It has managed to stick to the defence of a territory, but also complement it with an ambition of securing values and protecting individuals.

Conclusion Our aim in this paper was to explore mutual dynamics between the conditions, which influenced the appearance of NATO, and its evolution. We tried to present and argue the understanding that international security environment played a crucial role in this process as well as that NATO was capable of reacting to changes and to cope with them. Obviously, the organization was able to carry out its mission, but also to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. According to our mind, two complementary aspects define this endeavour, namely the enlargement of the Alliance and its transformation.

¹⁹ Salonius-Pasternak describes them as those of NATO-members, MAP-aspirants, NATO Response Force, Other Operations, Training/Defence Reforms and General/“Practical” cooperation. (2007, p. 25)

Basically, two different and major phases could be noticed in the organization's development, stemming out of the nature of its dynamics and growing structural complexity. During the first six years it expanded to fifteen members, while during its previous decade it expanded by twelve members. In between, there is a time span of four decades and a half, during which only one new member joined the Alliance. Therefore, two periods of high and one period of a very low enlargement dynamics have characterized the development of NATO so far. In any case it is interesting to observe that both the first and the last decade so far share the same level of high enlargement dynamics, although their circumstances differ much. During the former the deterrence-driven provision of security dominated, while during the latter a high level of uncertainty prevailed.

However, due to a highly complex and uncertain security environment, impregnated above all with new, combined and unpredictable threats, we do not expect another phase of low enlargement dynamics, but rather on the contrary. Among the major challenges, internal as well as external could be observed. They are intertwined and refer primarily to the decision-making process, further outreach and Afghanistan. Still, relations with Russia would decisively define future positioning of NATO and put to test its capability to include other actors in the security management not only within the organization, but also globally.

One can notice a further interest for the membership; at the same time the interest for cooperation remains high and stable. This would mean that the scope of activities, pursued by NATO, is welcomed and appreciated. They include Article 5 (collective defence) and non-Article 5 (crisis management) operations as well as a wide range of other areas (like humanitarian assistance, disarmament, politico-military issues, science, medical issues, environment etc.). This illustrates that NATO has evolved from a driven-driven regional player to a global security manager.

Since NATO succeeded not only to defend Western Europe during the Cold War era, but also offered secure environment for the Post-Cold War European integration process, this could be its most important message at the sixtieth anniversary, holding for sure also its global attractiveness.

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SLOVENSKE IZKUŠNJE PRI OBRAMBNEM PLANIRANJU IN ČLANSTVO V NATU

THE SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCE OF DEFENCE PLANNING AND NATO MEMBERSHIP

Professional article

Povzetek Ob peti obletnici vstopa v Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo in ob vseh naporih, ki so bili vloženi v pridobitev povabila, v naše dejavno članstvo in spremljajočo transformacijo obrambnega sistema, je ponovno dozorela priložnost, da na podlagi nedvoumno pozitivnih izkušenj in naučenih lekcij opravimo nov kakovostni premik k ustrežnejšemu obsegu ter usmerjenosti obrambnega sistema v prihodnosti. Vse to je tesno povezano z zaupanjem v obrambno zavezništvo, v katerega smo včlanjeni. Skepsa, ki bi se pojavila ob tem, je ne samo napačna, temveč v danih razmerah lahko celo zavajajoča in škodljiva. Dejstvo je, da sta naša gospodarski in politični napredek tesno povezana s skupino držav, s katerimi delimo članstvo v Zavezništvu. Če bi prišlo do preloma danih obljub in zavez, ki nas povezujejo, bi bili na kocki tudi drugi, za državo in ne nazadnje za ves evropski prostor temeljni postulati, ki bi revolucionarno spremenili sodobno podobo sveta, v katerem živimo, kar se ne more zgoditi čez noč. Ko primerjamo prednosti in pomanjkljivosti članstva, se pogosto zgodi, da so zlorabljene tiste najpomembnejše, med katerimi so tudi nenehna opozorila o racionalnosti in smotrnosti trošenja davkoplačevalskega denarja. Vlaganje omejenih virov v obrambne zmogljivosti je pri tem treba gledati s kakovostnega vidika. Članstvo in iz njega izhajajoči ciklusi implementacije dogovorjenih ciljev obrambnega planiranja onemogočajo prikrivanje ali celo izkrivljanje rezultatov dela na področju obrambne pripravljenosti. Rednih posvetovanj v Natu ne smemo razumeti kot diktate tujcev, kot jih nekateri neutrudno razlagajo, temveč kot pomoč pri razvoju racionalnega in učinkovitega obrambnega sistema. V delovanju na vseh področjih, vključno z obrambnim, je ključna harmonizacija prizadevanj posameznih zaveznic, ki mora biti kljub množici interesov in želja uravnotežena, stvarna, ciljno usmerjena, temeljiti mora na izpolnjevanju obveznosti, ki so jih članice sprejele. Brez ustrezne stopnje politične volje nam začrtane smeri ne bo uspelo ohraniti, s čimer je povezano izpolnjevanje danih zavez tako sebi kot našim zaveznikom.

Ključne besede *Obrambno planiranje, obrambne zmogljivosti, nacionalna obramba, kolektivna obramba, mednarodne operacije in misije, varnostno okolje, uporabnost sil.*

Abstract As Slovenia celebrates five years of membership in NATO, and after all the efforts invested in securing an invitation to join, in being a member of the Alliance and in the accompanying transformation of the country's defence system, the time is right for us to re-examine the positive experiences of and lessons learned in these five years, and to take a qualitative step forward towards a defence system of the right dimensions and one that looks to the future. All this is closely linked to trust and confidence in the defence Alliance of which we are part. Any scepticism in this regard is not only wrong but, in the circumstances, even misleading and damaging. The fact is that Slovenia's economic and political progress is closely linked with that group of countries with which it shares membership in the Alliance. If the promises and commitments that were given and which connect us are broken, other fundamental principles for the country, and not least for Europe as a whole, will be at stake, bringing about a revolutionary change to the world in which we live. However, this cannot happen overnight. When one weighs the benefits and shortcomings of membership, it is often the most important ones that are being abused, among them the continual warnings about the need to spend taxpayers' money cost-effectively and wisely. The investment in defence capabilities of what are limited resources must be subject to quality criteria. Membership and the associated cycles of implementation of the agreed defence planning objectives prevent the results of work in the area of defence readiness from being concealed or even distorted. Regular consultations with NATO should not be understood as foreign diktats and interventions, as some never tire of characterising them, but as assistance in the development of a cost-effective and efficient defence system. In the work carried out in all areas, including defence, harmonisation of the efforts of individual Alliance members is crucial; this harmonisation process must remain balanced, realistic and focused, despite the differences in interests and priorities, and must be based on fulfilment of obligations that have been jointly agreed by the members. Without an adequate level of political will, we will be unable to keep to the path we have mapped out and fulfil the commitments to ourselves and our Allies.

Key words *Defence planning, defence capabilities, national defence, collective defence, international operations and missions, security environment, usability of forces.*

Introduction After five years of membership in NATO and the EU, and still being a young democracy and country that has not yet entered its third decade, it is time once again for Slovenia to review its experiences and the lessons it has learned, whatever they may be and however differently we may perceive or understand them. If one looks at the development of defence capabilities, one finds missed opportunities as well as positive achievements, and bolder views and moves as well as more timid ones. What is missing above all is a set of bolder and more robust decisions on where and how we go from here. This paper will not only look back over the last five years of work within NATO but also the period of Slovenia's participation in the Partnership for Peace; and on account of a number of important experiences and dilemmas, it will also glance at the golden age of the Territorial Defence Force

that emerged from the Yugoslav Total Defence Concept (SLO) and National Self-Protection (DS) system, using least a few examples and paradigms. The Territorial Defence Force won distinction for itself with this doctrine in independence-related activities in 1990 and the war of 1991, while its spirit lingered for quite some time after the formation of a professional Slovenian army. The author himself began his professional career at that time and was not just educated and trained in that direction but was imbued with precisely that passion for defence of his homeland in which he was actively engaged; he therefore has an awareness as well as considerable experience of the co-formulation and discussion of different, new and more rational views of the security environment, of threats to national security and responses to them in new and changed circumstances, of integration mechanisms and security and defence frameworks, and of Slovenia's position within them. All these things have a significant impact on deciding what the mission of the defence system will be; this in turn directly dictates the development of defence and above all military capabilities, which is also in essence what we call 'defence planning'. This paper aims to present a number of causal relations between specific periods of development of the Slovenian defence system and explain their influence on the current situation. Even the experiences acquired after five years of active cooperation in the Alliance's defence planning process have not stopped certain of the ignorant and fallacious approaches common in the past from persisting. Some can simply not be understood since they have no link with logical thinking and common sense. It is expected that we will take a step out from the frameworks of past thinking and from a belief in the need for self-sufficiency in national defence, and a step in the direction of more solid trust in our Alliance partners and in the principles of collective defence. On the basis of past experiences, particularly the experiences of those who have worked more closely with the Alliance, it is possible to assert that the process of defence planning that has been established in Slovenia and taken from the Alliance model, which is almost identical to that of the EU, provides us with a mirror in which we can see the real nature of our work and ourselves ever more clearly.

There is not enough space in this paper in which to write a deeper and more comprehensive analysis; it is therefore hoped that it will at least prompt readers to think about the issues presented. The paper proceeds from practical experience, knowledge and deliberations connected with NATO after more than a decade of work with and within the Alliance; it therefore does not follow all the standards applying to traceability of sources and analyses, or the requirement to provide exact references for them. The statements contained herein may, however, be checked against the selection of sources provided at the end of the paper.

1 THE PERCEPTION OF SECURITY THREATS AND RISKS IN LIGHT OF SLOVENIA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

It is not an easy task today to speak of the security environment of the early 1990s, when we were home to almost 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia, which in addition to everything else added a dimension of reality to the daily pictures

of destruction and wartime atrocity that were appearing on our television screens. In tackling it, we do not wish to suggest that it was one-dimensional – first and above all because it now appears so far in the past, and second because the constant low-level turbulence of the region, which has acquired the name of the ‘Western Balkans’, reminds us of what conflicts can cause and what the consequences of them are. Despite all the negative trends in our wider environment in the 1990s, Slovenes took a crucial step forward with independence, tying its fate at almost all levels to the fates of other European countries economically and politically joined in a single area.

We can cast our minds back to the first years following independence, when war was raging just a few kilometres from Slovenia’s borders and threatened to spill over the Kolpa River, and in particular the fairly unfriendly statements that now and again denied the existence of the country, and even the people, wedged between the Kolpa and the Alps. The decision made by the Slovenian government, especially in light of the UN embargo on the sale of arms to the entire territory of ex-Yugoslavia, was a difficult one: as a young country, to risk being militarily weak or to prepare itself, as far as possible, under the given conditions, very probably aware, given the path that Slovenia had embarked on, that this could have been, in the long term, quite costly and more difficult to justify in the short term. Luckily, the latter proved to be the case, rather than its contrary – which would have been more difficult and, of course, costlier, from all aspects and not just the financial. Criticism of our understanding of NATO and of the work that took place within it in this paper must also be seen from this angle. With its consciousness still pervaded by the threat of a possible attack from the south and the doctrine of the SLO and DS, even though one did not dare voice these fears aloud, Slovenia purchased static towed heavy artillery and modernised its old tanks. The beginning of modern military aviation in Slovenia came when the country bought reasonable advanced training aircrafts for the still-young and enthusiastic flying corps from the former Yugoslav army, who dreamed of soon breaking the sound barrier. Slovenia also has a military patrol boat which does not have a military nor a combat role; but where there is the sea, there is also the navy. With all these things we began to develop the full range of military capabilities – incomplete, highly improvised and based on volunteers, but still.

The swift development of the young country and the Euro Atlantic integration processes it joined and, from the national standpoint of the perception of threat, the democratisation of Croatia and the fall of Milošević in Serbia, very quickly called the beginnings of the creation of a Slovenian army into question (Grayston, 2003). Nevertheless, we are obliged to admit that it would not have been possible to incorporate new aspects, horizons and visions so quickly. In this case we are justified in excusing ourselves by proving that this was indeed impossible. We insisted slightly too long in trusting ourselves only. This is a problem we are still faced with today. A retrospective apology is not in order unless we have learned at least something after five years’ membership in NATO. Appealing to the burden of history is not appropriate here, since there is simply not enough money for everything and there never

will be, and paying for hobbyhorses from the national budget at the expense of the Slovenian army's combat usability is once again irrelevant.

2 NATO DEFENCE PLANNING

It is now appropriate for us to give a structured presentation of defence planning as the key function of the organisation in which we have completed our first five-year period of service.

2.1 Principles of NATO defence planning

The defence planning process, which we can call the backbone of the Alliance without fear of contradiction, comprises the following basic principles which, at the same time, constitute the basis of the collective defence and security of the Alliance as a whole: political solidarity between nations, support for cooperation and firm links between them in all those areas that serve their joint and single interests, the division of roles and responsibilities and the recognition of mutual obligations, and joint efforts to maintain adequate military forces for the support of Alliance strategy and policy.

Defence planning procedures ensure that all essential issues are dealt with collectively, which in turn guarantees that collective and national resources for the realisation of all NATO tasks are utilised to the greatest possible extent. Close cooperation between international civilian and military staff and between NATO military authorities and the governments of the allies is maintained through the regular exchange of information and through consultation regarding national plans. This exchange enables the objectives of individual nation to be matched to the joint requirements of the Alliance and to be reviewed in the light of joint political guidelines, requirements to modernise, and changes to the role and responsibilities of forces.

2.2 Consultation and harmonisation in NATO defence planning processes

NATO defence planning has developed in accordance with the changed threats, risks and challenges faced by NATO members and by the organisation as a whole, the development of technology – the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) – and changes in the wider security and political environment, including economic development, experiences in international operations and missions, and as a consequence of the internal transformation process itself. There is actually no unanimously accepted definition of defence planning within NATO. We could define it most precisely as a process in which representatives of allies, NATO's military representatives and the International Secretariat attempt to determine the status of the forces or capabilities that must be available to the Alliance to allow it to carry out the tasks that have been determined unanimously by the members of the Alliance (Pfeiffer, 2008). Capabilities are developed, maintained and provided primarily by nations; their impact on national plans is therefore of vital importance, under the principle of solidarity or 'fair burden sharing' in the realisation of the requirements of a specific structure of forces and the

development of a feeling of collective ownership. The fair share taken on by an individual member country, which should present a reasonable and tolerable challenge, can be a relative category; for this reason, the entire planning process linked to defence reviews and studies is a transparent one and constitutes a balanced combination of professional and political input and the search for an appropriate ratio between needs and abilities. NATO defines defence planning (even though, as stated above, there is no unanimously accepted definition) as a basic process of consultation and harmonisation that enables members to utilise the political, military and other advantages of collective defence to increase security and stability (NATO Handbook, 2006). From this it is clear that Allies do not negotiate with their own Alliance. In Slovenia this understanding of defence planning processes and of the Alliance itself is still very much present and very meaningful.

Slovenian military and political circles are still coming to terms with this method of planning; they are frequently prey to an unclear vision of development and to a lack of political will at home on the one hand, and to the clear and extremely demanding expectations of the Alliance on the other. This is strongly evident as well in the perceptions of the Slovenian public. It is clear that the enforcement of national objectives for the armed forces agreed with NATO has contributed above all to more usable military capabilities. In this way both Slovenia and the Alliance have received confirmation that the objectives set can be achieved by means of consistent defence policy and planning, which must be supported by adequate resources. Special emphasis must be laid on the fact that the defence planning process and the fair contribution of an individual member country are matters of coordination by means of regular consultation; we can do this productively, and come to an understanding of it, when we know what, how and with what resources, and when we know where we want to go. It is an error, and one that is becoming an interference, when people mislead the public by saying that NATO wants something from us; we are, in fact, only one of 28 nations of an organisation in which decisions are taken by consensus and not by members outvoting each other. It is important to realise that we decide together on everything, from strategic orientations to operations themselves, and on specific projects and tasks, at the political and professional military levels. Consequently it is important, not to say imperative, that we do not say things differently in Ljubljana and Brussels – or rather, that we do at home what we talk about abroad.

2.3 NATO defence planning disciplines

NATO defence planning encompass seven planning disciplines: the force planning, resources, armaments or defence investments, logistics, C-3 systems ('Consultation, Command and Control'), nuclear planning and civil emergency planning. Defence planning is also linked to certain other related planning domains, including the planning of air defence, standardisation, intelligence activities and operational planning. The term 'force planning' is frequently replaced by the terms 'defence planning' and 'operational planning' (Colston, 2007). While defence planning is a wider term than force planning, operational planning is used in connection with a precisely determined NATO operation and the crisis response planning.

All NATO members take part in the great majority of these disciplines under the leadership of the North Atlantic Council and, directly below this body, within umbrella committees relevant to a particular area, such as the Defence Review Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the Senior Resource Board, the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board, Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. The Military Committee and the Allied Command Transformation both have a special role. Made up of defence ministers, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group both operate at the same level as the North Atlantic Council, which demonstrates the importance of defence planning for the effective functioning of the Alliance.

2.4 Development of defence planning since the end of the Cold War

The processes following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Warsaw Pact have considerably reduced the size and readiness of the armed forces of individual NATO members, which was followed by a significant fall in defence expenditure. This was understood as being a 'well-earned dividend' of the end of the Cold War. However, over the same period we witnessed a growth in the number of armed conflicts, the bloodiest of them taking place in Europe. These conflicts led to the first NATO military intervention in the continent's history.

2.4.1 Transformation of the Alliance

The emergence of new conditions and circumstances demanded a fundamental change in the structure of forces and capabilities, which were refocused on ensuring deployability, sustainability, an ability to operate in geographically distant arenas and all-round military superiority. The defence transformation of the Alliance began; this process is still ongoing and, for some, it seems that the constantly changing environment and level of threat mean that it will never end.

The transformation of NATO is taking place at the political level (expansion of basic values and interests, expansion of membership, consolidation of partner relations, etc.) and military level (implementation of operations, development and provision of the required forces, capabilities and other military resources, reformulation of the military command structure, etc.), where greater professionalism and a greater readiness to respond to new global challenges, in line with the agreed strategic directions, are expected from the military component of the Alliance.

The threats that accompanied the Cold War period were fairly well recognised, predictable and static; these have been replaced by a variety of asymmetrical, unpredictable and complex threats. In order to be able to respond appropriately to these new threats, it has been necessary to redefine NATO's 'level of ambition', determining the number and nature of the operations that the Alliance is capable of carrying out. This has led to fundamental changes in the approach to defence planning, which had previously been focused on threats but is now based on the planning of capabilities.

‘Capabilities-based planning’ is more focused on how possible enemies could threaten us than on who is able to engage with them and where (Alberts, 2005). A list has therefore been drawn up of the wide-ranging spectrum of capabilities that the armed forces of the nations will require in order to repel and defeat an adversary who will use surprise, deception and asymmetrical and hybrid forms of combat to achieve its objectives. With capabilities-based planning, we can achieve ‘jointness’ between combined operational concepts and tasks, by employing a full spectrum of possible scenarios and tasks.

This new NATO paradigm is clearly expressed in current strategic and planning documents. NATO enables its members to realise their national security objectives through joint efforts. Achievement of these objectives is based on the equal distribution of tasks, risks and responsibilities, which also brings the advantages of joint defence.

2.4.2 Linking of defence and operational planning

With the new millennium, the terrorist attacks of September 11, the evoke??? of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in NATO’s history and the operation in Afghanistan, the Alliance is faced with a new reality. The successful deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan is certainly one of the elements that is having a significant impact on defence planning, among other things because it appears that future NATO military operations will have considerable parallels with Slovenia’s joint efforts as part of ISAF. Here it should again be pointed out that national defence planning systems are the processes that ensure adequate forces and capabilities. Despite this, we are once again seeing a gap between the amount of items that they are able or willing to supply and their availability for current operations. Likewise, one cannot ignore the importance and influence of national caveats placed at the national level, which cause problems above all for operation commanders. This is closely linked to countries’ reservations about the serious deployment of capabilities, which is dependent on political will, to which this paper will pay particular attention. And so we once again come to the concept of fair burden sharing – a concept upon which the Alliance is built and whose absence could threaten its very existence.

2.4.3 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) 2006

Changes in the security environment at the start of the decade, and the trends associated with it, led to adjustments to strategic orientations in the form of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which Slovenia was involved in drawing up. This document, which came out of the NATO Strategic Concept 1999, sets out a further framework and political orientations for the transformation of NATO, and the priorities in the development of capabilities, planning disciplines and intelligence activities over the next ten- to fifteen-year period (to 2020). It shows NATO’s clear commitment to a wide-ranging approach to security and preserves collective defence as the basic purpose, alongside the readiness to work through joint decision-making

to prevent conflicts and ensure stability. Regarding capabilities, the CPG is very clear, emphasising the need for an ability to carry out the full range of tasks and operations, the importance of further development of usable (deployable and sustainable), interoperable, flexible and adequately prepared capabilities, the provision of adequate resources and adherence to the principle of fair burden sharing. The CPG also states that the provision of capabilities requires openness to new technologies, concepts, doctrines and procedures. Their aim is ‘the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome. Such an effects-based approach should be developed further and might include enhancing situation awareness, timely operational planning and decision-making, improving links between commanders, sensors and weapons, and employing and deploying joint expeditionary forces coherently and to greatest effect.’ (CPG, 2006)

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General James Jones, who is currently the US National Security Advisor, summed up the transformation of the Alliance on several occasions as follows: ‘We must change from being static to being expeditionary, from having a regional outlook to being global, from engaging in warfare based on the principal of “mass” to warfare based on precision, from a force based on quantity to one based on quality.’

We can assert with considerable certainty that that part of the CPG that sets out development of the usable capabilities of Allies and the Alliance will become the basis for the new NATO Strategic Concept. The CPG was agreed by the North Atlantic Council under the appropriate level of confidentiality in December 2005 so that it could serve as the basis for the new Ministerial Guidance of spring 2006. The Alliance’s Riga Summit in autumn 2006 endorsed the CPG at the highest political level, after which it was made public (which is why it bears the year ‘2006’).

2.4.4 Ministerial Guidance (MG) 2006

The strategic guidelines presented in the CPG were followed the Ministerial Guidance for Allied defence planning, which provides more detailed guidelines for them. The MG clearly defines the level of NATO’s ambitions and strives for a new balance between combat capabilities, Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). The result of the new guidelines and emphases in these documents are the Force Goals 2008 (for 2009–2018), which are focused on the development of expeditionary and sustainable forces, the surmounting of deficiencies in the area of support for transfer, and the development of key capabilities for ensure operation (MG, 2006).

The new national force goal packages that have arisen from this process are very demanding, being adapted to the requirements of modern operations. If the goals are to be met, cost-effective and focused resource management and the appropriate setting of priorities will be crucial.

2.4.5 Reform of NATO defence planning processes 2008–2009

An effective defence planning system must, like all others, be constantly adapted to take account of changes in the security environment; for this reason, the Alliance carried out a reform of defence planning in 2008 and 2009 in order to improve the effectiveness and coherence of the previous system. The advantages of the new (or rather, adapted) system, which was endorsed by defence ministers in June 2009, are greater harmonisation between planning disciplines and their executive committees, a tighter connection between force and operational planning, rationality of participants and harmonisation with EU efforts. The revolution that was expected to be instigated in this area by a number of Alliance members did not materialise – nor could it have done. This was not merely because of the principle of consent that applies to NATO decision-making but also as a result of the thorough expert assessment carried out of those areas of defence planning that were working well and of where adjustments or changes could be made. The unfounded accusations – that it was poor defence planning above all that was responsible for the critical shortfall of capabilities in current operations, particularly in Afghanistan – were rejected. If with the help of this NATO mechanism Allies and the Alliance had been unable to move towards a highly satisfactory outcome in the realisation of the force goals established ten years ago, the number of allies able to take part in operations would be very small, which in reality means that NATO itself would not be taking part (Pfeiffer, 2008).

3 POLITICAL WILL

One important element of NATO's joint defence planning is the existence of the national commitments of individual nation to (1) develop and maintain capabilities and (2) make them available when required. Both these obligations are conditional upon political will, which is itself directly linked to political risk, since it is primarily determined by the level of public support. In the narrower sense, political will is chiefly dependent on the cost-effectiveness and justifiability of use of public funds and taxpayers' money; in the wider sense, it is also dependent on other factors that determine the direction and level of public support. These factors include the safety of personnel involved in international operations and missions and the nature of their tasks, especially if these are offensive.

Readiness to contribute and, prior to that, to develop forces and capabilities, is also dependent on subjective perceptions of threat or danger to a country and, not least, to its inhabitants as taxpayers, voters and public-opinion formers (e.g. different nations face different levels of terrorist threat and understand and perceive that threat differently, just as the political decisiveness of their response to it and their prosecution and destruction of, for example, Al-Qaeda, can be greater elsewhere in the world and the public more tolerant).

Offensive military operations, at least when they first occur, can be shocking to the domestic public, as our soldiers are not only keeping the peace but are also being (or

will be) compelled to fight. This would be understandable in the case of self-defence, but to attack and destroy an enemy looks very much like a war that we should not be fighting because it is not ours and is unfolding far from home. Rather bring the soldiers home, for it is none of our business and we are not interested in others' quarrels. Moreover, some seize upon this feeling to drive their own political interests and are capable of blaming our membership in NATO on account of the fact that the Slovenian army is present in crisis zones and more or less at war with insurgents who are destabilising the entire world. For the same reasons, they are able to attribute responsibility for the relatively expensive purchases of military equipment and arms to NATO membership. But not all countries that are present in crisis areas are members of NATO. The governments of various prominent states express their strategic security interest and priorities in participation, in ISAF and for the stabilisation of Afghanistan for example, completely differently, and are, despite the casualties and the high costs involved, capable of explaining this to their respective publics. Are they more mature than the Slovenian government? It would be better not dwell on this further because this could show us at a disadvantage.

We must admit, and it is not difficult to find considerable proof of it, that the Slovenian public is not naive. It is fair and critical and therefore deserves proper answers, and sometimes, perhaps even without vain and self-regarding reports and communications, also a proper vocabulary for describing facts, reasons, interests, obligations and, not least, concern for its security, even though this is happening far from its borders. Communication with people must simply be methodical, regular and honest. Until they understand, believe and trust that investments in the development of adequate military capabilities are necessary and that they are intended for participation within the whole spectrum of international military operations, including the most intensive (what Slovenes, in common with others, call 'war'), where casualties could arise, every bolder decision by the government constitutes an excessive risk of loss of voter support. This is about either expensive purchases of arms or active participation in international operations and missions. Up to what point an acceptable level of political risk should be taken is a prominent and two-dimensional political question. Governments have a responsibility towards national defence, international security and stability, solidarity and credibility within the international community, and must conduct consistent policies in which they also take responsibility for the assumed risks that are a constituent part of them.

Who is able to communicate with the public more credibly and convincingly than a politician? With the solid support of the military profession which cannot do this itself because it has not received a mandate from the voters to do so. We are not talking here about the complete absence of strategic communication, and we should also not overlook the recent real and relatively convincing media activities of the country's first female minister of defence. Nevertheless, she will be unable to achieve the desired effect on her own.

Experience of NATO membership is teaching us a great deal about this. It is particularly worth pointing out that all democratic countries, including all our NATO Allies, are faced with exactly the same challenges. All are relatively successful in keeping in shape. In the last five years many of them have undergone stiff tests connected with political will and public support for the war in Afghanistan – the oldest members, the slightly younger ones and those that joined at the same time as we did, some with far more established models that exist in Slovenia. We can take courage from the positive surmounting of these difficulties by others and believe that Slovenia can do the same – even when, some day, we suffer our first casualties in an international operation or mission.

4 SLOVENIA'S EXPERIENCE OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS

Between expressing its desire and interest to join NATO and full membership in it, Slovenia made considerable progress and overcame quite a number of obstacles. The process began in 1994, when Slovenia joined the Partnership for Peace and formulated its first Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In 1996 we built on this cooperation by joining the Planning and Review Process (PARP), which remained one of the key tools available to us for accession and alignment. On the basis of our own experiences, we are now able to say that, in places, PARP still has a similar visible role that it had in Slovenia at that time. Put simply, this process is one of shadowing the Alliance process, but adapted to Partner countries, and is excellent preparation for the process of adopting specific objectives and assessing national results on the basis of voluntary commitments. This clearly exposes the inconsistency of national objectives and the deviations from the adopted timeframes.

After the NATO summit in Washington in 1999, at which the programme for future candidate countries was enhanced and adopted (the Membership Action Plan, or MAP), Slovenia joined this cycle, the key function of which was, without doubt, the need or obligation for close interministerial cooperation. Slovenia produced five annual MAPs up to 2004, when it became a full NATO member.

In retrospect, the shock when Slovenia did not receive an invitation to join at the Madrid Summit in 1997, especially given that one could hardly say of the three countries that were invited that they had gone further down the reform path than Slovenia had, was a sobering one and left us with the knowledge that we had work to do, having neither the luck nor the geostrategic position of these three new members. This led to a realisation that we had to complete the defence transition process, which could not be done with half-finished or ill-thought-out defence reforms. It was also clear to the Slovenian government at the summit that, with the best will in the world, this project could not be implemented without adequate resources (Kožar, 2008).

Slovenia received its invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit, along with six other countries. This was followed by a referendum on 23 March 2003 at which 66% of the population voted in favour of membership. Despite the convincing nature of

this majority, it was still considerably below the over-90% level of support for EU membership. As an invited state, Slovenia joined the Alliance planning cycle at the end of October 2003, officially becoming a full member on 29 March 2004.

We should agree that the experiences and knowledge acquired by Slovenia during the PARP and MAP period have been of crucial importance and served as excellent preparation for entry into the NATO club and the management of the national transformation process.

Despite this, we can regret the fact that in this period we missed a golden opportunity to speed up the enforcement of a more rational organisational framework for the defence sector, a more realistic structure of forces, more selective investment in the right priority areas, primarily on the basis of clearly determined strategic political objectives and policies. It seems that we have been successful in that fraught contest between preservation of the old, of dubious usefulness, and the new, which too many people mistakenly imagine is forced upon us by NATO. NATO does not, of course, either order or demand; instead, it strives to influence the development of proper, and therefore usable and beneficial, capabilities. We have managed to preserve almost everything we wished to preserve, and most of this is still too much today, making the problems greater and more painful. The financial crisis is still deepening and revealing the truth. It is a shame that we have not managed or not wanted to make more use of the tools as part of the Partnership for Peace, and particularly of the PARP and MAP processes, or of the first five years of membership. The only thing we have actually proved by this is that the sovereignty of a NATO member country is never in question.

When joining NATO, other Alliance members have stood alongside and supported us to a considerable degree, particularly the UK, US, Germany and Italy, for which we must be grateful. Although there has been positive progress, if we look back we can see that we have not always properly understood or even wanted to understand, still less make full use of, the advice we have received. Despite the long path to membership, we have still not managed to shake off a mistrust of the advice of Alliance representatives; we have therefore continued with our over-extended and over-dispersed development of capabilities of doubtful usability. This could be partly attributed to our nature and to our mistrust of foreigners, our bloody experience of alighting from the burning runaway train that was Yugoslavia, not to mention the suffering of the Slovenian people and their struggle for existence throughout history; and to this we can surely add the enforcement of the partial interests of individual groups and of professional (and sometimes political) lobbies, who pursue their own separate interests within the defence system and are concerned merely with their own patch of ground. For the latter we always find an explanation, adapted to the current mantra, along the lines of: *'We will defend ourselves in our own way, this is what history teaches us; We must build a Slovenian army, not a branch establishment of the NATO army; We are investing too much in NATO forces goals and too little in capabilities to serve national needs; NATO has its own interests and does not want to see militarily strong states in the Balkans, which is why they propose that we have armed*

forces without supersonic aircraft and rationalise the scope, structure and determination of priorities; They only want to use us to do their dirty work around the world. Some of these accusations are a real mix of fairytales and the ceaseless conspiracy theories which, unfortunately, always find an audience within the profession as well as among the general public. We have to admit that the general public is fairly indifferent to most of these issues and is stirred up only upon mention of the money or the costs which, as a rule, it does not approve of. Because, as we have already said, the public does not feel threatened militarily, the 'spirit' of the Alliance has not been internalised; this is because the political world addresses it so rarely on these issues.

5 SLOVENIA'S EXPERIENCE IN THE AREA OF DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING AFTER FIVE YEARS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

Full membership in NATO and the subsequent transformation of the Slovenian defence system have even further dictated the need for a change of the paradigm of defence spending – i.e. where to invest defence funds and how. But before this we must change our thinking, our awareness about where and how we can take care of our own national defence. There can be no more excuses to the effect that we are not yet within the ambit of collective defence, although there is no lack of scepticism of all kinds that generates doubt as to the seriousness of NATO, solidarity between Alliance members and adherence to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. With entry into NATO, a critical mass of elements was reached for defining new prospects for the development of defence capabilities. Efforts have been made towards the development of a modern, efficient and professional military organisation which, together with NATO, will be capable of ensuring national security, integration within a system of collective defence, and an active contribution to the security and stability of the strategic environment through participation in international operations and missions.

The professionalisation of the army in 2003 brought an end to the conscription system, which in turn reduced the volume of the armed forces. A contractual reserve gradually replaced the compulsory reserve. Integration with the Alliance had to be ensured at all levels and cooperation with Alliance partners facilitated, particularly within the NATO military structure and in international operations and missions. This means there was a significant move away from the development of forces and capabilities intended exclusively for national defence or for territorial operations to those capable of being deployed in collective defence. The Slovenian army redirected its priorities from stationary to mobile forces, while planning, which had been weighed down by direct military threats, became capabilities-based planning for the entire range of NATO operations.

There is still too little understanding of the new circumstances here in Slovenia. Interoperable, mobile and sustainable forces of an expeditionary character are the only useful capabilities, for national and collective defence as well as for participation in international operations and missions. National defence would take place under

conditions of collective defence, which means that Slovenian capabilities would, as part of NATO forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, work with Alliance capabilities – that is, in the most likely scenarios which, in the absence of any direct military threat, we cannot at all conceive of abstractly. The question is raised of whether, in these circumstances, the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces is the recipient of Alliance forces or provides forces to NATO, even though it would be a question of defence of Slovenian territory, i.e. a question of national defence. This is a similar situation, albeit somewhat simplified, to one in which forces would be provided if another Alliance country were to be threatened or would be transferred there and take part in an operation under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The capabilities we are describing are also the only capabilities able to perform tasks within operations led by the UN, EU or NATO. In addition, they are also the most appropriate for support for the capabilities of the system of protection against natural and other disasters or in international rescue or humanitarian operations, if indeed the army is asked to undertake such non-combat tasks. None of the above requires the creation of special military capabilities – which would in any case be completely impossible from financial and other aspects. One set of forces suffices for all the tasks outlined above, although that set of forces does have to meet the criteria of usability and readiness.

By becoming a NATO member, Slovenia signalled its adherence to the principle of fair burden sharing, which is a key principle of Alliance operation and enables every member country to bear a just share of the burden so that it is not simply a recipient of joint security. Burden sharing is manifested in the objectives which all nations must strive to meet. These objectives are a certain share of GDP that must be set aside for defence, and the development of forces and capabilities that are able to operate within NATO's collective defence system and that are, at the same time, suitable for participation in operations on the basis of a joint political decision of all members. As far as the latter are concerned, the sharing of burdens is accompanied by the sharing of risk, since the actual deployment of capabilities is about much more than simply spending money. With everything it is a question of understanding *Realpolitik* as applied to the historically expressed national interest. To just be there and not do anything for the common cause is not the way to proceed (Bučar, 2007).

Conclusion NATO has already begun a process of formulating a New Strategic Concept which will give transformation a more appropriate political context and vision for the future development of the Alliance. Today most people understand what NATO does; however, they are considerably less certain about how this is linked to their own security. We expect the New Strategic Concept to provide a clear framework for the operation of the Alliance in the 21st century – one that will be understandable in any description of the future imperatives and operations of the organisation and in any explanation of why these tasks cannot be assumed by other international bodies or indeed why, given their mission, the division of tasks between the EU, UN, OSCE and AU is necessary. It remains crucial for the Alliance that political elites and the public realise that the understanding of security has changed and that this must be

followed by a change in the measures to ensure security. Operations in remote areas of the world are simply inextricably linked with the modern concept of maintaining security. These operations are hazardous, very expensive and therefore, whichever way one looks at them, demanding and complex, with no guarantee of success. Ensuring security today and in the future will be a considerably more demanding task than in previous decades; nevertheless, security will remain far from ideal. We also expect clear definitions concerning collective defence so that public confidence in all nations returns to this most important segment of NATO – one which the majority of members regard as the glue that holds the Alliance together.

Returning to Slovenia, it cannot be emphasised too strongly that the current security environment makes imperative the need for a different way of thinking, a different mentality, which incorporates a shift away from national to collective defence. Slovenia has to realise that ‘we are NATO’, that we jointly formulate the decisions within its framework that have to be realised at the national level as well, and that NATO is not some kind of independent supranational organisation that operates independently and places pressure on individual members. Moreover, there has to be an understanding that NATO does not lie only within the domain of ministries of foreign affairs and of defence. Membership encompasses the whole of the country, which is why it is imperative that a comprehensive and coordinated approach is taken that brings together all players, including all ministries, parliament, civil entities and NGOs. Slovenia must be aware of the reasons that led it towards NATO membership and the objectives that it wishes to achieve by membership. At the same time, cooperation between civil and military capabilities must be improved. This must begin at the national level, with joint planning, training, preparations and improvements to the flow of information.

On the basis of the experience gained so far in the area of defence planning, it is clear how important harmonisation with NATO and the provision of links between all planning disciplines are. Realistic national plans must be ensured that lead to realistic expectations on the part of NATO, with an estimation of the scarce and increasingly limited financial resources made as a matter of priority and these resources allocated appropriately. We owe this not least to the taxpayers, since any loss of their trust because of non-transparent and reckless use of their money could backfire heavily on us. From this point of view it should be emphasised that an increase in the interoperability and usability of forces does not simply mean purchasing the latest and most expensive equipment, but securing cooperation with other Allied armed forces, investing in language training, doctrine, training and an understanding of concepts. The most recent Alliance evaluation of our plans emphasised that while they were consistent, they were also complex and demanding in terms of content and timescale, and almost entirely inflexible. The tiniest slip can cause a chain reaction and thus place the final objective at risk – the establishment of Slovenian armed forces that are small in size but efficient, highly professional and with modern equipment, mobile and interoperable. These would be armed forces that are capable, together with NATO, of successfully realising their own national missions and tasks and those of the Alliance. There are more than enough opportunities to slip up during

this current financial and economic crisis, even more so for one of the smallest ally of NATO with such limited frameworks. This has, unfortunately, happened this year.

As far as resources go, we hardly need to be reminded that effective and efficient transformation is not possible without sufficient funds for defence. Securing sufficient financial resources and allocating them properly is the basis of all our efforts. The current trends in this regard are fairly worrying, since we are moving away from a planned total number and losing the target ratio of expenditure on personnel, operations and maintenance, equipment and infrastructure (ratio of 50 : 30 : 20). In the long term, it is imperative that we maintain at least modest real growth in defence expenditure and guard against any possible reduction.

We should also not forget or overlook the experiences we have undergone in international operations and missions, since this year marks the 12th year of Slovenia's participation (1997). The fact that these modern NATO operations take place outside the territory of the Alliance, in very challenging environments and even without the support of the host country, makes them highly complex and demanding affairs and renders the provision of logistical support even more difficult. If we are to ensure our effective participation in operations and improve the development of capabilities, it is crucial that we learn from our experiences and provide the appropriate training. Slovenia must remain active and ambitious in international operations and missions. In the name of fair burden sharing and the fair sharing of risk, we must also assume more demanding tasks, including increasing our participation in NATO Reaction Forces. By doing so we will contribute in the best possible way to international security and stability as well as our own. In simple terms, we are defending our homeland far from its borders.

All the experiences outlined above lead us to find that we must invest only in capabilities with potential; expenditure on anything else is wasteful and, given the current economic climate, as confirmed by numerous warnings and even more pieces of advice, would be unfair to the people of Slovenia. Unfortunately, owing to its objective limitations, which include financial ones, Slovenia will never be able to secure the entire range of capabilities for itself, but a halfway solution could in these cases still be catastrophic. This could easily be proved by the size of the defence budget. If it is only around half a billion euros, the entire range indeed cannot be built; it is therefore necessary to focus on priorities, with almost no flexibility, which the current savings measures clearly confirm.

One element that we wish to point out in this conclusion is the size of our armed forces. The arguments opposing a reduction in the target number are well known; however, we must warn of the consequences that a failure to reduce the current numbers will bring about (the temporary shift from 14,000 to 10,000 is simply a paper exercise). The Alliance has already adopted a political decision on the new more demanding criteria relating to the sustainability and mobility of forces. If the current number of 10,000 members of the armed forces (including the voluntary reserve) remains unchanged, we will have to build capacities that will ensure the

permanent rotation of 1,000 members and ensure mobility and adequate support for 5,000 (we are talking, of course, of numbers that apply to a more appropriate internal structure, which is still not in place). We do not want to make ourselves feel better by comparing ourselves with other Alliance members, but we do have to point out that these numbers are unrealistic from the aspect of national needs and capabilities and also of NATO's expectations. They are also and above all most likely out of step with the expectations of the Slovenian public. If we wish to be more realistic in our national ambitions – by sustaining up to 700 military personnel in international operations and missions, for example – and in the worst case, i.e. collective defence, maintaining a battalion-sized combat group (numbering around 1,200) for one year, we must direct our development in the long-term towards a smaller number of armed forces personnel and develop a better internal structure than we have today.

Defence policy must propose realistically achievable and relevant long-term objectives, together with a financial framework, while a defence planning system can, following political definition by the highest state bodies, define a timetable of development for the medium-term periods and, as far as possible, harmonise the efforts of all planning disciplines with the objectives that have been designed. Adjustments and amendments will doubtless be necessary and present, but the objective must remain clear and must be supported by a robust and unrelenting political will. In this way we will set out the path along which we will travel with NATO and the EU.

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VKLJUČEVANJE SLOVENSKE VOJSKE V NATO IN VOJAŠKO STRUKTURO EVROPSKE UNIJE

INTEGRATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES INTO NATO AND EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

Professional article

Povzetek Ko smo državljani Slovenije na referendumu večinsko podprli vstop v EU in Nato, smo se zavezali tudi k integraciji Slovenske vojske (SV) v vojaški strukturi Nata in EU. Formalno sodelovanje z Natom je Slovenija začela kot članica Partnerstva za mir. Vojaška struktura EU je mlajša in manj razvita od Natove, pri njenem razvoju sodelujemo tudi mi. Slovenija zagovarja tesno sodelovanje EU in Nata na vojaškem področju, brez nepotrebne podvajanja zmogljivosti, zato imamo iste sile pripravljene tako za Nato kot za EU. Po sprejetju Republike Slovenije v Nato je SV postala del zavezniških vojaških sil in začela integracijo, ki naj bi se končala v prvi polovici leta 2010. Hkrati z integracijo v Nato smo se vključevali tudi v vojaško strukturo EU. Integracija SV v vojaški strukturi Nata in EU pomeni sposobnost delovanja SV v obeh strukturah, predvsem pa delovanje tistih sil in posameznikov, ki so posebej deklarirani za ti strukturi. Ker SV deluje s to strukturo v MOM in tudi v vojnem delovanju, moramo biti čim bolj integrirani, da bi zmanjšali morebitne izgube in povečali možnosti za uspeh.

Ključne besede *Integracija, pridruževanje, sodelovanje, zavezništvo, Slovenska vojska, Natova vojaška struktura, vojaška struktura EU.*

Abstract At the time the majority of citizens of Slovenia voted “yes” in the referendum on accession to the EU and NATO, the country also undertook to integrate the Slovenian Armed Forces¹ (SAF) into NATO and EU military structures. Slovenia began its formal cooperation with NATO as a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The military structure of the EU is younger and less developed than the military structure of NATO; Slovenia also participates in its development. The country advocates close cooperation between the EU and NATO in the military field, without unnecessary duplication of capabilities, which is why it has single pool of forces prepared for NATO and the EU. After the accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO, the

¹ SAF are not divided in services, there are Joint Forces with predominant Land Component.

SAF became part of the allied military forces and began the process of integration, which is to be completed in the first half of 2010. Along with integrating into NATO, SAF has also been integrating into the EU military structure. The integration of SAF into NATO and EU military structures signifies the capability of the SAF to operate in both structures, relating in particular to the operation of those forces and individuals that are specifically defined for these two structures. SAF has to be as integrated as possible to reduce potential casualties and increase the chances of success in operations.

Key words *Integration, accession, cooperation, Alliance, Slovenian Armed Forces, NATO military structure, EU military structure.*

Introduction One of the goals of the Slovenian emancipation process was the integration of Slovenia into Euro-Atlantic structures. The majority of citizens of Slovenia voted “yes” in the referendum on the accession of Slovenia to the EU and NATO.² The country thus also pledged to integrate the SAF into the military structure of both alliances. In this way, Slovenia has, for the long term, achieved its national interest regarding the provision of security and defence, mostly by cooperating within Euro-Atlantic structures at political and diplomatic levels, and, in case of necessity, also through the military capabilities of the alliances.³

The EU is a union of countries linking almost all areas of life. The Common European Security and Defence Policy is one of the newer policies through which countries have maintained much of their national independence. On the other hand, NATO is a political and security alliance, focused on the area of defence with well organised military structure.

Through accession into NATO and the EU, Slovenia became a full member of both organisations with the right to participate in decision-making processes and the use of common mechanisms; however, this was only the beginning of the integration process. In 2004, six other countries joined NATO besides Slovenia, while nine other countries joined the EU; Slovenia was therefore not alone in the integration of its armed forces. In NATO, this process was organised and is reflected in the establishment of representatives as well as in the integration of SAF members into NATO structures⁴, in the cooperation with other allies within different common organisations and in the integration of SAF units into the NATO Force Structure. By raising the quality of the SAF to the level of NATO standards and by successful participation in international operations and missions⁵ under the authority of NATO and the EU,

² *In the referendum in 2003, a good 66% of voters supported the accession of Slovenia to NATO, while almost 90% of voters supported accession to the EU. Source: Annual Report of the MoD for 2003, MoD, Birografika BORI, d. o. o., Ljubljana 2004.*

³ *Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, National Assembly of the Rep. of Slovenia, 1993.*

⁴ *Sklep Vlade RS o popolnitvi formacijskih dolžnosti v mirnodobnih poveljstvih in enotah Nata z dne 01.04.2004.*

⁵ *With “international operations and missions” we named all spectrum of operations and missions out of country and manly Crises Response Operations (CRO).*

Slovenia has entered into the final phase of SAF integration into the NATO structure. Integration is to be completed in the first half of 2010.

The military structure of the EU is younger and less developed than the military structure of NATO; Slovenia also participates in its development. Slovenia thus has forces planned for the EU military structure, it has participated in the rotation of the European Union battle groups (EUBG) and, during the presidency, actively participated in launching the operation under the EU authority in Chad.⁶

Particularly important is Slovenia's view, shared by most countries which are both EU and NATO members, of close cooperation between both structures. This view has led to the fact that Slovenia has single pool of forces planned for NATO and the EU.

This article will attempt to present the most important elements of SAF integration into NATO and EU military structures, a process which formally began with Slovenia's accession to the above organisations. As Slovenia's accession would not have been possible without preliminary processes, the article will describe the most important ones. It must be emphasised that SAF integration into NATO and EU military structures would not have been possible without the majority support of Slovenian citizens expressed in the referendum, meaning that it is not only the SAF operating in both alliances but the entire country. The most evident part of the integration process is seen in SAF forces and individuals participating in international operations and missions as well as structures led by NATO and the EU.

1 NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS, NATO MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

In early 1994, NATO launched the PfP initiative.⁷ The process of cooperation of the SAF in the Euro-Atlantic defence community started in mid-1994 when Slovenia presented the Presentation Document in which it formulated the rationale for joining the PfP.⁸

In 1995, the first Individual Partnership Programme was developed. In it and in the following ones, Slovenia was able to choose among activities offered in the Partnership Work Programme. Starting as a consumer, Slovenia gradually developed in the direction of a contributor – first as the host of a limited number of activities

⁶ *The decision on launching the EU humanitarian operation in Chad was adopted during the Slovenian presidency. Slovenia supported this decision by deploying a Slovenian contingent to Chad.*

⁷ *NATO, Official texts: Partnership for Peace Invitation Document, 10–11. 1. 1994.*

⁸ <http://nato.gov.si/slo/slovenija-nato/>

and later also as a creator⁹ of activities with content that had proved to be useful for a large number of other respective PfP and NATO countries.

The PfP is based on the principle of self-differentiation with respect to the level of cooperation of individual Partner countries with NATO. Those who preferred closer ties with the Alliance concerning the planning of forces available for operations opted for participation in the Planning and Review Process.¹⁰ The internal planning process in the SAF, the aim of which was fulfilment of interoperability objectives and later partnership goals, paved the way to better understanding, learning and adoption of force planning as conducted in the Alliance. The SAF started to participate in the PfP exercise with individuals and then HQs at different levels. One of the highlights of this process was the CAE Exercise in 1998, during which the AMF-L Brigade was deployed in Slovenia.

At the Washington Summit in 1999, the Membership Action Plan was offered to aspirant countries in order to maintain momentum and streamline the efforts necessary to prepare for NATO membership.¹¹

In parallel with efforts directed towards cooperation within the PfP framework, Slovenia became an associated partner of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1996. Although hardly comparable to the PfP with respect to intensity and diversity, activities linked to the WEU contributed to later integration of the Slovenian defence system into the Euro-Atlantic security and defence community.

2 ACCESSION AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES

Accession and integration are separate processes, both with regard to time and content. The main purpose of the accession process, which lasted from the signing of Slovenia's NATO Accession Protocol¹² on 26 March 2003 to the depositing of the Instrument of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 29 March 2004, was fulfilment of all conditions for entry into the Alliance and for full NATO membership. Both in NATO and in Slovenia, special working groups were organised for this purpose. The MoD also contributed a core working group for Slovenia's accession to NATO, a special coordinating group of the SAF and individual points of contact within key commands and units. Their task was the preparation of documents intended for work and for the preparation of solutions. The documents included identification of key capabilities, fulfilment of conditions for inclusion in the inte-

⁹ *Most permanently, officers of the Slovenian Armed Forces came from its Mountain School and the PfP Language Training Centre. Source: Invitation to attend courses at the Slovenian PfP Language Training Centre, July 2007.*

¹⁰ *NATO, Official texts: Chairman's Summary of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defence Ministers Session, 3. 12. 1997.*

¹¹ *Présidence de la République, Archives de la Présidence de M. Jacques Chirac 1995–2007: NAC-S(99)66 – 24 April 1999 Membership Action Plan (MAP).*

¹² *On 26 March 2006, Permanent Representatives of nineteen NATO members in Brussels signed Slovenia's NATO Accession Protocol. Source: <http://nato.int/docu/basicxt/b030326g.pdf>*

grated airspace security system, establishment of efficient communication and information connections, identification and validation of the infrastructure for support of the host country, and preparation for the takeover of national duties within the NATO command structure.¹³

Given that the activities in the accession process are politically driven and focused on the establishment of alliances for the provision of political, legal and military obligations arising from NATO membership, integration is the process which brings such alliances into effect. As early as in 1995, NATO identified its military requirements for candidate countries. The essence of these requirements is that the armed forces of the countries in question must be capable of contributing to the defence of the Alliance and be financially capable of implementing modernisation. We thus come to the core of the integration process, which is to define, build and maintain capabilities for cooperation in NATO operations.¹⁴ The SAF has integrated into the allied force planning within the framework of defence planning, implemented the Alliance's doctrines and standards, integrated its members into NATO and EU peacetime military structures, established capabilities and a force structure in accordance with force objectives and capabilities development programmes, modified capabilities and improved the quality of the provision of interoperability with other armed forces, and continued its participation in international operations and missions as well as in joint investment projects.

The SAF began the process of defining these capabilities with Membership Action Plan, when it identified those forces which became the framework of force objectives. The Motorised Battalion, Battalion Battle Group, Movement Control Team, CIMIC experts, CBRN Defence Battalion, Transport Company, Military Police Company and Medical Unit ROLE 2 LM became key capabilities for the achievement of the desired standards and required interoperability level during the integration process.¹⁵

Control, or direction, of the integration activities for all newly invited countries which, with regard to the old NATO organisation, would fall under the South Wing, is implemented by NATO Joint Force Command Naples. Tasks for the preparation of forces were delegated to component commands in Izmir, Madrid and Naples.¹⁶ Regarding the SAF force structure, the Slovenian centre of integration was between the Land Component Command in Madrid and the SAF Force Command in Vrhnika. These two commands established integration bodies which provided proper guidance and organised regular working meetings in which members reported on

¹³ *The timeline for implementation of reforms in the area of defence and military includes 12 areas. This timeline was attached to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, addressed to the Secretary General of NATO, which expresses the wish of the Republic of Slovenia to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and confirms the country's readiness and capability to respect political and military obligations and commitments arising from the North Atlantic Treaty, the Study on NATO Enlargement and the NATO Strategic Concept. Source: <http://nato.gov.si/slo/slovenija-nato/postopki/pismo/>*

¹⁴ <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.htm>

¹⁵ *Slovenia and NATO, Joint website in support of the accession of Slovenia to NATO, (active 2001–2004): Membership Action Plan.*

¹⁶ *Implementation plan of integration tasks of the SAF Force Command, April 2005.*

their progress and prepared annual plans of integration activities. Integration of each declared unit was conducted in two phases. The first phase included the preparation of a unit with the aim of achieving the required standards in the areas of operation, command and control, communication and information systems, preparedness, deployment capabilities, logistic support and sustainability of forces. NATO offered support in the form of workshops, visits by expert groups and organisation of various courses.¹⁷ During the second phase, the prepared units had to pass a national combat readiness evaluation, so-called certification, after which the NATO control group for affirmation,¹⁸ on the basis of unit checks and verification of the implementation of tasks, determined the level of interoperability and compliance with the prescribed NATO standards. Great emphasis was placed on knowledge of the English language as a condition for the attainment of interoperability.

3 INTEROPERABILITY

The overall objective of interoperability¹⁹ is the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.²⁰ The success of operations largely depends on the smooth functioning of and cooperation between the combined-joint²¹ HQ's and forces. Interoperability is the key enabler and as such a crucial force multiplier. The following objectives or capabilities must be attained: communication, implementation of joint tasks, support, practice and training. Interoperability is thus inseparable from the capability identified by common factors which direct development and interoperability requirements.²²

The SAF encountered this for the first time when Slovenia joined the NATO PfP Programme. First of all, we need to be able to communicate with each other, so

¹⁷ *Allied Command Operation Accession and Integration Plan, 30 April 2003.*

¹⁸ *Affirmation is NATO's official confirmation that a unit has achieved NATO standards and is capable of conducting its mission. Successful affirmation holds as very important that national combat readiness evaluation procedures (the procedure of certification) be as similar as possible to the procedures defined by NATO for the evaluation of units and commands. In determining the combat readiness of SAF units we could claim that the criteria in the national document for combat readiness evaluation are identical to the NATO CREVAL procedure. There was thus no question of successful affirmation during the process of certification.*

¹⁹ *The promulgation of NATO standards in the standardisation process ensures interoperability and affects the attainment of military capabilities. Appointed national representatives of the SAF actively cooperate on standardisation committees, working groups and NATO Standardisation Organisation panels and, by adopting NATO standards, ensure the interoperability of the SAF with the allied military structure.*

²⁰ *NATO Policy for Interoperability Annex 1 C-M(2005)0016. ("NATO Policy for Standardisation" C-M (2000) 54, dated 24 July 2000), <http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf>*

²¹ *Combined-joint HQ in NATO means that it is composed of multinational and multiservice personnel.*

²² *The NATO Policy for Interoperability suggests the following as the framework of interoperability: 1) mastering communication capabilities, including a) human relations (mutual understanding in terms of language, different military background knowledge, different cultures and terminology); b) adopted procedures important for joint operations; c) modern interoperable equipment, consultations, command, control, connections and information, all being important requirements for the operational speed of missions and implementation of tasks; 2) capability of operating in international operations and missions, which depends on common understanding, differences in doctrines, tactics and procedures of Joint Multinational Forces, Combat Support Forces and Logistic Support Forces; 3) support capability as a permanent advantage in procedures and standardised equipment; 4) practice, training and exercises prior to the implementation of operations.*

English language proficiency²³ was and still is one of the most important elements of interoperability. Second, the forces need to synchronise their goals, and in so doing they need to know what they are talking about. Thus concepts, procedures and doctrines become more important. This is where training and education become crucial before the DO IT part, i.e. participation in the execution of operations. We can call this the interoperability objective of the ability to communicate. There are several requirement areas influencing each other: human relations, cultural relations, military background, NATO terminology, and procedures and equipment for communication. The skeleton of common work is the accepted procedures and, of course, modern equipment.

The ability to operate is the interoperability objective which depends on common understanding of the nature, capabilities, strength and limits of the capabilities involved in joint and multinational operations. These are similarities and differences in doctrines, tactics and procedures in operations. With this, countries have the ability to operate with each other in an effective and efficient manner. The ability to support each other puts a premium on procedures, equipment and standardisation.

The interoperability of systems and equipment largely determines the degree of flexibility inherent in the use of forces. Essentially it rests on standardisation in order to comply with the interchangeability, commonality or compatibility criteria of their life cycle.

The main elements of interoperability are: language, doctrine, operational concepts and planning procedures, procedures for making decisions, implementation of systems, and command, control and communications. Today these are defined by the NATO Policy for Interoperability, which is basically part of our everyday activity.

We should now describe in more detail the four steps of interoperability in the Alliance.²⁴

Interoperability is the ability of the Alliance Forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other countries, to train, exercise and operate together effectively in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Interoperability should be achieved before a country starts participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions which are not considered complex and where the threat level is low. But even then, countries have to operate in line with the same doctrine, concepts, language and terminology, around the same principles of command, communications and computers and decision making and planning procedures, and knowing the formatting of documents. Participation in different PfP exercises, up to operations such as ALBA, SFOR, KFOR, NTM-I and OAE, is only one of the examples of increasing the interoperability level of the SAF.

²³ NATO STANAG 6001 *Language Proficiency Test*, 2009; <http://www.dlielc.org/bilc>

²⁴ <http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf>

Interchangeability is the ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another in order to fulfill the same requirement. This is needed for execution of more complex operations such as peacekeeping or Article 5 operations where in addition to the requirements from level 1 others also need to be added. These are in the fields of logistics, maintenance, engineering, medical, manning, CIMIC, air mobility, food, rescue, life saving on land, air and sea, and of course a compatible level of combat skills. The NRF/CJTF exercises and ISAF are part of the operational theatres where the SAF needs such a level.

Compatibility level in addition to the requirements from the two previous levels deals with the fields of weapons, ammunition, C3 systems, integrated logistics, materiel, tactics, all levels of skill, dedicated transport, etc. The Force Goals of the Alliance are taken into account together with the STANAGs developed and driving our acquisition process and force capability requirements, and the suitability of processes, products or services for use together under specific conditions.²⁵

Last is commonality. This applies when the same doctrine procedures or equipment are used.

4 FORCE PLANNING AND REORGANISATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

NATO Force Planning is conducted within the Defence Planning Process (DPP).²⁶ The EU uses the Capability Development Programme (CDP)²⁷, which is comparable to the above-mentioned process. The SAF harmonises its force planning with both the DPP and CDP, and thus establishes the basis for reorganisation.

4.1 Force Goals as a driving factor in the reorganisation of the Slovenian Armed Forces

As previously mentioned, the key forces declared by the SAF to participate in NATO operations were defined before Slovenia's accession to the Alliance. The requirements of the NATO Defence Requirements Review (DRR) from 2003 and the accepted levels of ambition have thus become guidelines for the first Force Goal proposal.

The Strategic Defence Review of 2004 states that the SAF, in cooperation with the allies, will develop the required capabilities for effective accomplishment of an entire range of military tasks in the air, on land, and on and below the sea. The forces that Slovenia is developing should be intended for collective and national defence. It is very likely that future NATO operations, including the operations of collective defence, will be conducted far from Slovenia's territory. All these facts, new

²⁵ *NATO Policy for Standardisation C-M (2000) 54, dated 24 July 2000.*

²⁶ <http://www.nato.int/issues/dpp/index.html>

²⁷ *Council of the European Union: Military capabilities.*

security challenges and ambitions influenced the identification of key military principles and the development of SAF capabilities and thus the operational capabilities of the declared units.²⁸

Force Goals identified with NATO during 2004 and 2006 and capabilities such as deployment, mobility, sustainability, timely availability of forces, survival and protection, combat efficiency, an effective command, control and communications system, effective intelligence, interoperability and compatibility, described in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative launched at the Washington Summit meeting in 1999 and the Strategic Defence Review of 2004, have become the backbone of the Slovenian Armed Forces, oriented to the implementation of tasks together with the Allied Forces. Last year, the SAF complemented the Force Goals with combat support forces, such as an explosive ordnance disposal platoon, technical divers, a bridge company and a water purification unit.

Attainment of the final operational capabilities of units, identified in the Force Goals, will also present a great challenge in the next five-year period. The SAF will be faced with equipment and procedures with which it has had little experience. It will introduce new standards and prepare new instructions and procedures. Through the process of achieving the Force Goals and participating in international operations and other activities, the characteristics and nature of the military will gradually change and bring about adaptation and reorganisation of the entire SAF.

4.2 EU Headline Goal 2010

The Headline Goal 2010 represents the level of ambition of the EU with respect to conducting autonomous military operations.²⁹ It was built upon the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003.³⁰ There the target was established to set up a military force 50,000 to 60,000 personnel strong, able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year, with necessary command, control and other capabilities in order to be able to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks.³¹

While not yet a Member State and thus not participating in setting both Headline Goals, Slovenia declared its contributions to both. After accession to the EU, the SAF participated in the development of Headline Goal 2010 force planning procedures, in particular the Scrutinising – Assessment – Evaluation process and in the production of Requirements, Force and Progress Catalogues. The Long-Term Vision study from 2006 gave a perspective up to the horizon of 2025, drawing a future capability profile and underlining the challenges that lie in front of defence planners. The

²⁸ *Strategic Defence Review 2002/2003 with a vision of development by 2015, MO RS document, No. 802-00-15/2003-19, dated 12 March 2004.*

²⁹ *Compared with NATO, the EU conducts out-of-area operations and not those of collective defence.*

³⁰ *Endorsed by the European Council in 1999 in Helsinki, Finland.*

³¹ *Endorsed by the Council of the Western European Union in 1992 at the Petersberg Hotel, Germany. In 1997, they were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union. EU crisis management tasks (Petersberg Tasks) are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.*

Capability Development Programme (CDP) emerged in 2008, incorporating both the Headline Goal and Long-Term Vision, along with two additional constitutive strands that depict current defence plans and programmes as well as lessons from current experience.

Although the CDP represents a broader framework for defence planning in the EU, including capability development priorities, the Headline Goal 2010 has remained the reference to which Member States declare their forces available for ESDP operations. Slovenia submitted its response on declared contributions according to diverse options at its disposal: in 2004 through the national response to the NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) that had specific EU questions inserted, in 2006 via the national response to the Headline Goal Questionnaire (HGQ) and in 2009 again via the national response to the DPQ.

4.3 Reorganisation and transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in line with NATO and EU expectations and goals

It is not easy for any country, small or large, to manage the myriad capabilities required to support transformation and modernisation efforts, national priorities and NATO, EU or other commitments. For smaller countries, finding the resources and developing the full spectrum of capabilities needed for Crisis Response Operations (CRO) is indeed challenging. Before joining NATO and the EU, Slovenia was determined to have everything that larger countries have, for what today we believe were wrong considerations. We can say that we have learned to be realistic and that the time for transformation has arrived. The transformation process of the SAF is composed of professionalisation, integration, modernisation and reorganisation. Generally speaking, the SAF has applied several steps towards full integration into the NATO structure: integration into the decision-making system through a presence in the NARO HQ and NCS, implementation of NATO standards in the SAF, national certification and NATO affirmation activities, affiliation activities of SAF units to the NATO Force Structure (NFS), and a contribution to and participation in Alliance operations.

After 5 years of membership in NATO, the SAF is close to finishing the formal part of the integration. The next part leads towards increasing efficiency and affiliation of declared capabilities within the NFS. Short- and mid-term goals for affiliation-declared capabilities to the NFS are, first of all, an increased ability to operate together, which leads to military capabilities which can be used for collective defence. The following table shows the main characteristics of the old and new defence patterns. These are at the same time the characteristics of military transformation.

Table 1:
Transformation
of the defence
paradigm

Old defence pattern	New defence pattern
From static defence, garrison forces	to mobile, expeditionary forces
From large institutional forces	to more powerful operational capabilities
From major conventional combat operations	to multiple irregular or asymmetric operations
From separate military service concepts of operation	to joint and combined operations
From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes	to the focus on information, knowledge and real-time intelligence
From threat-based planning	to capabilities-based planning

“The new defence pattern sets different demands on building military capabilities. Forces are to be more capable and efficiency-oriented, able to execute expeditionary operations as joint and combined forces. These forces focus on information, knowledge and real-time intelligence.”³²

Through unit affiliation, which is considered to be a peacetime relationship supporting training and exercise activities, smaller countries gain an opportunity to develop invaluable training and experience, and can then confidently deploy with affiliated units, since affiliated units should train and fight together.

In the field of declared forces, NATO and the EU established the principle of a “single set of forces”³³ for both organisations in order to reduce the burden of duplication of military capabilities. In respect of NATO and EU reaction forces, the SAF has used the NRF and the EUBG as a strong tool to build national military capabilities. The NRF/EUBG standards and lessons learned have been transferred into national practice. The Slovenian contribution has been constantly increasing since 2005, starting with a platoon and increasing to a company, and from 2011 it is planned to contribute a battalion-sized unit (CBRN framework battalion).

We can conclude that for the Slovenian Armed Forces, Crisis Response Operations and capability-building for Rapid Response Forces are the main driving factors for military transformation and integration.

³² A. Šteiner, *Slovenian Experiences and Challenges in Military Capabilities Development, EUMC Away Day Seminar, Šmarješke Toplice, Slovenia, 19 May 2008.*

³³ *A set of forces declared for NATO and the EU, excluding NATO and EU (BG) Rapid Reaction Forces.*

5 THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AS PART OF NATO AND EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

5.1 NATO military structure³⁴

NATO is a political and security alliance with a strong military component, having a diverse and complex structure, organised at several levels. As NATO is an alliance of countries, the most important part of its organisation lies at the inter-governmental political level at which final decisions are adopted. To realise these decisions, the countries provide capabilities and resources on the basis of free, proportional and reasonable burden-sharing. Forces and capabilities, contributed by member states, are under the limited control of NATO and at the same time remain in the national chain of command and control at all levels. Support to this organisation in the adoption and implementation of decisions is offered by the common organisational structure. This structure may be divided into political (civilian) and military as well as into agencies and organisations.³⁵ In terms of organisation, the systemised common organisational structure of NATO is composed of several types and divided into:

- NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) with agencies and other organisational units in Brussels,
- NATO Command Structure (NCS),
- NATO organisational units formed and operating in accordance with multinational agreements (MOU organisations³⁶),
- NATO Force Structure (NFS),
- NATO Response Forces (NRF), and
- NATO forces in international operations and missions.

The main decision-making institution at the political level in NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), while the Military Committee is the most important military body. Committees and other working bodies consisting of representatives of member states are subordinate to the NAC.

The NATO Command Structure consists of two large military commands: Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACO and ACT, closely supported by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency, present the mechanism of the Alliance for the command of military forces available in NATO.

NATO, except for the AWACS and signal units, has no common independent military forces. As the Alliance is composed of countries, one could even say that all the armed forces of member states constitute a common NATO army. NATO-led forces participating in international operations and missions constitute the most important part. Upon deployment of forces to international operations and missions, allies

³⁴ Humar, David, *Common organizational structure of NATO alliance*, Bilten SV 11/2, Ljubljana 2009

³⁵ *The general basic structure of NATO is shown at www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm*

³⁶ *MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) organisations are organisational units established by all or some allies in accordance with international agreements.*

transfer part of their command authority to the SACEUR,³⁷ who, through the chain of command and control, further transfers this authority to subordinate commanders. The national chain of command in international operations and missions is provided by the senior national representatives. Most of the forces, including NRF, come from the NFS, which consists of multinational and national forces.

5.2 EU military structure

Unlike NATO, the EU has no permanent command structure, but on the other hand, in order to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, the European Council³⁸ has decided to establish permanent political and military structures within the Council of the EU. These new structures are: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC is part of the overall structure of committees and working bodies of the Council of the EU. The EUMC is the highest military body set up within the Council and provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The Committee is supported by a military working group (EUMCWG) that deals with topics from the EUMC agenda at working level. The main operational functions of the EUMS comprise early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. It supports the EUMC regarding situation assessment and military aspects of strategic planning over the full range of EU-led military operations. Although the EUMS³⁹ assists the EUMC, it is a department of the Council General Secretariat and is directly attached to the High Representative. Its staff participates in the Joint Situation Centre.

For ESDP military operations, the EU has an additional military structure available. Berlin Plus arrangements provide for recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets such as SHAPE.⁴⁰ For autonomous ESDP military operations, several Member States have made available operational and force HQ's. In addition, since 2007, the EU has had its own capability for commanding operations of limited size, the EU Operations Centre. Operation and force HQ's consist of nucleus staff manned by personnel from contributing Member States.⁴¹

It should be mentioned that neither the EUMS nor the EUMC are part of the C2 structure. However, the Operation Commander's primary Point of Contact with regard to all questions related to an operation is the Chairman EUMC. The C2 structure at different levels must be decided by the PSC on an ad hoc basis.

³⁷ *Supreme Allied Commander Europe who leads ACO.*

³⁸ *In Nice, December 2000. Council of the European Union: ESDP structures and instruments, 20 May 2009.*

³⁹ *The EUMS, with around 150 persons, forms part of the Council Secretariat, with 2700 persons working there. This means that only 0.5% of the staff in the EU organisation are military.*

⁴⁰ *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, situated in Mons, Belgium it is Supreme HQ of ACO.*

⁴¹ *Apart from SHAPE (Berlin +) and the EU OPS Centre, five nations provide OHQ for EU needs, in rotation with delegated BGs: France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. In the case of the operation in Congo, Germany provided OHQ in Potsdam, and for the operation in Chad, France provided OHQ in Paris.*

The Operation Commander is appointed by the Council and usually supported by a non-deployed Operation HQ. The Force Commander, with his Force HQ, will be deployed in a theatre. And finally, the required number of component commands with subordinate units, of course also deployed in the area of operations. Evidently, this chain of command will always be tailored to the specific operation.

5.3 Integration of the Slovenian Armed Forces into NATO and EU military structures through participation in Crisis Response Operations

As previously stated, the SAF's CROs are one of the main driving factors of military transformation. Initial representatives of Slovenian cooperation in CROs in 1997/98 were members of the 10th Battalion for International Cooperation, the 15th Aviation Brigade and the 17th Military Police Battalion. However, members of other units also participated. Units are gaining valuable experience related to the required training and equipment for operations in different climates, and insight that will inform national training plans and affect future procurement decisions. The SAF started with deployments to CROs in 1997. Up to this day, the SAF has participated in 18 operations and concluded 12.⁴² In 2007, for example, Slovenia deployed a battalion to KFOR for the first time. We can affirm that the achievement of an FOC for that unit would essentially be harder without operational deployment. From among 4587⁴³ people, many have been deployed more than once.

The basic principle of participation was to start with staff positions and smaller units, gain experience, and then increase the importance and number of positions and units on the ground. Individuals were sent to different positions to support common goals and gain experience as a part of their professional growth. At the beginning, individual volunteers were sent, and later, units composed of volunteers; today CROs have become a normal activity of organic units.

Providing forces and other elements for CROs gives the best results for improving both national capabilities and contributing to NATO and EU operations, but there are advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, this provides an immediate impact. As a result of contributions to deployed operations, a large number of troops have received important operational experience, thereby enhancing the mission effectiveness of these forces and profiting from lessons learned. This ensures efficient pre-deployment training of rotating units and enhances the overall level of training within the national forces. A very important fact in CRO participation is the broad possibility for networking among people, which makes all further communications and exchanges of information easier. On the other hand, the SAF has made sure

⁴² NATO: Albania – Allied Harbour (1999), BiH – Joint guardian/Joint Force (1997-2004), Iraq – NTM-I (2006–2008), Pakistan – NATO Support to Pakistan (2005), Afghanistan – ISAF (2003-).

EU: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Concordia (2003), BiH Althea – EUFOR (2005-), Congo – EUFOR (2006), Sudan – AMIS II (Darfur) (2006–2007), Tchad (2008), EU NAVFOR ATALANTA (2009-)

UN: Cyprus – UNFICYP (1997–2001), Kosovo – MACC/UNMIK (1999–2001), BiH – OHR (2001–2004)

OSCE: Albania – ALBA (1997), UNTSO.

⁴³ Data from May 2009.

not to overcommit its forces exclusively to operations, also focusing on mid- and long-term capability development. A high operational tempo may, over time, have an effect on equipment readiness and modernisation timelines in a limited-resource environment.

Smaller countries can have immediate and lasting impact in contributing to operations by establishing one or more specific capabilities which are missing from the pool of forces and capabilities identified in the Defence Review. The SAF has been attempting to make a qualitative contribution as a necessary special or niche capability (helicopters, MP, Role 1). However, for smaller countries it is also imperative to have a combat presence on the ground to demonstrate their capability and the will of sharing risks. Thus the SAF has deployed the SF and motorised platoon to ISAF, and Motorised Infantry Battalion to KFOR.

A multinational approach to Combat Service Support has been essential, since the national capabilities required to provide full logistic support are limited. We have to be aware that there are also limits to what countries can do with multinational affiliations and mutually supportive arrangements.

The 10th Motorised Battalion (10. MOTB) is the main pillar and contributor of the SAF to international operations and missions. The history of the 10. MOTB extends back to 1996, when the 10th Battalion for International Military Cooperation was first formed. One year later, ten battalion members, including a medical unit, left for the first international operation and mission in Albania.⁴⁴ This took place almost simultaneously with the National Assembly adopting the decision that Slovenia's main security interest lay in the collective defence provided by NATO. Through the participation in first CRO, Slovenia symbolically, yet clearly, indicated its willingness to play a more distinctive role in the system of collective security.

SAF cooperation in international operations and missions after Operation ALBA continued with a section of the 10th Battalion participating in the UN mission in Cyprus. Eight platoon shifts operated in Cyprus until September 2001. In the same year the SAF began participating in the NATO-led SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Bell-412 helicopter and a Turbolet aircraft. Members of the Military Police joined the operation in 1998. A motorised company of the 10. MOTB⁴⁵ began participating in the operation in January 2003. The company was part of the international battle group in Doboj, composed of Polish, Portuguese and Slovenian members. Members of the 10. MOTB later also participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The year 2007 can be said to be a turning point for the SAF as regards their participation in international operations and missions. This was the first time that Slovenia deployed a battalion-size unit to KFOR which also included units of the allied armed forces. Eleven years after its establishment, the 10. MOTB

⁴⁴ The operation was named ALBA and was conducted under the auspices of the OSCE with a UN mandate from 14 May to 27 July 1997.

⁴⁵ The Battalion for International Military Cooperation changed its name to the 10. MOTB in 2001.

successfully passed national certification and NATO affirmation, and participated in an international operation. The Battalion returned to Kosovo this year.

Already at the time of its formation, the battalion was in a way assigned a developmental role, being the holder of the process of interoperability with NATO at the tactical level and playing an important role in the professionalisation of the SAF.⁴⁶ The knowledge and experience gained in international exercises as well as international operations and missions were not only passed on to the 10th Battalion members but became the driving force for the development and transformation of the 1st Brigade.

5.4 Incorporation and integration into the peacetime establishment structure

After joining the PfP, Slovenia sent liaison officers to NATO HQ in Brussels and the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons,⁴⁷ in September and November 1995, respectively. In 1998, the officers continued on to Brussels and Naples according to the decision on the establishment of Partner Staff Elements.⁴⁸ This constituted the start of filling both national posts in military liaison teams and international assignments dedicated to military personnel from Partner Countries. Both components were successively augmented in the years to come. Since 1995, more than 130 SAF members have gained experience in working within NATO and the EU.

Becoming a member state of the Alliance led to some new obligations of active participation in the NATO Command Structure (NCS). According to the agreements, Slovenia was obliged to fulfil different peacetime establishment positions in different NATO HQs.⁴⁹ Each position has its own job description describing the requirements to be met by the selected personnel to fulfil the position. Some of them also incorporate crisis establishment duty requirements. Language requirements are already known from the PfP, but now, doctrine, processes and procedures have to be upgraded to the highest level of interoperability, at the skill level of individuals. The process of preparing people already started in the PfP phase with our individual participation in exercises and in Command and War Colleges in Alliance nations. NATO Schools and the NDC, together with the Garmisch Centre, also play a valuable role.

The NCS, with HQs at tactical, operational and strategic levels and crisis establishment operational-level HQs (CJTF) give Slovenian soldiers experience in structures which the SAF does not possess. The individual is an active piece of the puzzle, shaping and contributing to the challenges of today's situations as well as preparing

⁴⁶ *Special issue of the magazine Slovenska vojska – Bulletin of the 10th Battalion, published on the 10th anniversary of the battalion, 27 May 2006, p. 9.*

⁴⁷ *According to the provisions of the Partnership for Peace Invitation and Framework Documents.*

⁴⁸ *The establishment of the PSEs was considered at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defence Ministers Session in December 1997 among other recommendations from the Comprehensive Progress Report on the Implementation of the EAPC Basic Document and the PfP Enhancement.*

⁴⁹ *Sklep Vlade RS o popolnitvi formacijskih dolžnosti v mirnodobnih poveljstvih in enotah Nata (št. 802-02/2002-16 z dne 01.04.2004) in dopolnitev z dne 22.04.2004.*

for future ones while doing their jobs. This is a unique opportunity to learn and practice all joint functions and processes in preparing, planning and conducting the operational level of war (operations) activities. Therefore, these personnel need to bring back their experiences to the SAF, further enhancing the interoperability level. How can the SAF best prepare future rotations of personnel? Using the same processes, procedures and doctrine, C2 arrangements and decision-making processes will give the personnel the best preparation for those positions.

5.5 Affiliation of units to the NATO Force Structure

By affiliation of units to the NFS, the units pass from the common NATO pool of forces, composed of forces of all the Allies, to the pool of those forces which methodically train together and unite in peace, thus reaching a higher level of interoperability. The units are still under the national command but train within the NFS at the unit level. The SAF, mostly composed of land forces, has set itself the goal of affiliating into two corps of the NFS. At the moment, the 10th Motorised Battalion is in the process of affiliation to NRDC-ITA and the 18th CBRN Defence Battalion to MNC N/E.

The 10. MOTB was the second SAF unit, after the transport company, to pass the national combat readiness evaluation with certification and later affirmation. Earlier, the battalion completed the training phase based on the operational cycle, which lasted a year and a half. The combat readiness evaluation took place during the exercise Hawk Strike, which lasted from 23 October to 17 November 2006 and was conducted at the Hungarian training ground at Varpalota. The first international assessment of an SAF unit took place at the same training-ground in May 2003 when the 20th Motorised Battalion was assessed within the MLF exercise.⁵⁰

The national combat readiness evaluation signified the last phase of attaining final operational capabilities for the 10. MOTB. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the national directive based on the model of NATO's Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) methodology and performed by a group of assessors from the SAF. After this certification, a group of NATO officers from Madrid conducted the affirmation. The group found minor deviations in the battalion, linked to interoperability, which, however, did not prevent the unit's inclusion in the NATO pool of forces.

The 18th CBRN Defence Battalion attained final operational capabilities this year, on the basis of which it will be capable of conducting nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological surveillance, reconnaissance, decontamination, sampling and laboratory analysis. The building of battalion capabilities proceeded gradually. Participation in the NRF forces, through which the unit gained important experience, played an important role in this process. The battalion began participating in the NRF in 2005 when it contributed a decontamination platoon to NRF-4,⁵¹ led by Germany. This

⁵⁰ *The Multinational Land Force (MLF) prepared and assessed the unit in the context of preparations for KFOR during the exercise Clever Ferret 2003.*

⁵¹ *CBRN Def Bn: Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defence Battalion.*

was an important milestone for the battalion, as its members began facing challenges which they had been unfamiliar with. The battalion has thus begun introducing NATO standards, testing new equipment, practicing deployment outside Slovenia, training in a real environment with real casualty agents and becoming familiar with similar units of other NATO members. All these experiences were upgraded in the six NRF rotations with units from the level of platoon to the level of company. One of the important experiences was also leadership of a unit from a different member state and familiarisation with the capabilities of the entire international CBRN battalion. Participation in the NRF was most valuable in terms of the exchange of experience among the armed forces of different countries, confirmation of comparability of knowledge and competence at the international level, confirmation of compatibility of resources and equipment, as well as in terms of following-up the progress made in the area of experience and equipment of CBRN units. These experiences will be very valuable during the leadership of the international CBRN element in the NRF in 2011.

5.6 NATINADS and air policing

The NATO Integrated Air Defence System is essential for maintaining a visible deterrent posture and the integrity of the Alliance airspace. Air policing is a peacetime task that is performed by the Alliance in an integrated way. The system includes the Air Surveillance and Control System, Air C2 System and Air Defence Capability, including fighters (interceptors) to execute the task of protecting the integrity of the Alliance airspace. The system will also include Theatre Missile Defence.

This is a peacetime operation executed by the SACEUR over the Alliance territory. NATO's provision of air policing is particularly important for Slovenia, which lacks its own interceptors. This operation is executed on behalf of Slovenia and thus increases its security and the security of Slovenia's air space. Slovenia is part of this with its ASOC,⁵² which is integrated into the NATO Integrated Air Defence System. For small countries with limited assets, this is a real force multiplier that helps Slovenia achieve and maintain the desired degree of control of the air through which the country also contributes to the protection and freedom of the manoeuvre of the Alliance in addressing the full spectrum of operations.

5.7 EU pool of forces and EU Battle Groups

The EU pool of forces comprises national contributions to the Force Catalogue. They come from EU Member States, mostly as national units, some as multinational. In addition, NATO countries in Europe that are not members of the EU may also declare their contributions. With the exception of multinational formations, such contributions are national stand-alone units and not included in the pre-arranged, structured and trained multinational deployable formations. Only the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) are structured and trained in advance, according to the EU semestrial roster.

⁵² ASOC (Air Sovereignty Operations Center) which supports the NATO Integrated Air Picture will in future become an Control and Report Post.

Slovenia declared contributions to the EU pool of forces as a candidate country.⁵³ In committing its forces, Slovenia has followed the principle of a single set of forces.

A root of the EU Rapid Response lies in the Helsinki Headline Goal, dated December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. The Member States set themselves the Headline Goal: “by the year 2003⁵⁴ cooperating together voluntarily, nations will be able to deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of ‘Petersberg Tasks.’” The Headline Goal 2010 expresses the requirements of the ESS, giving priority to the interoperability of European forces and to the capability for rapid deployment. The importance of Rapid Response Capabilities can also be seen from the EU illustrative scenarios from the Requirement Catalogue 05.⁵⁵ Rapid response is based on Rapid Response Elements – EUBG, combined and joint, tailored to a specific task and at very high readiness (available and deployable on short notice), either as part of an overall force or to conduct an urgent operation on a smaller scale and self-contained.

The EU permanently has 2 BG on 5–30 days readiness in a 6-month rotation. Slovenia has contributed a contingent to the EUBG composed of approximately 200 people.⁵⁶ Slovenia’s contribution was based on a pre-established MLF brigade, a trilateral brigade among Italy, Hungary and Slovenia. The BG was delegated for a stand-by period in the second semester of 2007 and is also delegated for the second semester of 2012. Before being delegated as an EU BG, the MLF had passed several evaluations and participated in two operations in Kosovo in 2003/2004 and 2005/2006. The MLF passed the hard way, from an initiative the intention of which was regional co-operation and which developed over many years.⁵⁷

After the conclusion of the stand-by period, Slovenia gained experiences which were positive, but also negative. The first and very positive experience was the MLF background. It was easy to work and pass all necessary steps within the unit, which had been operating together and which had passed several trainings, evaluations and missions. Additionally, a combined structure requires a strong liaison system, which was well established in the MLF.

The country also collected some challenges for the future, such as lack of strategic transport capabilities, related to very high costs for strategic lifts. All three nations

⁵³ *Supplement to Helsinki Force Catalogue 04. After becoming an EU Member State, contributions were made to Force Catalogue 06, Force Catalogue(s) 07 and Force Catalogue 09.*

⁵⁴ *By 2003, EU nations are supposed to provide up to 50–60,000 troops (additional air and naval elements), deployable within 60 days (+ high readiness elements), sustainable for at least 1 year (C2I, logistics, combat support), and to establish new permanent political and military structures (PSC, EUMC, EUMS, HTF).*

⁵⁵ *Four out of five existing illustrative scenarios require Rapid Response Forces. Under each scenario the Petersberg missions are included. These scenarios are: Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to Third Countries, Conflict Prevention, Evacuation Operations, and Assistance to Humanitarian Operations. Only in Stabilisation are reconstruction and military assistance to third countries not required.*

⁵⁶ *HQ elements 20, LOG Elements 40, Motorised COY125, MP element 3, NSE 12.*

⁵⁷ *A. Šteiner, Slovenian Experiences and Challenges in Military Capabilities Development, EUMC Away Day Seminar, Šmarješke Toplice, Slovenia, May 19, 2008.*

also have obligations in other organisations conducting operations around the world. Preparations for the BG lasted a year and a half, which meant 2600 persons not available for other deployments. On the other hand, the units were ready to go: but among troops there is certain disappointment after a stand-by period of not being deployed.

For the SAF, the MLF⁵⁸ was a useful transformational tool to elevate a unit from regional cooperation to a unit with importance at the global level in several meanings: on the one hand, the MLF proved that rapid reaction forces could also be created at the tactical level, such as EU BG; the MLF enabled the integration of the SAF in the NFS and NRDC-IT; through the MLF, the SAF took over a battle group in KFOR.

5.8 Single pool (set) of forces for NATO and the EU

Detailed medium- and long-term planning will assist nations in maximising the use of limited resources and in prioritising the equipping, training and modernisation of their forces and their ability to provide the required capabilities to national, multinational, EU and NATO operations. Most of the countries which are members of both organisations possess limited military resources. Therefore, they try to participate in joint projects and programmes provided by both NATO and the EU, often with the same goal in mind. The principle of a single set of forces can be applied first of all within national declared forces to NATO and the EU defined in the DPQ and HGQ. As a small country with limited resources, Slovenia is especially interested in a better and more efficient partnership, which means the least possible duplication of forces. Competition between organisations should be minimised. In this sense Slovenia supports the principle of a single set of forces in coordination with NATO and EU forces, as well as all activities which support reductions of duplication.

The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP reiterated the following political principles of strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO; respect for the interests of the EU and NATO Member States; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of military capability requirements in common.⁵⁹

Besides declared and reaction forces, NATO-EU cooperation is very active in CROs. The basis for a strategic partnership in EU-NATO crisis management is constituted in the “Berlin +” arrangements,⁶⁰ which have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well established and deep-rooted. These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and can be combined as: EU

⁵⁸ Croatia and Austria have had observer status since 2002.

⁵⁹ NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002.

⁶⁰ Initiated on 3 June 1996 at the Berlin NATO Council.

access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and the use of NATO assets and capabilities.⁶¹

Although the EU and NATO staffs exchange information on ongoing activities and efforts on priority issues of mutual interest in the area of military capability development, and in particular on overlapping identified shortfalls, we can assert that this cooperation could be much stronger and better. On the other hand, we can firmly say that although there is room for improvement, at the working level, especially in operations, cooperation between both organisations is good.

Conclusion The integration of the SAF into NATO and EU military structures signifies the capability of the SAF to operate in alliances. As the SAF operates in international operations and missions as well as in war operations in alliances, Slovenia has to be as integrated as possible to reduce potential casualties and increase the chances of success. The results of integration are visible in collective operations; transformation, through participation in international operations and missions, has thus been particularly useful in the process of integration.

The SAF is about to complete its formal integration into the NATO military structure. This does not mean, however, that integration will be finished. The levels of integration and interoperability will continue to increase, in part due to the fact that the Alliance is accepting new members⁶², but also because the allied armed forces are changing and growing in quality. Integration and interoperability will therefore be integral parts of the further development of the SAF. The SAF has the most recent experience in the integration process; it is therefore appropriate to share this experience and in this way help new members.

We have to be aware of the fact that the fundamental part of integration has been completed by SAF individuals and the certified units. These units will now continue conducting combined-joint exercises and operations within the NATO Force Structure. The task of the SAF is to expand this knowledge and experience to include the entire armed forces, all units and members.

In many areas, the conclusion of formal processes signifies that the SAF has attained only the minimum required quality. It should not, of course, be satisfied with this but aim for higher quality. It would be ideal if the entire SAF attained final operational capabilities. In order to achieve this goal, the SAF has to continue modernising and transforming into a modern deployable army which will include not only paid members but also professionals of active and reserve components who will be able to work with Alliance members on an equal rights basis and, if necessary, establish a strategic reserve for national purposes.

⁶¹ Additionally, the DSACEUR (NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) has the role of an EU Operation Commander.

⁶² http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm

NATO and EU member states must be aware of their national interests and capabilities. Each country accepts the obligations deriving from the alliance individually, yet on the basis of harmonisation. In taking joint decisions, the countries have to make sure that the requirements are acceptable and attainable. The alliances offer quality development criteria and the possibility of cooperation and comparison to others. Slovenia's contribution to the alliances depends on its capabilities; however, the country has to be aware of the principles of solidarity and burden-sharing, which represent the basis of the alliances. The goal of the SAF, with 50 percent deployable and 10 percent sustainable land forces, along with a defence budget ratio of 50:30:20 for personnel, operations and procurement, allows for the army's readiness and appropriate quality with regard to national requirements as well as those of NATO and the EU. The SAF, as the national armed forces of the Republic of Slovenia, a NATO and EU member, strives to meet Slovenia's goals in these two organisations but also the common goals of NATO and the EU.

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IZMENJAVA OBVEŠČEVALNO-VARNOSTNIH IZKUŠENJ Z EVROPSKO UNIJO IN NATOM

EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES IN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

Review paper

Povzetek Na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju so se s članstvom v Evropski uniji in Natu Sloveniji odprla številna nova vrata, kajti tudi tukaj, tako kot na drugih področjih, smo s svojimi partnerji sedli za isto, skupno mizo. Sodobna obveščevalno-varnostna dejavnost deluje v razmerah nove obveščevalne paradigme, ko je sodelovanje in izmenjavo informacij treba zagotoviti na različnih ravneh znotraj države, kot *intra-* in *interresorno*, ter zunaj države, dvostransko v EU in Natu ter z OZN, ko gre za udeležbo na mednarodnih operacijah in misijah na taktični in strateški ravni. Dejavnost ni odvisna od hierarhičnosti strukture, temveč je sploščena, deluje horizontalno, saj obveščevalno-varnostne strukture, ki so zelo jasno vpete v organizacijsko strukturo, neposredno podpirajo najvišje odločevalce ter samostojno izmenjujejo obveščevalne informacije med seboj, z državami članicami, poveljstvi Nata itn. Temu ustrezno je treba nadomestiti in nadgraditi načelo potrebe po vedenju z načelom potrebe po delitvi (drugimi).

V preteklosti je Nato namenjal varnosti precej več pozornosti kot EU, ki se je reševanja te problematike intenzivno lotila šele po letu 2001. Istega leta je tudi Slovenija postavila normativne temelje sodobnega, primerljivega sistema ravnanja s tajnimi podatki, njegova implementacija pa je nikoli končan proces.

Ključne besede *Evropska unija, nova obveščevalna paradigma, obveščevalno-varnostna dejavnost, Obveščevalno varnostna služba Ministrstva za obrambo, Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija, tajni podatki, varnost, zveza Nato.*

Abstract With membership of the European Union and NATO, a number of new doors opened up for Slovenia in the area of intelligence and security. Similarly to other areas, Slovenia sat behind the same table together with its partners. Modern intelligence and security takes place in conditions of new intelligence paradigm, where cooperation and exchange of information should be provided on various national

levels, as *intra-* and *inter-*agency activity, and outside the country, bilaterally within the EU and NATO, and with the UN when it is related to participation in international operations and missions on tactical and strategic levels. This activity does not depend on the hierarchy of the structure, but it is flattened and functions horizontally. Intelligence and security structures are namely clearly incorporated in the organizational structure, they directly support top decision-makers and exchange intelligence among themselves autonomously, with member states, NATO commands, etc. In consideration of this, the need-to-know principle should be replaced and upgraded with the need-to-share (with others) principle.

In the past, security was given far more attention within NATO than in the EU, which began to intensify its activity in this area only after the year 2001. In the same year Slovenia also set the normative basis for a modern, comparable system of classified information management, taking into account that its implementation is a never-ending process.

Key words *European Union, new intelligence paradigm, intelligence and security, Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of Defence, Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency, classified information, security, NATO.*

Introduction International cooperation in the area of intelligence and security has always been part of intelligence and security structures' operations. Since its beginnings, Slovenia has established bilateral intelligence and security relations with individual countries that have or have not been members of the European Union and/or NATO. Following the first democratic elections in the late eighties of the previous century, the intelligence and security, both civilian and defence-military, was directed at preserving Slovenia's independence processes. Given the current information, one can argue that it was a success story of intelligence and security structures of the then republic in the federation.

Approximately a decade ago the process of adjustment to modern standards in the intelligence and security area, and their implementation increased in intensity. This same period also saw the adoption of the modern Police Act in 1998 and the modern Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency Act in 1999, while the Defence Act underwent continued amendments and upgrades after the year 1994. The first two acts were important all the more as they regulated the uniform method of authority used in the past concerning the functioning of intelligence and security structures. Intelligence structures lost their police and executive powers linking intelligence with so-called political police in the past. For Slovenia of that period, the new European standard represented also a symbolic conclusion of the transformation process of intelligence and security structures launched during the first democratic elections. From a normative perspective worthy of special mention is the Classified Information Act developed in the late nineties and adopted in 2001. This

act introduced a NATO- and EU-comparable and modern framework for classified information management across the nation.

The aim of this paper is to analyze and highlight the importance of cooperation in the intelligence and security area as one of the major pillars of the intelligence paradigm. Intelligence and security cooperation within NATO and the EU with Slovenia functioning as an equal factor represents an important aspect of intelligence and security support for the countries and both organizations alike. The analysis is derived from key quality methods. An extra added value to the study is the method of direct participant observation as it enables gathering of relevant information from practice. The paper presents subject matter that is rather limited in its essence, since research of intelligence still involves a collision of scientific curiosity and secrecy requirements. A clear overview of modern trends and challenges is given in the context of international cooperation, and a complete and original description is provided about the position of intelligence in NATO and the EU. Particular attention is given to the role of Slovenia's intelligence and security structures *vis-à-vis* NATO and the EU.

When in the early nineties of the previous century Slovenia noted in its key documents that integration into the EU and NATO was its strategic objective, this also applied to intelligence and security. In the first stage it particularly implied more intensive cooperation with member states of the EU and/or NATO. It should be stressed, however, that a considerable part of cooperation evolved also in other branches of power, notably the legislative branch gathering experiences about the implementation of intelligence and security in democracy, but also about its appropriate control. Accession to these two international organizations, which otherwise pursue different missions, but whose legitimacy, at the same time, is based on respect for human rights and basic freedoms, democracy, respect for law and order, and other modern civilization principles, was imperative for Slovenia in order to ensure long-term stability of the country, its citizens and, after all, Slovenians as a nation.

In the continuation of the text some attention will be dedicated to the lessons learned and exchanged from the perspective of classified information management, with intelligence and security structures being incorporated primarily in the preventive aspects of providing security, as for instance security clearance of persons, bodies and organizations, introduction of minimum security standards, etc. Minimum standards in the EU and NATO pertaining to security are very similar and often interoperable. In the past, attention to security within NATO considerably exceeded that of the EU, which intensified its approach to these issues only after the year 2001.

Over the past five years of Slovenia's membership in the EU and NATO, several new doors have opened, as Slovenia, similarly to other areas, here also joined its partners behind the same table. In the EU, cooperation has evolved into presiding over equal partners with Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council in the first half of

2008. Slovenia has progressed to a country that gathers and also offers experiences, i.e. it exchanges them through various forms of cooperation.

More than ever before, and in particular after 11 September 2001, contemporary security environment has been marked by a global and transnational character of threats. A more intensified cooperation among all institutions facing these threats has, therefore, become necessary. The EU and NATO rely on the available intelligence and security capabilities and particularly on intelligence and security support of member states. Consequently, national intelligence and security services and structures of the EU and NATO had to adjust within the framework of a new intelligence paradigm.

1 NEW INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM

A **new intelligence paradigm**¹ is composed of the most recent trends in this area. There are at least **seven** trends which impact on the nature of intelligence service operations. *The first* trend refers to the transformation of national intelligence and other related structures. The most obvious example of this trend is the transformation of the largest intelligence community, i.e. the US intelligence. The aim of the transformation is to ensure better coordination and data evaluation, and their dissemination to users within the shortest time possible. Directly linked with the first is *the second* trend which expands the obligations and powers for data-gathering by intelligence services, most often through substantial encroachment on human rights and freedoms. *The third* emerging trend is a requirement for intelligence and evidence with forensic value. This trend is posing a whole range of new challenges and requirements to intelligence services. Data obtained through technical means require accurate and quality processing within a very short period of time, finalization to an appropriate evidentiary level (sic!) and then dissemination to clients within the shortest time possible. *The fourth* trend is linked with an increased capacity for the transmission of large amounts of data and information, which often makes intelligence services unable to compete with the means designed for transmission of data and information, such as television, radio, internet and telephone calls (conversations, SMS), which represent the most frequent medium for exchanging the news. *The fifth* is embedded in the spirit of the flattened, horizontal world. The flattening access and usability of information technology allowed one billion people to use the internet in 2007, although within this billion some individuals may misuse the internet to compromise the achievements brought by the internet itself. *The sixth* trend is the result and consequence of the penetration of the third and fourth trends into intelligence community. Intelligence services are required to support strategic, operational and tactical users with relevant intelligence. The contents should be adjusted for use on different levels, taking into account that, in the information age, tactical moves in the theatre or during the execution of intelligence can have strategic implications. *The seventh* trend is closely linked with the first, yet it surpasses its sole national dimension. International cooperation in the area of intelligence, among

¹ *More on the new intelligence paradigm in Črnčec, 2009b, p. 83–85.*

countries, and within the framework of various supranational, security, regional or economic organizations has nowadays become more important than ever before. In the continuation of the text, the new paradigm will be addressed mainly from the perspective of intelligence processes at the national and international levels.

The common denominator of all these trends is of course *man, an individual*² possessing appropriate education and qualifications, permanently trained in his area of expertise, as well as in the use of information technology and the protection of human rights and basic freedoms. An individual who understands that the environment around him has changed, that the organization he works for and he himself need to change. Changes should include changing the culture of secrecy that has always been and of course continues to be one of the key guiding principles of intelligence services. It is, therefore, essential that collaboration within, and among organizations, both domestically and internationally, be ensured. The culture of secrecy manifested through the *need to know* principle should be replaced and upgraded appropriately with the *need to share* principle or *responsibility to provide*. It is necessary to allow access to information to a wide circle of institutions that are differently involved in the process of ensuring national security, facilitated through information technology. A joint information network linking all institutions that function either as receivers or originators of information would be a welcome development. In the culture itself, it is not enough to be understood, defined in doctrines and then implemented by intelligence structure. It should be a process directed by and adhered to by the entire intelligence community in the widest sense, including those using intelligence products. These circumstances determined by the new intelligence paradigm could not be avoided neither by nation states nor international organizations, namely NATO and the EU. They will thus be given special attention in the continuation of the text.

2 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU is a supranational international organization founded as the European economic community of six countries which became a European organization (community) with 27 member states in 2007.³ The EU expects and demands from its members to renounce part of their national sovereignty for the benefit of the Union. Despite this, it is understandable that intelligence and security falls within the exclusive competence of member states as one of the key attributes of a modern sovereign state. As already referred to above, the EU and NATO **do not have** an intelligence and security service of their own. There are bodies existing in both organizations dealing with the issues of intelligence, counterintelligence or security. The management of classified information is regulated in detail, while the intelligence and security remains the domain

² *The Time magazine chose man as the 'Person of the Year 2006'. An individual is a person mastering the information era and one who both creates and uses information age services, an individual changing the art, politics and trade. A proactive individual is the citizen of the new digital democracy. Time, 25. 12. 2006/1. 1. 2007. The magazine was published in 6,965,000 copies.*

³ *Following the "big bang", i.e. the integration of ten new members in 2004, the EU expanded in 2007 to the present number of members with the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania.*

of member states of both organizations. Countries are still unwilling to delegate part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions such as the EU. However, modern threats and security challenges demand new forms and more effective ways of information exchange. The EU addresses these issues both in the second and third pillars⁴.

As part of the third pillar, the EU is focused primarily on countering the threat of terrorism. This involves some forms of cooperation dating several decades back. The ***Bern Group or Club*** was established in 1971. It originally involved six European security services, including the British Security Service, French DST, German BfV and Swedish SAPO. The director-level meetings are held twice a year and are not meant to be solely social gatherings. The group incorporates security services from the EU member states. Within the club, there are working subgroups dealing with specific problem areas (terrorism, organized crime). After 11 September 2001, the Bern Club established a new organisation called the ***Counterterrorism Group (CTG)***. This is a separate body with a wide range of membership involving EU intelligence and security services, and additionally the services of the US, Switzerland and Norway. The first meeting of CTG was in November 2001. Currently, the most important activity of this group is identification of threats posed by terrorism. Although not under direct jurisdiction of the EU, its analyses of security threats are available to individual high EU committees. CTG has no formal seat, and its presidency rotates together with the EU presidency (Aldrich, 2004).

The ideas of developing some sort of a European version of the US intelligence agency, the CIA, appeared previously within the European Union and tend to emerge during incidents that affect the entire Union. Such an example was the terrorist attacks in Spain in March 2003, which claimed more than 200 deaths and injured 1,500 others. The EU responded quickly and appointed a ***counterterrorism coordinator*** responsible for enhancing cooperation amongst member states, EU working bodies and other relevant entities. The main stress of their role is the exchange of intelligence among member states. Javier Solana, a high-ranking representative of the EU for common foreign and security policy, has proposed that the present Situation Centre of the EU Council, which collects and analyzes information on external risks should do the same in the area of internal security threats. Continued cooperation remains imperative among the countries and their intelligence and security services, as does the efficient exchange of information to allow timely implementation of preventive measures.


As part of the EU second pillar, cooperation among intelligence services depended heavily on bilateral relations. Military intelligence cooperation started as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) programme adopted at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The “intelligence architecture” project presented in Chart 1 stems from the EU Brussels Summit in 1999, when the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was created⁵. Between 2000 and 2001, the establishment of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) followed, which comprised an integrated intelligence component. The

⁴ The second pillar represents the ***Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)*** and the third pillar the ***Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)***.

⁵ It is now called the ***Policy Unit***.

end of 2001 saw the endorsement of the **ISTAR**⁶ concept for EU-led operations. The future challenges of the EU were outlined in the EU Security Strategy entitled “A Sustainable Europe for a Better World”. By the beginning of 2007, the development of EU intelligence became recognizable with the creation of common civilian, military, defence and analytical products. The products are made available to all key institutions within the EU and member states.

Chart 1:
Strategic Intelligence Architecture within the civilian and military structure of the European Union



Source: Črnčec, 2009b : 198

⁶ *ISTAR is a concept defining full intelligence support to (military) operations. The concept includes Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. ISTAR is an element of the intelligence cycle and denotes data collection sensors. NATO uses the acronym (J)ISR as a synonym for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.*

As mentioned previously, discussions about the formation of a European CIA are revived occasionally, but the European intelligence agency still remains just an idea. In practice, the provision of a common ESDP led to the creation of some institutions that dealt with the complete intelligence cycle or individual parts of it. The only real EU intelligence capability is the *Satellite Centre (EUSC)*⁷. EUSC is an important and proven asset that provides support to EU missions and geospatial products to member states that are the result of the analysis of satellite images and other data. EUSC plays an important role in ESDP by providing analysis of satellite imagery which can be essential for the success of military missions and the safety of military personnel. EUSC priorities are derived from the European security strategy and include: monitoring of regional conflicts, threats by organized crime, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has also provided full support for EU operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, it is an important early warning tool as it simplifies information-gathering for the prevention of armed conflicts. EUSC can also be guided by EU member states, and it commonly prepares documents for various international organizations, in particular for the UN⁸. EUSC users can be divided into five groups⁹:

- *EU Council and its bodies* – have direct relations mostly with the DG E VIII Directorate, EU Military Staff and the Situation Centre (SITCEN). In accomplishing these tasks, EUSC provided support to 15 different EU missions ranging from PROXIMA in Macedonia to MONUC in Congo. It is highly probable that it will support two important EU missions launched in the first half of 2008, i.e. EUFOR Chad and EULEX Kosovo;
- *With 27 member states*, EUSC cooperates with various working groups and has expert exchange and internship programmes;
- *The EU Commission* may request from EUSC products and services, and cooperates with the centre in joint research projects;
- *Non-members of the EU* (Iceland, Norway, Turkey and EU accession members) can request and receive products, and can also be involved in the direct implementation of EUSC tasks;
- *International organizations*, for instance various bodies of the United Nations Organization, are important partners of the EU in crisis management and conflict prevention. Therefore, EUSC has close cooperation with, and provides support to, the following UN bodies and operations: MONUC (operation in Congo), UNDOF (operation in the Golan Heights), UNDPKO (operation in Sudan - Darfur), UNMIK (Kosovo) and UNMOVIC (Iraq).

Within the EU structure, EUSC provides its products primarily to two bodies dealing with intelligence support of EU operations: the intelligence component of the EU

⁷ More on www.eusc.europa.eu.

⁸ *EUFOR RD CONGO (DRC): The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) in support of EU operations in the DRC, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), January 2007.*

⁹ http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7&Itemid=15, 6. 3. 2008.

Military Staff in defence and military areas and the *Joint Situation Centre*¹⁰ (*SITCEN*) of the EU in the civilian sphere. Both structures are heavily supported by EU member states, the defence/military resources of the Military Staff and the civilian resources of the Situation Centre. National contributions are primarily of human resources, whereas the *input* of products is ensured with the help of national representatives functioning under a »*dual-hatted*«¹¹ role. On the one hand, they are an integral element of the permanent EU structure and accomplish their tasks in accordance with job descriptions defined for individual positions. On the other hand, they also function as national representatives, and points of contact¹² responsible for uninterrupted exchange of national intelligence products between the EU and their own countries. Solutions of this type are particularly practical for small countries with limited human resources, and also useful for crisis response operations both within the EU and NATO.

In terms of formal hierarchical subordination, EUMS and the Joint SITCEN belong to the General Secretariat (GS) rather than the European Commission¹³. For the sake of efficiency, and due to the scarcity of intelligence resources, the High Representative of the GS established the *Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity*¹⁴ (*SIAC*) in 2006. The basic aim of this initiative is to provide all members of the European Union with the best possible analytical product, generated from all available resources and through the cooperation of the Joint Situation Centre and the intelligence component of EUMS. SIAC is jointly led and guided by the Director General of the EUMS and the Director of SITCEN.

There is an emphasis on combining processes as opposed to organizational structures, which of course does not mean that the upgrading of processes and their optimisation will not result in one structure. Harmonized joint products are then also distributed to lower levels. Coordinated analytical products are put on a list with clearly indicated tasking and supporting authorities. The responsible authority for SIAC products, in case of military and defence issues is, naturally, the EUMS *Intelligence Directorate*.

With intensified activity of the EU during international operations and missions, the EU Commands responsible for individual operations have a greater need for tactical and operational-security intelligence¹⁵. Such an example, in 2008 and 2009, was EUFOR Chad, which is under the command of the Paris Operation Headquarters. The provision of appropriate permanent intelligence support is one of the key challenges

¹⁰ When Henry Kissinger was the US State Secretary, he approached the EU with a question about the essence of the EU. The EU had no clearly defined representative or, as he put it, did not have a single telephone number. Joint SITCEN is now the single EU telephone number.

¹¹ POC (point of contact) can also refer to liaison officers involved in the exchange of information.

¹² The Commission employs approximately 27,000 employees, the Secretariat around 3,300 and EUMS some 200 employees.

¹³ The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity has been in operation since 1 January 2007. All products are produced in accordance with a 6-month programme which is jointly approved by both superiors.

¹⁴ For more on intelligence and security support of international operations and missions see at Črnčec 2009a.

¹⁵ The Strategic Concept, first published in 1991 and revised in 1999. On 7 July 2009, NATO formally launched the process leading to the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance at a major security conference in Brussels (see <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>).

of every international operation and mission. This trend, particularly in relation to defence and military considerations, will lead to even more intensified cooperation in relations between EU member states. If appropriate mechanisms for cooperation and exchange of information are properly established at a strategic level, the EU will definitely continue upgrading direct support capabilities for crisis response operations. An important role in this process is also being played by the European Defence Agency that is developing relevant intelligence capabilities.

The appropriate placement of intelligence structures within the secretariat organization is also important. EUMS occupies the top position in the hierarchy of organizational structures, similarly to the status of directorate-general. Its internal organizational structures, including intelligence, were not given sufficient status. In the structure, effective from March 2008, the Intelligence Directorate within EUMS is led by the director of the EUMS Intelligence Directorate. This appears to show that, in the future, specific attention will be given to strengthening the defence and military intelligence capabilities of the EU. The increased involvement of the EU in international operations and missions highlights a greater practical need for the provision of appropriate intelligence support at operational and tactical levels. In order to provide such support, every intelligence structure needs a clearly defined organizational structure and their own capabilities for collecting and processing data and information. Capabilities should be provided both in the civilian and defence and military areas, for successful and efficient exchange of information will always be a challenge for all intelligence structures and its professionals.

3 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN NATO

In contrast to the EU, NATO is not a supranational but a defence and political organisation that, as a counter balance to the former Warsaw Pact, has nearly accomplished its historical mission already. In the changed international security environment of the 21st century, the Alliance has taken on renewed significance and, in any case, remains a major factor in providing defence and security of the European Union and the European continent, as well as functions as the bridge for Euro-Atlantic partnership with the US and Canada.

In accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO is an organization whose main task is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. NATO is an alliance of 28 countries that are equal and sovereign in their decisions. It is committed to defending its member countries against any aggression or threat of aggression in compliance with the principle that *an armed attack against one member is considered as an armed attack against all*. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was first used after the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 when NATO provided assistance to the US. The Strategic Concept¹⁶ stipulates that NATO is committed not only to collective defence, but also to peace and stability of the

¹⁶ *NATO Handbook is an excellent source of information about NATO with detailed descriptions of the decision-making process in the alliance, its structures, role in contemporary security environment, etc.*

wider Euro Atlantic area. This broad definition of security acknowledges the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors as a supplement to the defence dimension (NATO, 2006)¹⁷.

Our own and other people's security cannot be provided without an appropriate intelligence and security support. NATO does not have an intelligence service of its own but structures charged with intelligence and security support at various levels, and relies increasingly on the input/contribution of intelligence services of its member states. Intelligence is one of the key factors for successful planning and crisis response. The perception of the necessary intelligence support is also evident from the tasking list of some structures within NATO HQ at Brussels or both strategic commands.

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, heads of states and governments of the Alliance agreed, among other things, to the development of high-tech capabilities for the protection of civilians and military forces against terrorist attacks. These assets are mainly of preventive and protective nature. The agreement also includes improvements to the exchange of intelligence and revision of the existing NATO intelligence structures. The mandate of the *Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU)* established after the 11 September attacks has become permanent. The heads also agreed that the Alliance should strengthen its support capabilities for the countries facing terrorist threats. The *Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU)* is a special capability closely linked with TTIU that has considerably improved the exchange of the relevant information. ILU is intended for the exchange of intelligence on counterterrorist activity between NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, and since March 2003 also the Mediterranean Dialogue countries¹⁸.

NATO Headquarters is the political "command" of the Alliance located in Brussels, and includes the Secretary General, national delegations, International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS). The Secretary General has the role of the superior for the "civilian" part of the International Staff, while the International Military Staff reports to the Military Committee. Its chairman is subordinate to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and acts as a superior to the International Military Staff. Intelligence elements or structures are embedded in both staffs and strategic commands¹⁹.

¹⁷ See Report on the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, 23. 6. 2004, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b040623be.htm>.

¹⁸ The name of the command located in Mons, Belgium, is the Allied Command Operations (ACO). Its commander is the Supreme Allied Commander Operations (SACEUR). The commander is still referred to with an old abbreviation stemming from the period when he eventually acted as the supreme commander for Europe before the latest transformation of NATO command structure. A more appropriate term would now be the allied commander for (NATO-led) operations as in fact he is the supreme commander of all NATO operational capabilities. Another strategic command is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), located in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, and is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

¹⁹ In September 2006 Slovenia held an informal meeting of NATO ministers in Portorož. The meeting was a demanding task for the Ministry of Defence, particularly in terms of logistics and security. Security activities were coordinated at the national level within the secretariat of the National Security Council. The MoD appointed a special group to ensure comprehensive preparation for the event. Its assistant head also acted as assistant to OVS director general, who coordinated all relevant "out" (police, SOVA, NATO) and "in" (MoD, Slovenian Armed Forces, military police) activities.

The International Staff also includes a special office responsible for coordination and implementation of the Alliance security standards. The office deals with security matters for the Alliance headquarters, coordination of NATO security operations with member and partner countries, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and NATO civilian and military bodies, implementation of NATO security policy, security intelligence measures and intelligence threats (NATO 2006: 83–84).

NATO Office of Security (NOS) has three main tasks: political control, security (co-counterintelligence) area and preventive security. As part of the first task of political control, inspections and visits to member states, NATO bodies and all others with access to NATO classified information verify the appropriacy of measures and management of data, and accredited communications and information systems. Security policy, directives, guidance and support in the area of security are approved at the level of *NATO Security Committee (NSC)* and NAC, if required. In the area of security NOS deals with counterintelligence policy and control within NATO, and together with TTIU collects information about potential threats to the North Atlantic Council and other key decision-making bodies, including the Military Committee. Similarly to the secretariat, it provides support to the operations of *NATO Special Committee* and carries out special security investigations and investigations related to espionage. Preventive security involves activities, such as coordination of protective security programmes and operations, including physical, personal and information security of NATO HQ, consultation for new NATO commands, coordination of security measures for NATO Ministerials²⁰ and other high-ranking meetings, awareness programmes for users, and response measures for attempts of unauthorized access to computer networks, and other computer-related security incidents.

The key security intelligence structure in the military part of NATO is *Allied Command Counter Intelligence (ACCI)* as the sole organic unit of NATO designated for security intelligence. The command is located at SHAPE. Its staff also provides security intelligence support to commanders of crisis response operations²¹. The command is tasked with detection, deterrence and neutralisation of terrorist threats, espionage, sabotage and subversive operations directed against NATO personnel²². The command can be manned with representatives of all member states. It provides security intelligence support to all NATO units, commands and personnel of the Alliance and member states.

An analysis of the civilian part of NATO that is considerably smaller than the military structure in terms of size reveals that intelligence and security areas concentrate mainly on security and security intelligence issues, yet to a different extent given the individual area. Intelligence is involved mostly in the provision of information for

²⁰ Instead of the term *international operations and missions (IOM)*, NATO uses a narrower term *crisis response operations (CRO)*.

²¹ See *What is ACCI and why should you care?*, *Kfor Chronicle*, Aug 2007, p. 28–29, at http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2007/chronicle_08/chronicle_08.pdf, 25. 12. 2008.

²² This function is supported through the *NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS)*. Owing to the need for early warning of the Alliance about imminent threats, NIWS is considered as one of the new intelligence tools of the Post-Cold War period (Kriendler, 2002).

TTIU and economy-related intelligence. However, the following text will show that intelligence support system is in place for the Military Committee and both strategic commanders within the military structure at the level of the International Military Staff and strategic commands. At the same time, additional intelligence capabilities are being developed in line with the guidelines of the Istanbul Summit and in response to addressing new, modern security challenges and providing intelligence support to NATO units in crisis response operations.

A constituent element of the International Military Staff is the *Intelligence Division*, which is responsible for day-to-day strategic intelligence support of the Secretary General, North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee, Military Committee and other NATO committees and bodies, as for instance other parts of the International Military Staff, Political Committee, etc. In carrying out its activity, the division relies on intelligence *input* of member states and NATO commands, for it has no capabilities of its own. Based on the gathered information it functions as the central coordination body responsible for collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence products within NATO HQ, its commands, agencies, organizations and states. Along with the provision of routine intelligence staff support, the Intelligence Division also develops and coordinates NATO strategic intelligence assessments, guiding and conceptual intelligence documents and basic intelligence documents, and manages selected databases and digital information. Moreover, it is involved in force planning, strategic warning²³ and crisis management, and functions as the contact point for intelligence affairs within NATO and among the responsible national structures. The Division is the key body providing direct intelligence support to all major institutions within NATO and the Military Committee in the development of military advice for political decisions. It is composed of three sections: the evaluation section, the intelligence and warning section, and the section for product publishing and intelligence structures²⁴.

The *Situation Centre* (SITCEN), a component of the International Military Staff, has some intelligence tasks, mainly related to uninterrupted monitoring of global situation and with a focus on operational areas of NATO forces. SITCEN functions 24 hours a day as the central point for the reception, exchange and dissemination of political, military and economic information of interest to the Alliance and member states. It also plays an important role in crisis situations and times of tension, and reports about its operations directly to the political structure of NATO, and assistant secretary general for defence planning and operations. It receives daily guidelines for the implementation of routine tasks from the director of the International Military Staff²⁵.

Within the framework of strategic commands, ACO provides intelligence support to operational planning and operations, whereas ACT conducts long-term analyses of trends, develops intelligence concepts and capabilities, and is in charge of

²³ NATO, 2001, p. 525.

²⁴ NATO, 2001, p. 244.

²⁵ See NATO School Oberammergau, at <http://www.natoschool.nato.int/>.

education²⁶. A similar division of responsibility is used in the field of communications and information systems. In accordance with the established command structure, intelligence support to planning and operations is delegated from ACO to three operational or joint commands²⁷.

In line with commitments adopted at the Prague Summit in December 2002, the Military Committee supported the establishment of *Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC)*²⁸. Its purpose is to ensure transmission of useful, time-relevant (real time) and accurate military intelligence and information crucial to support planning and execution of NATO-led operations. IFC represents an important capacity distributing global intelligence among the member and partner countries of the Alliance and thus improves direct intelligence support to ACO. Its purpose is to provide comprehensive intelligence from all sources in support of NATO-led operations. The establishment of IFC is yet another method of responding to security challenges of the 21st century. IFC was officially launched on 16 October 2006²⁹. The US provides logistic support for the centre in Molesworth, in the United Kingdom. Manpower plans foresee 160 experts from all NATO member states³⁰.

Intelligence and security channels in NATO are closely intertwined. There is a clearly expressed two-way role of member countries providing their *inputs* to be able to utilize the upgraded results. The essence of all processes is that they enable access to all required data to key players within NATO. The awareness of the altered security circumstances in the aftermath of 11 September demanded that the Alliance provide an even faster flow of all the relevant intelligence and security data and upgrade them as well, on strategic and operational levels alike. Undoubtedly, a suitable information and communications infrastructure is of course a precondition for this. This role has been predestined for the IFC which became a fact during the past three years, while the TTIU is becoming and remains a strategic capability of the Alliance, specialised in the field of terrorism. Considering that NATO is a politico-military organisation, the role of military (defence) intelligence and security services is correspondingly more emphasised as far as intelligence support is concerned. Namely, these services directly

²⁶ ACO has the following subordinate commands: Joint Force Command in Brussels, Joint Force Command in Naples and Joint Headquarters Lisbon.

²⁷ IFC is an organization outside permanent NATO structure and is designated for ACO support, primarily in providing intelligence support for NATO Response Forces), allied forces with top-level equipment that are deployable to any area if required. Throughout development, IFC, role has become significant in the provision of intelligence support, mainly to allied crisis response operations.

²⁸ See *Launch of the Intelligence Fusion Centre in Support of NATO, Global Intelligence Assessment for NATO Countries*, www.nato.int/shape.


²⁹ *New NATO Intelligence Center Opens in Britain*, www.britainusa.com.

³⁰ From 28.5.2009 to 29.5.2009 the spring conference of directors of defence intelligence services of NATO member states (NIB – NATO Intelligence Board) was held in Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia. The conference was chaired by Ms Karen A. Laino, AD IMS for Intelligence. Conference participants were also addressed by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, Ms Ljubica Jelušič, who emphasized the importance of work of intelligence services in support and protection of armed forces troops participating in international operations and missions and in support of the highest decision-makers as well as the importance of intelligence exchange and cooperation between the intelligence services. See [http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=novica&L=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=1518&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=1&cHash=2acd998ff](http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=novica&L=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1518&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1&cHash=2acd998ff)

support the key strategic body – the Intelligence Division. Directors of these services meet periodically and regularly with the head of Intelligence Division and *Assistant Director Intelligence (AD INT)* and they do so within the *NATO Intelligence Board (NIB)*³¹. Also, these services fill in the intelligence gaps at different levels, including the most important strategic-operative intelligence structure, the IFC. Chart 2 shows that intelligence support is not tied to some hierarchical nature of the structure but is rather flattened, i.e., operates horizontally, as intelligence structures, which are very clearly inserted into the organisational structure, directly support the highest echelons of decision-makers and independently exchange intelligence among themselves, the member states, NATO commands, etc.

Chart 2:

Strategic Intelligence and Security Architecture within the NATO Civilian and Military Structures



Source: Črnčec, 2009b : 205

³¹ In 2004, AC 46 was chaired by Denmark. In 2008, doubts appeared in the media about the appropriacy of Hungarian presidency, as the director of the responsible Hungarian service had been trained in the Soviet Union. In December 2007, the national security office was taken over by the new director Sandor Laborc, who had been trained at the KGB Academy Dzeržinski. Despite the articles in the media and numerous speculations, Hungary did not decide for his replacement, and none of the member countries demanded this officially. The presidency was then handed over to Iceland.

On the other hand, civil intelligence and security services are more incorporated in security - counterintelligence carried out in a smaller, civilian part of NATO HQ and involved in counterterrorism. The civilian structure also includes *NATO Special Committee* (also referred to as *AC 46*), which is “among other things responsible for the adoption of internal security measures in member states. Its chairman in the early 1970s was Günther Nollau, the head of federal office for the protection of constitutional order” of the time (Schultz 2001: 45). The Special Committee acts as the key advisory body to the North Atlantic Council on the issue of espionage and terrorist threats to the alliance. It functions at the level of directors (general) of intelligence and security services, with the presidency rotating among member countries. The committee represents one of the most senior NATO working bodies in charge of routine matters, such as security clearance and cryptography. In fact it accomplished a significant role during the accession period of new membership candidates. Along with NOS, the advisory committee exerted pressure on the candidates to “remove” those persons from intelligence and security services that were (had been) under the influence of Russian intelligence services (Aldrich 747: 2004)³². Comprehensive support to the operations of the Advisory Committee and the Security Committee is provided by NOS, and its director is the chairman of the Security Committee as well³. This committee functions as the advisory body to NAC from the viewpoint of security policy that is well-developed within NATO. The Security Committee is composed of national representatives, national security experts and security experts from NATO civilian and military structures. At the same time, counterintelligence within various NATO commands and for NATO staff falls within the competence of national military (defence) counterintelligence structures cooperating closely with NATO counterintelligence structure.

NATO has a clear mission. In order to provide intelligence support to the mission, the strategic system is fully appropriate to provide this support, notably following the establishment of IFC. If the mission spreads more to the “civilian” sphere, it may be reasonable also to think in that direction. Room for the improvement of NATO intelligence support is definitely on the operational and tactical levels, mostly in support of allied operations.

Following 11 September, NATO took first steps on the basis of the Prague and Istanbul Summit guidelines to improve intelligence and security architecture. Since security policy remains one of the key areas for efficient and secure operations of the alliance, it also received appropriate attention in the past. The intelligence aspect was in urgent need of development momentum toward IFC as its cornerstone. It is of course premature to think that this may be the very beginning of NATO intelligence service. The military sphere definitely shares a common interest for joint activity in crisis response operations, where everybody is confronted with collective threats to their own service members, which would press on military (defence) services for more intensive cooperation and exchange of information at the tactical and operatio-

³² *NATO 2006: 134*

nal (in crisis response operations) and strategic levels. Also in the future, cooperation will progress in the same direction.

The knowledge about the principal importance of the political-security and military dimension does not suggest that the economic aspect is being neglected, quite the opposite. Economic threats are part of the complex notion of the 1999 security concept. Economic and financial dimensions of terrorism are high on priority list. Based on the contributions of member states for NAC, the capitals of member states and military bodies are constantly harmonizing assessments of economic intelligence issues (NATO, 2006: 57). In consideration of the intensity of the global crisis in 2009, it can be expected that economic intelligence and security issues will attract even more attention in the future, both in NATO, the EU and other countries.

4 EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES IN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AREAS

There are two intelligence and security services in Slovenia: the *Intelligence and Security Service* of the Ministry of Defence (OVS) and the *Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency* (SOVA)³³. Both of them perform intelligence, counterintelligence and security, with the key responsibilities of SOVA being the field of national security and of OVS the field of defence. The SOVA personnel are empowered to undertake special forms of data collection, but have no police authority, while OVS personnel involved in intelligence and counterintelligence have the same powers as SOVA personnel, and the security personnel of the OVS have police powers. Simultaneous use of both types of powers is of course forbidden. Historically speaking, they are two totally different services. SOVA is the successor to the Security and Information Service (VIS), which succeeded the National Security Service (SDV) or political police³⁴ that functioned in Slovenia up to the introduction of a multi-party system³⁵. The OVS was established only after the first democratic elections in April 1990.

During the 1990s, Slovenia revised the legal framework for the operation of security and intelligence structures. The modern and democratic normative basis has facilitated integration into intelligence and security structures and processes in the EU and NATO.

³³ *In Slovene Obveščevalno varnostna služba Ministrstva za obrambo (OVS) in Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija (SOVA).*

³⁴ *Still in 1990, when the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs determined in the Rules on Operations of the National Security Service (SDV) the methods to be used by SDV concerning human rights of the citizens. Without any prior court approval it was allowed to carry out secret eavesdropping, secret control of telephones and other telecommunication means, international and other telecommunications traffic, mail and other shipments, secret recording and document management, technical checks and protection of premises and facilities, secret searches of premises, and maintenance of secret liaison with co-workers. The measures were carried out temporarily or permanently.*

³⁵ *For more on the activity of the National Security Service and the Security and Information Service in the period before, during and after Slovenian independence see Brejč 1994.*

Hence, there has been no great need for Slovenia to modify its national security system or the structure of its intelligence services after 11 September 2001. I would particularly like to stress that Slovenia, unlike some other countries, has not succumbed to the temptation of strengthening its counterterrorism legislation although terrorism in Slovenia remains a security threat and a criminal act. Intelligence services are primarily the first authority to detect or perceive terrorist threats. Should these threats be real and imminent, they are required to submit such information to potentially affected parties, the police and other bodies within the national security system.

4.1 Exchange of experiences and the European Union

With the adoption of the Classified Information Act in 2001 and the relevant amendments and changes in the next years, Slovenia set up the system of classified information management that is compatible with EU and NATO standards. Five years of experience deriving from the EU membership confirmed and highlighted the issue that despite the progress in the past years, the field of security in the EU is still less developed than that of NATO. Slovenia can make contributions to the development of this area by giving proposals and initiatives for the upgrading of the system of classified information management.

In intelligence, Slovenia has been a full partner of EUSC since 2004. The representative of the MoD is the national representative and member of the managing committee. EUSC provides Slovenia with its products on compact discs and DVDs kept in a special digital library of the MoD. Part of mainly more current products is also accessible through the EUSC web portal where the products are protected with the Chiasmus code key (Florjanc, Ilnikar, 2007: 19). EUSC is a highly usable capability, particularly for smaller countries. During the EU Council Presidency, Slovenia was the first presiding country to activate EUSC for the EU and, hence, caused a precedent.

EUSC is an important institution for the provision of intelligence and security support to international operations and missions of the EU. In 2008 and 2009, such an example was EUFOR in Chad commanded by the operational command in Paris. The establishment of appropriate and permanent intelligence and security support remains one of the key challenges for every international operation and mission. Slovenia ensured this support through bilateral links and assignment of intelligence officers to commands. Good knowledge of intelligence and security processes, part of which are also responsible Slovenian institutions, constitute an important contribution to the provision of adequate intelligence and security support.

Against such background knowledge of the modern security environment, Slovenian security and intelligence structures conducted preparations for the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2008. During the presidency, both services gained first-hand experience of the international environment. During the presidency, SOVA organized three events related to its area of work in Slovenia. The Security and Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence hosted the second

workshop on intelligence and security support in crisis response operations, focusing on Operation EUFOR in Chad³⁶.

During the preparations for and the actual presidency of the Council of the European Union, both agencies intensified the exchange of intelligence data and products, both domestically as well as with foreign partner services and international organizations. The agencies were faced with additional responsibility, namely, by potentially submitting wrong assessments and information they could risk immediate reaction not only at the national level, but also at the level of the EU. The provision of intelligence and security support for national decision-makers and at the same time the presiding EU Council also constituted **direct** intelligence support for the EU.

4.2 Exchange of experiences and NATO

The system of classified information management in NATO has set the basic framework for the establishment of a modern system of classified information management since the end of the 1990s. Security-related experiences were transferred to responsible Slovenian institutions through NATO inspections that visited Slovenia during its accession period. It should be stressed that the experiences flowed in both directions, and some Slovenian solutions were also implemented in NATO later on. For example, a considerable number of Slovenian functionaries were exempt from security clearance procedures for the access to classified information. Naturally, Slovenia is not the only exception in this case. Yet through the documents adopted in 2008 NATO enabled such a solution also for the classified information of the alliance in compliance with the national regulation of member states.

Immediately upon its accession to NATO, Slovenia filled up some intelligence and security duties in NATO structures. In operations conducted under the auspices of NATO, for instance IFOR and SFOR, it also manned similar positions, but with limited access to classified information. This restriction was of course removed after 2004.

Similarly, after 2004 Slovenia became active within the framework of the Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, both in providing protection for commands and in crisis response operations. In accordance with the decision of the RS Government, Slovenia has also become involved in IFC, with maximum two defence military experts. Participation of Slovenia in IFC is an important contribution as it involves continuation of participation in NATO intelligence structures and exchange of intelligence and security information, providing significant support to NATO-led operations and activity of the Alliance response forces. Detailed operation of the centre was regulated through a Memorandum of Understanding³⁷.

³⁶ See Report of the Slovenian EU Council Presidency, 2008.

³⁷ Press release about the decisions adopted by the RS Government at its 88th session, on 14 September 2006, p. 15–16, and the decision of the RS Government granting authority to OVS director general for the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding.

A precondition for this was surely an appropriate information and communications infrastructure. This was exactly what Slovenia, and in particular defence-related intelligence and security, gained with NATO membership. With the signature of the 2004 Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the organization structure for the introduction and operation of the battlefield information collection and exploitation systems, the Republic of Slovenia obtained the right to establish links with the *Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES)* and other NATO information networks. During this period, BICES has proved as one of the major sources and a key means for the exchange of intelligence in NATO³⁸. The present memorandum expired at the end of February 2006 and was superseded by a Memorandum of Understanding, with the basic element being the adequately amended document of NATO system organization for battlefield information collection and exploitation³⁹.

Conclusion The European Union and NATO have several bodies, committees and subcommittees tasked with policy adoption and implementation. Security is an area given special attention in both organizations, and, referred to as “*The issue*” in NATO, the key area enabling successful operation of both organizations.

Modern time requires a modern way of addressing the full range of risks and threats. In intelligence, this can only be possible *first*, with the new intelligence paradigm. The new intelligence paradigm, an important part of which involves active cooperation among intelligence and security structures, is something Slovenia cannot avoid as an active member of NATO and the EU, and a full partner in intelligence. *Second*, given the fact, that both the EU and NATO have no intelligence service of their own, the role of individual member states is so more important. The national intelligence system should be properly structured and organized in order to provide optimum support for intelligence capabilities of both organizations, but also to efficiently receive intelligence products. It is, therefore, reasonable and rational to upgrade the national intelligence system through better transparency and use of available resources. *Third*, in the period of modern transnational threats, cooperation and exchange of information should be ensured at various levels within the country, as *intra-* and *inter-agency*, and bilaterally outside the country, within the EU and NATO, and with the UN, concerning participation in international operations and missions at the tactical and strategic levels. The need for division considerably exceeds national dimensions and has, long ago, become a supranational need of all actively involved in international security environment.

Fourth, modern intelligence and security support is not dependent upon the structure hierarchy, but it is **flattened** and functions horizontally, as intelligence and security

³⁸ BICES is managed and maintained by NATO BICES Agency, owned by member countries.

³⁹ Press release about the decisions adopted by the RS Government at its 59th session on 2 February 2006, p. 10, and the decision of the RS Government granting authority to OVS director general for the signing of the memorandum.

structures that are clearly embedded in the organization structure carry out direct support to top decision-makers and autonomous exchange of intelligence among themselves, with member states, NATO commands, etc. The principle of the *need to know* should be replaced and upgraded appropriately in line with the principle of the *need to share*. Within the framework of a special strategy⁴⁰, the principle of the need to share should be upgraded to a new mind framework, a concept encompassing its full implementation according to the principle of *responsibility to provide*. A wider circle of institutions involved in national security should be given access to information through information technology. A collective information network linking all the institutions receiving or generating information would be a welcome innovation. In itself it is insufficient for this new culture to be understood, defined in doctrines and implemented solely by intelligence structures. It should rather be a process guided and adhered to by the entire intelligence community in the widest sense of meaning, including the users of intelligence products that are harmonized, guided or controlled by intelligence services.

Finally, it can be expected that intelligence and security capabilities of the EU and NATO will be built up also in the future. The integration of intelligence and security processes will surely enhance, and may at the same time lead to integration of parts of intelligence and security structures. The final goal remains, nevertheless, unchanged – to provide the best intelligence and security support to all EU and NATO users. Considering the progress of the past years it should not be forgotten that we are still a long way from a “European or NATO” intelligence service functioning as national intelligence services. During its five years of membership in both establishments and a decade of experience exchange, Slovenia has demonstrated and proved several times that membership of intelligence and security structures should be understood as a two-way process, involving the principle of both give and take. Sitting behind the same table that Slovenia chaired as *primus inter pares* can only confirm our self-confidence that the exchange of experiences has been and will be understood also in the future as a commitment and responsibility to our current and future partners.

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POT SLOVENIJE V NATO

SLOVENIA'S ROAD TO NATO

Review paper

Povzetek Slovenija se z več vidikov razlikuje od vseh drugih držav, ki so se od konca “hladne vojne” pridružile Zavezništvu. Od leta 1992 so se vse slovenske vlade močno zavzemale za članstvo v Natu, predvsem iz dolgoročnih varnostnih razlogov. Kljub vsemu pa je to vprašanje zadevalo celoten slovenski politični sistem in je na začetku naletelo na precejšnje nasprotovanje na obeh straneh spektra. Slovenija je bila druga država kandidatka, ki je pred vključitvijo razpisala referendum v zvezi s tem vprašanjem. Glasovi na referendumu so pokazali dvotretjinsko podporo članstvu v Natu, ki je od takrat naprej uživalo široko javno podporo. Sodelovanje Slovenije pri delovanju Zavezništva je postalo pravno urejeno tako v civilni politični kot tudi v vojaški sferi. S slovensko izkušnjo od vključitve dalje je država prejela najpomembnejše lekcije o realističnem obrambnem načrtovanju, solidarnosti med članicami in pomoči državam kandidatkam.

Ključne besede *Balkan, Vzhodna Evropa, širitev, Nato, Slovenija.*

Abstract Slovenia differs in several respects from all other countries which have joined the Alliance since the end of the “Cold War”. From 1992 onwards, all Slovenian governments have strongly advocated NATO membership, primarily on long-term security grounds. The issue, however, cut across the Slovenian polity, initially with considerable opposition on both sides of the spectrum. Slovenia was the second candidate country to submit the issue to a referendum prior to the admission. The vote showed a two-third support for NATO membership. Since then it has become widely accepted by the public. Slovenia's participation in the functioning of the Alliance has become regularised both in the civilian political and the military spheres. Slovenian experience since the admission has brought the country the most important lessons in realistic defence planning, solidarity among members and assistance to aspirants.

Key words *The Balkans, Eastern Europe, enlargement, NATO, Slovenia.*

Introduction Slovenia, in its relationship to NATO, differs in several respects from all other countries which have joined (and one which was absorbed into) the Alliance since the end of the “Cold War”. It was the first admitted former East-Central European communist-ruled country which never belonged to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, either as an individual state or as part of a pact member. Moreover, at the height of the “Cold War”, soon after the signing of the Washington Treaty in June 1949, Slovenia – then part of Yugoslavia – was included into NATO’s strategic plans as a potentially friendly territory in case of a continental war (plan Smartweed). Slovenia, unlike all the other former East European countries but Hungary, held a national referendum on membership, prior to its admission to NATO.

1 SLOVENIA AS PART OF YUGOSLAVIA

During the “Cold War” confrontation with the Eastern Bloc, Slovenia’s position as the north-westernmost republic in the federal Yugoslavia was considered by NATO planners as strategically highly important for NATO’s ability to thwart the expected Soviet-led massive armoured thrust from Hungary to Northern Italy. On the basis of a secret understanding between the Tito regime and the United States, the Yugoslav Army was positioned to defend the axis Maribor – Trieste – Gorizia and the area between Graz and Villach in the then still occupied Austria. Once this arrangement was operationalised with the Yugoslav General Staff, the United States signed a mutual assistance agreement with Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1951. In addition to the Marshall Plan-like economic aid to the Tito regime, the Yugoslav Army subsequently received a large quantity of heavy weapons from the US stocks in Western Germany. Most of these heavy arms, including tanks, heavy artillery, jet warplanes, trucks, ammunition etc. were to be deployed in north western Yugoslavia, mostly in Slovenia. Yugoslavia’s leader, Marshall Tito, assured the US and British governments that, in case of war with the Eastern Bloc, the Yugoslav Army would fight on NATO’s side even if Yugoslavia was not attacked directly (Bebler, 1990, pp. 175-176). A US Army brigade stationed near Trieste was presumably to be moved across the present Slovenian-Italian border in order to help defend the Ljubljana gap.

At a hearing in the US Senate in May 1951, the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower, future US President, publicly argued that in order to protect NATO’s “soft belly”, its members should urgently invite four Mediterranean states into the Alliance – Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Spain. The first two governments responded enthusiastically to the soundings by American diplomats; their countries were speedily invited and joined the Alliance already in 1952. Yugoslavia’s leader Tito, however, gave a cunningly evading answer and instead of Yugoslavia’s straight membership in the Alliance proposed a trilateral mutual assistance treaty among Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The three countries signed a “Treaty of Friendship”

in February 1953. After protracted negotiations and in spite of strenuous Italian objections, a tripartite “Treaty of alliance, political cooperation and mutual assistance” was finally signed by the three foreign ministers in Slovenia, at Bled, in August 1954. (The initial draft, however, was watered down sometime after Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953.) Through this new Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia became legally linked to NATO’s network of mutual security guarantees (Ibid., pp. 178-179). Soon after its signing, the Balkan Pact became irrelevant in practical terms, partly due to the tensions between Greece and Turkey. The still valid treaty has been never activated.

The most important reason for a twist in Yugoslavia’s attitude, however, was the perceived diminished threat of a Soviet invasion. This assessment prompted Marshall Tito to normalise relations with the Soviet Union, distance Yugoslavia from the Alliance and assume a prominent role in the international movement of the non-aligned. Yugoslavia actively contributed to forging the Helsinki Final Act. Within the newly founded “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” it joined the group of neutral and non-aligned states. For about three decades after the mid-1950s, Marshall Tito maneuvered skilfully between the two blocs, exploiting Yugoslavia’s geopolitically sensitive position. The presumed equidistance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation remained an official foreign policy posture until the breakdown of the SFR Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. Already during SFRY’s last decade, its validity was openly questioned on several grounds. During the closing years of communist rule, the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment became to be viewed in Slovenia as inconsistent with and even contrary to the widespread desire to “(re) join Europe”. In early summer of 1990, this critical attitude was quietly adopted by the first post-1945 non-communist government in Slovenia.

2 SLOVENIA’S QUALIFICATION FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

Since the proclamation of independence in June 1991, the successive Slovenian governments have abandoned the ex-Yugoslavia’s stance of “active non-alignment” and identified the country’s full-fledged memberships in the EU, WEU and NATO as their chief international objectives. The Slovenian political elite found too little comfort in relying on the country’s participation in OSCE and membership in the UN alone. The ineffectiveness of the international community in dealing with even a relatively small aggressor in the Balkans confirmed this dissatisfaction. Due to the greatly reduced influence of the pacifist “Greens”, to the lacking tradition of neutralism or any constitutional obligations in this respect, the Slovenian National Assembly has been able to pass several resolutions in favour of the country’s membership in Western integrations since 1993. When the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was stopped by a NATO armed intervention, all major political parties came to support Slovenia’s entry both into NATO and the EU. However, as long as it remained outside the only functioning regional security organisation in Europe, Slovenia had no other option but to pursue the policy of non-engagement and armed self-reliance. In addition, the Slovenian Defence Ministry

signed bilateral cooperation protocols with the defence ministries of the USA, UK, Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic etc. and a trilateral protocol on military co-operation with Italy and Hungary.

Although successive Slovenian governments since 1991 have hardly missed a single opportunity to express their interest in being invited to NATO, the Slovenian diplomatic campaign to attain this goal was launched in earnest only in the first half of 1996. The signing of the Dayton-Paris accords at that time allowed the ending of the UN-imposed arms embargo on all ex-Yugoslav republics. By then Slovenia had already joined the NATO "Partnership for Peace" programme and entered the Europe Association Agreement with the EU. It should be noted that the Slovenian government's keen interest in NATO membership was not prompted by the fear of social and political instability, by internal dangers to Slovenia's democratic order, unresolved conflicts with the neighbouring states or by the desire to obtain financial assistance or military hardware. Security concerns related to the geographic proximity of the volatile Western Balkans did play some role but the primary aim in joining NATO was the country's integration into the community of Western democratic states.

According to many experts and NATO officials, an important rationale for NATO's decision to expand eastward lied in the desire to reduce the "gray zone" of insecurity and uncertainty in Europe. Although the underlying contention sounded plausible in general terms, it raised some doubts in relation to e.g. Slovenia. On the whole, the lines separating security and insecurity areas in Europe, Mediterranean and Asia did not coincide with the division between NATO members and non-members. Already for decades, there were flash-points of violence and terrorism on the territory of several NATO members, such as Ulster, the Basque country, Corsica, parts of Turkey etc. Actual or potential interstate conflicts took or could have conceivably taken place between several NATO member states, e.g. on the Greek-Turkish border, in Cyprus or at Gibraltar. Although situated in the geographic proximity of recent armed hostilities in the Balkans, Slovenia, together with a number of other European countries and like neighbouring Austria, belonged to the area of stability and security.

The same has been true of Slovenia's record as a democratic state. Since 1989, the country has successfully, relatively painlessly and peacefully overcome the stresses, tensions and crises surrounding its fast triple evolution - attaining independent statehood, transforming its political order and the economic system. The rapid transformation in all three dimensions in due legal form took the form of peaceful evolution based on a high degree of consensus between different political currents. In this process there was no politically motivated violence and very few cases of mass civil unrest. Since 1990, six rounds of multiparty parliamentary election, five presidential elections as well as local and municipal elections have been carried out successfully, in full conformity with the European rules for free, competitive and clean electoral contests.

Already in 1997, Slovenia was viewed by qualified observers as a consolidated democracy. For instance, Freedom House rated Slovenia as a "free post communist"

country with the highest score of 1.5 (together with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia) (Rose, 1998, p. 281). While being a candidate for membership both in NATO and the European Union, Slovenia's credentials underwent thorough examinations by the US government, European Commission and NATO. In its published opinion on Slovenia's application for EU membership, the European Commission concluded on July 15, 1997:

“Slovenia presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Slovenia can be regarded as a functioning market economy...” (Agenda 2000, p. 114).

By 1997 Slovenia had also satisfied, to the highest degree, the key NATO-specific requirements elaborated in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* (1995). Having adopted a Western European pattern in civil-military relations, Slovenia reaffirmed democratic civilian rule as one of its fundamental constitutional norms. Moreover, these norms as well as human rights were being observed more thoroughly in Slovenia than in at least one older NATO member state and more thoroughly than minority rights in several NATO member states.

Several circumstances have contributed to a very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military: the strong rejection of the previous Yugoslav model of civil-military relations (which contained both militarist and praetorian proclivities); the smallness of the armed forces; the paucity of Slovenian military traditions; the numerical and intellectual weakness of the Slovenian military professionals; the underdeveloped corporate identity of the Slovenian military officers and the army leadership's extremely low political profile. The parliamentary system of government gave the civilian domination its constitutional and legal foundation and form. An elaborate and partly redundant system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment has been erected in Slovenia.

3 DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN TO OBTAIN AN INVITATION

After a pause in the second half of 1996, caused by parliamentary election and the formation of a new ruling coalition, the campaign for NATO membership was restarted in early 1997. Slovenian diplomats lobbied among the NATO member states using the following arguments:

- Slovenia has conformed to the overlapping EU requirements and NATO expectations concerning successful reforms, functioning political democracy, market economy, human and minority rights, constructive international behaviour and settled relations with neighbours;
- the country has complied with the NATO-specific expectations concerning civilian control over the military;
- Slovenia borders on two EU members and two NATO members; its geographic position would provide for the shortest and safest land bridge between Italy and Hungary;

- Slovenia has conducted a responsible and constructive foreign policy, and has actively supported all international efforts to bring peace, stability, prosperity and democracy to the troubled Balkans (UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, UNFICYP, KFOR);
- Slovenia was able to shoulder its membership responsibilities in NATO and the EU, including the financial ones (a reflection of Slovenia's highest GDP *per capita* in Central-Eastern Europe);
- Slovenia's admission would make NATO and EU enlargement more geopolitical-ly balanced, would move the area of security and stability in the direction of the volatile Balkans and serve as a positive incentive among the Balkan aspirants for NATO and the EU.

In July 1997, Slovenia's admission in the first round is said to have been supported by nine NATO members, including all Mediterranean members. Eventually, the considerable effort by Slovenian diplomacy to gain an invitation ended up unsuccessfully. It was to a considerable extent due to the French insistence on also inviting Romania and on having a French admiral appointed to head the NATO Southern Command in Naples. These demands were said to have been rejected by President Clinton. The position of the US administration in favour of a restrained enlargement in stages finally prevailed with only three new NATO members added by 1999. In a compromise move Slovenia and Romania were mentioned in the final document and singled out as serious candidates to be reconsidered in 1999.

President B. Clinton's arguments in favour of only three candidates, if understood as indirect disqualification of Slovenia's candidacy, remained, however, mostly unconvincing. In some respects, such as firm civilian control over the military, financial ability, low cost of admission for NATO, public support for NATO membership in 1997 etc., Slovenia should have certainly been ranked higher than no. 4. The US Department of State assessment also differed substantively from the US President's statement: "Slovenia is moving rapidly toward integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. Its immediate foreign policy goals are to join NATO and the European Union. In the five years since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has become a democracy with a multi-party political system, a free press and an excellent human rights record. Slovenia's market economy has registered a healthy growth in recent years, largely due to economic reforms introduced shortly after independence. Slovenia now has the highest per capita income in Central Europe. Slovenia's successful democratic transition, economic transformation, peacefulness and stability serve as an example to other nations in the region. The US has a strong interest of supporting Slovenia's efforts to consolidate and build on its accomplishments. The key (US) objective is: ... full integration (of Slovenia) into Euro-Atlantic community of nations, including such institutions as NATO and the European Union."

The NATO decision in 1997 to defer Slovenia's admission could be explained in a number of ways. One conceivable calculation in NATO might have been that bringing Slovenia in the Alliance would not make any appreciable geopolitical and military

gain in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Slovenian officials repeated time and again that Slovenia had not been in the past a Soviet/Russian satellite and a Warsaw Pact member, that the Russians did not object to Slovenia's membership, that the country showed full cooperativeness with the US and NATO when their military forces were transiting or over-flying Slovenia etc. However, the Slovenian argumentation apparently did not impress the key NATO players. Some of them might have still blamed Slovenia for Yugoslavia's breakdown and for the ensuing troubles in the Balkans. It was also informally suggested to Slovenian diplomats that the Alliance would need a convincing candidate for the next round and that Slovenia fit well into this role.

4 SLOVENIAN SOCIETY AND NATO MEMBERSHIP

The successive Slovenian governments' advocating NATO and EEC/EU membership as soon as possible was buttressed by strong majorities in the Slovenian parliament. Among the five major political parties, three consistently advocated Slovenia's accession (LDS, SDS, SKD), while two others showed certain reservations concerning either the EU or NATO (SLS, ZLSD). In three parties (LDS, ZLSD, SLS) there were minorities in disagreement with their leaderships' pro-membership position. However, public opinion polls showed a very different picture. The discrepancy between the enthusiasm of the political elite and the more sanguine mood of the population was the largest during the first four years of independence in 1991-1995, when the principal sources of perceived threats were closely related to the armed violence and wars in the Western Balkans. During that period the Slovenian public mostly supported the stance of neutrality in foreign affairs (roughly 40 percent), while the reliance on Western Europe (32 percent) and the reliance on NATO and the USA (13 percent) trailed behind.

Support for NATO membership started rising in late 1995, probably due to NATO's successful intervention in the Balkans. A USIA-commissioned survey in April 1997 showed that 56 percent of respondents would vote in favour if a referendum were then to be held. The support reached its acme of 66-67 percent in summer 1997, at the time around the NATO Madrid summit. The opposition to NATO membership accounted then for about 20 percent, while the rest of the respondents were undecided. The Slovenian public opinion support for joining NATO significantly exceeded the corresponding figures in Hungary (32 percent) and the Czech Republic (28 percent) in 1997, while trailing behind those in Romania (76 percent) and occasionally also Poland. However, like in Hungary and the Czech Republic, a very considerable number of respondents still did not accept some corollaries of possible NATO membership, such as increased defence outlays, sending national troops to defend a NATO ally, allowing routine over-flights by NATO aircraft, and particularly the otherwise utterly improbable placing of NATO nuclear weapons.

Thus, although improved from the government's standpoint, the state of public opinion on Slovenia's NATO membership was contradictory and trailing behind the much more enthusiastic position held by the Slovenian political elite. NATO

membership was most favoured by males over 49 years of age, with low education and status. Support for the government's stance was the lowest among the age group under 30 and among those with university degrees. Slovenian housewives could not decide on this issue. The degree of support for EU membership was generally higher than that for NATO membership but occasionally slipped lower. This happened, for example, in the aftermath of the epidemic of "mad cow disease".

The NATO decision in Madrid in July 1997 had little immediate impact on Slovenian public opinion. However, the political opposition and critical press portrayed the Madrid decision as a heavy diplomatic defeat for the government. Two opposition parties seized the opportunity and demanded convening an extraordinary session of the National Assembly. However, the reaction of disappointment among the elite was soon softened when on July 15, 1997, the European Commission recommended the inclusion of Slovenia into the first round of EU enlargement talks. This move helped the Slovenian government survive the interpellation. However, the Foreign Minister was replaced, partly due to the increased opposition pressure.

Following the failure in Madrid and particularly after the US presidential election of George W. Bush in November 2000, the public support for NATO membership started sliding down appreciably, with occasional ups and downs of several percentage points. By April 2002 it had, for the first time, fallen below 50 percent. The opposition to membership then rose correspondingly to about 30 percent. By the second half of 2002 a virulent negative campaign in several Slovenian printed media brought the level of support further down to about 40 percent, occasionally below the corresponding figures for the opposing opinion. The altered post-Cold War perception of diminished external security risks (and downgrading the military ones) and the rather naive sense of security in South-Eastern Europe (to which NATO's successful peace-enforcement in the Balkans greatly contributed) generally lowered the interest of the public in Slovenia's joining any military alliance. As a consequence, the close relationship between Slovenia and the North Atlantic Alliance became increasingly an object of lively public debates and controversies. The negative trend in the public opinion support to membership ran time-wise parallel to the ever growing integration of Slovenia in the Alliance, and to considerable efforts to effect necessary reforms in the security sector. Slovenia was successfully completing the preparation for membership (MAP), while Slovenian soldiers and policemen were proving their worth as peacekeepers in NATO-led "out-of-area" missions.

The rise of vocal opposition to NATO membership led the Slovenian government to accept the demand for a referendum on NATO membership, which otherwise was not constitutionally required. Under the pressure of criticism expressed in the Slovenian media and emanating from among several groups in civil society (cultural elite, pacifists, anti-globalists, anarchists, environmentalists, veterans etc.) the government decided to hold two simultaneous referenda on Slovenia's EU and NATO membership on March 23, 2003. By late November 2002, Slovenia's membership ceased to be a mere theoretical proposition or a pious wish by the government. When

Slovenia, together with six other states, received an invitation to join the Alliance, this question became a practical and politically acute one. The confluence of events put Slovenia into an exceptional position. Among 26 countries (19 NATO members and 7 invitees) which were to sign the new accession protocols on March 26, 2003, only in Slovenia was this decision submitted for a direct approval or disapproval by the voters. The Slovenian government alone exposed itself to an acid democratic test, while, according to available public opinion polls, NATO enlargement did not enjoy then the majority public opinion support in several older NATO member states.

In internal debates the successive Slovenian governments argued in favour of Slovenia's NATO membership, primarily on the long-term national defence and military security grounds. In general, security arguments dominated in the discussions. The underlying social values as well as the extensive common political, economic, cultural, technological and other interests with the NATO member states were also used in this context. Some ardent supporters of NATO membership, on the other hand, tried to present the Alliance as a bulwark of anticommunism. This dubious contention might have scared off some leftist voters who would have otherwise supported Slovenia's membership.

In this matter, the ruling left-of-the-centre coalition cooperated closely with the largest opposition party and several non-governmental organisations. However, the issue cut across the fabric of Slovenian polity on both sides of the political spectrum with heterogeneous mellays of supporters and rejectionists. Many opponents of NATO displayed outright ignorance of the Alliance as well as prejudices and unfounded fears, such as the presumed danger of losing Slovenian national identity, Slovenia's independence, Slovenian Army etc. They claimed that the Alliance lost its *raison d'être* and became an obsolete and even dangerous remnant of the Cold War. In order to maintain peace in Europe, a much wider, all-inclusive continental security organisation was presumably needed, such as OSCE. Many opponents claimed that Slovenia is not and will not be threatened by anyone if it were to stay neutral. By entering NATO, Slovenia would diminish its security, having become a target of international terrorists. In the post-Cold War environment it would be foolish to raise the country's defence spending, which would be required by NATO membership. NATO was portrayed by some radical opponents as a militarist organisation and even a threat to democratic freedoms. Some opponents cited the NATO enlargement policy in the past and Turkey's poor human rights record. This presumably proved that NATO was not at all an alliance of democratic states. The pacifists and environmentalists opposed NATO because they rejected in principle the presence of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Slovenian soil and/or everything related to the military and to nuclear energy. Some old-style leftists held NATO for a symbol of capitalism, of Western imperialism and of globalisation which, as they claimed, brought abnormal poverty and mass unemployment to the Third World. Among critics, one was also filled with nostalgia for the former Yugoslavia and Marshall Tito's past policy of non-alignment. Some sharp opponents of NATO at the same time uncritically idolised the European Union, claiming that the EU membership

would be an ample substitute for NATO membership. Some opponents were against NATO simply because they opposed the Slovenian government, disliked Coca-Cola, McDonalds' hamburgers, the domination by the Hollywood film and TV industry etc. Some even linked NATO to global warming. Many of these arguments or objections were due to the relatively widespread misconception which equated George W. Bush with the USA and the USA with NATO. Indeed, the level of public opposition to NATO membership grew visibly in Slovenia after the neoconservative Bush administration came to power in the USA.

However, in spite of the largely negative publicity in the Slovenian printed media, the twin referenda on March 23, 2003, clearly confirmed the government's position. On that day, Slovenia became the third country (after Spain and Hungary) to hold a referendum on NATO membership and the second country (after Hungary) to hold it prior to the country's admission to the Alliance. The somewhat surprisingly positive results (in comparison with the public opinion polls only one month earlier) showed roughly a two-third support for NATO membership and a still higher support for EU membership (about 85 percent). Similarly to the Hungarian referendum, these results were apparently largely due to the publicly stated views of important opinion leaders, to the strong pro-membership position taken by the Roman Catholic Church and to a high abstention rate among the opponents of NATO membership. A solid majority of voting citizens recognized the country's long-term security, political and economic interests in joining the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Compared with the Hungarian referendum in 1997, the Slovenian referendum ought to be given a higher mark due to a more straightforward question and a much lower abstention rate. It also took place in a much less favourable international environment, as the war in Iraq clearly negatively influenced public attitudes toward NATO.

The ratification of accession protocols by NATO member states in 2003 went more smoothly than in 1997-1998. There were several reasons for this difference. The Eastward opening of 1999 paved the way for the second (or more precisely the third) enlargement into the former Warsaw Pact area, the Balkans and to Slovenia. Thus, in spring 2004, about eleven years after the first pronouncement by the Slovenian National Assembly in favour of NATO membership, Slovenia finally joined the Alliance.

Since the country's admission, the Slovenian government has consistently supported NATO's further enlargement to the Western Balkans. At the Bucharest summit of 2008 it was in favour of inviting Croatia, Albania and Macedonia as well as of upgrading the Alliance's relations with the rest of the region. The Slovenian delegation, however, went along with the omitting of Macedonia, thus bowing to Greece's intransigence over that country's official name (which Slovenia officially recognises). It also fell in line when a compromise paragraph on Ukraine and Georgia was agreed upon between the USA and the more cautious Western European members. In February 2008, after short delays caused by parliamentary opposition parties and in spite of the second chamber's appeal to postpone the decision, National Assembly, with 75 votes for and 11 against, ratified the protocol on Croatia's and Albania's accession to NATO.

Since Slovenia entered the Alliance, the issue of NATO membership ceased to be a polemical item in Slovenian politics, as occasional verbal attacks on the Alliance in the press have time and again failed to ignite a wider public debate. The membership became a fact of life accepted by a great majority of Slovenian citizens, including many of those who opposed NATO membership in 2002-2003. The movement in Slovenian public opinion during the last decade is illustrated by the following tables:

Table 1:
The level of trust in NATO

	Year	Full distrust 1	Little trust 2	Considerable trust 3	Full trust 4	Unaware 8	Do not know 9
NATO	1999	8,1	32,1	31,6	12,4	5,4	10,5
	2001	12,0	32,1	32,1	5,4	9,0	9,4
	2003	12,0	36,5	32,1	12,0	3,3	4,0
	2005	9,9	32,8	36,2	10,8	2,9	7,4
	2007	9,6	32,5	38,8	10,5	2,2	6,4

Data from the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey 1999-2007.

Table 2:
The usefulness of Slovenia's membership in NATO

		2003	2005	2007
1 -	Useful	59,5	51,0	53,1
2 -	Not useful	27,7	19,9	29,4
9 -	Do not know	12,8	29,1	17,5

Data from the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey 2003, 2005 and 2007.

However, Slovenian public has been rather critical of NATO's engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, has viewed the threat of international terrorism very differently from the official NATO (and EU) documents on the subject and has not supported an increase in Slovenia's defence spending in line with its government's previous promise. Slovenian participation in the functioning of the Alliance has become regularised both in the civilian political and the military spheres, with about 25 civilians posted in the NATO headquarters in Brussels and about 40 military personnel serving in the NATO commands in Brussels, Mons, Naples, Madrid, Izmir etc. To these numbers one should add civilian and uniformed officials in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs dealing with NATO matters.

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ČAS JE ZA TRANSFORMACIJO

IT IS TIME FOR TRANSFORMATION

Review paper

Povzetek Vojaške organizacije in obrambni sistemi se na prelomu tisočletja intenzivno prilagajajo spremembam v varnostnem okolju ter so postavljeni pred izzive popolne preнове. Ta je sprožena s transformacijsko paradigmo, ki kaže težnjo po tem, da postane nova teorija spreminjanja obrambno-vojaške organiziranosti. To spreminjanje se pojavlja v vseh državah, razvitih in manj razvitih, s poklicnim in naborniškim popolnjevanjem, v velikih in majhnih. V majhnih državah se lahko opuščanje starih modelov obrambno-vojaškega organiziranja navidezno kaže tudi kot izginjanje nacionalnega vojaštva. Obenem pa sprejemanje novih modelov ustvarja vtis utapljanja v večnacionalne ali transnacionalne vojaške strukture ter s tem občutek izgubljanja svoje vojaške identitete. Transformacijska paradigma se zato pojavlja kot pravšnja s svojo zasnovi o celoviti prenovi ob enakovredni vključenosti v transformacijske procese držav in njihovih vojsk, ne glede na velikost. Tudi slovenski primer kaže, da je po osemnajstih letih tranzicije in organizacijskega prilagajanja čas za transformacijo, pri čemer je treba ustvariti razmere za celovito prenovi. Posebno vprašanje pa je, kako v majhnih državah, kot je Slovenija, transformacijo načrtovati in uresničiti med gospodarsko recesijo.

Ključne besede *Transformacija, tranzicija, reorganizacija, preoblikovanje, reforma.*

Abstract At the turn of the millennium, military organisations and defence systems are intensively adjusting to the changes in the security environment and are being confronted with the challenge of complete renewal. The latter has been launched with a transformation paradigm, which is showing a tendency to become the new theory of modification of defence and military organisation. This modification is occurring in all countries, the developed and the less developed, with full voluntary manning and with conscription, in small and large countries. In small countries the abandonment of the old models of defence and military organisation can be seen in the

disappearance of the national military. At the same time the adoption of new models creates the impression that national armed forces are being subsumed into multinational or transnational military structures, consequently creating a feeling of loss of national military identity. For this reason the transformation paradigm, with its concept of comprehensive renewal together with equal integration into the transformation processes of the countries and their armies, regardless of their size, seems to be the most appropriate. The example of Slovenia also indicates that, after 18 years of transition and organisational adjustment, it is time for transformation, whereby we have to create the conditions for a comprehensive renewal. One specific concern is how to plan and realise transformation in such a small country as Slovenia under conditions of economic recession.

Key words *Transformation, transition, reorganisation, reform.*

Introduction Change is a constant of military organisations, while the search for and formation of organisational models is the driving force of their progress. Depending on the modification objectives and the approaches and methods, the modification periods are likewise defined differently. Such periods are periods of revolutionary change or revolution in military affairs, adjustment or transition periods and lately transformation period as well.

With the end of the Cold War and bipolarity came the changes to the models of military organisation that had prevailed until then (Moskos et al., 2000, p. 1). This initiated the abandonment of the mass armed forces concept. The changes have been manifested in a large reduction in scope, in modifications to the structure of armed forces and, predominantly, in a new way of manning and preparing personnel not only for classic but also for completely new military tasks. Through intensive integration into peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations and into crisis response operations implemented by different alliances or coalitions, the military's role and tasks started to change from the classic national defence tasks to preventive tasks in crisis areas, usually far from national borders. At the same time, numerous countries started to modify their defence and security standpoints, their foreign policy standpoints, and even their defence and military concepts, consequently beginning the modification of strategies and national legislation. This confirms that a new form or paradigm of change is taking shape. The terms used so far, such as transform, reorganise, restructure, transfigure or reform, are becoming too narrow. For this reason, the term transformation, which unites the aforementioned characteristics of comprehensive modification of defence and military organisations, seems the most appropriate.

The main purpose of this article is to present the transformation paradigm and transformation process in the defence and military field, more precisely by presenting the theoretical aspects and the key characteristics of this paradigm, as well as the indicators of its establishment. When describing the characteristics, we will take into

consideration the fact that transformation activities take place at the national level as well as at the level of military and political alliances.

The subject of the research is linked to two hypotheses. First: that the notion and process of transformation differ from transition processes and the related occurring notions of transformation, reorganization, restructuring, transfiguration and reform. Second: that the transformation process and activities lead to the renovation of defence and military systems and military organizations. In this they are centrally oriented towards the new, integral approach to the formation of multipliers to make up for the reduction of military capabilities and towards the spectrum of crisis management and preventive operations for the provision of security.

To study the transformation paradigm and the transformation process, the descriptive method and the method of analysis of written sources will be used. The characteristics of the transformation paradigm at the national, transnational and Alliance level will be presented, along with those aspects capable of presenting the new theory of modification of military organisation. The course of adjustment of the defence system in the Republic of Slovenia and in the Slovenian Armed Forces during the period of social and military transition will be explained on the basis of our own experience and by using the descriptive method and the method of observation with participation. The discussion will outline the situation already reached and present the standpoints that should be taken into consideration in the planning of transformation and its implementation in the Slovenian Armed Forces.

1 OCCURRENCE OF THE TRANSFORMATION PARADIGM

As the 21st century gets underway and the asymmetric threats of international terrorist networks intensify, a new term **transformation**¹ is beginning to come into general use in professional resources to describe modification of the role of the armed forces and the defence and military system. The transformation of military and non-military threats, the transformation of the role of the military and military force in society and in the global environment, transformation in the fields of military strategy, the global economy, new technologies and new weapons systems, and strategic leadership are the main topics of numerous expert discussions and, increasingly, of scientific discussions and research. In the literature, the new approach is referred to as the **transformation process** (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 20–21), which intensively supplants and replaces the paradigm of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Potts et al., 2005, p. 30). A more comprehensive insight into and study of transformation and its characteristics shows that we can also refer to the **transformation paradigm** (Binnendijk and Kugler, 2006).

¹ Some authors were referring to transformation and its characteristics in the second half of the 1990s; these included Rogers (1995) in: *The Military Revolution Debate – Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Donnelly (1997) in the article: *Defense transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem in the NATO Review publication*, and Jelušič (1997) in: *Legitimnost sodobnega vojaštva (Legitimacy of the Contemporary Military)*.

The transformation factors are the new, primarily asymmetric threats to national and international security, and the information revolution. The fact that the information revolution is primarily the preserve of industrially developed countries enlarges the gulf between the technologically developed and the technologically less developed or undeveloped countries and moreover between politics, ideologies or religions at risk. On the other hand, it enables new information access and the establishment of networks and connections, and poses questions about their management or control. The threat no longer comes primarily from a sovereign country, a member of the international legal order, but from the transnational association or from the countries without effective authority or social structures (Failed States). The above creates new expectations in relation to armed forces' ability to confront such challenges (Born et al., 2006, p. 15–17). Transformation is global and transnational and appears as a guideline for further development of military force within society.

At the beginning of the new millennium, transformation went through real expansion in the United States, where the first strategic guidelines on implementation were contained in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Binnendijk, 2002, p. xix), which was already in the process of creation before 11 September 2001². Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States, in November of the same year, a special Office of Transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense was formed (ibidem, p. xxxi).

In NATO the process of transformation is a means for intensifying the search for answers to the new terrorist and asymmetric threats (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 20) following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center skyscrapers in New York on 11 September 2001, and on Madrid railway station on 11 March 2004. The official start of the transformation period was politically verified at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002 (ibidem, p. 20), although the notion of transformation had already been in use within NATO³. In practice it is manifested in the transformation of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) into the first functional strategic command for transformation (Allied Command Transformation or ACT). The beginning of ACT operation brought transformation action plans at the Alliance level, as well as integration and the harmonization of allied efforts by encouraging transformation activities at the national level and between partner countries and even more widely, for example, through cooperation between NATO and Russia (ibidem, p. 91). In NATO the transformation is a proactive and innovative process of development and integration of new concepts, doctrines and capabilities, with a view to enhancing interoperability within the Alliance and with partners.

During the application of the transformation process in NATO, the concept of reforms was still being used within the EU, although transformation was likewise

² Barnett (2004, 2) describes this event as an event, which uncovered the gulf between the military structure that was built for the victory in the Cold War and the need for a safe globalization.

³ The transformation of the NATO Alliance is already in the NATO Handbook issued in 2001 (NATO Handbook, 2001, 47–50).

being applied. Transformation efforts have progressively seen the light of day with the European Security Strategy from 2003, the Headline Goal 2010 document and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA)⁴ in 2004. In the EU, transformation is mentioned when we refer to changes within the country and when we refer to connections with NATO. Within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the term Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Germann et al, 2005, p. 7–8) and its concept, which were formulated at the Geneva Center for Democratic Control over the Armed Forces (DCAF), are still being used.

2 SOURCES FOR THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF TRANSFORMATION

The sources for the theoretical study of transformation issues are scientific and expert monographs, conceptual documents and documents of a doctrinal nature, as well as scientific documents, expert and organizational documents accessible through the specially designed transformation networks.

In the monograph sources, the transformation paradigm and process and the implementation of transformation are described and treated from numerous perspectives. The conceptual sources include: Binnendijk (2002): *Transforming America's Military*; Alberts (2003): *Information Age Transformation: getting to a 21st Century Military*; Binnendijk and Johnson (2004): *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*; Knott (2004): *Knowledge Must Become Capability: Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation*; Barnett (2004): *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*; Alberts and Hayes (2005): *Campaigns of experimentation: pathways to innovation and transformation*; Edmunds and Malešič (2005): *Defence Transformation in Europe*; Binnendijk and Kugler (2006): *Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security*. We should also add those authors 'searching' for a paradigm but not describing it using the term transformation, e.g. Haltiner and Klein (2002) in: *Europas Armeen im Umbruch*; Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000) in: *The Postmodern Military Armed Forces after the Cold War*.

Important sources also include Allied and national conceptual and doctrinal as well as implementing organisational documents on transformation available online. One such online source is the TRANSNET website of the NATO Allied Command Transformation, which also links the websites of national centres or organizational units for transformation⁵.

It should be mentioned that there is some confusion regarding the use of the term transformation. The term is relatively young and, in practice, supplants the more established and well-known expressions, such as remodelling, reorganization, restructuring, transfiguring and reform, or even revolution, in the field of military affairs (RMA). The terminological confusion continues to increase when we observe

⁴ Also addressed by Korteweg (2005) in: www.ccss.nl/publications/2006/20060000_ccss_edp_update.pdf.

⁵ The TRANSNET website (<http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Help0>) provides access to the most important Allied and national conceptual, doctrinal and organisational solutions.

the use of these terms in different countries, with which the terms referring to modifications of organizations are being described. In Slovenia⁶ the term **remodel** means to give a different form to something, remodel, obtain different characteristics; the term **reorganize** means to reorganize anew, organise differently, reorganize work; the term **restructure** means to change the structure, restructure the economy, society; the term **transfigure** means to do something or give someone or something different content, form, new ideas, to transfigure people with ideas; the term **reform** means to change a system, organize something, reform an organization; the term **transform** means to remodel, transfigure an organization, transform an organization. It is clear that in order to describe the use of individual terms, the mere lexicographical definition of a term does not suffice, hence we have to take the established usage in theory and practice as a basis.

An in-depth examination of the term transformation demonstrates that this is not only a new or merely a competing notion, but also involves new contents and breadth, which at the same time presents a new quality in perception, approaches and modifications. It is at this very point that we establish that terms such as the remodelling and reorganization of the military, defence restructuring, conversion and defence and military reform have been used in the Slovenian language in those texts and circumstances which refer to the adjustment of defence and military organization in the period of social transition. If we want to use a certain notion to clearly state that, with transformation, we are passing over into a new period and to an entirely new form of change (renovation) in terms of quality, we cannot do this by using notions that have been used for to describe previous transition processes. In order to keep an adequate degree of distance from transition forms of adjustment to modified security circumstances in the Slovenian language as well, we must use the term transformation for new forms of renovation of defence and military systems. Moreover, we must take into consideration the fact that transformation includes the previous forms of modification, to which it adds new ones, and that it is wider in meaning than all other terms previously used. The introduction of the term transformation is also appropriate because the notional and institutional instruments and the approach to transformation have already been established within NATO and the EU, of which Slovenia is also a member. The performed of the written sources below enables a description of the term, paradigm and process of transformation, as well as the drawing of conclusions regarding the objectives and characteristics of transformation and its forms.

3 PARADIGM AND PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION AS A NEW APPROACH TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE ARMED FORCES

The transformation paradigm refers to the social and military transfiguring of the role of military force or, as Binnendijk and Kugler (2006, p. 10–13) write, it refers to

⁶ Based on the dictionary of the Slovenian literary language (*Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika, SSKJ*), 1994.

the abandonment of Neo-Hobbesian⁷ philosophy and the nature of countries, which use military force as a key instrument. The necessity of transformation is based on an analysis of the national armed forces model and the use of military force according to Clausewitz, its inner conflicts and restrictions at a time of globalisation, and the phenomenon of national threats and crisis. This is transition from the armed forces of the industrial age to the armed forces of the information age. Therefore, in the defence and military field, transformation is seen as a rational alternative to the social transformation of the use of military force.

'The concept of transformation of the military is connected with a redefinition of approaches to warfare formed in the transition from the industrial to the information age, where the predictable threats of the Cold War period are increasingly replaced by unpredictable asymmetrical and unconventional threats. This demands renovation of the military and its role and a thorough modification or remodelling.' Transformation has been thus defined in the Slovenian Doctrine of Military Defence (Furlan et al. 2006, p 105).

It should be stressed that in explaining and understanding transformation, we must proceed from the fact that this is a new approach, a new perception of changes, not only in a narrow defence and military sense but also in a wider security and political sense. Transformation thus includes the area of remodelling and transfiguring, in a narrow sense, within the defence and military systems, connecting it with and expanding it to the social environment or the social subsystems. The 'internetwork' approach, in which wide access to knowledge and cognition is becoming one of the transformation principles or one of the levers of a more rapid modification and realization of the new features introduced by transformation, is important in expanding and realizing the transformation paradigm. Transformation is oriented towards an integral approach in understanding and modifying the defence and military sphere, not only in the defence and military structure, defence forces and activities, but also towards political decision-makers including political masters, defence and military strategies and visions. Moreover, it is oriented towards new organizational models.

The special feature of transformation is its orientation towards a carefully planned and voluntary or non-revolutionary modification⁸, which does not exclude radical changes. Due to this, a dilemma appears as to whether this is a continuation or replacement of revolutionary changes. Revolutionary and radical modification in the

⁷ In the book *Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security*, Binnendijk and Kugler (2006) analyse a variety of theories, concepts and philosophies. Among other things they compare two predominant models of state structures, namely the Neo-Kantian and the Neo-Hobbesian. According to the first, the role of military force is of secondary importance because political infrastructure and economic power prevail, but according to the second, military force is primary.

⁸ The text *No Revolutions Please, We're British* by the authors Potts and Thackray (2005, p 29–42) published in the book *The Big Issue: Command and Combat in the Information Age* has a meaningful title. The book presents a comparison of three models of modifications of military capabilities. A comparison of two revolutionary models has been made; more precisely from the period of the Blitzkrieg and the model from the period of the later Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with the model of Planned Incremental Change, which is used in the contemporary modification of military capabilities.

defence and military sphere brings more risks and negative consequences, particularly as the old structure is demolished and the new one cannot be installed right away to replace the operation of the previous system. Transformation signifies the abandonment of revolutionary approaches towards changes in the field of military affairs, due to which it is, at times, difficult to distinguish it from the changes and adjustments that took place in the transition periods.

In countries in which there is a passage from military transition to transformation, this signifies a distancing from adjustment and an orientation towards renovation. Such a passage from the transition to the transformation period requires an orientation towards new ways of thinking regarding renovation of the military and its role so that it is prepared for new challenges and threats. Due to asymmetrical threats, the approach towards the formation of military doctrines is also changing. Here, more than the attainment of military victories, where the standards for their evaluation are increasingly blurred, the management of situations and preventive action are coming to the forefront (Kennedy, 1987, p. 525–535; Pastor, 1999, p. 1–30; Nye, 2005, p. 58, 197–205). Military transition is characterised by the adaptation of military structures and its organizations and operations to emerging circumstances; transformation attempts to establish the advantages not only in structure, organization and operation but also in modification, and to anticipate the possible, which brings a decisive advantage in dealing with the situations to come. With this, the transformation paradigm shows a tendency to become a new theory of modification of military organization.

The objectives of transformation are oriented towards the attainment of new quality and modifications corresponding to contemporary needs in the field of the organization and operation of military forces and the defence sector, more precisely in the personnel, material, technological, informational and political fields. Transformation is manifested in the changing of organizational structures, doctrines and operations, and in an orientation towards capabilities, particularly in the fields of research and development, experimentation and lessons learned. An important element of transformation, perhaps even the most important, is the intellectual element, which includes knowledge, learning and understanding. In this way, education and training, research and development, experimentation and learning from experience, and consequently the intellectual profile of a military professional, are becoming the central areas in which the transformation process is taking place.

Transformation characteristics are also the inclusion of new ways of thinking and the redefinition of approaches to the use of the military and to warfare. Therefore, some of the most dominant characteristics of the transformation process should be listed. These can be seen in the structure of the armed forces, linked with the combined type forms of forces organization at the tactical level as well, in joint staffs, in the orientation towards capabilities and the deployability and sustainability of forces, in the commitment to the management of the requirements of expeditionary operations, in the digitalisation and informatisation of operations, which is spreading into space, in the formation of new branches of military and the new profile of military

professionals, in support for army professionalisation processes and in the demonstration of its new image externally and internally, to the public and society. We should also mention the handover of certain military or support activities to external ('outsourcing') contractors. Another characteristic of modification can be observed in the very approach towards this: that is, the commercialisation or privatisation of military activities. This opens up new possibilities for the commercialisation of peace and security activities at the international level, particularly in those areas where countries and their structures do not have the possibility of operating effectively due to political or normative restrictions.

Transformation can also be observed at the national and transnational levels, as well as at the level of alliances. The indicators of transformation in large and small countries are similar, but it is nonetheless possible to claim that the degree and scope of modifications are greater in larger countries. In the period of bipolarity, countries and alliances strived towards the accumulation of military potentials and, on the basis of this, towards a balance of power (Kennedy, 1987, p. 525–535; Pastor, 1999, p. 1–30). But in the transformation period, countries are keen on mutual interdependence, the reduction or disarmament of weapons potentials and a focus on key, often technologically completely new military capabilities because these present the foundation for multiplying military power (Binnendijk, 2002, p. 31–35; Alberts, 2003, p. 13–22; Knott, 2004, p. 39–42, and others.) The above is already the central challenge of transformation and demands an answer to the question of where it is leading to, particularly at the national level.

The measurement of transformation indicators and characteristics is a special challenge and a foundation for comparisons and for answers to questions about the differences and common characteristics of changes in the defence and military field in different countries. In the available professional literature and defence practice, we can find more approaches, which are useful for evaluating and demonstrating military transformation indicators. NATO has developed a special instrument, which is manifested in the *Defence Planning Questionnaire* and is a foundation for monitoring and for annual reports on defence planning and the capabilities achieved. The methodology is used both for members of the Alliance as well as for members of the Partnership for Peace, but the methodology and the collected data are not accessible to the general public; therefore the methodology cannot entirely be used to examine the transformation characteristics of individual countries. Among the more widely known approaches to the evaluation of modifications in the defence and military system and the armed forces is the methodology for measuring national power, developed by the RAND Corporation in the manual *Measuring National Power in the Post-Industrial Age* (Tellis et al, 2000). The methodology used by the British International Institute for Strategic Studies⁹ in its study of the assessment of military capabilities (*European Military Capability – Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations* (IISS, 2008)) is also appearing in professional circles in Europe.

⁹ The IISS is known chiefly for its *Military Balance* study, which was drawn up for comparisons between different European countries.

Transformation characteristics in the military field can be observed mainly within the special organizational units of the ministries of defence and joint or general staffs of the armed forces, including the special authorities for transformation¹⁰, in the existence of special transformation action plans and programmes, in the orientation towards the introduction of changes in research and development activities and experimentation, education and training, as well as in the approaches to the formation of Multiple Futures, in learning from experience and in the existence of transformation networks and connections, which expand the circle of knowledge and experience and influence the changes. In addition, it is possible to compare the changing of the functional and social structure of the armed forces, its operations in national and international environments, the changing of the structure of consumption of financial resources and the indicators of integration into the Allied command structure and forces structure.

4 SLOVENIAN SOCIAL AND MILITARY TRANSITION AS A STARTING POINT AND FOUNDATION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

The end of the Cold War, the crisis in the socialist political arrangement and the end of the bipolar international and political structure have all encouraged the processes of comprehensive social transition in Europe. These processes have been most intensive in the former socialist countries of Europe, and have also taken place, to varying degree of intensity, in Western European countries. An examination and comparison of conceptual, structural and functional modifications in the defence and military field in the transition period in Slovenia points to a variety of characteristics that can be also found in other small countries after the end of the Cold War, and also shows numerous particularities which apply only to Slovenia as a new country and which have continued beyond the period of transition, to form the starting points for the transformation process.

The main common characteristic of these processes is the adaptation of defence and military organization to new circumstances. In the transition period, the essence of the functional imperative¹¹ was directed towards the provision of national defence and towards entry into military and political alliances, which brings cooperation in the crisis response operations. The essence of the social imperative is the establishment of the operation of institutions of democratic control over the armed forces, which Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002, p. 1–10) treat as the first and the second generations of problems in the civil-military relations. These characteristics are also present in the Slovenian case.

¹⁰ *These are the secretaries or assistants of defence ministers for transformation and the deputies of general staffs in charge of transformation, or special assistants for transformation.*

¹¹ *The functional and social imperative is described by Jelušič (1997, p. 68-69) in: Legitimnost sodobnega vojaštva (Legitimacy of the Contemporary Military).*

As an independent country internationally recognised since 1992 (it was recognised initially as a republic of the former Yugoslavia in 1991), Slovenia has participated in the processes of political, economic, state and national security transition. This includes the introduction of a multilateral political system of parliamentary democracy and a market economy, the construction of the country and its national security components, and preparations for entry into international, political and economic associations such as the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO. Slovenia spent part of the national security transition process simultaneously in the formation and subsequently in the remodelling of the national security system.

The remodelling of Slovenian military organization as a component of national security commenced in 1991, when the process of independence and the protection of a democratic and independent country was conducted on the basis of the previous concept of total defence and mass armed forces, founded on the comprehensive mobilized reserve structure of the Territorial Defence. In Slovenia the process of formation of military organization has taken part simultaneously with the processes of a reduction in mass armed forces and the abolition of military service that have taken place in several industrially developed countries in Europe. It is easier to understand Slovenia's deviations from the tendencies of developed European countries at that time if one considers that it came out of war and was under military threat due to the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia until 1995.

In the process of forming the active component of the Slovenian Armed Forces, at the exact time when the armed forces should, in compliance with European tendencies, have been transformed into smaller armed forces, the threats to Slovenia gave rise to certain particularities which could not be abolished in the transition period. Most of the transition changes tended towards adjustment rather than a radical modification of the defence and military structure. Those characteristics that can present an obstacle to the transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces have persisted from the initial period of formation of military organization, through the period of transition and all the way to entry into the period of transformation. The period of the conscripts reserve and the personnel manning adapted to the latter have left behind an officer structure which is inadequate and too large and which still has the mentality displayed by conscript-based armed forces. Two other things, which have persisted, are the infrastructure, which was adapted to obligatory military service for the male population and spread across the entire country, and the branch-like civil and administrative recruitment network. All this was actually remodelled several times during the military transition, but it has not been surpassed in compliance with the new tasks and mission of the Slovenian Armed Forces.

With the intensive help of the countries with which Slovenia began to cooperate at the beginning of the 1990s (United States, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Israel and others), there was a gradual realisation that the outdated models of military organization and the operational patterns from the past had to be left behind. Slovenia's entry into the Partnership for Peace in January

1994 signified the beginning of the withdrawal of the old models, and gave rise to the adoption of numerous foreign models. The adoption of models often means the acceptance of everything that has been offered and evaluated as good, regardless of the effectiveness or otherwise of the adopted models when tested under actual conditions in the Slovenian military and defence system. The non-critical and insufficiently selective adoption of models from elsewhere is a characteristic of all transition countries, as pointed out by Haltiner and Klein (2002, p. 7–22).

In the period when extensive preparations for the join into NATO were taking place and when the number of foreign models available was at its greatest, it became clear to the Slovenian defence and military system that we had to be selective. Because the simple imitation or transfer of solutions from partner countries is mostly not possible, questions emerged regarding which military and organizational solutions could serve as a model and which could simply be transferred. We also had to ask ourselves where modifications to the system were necessary so that the transferred solutions could be implemented. A gradual approach and a relatively slow pace of change were characteristic of the period up to 2002, which represented a milestone between the two major strategic changes. First, the Slovenian government and parliament adopted a decision abolishing obligatory military service; and second, Nato adopted a decision at the Prague Summit inviting Slovenia to become as a full member of the Alliance. Both signified the beginning of a period of intensive change and the end of the strategic development orientation, meaning that, despite the limited resources and the small size of the country, in the features of military organization which characterise large countries have to be implemented in the military field in Slovenia as well. The acknowledgement that this was false was as difficult as to give up everything that the Slovenian Armed Forces had believed in up to that point (Šteiner, 2002, p. 9–15).

In relation to the characteristics of the modifications to military organization in the transition period, we should stress the numerous remodellings of the command structure and units of the Slovenian Armed Forces, which were meaningfully dubbed *Kokon*¹². The transition from one structure to another has often performed mainly at the formal level; therefore, in some examples, no larger changes took place. If the modifications had taken place more slowly, there would probably have been an even greater number of negative influences; without doubt, quite a number of deficiencies or difficulties could have been avoided. The attempt at the systemic formation of the army was realized in the professionalisation of the armed forces project (PROVOJ)¹³. This project was oriented towards the comprehensive formation of a professional army, complemented by a contractual reserve. Different views on how to realize the project and, in particular, on how to conduct it and how to achieve synergy with the support within the Ministry of Defence and the country as a whole, were addressed

¹² *Kokon* was a joint denotation for the plans for the remodeling of commands, units and institutions of the Slovenian Armed Forces from 1997 to 2000. *Kokon* means 'cocoon', from which a butterfly emerges.

¹³ The PROVOJ project was prepared in 2002 and implementation commenced in 2003. By 2006 it included more detailed activities. It should last into 2010, in accordance with the dynamics of modification of the structure of the armed forces.

prior to the key matters of the thematic nature of the project. Nevertheless it is PROVOJ that serves as an introduction to the transformation period of modifying the Slovenian military organization, for it signalled an integral approach to the modification of the armed forces and to the solving of all key questions regarding structural and functional professionalisation, which was also characteristic of the transformation processes.

5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several answers we can give to the question of why the topic of the transformation of the armed forces matters within the Slovenian expert and scientific environment. First, it matters because it demonstrates the complexity of institutional and functional modification and the perception of the role of military force and the armed forces. Second, it matters because it points to future security challenges and, if we examine the trends, to possible solutions for a more adequate formation of defence and military systems. An understanding of the characteristics, legality and forms of transformation is not only the domain of defence science but also a necessity for Slovenian defence practice.

One characteristic of transformation is the wide range of research and expert and scientific works in this field that have appeared in those countries which are dealing intensively with transformation and which treat it as one of the key scientific, conceptual, strategic and practical challenges of the information society. By contrast, there are not a lot of such studies in small countries. This means, therefore, that those countries in particular which are abandoning the old models of military organization and preparing to become partners or Allies are now confronted with very similar traps and challenges to those with which Slovenia was confronted and are, of course, not sufficiently prepared for them.

Transformation is not a 'fad'. As mentioned elsewhere in this text, the defence and military system is too complex and too sensitive to be a polygon for the testing of precarious models. Another set of questions is therefore arising from the monitoring and study of the military transformation of small countries: whether transformation really is a new approach in terms of content, or is indeed only a 'fad', or is only a new term for the processes of military organization modification used by large countries. From the point of view of small countries, it is also important to know whether the modification of military models of organization using a method that encourages the formation of new military capabilities is in fact a process that leads to the strengthening of the industrially developed countries in which the military technologies for new capabilities are produced, which would in turn lead to the abolition or marginalisation of the defence industries of small and industrially less developed countries. We are therefore also confronted with the question of whether transformation hides levers for the disappearance or excessive reduction of small countries' military or, as some authors write, whether it involves the loss or modification of the national identity of the armed forces (Forster et al, 2003) and its incorporation within

multinational military structures (Haltiner and Klein, 2004). Here the question arises of where the process of ‘reducing the mass armed forces’, analysed by Karl Haltiner in several of his works, is actually leading. All this causes concern that, due to the transformation and the modification of the army, which takes place in line with the available resources, we will become insignificant in a military sense and thus more under threat. Because in both large and small countries transformation is the search for new multipliers to replace the reduction in the military power of nation states and alliances, it is possible to conclude that small countries are more vulnerable in this search than large ones.

National transformation activities are, as a rule, launched ‘top down’, which means from the transformation authorities or centres to implementers at the lower levels. At the transnational level or within alliances there are approaches which strive to multiply national efforts and accelerate national achievements, particularly in planning, capabilities construction, and to introduce certain common denominators of transformation visions and strategies. However, the question of whether and to what extent countries are capable of entering transformation activities at their level and whether all countries, regardless of their military and economic power are equal, remains an unanswered one.

In today’s conditions, associations and alliances, transformation can simply not be avoided. We could understand it differently, but this would only take us further from international currents and from what transformation represents in its wider sense when we refer to the modification of the defence paradigm above the national framework. It is therefore true of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces that they have entered a period in which it is time for transformation. Or in other words: there is no longer a dilemma of whether we should have transformation or not but, rather, how to undertake and realise it.

6 IT IS TIME FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AS WELL

The answer to the question of whether the Slovenian Armed Forces are still or predominantly subject to modifications of a transition character or whether we can already talk of the ‘period of transformation’ also depends on the angle from which we observe the questions and challenges of further modification. Given the scope of the changes made so far, the speed and relative success of the transition from a model of territorial organisation into a model of deployable and non-deployable forces, and given the transition from an obligatory reserve to a full voluntary manning system, we can conclude that the transition period has ended successfully for the Slovenian Armed Forces (Grizold, 2005, p. 132–137).

Some sources state that the acknowledgement of military transformation at the national level is achieved when we approach the wide spectrum of transformation processes and activities methodically with a special functional (transformational)

organizational unit, the realization of transformation projects and measures, and exchanges with the international transformation environment. The majority of formal conditions in the Slovenian case have not yet been entirely fulfilled, which means that the passage from the transition to the transformation period has not yet been completed.

The conditions for successful implementation of transformation at the national level are, in addition to its vision and implementation plans, an adequate social climate and support, as well as a connection with Allied transformation efforts. An adequate internal organizational climate and successful management of the transformation process are also necessary. Even though a transnational and global effect is characteristic of transformation, this does not mean that it will be possible simply to lay transformation solutions onto the Slovenian Armed Forces and the wider defence and security system. In the Slovenian environment, the fear that, due to transformation, it will become unimportant in the military sense and therefore more at risk militarily, and that the Slovenian Armed Forces will lose its national identity, will persist. All these reservations provide additional encouragement in the search for scientific and expert arguments and answers to the dilemmas posed and in the search for reasonable solutions for the transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in accordance with Slovenian needs and global tendencies in the field of the countering of asymmetric threats.

The development of the armed forces and defence systems shows that important changes have occurred in special (often crisis) conditions and that they have been characterised as revolutionary. Therefore the question of the circumstances in which it is possible to successfully carry out transformation is posed, particularly if we know that transformation is not in favour of radical or violent modification. This question is much more topical at a time of global economic crisis and recession affecting both large and small countries. In these circumstances the transformation paradigm is confronted with the question of whether survival and adaptation, which are the main characteristics of transition, are the two things that will move the transformation process into the distant future during a general economic recession. The fact is that transformation changes require conditions that do not present any major general threats: they also require the stable provision of resources, mainly financial. Despite this, I am convinced that it is precisely during an economic recession that the requirement to abandon outmoded structures and capabilities and produce new organisational solutions is most relevant.

In the Slovenian case as well, the need for transformation is being felt more than ever before, mainly because the future objectives can no longer be attained by continuing the transition adjustment of the structure, tasks, organization and the armed forces operation. To this we should add the realization that, with the continuation of transition-style modification, the Slovenian Armed Forces would not be able to cope with future security challenges. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia also confirmed this orientation with the adoption of the Military Defence Doctrine

(Furlan et al. 2006, p. 7), where the dilemma of whether to continue with military transition or whether it was time for transformation was solved in favour of transformation. We cannot ignore the radical effects of the economic crisis and recession on the future development of the armed forces. If ever, now is the time for modifications – or more precisely, for *transformation modifications*. It is clear that future transformation solutions and efforts involving the Slovenian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence and the wider environment cannot simply be copied from other countries or armed forces.

Conclusion After the end of the Cold War, the defence and military system and the armed forces had to adjust to new security conditions by reducing the scope of the armed forces, introducing new tasks and missions, and seeking legitimacy in accentuating the necessity of defence reforms and democratic civil control of the armed forces. With the globalisation of asymmetric threats at the beginning of the 21st century, transformation processes and activities were introduced at the national and transnational levels, and at the levels of military and political alliances, which led to renovation of defence and military systems and were oriented towards a new spectrum of operations for crisis management and preventive operations. The processes of transition- and transformation-based modification of the armed forces are taking place in large and small countries, where, during the transformation period, small countries have the opportunity to enjoy more equal participation in modifications within the framework of transnational structures and military and political alliances than was possible during the transition period.

The purpose of this paper is to present the transformation paradigm and the fields affected by the transformation process. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the written sources, the hypothesis that transformation processes differ from transition processes has been confirmed. In confirming the hypothesis, I have taken a description of Slovenian military transition as my basis. The paper also presents arguments for the establishment of transformation as a term within the Slovenian environment as well, where use of this term differs from the use of the prevailing ones such as remodelling, reorganization, restructuring, transfiguring and reform. Alongside confirmation of the hypothesis that the renovation of military systems and military organizations in transformation is based on the introduction of multipliers of military capabilities, certain particularities, dilemmas and doubts are enumerated. In small countries this is manifested in questions regarding the reduction of military capabilities and the orientation towards crisis response operations for the provision of international security.

In the conclusion to the paper, I answer the question of why it is time for transformation in Slovenia, and draw attention to the necessary conditions for its successful realization. I highlight the dominant questions and the influence of the economic crisis and the recession, which pose questions regarding the survival of transformation.

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IZKUŠNJE REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE PRI UVAJANJU ZMOGLJIVOSTI OMREŽNEGA DELOVANJA

EXPERIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NETWORK OPERATION CAPABILITIES

Professional article

Povzetek Človeški dejavnik, tehnologija in njena uporaba ter prostor so bili v zgodovini vedno dejavniki, ki niso vplivali le na vojaško organizacijo, temveč skoraj na vso družbeno sfero. Način, kako se je informacijsko-komunikacijska tehnologija (IKT) uveljavila v vsem našem življenju, pa je resnično velika revolucija. V članku bomo predstavili to revolucijo predvsem na področju preoblikovanja sodobnih oboroženih sil ter vseh drugih akterjev sodobnih (ne)bojnih operacij v enotno delujoč mehanizem na omrežju. Zato ne govorimo več o bojevanju, temelječem na omrežju, temveč uporabljamo izraz *network enabled capabilities*. Posebna pozornost v članku je namenjena Sloveniji in njenemu približevanju klubu (tehnološko) visoko razvitih držav, prav tako želimo opozoriti na temeljne napake, ki so se dogajale in se še pri uveljavljanju tega dela preoblikovanja v Slovenski vojski. Tu namreč opažamo predvsem problem tehnološkega determinizma ob hkratnem zanemarjanju človeškega dejavnika, ki je (še vedno) ključni element informacijsko-komunikacijskega omrežja. Članek zaključujemo s priporočili, kako trenutno stanje ob drastičnem zmanjšanju finančnih sredstev ter gospodarski krizi optimizirati ter uravnotežiti tehnološki, doktrinarni, organizacijski ter človeški (human) razvoj slovenskih obrambnih zmogljivosti.

Ključne besede *Transformacija, informacijska premoč, zmogljivosti omrežnega delovanja, informacijsko-komunikacijska tehnologija, tehnološki determinizem, človeški dejavnik.*

Abstract In the past the human factor, technology and its use as well as space have always been factors, which have influenced not only the military organization, but also the entire social sphere. The way in which the information and communication technology (ICT) established in our entire life is in deed a great revolution. The article presents this revolution mainly in the field of transformation of modern armed forces and all other modern actors of the (non)-combat operations into a uniformly operating mechanism in the network. Therefore we no longer talk about network based combat, but rather use the expression *network enabled capabilities*. The article

pays special attention to Slovenia and its approach to a club of (technologically) highly developed countries. We also want to draw attention to fundamental mistakes, which occurred and continue to occur in the implementation of this part of transformation in the Slovenian Armed Forces. It is here that we notice principally the problem of technological determinism along with simultaneous negligence of the human factor, which is (still) a key element of the information and communication network. We conclude the article with recommendations on how to optimise the current situation, confronted with a drastic decrease in financial assets and the financial crisis, and with recommendations on how to balance the technological, doctrinal, organizational and human development of Slovenia's defence capabilities.

Key words *Transformation, information superiority, network operation capabilities, information and communication technology, technological determinism, human factor.*

Introduction Throughout the history, the human factor, technology and its usage along with space have always been factors which have influenced not only the military organization, but the entire social environment. We can conclude, that all these three angles of an equilateral triangle are in an interactive relationship. This means that a single factor can never completely prevail, but it is true, however, that these factors take turns according to their significance.

Even though numerous technologies changed the course of events in the history, not many marked our lives in the way the information and communication technology has. If in the ninety-sixties of the previous century it seemed that this is only one of many technologies, which will be used mainly by the national defence system, the subsequent course of actions brought one of the largest revolutions in the history. Not only have the armed forces and their communication capabilities informatised (in terms of software and hardware development), the conventional weapons also got an entirely different meaning and effectiveness through digitalisation and informatisation. On the other hand, other social subsystems also informatised and digitalised, among which the most important ones are undoubtedly the economic, media as well as administrative and political social subsystems (Network Science, 2005). In the beginning of the ninety-nineties of the previous century we have, almost at the same time that the Cold War ended, stepped on the path of the information society, which is one of the main factors of the so-called modified security environment, something that almost no one forgets to mention nowadays. But what makes such a difference between the pre-information and information society, for the famous Chinese war theoretician Sun Tsu already knew the significance of information in combat? **In our opinion the biggest difference is in the amount of data and information, which we (still principally humans) are able to absorb, process, transfer and make decisions based on them.** This very characteristics of the modern society and the digital information and communication technology is what gives foundation to network operation, not only of the armed forces, but of almost all those actors, which play an important role in the modern combat and non-combat operations. It is

nonetheless indisputable that without the information and communication platform, it would not be possible to attain such high complexity in the implementation of combat operations and all kinds of non-combat activities. It is likewise indisputable that without information and communication support it would be impossible to attain the formation of task force¹, which surpasses the classical division of the armed forces on services and branches, and which can even combine parts (or the whole) of armed forces of individual states.

Within this framework, we will also highlight our central research question that we want to explain in this article. **The risk of technological determinism or the omnipotence of technology** is one of the biggest threats, which can impede the introduction of network operation² of the armed forces and wider. As we will demonstrate on the example of the American Army in Iraq experience, later in the article, too much attention has been dedicated to technological solutions and too little to the users of the network. And here we come to our main thesis. **Regardless of how large a system is adapted for network operation without a holistic (integrated) implementation plan, which covers both technological as well as human and doctrinal component, we will never be able to bring into effect the essence of the network, that is the shared knowledge and capabilities for the attainment of synergistic effects or the added value of individual parts, combined into a network.** Even at the appearance of artificial intelligence and increasingly numerous entirely automated processes, **it is the human, which remains the most common decision-maker and the main component part of the network.** In that respect, we believe that we should invest much more means for education and training particularly in the human. In the information societies the problem of the so-called information overload, when there is an abundance of information or even too much of information, is becoming increasingly common. The narrow throat of such network remains the human with his poorly utilized cognitive potential.

If we want to prove the necessity of a comprehensive approach in the introduction of network operation, the structure of this article has to be adapted to that purpose. The article is based on a deductive scientific analysis, which is founded on general social and technological influences on the modern armed forces. In the second part, the article continues with the presentation of the network operation concept, as it is understood in NATO. The last part of the article deals with the example of Slovenia on a micro level. This last part in particular presents an important added value, since it also uses the principle of research with participation and the constructive critical approach to scientific writing, apart from the traditional (sociological) methods of scientific writing, as for example the descriptive analysis and the analysis of primary

¹ *The example of the American Navy in the Enduring Freedom operation (U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet Task Force 50 in Operation Enduring Freedom, 2007).*

² *The term network operation is used because the concept itself envisages much more than mere combat operations of the armed forces. These are the so-called full spectrum operations, in which, nowadays, the non-military and non-state actors participate as well. In compliance with the concept of network operations, all of them would be using a uniform information, communication and procedural platform.*

and secondary sources. This is the only way that transition, which strives to be explicitly application-oriented, with its vision of the situation in Slovenia, can be possible. The main purpose of the article is not to describe the already known concepts, but to address the mistakes (foreign as well) made at their implementation, followed by a relatively ambitious attempt to exit the given situation by making propositions, since a great deal of attention, in Slovenia as well, has been devoted to technology and technical solutions, and too little to the human factor or to the users.

1 SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON CONTEMPORARY ARMED FORCES

It is unambiguous that the armed forces or the military subsystem are that part of a society, which is constantly subject to transformation and reforms. It is true that in different historical periods this cycles are of various intensity, but on the other hand, we can say that in the last twenty years we have witnessed numerous revolutions (not only in military and technological affairs). The first undoubtedly refers to social changes of which the decay of numerous multinational countries is characteristic, but on the other hand we are confronted with increasingly numerous merger (economic, political and security) initiatives on local and even on global level. In many countries the social relations also changed and we can undoubtedly say that a modern state (despite a possible renaissance due to a response to the current economic crisis) is confronted with numerous challenges and actors in both, home and international scene. Some theoreticians talk about the **deetatization** and the loss of power and monopole, which a modern state had for the last three hundred years, after the Westfall Peace, particularly in the security and military field. In short, the internal and global social changes and the changes of the security environment, dictated by both the actors as well as the security instruments and technology, have created an entirely different perception of security, into which we must unquestionably place the new types of conflicts and the asymmetric warfare. The latter is not a novelty, but it is true that, as Ivan Arreguin Toft notes in his book *How the Weak Win Wars*, the number of conflicts in which the seemingly weaker actors win, is rising rapidly. Why? Do we have wrong instruments for measuring power or are certain individual forms of power nowadays less useful in conflicts as they once used to be. It is true that in our time the weaker not only win numerous conflicts, but cause them as well. We can establish this by merely observing the Middle East and the operation of typical asymmetric actors, such as the movements Hamas in Palestine and the Shiite Hebsollah in Lebanon. In 2006 and in 2009, the two movements more or less intentionally provoked the Israeli intervention, at which it was clearly demonstrated that at the present time, even such superior armed forces as the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are unlikely to fully attain their objectives.

All these factors (social changes, changes of the security environment, joining into the alliance, new types of conflicts /asymmetry/ and technology) dictate the current transformation of the armed forces, but it is especially important for the organizational and technological transformation to accentuate the role and the significance of the

information and communication technology (ICT). Without its integral (social and technical) understanding we shall not be able to comprehend the network operation. **So the information and communication technology (ICT) refers to collecting, processing and presenting data and at the same time includes the communication element, which enables data transfer.** The data processing technology includes data fusion and their analysis as well as support in the decision-making process (Alberts, 1996; Wilson, 1998). It defines the breakthrough of the modern electronic, although principally computer and communication technology into the information processing methods. The origin of the term dates back in the ninety-seventies of the twentieth century (Bosch, 2000: 86-87), but what is essential for its wider understanding is, that it does not refer only to the technical and infrastructure hardware aspect and devices. **We must, above all, consider the aspect of software, which gives the appliances a useful value and a human factor,** which, of course, uses the software and hardware. It is therefore essential that we link the software and the hardware aspect with usage in the attainment of the desired objectives (technological utility/adaptability or the social utility). **Therefore the information and communication technology (ICT) can be defined as the ability, knowledge, skill or technique to achieve the desired effects mainly with the use of machines and appliances, enabling the information activities** (Svete, 2005: 8).

At the analysis of social dimensions of usage, above all, it is highly appropriate to distinguish between the three different aspects of information and communication technology (ICT), as suggested by Wilson (1998: 7): **The information and communication technology (ICT) as a medium, as an inserted production factor, and as a motive power of the organizational changes.** The information and communication technology (ICT) as a medium does not refer only to the contents. The broadcasted and printed messages and the programs contain both implicit and explicit values; nonetheless it is the researchers' task to infer the implicit context, which includes cultural, political and other values (worth), which are presumably a part of messages. In addition, it has to be studied whether the implicit content even came to the recipient (viewer, listener or reader), how he perceived it and how it influenced his behaviour and activity. Such flows of content are extremely important; for they can potentially influence the ethnic or social relationships, cause tension or produce cooperation.

The treatment of the information and communication technology (ICT) as an inserted part of the production is considerably different. The latter considers the information and communication technology similarly as traditional production elements (soil, work and capital), the relationships of which influence the economic production. Within this framework the most significant meaning of the information and communication technology (ICT) refers to the modification of resources, to which different individuals or groups in the society have access to, including work and capital.

The third aspect addresses the information and communication technology (ICT) as a motive power of organizational changes. In this event, the communication aspect of the information and communication technology (ICT) in particular, both within as

well as between the hierarchies, leads to the levelling of the organizational pyramids in public, private and non-governmental sector and of course also or mainly in the military organization, which wants to use the network as a spine for its operation. How have the USA undertook the introduction of such approach will be demonstrated on the example of the *Iraqi Freedom* operation. These experiences have also defined the NATO's approach to the network operation, which will also be analysed in the article.

1.1 The implementation of the network armed forces concept in the Iraqi Freedom operation

At the analysis of the use of the information and communication technology (ICT) on the side of the coalition forces, we have to highlight the critical estimations of effectiveness or successfulness of this usage, particularly at the coalition armed forces and the indirect implementation of military operations. Within this framework we will use the estimation presented in the document *OnPoint: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004)*, prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Talbot (2004) in the magazine *Technology Review*, published by the recognized Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), comes to similar findings regarding the unsuccessfulness of particularly the usage of communication and information technology (ICT) in indirect combat actions.

In the document *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the very area of informational and psychological operation or the introduction of the armed forces concept, based on the network, and informational operations in the preparatory phase of the operation and in the second phase, after the commencement of hostility, has been very critically estimated. The first critique refers to the concept of the network armed forces or the warfare. Given the decisive meaning of information for a successful and efficient operation of the armed forces, which have, apart from the human and the technological factor, influenced the outcome of conflict, in the first Gulf War in 1991, particularly after a successful use of certain information and communication systems (e.g. GPS, video, conference connections, and data processing capabilities), among American theoreticians and key decision-makers prevailed the standpoints that the very use of information and communication technology (ICT) is a key factor of America's supremacy. To this end has been developed the already presented concept of warfare, based on the network, which in stead of the traditional warfare theories (Clausewitz) uses the system theory, the theory of chaos and complexity, and warfare, the objective of which is critical (information) infrastructure nodal warfare. All types of American Armed Forces have treated the network as a key means for the supply of information to commanders and units. In this way the initiatives, such as Army Digitalisation and Force XXI (Land Forces), Effects-Based Operations (Air Forces), Cooperative Engagement (Navy) and the Sea Dragon (Marine Corps) have been formed. Despite the abundance of definitions regarding the network operation concept, it should not be confused with warfare in information systems, such as have been the most radical initiatives and plans of information warfare (in particular its cybernetic and hacker supposition), and this is

also not a case of warfare between networks of individual actors. **In this context, the network presents exclusively the way and the means for the establishment of self adaptable armed forces**, in which information sharing shall be ensured from the highest level of command down to each individual soldier in the battlefield. On the basis of such information support, each level of the armed forces or every individual within them would be able to understand the commander's intention as well as his own tactical position. In order to achieve the set objectives, the American (Land) Forces started the digitalisation of their forces already in the ninety-eighties of the previous century, but it got additional impetus particularly after 1991. In the Iraqi Freedom operation the positive influences of digitalisation on the effectiveness of force operations already manifested themselves, mainly in the understanding of the position in relation to other, own or adversary forces (situational awareness), and in addition, digitalisation also increased the effectiveness of the forces. However, numerous imperfections also came to light, due to which a complete establishment of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept is not possible. One of such imperfections is undoubtedly the **interoperability within the American Forces and with allies**. If the first was a consequence of certain differences in the use of platforms; the second has been influenced by technical differences and security reasons. The land communication systems have also caused problems, as they have considerably reduced the manoeuvre capabilities. Regardless of the fact that a complete interoperability of communications, sensors and systems into a functional network anywhere in the world is difficult to accomplish, the American tendency for the implementation of network armed forces will continue in the field of education and training, doctrines, organization and leadership abilities of the command staff as well as in the development of the (information and communication) technology. **Besides the doctrinal, educational and organizational difficulties, one of the most important difficulties is also technological and technical aspect of data transfer**. The problem in introducing the tactical Internet as an information and communication basis for the introduction of the armed forces, based on networks, is the bandwidth of data transfer, something that is addressed by several authors and studies (Lettice, 2003; Moseley, 2003; Information Warfare Monitor, 2004).

2 NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITY (NEC) AS A NEW APPROACH

If five or six years ago, we have dealt with the question of how to establish the network armed forces in the most effective way, we today prefer to discuss the network operation capabilities, which links almost all (civil, military, state and non-state) actors of modern operations.

The network operation capabilities or the Network Enabled Capability (NEC) actually signify the transformation of the alliance. We intentionally refuse to use the title *NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC)*, since the network enabled capabilities (NEC) are not intended merely for the NATO alliance, but, in the sense of interoperability, their purpose is to mutually connect the participants in their joint activities, regardless of their affiliation to an individual alliance or organization.

The Network enabled capability (NEC) affects other capabilities by ensuring greater quality of operations. The network operation capabilities increase the effectiveness of operation by the speed of command, accuracy, safety and the speed of the information flow, higher speed and the accuracy of the weapon system operation, improved overview of the battlefield position, surveillance over the level of task realization with the increased speed of operations implementation and by the reduction of risk and the resources consumption (Alberts, 1999: 7). They also ensure superiority of decision-making, which is defined as a state in which better solutions are passed on faster than the adversary can respond. They are a link between sensors, decision-makers and the weapon systems. As written in the Network Operations Case Study (Gonzales, 2005), the Stryker Brigade Combat Team with the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and RSTA³ capabilities in organic composition, operating in conformity with the new concepts and doctrine, is incomparably more effective and efficient than a comparative unit without the NCW capability, presented by the Light Infantry Brigade. The mentioned literature is one of the rare actually performed comparisons and analysis of units capabilities, which operate in compliance with different doctrinal principles and undoubtedly manifest advantages, introduced by the NEC or NCW capabilities, as they are called in the American Armed Forces. **The NEC capabilities are a key condition for the transformation of the alliance and are crucial for the attainment of effective operation implementation, which, is in compliance with new concepts, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) concept and the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept.** The NEC capabilities have a special added value in **the expedition operations** (out of area) at which the forces are geographically spread and dependant of many factors, mainly logistic and communication. They integrate different processes, form the highest – political level to the lowest – tactical, and for that reason they expressed an urgent need for the change of mentality, attained political will and obligation, which will ensure information exchange among all actors, involved in the operations implementation. With the use of modern technology, NEC enables NATO and the members of the ad hoc alliance the attainment of objectives with smaller forces. Each alliance member should define its level of commitments for the attainment of NEC capabilities with the greatest possible use of current systems. That is to say, that the implementation of network operation capability demands close cooperation of different government departments, industry and other actors in individual members, and it is also linked with considerable financial expenditures⁴.

A known fact connected with NEC defence capabilities is that the alliance will provide only a small part of capabilities, while the bigger part is under national

³ *The RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition) are reconnaissance capabilities, control capabilities and capabilities for target acquisition.*

⁴ *The clearest answer regarding the importance of achieving network operation capability for a successful execution of transformation is probably written in the book of the Dutch Ministry of Defence on the development of the network operation capability in Netherlands in the following words: »If you can't plug in, you can't play.« (Networked operations, The Netherlands Defence organisations steps into the future with Network Enabled Capabilities, NEC steering group of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence in Cooperation with TNO Defence, Security and Safety, Netherlands Ministry of Defence, October 2006).*

jurisdiction and responsibility, therefore it is of key importance that the members of the alliance agree upon the standards they have to comply with at the realization of national projects and the capabilities implementation dynamics.

If we address transformation in the Republic of Slovenia, which would be in compliance with the alliance transformation, in a wider context, we cannot neglect the fact that it is not only the armed forces and the defence department that are participating in its realization, but also numerous other departments, acting as stakeholders. Many members of the alliance are aware of this fact and for this reason they have introduced the management and coordination of transformation holders on a higher level. In this way greater effectiveness, interoperability and a clearer system architecture is ensured, the system of management and maintenance is simplified and the expenditures as well as the necessary personnel structure is reduced. The process is, of course, very complex and it demolishes the current “small gardens” and acquired benefits of individual structures, while at the same time, it considerably changes the processes, the doctrines and concepts.

The development of future capabilities with which the implementation of operations will be possible through the development of new concepts, architecture, standards and processes as well as connecting people, information and technologies, is of key importance for the transformation of the armed forces, capable of operating in the network operation environment. The operational demands, which will ensure more effective use of units and the battle systems, more effective logistic support and the CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) system and more opportunities for the implementation of the expedition operations, are a very important element for successful transformation.

In many cases, the interaction between NEC capabilities and transformation could be **wrongly understood and therefore inappropriately placed exclusively in the segment, which deals with transformation of the networking and information infrastructure (NII)**. It is therefore very important to ensure a comprehensive approach to the management of transformation, which will provide favourable frameworks for the operation of various holders, responsible for transformation.

NEC requires a **“from-up-downwards” approach**, which enables coherence of all activities. NEC has to be open for cooperation, not only with the defence area, but also with other structures cooperating in the alliance, for example the nongovernmental organizations, development organizations etc. The coherence of the NEC capabilities implementation is one of the main requirements for successful transformation.

The key guidelines and requirements regarding the development of network operation, which should ensure the alliance transformation, the development of NNEC capabilities, adequate concepts and the development strategy, the timeline for the provision of the communication and information technology (CIT) within NNEC and the model of the NNEC capabilities management, are written down in the NNEC

Feasibility Study, Business Case for NEC, Roadmap for NNEC, NNEC Vision & Concept, Management Approach to NNEC, NATO architecture framework, NNEC Data strategy and others, which define the approach of the alliance and the recommendations to the members regarding transformation. Due to the demand for consistency between activities for the attainment of NEC capabilities, they are the foundation of the national approach to strategic decisions for the provision of NEC capabilities in a new national environment.

3 KEY AREAS OF TRANSFORMATION

The key areas of transformation and the attainment of NEC capabilities **comprise of the areas Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability (DOTMLPFI)**, in the framework of which are presented operational demands, connected with transformation (NATO Network enabled capability (2005), Feasibility study, Executive summary, Version 2.0, 2-8). In addition, **the attainment of NEC capabilities will demand larger changes in the safety policy and in the policy of information management.**

Even though individual countries are holders of the network capabilities development, the alliance is aware of the importance of a harmonized approach. In consequence, the alliance proposes four coordination areas, »NEC Coherence Areas⁵«, for the management of key NEC capabilities. These areas present a capabilities management system and a decision-making system, connected with the attainment of NEC objectives, and also contribute to the synchronization activity. The organization of the coordination areas provides a more transparent way of capability monitoring and facilitates the management and governance of their attainment. Without an adequate management approach, there is a risk of non-coordinated operation among different holders, which manifests itself in reduced interoperability, duplication of activities and excessive use of resources. The coordination areas are:

- a) **The area of operational concepts and operational requirements**, which ensures compliance of operational requirements and the NEC capabilities requirements, manifested within the framework of requirements for changes of operational concepts, doctrines and organization. It is very important that the holders of the development of doctrines, concepts and organization are familiar with key NEC ingredients and principles. The majority of operational demands are manifested within the networking and information structure (NII), which is based on Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), in such a way, that the operational demands are manifested in the required services, which are transferred to structures, responsible for technological development. A special interaction between these two communities is essential, since the operational community often is not familiar with NEC technological advantages and capabilities. Special attention

⁵ *Despite the educationally designed system and approach to NEC capabilities management, the imperfections in the current management model can be observed. Consequently, more appropriate solutions are being searched for.*

- must be given primarily to interoperability on international level. In the alliance, the Allied Command Operations (ACO) play a key role in this area.
- b) **The second area includes the provision of a coherent architectural development and a detailed description (specification) of services, based on operational demands.** The use of uniform specifications enables an improvement of solutions and a competitive execution and acquisition of new systems on international level. In this area the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Organization (NC3O) plays a key role in the alliance.
 - c) **The area, responsible for coordinating the introduction of NEC capabilities ensures coordination and the dynamics for the provision of NEC capabilities** in the framework of attaining all other capabilities or realizing programs comprising of various projects for the attainment of capabilities. The ones responsible for this area cooperate with the area for the development of operational demands and with the area for the development of technical architecture.
 - d) **The management and direction area** is a community, which collects and analyses information from other fields and in this way ensures the effectiveness of the decision-making system, the preparation of directives and recommendations, coordination of different recommendations, decision-making processes regarding the level of ambition, the preparation of plan documents, notification, promotion and education about NEC.

3.1 The technological foundation in the introduction of network operation capabilities

The networking and information infrastructure (NII) is a key element, providing technological interoperability of all factors in the battlefield into a uniform system and serves as a foundation for the provision of NEC capabilities.

The key purpose of the NNI is to ensure a robust, developing communication and information infrastructure between the members of the alliance, which ensures the possibility of mutual integration also between the partner states and other governmental and non governmental organizations. The NII infrastructure must provide dynamic adjustment to the needs of operation in the rapidly changing environment. The NII will develop gradually and by stages. It will include specific areas and capabilities from communication and information area, management and control area and the informational safety. The areas are described in detail in the NNEC feasibility study.

In the communication field, the influence will be expressed principally in the tendency for transition to IP networks⁶, the development of the Advanced Combat Network Radio (ACNR), the Software Defined Radio (SDR), which will enable the establishment of mobile Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET), mainly in tactical environment, in which ever greater transfer capabilities are required. In addition,

⁶ *The IP networks will not be able to develop independently, but they have to be compatible with the current communications solutions, such as Link 16 (Axe, 2006).*

rapid changes in tactical situation will also occur and the installment of different communication infrastructure is disabled (NNEC Feasibility study, 2005).

For the provision of long range communications capability, the network operations capability will influence the development of radio and satellite (SATCOM) HF-systems, which will increase the effectiveness of expedition operations and decrease the necessary infrastructure and the forces at the area of operations.

At the information system capabilities the influence will be observed in the development and the use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) compatible solutions and in the development and integration of systems as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), at which the SOA presents the IT infrastructure, enabling data exchange in the business process to different applications. The information systems will also develop in the direction of optimising the solutions for work of deployable forces in tactical environment (NNEC Feasibility Study, 2005).

Special attention will be given to solutions for monitoring situational awareness, capabilities for Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) all the way to the lowest tactical levels, which will, among other data, provide the entry information for the Common Operational Picture (COP). In the field of informatisation services is required a wide spectrum of capabilities, which will enable automatisisation of processes in different functional areas.

In the field of information security the capabilities development will be oriented towards a safer exchange of information among other participants (Ibidem).

3.2 Necessary functional and organizational modifications

The modifications in the concept of operations must ensure conformity of the way they are implemented with NEC enabled capabilities. An actual conformity can be seen in the achieved effects and advantages, which the information and capabilities (of sensors, weapon systems, units etc.) attain in the required time-frame of the operation. The concept, which is in compliance with NEC capabilities must be oriented towards identification, selection and the use of those own forces capabilities, which bring the largest possible effect, supremacy over the opponent and the attainment of the desired effect.

In order to provide the conformity of the development of all areas of transformation, special attention must be given particularly to the elaboration of a new units operational cooperation concept ⁷, which will support the effects, introduced by NEC capabilities to the greatest extent possible and adjust it to NATO concepts and develop or change the majority of field doctrines. Without the latter, the introduction of NEC

⁷ *A new operational concept Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is based on technological solutions, which enable an improved exchange of information and an operative picture of the battlefield, improve the cooperation among units, enable rapid decisions, the unit maneuver and their self synchronization, provide greater accuracy of the armed systems and finally a greater efficiency and a more successful task realization.*

capabilities is blind, lacking appropriate measures and indicators, which would demonstrate whether the transformation is going in the right direction.

We can expect modifications also in the process of command and control, mainly in monitoring of the process with a time determinant. The NEC capabilities enable a considerable reduction of responsiveness of individual systems and units and at the same time enable control of the activities realization in almost real time. In this way, the activities, which were, until now separated in time, are now joining in the command and control process, while at the same time a new, more important aspect is coming into view, that is the synchronization or coordination, which is becoming much more complex. If we concentrate on control as a time determinant, which in contents included the degree of realization of commander's decision, the introduction of network operation considerably shortened this time determinant, as NEC capabilities ensure control over realization of activities and an almost real-time decision, so that due to the dynamics of the operation implementation it is more important to ensure the synchronization and coordination in the field of operation. Due to the dynamics of the activity, the responsiveness of units and the weapon system, greater attention should be devoted to the synchronization and coordination segment in the command and control process.

The implementation of expedition operations demands a high dynamics of transferring commands and command posts as well as the reduction of forces (commands), required for the realization of tasks or for the command and control process. To achieve a certain level, essential for the implementation of expedition operations, a robust communication and information system (CIS) has to be provided within the network operation capability. The system would be reliable and would have to ensure that a part of analytical activities would take place in the homeland. For this reason it will have to be established which processes or parts of processes can be conducted or are conducted in the homeland. At the same time the headquarters procedures and the command and control concepts have to be adequately modified and adapted.

On the basis of the developed concepts and the introduction of new technologies, all current training programs have to be modified or supplemented, not only those that designated for the use and management of individual communication and information systems.

The network operation capabilities influence the organization and formation structure primarily with automation of individual processes. If we want for the capability, built on the basis of NEC capability to obtain its effect, the organization must follow the function of an individual capability. At the installation of the organization and formation structure of commands and units, we have to establish a close connection between the concepts and processes, being implemented and the available technology. The organizational structure must mitigate and accelerate the flow of information and material for the implementation of tasks, and disable the possible occurrence of organizational obstacles or time lags, which diminish the effectiveness of tasks.

The organizational structure, built on the basis of NEC capabilities will be considerably more active (flexible, agile) than the current structures. The network operation capabilities will enable the so-called virtual operational organization, which will be designed only for the execution of a certain task or for the execution of the tasks in a certain time period (task force). Due to larger capabilities and weapon system accuracy, attained by the units with the network operation capability, the structure of individual units and the number of weapon systems, necessary for the attainment of the same effects, can diminish. The NEC capabilities as well enable the reduction of the structure of commands, since the processes, which once demanded a great deal of steps and people, are shortening and becoming automatic.

The structure and infrastructure of educational institutions has to be coordinated with the demands deriving from the NEC concept, at which they also have to be upgraded. Greater attention has to be devoted to organizational units that deal with experimentation, research and the development of concepts and capabilities.

People are the basic and fundamental part of capabilities, for they are the key element, which transform concepts into reality. People have to think in the spirit of capabilities that the network operation provides and introduces. Therefore the **education and training**, which will enable the realization of the NEC concept, is necessary. The NEC capabilities demand a change of mind and a much greater understanding of information, available to the decision-makers, of processes and tools for data processing as well as of sensors, which enable data collection. Only then we can talk about the attainment of the “decision-making superiority”, which can be defined as a state in which better decisions are spread and realized faster than the adversary can respond. The new role of individual actors in the battle field and their mutual connections have to be defined. Greater emphasis has to be given to gaining peoples’ trust in the C4ISR systems and information the system provides and in the tools the members use at data processing.

3.3 Exchanging information with allies – between the current necessity and the past fears

The mentality connected with information protection, deriving from the Cold War, continues to prevail. Together with the concept of operations implementation, based on the EBAO effects (Effects Based Approach to Operations), the network operation concept gives special meaning to the safe exchange of information for all, which contribute to the realization of the set goals. At the same time it has to change the way people think and tip the scale in favour of the need for the exchange of information, keeping in mind the safety features of information. The exaggeration in the information safety segment disables their exchange, which is in contradiction to the NEC concept.

In terms of cooperation of commands and units with the commands of other NATO members, of training of individuals, the reduction of expenses as well as in terms of simplification and unification of procedures, more educations on joint and expanded

computer-supported alliance exercises have to be provided, at which the feasibility of concepts is realized and cooperation of members in different tasks is provided. Due to smallness of their armed forces certain members do not have enough experience in the implementation of joint operations on strategic and operational level, but as alliance members, they will undoubtedly cooperate in commands on the highest levels as well. The system should enable access to standardized and educational contents, which the members can use for educating their staff and for preparing missions.

NEC capabilities demand technically more educated and informed staff. We do not refer only to those that will be dealing with the management of communication and information systems, but also to the users of the system services. The user should no longer be familiar only with the interface, through which he or she gets the desired information, but should have a more profound knowledge of the system as a whole. We can observe resistance to changes and novelties, introduced by technological solutions at numerous important individuals in the system. Consequently greater efforts have to be oriented towards informing about solutions that contribute effectively to the solving of tasks for which they are responsible in an individual process and to the creation of trust in technological solutions. The key problems usually do not emerge due to technology, but due to unorganised processes and unorganised data in the system, responsible for which are the users and the managers of a certain process. A tight connection between the members dealing with operational work and the development of technological solutions and those dealing with the development of doctrines and concepts, has to be established.

For the provision of NEC capabilities and the attainment of informational predomination, all units and commands as well as weapon systems must be equipped with different communication and information systems. The systems are becoming more complex and, apart from the adaptation of the structure, also demand more adequately trained staff for the management of these systems. Due to competition in the labour market, the alliance is confronting difficulties in the acquisition of staff of adequate profile and at keeping this staff in the structures. Given that the purchased technique itself does not present capability, we have several possibilities available for the solution of these problems. NATO devotes great attention to this area, also at providing staff resources, for it is aware of the significance of the contribution for the provision of the future capabilities of the alliance in transformation as a whole.

4 OBLIGATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF NEC IN THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

At the Prague summit, in November 2002, matured the decision for transformation of the alliance forces, which will enable all kinds of operations in the new security environment. In this way, the commitment for the formation of the NATO Response Forces has been adopted. The forces will present the technologically advanced, adaptable, transferable, interoperable and endurable forces, composed of elements of all types, which would be transferable anywhere as fast as possible.

As an answer to the adopted guidelines at the Prague summit, the system of transformation objectives and the targeted areas of transformation, which would support the development of capabilities of future alliance forces, has been developed in conjunction with NNEC capabilities which support the NATO Response Force Concept. In this way, the forces would be able to perform tasks of the alliance in compliance with adequate concepts.

A NNEC feasibility study has been performed, defining the operational needs and demands with an envisaged strategy and the dynamics of changes, linked with the provision of the networking and information structure (NII) in support of transformation of the alliance and in support of the NATO network operation concept.

At the Riga summit, the efforts of NC3O for the development of NATO NNEC capabilities, which would ensure the exchange of information, reliability and security of intelligence operations as well as the protection against cybernetic attacks on informational systems, with which information predominance would be achieved, have been supported in the joint declaration and political guidelines.

The only commitment of the Republic of Slovenia, which tries to comply with the stated objectives, is the Mid Term Defence Program (Srednjeročni obrambni program, SOPR) 2007-2010, which also includes the adopted objectives, but not the ones that refer to the NNEC capabilities. The last adopted force objectives in 2008 are not a part of the applicable Mid Term Defence Program (SOPR), and therefore we are currently preparing a new one, which would also include force objectives connected with NNEC capabilities.

All force objectives propositions are oriented towards the provision of capabilities of future transferable allied forces, which will provide interoperability of national forces with other members via a timely and time coordinated implementation of objectives, for which a certain member state engaged itself. The objectives are not oriented only towards the field of networking and information infrastructure transformation, but to all areas or all capabilities. We must stress that the objectives of NNEC capabilities refer to almost all other capabilities. The force objectives content, referring directly to the network operation capability for the Slovenian Armed Forces, is listed in a separate chapter. One of the main force objectives, adopted by the Republic of Slovenia, requires the network operation capabilities, in relation to their role in combat, for all Slovenian Armed Forces capabilities, more precisely for combat forces, combat support, combat service support and command support, which is undoubtedly written in the implementation requirements in the so called Capability statements.

On the whole, we can say that from the very beginning already, the Slovenian Armed Forces are in a sort of a transformation phase – technological, organizational, staff and partly functional phase (they have been transformed from a classical military organization into a predominantly expedition organization.) Numerous activities that

contribute to the development of NEC capabilities have already been carried out, but the coordination with NATO or other alliance members is also necessary.

One of the main reasons for transformation is undoubtedly interoperability in operations. Given the obligations of the Republic of Slovenia and the technological progress in the field of communication and information technology (CIT), the Slovenian Armed Forces also commenced the realization of the adopted commitments.

The alliance thoroughly addressed the task of transformation at the strategic level. It was followed by certain key documents, which clearly indicate the desired direction of capabilities development. When we pass over to the implementation level, we establish that the dynamics and the realization are more or less in the domain of individual alliance members. The demands are relatively clearly defined with strategic documents and goals, but despite the plans and the defined dynamics, they are not followed by adequate technological standards in the fields, which should be taken into consideration by all members of the alliance. Even more problems occur when we talk about standards adopted in NATO and about possibilities of their implementation in the EU, with a view to ensure the “Single set of forces” and interoperability also for those EU members that are not NATO members. The national industry of individual members and its influence on technological solutions, which later on change into standards, play the key role in answering this question. Therefore an actual competition among individual members is taking part in this field. Smaller members, such as the Republic of Slovenia, usually do not have any greater problems with this, because they are most frequently the only buyers of individual solutions of members at which this technology is highly developed. This can be either an advantage or a disadvantage. For the development of such capabilities smaller members should invest a very large amount of resources and, in addition, they are a relatively small consumer due to their size and would have problems with marketing their solutions, because of an exceptional tender. Nonetheless, I believe that the Republic of Slovenia’s industry as well as its education and research institutions have a lot of knowledge and solutions to offer, but they are not sufficiently involved in or are inadequately acquainted with the possibilities of cooperation. In the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces, we have chosen a path on which we strive to follow modern technological solutions, which have already been established at one of the alliance members. **Of course, we have to stress that we refer only to technological solutions.** When we address the network operation capabilities, we have to think about the synergy of different fields that influence the transformation, and above all about the changes in the doctrine and the concepts as well as other changes, which derive from the security environment changes.

Due to inadequate understanding of transformation, the latter **has been limited mainly to technological segment of the communication and information system (CIS)** in the Republic of Slovenia and in the Slovenian Armed Forces, and is proceeding from the adopted forces objectives, which are defined as those objectives enabling greater quality of the Slovenian Armed Forces capabilities for operation. This was followed

by quite a few mistakes. The first mistake was that the introduction of the network operation capability was left to the technological segment, and the second mistake was that the other fields, essential for the introduction of NEC capabilities have not followed the technological field. These are mainly the doctrinal, organizational and personnel field. The reason because of which the objectives, which ensure network operation capability, are overlooked is that they by themselves do not ensure any capabilities even though they are represented in almost every objective or capability. **The statement, which has been written down in certain strategic documents of the alliance, referring to the fact that NEC transformation can be performed almost entirely without large financial resources is demonstrated to be wrong,** especially for those members of the alliance, which have had or have a relatively poorly developed communication and information structure. This statement will be proven true at recession, when the resources for investments and for the purchase of new systems will diminish. Desiring to provide these capabilities for the Slovenian Armed Forces, the Republic of Slovenia adopted almost all objectives, which refer to network operation capabilities, but with an incomplete analysis of the necessary resources in the defence planning process. Along with annual structure modifications and the reduction of financial and personnel resources at current financial obligations, the resources, necessary for the realization of projects deriving from the forces objectives, have been continuously diminishing. In this way, the project was brought to a standstill in the middle of the road in numerous cases of introducing information solutions. There have been several reasons. One of the key reasons was the lack of financial and personnel resources. Already for the informatisation of smaller armed forces, such as is the case in the Republic of Slovenia, a lot of resources are needed. Due to their lack and due to the fact that the NEC capabilities are provided only for a certain segment of the Slovenian Armed Forces, the interoperability problems occur already within the Slovenian Armed Forces structure, and due to the two-tire nature of modernization and different purchase rates of new capabilities or the so-called development of individual capabilities of varying speed, they occur even within the same unit, which does not present capability as a whole and which contributes only a part of its unit as a module into the capability of, for example, a battle group. This problem becomes particularly evident when we change the producer or supplier of individual communication and information solutions. Therefore the introduction of the C4ISR capabilities can present an exceptional technological challenge even within one's own commands and units due to utilized technological solutions of different generations.

For the management and the use of all C4ISR systems and for an adequate level of services of these systems it is necessary to have a highly qualified personnel⁸. The transformation into a digitalized army presents a challenge primarily or among other things also in the enlargement of the necessary number of expert personnel,

⁸ *The importance of qualification is proved by the writing in the Network-Centric Operations Case Study (Gonzales, 2005: 35), which describes how the USA and the UK units have been equipped with NEC capabilities in the Iraqi Freedom Operation. Because the UK unit received the resources immediately before the operation, the unit was not adequately qualified for their use, so they transferred to the classical use of technology, without the utilization of NEC enabled capabilities.*

which professional armed forces, based on voluntariness, are having problems to provide. Beside the Slovenian Armed Forces, the alliance and most of the armies worldwide are confronted with this problem, because such personnel is very esteemed in the labour market and the armed forces usually cannot provide or keep such personnel in their lines for various reasons. **The general problems in the acquisition of personnel for the Slovenian Armed Forces taken into account, the increased demands for individual personnel profiles from the field of communication and informatics, are completely overlooked despite the expressed and confirmed demands within different projects.** The current personnel already, which has been dealing with the development and management of individual C4I capabilities, has been burdened over all reasonable limits, which caused dissatisfaction and initiated departure to other workplaces from the defence structures, or has the personnel, due to necessity to provide final operational capabilities, been transferred to other workplaces, outside the structure and units, responsible for services of communication and information systems.

Other reasons for the standstills in the introduction of information solutions are that some of the solutions introduced in the operative use have been technologically incomplete and that the processes in the defence ministry have not been adapted to new technological solutions. Problems occur mainly in the introduction of solutions on lower command and control levels. In the alliance and smaller members, which have smaller armed forces, the image of strategic, operational and tactical level of command and control can be very different. While the component command presents the tactical level of command and control in the alliance, in the Slovenian Armed Forces, for example, this is a brigade level and all that is higher is referred to as the operational and strategic level. When we talk about the tactical level in the Slovenian Armed Forces, we refer to the communication segment and the transferable radio systems with a smaller bandwidth. Informational solutions, which we have wanted to introduce on the tactical level, have not been adapted to current capabilities in the communication area. Therefore the adaptation and optimisation, which took place during the introduction of solutions into operative use, have been necessary, although they caused dissatisfaction at users as well as mistrust in the adequacy of the information solutions. Despite all that, there has not been an adequate interaction with users and their cooperation in the formation of minimal operational demands, which caused a large number of difficulties, mainly to those who were in charge only of the technological segment of an individual capability.

As already mentioned, we have wanted to accept all objectives for the provision of network capabilities, as a trustworthy partner. The consequence was the opening of numerous projects and overload of the already burdened personnel in the information and communication field. Due to the lack of personnel resources the course of the projects has not been in conformity with the planned dynamics and at certain projects, which have been mutually linked, occurred certain delays and asynchronous activity, which additionally increased time delays because of which individual solutions became too expensive or outdated and dysfunctional. Despite all of the

above, we have made the largest step in the right direction, in relation to other fields, in the technological field in particular.

At the introduction of new capabilities, the decision-makers have likewise not played their role adequately. Other than actual capabilities in the form of units that are sent to the Crisis Response Operations (CRO), the decision-makers have not been interested in NEC capabilities and in the capabilities, deriving from other objectives. In this way, the certification of individual capabilities for which it says in the capability statement that they have to ensure operation in NNEC environment, but do not fulfil this, is questionable. Undoubtedly this does not refer only to the units of the Slovenian Armed Forces. But we can nonetheless accentuate the question of measures, based on which the achieved degree of NEC capabilities in the certified units is verified.

The Slovenian Armed Forces organizational structure is constantly changing. Is it changing into a structure which will be able to upgrade and realize the capabilities and advantages offered by the network operation concept and capabilities on the basis of concepts and defined processes?

When we talk about standards, which we are supposed to take into consideration in the introduction of NEC capabilities and the adopted forces objectives, we estimate, that we also lack several other standards. In addition we witness in practice the changes of requirements and recommendations, which are not a consequence of development or the experiential learning process, but of the interest of an individual member's industry. We have especially negative experience at the latter in relation to the alliance's demand for the implementation of military information system at which the alliance is late with solutions and the members, on the other hand, adopt the solutions entirely unsynchronised, regardless of the adopted standard, which is referring to the military information system. We are convinced that all members of the alliance encounter more or less the same difficulties.

The gap between desires, commitments and resources, available for the realization of transformation and the implementation of NEC capabilities is a special problem. The desires and commitments usually exceed the actual capabilities for their realization, and therefore these commitments, in the defence planning process, are at the best, more and more frequently moving away from the promised date.

To conclude, we shall mention some experience, related to the different degree of commitments and to the implementation of NEC capabilities in the members of the alliance, which is manifested in the inadequate degree of the interoperability of units in operations. It occurs that in certain examples it is not enough to have capabilities developed to an adequate degree, since there still exist "national" safety hindrances which prevent interoperability.

The phenomenon of relying on technological solutions and the omitting of contents, which enable operation of the system even after the technology fails, should be examined in particular.

We believe that more attention has to be given to the vulnerability of modern technology and to the manners of implementing the processes without it, for without a doubt there are being developed such systems, which are directed towards disabling the communication and information systems operation.

Recommendations and the conclusion

Numerous members of the alliance have, each in their own way, started with the introduction of NEC capabilities and invested a considerable amount of financial resources into the realization of projects, which support the attainment of these capabilities. Due to the attainment of interoperability in operations performed by the alliance, high priority has to be ensured for the capabilities, which provide operation in the NEC environment. The recommendations are intended mainly for those members, which are at the beginning of the process, connected with the attainment of NEC capabilities.

The main recommendation, which has to be mentioned first, is that the commitments for the attainment of capabilities should base on an in-depth analysis and actual resources that can be provided for the attainment of NEC capabilities. During the defence planning process, special attention has to be dedicated to this question, since we ourselves decide on the degree of commitment for the implementation of the forces objectives. Industry is very aggressive in offering various “comprehensive solutions”, which are to correspond to all standards, regardless of the fact that in numerous cases, these standards are not yet developed and that the solutions are still in the development phase. **We therefore recommend not to go ahead of ourselves in the introduction of solutions, which are not completely developed or are already successfully introduced in one of the alliance members.** Therefore all projects that do not lead to NEC capabilities have to be abandoned due to the rationalization of resources.

Without the necessary changes and the synchronization in the approach to the attainment of NEC capabilities in all areas (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability (DOTMLPFI), the introduction of capabilities will not be successful, since the mere purchase of technology does not present the introduced capability. Above all things we have to ensure the synchronization of NEC capabilities development and implementation by introducing the capabilities in other members and in the alliance.

The recognisability of NEC capabilities in all capabilities has to be ensured in compliance with the capability statement, and for each separate capability it has to be specifically defined which NEC capabilities are implemented within each of them.

At the same time has to be ensured the cooperation of all holders of various NEC coordination areas, mentioned in the article.

Due to differences in the organizations and actors, participating in the process of attaining NEC capabilities and in the process of successful integration and synchronization of their activities, the management for the attainment of NEC capabilities and the efficiency of transformation have to be brought to a higher level. The stakeholders and the key users as well as their jurisdiction and mutual relations have to be defined.

NEC brings new, technologically more complex solutions, mainly from the systems management aspect, and therefore demands a highly qualified user and manager. Special attention has to be dedicated to this field.

Vital for the introduction of NEC capabilities are the consensus of the decision-makers regarding the necessity of their introduction and the familiarisation with the acquisitions, which the organization will have benefit of due to their implementation. Without their consent and support the resources and the introduced capabilities will not be provided.

The change of mind regarding the question of information exchange is likewise extremely important. Apart from changes, essential within the framework of safety policies and the policy of information management, the way of thinking of the members, which will enable the exchange of information and mutual trust when addressing the question of their protection, has to be changed as well.

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SCHENGEN, EVOLUCIJA, ŠIRITEV IN VSTOP SLOVENIJE NA SKUPNO SCHENGENSKO OBMOČJE

SCHENGEN, EVOLUTION, ENLARGEMENT AND SLOVENIA'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMON SCHENGEN AREA

Professional article

Povzetek Kljub temu da je besedica »šengen« že kar domača, le malokdo ve, kaj pravzaprav pomeni. V geografskem smislu je Schengen ime vasice v Luksemburgu, sicer pa se z besedo schengen označuje pravni red, ki pomeni ukinitve mejnega nadzora na notranjih mejah (mejah med državami članicami schengenskega pravnega reda), ukrepe čezmejnega policijskega sodelovanja in ukrepe na zunanjih mejah. Celoten sistem, ki je zelo zapleten in v svetu pomeni svojevrsten unikum, se je razvil predvsem zaradi gospodarskih potreb. V zgodovini Evrope je to velika prelomnica. Nastajal je postopno, od prvega, sorazmerno preprostega sporazuma je prek konvencije in vrste sklepov izvršnega odbora nastal sistem, ki ga poznamo pod imenom Schengen Acquis. Zaradi svoje učinkovitosti in močne politične volje držav članic Evropske unije je bil leta 1999, torej 14 let po podpisu prvega sporazuma, vključen v pravni red EU.

Vključitev schengenskega pravnega reda v pravni red EU pomeni bistveno spremenjene okoliščine, tako za stare države (spremenjen sistem odločanja) kot tudi za nove. Za nove države članice oziroma za države kandidatke integracija schengenskega pravnega reda v pravni red EU pomeni dodatno obveznost. Ni namreč mogoče, da bi se posamezna država odločila za vstop v EU, pri tem pa ne bi izpolnila obveznosti za vstop v schengenski prostor. Kljub temu pa ostaja obratna možnost. Še vedno se lahko posamezna država odloči za vstop v schengenski prostor, ne da bi se pridružila članstvu v EU.

Vstop v družbo elitnega kluba držav, torej v schengenski prostor, pa ni brezpogojen. Država, ki se odloči za članstvo v EU ali samo za članstvo v schengenski družbi, mora izpolnjevati vrsto izjemno visoko postavljenih pogojev. Pripravljenost držav se po posebnem postopku podrobno preveri in šele po pozitivnih poročilih posebnih skupin se vrata lahko odprejo – ukine se mejna kontrola na notranjih mejah, torej na mejah med državami članicami schengenskega prostora. Širitev tega prostora v

letih 2007 in 2008 je bila povezana tudi z drugimi problemi, predvsem s težavami, ki jih je povzročil velik zaostanek pri razvoju schengenskega informacijskega sistema druge generacije. Kljub temu da je bilo sprva načrtovano, da bo ta sistem končan pred letom 2005, se to še ni zgodilo.

Republika Slovenija se je na vstop začela pripravljati že v devetdesetih letih. Priprave so trajale več kot deset let, pri tem pa je bilo opravljeno več reform, med drugimi reforma pravnega sistema na področju varovanja meja, kadrovsko-organizacijska reforma, spremenjene so bile metode in oblike nadzora državne meje, zgrajeni novi mejni prehodi, policija je dobila novo (predvsem pa drugačno) opremo in še in še.

Ključne besede *Schengen, širitev, Slovenija, schengenski pravni red, razvoj, priprave, uveljavitev, meja, policija.*

Abstract Despite the fact that “Schengen” has become a familiar term, not many know its meaning. In geographical terms it is a name of a small village in Luxembourg. In fact, the word indicates the Schengen Acquis, which means the abolition of border controls at the internal borders (the borders between Member States of the Schengen Acquis), measures of cross-border police cooperation and measures at the external borders. This extremely complex system can be seen as a peculiar uniqueness and has been developed due to economic needs. It signifies a turning point in the history of Europe and has evolved gradually. Over the period of the first, relatively simple, agreement through the Convention and the several decisions of the Executive Committee a complex system, known under the name “Schengen Acquis”, was formed. Due to its efficiency and strong political will of the Member States of the European Union, this system was integrated into the Acquis Communautaire in 1999, 14 years after the signing of the first agreement.

The inclusion of the Schengen Acquis into the Acquis Communautaire signifies substantial changes in conditions, both for the old (a modified system of decision-making) as well as the new Member States. For the new Member States and Candidate States, for the integration of the Schengen Acquis into the Acquis Communautaire, it represents an additional obligation. It is not possible that a state decides to join the European Union and fails to fulfil its obligations for entry into the Schengen area. Nevertheless, there still remains a possibility that a state decides to enter the Schengen area without joining the European Union.

Entry into the elite club of states - joining the Schengen area is not easy. A state that decides to join the European Union or merely the Schengen area must fulfil a number of extremely high set conditions. The readiness of the states is fully examined with a special procedure and only after positive findings from specific groups can the doors open - border checks at internal borders are abolished at the borders between Member States of the Schengen area. The enlargement of the Schengen area in 2007 and 2008 was also associated with other difficulties, especially with the difficulties resulting from the arrears in the development of the second generation of the

Schengen Information System (SIS II). Despite the fact that SIS II should have been completed by the year 2005, this project is still ongoing.

The Republic of Slovenia started to prepare for entry in the nineties. The preparation lasted over 10 years with the implementation of numerous reforms. A reform of the legal system in the field of Border Security, reform of the human resources organization and changes of the methods and types of border control were made. In addition a new border crossing point was built; the Police received new (and above all different) equipment and there was a series of other changes.

Key words *Schengen, enlargement, Slovenia, Schengen acquis, evolution, preparation, implementation, borders, police.*

Introduction The slovenized word *šengen* is known to everyone and frequently heard. It is often used in phrases such as the Schengen border (*šengenska meja*), the Schengen Policemen (*šengenski policisti*) etc. Due to problems this border brings for the local inhabitants it often has a negative meaning. Not many people know that Schengen is a small village in Luxemburg near the triple border of Germany, France and Luxemburg. In this village, with less than 500 inhabitants, an Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders was signed in 1985 and in 1990 the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed in the same village. More precisely, both documents were signed on a small boat. The region is otherwise known for winemaking, even so, in 2006, the municipal council of the Remerschen municipality named the entire municipality after the renowned Schengen village. The reputation of this village is in deed justified. Both documents, signed in this village mark a turning point in the philosophy of providing security for inhabitants, and a unique, non-recurring paradigm in the history of Europe. Out of a relatively simple agreement and convention developed one of the most comprehensive systems of modern time.

1 REASONS FOR CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHENGEN ACQUIS

Essentially, the national borders represent a conflict imperative. The borders should be concurrently open and closed and should at the same time be a wall and a door (Marenin, 2006, p. 19). Globalisation and new security threats require new approaches to the management of borders. In this field, development should and does follow economic development and economic possibilities. This statement is of global nature, since the successfulness of the economy, its growth and progress and not least the level of democracy are closely connected with the management of national borders.

It can be stated that the establishment of the common market and the related greater economic power is the most important reason for European integration. This was

one of the objectives of the six¹ Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) already in 1955. On the basis of the Messina Declaration two other communities have been founded in 1957 with the two Treaties of Rome – European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The Contracting States wrote a definition of the internal market in the treaties regarding the European Economic Community (EEC) /.../ “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. In order to attain this objective the border control on internal borders had to be abolished and as free movement of all factors of the internal market as possible had to be ensured. In this way the states engaged themselves to give up control, which up until then effectively prevented cross-border criminal, drug and weapons smuggling, terrorism and illegal migrations. In short, the ambition to abolish internal borders was conditional on the economy (Sie Dhian Ho, 2006, p. 125)

Regardless of the fact that the abolition of border control on internal borders was one of the basic factors of the European integration, this process was difficult and tedious. In addition to technical difficulties, caused by the abolition of the border control, arose political difficulties. Despite integration the internal security of Member States remained at the national level. Due to the lack of a clear and generally accepted political encouragement the process was conducted in a two-track manner – within the community and on the initiative of certain Member States.

Within the framework of the community developed a mechanism for greater mobility of students and pensioners² and on the initiative of the Member States the so-called TREVI³group, whose origin dates back to 1976, has been formed. It should be stressed that the two trends have not complemented themselves, but have in some parts been rivals to one another. Due to an exceptionally great political motivation of certain Member States, the system as we know it today, developed under the auspices of international cooperation and not within the framework of the Community law. Numerous analysts ascertain that the system in its present form - based on the level of community could not be established due to the lack of political will (Gogu, 2006).

The first step towards the objective (abolishment of the border control on internal borders) was the agreement signed between France and the Federal Republic of Germany on 13 July 1984 in the German city Saarbrücken. The agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the Franco-German borders is most known for the so-called “green E” - a label on cargo vehicles, due to which the crossing of border was possible without border control on roads that linked the two states.

¹ *The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux states – Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg.*

² *Examples are the directives 90/364/EEC and 90/365/EEC.*

³ *After a series of terrorist attacks a first meeting of senior officials has been convened in Rome on the British initiative at which they have discussed the possibilities of fight against terrorism and the cross-border criminal. The general opinion is that the group got a name after a famous fountain in Rome, particularly because the president of the meeting was a Dutch representative with the surname Fonteijn.*

On 11 December of the same year, the ministers of transport of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux states adopted an agreement on the mitigation of the border congestions in the car traffic, while a day later, on 12 December 1984 a group of five (Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Benelux states) was established with the Benelux Manifest. The representatives of the states prepared an Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders⁴, which was signed in a small Luxemburg village Schengen on 14 June 1985 by the presidents of the governments. In everyday use the term Schengen Agreement is used for this agreement. The agreement is very general in nature with principle-based objectives, framework program and short- and long-term measures for their realization.

It took five years for the states to reach an agreement on concrete measures, which have been written down in the new convention. On 19 June 1990, again in the Schengen village, has been signed the convention on the realization of the Schengen Agreement. The new convention with the full name *Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement dated 14 June 1985 between the governments of the Benelux Economic Union, Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks on their common borders*⁵ is an important step to the realization of political objectives and the Schengen Agreement. For this document the name Schengen Convention is used in practice. The original signatory states of the Convention were Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and France.

Both documents together (the Agreement and the Convention) got the title *Schengen* in everyday use. Since Schengen or the Schengen system signified an actual progress in the abolition of checks at the internal borders Italy (27 November 1990), Spain and Portugal (25 June 1991), Greece (6 November 1992), Austria (28 April 1995), Denmark, Finland and Sweden (19 December 1996) also acceded to this convention. On December 19, 1996 Iceland and Norway, which are not members of the EU, but were able to become members of Schengen, also signed the cooperation agreement.

The Schengen Convention envisages a complete abolition of checks on internal borders for everyone, even for the citizens of the so-called third countries.⁶ In order to compensate for the abandoned security tool⁷ the Agreement introduces a variety of mechanisms for the provision of security in the Member States. The Schengen Convention is a rather comprehensive document comprising the provisions on: free crossing of the internal borders without personal border control;

⁴ The full name is the Agreement between the governments of the states of the Benelux economic union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.

⁵ The full name is: Convention implementing the Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the states of the Benelux economic union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.

⁶ The Convention demands that the Member States completely remove all facilities in which the border control has been implemented. The traffic on internal borders must be running smoothly and unimpeded. Only reasonable speed limits are allowed (conclusion of the administrative board SCH/Com-ex (94) 1, rev. 2).

⁷ The control of the national border included both the border crossings control as well as the protection of the national border outside the border crossings; more precisely is the protection of the green and the blue border.

- uniform conditions for the entry and a short stay;
- asylum;
- police cooperation;
- judicial cooperation;
- Schengen Information System;
- free circulation and free movement of goods;
- tasks and competences of the Executive Committee for the implementation of the Convention;

It is even more important that we can assert that the convention was not rigid, for it had built-in a special instrument for simultaneous upgrading. From Article 131 to 133 the convention defines the establishment of the Executive Committee and its jurisdictions. The decisions of the Executive Committee have been obligatory and have gradually upgraded the Convention in relation to the actual state and political progress.

Because the decisions of the Executive Committee have been binding for the Member States the entire legal system developed in practice. This system has been composed of the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention, the Accession Agreement of the Member States, the provisions of the Schengen Executive Committee, declaration and decisions of the Schengen authorities. For this legal order is used the term Schengen legal order⁸ or the Schengen Acquis (quoted from Travner, 2008).

It should be stressed that the Schengen Acquis was created shape and was developing independently from the Acquis Communautaire, nonetheless the Schengen members constantly endeavoured that the Schengen Acquis would be in compliance with the Acquis Communautaire. Both the Schengen Agreement and the Convention are addressed to the citizens of the EU Member States. The Convention determines that its provisions are to be applied only if they are in compliance with the Community law; any Member State can adhere to the Convention at any time.

Even though the two-track system seemed coordinated this was not the case, due to which the tendencies for the integration of the Schengen Acquis into the Acquis Communautaire appeared (unfortunately unsuccessfully) already during negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty⁹.

The idea of integration re-emerged during the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty¹⁰, which is one of the key landmarks in the development and the transformation of the EU, being a result of endeavours at the Intergovernmental Conference esta-

⁸ *The general Secretariat of the council issued a publication The Schengen acquis integrated into the European Union in which are collected all important documents, which were elaborated under the »Schengen« auspices by 1999. This publication is actually a collection of all documents for which we use the name the Schengen ACQUIS.*

⁹ *The established name for the Treaty on European Union or shorter TEU.*

¹⁰ *The Amsterdam Treaty consists of three parts, an annex, 13 protocols and 51 statements, adopted by the conference, and 8 statements that were presented at the conference.*

blished on the basis of the Article 48 of the European Union Treaty. The Schengen Protocol is a part of the changes introduced into the Acquis Communautaire by the Amsterdam Treaty *II*.

On the basis of the Schengen Protocol the participation of the Schengen states moved under the institutional and legal frame of the EU. Such transfer was enabled by the establishment of the legal concept of a closer cooperation under the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 1 of the Schengen Protocol allows the thirteen EU Member States to carry on with the Schengen cooperation within the legal and institutional framework of the EU¹². Article 2 Paragraph 1 defines that the Schengen Acquis is applied immediately after the establishment of the Amsterdam Treaty, that is, as a part of the Acquis Communautaire.

After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the Council of the EU replaced the Schengen Executive Committee. Measures adopted by the Council, which substitute the provisions on the abolishment of checks on the internal borders from the Schengen Convention, must provide the same degree of security as the Schengen Convention provides. This made the Schengen Acquis more transparent and more effective.¹³

2 CONCEPTUAL IDEAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

After the transposition of the Schengen Acquis to the Acquis Communautaire that is after 1999 appeared the first tendencies and need to upgrade and improve the control of the external EU borders. The European Council held in Laeken between 14 and 15 December 2001, has adopted a carefully selected compromise text¹⁴, providing a mandate for the Senate and the Commission during which they should find more successful means of cooperation in controlling the external borders (Monar, 2006).

Prior to this event appeared the idea of the establishment of the European border police. Since this idea has been rather futuristic Belgium, Finland and Austria engaged themselves to prepare a study on the so-called European border police. The study was concluded in March 2002. On 30 May 2002 Italy, which also participated in the

¹¹ *The B2 Protocol – Protocol on the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU. The Point B of the Amsterdam Treaty includes the protocols, which are an appendix to the European Union Treaty and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.*

¹² *Denmark is also included in these 13 states. Great Britain and Ireland are the only EU members not participating in the Schengen Agreement. Norway and Iceland are members of Schengen, but not members of the EU. Based on the Council's Decision from December 2007, Slovenia, Hungary; Slovakia, Czech, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Malta, enter the Schengen area.*

¹³ *Until this moment the Schengen Acquis was composed of almost 100 different documents, out of which some were classified and available only to a limited circle of persons in the Member States. The system has been truly nontransparent. This manifested in a series of decisions of the Executive Committee, which referred to the Executive Committee's previous decisions, supplementing or partly canceling them.*

¹⁴ *Decision no. 42.*

study and 12 other states, organized a ministerial conference in Rome. The candidate countries for the entry into the EU have also been invited to the conference¹⁵.

Due to opposition of certain large countries it became clear at the conference that the EU is still not ready for such radical changes in the control of its external borders. Even though the idea on the establishment of a uniform European border police has not been adopted, the conference was a great success; it highlighted certain priorities which served as a guideline for the development of this area during a few more years to come. The need for a more close cooperation and the division of burden of protecting the external borders was also stressed. Until that time the policy of the EU was that each state has to ensure the control of its own borders, which are at the same time the external borders of the EU. This was not a just solution, because those states, which did not have an external border, could redirect a part of the budget, primarily devoted for the protection of their borders, while those states, which did have external borders were sometimes forced to allocate more resources for the protection of the external borders due to increasing demands for protection.

Based on the Laekn decisions from May 2002, simultaneously with the idea on the establishment of the European border police, the European Commission issued a communication envisioning five key components of development in the field of management of the external borders of the EU (Gogu, 2006).

The Commission suggested the following in order to unify the legal order:

- a. common coordination and the establishment of an operational mechanism;
- b. joint threat assessment;
- c. uniform approach to training and infrastructure;
- d. burden-sharing.

The European Commission suggested the establishment of a common unit of external border practitioners as a concrete proposal for the improvement of coordination and operational mechanisms. A few weeks later, in June 2002, the European Council adopted an action plan envisaging the establishment of such group. Following the discussion on the legal basis and the form of this body was adopted a solution, which signified that the so-called SCIFA+/Common unit is to be formed within the SCIFA (strategic committee for migration frontiers and asylum). This group was composed of the representatives (mainly chiefs) of the EU Member States border police. The working group met for the first time at the end of July 2002 in Denmark (Gogu, 2006). This group's¹⁶ task was to prepare a discussion or the proposals for closer cooperation in the field of protection of the EU's external borders. Based on the initiatives of several Member States and in accordance with the Commission's communication numerous centres (Threat assessment centre in Finland, Centre for air borders in Italy, Training Centre in Austria, Sea borders centre in Greece and Spain and the Land borders centre in Germany) have been established.

¹⁵ The author of this article was also among the participants of this conference.

¹⁶ The author of the article has been a member of this working group from May 2003 to June 2004.

Initially the task of these centres has been the care for the unification of standards and procedures on individual areas of control of the external EU border. The practice showed very different approaches. Some centres (primarily for the land borders, threat assessment and training) have performed their work very seriously and accurately and have in deed greatly contributed to progress on individual fields, while others have been less active.

The results of the centres' work have been often discussed at the SCIFA+/Common Unit. The outcomes of the discussion in this working group, strongly supported by the Commission, showed that perhaps the best answer to the initial idea (unification of the standards for the control of the external border of the EU with the establishment of the European border police) is the establishment of the agency for external borders. After lengthy and wearisome discussions (mainly regarding the seat of the new agency – Slovenia also stood as a candidate for the seat, but the agency finally ended up in Warszawa) Frontex¹⁷ was established in 2004, while the decision regarding the seat has not been adopted before April 2005¹⁸.

Today Frontex is a modern agency, employing over 180 experts and other personnel. In 2008, it used over 70.4 million Euros for salaries and other expenses, mainly for the support and financing of joint operations (operations on external borders return of the foreigners to their home states and other operations). Frontex is lead and directed by the *executive committee* composed of the representatives of all Member States. It is currently presided by Austria's representative, Robert Strondl. The executive director, which is currently the Finland representative Ilka Laitinen, is in charge of the operational management of the agency. Beside a member of the *executive committee* Slovenia also has some other people employed in Frontex. It should be noted that after the initial period Frontex developed rapidly and is taking over more and more important tasks (More about the agency can be read at the www.frontex.europa.eu).

The Regulation (EC) no. 863/2007 of the European Parliament and European Council dated 11 July 2007 on the establishment of the mechanism for the foundation of the groups for rapid intervention on the frontiers and on the changes of the Council Regulation (EC) no. 2007/2004, referring to this mechanism and to the arrangement of tasks and authorisations of the guest officials prove that the idea of the European border police is not entirely forgotten. This introduces the so-called Rapid Border intervention Teams (RaBIT), which were given the name "rabbits". The Regulation introduces a rapid intervention mechanism on frontiers, intended for the provision of time-limited rapid technical and operational assistance for the Member States confronted with worrying and immense pressure, particularly due to the arrival of a large number of the third countries citizens, which are trying to

¹⁷ Regulation of the Council no. 2007/2004 dated 26 October 2004 on the establishment of the Agency for the management of external borders of the EU Member States.

¹⁸ The Decision of the Council dated 26 April regarding the determination of the seat of the Agency for the Management of External Borders (2005/358/EC).

illegally enter the EU at its external borders. The Regulation also defines tasks and authorisations of group members during operations in the Member States. The rapid intervention units, capable of providing personnel, expert and technical support at any time and anywhere to states which ask for such help, were formed under the auspices of Frontex.

Contingents are composed of competent border policemen from all Member States, which can exercise all border police authorizations in any state or which are equal to the home policemen. They are a kind of a European border police and if a foreign policeman addresses you in English at the border crossing point or at the green border, this is no longer unusual or unlikely to happen as it has been some years ago.

We can only guess of the direction the progress will take. However, it is true that the question of protecting the external EU border is a very delicate one, especially after the enlargement of the Schengen area. During the enlargement strong critics and a fear of the deterioration of internal security could be perceived in certain “old” states. These fears were proven to be entirely unjustified, nonetheless this topic remains very popular and a good way of acquiring votes, particularly by radical political parties in certain EU states.

3 SLOVENIA AND SCHENGEN

3.1 First steps

The first preparations for Slovenia’s entry into the Schengen area started well before 1999. The first pioneers were employed in the then division for national border and foreigners within the Uniformed Police Directorate of the General Police Directorate¹⁹. Due to exceptional understanding of the then director of the Administration²⁰ and the management of the police started the first preparations and the first conceptual steps were undertaken. These steps later showed that Slovenia was the only new member that prepared for the entry into the Schengen area in a timely manner and the most thoroughly (Anželj, 2002 also discusses this topic).

3.2 Inter-Institutional Assistance

The EU provided considerable financial resources for the assistance at the preparations for the entry of Slovenia into the EU and into the Schengen Area. Initially these were the projects of the PHARE program (over 50 million Euros), and later the instrument called the SCHENGEN FACILITY (over 110 million Euros). The assets have been used for equipment, infrastructure, partly for the salaries of policemen, education and training, while a part of them has been intended for various projects.

¹⁹ *Branko Celar, Marko Gašperlin and Rajko Komat have been heads of the division for national border and foreigners until the year 2000. From 2000 to 2004, the author of this article has been head of the department for Border Security and later the head of the division for national border and foreigners.*

²⁰ *In this period Stanislav Veniger was the head of the Uniformed Police Directorate.*

Since 1999, we have come across different *twinning* projects. I would like to highlight three projects within the PHARE Institution Building titled *Establishment of an effective national border control system I*, *Establishment of an effective national border control system II* and *Police cooperation*. In the first two projects participated experts from Germany and Austria and in the last one participated experts from Spain. The projects between 1999 and 2003 helped to set-up the foundation of subsequent reforms and Slovenia's preparations for the entry into the Schengen area.

3.3 Adjustment of the National System

Most importantly, the Republic of Slovenia persisted in the process of joining to the EU and consequently did not have to establish a special border police, which all other new members had to do. In view of the attainment of standards set-up by the Schengen Acquis, we have prepared organizational changes on all three levels; local, regional and national.

3.3.1 Deciding Between the Concept of Independent Border Police and the Concept of Border Police as an Integral Part of the Police

The Schengen Area Member States had different organizational personnel approaches, because of which the European Commission proposed certain measures in the field of education and appointments and infrastructure, already in correspondence from 2002.

Organizational approach to the control of the external border has two forms in Europe:

- border police as an integral part of other police forces or security services;
- border police as an independent service.

The personnel controlling the external border can be policemen (e.g. Belgium), border guards (Finland), gendarmes (France) or even the coast guard (e.g. Greece, where the coast guard is a part of the armed forces under civilian control). Influenced by large states, the European efforts have directed towards unification of the standards for appointment and training (Gogou, 2006). The sovereignty of the Member States taken in consideration, the Commission and other certain Member States have not managed to direct the development in such a way that the external borders would be protected by special border guards. Such ideas have been unacceptable for the old members, but the conditions for the new members have been completely different. The standpoints have been rather "soft", meaning that a majority of the experts insisted on recommendations that we should follow the examples of good practice in the reorganization of the border services, among which attention was drawn particularly to the Finland and German border guards.

In the process of joining the EU, the Republic of Slovenia managed to assert the concept of a single police and consequently avoid a too large increase of employments. The then management of the police was convinced that this would be

the only acceptable and rational concept for Slovenia as a small state. Otherwise Slovenia would introduce special border police and as a result additionally and unnecessarily burden the national budget. The enforcement of this decision was not very simple, because it demanded a lot of efforts, persuasion and lobbying. During the first *twinning* project already, the foreign experts suggested and persisted that Slovenia should establish a special autonomous and independent border police. In so doing they followed the tendencies of the European Commission and experiences of certain old Member States, in particularly Germany and Finland. The pressures at both, expert and political levels have been extremely strong and persistent. Due to these pressures the majority of the new states decided to introduce a special autonomous and independent border police. The Slovenian concept of the integrated border police received a lot of political and expert critiques (Hills, 2006).

As we have already mentioned, Slovenia stubbornly opposed to the introduction of a special autonomous and independent border police and persistently defended its views. To this day, quite a few other states gave up the special border police and rather decided to have an integrated border police (Hungary, Estonia and Germany, after it lost its external border), which proves that our path was a right one.

The Slovenian concept is actually a bit more complicated, as we have the border police on the local level, while the police on the regional and national level (with the exception of the special operational units) are an integral part of police directorates and of the General Police Directorate²¹ (more on this in Hills, 2006, p. 52–54).

Through the single police concept we have established a standpoint, supported also by Slovenia's national legislation (mainly in the National Border Control Act and in the Police Act), which determines that the external EU border is controlled across the entire Slovenia's territory and not only at the border line and some ten kilometre zones, such as is the case in other states which have incomparably more policemen per kilometre of a border than Slovenia does. This is also apparent from Slovenia's negotiation position for Chapter 24 of the Acquis Communautaire.

3.3.2 Possibility of Participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in Border Control and the Possibility of Establishing a Gendarmerie

Due to frequent and justified tendencies of rationalization in 2003 and 2004, appeared the idea that the Slovenian Armed Forces could participate in the protection of the national border. Inherently, the idea is not bad and would indeed be a great contribution to the rationalization of the use of the budgetary resources, but such solution is simply unacceptable. The idea is not unacceptable because such manner would be less effective, transparent or undemocratic. On the contrary, the solution would be just as effective, the system just as transparent and democratic control would be provided for the police as well as for the army. The problem lies elsewhere, namely in the legal order and the recommendations as well as in the practice of the EU. The

²¹ More on the organization of the Slovenian police is available at the www.policija.si.

Schengen Convention does not clearly state that the armed forces could not be used for the protection of the borders; however, this is clearly defined in the Schengen Catalogue which is a guide for all states and which indicates the unification of the practice and is at the same time used as a guide for evaluation. In 2003, evaluation has been performed in Austria. The experts came to a conclusion that the Austrian Armed Forces are not responsible or competent for the protection of the green border and that they merely assist the Austrian gendarmerie in its protection. The report has been negative and critical²² and the Justice and Home Affairs Council instructed Austria to immediately abolish this practice. It is true that Austria lingered for a long time and has not immediately complied with the decision, but what is even more important is the second fact, which is that Austria has already been a member of the Schengen area during evaluation. If it would not have been a member already, it would not be allowed to enter this area. Slovenia followed these examples of practice and complied with the clear decisions of the Council and after careful consideration decided that Slovenian Armed Forces will not participate in the protection of the border.

The other proposal, similar to the first one, has been to establish in Slovenia a gendarmerie, which would be a semi-military organization. Not even this idea, which has been in play for quite some time, has been applied at the end. To this contributed not only the arguments previously used to counter the use of the armed forces at the borders, but also the demand of the EU for specialization and professionalization of the personnel for the protection of the national border. It is written in the catalogue, that the formation protecting the border cannot be a military one, but it is also written that the officials protecting the border must be specially trained and professionalised. Considering these demands the introduction of gendarmerie would not indicate rationalization, but would additionally complicate the system, making the management of personnel even less transparent.

The EU practice described beforehand, the establishment of the Agency and the introduction of the rapid intervention units point to the accuracy of Slovenia's decision, also confirmed by the results of the Schengen evaluation.

3.4 Schengen Implementation Plan

As a part of preparations for the EU membership Slovenia's government adopted the Schengen Implementation Plan (SIN, decision 003-06/2001-4)²³ at its 28th session on 24 May 2001 in which it defined the tasks and deadlines for the implementation of the Schengen standards for the control of the future external border (Mihovec, 2007). In view of the implementation plan regarding the enforcement of the Schengen control standards for the future EU external border started a new type of activities which were to ensure that by 2005 Slovenia would be able to apply the Schengen level of control at the external EU border, at which the border control on internal borders could be abolished.

²² All evaluation reports are confidential.

²³ The majority of the Government material has been prepared by the Police.

As a part of the negotiation positions for the Chapter 24 of the Acquis Communautaire, this document was also communicated to Brussels. The Member States of the EU and the European Commission accepted it as a relevant document for preparing Slovenia to takeover commitments for a full enforcement of the Schengen Convention within the timescale provided. Based on the data known at the time, it could be foreseen that the implementation of the Schengen Convention for the new Member States could start already in 2006, but it was postponed until 2007 due to problems regarding the setting-up of the second-generation information system (SIS II).

At the 158th correspondence session on 14 August 2002, Slovenia's government addressed the report on the realization of the Schengen Implementation Plan for the establishment of the future external border of the EU and adopted the employment dynamics.

At the 34th regular session on 28 August 2003, the Government addressed the report on the evaluation of the implementation plan for the enforcement of the Schengen standards at the control of the future external border of the EU and adopted the report and some supplementations of the implementation plan. The report has also been addressed at the Government's 30th regular session on 23 June 2005 at which the Schengen Implementation Plan has been supplemented.

The plan envisaged in detail all measures, activities, holders of activities and deadlines in the following fields:

- alignment with the Acquis Communautaire;
- implementation of the organizational personnel conception for the control of the national border:
 - organizational personnel conception;
 - organizational changes;
 - systemization of workplaces;
 - employment and transfer;
- education and training;
- information and telecommunication system and the implementation and operation of the Schengen Information System;
- introduction and operation of SIRENE and other forms of international cooperation;
- other technical equipment;
- police units facilities for the control of national borders and accommodation facilities:
 - new constructions and adaptation of facilities;
 - provision of apartments and beds in single rooms;
- measures undertaken at the airports and in the harbours;
- measures undertaken at internal borders and in the inland of the state;
- realization of the Schengen Agreement provisions in the field of data protection;
- cost estimate;
- Schengen evaluation;
- activities of the police at the abolishment of the border control at the internal borders.

The plan referred to the activities in charge of which have been the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police, but special parts of the plan have been devoted to the activities of the Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Traffic and the Ministry of External Affairs. At the same session, the Government decided that in order to provide a timely and effective establishment an effective control mechanism has to be set-up. The Government also set-up an inter-ministerial coordination for the establishment of security, customs and inspection control on the external EU border. Until Slovenia's entry into the Schengen Area the pace of changes and adjustments has not changed much. We have been running behind in some areas (adjustment of the Jože Pučnik Airport), but the preparations have been mostly carried as planned.

4 ENLARGEMENT OF THE SCHENGEN AREA

Even though since the Amsterdam Treaty, the enlargement of the Schengen Area is closely linked with enlargement of the EU for the new members, these enlargements should not be equated. It should be stressed that the Schengen Area is enlarging independently of the EU enlargements. This is the case of Switzerland, which is not an EU member and shows no signs of wanting to become one. Nonetheless, in 2008 Switzerland entered the Schengen Area and in the future we can expect Lichtenstein to enter as well. For the new EU members the entry into the Schengen Area is obligatory, but the process of full entry is conducted independently and separately.

The process of enlargement of the Schengen Area is demanding and is introducing numerous particularities for the old and the new members (Sie Dhian Ho, 2006).

Undoubtedly the first particularity is the EU's preparation for enlargement. Since the Amsterdam Treaty the entry into the Schengen area is connected to the entry into the EU, nonetheless it should be noted that the area of control of the external borders is rapidly developing and that this development causes problems to the old members. The legislation of the Community is developing exceptionally fast and causes quite some troubles in the implementation process. At the same time we witness great (if not existential) difficulties in the development of the Schengen Information System of the second generation.

The next particularity is that the new members start with the realization of a part of the Schengen Acquis with the entry into the EU and also start intensive preparations for the second part, which is connected with the abolishment of the border control at internal borders. As already described, extremely fast development presents a difficulty already for the old members and therefore the new members find the process of adjustment much more difficult because of rapid and comprehensive changes.

The process of integration into the Schengen Acquis is very demanding from the financial aspect. It is true that the EU contributes a part of the resources, but the enlargement of the Schengen area is a great financial burden also for the state, which is to enter this area.

Regardless of the sovereignty of individual states, the enlargement of the Schengen border signifies changes in both the quantity and the quality on the future external border. This is related to a variety of problems, which the enlargement of the Schengen area brings to the borders between the member and non-member states.

Finally, the enlargement of the Schengen area is a very sensitive political question. At the last enlargement this could be noted mainly in Austria and in Germany, since their right-oriented political parties associated the enlargement with the collapse of internal security.

4.1 System of Enlargement

For new Member States of the EU the adoption of the Schengen system is carried-out in two phases. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, more precisely, since the integration of the Schengen Acquis into the Acquis Communautaire, a part of the Schengen Acquis is implemented at the entry into the EU and the second part after evaluation is concluded.²⁴ A special horizontal working group named SCH-EVAL²⁵ is organized in the EU Council. The group is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Schengen Acquis in the Member States. Appointed to this group are the representatives of all EU Member States as well as representatives of Iceland and Norway and since 2008 also of Switzerland. Among other things this working group prepares and deals with the Schengen evaluations. On the proposal of the state, which wants to enter the Schengen area it prepares and approves a questionnaire, it addresses and aligns the schedule and the places of the evaluation groups visits and discusses the report after the evaluation is finished. The end report is discussed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which makes decisions regarding the enlargement.

4.2 Evaluations

As I have already mentioned, evaluation has several stages:

1. First of all, the state, which claims to fulfil and assesses that it fulfils all conditions for the entry into the Schengen area, declares this by a special statement, which acts as a basis for the beginning of the procedure.
2. After political decision to start the evaluation, the SCH-EVAL questionnaire for this state is confirmed. The questionnaire is a very comprehensive document, providing the experts initial and rather accurate information regarding an individual state, its system and its current situation. With the help of the questionnaire the experts can later prepare themselves for field evaluation. I should stress that all questions are very precise and comprehensive. The questionnaire for Slovenia had over 200 questions written on 30 pages and has been published in June 2005.

²⁴ *The Conclusion of the Executive Committee dated 16 September 1998 on the establishment of the Committee for evaluation and implementation of the Convention (SCH/Com-Ex (98) 26 def).*

²⁵ *The name of the working group is not an abbreviation, but derives from group's basic activity – the Schengen evaluation (SCH-EVAL).*

3. A state prepares the answers to the questionnaire, and if necessary, defends its position also at the group's session. Slovenia presented its answers (without the SIS field, because at the time the decision for the Schengen Information System has not yet been adopted) on 182 pages.
4. After a detailed examination of the answers, concrete evaluations of individual fields are planned, namely for:
 - a. land borders;
 - b. air borders;
 - c. sea borders;
 - d. visas;
 - e. police cooperation;
 - f. data protection;
 - g. information technology (IT) – mainly the inclusion into the Schengen Information System (SIS).

A group of experts is determined for each field. It should be noted that all states are allowed to send one expert to each mission. This does not happen in practice, but the missions are nonetheless quite strong in number. However, it is even more important that the mission members are exceptionally experienced and trained high officials.

5. Evaluation missions visit each state, where they closely examine how the state is prepared and how it implements the Schengen Acquis. Evaluations are very accurate. The experts also ask very unpleasant questions, perform a variety of field inspections, interview randomly selected discussion partners etc.
6. The draft of the report is starting to take form already during the evaluation. When the proposal for a report is finished, the state that was being examined can suggest certain changes, which are or are not included in the report after the discussion. Afterwards the report is discussed at the working group and at the Justice and Home Affairs Council.

4.3 Enlargement of the Schengen Area in the Years 2007 and 2008

The process of evaluation and the process of entry into the Schengen area seem relatively simple, but at the last enlargement this was not the case. Because this has been the biggest enlargement of the Schengen area so far, the number of difficulties has been correspondingly larger. The greatest and the most complicated difficulty was the Schengen Information System. The project of its renovation or the construction of the second-generation system is lasting for over a decade. At first the position of the EU has been that the project will undoubtedly be finished before 2005 and that enlargement will be possible at that time. Already in 2002 and 2003 it became evident that the SIS II project is accompanied by bad luck and that it would probably be finished no sooner than by 2007. In 2006, it became evident that the project will not be finished in 2007 either. Despite numerous oppositions during the overall rush of pessimism, Portugal presented a solution - the upgrading of its own system. At first the European Commission believed it to be impossible, but Portugal itself developed a test system and proved to all sceptics that the enlargement is possible and that the upgrading of the SIS – SISone4all will be prepared during its presidency.

The problems related to the SIS were not the only problems. Some countries were less well prepared, for which reason new evaluations had to be made. But as all new countries envisaged the abolishment of the border checks on internal borders, the Slovenians were treated within the same framework. On one side there were Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and on the other side there were Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. The Portugal Minister of Internal Affairs and his Slovenian colleague Dragutin Mate have taken the initiative for the coordination of preparations. All candidate states for the entry into the Schengen area have obliged themselves to do their best and to mutually help each other. Portugal also offered all available help at the implementation of the system. There are a lot of anecdotes and interesting stories on behind-the-scenes activity, which has been very lively during the last preparations for the enlargement. Regardless of the difficulties, success has been expected. On 21 December 2007 Slovenia and seven other states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) entered the Schengen area. The border control on internal land borders has been abolished. From this day forward Slovenians too can travel freely, without border controls anywhere around Europe in road and rail traffic. On 30 March 2008 (when the flight schedule has been changed) the border controls in air traffic have also been abolished.²⁶ And so after ten years the Schengen external border once again moved towards the south and the east (Brozina, 2008).

The Schengen area is very attractive to everyone. At a referendum the inhabitants of Swiss Confederation voted for Switzerland, which is not a member of the EU, to enter the Schengen area. During the Slovenian EU presidency evaluations have been performed also in Switzerland and were conducted by Slovenian experts. There were some minor irregularities, which Switzerland eliminated and is therefore today also a part of the Schengen area. The evaluations of Romania and Bulgaria are also under way.

Even though the Schengen area enables free movement of persons and is an area without border control, the latter can be temporarily reintroduced at certain events, which would be demanding in security. The states reintroduce the border control at large sports events (Olympic Games in Italy, football world championship in Austria and Switzerland) or at large economic and political events (G8 summit in Italy.) Special and very strict rules apply for all such events and the reintroduction of border control on internal borders, and usually the states consistently adhere to these rules.

²⁶ *The Conclusion of the Council dated 6 December 2007 on the full implementation of the Schengen legal order provisions in the Czech Republic, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, Republic of Lithuania, Republic of Hungary, Republic of Malta, Republic of Poland, Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Slovakia (2007/801/EC).*

Conclusion

As I have already mentioned in the Introduction, the entry into the Schengen area brings certain advantages and certain disadvantages. The inhabitants living along the border are for the time being definitely in a disadvantage due to the introduction of a more severe regime of control on the external border, since there are as much as seven times more policemen in this areas as there are in others. The police checks are more frequent and sometimes disturbing. The transit of the external border is no longer as simple as it used to be. Many points of transit, where the local inhabitants used to illegally cross the border are closed, the control of the green border is much stricter and the control at the border crossing points is much more thorough. Despite the strong support of the EU the entry into the Schengen area has been a considerable expenditure for the taxpayers. In spite of certain negative consequences, I am convinced that there are a lot more of positive consequences. In a way we have already got used to the fact that we no longer have to show our passports on the border crossing points in order to travel around the EU (except in air traffic for purposes of insolvency assessment). Entry into the Schengen area has brought quite a few new workplaces and employments as well as considerable progress. I am convinced that we have become a safer state and a more appealing state for tourism in the eyes of foreigners, for we are now a part of the same area. At the present, we probably cannot foresee all consequences of the entry and we can not foresee them through superficial examination. In time many positive sides will come into view and when we will get completely used to this system, we will find it foreign, unpleasant and unappealing to have to show our passports at border crossing points.

Regardless of the advantages and the disadvantages brought by the enlargement of the Schengen environment, we expect more enlargements to come (the entry of Romania, Bulgaria and the Western Balkan states). Only through enlargement will Europe become an area in which the free movement of persons will be possible.

The enlargement of the Schengen area brings numerous changes to everyone. A lot of them are positive, but there are certainly some negative changes. Regretfully, due to the limitations in length of the article I was not able to present the advantages or disadvantages that the enlargement will bring.

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VKLJUČEVANJE EVROPSKIH DRŽAV V NATO: VOJAŠKI IN POLITIČNI KAZALNIKI

NATO INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: MILITARY AND POLITICAL INDICATORS

Professional article

Povzetek Avtor v članku analizira obseg vključenosti držav članic v Nato. Za integracijo velja, da jo sestavlja več vojaških in političnih spremenljivk, in sicer obrambni izdatki, sodelovanje v operacijah v podporo miru, procesi obrambnih reform in javno mnenje. Kazalniki kažejo precejšnje razlike med evropskimi državami, na primer na področju obrambnih izdatkov in napotitve sil v mednarodne operacije. Medtem ko Nato z usmerjanjem spodbuja vojaško in politično integracijo, pa na takšno usmerjanje in politične odločitve kot njegovo posledico močno vplivajo okoliščine na nacionalni ravni. Zaradi vedno težjih razmer na področju virov bo treba reformna prizadevanja usmeriti v zmogljivosti za doseganje določene ravni ambicij v posameznih državah, druga pa opustiti, čeprav bodo za to potrebne težke politične odločitve.

Ključne besede *Nato, vojaška in politična integracija, obrambni izdatki, napotitev sil v mednarodne operacije, obrambna reforma, javno mnenje.*

Abstract This article analyses the extent to which member states are integrated into NATO. Integration is understood to consist of several military and political variables, namely defence expenditure, participation in peace support operations, defence reform processes and public opinion. The indicators show marked differences among European countries, for example in the areas of defence spending and international deployments. While military and political integration into NATO is facilitated by guidance from NATO, the implementation of such guidance and the resulting policy choices are being influenced heavily by national level circumstances. The increasingly difficult resource situation will make it important to focus reform efforts on capabilities that are required to meet the stated level of ambition in each country and to dispense with others, even though this will necessitate difficult political decisions.

Key words *NATO, military and political integration, defence spending, international deployments, defence reform, public opinion.*

Introduction

Defence reform processes, including major restructuring of the armed forces, are in full swing in virtually all NATO members.¹ At the same time, militaries are increasingly deployed and involved in multinational operations beyond their countries' borders. In fact, deployments have played a role in fostering military reform and governments are trying to reorient their forces to reflect a modern security environment in which diverse global threats often demand military action. Operational demands have placed considerable strain on armed forces, in particularly since they are being asked to do more with less in the context of limited financial resources. Defining the most important requirements for the armed forces and translating NATO's political and military guidance to the national level is a demanding task. NATO, in the context of its discussion about a new strategic context, will debate its underlying purpose and the decisions member governments and NATO itself would need to take in order to best serve this purpose.

Integration in this context has to be understood in a rather loose way, not as the consolidation of several parts in one, hopefully harmonious, whole. Integration, for the purposes of this article, rather reflects the political, economic, and military investment governments make into the defined priorities of a multinational organization of which they are a part, NATO. Thus, it has to do with levels of support for what NATO as a whole is trying to do. This level of effort is operationalized by means of analyzing key indicators such as defence spending, contributions to international crisis management missions, defence reform processes and levels of ambition, and public opinion to develop a picture of different European countries' military and political integration into NATO. These indicators span the realms of political, economic and resource, and military aspects and will thus provide a multidimensional understanding of the levels of integration that different member states have achieved.²

However, it should be clear that these indicators ultimately describe the output of different national political systems. This output is the result of a variety of domestic and international variables. A straightforward foreign policy analysis approach would point to the importance of domestic factors such as the societal norms regarding the armed forces, political and legal constraints on their use, competing economic priorities, and bureaucratic perspectives. On the international side, pressures arise from the nature of contemporary security risks and threats, but also from bilateral relationships with other important states or demands of other multinational frameworks such as the EU or the UN. The priorities and demands of a multinational framework such as NATO is just one of these variables (see: Giegerich 2008: 11-14). An often

¹ *Defence reform refers in this article to a variety of modernization and restructuring efforts which central governments have adopted to try and create armed forces better fitted to modern operational demands. They refer to doctrine, equipment, structure, organization and resource allocations. The term 'transformation' is avoided in this article because it usually refers to a particular kind of defence reform. See: Foster (2006: 41-73).*

² *This article is concerned with levels of integration of European countries. Other, non-European, members of NATO will form a reference point in the analysis. For some indicators it is not possible to generate comparable data for all countries under consideration. Therefore, the analysis has to be somewhat selective.*

observed difficulty is that multinational defence planning, force planning, and force generation processes do not necessarily penetrate the national level where decisions are ultimately taken and justified. A hypothesis would be that governments would find it much easier to invest significant resources in the priorities of a multinational organization if those priorities are closely aligned with priorities the government determined at the national level anyways. From this follows that NATO's ability to direct member states on the indicators that will be discussed below are very limited.

1 DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, defence spending in Europe, has steadily declined. Although the pace of decline has moderated in recent years, the overall trend remains firmly in place. NATO encourages its members to spend around 2% of GDP on defence, but very few countries either within NATO or in the broader European area achieve this target. The 2% figure is a recommendation and not an agreed target and the data below underlines that the impact of this recommendation is rather limited. In fact, in 2008, it is estimated that Bulgaria, France, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States were the only members who spent more than 2% of GDP on defence. Because of the high spending levels of the US, NATO members still spend a total of 2.6% of GDP on defence. However, if these calculations are limited to the European members of NATO only, the percentage goes down to about 1.7% of GDP (see table 1). Per capital spending levels vary from USD 42 in Romania to USD 1,479 in the US in 2008. Six NATO members spend less than USD 100 per capita on defence in 2008 (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey).

The fall in European defence expenditure over recent decades, as both a proportion of national output and of government spending, is a result of economic, social and demographic developments that began with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (Giegerich and Nicoll 2008: 93-98). Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, West European governments were quick to reduce the size of their armed forces and reallocate burdensome defence budgets to other spending priorities. Following this 'peace dividend', defence budgets came under further pressure as macroeconomic and demographic developments forced many European governments to adopt fiscal measures that limited their ability to spend on discretionary sectors.

Even before the economic and financial crisis of 2008/09 unfolded, macroeconomic and demographic developments have created a fiscal environment that limits the overall availability of resources for European armed forces, the reorganisation of those forces to be better prepared to meet future threats has also added to funding challenges. Many countries, especially those moving away from conscription towards all-volunteer forces, have found it difficult to balance the various internal elements of their relatively limited budgets. As a result, personnel and other operational costs (particularly in countries involved in international operations) have steadily consumed a higher proportion of the defence budget than is desirable, while investment funding – that is, equipment procurement plus research and development

Table 1:
Defence
expenditure

Country	% GDP 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Per cap. 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2008 pers. exp %	2008 equip. exp %
Belgium	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	281	269	265	284	272	72.5	9.3
Bulgaria	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.0	2.6	50	52	64	72	67	58.9	21.4
Czech Rep.	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.4	114	118	120	108	112	50.2	16.0
Denmark	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	444	423	460	441	430	49.0	19.9
Estonia	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.9	1.9	85	90	96	133	132	32.8	10.6
France	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	583	566	572	565	556	56.9	21.7
Germany	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	326	324	320	322	326	53.6	18.1
Greece	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.8	355	387	401	399	442	74.1	16.4
Hungary	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.2	84	85	76	79	74	48.0	15.0
Italy	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.4	1.3	353	322	287	221	209	73.5	13.6
Latvia	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.7	58	64	90	103	106	46.3	14.9
Lith.	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	66	61	66	72	73	55.1	18.6
Luxemb.	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	349	346	332	336	247	49.4	32.2
Netherl.	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	373	373	388	391	379	50.9	18.4
Norway	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3	741	680	664	679	634	42.2	23.2
Poland	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	92	95	100	109	120	54.0	17.6
Portugal	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	177	189	182	170	174	71.7	13.5
Romania	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.5	44	45	45	40	42	69.6	16.7
Slovakia	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	76	83	85	87	93	51.9	15.1
Slovenia	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.5	167	171	197	196	210	62.0	7.4
Spain	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	187	181	188	190	195	53.7	22.5
Turkey	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.8	100	96	100	87	87	50.6	23.0
UK	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.2	609	679	687	714	656	40.7	23.0
NATO Europe	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	305	307	306	301	294	Na	Na
Canada	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	289	296	305	331	346	43.0	16.9
US	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	1,417	1,460	1,465	1,489	1,479	29.9	27.3
NATO Total	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	682	699	702	709	703	Na	Na

Source: NATO 2009

Note: NATO's defines military expenditure as the cash outlays of central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces.

(R&D) – has been squeezed. Among EU member states about 80% of investment funding is accounted for by the top-five spending countries: the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

In general, European governments are striving to achieve a balance within their defence budgets that would allocate about 50% of spending to personnel costs, with 20–30% each allocated to operational and maintenance costs, and procurement and R&D. In 2008, many NATO member states still were still struggling to establish the desired balance. No less than 17 of the then 26 member states spent more than 50% on personnel costs. In many cases, spending on equipment is well below 20% (see table 1). Several defence budgets have fluctuated because of changes in political leadership or government priorities. Where spending has slipped, some have acted to reverse the trend, though they have been constrained by broader economic priorities. It will take significant and sustained increases by many countries to reverse the downward real terms trend in spending on European defence, but neither European threat assessments nor the continent's political and economic climates indicated that this will occur. In the context of the global economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 any such move has become even more unlikely for the foreseeable future. Defence establishments will have to confront the reality that there will be less money for defence in the future as governments will have to reign in sectors of discretionary spending.

2 DEPLOYMENTS

NATO members' armed forces have been engaged in an ever-wider variety of operations involving a multitude of locations and missions. While in the 1990s operations in which European forces were involved were for the most part confined to the Balkans, the Gulf region and Afghanistan have since become major theatres for ground troops and air assets, and European warships patrol the Indian Ocean as well as the Gulf. Because the primary function of European forces is now to address international security threats, there may be no geographical limit on areas of deployment. Almost all contemporary operations are multinational, since deployments are almost always undertaken in the name of global stability and security rather than as a result of a direct threat to a single NATO country. The intention is to spread the burden, to ensure legitimacy and to help win domestic political backing for deployments by pointing to the international consensus behind them.

International operations often begin at short notice – for example the attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and, on a smaller scale, the UK operation in Sierra Leone in 2000. Natural disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake demand immediate emergency action. Reflecting such needs, individual countries – in particular Britain and France – always keep a proportion of their forces at a high state of readiness, with procedures in place to increase the readiness levels of other units if required. While the need for a rapid-reaction capability is obvious, in practice most deployments occur with plenty of notice. The countries charged

with operational planning, provision of operational headquarters and generation of international commitments to forces will find themselves under considerable time pressure. However, the majority of deployments will be rotations of already-established forces, and there is ample time for contributing countries to prepare for these.

All operations in which NATO troops have been involved since the mid 1990s, including those that entailed combat, have been conducted with limited objectives because they were not conducted in response to existential threats, in the sense that the overall survival of a country or its population was at stake. Limited objectives for military operations are a natural consequence of the political goals set by the governments that order such action – for

example, to achieve a political solution in a troubled country with a minimum of casualties among its citizens. Operations are conducted to defend interests or address international threats viewed as important by governments, but not as threats to their own sovereignty or national security. Participation is optional, and objectives are narrowly defined. This was true even of the only operation during the period under consideration undertaken in response to a direct attack on Western interests: the invasion of Afghanistan that immediately followed the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

While numbers of troops deployed show an upward trend, they remain a small percentage of overall armed forces. The NATO Istanbul summit in 2004 set deployability targets: each member state should be able to sustain 8% of ground forces on operations, and 40% should be deployable. While countries have over time displayed an ability to deploy more troops on foreign operations, very few have attained the NATO targets. Of the European members of NATO only the UK had sustained more than 8% of its active forces on operations in 2007.

NATO members who joined since 1999 have gradually sustained higher percentages of active forces on deployments annually (see tables 2 and 3).³ There are two marked shifts where increases were significant. The first one occurred from 2002 to 2003 when the Iraq war and the support for US action by many of the governments in the new and soon to be NATO member countries in itself meant an increase of deployments from 1% to 1.8% of active forces. The second occurred from 2005 to 2006 when increasing commitments, for example in Afghanistan, made up much more than the withdrawals and reductions to the Iraq mission that most countries were by then engaged in. Deployments rose from 1.8% to 2.5% of active forces. Currently, about 2.6% of active forces from the twelve new member states are deployed on international missions.

³ *It is near impossible to obtain precise figures on troop deployments over time for all countries and there are many different ways of counting. The number of deployed personnel varies, sometimes from month to month. The data presented in tables 2 and 3 is the best estimated based on the data available to the IISS Military Balance. It has to be stressed that the figures present a snapshot and do not represent an average number of troops deployed during a particular year. Figures do not include permanent military bases in third countries.*

Table 2:
Percentage of
active forces
deployed on
international
missions

Country	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Albania	NA	0.21	0.37	0.37	0.92	1.04	0.78	2.01	3.06
Belgium	3.97	3.72	3.73	3.76	1.67	1.88	2.12	2.82	3.22
Bulgaria	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	1.06	1.07	1.09	1.28	1.76
Croatia	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.23	0.35	0.73	1.38
Czech Rep.	0.99	1.27	1.28	1.57	2.14	1.25	3.27	3.63	4.71
Denmark	6.22	6.23	6.01	5.33	6.74	4.34	5.23	6.32	6.22
Estonia	0.98	0.98	1.06	0.05	0.05	3.07	1.32	5.39	4.78
France	2.85	3.49	3.48	3.83	4.26	4.05	3.82	4.62	4.51
Germany	2.15	2.40	2.28	2.83	2.39	2.53	2.51	3.67	2.89
Greece	0.49	0.43	1.23	1.12	1.12	1.22	0.97	1.35	0.74
Hungary	1.09	1.84	2.41	1.99	3.11	3.25	3.79	2.18	3.12
Italy	2.33	3.27	3.11	3.54	4.77	4.06	4.27	3.39	4.16
Latvia	0.70	0.99	1.65	2.04	3.38	2.11	3.07	3.09	2.10
Lithuania	0.34	0.56	0.26	0.93	1.37	1.65	1.58	1.85	1.70
Luxembourg	2.99	2.56	2.56	2.56	6.77	6.44	6.11	4.33	5.00
Netherlands	3.07	5.44	5.09	6.08	5.26	4.26	4.23	4.52	4.10
Norway	2.64	5.07	4.24	4.38	4.36	4.89	2.84	2.88	4.22
Poland	0.92	0.95	0.88	1.12	2.37	2.75	1.49	3.00	2.52
Portugal	1.29	3.23	3.61	3.21	3.20	2.88	1.59	1.81	1.58
Romania	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.91	1.61	1.60	2.20	2.27	2.02
Slovakia	0.08	0.35	1.85	2.45	3.87	3.81	2.82	4.16	3.09
Slovenia	0.16	0.34	1.17	0.96	1.30	2.75	3.74	4.76	3.31
Spain	0.86	1.51	1.75	1.60	2.76	1.51	1.66	2.31	1.85
Turkey	0.28	0.37	0.42	0.69	0.69	0.45	0.41	0.39	0.62
UK	7.24	3.60	4.12	2.96	8.31	5.56	6.65	8.64	8.24

Source: IISS 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008.

Table 3:
Deployment
on international
missions

Country	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Albania	101	101	101	101	203	224	167	222	338
Belgium	1659	1461	1471	1475	683	768	785	1118	1279
Bulgaria	39	36	42	43	543	546	554	654	719
Croatia	0	10	15	15	53	48	72	152	245
Czech Republic	574	734	684	775	1219	562	729	899	1089
Denmark	1512	1358	1287	1211	1543	920	1108	1366	1409
Estonia	47	47	47	3	3	153	65	221	196
France	9048	10261	9528	9981	11025	10483	9733	11766	11497
Germany	7154	7693	7026	8368	6810	7203	7142	9008	7045
Greece	811	690	1961	1989	1989	2085	1590	1992	1165
Hungary	475	806	816	665	1039	1049	1224	705	1010
Italy	6177	8203	7171	7674	9537	7868	8159	6482	7717
Latvia	40	50	107	112	165	103	161	165	120
Lithuania	41	71	32	125	174	223	214	222	236
Luxembourg	23	23	23	23	60	58	55	39	35
Netherlands	1733	2827	2569	3015	2792	2265	2246	2400	1871
Norway	818	1353	1133	1166	1161	1301	734	673	668
Poland	2205	2058	1812	1823	3856	3887	2113	4246	3205
Portugal	640	1442	1572	1401	1438	1294	715	795	680
Romania	205	215	90	905	1569	1558	2137	1578	1503
Slovakia	37	137	610	641	852	769	569	633	530
Slovenia	15	31	89	86	85	180	245	312	189
Spain	1600	2500	2505	2856	4158	2270	2439	3400	2762
Turkey	1811	2263	2153	3554	3546	2307	2104	2008	3171
UK	15369	7644	8702	6226	17669	11553	14421	16509	14883

Source: IISS, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008.

For the deployments that the new member states undertake, NATO has clearly developed into the dominant framework (see table 4). This reflects a broader Europe-wide trend. However, it is remarkable that, in 2008, only Albania (not yet a NATO member in 2008), Poland, Romania and Slovakia deployed less than 60% of their troops abroad through NATO.⁴ Even they deployed a majority or near majority in KFOR and ISAF with 49%, 57% and 53% respectively. Four of the new members had deployed 85% or more of their troops on missions in KFOR or ISAF in 2008:

⁴ Croatia, although not yet a NATO member in 2008, had some 66% of its forces abroad deployed in ISAF that year.

Table 4:
Dominance
of NATO
Framework
for
Deployments

Country	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF	KFOR	ISAF
Albania	0	NA	0	0	0	30	0	30	0	81	0	22	0	22	0	138	0	140
% of depl.	0	NA	0	0	0	29.7	0	14.8	0	36.2	0	13.2	0	10	0	40.8	0	30.5
Bulgaria	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	5	37	46	150	46	401	51	460
% of depl.	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.2	0.9	6.7	7	22.9	6.4	55.8	6.5	58.5
Croatia	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	22	0	45	0	120	0	199	0	280
% of depl.	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	56.6	0	45.8	0	62.5	0	78.9	0	81.2	0	65.9
Czech Rep.	160	NA	175	0	400	0	409	133	408	19	500	17	501	103	500	435	400	415
% of depl.	21.8	NA	25.6	0	51.6	0	33.6	10.9	72.6	3.4	68.6	2.3	55.7	11.5	45.9	39.9	47.3	49.1
Estonia	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	98	7	25	7	26	120	28	128	30	120
% of depl.	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	64.1	4.6	38.5	10.8	11.8	54.3	14.3	65.3	15.6	62.5
Hungary	325	NA	325	0	325	0	325	0	294	130	484	187	268	175	484	225	317	240
% of depl.	40.3	NA	39.8	0	48.9	0	31.3	0	28	12.4	39.5	15.3	38	24.8	47.9	22.3	37.5	28.4
Latvia	10	NA	10	0	15	0	11	8	0	2	10	28	9	35	18	97	19	70
% of depl.	20	NA	9.3	0	13.4	0	6.7	4.8	0	1.9	6.2	17.4	5.5	21.2	15	80.8	20.2	74.5
Lithuania	30	NA	30	0	29	0	30	4	30	6	30	120	32	130	30	195	34	200
% of depl.	42.3	NA	93.8	0	23.2	0	17.2	2.3	13.5	2.7	14	56.1	14.4	58.6	12.7	82.6	14	82.3
Poland	763	NA	532	0	574	0	574	0	574	22	312	3	312	10	312	937	271	1130
% of depl.	37.1	NA	29.4	0	31.5	0	14.9	0	14.8	0.6	14.8	0.1	7.3	0.2	9.7	29.2	9.5	39.5
Romania	0	NA	0	0	221	48	226	34	226	32	150	550	146	558	153	536	150	725
% of depl.	0	NA	0	0	24.4	5.3	14.1	2.2	14.5	2.1	7	25.7	9.3	35.4	10.2	35.7	9.7	47
Slovakia	40	NA	40	0	40	0	100	0	100	17	111	17	132	57	134	59	196	70
% of depl.	29.2	NA	6.6	0	6.2	0	11.7	0	13	2.2	19.5	3	20.9	9	25.3	11.1	38.8	13.9
Slovenia	0	NA	6	0	6	0	2	0	2	18	92	58	158	54	92	42	360	70
% of depl.	0	NA	19.4	0	6.7	0	2.3	0	2.4	21.2	51.1	32.2	64.5	22	48.7	22.2	72.4	14.1
Total	1328	NA	1118	0	1610	48	1677	179	1732	287	1719	1024	1630	1392	1797	3055	1828	3500
% all depl.	31.7	NA	25.8	0	31.1	0.9	17.6	1.9	19.2	3.2	21.5	12.8	16.9	14.4	20.4	34.7	21.7	41.6

Source: IISS, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009.

Czech Republic (96%), Latvia (95%), Lithuania (96%), and Slovenia (86%). The overriding importance of the Alliance as a mechanism for deployments is thus evident. In more general terms, deployments by European countries have definitively shifted 'out-of-area'.

3 DEFENCE REFORMS: CAPABILITY PRIORITIES AND LEVELS OF AMBITIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, the purpose of NATO nations' armed forces has changed considerably. The defence reforms launched in virtually every member state were designed at least in part to increase force-projection capabilities – the capacity of the military to be deployed on operations abroad. Both NATO and the EU have launched institutional initiatives aimed at guiding member states towards capability profiles that more adequately reflect the demands and requirements of contemporary operations. In general, however, the broad capabilities needed can be inferred from the characteristics of modern operations.

The ability to deploy means, first, having troops and equipment available, trained and ready, and second, the means to transport them. Most national reform processes have focused on increasing the proportion of armed forces that can be used in operations abroad, including those available at high readiness. Global participation in operations demands the ability to train for and operate in a variety of weather conditions. Harsh climates and challenging terrain cause high wear and tear on equipment, forcing repair or replacement sooner than planned. Access to reliable strategic air/sealift is fundamental to Europe's future as a strategic actor.

Interoperability – the ability of armed forces to cooperate and act with the services of other states at tactical and strategic levels – is a necessity when almost all operations are multinational, but is difficult to achieve. Among the areas in which common understanding is needed are the ability to operate together and communicate effectively in the field; adequate support and logistics; and rules of engagement, in which national differences of approach can cause problems for operational commanders. NATO members have benefited from the organisation's focus on harmonisation and common standards since its establishment in 1949. NATO coordinates and defines standardisation efforts throughout the alliance to increase interoperability of NATO forces and ensure the effective use of resources. The NATO Standardisation Organisation (NSO) aims to eliminate duplication and fragmentation in all aspects relevant to the Alliance, including operational tasks, procurement and research. However, operational experience has revealed limits. For example, although the allies who deployed Chinook helicopters on operations in Afghanistan, each operates a different configuration, limiting the degree to which they can be used interchangeably. Spare parts cannot be exchanged, and maintenance crews from one nation would not be able to service helicopters from another.

As noted above, crisis-management operations have shown a heightened need for rapid reaction. Both NATO and the EU have launched initiatives in this area, the fruits of which have yet to be seen in terms of actual deployments. The effort to make more personnel available at short notice will lead to an improvement in the general capabilities and usability of a nation's forces. It therefore has a value beyond the increased speed with which troops can be made available.

Among the tasks undertaken on modern operations, the same force may need, for example, simultaneously to conduct peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, stabilisation operations, intelligence-gathering and training. The many resulting requirements include a high level of mobility in theatre (operational experience has revealed deficiencies in this regard, particularly in helicopters); the ability to carry out urban operations; force protection that keeps casualties among intervening forces to a minimum (several countries, including Britain, France, Poland and the Netherlands, have acted to improve armoured vehicles following experience in Afghanistan and Iraq); surveillance and precision targeting. Soldiers must build relations with the local population both as part of the battle for 'hearts and minds' and to collect intelligence. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq seek to deliver a mix of security and reconstruction, intended to provide the basis for a long-term peaceful future. However, there is a risk of a lack of cohesion as separate national units enact differing national visions of this concept.

NATO countries contribute troops to more than one international mission at any given time. Operations, as already noted, often last a long time. This puts strains on several elements of defence establishments. For example, a sense among military personnel that operational tours are too frequent may undermine retention of personnel and thus limit the numbers available for deployment, especially in branches that develop skills attractive to private-sector employers. All foreign deployments must be supported by logistics chains providing fuel, food and medical supplies and maintenance, repair and replacement of equipment. These requirements are substantial and form a vital part of each nation's capability. NATO has made considerable efforts to expand communal capabilities in this area, and in 2008 the EU's European Defence Agency, EDA, launched an initiative intended to boost the mechanisms for outsourcing logistics.

At the Riga summit NATO leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) setting out further capabilities priorities for the next 10–15 years (NATO 2006). The CPG defines a capabilities profile around ten requirements: to deploy and sustain expeditionary operations over a long distance with little or no host-nation support; to generate adaptable and flexible high-readiness forces; to counter terrorism and support consequence management; to protect critical information systems against cyber attack; to be able to conduct operations in which NATO forces have to defend against CBRN and ballistic missiles; to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments; to identify and counter hostile elements in urban environments, minimising collateral damage; to improve NATO's ability to conduct operations in which a comprehensive approach, including coordination with a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors, needs to be implemented; to be able to conduct military support for stabilisation missions including security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of military personnel, and humanitarian relief; and to achieve the greatest practical level of interoperability and standardisation among allies and partner forces. The CPG also defined as top priorities the ability to deploy

and sustain joint expeditionary forces; high-readiness forces; the ability to address asymmetric threats; information superiority; and a capability of comprehensive action and coordination with other actors.

The armed forces of all NATO countries remain in a state of transition. In almost all cases, key elements of planned reforms have yet to be implemented. This is unsurprising in light of the fact that major changes in defence posture require acquisition or modernisation of equipment. Procurement of defence equipment takes time, and the process is hindered in all countries by defence budget constraints. A number of reform programmes also involve substantial changes to military structures, including shifts away from conscription towards all-professional volunteer forces. New rationales for armed forces, and new types of missions and tasks, involve changes to training and exercises. All this takes time. A further factor has been the challenge of simultaneously undertaking deployments and reforms intended to make forces more deployable. Finally, successful defence reform requires political will to drive through changes that may mean loss of jobs and skills as well as significant expenditure on new capabilities.

The overriding priority of most governments is to make their forces more flexible and to increase force-projection and rapid-reaction capacities, but their threat perceptions differ and they are at different stages in the process. While some nations have embraced a pure expeditionary-warfare model, it is more common to adopt a hybrid posture in which the armed forces are structured for roles in both territorial defence and operational deployments.

The central drivers of defence reform are, in general, perceived developments in the international security environment and obligations within NATO or the EU. All governments acknowledge the risks posed by asymmetric and transnational threats such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), failed states and organised crime. For several, however, this security agenda is overshadowed by conventional direct threats. Some northern and eastern European governments want to hedge against possible future developments in Russia, even if it is not currently perceived as a direct military threat. Other European countries – including NATO allies Greece and Turkey – have unresolved territorial disputes and view territorial defence as the prime concern of the armed forces. Commitments to participation in international crisis-management operations are an important but secondary priority.

Meanwhile, several countries have recent experience of instability and conflict and this inevitably influences their threat perceptions. These nations are also all driven by a strong desire to join NATO and the EU, and this has been a strong factor in building institutions and carrying out defence reforms to provide troops for multinational operations. In framing defence policies, countries must strike a balance between guarding against low-probability but high-impact events that would demand territorial or collective defence, and the high probability that demands will continue to be

placed on them for participation in international operations. Very few governments are willing to base defence reform unequivocally on the demands of crisis-management missions. But, in practice, most have taken the view that they would have a warning time of several years before emerging conventional military threats to their territory would come to a head.

Most European NATO governments have therefore made creating more effective and more deployable forces the priority. They have reduced the size of their militaries, and many have moved to all-professional forces and phased out conscription. They put a premium on quality over quantity, seeking to do more with less.

Capability choices expressed in defence-reform documents generally reflect multinational force goals as determined by NATO. In particular, smaller countries that recently joined NATO (and the EU) are keen to move from national to multinational planning assumptions, because the ability to rely on allies for some capability that would otherwise have to be provided on the national level frees up resources and opens the way to specialisation.

In comparison to other European members of NATO, the national levels of ambition in the new member states are relatively well defined. Of course, this statement has to be immediately qualified by the fact that for most countries these levels of ambition are aspirational, i.e. describing a planned ambition, the realization of which is often still years away. The national level of ambition here refers to a state's expression of the maximum military contribution it intends to make to international crisis management missions. This is of course distinct from the effort a country anticipates it would make in a territorial- or collective-defence scenario. Given that international crisis-management missions are not conducted to combat a direct existential threat to the contributing nation, governments will only ever make a part of a country's total capability available for them. The following paragraphs outline levels of ambition for those of the new member states in which publicly available documents paint a relatively precise picture.

According to the 2005 Strategic Defence Review, Croatia aims to be able to deploy up to 700 troops on international missions by 2010. Between 2011 and 2015 the number is set to increase again, and the range of operations in which Croatian forces can become involved in will be broadened. Before 2011, these will be limited to low- and medium-intensity operations due to existing training and equipment shortfalls. Croatia aims to have up to 10% of its active duty personnel available at 5-day readiness once its ongoing defence reform process is completed and a new force structure is in place (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia 2005; 2006).

In 2005, the Czech Republic defined its level of ambition for crisis management as participation in a peace-support operation with a mechanised battalion and a special company (up to 1,000 personnel in total), sustainable for a year with rotation at six

months, plus deployment of another contingent of 250 personnel for six months without rotation on a humanitarian or rescue mission. It also offered an alternative contribution, whereby the armed forces should be able to deploy one brigade-sized army task force (up to 3,000 personnel) for six months and an equivalent air-force contingent for three months (Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic 2005).

In Estonia, the level of ambition, to be attainable by 2010, was defined in 2005 as a 'sustainable' (i.e., sustainable for a year or longer) deployment of one infantry company, a Special-Forces platoon, several military observers, a staff element and two vessels. By 2008, up to 250 personnel and one mine-countermeasure vessel were to be available for long-term deployment, the personnel figure rising to 350 by 2010. The maximum number of Estonian troops available for short-term deployment is 850. Regarding concurrency, Estonia aims to be able to send a contingent on a short-term mission while maintaining one sustainable deployment (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2005).

Lithuania's goal is to deploy larger, self-sustaining units, while simultaneously reducing the number of missions in which Lithuanian forces are involved. From 2015, a 950-strong battalion task force, including combat support and combat service support, plus a 50-strong Special-Forces squadron, is to be sustainable with full rotation in one operation. As an alternative, Lithuania also aims to make available three specialist units, each of company strength, for simultaneous deployment. The country aims to be able to participate in up to three international deployments in addition to up to two domestic-assistance missions.

From 2015 on, Romania aims to make available either one division with one combat brigade for six months without rotation; or two combat brigades in either the same or separate operations for six months without rotation; or three battalions in either the same or separate operations for up to 12 months, with rotation after six months (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania 2006).

Slovenia seeks to have the capability to sustain one long-term, medium-scale operation at company level and one long-term small-scale operation at platoon level until 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, the Slovenian government aims to be able to commit one company-level unit to two medium-scale operations for a long-term period and one platoon-level unit to a long-term small-scale operation. Alternatively, a battalion-sized unit could be deployed to a large-scale operation for up to six months. From 2015, the commitment of one company to two long-term, medium scale operations and one platoon to one long-term small-scale operation is planned, or alternatively one battalion to one large-scale operation for up to 12 months (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2007). For all countries in the alliance, the current economic woes will make it harder to meet their targets in defence reform and level of ambition terms.

4 PUBLIC OPINION

Given that NATO member states are liberal democracies, the policy choices of governing elites will have to draw on significant levels of public support if they are to be sustainable. How public opinion evaluates NATO membership and the roles the alliance is supposed to play is thus another important factor of political integration into NATO. Public opinion can be expected to be influenced by a variety of macro- and micro-level factors (Kostadinova 2000). On the one hand, the shared historical experience of a society and the way in which domestic political institutions are set up and deal with defence policy questions can be expected to be among the macro-level influences. At the same time, individual factors such as political beliefs, levels of education and other socio-economic factors will play a role as well.

The influence of public opinion, especially on defence policy questions, is difficult to assess. On the one hand it is not clear whether policy-makers are leading public opinion or are being led by it. On the other hand, most members of the public have very little detailed knowledge about defence matters and are probably not affected by defence questions in their daily lives. Hence, they will find it difficult to form opinions on specific issues. Clearly, these limitations have to be kept in mind and public opinion data has thus to be interpreted with the necessary care.

Table 5 draws together data on several important questions. Unfortunately, the relevant data does not exist for all NATO member states so that this discussion will only represent a partial picture. On the question of whether NATO is essential to the security of the respective countries, the view that it is essential has lost ground between 2002 and 2008 even though there are signs that it is recovering again among European members of NATO. Differences among the members are quite strong on this matter. Whereas 70% of the Dutch respondents in 2008 were of the opinion that NATO was essential, only 38% of Turks polled agreed. Whereas only 19% of Romanians argued that NATO was no longer essential, a full 41% of Italians were of the same opinion. Clearly, country level differences exist which points to the explanatory power of macro-level factors in public opinion.

Questions relating to burden-sharing among allies provide another measure of political integration that is reflected in table 5. For example, whereas 82% of Americans, Brits, and Dutchmen polled argued that all NATO members should contribute troops if NATO conducts a military operation, only 28% of Turks, 37% of Slovaks, and 42% of Bulgarians were of the same opinion. Naturally, the US, the UK, and the Netherlands were heavily engaged in demanding operations in Afghanistan at the time which will have heightened perceptions of disproportionate efforts being undertaken by some countries but not others. It is very interesting to see that the issue of burden-sharing is almost identical in terms of financial aspects. Here 82% of Americans, 80% of Brits and 82% of Dutchmen agreed that all NATO members should contribute to the financial costs of a NATO military operation even if not all contribute troops. Only 27% of Turks, 37% of Slovaks and 41% of

Table 5:

Public
Opinion and
NATO

	USA	FRA	GER	UK	IT	NL	PL	PT	SP	SK	TR	BG	RO
Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?													
Still essential 2008	59	62	62	68	55	70	51	60	60	47	38	54	57
2007	60	55	55	64	55	66	46	59	49	44	35	58	62
2006	61	59	56	62	52	66	48	56	49	45	44	58	63
2005	60	58	61	65	52	68	47	65	48	53	52	Na	Na
2004	62	57	70	70	60	71	52	67	55	47	53	Na	Na
2002	56	61	74	76	68	74	64	na	na	na	na	Na	Na
No longer essential 2008	32	34	36	25	41	26	32	30	35	27	32	25	19
2007	29	36	41	26	39	27	39	28	45	30	34	19	16
2006	29	36	41	30	41	29	37	31	45	36	35	22	16
2005	26	34	36	24	43	27	36	25	40	27	32	Na	Na
2004	28	34	27	22	31	24	32	18	34	37	26	Na	Na
2002	30	33	22	20	27	25	26	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na	Na
To what extent do you tend to agree or disagree that ALL NATO member countries should contribute troops if the NATO alliance decides to take military action?													
Strongly agree	54	19	22	50	17	53	19	31	24	9	11	17	25
Somewhat agree	28	43	33	32	34	28	38	38	32	28	18	25	39
Somewhat disagree	7	21	27	9	26	8	21	12	19	33	14	24	19
Strongly disagree	5	15	15	6	22	8	10	14	22	15	23	23	7
To what extent do you agree or disagree that ALL NATO member countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops?													
Strongly agree	60	24	32	56	18	59	20	29	28	9	9	16	26
Somewhat agree	22	38	30	24	33	23	37	35	32	28	18	25	42
Somewhat disagree	7	19	20	9	25	8	22	15	17	32	14	22	16
Strongly disagree	6	17	16	8	22	8	10	15	20	20	23	25	6

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2008.

Bulgarians agreed. Thus on the burden-sharing question there are two groupings with the remaining allies falling somewhere in between. Since data does not exist for all members it is not possible to draw any definite conclusions about the composition of those groupings. However, it would be appropriate to suggest that low levels of support for burden-sharing within the alliance and significant support for the position that NATO is no longer essential for a country's security would point to low levels of political integration in NATO.

Conclusion A rise in demand for military operations and a fall in resources, the latter likely to become even more pronounced in the coming years, mean the day has long gone when NATO countries could afford to maintain large and static military establishments. The proportion made available for use in international missions remains on average low among the countries that joined NATO since 1999 and defence budgets are severely stretched. While in principle this situation is mirrored among most of the 'older' Alliance member states, the challenge is particularly daunting for some of the recent additions to NATO's membership roster. Efforts are underway in each country and progress is being made. The increasingly difficult resource situation will make it all the more important to focus reform efforts on capabilities that are required to meet the stated level of ambition in each country and to dispense with others, even though this will necessitate difficult political decisions. With regards to the different military and political indicators for integration discussed in this article it emerges that the implementation of NATO guidance and the policy choices that result are being influenced heavily by national level circumstances. Thus, NATO has limited means to direct the process after countries join. The increasingly difficult resource situation will make it important to focus reform efforts on capabilities that are required to meet the stated level of ambition in each country and to dispense with others, even though this will necessitate difficult political decisions.

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PET LET V ZAVEZNIŠTVU IN 60 LET ZAVEZNIŠTVA: SLOVENIJA IN NATO

FIVE YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE AND 60 YEARS OF THE ALLIANCE: SLOVENIA AND NATO

Review paper

Povzetek Članek analizira potek dogodkov, ki so zvezo Nato pripeljali do tega, da se spoprime z enim največjih izzivov po hladni vojni, s stabilizacijo Afganistana. Sedem let po padcu talibskega režima se je smiselno vprašati, kaj so pri poskusih vzpostavitve državnih struktur dosegli zainteresirani akterji mednarodne skupnosti – Nato je le eden izmed številnih – skupaj z afganistanskimi oblastmi za stabilizacijo oziroma za to, da bi Afganistan lahko začel delovati samostojno, brez zunanje pomoči. Analiza pokaže, da je na nekaterih področjih, kot sta na primer izobraževanje in vračanje beguncev, prišlo do napredka, razmere na drugih področjih pa ostajajo nespremenjene ali se celo slabšajo, na primer varnostne razmere. Ker je leta 2004 članica zavezništva postala tudi Slovenija, je stabilizacija Afganistana posledično postala tudi njena naloga, zato članek analizira dosedanje vlogo Slovenske vojske pri stabilizaciji Afganistana. V članku so analizirani »vojaški prispevki« držav članic; pokazalo se je, da Slovenija med državami, s katerimi se pogosto primerja, na misijo Isaf prispeva razmeroma malo vojakov glede na število prebivalcev. Slovenija sicer izdatno prispeva drugam, in sicer tja, kjer naj bi bili strateški interesi Slovenije jasneje izraženi, oziroma tja, kjer meni, da ima primerjalne prednosti, na primer na Kosovo. Ker se je v Natu nedavno začel proces oblikovanja novega strateškega koncepta, ki bo poleg največjega samoopredeljenega izziva, stabilizacije Afganistana, moral odgovoriti tudi na to, kako se bo Nato spopadel z nekaterimi novimi izzivi, članek s pomočjo metode strukturiranega intervjuja z visokim uradnikom Nata odgovarja na vprašanje, kateri izzivi oziroma grožnje bi morali biti vključeni v dokument, ki bo določal prihodnjo usmerjenost zavezništva, in kakšno vlogo bi Slovenija morala imeti v tem procesu.

Ključne besede *Slovenska vojska, Afganistan, stabilizacija, Nato, Isaf, strateški koncept Nata.*

Abstract The article analyses the course of events which brought NATO to face one of the biggest challenges after the Cold War, the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Seven years

after the fall of the Talib regime it is appropriate to ask ourselves what the interested actors of the international community - NATO is merely one of many such actors - together with the Afghan authorities, in their efforts to establish government structures, have done for the stabilisation of Afghanistan or for Afghanistan to be able to function independently, with no outside help. The analysis shows that progress has been made in certain areas, such as education and the return of refugees, while the situation in other areas has remained unchanged or even worsened, such as the security situation. Because Slovenia also became a member of the Alliance in 2004, the stabilisation of Afghanistan is now consequently its task as well, and the article thus analyses the hitherto role of the Slovenian Armed Forces in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. The article analyses “military contributions” of member states and the results show that Slovenia, from among the countries with which it is usually compared, contributes a relatively small number of soldiers for the ISAF mission, regarding the number of the population. Otherwise, Slovenia substantially contributes elsewhere, mostly where strategic interests of the country are more clearly expressed or where it believes it has comparative advantages, for example in Kosovo. Considering that NATO has recently started the process of forming a new strategic concept which, besides the biggest self-imposed challenge, the stabilisation of Afghanistan, will also have to define how NATO will face some new challenges, the article, on the basis of a structured interview with a high NATO official, answers the question of which challenges or threats should be included in the document which defines the future orientation of the Alliance and what role Slovenia should play in this process.

Key words *Slovenian Armed Forces, Afghanistan, stabilisation, NATO, ISAF, NATO’s strategic concept.*

Introduction At anniversaries we like to ask ourselves what we have achieved and look back on the path taken. Various scientific, technical and other publications talk a lot about the fifth anniversary of Slovenia’s accession to NATO which is now celebrating its 60th anniversary. Upon receiving an invitation by the responsible editor-in-chief to write an article for the *Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, the authors of this article focused primarily on the possible contribution and the added value to what has already been written, in order to avoid repeating the previously written and discussed issues.

There are several current problematic assemblies which NATO and Slovenia will have to find answers to if they wish to appear as trustworthy subjects of international relations. *First*, how, since the dissolution of the organisation of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in the 1990s, NATO has gradually, organisationally and institutionally as well as functionally, adapted to the new international security environment; *second*, what is the issue with the ever increasing (self-)questioning regarding NATO’s identity crisis and its new mission; *third*, what are the advantages and costs of Slovenia’s membership in NATO five years after the accession; *fourth*,

what are the current and future roles of Slovenia in facing the most currently adopted NATO challenge, the stabilisation of Afghanistan.¹

Comprehensive answers to each of the four problematic assemblies call for an in-depth analysis. Due to limitations regarding space and content as well as the provision of an in-depth analysis, the article limits itself only to currently the main challenge of NATO, that is to the participation in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. The importance of analysing NATO's operations in Afghanistan and commitment to stabilisation are emphasized by the highest NATO representatives,² Alliance members (including Slovenia)³ as well as national and foreign professional and academic public.⁴ The course of the operation in Afghanistan and its completion will have strategic and conceptual implications for the existence of NATO and its future operations. Due to the broader title of the article, the conclusion will also include thoughts on Slovenia's participation and operation within NATO as well as within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The analysis of the problem of NATO's operation in Afghanistan and of Slovenia in this context is based on the method of analysing secondary and primary resources as well as on the structured interview with a high civil representative of NATO, director of the Policy Planning Sector at the Secretary General of NATO, Jamie Shea.⁵

The article is composed of six topic areas: the introduction defines the purpose of the article, the methodological approach as well as some challenges and limitations of conducting the analysis. The remainder of the article presents: the reasons which led to NATO's participation in the mission in Afghanistan; the decision of the Slovenian Government to deploy members of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) to Afghanistan as well as several characteristics of the now five-year operation of the Slovenian contingents in this restless country; several characteristics of the security situation in Afghanistan seven years after the fall of the Talib regime;⁶ challenges in the formation of a new strategic concept of NATO and the view of a high expert

¹ *The main challenge of such a subject of international relations as NATO is perhaps mostly dependant on the perspective or on own definition of missions and tasks, which is why we wrote »adopted challenge«. The stabilisation of Afghanistan is definitely also a challenge for the wider international community or the UN, not only for NATO. However, it is not a **conditio sine qua non** for the future existence and development of the Alliance.*

² *The question of the stabilisation of Afghanistan has been mentioned in most official speeches of the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in 2009 (see, for example, Scheffer 2009 a, Scheffer 2009 b, Scheffer 2009 c).*

³ *Defence Minister Dr. Ljubica Jelusič says that Afghanistan remains »...our common concern within NATO, increasingly within the EU, and since 2001 also within the UN«. (Slovenian Press Agency 2009 a).*

⁴ *During the conference at the 60th anniversary of NATO in February 2009 at Brdo pri Kranju, Afghanistan was one of the important topics (Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, 2009). See also Harvard University Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (2008).*

⁵ *The result of the analysis will not be exactly as we would wish, mostly because of the relatively high level of classification of data regarding NATO's operation in Afghanistan.*

⁶ *Slovenian and foreign technical and scientific literature often incorrectly uses the words **Talib** and **Taliban**. **Taliban** is the plural form of **talib** which literally means »student«. The correct singular form is thus **talib** and plural **talibs**.*

of this organisation of the newly formed concept which would reflect the changed security situation in the world and define the role and mission of NATO for the future; the last part of the analysis presents several starting points for the future study of the proposed issue.

1 STABILISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A CHALLENGE FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EXISTENCE AND OPERATION OF THE ALLIANCE TODAY

Seven years have passed since NATO, celebrating its 60th anniversary, faced its, perhaps biggest challenge since the end of the Cold War, the stabilisation of Afghanistan. In the territory of this country, in the 1990s, after several years of fights which began after the departure of the Soviet soldiers, settled the Talibs who soon offered shelter to members of the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda. The day after the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on September 11, 2001, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) severely condemned these actions and used Resolution 1368 to urge member states to punish the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of the attack (UNSC Resolution 1368). This subchapter specifies the course of events which led to NATO's participation in this Asian country. The mentioned participation is contrary to NATO's operations during the Cold War when the union as a whole skilfully evaded direct participation in any of the (post)colonial conflicts, despite the fact that individual members of the Alliance did participate in them.⁷

Even before the Talib seizure of power and particularly under the Talib regime, Afghanistan was an unstable country and a threat to the international community with its internal tensions and foreign policy. Some authors and particularly politicians declared the Talib regime as "wicked" or terrorist because it offered shelter to terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda.⁸ Most people, weary of bloody combats which raged in Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviet soldiers in 1989, welcomed the Talibs who occupied Kabul in 1996 (they later expanded their control to as much as 90 percent of the territory).⁹ However, by establishing a regime which proved to be much crueller from the previous one in some respects, the Talibs soon withdrew from the population (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006, Roberts, 2009, p. 30-31).

⁷ Such cases include French wars in Indochina and Algeria, Portuguese wars in Africa, British wars in Malaya, Dutch wars in Indonesia etc. (Roberts, 2009, p. 47).

⁸ »Afghanistan is ruled by a rogue regime, the Taliban.« (Khalilzad and Byman in Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006, p. 29). Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2006, xii) warn that such a denotation has a negative connotative meaning and signifies the search for an excuse for outside interference.

⁹ Only the Pashtuns generally opposed the victory of the Northern Alliance at first, which, with the support of the US, gradually banished the Talibs. The voice of the Pashtun people strengthened particularly in 2003 and 2004 when their representatives were elected into the government (Roberts, 2009, p. 32-33).

The terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001 actually marks the beginning of an end of the Talib regime in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Afghanistan was also said to be a place of hiding for the initiator of the attacks and the leader of the terrorist network Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, along with his most devoted followers. On October 7, 2001, less than a month after the terrorist attacks, the US began the military operation Enduring Freedom (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006).¹¹ Merely a day after September 11, the North Atlantic Council of NATO adopted a Declaration which states that "...the attack was directed towards the US from abroad and has to be treated in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which states that an attack directed at a member of the Alliance in Europe or North America is an attack directed at the Alliance as a whole." The US declined NATO's offer because they wished, as claimed by Roberts (2009, p. 47), an 'A La Carte' coalition which would include no institutional constraints to the American conduct of the operation, which caused much dissatisfaction among the European NATO members. The US, with the support of their Allies, conducted the military operation Enduring Freedom outside the shelter of the NATO umbrella, even though, for the first time in history of the Alliance, one of its member states referred to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

On December 20, 2001, two weeks after the adoption of the Bonn Agreement which laid the framework for the political future of Afghanistan, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1386.¹² The resolution authorised the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission as well as the deployment of multinational forces in Kabul and its surroundings. 18 countries participated in the ISAF mission at that time, either by deploying soldiers or materially (NATO 2009 a, UNSC Resolution 1386).

Right after the attacks, NATO was removed from the "Afghan story" but soon returned to the scene. It entered directly in August 2003 when the union assumed the conduct of ISAF. The Alliance assumed responsibility for commanding, coordinating and planning the operation. It soon faced the problem which had been present the whole time; how to provide enough soldiers or countries which would be willing to send members of their armed forces to the restless country of Afghanistan (NATO 2009 b). The mandate of ISAF was first limited to Kabul and its surroundings. However, in October 2003, the UNSC, with Resolution 1510, expanded the mandate to the entire territory of Afghanistan. The operation again reflected the mutual commitment of the Afghan transitional government and ISAF to the stabilisation of

¹⁰ Some authors, including Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2006, p. 41-3), claim that the attack on Afghanistan was merely one of the points of the American strategy for this Central Asian country, which the US had planned long before the attack on September 11, 2001.

¹¹ The military operation Enduring Freedom has to be distinguished from NATO's operation ISAF. Several other operations within the so called Global war against terrorism are also connected with the operation Enduring Freedom, for example Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa etc. Operation Enduring Freedom is an operation of the American Army (with the support of British and Afghan troops), while the operation ISAF runs under NATO command, with American and British soldiers participating in it. In the past there had been tendencies to join both operations; this, however, did not happen, mostly at the wish of the US to preserve part of their units directly under own command.

¹² Exclusion of the Talibs from the negotiations at the Bonn conference was, according to many analysts and politicians, a primary error at the initial stage of the stabilisation of Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 229).

Afghanistan. ISAF is granted legitimacy through the request of the Afghan authorities for assistance. The resolution particularly emphasizes the principle of cooperation, meaning that ISAF, from legal and formal points of view, cannot function without the approval of the Afghan government (UNSC Resolution 1510).

ISAF first began expanding the mission to the north. In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council of NATO authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to expand the ISAF mission by assuming command over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz which had until then been under German command. The other eight PRTs remained under the command of the operation Enduring Freedom, that is under the American command. On December 31, the military part of the PRT in Kunduz passed over to ISAF. Half a year later, on June 28, 2004, at the NATO Summit in Istanbul, the establishment of PRTs in four other provinces was announced (in Mazari Sharif, Fayzabad and Baghlan), which took place on October 1 of the same year. The first phase of the expansion was thus finished. The territory whose stabilisation was the responsibility of ISAF included nine provinces or approximately 3600 square kilometres (NATO 2009 b).

In February 2005 NATO announced that it will also expand the operation of ISAF to the west of Afghanistan. The second phase of the expansion began on May 31, 2006, when ISAF assumed command over two more PRTs in the provinces of Farah and Herat. Members of the Slovenian Armed Forces were also sent to Herat later and remain there until today. They are also stationed at the logistic base in Herat, the so called Forward Support Base. Two more PRTs started operating in September of the same year. One in Chaghcharan, the capital of the Ghor province, and the other in Qala i Naw, the capital of the Badghis province. By expanding to the west, ISAF expanded its mandate to half of the Afghan territory (*ibid.*).

The third phase of the expansion included the restless south of Afghanistan. On July 31, 2006, ISAF, within the operation Enduring Freedom, took over the command of the south of Afghanistan from the American forces and thus expanded its area of operation to additional six provinces, namely Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Oruzgan and Zabul. At the same time it also assumed command of four other PRTs. The number of soldiers within ISAF increased from about 10.000 to about 20.000 (*ibid.*).

During the fourth phase, ISAF assumed responsibility of the entire territory of Afghanistan when, on October 5, 2006, it took over command of the forces in the eastern Afghanistan from the coalition under the American command. A new operational plan was also adopted at that time, which enabled ISAF to play a more important role in Afghanistan. Among other things, ISAF could now establish Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT), designed to support the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) (*ibid.*).

In April 2009, approximately 58.390 soldiers from 42 countries participated in the ISAF mission, while 26 PRTs operated in the territory of Afghanistan. Most soldiers are stationed in Regional Command South (approximately 22.830) and in Regional Command East (just over 22.000), while Regional Command Capital (approximately 5830 soldiers), Regional Command North (approximately 4730 soldiers) and Regional Command West (approximately 2940 soldiers) stay considerably behind in the number of soldiers (ISAF, 2009, p. 1).¹³

The diverse “coalition” of countries within ISAF provides for the legitimacy of operations. The US contributes the highest number of soldiers, that is more than 26.000.¹⁴ Next comes Great Britain with 8300 soldiers; other countries which contribute more than 1000 soldiers are Germany with 3465 soldiers, Canada with 2830 soldiers, France with 2780 soldiers, Netherlands with 1770 soldiers, Poland with 1590 soldiers and Australia with 1090 soldiers. The representation of some countries in ISAF in April 2009 was merely symbolic: Georgia with one soldier, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Austria with two soldiers, Jordan and Ireland with seven soldiers each, Iceland with eight soldiers, Luxembourg with nine and Ukraine with ten. Slovenia, with 70 soldiers, was listed in the lower part of the spreadsheet; 27 countries contributed more soldiers and 14 countries contributed less (*ibid.*).

2 COOPERATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

The absolute contributions regarding the number of soldiers for the ISAF mission, shown in the previous chapter, are only one of the ways of comparing data. However, due to different number of inhabitants, different gross domestic product (GDP), different number of armed forces etc., the comparison only gives a partial image of the actual participation of countries.

To obtain a more accurate comparison it is important to determine the number of soldiers contributed by individual countries regarding the number of inhabitants.¹⁵

¹³ Much professional and scientific literature talks about the minimum number of soldiers (occupation forces) required for the stabilisation of a country. Authors mostly agree that generalising is not suitable. Older doctrines of anti-insurgent combat or occupation state that stabilisation requires at least 20-25 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants (Roberts, 2009, p. 33-34). In the case of Afghanistan, with 33 to 34 million inhabitants, this means more than 750.000 soldiers. The calculation is based on the CIA World Factbook 2009 and the mean value of the »recommended number«, that is 22.5 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants.

¹⁴ The US also has additional 12.000 soldiers participating in the operation Enduring Freedom, that is outside the auspices of the ISAF mission (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 301).

¹⁵ The calculations are based on the data for individual countries, found in the CIA World Factbook (2009), and on the spreadsheet of contributions for the ISAF mission (ISAF, 2009).

Table 1:
The number of soldiers in ISAF per inhabitant

Country	Number of inhabitants	Number of soldiers in the ISAF mission	Number of inhabitants of a country per one soldier of this country in ISAF
Slovenia	2.005.692	70	28.653
Hungary	9.905.596	370	26.772
Slovakia	5.463.046	230	23.752
Lithuania	3.555.179	200	17.776
Czech Republic	10.211.904	580	17.607
Croatia	4.489.409	280	16.034
Latvia	2.231.503	160	13.947
Estonia	1.299.371	140	9281

Among the comparable countries, Slovenia contributes the least soldiers to Afghanistan regarding the number of inhabitants; that is one soldier per 28.653 inhabitants. The most active countries are Estonia, where each 9281st inhabitant participates in ISAF, and Latvia, which sends a soldier per every 13.947th inhabitant to ISAF.

We began this topic area in chronologically reverse order because of the logical sequence to the previous topic area, namely with a review and data comparison of the number of foreign soldiers in Afghanistan in the first half of 2009. Let us now return to the beginning of Slovenia's cooperation in the mission for the stabilisation of Afghanistan.

The first Slovenian contingent, with 18 members of the Slovenian Armed Forces, was sent to Afghanistan in March 2004. It operates in the west province of Herat with a capital of the same name and in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. As many as 485 members of the Slovenian Armed Forces have already participated in this operation. Most of their tasks include protecting the logistic base at the airport in Herat, operations at control points and patrolling in their immediate vicinity as well as escorting vehicles in the immediate area of Herat. Soldiers are stationed at the military camp Arena near Herat, together with members of the Italian and Spanish international forces (Slovenska vojska (The Slovenian Armed Forces magazine), 2009).

NATO had no financial obligations in the case of Slovenia's participation because the Slovenian government assumed responsibility for the transfer of the members of the Slovenian contingent, weapons and equipment. Slovenia also took care of the provision of food, accommodation, utility services, fuel, oil, lubricants and medical services. The country also made a commitment to provide for and maintain the equipment of the Slovenian contingent, and to assume responsibility

for the salaries of the Slovenian soldiers and other financial obligations resulting from their participation in Afghanistan (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 105/2005). Slovenian political leadership states that Slovenia will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan in the future as well. Prime Minister Borut Pahor and Defence Minister Dr. Ljubica Jelusič often emphasize that members of the Slovenian Armed Forces will remain in this restless country, as the stabilisation of Afghanistan is also of national interest to Slovenia. They made an official statement about this issue at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009. (Slovenian Press Agency 2009 a, Slovenian Press Agency 2009 b).

3 SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF THE TALIBS

The purpose of this topic area is to present the internal security situation in Afghanistan, measures or progress of the Afghan government, and the role of several evident international actors (NATO, USA, UN etc.). Only a few facts from the area of security will be exposed; that is those facts that could be the result of the efforts of the international community regarding stabilisation. The available data shows that, hypothetically, Afghanistan will find it difficult to transform into a stable country in the future if it does not receive serious and comprehensive international assistance. We must not, however, get into reductionism and, based on the partial analysis, equate the security situation with the (success of the) mission for the stabilisation of Afghanistan.

Seven years after NATO members adopted the stabilisation of Afghanistan as the priority challenge on the basis of which an alliance would either finally be put into force or completely fall through, as is claimed by some people, there are very few reasons for optimism in this Central Asian country. The United Nations reported that the number of civilian victims in 2008 increased by 70 percent in comparison with 2007.¹⁶ Insurgents under the leadership of the Talibs (authors such as Giustozzi (2008), Roberts (2009, p. 31) and Synnott (2009, p. 71) warn, however, that linking the insurgency exclusively to the Talibs is problematic, since many

¹⁶ Analysts point to the aviation, which people rely too much on, as one of the main reasons for the numerous civilian victims because it operates in a non-discriminatory manner. Reliance on the aviation is particularly strong in the east and south of the country where insurgents are most active and there is shortage of coalition soldiers (Roberts, 2009, p. 40-41).

Afghan insurgency groups have little in common with them)¹⁷ have expanded the area of operation and began resorting to new tactics.¹⁸

The last report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan contains quite pessimistic data. It states that the year 2008 was the most violent since the fall of the Talibs in 2001 – 31 percent more so called security incidents took place that year than in 2007. The number of incidents in December 2008 was 42 percent higher than in December of the previous year. The second half of 2008 saw an average of 857 so called security incidents per month, while the average for the first half of that year was 625 per month. The report also states that insurgents began operating in areas which, until recently, were relatively peaceful, including the provinces of Faryab and Badghis (the latter is a province bordering on Herat where members of the Slovenian Armed Forces are also stationed; author's warning) (UN General Assembly, 2009, p. 5).

The security situation is also unsatisfactory because of badly trained and personnel deficient Afghan armed forces. In April 2009, ANA included less than 83.000 members. The planned objective is having 134.000 soldiers by 2011 (ISAF, 2009). There is no shortage of recruits but many are joining the insurgents because of poor economic conditions and lack of opportunities (Roberts, 2009, p. 44).¹⁹ An important element talking in favour of the hypothesis about the incohesiveness of the Afghan armed forces and consequently the inability of a successful combat against the insurgents is also the ethnic structure of the Afghan National Army. The Tajiks possess the most political power and the most manpower within ANA; almost 56 percent of the officers' assembly is composed of Tajiks (only 32 percent of officers are Pashtuns), despite the fact that Tajiks only represent 27 percent of the Afghanistan ethnic structure, while the Pashtuns represent 42 percent. Regarding the ethnic structure,

¹⁷ *Insurgents are often joined by the inhabitants of those provinces which are characterised by high unemployment (up to 40 percent) and poverty. Insurgents, in return for joining, often give a relatively large amount of money. Rashid (Roberts, 2009, p. 31) claims that the United States of America and NATO could not understand that Talibs do not belong to Afghanistan and Pakistan - this was about a poor population with no future, the product of refugee camps, militarised religious schools (medrese) and the lack of opportunities in the border areas at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.*

¹⁸ *Giustozzi (2008, p. 13 and 147-157) warns about the spread of informatisation in the operation of insurgents. They make wide use of modern means of communication, such as cameras, video footages, DVDs and internet. Some insurgent commanders at the level of county commanders are, since 2005, equipped with laptops in those areas that have practically no electricity. There are also great changes in the way of attacking coalition forces. In the beginning of 2009, the largest British base in the Helmand province in the south of Afghanistan, the location of the fiercest combats between the coalition forces and insurgents, experienced an indirect rocket attack: insurgents brought trucks with rockets installed on them to the wider area of the base. They then deserted these improvised weapon systems and activated the rockets from a safe distance. The insurgents used 107 mm Type 63 rockets. The NATO base in the Qandahar province has also been a frequent target of rocket attacks in the last four and a half years. NATO has never succeeded in eliminating the constant threat (Ripley, 2009, p. 5). Insurgents, as emphasized by Clements (2009, p. 5), resort more frequently to attacking NATO's supply capabilities outside Afghanistan - in December 2008, in Peshawar, Pakistan, two terminals were attacked within two days and more than 140 trucks with supplies for the coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed altogether. The number of attacks on NATO convoys in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province has generally increased in the past months (ibid.).*

¹⁹ *The Talibs are trying to win the inhabitants of the areas in which they are active, for example by building schools, hospitals etc. (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 111).*

the officers' assembly and the soldiers also include the Hazaras and the Uzbeks (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 187, CIA, 2009).

Afghanistan, almost seven years after the overthrow of the Talib government in Kabul, remains the largest world "exporter" of opium, although the international community is striving to suppress opium production. The production of opium is present especially in those areas where the security situation is bad – as much as 98 percent of Afghan poppy is produced in the east and south of the country, two thirds in the Helmand province, the location of the fiercest combats.²⁰ However, there are also several positive elements which need to be exposed: according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the opium production in 2008 decreased by 20 percent compared to the previous year, while the number of provinces which do not produce opium increased from 13 to 18 (Afghanistan has 34 provinces). The decrease in the opium production is thought to be the result of several related elements, namely the political pressure, development assistance and drought (Wright, 2009).

Poor economic situation, precarious conditions and a high level of corruption also influence the investors' trust. Foreign direct investments in Afghanistan remain relatively modest but the situation is slowly improving. In 2004, foreign direct investments totalled nearly 190 million American dollars; the number increased to 273 million dollars the following year and fell back to 242 million American dollars in 2005. In 2007, these investments slightly exceeded the level from 2005, totalling 288 million dollars. Afghanistan did not invest in foreign markets (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008, p. 1, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 304).

One of the important indicators of the post-war stabilisation is the number of refugees returning to their homes. According to the data of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, almost five million Afghan people returned to their homes from January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2007. This is the biggest return since the data on refugees is being recorded. It is encouraging to know that refugees are still returning today, although to a smaller extent (Roberts, 2009, p. 43).²¹

It is also positive that schools are attended by more children than in the past. 6 million children are being schooled, of whom 30 percent are women. However, schooling is mostly present in the relatively peaceful north in west of the country. 85 percent of the population has access to medical services; in 2002, this number was below 10 percent. The number of media has increased as well; Afghanistan has more than 60 radio stations, 15 television networks and many printed media (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 304).

²⁰ 157.000 hectares of cultivated area is designed for poppy production (Wright, 2009, p. 38).

²¹ It has to be stated that not all refugees returned voluntarily. Some host countries indirectly forced people to return. Also, at the return of refugees from abroad, internal emigration continues due to violence (Roberts, 2009, p. 43).

When planning the strategy for fighting against insurgents, one has to be familiar with the opponent's power. NATO faces a problem here because the opponent's power is hard to determine, particularly due to the fact that there are many "occasional militants" who only fight in case an operation against the coalition forces is taking place in the vicinity of their homes. In 2004, the US estimated that the hard-core militants of the opposite side only number approximately one thousand men, but this number increased with years (from 2.000 to 3.000 in 2004, from 3.000 to 4.000 in 2006). The UN gave much higher numbers: approximately 6.000 insurgents were supposed to be engaged in combats in the south alone. Based on these estimates and some other sources, Giustozzi (2008, p. 34-35) assesses that in 2006 the number of Talibs and their allies in the fight against the coalition forces totalled approximately 17.000 men, of whom 6.000 to 10.000 were constantly active. These estimates do not include the 40.000 Talibs in Pakistan for whom the Afghanistan-Pakistan border signifies an artificial formation and who pass over the border and fight in Afghanistan.

Numerous analysts (Roberts, 2009, p. 52, Synnott, 2009, Vendrell, 2008) and politicians, including American president Barack Obama (Reid, Hussain, 2009), thus see the key to at least partial stabilisation of Afghanistan in the neighbouring Pakistan because the porous border enables the insurgents to pass over without any trouble – the insurgents train in Pakistan and fight against the coalition forces in Afghanistan. The situation in the Pakistan provinces on the border with Afghanistan, otherwise known for their secessionist tendencies, was so unbearable for the Pakistan government from the point of view of security that it complied with the enactment of the Sheriatic law. Time will show what consequences this will have on the future stabilisation of Afghanistan. Many in the west, including NATO and the US, officially criticised the enactment of the Sheriatic law in some parts of the Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province; however, according to some information, even the American government or the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton quietly agreed to the enactment, as this move would set the religious communities of various nationalities in this province at variance (Nelson, Siddiq and Khan, 2009). Giustozzi (2008, p. 25-26) also warns of a strong likelihood of an eventual double role of the Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) which not only supplies insurgents with intelligence but possibly also with weapons.

It has turned out that partial analysis of merely certain aspects of internal security considers both positive and negative indicators and it is therefore difficult to form a comprehensive assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan: some issues have improved, others have deteriorated. Although this can be scientifically questionable, it is sometimes necessary to rely on common sense and the experience of those who have lived in a country for some time and have a better understanding of it, and not on dry "facts" alone, which are often also methodologically questionable. The authors are citing the opinion of Rory Stewart who researched Afghanistan in 2002 and later, after he had retired from British diplomacy, began leading a humanitarian organisation. Stewart (Roberts, 2009, p. 45) states that people should focus less on

investing and more on what they are able to do. He is especially critical of increasing the number of soldiers because:

»... increasing the number of soldiers would lead to the incitement of the Afghan nationalism, as the Afghan people are more opposed to everything that is foreign than we acknowledge, while the support to our presence /.../ is declining. The Talibs, who were a reactionist and discredited movement, are gaining support by representing themselves as those who fight against foreign military occupation, for Islam and for Afghanistan (*ibid.*).«

Stewart's opinion, which is also shared by other people who are familiar with the situation in Afghanistan, reflects some fundamental, even identity, questions which NATO is now facing: what exactly is the primary mission of this international organisation today? An answer to this question, as well as to the question of NATO's role outside the territory of its members, is given by the Alliance's strategic concepts. NATO is well aware that the Strategic Concept of 1999, which is still valid today, is obsolete because it does not reflect the current situation in international relations. Appeals and discussions of the political and expert public on the nature and contents of a new strategic concept have thus enhanced in recent months.²²

4 FORMATION OF A NEW NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The new Alliance's strategic concept will be the first such strategic doctrinal NATO document which Slovenia will be able to co-create. Upon entering NATO, Slovenia had to adopt the valid strategic concept, adopted in Washington in 1999. However, as regards the new strategic concept, the Slovenian political leadership, with the support of experts, may and probably must help in its creation, as this primary document of the Alliance, which reflects the Alliance's view of the security environment, will establish NATO's role and mission for at least the next decade.²³ This is a topical subject, especially in light of the fact that the formation of a strategic concept is usually conducted as a two-way process (member states – organisations and vice versa). The new strategic concept will define and possibly hierarchize current security threats to the Euro-Atlantic area and the Alliance. It is thus all the more necessary that Slovenia plays a proactive role in this process.

Already in 2006 did Secretary-General Scheffer call upon and illustrate the formation of a new strategic concept which would redefine NATO operational guidelines. At that time, many saw this appeal as premature (Scheffer, 2008); however,

²² See, for example, Scheffer (2008), Hutton (2009) etc.

²³ The first strategic concept focused on defending the territory of NATO member states. The mid-1950s emphasized the so called mass retaliation, including nuclear weapons. The Strategic Concept of 1967 introduced the so called **flexible response** which replaced mass retaliation. The Strategic Concept of 1991 emphasized coordination with the former opponents. The today valid Strategic Concept of 1999 includes the commitment to maintain peace in the wider Euro-Atlantic area as well as the commitment to conduct non-Article 5 operations. All strategic concepts adopted so far also consider the nuclear aspect (NATO and Hatfield in Regehr, 2009, p. 6).

such appeals strengthened just before and at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009.²⁴ At this Summit, the last point of the Declaration on Alliance Security assigned Secretary-General the official task of starting the preparations for the formation of a new strategic concept (Šinhva, 2009, Declaration on Alliance Security, 2009).²⁵

If the question of the Alliance's new strategic concept was perhaps truly premature in 2006, it is today, for various reasons, necessary to adopt a new strategic framework for the operation of NATO:

- the Strategic Concept of 1999 is obsolete and does not reflect certain essential characteristics of the new strategic environment as well as the new security threats;
- NATO requires a clear conceptual framework which will define future planning and operation of the organisation;
- the new security environment (military threats are less exposed, while non-military threats are becoming very extensive: global economic-financial crisis, diseases, poverty etc.) requires quick setting of priorities which will be addressed by the Alliance and determining proper division of labour between international organisations and alliances which ensure international peace and security;
- discussion of NATO's identity crisis has been revived in recent years and the new strategic concept may also offer a new answer to this question.

An outline of the new concept, which was presented at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in Krakow in February 2009, but has not been presented to the public yet, contains the following main subjects: fight against international terrorism and related threats, proliferation of nuclear weapons, cyber attacks, climate changes, energy security, other post-modern threats and security challenges (Socor, 2009, Šinhva, 2009). Such a selection of threats to be included in the new strategic concept of the Alliance has also been indirectly verified by the director of the Policy Planning Sector at the Secretary General of NATO, Jamie Shea, in the interview with him (Zupančič, 2009).

It is expected that Afghanistan will be considered a priority in the new strategic concept. Afghanistan may not be defined a priority directly, but the concept will definitely define generic problems present in the country, such as unstable authority, terrorism, the risk of nuclear expansion etc. The next important question that the Alliance will have to find an answer to is relation to the Russian Federation. The

²⁴ See, for example, Socor (2009), Spiegel Online (2009), Hutton etc.

²⁵ »... we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts who, in close consultation with all Allies, will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept...« (Declaration on Alliance Security, 2009). This indicates that the process of forming the concept is to be conducted as a two-way process. Shea (Zupančič, 2009) adds that the group of experts will represent both a professional basis and a mediator between the organisation and member states, and that member states will be included in the process of forming a new concept from the very beginning. The group of experts will include experts from different fields; however, an approximate geographic balance will also have to be ensured (not in a way that each member state contributes an expert, but that the group includes experts from the largest member states). The possibility for Slovenia to significantly contribute to the formation of the new document is thus, if the process is really conducted in such a way, very topical.

Georgian-Russian armed conflict in 2008 caused the relations between both actors to weaken. The Russian Federation constantly emphasizes that Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO is a threat to its national interests and security, but Shea believes that the new strategic concept will repeat the commitment to the openness of the organisation to new members; however, we must not expect a time line (*ibid.*).

Due to the mentioned and many other aspects, the formation of a new strategic concept is a demanding process because it is necessary to find the highest common denominator of all member states of the Alliance whose number increased to 28 countries in April 2009 when Croatia and Albania joined NATO. This means more difficult coordination, as the countries perceive threats differently and the selection of security areas, which the countries would like to include into the strategic concept, will thus be very large: for example, Southern European countries perceive security quite differently (they are traditionally oriented towards the Mediterranean Area or Africa, which is also reflected in their national strategic documents) from the Baltic countries which, almost two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, have still not been able to free themselves from the pressure coming from the east and would especially like the strategic concept to include areas which regard protection against potential threats of the Russian Federation.

The time limit for the preparation of the strategic concept is until the next NATO Summit which is at the end of 2010 in Lisbon. The new concept, as stated by Shea, is expected to reflect three main groups of challenges:²⁶

- 1) challenges arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: inclusion of such challenges is particularly important for the Eastern European and Baltic countries as well as Northern countries, as the Russian Federation has been more active in their vicinity recently, for example in the Arctic regions;
- 2) the challenges outlined in the previous concept are still topical: terrorism, disintegrated countries, proliferation of nuclear weapons etc.;
- 3) “new challenges”²⁷ which have become topical in the last years and need to be included in the agenda or the strategic concept: climate changes, migrations, organised crime, cyber terrorism etc.

NATO, in the new strategic concept, will have to explain what its comparative advantage is in comparison to other organisations. The Alliance does not possess most security instruments and mechanisms which could be defined as the mechanisms or instruments for the provision of the so called *soft security*. NATO should not interfere with areas, such as provision of social and development assistance, integration in the post-conflict society, judicial administration and police tasks, as other organisations, such as the UN, World Bank, European Union and other regional or-

²⁶ NATO terminology uses the term *challenge* more often than the term *threat*.

²⁷ The term »new challenges« has to be used conditionally as these are traditional challenges or threats that were present in the past but were not given such attention.

rganisations, are better equipped and trained for the implementation of these tasks.²⁸ NATO should therefore not be overambitious; ambitions and capabilities should be mutually balanced. In particular, in light of successful provision of international security at the beginning of the 21st century, the following fundamental strategic question needs to be answered: which security aspects NATO is able to provide to its members and the wider international community and which aspects would be reasonable to leave to other international organisations (the UN, EU, OSCE; SE...). In a word, NATO's new strategic concept will be operational and only possible to conduct if it is also based on a clear division of labour and plans for coordination and cooperation with other international organisations. In this case, the legitimacy of the existence of NATO and its future operation would be guaranteed.

Conclusion Within the analysis of NATO's operation, the resultant operation of Slovenia has exposed the following issues:

1 The status of ISAF or NATO in Afghanistan: NATO has set itself a legitimate objective of stabilising Afghanistan, which, however, can only be achieved slowly and gradually, while receiving substantial and constant support of other countries and international organisations. The ISAF mission has gradually formed and increased in number (although several countries removed their troops from Afghanistan during this process!) and expanded its mandate to the entire territory of Afghanistan. NATO is guaranteed international legal support in Afghanistan by the UNSC resolutions or the wish of most of the large countries for stabilisation. Eight years after the fall of the Talib regime there are two operations being conducted simultaneously in Afghanistan: the operation Enduring Freedom under the American command and NATO ISAF forces operation, which sometimes leads to questions of the division of tasks. Larger problems are also brought on by the so called national constraints, as the main proportion of combat operations is conducted by units of only several countries, namely the US, Canada, Britain, Netherlands, Denmark, and partly France, which raises doubts about cohesiveness and commitment of member states to stabilisation. NATO is constantly appealing for larger military contributions and potential withdrawal of national constraints. As many as 42 countries within the ISAF operation are supporting the transformation of Afghanistan into a peacetime society and providing proper legitimacy for the efforts of the entire international community in this country. Legitimacy of the operation is formally not denied by any of the countries in the international community; however, the state-focused view can be misleading in this case, as the main opponent of NATO is no longer an organised country but a more or less organised insurgent movement.

2 Experience of the Slovenian Armed Forces participating in the ISAF operation: members of the Slovenian Armed Forces have, by being deployed to Afghanistan,

²⁸ Shea (Zupančič, 2009) thinks that it is unrealistic to expect the new Strategic Concept to define the development of NATO's civil capabilities, as resistance to this is quite strong in some member states, for example in France. France believes that NATO's primary task is »hard« military defence.

become acquainted with new areas of operation (new cultural and social framework, new geographically conditioned challenges ...) and directly faced with solving one of the biggest challenges adopted by the Alliance. It has been shown that Slovenia, from among the countries with which it is often compared, is among those that contribute fewer soldiers to the ISAF mission, regarding the number of soldiers per inhabitant.²⁹ Participation in multinational units has brought important experience to numerous members of the Slovenian Armed Forces as well as the institution as a whole. Exchange of experience and learning are opportunities for improvement; however, organisational learning is mostly dependant on whether the Slovenian Armed Forces will know how to transfer knowledge to those members of the Slovenian Armed Forces who are leaving for Afghanistan.

3 Security situation in Afghanistan: it has been seen that chances of successful stabilisation and rapid improvement of the security situation in Afghanistan are small, although gradual improvement can be observed in some areas, such as education, return of refugees, partly also in the fight against production of drugs and drug trafficking as well as in the economy, in particular as regards gradual increase of foreign indirect investments. The international actors who participate in these efforts are aware of the fact that the biggest internal challenges in Afghanistan are currently seen in suppression of violence, prevention of corruption, establishment and operation of the judicial system or operation of the current authority as well as enhancement of the police and army, which is one of the key problems of the Afghan society. Many of those who should take responsibility for the security in the country are illiterate, insurgents are also infiltrating into the armed forces, the ethnic structure of the armed forces is highly unbalanced or in favour of the Tajiks etc. In a word, improvement of the security situation is necessary for the stabilisation of Afghanistan as a whole and for the country to start functioning as a trustworthy subject of international relations.

4 New strategic concept of NATO: its formation is linked to the experience that NATO is gaining in Afghanistan as well as to the question of mutual relationships between the main actors for the provision of international peace and security. The document in preparation will have to clearly divide and define the mission and the priorities of the Alliance. It should also answer the question of how NATO understands the provision of collective defence and international security in the world which is now also facing new threats which NATO has so far not addressed (climate changes, energy security, protection against cyber attacks).

5 The changed security paradigm, which is also reflected in the analysis of NATO's operation in Afghanistan, acquired some new characteristics and emphases at the end of the Cold War. The traditional patterns of conflicts and cooperation are thwarted by the new dynamic of the international security environment, which calls for new definitions of what is considered internal security and what international security, who needs to be protected and how. In this regard, NATO has to establish its legitimacy

²⁹ *It also needs to be mentioned that the Slovenian Armed Forces participate in several other areas which are perhaps strategically more important for Slovenia (for example Kosovo).*

for the future in three main areas: 1. attainment of unanimity among member states regarding perception, assessment and categorisation of threats; 2. development of proper capabilities, organisation and unanimity of when these capabilities should be used (Grizold, 2006, p. 14); 3. attainment of general international unanimity of the division of labour, cooperation and regular coordination between NATO and other international organisations in the provision of international peace and security. The existence of NATO in the future is dependant on whether member states are able to conduct strategic discussions in the above-mentioned fields among themselves and with the wider international community.

Besides the proposed consideration regarding the operation of Slovenia within NATO and ESDP, the following issues also have to be exposed:

1 Inclusion in NATO: by joining NATO in 2004, Slovenia achieved one of its strategic objectives which it set itself at the time of emancipation; the other objective was joining the EU, which was, regarding the provision of security, directly linked to Slovenia's inclusion in NATO. Slovenia travelled a long way to join NATO. In 1994 it joined the Partnership for Peace programme, then NATO Defence Planning Committee in 2003, and gained full NATO membership in 2004. By joining NATO, Slovenian national security acquired new and modified dimensions as well as new challenges – one of the more important ones became the stabilisation of Afghanistan. In the modern international environment the security of an individual country finally became part of international security and the role of Slovenian national security, regarding regional and international security, has thus been modified. The new strategic environment considers Slovenia first as part of the Euro-Atlantic and at the same time the wider international security, which brings not only advantages but also responsibilities for the accomplishment of common goals. This involves, in particular, the political-security role and recognisability of Slovenia in Europe and the world as well as the possibility of cooperation and participation in decision-making on an equal rights basis regarding matters that shape the wider international environment. Slovenia can either be merely a passive observer and executor of common security policy of NATO or a partner who runs a proactive policy and pursues own capabilities, knowledge, experience and interests. So far, Slovenia has, also in the case of Afghanistan, mostly joined the efforts of the Alliance, whenever the initiative came, and not engaged so much in co-creating an active policy.

2 Slovenia's operation in NATO and the EU: even a superficial analysis of Slovenia's operation within NATO in the last five years shows that the country has mostly performed the roles of an observer and executor, but played a much smaller part in actively helping to shape the security policy of NATO and the EU. Let us refer to two specific examples to illustrate this general statement. *The first case* points to a lack of commitment and activity of Slovenia within the security policy of NATO and the EU. The accession process for EU and NATO membership showed a common interest of Slovenia, the EU and NATO for Slovenia, as a South Eastern European country, to especially engage in efforts for the enhancement of stabilisation

and association processes in South Eastern Europe and for the shaping and implementing of specific measures and solutions. Slovenia, as a member of the EU and NATO, was expected to play an active role of a mediator, explainer and contributor to better understanding of the situation and finding of proper solutions for the stabilisation of the situation in South Eastern Europe and particularly in the area of the so called Western Balkans (Rupel 2004, p. 22-24). Various indicators of the present situation and previous solving of a complex situation in the mentioned area, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as indicators of Slovenian economic, cultural, scientific and similar presence or engagement in this area point to the conclusion that Slovenia, in the last five years of operating within the EU and NATO, has not realised the afore-mentioned expectations of both organisations and own interest in this matter. It is not too late, however. Now that the situation in the above-mentioned areas is slowly improving, Slovenia can also contribute to stabilisation in a different way. Its assistance in Afghanistan can be carried out not only by military operation but also by contributions of civil experts, which may also help Slovenia enhance its international recognisability and reputation.

The second case clearly shows that Slovenian standpoint and solutions can be put forward within the EU and NATO if, at the government level, there exists a clear and coordinated concept of national interests on the matter of what is important and good for Slovenia. Slovenia clearly strived for such a concept during the accession process and immediately after joining the EU and NATO. The cooperation of the EU and NATO in the area of defence and security is based on the principles of reciprocity and not on duplication of their military and defence capabilities. Slovenia, during the process of integration into these two organisations, pursued the policy of organising its military and defence capabilities in a way that will enable its credible cooperation in both organisations. In this context, Slovenia did not provide for the development of special military and defence forces for each of the organisations.

3 Strategic priorities of Slovenia: Within NATO and the EU, Slovenia has so far pursued a proactive policy of cooperating in peacekeeping operations, which was mostly based on two starting points. *First*, the strategic security area of interest to Slovenia is South Eastern Europe. It was estimated that security and stability of this area are key elements for the provision of political, military and defence, economic, cultural and other relations with the countries in this area as well as for the maintenance of communication and supply relationships and for the prevention of potential threats coming from this area. *Second*, Slovenian contribution to common security and defence policies of the EU and NATO in this area should be the most important, particularly due to Slovenia's geostrategic position, knowledge of history, culture, language and situation in the area of South Eastern Europe. The climax of Slovenian efforts was Slovenia's participation in the political preparation and execution of transferring NATO's peacekeeping operation (SFOR) to the EU (EUFOR). The EU's assumption of the leading role in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina signified an important incentive for future development of a common

EU security and defence policy and for the development of cooperation between the EU and NATO in the area of security and defence.

The new reality of the Euro-Atlantic framework demands that Slovenia have clearly defined standpoints, views and interests regarding various questions within the EU, NATO and the world. A synthesis of such a subject matter is usually formed within a country's political strategy which is implemented by state and non-state institutions and individuals. The basic condition for the implementation of active and internally coordinated foreign and security policies of Slovenia is the establishment of a comprehensive institutional framework for their permanent cooperation and coordination within government sectors, between the government and the National Assembly, the National Council and justice administration, and between national authorities and the civil society. Slovenia is still to establish such a consistent institutional framework. Also, if it wishes to function as a credible international actor, Slovenia needs to conduct a comprehensive public, expert and political discussion of the position, role and operation of Slovenia within NATO and the EU.

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STRUKTURIRANI INTERVJU Z JAMIEJEM SHEO, DIREKTORJEM URADA ZA NAČRTOVANJE POLITIK PRI GENERALNEM SEKRETARJU NATA

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH JAMIE SHEA, DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING SECTOR AT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

The telephone interview was conducted by Rok Zupančič on 28 April 2009

1 Which are the new security challenges NATO is facing today? Should they be incorporated into the new Strategic concept (SC)?

There are three groups of challenges, obviously: first, the so called »*Article 5 challenges*«; these are perhaps less urgent now, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, than in the times of the Cold War. However, »*Article 5 challenges*« are still very important for the allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states or for those allies that have witnessed an increase of Russian activities in their vicinity recently, like the High North or the Norwegians, Icelanders, the Baltics or those who saw what happened in Georgia last year. I think one of the big challenges of the SC is having to ask ourselves what we need to do to be able to implement Article 5 credibly, because that is the issue we simply have to address. We have to look at issues such as contingency planning, exercises, the need for new forces specifically tailored for Article 5 missions. We have to tackle the practical issues: what we need in military terms to be able to shape contingency planning, because member states, such as the Baltic states, want to know which forces are designated to protect them if the need arises. The second category includes issues that we still have on the table, the same as in the previous SC: issues like failed states, terrorism, proliferation. These are not really new challenges but there is a question of whether NATO has been successful in addressing them. The third group includes the issues we have not had on the agenda so far – the question is whether we have to put them on the agenda – issues like climate change, migration, organised crime, cyberterrorism. However, it is the question of NATO's need to raise the priority of these issue regarding their profiles.

2 What will be the »added value« of the new Strategic concept of the Alliance?

The SC has an external and an internal function: externally, we have to answer the question of what NATO is for, we have to ask what its core mission is or if it is just looking for something to do. So I think we all have public and clear mission statements to link what we are today doing better for the security of citizens. So this is what NATO is doing - protecting citizens - and not only keeping itself busy. Internally, we need a

document to drive the planning. So far, we have lacked a clear definition of the threats, we have lacked a definition of priority of the threats – is it more important to deal with proliferation or terrorism? Third, we have lacked a clear sense of which military capabilities and other instruments we need in order to be able to deal with those threats. We obviously live in a very difficult financial environment, so we cannot do everything. We have to narrow the scope of NATO's required contribution, rather than emphasize what may be better done by the European union, the World bank, the UN or other organisations.

3 Should the new Strategic concept define some substantial new challenges, such as global warming, cyber-terrorism or other specific forms of terrorism?

We need to reach a compromise between, on the one hand, the most threatening threats, that is the threats that are posing existential risk, and, on the other hand, the threats that are serious but do not pose an existential threat to the society. The second aspect is NATO's added value - e. g. one can argue that swine flu outbreak in Mexico is a major threat to our population, but obviously NATO does not deal with this kind of pandemics. NATO is not WHO, so one cannot define NATO's role as purely linked to existential threats because, as I have said, some of the threats are simply not NATO's issues, we do not have expertise for them etc. So the second part is choosing the existential threats that affect military capabilities, trans-Atlantic solidarity. This is a compromise we have to find: important threats for which NATO is an important responder.

4 Is it necessary for terrorism to be the central focal point of the Alliance and / or the Strategic concept?

No, definitely not. Because, if I repeat again, NATO lacks many instruments for dealing with terrorism; we are not the police, judiciary etc., we do not deal with airline passenger lists, we do not deal with social programmes for the integration of Muslims or for tackling the sources of radicalism or integration in schools, we do not provide the development aid, for example, for the Pakistani school children to no longer attend madrassas but regular schools etc. So NATO's added value is limited to dealing with terrorism; yes, it (terrorism, added by R. Z.) will be on the list (of the SC, added by R. Z.) because there is much that NATO can do, but I do not believe it will be the central focal point. There are issues like cyberattacks, dealing with failed states, proliferation etc. that are probably more significant than dealing with terrorism. The new SC has to be a disciplined intellectual exercise in distinguishing between issues in which NATO is in the lead and issues in which NATO can support others.

5 How will the so called »group of experts / thinkers« that will prepare the new SC be formed? When and how are members of this group going to be confirmed?

It has been decided in Strasbourg: the Secretary-General (SG) has to nominate a group of experts. However, there is no sacred number or anything like that, it is really up to the new SG to decide on the matter. Basically, he will have to take a decision on his

own authority. But I think he will want to make sure there is a military expert in the group; he has to have various experts. However, there is no need to have ten experts on terrorism, two experts on proliferation and nobody who knows about cyberdefence, climate change or similar issues. Therefore, the SG has to make sure to have a range of skills in the group. And of course, he has to make sure that large regions are represented – there has to be an American representative, several people from large NATO countries, and of course representatives of small countries. I do not think he will have one expert from each country, that would be too much, but he has to make sure the geographical balance is preserved.

6 How can a member state contribute to the new concept? Is the group of thinkers going to consult member states on the new concept?

Absolutely. The thinkers cannot provide all ideas themselves, there will be facilitators. If the new SC is to be accepted by capitals, then of course the capitals have to be very carefully integrated into the process. They cannot be asked at the end or on the basis of logical thinking of *»here is the concept«* - they have to be familiar and comfortable with the concept, they must not be shocked. So experts will come up with good ideas, but they will speak to the capitals, national parliaments,; it will be a kind of a two-way process in which also NGOs and think tanks will be included, otherwise it will not be successful.

7 When is it expected for the new concept to be officially presented?

At the next Nato Summit in Lisbon, to NATO Heads of State, at the end of 2010; so we still have 18 months to do the exercise.

8 Military Capabilities of Member States and the new Strategic concept – any hints or requests, especially for or from the European countries on that?

It is not good to come up with too high ambitions that exceed NATO's abilities. We have to do things. Ambitions and capabilities have to be in conformity with one another. We have to define which capabilities we need. Of course, military will take the position of *»we need everything«*: aircraft carriers, special forces, transport carriers etc. This will not be possible. We have to define the capabilities which can fulfil multiple roles, e. g. capabilities which can be used for *»Article 5 missions«* as well as for peacekeeping. Which innovative solutions do we need for capabilities to be more deployable? For example, common funding, sharing of transport aircraft. The SC shall be the instrument which can drive the process of transformation of the Alliance. It should not be neutral, but must drive the process.

9 Shall the new SC define some strategic geographic priorities of the Alliance, such as Afghanistan or maybe the Middle East?

I think Afghanistan will be defined as a priority, because the lifespan of the SC will be approximately 10 years. NATO usually defines generic problems, not geographic

positions: it talks about terrorism, not terrorists; about proliferation, not proliferators. I do not have an actual answer to this question; generic problems may be linked to some specific areas. We have partners and challenges in the Middle East, we have the Mediterranean dialogue, the Istanbul Initiative etc., but I am not sure to what extent we will link the challenges to specific areas.

10 The relation between »hard« and »soft« power of NATO – is the new Strategic concept going to elaborate on that? For example, in terms of promoting more soft power, such as NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

I do not believe NATO will develop civilian capabilities in the SC; there is quite some resistance to that among the allies, particularly in France which believes NATO's role is defence, the defence side of security, the hard-core military side. Of course, the SC also has to include soft power, a comprehensive approach, like education, police or similar, so that we get lasting solutions. However, I do not believe nations will see that NATO's contribution is more in terms of upgrading the »hard elements« than of diversifying into soft power; we have to find a better way of connecting a comprehensive approach to better integration, better joint planning, better relations between NATO and the EU as well as the UN, better way of integrating hard power elements into a more comprehensive soft power concept. I think the PRTs in Afghanistan are an exception on a temporary basis, until things are handed over to civilian authority.

11 Will the new Strategic concept reaffirm the openness towards new members, such as Ukraine or Georgia?

Yes, absolutely, no doubt. But I do not think we will see a timetable regarding the admission of Ukraine and Georgia

12 But do you think the two countries will be mentioned?

That is a good question. I believe they probably will be mentioned because we have made a distinctive promise on that at the Bucharest Summit. But without a date! I think there will be some kind of reaffirmation of NATO's Study on Enlargement from 1997.

13 Do you think it is necessary to define a new framework of cooperation with the Russian Federation? Will it be reflected in the new Strategic concept?


I think that when the new SC is finalised, things with Russia will move forward. If there is still a feeling of the relations with Russia being at a standstill, of Russia not being particularly interested, then of course Russia will be mentioned in the new SC, probably in a rather short generic form. So it very much depends on the sense that we are gently moving forward since the events in Georgia.

Slikovno gradivo

Pictures

Slika 1:
»V podporo
Natu«
slogan IFC,
Molesworth,
Velika
Britanija
(Foto: Aleš
Čretnik)

Photo 1:
»In support
of NATO«
IFC slogan,
Molesworth,
Great Britain
(Photo: Aleš
Čretnik)



Slika 2:
Odprtje
zasedanja
NIB-ov
(direktorjev
obrambnih
obveščevalnih
služb zveze
NATO), Brdo
pri Kranju,
27. 5. 2009
(foto: MO RS)

Photo 2:
Opening of
the NIB (NATO
Intelligence
Board)
conference
(directors
of defence
intelligence
services of
NATO member
states), Brdo
pri Kranju,
May 27, 2009
(Photo: MD)



Slika 3:
Čad,
posnetek
naselja iz
zraka

Photo 3:
Chad – aerial
photograph



Sprememba okolja delovanja in zagotavljanje humanitarne podpore, predvsem nevladnim in mednarodnim organizacijam, je ena izmed značilnosti delovanja vojaških sil. Med slovenskim predsedovanjem EU leta 2008 so bili slovenski vojaki prvič napoteni na Euforjevo operacijo v Čad (Srednjeafriška republika). Slovenski vojaki so delovali v vzhodnem Čadu, kjer je bilo veliko beguncev iz Darfurja in notranje razseljenih oseb. Glavni izzivi za vojaške sile so bile drugačne klimatske, geografske in taktične značilnosti območja delovanja, pa tudi poslanstvo in naloge. Oprema, vojaki in oskrba iz domovine so dobro prestali vse preizkušnje in tako dobili pomembne izkušnje, ki so kot *lessons learned* koristne za prihodnje operacije.

A change in operational environment and the provision of humanitarian aid, particularly to non-governmental and international organisations, is one of the characteristics of the operation of military forces. During the Slovenian EU presidency in 2008, Slovenian soldiers were for the first time assigned to EUFOR operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. Slovenian soldiers operated in eastern Chad which housed many refugees from Darfur and internally displaced persons. The main challenges of military forces included different climatic, geographical and tactical characteristics of the area of operations, as well as the mission and tasks. Equipment, soldiers and national provisions underwent all trials and gained important experiences which, as lessons learned, are useful for future operations.

Slika 4:
Zastave
sodelujočih
držav

Photo 4:
Flags of
participating
countries



Zastave sodelujočih držav v operaciji Eufor Čad/CAR na vojaškem delu letališča N'Djamena v Čadu. Pogosto se ob delovanju v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah pojavlja vprašanje učinkovitosti večnacionalnih sestav, tudi zaradi posebnosti političnega odločanja in zapletenih ter raznovrstnih postopkov delegiranja pristojnosti o uporabi sil.

Flags of the countries contributing to EUFOR Chad/CAR operation at the military part of the N'Djamena Airport in Chad. In part also due to the particularities of political decision-making as well as of complicated and diverse procedures for the delegation of authority regarding the commitment of forces, the efficiency of multinational formations in the practical functioning of international operations and missions is often questionable.

Slika 5:
Potovanje
v SHAPE
leta 2006

Photo 5:
Study trip
to SHAPE
in 2006



Integracija v zavezniško strukturo zahteva sposobnost delovanja v mednarodnem in večkulturnem okolju, obvladovanje jezika in štabnih postopkov ter poznavanje standardov delovanja. Izpolnjevanje pogojev za delo v zavezniških poveljstvih in uveljavljanje enakih pogojev doma sta pomembni transformacijski orodji. Na sliki so predstavniki Generalštaba SV ob študijskem potovanju v SHAPE leta 2006. Slovenska vojska od leta 2004 za delovanje integrirane zavezniške poveljniške strukture namenja nekaj več kot en odstotek svoje stalne sestave.

Integration into the Alliance structure requires the capability of operating in an international and multi-cultural environment, command of a language and good knowledge of staff procedures and operational standards. Eligibility for operation in allied commands and establishment of equal conditions in own country are important transformation tools. The photo shows members of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces on their study trip to SHAPE in 2006. Since 2004, the Slovenian Armed Forces have been devoting just over one percent of their active component to the operation of the integrated allied command structure.

Slika 6:
KIA – Kabul
Internacional
Airport

Photo 6:
KIA – Kabul
Internacional
Airport



Afganistansko bojišče je eno najbolj zapletenih in pomembnih preizkusov za prihodnjo uporabo ter delovanje vojaških sil. Namera za izvajanje učinkovitih stabilizacijsko-rekonstrukcijskih ukrepov je pogosto soočena z zahtevami po učinkovitem protiuporniškem delovanju (counter insurgency).

The Afghan battlefield is one of the most complex and an important test for future commitment and operation of military forces. The intention of implementing efficient stabilisation and reconstruction measures is often faced with requirements for efficient counter insurgency.

Slika 7:
»Z manj narediti več,« je znamenita misel predsednika Republike Slovenije dr. Danila Türka.

Photo 7:
Do more with less – a famous thought by the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Danilo Türk, PhD,.



»Z manj narediti več,« je znamenita misel predsednika Republike Slovenije dr. Danila Türka, ki jo je v javnosti že večkrat ponovil. Misel razloži osnovno transformacijsko značilnost, ki v multipliciranju različnih dejavnikov in elementov išče odgovor na zapisano misel.

Do more with less – a famous thought by the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Danilo Türk, PhD, which he has articulated many times in public. The idea explains the main characteristic of transformation which, in multiplication of various factors and elements, searches for the answer to the written thought.

Slika 8:
Alojz Šteiner na letališču v Kabulu skupaj s slovenskimi gasilci

Photo 8:
Alojz Šteiner at the airport in Kabul, together with Slovenian fire-fighters



Alojz Šteiner na letališču v Kabulu skupaj s slovenskimi gasilci, ki so kot pogodbeniki na letališču skrbeli za požarno varnost. Pogodbo so sklenili, ko se je tam končal njihov del vojaške misije. Prepletanje med izvajalci vojaških nalog in pogodbenimi zunanjimi izvajalci je vedno bolj pogost način delovanja v mednarodnih okoljih.

Alojz Šteiner at the airport in Kabul, together with Slovenian fire-fighters who, as contractors, were in charge of fire safety at the airport. The contract was awarded after the fire-fighters had completed their part of the military mission in Afghanistan. Interaction between those who perform military tasks and external contractors is becoming an increasingly more common form of operation in international environments.

Slika 9:
Abeche,
Afrika

Photo 9:
Abeche,
Africa



Operacije kriznega odzivanja so večkrat povsem humanitarne narave. Na posnetku so slovenski pripadniki v čadskem naselju blizu Abecheja. Afrika bo v prihodnje gotovo zelo pomembno središče za transformirane vojaške sile.

Crisis response operations are often of entirely humanitarian nature. The photo shows Slovenian members in a Chad settlement close to Abeche. In the future, Africa will undoubtedly be a very important centre for transformed military forces.

Avtorji

Authors



Dr. Milan Jazbec

Dr. Milan Jazbec je vodja Sektorja za načrtovanje politik in raziskave na Ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije. Od decembra 2000 do novembra 2004 je bil državni sekretar za obrambno politiko in mednarodno sodelovanje na Ministrstvu za obrambo. Je avtor osmih knjig o diplomaciji, med njimi *The Diplomacies of New Small States: The Case of Slovenia with some comparison from the Baltics* (Ashgate, 2001) in *Osnove diplomacije* (FDV, 2009) ter številnih člankov in študij o diplomaciji ter mednarodnih varnostnih in obrambnih temah. Od maja 2009 je izredni profesor diplomacije, njegovi osrednji raziskovalni temi sta postmoderna diplomacija in sociologija diplomacije. Marca 2005 je za svoje delo prejel visoko avstrijsko državno odlikovanje *veliki zlati častni znak z zvezdo za zasluge za Republiko Avstrijo*.

Milan Jazbec, PhD, is Head of the Policy Planning and Research Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Slovenia. From December 2000 to November 2004, he was State Secretary for Defence Policy and International Affairs at the Slovenian Ministry of Defence. He is the author of eight books on diplomacy, including *The Diplomacies of New Small States: The Case of Slovenia with some comparison from the Baltics*² (Ashgate, 2001) and *Osnove diplomacije (Diplomatic Handbook)*² (Faculty of Social Sciences Press, 2009) as well as numerous articles on diplomacy, international security and defence. Since May 2009, he has been Associated Professor of Diplomatic Studies, focusing primarily on postmodern diplomacy and sociology of diplomacy. In March 2005, he was awarded the prestigious Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold with Star for Services to the Republic of Austria.



Primož Šavc

Primož Šavc je po končanem študiju na FDV v letih od 1986 do 2000, služboval kot častnik v TO in SV. Kot občinski organizator MSNZ je sodeloval pri pripravah na oboroženo obrambo in si pridobil poveljniške ter vojne izkušnje. Mednarodne izkušnje na vojaškem področju si je nabiral v mirovnih operacijah in večnacionalnih pobudah. Po šolanju na NDC v Rimu (2000) je sodeloval pri medresorskem usklajevanju obrambnih ter vojaških zadev v Akcijskem načrtu RS za članstvo v Natu. Kot vodja Obrambnega oddelka v Stalni misiji RS pri Natu je kot diplomat v Natovih odborih, kot sta Izvršna delovna skupina (EWG) in Odbor za pregled

obrambe (DRC), aktivno soustvarjal področje obrambne politike planiranja. Od 30. julija 2009 opravlja funkcijo generalnega direktorja Direktorata za obrambno politiko.

Primož Šavc upon graduating from the Faculty of Social Sciences, he served in the Slovenian Territorial Defence Forces and the Slovenian Armed Forces as an officer between 1986 and 2000. He also took part in the organisation of the Manoeuvre Structure of National Defence (Manevrska struktura narodne zaščite - MSNZ) at the municipal level, where he carried out preparations for the armed defence and acquired command experience during the War for Slovenia. He gained international experience in the military field, in particular peace operations, as well as multi-national initiatives. Upon completing his studies at the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome (2000), he participated in the coordination of defence and military affairs as part of the NATO's Membership Action Plan for the Republic of Slovenia. As the Head of the Defence Department at the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia, he gathered diplomatic experience, in particular by participating in NATO committees, such as the Executive Working Group (EWG) and the Defence Review Committee (DRC). He also contributed to the creation of defence policy and planning. Since 30 July 2009, he holds the post of General Director at the Defence Policy Directorate at the Ministry of Defence



Brigadir
mag. David Humar

Brigadir mag. David Humar je slovenski nacionalni vojaški predstavnik pri SACEUR-ju (vrhovnem zavezniškem poveljniku v Evropi). Prve vojaške izkušnje si je pridobil na srednji vojaški šoli kopenske vojske, po kateri je delal kot podčastnik. Diplomiral je na vojaški akademiji kopenske vojske, končal generalštabni program in magistriral na nacionalni obrambni univerzi ZDA. Delal je na poveljniških dolžnostih od oddelka do bataljona izvidniških in pehotnih enot, bil učitelj več vojaških predmetov v slovenskih vojaških šolah in učil teorijo taktike na Fakulteti za družbene vede v Ljubljani. Delal je v Generalštabu SV in Natovem poveljstvu v Sarajevu. Je avtor in soavtor številnih programov vojaškega izobraževanja in usposabljanja, učnega gradiva ter navodil. Napisal je tudi taktični priročnik za bojevanje pehotne čete SV. S strokovnimi prispevki je sodeloval na več mednarodnih konferencah.

Brigadier David Humar is the national military representative of the Republic of Slovenia to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). He gained his first military experience during his education at the Land Forces School and was, upon graduation, promoted to Non-Commissioned Officer. He graduated from the Land Forces Academy, completed the general staff programme and received a master's degree at the US National Defence University. Later, he was assigned to command duties at squad to battalion level in reconnaissance and infantry units. In addition, he taught a range of military subjects at Slovenian military schools as well as tactics at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. He served at the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) General Staff and at the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. He is the author and co-author of several military educational and training programmes, teaching materials and instructions. He also wrote the Tactical Handbook for the Infantry Combat of SAF Companies. He participated in numerous international conferences with his expert contributions.



Polkovnik Ivan Mikuž

Polkovnik Ivan Mikuž je načelnik sektorja za vojaško politiko, integracije in načrtovanje v Generalštabu Slovenske vojske. Je diplomant akademije kopenske vojske in zaposlen v Slovenski vojski od njenega nastanka. V njej je opravljal različne naloge, in sicer kot poveljnik učnega centra, poveljnik lahke pehotne brigade, načelnik štaba operativnega poveljstva SV, načelnik Poveljniško-štabne šole, načelnik združenega oddelka za koordinacijo v Sektorju za operacije v Združenem poveljstvu sil zveze Nato v Neaplju ter načelnik Centra za doktrino in razvoj v Poveljstvu za doktrino, razvoj, izobraževanje in usposabljanje.

Colonel Ivan Mikuž is Chief of the Military Policy, Integration and Planning Division at the General Staff, Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). He graduated from the Land Forces Academy and has served in the Slovenian Armed Forces since its establishment. During his service, he was assigned to a variety of duties. He was Commander of a training centre and a light infantry brigade, Chief of the SAF Operational Command Staff, Chief of the Command Staff School, Chief of the Joint Coordination Department, Operations Division, NATO Joint Forces Command Naples and Chief of the Doctrine and Development Centre at the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command.



Podpolkovnik
Samo Zanoškar

Podpolkovnik Samo Zanoškar je diplomant vojaške akademije kopenske vojske v Beogradu. Končal je tudi višji tečaj na Natovi obrambni akademiji v Rimu. Med slovenskim predsedovanjem Svetu EU je vodil delovno skupino vojaškega odbora EU za načrtovanje zmogljivosti (HTF). Sredi devetdesetih let je bil častnik za povezavo v Natovi partnerski koordinacijski celici. Trenutno dela v poveljstvu pomorskih sil EU v Džibutiju.

Lieutenant Colonel Samo Zanoškar is a graduate of the Land Forces Academy in Belgrade. He completed a higher course at the NATO Defence College in Rome. During the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, he headed a working group of the EU military committee for capability planning. In the mid-90s, he served as a Liaison Officer at the NATO Partnership Coordination Cell. Currently, he is assigned to a post at the EU Naval Forces Headquarters in Djibouti.



Podpolkovnik
mag. Dean Groff

Podpolkovnik mag. Dean Groff je magistriral na italijanskem inštitutu za obrambne študije in na Fakulteti za pomorstvo in promet. Opravlja dolžnost namestnika nacionalnega predstavnika SV pri Zavezniškem poveljstvu za operacije (SHAPE) v Belgiji. V preteklosti je bil poveljnik 17. bataljona vojaške policije, nacionalni vojaški predstavnik na poveljstvu MLF v Vidmu v Italiji ter na GŠSV izvršni pomočnik za predsedovanje EU. Vodil je kontingente SV v operacijah Sfor v BiH leta 2000 in Kfor na Kosovu leta 2003.

Lieutenant Colonel Dean Groff, received his master's degree from the Italian Defence Studies Institute as well as from the Faculty for Maritime Studies and Transport. He is currently assigned to the post of national representative of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) at the Allied Command Operations in SHAPE, Belgium. Before entering his present post, he was commander of the 17th Military Police Battalion, national military representative to the MLF headquarters in Udine, Italy and served as executive assistant at the SAF General Staff for Slovenia's Presidency of the EU. He led SAF contingents during the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2000 and the KFOR operation in 2003.



Major Leon Holc

Major Leon Holc je specialist obramboslovja. Trenutno je zaposlen kot višji častnik za integracije v Poveljstvu sil, kjer aktivno spremlja ter usmerja integracijske ter standardizacijske dejavnosti. V dosedanji karieri je opravljal različne poveljniške dolžnosti ter si nabiral izkušnje v mednarodnem okolju, saj je pred vstopom Slovenije v Nato kar pet let delal kot naš predstavnik v partnerski koordinacijski celici v Vrhovnem poveljstvu zavezniških sil za Evropo s sedežem v Monsu. Končal je tečaj za poveljnike vodov v Veliki Britaniji ter poveljniško-štabno šolo *Command and General Staff College* v Fort Leavenworthu v ZDA.

Major Leon Holc is a defence specialist. He currently holds the position of Higher Officer for integrations at the Force Command of the Slovenian Armed Forces, where he monitors and directs integration and standardisation processes. Prior to his present post, he conducted numerous command duties and gathered experience in the international environment. Before Slovenia's integration into NATO, he spent five years as representative of the Republic of Slovenia at the Partnership Coordination Cell at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe based at Mons. He completed a platoon leader course in Great Britain and attended the *Command and General Staff College* in Fort Leavenworth in the USA.



Dr. Damir Črnčec

Dr. Damir Črnčec je diplomirani politolog – obramboslovec ter magister in doktor politoloških znanosti. Končal je usposabljanje s področja mednarodnih in varnostnih zadev v *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies* ter na univerzi Harvard usposabljanje s področja nacionalne in mednarodne varnosti. Po opravljenem fakultetnem študiju se je zaposlil na Ministrstvu za obrambo, kjer je med drugim kot podporočnik končal Šolo za častnike in v letih 1999/2000 vodil 5. kontingent Slovenske vojske v mirovni operaciji UNFICYP na Cipru. Je avtor in soavtor številnih strokovnih in znanstvenih člankov ter dveh znanstvenih monografij, v katerih se ukvarja z nacionalno-varnostnimi vprašanji, delom obveščevalno-varnostnih služb, ravnanjem s tajnimi podatki, varnostnim preverjanjem, biometrijo ipd. Posebno pozornost pri proučevanju vedno namenja vprašanju varovanja človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Po različnih operativnih, analitičnih in vodstvenih nalogah v Obveščevalno varnostni službi Ministrstva za obrambo je od decembra 2005 njen generalni direktor.

Damir Črnčec, PhD, graduated in political sciences – defence studies and received a master's degree and a PhD in political sciences. He completed his studies in the area of international and security affairs at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies as well as national and international security studies at the Harvard University. After his university studies, was employed at the Ministry of Defence. During that period, he attended the Officer Training School and was commissioned as First Lieutenant. From 1999 until 2000, he led the 5th SAF contingent during the UNFICYP peace operation in Cyprus. He is the (co)author of several expert and scientific articles and two scientific monographs, which discuss national security issues, the area of information security services, the handling of classified information, security clearance processes, biometry etc. When studying these areas, he dedicated special attention to the protection of human rights and basic freedoms. After carrying out several operational, analytical and leadership assignments at the Ministry of Defence, he was assigned to the present post of General Director of the Information and Security Service of the Ministry of Defence.



Dr. Anton Bebler

Dr. Anton Bebler je doma in v tujini objavil več kot 400 znanstvenih in strokovnih del o evroatlantskih integracijah, mednarodnih odnosih, mednarodnih organizacijah, sodobnih političnih sistemih, vojaški sociologiji in politologiji, regionalnih (afriških in vzhodnoevropskih) študijah itn. Zadnja objavljena avtorska knjiga v slovenščini je *Uvod v evropske integracije*, Uradni list, 2007.

Anton Bebler, PhD, has, in Slovenia and abroad, published over 400 scientific and expert writings in the areas of Euro-Atlantic integrations, international relations, international organisations, modern political systems, military social and political sciences, regional (African and Eastern-European) studies etc. His last published book in the Slovenian language is “*Uvod v evropske integracije*” (Introduction into European Integrations), Official Gazette of the RS, 2007.



Generalmajor
mag. Alojz Šteiner

Generalmajor mag. Alojz Šteiner je magister obramboslovja, magistriral je tudi v programu *Industrial College of Armed Forces na National Defence University* v ZDA. Je generalmajor SV in od maja 2009 načelnik Generalštaba SV. Med pomembnejšimi dolžnostmi, ki jih je opravljal v preteklosti, so dolžnosti poveljnika 7. pokrajinskega štaba Teritorialne obrambe v Mariboru, namestnika poveljnika 3. operativnega poveljstva SV, namestnika poveljnika sil SV, na Generalštabu pa dolžnosti v J-3, J-4 in J-5, bil je svetovalec trem načelnikom, direktor štaba in namestnik načelnika. Napisal je več člankov o preoblikovanju Slovenske vojske.

Major General Alojz Šteiner *received his master's degree in defence studies as well as from the Industrial College of Armed Forces at the National Defence University, USA. He is Major General of the Slovenian Armed Forces and, since May 2009, holds the post of Chief of General Staff. His most significant duties in his past carrier include Commander of the 7th Regional Territorial Defence Staff in Maribor, Deputy Commander of the 3rd Operational Command of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), Deputy Commander of the SAF as well as posts at the General Staff (J-3, J-4 and J-5). He was also advisor to three chiefs of the SAF General Staff, the Director of Staff and Deputy Chief of the SAF General Staff. He wrote several articles on transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces.*



Dr. Uroš Svete

Dr. Uroš Svete je diplomiral iz politologije, smer obramboslovje, ter končal podiplomski študij na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani z magistrskim (Vloga informacijske tehnologije in sodobno asimetrično vojskovanje, 2002) in doktorskim delom (Varnostne implikacije uporabe informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije, 2005). Njegovo raziskovalno delo zajema zlasti področja (ne)vojaške varnosti, asimetričnega vojskovanja in analize konfliktov. Zaposlen je tudi kot asistent na omenjeni fakulteti, na kateri poučuje predmete, povezane s civilno obrambo in kriznim upravljanjem, sodobnimi oborožitvenimi sistemi in informatiko za obramboslovce. Na mednarodnem področju sodeluje v združenju ISA RC01, trenutno je njegov izvršni sekretar.

Uroš Svete, PhD, graduated in Political Science-Defence Studies and accomplished his postgraduate studies with master's degree (*The role of information technology in contemporary asymmetric warfare, 2002-M.Sc.*) and PhD (*Security implications of Information-communication technology use, 2005*) at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His main research fields are (non) military security, asymmetric warfare and conflict analysis. He is also employed as a Teaching Assistant at the same faculty, where he teaches several courses on Civil Defence and Crisis Management, Contemporary Weapon Systems and Informatics. Internationally he is active in scientific association ISA RC01 where at the moment he is in the position of Executive Secretary.



Polkovnik Zoran Jankovič

Polkovnik Zoran Jankovič je leta 1985 diplomiral na Vojaški akademiji in pridobil čin podporočnika v polku za zveze. Zaključil je višji štabni in generalštabni tečaj. Poleg tega se je udeležil več tečajev v organizaciji Natove šole za komunikacijsko-informacijski sistem. Opravljal je dolžnosti v vodu za zveze, poveljnika čete in bataljona, načelnika S-6 ter glavnega častnika SV za INFOSEC. Kot predstavnik Slovenske vojske je bil član pododbora NC3B za zagotovitev informacij. Trenutno opravlja dolžnosti glavnega predstavnika SV v NC3B. 30. junija 2005 je prevzel dolžnost načelnika J-6 v Generalštabu SV. Odgovoren je za razvoj in zagotovitev sistemov za poveljevanje, kontrolo, komunikacije in informacijski sistem (C4) ter podpore KIS za vsa poveljstva in enote SV.

Colonel Zoran Jankovič was born in Maribor, Slovenia. He attended the Military Academy, where he graduated in June 1985, and received his commission as a First Lieutenant in the Signal Regiment. Colonel Zoran Jankovič is a graduate of the Higher Staff Officer Course and a General Staff Course. He also attended several courses at the NATO CIS School. He was posted as a signal platoon, company and battalion commander, brigade chief of S-6, Chief INFOSEC Officer of the SAF. As a representative of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) he was a member of information assurance sub committee NC3B. At the moment he is a principal representative of SAF in NC3B. Col Zoran Jankovič assumed duty as Chief of J-6 at the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces on June 30, 2005. As a Chief J-6 General Staff, Col Zoran Jankovič is responsible for development and provision of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems and CIS support to all SAF commands and units.



Mag. Anton Travner

Mag. Anton Travner je svojo poklicno pot začel leta 1985 kot policist v Velenju in jo po študiju nadaljeval na delovnih mestih namestnika komandirja policijske postaje Šmarje pri Jelšah in Žalec ter inšpektorja v Policijski upravi Celje, nato pa na Generalni policijski upravi. Med letoma 2000 in 2004 je bil vodja sektorja za državno mejo in tujce. Po kratkem delu kot vodja kabineta na Ministrstvu za promet se je novembra 2004 vrnil v vodstvo Policije, kjer je bil zadolžen za usklajevanje aktivnosti po schengenskem izvedbenem načrtu in odgovoren za finančna sredstva iz schengenskega sklada. Med predsedovanjem Slovenije EU je bil predsednik odbora po 36. členu PEU, zdaj pa je direktor Inštituta DCAF v Ljubljani.

Anton Travner began his professional carrier as a police officer in Velenje in 1985 and was, upon graduation, assigned to the post of Deputy Commander at the police station in Šmarje pri Jelšah and Žalec, inspector of the Celje Police Administration and, later, at the General Police Administration. From 2000 until 2004, he was the Head of the Border Crossing and Foreign Citizens Division. After a short period of working as Head of the Minister's Office at the Ministry of Transport, he returned to the Police management, where he was responsible for coordination of activities based on the Schengen Implementation Plan. Furthermore, he was responsible for financial assets of the Schengen Fund. During Slovenia's EU Presidency he was the Head of the Committee under Article 36 of the European Union Treaty and is currently the Head of the DCAF institute in Ljubljana.



Dr. Bastian Giegerich

Dr. Bastian Giegerich je znanstveni sodelavec za področje evropske varnosti na Mednarodnem inštitutu za strateške študije (International Institute for Strategic Studies – IISS) v Londonu. Dr. Giegerich je doktoriral na londonski fakulteti za ekonomijo in politično znanost, kjer tudi poučuje na oddelku za mednarodne odnose. Kot diplomant Univerze v Potsdamu (Nemčija) je bil Fulbrightov štipendist na Univerzi v Marylandu (ZDA), pridružen raziskovalec na Nacionalni obrambni univerzi v Washingtonu in projektni vodja na Apsen Institute Berlin. Je soavtor (z Alexandrom Nicollom) dela *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations* (IISS: Londiong 2008) in avtor dela *European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality* (Routledge: Abindgdon, 2008) ter *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2006). Dr. Bastian Giegerich je v številnih znanstvenih revijah in časopisih objavil več člankov o evropski varnosti.

Bastian Giegerich, PhD, is the Research Fellow for European Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, UK. He obtained his PhD at the London School of Economics & Political Science, where he also teaches at the Department for International Relations. A graduate of the University of Potsdam (Germany), he was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Maryland (USA), a Research Associate at the National Defense University in Washington DC and a Project Manager at the Aspen Institute Berlin. He is the co-author (with Alexander Nicoll) of *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations* (IISS: London, 2008) and author of *European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2008) and *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2006)*. Giegerich has published widely on European security issues in various journals and newspapers.



Dr. Anton Grizold

Dr. Anton Grizold je diplomiral in magistriral iz obramboslovja na Fakulteti za družbene vede, opravil pa je tudi dvo-semestrski specialistični študijski program na *School of Public Affairs* na *University of Maryland* (ZDA). Doktoriral je leta 1989 na FDV s področij obramboslovja in varnosti v mednarodnih odnosih. Med letoma 1989 in 1994 je bil predstojnik katedre za Obramboslovje na FDV, pozneje pa tudi prodekan in predstojnik Obramboslovnega raziskovalnega centra Raziskovalnega inštituta za družbene vede. Leta 1999 je postal predsednik Strateškega sveta na Ministrstvu za obrambo Republike Slovenije, leta 2000 pa minister za obrambo. Danes je redni profesor na FDV, od leta 2007 tudi dekan fakultete. Njegovo temeljno raziskovanje je usmerjeno na področja nacionalnovarnostnih sistemov, primerjalnih obrambnih politik, reševanja konfliktov in varnosti v mednarodnih odnosih.

Anton Grizold, PhD, received a master's degree in defence studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences. In addition, he attended a two-semester study programme at the *School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland (USA)*. In 1989, he obtained his PhD from the Faculty of Social Sciences in the areas of defence studies and security in international relations. From 1989 until 1994, he was the principal of the Chair for Defence Sciences at the Faculty of Social Sciences, later also vice dean and principal of the Defence Research Centre at the

Research Institute for Social Sciences. In 1999, he became the Chairman of the Strategic Council at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. In 2000, he was assigned to the post of Minister of Defence. He is Full Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences and, since 2007, also dean of the faculty. His basic research work focuses on the areas on national-security systems, comparative defence policies, conflict management and the security in international relations.



Rok Zupančič

Rok Zupančič, diplomant obramboslovja (2006) in diplomant mednarodnih odnosov (2008) na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani, dela od oktobra 2008 kot mladi raziskovalec in asistent na Katedri za obramboslovje. Pred tem je sedem let delal kot novinar zunanjepolitičnega uredništva Televizije Slovenija. Temeljno področje njegovega raziskovanja so mednarodne organizacije, povezane z zagotavljanjem mednarodne varnosti, kot so OZN, OVSE, Nato, EU, in koncepti, strategije ter mehanizmi preprečevanja konfliktov (conflict-prevention).

Rok Zupančič, a graduate of International Relations (2008) and Defence Studies (2006) at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana, has been, since October 2008, working as an early stage researcher and assistant at the Defence Studies Department. Previously, he worked seven years as a journalist of the Editorial board of foreign policy of Televizija Slovenija. His fundamental research field includes international organizations linked to the provision of international security – UN, OSCE, NATO, EU – as well as concepts, strategies and mechanisms of conflict prevention.

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA BILTEN SLOVENSKE VOJSKE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNİK

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno **Bilten Slovenske vojske** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, v kateri se objavljajo prispevki o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, mora to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzije Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS njegov prispevek spada. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založništvo. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

- Prevajanje** Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajanje.
- Navajanje avtorjev prispevka** Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano.
Primer:
 Ime 1 Priimek 1,
 Ime 2 Priimek 2
 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
- Naslov prispevka** Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa je sredinsko poravnano.
- Povzetek** Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
- Povzetek v angleščini** Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
- Ključne besede** Ključne besede (od 3 do 5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
- Besedilo** Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
- Kratka predstavitev avtorjev** Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
- Strukturiranje besedila** Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).
Primer:
 1 Uvod
 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)
 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)
 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)
 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedite vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu ste dokument našli in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj ste dokument dobili, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja spletnega okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008.

Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer: ... (Smith, 1997) ...*

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišite besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišite, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer: (po Smith, 1997, str. 15)*. Če avtorja navajate v besedilu, v oklepaju navedite samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.

Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (samo besedilo).

Naslov avtorja

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

Kako poslati prispevek

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.

Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.

Korekture

Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

**Naslov
uredniškega
odbora** Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Bilten Slovenske vojske
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija
Elektronski naslov
Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE BULLETIN OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

Content-related instructions

General **The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces** is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from security, defence and military field.

The Military Education Journal is a military professional and an informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovenian with abstracts translated into English and, based on the decision of the editorial board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovenian.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all eventual copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical instructions

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The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters, at a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Reviews

The papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewers assessment, the editorial board or the editor either accepts the paper, demands modifications if necessary or rejects it. After the receipt of the reviewers' remarks the author uses them in his paper.

Due to an anonymous review process the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be revealed.

Next to the title the author indicated the category the paper belongs to according to him and according the classification in the COBISS. The classification is available at the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The editorial board determines the final classification.

- Proof-reading** The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.
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Name 1 Surname 1,
Name 2 Surname 2,
Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they are coming from in the footnote. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they are coming from.
- Title of the paper** The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The letters in the title are bold with font size 16. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). It should briefly present the topic of the paper, especially the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on a A4 paper format, with a 1,5 line spacing written in Arial and with font size 12. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space, the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm wide. Each page should consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.
- A brief presentation of the authors** The authors must prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually as short and as concise as possible. These text should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited bibliography.

Text structuring Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

Example:

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing In the bibliography only the authors of the references you refer to in the paper have to be listed alphabetically. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:

Surname, name (the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

At certain papers published in a collection of papers, at the end of each reference a page on which the paper can be found is indicated.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45–100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same way as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information on the time the document was taken off the internet is important because the WWW environment constantly changes.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

More on the Harvard referencing style in the A Guide to the Harvard System of Referencing, 2007; <http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.thm#1.3>, 16 May 2007.

Citing When citing references in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

If you cite the text literary, that part should be adequately marked “text”...after which you state the exact page of the text in which the cited text is written.

Example: ... (Smith, 1997, pp 15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files that allow proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

If the author cannot submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text for it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures. All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is listed beneath it and the title of the table is listed above it.

As a rule at least one reference to a figure or a table must be in the paper. Reference to a figure or a table is: (figure 5) (table 2)

Example of a figure:





Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

Numbering footnotes is individual from the structure of the text and starts with the number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the footnotes are intended for explaining thoughts written in the text and not for referencing literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis, for which reason non additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English we have to write the appropriate Slovenian term with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The editorial board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally texts in the text only format.

Title of the author

Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so the editorial board could reach him or her.

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