TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
394
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR*
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GENDER QUOTAS  
IN MACEDONIA, SERBIA AND CROATIA
Abstract. In Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia, women 
activists supported by strong international partners, 
using lobbying in pre-electoral competitions, succeeded 
to put the issue of underrepresentation to the agenda of 
mainstream politics, to introduce party quotas and leg-
islated candidate quotas. Trends regarding women MPs 
are showing that party quotas were effective in Croatia, 
but not in Serbia and Macedonia and legislated can-
didate quotas were effective in Macedonia and Serbia 
but not in Croatia. This article comparatively analyses 
reasons for the (in)effectiveness of legislated candidate 
quotas and party quotas, offers basic evidence on (in)
sustainable legal improvements and a conclusion that 
it would be a great mistake to expect that quotas alone 
could lead to transformative gender equality aware pol-
icies.
Keywords: women activists, formal and substantive 
political representation, effectiveness of party quotas 
and legislated candidate quotas
Introduction
During the disintegration of SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via), due to the numerous conflicts and wars, gender equality in the main-
stream politics in these countries has been for almost a decade framed in 
the context of belligerent nationalist patriarchal paradigm, while civil soci-
ety actors were focused on the issues of regaining peace and offering help 
to the victims of open armed violence. 
In all three countries new women’s movement, strongly supported by 
international actors with gender mandate (United Nation agencies; OSCE-
ODIHR – Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe- Organi-
sation for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; NDI – National 
Democratic Institute; FES – Freidrich Ebert Stiftung; Olof Palme Centre; 
Westminster
* Elena Nacevska, PhD, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; Sonja Lokar, Executive Director of the CEE 
Network for Gender Issues, Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
395
Foundation for Democracy),started the advocacy for better political rep-
resentation of women in decision making structures, striving to get women 
accepted as agents of reconciliation, democratisation and normalisation of 
post war societies. Their advocacy has been focused on political empower-
ment of women, gender quotas, and electoral systems and on the engender-
ing of the political parties (Lokar, 2001).
The key point of this paper is the analyses of the interaction of the agents 
(women activists, regional cooperation, political parties and their coali-
tions, international supporters) that led to establishment of legislated can-
didate quotas and evaluation of its impact on women’s formal (presence 
in numbers) and substantive representation. It compares electoral statistics 
for women MPs before and after introducing legislated candidate quotas, 
explores and explains trends in formal women’s representation.
The main subject is the process of adoption, evaluation and imple-
mentation of the legislated candidate quotas for raising political presence 
of women in three post-socialist (i.e. transition) countries. The paper is 
focused on the cases of Macedonia (MKD), Serbia (SRB) and Croatia (CRO) 
in the period of democratic changes 1990–2016, using quantitative data (rel-
evant electoral statistics) and relevant empirical research (interviews done 
by Nacevska, 2013), published reports and internal reports and database 
of the SP GTF (Stability Pact Gender Task Force) and CEE (Central Eastern 
Europe) Network for Gender Issues, (collected and partially published by 
Sonja Lokar from 1990 till 2016) which relate to the researched topic. 
According to the categorization by Ann Phillips (1995, 1998) we use the 
term ‘presence’ as the most adequate solution for the numerical represen-
tation of women in authorities, as opposed to the research of substantive 
representation (Mansbridge, 2011). 
This paper starts from the wide scientifically recognized fact that politi-
cal underrepresentation of women is rooted in the imbalance among the 
power of men and women, reflected in the culture, value matrix and political 
culture. The value matrix and especially the religious and ethnic discourse 
are reflected in the prevailing conservative understanding of the wom-
en’s role in politics. In the research case studies, there is evidence that the 
dynamics of institutional changes did not trigger adequate changes in the 
value matrix of broader public, especially regarding women interests. For 
example, in CRO which has the fastest institutional and legislative progress, 
in 2008, 89.5per cent of the population expressed strong faith in catholic 
religious values regarding women social roles (Dobrotić, 2012). In SRB and 
in MKD at the micro level gender relations, especially in Muslim communi-
ties, reveal the prevalence of the notion that women are inferior to men 
(Nacevska, 2013). Acceptance of stereotypical subordination of women in 
the private sphere is also typical for the Muslim Albanian minority in the 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
396
region (MKD, Kosovo) (Nacevska, 2013). Persistence of patriarchal stereo-
types in these societies continuously imposes marginalization of women in 
the public sphere. 
Particular contribution of this article in relation to other dealings with 
political representation of women is that it explores how party quotas and 
later legislated candidate quotas were introduced based on the interactions 
of governing political coalitions, pre-electoral competition between the 
opposing party blocks (conservative versus modernist and vice versa) and 
parallel women’s activists’ coalitions advocating and lobbying for establish-
ing of party and legislated candidate quotas.
The transition from a communist party political system to parliamen-
tary democracy ended up in the creation of ideologically different parties 
led by autocratic, male dominated executive party leaderships. During the 
communist regime a model of strong formal presence of women in legisla-
tive branches of political representation was imposed, but not in the places 
where real political power was concentrated (Antić Gaber and Lokar, 2006). 
Communist state feminists were framing gender equality in the concept of 
liberation of the working class, seeking for the solutions in public property, 
self-governance of the workers and citizens, full employment of women 
and the liberation of women from the non-paid care and domestic work. 
(Tomšič, 1978). In all three countries during the difficult conditions and 
processes of disintegration of the SFRY, nationalistic conservative parties 
revived the concept of the woman as “Queen of the home and mother of 
the nation” (Lokar, 2001). This ideological shift was especially remarkable 
through the political revival of traditional division of gender roles and con-
servative cultural stereotypes (Nacevska, 2013). The presence of women in 
the three parliaments, after the first free elections at the beginning of the 
nineties, dropped from 17 per cent in 1982 and 1986 to 3 to 4 per cent in 
1990/1991 (Lokar, 2001; Kašić, 2006). 
This paper tries to answer the questions: How do legislated candidate 
quotas influence the political presence of women? Did legislated candidate 
quotas as well as party quotas have an effect only on increasing the shares 
of women candidates on the electoral lists, or also on increasing the number 
of elected women? Is marginalization of elected women a result of the value 
matrix or one can detect gender sensitive democratic deficits and flaws in 
the processes of implementation of party and legislative candidate quotas?
Introducing legislated candidate quotas (1990/2016) 
A growing number of democratic societies are introducing quotas for 
overcoming gender barriers and increasing political presence of women in 
different political decision making bodies. Since 2008, almost 90 countries 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
397
have legislated candidate quotas and about 30 countries party quotas 
(Global quota website, 2016). However, the lower formal and substantive 
representation of women in higher political positions of power is still evi-
dent.
Quotas are most often defined as affirmative measures for achieving tar-
geted per cent of political presence of specific groups within a society (Dah-
lerup, 2006). 
In post-socialist countries introducing legislated candidate quotas had a 
significant effect on the increasing of the numerical presence of women in 
decision-making structures. But there are still questions – Will quotas con-
tribute to the political representation of women? – Which variations and 
combinations of quota-models are the most suitable (legislative candidate 
quotas, party quotas or reserved seats)? – What kind of quota is most suita-
ble for the women in the multiethnic societies, which are marginalized both 
as women, and as women from minorities, for example Roma and Albanian 
women in MKD, Roma and Serbian women in CRO, Albanian, Hungarian 
and Roma in SRB? Most researchers (Kymlicka, 1995; Mansbridge and Tate, 
1992) believe that not all quotas have a positive influence on the political 
presence of women. Party quotas are in general less influential for increas-
ing the number of women in parliaments, as opposed to legislated can-
didate quotas binding for all parties. But this is not valid for all countries. 
For example, in CRO before 2008, SDP (Social Democratic Party) practiced 
strong party quotas, while there were no legislated candidate quotas, and 
brought strong women presence in the parliament, while after 2008 when 
the legislated candidate quotas were introduced without any ranking rules 
and strong sanctions, the share of women elected on the list of the SDP 
dropped significantly. It is obvious that something changed in the gender 
power balance within the party that poorly designed legislated candidate 
quotas were not able to replace. 
MKD, SRB and CRO – convergences and differences important for 
the comparative analyses of the positive measures 
Political and electoral system design
All three countries are parliamentary democracies with the proportional 
electoral system with d’Honte method for the allocation of the seats. In the 
past, MKD used to have majority electoral system, followed by mixed elec-
toral system and currently relies on a proportional electoral system. MKD 
and CRO have several regional lists, SRB has one national list. MKD and SRB 
have closed lists, while in CRO the voters can use preferential votes, but are 
not obliged to do so. 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
398
Legislated candidate quotas in electoral legislation 
First it was adopted by MKD, then by SRB and finally by CRO. Each coun-
try had a specific, gradual process of inclusion of legislated candidate quo-
tas in their electoral legislation. MKD and SRB improved the design of their 
quota rules step by step, using advocacy and lobbying of the big crosscut-
ting women coalitions, making them effective, while CRO initially based the 
inclusion on requests of the coalition of women from the civil society and 
WF (Women Federation) of the SDP when the party was a leader of the gov-
erning coalition in 2008. 40 per cent legislated candidate quotas, with a long 
grace period of three parliamentarian mandates, without ranking rules and 
sanctions in the form of fines, had been firstly enacted in the Law on Gen-
der Equality in 2008. Left-centre coalition improved these positive measures 
by the same type of advocacy action, accepting amended Electoral Law in 
2014, enacting 40 per cent legislated candidate quotas without ranking rules 
but with the strong sanctions (decertification of the lists for non – compli-
ance), only to see their Constitutional Court annihilate these sanctions. 
Law on Gender Equality and institutional mechanisms
In all three countries, even if these laws have explicit positive measures 
for increasing of political presence of women, it did not produce any posi-
tive changes in electoral behaviour of the parties. Gender Equality state 
mechanisms were not strong enough to force the parties to implement it. 
In all three countries party quotas were tested before the enactment of 
the legislated candidate quota. 
SDSM (Social Democratic Union) in MKD and SDP in CRO as well as a 
small SD (Social Democratic) Union in SRB made a statutory decision of 30 
per cent quotas for party organs and electoral party lists on the request of 
their WFs, connected in the SI Women and CEE Network for Gender Issues 
in 1998. But only the SDP in CRO in times of electoral growth respected their 
quotas, while the other two parties did not. 
Within all three researched countries (MKD, SRB, CRO) legislated candi-
date quotas enacted within electoral laws or Gender equality act, obliged all 
parties competing in elections to nominate a certain per cent of women on 
the candidate lists. They had a positive effect, strongly increasing the share 
of women candidates on the electoral lists and though not satisfactory, they 
produced a positive effect on the number of elected women MPs; they did 
increase political presence of women i.e. numerical representation. 
In SRB, after the 2000 elections which have ousted Milošević, the per cent 
of elected women in parliament was 5.1, while after the introduction of legis-
lated candidate quotas (2004) and their implementation on the parliamentary 
elections in 2007, the per cent of women MPs increased to 20.4. This increase 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
399
was the result of strong sanctions against political parties that would not 
respect the obligation of quotas for under-represented gender. As opposed to 
1.7 per cent elected women in 1992 or the highest 5.5 per cent by the ending 
of the authoritarian regime of president Milošević, legal changes expressed 
through the modification of the Law on election of members of parliament 
in 2004, and the introduction of 30 per cent quotas for the under-represented 
gender, even without any ranking rules, led to the higher level of political pres-
ence of women in the national parliament. Also, this happened due to the big 
women’s crosscutting coalition and its parallel electoral campaign before the 
elections in 2007. In 2011, the enlarged crosscutting coalition of women activ-
ists has renewed its efforts and succeeded to persuade the parliament to enact 
firm ranking rules: at least every third candidate had to be from the less rep-
resented sex. This amendment made legislated candidate quota rules in SRB 
finally effective. Today, Serbian parliament has 34 per cent of women MPs. 
As a result of heavy advocating and lobbying of the big national women’s 
coalition, the Law on Election on Members of Parliament in MKD (Сл. Весник на 
РМ, 42/2002) introduced 30 per cent legislated candidate quotas in 2002, and 
this led to the changes in the political presence of women in the Assembly of 
MKD from 6.7 per cent in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2002. The Electoral Code from 
2006 (Сл. Весник на РМ, 40/06) envisaged firm ranking rules: out of every 
three places on the list, at least one should belong to the under-represented 
gender. The distribution of female candidates and their positioning on the lists 
in MKD in 2006 varied from 4.53 per cent between the first five candidates, 
7.81 per cent from the sixth to the tenth place, and 19.84 per cent from the 
eleventh to the twelfth place on the list. Unlike in the previous elections in the 
majority electoral system (1990, 1994) and mixed system (1998), the per cent 
of elected women varied between 4.1 per cent, 3.3 per cent, 6.6 per cent, while 
after the introduction of the 30 per cent legalized candidate quotas within the 
proportional electoral system the per cent of elected women increased to 18 
per cent in 2002. The positive influence of the quotas was reflected also in the 
Albanian ethnic community in MKD- an Albanian woman was elected MP for 
the first time in 2002. Today, in MKD legislated candidate quota guarantee 
a diversity of women from different ethnic background. But, still, it has not 
happened without political action led by a big national women’s crosscutting 
coalition. In order to protect the rights of women candidates from the list of 
ethnic minority parties, civil society movement had to exert direct public pres-
sure on the national electoral commission to ensure that the lists of the parties 
of ethnic minorities, based on the principle of ethnicity, have to apply legal 
ranking rules the same way as any other party.1
1 Internal report on the advocacy visit payed to the National Electoral Commission in 2002 by Stavka 
Todorovska and Sonja Lokar.
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
400
T
a
bl
e 
1
:  L
E
G
IS
LA
T
E
D
 C
A
N
D
ID
A
T
E
Q
U
O
T
A
S 
F
O
R
 T
H
E
 U
N
D
E
R
-R
E
P
R
E
SE
N
T
E
D
 G
E
N
D
E
R
 A
N
D
 I
T
S 
A
P
P
LI
C
A
T
IO
N
  
O
N
 T
H
E
 N
A
T
IO
N
A
L 
E
LE
C
T
IO
N
S 
 
Elect. system
Ye
ar
 of
 th
e fi
rs
t a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 
LC
 q
uo
ta
(%
)
Ra
nk
in
g 
or
de
r f
or
 th
e p
ar
ty
 li
st
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 fo
r n
on
-co
m
pl
ia
nc
e
(%
) o
f e
le
ct
ed
 w
om
en
 
in
 n
at
io
na
l p
ar
lia
-
m
en
ts
 b
ef
or
e t
he
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 LC
 
qu
ot
as
(%
) o
f e
le
ct
ed
 
wo
m
en
 in
 
na
tio
na
l p
ar
lia
-
m
en
ts
 af
te
r t
he
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
LC
 q
uo
ta
s
MKD
Proportional system
20
02
Ele
cto
ra
l c
od
e  
(С
л. 
Ве
сн
ик
 на
РМ
 42
/2
00
2)
20
04
La
w 
on
 Lo
ca
l E
lec
tio
ns
 –
 
(С
л. 
Ве
сн
ик
 на
РМ
 35
/2
00
4, 
Ar
tic
le.
15
). 
20
06
Ele
cto
ra
l c
od
e  
(С
л. 
Ве
сн
ик
 на
 РМ
 40
/2
00
6)
.
20
08
 an
d 2
01
2 L
aw
 on
 Eq
ua
l 
Op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 (С
л. 
Ве
сн
ик
 на
 РМ
 
11
7/
20
08
) a
nd
 (С
л. 
Ве
сн
ик
 на
 
РМ
 6/
20
12
)
20
15
 –
 La
w 
am
en
dm
en
ts 
to
 th
e 
ele
cto
ra
l c
od
e (
Сл
. В
ес
ни
к н
а Р
М
 
19
6/
20
15
).
20
02
 –
 Le
gis
lat
ed
 
ca
nd
ida
te
 qu
ot
a (
30
%
) 
30
%
30
%
40
%
YE
S: 
 
On
e i
n e
ve
ry
 th
re
e p
os
iti
on
s o
n t
he
 ca
nd
ida
te
 lis
ts 
is 
re
se
rv
ed
 fo
r t
he
 un
de
r-r
ep
re
se
nt
ed
 se
x (
Ar
tic
le 
64
 
(5
) o
f t
he
 El
ec
to
ra
l C
od
e (
42
/2
00
2)
.
20
04
 –
 Po
sit
ion
ing
 in
 th
e u
pp
er
 or
 lo
we
r h
alf
 of
 
th
e l
ist
.
20
06
 –
 At
 le
as
t o
ne
 in
 ev
er
y t
hr
ee
 pl
ac
es
 on
 th
e l
ist
s 
sh
ou
ld 
be
lon
g t
o t
he
 un
de
r-r
ep
re
se
nt
ed
 se
x.
20
15
 –
 At
 le
as
t o
ne
 ou
t o
f e
ve
ry
 th
re
e p
lac
es
 w
ill 
be
 re
se
rv
ed
 fo
r t
he
 le
ss 
re
pr
es
en
te
d g
en
de
r a
nd
 
ad
dit
ion
all
y a
t l
ea
st 
on
e p
lac
e o
ut
 of
 ev
er
y t
en
 
pla
ce
s A
rti
cle
 21
 of
 th
e L
aw
 am
en
dm
en
ts 
an
d 
m
od
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 to
 th
e e
lec
to
ra
l c
od
e (
Сл
. В
ес
ни
к н
а 
РМ
 19
6/
20
15
).
YE
S.
If t
he
 po
lit
ica
l p
ar
ty
 do
es
 no
t f
ulfi
ll t
he
 qu
ot
as
, 
th
e l
ist
 sh
all
 be
 re
jec
te
d (
Ar
tic
le 
67
 (1
–4
) o
f t
he
 
Ele
cto
ra
l C
od
e (
42
/2
00
2)
.
YE
S
YE
S
YE
S
20
00
 / 
6.7
%
20
02
 / 
18
%
20
10
 / 
32
.5%
20
16
 / 
35
%
SRB
Proportional system
20
04
(С
л. 
Гл
ас
ни
к Р
С 1
8/
04
)
20
09
Ge
nd
er
 eq
ua
lit
y a
ct 
 
(С
л. 
Гл
ас
ни
к Р
С 1
04
/0
9)
20
11
Ele
cto
ra
l L
aw
  
(С
л. 
Гл
ас
ни
к Р
С 3
6/
20
11
).
Le
gis
lat
ed
 ca
nd
ida
te
 
qu
ot
a (
30
%
)
YE
S: 
 
‘Fo
r e
ve
ry
 th
re
e c
an
did
at
es
 on
 th
e e
lec
to
ra
l li
st 
th
er
e s
ha
ll b
e a
t l
ea
st 
on
e c
an
did
at
e o
f t
he
 un
de
r-
re
pr
es
en
te
d s
ex
 on
 th
e l
ist
 (fi
rst
 gr
ou
p o
f t
hr
ee
 
pla
ce
s, 
se
co
nd
 gr
ou
p o
f t
hr
ee
 pl
ac
es
 an
d s
o o
n u
nt
il 
th
e e
nd
 of
 th
e l
ist
)’ (
Ar
tic
le 
40
a, 
36
/2
01
1)
.
YE
S. 
 
If t
he
 su
bm
itt
er
 of
 th
e l
ist
 do
es
 no
t r
es
pe
ct 
it,
 th
e R
ep
ub
lic
 El
ec
to
ra
l C
om
m
iss
ion
 sh
all
 
re
fu
se
 th
e e
lec
to
ra
l li
st 
(L
aw
 on
 th
e E
lec
tio
ns
 of
 
Re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
, A
rti
cle
 40
a)
’.
20
00
 / 
5.1
%
20
07
 / 
20
.4%
20
12
/3
3%
20
16
/3
4%
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
401
 
Elect. system
Ye
ar
 of
 th
e fi
rs
t a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 
LC
 q
uo
ta
(%
)
Ra
nk
in
g 
or
de
r f
or
 th
e p
ar
ty
 li
st
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 fo
r n
on
-co
m
pl
ia
nc
e
(%
) o
f e
le
ct
ed
 w
om
en
 
in
 n
at
io
na
l p
ar
lia
-
m
en
ts
 b
ef
or
e t
he
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 LC
 
qu
ot
as
(%
) o
f e
le
ct
ed
 
wo
m
en
 in
 
na
tio
na
l p
ar
lia
-
m
en
ts
 af
te
r t
he
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
LC
 q
uo
ta
s
CRO
Proportional system
20
03
 / 
20
08
Ge
nd
er
 Eq
ua
lit
y A
ct 
 
(N
N 
11
6/
20
03
) a
nd
(N
N 
82
/0
8)
La
w 
on
 po
lit
ica
l p
ar
tie
s  
(N
N 
76
/9
3; 
16
4/
98
; 3
6/
01
)
20
15
Ele
cto
ra
l la
w 
 
(N
N 
19
/1
5)
Le
gis
lat
ed
 ca
nd
ida
te
 
qu
ot
a (
40
%
)
10
%
 fin
an
cia
l 
co
m
pe
ns
a-
tio
n f
or
 th
e 
po
lit
ica
l p
ar
tie
s f
or
 
ea
ch
 ca
nd
ida
te
 fr
om
 
th
e u
nd
er
-re
pr
es
en
te
d 
ge
nd
er.
Ar
tic
le 
21
a –
 ob
lig
at
ion
 
of
 at
 le
as
t 4
0%
 of
 
ca
nd
ida
te
s o
f b
ot
h s
ex
es
 
(N
N1
9/
15
). 
No
ne
Ev
en
 ac
co
rd
ing
 to
 th
e E
lec
to
ra
l L
aw
 (N
N 
19
/1
5)
 
– 
Th
e i
m
ple
m
en
ta
tio
n o
f t
he
 pr
ov
isi
on
 of
 40
%
 
ge
nd
er
 qu
ot
a W
AS
 gu
ar
an
te
ed
 by
 sa
nc
tio
ns
 
– 
no
t a
cce
pt
an
ce
 of
 th
e l
ist
s b
y t
he
 SE
C, 
th
e 
Co
ns
tit
ut
ion
al 
Co
ur
t i
n C
ro
at
ia 
in 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
5 
ov
er
tu
rn
ed
 th
is 
sa
nc
tio
n.
 Th
e s
an
cti
on
s w
er
e 
ab
oli
sh
ed
.
Th
e e
nv
isa
ge
d s
an
cti
on
s 
fo
r n
on
-c
om
pli
an
ce
 
we
re
 pl
an
ne
d o
ve
r t
he
 
ne
xt
 th
re
e e
lec
tio
ns
 
(n
at
ion
al 
an
d l
oc
al)
 
fro
m
 th
e m
om
en
t o
f t
he
 
en
fo
rce
m
en
t o
f t
he
 G
EA
19
92
 /5
.4 
%
19
95
/7
.1%
20
00
 / 
21
.9%
20
04
- 1
9%
20
15
–1
5.2
%
20
16
- 1
2.6
%
So
u
rc
e:
 N
ac
ev
sk
a,
 2
01
3;
 Q
u
o
ta
p
ro
je
ct
 w
w
w
.q
u
o
ta
p
ro
je
ct
.o
rg
.
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
402
In SRB and MKD, the introduction of legislated candidate quotas with 
firm ranking rules and drastic sanctions (disqualification of the list in case 
of noncompliance) had positive effect in the increasing of elected women 
in national parliaments in comparison with the previous parliaments. The 
selection of women candidates, capable or not for the real representation of 
women’s interests, now becomes an issue of each party value system, pro-
gram, political power of their women’s party organization, internal capac-
ity building, women’s cross party cooperation and cooperation between 
elected women and women in civil society movements. While political par-
ties, regardless of their ideological affiliation, stay the biggest hurdle for real 
political representation of women, SRB has a lot to be proud of with regard 
to women’s crosscutting coalitions: Palić process, Women’s Parliamentary 
Network and their joint Women’s Platform for the Development of SRB, 
“Follow us” Kosovo and SRB women peace initiative (Women’s Platform 
for the Development of Serbia 2014–2020). It has yet to be seen how much 
the strengthening of radical right, nationalistic and belligerent governing 
authoritarian parties and global swing to the radical populist right will be 
able to jeopardize these positive developments. 
In MKD, authoritarian and populist conservative governing coalition and 
the fact that the big women’s crosscutting coalition has fallen apart, are now 
the main reasons why the progress of genuine representation of women in 
MKD has turned little by little into a backlash, visible clearly in the field of 
family policy and personal women’s rights (Legal abortion was made much 
less liberal and affordable, the government has accepted conservative policy 
of special income and pension to encourage women to stay at home with 
many children). Due to the strong women’s movement within the SDSM, the 
competition between VMRO DPMNE (Democratic party for national unity 
in Macedonia) and pre-electoral coalition led by SDSM before the last elec-
tion (2016) led to the raise of minimal legislated candidate quota from 30 
to 40 per cent and for the first time ever the opposition formed a joint plat-
form for the improvement of gender equality (SDSM: За живот во Македонија). 
Political outcome of the election in December 2016 was tight and contested. 
The incumbent party VMRO DMPNE got the first chance to form the govern-
ment. If it succeeds, gradual progress made from 2003 in political presence 
of women in Macedonia is very likely to come under a serious threat. 
Positive changes in CRO are noticeable from 1996 as a result of pres-
sures of organized women within SDP on one side and national Ad Hoc 
civil society women’s coalition formed by B.A.B.E. (NGO) on the other. SDP 
was the first party in CRO to establish Women’s forum (Women’s forum in 
CRO) and incorporate party quotas for party organs and party lists in their 
statutes. However, these quotas gave the best result in 2000 elections when 
the party was sure it would win election. In 2004, a the moment of losing 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
403
the election, SDP despite respecting its party quotas, got very disappointing 
election results for women candidates, as they could not get enough win-
nable places on the party list. At the same time, the winning HDZ (Croatian 
Democratic Union) appointed a woman Deputy Prime Minister (Nacevska, 
2013). First positive measures aimed at all parties were included in the Law 
on political parties (NN, 76/93; NN, 164/98; NN, 36/01 determining a 10 per 
cent additional financial compensation for the party for every candidate 
from the under-represented gender. 10 years later the Law on Gender Equal-
ity in 2008 (NN, 82/08) enacted 40 per cent legislated candidate quotas for 
the under-represented gender. This law obliged political parties to include 
a minimum of 40 per cent of under-represented gender in the electoral lists 
with a long grace period of three regular national elections. Weak sanctions 
– fines for the non- compliance were enacted too. This law has never been 
applied. Instead the laws on elections have been changed, in 2014 with 40 
per cent legislated candidate quotas without any ranking rules, but with the 
sanction of discarding the list for non- compliance. Constitutional Court has 
annihilated this sanction before the 2015 elections. 
Figure 1:  CROSS-SECTION OF THE CHANGES IN THE PER CENT OF PRESENCE 
AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATED CANDIDATE QUOTAS 
Source: Nacevska, 2013; Quotaproject www.quotaproject.org; ДЗС, 2012; DZS HR, 2013. 
Note: Vertical arrows mark the year of introduction of legislated candidate quotas.
In elections for the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) in 2007, elected women 
accounted for 21.9 per cent of the total number of elected members of par-
liament, while in 2011 elections, with the 40 per cent legislative candidate 
quotas, this per cent fell to 19.9 (DZS HR, 2012). Most of the parties did not 
respect 40 per cent legislative candidate quotas as they were not binding. 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
404
From 313 regional candidate lists for national elections 37.70 per cent had 
40 per cent female candidates on the lists, while 62.30 per cent had less than 
40 per cent (PRS, 2011). There were even amendments to the election law 
adopted by the parliament in February 2015, introduced mandatory gen-
der quota for candidate lists, in 2015 elections, the share of elected women 
dropped from 15.2, in 2016 to 12.6 percent. In the last elections of 2016 
only 14.7 per cent of the party lists were led by women candidates, two big-
gest coalitions HDZ and Narodna koalicija where SDP was a leading party, 
did not respect 40 per cent quotas. This negative trend has a lot to do with 
bad quota regulation design, unclear and long grace period, annihilation of 
strong sanctions, but it is mostly due to absence of big crosscutting wom-
en’s coalition in CRO, which would have given additional support to the 
women within all parties. The last electoral swing of Croatian political scene 
to the nationalistic and populist Catholic right and huge political polarisa-
tion of the country gave little hope that this trend will change, especially 
since women’s power within the biggest central left party in the country, 
SDP, seriously declined too, as one has to conclude from the results of the 
percent of elected SDP women MPs. In spite of the party quota of 40 per 
cent, SDP got only 14 per cent of elected women MPs. After the lost elec-
tions, the deterioration of women’s power within the SDP got additional 
confirmation: in presidential elections in the party, 3 women candidates for 
the party president got less than 3 percent of the party members’ votes com-
bined with the elections of the new party executive national organ, only 4 
men became elected vice presidents and in newly elected party presidency, 
only 17 per cent of elected members are women (3 out of 17).2
Women movement in MKD and SRB, but not in CRO, succeeded in their 
advocacy to efficiently change electoral legislation. The parties did not have 
any other choice but to nominate women on the lists according to the oblig-
atory 30 and 40 percent quotas and obligatory ranking rules with hard sanc-
tions for non-compliance (exclusion of the lists from the race). This is why 
these quotas have a strong positive influence on the political presence of 
women in SRB and in MKD. Legislative candidate quotas proved to be a 
good first step solution for improved numerical presence of women in the 
parliament. But the effect on women’s political influence (substantive rep-
resentation) remains a question for deeper research and discussions. 
However, it is clear that legislated candidate quotas alone could not 
change existing power balance between men and women in political par-
ties in a way that women MPs would automatically exert substantive rep-
resentation. Levelling of power skew between men and women within the 
parties to a crucial extent depends on the ability of organised women within 
2 More onSDP official website- ww.sdp.hr/nasi-ljudi/
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
405
the parties to snatch women’s half of the power from male dominated and 
gender equality insensitive old boys’ party networks and leaderships. 
Impact of political parties on women’s position in politics in the 
selected countries
Lovenduski and Norris (1993) define political parties as ‘Gatekeepers’ 
due to their very important role regarding the political representation. In 
the SEE post conflict societies, the initiative, advocacy, lobbying and creat-
ing of parliamentary support for the enactment of the quotas were on the 
shoulders of women from the centre left and liberal oriented political par-
ties depending heavily on their ability to help to build societal consensus 
on this issue bottom up, with the advocates from the civil society and with 
the support from international actors and mainstream media. This means by 
using so called “sandwich strategy” (Lokar, 2014). 
According to Jalušić and Antić Gaber (2001), the left and centrist ori-
ented parties (liberal, socialist, democratic and Green) are less capable and 
eager to block and reject women as agents of change in the political process 
than right-oriented parties (people’s parties, Christian parties, parties of free 
enterprise, etc.). 
In the researched countries, when the post conflict stabilization has been 
started till the birth of the new radical left and radical right parties after the 
economic crises of 2008, it is difficult to apply a classical division between 
the left and the right wing parliamentary parties. Regardless of other ideo-
logical differences, the differences in the male dominated party leaderships’ 
perception of the need to establish gender power balance within the parties 
are minimal. None of them really embrace it. Proportional electoral systems 
led to the coalition governments of all kinds. The change of the electoral leg-
islation always needs constitutional majority. That means: no cross position-
opposition consensus in the parliament, no change. Even if it is true that in 
all three countries women from progressive NGOs, SD and liberal parties 
were pushing harder for the firm legislated candidate quotas, not in all cases 
this “per definition” more progressive parties were the ones to accept these 
proposals the first. In SRB the right wing parties (at that moment in 2011, 
still in opposition) were the ones to corner the biggest “left” party DP (Dem-
ocratic party) in a way that it had to give in to the civil society amendment 
put forward by a young woman MP from a small party named League of 
Social Democrats of Vojvodina, for the enactment of the firm ranking rules. 
Effective legislated candidate quotas were not enacted because any of the 
parliamentary party leaderships really thought they were crucial for the suc-
cess of their social project, but in spite of their reluctance, always due to the 
good organization, strategy and advocacy of broadly organized women’s 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
406
pressure groups and coalitions and their savvy use of so called “sandwich 
strategy” and parallel electoral campaign strategy (Lokar, 2014). 
In SRB and in MKD, both centre-left and right coalitions have not raised the 
number of nominated women just to fulfil enacted legislated candidate quo-
tas. In fact, before these measures were introduced, there was an exception-
ally low level of women candidates on all party lists. Crucial reasons for the 
change in party attitude towards women were powerful and publically vocal 
pre-electoral crosscutting women coalitions. In SRB for example, the direct 
result of the pressure exerted by women’s crosscutting networks established 
at the Palić 1 conference in 2000 was not more women on electoral lists and 
more elected women MPs in 2000, but the raise of women on powerful execu-
tive positions: speaker of the parliament, mayor of Belgrade, governor of the 
National Bank (Lokar, 2001). In all three researched countries, the first party 
quotas came into being after mid-nineties, in connection with the attempts of 
their different SD parties (LSDV-League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, SD 
Union of SRB, SDP in CRO, SDSM in MKD) to be accepted as members of the 
Social International and as a result of their regional cooperation within CEE 
Network for Gender Issues. Following the rules of the SI, established due to the 
pressures of the SI Women, they were directly asked to form women’s party 
organizations and to introduce party quotas in their statutes in order to earn 
full membership status within Socialist International. Second encouragement 
to establish women party organizations and set up party quotas was organ-
ized by the Women Can Do It II regional project of the SP GTF (Lokar, 2010), 
implemented from 2002 till 2009, when also other political parties introduced 
party quotas. In MKD, in 1994, within SDSM, out of a total of 79 members in 
the Central Board of the party only 10 were women. However, after the intro-
duction of the 30 per cent party quota in SDSM in 1997, women’s presence in 
party elected bodies increased to 30 per cent. Serious improvement of one 
big party in dealing with women’s representation triggers contagion effect 
and party competition for swinging votes. On the other side, the biggest right-
oriented party, VMRO-DPMNE, where women never had and do not have any 
public voice or visible engagements even when they hold higher positions 
in the party, there is the highest number of women within the party decision 
making bodes – 51 per cent. This is due to the party neck to neck competi-
tion for the voters with SDSM, during the period when VMRO-DPMNE was in 
opposition for almost eight years. The same motive today drives SDSM to tar-
get absentees and undecided voters also by developing specific gender equal-
ity policies and electoral promises (SDSM: За живот во Македонија, electoral 
programme 2016). Before 2016 elections SDSM led coalition succeeded also 
to raise legislated candidate quotas from 30 to 40 per cent. 
In SRB, as a result of the political conditions, specifically, interwoven 
processes of armed conflict and post conflict marred economic and social 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
407
transition, was not realistic to expect huge increase of political presence of 
women in legislative power that will lead automatically to the consistent 
policies in favour of better everyday life of women. What really happened 
was that women activists were able to become an active part of the main-
stream politics of democratic change and to make the best of it to increase 
the effectiveness of their future political agency such as Palić II and Palić 
III coalitions, gender sensitive new Constitution, Women’s Platform for the 
Development of SRB, Parliamentary Women’s Network, “Follow us initia-
tive”. In MKD and in CRO, with very similar political and ideological chal-
lenges, there would be no freedom of abortion any more, in MKD, positive 
measures for women pensions would have been banned, a woman would 
need the consent of her partner, husband, to be able to get an abortion. 
Influence of electoral system and party ideology on designing 
gender quotas 
In researched countries, there is a strong evidence of bigger support of 
centre left-oriented coalitions and political parties to the numerical increase 
of elected women and to the acceptance of positive measures within the 
parries in times when they are striving to get to power. Their enthusiasm 
diminishes if they are losing support or are even fearful of losing the elec-
tions. Proportional electoral system makes the designing of effective party 
quotas or legislated candidate quotas easier. 
After the ten-year ruling of right wing HDZ, in 2000, in the context of the 
victory of the coalition led by Račan, as a centre-left party with party quotas, 
the per cent of elected women in parliament has sharply increased. In this 
case, former low level of the women MPs was mainly due to the majority of 
nationalist and conservative policy of HDZ (Glaurdić, 2001). However, at 
the next elections in 2004, the institutional set up of electoral system did not 
change, neither in the country nor in the SDP, the share of elected women 
MPs in SDP dropped to disappointingly low level. This proves that the share 
and number of elected women in political parties are in close connection 
with the party electoral trend. The misbalance of power between men and 
women within the parties is generally mirrored in the following rule: when 
the party is winning, women will get more seats but proportionally less than 
men, when the party is losing, women are the first to lose and they will lose 
more than men will. In a research of women’s power within SD political 
parties in the internal case study, done within SP GTF in Women can do it 
II project in 2009, a new indicator for the growth of women’s real political 
power within the parties has been discovered.3 In times when the party is 
3 Final internal WCDI II Report by Sonja Lokar to Norwegian Development Cooperation, 2009.
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
408
winning, women get proportionally more seats than that of male candidates 
or in times when the party is losing, women proportionally lose fewer seats 
than that of party men candidates, and vice versa. 
In MKD positive changes happened only after the introduction of nor-
mative solutions and institutional changes in the electoral system, com-
bined with the change of the ideological colour of the coalition in 2002. 
Majority system has been transformed firstly in the mixed electoral system 
in 1998, but due to the victory of the centre right wing coalition, the share of 
elected women MPs stayed dramatically low. The introduction of legislated 
candidate quotas without ranking rules in 2002 and the transformation of 
mixed electoral system in a proportional system after the victory of a cen-
tre-left parties led to a sharply improved share of the women MPs in MKD 
Parliament – Sobranie. Due to the strong national cross cutting coalition of 
women activists advocating for the strict ranking rules within the legislated 
candidate quotas, this improvement, voted with a lot of opposition within 
SDSM male leadership, but with strong support of women MPs of the cen-
tre left coalition and of the women from the right wing opposition in 2006, 
stayed, due to this crosscutting coalition, formally intact also in the next ten 
years of very conservative and autocratic right wing coalition from 2006-
till 2016. Centre left coalition entered neck to neck electoral campaign in 
2016 by forging a nation – wide parliamentary consensus on the next step 
in strengthening of the legislated candidate quotas, by raising them to 40 
per cent and making them obligatory also for future executive posts. 
The situation in SRB in the first ten years after SFRY’s dissolution with 
the autocratic nationalistic Milošević right wing regime, running under the 
tag of “pure left and centre- left” was dire for women in the parliament with 
the share of 3–4 per cent from 1990 till 2000. After the fall of this regime and 
the change of the government in SRB with the victory of the centre named 
Democratic Opposition of SRB – DOS (led by the leaders of the DP – Zoran 
Đinđić, Zoran Živković, Boris Tadić from 2000–2012, and replaced by the 
pure right coalition led by Vućić, from 2012-till today) the changes in the 
political presence of women in the Serbian parliament took a positive trend. 
Once again due to the crosscutting national women’s coalition, broad-
ened cleverly exact in the last moment before the elections in 2012 with 
the women MPs from the right parties, in the form of the newly established 
Women’s Parliamentary Network of SRB (Women in parliaments, 2014). 
This improvement would not have been accepted due to the reluctance 
of the DP leadership, but joint lobbying of the women from the civil society 
and from all parliamentary parties had brought the far right wing parties 
on board for the first time. This has, in the end, led to the acceptance of the 
ranking rules amendment in the Serbian parliament with unanimity. 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
409
Conclusion
Empirical analyses (Nacevska, 2013) of the legislated candidate quotas, 
as well as of the influence of proportional electoral systems, show a signifi-
cant positive influence of properly designed quotas on the increasing of 
the number of women candidates. But even when the number of elected 
women is higher, it is still not at the satisfactory level and does not ensure 
the parity of women candidates and elected women. Larger share of women 
MPs did not trigger a sustainable large presence of women in political deci-
sion-making positions in the governments – the trends are mixed. There 
might be a need to enact additional legislated quotas for positions in differ-
ent fields of decision making. MKD seems to be on this track already. 
Political parties have the key role in forming, recruiting and nominating 
the candidates. 
It can be concluded that political parties, apart from being “friendly 
persuaded” in acceptance of effective (SRB, MKD) or toothless (CRO) leg-
islated candidate quotas, do not work for real, substantive political repre-
sentation of women. They do not invest in strategic and capacity building 
work of their women’s party organisations, they do not develop mentorship 
schemes for promising newcomers, they do not develop merit based career 
plans and transparent, democratic recruitment and nomination procedures 
for the female activists (neither for the male ones) in their parties. 
Male dominated party leaderships are doing everything to keep gender 
power imbalance intact (Old boys’ network power structure and its rues of 
the game). When there are no quotas, they simply exclude women. When 
they have to accept quotas for the party organs and/or party lists (due to 
the pressure of organised women within the party and in the society) they 
adopt to the new situation: they co-opt the women who will play along 
established priorities and rules of the old boys’ network. 
How do they do it?
They monopolise the distribution of the eligible seats in party bodies or 
/and on the electoral lists, making sure that they have the last word of who 
will get real opportunity to get elected. They choose women who are loyal 
to them, not to the interests of at least those women who vote for their party. 
Male leaders can do it, because internal party democratic selection and 
nomination procedures are not transparent and democratically organised, 
or they are only on paper, and the democratic rules are cleverly avoided, 
tacitly not respected (OSCE-ODIHR, 2014; Lokar, 2014).
It would be a big mistake to expect that efficient, perfectly designed 
legislated candidate quotas or even legislated parity for elected seats could 
solve this problem. Imbalance of power between men and women in the 
parties and party internal democracy are much tougher nut to crack! 
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
410
It is thus important to discuss how to strengthen voters’ influence in 
the elections. In Croatia, in 2016 elections for example, there were several 
women candidates who got elected or were pushed higher up on the lists 
contrary to their parties believe, with the preferential votes, but also several 
which have lost the seat or were pushed further down the list, due to the 
higher number of preferential votes, given to the male candidates. We were 
not able to make deep analyses of what has influenced voters’ behaviour in 
CRO: to what extent if at all, women candidates could have been rejected 
or less preferred just due to gender stereotypes and prejudices of the vot-
ers. Public opinion surveys (WVS, 2011) show the dominant value matrix: 
patriarchy, collectivism and family-orientation in all three countries. One 
can realistically assume that the state needs to undertake special measures 
for changing prevailing negative public attitude towards women in politics 
(Nacevska, 2013). The changing of the patriarchal conservative stereotypes 
is a long process. Awareness raising campaigns should be focused not only 
on the male but more over on the female misperceptions. From the point 
of view of ensuring equal representation of men and women in decision 
making positions in a shorter term, there is a need for an open discussion 
of the question: how to design the positive measures in order to insure that 
voters will be able to have the final word, that candidates from their party 
lists should seat in the parliament and at the same time get elected gender 
balanced representation of each party delegation to the parliament. Techni-
cally such solutions are not too difficult to device, but political consensus 
that this would be fair and needed might be much more difficult to forge. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Antić Gaber, Milica and Sonja Lokar (2006): The Balkans. From total rejection to 
gradual acceptance of gender quotas. In Drude Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quo-
tas and Politics, 138–167. New York: Routledge.
Dahlerup, Drude (2006): Women, Quotas and Politics. NY: Routledge – Taylor & 
Francis Group.
Dobrotić, Ivana (2012): Dejavniki politik usklajevanja plačanega dela in družinskih 
obveznosti v posocijalističnih državah. Doktorska disertacija. Ljubljana: Uni-
verza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede.
Jalušić, Vlasta and Milica Antić Gaber (2001): Women-Politics-Equal Opportunities, 
Prospects for Gender Equality Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Ljubljana: 
Peace Institute.
Kašić, Biljana (2006): The Dynamic of Identifications Within Nationalistic Dis-
course: From Archetypes to Promising Female Roles. In Rada Iveković and Julie 
Mostov (eds.), From Gender to Nation, 189–201. New Delhi: Zubaan. 
Kymlicka, Will (1995): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. NY: Oxford University Press.
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
411
Lokar, Sonja (2001): The Women’s Role in Armed Conflicts. OSCE Yearbook (2001): 
237–251, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagesgesellshaft.
Lokar, Sonja (2010): The shift in the approach of international actors. In Bjorn 
Kuhne (ed.), The Erchard Bused, From Stabilisation to Integration, 65–73. 
Wien: Bohlau.
Lokar, Sonja (2014): Materials developed for the Handbook on Promoting Wom-
en’s Participation in Political Parties. OSCE-ODIHR 2014, 52–53 and 135.
Lovenduski, Joni and Pippa Norris (1993): Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage 
Publications.
Mansbridge, Jane (2011): Clarifying the Concept of Representation. American 
Political Science Review, 105 (3): 621–630.
Mansbridge, Jane and Katherine Tate (1992): Race Trumps Gender: The Thomas 
Nomination in the Black Community. Political Science and Politics (25): 488–
492.
Nacevska, Elena (2013): Women in politics in the countries of the Western Balkans. 
Doctoral dissertation. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social sci-
ences.
SOURCES 
NN 76/93 – Law on political parties, 1993. 
NN 164/98 – Law on political parties, 1998.
NN 36/01 – Law on political parties, 2001. 
NN 116/2003 – Gender Equality Act, 2003.
NN 82/08 – Gender Equality Law, 2008. 
NN 19/15 – Electoral law, 2015.
OSCE/ODIHR (2014): Handbook on Promoting Women’s Participation in Political 
Parties. Poland, Warsaw: OSCE-ODIHR.
Phillips, Ann (1995): The politics of presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
--- (1998): Feminism and politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tomšič, Vida (1978): Žensk, delo, družina, družba. Ljubljana: Komunist.
Сл. Весник на РМ, 42/2002 – Law on Election of Members of Parliament, 2002. 
Сл. Весник на РМ, 35/2004 – Law on local elections 2004.
Сл. Весник на РМ, 40/2006 – Election code 2006.
Сл. Весник на РМ117/2008 – Amendments and changes to the Law on gender 
equality 2008.
Сл. Весник на РМ 6/2012– Law on equal opportunities 2012.
Сл. Весник на РМ 196/2015 – Law amendments to the electoral code 2015.
Сл. Гласник РС18/04 – Republic election code 2004.
Сл. Гласник РС 104/2009 – Gender equality act 2009.
Сл. Гласник РС 36/2011– Electoral Law 2011.
DZS HR (2013): Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske 2013, Žene i 
muškarci u Hrvatskoj 2013, Statistička Publikacija. Zagreb: Državni zavod za 
statistiku. Accessible at http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/menandwomen/men_
and_women_2013.pdf (10. 4. 2013).
Elena NACEVSKA, Sonja LOKAR
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 2/2017
412
Glaurdić, Josip (2001): Croatia’s Leap toward Gender Equality in the Parliament: 
The Role of the Electoral System Design. Res Publica – Journal of Undergradu-
ate Research 6 (1): 5. Accessible at http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/
vol6/iss1/5 (10. 1. 2012).
Global quota website. Accessible at www.quotaproject (10. 4. 2016).
PRS – Pravobraniteljica za ravnopravnost spolova (2011): Accessible at http://
www.prs.hr (12.05.2012).
Quota Project website. Accessible at http://www.quotaproject.org (10. 4. 2016).
SDP official website. Accessible at ww.sdp.hr/nasi-ljudi/ (10. 4. 2016).
Women in parliaments (2014). Accessible at http://www.womeninparliaments.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Serbia-WPN-Wasington.pdf (20. 1. 2017).
Women’s forum in CRO. Accessible at http://forumzena.sdp.hr/dokumenti (20. 1. 
2017).
Women’s Platform for the Development of Serbia 2014–2020: Inclusion. Accessi-
ble at socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/…/womens-platform-for-the-development 
(12. 1. 2017).
WVS (2011): World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009. 
World Values Survey Association. Accessible at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org and aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. Accessible at http://www.
wvsevsdb.com/wvs/wvsanalizesample.jsp (22. 6. 2011).
ДЗС (2012): Државен Завод за статистика, Жените и мажите во Македонија 2012. 
Публикација. Скопје: Државен завод за статистика. Accessible at http://www.
stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/Gender2012.pdf (April 11, 2013).