Received: 2011-10-18	UDC 94:338.14(560)"1468/1517"
Original scientific article
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE JULBAN RIOTS DURING THE MAMLÜK PERIOD (1468-1517)
Wan Kamal MUJANI University Kebangsaan Malaysia, Institute of West Asian Studies (IKRAB) 43600 Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia e-mail: inamal@yahoo.com / inawan@ukm.my
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the economic impact of the public order violations and riots of the Julban during the half-century before the fall of the Mamluk sultanate. This group in their own way disrupted the normal flow of domestic trade and commerce. They terrorised, intimidated and caused losses for those involved in trade and commercial affairs. Thus, the main aim of this article is to discuss the factors leading to the havoc caused by the Julban, and the extent of the economic impact during that time. This article finds that among the reasons for the Julban revolt are factional ambitions and the regime's failure to meet their demands. There was also the government's increasing reluctance to vigorously prosecute such behaviour. The chaos created by the Julban, however, did not lead to an absolute decline of the economy. Rather, they distracted the Mamluk authorities from more productive activities and placed increasingly onerous financial demands on the government treasury.
Key words: Mamluk, Julban, riots, economic effects, trade and commerce
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EFFETTI ECONOMICI DELLE RIVOLTE DEGLI JULBAN DURANTE IL PERIODO DEI MAMELUCCHI (1468-1517)
SINTESI
L'articolo tratta degli impatti economici provocati dalle violazioni dell'ordine pubblico e dalle rivolte degli julban nei cinquant'anni precedenti alla caduta del sultanato mamelucco. Questo gruppo interruppe a modo suo il corso usuale del commercio interno, terrorizzando, minacciando e determinando perdite nelle attivita commerciali. Pertanto, l'obiettivo principale di questo contributo e di analizzare i fattori cheportarono alle distruzioni causate dagli julban e di quantiicarne l'impatto economico nell'epoca. L'articolo mette in evidenza che tra le ragioni della rivolta degli julban ci furono lotte tra fazioni, 'incapacita del regime di soddisfare le loro richieste, nonché la crescente riluttanza del governo a perseguire vigorosamente la rivolta. In ogni caso, il caos creato dagli julban non provoco in assoluto un declino economico, ma distrasse le autorita mamelucche da attivita piú produttive e comporto per il bilancio dello stato oneri sempre piú pesanti.
Parole chiave: mamelucchi, julban, rivolte, effetti economici, commercio INTRODUCTION
In Islamic history, the word 'Mamlük' means a slave, more specifically a white slave, used in the military institution. In the Ayyibid sultanate, the Mamlüks served as soldiers and later took over the throne and appointed themselves as the sultans. For more than 250 years they ruled Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. The period of Mamlük reign can be divided into two eras. The first is from 1250 until 1381 and is known as the 'Turkish Mamlük' era. The second period covers 1382 to 1517 and is known as the 'Circassian Mamlük' era. It is generally accepted among historians that the Mamlük sultanate reached its glory under the Turkish sultans and then fell into a prolonged phase of worsening under the Circassians. Between 1468 and 1517, the period under review, seven persons were installed as sultans. Two of them (Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay and Sultan Qansüh al-Ghawri) ruled for a combined total of forty-four years while the remaining five (Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad, Sultan al-Zahir Qansüh, Sultan al-Ashraf Janbalat, Sultan al-'Adil Tümanbay and Sultan al-Ashraf Tümanbay) reigned for a total of only five years. Indeed, there was a good deal of political turmoil during the reign of the latter five sultans, while even under the rule of the two longest reigning sultans there were internal and external problems.
The base of the Egyptian economy, that is, agriculture, industry, commerce and monetary affairs, was in a somewhat weakened state during the half-century before the fall of the Mamlük kingdom. For instance, the emergence of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean disturbed the flow of spices from Calicut to Egypt and caused a rise in the cost of protecting that trade. The Portuguese also cut commercial relations between India and the
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Far Eastern countries and the Mamluk territories of Egypt, Syria and Arabia (Ibn Iyas, 1963). In this way, the Mamluk sultans were deprived of the heavy duties from Alexandria and Jeddah, the transit harbours for oriental merchandise. The commercial balance tilted in favour of Europe, and Lisbon became the centre of the international spice trade instead of the Mamluk cities. The Mamluks recognised the immediate effects of these events, and, urged into action by the Venetians who also suffered from this development, tried by diplomacy and then by war to avert the Portuguese threat. However, their efforts were fruitless. After the discovery of the new route to India via the Cape of Good Hope, the price of one Qintar (equivalent to 44.93 kilograms) of spice in Alexandria was still eighty Ducats, while in Lisbon it was sold at about forty Ducats (Inalcik, 1960). This situation worsened the role of Egypt as the middleman in the spice trade between the East and the West. As a consequence, the treasury did not have sufficient funds to cover military expenses.
During the period under review, the instability of internal politics also influenced and affected the Mamluk economy. One of the factors that caused political unrest was the havoc and chaos created by the Julban. Indeed, this is an aspect which is often neglected by the modern scholars when they discuss the causes which weakened the Circassian Mamluk economy. The priority and privileges given by the sultans made the Julban feel free to do anything and the sultans sometimes lost control of them. Stories of the pillaging and plundering of markets and shops were associated with them. They also confiscated the belongings of stockmen and merchants. This caused the closure of trading centres such as markets, bazaars and shops (Qasim, 1994). The Mamluk chroniclers, namely Ibn Khalil (AB, 1) and Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:82,272-273,310-311) report extensively on the Julban's nefarious and impious activities which affected the economy at that time. Therefore, it is important to discuss all of these matters in detail by adding another important issue, namely how far the disruptions by the Julban led to the weakening of the economy. In order to examine these matters, discussion will be divided into three parts i.e. the relationship between the sultanate, changes in the military institution and the commercial economy.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SULTANATE
The Mamluk armed forces played a very important role in the continuity of the kingdom because they were the actual strength of the empire, expanding Mamluk authority and defending the state from internal and external enemies. Their number was not fixed and varied from one reign to another, based on the political and economic situation at the time. However, Mamluk sources reported that the number of soldiers decreased during Circassian times.
THE MAMLUK ARMIES
Relying on information from the Mamluk chronicles, the Mamluk armies, especially in Egypt, can be divided into three main categories, as follows:
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1) Mamaluk al-Sultaniyya (The Royal Mamluks)
Mamalik al-Sultaniyya were the backbone and main strength of the Mamluk army and each of them was trained in the barracks. They were responsible for engaging in important military expeditions or in main battles. During the Circassian period, they could number up to 10,000 men, while in the Turkish period they were more in number. According to al-Qalqashandi (1987, 4:15), they were the most significant and the most respected soldiers, and the nearest to the sultan. They were also owners of large Iqta's (the land or rarely, the taxes allocated by the great amir or sultan to soldiers in return for military service). The amirs of various ranks were elected from this group. Most of the Mamalik al-Sultaniyya were stationed in the capital and it was very rare for them to stay out of Cairo except for military purposes (Ayalon, 1953). The Mamalik al-Sultaniyya was subdivided into two categories: the Julban and the Mustakhdamun, as follows:
i)	The Julban (The MamUiks of the Ruling Sultan)
The Julban were those Mamluks who were purchased and manumitted by the ruling sultan (Popper, 1955). They constituted the most important army of the sultan and served to strengthen his position as ruler. Besides the term Julban, they were also called Mushtarawatand Ajlab. Historians of the later period, however, such as Ibn Khalil (AB,1) and Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:82), use the appellation Julban more often.
After his enthronement, the new sultan would attempt to increase the number of his Mamluks as much as he could with the purpose of reducing the influence and power of the Mustakhdamun. This was what Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay did when he purchased hundreds of Mamluks after his accession to the throne. Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri also actively taught his Julban the art of war to enable them to break the power of the Mustakhdamun (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:18,4:60; Ayalon, 1954). The Julban would be appointed as Amir 'ashara (Amir of ten) and gradually promoted to higher ranks to replace the Mustakhdamun. The same happened in the administration offices where the Julban slowly replaced the Mustakhdamun. After the death or dismissal of the ruling sultan, their position and status changed and they would be classified as Mustakhdamun under a new sultan.
ii)	Mustakhdamin
The Mustakhdamun were the Mamluks who passed into the service of the ruling sultan from the service of another master. They can be divided into two categories: the Qaranis and the Sayfiyya:
a) Qaranis
The Qaraniswere the Mamluks who passed into the service of the reigning sultan from that of former sultans (Majid, 1964). This group or faction still used the surname of their former master who had purchased and freed them. For example, the Zahiriyya owed their
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name to Sultan al-Zahir Barquq, the Nasiriyya to Sutan al-Nasir Faraj, the Mu'ayyadiyya to Sultan Mu'ayyad Shaykh, and the Qaytbayiyya to Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay. After the accession of a new sultan they would be transferred to serve under that sultan as one of the components of the Mamalik al-sultaniyya. This was the tradition in the military system in the Mamluk kingdom. Thus we can see various factions of Qaranis during the reign of each sultan. For instance, in the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbay, there were the factions of the Zahiriyya, the Nasiriyya and the Mu'ayyadiyya in his service, whereas, during the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay, there were the factions of the Ashrafiyya, the Khushqaddamiyya and the Inaliyya.
According to Ibn Iyas (1963, 4:448,5:23) in addition to serving in major wars, one of the duties of the Qaranis was to maintain safety in all parts of Egypt including some sectors of the Red Sea coast. They were also sent out to al-Sharqiyya, al-Gharbiyya, al-Buhayra, al-Sa'id and other places to keep the Bedouin at bay. Sometimes they were ordered to stop the dams from being destroyed by the Bedouin. At the end of the Mamluk kingdom, the status of the Qaranis became progressively worse and they remained second only to the Julban.
b)Sayfiyya
The Sayfiyya were those Mamluks who passed from the service of the amirs to the sultan because of their master's death or dismissal (Ibn Shahin, 1894). Generally their position or status was lower than that of other groups in the Mamalik al-sultaniyya. When they were transferred into the Mamalik al-sultaniyya, they were indifferent or antagonistic toward the Julban, the Qaranis and the sultan. Their feeling of loyalty towards the sultan was also less or totally lacking because he was only their second master. It was very rare for this group to obtain a better status from the sultan. Towards the end of the Mamluk period, the Sayfiyya were treated with cruelty. Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qaytbay is reported to have sent the Sayfiyya back to serve under other amirs after the Julban threatened to kill them. The Sayfiyya were sometimes allied with the Qaranis in their struggle to improve their position (Ayalon, 1953).
2) Mamaluk al-Umara' (The Mamluks of the Amirs)
The Mamalik al-umara' was the Mamluk army who served the amirs. The number of these that could be kept by amirs was fixed. Nevertheless, some of the amirs added to the number of their Mamluks without concern for such regulations (Dumit, 1980). The Mamalik al-umara' received their payments from the fief belonging to their masters. Usually, the income from the Iqta's would be divided as follows: one third to the amirs and two thirds to the Mamluks. However, sometimes the amirs did not follow this division and took one half for himself.
The Mamalik al-umara' did not constitute a serious political factor in the Mamluk army and were rarely involved in rebellion. Normally, they followed their masters and participated in battle if they were ordered to do so. They were also not as well-trained as the Sayfiyya (Ibn Taghri Birdi, n.d.).
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3)Halqa (A Free Corps)
The Halqa or the Ajnad al-halqa, as they were sometimes called, was the non-Maml uk army and al-Qalqashandi (1987, 4:16) mentions that they were non-military people. They comprised of the Awlad al-nas (Sons of the amirs and of the Mamluks). Sometimes Mamalikal-umara'was transferred to Halqa after the death or dismissal of their masters. The Bedouins, Kurds and Turcomans were also regarded as groups within the Halqa when they were sent out to participate in battle (al-Turkhan, 1960). Besides participating in battle, other duties of the Halqa in the Circassian period included guarding the Cairo Citadel, the gates of Cairo, the old city and the suburbs in the absence of the main forces (Ibn Shahin, 1894).
In the early Turkish period, the Halqa held exalted positions and received sufficient Iqta's. Their income was, however, greatly affected after the land redistribution in the Mamluk kingdom at the end of the seventh century and the cadastral survey conducted in Egypt in the early eighth century. Their Iqta's became fewer after a large number of them were allotted to the sultan.
Among the reasons that led to the fall of the Halqa was the fact that they were not Mamluks and did not have any military ability. In addition, it cost a great deal to maintain them and this resulted in their numbers being reduced and their position becoming less important. At the end of Circassian period, they also were not involved in many wars. During the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay, he gave them a choice either to participate in battle or to pay 100 Dinars (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:8; al-Sayrafi, 1970).
CHANGES IN THE MILITARY INSTITUTION
According to the Mamluk chroniclers, the Mamluk armies during the period under review did not maintain high discipline and demonstrated less respect for their lords and masters. They were infamous for their chaotic and political conspiracies. One of the important factors which weakened the military institution and caused the political instability was the frequent strife and coup d'états to usurp the throne by the amirs from different factions. This necessarily affected the stability and the effectiveness of the armies. The works of contemporary historians also contain abundant information about the conflict and strife among the groups in the Mamalik al-sultaniyya. These were factors behind the disorder in internal politics, especially at the end of the Circassian period.
To maintain the influence and power, the sultan relied more on the Julban than on other sources of military support. This was because the Julban and the sultan had a tightly-knit association, being united by strong bonds of solidarity. The Julban were loyal to the sultan, regarding him as a master and liberator. They needed each other because the Julban would only continue to receive their privileges as long as the sultan was on the throne. On the other hand, the sultan would only possess sovereignty as long as the Julban had power and supported his rule.
The sultan gave priority and privilege to the Julban because he saw the Qarânis as factions who would not give him total loyalty as he was only their second master, and thus
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they always remained potential rivals to the throne. Indeed, it was said that the stability of the reign of any sultan depended on how far he could control the dominance and the power of the Qaranis.
As the Mamluks of former sultans, the Qaranis were veterans and had more experience in war and politics than the Julban. Nevertheless, the sultan ignored them and was careful not to promote them into positions which could give them too much influence and power. There are some accounts indicating that the sultan discriminated against the Qaranis. For example, the sultan preferred to send them into battle instead of his Julban. Thus, Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay sent the Khushqaddamiyya, and Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri sent the Mamluks of al-Zahir Qansuh, al-Ashraf Janbalat and al-'Adil Tumanbay into most battles. In fact, the participation of Qaranis in military campaigns was considered a substitute for banishment and exile (Ayalon, 1949). Another purpose for sending them into battle was to reduce their numbers. The sultan also dismissed them from the posts that they held, imprisoned, exiled or even killed them (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:5,7-8).
Payments to the Qaranis also showed discrimination. Although they were senior, veterans and more experienced, the emoluments they received were always less than those for the Julban. For example, in 1486, the bonus given to each Qaranis was five Dinars, while the Julban received ten Dinars per person. The distribution of Iqta's to Qaranis was also unfair: they received a small fief compared with what the Julban received. Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:231,4:107) reports that in March 1507 one of the Julban killed one of the Qaranis to obtain his Iqta'. The sultan was reported to have done nothing to the Julban and did not even charge him.
The Mamluk sources report that the Julban were helpless in combat and were unenthusiastic or unwilling to fight, showing no chivalry and no bravery in war. They were lacking in military spirit and their training was most ineffective. In 1503, during Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri's reign, they were scorned by the Mustakhdamun for the poor quality of their lance play (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:60). One of the reasons why they did not make good soldiers was that they were already matured when the sultan purchased them. The sultan preferred to acquire this kind of Mamluk because their price was lower than that of younger Mamluks. This was particularly the case in the later Circassian period due to financial difficulties. It was harder to discipline and train older Mamluks in the art of war than it was to train young Mamluks, nor was it easy to instill in them an esprit de corps and a duty to obey the law. This led to their lacking good discipline and training ('Ashur, 1977).
The Mamluk sources continuously report the strife and rivalry that existed between the Qaranis and Julban, especially during the Circassian period. For example, during Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri's reign, there were riots and threats from the Qaranis who were dissatisfied when their privileges were reduced following the appointment of the Julban to replace them. At the same time, these Julban took the opportunity to demand a high payment and constantly caused disturbances (Holt, 1978). However, the sultan rarely took serious action against the Julban because, as already mentioned, he needed them to support his reign against the rivalry of other factions. For example, one of the Julban
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and his groom were found guilty of murdering a prominent jurist, a Hanbali deputy judge, in broad daylight. al-Sayrafi (1970, 149), however, reports that they received no punishment.
It seems that the Qaranis were antagonistic towards the Julban because they were junior but usurped their positions or privileges. Meanwhile, the Julban took every opportunity to oppress the Qaranis using the power they had as the group with the highest status in the Mamalik al-sultaniyya. Occasionally, hostility from the Julban and the ruling sultan made the various factions in the Qaranis unite against them.
THE COMMERCIAL ECONOMY
Ibn Khalil (AB, 1) and Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:75,197,4:13-16,5:81) report extensively on the Julban's nefarious and impious activities which disrupted the economic activities at that time. As a result, the people continued to live under the threat of terror and oppression by the Julban. Most of these unfortunate events were related to their dissatisfaction with their payments and the failure of the sultans to meet their demands. Often, when the government could not give bonuses or sacrifice animals for religious festivals to the Julban, the shopkeepers and merchants lost their goods or herds with no compensation.
The chroniclers' narratives about the Julban can be classified into three categories, i.e. i) the increasing demands of the Julban, ii) the confiscation of merchant goods and the closure of shops and markets and, iii) the Julban attacks on the civilians.
1. The increasing demands of the Julban
The constant demand for increases in pay always caused problems for the sultans. For instance, in February-March 1489, the Julban demanded a bonus of one hundred Dinars from Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay. The sultan could not meet their request because of financial difficulties and he threatened abdication. However, after a discussion between both parties, the sultan agreed to grant a bonus of only fifty Dinars paid in two monthly instalments. Meanwhile, the veterans (Mustakhdamun) received only twenty-five Dinars each (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:261).
In November-December 1490, the Julban once again demanded a bonus and Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay, who was in Mecca at the time, threatened abdication. However, the sultan had no choice but to grant them the bonus after the Julban revolted and caused general mayhem. The Julban did not stop their wild demands and in April-May 1493, they blocked the Citadel gates in order to force the sultan to grant them another bonus (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:276,280,295).
In 1500, they revolted because Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri failed to pay their Nafaqa (payment) on time. In 1501, the sultan had once again delayed paying their Nafaqa for three months at which the Julban confiscated property belonging to civilians. Meanwhile the sultan had to order the shopkeepers to pay the rent on their shops ten months in advance, something which led to the closure of shops and the interruption of economic activities (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:8,16-17).
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Disturbances by the Julban over salary payments increased during Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri's middle years, and continued until the sultan began planning for his confrontation with Sultan Salim. It can be seen from the Mamluk sources that the resultant riots intensified after 1508. The first event occurred in February when the Julban demanded a bonus of one hundred Dinars. The sultan's reluctance to grant the bonus caused them to revolt and the rebellion continued for three days with the Citadel being closed and no amir able to visit the palace (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:127).
In April-May 1510, several units of Julban attacked civilians with stones. They crowded the streets of Cairo, many shops were plundered and they stole the goods sold in several markets such as Suq Jami' Ibn Tulun, Suq al-Saliba and Suq taht al-Rub'. This happened because their rations were delayed and Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri could not pay their Nafaqa on time. It is reported that in March 1511, the Julban again created havoc by pillaging animals (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:177-178,207).
2. The Julban confiscation of merchant goods and the closure of shops and markets
The reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay witnessed considerable disruption by his Julban for almost every year of his reign. In 1474, the Julban created such chaos that the merchants were forced to stop their businesses and the shopkeepers had to close their shops and stalls. The disturbances caused by the Julban became widespread because nobody was able to stop them. In 1482, they freely took what they wanted from markets and stores. Similar events happened in 1486, 1489 and 1492. Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:96,197,233,322) reports that the markets and bazaars were closed in expectation of looting. At the end of Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay's reign, the situation worsened and the merchants were frequently afraid to conduct their businesses. This necessarily caused an interruption in normal economic activities.
During the reign of Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qaytbay, the Julban are also reported to have disrupted the economy by stealing clothes from shops and goods from the markets. Examples of these events can be seen in the years 1496 and 1498. Ibn Iyas (1963, 3:349,400,463) states that Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad could do nothing to get the situation under control. Sometimes, however, he is said to have extorted money by whipping and torturing to meet the demands of his Julban. Sultan al-Ashraf Janbalat is also reported to have confiscated property belonging to magnates, merchants, Jews, Copts and others in order to cover his Julban expenses.
In a more serious case, in August-September 1506, one of the Julban robbed a Greek merchant who was under the sultanate's protection and Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri was forced to take action by banishing him (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:98).
Property belonging to the sultan also did not escape the misdeeds of the Julban. In September-November 1511, a group of Julban misappropriated barley stored in the royal granary. On another occasion in February-March 1513, livestock became difficult to obtain because the Julban were seizing animals from the peasants. Other riots by the Julban caused by a delay in provision of rations and Nafaqa are reported to have occurred in March-April 1514 and January-February 1515. On the latter occasion, the Saliba
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markets were pillaged and the sultan threatened to abdicate if the demands for payment were not dropped. Although the stockmen and merchants experienced considerable losses the sultan rejected their claims for compensation (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:241,368,430431,466).
The activities of the Julban not only affected Egypt but other places as well. In January-February 1515, a group of Mamalik al-sultaniyya garrisoned in Aleppo to monitor Sultan Salim's acts, assaulted the local populace and their houses, pillaged their clothing, violated their harems, plundered their markets, and seized their goods. As a result, Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri ordered them to return so as to avoid a worsening situation. After 1515, while relations with the Ottomans were worsening, both Julban and Qaranis, seeing an opportunity for an increase in stipends, increased their disorderly behaviour. They caused riots several times in 1516 when they were ordered to take part in the military expedition against the Ottomans and they confiscated goods belonging to the merchants. Both the garment markets and wheat mills were closed and this disrupted the buying and selling of textiles and led to a scarcity of flour and bread. The shopkeepers, craftsmen and cloth makers are said to have gone into hiding out of fear of the Julban (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 4:432,465,474).
3. The Julban's attacks on the civilians
Civilian vulnerability to crimes inflicted by troops may have been a ubiquitous aspect of Mamluk oppression unaffected by the regime's incapacity to restrain them. For example, at the end of 1468, the Wali al-shurta (the sultan's prefect of police) detained many of the Julban and grooms who had been attacking civilians and tearing their turbans off (AV, 1). Three years later, when Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay commanded the departure of an expedition against Shah Suwar (the eighth ruler of the DM al-Ghadir dynasty), he warned the Julban against 'striking any civilian', warning that whoever did so 'would be drawn and quartered without a hearing of his case' (al-Sayrafi, 1970, 193).
In July 1472, in order to maintain public safety, Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay ordered three Julban to be beaten for public disruptions. The disturbances by the Julban continued in January 1473 when some of them rebelled against Sharaf al-Din ibn Katib al-Gharib, a Muslim of Coptic ancestry, who carried out duties of the vizierate and the major-domoship on behalf of the Amir Yashbak. The Julban, who were dissatisfied with him, marched to his house and damaged the front gate. Sharaf al-Din was afraid to face the angry mob and went into hiding (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:75,82)
A problem during Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri's reign was similarly the threat from the Julban. They demanded high wages and this pressure caused him to impose heavy taxes on merchants (AR, 1). The Julban are also said to have freely pillaged the people's property and to have accumulated a lot of money from this activity (AR, 2). There are indeed many examples of the havoc created by them.
For example, in June 1516, one of the Julban seized a donkey and a bag belonged to a peasant from Upper Egypt and killed him. However, there was no charge against him. Meanwhile in August-September 1516, the Julban attacked the Anatolian merchants in
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the Khan al-Khalili area. After the departure of the Mamluk troops from Cairo to Syria on 18 May 1516 to encounter the Ottoman armies, the remaining Julban in that city continued to cause trouble (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 5:50,82).
It is worth noting that the strife and struggle for power among the amirs also affected the common people. For instance, the clash between Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'ban and Amir Yalbugha in 1368 and the battle between Amir Barquq and Birkat in 1379-1381 disrupted daily activities of the Cairo populace. The fights always took place in the city or its vicinity where many of the markets were situated. This led to the closing of stalls, shops and markets for a certain time until the situation became calm (al-Maqrizi, 1972, 280,352). During the period under review, the same situation occurred frequently especially during the short reigns of incompetent sultans such as al-Zahir Qansuh, al-Ashraf Janbalat and al-'Adil Tumanbay (Ibn Iyas, 1963, 3:388,395,443,463).
From the above discussion, it is clear that the rulers were too weak to exercise control and supervision over their own Mamluks and the resulting frequent disorders by the Julban had an effect on the economy. In particular, the commercial activities of the merchants and shopkeepers were often severely disrupted and their plight was aggravated by the fact that the sultan also put pressure on them in order to fulfil the Julban's demands. Men of commerce were no more immune from the breakdown in public order plaguing the sultanate in its final decades than any other property holders. But the historians were well aware of the stymieing effect such seizures had on economic growth. None touted the empire's prosperity during these troubled times. If rebellion is examined as process, its frequency may be understood as the result of frustrated factional ambitions and the regime's failure at maintaining the standard of living the elite expected as a right of caste (Petry, 1994, 78,88).
CONCLUSION
The last fifty years of the Mamluk sultanate witnessed developments in the regime's internal situation which affected the Egyptian economy. One of these developments was the increasing chaos and havoc caused by the Julban, and they are frequently connected to reports of disruption of the economic activities. They showed little discipline and respect for their masters and caused various problems in society. Among the reasons that caused them to revolt were factional ambitions and the regime's failure to meet their demands. Meanwhile, in addition to there being no compensation for those who suffered losses because of the Julban's misdeeds, the sultan had to put pressure on the populace to cover the expenses of the Julban. In this situation, economic activities could hardly run smoothly.
Wan Kamal MUJANI: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE JULBANRIOTS DURING THE MAMLUK ..., 1-14
GOSPODARSKE POSLEDICE JULBANSKIH IZGREDOV V OBDOBJU MAMELUKOV (1468-1517)
Wan Kamal MUJANI University Kebangsaan Malaysia, Institute of West Asian Studies (IKRAB) 43600 Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia e-mail: inamal@yahoo.com / inawan@ukm.my
POVZETEK
Nobena tema ni bila deležna obširnejše obravnave v kronikah poznejšega čerkeškega obdobja kot likvidnostni primanjkljaj režima vpričo nenehnih zahtev njegove vojske po zvišanju plač. Izgredi, do katerih je prihajalo skozi celotno obravnavano obdobje, so razkrili, kateri deli vojske so bili najbolj nagnjeni k nasilnemu vedenju, in kako ranljivo je bilo neoboroženo ljudstvo. Bolj kot je upadala sposobnost režima, da kaznuje samovoljo Julbanov in zadovolji njihovim težnjam, bolj je njihova predrznost in frustracija naraščala. Sultani so le neradi grajali njihovo nesramnost..
Izgredi in zmešnjave so bili zato pogosti. Zdi se, da so Julbani poskušali ustvariti politično nestabilnost s prekinitvijo toka gospodarskih aktivnosti in z napadi na civiliste. Upali so, da bodo s taktiko rušenja ekonomske stabilnosti prisilili sultane k izpolnitvi njihovih zahtev. Povsem jasno je, da julbanski nemiri niso pripeljali do popolnega propada mameluškega gospodarstva, temveč so samo zmotili dnevne gospodarske tokove in povzročili škodo tistim, ki so se ukvarjali s trgovskimi dejavnostmi. Nezadostni prihodki v državno blagajno pa so nezmožnost sultanov, da izplačajo Julbane, še povečali. Šlo je za dinamičen proces, ne zgolj za vzročno-posledičen odnos med sultani in Julbani.
Ključne besede: Mameluki, Julbani, izgredi, gospodarske posledice, trgovina
Wan Kamal MUJANI: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE JULBANRIOTS DURING THE MAMLUK ..., 1-14
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