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S T R U G G L E S  A N D  D I L E M M A S 
O F  U Y G H U R  I M M I G R A N T S  I N 
T U R K E Y
M e t t u r s u n  B e y d u l l a
 
Introduction
The Ottoman Empire had a tradition of accepting refugees from 
various parts of the world. Asylum was given primarily to Muslims, but 
Jews and Christians were also welcome. This tradition continued into 
the Turkish Republican period, although considerations of ethnicity 
and language were substituted for religion. Over the last nine decades, 
Turkey has given refuge mostly to Turkic-speaking Muslims (with the 
exception of Syrian refugees, Bosnian and Albanian refugees from the 
Balkans), especially those facing persecution in their homelands. Large 
numbers of refugees from such disparate regions as the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, the Soviet Union Central Asian Republics, Xinjiang Uyg-
hur Autonomous Region, China (East Turkistan), and Afghanistan 
have settled in Turkey. A smaller number have been accommodated 
from other regions as well. Aside from this tradition, concern for what 
Turks call “Outside Turks” (Dış Türkler) has long been an important 
feature of right-wing nationalist rhetoric. It can be argued that in the 
very formulation of “Outside Turks,” which began to be popularized in 
the 1950s, Turkey can be seen as the natural protector of the “Outside 
Turks” interests. Both the tradition of accepting Turkic refugees and the 
big brotherly interest in the welfare of “Outside Turks,” sometimes also 
termed “Captive Turks,” have been prominent in conservative circles. 
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Already in the late 19th century, Turkey served as a model for East 
Turkistan nationalism. Uyghurs have long regarded Turkey as a model 
and a source of moral support and ideological inspiration. Turkey, a 
supporter of Uyghur aspirations in Xinjiang (East Turkistan), has also 
historically been a major destination for Uyghurs fleeing Chinese rule. 
During the great Turkic-Muslim rebellion (1864‒1876) in Xinjiang 
against the Manchu-Qing Occupation, led by the Koqandi adventurer 
and opportunist Yaqub Beg, the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul not only 
provided Beg’s prospective state in Kashgar with weapons and military 
advisers, but also granted him the title of emir.1 In the 20th century, 
Turkey became a haven for Uyghur nationalists fleeing Xinjiang after 
it had been taken over by the people’s Liberation Army (pLA) in 1949. 
Turkey was the most influential locus in the Uyghur diaspora in the 
twentieth century. Since the 1950s, Turkey has provided Uyghur ac-
tivists a primary haven to help shape an East Turkistan independen-
ce movement.2 The second largest presence in the diaspora resides in 
Turkey (about one million Uyghurs live mostly in Turkic republics in 
Central Asia), where Uyghurs claim ancestral links to the Turks. Mo-
reover, Turkey’s ancestral, historic, linguistic, and cultural ties made it 
the most attractive destination for Uyghurs looking to escape Chinese 
repression. 
Viewing Uyghur immigrants as “Outside Turks” (Dış Türkler) has 
been an exceedingly volatile topic. At the core of the controversy is a 
concern with Turkish national identity and how to deal with all forei-
gners, not just Uyghur immigrants. A number of policy strategies have 
been attempted, including integrating the Uyghur population into ma-
instream Turkish society, and restricted citizenship and legal resident 
status. There are significant bureaucratic rules and unwritten regulati-
ons as well as vague and floating policies that individuals must navigate 
1  Mettursun Beydulla, “Sources and perspectives on Late Nineteenth Century Uyghur His-
tory,” in Conference Proceedings of the XVI Turkish Congress of History, September 22‒25, 2010. 
History of Central Asia and Caucasia 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish Historical Soci-
ety], 2015), 206.
2  Yizhak Shichor, “Limping on Two Legs: Uyghur Diaspora Organizations and the pros-
pects for Eastern Turkestan Independence,” Central Asia and the Caucasus 6, 48 (2007): 121, 
https://ca-c.org/article/4216.
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in order to become citizens and legal residents of Turkey. Integration 
itself is an elusive, though contradictory, concept. for most Turks, inte-
gration has meant acculturating Uyghurs into Turkish society without 
any attention paid to pluralism or multiculturalism. The purpose of 
this essay is to raise and discuss several important issues that will con-
textualize the current Turkish view of integrating the Uyghur commu-
nity as well as the Uyghur struggles and dilemmas. I will also describe 
and discuss pro-Uyghur and anti-Chinese mobilization in Turkey and 
the Chinese reaction and the attention they pay to this issue. This at-
tention has affected Uyghurs in Turkey and the relationship between 
Turkey and China. finally, I will discuss the new world order: Turkey’s 
relations with China and its reflection on the Uyghurs and the Uyghur 
cause at home and in the diaspora.
I carried out a research project from 2013 to 2016, involving inter-
views with 200 Uyghur immigrants (including refugees), asking about 
identity, struggles and dilemmas and those interviews are the basis for 
this paper. The objective of this article is to illuminate the historic and 
ethnographic context of the exodus of Uyghurs from China to Turkey 
from the 1950s to the present, as well as their subsequent immigration 
to Europe and the United States. I intend to do this primarily by re-
porting the content of interviews with participants and eyewitnesses to 
those events who are currently living in Turkey. I also include updated 
information about Uyghur refugees and immigrants from around the 
world. Qualitative analysis reveals the differing historical and contem-
porary pathways of Uyghur migration to Turkey. This analytical per-
spective shows the nature of Uyghur migration to Turkey as it interfaces 
with the Turkish national project and how these perspectives have been 
shaped by recent periods of neoliberalism, authoritarianism and globa-
lization.
Uyghur migration to Turkey and the struggle to survive 
The Chinese Army entered Xinjiang in September 1949 after the 
victory of the Communist party in the Chinese Civil War (1945‒1949). 
Uyghur and other Turkic people’s quest for independence was suppres-
sed inside China; it was revived abroad after a number of Uyghur lea-
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ders including Isa Yusup Alptekin and Mehmet Emint Bugra managed 
to escape, finally settling in Turkey. Uyghur migration has generally 
been in phases. In the first, Uyghurs fled China to neighboring coun-
tries, mainly to India (Kashmir), pakistan, and Afghanistan, but also to 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In March 1952, Turkey, supported by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), offered 
sanctuary to 2000 Eastern Turkistan refugees who had fled to India and 
pakistan following the communist occupation. In 1953 Turkey accep-
ted an additional 900 refugees. But in the 1950s Uyghurs were only 
offered a substitute, either temporary or permanent, for their occupied 
homeland. This Turkish policy persists to this very day. In 1965, Turkey 
accepted 235 immigrants from Yarkand, one third of a group of Uyg-
hur refugees who had fled to Afghanistan in 1961. Their absorption had 
been made possible by a special program financed by UNHCR, at the 
request of the Turkish government. Like their predecessors, they were 
given citizenship and provided with housing. Uyghurs have continued 
to arrive in Turkey since the late 1960s, mostly on an individual basis. 
In Xinjiang under Deng Xiaoping, the Uyghurs benefitted from a 
certain liberalization on the cultural and economic levels, with the re-
opening of mosques and Uyghur-speaking schools.3 After the 1980s, 
many Uyghur left China to study abroad or to go on pilgrimage (hajj) 
to Mecca, never to return. In August 1982, Turkey accepted another 
group of several thousand refugees from Afghanistan and pakistan. 
Many of them had escaped by crossing the border, now more open and 
less guarded. Then, with the fall of the Soviet Union, and bolstered by 
the independence of the neighboring Central Asian states, the dream 
of an independent Uyghur state came to life. However, this led to new 
political tensions. These tensions intensified in the 2000s in the inter-
national context of the “war on terror,” which allowed Beijing to play 
on the so-called threat of Islamist Uyghur terrorism.4 
Meanwhile, in Turkey, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, leader of the Uyghur di-
aspora throughout the Cold War, focused on a two-track approach to 
3  Collin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization (London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 126.
4  Dru gladney, Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern 
Subjects (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2004), 365.
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raise the profile of the Uyghur cause. first, he actively sought to culti-
vate relationships with Turkish political and military leaders with pan-
-Turkist leanings, most notably Suleyman Demirel and Turgut Ozal. 
Internationally, Alptekin attempted to enlist support for Uyghur na-
tionalist claims through a broad appeal to anti-communist sentiments 
in the Muslim world, the non-aligned developing world, and Taiwan. 
In raising awareness for the Uyghur cause, he paid visits to many or-
ganizations such as the Muslim World League and the Arab League, 
as well as attending the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Afro-Asian 
Conference in 1965 and the World Congress of Islam in 1964.5 One 
of the first Uyghur organizations in Turkey was the East Turkistan Re-
fugee Committee (Doğu Türkistan göçmenler Derneği Yayını), whose 
journal was launched in the early 1950s. Later, the National Center 
for the Liberation of East Turkistan was set up to promote culture and 
participate in various political demonstrations, and to distribute nati-
onalist propaganda. In 1976, the Eastern Turkistan foundation (Doğu 
Türkistan Vakfı) was formed, officially committed to the preservation 
of Uyghur cultural and social identity in China (and elsewhere), rather 
than to the promotion of political independence. 
The ideological divisions dominating Turkish political life throug-
hout the 1970s also affected these associations, which became “poli-
ticized” due to internal factions. following the 1980 military coup in 
Turkey, all associations, except for those in Uyghur, were closed. This 
continued until the mid-1980s and was followed by a more politically 
active period in political terms, when Uyghur immigrants gradually 
became the Uyghur diaspora. Doğu Türkistan’in Sesi (Voice of East Tur-
kistan), Alptekin established a quarterly journal of cultural studies in 
1984 in Turkish, English, and Uyghur. In 1992, the Eastern Turkestan 
World National Congress was established in Istanbul, the first transna-
tional umbrella organization representing Uyghurs. 
5  Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity press, 1995), 118, 150; Yizhak Shichor, “Virtual Transnationalism: Uyghur Commu-
nities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence,” In Muslim Networks 
and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, ed. Stefano Allievi and Jørgen S. Nielsen 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 290.
p O L I g R A f I
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Since 2010, Uyghurs have established many community organiza-
tions to facilitate their adaptation to life in Turkey, geared towards sol-
ving social and economic problems, easing the difficulties of transition 
and also aiming to alleviate the feeling of longing for their place of 
origin by providing a social and cultural life and network. Today, the 
Uyghurs have a large number of associations and foundations ranging 
from small solidarity associations concentrated in the big cities such as 
Istanbul, Ankara and Kayseri, to more advanced organizations that can 
be called unions or coalitions. Based on unofficial information, Turkey 
now has about 180 Uyghur associations and organizations. Some work 
closely together; most work independently. Their purposes are eclectic 
and often with the sole idea of sustaining themselves, ensuring solida-
rity within their own immigrant groups, and preserving their identities 
through cultural activities. Some organizations such as the East Tur-
kistan Education and Solidarity Association (Doğu Türkistan Maarif 
ve Dayanışma Derneği) are officially committed to the preservation of 
Uyghur culture and social identity, both in China and the diaspora, and 
openly promote political independence from China. Leaders are active 
in raising awareness for the Uyghur cause and have paid visits to many 
organizations both in Turkey and abroad. They have also visited high 
ranking Turkish officials including president Recep Tayip Erdogan and 
presidents of other political parties in Turkey. Doerschler6 contends that 
immigrants motivated principally by economic concerns are likely to be 
“largely focused on material and status gains in the host country, lea-
ving many quite detached from and disinterested in politics.” By con-
trast, groups that were expelled or otherwise left reluctantly may pine 
for the day when they can end their “exile” by returning home. With 
stronger ties to their society of origin, they might well see themselves as 
duty bound to advance the interests of their homeland in a more poli-
tical way in their temporary abode. They are attentive to events in their 
place of origin that “continue to have a bearing on the lives of friends, 
family, and other related minority or citizen groups”.7 
6  peter Doerschler, “push-pull factors and Immigrant political Integration in germany,” So-
cial Science Quarterly 87, no. 5 (December 2006): 1101, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956597.
7  Doerschler, “push-pull factors,” 1102.
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Starting in the1980s, and especially since 2009, there has been a new 
wave of immigrants who came to visit relatives, engage in trade, and 
study, many of them fleeing from Chinese persecution. The Uyghur 
ethnic networks in Turkey plays a significant role. They are characte-
rized by a well-functioning extended family, an ethnic neighborhood, 
community-based groups, and self-help organizations. Initially, most 
Uyghur migrants who had arrived collectively tended to settle together, 
creating special quarters, Zeytinburnu, Sefaköy, Aksaray, Selim paşa in 
Istanbul or Yasevi in Kayseri. The number of fundamentalists comple-
tely rejecting integration into Turkish society is very low. Most Uyg-
hurs want economic integration and access to employment, health care, 
schooling and other social services; however, the desire for cultural and 
social integration is the least of their concerns. Hundreds of Uyghurs 
who seek asylum temporarily are settled across Turkey by the UNHCR. 
In addition to these, thousands of Uyghur refugees and immigrants 
are living in limbo in precarious situations.8 Of the total population 
of Uyghurs living in Turkey, estimated at 50,000, at least 10,000 are 
refugees, plus 10,000 Kazakhs and Kyrgyz immigrants from Xinjiang 
living in Turkey. A number of Turkish politicians along with Turkish 
and Uygur scholars have speculated that the Uyghur population living 
in Turkey is about 320,000.9 However, it should be remembered that 
although not numerically strong, in terms of political leverage for Tur-
key, “the Uyghurs of China” can be used as a bargaining chip between 
Turkey and China. 
In the last couple of years, about 10,000 Uyghurs have applied for 
Turkish citizenship, but most of their applications have not been pro-
cessed. Just before every election and when Uyghur activists visit them, 
high-ranking politicians make promises to solve issues of residency and 
citizenship, but invariably they do not keep their promises. Occasi-
8  Mettursun Beydulla, “Experiences of Uyghur Migration to Turkey and the United States: 
Issues of Religion, Law, Society, Residence, and Citizenship,” in Migration and Islamic Ethics: 
Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship, ed. Ray Jureidini and Said fares Hassan 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 184, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004417342_011. 
9  Areeb Ullah, “Turkey to Block Anti-China Media to Dismay of Uighur Activists,” Middle 
East Eye (MME), August 4, 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-block-anti-chi-
na-media-dismay-uighur-activists.
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onally, the Turkish government has organized a big feast and invited 
thousands of Uyghurs and high-ranking Turkish politicians to address 
Uyghur and Xinjiang problems including human rights violations. All 
of these events are delivered live to the Turkish people and the world. 
Some Uyghurs believe these kinds of events help the Uyghur cause, but 
a number of activists and intellectuals have stressed that this type of 
event plays to targeted audiences. They are used to gain support from 
the nationalist and religious forces in Turkey, toying with the Uyghur.
Currently, many Uyghurs do not have resident permits or even valid 
passports. Many Uyghurs live in Turkey “illegally” and their situation 
is uncertain and precarious. Hundreds of Uyghurs are living in deten-
tion houses or deportation centers (Geri Gönderme Merkezi) under the 
guise of being terrorist suspects. Uyghurs in Turkey believe they are 
innocent. A prominent Uyghur activist and community leader stressed 
it this way: 
I don’t understand this and I have a hard time explaining this to my fellow 
Uyghur brothers. first, I visited Abdulkadir Yapchan/Yapçan in the deportati-
on center and he is a well-respected religious scholar, activist and community 
leader. (He has been in the deportation center since 2016).10 Then I visited 
Amine Vahit in the deportation center in Selim pasha Istanbul. I talked to her 
lawyer Mr. Zeynep and he told me that Amine is clean and innocent. Some-
one called the police and complained about her. So, she was arrested and put 
10  Abdulkadir Yapçan, who has been granted political asylum by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and has been living in Istanbul for 18 years. Yapchan escaped 
from China in 1998 reportedly the most wanted man in China, was accused of being a senior 
leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Due to the Chinese government’s 
lobbying and pressure, Turkey detained him in 2002 and 2008 but released him (Radio free 
Asia, “Exiled Leader Claims China Is behind Turkey’s Decision to Detain a Uyghur,” last modi-
fied October 10, 2016, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/exiled-leader-claims-chi-
na-10102016155133.html). Turkey’s Constitutional Court ruled on May 2, 2019 and ordered 
him freed from the deportation center. However, the next day the Istanbul Çağlayan 29th 
High Criminal Court issued a judgment in his renewed extradition case, but he was barred 
from leaving his neighborhood in the Küçükçekmece district of Istanbul (Abudulla Bozkurt, 
“Abdulkadir Yapuquan, China’s Most Wanted Uighur, freed in Turkey,” Nordic Monitor, May 
26, 2019, https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2019/05/abdulkadir-yapuquan-uighur-man-want-
ed-in-china-over-terror-charges-freed-in-turkey). On April 8, 2021, Istanbul Çağlayan Justice 
palace dismissed his case, citing a lack of credible evidence (Radio free Asia, “Turkish Court 
Rejects China's Request to Extradite Uyghur Religious Teacher,” April 9, 2021, https://www.
rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/turkey-dismiss-04092021192932.html).
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in a deportation center. She has two fatherless children. It is very sad. Do you 
think Allah can forgive us? We are persecuted and oppressed in China. But 
similar things are happening here in Turkey. It is because of Turkish burea-
ucracy and it is the fault of Turkish officials. Turkey is responsible for this in 
this world and in the next world. We will seek our rights and justice now and 
in the next world, in the name of Allah.11 
The Turkish immigration experience has created two groups of Uyg-
hurs, called yerlik (local) or kona (old) who were descendants of those 
migrating at earlier times (in the 1950s), and yengi kelgenler (newco-
mers), those who have immigrated since 1980. At first the cultural dif-
ferences between these groups were significant. The yerlik were more 
Turkicized, more religious and looked down upon by the newcomers 
because of their ignorance of religion. The second and third generation, 
young Uyghurs who were born in Turkey and are better educated than 
earlier generations, perceive and experience more acutely the discrimi-
nation and the status of being outsiders. The second and third genera-
tions of Uyghurs in Turkey assimilated so rapidly that in fact, commu-
nity activists worried about the dangers to Uyghur continuity posed by 
intermarriages, low levels of connection to the (East Turkistan) home-
land, the loss of the Uyghur language, and other indicators of declining 
distinctiveness. Some communities have been dissolved as the younger 
generations, some of whom had already been Turkicized and lost their 
Uyghur cultural and linguistic identity, tend to leave their traditional 
encapsulated compounds seeking accommodation and employment. 
Consciousness of Uyghur ethnic identity is typically highest at the time 
of arrival and erodes over time and across generations. Newly arrived 
Uyghur are thus more likely to be tied to East Turkistan and, to the 
extent that they are capable of collective political action in the host so-
ciety, to act on its behalf in the political realm. Time in Turkish society 
may also soften the sense of marginal status felt by Uyghur members 
as a whole. On arrival, a group’s folkways, traditions, social practices, 
cuisine, language, and public behavior may mark them as outsiders. 
11  Abdusalam Karataş, “gundem Icinden: Doğu Türkistan (Agenda: East Turkistan),” TV5, 
July 23, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/100008284862701/videos/2228935120725962/
UzpfSTEwMDAwODI4NDg2MjcwMToyMjI4OTc0MDc3Mzg4NzMz.
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Nonetheless, Alba and Nee12 have documented the gradual erosion of 
ethnic consciousness over time in a manner consistent with the for-
mulations of the concept and resistance to nativist elements. Religion, 
though less-commonly cited as a factor in receptivity, is undoubtedly 
part of the package.
for similar economic and professional reasons, since the 1960s many 
of Turkey’s Uyghurs began immigrating to third countries such as Ca-
nada, Holland, and Scandinavian countries, but primarily to germany. 
paradoxically, it has been more difficult for them to assimilate and ea-
sier to maintain their identity in these countries compared to Turkey. 
Under these circumstances germany, and later the United States, has 
become the central outpost and the most important base for promoting 
the cause of East Turkistan independence and Uyghur nationalism.
The Uyghurs in Turkey consider themselves to be Uyghur Turks, a 
Muslim part of the Umma, but they still try to retain their Uyghur cultu-
re. They generally have positive feelings towards Turkey, even those who 
have been subjected to unfair treatment, being ignored, ridiculed or tre-
ated differently. Most maintain ties with relatives in East Turkistan and 
even in the absence of such ties, they maintain an interest in Uyghur 
news, customs and a desire to revisit their homeland. They have formed 
various cultural and religious associations through which they have con-
tact with other immigrants and refugees from East Turkistan and main-
tain an identification with the Uyghur community. Unfortunately, most 
of the Uyghur diaspora in Turkey have not been able to contact their 
families in East Turkistan since December 2016. E-mail, telephone and 
internet have been shut down by the authorities. Authorities have severe-
ly restricted Uyghurs leaving since the summer of 2017, in what Uyghurs 
believe is an attempt to keep the lid on stories that might be told about 
the ongoing repression inside Xinjiang. The Chinese government is con-
ducting a mass, systematic campaign of human rights violations against 
Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang.13 Dr. Abudreşit Celil Karluk 
12  Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Con-
temporary Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 2003).
13  HRW, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses China’s Campaign of Repression against Xinjiang’s 
Muslims,” Human Rights Watch, September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re-
port_pdf/china0918_web.pdf.
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(professor at Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey) highlighted 
these issues in a press conference:
China has not only violated human rights in East Turkistan, China has 
violated human rights every place it can reach. Look at our room now, where 
are the media? Why is this room not full? These things clearly prove China’s 
human rights violations of people here, in Turkey. China is using its lobby to 
violate Uyghurs’ rights all over the world. East Turkistan has double the honor 
of Turkey as both Muslim and Turkish. Uyghurs are hopeless and powerless. 
My fellow Uyghur brothers in East Turkistan said, “Our ancestors fought aga-
inst the invaders in the Battle of gallipoli (Çanakkale Savaşı) and they were 
martyred there. We gave support and help to the establishment of the Repu-
blic of Turkey. Where is Turkey now? Why is Turkey so silent during our dif-
ficult and dark time? Where is the fidelity of the Turkish people?” My fellow 
Uyghur brothers in Turkey asked me why if, “We have skills and are capable 
of working, why not give us a work permit? Why doesn’t the Turkish gover-
nment give us the same benefits they gave to Syrian refugees? Why don’t they 
give us the same benefits they gave to Syrian students? Thousands of Uyghur 
students who came from East Turkistan and fled from Egypt are studying in 
Turkey now. Most of them don’t have a scholarship and most Uyghur students 
can’t communicate with their families, since communication is banned by 
the Chinese government. They can’t receive any financial support from their 
parents. So, they aren’t able to pay 5,000 TL‒ 30,000 TL tuition. In the end 
they give up school and a lot of them work for Turkish tourism companies as 
tour guides and interpreters for Chinese tourists in Turkey. We know thousan-
ds of Uyghurs whose residency permits and other problems are not solved in 
Turkey. When the dead body of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi washed up on the 
beach in Turkey, the whole world, including Turkey, was shocked and raised 
their voices. The same things are happening in East Turkistan, but Turkey 
and the rest of the world are silent. Why? Turkish musicians are performing 
Uyghur music and songs and making money. Hundreds of Turkish scholars 
are studying and teaching Uyghur language, literature, culture and history in 
Turkey. Where are these people? Why didn’t these folks give voice to hundreds 
of Uyghur artists and scholars in jail? All of this makes us think. Obviously, we 
see the fear of China’s huge impact on our Turkish and Muslim brothers and 
other humanity. I want to say one more thing. It would be very different and 
we would receive more attention and more support, if we held a conference 
about animal rights and dogs were killed in the street.14 
14  Türk Ocakları, “Dogu Turkistan’daki Insan Haklari Ihlalleri Hakkinda Basin Açiklaması 
[press Conference on Human Rights Violation in East Turkistan],” Turk Ocaklar, accessed Octo-
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In August 2018, a United Nations panel reported that China had 
turned Xinjiang into “a massive internment camp.” United Nations hu-
man rights experts expressed alarm over what they said were many cre-
dible reports that China had detained a million or more ethnic Uyghurs 
in the western region of Xinjiang and forced as many as two million to 
submit to re-education and indoctrination. gay McDougall, a member 
of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
said that “something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded 
in secrecy, a sort of no-rights zone,”15 had been created, and Uyghur 
human rights organizations reported that three to five million Uyghur, 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz (mostly Uyghurs) were locked in the concentrati-
on camps. The “people’s War on Terror” is directly linked to president 
Xi Jinping’s broader moves to establish his personal authority, and to 
demonstrate absolute control over this key strategic region in order to 
ensure the success of the flagship BRI, of which Xinjiang is an impor-
tant part. Current policies seek to quarantine Uyghurs from any foreign 
contact by targeting individuals who have promoted Uyghur language 
or culture, as well as people who resist, or are insufficiently enthusiastic 
about “security” and the “war on terror” campaign.16 Now the United 
States, Canada, the Netherlands and UK parliaments and governments 
recognize that what happened to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim 
people in Xinjiang is genocide. More than 50 recognized independent 
researchers into international law, Chinese ethnic genocide policy and 
Uyghur studies have conducted research and released their report. This 
report stated that Chinese authorities’ treatment of Uyghurs meets eve-
ry criteria of genocide under the United Nations 1948 genocide Con-
vention. This report concluded that China bears state responsibility for 
an ongoing genocide against the Uyghurs, in breach of the genocide 
Convention. It included mass internment, mass birth-prevention stra-
ber 28, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=turk%20ocaklari%20dogu%20turkistan.
15  Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. panel Confronts China over Reports that It Holds a Million 
Uighurs in Camps,” New York Times, August 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/
world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html.
16  Rachel Harris, “Securitization and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang: How Uyghurs Became 
Quarantined from the Outside World,” Quartz, September 5, 2018, https://qz.com/1377394/
securitization-and-mass-detentions-in-xinjiang-how-uyghurs-became-quarantined-from-the-
outside-world.
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tegy, forced sterilization, forcible transfer of Uyghur children to state-
-run facilities, and eradication of Uyghur identity, community, and do-
mestic life, selective targeting of intellectuals and community leaders.17 
The educational dilemma among the Uyghur in Turkey 
Compared to Turkish youth, many young Uyghurs in Turkey are 
more likely to grow up marginalized in an economically deprived en-
vironment with restricted educational opportunities. for Uyghurs, in-
cluding those from families who have been in Turkey for three genera-
tions, the most important issue is employment; they have a hard time 
competing with Turks. Above and beyond the discrimination to which 
they are subjected there is the accumulation of educational deprivation 
that begins with linguistic deficiencies. first-generation Uyghurs have a 
limited command of the Turkish language. These linguistic challenges 
have been identified as a major factor for the first generations, which is 
then reinforced by the Turkish school system and regulations that do 
not adapt to the needs of Uyghur children. Though Uyghurs are the 
single largest minority group in some counties such as Zeytinburnu 
and Selim paşa in Istanbul and constitute the biggest minority of the 
population in some school districts, there are currently no teachers who 
can speak the Uyghur language. There are no initiatives to establish a 
bilingual educational system or language programs for Uyghur students 
and their parents. 
Standard Turkish is not typically spoken in Uyghur communities 
in Turkey, especially while participating in social and cultural acti-
vities and at home. Many Uyghurs who are legal residents in Tur-
key (even naturalized citizens) will “fetch” a bride from inside their 
Uyghur community, Central Asia or from East Turkistan. (This was 
the case until recently; now there is an overseas travel ban from East 
Turkistan instituted by the Chinese government). These spouses often 
remain anchored at home for a number of years. This means they 
17  Newlines Institute for Strategy and policy, The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s 
Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, March 2021, https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-gC3.pdf, 3‒5.
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might spend most of their time at home, watching Uyghur DVDs, 
reading Uyghur novels and studying the Quran. Except for watching 
Turkish television programs, they will have virtually no exposure to 
Turks, Turkish society or their language. given the recession in Tur-
key, such a process is likely to continue for a number of years when 
women have children. The children in turn will spend their formative 
years consuming Uyghur language and culture. To a large extent it is 
a vicious cycle. 
Lacking economic independence, young Uyghurs are forced into a 
dependent relationship with their families and the larger Uyghur com-
munity that serves as their support system. Based on my study, the 
family ranked highest in the values held by Uyghurs, followed by the 
desire for true friendship, and a satisfying occupation. Most Uyghur 
first-graders do not master standard Turkish because they are raised in 
settings where mostly Uyghur is spoken. Most parents cannot parti-
cipate in parent-teacher conferences or school meetings because their 
command of Turkish is limited. It is rare that such linguistic barriers 
can be surmounted in schools, and it is therefore a significant factor in 
the inability of Uyghur students to acquire knowledge in other subjects 
in school. In an interview, my informant Mr. Karahan touched on this 
important issue: 
In elementary school, in the first and second grades, my daughter and 
son were not able to acquire knowledge in Turkish and other subjects at 
school. Their teacher and director of the school asked to meet me to discuss 
my children’s situation. I was not aware of this until I met them. They told 
me that my children didn’t talk and were very silent in the classroom. They 
got very low scores in all subjects. They thought my children might have 
mental and psychological problems. They recommended that I see a psychi-
atrist they knew. My wife and I were very worried. So, I took my children to 
that psychiatrist and he told us to speak Turkish at home all of the time and 
take time to help them with their homework at home. I agreed with him 
and we did what he said. My children are gradually doing better and their 
scores are improving at school. We did not hear any more complaints from 
the teacher and the school director. Now we are facing another serious pro-
blem: my children do not speak Uyghur at all at home. We speak Uyghur 
to them, and they reply in Turkish. They are in middle school now and they 
feel comfortable speaking Turkish and behave more like Turks, not Uyghurs. 
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I am worried and I feel awkward about this situation. I hope they will go 
back to being normal one day. 
The Turkish educational establishment does not focus on the langu-
age problem of the Uyghur community. A number of my informants 
complained that their Turkish counterparts have more advantages in 
schooling and in job prospects in Turkey because of their connections 
(torpil) and untouchable social network, not just because of qualifica-
tions. A number of Uyghurs I interviewed complained about the poor 
quality of education in Turkey, especially the public schools and they 
said they wished to send their children to Europe or North America, if 
they would be able.
The social distance between Uyghur immigrants and the Turkish 
population has become larger, with the exception of the relatively small 
group of upper-middle class Uyghur immigrants, and a small cadre of 
technical and cultural intelligentsia, religious scholars and traders, who 
by virtue of their class position have closer contact with their Turkish 
counterparts. According to my study, the upscale Uyghur groups feel 
more at home with their Turkish counterparts than with the poor and 
marginalized members of the Uyghur community. So, we can see there 
is an emerging class-based rift within the Uyghur community in Turkey.
Turkish policy toward Uyghurs 
The Turkish government has traditionally denied the diverse ethnic 
character of Turkey’s population, which is the popular view of ethnicity 
in Turkey. people recognize the different heritage of their neighbors, 
identifying them as Circassians, Tatar, Kurdish or Laz with little tension 
arising. Uyghurs in Turkey who are the descendants of refugees from 
Xinjiang in the 1960s, are largely assimilated and consider themsel-
ves Turks rather than Uyghur or East Turkistanis. According to some 
of my informants, Turkish people generally called them “immigrants” 
(göçmen), even “Japanese” (Japon) or Chinese (Çinli) because of their 
different facial features, in particular their “almond eyes” (çekik göz). 
Some of my informants stressed that they felt extremely unhappy and 
even insulted by these descriptions and attitudes. They also mentioned 
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that the Turkish attitude and behavior have radically changed since the 
1990s. These Uyghurs explained this change occurred because of the in-
dependence of the Central Asian republics, Turkey’s subsequent policy 
change toward “Outside Turks,” and public knowledge and awareness 
about Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. for exam-
ple, media such as TV and newspapers cover more news about “Out-
side Turks”; history and literature course materials have included more 
about “Outside Turks.” The Turkish government awarded scholarships 
and encouraged “Outside Turk” students to study in Turkey. Thousands 
of students have come to Turkey from Central Asian Turkic republics 
and about one hundred from East Turkistan have come to study in 
Turkey every year since 1990. This number increased in the last couple 
of years and now thousands of Uyghur students from Xinjiang are stu-
dying in Turkey, although most don’t have a government scholarship.
government policy throughout the life of the Republic has aimed 
at the homogenization of the population of Anatolia based on Turkish 
cultural and linguistic norms. for Kemalists, this approach was crucial 
to the goal of the survival and long-term viability of the nation-state. 
In order to achieve this goal, Mustafa Kemal and the military/political 
elite equipped the state with a superior power over the civil society. Serif 
Mardin18 put special emphasis on the statist and centralist character of 
the Republic in its founding years. Ottoman history demonstrated that 
external power exploited minority and nationality questions to advance 
Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy goals. To avoid this problem, a new 
identity had to be created and disparate elements made to cohere.
The descendants of Muslim émigrés from East Turkistan were not 
exempt from legal pressure and propaganda. There was to be no edu-
cation or publishing in Turkic dialects such as Uyghur. This had been 
undertaken so rarely as to be inconsequential. To prosper in society, it 
was important that an obvious non-Turkish identity be suppressed. More 
significantly, rural to urban migration and the tendency to inter-marry 
into the Turkish Sunni majority have played a key part in the assimilation 
18  Serif Mardin, “Center and periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish politics,” in Political Par-
ticipation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, ed. Engin Akarlı and gabriel 
Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bogaziçi University publications, 1975), 22.
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process. Youths, especially those of the second and third generations, have 
failed to develop their knowledge of the Turkic or Uyghur languages of 
their forefathers, long gravitating instead to the prestige language of the 
state, Istanbul Turkish. Even the involvement of Uyghurs in local politics 
in Turkey can have the purpose of raising awareness of the Uyghur que-
stion and identity locally; for instance, advocating the recognition and 
use of Uyghur ethnicity, and demanding Uyghur language instruction 
in Turkish schools (thus far not successful). But crucially, it is also aimed 
at gaining support for the Uyghur struggle in East Turkistan. Having 
become Turkish citizens and voters, Uyghurs have started to engage in 
the political lobbying of Turkish political leaders on the issue of Uyghur 
rights in East Turkistan. Such forms of lobbying and generating support 
for the Uyghurs, unfortunately, have not put any pressure on China; it is 
a case of politicians giving lip service. 
Chinese repression across borders: 
Anti-China mobilization among the Uyghurs in Turkey
Anti-Chinese sentiment among Uyghurs in Turkey has attracted the 
attention of Chinese authorities for a long time, and this attention has in 
turn affected and shaped mobilization. Uyghurs in Turkey have worked 
with “newcomers” or new Uyghurs or Kazaks from Xinjiang to distribute 
information to the rest of the world about Chinese human rights abuses. 
During the february 1997 riots in ghulja, the July 5, 2009 Urumchi riot, 
and recent implementation of China’s “re-education camps,” for exam-
ple, Uyghurs in Turkey have gathered eyewitness accounts of events in 
ghulja, Urumchi and across Xinjiang from newcomers in Turkey and 
distributed these accounts to the world press both through news confe-
rences and social media. 
Radio free Asia Uyghur Services has documented that Chinese 
agents have offered jobs to native Turks to collect information about 
Uyghurs in Turkey.19 A number of my informants indicated that Chi-
nese embassy or trade office staff are dedicated solely to mapping dissi-
19  Radio free Asia, “Uyhgurlar Hakkide Melumat Toplash Uchun Hitay Bezi Turklerge Ish 
Teklipi Sunghan [Chinese Offer Jobs to Some Turks to Collect Information about Uyghurs in 
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dents and other Uyghurs including refugees and their activities in Tur-
key. Threats, often directed at family members still in Xinjiang, are the 
most common way the Chinese government has used to silence dissi-
dents in Turkey, and a large number of refugees and immigrants still live 
in fear of Chinese authorities.20 TRT World has documented that, “The 
persecuted community who are living in Turkey say Chinese authorities 
have recruited Uyghurs to watch over whether their behavior is ‘suspi-
cious’ or opposed to the ruling Communist party”.21 Therefore, most 
of the Uyghurs I interviewed asked me to keep their identities confi-
dential, and a number of Uyghurs, including students, university lectu-
rers, tradesmen, and housewives, refused to agree to an interview out of 
fear. A couple of them asked me to delete the recording after I finished 
the interview. Uyghurs live with fear and trauma because their families 
remain stranded in China’s growing “re-education camps”.22 China is 
tearing Uyghur families apart.23 As a consequence, a number of my 
interviewees would not socialize with other Uyghurs, especially Uyghur 
organizations and activists. They said that there was no way of knowing 
whether or not these people were connected to the Chinese Commu-
nist regime. A lot of my informants stated that the Chinese government 
was documenting demonstrations, identifying those involved in these 
activities, sending out threats and harassing Uyghurs and their family 
Turkey],” last modified October 6, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/xelqara-xewer/
xitaydin-turuk-yashlirigha-jasusluq-teklipi-10062017222809.html.
20  Amnesty International, “Nowhere feels Safe,” accessed february 26, 2020, https://www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/02/china-uyghurs-abroad-living-in-fear.
21  TRT World, “Uyghurs in Exile Say China Is Spying on Them Worldwide,” accessed June 
14, 2018, http://www.etaa.org.au/uyghurs-in-exile-say-china-is-spying-on-them-worldwide. 
22  ABC, “Uighurs Live with fear, Trauma as families Remain Stranded in China’s grow-
ing ‘re-education Camps’,” ABC’s Asia pacific Newsroom, October 6, 2018, https://www.abc.
net.au/news/2018-06-24/uighur-community-in-australia-fear-reports-of-crackdown-in-chi-
na/9824554.
23  Ivan Watson and Ben Westcott, “Cultural genocide: How China Is Tearing Uyghur fami-
lies Apart in Xinjiang,” CNN, November 15, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/14/asia/uy-
ghur-china-xinjiang-interview-intl/index.html; fergus Hunter, “Detained and in Danger: The 
Tortured Australian families Who fear for Their Missing Loved Ones,” The Sydney Morning 
Herald, November 17, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/detained-and-in-dan-
ger-the-tortured-australian-families-who-fear-for-their-missing-loved-ones-20181115-p50g5q.
html.
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members still in Xinjiang.24 The Chinese government used WhatsApp 
and WeChat to intimidate and surveil Uyghurs in Turkey.25 These re-
velations then contribute to the widespread feeling among activists and 
many Uyghurs that Chinese authorities have eyes and ears everywhere. 
This, in turn, is a powerful obstacle to Uyghur diaspora mobilization in 
Turkey and the rest of the world. On September 15, 2018, a prominent 
Uyghur activist, community leader, president of East Turkestan Cul-
ture and Solidarity Association (Doğu Türkistan Kültür ve Dayanışma 
Derneği) and former deputy president of the World Uyghur Congress, 
Sayit Tumturk, said:
Turkey does not allow us to establish a new independent organization for 
the campaign for East Turkistan independence because of China. But we have 
permission from the french authorities. So, we will establish our new or-
ganization in france between September 28 and October 1, 2019. Turkey’s 
isolation by the international community and economic crisis has pushed 
Turkey close to China. China’s economic, military and technological power 
and investments in Turkey are increasing its influence in Turkey; Turkey is also 
silent on human rights abuse in East Turkistan. Turkey is behaving and acting 
like a political ally of China. This is encouraging China’s policy toward East 
Turkistan. I have been campaigning for human rights and democracy for East 
Turkistan for the last 30 years, peacefully and legally. Now our activity has 
been restricted by the Turkish authorities, especially since february 2018. I 
am very disappointed. I think and I hope this friendship between Turkey and 
China is temporary and not forever. The government controls the media and 
is hiding the real situation from the Turkish people. The Turkish people will 
not remain silent about the terrifying tragedy in East Turkistan. I have been 
warned by the Turkish authorities. I am afraid for my security and I am afraid 
of being arrested by the Turkish authorities. I think nobody can stop me. It 
is my moral and religious obligation. I will continue my liberty, freedom and 
independence campaign for East Turkistan with my fellow brothers. I am wil-
24  Borzou Daragahi, “We Can Reach You Wherever You Are: Uighurs Abroad feel China’s 
Reach,” The Independent, November 12, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
middle-east/china-uighur-repression-espionage-informants-muslim-terrorism-a8626526.html.
25  John Beck, “How China Spies on Uyghurs in Turkey. WhatsApp and WeChat Are Used 
to Intimidate and Surveil Uyghurs,” Coda Story, february 13, 2020, https://codastory.com/
authoritarian-tech/surveillance/uyghurs-turkey-whatsapp-wechat.
p O L I g R A f I
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ling to become a refugee in a safe place such as Europe, if it is necessary. I hope 
for the best, and I am preparing for the worst.26 
from September 28 to October 1, 2018, 200 delegates from 15 or-
ganizations in 20 countries attended the summit in paris, france. They 
established the East Turkistan National Council (Doğu Türkistan Milli 
Meclisi) and the East Turkistan Independent Organization (Doğu Tür-
kistan Bağımsızlık Teşkilatı) in paris. Seyit Tumturk was elected as the 
president of the East Turkistan National Council.27 
Turkey’s relations with China and its impact on the Uyghurs
We cannot draw a full picture of the current and future situation 
and status of Uyghurs in Turkey unless we discuss Turkey’s economic, 
military and trade ties with China. Relations between the Republic of 
Turkey and the people’s Republic of China began on August 4, 1971. 
This change in position was tied to the change in the U.S. position to-
wards China. president Nixon and his leadership’s long-running adver-
se position toward China began to change in the early 1970s, leading 
many countries, including Turkey, to establish relations. However, little 
close cooperation occurred between the two countries in the 1970s and 
80s. This situation changed after the Justice and Development party 
(AKp) came to power in 2002. from June 24 to 29, 2009 Turkish pre-
sident Abdullah gül became the first Turkish president to visit China in 
14 years. He called on Uyghurs to play the role of a “friendship bridge” 
between Turkey and China. The two sides signed $1.5 billion worth of 
trade deals. This was an important visit, but relations were then locked 
due to strong public reactions in Turkey against the Urumchi riot and 
massacre on July 5, 2009. (Hundreds of Uyghurs died and thousan-
ds were injured and disappeared, according to independent sources. 
Eyewitnesses set this number much higher). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
26  Huseyin Tejelli, “Sheriqi Turkistan Musteqqilliq Herkiti [East Turkistan Independent 
Movement: Talk with Mr. Seyit Tumturk],” Qerindashliq Situdisi, accessed September 15, 
2018, https://www.facebook.com/search/videos/?q=huseyin%20tejelli. 
27  Ömer Aydin, “‘Doğu Türkistan Milli Meclisi’ Kuruldu,” Memleket, September 30, 2018, 
http://www.memleket.com.tr/dogu-turkistan-milli-meclisi-kuruldu-1512118h.htm.
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denounced what he called “savagery” and called on the Chinese go-
vernment to “give up efforts to assimilate” Uyghurs. He announced to 
journalists upon his return to Ankara from the group of Eight summit 
in Italy that the July 5 riot and massacre in China was genocide. There 
was no way to interpret this otherwise.28 He also said in the g8 mee-
ting that Turkey would bring the Uyghur issue to the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation, the UN and AB’s agenda. Just after the Urumchi 
massacre, Turkey gave citizenship to 3000 Uyghurs. It is an open secret 
that Erdogan supports a Xinjiang secession to become an independent 
East Turkestan “under Turkey’s responsibility.” In february 2012, then 
Chinese Vice president Xi Jinping (the current Chinese president) visi-
ted Turkey and reiterated the goal of increasing bilateral trade to $100 
billion by 2020.29 
In 2010, a “strategic partnership” between Turkey and China was 
forged. The partnership has rapidly deepened through agreements, such 
as the one signed in 2015 during the g20 summit in Antalya, which 
subsequently made Turkey part of China’s BRI.30 Turkey’s currency, the 
lira, has lost about 40% of its value against the U.S. dollar and the 
euro since the start of 2018. The drop has been made worse by a row 
between Turkey and the United States that led to U.S. economic sanc-
tions against Turkey. Turkey’s gross external debt stock stood at $466.67 
billion, more than half of its gross domestic product (gDp), 52.9%, at 
the end of March 2018, the Treasury announced on June 29.31 China 
could play an important role in helping Turkey overcome this econo-
mic crisis. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in August 
2018 provided a $3.6 billion loan package to the Turkish energy and 
28  CNN, “Turks Criticize Chinese Treatment of Uyghurs,” last modified July 11, 2009, 
http://https://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/07/11/turkey.china.uyghurs/. 
29  Today’s Zaman, “Turkey, China Set Eyes on $100 bln Mutual Trade,” last modified febru-
ary 22, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-272194-turkey-china-set-eyes-on-100-bln-
in-mutual-trade.html.
30  Xinhua, “China’s g20 presidency Aligns with Turkey’s priorities,” last modified Novem-
ber 16, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2015-11/16/content_37078424.
htm. 
31  Hurriyet Daily News, “Turkey’s External Debt Stock Reaches $466.7 Billion in first Quar-
ter,” June 29, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-external-debt-stock-reaches-
466-7-billion-in-first-quarter-133976.
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transportation sector. One thousand Chinese companies are active in 
Turkey and Ankara is working to attract more Chinese tourists.32 
Scholars claim that the Turkish support for the Uyghurs will weaken 
long-term bilateral relations,33 as well as China’s and Turkey’s divergent 
policies regarding regional issues, such as China’s handling of religious 
freedom in the Xinjiang region, and Turkey’s attempt at seeking incre-
asing economic relations with Taiwan, may impact the possibilities for 
potential cooperation between China and Turkey.34 The impact of the 
Uyghur issue on China-Turkey relations may be large, as China suspec-
ts Turkey is harboring Uyghur terrorists and thus this may lead to dif-
ficult relations between the two countries.35 Due to the shift in support 
away from the United States in the post-Cold War era, Turkey needs to 
diversify its security, military and economic interests through pursuing 
a “balance” towards China, the newly-emerging power.
 At an unofficial level, emotional and hostile attitudes have prevailed. 
The public mood displayed varying degrees of hostility towards China 
over their persecution of Uyghurs and human rights abuse in Xinjiang, 
and politicians and government cannot stand aside. Turkish public opi-
nion is split regarding opportunities with China and China’s growing 
threat to its values and interests.36 Left-leaning groups in Turkey favor 
China; Turks who are oriented towards Turkic or Muslim identity and 
values see China very negatively because of the Uyghur issue. The bu-
siness community in Turkey sees China as the golden goose and they 
want to take advantage of China’s economic growth. The Turkish go-
32  Thomas Seibert, “Anxious Not to Offend China, Turkey Stays Mum on Treatment of Ui-
ghurs,” The Arab Weekly, September 16, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/anxious-not-offend-
china-turkey-stays-mum-treatment-uighurs.
33  Erkin Ekrem, “Türk-Çin İliskilerinde Uygur Sorunu [Uyghur Issue in the Relationship 
between Turkey and China],” World Uyghur Congress, March 10, 2015, https://www.uyghur-
congress.org/tr/turk-cin-iliskilerinde-uygur-sorunu/.
34  Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Turkey-China Relations: Rising partnership,” Ortadogu Analiz 5, no. 
52 (2013): 42, https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/3selcukcolakoglu.pdf.
35  Yizhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, East West 
Center policy Studies 53 (Honolulu: East West Center, 2009), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/
system/tdf/private/ps053.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32351.
36  Selçuk Çolakoğlu, Turkish Perceptions of China’s Rise, Report No. 39. (Ankara: Interna-
tional Strategic Research Organization, 2014), 9.
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vernment evaluates China as the balancing factor in world politics.37 
Officially, for example, Turkey has always pledged to help China fight 
Uyghur separatism and “terrorism.” Turkish foreign Minister Mevlut 
Cavusoglu stated in Beijing: “We take China’s security as our security. 
We absolutely will not allow in Turkey any activities targeting or oppo-
sing China. Additionally, we will take measures to eliminate any media 
reports targeting China.”38 While on July 8, 2019 a letter signed by 22 
countries was sent to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
which voiced concern about the oppression of the Uyghurs, including 
the use of internment camps, 37 countries defended China over the 
mass detention of Uyghur Muslims in a letter to the UN on December 
6, 2019.39 Turkey did not sign either of the letters. The official oppo-
sition in the Turkish parliament (CHp, IYI party and HDp) has twice 
requested the government condemn human rights violations in Xinji-
ang and send an independent investigation to the Xinjiang, but both 
times this was rejected by the Turkish government (AKp and MHp).
Turkey and China have pledged closer cooperation on judicial mat-
ters. To help nurture closer relations, eight Turkish prosecutors and jud-
ges are learning the Chinese language at the public Security University 
in Beijing.40 Yücel Oğurlu (law professor and rector of Istanbul Com-
merce University) touched on many of these factors at the nexus of law, 
immigration, Turkey’s relationship with China, and Uyghur’s status in 
Turkey:
Turkey must immediately show concern and put on its agenda the citi-
zenship application of these 5‒6 thousand Uyghurs who came to Turkey as 
students and traders.41 China is proposing that communications with foreign 
37  Çolakoğlu, Turkish Perceptions of China’s Rise, 9.
38  Reuters, “Turkey promises to Eliminate Anti-China Media Reports,” August 3, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-turkey-idUSKBN1AJ1BV.
39  france 24, “37 countries defend China over Xinjiang in UN letter,” July 12, 2019, https://
www.france24.com/en/20190712-37-countries-defend-china-over-xinjiang-un-letter.
40  Anadolu Agency, “Turkey, China Justice Ministers Seek More Cooperation,” November 
14, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkey-china-justice-ministers-seek-more-
cooperation/1310926.
41   Yücel Oğurlu, “Uygurlar’ın Vatandaşlığında İnsanlık Sınavını Kaybediyoruz… (I) [We 
Are failing Our Test on the Uyghurs’ Citizenship],” Diriliş postasi, November 17, 2018. 
https://www.dunyabulteni.net/analiz/uygurlarin-vatandasliginda-insanlik-sinavini-kaybedi-
yoruz-h432888.html. 
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countries’ ministries, institutions and universities be proof of its legitimacy. 
Any communication with China from a Turkish ministry or official, using the 
words they said on purpose or not, and for good intention, discussing China’s 
security, territorial integrity, peace or terrorism, can be used against Uyghurs. 
As an example, the Turkish public Administrations or justice departments, 
jurisdictions and financial authorities have nothing to learn from China, no 
lessons and no practical experiences. We should be aware that every com-
promise contributes to Uyghur oppression; we should be conscious of our 
obligation as humans and as the brotherhood of Muslims and Turks. After 
I saw the desperate situation, I felt a humanitarian and conscientious obli-
gation to say the following: Uyghurs are human, if humans matter. Uyghurs 
are Muslim, if Muslims matter. Uyghurs are civilized, if civilization matters. 
Uyghurs are Turks, if Turks matter. The Chinese embassy and consulates have 
stopped renewals and extensions of Uyghurs’ passports, and have not given 
passports to the newborn babies of Uyghurs in the last two years. Most Uyg-
hurs’ passports in Turkey are about to expire. They will be without any legal 
papers or identification… and then other serious problems will start, such as 
residency permits and student affairs processes… As Turkey, we should give 
these 5000‒6000 Uyghurs citizenship or refugee status. They will not be able 
to go back to East Turkistan. They will be executed or put in jail as political 
criminals if they return. We should not evaluate their citizenship applications 
based simply on our foreign policy. We should go beyond this, and should 
evaluate their applications in light of history, faith, and humanistic values.42 
China’s strategy in Turkey is positively aimed at gaining political 
influence, security guarantees, furthering the BRI, an economic pre-
sence and access to natural resources. China wants to become one of 
the main economic powers in Turkey, and has made great strides sin-
ce 2010. On balance, Turkey has been far more important for China, 
and predominantly for Xinjiang. Since Communist China took over 
Xinjiang in 1949, the Chinese government has always been concerned 
about separatism among Uyghurs. Inevitably, China’s strategy and fo-
reign policy in Turkey is determined by tactics and domestic politics, as 
a means to consolidate its control of Xinjiang and restrain the Uyghur 
independence movement in Turkey. Right now, China’s major foreign 
42  Yücel Oğurlu, “Uygurlar’ın Vatandaşlığında İnsanlık Sınavını Kaybediyoruz… (I) [We 
Are failing Our Test on the Uyghurs’ Citizenship],” Diriliş postasi, November 19, 2018, https://
www.uzerk.org/tr/uygurlarin-vatandasliginda-insanlik-sinavini-kaybediyoruz-i.html.
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policy initiative is the BRI. Xinjiang is right in the middle, the hub of 
that infrastructure development plan. Therefore, the concern is that if 
Xinjiang is not stable, it could undermine all foreign policy initiatives. 
Beijing expects BRI recipient countries such as Turkey, and particu-
larly Central Asian states, to be loyal to the “One China” policy. This 
includes refusal to support the Uyghur cause, collaborating in the “hunt 
for dissidents” within the frame of anti-terrorism, limited relations with 
Taiwan, silence on the Uyghur and Tibetan issues, and (in some cases) 
alignment with China at the UN Security Council. Uyghurs have re-
portedly been arrested and harassed by Turkish authorities.43 Thousands 
of Uyghurs seeking asylum have been waiting in Turkey for a number 
of years for resettlement to a third country. Also, hundreds of Uyghurs 
are living in Turkey without any legal documents. Turkey and China 
have signed an extradition treaty.44 China is now using its growing di-
plomatic and economic clout to pressure the Turkish governments to 
deport Uyghurs. Turkey is also helping China repatriate Uyghurs by 
sending them to third countries from which they can be extradited by 
Beijing.45 Exiled Uyghurs are fearful and do not feel safe in Turkey.46 
Turkey signed a deal with China in November 2020 to buy 100 mil-
lion doses of the COVID-19 vaccine developed by Sinovac Biotech, to 
be delivered in batches. Based on the agreement, China was meant to 
deliver 50 million doses of the Sinovac vaccine to Turkey by the end of 
february, and the rest by the end of April.47 However, shipments have 
43  Amnesty International, “Nowhere feels Safe.”
44  Turkey - China Extradition Agreement, “Treaty on Extradition between the Republic of 
Turkey and the people’s Republic of China,” accessed May 13, 2017, https://www2.tbmm.gov.
tr/d27/2/2-1798.pdf.
45  gareth Browne, “How Turkey Is Sending Muslim Uighurs back to China without Break-
ing Its promise,” The Telegraph, July 27, 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/07/26/
turkey-sending-muslim-uighurs-back-china-without-breaking-promise; Kuzzat Altay, “Turkey 
Is No Longer a Safe Haven for the Uyghurs,” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2021, https://foreign-
policy.com/2021/03/02/why-erdogan-has-abandoned-the-uyghurs;Radio free Asia, “Uyghur 
Mother, Daughters Deported to China from Turkey,” last modified August 9, 2019, https://
www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deportation-08092019171834.html.
46  Joanna Kakissis, “‘I Thought It Would Be Safe’: Uighurs in Turkey Now fear China’s 
Long Arm,” NPR, March 3, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/03/13/800118582/i-thought-it-
would-be-safe-uighurs-in-turkey-now-fear-china-s-long-arm. 
47  Sadet Ergin, “Çin’den aşıların gecikmesinin nedeni Uygur Türkleri meselesi mi? [Are the 
Uyghur Turks Issue Reason for the Delay in Vaccines from China?],” Hurriyet, May 26, 2021, 
p O L I g R A f I
226
been beset by delays and China is still 32 million doses short of meeting 
the february target. These promises never materialized in full or on 
time as China postponed the delivery of vaccines numerous times.48 Ac-
cording to Bridge Beijing, by September 6, 2021, Turkey had received 
only 31.4 million vaccine doses from China.49 Turkey has struggled to 
get vaccine. By September 15, 2021, there have been 6,737,641 infec-
tions and 60,606 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country 
since the pandemic began.50 
The shortages caused a heated debate in Turkish society and rai-
sed suspicions that China was delaying vaccine shipments to pressure 
Ankara to extradite Uyghurs living in Turkey to China, though Tur-
kish and Chinese officials have denied any such pressure. With those 
deliveries repeatedly delayed, there is growing suspicion Beijing could 
be using the vaccines as leverage. Uyghur activists and many Uyghurs 
living in Turkey and around the world believe this is the reason behind 
the delays. They pointed to a treaty for the extradition of Uyghur Turks 
signed between Turkey and China in 2017 as a potential reason for the 
delay.51 That treaty was ratified by China in December 2020 but has not 
yet been ratified by the Turkish parliament.
https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/cinden-asilarin-gecikmesinin-nedeni-uy-
gur-turkleri-meselesi-mi-41818288.
48  Kareem fahim and Karen DeYoung, “China Has Made Big Vaccine promises. When 
They Come Up Short, Nations Struggle,” The Washington Post, April 7, 2021, https://www.was-
hingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/china-sinovac-turkey-coronavirus-vaccine/2021/04/06/
f87bc1bc-93cd-11eb-aadc-af78701a30ca_story.html
49  Bridge Beijing, “China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker,” August 12, 2021, https://bridge-
beijing.com/blogposts/china-gives-a-major-boost-to-global-distribution-and-access-to-covid-
19-vaccines/.
50  Reuters, “World-Coronavirus-Tracker-and-Maps,” last modified September 15, 2021, 
https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/
turkey/.
51  Dake Kang and Suzan fraser, “Turkey Uighurs fear Sellout to China in Exchange for Vac-
cine,” AP News, february 5, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/turkey-beijing-coronavirus-pan-
demic-ankara-china-c8b714974552c484c501a5784efc117a.
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Conclusion
In Turkey, the widespread failure to respect cultural differences and 
thus the right to be different makes the development of successful im-
migration policies difficult. It is unlikely that affirmative action policies 
will be developed that would ensure Uyghur immigrants equal access to 
educational and occupational opportunities. If no action is taken, the 
socioeconomic disparities between native Turks and the Uyghurs will 
continue to grow. Turkey, facing a period of economic recession and a 
lack of resources, is likely to grow more dependent on outside resour-
ces and economic and technological support, especially from countries 
such as China. We can see from the last fifty years of the relationship 
between Turkey and China, that if Turkey receives more economic and 
technological support from China, the result will be increased suffering 
at home and in the diaspora in Turkey. framing the issues in terms 
of assimilation and acculturation or exclusion and segregation may be 
helpful, but ignores the socioeconomic and political contexts. Among 
these policies are the priorities of “economic development,” “fair distri-
bution of equal opportunities,” “participation in the political process,” 
“raising the standard of education,” and “engaging in serious dialogue.” 
The best prescription is effective policies leading to an improvement of 
the educational and occupational standing of the Uyghur, providing 
them with a fair and accountable legal process and protection for ci-
tizenship, and residence or refugee status, which would go a long way 
toward their economic, cultural and social integration.
In response to the external forces that provide Uyghur nationalists 
within Xinjiang with moral and ideological support, the Chinese go-
vernment has actively sought cooperation with Turkey in preventing 
citizens from promoting Uyghur nationalism inside Xinjiang and su-
pporting a Uyghur independence movement abroad. The Chinese go-
vernment has been especially successful in gaining such support through 
the establishment of strong economic, trading, and military relation-
ships and mutual security guarantees with Turkey.52 Turkey’s economy 
52  In 2015, a Chinese consortium bought 65 percent of Turkey’s third-largest container termi-
nal, Kumport, in Istanbul, acquiring a pivotal position in container transportation. In January 
p O L I g R A f I
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has been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, which has devastated 
its primary economic sector, tourism. As Erdogan tightens his control 
over the central bank and the courts, foreign reserves are shrinking, the 
trade deficit is rising, and the Turkish lira is plunging. On the Liberal 
Democracy Index compiled by the University of gothenburg’s V-Dem 
Institute, Turkey now ranks in the bottom 20.53 China’s economic and 
technological power and investments in Turkey aren’t just increasing its 
influence; they are making Turkey far more reticent to speak out about 
Beijing’s abuses, systematic oppression and atrocities in Xinjiang. Tur-
key is thus more vulnerable to Beijing’s economic and political pressure 
and shares its wish to prioritize development over human rights.54 Chi-
na is now a major player on the world stage and because of this Turkey, 
as well as many other nations and international institutions, are afraid 
to hurl any criticism.
2020, a Chinese consortium bought 51 percent of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge connecting 
Europe and Asia across the Bosporus. China’s Export and Credit Insurance Corp. committed 
up to $5 billion for Turkey’s Wealth fund, to be used for BRI projects. China is providing $1.7 
billion to build the Hunutlu coal-fired power plant on the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey’s Bora 
ballistic missile ‒ modeled on the Chinese B-611 missile, introduced in 2017 and deployed in 
the Turkish military operation against the Kurdistan Workers’ party (pKK) in May 2019 ‒ is 
a product of bilateral defense cooperation, as was the participation of Chinese military officers 
in Turkey’s Ephesus military exercise in 2018. Huawei’s share in the Turkish market has grown 
from only 3 percent in 2017 to 30 percent in 2019. Another Chinese technology company, 
ZTE, took over 48 percent of Netas, Turkey’s key telecommunications equipment manufac-
turer, in 2016. Netas manages pivotal projects including the new Istanbul Airport’s telecommu-
nications and the digitalization of national health data (Ayca Alemdaroglu and Teppe Sultan, 
“Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese Client State, “ Foreign Policy, September 9, 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/16/erdogan-is-turning-turkey-into-a-chinese-client-state). 
Alibaba bought a stake in Turkey’s online retailer, Trendyol, in 2018 (Robert Stone, “How 
Coronavirus pandemic Could Expand China’s footprint in Turkey,” Middle East Eye, May 21, 
2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/how-coronavirus-pandemic-could-expand-chi-
nas-footprint-turkey). One thousand Chinese companies are currently operating in Turkey. The 
China ambassador to Ankara, Deng Li, stated that China’s investments in Turkey will reach $6 
billion by 2021. Turkey’s leading mobile phone operator Turkcell signed a $590 million long-
term loan package with the China Development Bank (CDB) (Tuba Sahin, “Turkcell, China 
Development Bank Ink $590M Loan Deal,” Anadolu Agency, August 10, 2020, https://www.
aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkcell-china-development-bank-ink-590m-loan-deal/1937231). 
53  V-DEM Institute, “Autocratization Surges–Resistance grows: Democracy Report 2020,” 
University of gothenburg, March 2020, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/
de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf.
54  Alemdaroglu and Teppe, “Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese Client State.”
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Acknowledgments
I would like to say thanks to Dr. Wachob for her helpful comments 
and for editing this article. I also would like to say thanks to poligrafi 
reviewer’s valuable comments and feedback in the revision of my paper. 
I am also very grateful to the countless Uyghurs in Turkey who opened 
their doors and hearts to me and who have shared meals, joys, frustra-
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